

Beyond the Body:
Yoga and Advaita in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*

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This thesis is presented in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion

Lancaster University,
Lancaster, United Kingdom

May 2022

THESIS DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own work and that it has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere. The work in this thesis has been produced by me, except where due acknowledgement is made in the text. I have been granted permission by Professor Chris Edwards to exceed the prescribed limit of 80,000 words, to include the original Sanskrit text that I translate, in Appendix A and footnotes.

Zoë Slatoff

4 May 2022

ABSTRACT

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The *Aparokṣānubhūti* incorporates dualistic Yoga practice and philosophy into non-dual Vedānta. Yoga is presented as a purificatory practice, which helps to develop the discernment (*viveka*) required for the ultimate Advaitic realization of the equality of *ātman* and *brahman*. Although attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* was more likely written between the late fifteenth and mid-sixteenth century, on the early side of the Advaitic response to the growing popularity of *haṭhayoga*. The *Aparokṣānubhūti* is one of the earliest texts to mention *rājayoga*, teaching a unique fifteen-part path, which includes a redefined version of Patañjali's eight auxiliaries, leading to *samādhi* and ultimately to immediate awareness of the self, as its title suggests. Its main commentary—the *Dīpikā*—attributed to the fourteenth-century Vidyāraṇya, though probably written a few centuries later, suggests *haṭhayoga* as a last resort and unusually equates it with the yoga of Patañjali.

This incorporation of Yoga into Advaita occurs in the *Aparokṣānubhūti* through the widening definitions of key Advaitic terms such as *nididhyāsana* (contemplation) to include yogic practices. The reason given for this inclusivity is the need to address the *prārabdha* (ripe) *karma* of those who have not yet cognized *brahman*, though presumably with the greater

intention of subverting the growing tradition of *haṭhayoga* into its domain. In this thesis I translate the entire *Dīpikā* and look at key verses in some of the other, more recent commentaries to understand how and why Yoga and Advaita have been integrated together over time. I contextualize this with respect to contemporaneous texts on *haṭhayoga*, as well as later syncretic texts such as the Yoga Upaniṣads, which incorporate Advaita and the *Aparokṣānubhūti* in their own way. I then briefly look at how this has manifested in modern yoga, where the teachings of Yoga, Sāṃkhya, and Vedānta have become inextricably intertwined.

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नित्याभ्यासादृते प्राप्तिर्न भवेत्सच्चिदात्मनः ।

nityābhyāsād ṛte prāptir na bhavet saccidātmanah |

Without constant practice one may not attain,
The self that is characterized by being and consciousness.

— *Aparokṣānubhūti* 101ab

“Time and contemplation gradually modify our vision, and at last we reach understanding.”

— Paul Cézanne

PREFACE

When my teacher, Śrī K. Pattabhi Jois (affectionately known as Guruji), came to teach in Boulder, Colorado, sometime around 1987, he brought with him a copy of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, which he was reading and memorizing. Richard Freeman, one of his senior students who hosted the visit, asked to borrow it to make a Xerox copy. Guruji was very nervous that this would in some way damage the text or perhaps take away its essence. Richard finally convinced him that it would be okay to copy the text and began to study and eventually teach it himself. I have also been intrigued by the *Aparokṣānubhūti* since the first time I heard Guruji quote its verses. This is my way of trying to help that essence live on.

I never actually intended to write a thesis. However, after I finished writing my Sanskrit textbook “*Yogāvatāraṇam: The Translation of Yoga*,” I wanted a new project to keep me busy. I started translating a verse or two of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* a day, and at the end, after a bit of revision, I sent it to my publisher to see if he was interested. He said, “How about we sell some copies of your other book first?” He also recommended that I send it to Christopher Chapple at LMU, to see what he thought. Chris’ very clear reply was that I should use it as the basis of a PhD thesis and that I should apply to work with Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad. So here I am a few years later, having had no idea of what I was getting myself into, but very grateful for the journey. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. All mistakes are my own.

I would like to thank first and foremost Professor Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad who has kept steering me in the right direction every time I have wanted to veer off track, with kindness and wisdom every step of the way. I am grateful to Jeff Seroy and Christopher Chapple for having sent me in his direction. I am thankful to Lancaster University for providing me with a

scholarship for this work, particularly the Covid funding extension that helped me pull it all together at the end of a challenging year. Thank you to Diwakar Acharya for reading through a good part of the commentary with me and to the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies for the scholarship that allowed me to be in Oxford to do that.

Thank you to Jason Birch for his insight and generous sharing of knowledge and texts. I am also grateful to James Madaio, Michael Allen, and Amol Bankar for sharing their work and ideas. I would like to thank Daniel Simpson for his encouragement throughout and for seeing my vision clearly before I even did—I don't know that I would have done it without him. Thank you to Sarah Waggener for taking such good care of my yoga shala while I traveled for my research and to Jessica Greenfield for providing immeasurable support as a friend and teaching assistant. Thanks to Patricia Sauthoff for the pep talk when I needed it most. Thank you to my students for giving me a good reason to want to keep studying and to all my friends and colleagues for their support and words of wisdom along the way.

I am forever grateful to my first teachers, Śrī K. Pattabhi Jois, who ignited the spark of my inquiry, and Gary Tubb, who inspired me to keep learning. Thank you to my parents for always supporting my unusual path and for being so different from each other that I have always felt like I can do anything. Thank you above all to my grandfather, who was an English professor at Cornell, and instilled a romantic notion of academia in me as a small child, despite having spent his whole career struggling over “whether the reading and teaching of literature can be decent occupations in a universe so much ordered by suffering as this one” and whether personally “in my reading and teaching I am performing something ugly, voyeuristic, and evasive or am doing one of the best and least harmful things I know how to do.”¹ I strongly think the latter and this thesis is dedicated to you.

¹ Slatoff, Walter J. 1985: 3.

CHAPTER 1

The Incorporation of Yoga into Advaita and Advaita into Yoga

1.1 Introduction

The *Aparokṣānubhūti*, attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, is distinctive in its efforts to incorporate Yoga teachings into the Vedāntic system, providing a concise and accessible entry into Advaita philosophy. Its 144 verses, written exclusively in traditional *śloka* meter, consisting of four *pādas* of eight syllables each, teach a method of *vicāra* or inquiry, which incorporates a fifteen-part system of yoga leading to *samādhi*, and ultimately to the realization of the oneness of *ātman* (the individual self) and *brahman* (the universal self). The most well-known commentary on the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is the *Dīpikā*, attributed to Vidyāraṇya.

Manuscripts of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* are also found with the names *Aparokṣānubhava*, *Aparokṣānubhavasudhārṇava*, and *Aparokṣānubhavāmṛta*. According to the New Catalogus Catalogorum (NCC) there are at least 150 manuscripts of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, but only about twenty-five extant copies of the *Dīpikā*. There are about eight other commentaries, most of which only seem to have a couple of witnesses. There is a printed edition of the *Dīpikā*, originally published in 1878 and reprinted in 1965, which I have mainly worked from, although I have compared it to the manuscripts that I was able to locate in Pune as well, here labeled A, B, and C, all in *devanāgarī*. I have mostly consulted them in places where the printed edition seems a bit obtuse. Aside from the *Dīpikā*, I have looked at the four other commentaries that I found at Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (BORI) and Bhārat Itihās Samśodhak Maṇḍal (BISM) in Pune. I will discuss these manuscripts in greater detail at the beginning of Chapters 2 and 3. While I originally had hoped to travel to look at other manuscripts and possibly create a critical

edition, I had to revise that plan when all travel became impossible because of Covid and decided to focus on the manuscripts I had already gathered.

The most popular translation of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is by Swami Vimuktananda, first published at Belur Math in 1938 and later by Advaita Ashrama, accompanied by his commentary on the text. Swami Vimuktananda considers the text to have been written by Śaṅkara and mentions that he has consulted other translations as well as Vidyāraṇya's commentary. Other translations exist, such as one by Swami Chinmayananda, though with minimal circulation, and as far as I am aware, there is no existing English translation of the *Dīpikā*. There was also a PhD dissertation written by Douglas Fox on the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, as well as one written by Donald James Foster, but neither references the *Dīpikā*, is well known, or seems to have much insight to add.

In this thesis, I translate the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, along with the *Dīpikā* and extensive sections of other commentaries, in order to examine its unique role in the historical reconciliation of Advaita and Yoga. To understand and contextualize this evolution, we will begin by briefly looking at traditional Advaita and some of its fundamental ideas, as well as early *haṭha* and *rājayoga*, tracing their developments over time. As I hope to make clear, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is a pivotal example of the way in which Advaita incorporated Yoga, in order to appeal to a wider audience. As we shall see, this subversion happened through the broadening definitions of key Advaitic concepts and a gradual softening of philosophical boundaries.

In this first chapter I review the literature on the subject and trace the ways in which Yoga practice and philosophy has (and has not) been incorporated into Advaita by Śaṅkara and his followers up until the present. I also look at the historical reverse process of the integration of Advaita Vedānta into Yoga. This will serve as a backdrop to understand the distinctive position

of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* and where it emerged from. My second chapter is a translation of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, along with the entire *Dīpikā* commentary, attributed to Vidyāraṇya. In Chapter 3, I take a close look at the *Aparokṣānubhūti*'s unique view on *prārabdha* (ripe) *karma* and *nididhyāsana* (contemplation), which are respectively the reason for and the means to the “subordinating identification”² which allows for the incorporation of the yogic auxiliaries into the Advaitic core of the text, translating the relevant verses in the other commentaries and situating this within the broader framework of the tradition. In Chapter 4, I translate and compare all the verses on the fifteen auxiliaries of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*'s *rājayoga* and the references to *haṭhayoga* in the other main commentaries, considering the philosophical implications. And finally, in my fifth chapter, I look at the different strategies for the synthesis of Yoga and Advaita used in contemporaneous texts, from the early *haṭhayoga* ones to late medieval and early modern yoga compilations such as the *Haṭhapradīpikā*, and later Vedāntic works, particularly the Yoga Upaniṣads, which quote the *Aparokṣānubhūti*. I then briefly look at modern yoga and its relationship to Advaita.

The significance of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* lies in its emergence as an Advaita text of the early modern period—though it draws its authority from its attribution to Śāṅkarācārya—which seeks to incorporate yoga, while subverting its competing claims into its domain. Through a close reading of this essential and understudied text and its commentaries, I examine the various ways that they understand and respond to this incorporation. I discuss the philosophical challenges involved in joining Yoga and Advaita Vedānta together and look at how the evolving Yoga traditions have managed to embrace the fundamental concepts of Advaita, while sidestepping these contradictions, through a dynamic negotiation of meaning. Tracing the journey of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* through the complex developments of Yoga and Advaita over

² See Hacker's definition of “inclusivism” in Chapter 3 of this thesis, from Halbfass 1988: 411.

the centuries, we can see that in a dramatic reversal, it ends up being taken as a yoga text in the 20th century. This can perhaps be considered the greatest sign of the success of Advaita and the importance of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, as I intend to show in this thesis.

1.1.1 Yogic Advaita

The synthesis which occurs in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, and also appears in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, and later *Upaniṣads*, has been termed “Yogic Advaita” by Andrew Fort, who explains: “Yogic Advaita holds to Śāṅkara’s view that knowledge of the nondual self brings liberation, yet adds emphasis to Sāṃkhya concepts and Yoga practices, particularly exerting control of mental states and modifications.”³ The dualistic system of Yoga/Sāṃkhya can provide the tools to make one’s mind ready for the ultimate Advaitic realization of the equality of *ātman* and *brahman*. The interweaving of the philosophy and practices of Yoga and Advaita Vedānta by Śāṅkara and his followers, as evidenced by texts such as this one, has become an essential part of modern yoga.

The word *aparokṣānubhūti* or *aparokṣa-anubhūti* means immediate awareness and is often used as a synonym for *brahmānubhava*, which is direct apprehension of *brahman*. In other words it is the experience of pure, imageless consciousness—an awakening to our true self. This happens by penetrating the illusion we are enmeshed in, by means of *jñāna* or cognition. As Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad emphasizes, “the word *anubhava*, normally translated as ‘experience’, should be understood in a more neutral way as a ‘coming to be’.”⁴ Or taken a step further, it is really “coming to be” our true self.

³ Fort 1998: 86.

⁴ Ram-Prasad 2001: 170.

Yoga can be considered a purificatory practice, which helps to develop the discernment (*viveka*) necessary to cultivate this ultimate wisdom. Vidyasankar Sundaresan elaborates: “Early Advaita Vedāntins not only presume the usefulness of meditation according to Yogic praxis for the *mumukṣu* [one desirous of liberation]; they also accept that it has its uses for the *jīvanmukta* [one who is liberated while living]. In the process, they co-opt a significant portion of Yoga into their own system.”⁵ According to Sundaresan, Śāṅkara actually incorporates all eight aspects of *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, albeit in his own order and understanding, into his system of thought. “Thus, beginning with *yama-niyama* and ending with *samādhi*, every limb of yoga has a place in Advaita Vedānta, initially as things to be accomplished by the seeker of liberation and ultimately as characterizing one who is established in Self-knowledge.”⁶ In other words, it is a circular process. Yoga practice can be considered preparatory to self-knowledge. And the steady recollection of self-knowledge results in the goal of yoga—the stilling of the fluctuations of the mind.

In modern yoga, the teachings of Yoga and Advaita have become inextricably intertwined. Ask most modern practitioners for a definition of yoga and they will tell you it means “union,” even though this is the exact opposite of the isolation (*kaivalya*) that is the traditional goal in the *Yogasūtra*, which is probably the most well-known yoga text. Despite their oppositions, this merging is not actually that novel: the dualistic system of Yoga has always fit neatly inside of the Advaitic paradigm. In this thesis I will examine that evolution, without which modern yoga would not have attained its current popularity, focusing on the important role that the *Aparokṣānubhūti* has played in this synthesis.

⁵ Sundaresan 2002: 16.

⁶ Sundaresan 2003: 117.

1.1.2 Authenticity and Dating

Although the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is traditionally attributed to Śaṅkara, the majority of modern scholars question this, citing deviations in content and style. However, there are enough similarities to suggest that the text was written by someone belonging to his school of followers. Current scholarship tends to place Śaṅkara in the first part of the eighth century (c. 700–750 C.E.).⁷ By taking Śaṅkara as the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, the German Indologist Paul Hacker developed certain criteria for determining authorship of work attributed to Śaṅkara, based on the use of four key terms: *avidyā* (ignorance), *nāmarūpa* (name and form), *māyā* (illusion), and *īśvara* (the Lord). In his analysis, the only other works legitimately written by Śaṅkara are the ten commentaries on the major Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (the only non-commentarial text actually attributed to him), and quite possibly the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa*. Hacker calls his criteria “a sieve, with mesh wide enough to sift out spuria, yet narrow enough to retain developments within the Advaita period of Śaṅkara.”⁸ This method has been applied by scholars such as Ingalls and Mayeda to determine the authorship of works attributed to Śaṅkara and his students and successors. Another criterion for determining authorship is the citation in the colophon. Most works attributed to “Śaṅkarācārya,” such as this text and the *Ātmabodha* are false ascriptions, whereas those that name him as Bhagavat, Bhagavatpāda or Bhagavatpūjyapāda are more likely to be true.

While Belvalkar thinks the *Aparokṣānubhūti* could be original (although he finds it simplistic and thus conjectures it an early work), Ingalls, Mayeda, Potter, Bouy and others agree that it was most likely not written by Śaṅkara. As Fox emphasizes, and as we will examine in more detail in Chapter 3, the biggest discrepancy between the philosophy of the

⁷ See for example Nakamura 1983, p. 48–67 for this hypothesis (p. 67) as well as alternative theories on Śaṅkara’s dates.

⁸ Halbfass 1995: 116.

Aparokṣānubhūti and what we know definitively as Śaṅkara’s views, is in the idea of *karma*. As he explains, “To the question whether a person who is finally fully enlightened, who has ‘seen’ the ultimate truth and who is therefore liberated from ignorance, can still have to face some residual effects of former behavior, the traditional answer--and Śaṅkara’s--has been yes. But the work we are to examine boldly denies that this can be the case.”⁹

Many modern scholars have hypothesized a pre-fourteenth-century date for the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, taking Vidyāraṇya’s commentary as a *terminus ad quem*.¹⁰ However, due to differences in style, it seems quite unlikely that Vidyāraṇya is actually the author of the commentary, which may well postdate the Yoga Upaniṣads it seems to reference.¹¹ Additionally, if Vidyāraṇya were indeed aware of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, which he surely would have been if it were in popular currency, he would likely have quoted it in his other works, as he did with so many other texts.¹² Jason Birch also suggests a later date due to the presence of the word *upanetra* in verse 81, which seems to represent some sort of magnifying lens that, as far as we have evidence for, did not exist in India until its introduction by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century.¹³ This seems to me a more likely conjecture: because of the text’s blatant criticism of *haṭhayogīs*—for getting caught up in looking at the tip of their nose for example—I would hypothesize that the text was written sometime between the late fifteenth to mid-sixteenth century, in response to the increased output of *haṭhayoga* texts. This would place it on the early side of the known period of Advaitic interest in Yoga, from the sixteenth to eighteenth century,

⁹ Fox 1995: 2–3.

¹⁰ See Birch 2013b: 408–9 for example.

¹¹ I am grateful to Diwakar Acharya for highlighting these references. For example, the *Dīpikā* on verse 105 refers to the “well-known Upaniṣads” with regard to *yama* and *niyama* and the *Dīpikā* on verse 143 refers to the Upaniṣads in reference to the *haṭhayoga* which it says is taught in the “well-known *aṣṭāṅgayoga* of Patañjali.”

¹² Thank you to James Madaio—who has studied the works of Vidyāraṇya in depth, and strongly thinks that the *Dīpikā* is quite different in style to his known texts, and therefore unlikely to be his composition—for this insight.

¹³ Birch 2011: 540, fn. 98.

when *rājayoga* was reinterpreted in various ways.¹⁴ Nonetheless, it is essential to look at Śaṅkara's philosophy, in order to understand where this text emerged from and why it has been attributed to him.

1.1.2 Śaṅkara

Many stories have been told about Śaṅkara, the majority derived from *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya*, the traditional biography written about him by Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya, and he is viewed through a variety of lenses—as practitioner, scholar, and teacher. Jacqueline Suthren Hirst focuses on what she considers most important—his role as *ācārya*: “From the testimonies of his direct disciples and from his honorifics, all of which indicate the reverence in which he was held as a teacher, we gain a picture of one remembered primarily as a great teacher.”¹⁵ In the Indian tradition, *paramparā*—the passing on of knowledge from teacher to student—is considered essential to gaining self-knowledge. “Śaṅkara constantly emphasizes that the desire to know *brahman*, the enquiry into *brahman*, what Vedāntin study is all about, is achieved only by hearing and reflecting on scripture with a teacher in the correct teaching tradition.”¹⁶ He was that teacher to many, including his main disciples, Sureśvara, Padmapāda, and Totāka.

Hacker's theory is that Śaṅkara was first a *yogī* and later became an Advaitin. He conjectures that “in conjunction with his theism, it was the mysticism of the Om sound” that led Śaṅkara from Yoga to Advaita Vedānta.¹⁷ In other words, this realization helped him to shift towards a goal that was beyond duality. Through the understanding that everything is contained

¹⁴ The only definitive *terminus ad quem* that I am aware of is the Marathi *Samaślokī* of Vāmanapaṇḍita, which must be mid-late seventeenth century. There is also a Marathi *Ṭīkā* written by Jagannātha Swāmi, which, if the same person who received patronage in the court of Shah Jahan (though perhaps unlikely, since it is a common name), would be the first half of the seventeenth century. Given that these are in Marathi, it seems that the *Aparokṣānubhūti* was quite popular by this point. See Chapter 3.

¹⁵ Suthren Hirst 2005: 177.

¹⁶ Suthren Hirst 2005: 177.

¹⁷ Halbfass 1995: 105.

within this single syllable, he began to think that yoga practice was unnecessary, and one could come to this realization more directly and easily. Hacker hypothesizes that in order “to learn this new doctrine of Om and this new Yoga, Śaṅkara went to school with an Advaita master, who instructed him in the MK [*Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*] and introduced him to the Advaita system, and that as a result he became a monist and was finally given the task of writing a commentary on Gauḍapāda’s work by his teacher.”¹⁸ Although Gauḍapāda does mention yoga, his is called *asparśa*, or contactless yoga, which entails a withdrawal of the senses. His commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* also emphasized a meditation on the parts of Om in order to experience the self.

Other scholars, such as Tuvia Gelblum, disagree with this theory, arguing that the idea that Śaṅkara “had been a Yoga follower before becoming an Advaita-Vedāntin is in keeping with a tradition which may amount to no more than a reflection of a recurrent model in mythical biographies of eminent sages, namely, the motif of preliminary experimentations with rival schools in search for truth.”¹⁹ But even if this is a common trope, it seems a plausible suggestion that a renowned scholar would have grappled with other systems first to arrive at such a clear understanding. And according to Sundaresan, who disagrees with Hacker’s idea that Śaṅkara wrote the yoga-related texts/commentaries first, “Nowhere does Śaṅkara reject yoga as completely as academic scholarship is inclined to believe.”²⁰ He elaborates: “The influence of Yoga on Śaṅkara has been especially misunderstood [...] his mature works lend a qualified approval of the practice of Yoga.”²¹ He cites Biardeau and Vetter, who have also come to different conclusions about chronology. In Sundaresan’s understanding, “Śaṅkara’s stand that the

¹⁸ Halbfass 1995: 105–6.

¹⁹ Gelblum 1992: 77.

²⁰ Sundaresan 2003: 120.

²¹ Sundaresan 2002: 24–5.

steady recollection of Self-knowledge leads to *citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ*, combined with his recommendation of such recollection in order to counter a tendency toward further action, implies that one should expect at least a little influence of Yoga in his independent works.”²² It makes sense that a scholar/practitioner would fold the helpful pieces of other systems into his own tradition. Śaṅkara’s pupil Sureśvara even explicitly recommends *yogābhyāsa* (yoga practice).

According to Hacker, Śaṅkara grew up in a Vaiṣṇava context. The older texts which consensus genuinely attributes to Śaṅkara begin (and often end) by invoking Viṣṇu, as does the *Aparokṣānubhūti*. Although Vidyāraṇya (known as Mādhava before becoming a *sannyāsin*) constructed a legend of Śaṅkara as an incarnation of Śiva, this was based solely on his name, not on the evidence given in his early works.²³ It seems that similarly to Vivekananda in more recent years, Vidyāraṇya helped to publicly reimagine Śaṅkara as a popular hero. According to Vidyāraṇya, he established the Śaṅkara Maṭha, an Advaitic cloister in Śrīṅgeri, with a series of directors, who all could have been known by the name Śaṅkara, thus leading to the proliferation of works under his name.

1.1.3 Vidyāraṇya

Much of what we know about the *Aparokṣānubhūti* comes from the *Dīpikā* commentary attributed to Vidyāraṇya, who was the *jagadguru* at Śrīṅgeri maṭha from at least 1374–75 until 1386, the year of his death. It is known from both inscriptions and textual tradition that he was an important figure and *guru* of king Harihara II. Partly in response to the threat of Islamic power on the Vijayanagara empire, he was commissioned to write commentaries and work on

²² Sundaresan 2002: 15.

²³ Halbfass 1995: 34.

philosophical exposition.²⁴ He helped to spread Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta and turn him into a legend and is also credited for the rise of Advaita Vedānta as the highest philosophical system, growing in fame himself through works such as his *Pañcadaśī*.

Regardless of whether Vidyāraṇya wrote the commentary on the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, it is easy to see why it might be attributed to him, based on studies of other texts he did write that combine Yoga and Vedānta. Walter Slaje examines the ways in which Vidyāraṇya may have re-interpreted the *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha* in his commentary on it, explaining that he seemed to be “aware of the fact that the YV originally did not meet the traditional requirements of brahmanical *dharma*, did not teach *advaita* exactly as understood by Śaṅkara's tradition, nor did it approve of yoga in the sense of the recognized *darśana*.”²⁵ To counter this, in describing *jīvanmukti*, Vidyāraṇya “stresses right from the beginning the necessity of the practice of yoga (*yogābhyāsa*). For, according to him, this practice was not only capable of subduing all functions of the mind, but it also has to be accorded the power of being able to overcome the retributive causality of one's own deeds of the past already in operation (*prārabdhakarman*), which he considers to be even stronger than adequate knowledge (*tattvajñāna*). It is already here that he, in a passing remark, equates successful human activity (*puruṣaprayatna*) mainly with the practice of yoga (*yogābhyāsarūpa*).”²⁶ As we shall see, the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, despite claiming that one who has realized *brahman* is freed from their *prārabdhakarman*, uses this ripe karma as justification for including the fifteen auxiliaries of yoga for those who have not attained cognition yet.

In his syncretic *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, “Discernment of Living Liberation,” Vidyāraṇya combines Yoga and Advaita, drawing together elements from the *Yogasūtra*, *Bhagavadgītā*, and *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha*. As Fort explains, “In a way rarely seen in Śaṅkara's ‘mainstream’ Advaita,

²⁴ Slaje 1998: 116.

²⁵ Slaje 1998: 116.

²⁶ Slaje 1998: 109.

Vidyāraṇya claims that yoga and ascetic renunciation (*saṃnyāsa*) together both lead to and express the liberating knowledge (*jñāna, vidyā*) of *brahman*. In the case of yoga specifically, knowledge and yogic practice are linked, for discerning nonduality breeds the cessation of mental activity, and ceasing mental activity by yoga assists seeing nonduality.”²⁷ Though Vidyāraṇya’s ultimate allegiance is clearly to Advaita and the text discounts yoga as a complete method in and of itself, it is seen as a helpful means to an end. As Slaje emphasizes, “To him *samādhi* is the central element leading to the state of *jīvanmukti*. *Samādhi*, however, as understood by Vidyāraṇya, is the result of the means of (Patañjali’s) Aṣṭāṅgayoga beginning with *yama, niyama* etc.”²⁸ Slaje, underscoring the importance of yoga, even says: “Obviously by an ‘inclusivistic’ intention he first proclaims (JMV 144, 11–14) an universal agreement of *all traditions with regard to the means of deliverance*, including even the Jainas and Buddhists, to regard a master of Aṣṭāṅgayoga (*yogīśvara*) as the highest Yogin.”²⁹ Fort reiterates this, focusing on Vidyāraṇya’s concentration on the eight-part path culminating in *samādhi*, as well as the importance of repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) and detachment (*vairāgya*) in “yogic Advaita.”

Fort continues: “Vidyāraṇya’s extensive attention to these matters shows his nature as a ‘yogic Advaitin.’ Traditional Advaita often downgraded yoga as another form of action tied to cause and effect, as opposed to eternally existent nondual knowledge which once gained is never lost. One can argue that Advaitins do not sufficiently attend to the difficult issue of how gradually insight seems to be gained in most cases. Mental stability and serenity are very rarely present once and for all, and the process of yoga mastery described here (including stages of *samādhi* and the workings of certain impressions) attempts to account for the lengthy and

²⁷ Fort 1999: 377.

