

1 **The Public Needs More: the Informational and Emotional Support of** 2 **Public Communication amidst the Covid-19 in China**

3 **Abstract**

4 Public communication is critical for responding to disasters. However, most research on public
5 communication is largely focused on its informational support function, overlooking the
6 emotional support that could equally offer. This study takes the lead to investigate their separate
7 impacts. In particular, the variable public engagement, which is a function of the number of
8 Shares, Likes, and Comments in a particular post, is introduced to benchmark the effect of
9 public communication. Besides, considering the evolving nature of the crisis, their dynamic
10 impacts across different COVID-19 pandemic stages are examined. Data from Dec 2019 to Jul
11 2020 were collected from 17 provincial government-owned social media (Weibo) accounts
12 across COVID-19 in China with a Natural Language Processing-based method to compute the
13 strengths of informational support and emotional support strength. An econometric model is
14 then proposed to explore the impacts of two supports. The findings are twofold: the impact of
15 emotional support on public engagement is empirically confirmed in the study, which is not in
16 lockstep with the informational support; and their impacts on public communication are
17 dynamic rather than static across stages throughout the crisis. We highlighted the importance
18 of emotional support in public engagement by deriving its impact separately from informational
19 support. The findings suggest incorporating both social supports to create stronger public
20 communication tactics during crises.

21 **Keywords:** COVID-19; Emotional Support; Government-owned Social Media; social
22 Support Theory; Public Communication

23 **1 Introduction**

24 Government agencies have become unprecedentedly relied on social media for public
25 communication (Reuter & Kaufhold, 2018), especially during emergent situations (Palen, *et al.*,
26 2009). Its impelling advantage for this role is genuine and deeply ingrained communication

1 amongst users given that social media entails the systemic capacity to the public information
2 and warning approaches (Tagliacozzo & Magni, 2018). Comparatively, the information on
3 social media is updated in a highly prompt manner (Al-Saggaf & Simmons, 2015) and its flat
4 networked structure transmits the information timely to a wider range of audiences (Dabner,
5 2012). Those affordances together ensure that social media can efficiently and effectively
6 disseminate situational awareness information, which is of utmost importance in a crisis context
7 (O'Brien, *et al.*, 2020; Zhang, *et al.*, 2019). Particularly, the restrictive measures involving self-
8 isolation, quarantine, and city lockdown at the height of Covid-19 have largely reduced
9 mobility, resulting in social media as a prominent channel for the government authorities to
10 broadcast and disseminate information (Chen, *et al.*, 2020; Islam, *et al.*, 2020).

11 In addition to its information influences, there is an increasing understanding that social media
12 can be leveraged to impose psychological impacts on social communities (Hu, *et al.*, 2022a;
13 Hu, *et al.*, 2022b). Specifically, social media can create a mutual aid environment, providing
14 an outlet for social interaction and voicing fear, and offering a voluntary reciprocal exchange
15 of resources and services for mutual benefit (Marzouki, *et al.*, 2021). Nevertheless, most extant
16 studies emphasize on mutual aid amongst the public, overlooking the situation between the
17 government (the sender) and the public (the receivers), where psychological influence is
18 transposed through public communication as the public are seeking psychological support in
19 addition to information through social media (Jin, 2010). Indeed, the public communication
20 posts released by government-owned social media play a prominent role not only in publishing
21 pandemic information but also in providing emotional support (e.g., encouragement, and
22 sympathy) during the COVID-19 pandemic (Hu, *et al.*, 2022a). As a result, while a multitude of
23 studies have posited that emotional support can be conveyed through public communication
24 (Langford, *et al.*, 1997; Liang, *et al.*, 2011), empirical evidence on how the government can
25 exploit social media to transpose emotional support to the online community remains scant.

26 Furthermore, the devastating pandemic has gripped the globe for more than two years as of
27 February 9, 2022, when Sweden first set to lift all coronavirus restrictions. Given this prolonged

1 duration of the pandemic, the impacts of both informational and emotional support are prone
2 to be rather complex than fixed. According to McKinney, *et al.* (2002), the impact of web
3 service is affected by public expectations and possible disconfirmation between such
4 expectations and web performance. Waves of Covid-19 compounded by rounds of lockdowns
5 have altered the public's expectations for public communication with the government (Chen,
6 *et al.*, 2020), giving rise to changes in their expectations for social media (Huang, *et al.*, 2020).
7 In such a sense, the impact of social media is prone to be dynamic throughout the emergency
8 rather than static. Further, amidst the emergency, reasonable caution has been allocated to the
9 "infodemic" or information overload (Zarocostas, 2020). It is identified as a pressing issue as
10 it hinders the effective dissemination of information on social media, and may further impose
11 negative impacts on an individual's mental well-being by triggering stress, frustration,
12 dissatisfaction, and feeling of loss of control (Bucher, *et al.*, 2013). In addition, the interim
13 public policies formulated in the first place during crises are not often fully supported by
14 sufficient scientific evidence when being disseminated via social media (Moore & MacKenzie,
15 2020), which may lead to confusion and/or uncertainty (Erku, *et al.*, 2021). Likely, the
16 information provided through social media may not always stay in line with the public's
17 expectations (Coombs, 2007, 2010). To this end, instead of assuming social media's support
18 are constantly positive, we must accept that the impact of information support and emotional
19 support can be negative. It thus highlights the need of making the best use of social media
20 between the government and the public for desirable outcomes.

21 Considering the above, we aim to examine two research questions in this study:

- 22 (1) What is the empirical evidence for emotional support along with informational support on
23 Weibo amidst COVID-19 in China?
- 24 (2) How did the impacts and dynamic changes of informational support and emotional support
25 present during the emergency?

26 To answer these questions, we utilized Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to
27 investigate and quantify the information support and emotional support from the government

1 to the public by analyzing the social media data from 17 government-owned Weibo in China.
2 We then deployed public engagement as the proxy for the effect of public communication and
3 an econometric model is then proposed to explore the impacts of two supports. Then, we
4 deployed COVID-19 as the context because it is an ongoing global event, which offers us long
5 enough time and sufficient data to empirically collect and analyze data.

6 **2 Literature Review**

7 *2.1 Public communication*

8 It has been well documented that public communication has a significant impact in emergent
9 situations to limit the scope and mitigate the impacts of adverse events through disseminating
10 timely and verified information to wide public audiences (Seeger, 2006; Wirtz & Zimbres,
11 2018). According to Perry and Nigg (1985), the role of public communication in crisis is three-
12 fold, it improves situational informing, facilitates information exchange, and supports
13 government reputation restoration.

