Chinese Nationalism, PRC Resolve, and Crisis Escalation : Views from Indo-Pacific Experts

Chubb, Andrew (2024) Chinese Nationalism, PRC Resolve, and Crisis Escalation : Views from Indo-Pacific Experts. Asia Society, New York.

Abstract

Summary How do Indo-Pacific experts assess the role of Chinese public opinion during a crisis? Does Chinese nationalist pressure boost Beijing’s resolve in the eyes of analysts, former officials, and policy advisers around the region? What effect does Chinese nationalist outrage have on these strategic elites’ views of different policy approaches? Do China specialists differ from generalists in their interpretations of Chinese public opinion’s significance? This report offers insight into these questions using data from a survey conducted with 799 international affairs experts in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in late 2023 and early 2024. Comparing respondents’ views of a crisis before and after Beijing goes public — issuing a public threat statement, leading a wave of online outrage, and permitting street demonstrations — indicates a large majority of experts regard Chinese public opinion as a significant factor in hypothetical crisis situations involving their country. However, its effects on observers’ policy preferences generally run counter to Beijing’s interests. Key Findings 1.) Beijing’s mobilization of Chinese public opinion elevated experts’ perceptions of risk in the crisis scenario. Region-wide, Chinese public opinion consistently generated substantial upgrades in experts’ assessments of the likelihood that China would use military force, impose economic punishment, and not back down. 2.) The main effect on experts’ policy preferences was provocation. Chinese publicity was more likely to push analysts toward approving a military response and standing firm in the face of economic punishment than promote caution and compromise. 3.) Initially, with the hypothetical crisis being handled behind closed doors, U.S. experts were the most confident that China would back down. But after Chinese public opinion was introduced into the scenario, U.S., U.K., and Australian analysts were more likely to upgrade their assessments of China’s resolve than their counterparts in the six Indo-Pacific countries. 4.) Chinese-speaking experts expressed warmer feelings toward China but favored tougher and more uncompromising policy responses than non-Chinese-language speakers. Sinophone experts also appear less inclined than generalists to be provoked by China’s publicity and nationalist mobilizations. 5.) The elites sampled in this survey took Chinese public opinion much more seriously as a signal of resolve than general citizens did in a previous study. However, the effects on policy preferences inside the target country were similar, with both citizens and elites increasing their approval of escalatory countermeasures and standing firm in the face of economic punishment. 6.) The results underscore that China and its counterparts need to address these dynamics by defining principles regarding the release and presentation of information during active crisis situations.