²⁸ Slaje 1998: 114.

²⁹ Slaje 1998: 114.

difficult road to liberation, and shows how one might ‘fall back’ along the way.”³⁰ Basically, Vidyāraṇya and his followers helped to make Advaita more householder friendly, by incorporating yoga practices to keep people engaged on the path. As we shall see, this ultimately led to the reverse process—the incorporation of Vedānta into Yoga—and the creation of what could be termed Vedāntic Yoga.

1.2 The Incorporation of Yoga into Advaita Vedānta

It is generally agreed upon that Śaṅkara was a student of Govindapāda, who was thought to be a student of Gauḍapāda, the great teacher whose *Kārikā*, inspired by the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, is the first recorded text on Advaita Vedānta to our knowledge. Gauḍapāda’s version of yoga, which ultimately is the realization that *ātman* and *brahman* are one, “promotes the happiness and well-being of all creatures and is free from strife and contradictions.”³¹ In one of the first expressions of the compatibility of Yoga/Sāṃkhya with Advaita and perhaps a license to incorporate the former into the latter, Gauḍapāda says: “Dualists, firmly clinging to their conclusions, contradict one another,” but “nondualists find no conflict with them.”³²

Gauḍapāda’s dates are a subject of debate as well, but he was probably a more distant teacher to Śaṅkara than seen in traditional biographies. The difference in time suggests that their writings were responding to different social/political environments. Michael Comans, in his study of the early Advaita tradition emphasizes the influence of Buddhism on Gauḍapāda, in ideas such as viewing the world as *māyā* (illusion), which are seen in many of his *kārikās* where “he displayed a close acquaintance with the prevalent Buddhist thought of his time.”³³ However,

³⁰ Fort 1999: 385.

³¹ *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* 4.2 in Nikhilananda 1952: 314.

³² *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* 3.17. In Nikhilananda 1952: 292.

³³ Comans 2000: 164.

he notes, “by the time of Śaṅkara, in the early part of the eighth century, Buddhism had declined in importance.”³⁴ Instead, Śaṅkara “saw the Mīmāṃsakas as his principal opponents, and one of his main tasks was to establish against the followers of Mīmāṃsā that the Upaniṣads constitute an independent means of knowledge; that they teach the liberating knowledge of the non-dual Self; and that the knowledge they generate is entirely independent of the performance of rites.”³⁵ Consequently, much of Śaṅkara’s writing was spent in defending his position and this helped to define his focus on the primacy of self-knowledge gained from the *mahāvākyas* (great sayings). In the process, though—just as with Gauḍapāda and Buddhism—despite their oppositions, these traditions influenced and borrowed from each other.

According to Hacker, “the Sāṃkhya as taught in the schools of Pātañjala Yoga, the Mīmāṃsā versions of Prabhākara and Kumārila, the radical monism and illusionism of Gauḍapāda, and the moderate monism and illusionism of some Vedānta schools of his time—the latter difficult for us to discern but to some extent inferable from some passages of Śaṅkara’s works—all these schools of systems supplied him with conceptual tools. He utilized them all but committed himself to none of them exclusively. His only concern was the truth, whose supreme expression he saw in the Upaniṣads.”³⁶ According to Sundaresan, Śaṅkara never rejects yoga, what he objects to is viewing *cittavṛttinirodha* as an injunction, like in Mīmāṃsā. He describes the relationship of Yoga and Vedānta for Śaṅkara more explicitly: “After the knowledge taught in scripture, that the Self is Brahman, has been properly grasped, its steady recollection naturally culminates in *citta vṛtti nirodhaḥ*. Thus, the process of gaining Self-knowledge and ideally maintaining it leads to the cessation of mental transformations.”³⁷ In this way, yoga mediates the

³⁴ Comans 2000: 164.

³⁵ Comans 2000: 164.

³⁶ Halbfass 1995: 179.

³⁷ Sundaresan 2003: 104.

transition from action to knowledge. Although later Advaitins talk about *jīvanmukti*, liberation while living, for Śaṅkara, yoga was just a means to the ultimate end. “Thus, the path leading from *pravṛtti* (action in the world) to *nivṛtti* (withdrawal from the world) passes through yoga, and the life of *nivṛtti* naturally culminates in the goal of yoga.”³⁸

Yoga can therefore be considered a purificatory practice, which helps to prepare the aspirant for self-knowledge. As Comans concludes, “according to Śaṅkara, the role of *samādhi* is supportive—or purifying—and is preliminary to, but not necessarily identical with, the rise of the liberating knowledge.”³⁹ He explains that similarly to deep sleep, *samādhi* is a state that one goes into and comes out of. It doesn’t actually remove false cognition (*mithyājñāna*); it only temporarily pacifies it. According to Comans, “Śaṅkara does not consider the attainment of *samādhi* to be a sufficient cause to eradicate false knowledge, and according to Śaṅkara, since false knowledge is the cause of bondage, *samādhi* cannot therefore be the cause of liberation.”⁴⁰ As K. Satchinanda Murty sums up, although Śaṅkara “denies the capacity of the Yogic practices to vouchsafe the knowledge of the oneness of the Self, which can be had from the *Vedānta Vākyas* alone and which alone can lead to liberation [... he] grants that Yoga can be a proximate means to right knowledge, because it helps to still the wayward and fleeting mind and enables one to understand the meaning of the *mahāvākyas*.”⁴¹

Sundaresan emphasizes Śaṅkara’s attention to some of the physical details that might still concern modern yogis: “Śaṅkara does not neglect to offer practical comments on the regulations of the aspiring *yogin*, and the characteristics of the perfected *yogin*, such as how to lay down a seat for meditation, the proper posture for meditation and the food intake required for bodily

³⁸ Sundaresan 2003: 109.

³⁹ Comans 1993: 29.

⁴⁰ Comans 1993: 24.

⁴¹ Murty 1959: 136.

maintenance.”⁴² Thus, even for Śaṅkara, there is the understanding that one can use yoga practice to ultimately get beyond yoga practice, i.e., use the body to get beyond the body and the mind to get beyond the mind.

In considering Śaṅkara’s authorship of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, it is helpful to look at other yoga-related work attributed to him, most significantly, the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa*, a commentary on the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* (the *Yogasūtra* with “Vyāsa’s” commentary, now widely considered an auto-commentary). Trevor Leggett, in the introduction to his translation of the *vivarāṇa* commentary, concludes that based on his study there are many reasons to support Śaṅkara’s authorship and nothing to clearly contradict it, as supported by the more recent Foreword by Kengo Harimoto. As Leggett points out, “If he has chosen to write a commentary on Yoga meditation, it must have been a central part of his own standpoint, although he was opposed to some of the philosophical doctrines of the official Yoga school. One would expect a tendency to modify these unacceptable doctrines, if this text is really by Śaṅkara. This turns out to be the case.”⁴³ The argument for authenticity of the text is supported by Hacker, Wilhelm Halbfass, H. Nakamura, and S. Mayeda.

Others, such as T.S. Rukmani, strongly argue against Śaṅkara as the author of the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa*. However, in examining Śaṅkara’s views on yoga in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, she nonetheless emphasizes his acceptance of the Yoga system. “Apart from the approval of the *Yoga* methodology for spiritual progress, Śaṅkara’s *BSBh.* also accords a very high place to *Yoga*, including the divine powers that accrue to one practicing *Yoga*. There are places where *Yoga* as a system is lauded and where Śaṅkara quotes Patañjali’s *Yogasūtras* in support of his arguments.” Rukmani continues: “He mentions *yama*, *niyama*, *dhyāna*, *samādhi*

⁴² Sundaresan 2003: 115.

⁴³ Leggett 1990: 1.

and other yogic means that help one in spiritual progress [...] But while accepting *Yoga*'s methods for spiritual progress, Śaṅkara does not, at any stage, dilute his opposition to the ontological stand of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, i.e. dualism.”⁴⁴ In her view, although he does acknowledge it as a “methodology for mind purification,” he argues strongly enough against it that she thinks it improbable that he would have written a commentary on the *Yogasūtra* at any stage of his life.⁴⁵

We will now look at some fundamental Advaitic concepts in order to understand how Advaita has been able to incorporate Yoga over time. We will briefly examine traditional views on misunderstanding (*avidyā*) and superimposition (*adhyāsa*) onto the self, the self (*ātman*) in relation to the Sāṅkhya/Yoga concept of spirit (*puruṣa*), and immediate awareness (*aparokṣa-anubhūti*) of the self. This will serve as a backdrop to understand where the *Aparokṣānubhūti* aligns and departs from tradition and the philosophical creativity it employs to allow for the inclusion of its *rājayoga* with fifteen auxiliaries.

1.2.1 Misunderstanding (*avidyā*) and Superimposition (*adhyāsa*)

Although Śaṅkara critiques the Yogācāra Buddhist argument that denies the external world based on the analogy of dreaming, he does use the dream analogy to a certain extent. In his view, in the same way as we believe our dreams are real while we are dreaming, we believe our waking world to be real while we are awake. So even though the ultimate realization of *brahman* is beyond and different to the experiential reality of the world, it does not invalidate our experience of the world while we are living in it. We see this extrinsic world because of *avidyā* (misunderstanding), which imposes *upādhis* (limiting adjuncts)—the material body, the finite mind and other psychological components, and misunderstanding itself—onto the *ātman*. The

⁴⁴ Rukmani 1993: 397.

⁴⁵ Rukmani 1993: 401.

mental fluctuations or *vṛttis* make us predisposed to seeing these things. Śaṅkara never actually admits *avidyā* to be either real or unreal, avoiding the difficulty of this dilemma, which he leaves to his followers to make sense of. Instead, as Daniel Ingalls explains, “he concentrates on what he considers the heart of the matter, the teaching that is necessary for the attainment of *mokṣa*. This teaching is that *avidyā*, whatever its modality, is never truly connected with the self.”⁴⁶ So, ultimately, one can learn to see beyond this misunderstanding.

Much of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is concerned with the misidentification of the self with the body. In the way that a snake is mistakenly superimposed on a rope, or silver on mother-of-pearl, the body is considered to be superimposed upon the self. Śaṅkara equates *avidyā* with the basic error of all worldly existence, unlike later Advaitins who consider it causal. For Śaṅkara, *avidyā* is equal to *adhyāsa* (superimposition), which is the same as false cognition, and thus is considered the fundamental *kleśa* (affliction), as in yoga. As Ram-Prasad puts it, “Simply (though admittedly not clearly), the self superimposes what is not self on itself.”⁴⁷ This seems to echo the definition of *avidyā* in the *Yogasūtra*: “Misunderstanding is the perception of that which is eternal, pure, happy, and the self in the un-eternal, impure, painful, and non-self.”⁴⁸ But unlike in Buddhism and Sāṃkhya/Yoga, Śaṅkara “does not think that the *basic* problem is that life is suffering. He contends that the unliberated state occurs because of misunderstanding; suffering is just what follows in unliberated life.”⁴⁹ For Śaṅkara, Yoga offers a systemization of disciplinary practices that can be pretty much imported en masse into Advaita Vedānta to help address this.

⁴⁶ Ingalls 1953: 72.

⁴⁷ Ram-Prasad 2001: 181.

⁴⁸ *Yogasūtra* 2.5: *anityāśuciduḥkhānātmāsu nityāśucisukhātmakhyātir avidyā* |

⁴⁹ Ram-Prasad 2001: 187.

1.2.2 Self and Spirit

In the merging as well as distinguishing of the essential ideas of Sāṃkhya/Yoga and Vedānta, the question arises as to the relationship between the terms *ātman* and *puruṣa*, which the *Aparokṣānubhūti* uses interchangeably. The term *puruṣa* originally just signified a person, although its most famous early usage in the *R̥g Vedic* hymn, the *Puruṣasūkta* or “Hymn to the Cosmic Person” already had larger implications, in the dismemberment of this giant to create the entire universe in all of its forms. As Purushottama Bilimoria notes, emphasizing the cosmological usages of the term: “This important signifier of ‘*puruṣa*’ is never far off from Hindu speculations, from Sāṃkhya psychology to the ground plan for temple architecture, and the deepest metaphysical critiques towards outlining the parameters of authentic personal existence or *personhood*.”⁵⁰ However, over time, “*puruṣa* itself changes in connotation to signify the principle of existence within each living being – gods, humans and animals alike. The term *ātman* more specifically is used to refer to this principle in human beings, while *jīva* occasionally is used to refer to the putative self in embodiment.”⁵¹

The earliest Advaitic descriptions of *ātman* are in Gauḍapāda’s *Kārikā*. He draws on the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, which talks about the self in terms of negation. “On account of the incomprehensible nature of *ātman*, the scriptural passage ‘Not this, not this’ negates all [dualistic] ideas,” Gauḍapāda says. “Therefore the birthless *ātman* alone exists.”⁵² As Ram-Prasad elaborates, “Gnosis liberates even as it ends. The knowing person is truly knowing, just on the verge of being a person no longer. The self is the condition for both unknowing and

⁵⁰ Bilimoria 1999: 208.

⁵¹ Bilimoria 1999: 208.

⁵² *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* 3.26. In Nikhilananda 1952: 297.

knowing, even while it is itself neither, thereby does freedom become possible, for the self realizes itself through what it is not.”⁵³

Referring to the use of the terms *ātman* and *puruṣa* in the *Bhagavadgītā*, Ram-Prasad notes that, “the *Gītā*, with its deep reliance on the terminology of early Sāṃkhya thought, often uses the two terms interchangeably. Its characteristic polyvalence is typified by the fact that ‘*puruṣa*’ at base refers in the *Gītā* to the entity that is principally defined as conscious (as opposed to being inert, *jaḍa*). As such, it usually means a spirit, that which is not material but reflexive, the subject of phenomena or experience, albeit requiring the co-presence of *prakṛti*, or materiality.”⁵⁴ As emphasized by Hacker, “the Vedānta theory of the self is greatly indebted to the Sāṃkhya. This holds also for Śaṅkara’s version of the Vedānta [...] Śaṅkara retained the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the purely spiritual nature of the self.”⁵⁵ And as Hacker elaborates, “In the period of the Upaniṣads, the view that the *self* is *spirit* gained increasing prominence. Vedāntism becomes almost a pure philosophy of the spirit; and thinking about being is usually dependent on the concept of spirituality.”⁵⁶ It makes sense that the word *ātman*, thought to be derived from the root *an*, “to breathe,” could be best understood as “spirit,” from the Latin *spirare*, also meaning “to breathe.”

As Ram-Prasad elaborates, “In many ways, the *ātman* concept resembles that of the psyche and the soul in pre-modern Western thought, by referring very generally to the essence of a human being (at the very least). But generally, and especially in the *Upaniṣads* and the tradition based on them, the *ātman* does not provide personal identity, i.e., the set of criteria by which the individual being is distinguished from another through a complex combination of

⁵³ Ram-Prasad 2013: 87.

⁵⁴ Ram-Prasad 2013: 81.

⁵⁵ Halbfass 1995: 180.

⁵⁶ Halbfass 1995: 191.

qualities that gives each a distinct(ive), potentially nameable, narrative existence. The *ātman* does not pertain to personhood in such a manner.”⁵⁷ According to Śaṅkara, it is instead the *jīva* that represents the individual soul or personalized aspect of the self. Ram-Prasad explains that the essence that is *ātman* allows for individuality but is not individuated itself, since it is really just *brahman*, the universal self. “Presumably, this detaching of essence from personhood went hand in hand with the presupposition of a cycle of lives and rebirths: a distance was created between the person inquiring into reality and the existence they might have in other lives, as other persons.”⁵⁸ This distinction was necessary to understand reincarnation and what transiently dies along with the body as opposed to the absolute essence that transmigrates on until one attains liberation. But as the *Aparokṣānubhūti* will make clear through an analogy, “when *brahman* is realized, one does not see individuality.”⁵⁹

1.2.3 Immediate Awareness

Śaṅkara clearly brought together the concepts of *aparokṣa* and *anubhūti* in his writings, although the word *anubhava* was much more common than the latter. As Halbfass explores in detail, “It is obvious that Śaṅkara uses the word *anubhava* at different levels of reflection and in accordance with his hierarchy of ‘conventional’ and ‘absolute’ truth. There is ‘wrong’ and ‘right,’ provisional and absolute experience. Yet, there is a common denominator; even false *anubhava*, which implies superimposition and false identification of self and non-self, is still *anubhava*, containing the element of immediate presence, in which being and knowing, subject and object coincide. [...] any act of perception or awareness can remind us of, and help us to approach, that

⁵⁷ Ram-Prasad 2013: 82

⁵⁸ Ram-Prasad 2013: 82.

⁵⁹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 59cd: *tadvad brahmaṇi jīvatvaṃ vīkṣyamāṇe na paśyati* ||

absolute and ultimate experience which according to the Upaniṣads coincides with the being of *brahman* itself.”⁶⁰ But can there really be such a thing as “absolute experience”? Doesn’t this ultimate awareness actually represent the end of experience itself? Perhaps it is just beyond what we can express with language, or as the *Aparokṣānubhūti* echoes the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*: “that from which words turn back.”⁶¹

Comans explains the inherent nature of Śaṅkara’s understanding of “immediate awareness” as opposed to other traditions. “[From] Śaṅkara’s understanding of the self-luminosity and immediacy (*aparokṣatva*) of pure Awareness, and his understanding of the Self as Experience Itself (*anubhavātman*), there is no doubt that when Śaṅkara speaks of knowledge of the Self he refers to an intuitive knowledge, or direct insight, about the already existing fact of the Self as pure Awareness. He does not put forward the view that the experience of pure Awareness must be produced; a view we find, for example, in the Tantric tradition, with its model of the *cakras* and the ascent of the *kuṇḍaliṇī*.”⁶²

Halbfass points out that it is “Śaṅkara’s disciple and commentator Padmapāda [who] pursues the phenomenology of immediate awareness (*anubhava*) further than his master; and he comes closer to seeking in its immediacy independent, extra-scriptural confirmation for the absolute unity of the self: Immediacy or self-evidence (*aparokṣatā*) as such is always one and the same in different acts of awareness and perception; and the immediacy which is attached to objects (in-sense-perception) is not different from inner immediate experience, since the same character of self-evidence is manifest in them.”⁶³ And although all Advaitins are committed to this self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatā*), it is this stream of thought beginning with Padmapāda,

⁶⁰ Halbfass 1988: 390.

⁶¹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 107ab: *vāco yasmān nivartante* | Similar to *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.4.1 and 2.9.1. See Chapter 2.

⁶² Comans 2003: 308.

⁶³ Halbfass 1998: 391.

which eventually gets identified as the Vivaraṇa school, that re-defines non-dual realization as experience of *brahman*.

Stephen Phillips explores Padmapāda’s thought further: “Even in the waking state [as well as in dreaming] the immediacy [of conscious-ness—‘*aparokṣatā*’] that involves [external] objects is not to be distinguished from inner immediate experience (*anubhava*)—[at least not] according to [any] cognition that is valid—for they are presented in the same way. Thus, an object even in the waking state is experienced invariably (*eva*) as intimately associated with inner immediate experience. Otherwise the presentation of the material world would be impossible. As a pot that is covered (*avagunṭha*) by darkness is not presented [to cognition] without the [counter-]covering (*avagunṭhana*) of the light of a lamp, so it is here.”⁶⁴ In other words, for Śāṅkara and his followers, beginning by considering the external world as real, one can perceive increasingly subtler levels of reality, eventually leading to the immediate awareness of the self.

1.2.4 Yoga in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*

After its initial verses praising Viṣṇu, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* lists in detail the four means (*sādhana**catuṣṭaya*) that are considered prerequisites for knowledge of *brahman*. These qualities, which are to be cultivated by the seeker of liberation, characterize one whose insight is steady (*sthitaprajña*), as first described by Kṛṣṇa in answer to Arjuna’s question in *Bhagavadgītā* 2.54–72. They are also derived in part from Yājñavalkya’s advice to Maitreyī in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. These qualities come to convey the traditional system delineating who has the *adhikāra* or qualifications to become a student. Students must be accomplished in these four practices (*sādhana*s) as a prerequisite to beginning inquiry. They are detachment (*vairāgya*),

⁶⁴ Phillips 1987: 12.

discernment (*viveka*), the six treasures—tranquility (*śama*), restraint (*dama*), withdrawal (*uparati*), endurance (*titikṣā*), faith (*śraddhā*), and profound contemplation (*samādhāna*)—and finally, desire for liberation (*mumukṣutā*). Sundaresan compares these traits to the *yamas* and *niyamas* of Patañjali’s *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, citing Śaṅkara, who says: “they are justifiably exalted as being equal to knowledge, inasmuch as they lead to and co-operate with the direct cause of Self-knowledge.”⁶⁵

According to Anantanand Rambachan, “The collective aim of *sādhana-catuṣṭaya* is the attainment of what is termed in *Advaita* as *citta-śuddhi* (mental purity). *Karmayoga*, in Śaṅkara’s view, is intended for the accomplishment of the same end.”⁶⁶ As Rambachan explains the latter: “*Karmayoga*, envisaged by Śaṅkara, is a method of neutralizing *rāga* and *dveṣa* while remaining in the field of activity. It involves the recognition that while we have to perform actions, the results are beyond our control.”⁶⁷ Although Rambachan may be taking Śaṅkara’s sanctioning of these methods a bit too far, similarly to the incorporation of Yoga we have seen previously, he explains that for Śaṅkara it was merely a preparatory step for those who are not immediately ready for knowledge of *brahman*. “Although these schools might be indirectly conducive to the gain of self-knowledge, that knowledge itself, however, contends Śaṅkara, can be had only from the texts of the *Upaniṣads*. Although Śaṅkara admits that extraordinary powers are attainable through *Yoga* practices, he denies that the mere discipline of mind control or concentration is a means to freedom.”⁶⁸

In more recent Vedāntic texts, however, such as Nīscaldās’ nineteenth-century Hindi *Vicār-Sāgar*, “The Ocean of Inquiry,” as Michael Allen explains, yoga practices are folded into

⁶⁵ Sundaresan 2003: 111.

⁶⁶ Rambachan 1991: 92.

⁶⁷ Rambachan 1991: 93.

⁶⁸ Rambachan 1991: 113.

these preliminary phases to help eliminate impurity and instability so that “practices of purification are necessary to subdue the quality of *tamas* [and] practices of meditation are necessary to subdue the quality of *rajas*. [...] Once the qualities of *tamas* and *rajas* have both been subdued, the quality of *sattva* can function without hindrance, giving rise to knowledge.”⁶⁹ This incorporation of the Sāṃkhya cosmology in terms of the three *guṇas*, as a way of making sense of life in the world—which has its precedence in the *Bhagavadgītā* and was expanded by Śaṅkara in the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*—becomes a more prominent feature of Vedānta, beginning in the early modern period.

Essential to attaining the liberation of Vedānta and a fundamental idea in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, is *vicāra* or inquiry. As Yohanan Grinshpon puts it in “The Secret Śaṅkara,” “Doubt is inherent in the vivekin’s life. For the author [Śaṅkara] attending to the unbridgeable gap between self and non-self cannot but be acutely aware of the riddle of being ‘alive in the body,’ a living embodiment of contradiction, as it were.”⁷⁰ Healthy doubt inspires questions, which can lead to the ultimate answer. Although the emphasis on *vicāra* was well established by Śrīharṣa in the eleventh century, it gained renewed focus in the nineteenth century. As Allen explains in relation to the main character of *Vicār-Sāgar*: “For Niścaldās, once the preliminary qualifications have been met, the most important goal on the path to liberation is the removal of doubt; and doubts are removed through the practice of inquiry.”⁷¹

The *Aparokṣānubhūti* presents a system of yoga with fifteen parts,⁷² which is not seen previously. These fifteen include the eight auxiliaries of the *aṣṭāṅgayoga* of Patañjali, as well as renunciation (*tyāga*), silence (*mauna*), place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), the root-lock (*mūlabandha*),

⁶⁹ Allen 2013: 182.

⁷⁰ Grinshpon 2011: 2.

⁷¹ Allen 2013: 174–5.

⁷² Here termed *tripañcāṅga*, or three-[times]-five, rather than *pañcadaśā*, which while probably simply for metrical purposes, seems to influence at least the interpretation in the Marathi *Ṭīkā*. See Chapter 4.

equilibrium of the body (*dehasāmya*), and steadiness of the gaze (*drksthiti*). Although the text includes the *aṅgas* of Patañjali, they are all redefined in terms of the realization of *brahman*. In the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, these steps are considered to lead to contemplation (*nididhyāsana*) and constitute a part of the *rājayoga* it describes. We will go into this in much greater detail in Chapter 3.

Nididhyāsana is one of the traditional trio of elements leading to liberation, preceded by hearing (*śravaṇa*) and reflection (*manana*). As Allen explains, their purpose is “to remove epistemic obstacles from the mind of the student,” or in other words doubt and false inclination.⁷³ The first two of the triad are not mentioned in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, although perhaps they are such an ingrained part of the tradition that it is deemed unnecessary and they are intended to be addressed through the various inquiries in the first sections of the text, as suggested by a couple of the commentaries.⁷⁴ Rambachan explains that knowledge acquired from *śravaṇa* is not “self-certifying” and is “indirect (*parokṣa*)” so therefore cannot lead straight to liberation. He explains that *manana* helps to remove all the doubts about the knowledge acquired through *śravaṇa*. However, “the removal of all doubts is somehow not doubtless, immediate (*aparokṣa*) knowledge. It is only after *manana* that we can undertake the practice of *nididhyāsana*, which eventually provides us with a direct experience of what we have gathered as a possibility in *śravaṇa* and reasoned over in *manana*. This experience (*anubhava*), it is claimed, offers us a direct insight, and it is held up as the true *pramāṇa* of *brahman*.”⁷⁵ But this attainment of *brahman* through *pramāṇa* is a neo-Vedāntic step, which was not a part of Śaṅkara’s thought or classical Advaita.

⁷³ Allen 2013: 187.

⁷⁴ See Chapter 3.

⁷⁵ Rambachan 1991: 97.