14 The importance of early warning and risk information cannot be overstated during disasters.
15 Public communication address this need by reaching the public timely and informing them of
16 the nature, magnitude, and significance of the disaster, its associated risk, and possible coping
17 strategies through the production of the public message (Reynolds & W. Seeger, 2005). This
18 process seeks to alert individuals, provide protective action guidance and induce a public
19 behavioral change in alleviating the threat (Reynolds & W. Seeger, 2005; Sutton, *et al.*, 2014).
20 Particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic, an absence of verified information has caused
21 “panic buying” in many parts of the world (Torero, 2020; Zhu, *et al.*, 2021). Such behavior not
22 only impairs the government’s central effort in mobilizing the resource but also stressing to the
23 psychological distress among the citizens (Hu, *et al.*, 2022a).

24 Its next role is surrounding information exchange, where public feedback is sought on specific
25 procedures and/or policies to further address public concern (Covello, 1992). This process
26 emphasizes developing communication strategies that respond to and anticipate the public’s

1 needs (Lachlan, *et al.*, 2016; Reynolds, *et al.*, 2014; Reynolds & W. Seeger, 2005; Veil, *et al.*,
2 2008). It is widely argued that public service needs to account for the demand sides (Andrews
3 & Entwistle, 2013; Andrews & Van de Walle, 2013). An absence of communication between
4 the government and the public, especially during disasters, may consequence in mismatching
5 demand. As stated above, rumors or unverified information may lead to the public's
6 psychological distress, distrust in the government, and non-compliance behaviors during the
7 disaster response, which imposes significant challenges to the ability of society in coping with
8 the disasters. The imbalance of demand-supply relationships is prone to further result in a waste
9 of public resources and improving the effectiveness of public communication.

10 In addition, good public communication can also be exploited to restore public trust in
11 government and minimalizes the potential reputation loss caused by rumors or misinformation
12 (Coombs, 2007). When a crisis occurs, rumors may distort the truth, further reinforcing the
13 public's distrust of the government authorities (Cheng, *et al.*, 2020). If it is not properly
14 managed, such a miscommunication would erode public trust in the government (Schmelz,
15 2021). Good public communication can not only facilitate the clarification of rumors,
16 misunderstandings, and distorted facts but also signify the government's responsibility and
17 accountability to manage disasters (Goldfinch, *et al.*, 2021), which are drivers for the public's
18 trust in the government. Further, Rosenberg (2021) argued that the level of citizens' compliance
19 with policy reflects their level of trust in government, whereas a low level of trust may result
20 in non-compliance behaviors and even social chaos (Bargain & Aminjonov, 2020).

21 *2.2 Social media based public communication*

22 Compared to traditional medium (e.g., radio, television), online medium, such as social media,
23 has quickly evolved into a new impetus for public communication during a crisis because they
24 can greatly address the public's needs (Lachlan, *et al.*, 2016; Ma & Zhan, 2016). As an
25 alternative to traditional media, social media is considered a reliable channel for situational
26 informing, information exchange, and reputation restoration (Hu, *et al.*, 2022a; Liao, *et al.*,
27 2020; Marzouki, *et al.*, 2021; Mori, *et al.*, 2021).

1 Its remarkable benefit in public communication is ingrained in its disperse networked structure.
2 Such structure, as opposed to the conventional top-down hierarchical public communication
3 paradigm, enables government information to communicate directly and promptly to a wider
4 range of people (Dabner, 2012). This benefit has been empirically observed in scenarios such
5 as the Haitian earthquake (Yates & Paquette, 2011), Hurricane Sandy (Hughes, *et al.*, 2014),
6 and the Covid-19 pandemic (Liao, *et al.*, 2020; Marzouki, *et al.*, 2021; Mori, *et al.*, 2021).
7 Particularly during Covid-19 when strict quarantine and city lockdown measures are taken,
8 social media has become an indispensable tool for public communication (Marzouki, *et al.*,
9 2021). Such rapid information and warning delivery facilitate the public to prepare for the
10 coming risk and adverse impact, which is foremost in the public's response to the crisis.

11 Second, with the increasing adoption of social media amongst government agencies, such as
12 the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (Hughes, *et al.*, 2014; Yates & Paquette,
13 2011), the National Health Commission of China (Liao, *et al.*, 2020), in promoting public
14 communication during crises, the information posted is carefully scrutinized and validated (Li,
15 *et al.*, 2020), further enhancing the credibility. The timely and trustworthy information from
16 the government in the online medium is most likely to exert positive impacts on bundles of
17 multiple and heterogeneous aspirations, values, and perspectives between governments and the
18 public (Li, 2020; Wu, *et al.*, 2021).

19 In addition, online mediums have radically revolted public communication during crises by
20 bringing forward two-way communications (Panagiotopoulos, *et al.*, 2016). Indeed, one-way
21 asymmetrical communication might be efficient in terms of speed (Bertot, *et al.*, 2012), but
22 two-way dialogical interaction is more effective in information exchange because it enables the
23 public to voice their needs and concerns while also making it easier for government to collect
24 of first-hand information (*ibid*). These information exchange activities will serve as a bottom-
25 up channel to inform the government of better disaster situational awareness, which is critical
26 for policy-forming and policy development amid a crisis (Brombal, *et al.*, 2017). Moreover,
27 recent studies have implied that social media shift the role of the public in public

1 communication from a passive recipient to an active information seeker (Oh, *et al.*, 2013) or
2 even an information service co-providers (Mori, *et al.*, 2021).

3 Nevertheless, most of the existing studies on the possible influence of public communication
4 during disasters are revolving around the information service provision, sporadic evidence also
5 implies that beyond information, online public communication can also convey positive
6 emotions, perception of support, and companionship (Hu, *et al.*, 2022a).

7 *2.3 Social support in social media based public communication during the crisis*

8 Social support theory (Langford, *et al.*, 1997) provides a theoretical foundation to reveal the
9 impact of both informational and emotional support through social media based public
10 communication amidst an emergency Broadly, social support has been defined in the literature
11 as the assistance and protection given to others, especially to individuals (Wortman & Dunkel-
12 Schetter, 1987), shielding them from precarious events and adverse effects. Shumaker and
13 Brownell (1984) describe social support as a process of resource exchange between individuals,
14 giving rise to the notion that social support is reciprocal in nature (Cohen & Syme, 1985).
15 Indeed, social support is a complex concept and researchers have put forth various taxonomies
16 (Cohen & Syme, 1985; Coulson, *et al.*, 2007; House, 1983) to categorize it, including the classic
17 four-dimensional framework by House (1983), namely informational, emotional, instrumental,
18 and appraisal support. Notwithstanding the diversity of taxonomies, more recent studies
19 classified different social support constructs into two main types (Hu, *et al.*, 2022a; Kort-Butler,
20 2017; Yan & Tan, 2014). Specifically, informational support comes in the form of the
21 transmission of information during a time of stress while emotional support in the form of
22 provisioning caring, concern, empathy, love, and trust (Kort-Butler, 2017).