The centrality of yoga practices, combined with the rhetoric of experience as the authority and mode of *brahman* attainment, came to be two of the main defining features of modern Advaita. In relation to the seventeenth-century South Indian Nārāyaṇatīrtha, Jason Schwartz notes his justification for his commentary on the *Yogasūtra* through his insistence on the essentialness of yoga practices for Vedāntic liberation. In so doing, Nārāyaṇatīrtha “elevates *nididhyāsana* as the foremost and most efficacious of these modalities, and then conflates the term with *samādhi*.”⁷⁶ Moreover, as opposed to in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, in this context, these two terms themselves are used as synonyms for *rājayoga*. In medieval yoga texts as well, the term *rājayoga* is used both as a synonym for *samādhi*, as well as the name for the kind of yoga based on this practice. Texts such as the *Amanaska*, the *Dattātreyaयोगśāstra*, the *Amarāughaprabodha*, the *Śārṅgadharapaddhati*, the *Yogabīja*, and the *Haṭhapradīpikā*, use the term to indicate both the method and the goal. The *Aparokṣānubhūti*, as Birch points out, “is unique in using the term ‘*rājayoga*’ to denote only a system of yoga without the connotation of *samādhi*.”⁷⁷

The last two verses explain that for the mature, devoted student, this is all that is necessary, but for others who still suffer from afflictions, it can be joined with *haṭhayoga*. *Haṭhayoga* is mentioned as an alternative but lesser practice, for those practitioners whose afflictions are only partially cooked (*paripakva*). Contrary to modern associations, in the *Dīpikā* commentary on this verse (143), *haṭhayoga* is identified with Patañjali’s *aṣṭāṅgayoga*. Birch notes that Vidyāraṇya also makes this connection and further research is needed to understand the significance of this. “In his *Jīvanmuktiviveka* he defines *Haṭhayoga* as the Yoga of ‘man-made effort,’ which includes practices such as *prāṇāyāma* and *pratyāhara*. Since Vidyāraṇya

⁷⁶ Schwartz 2017: 380.

⁷⁷ Birch 2013b: 409.

quotes Patañjali's *Yogasūtras* when discussing *prāṇāyāma* and *pratyāhara* elsewhere, it may be inferred that he conflated Pātañjalayoga with the term *haṭhayoga*.⁷⁸ While Vidyāraṇya may not have composed the commentary himself, it seems quite likely written in his school, with these ideas in mind, even if a few centuries later.

1.3 The Incorporation of Advaita into Yoga

As we have seen, it is relatively straightforward to make sense of integrating Yoga practice and philosophy into Advaita philosophy. Yoga is always considered of penultimate value and thus is un-contradictory. Duality fits neatly within non-duality and provides techniques to help on the path towards the ultimate realization. But how do we make sense of the opposite move—the incorporation of Advaita into Yoga—which is fundamental to much of modern yoga? This question is twofold—firstly, the question of metaphysics and how to reconcile the duality of classical Yoga with the Advaitin desire to overcome all duality through knowledge. Secondly, there is the question of the purpose of practices—in classical Yoga, they are always done with the aim of *cittavṛttinirodha*, stilling the fluctuations of the mind. Even Śaṅkara recognizes that *āsana* and *prāṇāyāma* can help to decrease sensory desires. However, in *haṭhayoga*, practices get repurposed as a means to perfecting the body as a step towards a greater goal. So, as we examine the relationship between Advaita and Yoga, we will have to bear in mind its changing definition and the tensions between Pātañjala and *haṭhayoga*, both of which influence late pre-modern and twentieth-century yoga. While we will examine this in greater depth in Chapter 5, I want to set the stage for looking at the *Aparokṣānubhūti* now, in relation to its contemporary texts. Juxtaposing it in this way is not to suggest that it is a yoga text; instead, it is to highlight its unique contribution and understand the milieu from which it emerged.

⁷⁸ Birch 2011: 541.

1.3.1 *Haṭhayoga*

This trend of incorporating Advaita into Yoga started in the early *haṭhayoga* texts around the beginning of the second millennium CE. As explained in *Roots of Yoga*, “A formalized system of yoga called *haṭha* is taught for the first time in the c. thirteenth-century *Dattātreyayogaśāstra*, a Vaiṣṇava text. *Haṭhayoga*’s methods draw from those of Pātañjala and tantric yoga, but also include physical practices found in neither.”⁷⁹ The word *haṭha* means “force” and *haṭhayoga* is considered “yoga by means of force.” As Gundrun Bühnemann elaborates, “This interpretation of the term is supported by practices which aim at raising the *kuṇḍalinī* energy in the human body, making the *prāṇa* enter the *suṣumnā* channel and attempting to keep death away from the practitioner.”⁸⁰ In these early texts, there is a strong association of *haṭhayoga* with *prāṇāyāma* (breath control). From the beginning, this focus on physical and breathing practices allowed for a wide range of inspirational sources. Additionally, the “adaptation of ascetic methods for a wider, non-ascetic audience is likely to be the reason for the composition of the texts on *haṭhayoga*.”⁸¹ In trying to appeal to a broader population, these texts incorporate elements of various philosophies.

James Mallinson explains: “In general, the texts of *haṭhayoga* reveal, if not a disdain for, at least an insouciance towards metaphysics. Yoga is a soteriology that works regardless of the yogi’s philosophy.”⁸² This viewpoint blurred the boundaries between Yoga and Advaita and between various forms of Vedānta, which allowed the incorporation of Vedāntic metaphysics into *haṭhayoga* to happen seamlessly. Rather than a metaphysical tension between Yoga and Advaita in need of resolution, Yoga is seen divorced of its classical metaphysics and therefore

⁷⁹ Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 42.

⁸⁰ Bühnemann 2007: 11, fn. 21.

⁸¹ Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 43–44.

⁸² Mallinson 2014: 225.

able to incorporate the language of any dominant system it encounters. This does, however, require a radical discontinuity between Pātañjala and *haṭhayoga* and a dramatic separation of metaphysics and soteriology. In examining the fifteenth-century *Haṭhapradīpikā*, a compilation of earlier *haṭhayoga* texts, Mallinson observes: “the texts from which Svātmarāma borrowed most were products of a Vedantic milieu—bearing testament to Vedānta’s newfound interest in yoga as a complement to *jñāna*.”⁸³ Of course, Vedānta does not necessarily mean Advaita and there are other dualistic Vedāntic systems whose metaphysics would be more compatible with Yoga. Regardless, it does appear that the influence was circular—the incorporation of Yoga into Vedānta helped to make the relationship between the two more fluid and led to its reverse.

As in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, in many of the early *haṭhayoga* texts key yoga terms are given a Vedāntic twist. We will return to this later, but as a brief example: “In the *Dattātreyayogaśāstra*, *samādhi* is said to be the union of *ātman* and *paramātman* (126ab), and when the yogi wants to cast off his body he is to dissolve it into *parabrahman* (127ab). Yet *jñāna*, the key to vedantic liberation, has almost no place in the *Dattātreyayogaśāstra*.”⁸⁴ Here, *samādhi* is redefined in Vedāntic terms, without using the Vedāntic methods to get there. Additionally, these terms are used rather haphazardly in the *haṭhayoga* texts, rather than with the conceptual precision seen in contemporaneous Advaita texts, often assimilating together different forms of Vedānta without noting the distinctions. This definition makes for an interesting comparison with the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, which defines *samādhi* as follows: “By means of the unchanging mental state, again, with the form of *brahman*, forgetting mental states completely, that is absorption (*samādhi*), which is the same as cognition [of *brahman*].”⁸⁵

⁸³ Mallinson 2014: 225.

⁸⁴ Mallinson 2014: 232.

⁸⁵ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 124: *nirvikāratayā vṛttyā brahmākāratayā punaḥ | vṛttivismaraṇam samyak samādhir jñānasamjñākah ||*

Ultimately though, unlike in the *haṭhayoga* texts, in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, knowledge reigns supreme and ultimately, “After that, the king of *yogīs* is free from practices, and becomes perfected.”⁸⁶

It makes sense that Advaita teachings would have been incorporated into the *haṭhayoga* texts in an attempt to interest the Vedāntins. Around this time, Śaivism and Advaita began to be more closely allied and synthesized together, with the growth of Śāṅkara *maṭhas* as Smārta Brahmin sectarian institutes, especially in the south. Mallinson emphasizes that, “Svātmarāma, while rarely borrowing verses that teach metaphysical doctrine and being somewhat indiscriminate in his choice of those, continued and contributed to a process that was already underway, in which vedantic and Śaiva non-dualism were synthesized, albeit with the vedantic *brahman* ultimately winning out as the accepted understanding of the absolute.”⁸⁷ However, the understanding of *brahman* was continually changing, even within Advaita, so it is impossible to claim a singular overarching understanding. Nonetheless, despite differences in definition, the question is, if *brahman* always won, is it really Advaitic yoga or is it always just yogic Advaita in disguise?

Part of answering this question depends on how we define yoga. According to Mallinson, “yoga’s true triumph came during the first half of the second millennium CE. It is then that, thanks to the composition of the haṭhayogic corpus, yoga’s practices ceased to be the preserve of ascetics or initiates into tantric cults; that mainstream formulations of yoga—in which *haṭha* and Pātañjala yoga were not distinguished—first teach it to be an essential counterpart to *jñāna* in the pursuit of liberation, wedding it forever with Vedāntic soteriology.”⁸⁸ In this new synthesis, it is very difficult to distinguish these systems into separate *darśanas*, with separate means and

⁸⁶ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 126ab: *tataḥ sādhananirmuktaḥ siddho bhavati yogirāt |*

⁸⁷ Mallinson 2014: 236.

⁸⁸ Mallinson 2014: 238.

separate ends. When mass appeal becomes a central priority, the philosophical nuances tend to get lost.

1.3.2 The Yoga Upaniṣads

The early *haṭhayoga* texts took on a life of their own, separate from their sectarian origins, and became both the basis of later *haṭhayoga* texts, such as the *Haṭhapradīpikā*, which were mainly compilations, as well as the foundation for the Yoga Upaniṣads, beginning in the seventeenth century.⁸⁹ These Yoga Upaniṣads invoke the older tradition of Upaniṣads in order to invest ancient authority into their new ideas and are of particular interest to our study as they are really Advaita Vedānta texts, which incorporate yoga practices. While the earlier Northern recensions, composed between the ninth and thirteenth centuries, are mainly short, aphoristic texts, focusing on *mantrayoga* and the recitation of Om, the later Southern recensions, composed between the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, expand upon these texts and add to them, resulting in twenty-one Yoga Upaniṣads. These later texts draw on *haṭhayoga* and tantric traditions, particularly from the Nāth Siddhas, although they seem to have arisen within a Brahmanical context. They often incorporate verses and whole sections of earlier texts.

Three of the Yoga Upaniṣads—the *Tejobindu Upaniṣad*, the *Nādabindu Upaniṣad*, and the *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad*—borrow a significant number of verses from the *Aparokṣānubhūti* in their southern recensions. As is common practice in these syncretic texts, the verses are incorporated without citation or attribution, naturally becoming part of a new tradition. Because of the lack of citation, twentieth-century scholars, such as Mircea Eliade and more popular authors, such as Georg Feuerstein, understood these texts to have been composed much earlier and mistook the borrowing to have happened in the other direction.

⁸⁹ See Bouy 1994.

The *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* is often classified as a non-dual Vedāntic text since it contains no references to *haṭhayoga*. In its southern recension (seventeenth–eighteenth century), nearly forty verses are drawn from the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, repeating the fifteen-part system it introduces, as well as the obstacles that arise along the path. Although it quotes almost the entire end of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, it concludes its first section by emphasizing the realization of *brahman*, omitting the last two verses which name this method *rājayoga* and mention *haṭhayoga* as a possibility for those who need it. We will return to this in greater detail in Chapter 5.

The *Nādabindu Upaniṣad* also incorporates verses from the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, as well as the *Haṭhapradīpikā*, describing a Vedāntic style of *nādayoga*, which leads to the realization of *brahman* and liberation.⁹⁰ The southern recension of the *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad* is mainly a yogic Śaiva Āgama work, drawing on tantric and Nāth sources, which incorporate some Advaitic teachings. The fourth chapter quotes the *Aparokṣānubhūti* exclusively, beginning with the idea that everything is *brahman* and ending with the idea that “one sees the body as the self on account of miscognition.”⁹¹ While the *Aparokṣānubhūti* continues in this vein, the *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad* jumps into a chapter talking about the body as a means to realization through *haṭhayoga* practices, discussing *cakras*, *kuṇḍalinī*, *nāda*, *bindu*, *mudrā*, and *bandha*. This juxtaposition would be surprising if it wasn’t the norm of this time. As Ruff explains, “Like the other southern *Yoga Upaniṣads* compilation texts, the materials from older sources are organized and manipulated by the redactor(s) with various flourishes and elaborations. In other words, they do not always appear as direct quotes. The redactors use the sources with rhetorical flair to meet their own interests and fulfill their own philosophical and programmatic needs.”⁹² In this sense, it

⁹⁰ Verses 21–22ab of the *Nādabindu Upaniṣad* come from 89–90b of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*; verses 22cd–29ab are from 91–97 (*Aparokṣānubhūti* 90cd is omitted); and 29cd is from the *Muktikā Upaniṣad* (1.1, 43ab).

⁹¹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 75cd = *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad* 4.24cd: *tad vad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ* |

⁹² Ruff 2002: 193.

seems that the *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad* employs the Advaitic understanding of oneness with *brahman* and the misidentification with the body to then use the body to get beyond the body. Or perhaps the text is just fleshing out the *haṭhayoga* that the *Aparokṣānubhūti* mentions as an alternative in its brief comment at the end. Other contemporary texts, such as the *Yogatattva Upaniṣad*, combined the eight *aṅgas* of Patañjali with other practices including *mudrās* (seals) and *bandhas* (locks), defining this new synthesis as *haṭhayoga*. This period of integration was very important for the consolidation and dissemination of these teachings.

1.3.3 Evolving Meanings

I want to emphasize that the understanding of what *haṭhayoga* actually is and how it relates to *rājayoga* was continually changing. As Mallinson summarizes: “In its first formalization, in the *Dattātreya yogaśāstra*, *haṭhayoga* is taught as an alternative or supplement to a yoga consisting of the eight *aṅgas* taught in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. In the middle of the second millennium CE the orthodox Brahmanical scholar Śivānanda Sarasvatī taught the methods of *haṭhayoga* alongside those of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* in his *Yogacintāmaṇi*, a lengthy compendium of passages on yoga. By the eighteenth century, *haṭha* and Pātañjala yoga were seen as one and the same, and *haṭha*’s rise to orthodox acceptance had been cemented by the compilation of a corpus of Upaniṣads (later referred to as the Yoga Upaniṣads) that borrowed wholesale from the texts of *haṭhayoga*.”⁹³ *Haṭhayoga* and *rājayoga* were also often seen as part of a fourfold yoga which included *mantrayoga* and *layayoga*. And *rājayoga* was often used merely as a synonym for *samādhi*, rather than to denote a system of yoga. However, regardless of the prevailing definitions of these terms at various times, Vedānta was generally incorporated into the understanding of *haṭha* and *rājayoga* in some way.

⁹³ Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 44.

As mentioned earlier, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* refers to *haṭhayoga* as a system that is used—as a last resort—as a preliminary tool for *rājayoga*.⁹⁴ And the *Dīpikā* equates this *haṭhayoga* with “the well-known *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, taught by the followers of Patañjali.”⁹⁵ As we shall see in Chapter 5, while this was a novel idea at the time, later texts, such as the eighteenth-century *Hamsavilāsa*, which includes the fifteen *aṅgas* of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* and *Tejobindu Upaniṣad*, and the *Yogamārgaparakāśikā*, make this same equation. However, as Bühnemann emphasizes, “the approach to Yoga in the *Yogasūtra*, which is influenced by Sāṃkhya thought and emphasizes mental processes, and the approach to Yoga taken by the Nāthas as laid down in later *haṭhayoga* texts clearly differ.”⁹⁶ By “mental processes,” she is referring to the definition of yoga as *cittavṛttinirodha*, and the focus on stilling the fluctuations of the mind by means of controlling the mind and senses. Bühnemann continues: “In the *Yogasūtra* there is no mention of *bandhas*, *mudrās*, *cakras* or *kuṇḍalinī*, practices and concepts which take on great importance in the Yoga of the Nāthas. The teachings collected in the *Yogasūtra* originated in a different milieu and breathe a different spirit than those advocated by proponents of the Nātha traditions, which employed physical and physiological means. Although the goal of *haṭhayoga* is also defined as liberation, the Nāthas’ understanding of what liberation means, namely escape from death and immortality, differs.”⁹⁷

How then do we understand this identification of *haṭhayoga* with Patañjali’s *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, when they clearly have different means and different ends? It seems that this identification was made primarily to distinguish them both from the Advaita Vedāntic path to realization, which only accepts them as preliminary means. And as Mallinson notes, “Given the

⁹⁴ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 143: *ebhir aṃgaiḥ samāyukto rājayoga udāhṛtaḥ | kiṃcitpakvakaṣāyānām haṭhayogena samyutaḥ ||*

⁹⁵ *Dīpikā* on 143: *haṭhayogena pātañjaloktena prasiddhenāṣṭāṅgayogena*

⁹⁶ Bühnemann 2007: 35.

⁹⁷ Bühnemann 2007: 35–36.

common modern identification of Patañjali's yoga with a 'mental' or 'spiritual' *rājayoga* that stands in opposition to the merely physical *haṭhayoga* (a notion popularized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by Swami Vivekananda and Theosophical Society authors), such references to *haṭhayoga* as the yoga of Patañjali are particularly striking."⁹⁸ We will now turn to the modern confluences of Vedānta and Yoga, including Vivekananda and his identification of *rājayoga* with Pātañjala yoga, which is still the foundation of much of the popular understanding of yoga today.

1.3.4 Later Integration of Vedānta and Yoga

Over time, the importance Advaita has placed on the incorporation of yoga techniques into its philosophy has clearly grown. With regard to early modern Advaita Vedānta, Christopher Minkowski asks the following helpful questions: "Can there be a social history of Advaita Vedānta, or at least, of its proponents? Can this unworldly philosophy, which propounded the doctrine of undivided Being, have been changed through its involvement with the world of ordinary life, in which it found so little conceptual interest, and can it in turn have affected change in that world?"⁹⁹ Contemporary thinkers seem to answer yes. Arvind Sharma, for example, makes an argument for Śaṅkara's "life and works as a source for a hermeneutics of human rights."¹⁰⁰

In *Unifying Hinduism*, Andrew Nicholson examines the integration of Yoga, Sāṃkhya, and Vedānta from the twelfth to sixteenth centuries, specifically through the writing of Vijñānabhikṣu. Although our concern here is mainly with the Advaita of Śaṅkara and Vijñānabhikṣu argues for this unity from the perspective of Bhedābheda ("difference and non-

⁹⁸ Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 112.

⁹⁹ Minkowski 2011: 205.

¹⁰⁰ Malkovsky 2000: 109.

difference”) Vedānta, it is still an important piece of the puzzle and (often unwittingly) influences our conception of modern yoga. Before his more well-known commentaries on Sāṃkhya/Yoga, Vijñānabhikṣu wrote about Vedānta, particularly in his *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya*, a commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, which he references repeatedly in his later works. As Nicholson explains, “He sees the dualism of Sāṃkhya-Yoga’s *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as valid at a certain level of analysis, and refrains from positing a higher, overarching unity in his works on Sāṃkhya-Yoga. However, by his references to the *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya*, he clearly maintains that this higher unity exists—in his later works, he never retracts statements from his earlier Vedantic writings. In most cases, he instead skims over issues on which Vedānta and Sāṃkhya-Yoga disagree.”¹⁰¹ This avoidance of the instances where the two philosophies diverge was the easiest and most common way to reconcile their differences. Nicholson argues that “any attempt to distinguish these three systems goes against the spirit of Vijñānabhikṣu’s fundamental project itself. For him, all three are ultimately aspects of one and the same truth.”¹⁰² And this is one of the fundamental characteristics of modern yoga—these three systems become inseparable.

In his analysis of later Advaita Vedānta, Michael Allen explores the relationship between epistemology and soteriology, or knowledge and liberation. Strikingly, he notes that “there is a continuity between everyday knowledge and the knowledge of Brahman, such that by understanding how everyday knowledge works—what causes it to arise, what prevents it from arising—we can better understand the path to liberation.”¹⁰³ This continuity allows for much more flexibility in terms of who can gain knowledge and how and for yoga practice to lead more seamlessly to ultimate freedom.

¹⁰¹ Nicholson 2007: 373.

¹⁰² Nicholson 2010: 117.

¹⁰³ Allen 2013: 106.

Schwartz sums it up well: “On the cusp of colonialism, then, the Yoga of the Advaita Darśana had become so inclusive that, in both its canon and content, it is virtually indistinguishable from the multitude of Yogas enacted throughout the subcontinent by other non-Brāhmaṇical lineages of itinerant Yogins. Such a blurring of boundaries went both ways. For, not only do we find an Advaita Vedāntin scholar like Nārāyaṇatīrtha quoting with approval from the writings of caste-blind Nātha Yogins, but in turn, when Brahmānanda, the great eighteenth-century commentator on the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā*, moves past the discussion of physical postures, it is the Advaitin Nārāyaṇatīrtha he adopts as his guide.”¹⁰⁴ This “blurring of boundaries” and fluidity between philosophies is key to understanding the ways in which Yoga and Vedānta have merged together over time.

Swami Vivekananda, born as Narendranath Datta in Calcutta in 1863, was instrumental in introducing both Vedānta and Yoga to the Western world, setting up the Vedanta Society in New York in 1894, with the support of Madame Blavatsky’s Theosophical Society. Vivekananda is credited with popularizing a form of Neo-Vedānta, which was elaborated in his book “Rāja Yoga,” published in 1896, that included a translation of the *Yogasūtra* and was the foundation of the still prevailing identification of this term with this text, even though there is no mention of *rājayoga* in the *Yogasūtra*. Vivekananda was quite dismissive of the physical practices of *haṭhayoga*. For him, a comfortable, easy posture was mainly important as the basis for *prāṇāyāma*, which he devoted more attention to, as well as the increasingly internal aspects that follow. Where Vivekananda really departs from Patañjali is in his incorporation of the Tantric idea that *samādhi* “is the result of the awakening of the *kuṇḍalinī*.”¹⁰⁵

Vivekananda repeatedly emphasized experience and direct perception as the fundamental

¹⁰⁴ Schwartz 2017: 382.

¹⁰⁵ Rambachan 1994: 98.

means to attain liberation, as opposed to Śaṅkara’s focus on *śruti* and Upaniṣadic knowledge. “To be free from all doubts and incontestable, the declarations of the Upaniṣads, according to Vivekananda, must be personally verified by each individual through some sort of direct perception of their claims. It is only knowledge derived through this direct apprehension that he considers to be ultimately valid and capable of liberating from *avidyā* (ignorance).”¹⁰⁶ For Vivekananda, *samādhi* is the only real source of the knowledge of *brahman*, whereas for Śaṅkara other methods could only help shine the way and remove the obstacles to the ultimate realization. Fundamental to Vivekananda’s thought was realization—*anubhava* or *anubhūti*. “The mighty word that came out from the sky of spirituality in India was *anubhūti*, realization, and ours are the only books which declare again and again: ‘The Lord is to be seen.’ [...] Religion is to be realized, not only heard; it is not in learning some doctrine like a parrot.”¹⁰⁷ Vivekananda’s emphasis on experience rather than on book learning as fundamental to knowledge helped to pave the way for modern yoga, most well-known through the teachings of the man often considered its father—Krishnamacharya—and his students.

Tirumalai Krishnamacharya was born to a Vaiṣṇava Brahmin family in the state of Karnataka, South India, in 1888 and was initiated into yoga at a young age by his father. Much of Krishnamacharya’s teaching was based on the *Yogarahasya*—a text supposedly lost for many centuries—which he claimed was taught to him in a vision by Nāthamuni, the ninth- to tenth-century Vaiṣṇava saint and founder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta, later elaborated and made famous by Rāmānuja, from whom his family was thought to descend. The *Yogarahasya* emphasizes the importance of Patañjali’s *Yogasūtra* and connects the physical practice of yoga to the perfection of health and the removal of disease. It understands *āsana* as a practice of physical

¹⁰⁶ Rambachan 1994: 94.

¹⁰⁷ CW 3: 377–378. In Rambachan 1994: 95.

postures, a concept developed in *haṭhayoga* texts, which makes the early attribution seem quite improbable. However, the desire to historicize this connection is important to recognize. As Klas Nevrin describes, “With reference to Nāthamuni himself, Krishnamacharya legitimates and authorizes a set of practices and doctrines that combines Patañjali’s *Yogasūtra* with his version of Sri Vaishnavism, as well as with various Haṭha-yogic practices, healthistic ideologies and Neo-Vedāntic interpretations of classical Hinduism.”¹⁰⁸

For him, focus on God was an essential part of the path to liberation and the practice of yoga required a devotional element of some kind. According to Nevrin, “this is only possible by reinterpreting the *Yogasūtra* in an inclusivistic manner, thus subsuming the *Yogasūtra* within a Viśiṣṭādvaitic interpretation. [...] Yoga provides for the ‘experience’ of Brahman (i.e. *brahma-jñāna*). Thus, Yoga makes it possible to experience God, to reveal by experience what is otherwise only given in texts.”¹⁰⁹ So it turns out that even for the “father of modern yoga,” yoga is only a stepping-stone, albeit an important one. However, as is often the case, most of that seems to get lost in translation. This emphasis on God was non-specific and inclusive and although Krishnamacharya’s own Śrīvaiṣṇava inclinations were clear, he encouraged his students to find their own version. Like for Swami Vivekananda, the Neo-Vedāntic idea of a universal Hindu worldview was clearly prevalent.

1.3.5 Modern Teaching of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*

This inclusive approach was also taught in their own ways by Krishnamacharya’s main students, K. Pattabhi Jois, B.K.S. Iyengar, and his son, T.K.V. Desikachar, the former an Advaitin and the latter two both Viśiṣṭādvaitins like their teacher. While modern yoga practitioners may be able to

¹⁰⁸ Nevrin 2005: 76.

¹⁰⁹ Nevrin 2005: 79–80.

tell you the difference between Ashtanga, Iyengar, and Viniyoga (taught by the three respectively) in terms of form, very few would be able to tell you about the differences in lineage among these teachers and their philosophical and religious viewpoints, which greatly informed their understanding and interpretation of the tradition and have become embedded in the physical practice.

Pattabhi Jois was born a Smārta Brahmin and his family guru was Śaṅkarācārya. He began to study yoga with Krishnamacharya at the age of twelve. Having grown up immersed in an Advaitic tradition, this non-dual outlook naturally was incorporated into his understanding of yoga practice. Jois called his system of yoga “Ashtanga,” connecting it to the eight-part path described in Patañjali’s *Yogasūtra*, even though there is a strong focus on the third step of *āsana* or postural practice. In his teachings, he seamlessly joined together Yoga and Advaita, often quoting the *Aparokṣānubhūti* and emphasizing the final goal of seeing God (meaning *brahman*) everywhere. We will briefly return to how this got transmitted to his students in Chapter 5.

The *Aparokṣānubhūti* with a translation by Swami Vimuktananda¹¹⁰ was published in a small, printed edition in 1938. While admitting the authorship is unclear, Vimuktananda nonetheless says in his preface, “To those, therefore, who have neither the time nor the opportunity to go through the classical works of Śaṅkarācārya, a treatise like the present one will be an invaluable guide in their quest after spiritual truths.”¹¹¹ In his summation, “The central theme of the book is the identity of the Jīvātman (individual self) and Paramātman (Universal Self). This identity is realized through the removal of the ignorance that hides the truth, by the light of vicāra or enquiry alone.”¹¹² This encapsulates the importance of this text—it explains

¹¹⁰ It is unclear whether the lack of the diacritic mark on the first “a” in Vimuktananda is simply because it is his name, like Swami Vivekananda, or if it is meant to be *vimukta-nanda* rather than *vimukta-ānanda*.