23 In social media, social support theory is also a popular theoretical framework for understanding
24 the use of impact of the online community on individuals (Reblin & Uchino, 2008; Stephens &
25 Berner, 2011; Yan & Pedraza-Martinez, 2019a). One of the most noticeable practices is social
26 support reinforces two-way interactions in the online community, as the public perceives

1 supportive resources by collectively interacting with the posts through embedded functions,
2 such as like, share, and comment (Yan & Pedraza-Martinez, 2019a). This further motivates
3 their engagement in resource exchange in social media, contributing to the decision-making
4 process for fast-evolving situations (Lovari & Bowen, 2019). Particularly, the influence of
5 social support in social media can be understood through two influence mechanisms, namely
6 emotional and informational support (Carr, *et al.*, 2016; Liang, *et al.*, 2011; Rains & Keating,
7 2011). While the compelling advantages of social media in delivering timely information
8 update to a wider audience is extensively acknowledged in literature (Al-Saggaf & Simmons,
9 2015; Dabner, 2012), recants studies have shifted the focus to social media's role in providing
10 emotional support. For instance, Marzouki, *et al.* (2021) posited that social media can create a
11 mutual aid environment, providing an outlet for social interaction and voicing fear, and offering
12 a voluntary reciprocal exchange of resources and services for mutual benefit. Similar findings
13 are evidenced in the work by Yan and Pedraza-Martinez (2019a) that online communities via
14 social media can construct different social relationships, by which to exchange emotional
15 support.

16 Particularly in times of crisis, the need for informational and emotional support is highlighted
17 in the literature. For instance, it is repeatedly identified that fast information and warning
18 delivery helps the public prepare for potential danger and negative effects, which is crucial in
19 the public's response to the crisis (Dabner, 2012; Hughes, *et al.*, 2014; Marzouki, *et al.*, 2021).
20 On the other hand, recent COVID-19 pandemic related studies have stressed the importance to
21 address the prevailing mental health issues among the general public and suggested that social
22 support in social media may provide a potential solution to address when professional treatment
23 is not readily available to the massive public (Cohen & McKay, 2020; Hu, *et al.*, 2022a; Li &
24 Peng, 2021; Liao, *et al.*, 2020; Yan & Pedraza-Martinez, 2019b).

25 In line with Hu, *et al.* (2022a), we argued that facilitated by the interactive function of social
26 media, public communication can exert a positive impact on the massive public through social

1 support provision. Indeed, evidence from China during the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated
 2 that social media postings did play a crucial role in establishing the truth (e.g., sharing pandemic
 3 information, refuting rumors, fostering public self-protect measures) (Shen, *et al.*, 2022) and
 4 boosting the social morale (e.g., encouraging messages, voices from top scientists and the
 5 COVID-19 fighters) (Hu, *et al.*, 2022a). Nevertheless, several research gaps remain
 6 unaddressed. First, while the impacts of both emotional and informational support have been
 7 well studied independently, they have not been compared. Second, much of the study treats the
 8 effects of social support as static, omitting to look at their dynamic effects at various stages.
 9 Last but not least, despite all the attempts, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on how
 10 government can leverage social support for better public communication.

11 3. Methodology

12 3.1 Research Setting

13 To investigate the dynamic of informational support and emotional support strategies, we
 14 phased the timeliness of the pandemic into five stages according to the White Paper released
 15 by China’s State Council Information Office (SCIO, 2020) as depicted in Appendix 1. In
 16 addition, according to the National Health Commission, after nearly two months of no new
 17 local Covid-19 transmissions, Beijing reported 79 fresh cases since June 12, 2020, where the
 18 public fell into fear of the second wave in Beijing after the Xinfadi market outbreak (Tan, *et*
 19 *al.*, 2020). Therefore, we further separate Stage 5 into Stage 5a and Stage 5b (Figure 1).




Figure 1 Division of Pandemic Stage

3.2 Data

We took extra efforts in mitigating the data collection challenges in social science research (Starr and Van Wassenhove (2014) by collecting time-series *Weibo data* (including id, post time, post content, like, share, comment, etc.) and *pandemic data* that both cover all five pandemic stages. First, applying the inter-rater policy, each author had a preliminary search independently on the scope of Weibo data. We then reached the conclusion that 23 out of the 34 provincial administrative units in China so far have operated social media accounts (by Information Officer) at Weibo, the most influential social media in China with 550 million monthly active users (WeiboCorporation, 2020), and 17 provincial administrative units (Table 1) released posts that covered all above five stages. For selected provincial administrative units' Weibo accounts, Sina Weibo Application Processing Interface (API) is employed to collect relevant such as daily activity (e.g., daily information released frequency, the content of each post) and its corresponding feedback (like share, and comment) from the public. In addition, we used daily pandemic data from the health commission office as a proxy for the severity of the pandemic (provincial level). The pandemic data includes both newly and accumulated cases (confirmed, suspicious, cured, and dead) data.

Table 1 The sample scope of this study

Total Numbers	Sample Scope * (17)	Out-of-Sample Scope (17)
Provincial Administrative Unit	Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Shandong, Qinghai, Guangdong, Guizhou, Zhejiang, Xinjiang	Hebei**, Hunan**, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Anhui, Hainan, Fujian, Taiwan, Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan**, Tibet, Ningxia, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong, Macau

Note: * The social media account selected for analysis in this study are Weibo accounts that are officially operated by the Information Office of the government of each provincial administrative unit respectively.

**Hebei, Hunan, and Sichuan do have official Weibo accounts, but neither of them posts information that covers the entire epidemic period, and therefore not included in this study.