¹¹¹ Vimuktananda, 2010 [1938]: ii.

¹¹² Vimuktananda 2010 [1938]: i.

complex concepts in a concise and understandable way and gives practical tools for attaining its goals. It is this *vicāra* that sets the stage for the fifteen-part path leading to *samādhi* and ultimately to the realization of *brahman*, which is the culmination of *rājayoga*.

A translation and commentary on the text has also been published by Shri Brahmananda Sarasvati (Ramamurti S. Mishra, M.D.), which he titles “Direct Experience of ‘I-AM.’” Brahmananda Sarasvati founded the Yoga Society of New York in 1958 and the Ananda Ashram in Monroe, New York in 1964, as well as a center in San Francisco. His life’s work was devoted to a modern synthesis of Yoga and Vedānta and he was the author of translations and commentaries on other texts, such as the *Yogasūtra* and Śaṅkara’s *Ātmabodha*, which were also taught at his ashrams. In the introduction to Sarasvati’s translation of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, Sadguru Sant Keshavadas says that this book is “like fragrance added to a golden flower or ghee mixed into a sweet porridge.”¹¹³ And in his preface, Sarasvati says: “May this book help to establish world unity and world peace through *ahiṃsā* (non-violence) and understanding. The principle of absolute Godhead in the form of absolute “I-Am” is always residing within you, physically, mentally, and spiritually.”¹¹⁴ In his interpretation, the ultimate realization leads towards world peace and understanding, rather than spiritual isolation.

The *Aparokṣānubhūti* is considered part of an introductory course on Vedānta at places such as Kailas Ashram and Dayananda Ashram in Rishikesh, along with texts such as the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, *Tattvabodha*, and *Ātmabodha*. It is also taught as a fundamental text at Vivekananda’s Vedanta centers, which makes sense, given his emphasis on realization. At 34 W. 71st Street, on the Upper West Side in New York, is the first Vedanta Society Center founded by Vivekananda in 1894, in association with the Ramakrishna Order of India. Every Friday night for

¹¹³ Sarasvati 1988: iii.

¹¹⁴ Sarasvati 1988: i.

over a year, the resident Swami Sarvapriyananda read the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, reciting its verses and discussing its meaning as well as live-streaming all of the sessions on Youtube. In the session I attended, which began to address the *aṅgas* in verses 100–105, Swami Sarvapriyananda told his audience not to discount yoga practice, that it was a useful tool. In this modern environment—there are five yoga centers on West 72nd Street alone—his words were quite striking. Is the contemporary obsession with yoga all just a form of *avidyā* (ignorance) or *māyā* (illusion)? Is it the corruption of pure ancient practices, that should be only passed along in the tradition of *śrutiparamparā*, from teacher to student, with the ultimate aim kept in mind? Or is it just perhaps the most recent form of synthesis? Maybe it is actually a step towards the ultimate Vedāntic realization without people even knowing it. And perhaps it is planting the seeds for further inquiry, as in verse 12 of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*:

ko 'haṃ katham idaṃ jātaṃ ko vai kartāsyā vidyate |
upādānaṃ kim astīha vicāraḥ so 'yam īdrśaḥ ||

Who am I? How is this [world] created?

And, truly, who is the creator of this?

What is the material cause here [in this world]?

Such is this inquiry.

CHAPTER 2

The *Aparokṣānubhūti*, “Immediate Awareness”

2.1 Introduction to the text

We will now turn to the text itself, accompanied by the *Dīpikā* commentary, attributed to Vidyāranya. (See Appendix A for Sanskrit text). As mentioned earlier, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* consists of 144 verses, written exclusively in traditional *śloka* meter, consisting of four *pādas* of eight syllables each. I have mainly worked from the printed edition of the *Dīpikā*, originally published in 1878 and reprinted in 1965, but have consulted the witnesses from BORI (2) and BISM (1), here labeled A, B, and C, where necessary. All manuscripts are in *devanāgarī*. Manuscript A is a bit messy, with words and phrases crossed and whited out and emendations and extra text in the margins, with *A.* and the page number on the folium versum. It also includes an invocation to Dakṣiṇāmūrti, a manifestation of Śiva as the teacher of knowledge, after the standard invocation to Gaṇeśa at the beginning of the *Dīpikā*.¹¹⁵ Manuscript B is a bit neater, though still has the occasional emendation in the margins and *Aparokṣā* on the upper left and *nubhūti* on the upper right of the folio versum as well as page numbers. It also begins and ends with *śrīśaṃkaraprasanna*, the graciousness of the glorious Śaṅkara. Aside from the beginnings of verses and verse numbers highlighted in orange, Manuscript C is clean, aside from the page numbers and *A. Bhū* on the folium versum. Manuscripts A and B contain four additional verses at the end—all quotations from other texts—which emphasize the complete transcendence of all dualities in Advaitic liberation. They are clearly a later addition and as they do not directly

¹¹⁵ *śrīdakṣiṇāmūrtiśrīyai namaḥ* |

contribute to or change the direction of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*'s subsumption of yoga, they form a coda to the text (see Appendix B).

2.2 Translation of the text, accompanied by the *Dīpikā* commentary

*śrīharim*¹¹⁶ *paramānandam upadeṣṭāram īśvaram* |
vyāpakam sarvalokānām kāraṇam taṃ namāmy aham || 1 ||

I bow to him, the radiant Viṣṇu,
The highest bliss,
The teacher, the Lord,
All-pervading, the cause of all the worlds.

Salutations to the radiant Gaṇeśa.

And the self-luminous cause, which is the supreme self, that has the nature of consciousness, is called *Aparokṣānubhūti*. I am that supreme happiness. || 1 ||

The arising of worldly activity with all its parts, because of the division of the Lord and the teacher, that *aparokṣānubhūti*, immediate awareness, pertains to the conditional world as being merely one's own consciousness. || 2 ||

Having considered that to be so, I shall make clear the sayings of the teachers [in the work] called the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, which is without obstacles [and for] one's own chosen deity. || 3 ||

Even if this is self-evident, nonetheless, this effort, for the sake of the attainment of one's own self, is also concisely composed, removing what is meaningless. || 4 ||

¹¹⁶ Some manuscripts have *rāmam* = Rāma instead.

Where is the “I” which makes this torch? Where is this sun they say is the treasure of light?¹¹⁷
Even so, who is devoted? What would he not do for the attainment of what is beneficial to one’s
own [self] ?¹¹⁸ || 5 ||

With respect to that, the teacher,¹¹⁹ having composed this auspicious verse in his own mind—with the characteristic of consideration of one’s own desired deity, for the attainment of a work free from obstacles—writes it down at the beginning of this work, for the teaching of his students, [beginning with] **the radiant Viṣṇu**.¹²⁰ **I bow to him** is the syntactical arrangement. Here, i.e., in this section, the meaning is twofold—the self and the not-self. With respect to that, the self is twofold—the divine self and the individual self. Also, these two are twofold because of the division between pure and impure. With respect to that, in the case of impure, there are the two causes of worldly activity and division, which have the attributes of illusion and misunderstanding. But in the case of pure, the two causes are worldly activity and lack of division. And likewise, the not-self is threefold because of the division of being causal, subtle, or gross. This, alone, is designated as the three bodies. Thus, because of the different qualities in the form of consciousness and inertness, like of the division of *sattva* and *tamas*, lack of discernment, alone, between both the self and not-self, is the cause of bondage, but discernment between the two is the cause of liberation. This is what is indicated. With respect to that, first, by the word **I**, which has the distinctiveness of the three bodies, one’s impure individual self, alone, [is meant], since it is uncultivated.

¹¹⁷ These two things—a man-made torch and the divine sun—are clearly being contrasted here, to set up the great distinction between the individual “I” and “Lord Viṣṇu,” who is being honored in this verse.

¹¹⁸ I take *svahitāptaye* to refer to the Self in line with the *svātmāsiddhaye* in the previous verse, which makes more sense with what follows. One could alternatively take *svahita* more literally to mean “beneficial to himself,” translating as: Even so, one who is devoted would not do anything for the attainment of what is beneficial to himself.

¹¹⁹ Presumably the plural *ācāryāḥ* and *nibadhnanti* (writes down) are used honorifically, though it is a bit incongruous with the singular *svamanasi* (in his own mind).

¹²⁰ Words from the verse being commented on are in bold.

I bow to him, who is also the destroyer of the effect of that illusion, by reason of being the support of that. The cause of everything is well known in Vedānta as the Lord; to him alone, because of the preeminence among all, I bow, i.e., I make a bow. The meaning is that I inspect with my own essence. [To explain] the appropriateness of inspection by reason of that very preeminence among all, he says **the radiant Viṣṇu**. The meaning is that he is the giver of radiance. Or else he shines by reason of being his own support, or creates himself, by means of all the elements, beginning with dissolution and deep sleep. That radiance removes the ignorance, produced by the condition of individuality. [In other words], by bestowing cognition of the self it destroys; thus, he says **to him, the radiant Viṣṇu**. Or else he, alone, is radiant by reason of being the support of everything; thus, he says **to him, Viṣṇu**, who is that very radiance.

Now you might ask what happens by this removing of that effect of ignorance; anticipating this doubt, to show that there is the attainment of the highest human aim, which has the form of the highest bliss, he says **the highest bliss**. The highest, because of its indestructability and unsurpassedness, is superior bliss; the meaning is that form which has the distinction from [worldly] happiness. In that case there may be dullness, which possesses the happiness related to the sense objects. Because of this, he says **the teacher**. The meaning is one who teaches the happiness of the self by means of action, which has the form of consciousness.

Now you might ask, how can there be the instruction of complete bliss? To answer this, he says **the Lord**. When worshipped,¹²¹ that Lord, because of his manifold power is capable of everything; **I bow to him** is the syntactical arrangement. Even thus, from the limitedness of things like a pot, etc., there might be the state of not-self; because of this, he says **all-pervading**. It pervades names and forms by its own existence and illumination, i.e., that is pervading

¹²¹ Emended from *īśvaram iti īṣṭe* to *īśvaram itīṣṭe = iti iṣṭe*. Other manuscripts say *īśvaram īṣṭe* which is clearly incorrect.

because of the illusoriness of the differentiation of place, time, and so forth. The meaning is that it is infinite. Now you might say that when there is the state of the pervading and the pervaded there is no attainment of infiniteness¹²²; because of this he says **the cause of all the worlds**. The meaning is that the material and instrumental cause are not different, because the scripture says, “*Brahman*, which is infinite truth and cognition, entered the self by the self,”¹²³ and so forth.

aparokṣānubhūtir vai procyate mokṣasiddhaye |
sadbhir eva prayatnena vīkṣaṇīyā muhur muhuḥ || 2 ||

Aparokṣānubhūti, immediate awareness of the self,

Truly, is taught, for the attainment of liberation.

Only by virtuous people, with great effort,

It is to be considered again and again.

Now for the application of a wise person, pointing out the fourfold connections,¹²⁴ he introduces his purpose with **immediate awareness**. By the particle **truly**, the awareness of the wise is regarded as authority; and so too, this meaning: that which is well known through the awareness of the wise, with the subject of *brahman* as not different from the self, born from hearing great sayings such as “You are that.” **Immediate awareness** of the eyes, i.e., of the senses, does not exist beyond that, thus it is **immediate**, whose true nature is the self, which is self-luminous

¹²² I take this as *vyāpyavyāpakabhāve nānaṃtatvaṃ siddhim* rather than *vyāpyavyāpakabhāvena anaṃtatvaṃ siddhim* (by means of the state of the pervading and the pervaded there is infiniteness), because each successive objection is used to explain the reason for the subsequent adjective.

¹²³ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.1.1.

¹²⁴ The *anubandhacatuṣṭaya* are the traditional fourfold connections or points that must be addressed at the beginning of a work on Advaita Vedānta. They are the qualified aspirant (*adhikārin*), the subject (*viśaya*), the purpose (*prayojana*), and the relationship between the text and the subject (*saṃbandha*), all of which are being addressed in this verse.

through constant direct perception, by means of the support of the senses and the illumination of that; **awareness** of that is the unbrokenness reached by the mental states. Or else **immediate awareness** is that which is both immediate and awareness (a *karmadhāraya* compound). Knowledge is the unrivaled method for the realization of *brahman*. It is also a treatise on the practice of that, like the words of the Upaniṣads. By the words **immediate awareness** it is undertaken at once, by merely seeing, among the most qualified aspirants. The meaning is the spreading of the treatise for the cause of the realization that the self is *brahman*. By this, the distinction of the truth of the self as *brahman* through eternal awareness is indicated. That is **taught** by reason of pre-eminence, preceded by the removing of doubt about that, with the form of the teaching of the secret of the established truth. The meaning is it is said or explained. According to the circumstances, “by us, i.e., by the previous teachers,” is to be supplied.

Now you might say that for the most part, having pointed out the purpose, the mediocre [aspirant] does not even exist, since because of propriety, the treatise will not be undertaken; anticipating this doubt, he tells the purpose: **for the attainment of liberation**. What is called liberation is the residing in one’s own intrinsic form, by means of the cessation of bondage in the form of the conception of self-ness of the non-self, i.e., the body and so forth, which is invented by one’s own ignorance. The attainment of that, i.e., the obtainment of that aim, is by means of the cessation of everything that is not for that aim; by this, the purpose is indicated, with the form of the attainment of the highest bliss. What are the characteristics of this immediate awareness? **By virtuous people**, i.e., by good people, endowed with the four means, beginning with the discernment between eternal and non-eternal things; the meaning is by those who are desirous of liberation. Because of the word **only**, it is not by others; the idea is by those who have the authority through intention on action. **Again and again** is by the effort of practice that is

uninterrupted for a long time; the meaning is also having become indifferent to bathing, alms, and so forth. It is **to be considered**, i.e., to be reflected on, having learned from the mouth of the teacher, by this person who is desirous of liberation; the qualified aspirant is indicated by this alone, according to the circumstances. And it is to be known that the relationship between the means and that which is to be accomplished, in the previous section and the latter section, is indicated.

svavarṇāśramadharmeṇa tapasā haritoṣaṇāt |
sādhanañ ca bhavet puṁsāṃ vairāgyādicatuṣṭayam || 3 ||

From pleasing Lord Viṣṇu by means of austerities,
 With the form of the duties of one's own social class and stage of life,¹²⁵
 The four means beginning with detachment,¹²⁶
 Should arise for people.

Now you might ask—because of the dependence of the effect on the cause, what is the cause of the four means, that were spoken of previously? Anticipating this, he says **one's own social class**. Here, by the words **one's own**, with respect to the threefold division of primary, indirect, and false, in the middle case, with respect to the self with the characteristics of the body, etc., being like the son of a witness, for example, it is understood that that body, etc., is useless for

¹²⁵ I have translated this in accordance with the second option given in the commentary, which takes the pleasing of Lord Viṣṇu (because of the ablative) as consequential to the practice of austerities (*tapasā*) and considers the first compound as a *bahuvrīhi* describing that. This is in line with the other commentaries, for example, the *Vivarāṇa* which succinctly says: Austerities have the form of the duties of one's own social class and stage of life alone. From the pleasing of Viṣṇu by those austerities (*svavarṇāśramadharmeṇa eva tapasā tena tapasā haritoṣaṇāt*).

¹²⁶ These fourfold conditions, which will be explained in the following verses are *vairāgya* (detachment), *viveka* (discernment), the six treasures beginning with *śama* (tranquility), and *mumukṣutā* (desire for liberation).

him, because it is a false self. **With the duties** arising from social class, such as Brahmin, and stage of life—celibate studenthood and so forth—i.e., by the remote consequences produced by the performance of action done as an offering to *brahman*. The meaning is by that produced as the support of future fruit, to be expressed by the word virtue and so forth, by the well-known Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. Likewise, **by means of austerities**, such as the moon-penance; the meaning is by atonement. Further, **from pleasing Lord Viṣṇu** is from creating happiness of the Lord, from particular actions, which have the characteristic of compassion for all beings. By these three practices, **the means** in the form of the **four beginning with detachment, should arise for people** who are reflecting, with the specific property of producing liberation. Or else the syntactical arrangement of the optative form is thus: accomplishing **by means of austerities with the form of the duties of one’s social class and stage of life—the pleasing of Lord Viṣṇu** from that. Even though with respect to the sequence of the four means, beginning with discernment, there is the state of cause and effect, nonetheless, detachment, which has a cause that is not common is to be illuminated first; it is to be known that understanding is obtained.

brahmādisthāvarānteṣu vairāgyaṃ viṣayeṣv anu |
yathaiva kākaviṣṭhāyāṃ vairāgyaṃ taddhi nirmalam || 4 ||

The detachment toward objects,
 Beginning with *brahman* up until inanimate things,
 Is just like toward the feces of a crow.
 Surely, that is pure detachment.

Of what sort are those four means beginning with detachment? In anticipation [of this question], he explains the very self-evidence, commencing with **beginning with brahman**. That desire for liberation is to be told by the portion of the work consisting of six verses. With respect to that, at the beginning he tells the description of detachment with **beginning with brahman up until inanimate things**, i.e., beginning with the world of truth up until the world of mortals, with regard to the means of enjoyment. **Toward** is referring to the un-eternality by reason of being produced by *karma*; this is the meaning. Detachment is the freedom from desire. To give an example with respect to that, he says **like**. **Like detachment toward the feces of a crow**, also, toward the feces of an ass, etc.; whenever, and of whomever for the purpose of pacifying fever, there is the desire of grasping—because of this the grasping of the feces of a crow is given as part for the whole. Or this is with respect to the non-arising of desire among objects beginning with the worst; to give a particular cause of detachment, he says **that**.¹²⁷ From the word **surely**, that detachment is pure, or free from the stain of attachment, etc.

nityam ātmasvarūpaṃ hi dṛśyaṃ tadviparītagam |
evaṃ yo niścayaḥ samyag viveko vastunaḥ sa vai || 5 ||

Surely, the intrinsic form of the self is eternal,

The seen is the opposite of that.

Thus, such complete conviction,

Certainly, that is discernment of reality.

¹²⁷ I have taken *vāṃtyādīnām* as *vā aṃtya-ādīnām* = “or beginning with the worst,” which seems to make the most sense with the rest of the sentence. Manuscripts A and B take this *vāṃtyādīnām* as vomiting, etc., preceding it with the synonym *chardita* and omitting the rest of the sentence, following it simply with *atra hetuḥ*, translating as “with respect to this the cause is vomiting, etc.” However, this seems like a spurious oversimplification—if the words following *vāṃtyādīnām* were lost, then perhaps *chardita* would have been added as a gloss.

Now he describes discernment, the cause of detachment, with **eternal**. **Certainly** [means] well known. That **discernment**, or distinction by discrimination of **reality**, i.e., of an entity, is to be known. To tell what that is he says **thus**. **Thus**, i.e., by the type that is **complete**—or devoid of doubt, etc.—**conviction**. Thus, to tell how he says **eternal**. **Surely** indicates it is well known in the experience of the wise. **The intrinsic form of the self is eternal**; the meaning is that it is indestructible, unopposed, or true. The intrinsic form of the self is seen by scriptures such as “And this self is indestructible.”¹²⁸ **The opposite of that** [means] the intrinsic form of the self goes by means of the opposite way from that; the meaning is that it obtains worldly things, with the qualities of being destructible or bound. Here this inference also is hinted at: the intrinsic form of the self is eternal because it is the seer, so that which is not eternal is not the seer, like a pot, etc.; therefore, the cause is negation alone. Likewise, the intrinsic form of the not-self is un-eternal, because it is the seen, so the intrinsic form of the self, which is not un-eternal, is not the seen; thus, this too, has the cause of negation alone.

sadaiva vāsanātyāgaḥ śamo 'yam iti śabditaḥ |
nigraho bāhyavṛttīnāṃ dama ity abhidīyate || 6 ||

The abandoning of mental impressions at all times,

This is named tranquility.

The suppression of the external states [of the senses],

Is designated as restraint.

¹²⁸ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.14.

Thus, having described that discernment, which is the cause of detachment, he describes the effects of detachment, which are the six treasures beginning with tranquility, by the three verses beginning with **at all times. At all times**, i.e., even at all times, **the abandoning of mental impressions**, or disregard of previous impressions; **this is named tranquility**. The suppression of the internal organ is for the purpose of what is called tranquility. **The suppression**—or the removing of the arising of what is warded off—**of the external states**, which are hearing, speech, and so forth, **is designated**, or told, by the name **restraint**.

viṣayebhyaḥ parāvṛtīḥ paramoparatir hi sā |
sahanam sarvaduḥkhānām titikṣā sā śubhā matā || 7 ||

Turning away from the objects of the senses,

That, surely, is the highest withdrawal.

The bearing of all suffering,

That endurance is considered [to have the form of] happiness.

[He says] **from the objects of the senses. Surely** [means] from the well-known binding of words, etc. The **turning away**, or cessation, is by the seeing of faults such as un-eternality; the meaning is that the lack of desire for grasping is called **withdrawal**. To tell which type he then says **the highest. The highest** is the best; the highest is that from which cognition of the self arises, because of nearness. The meaning is that it exists as the means to cognition of the self. By this, the renunciation of all action is described. Moreover, **the bearing of all suffering** is the bearing of the means of all suffering, i.e., of the dualities such as hot and cold, which is the lack

of desire for reaction. The meaning is that **that endurance is considered happiness**, i.e., having the form of happiness, among the wise.¹²⁹

nigamācāryavākyeṣu bhaktiḥ śraddheti viśrutā |
cittaikāgryam tu sallakṣye samādhānam iti smṛtam || 8 ||

Devotion to the words of the Vedas and the teacher,
Is known as faith.

And one-pointed concentration of the mind on the aim of existence,
Is regarded as deep meditation.

And also [he says] **the Vedas. To the words of the Vedas and the teacher** [means] in the speech of the Vedas and the guru or else in the teachings from the commentary on the Upaniṣads. The meaning of **devotion** or worship is trust. It is well known in Vedānta that this **is known as faith**. And also, **on the aim of existence** is on the aim of scriptures such as “In the beginning, my dear, this world was existence alone.”¹³⁰ It is the **one-pointed concentration of the mind** on *brahman* as not different from the self. The meaning is that the desire to know the oneness of **that is regarded as deep meditation**.

saṃsārabandhanirmuktiḥ katham me syāt kadā vidhe |
iti yā sudṛḍhā buddhir vaktavyā sā mumukṣutā || 9 ||

¹²⁹ Manuscripts A and B have these sentences in different orders with bits missing, though with no significant change in meaning.

¹³⁰ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.2.1.

How and when, O Creator, may I be liberated,
From the bonds of worldly existence?
Such a strong understanding,
That is to be called desire for liberation.

Thus, having explained the six beginning with tranquility, to explain the effect produced by this, which is the desire for liberation, he says **the bonds of worldly existence. Such a strong understanding, that is to be called desire for liberation** is the syntactical arrangement. Then, to explain what that is he says **O Creator**, i.e., my fate, or else the maker of all, the creator, or *brahman*. **I** [means] of me. **Liberated from the bonds of worldly existence** is the cessation of connection to various forms of existence. **When** is at what time. **How** is in what way may it exist. Thus, the meaning is that **desire for liberation** has the form of understanding.

uktasādhanayuktena vicāraḥ puruṣeṇa hi |
kartavyo¹³¹ jñānasiddhyartham ātmanaḥ śubham icchatā || 10 ||

Surely, by a person who is yoked,
To the means that were spoken of,
Inquiry is to be undertaken for the purpose of attaining cognition,
With the desire for the happiness of the self.¹³²

¹³¹ Emended from *kartavyo*.

¹³² I have translated this in accordance with the second interpretation given in the commentary, taking *ātmanaḥ* with *śubham* rather than with *jñānasiddhyartham*.

Now he indicates for what purpose these four means were inserted with **spoken of**, i.e., spoken, that were told commencing with **beginning with *brahman***, described by the arrangement of the text ending with **that desire for liberation**. By these means beginning with detachment, which are useful for cognition, **by a person who is yoked** with these, i.e., by an aspirant, or by a man, or by the best person. **Surely** indicates that the characteristic being spoken of is well known among learned people, or else **surely** is in the sense of the imperishable alone; the meaning is for the purpose of negation of another. **Inquiry**, or discernment, is to be undertaken, i.e., to be turned toward. To explain for which purpose, he says for the **purpose of attaining cognition**, i.e., for the purpose of attainment of cognition of the self, or for the arising of the awareness of the oneness of the self and *brahman*. Now you might ask: which personal aim [is intended] by the attainment of cognition of the self? Anticipating this, to hint at the fruit with the form of the fourth personal aim with the name liberation, he specifies the personal aim with **happiness**. Happiness has the form of the highest bliss, i.e., auspiciousness; the meaning is the happiness of liberation. Or **with the desire**—i.e., with eagerness—**for the happiness of the self** is the syntactical arrangement.

notpadyate vinā jñānaṃ vicāreṇānyasādhanaiḥ |
yathā padārthabhānaṃ hi prakāśena vinā kvacit || 11 ||

Cognition does not arise,
 By any other practices than inquiry.
 Just as, surely, there is no appearance of an object,
 In some place without light.

Now you might ask that if only inquiry for the purpose of the attainment of cognition is to be done, then why are observances performed? Anticipating this he gives an example with **does not arise** without **inquiry**. **By any other practices** with the characteristic of intention on action, **cognition does not arise**; with respect to that he gives an example with **just as**. **Just as** somewhere, **in some place without** the **light** of the sun, etc., there is no **appearance of an object**, i.e., the manifestation of a thing such as a pot. The word **surely** means well known among all people; the idea is that because of this, observances are performed.¹³³

*ko 'haṃ katham idaṃ jātaṃ ko vai kartāsyā vidyate |
upādānaṃ kim astīha vicāraḥ so 'yam īdṛśaḥ || 12 ||*

Who am I? How is this [world] created?

And, truly, who is the creator of this?

What is the material cause here [in this world]?

Such is this inquiry.

Then of what sort is that inquiry? To explain this, he says: **Who am I?** I am the creator, being designated as possessing happiness and so forth. **Who** [means] with what form? Likewise, **this world**, consisting of moving and unmoving, **how**, or from what, **is it created?** The meaning is: what is the support? Likewise, the uncertainty is expressed: **truly, who is the creator**, i.e., the producer **of this** universe, which is realized by correct understanding through direct perception and so forth? The uncertainty is: what is the creator of visible life or who is the Lord or even

¹³³ This conclusion—that observances are performed—does not follow from the preceding explanation. It seems there is a missing link that until one understands inquiry, one should keep doing other practices, in the same way that one may fumble around in the dark, looking for a light.

what other something? And **what is the material cause here in this world**, like clay of a pot? What is this self, whose sphere is the cause of the universe? This sort, i.e., of such a form, is **this inquiry**; the meaning is that, alone, is the means to cognition.

*nāhaṃ bhūtagaṇo deho nāhaṃ cākṣagaṇas tathā |
etadvilakṣaṇaḥ kaścīd vicāraḥ so 'yam īdrśaḥ || 13 ||*

I am not the group of elements which is the body,

Likewise, I am not the group of senses.

I am something different from this.

Such is this inquiry.

Now you might say that from the *Bārhaspatyasūtra*—“The spirit is the body particularized by consciousness”—Cārvāka says that the self with the aspect of the body is the transformed four elements beginning with earth alone, and that alone is the creator, which is well known by all people as the possessor of happiness, etc., and as the root of all worldly activity; [but] veracity particularized by the self should not be inquiry. Because of this he says **I am not. I**, which has as its support the word I, the internal self, **am not the group of elements which is the body**; the meaning is because of the visibility of that, like a pot, etc. Then, the doctrine of the commentary of Cārvāka saying “you may be the group of senses,” having arisen, is spoiled by **I am not**. And, also, **the group of senses**, i.e., the collection of senses, beginning with hearing; also, **I am not** that. By the word **likewise**, like the body, also of the group of senses—the changeability of the elements is shown by scriptures such as: “Or that is this spirit made up of the essence of food, for

my dear one, the mind is made up of food, breath is made of water, speech is made of fire.”¹³⁴ In both cases there is correct knowledge. Now you might say that if you are not the dual body then you should only be emptiness; anticipating this doubt he says **this. Different from this**, i.e., from these two, the gross and subtle bodies, [meaning] I am possessing opposite qualities, because of scriptures such as: “He is not gross, not subtle, not short.”¹³⁵ **Something**, because of being free from class, etc.—the state of being beyond the senses of mind and speech is shown; that **inquiry** is of this sort. For the purpose of explanation, the fourth quarter of the next four verses is also to be known.

ajñānaprabhavaṃ sarvaṃ jñānena pravīṛyate |
saṅkalpo vividhaḥ kartā¹³⁶ vicāraḥ so 'yam īdrśaḥ || 14 ||

Everything is produced by miscognition.

[It] melts away through cognition.¹³⁷

Our various intentions are the creator.

Such is this inquiry.

Thus, having resolved this [question] of **Who am I?**, now the investigation of **How is this created?** is done. With respect to that, the logicians and others think that because of the innate infinitesimal effects, the elements beginning with earth are produced; the Mīmāṃsakas say

¹³⁴ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.5.4.

¹³⁵ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.8.8.

¹³⁶ Emended from *kartā*.

¹³⁷ While one could read these two *pādas* together—i.e., Everything produced by miscognition melts away through cognition—the commentary clearly takes them as separate ideas. Firstly, that the whole universe arises from miscognition and secondly, that the way to remove that is through cognition.

actions are produced, but from the very pre-eminence of Sāṃkhya, this is not being done; thus, he says **miscognition**. This entire universe—consisting of names and forms—is **produced by miscognition**, or from miscognition, i.e., it arises from the non-breaking forth of the intrinsic form of each that was previously spoken of, according to type. From this alone, by the opposite of this, i.e., **through cognition**, or by the breaking forth of the intrinsic form of each, like darkness **melts away** by light; the meaning is that it becomes completely dissolved. **Truly, who is the creator of this?** To explain the resolution of this he says **intention**. **Various**, i.e., of various types, such as the transformation of the internal organ with the characteristic of “I will make this intention.” One whose concern is favorable cause is the creator. The rest was previously spoken of.

etayor yad upādānam ekaṃ sūkṣmaṃ sad avyayam |
yathaiva mṛd ghaṭādīnāṃ vicāraḥ so 'yam īdrśaḥ || 15 ||

The material cause of these two,
 Is the one, the subtle, imperishable existence.
 Just as only clay [is the material cause] of a pot, and so forth,
 Such is this inquiry.

Now, **what is the material cause** of this? To explain the resolution of this he says **of these two**, i.e., of lack of cognition and intention. **The material cause** is the cause for the arising, stability, and destruction, that yet is unbound by the three times of existence; the meaning is *brahman* alone and not any other. From this alone, having removed cognition as the support, by reason of

having the effect of miscognition, the universe also becomes false, to the extent that it is the arising of cognition like a rope and a snake and so forth; the idea is that it might be suitable for the worldly activity due to the fear of cyclic existence. When *brahman* exists as the cause, it is **imperishable**. **Imperishable** [means] free from decline; by this, also, what is previously produced from this, i.e., the [six] changes¹³⁸ beginning with birth are cast off and destruction is cast off.¹³⁹ When there is freedom from the six states of change, the cause is **the one**. From the absence of difference in the form of class, etc., how is it not seen? With respect to that he says **subtle**. **Subtle** is beyond the sphere of the senses such as mind and speech; the meaning is because these are devoid of action of the type of the cause of arising, etc. With respect to *brahman* being the material cause, he gives an example, with **just as only**. **Just as only clay is the material cause of a pot, and so forth**; the meaning is in that very same way. By such a way, it is hinted that the difference between cause and effect is only in name.

aham eko 'pi sūkṣmaś ca jñātā sākṣī sad avyayaḥ |
tad ahaṃ nātra sandeho vicāraḥ so 'yam īdṛśaḥ || 16 ||

I am also the one, the subtle, the cognizer, the witness,

The existent, and the imperishable.

I am that; here there is no doubt.

Such is this inquiry.

¹³⁸ The *ṣaḍvikāra* / *ṣadbhāvavikāra* or six changes are birth, existence, transformation, growth, decay, and destruction.

¹³⁹ This seems a bit redundant given that destruction is the final *vikāra*. Manuscript A says simply: By this, also, what precedes this, i.e., the six changes beginning with birth, are cast off (*anenaitatpūrvam api janmādiṣaṭvikārā nirastā*). B oddly says: By this, also what is previous to this, i.e., the five changes beginning with birth are cast off (*anenaitatpūrvā yā api janmādiṣaṭvikārā nirastā*). This seems spurious, especially as the next sentence begins with “when there is freedom from the six states of change” as elsewhere.

Now you might say that even if the difference between cause and effect is only a verbal handle, nonetheless, the difference between the individual soul and *brahman* might be true; anticipating this doubt he says **I**. Supplying “with respect to this, from which”; the meaning is “and likewise this.” From which [he says] **I**, to be understood as the notion of I, **am also the one**, devoid of difference of possessing class, etc., that is also merely human; the meaning is that I am the intellect’s conviction of oneness. And also **subtle**, beyond the sphere of the senses, and also the **cognizer**; the meaning is consciousness, which is the light of the ego, and so forth. Likewise, **the witness**, because of the direct seeing of the connection between the sense organs and their objects; without this, one only views, i.e., sees. The meaning is that the unchangeable witness illuminates. From this, alone, **the existent, the imperishable**. That is existent and imperishable, i.e., indestructible; the meaning is devoid of all change with the characteristic of decay. From which, having such a nature, **I am that**; therefore, I, or what is to be known by the notion of I, am *brahman* with the characteristics of truth, cognition, and so forth. The meaning is that **here there is no doubt. Such is this inquiry.**

ātmā viniṣkalo hy eko deho bahubhir āvṛtaḥ |

tayor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam ataḥ param || 17 ||

The self is surely one, without parts,

While the body is covered by many.

They see oneness of these two.

What is miscognition, other than this?

This, alone, by explaining the cognition of the oneness of the individual soul and *brahman*, is made firm by the five verses beginning with **the self**. From which it is to be known regarding the doubt whether the past self, by continual presence, endures in all states beginning with waking: the meaning is that the self by witnessing the absence and presence of the three states, has the intrinsic form of truth, cognition, etc. Also, that is for the purpose of indicating the word you, or for the purpose of indicating the word that, alone, is **without parts**, or with the distinction of parts that have gone away; the meaning is that it has no members. Otherwise, the idea is destroying the occurrence when something has parts, like a pot, and so forth. With respect to this the cause is [given by] **surely one**, which is well known through scriptures, such as “One alone, without a second”¹⁴⁰; this is hinted at. Now if you were to say that, likewise, there is also the subtle body—to answer no, he says **the body**. The body, i.e., the subtle body, is covered or clothed with many parts, i.e., by the seventeen starting with the ear up until the intellect; the meaning is that collection. From this alone, because the subtle body is not without parts and so forth, by cognition—when there is the cessation of the miscognition which is the cause of that—there is cessation; the idea is that otherwise there is attachment to non-liberation. Thus, the meaning is that even when there is great opposition of the two, i.e., of the self and the body, or like luminosity and inertia, the logicians and others see oneness or one nature. From this, i.e., from the seeing of the opposite, **what other**, i.e., different, **miscognition** is there? The meaning is that this alone is miscognition. Otherwise, it is the cause of that whose effect has the form of false cognition, which has miscognition as its root; the idea is that this occurs by inconclusive reasoning.

¹⁴⁰ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.2.1.

ātmā niyāmakaś cāntar deho bāhyo niyamyakah |
tayor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam ataḥ param || 18 ||

The self is the ruler and the internal,
The body is the external and the ruled.
They see oneness of these two.
What is miscognition, other than this?

Again, to explain the opposition he says **the self**. **The self is the ruler**, the master, and also **the internal**, inside the five sheaths, but the body exists as the ruled, external. The latter half with **oneness of the two**, was explained and thus also subsequently it is to be known.

ātmā jñānamayaḥ puṇyo deho māṃsamayo 'śuciḥ |
tayor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam ataḥ param || 19 ||

The self is pure, made of cognition,
The body is impure, made of flesh.
They see oneness of these two.
What is miscognition, other than this?

To give another opposition he says **the self**. **The self is made of cognition**, in the form of luminosity; from this alone it is **pure**, i.e., purified. But **the body** possesses the changes **of flesh**,

etc.; from this alone it is **impure**. By this, also, the opposition of the self to the gross body is spoken of. **Oneness of the two** and so on was previously spoken of.

ātmā prakāśakah svaccho dehas tāmāsa ucyate |
tayor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam ataḥ param || 20 ||

The self is illuminating and clear,

The body has the nature of inertia, it is said.

They see oneness of these two.

What is miscognition, other than this?

To tell another opposition he says **the self**. **The self** exists as its own illumination like the sun and so forth, **illuminating** all others; from this alone it is **clear**. The meaning is that it is devoid of connection with the evident good and bad qualities, from scriptures such as “This spirit is surely unattached.”¹⁴¹ **But the body has the nature of inertia**, like a pot and so forth—because it is illuminated it is inert. **Oneness of the two** and so on was previously spoken of.

ātmā nityo hi sadrūpo deho 'nityo hy asanmayah |
tayor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam ataḥ param || 21 ||

The self is eternal since its form is existence.

¹⁴¹ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.15.

The body is transient since its essence is non-existence.¹⁴²

They see oneness of these two.

What is miscognition, other than this?

With respect to this, it is also said everywhere, and it is not to be objected to by reason of the supernaturalness of the self. Because of the very difficulty of knowing it completely, various oppositions are shown by the most compassionate glorious teachers with **the self**. **The self is eternal**, without the adversary of destruction. With respect to that, the cause is [indicated by] **since**, i.e., because **its form is existence**; the intrinsic nature of the self is unopposed. But the body has the adversary of destruction; here also the cause is [indicated by] **since**, i.e., because **its essence is non-existence**. It is **transient** because it is subject to change; the meaning is that it is capable of opposition. From which, thus, there is the very great opposition of the self and the body; therefore, the seeing of **oneness of these two** is only **miscognition**.

ātmanas tat prakāśatvaṃ yat padārthāvabhāsanam |
nāgnyādidīptivad dīptir bhavaty āndhyaṃ yato niṣi || 22 ||

That is luminosity of the self,

Which illuminates objects.

[That] light is not like the light of fire and so forth,

From which there is still darkness at night.

¹⁴² I have translated the first two lines in accordance with the *Dīpikā*. Alternatively, this could be translated in line with the *Bodhadīpikā*, which still uses the particle *hi* to show causality, but adheres to its enclitic nature more faithfully. The meaning is the same. *hi yata ātmā sadrūpaḥ satyaḥ ataś ca nityaḥ | hi yato deho 'sanmayo mithyābhūtaḥ ata evānityaḥ |* The self has the form of existence, from which it is eternal. The body has the essence of non-existence, from which it is transient.

Now you might ask, what is called the luminosity of the self? To answer this, he says **of the self**. **That luminosity of the self** is to be known; because of this, to explain what that is, he says **which**. **Which illuminates objects**, when the light is on sense objects, i.e., things such as a pot or cloth; to be precise, it is this seeing of sense objects which is being described by that. Then, like the light of fire and so forth, it should be changeable; because of this he says **not like the light of fire and so forth**. The meaning is this light of the self is never like the light of fire and so forth, which possess changeability through arising, destruction, etc.

With respect to that, to explain the cause he says **there is**. **From which there is still darkness at night**, i.e., from which cause at night, or in the evening, even when the light of fire and so forth exists in one place, elsewhere there is darkness of the world, which is the inability to apprehend forms.¹⁴³ The light of the self is not of this kind, existing in one place and not existing in one place, and limited. Moreover, in the absence of that luminosity of the form of a light, etc., i.e., the light of fire and so forth, and the [presence of] the luminosity of darkness, which is free from arising and destruction, it is always everywhere complete. Or else this light of the self is not of the sort of the light of fire and so forth, from where, i.e., from which cause, at night or in the evening, there is darkness, or darkness exists. This characteristic of the light of the self is to be known.

If the light of the self might be similar to the light of fire and so forth, then just as there is destruction of darkness by the light of fire and so forth, also in that way there should be destruction of darkness by the light of the self; however, when the self—by its being and light—exists everywhere at all times, there is not also the destruction of darkness. From this, the light of the self is not similar to the light of fire and so forth. Moreover, the light of the self is not

¹⁴³ Manuscripts A, B, and C omit the entire next section, skipping from here to the final sentence, perhaps for the better, as while the general idea seems clear, this next section is, ironically, quite opaque.

obstructive to the light of fire and so forth and of darkness with the form “this light of fire and so forth shines,” “that darkness shines,” etc. and the luminosity of all others. The meaning is that self-illumination, alone, is to be admitted by all who have ascended to cognition of the self. Therefore, the idea is that even among the lights of fire and so forth, that light that is regardless of other means, that light is the light of the self.

deho 'ham ity ayaṃ mūḍho dhṛtvā tiṣṭhaty aho janaḥ |
mamāyam ity api jñātvā ghaṭadraṣṭeva sarvadā || 23 ||

How strange this foolish person remains,

Holding [the thought], “I am the body,”¹⁴⁴

Even knowing at all times, “This [body] is mine.”

Like one who sees a pot.

Thus, having illuminated that, even when there is a difference in the characteristic of illumination, and so forth, summarizing the seeing of the difference between the self and not-self, he makes clear the difference between the two with **the body**. **I** is the inner self, which has as its support the idea of the word **I**. **This** is being indicated by identity, i.e., being seen by direct

¹⁴⁴ I have followed the interpretations in the other commentaries, particularly the *Vijñānavinodiniṭīkā (Vvṭ)*, in my translation, which take *ayaṃ mūḍha janaḥ* together as “this foolish person” and *aho* to mean “how strange!”
Vvṭ: ayaṃ mūḍhajano maṇḍabuddhir mānavo dhṛtvā samyañ manasy avadhārya tiṣṭhati varttate | aho āścaryam ity ākrośati bhagavān bhāṣyakāraḥ | ākrośane hetum āha | mamāyam ity api jñātvēti | This foolish person, i.e., this dull-witted man, holding [the thought], i.e., considering completely in the mind, remains, i.e., exists. Ah! i.e., how strange, the revered writer of the commentary cries out. He tells the cause with respect to the crying out with even knowing “this [body] is mine.”

Vivarāṇa: ayaṃ mūḍho jano 'yaṃ deho mameti jñātvāpy aham iti dhṛtvā tiṣṭhatīty anvayaḥ | The syntactical meaning is: this foolish person, even knowing “this body is mine,” remains holding [the thought], “I am [the body].” The *Vivarāṇa* also concurs that *aho* means *āścaryam*. The *Bodhadīpikā* says a person remains in worldly existence (*janaḥ saṃsāre tiṣṭhati*) and that he, alas is excessively foolish (*sa aho atīva mūḍho bhavati*).

perception like a pot, etc., thus, “**I am the body.**” Having made oneness of the two—the seer and the seen—one is **confused** or pervaded by the delusion of false cognition whose cause is one’s own miscognition. A **person remains** with the understanding of one who is contented; the meaning is that there is passivity. The idea is that this, **alas**, is great miscognition. To explain **even** having done what he says **mine**. **This** body is **mine**, belonging to me; similarly, even knowing the difference, from this alone there is the wonder, what is the purpose like? At all times it is **like one who sees a pot**, just as at all times a person who sees a pot knows “this pot belongs to me” and not “I am this pot.” The meaning is even at any time one knows [this].

brahmaivāhaṃ samaḥ śāntaḥ saccidānandalakṣaṇaḥ |
nāhaṃ deho hy asadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 24 ||

I am *brahman* alone, constant, peaceful,
 With the characteristics of existence, consciousness, and bliss.
 I am surely not the body, whose form is non-existence.
 This is said to be cognition by the wise.

Now you might ask, in regard to this, what then is the ceasing of that intellect, which is to be inferred by the mark of the effect of delusion of another repetition of the error of the characteristic, similar to miscognition? Anticipating this, because that is removed only by cognition of the self, [meaning] the turning back of miscognition of the self, to tell the characteristics of that, he gives the five verses beginning with **brahman. I**, the inner self, which has as its support the idea of the word I, **am brahman alone**, which is the cause with respect to

the oneness of these two categories of truth; to tell the hidden characteristics he says **constant**. It is **constant** by means of light and existence that are unbroken by everything. Then what are the characteristics? It is **peaceful**, i.e., devoid of change such as agitation, and so forth, because of the limitation of separation and combination. Then what are the characteristics? **With the characteristics of existence, consciousness, and bliss**. By existence, consciousness, and bliss, characterized by being the opposites of untruth, inertness, and suffering, with the form of the renunciation of the opposite part; thus, by the characteristic of a part it is known, with the characteristics of existence, consciousness, and bliss. Indeed, when there is awareness of *brahman*, the twofold means are assertion and negation. With respect to that, because of the direct perception of truth and cognition, the characteristics for the application of the signifying word are said to be assertion. Now the characteristics of the removal of that, i.e., negation, are shown by **I am not. I**, the self, which has as its support the idea of the word I, **am not the body** is the syntactical arrangement. **Body** implies also the breath and senses, etc. **Surely** means well known among wise people. He explains the cause [for the fact that] the body and so forth is not the self, with **non-existence. Its form is non-existence**, i.e., contradictable, or untrue; it is of that sort whose intrinsic nature has that sort of form, i.e., of such a kind. The meaning is that **it is said by the wise**, i.e., explained by those who know the true nature of the self, **to be cognition**, whose form is understanding of the unbroken aspect produced by great sayings such as “I am *brahman*.” The idea is that everything that has different characteristics from this appears as miscognition.

nirvikāro nirākāro niravadyo 'ham avyayaḥ |

nāhaṃ deho hy asadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 25 ||

I am without change, I am without form,

I am without blemish, I am undecaying.

I am surely not the body, whose form is non-existence.

This is said to be cognition by the wise.

Now you might ask—by means of various changes such as “I am born, I have died, I am happy, or suffering,” because the foundation of the idea of the word I is implicit—how is that *brahman*? To answer that he says **without change**. The foundation of the idea of the word I is the inner self. **I am without change** is to be supplied, i.e., that from which change, beginning with birth has gone out; the idea is it is of that sort because it has the properties of the body. With respect to that, the cause is **without form** or devoid of the aspect of the body and so forth. From this alone it is **without blemish**; the meaning is that it is devoid of the three sufferings of the self, produced by *vāta*, *pitta*, etc. From this alone it is **undecaying**; the meaning is that it is free from decay, i.e., from convictions such as “I am a human being.” You might ask, “How is there unchangeability?” because of opposition to that conviction like silver in a pearl oyster; to explain that this is delusion he says **I am not**. The latter half with **I am not** is explained in the previous verse. Thus, also with respect to the latter, it is to be known again, but the statement is questionable, because the strength of false perception due to weakness of the intellect is an obstacle to cognition.

nirāmayo nirābhāso nirvikalpo 'ham ātataḥ |

nāhaṃ deho hy asadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 26 ||

I am without disease, I am without false appearance,

I am without doubt, I am all-pervading.

I am surely not the body, whose form is non-existence.

This is said to be cognition by the wise.

Again, what are the characteristics of cognition? Because of this he says **without disease**. **I am without disease**, i.e., free from all illness. **Without false appearance** is devoid of the permeability of mental states and fruits; **without doubt** is free from doubt; and **all-pervading** is pervasive.

nirguṇo niṣkriyo nityo nityamukto 'ham acyutaḥ |
nāhaṃ deho hy asadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 27 ||

I am without qualities and without action, I am eternal,

I am eternally free, I am imperishable.

I am surely not the body, whose form is non-existence.

This is said to be cognition by the wise.

Again, what are the characteristics of knowledge? Because of this he says **without qualities**. **I am without qualities**, i.e., devoid of qualities because of the illusoriness of the qualities. From this alone, I am **without action**, i.e., free from action; likewise, **eternal**, or free from destruction. From this alone, I am **eternally free**, even in the three times devoid of bondage. With respect to

that, the cause is **imperishable**, i.e., unmoved from one's inherent state of existence, consciousness, and bliss.

nirmalo niścalo 'nantaḥ śuddho 'ham ajaro 'maraḥ |
nāhaṃ deho hy asadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 28 ||

I am without impurity, immovable, infinite,

I am pure, undecaying, immortal.

I am surely not the body, whose form is non-existence.

This is said to be cognition by the wise.

And again, to tell the characteristics of cognition he says **without impurity**. **I am without impurity**, i.e., free from impurity that has the characteristic of the effect of miscognition. From this I am **immovable**; the meaning is because it is pervasive like ether. With respect to immovability, the cause is **infinite**, i.e., devoid of the limitation of things by place and time. It is **pure**, or free from impurity; also, **undecaying**, i.e., free from decay; and **immortal**, or free from death. The idea is because all these properties are situated in the three bodies.

svadehe śobhanaṃ santaṃ puruṣākhyam ca saṃmatam |
kiṃ mūrkhā śūnyam ātmānaṃ dehātītaṃ karoṣi bhoḥ || 29 ||

O you fool! How can you think that the self,

Which is in one's own body, auspicious, always existent,

Called the spirit and beyond the body,

Is non-existent?

Now you might say that if the self in the form of the visible body does not exist, then the self might be empty; to anticipate this doubt he says **in one's own body**. **O** is **o fool**, or Buddhist. **In one's own body** it is **called the spirit**. **In the body** [means] it lives in the body of a person, or dwells with the aspect of I; **called the spirit** [means] of whom that is the name. From this alone it is **auspicious**, i.e., propitious—because it has different qualities from the body it is very auspicious. Likewise, it is **considered**, i.e., determined by statements such as “This self is *brahman*”; also because of the word **and** it is determined by texts such as “but the highest spirit is another.”¹⁴⁵ Like a person who has seen a pot, by a person who has seen the body, it is **beyond the body**; the self is eternally existing, i.e., **existent**, or void of a basis in all worldly activity like a sky flower, whose form is absolute non-existence. **How can you think?** The question is: how can you think me otherwise? Sometimes there is the reading with the accusative ending: one's own body. In this view, he speaks of the doctrine of the self as the body alone, having abandoned the human body, with the characteristics that were said. The rest is the same.

svātmānaṃ śṛṇu mūrkhā tvam śrutyā yuktyā ca puruṣam |
dehātītaṃ sadākāraṃ sudurdarśaṃ bhavādṛśaiḥ || 30 ||

Listen you fool! Learn about your own self, your spirit,

By scripture and reasoning.

Beyond the body, whose aspect is existence:

¹⁴⁵ *Bhagavadgītā* 15.17.

So difficult to be seen by those like you.

Now you might say that even for a Buddhist, because of entering into absence, there should not be emptiness; however, with respect to the self that is beyond the body, from the absence of direct perception, the body alone might be the self. To anticipate this doubt, he says **your own self**. O **fool** is one who speaks of the self as the body, i.e., a Cārvāka materialist; **you** is your own self, i.e., one's own self; the **spirit** is **beyond the body**, [meaning] over and above the body. **By the scripture** “Or therefore, the self is higher than the other which is made of the essence of food,”¹⁴⁶ and also **by reasoning**, at the same time, with the form of the opposition between agent and action, and so forth. **Learn about**, i.e., consider with respect to being beyond the body, what is the aspect of the self? Because of this he says **whose aspect is existence**. **Whose aspect is existence** is that whose aspect is produced only by the cause of worldly activity. If this is of that sort, how is it seen? Because of this he says: **so difficult to be seen by those like you**, i.e., by those who are devoid of faith in the scriptures and teachers it is very difficult to see. The meaning is those who are always unfit for seeing, because that has the form of the invisible, alone. Or else with reference to the second line of the previous verse, for the purpose of answering an objection for the Cārvākas, he gives this verse with **your own self**.

ahaṃśabdena vikhyāta eka eva sthitaḥ paraḥ |

sthūlas tv anekatāṃ prāptaḥ kathaṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 31 ||

The Supreme Spirit, known by the word “I,”

Exists as one alone.

¹⁴⁶ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.2.1.

But the gross body has obtained manifoldness.¹⁴⁷

How could the body be the self?¹⁴⁸

He explains that very thing with the seven verses beginning with **I. The Supreme Spirit** is the self, which is other than the body, [known] **by the word I. Word** is the designation of an idea; also, **known** is well known. To tell what the characteristics are he says **one. One alone exists**, i.e., the ascertainment of each one alone. The word **but** indicates the different characteristics of the **gross body** from what was previously said of the self. The gross body is the body alone. In *dehakaḥ*, the suffix ka is in the sense of the base (*dehaḥ*) itself. **How could it be the self**, i.e., the spirit, or the soul? The meaning is not in any way. To explain the cause [for the fact that] the body is not the self,¹⁴⁹ he says **manifoldness. Manifoldness**, i.e., having differentiation from each other, is **obtained**; thus, even when there are very different qualities, like inertia and light. He is saying that because of the excessive foolishness of the [idea that] the body is the self, it is disregarded. This is the idea.

ahaṃ draṣṭṛtayā siddho deho drśyatayā sthitaḥ |

mamāyam iti nirdeśāt kathaṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 32 ||

¹⁴⁷ The *Vṛt* has *sthūlas tv anekasaṃprāptaḥ*: but the gross body has attained many. It then says: without the restriction of oneness, like the clothes of Devadatta (*ekatvaniyamaṃ vinā vāsāṃsīva devadattasya*). This seems to refer to *Bhagavadgītā* 2.22: *vāsāṃsi jīrṇāni yathā vihāya navāni gṛhṇāti naro 'parāṇi | tathā śarīrāṇi vihāya jīrṇāny anyāni saṃyāti navāni dehī ||* Just as casting away old, worn-out clothes, a person acquires others; In the same way, casting aside old, worn-out bodies, the self comes into new ones.