3.3 Variables

1 The definition and description of all the variables are depicted in Appendix 3.

2 3.3.1 Dependent variables

3 The public engagement level in social media is set as the dependent variable. We deduced the
4 measuring metric from Agostino and Arnaboldi (2016), Bonsón and Ratkai (2013), and many
5 other scholars that daily public engagement is computed as a function of the feedback from the
6 public (like share, and comment) and the characteristics of the e-government platform (number
7 of followers, number of daily posts). In particular, the public engagement level
8 $Engagement_{i,t}$ of all posts in province i at date t is computed as the equation below:

$$9 \quad \mathbf{Engagement}_{i,t} = \frac{\mathbf{Likes}_{i,t} + \mathbf{Shares}_{i,t} + \mathbf{Comments}_{i,t}}{\mathbf{Followers}_i \times \mathbf{Post}_{i,t}}$$

10 Where $Likes_{i,t}$, $Shares_{i,t}$, $Comments_{i,t}$, $Post_{i,t}$ denotes the total number of likes, shares,
11 comments, and posts in province i at date t . $Followers_i$ represents the total number of
12 followers of province i . It should be noted that consistent with previous work (e.g., Agostino
13 and Arnaboldi (2016), Bonsón and Ratkai (2013)), we treat $Followers_i$ as a time-independent
14 variable, since it is assumed that changes in followers are relatively small compared to changes
15 in other variables.

16 3.3.2 Independent variables

17 We considered daily public communication frequency, informational support, and emotional
18 support strength as three independent variables for this study. Specifically, the daily public
19 communication frequency is computed as the number of posts released from a particular social
20 media account on a particular date. The variable is introduced to verify whether the frequency
21 of public communication activity (e.g., too many, or too less) would influence public
22 engagement.

23 To quantify the informational and support strength of the post, a supervised machine learning
24 approach is adopted. The complex post content was first tokenized into simple unit tokens. A

1 Part of Speech (POS) tagger is then applied to identify the parts of speech (e.g., noun, verb,
2 adjective, adverb, preposition, and conjunction) of each token. For the informational support
3 strength study, we only kept nouns and verbs, however for the emotional support analysis, we
4 kept nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. The frequency of each token is then determined
5 using the Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) vectorizer. To save effort, only
6 tokens with a frequency of more than 50 times (7,123 tokens) are chosen for the manual
7 annotation.

8 In the annotation process, three domain experts are asked to annotate the score for emotional
9 support and informational support independently using a 5 points Likert scale measurement (1:
10 not at all, 2: slightly, 3: somewhat, 4: very, 5: extremely). The strength is computed as the mean
11 score from the three experts. To ensure internal consistency, the three experts are asked to reach
12 a consensus on the annotation standard before labeling. The internal consistency test achieved
13 a Cronbach alpha value of 0.93, indicating excellent internal consistency. The strength for
14 emotional support and informational support are respectively computed as the maximum
15 emotional support and informational support strength of all tokens in a post.

16 Using a training dataset of 3,104 posts, we then trained the model using Naive Bayes
17 classification in "SnowNLP", a popular NLP toolkit (Wang, 2020). The whole set of test data
18 (61,297 posts) is then applied to the model. It is noted that all the informational support strength
19 and emotional support strength are normalized to [0,1], where 0 indicates no support and 1 is
20 extremely strong support. Sample texts in the data set are depicted in appendix 2

21 3.3.3 Control variables

22 We controlled for a set of other factors that could potentially influence the level of public
23 engagement in social media amid a crisis including provincial characteristics and pandemic
24 development tally. In addition to Gross domestic product (GDP), and population (POP), we
25 also controlled for the number of 3A hospitals (Hospital), distance to Wuhan, adjacency with
26 Wuhan, number of followers in the Weibo account, etc. It should be noted that we adopted the

1 number of 3A hospitals as the control variable because it is argued that the number of 3A
2 hospitals mirrors a province's medical capability. In addition, among all the pandemic tally, we
3 adopted accumulative confirmed cases, accumulative cured cases, newly confirmed cases, and
4 newly cured cases as control variables.

5 *3.3.4 Model specification*

6 We developed the research model by drawing on the Social Reciprocity Theory (SRT). SRT
7 suggests that positive reciprocity occurs when an action committed by one individual that has
8 a positive effect on someone else is returned with an action that has an approximately equal
9 positive effect (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). When social media is deemed as a social
10 community, members consider exchange behaviors based on positive interactions, which
11 impacts their intention to engage in the social community in the future (Wu, *et al.*, 2019). In
12 social media, there are two primary participants – the sender (post agencies) and the receiver
13 (the public); reciprocity will be established by positive interactions when agencies provide
14 social support through releasing information and the public engages in the information and
15 provides feedback through functions such as like, share and comment (Yan & Pedraza -
16 Martinez, 2019a). It is thus understandable that the more social support offered, the higher the
17 public engagement would be on social media. We conjectured accordingly that (1) social
18 support provided by government agencies in social media has impacts on public engagement,
19 and (2) the effect of social support strategies on public engagement may vary across different
20 pandemic stages.

21 *3.3.5 Analysis procedure*

22 Our main interest lies in how social support strategies, particularly informational support and
23 emotional support as proposed by (Kort-Butler, 2017; Liang, *et al.*, 2011; Yan & Pedraza -
24 Martinez, 2019a), may influence public engagement in social media-based public
25 communication. The analysis procedure is described as follows. First, the normality for all the
26 variables is checked using the Q-Q plot in R. For those variables (engagement, emotional

1 support, information support, accumulated confirmed cases, accumulated cured cases, newly
2 confirmed cases, newly cured cases) that do not follow the normal distribution, a log-
3 transformation is applied. Then the multicollinearity of all variables is checked using the
4 variance inflation factor (VIF) value. The VIF values for all variables are less than 5, suggesting
5 moderate multicollinearity problems among these variables are not likely to exist (Shrestha,
6 2020). Besides, the descriptive statistic and the correlation matrix of all the variables are
7 displayed in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5, respectively. After validating the assumption testing
8 for the model, we conducted ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis on the whole
9 dataset and at different stages, respectively.

10 **4. Results**


11 We analyzed the Weibo based social media data in regard to public communication amidst the
12 pandemic from all accounts of 17 provincial governments in China and several illuminating
13 findings arise.

14 *4.1 Descriptive statistics results*

15 In this section, the quantity of the post, the strength of both social support, and the
16 corresponding public engagement (e.g., Likes, Shares, Comments) outcome across different
17 stages of the pandemic will be presented.