¹⁴⁸ While it might be tempting to read *dehakaḥ* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound going with *pumān*, this *-ka* is a *svārthika* suffix, used with no change in the meaning of the word. The *Dīpikā* clearly indicates that the gross body is the body alone (*sthūlo dehakaḥ deha eva*) and the syntax here is “How could the body be the self?” The other reading—how could the self possess a body?—does not make sense, because the self can indeed possess a body! The *Dīpikā* then explains that the answer to this rhetorical question is “not in any way” (*na kathaṃcid*). The other commentaries concur.

¹⁴⁹ Literally, with respect to the not-self-ness of the body (*dehasyānātmatve*).

I am well known as the seer,
The body is established as the seen.
From the designation, “This [body] is mine,”
How could the body be the self?

He describes the great difference of that very thing with **I**. I, the self, which has as its support the idea of the word I, **am well known**, i.e., am well known by worldly activity such as “I hear sound,” **as the seer**, illuminating the sense objects of sound and so forth, but **the body is established as the seen**, [meaning] the thing to be illuminated by things like sound. To explain the cause with respect to that, he says **mine**. **This body is mine**, by belonging to oneself like a pot, etc. **From the designation** is from the established rule. Thus, with respect to the difference between the two, **how could the body be the self?** And the purpose of what is said is in the fourth quarter; thus, even at the end it is to be known.

ahaṃ vikārahīnas tu deho nityaṃ vikāravān |
iti pratīyate sākṣāt kathaṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 33 ||

I, [the self], am without change,
But the body is perpetually changing.
This is recognized with one’s own eyes.
How could the body be the self?

Again, to tell the other differences he says **I**. For the purpose of explaining that I exist without change, he gives the six verses beginning with **I am without change**. **But** is in the sense of opposition; **the body is perpetually**, or at all times, **changing**. With respect to this, what is the evidence? From this he says **this is recognized**, i.e., perceived, **with one’s own eyes**—by the correct knowledge of direct perception. This being so, **how could the body be the self?**

yasmāt param iti śrutyā tayā puruṣalakṣaṇam |
vinirṇītaṃ vimūḍhena kathaṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 34 ||

By the scripture beginning with,

“Since it is the highest,”

The characteristics of the spirit are ascertained by the wise.

How could the body be the self?

Thus, having explained the different characteristics of the body and the self by reasoning, to explain with scripture, he says **since it is the highest**. “Since it is the highest, there is nothing beyond; there is nothing smaller; there is nothing larger. Like a tree that stands rooted in the sky, alone. By that spirit, the whole world is filled.” Having shown this by the well-known scripture of the *Taittirīya*,¹⁵⁰ when it is the cause, the instrumental case is used. **The characteristics of the spirit** is of the self; **by the wise** is by those whose confusion has disappeared. The meaning is by the very clever, who are skillful in discerning the meaning of the scriptures. When the agent is shown with the instrumental case, these [characteristics] **are ascertained**; [thus] having reflected, they are determined to be otherwise like previously. Or else **by the scripture** is the

¹⁵⁰ It is actually *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.9.

agent word. In this reading, **by the wise** means the awakening of the Cārvākas among the wise. The idea is: O king, O master, because of having the very crown jewel of a fool, you do not heed the scripture.

sarvaṃ puruṣa eveti sūkte puruṣasaṃjñite |
apy ucyate yataḥ śrutyā kathaṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 35 ||

In the hymn called the *Puruṣasūkta*,
It is also said, “Everything is spirit alone.”

Therefore, by the scripture,
How could the body be the self?

Not only by that one scripture is it ascertained, but by another too¹⁵¹; to explain this he says **everything**. From which cause, **by the scripture**, which is for the highest deity named in the Veda, **it is also said**: “This whole universe is spirit, alone” **in the hymn called the *Puruṣasūkta***. Supply from the previous verse “the characteristics of the spirit.” After this, **how could** is like in the previous verse.

asaṅgaḥ puruṣaḥ prokto brhadāranyake 'pi ca |
anantamalaśliṣṭaḥ kathaṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 36 ||

And it is also said in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*,

¹⁵¹ The *Bodhadīpikā* also takes *api* as “also” (glossing it with *punar*), rather than “even,” which makes sense since the text continues to give examples in the following verses.

“The spirit is unattached.”

Endowed with infinite impurities,

How could the body be the self?

Also, by another scripture this very thing is ascertained; to explain this he says **unattached**.

“Surely, this spirit is unattached.” By this scripture in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the Upaniṣad of Yājñavalkya, it is said that the spirit is unattached, but the body, which is **endowed with infinite impurities, how could it be the self?**

tatraiva ca samākhyātaḥ svayaṃjyotir hi puruṣaḥ |

jaḍaḥ paraprakāśyo ‘sau kathaṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 37 ||

And it is declared with respect to that alone,

“Surely, the spirit is self-illuminated.”

The body is inert and illuminated by another,

How could that be the self?

With respect to that very thing, also by another way, the different characteristics of the body and the self are described; thus, he says **with respect to that alone**. **With respect to that alone**, [meaning] in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* alone, in this “**this spirit is self-illuminated**,” i.e., by the scripture **it is declared** that the spirit is self-illuminated. **Surely** illuminates that it is well known by the wise; **that** is the seen, like a pot. Because of this, alone, it is **illuminated by another**, and from that, alone, it is **inert**. **How could the body be the self?** has been explained.

prokto 'pi karmakāṇḍena hy ātmā dehād vilakṣaṇaḥ |
nityaś ca tatphalaṃ bhūṅkte dehapātād anantaram || 38 ||

Surely, it is also declared by the *Karmakāṇḍa*,
That the self is different from the body.
It is eternal and experiences the fruit of that [*karma*],
[Even] after the fall of the body.

Now setting aside this *Jñānakāṇḍa*, also in the *Karmakāṇḍa*, the very difference between the body and the self is described, thus he says **declared**. **Surely**, i.e., since, **also by the *Karmakāṇḍa*** with the form of “As long as one lives, one should offer the *agnihotra*,” etc.; the meaning is by that part of the Veda that is granting *karma*. **The self is different from the body** is declared. To explain how he says **eternal**. And why eternity? To answer this, he says **that**. **After the fall of the body, the fruit of that** is un-eternal, from which the self experiences the fruit of *karma*; because of this the meaning is eternal. Because of the word **and** it means in Nyāya and Sāṃkhya too; thus, the very difference between the body and the self is described, i.e., it is shown.

liṅgaṃ cānekaśamyuktaṃ calaṃ dṛśyaṃ vikāri ca |
avyāpakam asadrūpaṃ tat kathaṃ syāt pumān ayam || 39 ||

And the subtle body is endowed with many parts,
It is moving, perceptible, and variable.

It is not all-pervading, its form is non-existent,

How might this be the self?

Now you may say that being thus, it might be an erroneous conclusion among Vedāntins; because of this he says **the subtle body**. Subtle [means] **the subtle body**, distinguished by the property of being beyond the range of sight, etc.; **how might this be the self**, whose own state is immediate awareness of the eternal? It cannot be at all is the meaning. From the word **and** the causal body is also refuted. Also, with respect to the difference between the two, indicating the different specific characteristics of the subtle body, he says **many**. **Endowed with many**, i.e., endowed with the connection to various gross bodies of gods and men, etc., or else endowed with the seventeen parts starting with the ears up until the intellect. Likewise, it is **moving**; the meaning is trembling from the pre-eminence of the mind. Also, it is **perceptible**; since the self is the abode of ownership such as “this is my ear, this is my mind,” [the subtle body] has become subordinate. And again, it is **variable** like accumulation, etc.; it is **not all-pervading**, i.e., it is divided. **Its form is non-existent**, and with respect to this, this intention is to be known as possessing cognition of the self. Nonetheless, when there is the superimposition of the subtle body, the self is not the doer or the experiencer, likewise also of the self, i.e., of one’s own self, by the cognition of the absence of that. When there is the cessation of the superimposition, there is the attainment of the state of being the doer, experiencer, and so forth. Thus, among the Vedāntins there is not even a little erroneous conclusion. Like the other, it is auspicious.

evaṃ dehadvayād anya ātmā puruṣa īśvaraḥ |

sarvātmā sarvarūpaś ca sarvātīto ’ham avyayaḥ || 40 ||

Thus,¹⁵² the self is other than these two bodies,

It is the spirit, the Lord,
Self of all, and having all forms,
Beyond all, the imperishable I.

Now, to summarize the meaning that was previously spoken of he says **thus**. **Thus**, i.e., by the way that was previously spoken of, **the self** is **other**, i.e., different **than these two bodies**, with the characteristics of gross and subtle. To explain what that is, he says **the spirit**. If **the spirit** is the ruler of the body, then what is not the individual self? To answer, he says **the Lord**. With respect to that, if he is the cause, **the self of all**, then there might be the loss of non-duality. From this he says **having all forms**; thus existing, there might be changeability. After this he says **beyond all**; if the self is of this sort, then where is it not obtained? From this he says **I**. It is the direct perception of I, by having the support of the word I; the meaning is that one's intrinsic form is always obtained. Then [you might say] there should be ego. [To answer] no, he says **imperishable**. **Imperishable** is void of the change of decay, etc.; the idea is that it is the witness of the ego.

ity ātmadehabhāgena prapañcasyaiva satyatā |
yathoktā tarkaśāstreṇa tataḥ kiṃ puruṣārthatā || 41 ||

Thus, by means of the difference between the self and the body,

¹⁵² I use the word “thus” as defined by the OED to mean (1a) “in the way just indicated,” in accordance with the commentary which glosses *evam* with “by the way that was previously spoken of” (*pūrvoktaprakāreṇa*).
<https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.lancs.ac.uk/view/Entry/201582>

There is the truth of the manifold world alone,

Just as it is explained by the Logic texts.

[But] what aim of life [is served] from that?

Now, at this moment, to express the doubt that with regard to the self, stating the redundancy of the duality of the body is useless, he says **thus**. Thus, by the way that was previously spoken of, i.e., by the description, **by means of the difference between the self and the body, there is the truth of the manifold world alone**. Just as it was said, likewise **by the Logic texts**; from that, i.e., from the explaining of the reality of the manifold world, **what aim of life** [is served]? The meaning is the low aim of life, because of the absence of the cessation of fear, from the scripture, “From duality, surely fear exists.”¹⁵³

ity ātmadehabhedena dehātmavṃ nivāritam |
idānīm dehabhedasya hy asattvavṃ sphuṭam ucyate || 42 ||

Thus, by means of the difference between the self and the body,

The idea that the body is the self has been prevented.

Now, surely, the unreality of the distinction of the body,

Is clearly explained.

Because of the causality of the cognition of difference, with regard to the cognition of absence of difference, the explaining of the division of the self and the body is not useless; to tell this he says **thus**. Thus, by what was previously spoken of, **by means of the difference between the**

¹⁵³ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 1.4.2.

self and the body, i.e., by the cause of the self as separate from the body, **the idea that the body itself is the self**, obtained by the thought of the materialists, **has been prevented**. Now by the latter part of that, **the unreality of the distinction of the body**, that is free from the reality which is different from the reality of the self is **clearly**, i.e., distinctly according to that, **explained; surely** means well known.

caitanyasyaika rūpatvād bhedo yukto na karhicit |
jīvatvaṃ ca mṛṣā jñeyaṃ rajjau sarpagraho yathā || 43 ||

Because of the uniformity of consciousness,

Difference is not possible at any time.

And [even] the existence of the individual self is to be known as false,

Like the perception of a snake in a rope.

To explain just that he says **of consciousness**. **Of consciousness** is of the light which is the support of the manifold world belonging to all beings, **because of the uniformity** in statements such as “a pot is visible, a cloth is visible,” i.e., because of making one cause, **at any time**, or of any state, **difference is not possible**; the meaning is it is not appropriate. Then the difference of the individual self might be the truth; to explain this he says **existence of the individual self**. The word **and** has the meaning of also. **The existence of the individual self** is **false**, i.e., not true; **this is to be known** because of the very limitation of that; the meaning is because the inner organ and so forth are made up of illusion. This occurs by means of the truthfulness of the support, when there is awareness of the falseness of that which is invented. To give an example

he says **in a rope**. Just as in a rope, because of miscognition of that by resemblance through crookedness and so forth, in the darkness of dull-witted people there is **the perception of a snake**. There is the understanding of a snake of the unlearned, but not of the learned. Likewise, with regard to the self, because of the lack of cognition of the self from the similarity to light, when there is the light of nondifference, there is confusion of the appearance of consciousness in the form of the distortion of the inertia of consciousness for the undiscerning but not for the discerning; this is the secret of the Vedānta conclusion.

rajjavajñānāt kṣaṇenaiva yadvad rajjur hi sarpiṇī |
bhāti tadvac citiḥ sākṣād viśvākāreṇa kevalā || 44 ||

Just as because of miscognition of a rope,
Surely, the rope appears in that very moment as a snake.
So, too, pure consciousness appears with the form of the universe,
Before one's very eyes.

Now, describing an example of the very thing that was previously said and also of the whole manifold world which has the form of *brahman*, he says **rope**. The word **pure** is by reason of distinguishing—having not abandoned the previous state, the illusion with the characteristic of being obtained inside of the state is the very material cause that was spoken of. The beginning is not the material cause, and also transformation is not the material cause; thus, it is to be known. The rest is clear.

upādānaṃ prapañcasya brahmaṇo 'nyan na vidyate |
tasmāt sarvaprapañco 'yaṃ brahmaivāsti na cetarat || 45 ||

A material cause of the manifold world,
Other than *brahman* does not exist.
Therefore, this whole manifold world is *brahman*, alone,
And there is nothing else.

With respect to this, showing the cause of what was previously said he summarizes with a **material cause**. Because of which, [a material cause] **of the manifold world**, beginning with ether up until the body, i.e., of the expanse of the universe, [other] **than *brahman*** [does not exist]—because of the variegation of illusion, it is other than consciousness, i.e., than an infinitesimal particle. Or else the material cause of nature, i.e., the specific cause, **does not exist**. Because of scriptures such as “Or therefore from this self, ether arises,”¹⁵⁴ [the word] **therefore** is to give the cause. The rest is clear.

vyāpyavyāpakatā mithyā sarvam ātmeti śāsanāt |
iti jñāte pare tattve bhedasyāvasaraḥ kutaḥ || 46 ||

From the teaching, “Everything is the self,”
The state of the pervading and the pervaded is false.
Thus, when the highest truth is known,
Where is the occasion of difference?

¹⁵⁴ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.1.1.

Now you might ask—with respect to the difference in the form of the pervading and the pervaded when waking, how might the manifold world be *brahman*? Anticipating this, he says **pervaded**. The **pervaded** is internal; the **pervading** is external; the state of the two is **false**. The meaning is that like a pot, or ether, etc., because it is invented it is unreal. With respect to that, to tell the authority he says **everything**. The meaning is from the strength of knowledge of the Lord in the form of scriptures such as “This is *brahman*; this is power; this is nature; all of this is the self.”¹⁵⁵ What then? To answer this he says, **thus**. It is **thus known**; [the line] beginning with **thus** is very easy to understand.

śrutyā nivāritaṃ nūnaṃ nānātvaṃ svamukhena hi |
kathaṃ bhāso bhaved anyañ sthite cādvayakāraṇe || 47 ||

Certainly, by the scripture,¹⁵⁶

The plurality [of *brahman*] is surely directly denied.

When the non-dual cause¹⁵⁷ is established,

How can there be any other manifestation?

Now you might ask—the state of pervading and pervaded is appearing through direct perception, so how can it be false? Anticipating this doubt, he says, **by the scripture**. **Certainly** is in the sense of certainty; **surely** is in the sense of being well known. The meaning is by the scripture in

¹⁵⁵ Similar to *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.7.

¹⁵⁶ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.19.

¹⁵⁷ The idea here (as per the commentary) is that there is no cause of non-duality—the non-dual cause is of course *brahman*.

the form of “there is no plurality here”¹⁵⁸ and so forth. **Plurality is denied** by that and by the denying of plurality **when the non-dual cause**—i.e., the undivided instrumental and material cause or *brahman*—**is established, how can there be any other manifestation**—i.e., the produced effect with the appearance of pervading, pervaded, and so forth—that is different from the individual cause? The meaning is that there cannot be in any way.

doṣo 'pi vihitaḥ śrutyā mṛtyor mṛtyuṃ sa gacchati |
iha paśyati nānātvam māyayā vañcito naraḥ || 48 ||

Also, by the scripture, the fault has been decreed—

“The person [who], deceived by illusion,
Sees plurality here,
He goes from death to death.”¹⁵⁹

Moreover, from the cause of seeing difference and also from hearing a fault, the effect is only undivided. To explain this, he says **fault**. The meaning is by scriptures with the form such as “One who **sees only plurality here, he goes from death to death.**” From death, there is uninterrupted death; the meaning is a succession of birth and death. The rest is clear.

brahmaṇaḥ sarvabhūtāni jāyante paramātmanaḥ |
tasmād etāni brahmaiva bhavantīty avadhārayet || 49 ||

¹⁵⁸ *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 2.1.11.

¹⁵⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.19.

All beings are born from *brahman*,
The supreme self.
Therefore, one should understand,
That these are *brahman*, alone.

Then what might be done? To explain this, he says **from *brahman***. [From] *brahman*, because of greatness or undividedness, from that form, i.e., **from the supreme self, all beings are born** or arise. There is also the implication of stability and dissolution from scriptures such as “Or from which these beings are born.”¹⁶⁰ From which, thus, **from that cause, one should understand** or ascertain that **these** beings are ***brahman alone***, i.e., the forms of *brahman* are existence alone.

brahmaiva sarvanāmāni rūpāṇi vividhāni ca |
karmāṇy api samagrāṇi vibhartīti śrutir jagau || 50 ||

The scripture praised in song,
That *brahman*, alone, supports,
All the various,
Names, forms, and also all actions.

Now you might ask that by reason of the variety of actions, names, and forms of plurality, how do various beings consist of *brahman*? To anticipate this doubt, he says ***brahman alone***. “Or this world is threefold—names, forms, and actions.” The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (1.6.1), the **scripture, praised in song**, i.e., made a song; the meaning is it proclaimed from its own

¹⁶⁰ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 3.1.1.

authority. After this, to explain what, he says **brahman alone**. **All names**, beginning with ether up until the body, i.e., specific designations, and also various **forms**, beginning with space up until a human, are the specific transformations of plurality. The word **also** is in the meaning of “and”; the grasping of form also has the implication of the grasping of smell, etc. **All actions** are the offering of ether and so forth and also specific actions such as cleanliness by bathing, etc. It **supports** like a rope and so forth, i.e., it holds the appearance of a snake, etc.; the meaning is that it shows the emptiness of seeing a support.

suvarṇāj jāyamānasya suvarṇatvaṃ ca śāśvatam |
brahmaṇo jāyamānasya brahmatvaṃ ca tathā bhavet || 51 ||

And as [an object] made from gold,
 Has the nature of gold, eternally.
 So, too, a [being] born from *brahman*,
 Should have the nature of *brahman*, [always].

With respect to this, to tell a well-known example, he says **from gold**. The rest is easy to understand.

svalpam apy antaraṃ kṛtvā jīvātmaparamātmanoḥ |
yaḥ saṃtiṣṭhati mūḍhātmā bhayaṃ tasyābhibhāṣitam || 52 ||

The fear is addressed of the foolish person,

Who remains [with the thought of],
Making even a little distinction,
Between the individual self and the supreme self.

Thus, to explain the **fear** of one who sees the distinction of a pot, which has the case relations beginning with agent and action, even when it is established with the form of a single support, he says **a little**. Being engaged in **even a little distinction**, i.e., making a distinction with the form of being intent on; one **who remains with that fear is addressed**. The meaning is by scriptures such as “For when, on the other hand, one creates a hollow within this, then one experiences fear.”¹⁶¹

yatrājñānād bhaved dvaitam itaras tatra paśyati |
ātmatvena yadā sarvaṃ netaras tatra cāṅv api || 53 ||

Where duality may exist because of miscognition,
There one sees another.
And when everything exists as the self,
There is no another at all.

Now you might say that just as for light and darkness, whose inherent states are opposed to each other, how can there be one category for duality and non-duality? To anticipate this doubt, because of the difference of states he says **where**. **Where**, i.e., in which state of miscognition—by that miscognition, there might exist duality of some kind. **There**, i.e., in that state of

¹⁶¹ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.7.1.

miscognition, is **another**, [meaning] **one sees** the other, from scriptures such as: “For where there is duality of some kind, then the one sees the other, then the one smells the other, then the one hears the other, then the one greets the other, then the one thinks of the other, then the one recognizes the other. Or where there might be another of some kind one might see the other, one might smell the other, one might taste the other.”¹⁶² The word **and** indicates the different characteristics from what was previously spoken of. **When**, in which time of cognition, everything might exist as the self, **there**, in that time of cognition, one does not even see another at all, i.e., even a little of another. Or where, because of scriptures such as—“For one of whom everything has become one’s very self, then who might one see and by what means? Who is there to smell and by what means?”¹⁶³—by the cessation of miscognition with its effects, there is no duality; this is the idea.

yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni hy ātmatvena vijānataḥ |
na vai tasya bhaven moho na ca śoko ’dviṭyataḥ || 54 ||

Surely, when for one who knows,
 All beings are the self,
 In that [state],¹⁶⁴ there should certainly be no delusion and no sorrow,
 Because of the absence of duality.

¹⁶² This quote and the following are similar but not identical to both *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.14.14 and 4.5.15.

¹⁶³ Similar to *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.14.14 and 4.5.15.

¹⁶⁴ I follow the *Dīpikā* here in translating the genitive *tasya* with the meaning of the locative *tasmin*, because the original verse has *tatra*, which is more in line with the latter. However, it could alternatively be translated as “for him” following the *Vivarāṇa*, which glosses it with *puruṣasya*, “for a person,” or the *Vṛt* which glosses it with *pratyagabhinnabrahmasvarūpasya*, “for one whose intrinsic form is *brahman*, undifferentiated from the self.”

Now you might ask, when there is the seeing of duality what are the aims of life? To anticipate this doubt he explains, “When for one who knows, all beings have become the self, alone; what delusion, what sorrow can be there, for one who sees this oneness?”¹⁶⁵ Thus he expresses the meaning of the scripture with **when**. **When**, i.e., in which particular state all beings are identified with the self, [meaning] with the state of the self; **for one who knows** by direct perception from seeing directly, i.e., for a person who has the authority. **In that**—the genitive is being used with the meaning of the locative—meaning in a particular state, **certainly**, i.e., with certainty, **delusion**, or confusion, should not exist and also **sorrow**, or bewilderment, too, will not exist. With respect to both of these the cause is **from the absence of duality**; the meaning is from the absence of having that cause.

ayam ātmā hi brahmaiva sarvātmakatayā sthitaḥ |
iti nirddhāritaṃ śrutyā bṛhadāranyasamsthayā || 55 ||

Surely this self is *brahman* alone,
Existing as the self of all,
So, it is declared by the scripture,
With the form of the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*.

In the absence of duality, which is the cause of sorrow, to tell the means of correct knowledge he says **this**. “Everything is this self, which is *brahman*, made of realization.”¹⁶⁶ He gestures to this and others. The rest is clear.

¹⁶⁵ *Īśa Upaniṣad* 7.

¹⁶⁶ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.5.

*anubhūto 'py ayam loko vyavahāraṣamo 'pi san |
asadrūpo yathā svapna uttaraṣaṇabādhataḥ || 56 ||*

Even though this world is experienced,
And fit for ordinary life,
It has the form of non-existence, just like the dream world,
Because it is contradicted in the following moment.

*svapno jāgaraṇe 'līkaḥ svapne 'pi jāgaro na hi |
dvayam eva laye nāsti layo 'pi hy ubhayor na ca || 57 ||*

The dream is unreal in waking,
Also, surely, waking is not in the dream.
Both truly do not exist in deep sleep,
And also, surely, deep sleep is not in either.

Now you might ask—when this very world is the cause of that, how is it said that there is the absence of sorrow and so forth? To anticipate this doubt, he gives an example with **experienced**; it is clear. Describing another example, too, that is told in Nyāya, he indicates this with **dream**. **Unreal** is false; both means sleep and waking; **in deep sleep** is when one is fast asleep. The rest is clear.

trayam evaṃ bhaven mithyā guṇatrayavinirmitam |
asya draṣṭā guṇātīto nityo hy ekaś cidātmakaḥ || 58 ||

Thus, the three [states] should be unreal,
Created by the three qualities.
The seer of this is surely beyond the qualities, eternal,
One, with the nature of consciousness.

Drawing together what was said, to explain the fruitfulness he says **three**. **Three**, i.e., the three states beginning with waking itself; thus, by the mutual false reasoning that was explained, they are **unreal**: when there is falseness, the cause is the qualities. **Created by the three qualities** [means] arranged by illusion. Then what is the truth? To explain this, he says **of this**. Of this, i.e., of the three states. The rest is clear.

yadvan mṛdi ghaṭabhrāntiṃ śuktau vā rajatasthitam |
tadvad brahmaṇi jīvatvaṃ vīkṣyamāṇe na paśyati || 59 ||

Just as the illusion of a pot in clay,
Or the presence of silver in a pearl oyster.
So too, when *brahman* is realized,
One does not see individuality.

Now you might say: let the three states be false, but the individual self should be true; to anticipate this doubt, he explains the latter with **just as**. When **brahman is realized** as the self, i.e., directly perceived, **one does not see individuality**; this is the syntactical arrangement. The rest is clear.

yathā mṛdi ghaṭo nāma kanake kuṇḍalābhidhā |
śuktau hi rajatakhyātir jīvaśabdā tathā pare || 60 ||

Just as the name pot in clay,
In gold there is the name earring,
Surely, in silver there is the name pearl oyster,
So, too, in the supreme [*brahman*], there is the name individual soul.

To explain that when the state of miscognition is realized, the difference between the individual soul and *brahman* is merely by name, with many examples, he says **just as**. **In silver there is the name**; to be precise, it is called by name. **In the supreme**, i.e., in the supreme *brahman*, **so, too** there is **the name individual soul**. The rest is clear.

yathāiva vyomni nīlatvaṃ yathā nīraṃ marusthale |
puruṣatvaṃ yathā sthāṇau tadvad viśvaṃ cidātmani || 61 ||

Just as blueness in the sky,
Or like water in the desert,

Just as humanness in a post,
So, too, is [the illusion of] the universe, in the self that is consciousness.

Not only is the individual soul, itself, merely a name, moreover, the whole universe too, with respect to *brahman*, is merely a name. To explain this with several examples he says **just as**. It is clear.

yathaiva sūnye vetālo gandharvāṇām puram yathā |
yathākāṣe dvicandratvaṃ tadvat satye jagatsthitiḥ || 62 ||

Just as a ghost in a desolate place,
Like a city of celestial musicians,
Just as two moons in the sky,
So, too, is [the illusion of] the existence of the universe in the truth.

For the sake of corroboration of the mental impression of falseness of the manifold world that is merely a name, for this purpose alone, by many examples that are well known in the world, he explains with the three words: **just as in a desolate place** (*yathaiva sūnye*). **In a desolate place**, i.e., in a place without people, **a ghost** is suddenly appearing, i.e., a particular spirit. Also, as **a city of celestial musicians**, whose basis is unreal, is to be known by name as the city of celestial musicians, which has the aspect of a city of a king, or as a particular arrangement of clouds as dark green, etc., **in the sky**. The rest is clear.

yathā taraṅgakallolair jalam eva sphuraty alam |
pātrarūpeṇa tāmraṃ hi brahmāṅdaughais tathātmatā || 63 ||

Just as it is water, alone,
That appears as waves and billows.
Or, surely, copper with the form of a vessel,
So, too, it is the self that appears with the streams of universe.

Just as waves is very clear.

ghaṭanāmnā yathā pṛthvī paṭanāmnā hi taṃtavaḥ |
jagannāmnā cid ābhāti jñeyam tat tadabhāvataḥ || 64 ||

Just as earth with the name pot,
Or, surely, threads with the name cloth.
So, too, consciousness appears with the name universe.
From the negation of those [names], that [*brahman*] is to be known.

Moreover, **a pot**; with respect to that the three quarters of the verse are clear. Now you might ask, what is the use of this corroboration of the impression of falseness? To answer this, he says **to be known. From the negation of those**, i.e., the absence of names, that ***brahman* is to be**

known from scriptures such as: “The transformation is dependent on mere words, a given name; the truth is ‘it is clay’ alone.”¹⁶⁷

sarvo 'pi vyavahāras tu brahmaṇā kriyate janaiḥ |
ajñānān na vijānanti mṛd eva hi ghaṭādikam || 65 ||

But even all worldly activity is done,
By people, through *brahman*.
Because of miscognition they do not realize,
Surely, a pot and other objects are clay, alone.

Now you might say that by the showing of meaning by scriptures such as: “For where there is duality of some kind,”¹⁶⁸ with respect to the three states, it is said there is liberation of the dead, but there is not liberation of the living. To anticipate this doubt, he says **all. Even all worldly activity** and Vedic and so forth. The rest is clear. This is the idea: there is the cessation of miscognition, thus there is liberation while living, but not from disregard of duality.

kāryakaraṇatā nityam āste ghaṭamṛdor yathā |
tathaiva śrutiyuktibhyāṃ prapañcabrahmaṇor iha || 66 ||

Just as the relationship of cause and effect,
Always exists between clay and a pot.

¹⁶⁷ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 1.6.4.

¹⁶⁸ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.14.

So, too, it is here between *brahman* and the manifold world,

From scriptures and reasoning.

With respect to that, to explain the cause with an example he says **cause**. **Scriptures** are for example: “My dear boy, just as by one lump of clay, everything made of clay might be known.”¹⁶⁹ But **reasoning**, for example, is with respect to the difference between cause and effect—from cognition of one cause, cognition of all effects should not exist.¹⁷⁰ The rest is very easy to understand.

gr̥hyamāṇe ghaṭe yadvan mṛttikāyāti vai balāt |
vīkṣamāṇe prapañce 'pi brahmaivābhāti bhāsuram || 67 ||

Just as when a pot is being perceived,

[The awareness of] earth accompanies it, no matter what.

So, too, when seeing the manifold world,

The radiant *brahman*, alone, shines.

There is identity of the cause and effect alone. He makes this clear by an example with **when perceived**. It is **radiant** by independence even from correct knowledge, i.e., it has the quality of shining. The rest is clear.

¹⁶⁹ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.1.4.

¹⁷⁰ This seems a bit counterintuitive. Manuscript B omits the *na*, which makes more sense—from cognition of one cause, cognition of all effects should exist. Manuscript C has an interesting version: *yuktis tu kāryakāraṇayor anityatve ekakāraṇajñānāt sarvakāryakāraṇatām nityatvam eva |* But reasoning is with respect to the transience of cause and effect—from cognition of the one cause, there is eternity, alone, of the relationship of cause and effect of everything.

sadaivātmā viśuddho 'sti hy aśuddho bhāti vai sadā |
yathaiva dvividhā rajjur jñānino 'jñānino 'niśam || 68 ||

Surely the self is always pure,
[Although], indeed, it appears always impure.
Just as a rope continuously [appears] in two ways,¹⁷¹
To a wise person and to an ignorant person.

Now you might say when *brahman* is shining, the manifold world does not shine. Anticipating this doubt, he says that by means of the difference of state, both also shine; to give an example he says **always**. With respect to that, **to a wise person, the self is always pure**—because of the absence of the impurity of the manifold world whose effect is miscognition, there is a lack of manifoldness. But **to an ignorant person**, because of confusion, **indeed it appears** that it is **always impure**. **Surely** is with respect to the well-known-ness of that. He also gives an example of both with **just as**. **Just as a rope to a wise person**—by the non-existence of a snake, i.e., by the non-poisonousness it makes one fearless, but **to an ignorant person**, by the false perception with the form of a snake, it creates fear. Thus, this idea **appears in two ways**. Even though *brahman* always appears alone because it is self-illuminating, because of the rising up of the mental states, it is useful for the human aim. To a wise person it appears, but not to an ignorant one; like the light of the sun and so forth, seeing in darkness is being indicated.

yathaiva mṛṇmayāḥ kumbhas tadvad deho 'pi cinmayāḥ |
ātmānātmavibhāgo 'yaṃ mudhaiva kriyate 'budhaiḥ || 69 ||

¹⁷¹ As a rope and a snake.

Just as a jar is made of earth,
Similarly, the body is made of consciousness.
This division between self and not-self,
Is made only in vain by foolish people.

Now you might ask that if the self always appears as un-subject to manifoldness, then what is the purpose of describing the difference between the self and the body? Anticipating this doubt, he says for undiscerning people, it is for the purpose of awareness of the self as different from the body, but for discerning people it is just meaningless. To explain with an example, he says **just as**. With respect to that, he says **by foolish people** (*abudhahī*)—there is coalescence with the vowel “a.” It is **made only in vain**, but even the word no is explaining a word of negation that implies the contrary. All the rest is very clear.

sarpatvena yathā rajjū rajatatvena śuktikā |
vinirṇītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmā || 70 ||

Just as a rope is [thought to be] a snake,
And mother of pearl is [thought to be] silver.
So, too, the self is determined to be the body,
By a foolish person.

Now, for undiscerning people identity with the body is invented; to give an example he says **[thought to be] a snake**.

ghaṭatvena yathā pṛthvī paṭatvenaiva tantavaḥ |
vinirñītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmatā || 71 ||

Just as earth is [thought to be] a jar,
And threads are [thought to be] cloth.
So, too, the self is determined to be the body,
By a foolish person.

He says **[thought to be] a jar.**

kanakaṃ kuṇḍalatvena taraṅgatvena vai jalam |
vinirñītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmatā || 72 ||

Gold is [thought to be] an earring,
And indeed, water is [thought to be] waves.
So, too, the self is determined to be the body,
By a foolish person.

He says **gold.**

puruṣatvena vai sthāṇur jalatvena marīcikā |
vinirñītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmatā || 73 ||

A tree stump is indeed [thought to be] a person,
And a mirage is [thought to be] water,
So, too, the self is determined to be the body,
By a foolish person.

He says **[thought to be] a person.**

*gṛhatvenaiva kāṣṭhāni khaḍgatvenaiva lohatā |
vinirñītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmatā || 74 ||*

Wood is [thought to be] only a house,
And iron is [thought to be] only a sword.
So, too, the self is determined to be the body,
By a foolish person.

He says **a house.** Of these five verses, beginning with **[thought to be] a snake**, the meaning is also very clear, indeed; because of this, there is nothing to be said.

*yathā vṛkṣaviparyāso jalād bhavati kasyacit |
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayoḡataḥ || 75 ||*

Just as for someone, there is the illusion of a tree,
From [its reflection in] water.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self.

On account of miscognition.

Now you might ask, on the other hand, with respect to that determination what is the cause? To explain that it is miscognition alone, with an example, he gives the twelve verses beginning with **just as a tree.**

potena gacchataḥ puṁsaḥ sarvaṃ bhātīva cañcalam |
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayoḡataḥ || 76 ||

For a person going by boat,

Everything appears as if it were moving.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self,

On account of miscognition.

He says **by boat. By boat**, i.e., by a ship. The rest is clear.

pītatvaṃ hi yathā śubhre doṣād bhavati kasyacit |
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayoḡataḥ || 77 ||

Just as for someone, because of disease,

White [objects] surely become yellow.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self,

On account of miscognition.

He says **yellowness**.

caṣurbhyāṃ bhramaśīlābhyāṃ sarvaṃ bhāti bhramātmakam |

tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 78 ||

For one whose eyes are rolling about,
Everything appears with the nature of motion.
Similarly, one sees the body as the self,
On account of miscognition.

He says **eyes**.

alātaṃ bhramaṇenaiva vartulaṃ bhāti sūryavat |

tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 79 ||

A piece of burning wood, only through turning round,
Appears circular like the sun.
Similarly, one sees the body as the self,
On account of miscognition.

He says **a piece of burning wood**.

*mahattve sarvavastūnām aṇutvaṃ hy atidūrataḥ |
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 80 ||*

All things of great size surely [appear to be] very small,

From a great distance.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self,

On account of miscognition.

He says **of great size**. **Surely** is in the sense of being well known in the whole world.

*sūkṣmatve sarvabhāvānām sthūlatvaṃ copanetrataḥ |
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 81 ||*

And all objects, [even though] small,
[Appear] to be large, through a magnifying lens.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self,

On account of miscognition.

He says **small**.

*kācabhūmau jalatvaṃ vā jalabhūmau hi kācatā |
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 82 ||*

[One sees] water in a surface of glass,

Or, surely, glass in a surface of water.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self.

On account of miscognition.

He says **in a surface of glass**.

yadvad agnau maṇitvaṃ hi maṇau vā vahnitā pumān |

tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 83 ||

Surely, just as a person [sees] a jewel in fire,

Or fire in a jewel.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self.

On account of miscognition.

He says **just as**.

abhreṣu satsu dhāvatsu somo dhāvati bhāti vai |

tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 84 ||

While clouds are moving,

Certainly, it appears [as if] the moon moves.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self.

On account of miscognition.

He says **while clouds**.

yathaiva digviparyāso mohād bhavati kasyacit |
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 85 ||

Just as for someone, because of confusion,

Inversion of the directions occurs.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self.

On account of miscognition.

He says **just as**. Because the meaning of the verses beginning with **just as a tree** is clear, by reason of it being equal to grinding flour (i.e., useless work), explanation is not made.

yathā śaśī jale bhāti cañcalatvena kasyacit |
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 86 ||

Just as the moon, [reflected] in water,

Appears to someone as if quivering.

Similarly, one sees the body as the self,

On account of miscognition.

He says **just as the moon. The moon** has the implication of the sun and so forth as well. The rest is clear.

evam ātmany avidyāto dehādhyāso hi jāyate |
sa evātmāparijñānāl līyate ca parātmani || 87 ||

Thus, from not knowing,
Surely, the superimposition of the body onto the self arises.
And that, alone, from complete cognition of the self,
Disappears in the supreme self.

Thus, by the twelve verses that were told, the meaning is summarized with **thus**. **Thus**, by the way that was said, there is **the superimposition of the body onto the self, from not knowing**, i.e., from miscognition of the self; understanding such as “I am a person” **arises** or exists. **Surely** is in the sense of being well known. Now you might ask, how might there be the cessation of this? It is from cognition of the self alone; he tells this with the second half beginning with **that**. **That, alone**, i.e., **the superimposition of the body, alone, from complete cognition of the self**—from direct perception of the oneness of the self and *brahman*—**in the supreme self**, which is free from the effect of that miscognition, i.e., in *brahman* which is not different from the individual self, **disappears**. It remains with the intrinsic nature of *brahman*—surely, it is not without a substratum; it is the intrinsic nature of the superimposed. From the word **and** the cause of superimposition which is miscognition also disappears; otherwise, the meaning is from the absence of the dissolution of superimposition. For when there is no cause, the dissolution of the

effect occurs; therefore, from cognition of the self, alone, there is the cessation of the superimposition with its cause and effect. Enough of further amplification.

*sarvam ātmatayā jñātaṃ jagat sthāvarajaṅgamam |
abhāvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ dehasya cātmatā kutaḥ || 88 ||*

The whole universe, moving and unmoving,
Is cognized as the self,
From the absence of all objects,
And how could the body be the self?

This, itself, he describes with **whole**. The meaning is the body is not the self. The rest is clear.

*ātmānaṃ satataṃ jñāna kālāṃ naya mahādyute |
prārabdham akhilaṃ bhuñjan nodvegāṃ kartum arhasi || 89 ||*

O you of great splendor, spend your time,
Always contemplating the self.
Experiencing all the *prārabdha* (ripe) *karma*,
You should not feel anxiety.

Now you might ask—for a wise person who is not subject to manifoldness, what might be mine in *brahman*, if by fasting another is thirsty? To answer this, he says **the self**. **O you of great**

splendor, by the disappearance of desire and so forth, intent on practice that is self-beneficial, you, **spend time** uninterrupted in cognition that is attainable by superior self-inquiry, **always**—from sleep until death—contemplating, i.e., reflecting through the sayings of Vedānta, **the self**, which is not different from the individual self. And **experiencing all the *prārabdhakarma***—karma beginning with the last body—by direct awareness of the appearance of happiness and suffering, i.e., casting away, **you should not feel anxiety**; this is the meaning.

utpanne 'py ātmavijñāne prārabdham naiva muñcati |
iti yac chrūyate śāstre tan nirākriyāte 'dhunā || 90 ||

Even when realization of the self has arisen,
Prārabdhakarma does not ever let go.
 That [idea], which is heard in scripture,
 Is now being refuted.

But truly, if there is not ever *prārabdhakarma*, how is there experience? And in the absence of experience, how is this a cause for agitation? And in the absence of that how is there the instruction for the negation of that? Thus, to speak the hidden conclusion of the Vedānta argument the teachers say **arisen**. With respect to this method, the apprehension of the universe is threefold: worldly, scriptural, and from direct awareness. With respect to that, the first is transcendental, the second is not transcendental, but the third is apparent/illusory.¹⁷² But the

¹⁷² These appear to be in the wrong order. The printed edition notes the alternate reading of empirical (*vyāvahārikī*) for the second (seen in Manuscripts A and B). Manuscript C has this for the first and transcendental (*pāramārthikī*) for the second, but none of these readings make sense. The corresponding traditional levels of reality in Vedānta go from the apparent/illusory (*prātibhāsika*) to the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) to the transcendental (*pāramārthika*).

cessation of those gradually—by the waning of *prārabdhakarma* from direct experience of the three by hearing and so forth in Vedānta—occurs and not otherwise. With respect to that, this realization is to be known through the aim of the apprehension of the other, but the meaning of the verse is quite clear.

tattvajñānodayād ūrdhvaṃ prārabdhaṃ naiva vidyate |
dehādīnām asattvāt tu yathā svapno vibodhataḥ || 91 ||

After the arising of cognition of the truth,

Prārabdhakarma no longer exists.

Because the body and such things are unreal,

Just like a dream upon awakening.

[To explain] that, alone, he says **truth**. The meaning of the verse is that by cognition, when there is the cessation of the miscognition of the cause of all worldly activity, there is the absence of ripe *karma*. But the meaning of the words is very clear.

karma janmāntarīyaṃ yat prārabdham iti kīrtitam |
tat tu janmāntarābhāvāt puṃso naivāsti karhicit || 92 ||

That ripe karma from a previous birth,

Is known as *prārabdha*.

But that does not ever even exist for this person,

Because of the absence of other births.

Now deriving from the word *prārabdha*, to draw together what was said, he says **karma**. With respect to that, karma is threefold, from the division of accumulated, present, and ripe. Among those, accumulated is the future body and so forth, likewise, present is the cessation of the body from returning, and ripe is the existing body and so forth. With respect to that, although accumulated is only in another birth, nonetheless, of the future body, there is *prārabdhakarma* alone. By that there is this attainment of one's own self—because of the absence of agency, even in the three times there is no birth. Everything was said.

svapnadeho yathādhyastas tathaivāyaṃ hi dehakaḥ |
adhyas tasya kuto janma janmābhāve hi tat kutaḥ || 93 ||

Just as the body in a dream is supposed,

So, too, surely, is this body.

Where is the birth of that supposed [body]?

Surely, in the absence of birth, where is that [*prārabdhakarma*]?

Describing an example of what was previously said, when there is the absence of birth with a cause, to explain an application he says **dream**. **In the absence of birth where is that *prārabdhakarma*?** The rest is clear.

upādānaṃ prapañcasya mṛd bhāṇḍasyeva kathyate |
ajñānaṃ caiva vedāntais tasmīn naṣṭe kva viśvatā || 94 ||

And indeed, it is explained by the Vedānta texts,
That the material cause of the manifold world is miscognition,
Like clay of a vessel.

When that is destroyed, how can the universe exist?

Now you might ask—from scriptures such as “or from which,”¹⁷³ because of being produced by the true *brahman*, how does the manifold world, beginning with the body, exist only in appearance? Thus, he says **material cause**. With respect to this, the cause is twofold, from the division of instrumental and material. Among these, what is called the instrumental cause is the cause merely of arising, but the material cause is the cause of arising, stability, and destruction. With respect to that, **by Vedāntic texts** such as “but one should know illusion as nature,”¹⁷⁴ it is taught that **the material cause of the manifold world is miscognition**. Because of the word **and**, it is *brahman* also. This is the idea: it is not merely *brahman* alone, because of the non-changeability of the cause of the universe; there is also not merely miscognition, because it is inert. Therefore, having joined both together, this indeed is the cause of the universe, from scriptures such as “making a pair of truth and untruth.”¹⁷⁵ With respect to that, there is the example **of a vessel**, i.e., of a straw water-pot and so forth; **like clay** [means] like a lump of clay. There, in the vessel, it is *brahman*—there is miscognition because of the similarity to the capacity of making a lump of clay, but in an object made of clay, it is because of the similarity in

¹⁷³ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 3.1.1.

¹⁷⁴ *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 4.10.

¹⁷⁵ *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* 2.3.6.

the covering. With respect to that, because of the indestructability of *brahman*, by cognition of *brahman*, **when that** miscognition itself is **destroyed**, **how can the universe**, i.e., the universe of beings, the universe whose nature is God, **exist**? The meaning is it cannot exist.

yathā rajjuṃ parityajya sarpam grhṇāti vai bhramāt |
tadvat satyam avijñāya jagat paśyati mūḍhadhīḥ || 95 ||

Just as because of confusion,
Certainly, one perceives a snake, disregarding the rope.
So, too, a foolish person sees the universe,
Without realizing the truth.

He develops an example of the existence of the pair itself as the cause of the universe, with **just as a rope**.

rajjurūpe pariññāte sarpakhaṇḍam na tiṣṭhati |
adhiṣṭhāne tathā jñāte prapañcaḥ sūnyatām gataḥ || 96 ||

When the form of the rope is recognized,
The appearance of the snake no longer remains.
So, too, when the support [of the world] is known,
The manifold world disappears.

Now, [regarding] what was said (in Verse 94)—when that [miscognition] is destroyed, how can the universe exist? Developing the absence of *prārabdhakarma* that was previously spoken of, he draws it together with an example, by the half verse beginning with **the form of the rope**. The rest is clear.

dehasyāpi prapañcatvāt prārabdhāvasthiḥ kutaḥ |
ajñānijanabodhārthaṃ prārabdhaṃ vakti vai śrutiḥ || 97 ||

Since even the body is [part of] the manifold world,
How can *prārabdhakarma* exist?
The scriptures certainly speak of *prārabdhakarma*,
For the purpose of awakening uncognizant people.

Moreover, he says **of the body**. Now you might ask, for those who are liberated while living, i.e., the cognizant, when there is the absence of *prārabdhakarma*, what is the purpose in speaking of *prārabdhakarma* in scriptures such as “One attains *brahman* in this world”?¹⁷⁶ He answers with the half verse [beginning with] **uncognizant people**. The meaning is that the scriptures speak of *prārabdhakarma* **for the purpose of awakening uncognizant people**. When miscognition, which is the cause of all worldly activity, is destroyed by cognition, how could there be worldly activity for the cognizant? Thus, when there is reference to the uncognizant ones through the word *prārabdha*, it is for the purpose of awakening them. The rest is clear.

¹⁷⁶ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.7.

*kṣīyante cāsyā karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare*¹⁷⁷ |
bahutvaṃ tanniṣedhārthaṃ śrutyā gītaṃ ca yat sphuṭaṃ || 98 ||

And all one's actions are destroyed,
When that which is the highest and lowest is seen.
The plural is for the purpose of negation of that [*prārabdhakarma*],¹⁷⁸
Which is also declared clearly by scripture.

What then does the scripture say for the purpose of awakening the cognizant ones? To answer this, he says **are destroyed**. By the scripture—“**When that which is the highest and lowest is seen**, the knot of the heart is pierced, all doubts are cut away, and **one's actions are destroyed**,”¹⁷⁹—with regard to actions, **the plural is clearly declared for the purpose of the negation of that**, i.e., for the purpose of causing the absence of *prārabdhakarma*. Otherwise, with reference to accumulated and future [*karma*], actions would be declared as twofold, [but] it is not declared in that way. The idea is that the scriptures say it is from this, i.e., from direct seeing of the self as *brahman*, by the cutting of the knot between consciousness and inertness, there is the waning of the threefold *karma*—namely, accumulated, future, and ripe—for the purpose of the highest self, i.e., for the purpose of the awakening of the cognizant.

ucyate 'jñair balāc caitat tadānarthadvayāgamaḥ |
vedāntamatahānaṃ ca yato jñānam iti śrutih || 99 ||

¹⁷⁷ *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 2.2.8.

¹⁷⁸ The plural *karmāṇi* (actions) is used here to represent not just accumulated (*saṃcita*) and future (*kriyamāṇa*) karma, but *prārabdhakarma* as well, and all three types of karma are destroyed by the realization of *brahman*.

¹⁷⁹ *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 2.2.8.

And [if] this [*prārabdhakarma*] is [still] said by the uncognizant,
Without being able to help it, then they will approach a double untruth,

And abandon the thought of Vedānta.

[Therefore], the scripture [is to be accepted], from which cognition [arises].

To counter the opposition that was spoken, he says **is said**. **This** ripe *karma*—**by the uncognizant**, who do not know the meaning of the scriptures, **without being able to help it**, i.e., from the power of lack of discernment—**is said**, just as it is explained with meaningfulness. Because of the word **and**, they do not see the non-dual self; **then they will approach a double untruth**, i.e., attain two faults. With respect to that, when there is acceptance of duality with the form of ripe *karma*, attachment to the lack of liberation is one fault. In the absence of liberation, the second fault has the form of the cutting off of the tradition of cognition. And there is not only attainment of the two faults alone, but they will also **abandon the thought of Vedānta**, i.e., abandon the non-duality of the thought of Vedānta. The meaning is that abandoning will occur with the form of grasping *prārabdhakarma*, because of the acceptance of the truth of duality.

Then what is to be understood? Because of this he says **from which**. **From which**, i.e., from which presence, **cognition arises**—such **scripture**; supply “to be accepted.” And that **scripture** is: “Realizing that very [self], a wise Brahmin should obtain wisdom. He should not overly consider a lot of words, for that surely causes weariness of the voice.”¹⁸⁰ Thus, this is the intended meaning if you asked what is written. A wise, i.e., discerning Brahmin with the desire to know *brahman*, realizing that very [self], which is well known in Vedānta, i.e., the self, beginning from the instruction of the scriptures and cognizing uninterrupted wisdom, whose sphere is taught by the teachers in the scriptures, up until immediate awareness; one who desires

¹⁸⁰ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.21. The beginning of this passage is quoted in the commentary on verse 97.

cognition should complete this. He should not overly consider, or contemplate a lot of words, indicating the intention on *karma*, i.e., weaving together of speech. Then what should one say? To say no he says voice, mentioning the scripture on the duality of that; by the term “weariness of the voice,” he means making tired. Surely indicates attained in the experience of all. Enough of further amplification.

tripañcāṅgāny atho vakṣye pūrvoktasya hi labdhaye |
taiś ca sarvaiḥ sadā kāryaṃ nididhyāsanam eva tu || 100 ||

Now, surely, for the attainment of what was spoken of previously,

I will explain the fifteen parts.

And yet, by means of all of these,

Contemplation, alone, is always to be practiced.

Thus, by the discourse in the text so far, it was explained that the best means to liberation for the most qualified aspirant, preceded by the four means, beginning with detachment, is inquiry into the Upaniṣadic statements alone, by way of knowledge of the direct perception of *brahman* as not different from the self. Now, for the mediocre aspirant, for whom the knowledge of direct perception [of *brahman*] does not arise, even having reflected on this repeatedly, through the obstacles of slow-mindedness and attachment to sense objects and so forth, the teachers introduce the yoga of meditation, together with its means, intending the best method, which is being intent on the quality-less *brahman* alone.

Thus, he says **fifteen**. The word **now** is for the purpose of [indicating] a different kind of qualified aspirant. Some manuscripts say, “after this.” In this reading, because the mediocre aspirant does not achieve inquiry, he says “after this,” [meaning] therefore. **Tripañca** is three times five which means fifteen. Such a number of parts are the particular means to accomplish contemplation, the possessor of parts, just like a pre-sacrifice and so forth [are the means] for accomplishing a sacrifice. **Vakṣye** [means] I will explain, i.e., by these I will explain. By all of these parts, contemplation alone is to be done and it is not appropriate to stay quietly; this is the meaning. [To tell] the purpose of the statement that these parts are to be done for the sake of contemplation, he says **of what was spoken of previously**. Of what was spoken of previously means for the attainment of the liberation that has the characteristic of residing in one’s intrinsic form. The word **surely** means being well known in Vedānta. The word **yet** indicates for the attainment of liberation by means of the different characteristics given in Patañjali’s system. By this he is establishing the eight-part path—this is alluded to because of the non-Vedic-ness of Patañjali’s system, like Vaiśeṣika, etc.

nityābhyāsād ṛte prāptir na bhavet saccidātmanah |
tasmād brahma nididhyāsej jijnāsuḥ śreyase ciram || 101 ||

Without constant practice one may not attain,

The self that is characterized by being and consciousness.