18 The number of posts or government engagement on social media, according to Zhu, *et al.* (2021)
19 reflects a government's attentiveness toward the COVID-19 pandemic. The accumulated
20 number of post across different stages are depicted in Figure 2. In general, two findings, in
21 particular, are noteworthy. First of all, as the pandemic has progressed, the overall tendency for
22 government activity shows an upward trend, indicating an intention on the part of the
23 government to improve public communication, at least in terms of quantity, on social media.
24 Particularly, there are more than three times as many posts in Stage 5B (16411) than there are
25 in Stage 2. (5389). Second, the overall tendency of the number of posts is fluctuating rather
26 than constantly increase, suggesting the government's response (in terms of public

1 communication activity) to the pandemic is dynamic rather than static. Particularly, the
2 uncertainty in the COVID-19 pandemic and restrictive measures (e.g., social distancing, city
3 lockdown) may have boosted the need for government to communicate with the public in Stage
4 3, while Stage 4 may have seen a decrease in the number of posts as the need for communication
5 with the public decreases.



6 **Figure 2 The accumulated public communication counts at different stages**

7 Figure 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of social support, including both informational
8 and emotional support, as determined by the NLP-based content analysis. Surprisingly,
9 compared to the aforementioned post quantity, the average social support strength encompassed
10 in public communication is also fluctuating, however, demonstrated a different hump-shaped
11 pattern from Stage 2 to Stage 5B. This implies that the responsibility of public communication
12 may extend beyond simple posting to include more intricate social support provision functions,
13 which confirms the necessity of the present study. Further, while the strength of both
14 informational and emotional support peaks at mid-stages (Stage 3 and Stage 3, respectively),
15 there are not identical. Particularly, the overall strength of emotional support is weaker than
16 that of informational support, and it peaks later. All of these findings imply that public
17 communication should not be conducted without strategies and that revisiting its outcomes is
18 necessary in order to provide nuanced insights into its impacts.



1 **Figure 3 The strength of informational and emotional support at different stages**

2 In this study, we used public engagement level (measured by a function of shares, likes, and
 3 comments) (as depicted in Table 2) to proxy the outcome of public communication. Two
 4 findings are worth noting. First, compared to the average number of followers (272 thousand
 5 Appendix 4), the average daily Likes, Shares, and Comments start at a low level. In addition,
 6 the large standard deviation implies that the distribution of Likes, Shares, and Comments is
 7 highly dispersed. This indicates that the strategy for enhanced public engagement in social
 8 media is shy of systematic. Second, the distribution of likes, shares, and comments (Table 2)
 9 has a similar hump-shaped pattern to the strength of social support (Figure 3), raising the
 10 possibility that public engagement and social support from the government are related.
 11 However, the relationship between social support and public engagement has not yet been
 12 established, necessitating additional research on the interactions between the public and the
 13 government in order to offer more insightful conclusions.

1 **Table 2 Descriptive statistics of likes, shares, and comments across stages**


Stages	Likes		Shares		Comments	
	Mean	S.D	Mean	S.D	Mean	S.D
STAGE-2	70.76	565.13	4.33	15.97	8.39	32.98
STAGE-3	371.47	2874.80	60.67	263.28	32.32	282.63
STAGE-4	89.70	724.76	20.14	104.09	12.54	51.95
STAGE-5A	49.20	275.35	13.46	65.86	9.86	45.61
STAGE-5B	57.86	2727.58	7.57	159.38	7.72	52.09

2 *4.2 Regression analysis results*

3 Figure 4 summarizes the regression analysis result. Both social supports (emotional support
4 and information support) are testified to positively and significantly with the public engagement
5 level in the full model, however, demonstrate a subtle difference in the staged model. Regarding
6 the effect of emotional support, the significant correlation is only identified in later stages
7 (Stage 4, Stage 5A, and Stage 5B), but not in earlier stages (Stage 2, Stage 4). Specifically, the
8 effect reaches a peak at Stage 4 ($\beta = 0.577$) when phased success in controlling Covid-19 is
9 witnessed, however, drops at stage 5A ($\beta = -0.268$), when a new wave of the Pandemic strikes,
10 and then bounces back at Stage 5B, when the pandemic is properly handled ($\beta = 0.794$).
11 Regarding the effect of informational support, in contrast to the effect of emotional support, the
12 significant correlation is only witnessed in earlier stages (Stage 2, Stage 3, Stage 4), not in the
13 later stages (Stage 5A, Stage 5B). Particularly, the trend of the effect is on the decline from
14 Stage 2 (0.709) when mitigation and Containment of COVID-19 are observed to Stage 4 (0.327)
15 when phased success in controlling Covid-19 is witnessed. It is also intriguing to point out that
16 the effect of both support is not entirely positive. For instance, the effect of emotional support
17 at Stage 5A is significant and negative ($\beta = -0.268$). This implies that the impact mechanism
18 of social support is more complex than previously thought.

19 Regarding the effect of public communication frequency, the negative effect is confirmed in
20 both the full model ($\beta = -0.008$). Particularly the effect of public communication frequency
21 on public engagement is consistently negative and significant in all staged models, except for
22 stage 5B. This is in line with the concern over information overload or “infodemic” that has

1 been widely seen on social media amidst the pandemic (Erku, *et al.*, 2021; Zarocostas, 2020),
 2 which could eventually stifle communication between the government and the public.
 3 Surprisingly, the number of followers is found a minor predictor of public engagement. In all
 4 staged models except Stage 3 (Daily tally dropped to a single digit), the effect of the follower
 5 on public engagement is insignificant.



6 **Figure 4 Dynamic impacts of informational support and emotional support**

7 In terms of control variables, all provincial strength characteristics (e.g., GDP, EGDI, followers,
 8 3A hospitals, etc.) are found significantly related to public engagement in the full model,
 9 however, the effect is comparably small compared to the effect of emotional support,
 10 informational support, or public communication frequency. This gives rise to the thought that
 11 provincial strength may not be directly linked to the public communication between the
 12 government and the public, reinforcing the notion that social support is complex and dynamic.
 13 Regarding the control variables for the daily pandemic, it is identified that while the daily
 14 pandemic tally is generally significantly related to public engagement in the full model, but not
 15 necessarily significant in the staged model. This means that public engagement may not be
 16 strongly linked to the development of the pandemic. Besides, the adjacency of the province to
 17 Wuhan is found an insignificant predictor of public engagement.

1 Table 3 Ordinary least square regression results

Dependent variable: log(Engagement + 1)						
	OLS	panel linear				
	Full Model	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5A	Stage 5B
log(Emo_Sup + 1)	0.499*** (0.079)	-0.043 (0.263)	0.230 (0.181)	0.577*** (0.086)	-0.268** (0.120)	0.794* (0.426)
log(Info_Sup + 1)	0.376*** (0.076)	0.709*** (0.222)	0.356* (0.183)	0.327*** (0.097)	0.021 (0.096)	-0.709 (0.483)
Freq	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.005)
Followers	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0005 (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0005 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)
Adjacency	0.027 (0.020)	0.14 (0.291)	0.116 (0.152)	-0.052 (0.115)	-0.262 (0.209)	-0.066 (0.257)
Distance	-0.0001*** (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	0.00003 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0002 (0.000)
GDP	-0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00002 (0.00001)	-0.00002*** (0.00001)	-0.00001** (0.00000)	-0.00001 (0.00001)	-0.00001* (0.00001)
Pop	0.0001*** (0.00001)	0.0002 (0.00002)	0.0002*** (0.0001)	0.00004 (0.00005)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)
EGDI	0.018*** (0.001)	0.035 (0.022)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.010 (0.007)	0.002 (0.013)	0.017 (0.014)
Hospital	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.013* (0.007)	0.003 (0.005)	0.008 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.011)
log(Conf_Acu + 1)	0.064*** (0.020)	0.158*** (0.049)	-0.087 (0.130)	-0.079 (0.113)	0.388* (0.223)	0.389 (0.992)
log(Cure_Acu + 1)	-0.141*** (0.017)	-0.226*** (0.056)	-0.039 (0.088)	0.021 (0.126)	-0.584*** (0.217)	-0.488 (0.982)
log(Conf_delta + 1)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.082* (0.042)	0.088*** (0.029)	0.078*** (0.014)	0.070*** (0.027)	-0.022 (0.108)
log(Cure_delta + 1)	0.018** (0.008)	0.074 (0.053)	0.021 (0.023)	-0.008 (0.013)	0.047** (0.021)	0.012 (0.078)
Constant	-0.091 (0.094)	-0.627 (1.380)	-1.089 (0.683)	0.064 (0.55)	1.595 (1.001)	0.216 (1.180)
Observations	2,939	535	445	696	1,049	214
R2	0.314	0.154	0.173	0.191	0.045	0.063
Adjusted R2	0.311	0.131	0.146	0.174	0.032	-0.003
Residual Std. Error	0.468 (df = 2924)					
F Statistic	95.669*** (df = 14; 2924)	94.296***	89.860***	160.346***	48.612***	13.443

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

2 5. Discussion

3 Our primary goal is to analyze the impact mechanisms of public communication. The findings

4 confirm the significant correlation between both social support and public engagement,

1 suggesting that the social support theory can be a well-founded framework to explain the impact
2 of public communication. Our findings also suggest that the effect of public communication
3 (both emotional support and informational support) are dynamically evolving rather than static
4 during a crisis. This means that public communication is less likely to be a “one-size-fits-all”
5 government-oriented process, but rather should be handled with strategic adjustments.

6 *5.1 Impacts of emotional support cannot be underestimated*

7 While most of the extant studies emphasized the importance of public communication on
8 information dissemination and exchange (O'Brien, *et al.*, 2020; Zhang, *et al.*, 2019), drawing
9 upon social support theory, we argued that the power of public communication should go
10 beyond informational support, but encompass emotional support that is equally if not more
11 important. Specifically, the value of social support theory in dissecting the effects of public
12 communication has been demonstrated by the different impact patterns of the two dimensions
13 of support. First, the two aspects of social support have distinctive coefficients and levels of
14 significance. Specifically, the emotional support coefficient has shown fluctuation, but the
15 informational support coefficient is monotonously declining. This implies that the impact
16 mechanism of emotional support and informational support on public engagement may be
17 inconsistent. In light of this, the social support theory offers a theoretical framework to treat
18 emotional support as a separate dimension of information support, and in turn, make it easier
19 to comprehend how public communication exerts positive psychological or emotional influence
20 on the public (Ko, *et al.*, 2013; Liang, *et al.*, 2011).

21 Second, as discussed earlier, the outcome of public communication is prone to be stage-based
22 because the demand for informational and emotional support is likely to be stage-depend across
23 different stages of a crisis. Further, we can identify the distinct demand pattern for public
24 communication across stages with the aid of our incorporation of social support theory. Based
25 on the significant level (Figure 4), the demand for informational support is substantial in the
26 early stages (Stage 2, Stage 3, Stage 4) whereas the demand for emotional support may be
27 lagged (Stage 4, Stage 5A, Stage 5b) but cannot be overlooked. Information-focused research

1 can therefore undervalue or underestimate the necessity of offering emotional support through
2 public communication. In sum, it is evidenced that emotional support differs from informational
3 support regarding support strength, and stage-based variations. Our incorporation of social
4 support theory provides a more comprehensive understanding of both the influence of public
5 communication and the dynamic demand of the public across different stages. Underestimating
6 the influence of emotional support would otherwise result in an incomplete perception of the
7 impact of public communication, and further, restrain the rationality and effectiveness of public
8 communication strategies.

9 *5.2 The stage-based pattern of social support influence*

10 Our findings show that public communication outcome (as benchmarked by public engagement
11 in this study) is closely related to the strength of staged-dependent social support rather than
12 being anticipated by a province's strength (e.g., GDP, Pop, EDGI). This means, in order to
13 achieve substantial rather than symbolic public communication, government agencies may need
14 to play a more active role in communication by tailoring their communication strategies to the
15 public's staged-dependent demand in crisis (Zhu, *et al.*, 2021), rather than treating it solely as
16 the government-led process of information dissemination. Indeed, since the Government
17 Performance and Results Act of 1993, outcome-based performance evaluations are made
18 formal for measuring the service provision by the governments (Heinrich, 2002). Particularly
19 for public communication, numerous scholars are investigating the metrics to quantify the
20 performance from public feedback such as public satisfaction (Ho & Cho, 2017), public
21 engagement (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2016; Bonsón & Ratkai, 2013), etc.

22 Despite the differences, these works are all built upon an underlying assumption that there is a
23 major causality between public communication and the positivity of public activities: the better
24 the public communication becomes, the more positive the public's activities would be. This is
25 justifiable in a static situation where the public's demand for the communication service
26 remains almost the same. However, in a real-life setting, which is dynamic and fast-evolving,
27 such as Covid-19, the rapid change of public demand in public communication may alter their

1 evaluation because social support may fail to satisfy the changing demand. Given that the
2 expectations of informational demands and emotional demands from the public are evolving
3 across stages (Ozamiz-Etxebarria, *et al.*, 2020; Zhao, *et al.*, 2020), leading to the possible
4 disconfirmation between the demands of the public and support provision from the government.
5 For instance, in the early stages (Stage 2 and Stage 3) when the pandemic unsettled the public,
6 the informational support provided through Weibo posts greatly addressed the public's concern
7 for situational awareness, resulting in a high significance of the correlation between
8 informational support and public engagement. When the pandemic was taken under control
9 (Stage 4, Stage 5A, Stage 5B), the demand for informational support dropped, resulting in a
10 low significance level. In contrast, the full model, which treats the entire stages as a whole
11 (Table 3), failed to identify such insights at the granular level. As a result, the impact of public
12 communication on public engagement amid a crisis should be better understood and further
13 assessed by identifying the pandemic stages and evaluating them correspondingly.

14 *5.3 Information fatigue inhibits the impact of social support*

15 Infodemic, a term used frequently in relation to social media during COVID-19, refers to the
16 experience of information fatigue brought on by exposure to excessive amounts of information
17 (Zarocostas, 2020). In this study, we introduced daily public communication frequency as an
18 independent variable to see if such phenomena might be present in public communication. The
19 negative and significant association between public communication frequency and public
20 engagement confirms that too much public information may exert a negative effect on public
21 communication outcomes. In line with other works (Islam, *et al.*, 2020; Zarocostas, 2020), this
22 research confirms that the overwhelming volume of posts could dampen the intended social
23 support. According to the full model in Table 3, the daily public communication frequency is
24 reported to have a significant and negative ($\beta = -0.008, p < 0.05$) impact on public
25 engagement. This means excessive government communication may not only fail to bring about
26 good outcomes but also cause information fatigue among the public. This phenomenon is
27 echoed by the observation of Farooq, *et al.* (2020), who noted that excessive use of public

1 communication via social media may backfire as it can cause information overload or over-
2 thinking amongst individuals, negating public motivation to positively engage in public
3 communication or even crisis response.

4 Additionally, it is also necessary to provide social support that caters to the demand of the
5 public at different stages to prevent the detrimental effects of infodemic on public
6 communication (McKinney, *et al.*, 2002). Indeed, the public’s demand for both emotional
7 support and information could vary along with the development of the pandemic. If the type or
8 the amount of social support encompassed in public communication does not adjust accordingly,
9 the excessive provision of social support may overwhelm the public’s demand, leading to the
10 feeling of exhaustion and lower levels of engagement level (Maier, *et al.*, 2015). For instance,
11 the expectation for informational support may drop when the pandemic was progressively
12 brought under control and the situation grew less worrisome and unclear. The effect may
13 diminish as seen from Stage 2 to Stage 5A if the amount of information support remains
14 constant (Table 3). In other words, the change in stage-based need for emotional and
15 informational support may have *also* resulted in an abundance of social support that creates
16 information fatigue and further reduces the impact of information support.

17 *5.4 Implications*

18 Theoretically, drawing upon the social support theory, we proposed a prototype attempt to
19 comprehend the impact of social media based public communication amid a crisis. Regarding
20 public communication amid a crisis, the incorporation of social support theory provides
21 nuanced insights into how emotional support encompassed in public communication can exert
22 a positive influence on the public. Besides, we additionally introduced the variable daily public
23 communication frequency to conceptualize the commonly related “infodemic” phenomena in
24 COVID-19-related literature and unravel its potential impact. Regarding social support theory,
25 this study enhances its context by expanding it to public communication, urging further research
26 to better understand the interaction between the public and the government, which would, in
27 turn, support the theory's development and empirical examination.

1 Practically, the findings of this study can be extended to developing better public
2 communication strategies amid a crisis. Through identifying the distinctive impact patterns of
3 the two supports, we highlight that while informational support is crucial in the earlier stages
4 of a crisis, emotional support could be of great help in the later stages of the crisis to comfort
5 the emotions of the public. This means that when developing tactics for public communication
6 amid a crisis, the pivot role of emotional support cannot be overlooked. Second, our analysis
7 demonstrates that the influence of social support on public communication in times of crisis
8 varies depending on the stage. Governments must, therefore, adapt and tailor their public
9 communication strategy as the crisis develops rather than creating a strategy that is "one-size-
10 fits-all". Finally, we empirically validated that the "infodemic" could also occur in public
11 communication amid a crisis. We, therefore, argued that improving the quantity of public
12 communication would not help promote the public communication outcome. Rather, public
13 communication that accounts for the public's demand and tailors to the evolving of the crisis is
14 more effective.

15 **6. Conclusion**

16 The present studies investigate the impact of public communication amid crisis through the
17 theoretical lens of social support theory. Particularly, we utilized public engagement as a proxy
18 for the outcome of public communication amid the crisis and the dynamic impacts of two facets
19 of social support are examined. Using the 17 Chinese provincial government-owned social
20 media (Weibo) accounts, the separate impact of emotional support and informational support
21 on public engagement is examined. Based on the findings, this study recommends that
22 government organizations take into account emotional support as a strategy for public
23 communication, dynamically adapt their strategies to the people's demands as the crisis
24 develops, and exercise prudence when it comes to the "infodemic" phenomenon. Despite being
25 undertaken in a COVID-19 pandemic context, it is argued that all these findings are focused on
26 public communication strategies, which can extend beyond the scope of the pandemic to
27 general crises. The results of this study are preliminary overall, but they can be used as a starting

1 point and encourage more research into the role that emotional support plays in public
2 communication.

3 The present study is not without limitations. We adopted the public engagement metrics from
4 existing literature (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2016) to benchmark the outcome of public
5 communication, which is a function of share, like, and comment. However, it should be also
6 noted that the three facets (like, share, and comment) of engagement may reflect different
7 attitudes, which might be a consequence of different influences. For instance, a “like” in the
8 communication post may imply that the influence of the post on the citizens is positive, but
9 does not necessarily enact citizens to actively disaster preparation. On the other hand, a
10 “comment” in the post reflects citizens’ active involvement in the response, however, it may be
11 motivated by negative rather than positive affections. Thus, it is necessary to separately
12 investigate the mechanisms of how social support encompassed in public communication can
13 lead to three engagement activities and how three engagement activities connect to the public’s
14 better physical and mental readiness for disasters.

15 Two potential changes to the research methodology should be mentioned. First, it takes a lot of
16 time to annotate the work done by the domain experts for the supervised training model that we
17 used to extract both social support strengths. Future research on creating a more practical
18 strategy to address timeliness during a crisis is acknowledged as being necessary. Second, we
19 include daily public communication frequency as an independent variable in the regression
20 model to confirm the impact of social support overload. However, the post frequency may have
21 a moderation effect on emotional support and informational support, which needs to be
22 addressed in our future research.

23 Regarding the data, this study used 17 Chinese provincial government-owned social media as
24 the study cope and covered the period from the initial outbreak (Dec 2019) to the successful
25 control of Covid-19 (Jul 2020) in China. However, However, Covid-19 is a global crisis rather
26 than a regional incidence, and a dataset covering a longer duration would be favorable.

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1

2 **Appendix 1 Phased China's COVID-19 action timeline (SCIO, 2020)**

Stage	Description	Duration
Stage 1	Initial Response to Covid-19	27/12/2019 – 19/01/2020
Stage 2	Mitigation and Containment of Covid-19	20/01/2020 – 20/02/2020
Stage 3	The daily tally dropped to single digit	21/02/2020 – 17/03/2020
Stage 4	Phased success in controlling Covid-19	18/03/2020 – 28/04/2020
Stage 5	Ongoing prevention and control	29/04/2020 onwards

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1 Appendix 2 Sample texts in the data set

ID	Sample Content	Sample Content(in English)	Emotional Support Strength	Information Support Strength
1	截至1月29日24时, 国家卫生健康委收到31个省(自治区、直辖市)和新疆生产建设兵团累计报告确诊病例7711例, 现有重症病例...	As of 24:00 on January 29, the National Health Commission has received a total of 7711 confirmed cases from 31 provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: severe cases ...	0.12	0.89
2	...0-6岁儿童日常如何做好新型冠状病毒的预防? 外出时可采取哪些预防措施? 当孩子的照护者出现可疑症状时有哪些建议? 孩子生病时又该如何应对? 来看中国疾控中心的一图解读。详见↓ #上海战疫##上海加油# 0-6岁儿童如何预防新型冠状病毒? 一图解读	... How do children aged 0-6 prevent the new coronavirus? What precautions can be taken when going out? What advice do you have when your child's caregiver has suspicious symptoms? What should I do when my child is sick? Take a look at a picture interpretation of the China Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. For details, see ↓ #Fight! Shanghai# #Coming Shanghai# ...	0.47	0.71
3	...近日, 湖南疫情防控一线再传好消息。截至2月6日16时, 湖南已有75例新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎患者治愈出院。走出隔离医院, 他们会说什么?	... Recently, good news has spread on the front line of Hunan epidemic prevention and control. As of 16:00 on February 6, 75 cases of pneumonia patients infected by the new coronavirus in Hunan have been cured and discharged. What would they say when they walked out of the isolation hospital?	0.74	0.74
4	【为奋战在“战疫”一线的白衣天使而歌】抗疫歌曲《托起生命的风采》致敬逆行者, 呼唤众志成城! 加油中国! 加油武汉!	[Eulogy for the angels in white who are fighting on the front line of the epidemic] The anti-epidemic song "The Demeanor of Life" pays tribute to retrogrades and calls for unity! Come on China! Come on Wuhan!	0.91	0.09
2				
3				

1 Appendix 3 Definition and Description of Variables

Variable	Description
Dependent Variable	
Engagement	Computed as a function of (share, like, comment), denoted the daily engagement level
Independent Variable	
Emo_Sup	Emotional Support Strength
Info_Sup	Information Support Strength
Freq	Daily public communication frequency
Control for Provincial Characteristics	
Followers	Number of followers (in thousands)
Adjacency	The adjacency of the province to the pandemic center
Distance	The travel distance between the province and the pandemic center (in km)
GDP	GDP of the province (in billion yuan)
Pop	The population of the province (in thousands)
EGDI	The e-government development index of the province developed by the National School of Administration
Hospital	No of 3A hospitals in the province an indicator for benchmarking the medical care level
Control for Pandemic Development	
Conf_Accu	Daily accumulative confirmed cases of the province
Cure_Accu	Daily accumulative Cured cases of the province
Conf_Newly	Daily newly confirmed cases of the province
Cure_Newly	Daily newly Cured cases of the province

2

1 Appendix 4 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
log(Engagement + 1) (1)	0.37	0.56	0	5.38
log(Emo_Sup + 1) (2)	0.18	0.14	0	0.69
log(Info_Sup + 1) (3)	0.28	0.16	0	0.69
Freq(4)	16.99	12.83	1	68
Followers(5)	274.27	255.48	10.31	933.2
Distance(6)	1130.7	793.67	0	3268
GDP (7)	36542.45	28963.69	2966	107671
Pop(8)	4565.05	2849.83	608	11521
EGDI(9)	64.71	12.73	41.35	94.88
Hospital(10)	40.22	19.94	9	102
log(Conf_Acu + 1) (11)	5.89	1.94	0	11.13
log(Cure_Acu + 1)	5.45	2.26	0	11.07
log(Conf_delta + 1)	0.66	1.3	0	9.61
log(Cure_delta + 1) (14)	0.82	1.39	0	8.01

Note: To avoid multi-collinearity and skewness, engagement, emotional support, information support, accumulated confirmed cases, accumulated cured cases, newly confirmed cases, and newly cured cases are log-transformed.

2

1 Appendix 5 Correlation Matrix of the variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
log(Engagement + 1) (1)	1													
log(Emo_Sup + 1) (2)	0.27	1												
log(Info_Sup + 1) (3)	0.34	0.52	1											
Freq(4)	-0.15	-0.02	0.02	1										
Followers(5)	-0.16	0.03	0.13	0.25	1									
Distance(6)	-0.03	-0.12	-0.11	0.06	0.07	1								
GDP(7)	-0.13	0.1	0.08	-0.19	0.2	-0.47	1							
Pop(8)	-0.02	0.13	0.06	-0.3	-0.12	-0.43	0.87	1						
EGDI(9)	0.02	0.15	0.31	0	0.47	-0.45	0.67	0.5	1					
Hospital(10)	-0.02	0.06	0.13	-0.25	0.1	-0.35	0.77	0.81	0.68	1				
log(Conf_Acu + 1) (11)	-0.14	0.15	0.1	-0.06	0.06	-0.53	0.41	0.44	0.52	0.44	1			
log(Cure_Acu + 1) (12)	-0.26	0.01	-0.12	-0.09	0.03	-0.45	0.33	0.36	0.41	0.36	0.92	1		
log(Conf_delta + 1) (13)	0.23	0.3	0.47	0.07	0.14	-0.15	0.16	0.13	0.25	0.21	0.14	-0.18	1	
log(Cure_delta + 1) (14)	0.09	0.4	0.36	0.04	0.12	-0.24	0.2	0.2	0.27	0.26	0.41	0.26	0.47	1

2