Therefore, one who is desirous of knowing,

Should contemplate *brahman* for a long time, for the highest aim [of liberation].¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ *Vṛt: śreyase mokṣāya bhavatīti śeṣah.*

The mediocre aspirant, having abandoned all other action in the form of inquiry and intention on [brahman] with quality, with its means, through faith, **should contemplate** the quality-less **brahman** alone, by the method taught by the teacher; thus, he says **constant**. The rest is clear.

yamo hi niyamas tyāgo maunaṃ deśaś ca kālatā |
āsanaṃ mūlabandhaś ca dehasāmyaṃ ca dr̥ksthitiḥ || 102 ||

Restraint, observance, renunciation,
Silence, place, and time.
Posture and the root-lock,
Equilibrium of the body and steadiness of the gaze.

prāṇasaṃyamaṇaṃ caiva pratyāhāraś ca dhāraṇā |
ātmadhyānaṃ samādhiś ca proktāny aṅgāni vai kramāt || 103 ||

And, indeed, restraint of the breath,
Withdrawal of the senses and concentration,
Meditation on the self and absorption,
Certainly, are the auxiliaries taught in sequence.

Now if you were to ask—what are these auxiliaries, together by which, contemplation is to be done? In expectation of this, he specifies with **restraint**, etc. And both of these verses have open meaning.

sarvaṃ brahmeti vijñānād indriyagrāmasaṃyamah |
yamo 'yam iti saṃprokto 'bhyasanīyo muhur muhuḥ || 104 ||

From the realization that “Everything is *brahman*,”

There is the control of the collection of senses.

This is declared to be restraint (*yama*),

To be practiced again and again.

Now, according to the sequence that was specified, he tells the characteristics of these, one at a time, with the characteristics acceptable to him, beginning with **everything**, by means of twenty-one verses. With respect to that, first restraint is described, and he shows to what extent with **everything**. **Everything**—the universe, beginning with ether up until the body—is *brahman*, by means of having a common substratum and by supersession; the meaning is like a person and a post. Thus, **from the realization**, i.e., from the ascertainment or cause, there is **the control of the collection of the senses**, i.e., the aggregate of the eleven sense organs beginning with hearing, all together, because of seeing the defects of perishability, superiority, producing suffering, and so forth, of the sense objects beginning with sound. **Restraint** is the driving back of the sense objects. It is **declared** that **this is restraint**; the meaning is but not only non-violence, etc. And therefore, what then? He says **it is to be practiced**, thus this is **to be practiced again and again**.

sajātīyappravāhas ca vijātīyatiraskṛtiḥ |
niyamo hi parānando niyamāt kriyate budhaiḥ || 105 ||

The smooth flow of one type [of mental state of *brahman*],
And the disregard of other types [of mental states],
Surely is observance (*niyama*), the highest bliss,
Regularly practiced by the wise.

Thus, having defined restraint, he now defines observance with **one type**. **One type** [means] of the highest *brahman* which is not different from the self, and that **smooth flow** of the mental state of being one [with *brahman*], is the **smooth flow of one type**. Or else flow of the same type means of the conception of *brahman* which is not different from the self by thoughts such as “I am unattached” and “I am unchanging.” And also, **the disregard of other types** [means] different mental states, which are dissimilar to *ātman* and *brahman*, being produced from previous impressions of the world; the meaning is mental states with that form. The disregard of those [mental states] by the memory of fault is the highest abandonment or indifference and this is what is meant by **observance**. And not only cleanliness, etc., is the meaning. **Surely** means well known in the Upaniṣads. Now, by the well-known Upaniṣads, with regard to these two (*yama* and *niyama*), what aim of life is intended? Thus, he says **the highest bliss** (liberation) and therefore to explain what this is, he says **observance and so forth**. The rest is easy to understand.

tyāgaḥ prapañcarūpasya cidātmavāvalokanāt |
tyāgo hi mahatām pūjyaḥ sadyo mokṣamayo yataḥ || 106 ||

Renunciation of the form of the manifold world,

From beholding that its nature is consciousness.
Surely that renunciation (*tyāga*) is venerated among the great,
Because it immediately has the nature of liberation.

Now he defines the third part, renunciation, with **renunciation. Of the form of the manifold world** means it is presented as the manifold world, which has the characteristic of name and form, i.e., it is designated through name and form by statements such as “This is a pot” and “This is a cloth,” [meaning] it is referred to or illuminated in the forms which are the manifold world. **From beholding that its nature is consciousness**, which serves as the foundation of everything, there is the manifestation of things. **Consciousness** is that *brahman*, which is not inanimate, shining forth only of its own accord, whose intrinsic form is the self. Seeing that, i.e., by inquiry into the essential truth, from that, due to that cause, there is **renunciation**, which is the disregard of name and form; that alone is **renunciation**. By this and other statements from the Upaniṣads, it is said of the word renunciation: “This whole universe is pervaded by the Lord.”¹⁸² The word **surely** is in the sense of the well-established experience of learned people. Now you might say that this renunciation is nowhere well known; anticipating this query, he says **venerated among the great**. With respect to that, to explain the cause he says **immediately**, since this renunciation immediately, exactly at the time of inquiry, **has the nature of liberation**, which has the form of residing in one’s intrinsic form as the highest bliss. That is why it is desired by people who know the truth of the self. The meaning is that this renunciation is very well known. Therefore, this alone, by those desiring liberation is to be done and not another in the form of not doing one’s own duty; thus, this is the further meaning also to be inferred.

¹⁸² *Īśa Upaniṣad* 1.

yasmād vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha |
yan maunaṃ yogibhir gamyam tad bhavet sarvadā budhaḥ || 107 ||

The wise should always be that silence (*mauna*),
Which is attainable by *yogīs*,
From which words turn back, together with the mind,
Without being able to reach it.¹⁸³

Now he defines silence with **from which**. From the absence of action of the kind which is the grounds for the application of words, that is beyond the range of mind and speech, which it is not possible to speak of, there is that **silence** that is *brahman*, and nonetheless, **by *yogīs* it is attainable**, [meaning] by the *yogīs* relying on cognition, it is reachable through the state of non-difference from the self. That alone is the well-known silence in the form of *brahman* which **the wise**, or discerning, **should always be**; the meaning is from the inquiry in the form of “I am that” and so forth.

vāco yasmān nivartante tad vaktuṃ kena śakyate |
prapañco yadi vaktavyaḥ so 'pi śabdavivarjitaḥ || 108 ||

Since words turn back,
By whom is it possible to describe that?
If the manifold world were to be described,

¹⁸³ The beginning of this verse is similar to *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.4.1 and 2.9.1: *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha | ānandaṃ brahmaṇo vidvān na bibheti kadācana ||* From which words turn back, without being able to reach it, together with the mind. One who knows the bliss of *brahman*, is never afraid.

Even that is beyond words.

iti vā tad bhaven maunaṃ satāṃ sahasaṃjñitam |
girā maunaṃ tu bālānāṃ prayuktaṃ brahmavādibhiḥ || 109 ||

Or thus, that should be silence,

Which is known as the innate state of worthy people.

But silence by [restraining] speech is enjoined for the ignorant ones,

By those who know *brahman*.

Now, you might say that this inquiry into *brahman* as not different from the self appears like the fourteenth part in the form of meditation; anticipating this doubt, because of the self-evidence, he defines silence again in another way with the one and a half [verses] beginning with **words**; thus, this application. Just as *brahman* is beyond the domain of speech because of the absence of grounds for the application of words, in that way, even the manifold world, consisting of the categories of names and forms, etc., because of the non-endurance of the conceptualization of being or non-being, is beyond words.

He now gives the verse beginning with **thus**. By **or thus**, i.e., by the method that was spoken of previously, he says **that should be silence**, which has the form of discarding internal conflict about *brahman* and the world. In expectation of the question of whom, he says **of worthy people** and this is well known. Of the worthy, i.e., of worthy people, it is well known with the name of the innate state. Now you might say the well-known silence is the control of speech alone; anticipating this he answers with the half [verse] beginning with **by speech**.

*ādāvante ca madhye ca jano yasmin na vidyate |
yenedaṃ satataṃ vyāptaṃ sa deśo vijanaḥ smṛtaḥ || 110 ||*

That solitary state is regarded as place (*deśa*),
In which people do not exist,
At the beginning, in the end, and in the middle,
By which this whole universe is continuously pervaded.

Now he defines place, with **at the beginning**. Here, the absence in terms of the three times for people, related to experience, is to be known through self-awareness and not through awareness from the scriptures or the mundane world, because that would be in conflict. This is the meaning; the rest is clear.

*kalanāt¹⁸⁴ sarvabhūtānāṃ brahmādīnāṃ nimeṣataḥ |
kālaśabdena nirdiṣṭo hy akhaṇḍānandako 'dvayaḥ¹⁸⁵ || 111 ||*

Non-duality, which consists of unbroken bliss,
Surely is indicated by the word time (*kāla*).
Because it brings forth, in an instant,
All beings, beginning with Brahmā.

¹⁸⁴ Vyṭ: *kālatā*

¹⁸⁵ Vyṭ: *akhaṇḍānandakam advyam*. The commentary reads: *kālatā brahmaṇā eva*.

Now he defines time, with **because it brings forth. Because it brings forth**, having begun **in an instant**; the meaning is because it is the support for creation, sustenance, and dissolution. The rest is clear.

sukhenaiva bhaved yasminn ajasraṃ brahmacintanam |
āsanaṃ tad vijānīyān netarat sukhanāśanam || 112 ||

In which, with complete ease,
Unceasing meditation on *brahman* may arise,
One should know that as *āsana*,
And not any other posture that destroys ease.¹⁸⁶

He describes posture with, **in happiness, never. In which happiness**, i.e., in *brahman* whose form is happiness, **anxious thought**, or worry about what is to be done and what is not to be done, **may never be. One should know** that posture as *brahman*; this is the syntactical arrangement. Which sort of *brahman*? The **eternal**, who abides in the three times. This is the meaning; the rest is easy to understand.

siddhaṃ yat sarvabhūtādi viśvādhiṣṭhānam avyayam |
yasmin siddhāḥ samāviṣṭās tad vai siddhāsanam viduḥ¹⁸⁷ || 113 ||

¹⁸⁶ My translation here is based on the interpretation in the other commentaries, not the *Dīpikā*, which seems clearly wrong in this case. See Chapter 4. If one were to follow the *Dīpikā*, which splits the first two words as *sukhe naiva* (“in happiness, never”), rather than *sukhena eva* (“with complete ease”), it would lead to this translation: One should know that posture (*āsana*) as the eternal *brahman*, in which happiness there may never be anxious thought, and not any other [posture], that destroys happiness.

¹⁸⁷ *Vṛt*: *tasmin siddhāsanam bhajet*

That [posture] in which the seers are completely absorbed,
Which is established as the beginning of all beings,
The imperishable support of the universe,
That, certainly, is known as the posture of the seers (*siddhāsana*).

In that context, he defines one particular posture, with **established**. And that posture is **established** or else *siddhāsana* is the posture of the seers. Whether it is a *karmadhāraya* or a *tatpuruṣa* compound, it is *brahman* alone; that is the meaning.

yan mūlaṃ sarvabhūtānāṃ yanmūlaṃ cittabandhanam |
mūlabandhaḥ sadā sevyo योग्यो 'sau rājayoginām || 114 ||

That which is the root of all the elements,
On which the binding of consciousness is rooted.
The root-lock (*mūlabandha*) is always to be attended to,
That is appropriate for *rājayogīs*.

Now he defines the root-lock with **that which is the root**. **That which is the root of all the elements** beginning with ether, which is the primary cause, is *brahman*. Likewise, **the binding of consciousness** [means] the cause of the binding of consciousness, even that whose root, i.e., whose support—because of the absence of separate existence—has miscognition as its root. Or else **the binding of consciousness** is restraining in one place, and also that **on which it is**

rooted; the meaning is for whom it is the cause of the attainment of *brahman*.¹⁸⁸ That is the root-lock is the syntactical arrangement. **For *rājayogīs***, i.e., for those whose *rājayoga* has the quality of a mental state that is not agitated, even in mundane engagement; the idea is for those who are endowed with fully cooked knowledge. The rest is clear.

aṅgānāṃ samatāṃ vidyāt same brahmaṇi līyate |
no cen naiva samānatvam ṛjutvaṃ śuṣkavrkṣavat || 115 ||

One should know equilibrium of the limbs of the body,

Is being absorbed in the constant *brahman*.

If there is not this, there is no equilibrium at all,

[Then] it is [merely] straightening [of the body], like a dried-up tree.

Now, he defines equilibrium of the body, with **of the limbs of the body**. Of all the body parts, which are mapped on to *brahman*, that are uneven by their nature, by seeing the equilibrium of their foundation [which is *brahman*], one should know, i.e., understand, as equilibrium **in the constant brahman**. Here, supplying the words, “if one still has unevenness of the limbs,” then the meaning is if one cannot be absorbed, one does not reside with the form of the constant *brahman*. Here, supply, “then”—when there is **[merely] straightening** of the body parts, i.e., uprightness and motionlessness, **like a dried-up tree**—there will be **no equilibrium at all**. The idea is that the connection is because of the inherent unevenness of the parts of the body.

¹⁸⁸ Manuscripts A and B omit this second explanation.

dr̥ṣṭim̐ jñānamayīm̐ kṛtvā paśyed brahmamayam jagat |

sā dr̥ṣṭih̐ paramodārā na nāsāgrāv alokinī || 116 ||

Having made one's gaze full of knowledge,

One should see the universe as full of *brahman*.

That gaze (*dr̥ṣṭi*) is the most exalted,

Not looking at the tip of the nose.

Now he defines steadiness of gaze with **gaze**. Even though fruitfulness does not pertain to *brahman*, because it pertains to the pervasiveness of mental states, gaze is a state of the internal faculty (i.e., the mind). **Having made** [one's gaze] of the form of undivided *brahman*, **full of knowledge, one should see the universe** as completely **full of brahman**. The idea is only this mental state is allowed: "This whole [universe] is *brahman*, alone." The rest is clear.

draṣṭṛ¹⁸⁹darśanadr̥śyānām̐ virāmo yatra vā bhavet |

dr̥ṣṭis̐ tatraiva kartavyā na nāsāgrāv alokinī || 117 ||

Or where there may be the cessation,

Of seer, seeing, and seen.

There, alone, the gaze is to be directed,

Not looking at the tip of the nose.

¹⁸⁹ Emended from *dr̥ṣṭi* (based on the commentary and other manuscripts).

Now you might say that nonetheless, with respect to *brahman*, because of the absence of class and so forth, which is the ground for the arising of the mental state, how is it possible to have a vision of the universe, which is the object of the direct perception from the senses and so forth, with the form of *brahman*? Anticipating this, because of the self-evidence of the opposing viewpoint he says **seer**. The word **or** is in the sense of the opposing viewpoint. By **seer** and so forth there is the implication of the threefold nature of all of the senses such as hearing, etc. **Where**—in which true form of *brahman*—**there may be the cessation**, i.e., the dissolution of all the triads beginning with the seer, **there**—in that alone, in the sense of what exceeds the manifold world—**the gaze**, which is a state of the internal faculty, **is to be directed, not looking at the tip of the nose**; this is the meaning.

cittādisarvabhāveṣu brahmatvenaiva bhāvanāt |
nirodhaḥ sarvavṛttināṃ prāṇāyāmaḥ sa ucyate || 118 ||

From the understanding that all the states of the mind and so forth,

Are *brahman* alone.

That control of all the mental states,

Is called breath control (*prāṇāyāma*).

Now he defines breath control with **mind**. Because of the dependence of the breath on the mind, by the very control of the mind there is the control of the breath, but not only by control of the breath—which is accepted in Patañjali’s system—is there control of the mind, because of the absence of dependence on that. This is the resultant meaning.

niṣedhanaṃ prapañcasya recakākhyāḥ samīraṇaḥ |

brahmaivāsmīti yā vṛttiḥ pūrako vāyur īritaḥ || 119 ||

The negation of the manifold world,

Is the breath called exhalation.

The mental state, “I am *brahman*, alone,”

Is the breath called inhalation.

He defines that breath control by the way that is accepted by him, by the three divisions, beginning with exhalation, with the one and a half verses beginning with **negation**. The meaning is clear.

tatas tadvṛttinaiścalyaṃ kumbhakaḥ prāṇasaṃyamaḥ |

ayaṃ cāpi prabuddhānām ajñānām ghrāṇapīḍanam || 120 ||

After that, the fixedness of that mental state,

Is called retention (*kumbhaka*).

And this is restraint of breath among the awakened ones,

Though for the uncognizant ones, it is [just] tormenting the nose.

By **after that**, the disregard for the not-self, inquiry into the self, and the firmity of that [mental state] is referred to by the word exhalation, etc.; this is the intended meaning. Now you might say that all this breath control is not heard of anywhere; in expectation of this objection, he describes

the one who is qualified by the half verse beginning with **this**. **This** means the breath control, which has the characteristics that were spoken of. From the syllable **and** it is connected to the threefold division; this is the idea. **Among the awakened ones**, by the complete absence of incapability and so forth; the meaning is among the enlightened ones who are endowed with knowledge of the self, who possess knowledge through direct experience beyond doubt. Supplying “it is appropriate,” then among the uncognizant ones, what kind is there? To answer this, he says **for the uncognizant ones**.

viṣayeṣv ātmatām dṛṣtvā manasaś citimajjanam |
pratyāhāraḥ sa vijñeyo 'bhyasanīyo mumukṣubhiḥ || 121 ||

Having seen the self in all objects,
There is the submerging in consciousness of the mind.
That is to be known as sensory withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*),
To be practiced by those desiring liberation.

Now he defines sensory withdrawal with **in all objects**. **In all objects**, i.e., in pots and such things, or else in sound and the other [sense objects], by way of positive and negative concomitance, **having seen**—or repeatedly reflected on—**the self** with the essential properties of being, luminosity, and dearness, there is **the submerging in consciousness of the mind**, i.e., of the internal faculty, by the freedom from inquiry into action and names and forms. The staying in one’s true form, which is consciousness, **that is sensory withdrawal**. And then what? He says **it is to be practiced**.

yatra yatra mano yāti brahmaṇas tatra darśanāt |
manaso dhāraṇaṃ caiva dhāraṇā sā parā matā || 122 ||

Wherever the mind goes,
From seeing *brahman* there,
And only that fixing of the mind,
Is regarded as the highest concentration (*dhāraṇā*).

He defines concentration with **where**. **Wherever**, in whichever object **the mind goes**, i.e., goes towards, there, is *brahman*, which is only being, etc., by the disregard of names and so forth. **From seeing**, i.e., from inquiry, there is the **fixing of the mind**; the meaning is that the making fixed in *brahman* alone is concentration. Now you might say that it is well known that the fixing of the mind in one place—on one of the six *cakras* beginning with the [root] support—is concentration; to answer this, he says **that**. **That concentration** in this case which has the characteristic that was spoken of, is **regarded as the highest**, i.e., the most excellent; the idea is that it is accepted by those who have understanding of the truth. But the other, accepted by Patañjali's system, is like the others beginning with breath control, in every case; this is the meaning of the two particles **and only**, which illuminate the accomplishment of the experience of those who are learned in Vedānta.

brahmaivāsmīti sadvṛtṭyā nirālabhatayā sthitiḥ |
dhyānaśabdena vikhyātā paramānandadāyinī || 123 ||

Remaining steady, without holding onto anything,
By means of the superior mental state, “I am *brahman* alone,”
Is known by the word meditation (*dhyāna*),
Giving the highest bliss.

Now, he defines meditation on the self, with **brahman alone**. **By means of the superior mental state**, which is always existing, i.e., that mental state which is not fit for rejection by any other means of knowledge, by that mental state, **without holding onto anything**, by the state of being free of inquiry into the body, and so forth, **remaining steady**; the meaning is staying or residing. The remainder is clear.

nirvikāratayā vṛttyā brahmākāratayā punaḥ |
vṛttivismaraṇaṃ samyak samādhir jñānasaṃjñākāḥ || 124 ||

By means of the unchanging mental state,
Again, with the form of *brahman*,
Forgetting mental states completely,
[That] is absorption (*samādhi*), which is the same as cognition [of *brahman*].

Now he defines the next—in the form of absorption—which is the fifteenth part, with **by means of the unchanging**. **By means of the unchanging** is by the state of the internal faculty which is free of close inspection of the sense objects. The word **again** is only to connect **with the form of *brahman***, which is **completely** free of impressions of the manifest world, i.e., empty of mental

states in the form of the meditator and the thing to be meditated on. **Forgetting mental states** [means] not reflecting on duality; the meaning is that absorption is the fifteenth part. Now you might ask that because forgetting mental states has the form of miscognition, how can that be absorption? We would say when there is the absence of the knowledge of the oneness of *ātman* and *brahman*, simply as the forgetting of mental states, in such a state, one is not endowed with the knowledge of *brahman*. With this intention he qualifies absorption, **which is the same as cognition [of brahman]**. What is the same as what is called “cognition,” is that which is the same as cognition; the idea is its form shines forth with the form of *brahman*. And it is said: “Absorption is the arising of awareness of the oneness of the individual and highest self.”¹⁹⁰

imañ cākṛtrim ānandaṃ tāvāt sādhu samabhyaset |
vaśyo yāvat kṣaṇāt puṃsaḥ prayuktaḥ san bhavet svayam || 125 ||

And one should practice this [contemplation] properly,
 Which is unmanufactured bliss,
 Until it is under control and in an instant, for a person who is absorbed,
 It should arise of its own accord.

Now, to explain the purpose for which this contemplation (*nididhyāsana*), together with its parts, was spoken of, he says **this. Unmanufactured bliss** is that which reveals the bliss that is one’s intrinsic form; the idea is that this is contemplation. From the syllable **and** the inquiry into Vedānta according to one’s intellectual capacity is also [indicated]. The rest is clear.

¹⁹⁰ *Yoga Darśana Upaniṣad* 10.1.

tataḥ sādhananirmuktaḥ siddho bhavati yogirāt |
tat svarūpaṃ na caitasya viṣayo manaso girām || 126 ||

After that, the king of *yogīs* is free from practices,

And becomes perfected.

That intrinsic form of this [*yogī*],

Is not an object of mind or speech.

Thus, he tells the fruit for one who is practicing in this way with **after that**. **Free from practices** is without repetition of these practices; this is the meaning. The idea is that the true form of this *yogī* is well known in Vedānta as *brahman* alone.

samādhau kriyamāṇe tu vighnāny āyānti vai balāt |
anusandhānarāhityam ālasyaṃ bhogalālasam || 127 ||

But while practicing absorption,

Obstacles certainly arise against one's will.

Lack of inquiry, laziness,

Desire for pleasures.

layas tamaś ca vikṣepo rasāsvādaś ca śūnyatā |
evaṃ yad vighnabāhulyaṃ tyājyaṃ brahma vidā śanaiḥ || 128 ||

Sleepiness, inertia, and distraction,

Tasting of bliss and emptiness.

Thus, by one who has knowledge of *brahman*,

This multitude of obstacles is to be abandoned slowly.

This yoga, whose end is absorption, which gives the fruits of liberation with the characteristic of being situated with the intrinsic form of *brahman* that has one whole essence, is easy to be done for those who possess the favor of the teacher. Nonetheless, thinking it is easy to practice, one should not be negligent, because of the possibility of a multitude of obstacles; thus, he explains with the two verses starting with **in absorption**. The meaning is clear.

Now he says **sleepiness**. There, **sleepiness** means sleep. **Inertia** is the lack of discernment between what is to be done and what is not to be done. **Distraction** is the breaking forth of the sense objects. **Tasting of bliss** is the mental state whose aspect is delight, thinking “I am accomplished” and so forth. And lastly, **emptiness** is a fault of the mind through the intense impressions of attraction, aversion, and so forth, i.e., stagnation of the mind, dullness, and agitation. This is the meaning; the rest is clear.

bhāvavṛtṭyā hi bhāvatvaṃ śūnyavṛtṭyā hi śūnyatā |

brahmavṛtṭyā hi pūrṇatvaṃ tathā pūrṇatvam abhyaset || 129 ||

Surely, with the mental state of an object, [there is] objectness.

Surely, with the mental state of emptiness, [there is] emptiness.

Surely, with the mental state of *brahman*, [there is] fullness.

So, one should practice fullness.

Mental state alone is the cause of bondage or liberation; thus, he says **object**. **With the mental state of an object**, i.e., with the mental state with the form of a pot and so forth, there is **objectness**; being identical with that has to be supplied. **With the mental state of emptiness**, i.e., with the mental state of absence, there is **emptiness**; the idea is inertness. The word **surely** is in the sense of being well known in the world. Likewise, **with the mental state in the form of brahman**, there is **fullness**. The word **surely** is in the sense of being well known among the learned. After that, what then? To answer this, he says **fullness**.

ye hi vṛttiṃ jahaty enaṃ brahmākhyāṃ pāvanīṃ parām |
vṛthaiva te tu jīvanti paśubhiś ca samā narāḥ || 130 ||

People who abandon,
This supreme, purifying mental state designated as *brahman*,
For nothing, at all, do they live,
And are equal to animals.

Now, in order to praise the mental state, which consists of *brahman*, he reviles those who are intent on shunning that mental state. Those who abandon, i.e., renounce, the mental state designated as *brahman for nothing, at all, do they live*; this is the syntactical arrangement. The rest is clear.

ye hi vṛttiṃ vijānanti jñātvāpi vardhayanti ye |
te vai satpuruṣā dhanyā vandyās te bhuvanatrāye || 131 ||

Surely those who realize this mental state [of *brahman*],

And knowing it, they cause it to expand.

Certainly, these worthy people are fortunate,

And are to be respected in the three worlds.

Now, to promote that mental state—the supreme mental state of *brahman*—the text praises those alone, i.e., those worthy people, with the words **surely those**. The rest is clear.

yeṣāṃ vṛttiḥ samā vṛddhā paripakvā ca sā punaḥ |
te vai sadbrahmatāṃ prāptā netare śabdavādinaḥ || 132 ||

For whom that mental state [of *brahman*] is constant,

And grown, furthermore, is fully cooked.

Certainly, they attain the state of ever-present *brahman*,

Not others who only speak words.

Thus, having praised those who are intent on the mental state of *brahman*, now, he explains the fruit, whose form is the attainment of *brahman*, with the words **for whom**. It is easy to understand.

kuśalā brahmavārtāyāṃ vṛttihīnāḥ surāgiṇaḥ |
te 'py ajñānatayā nūnaṃ punar āyānti yānti ca || 133 ||

Also, those who are clever at conversing about *brahman*,
But devoid of that mental state and very passionate,
Certainly, on account of their ignorance,
They come and go again and again.

He reviles those who only speak words, with **clever**. It is clear.

nimeṣārdhaṃ na tiṣṭhanti vṛttiṃ brahmamayīṃ vinā |
yathā tiṣṭhanti brahmādyāḥ sanakādyāḥ śukādayaḥ || 134 ||

[These worthy people] do not abide,
Without the mental state consisting of *brahman*,
For [even] half a second,
Just like Brahmā, Sanaka, Śuka, and others abide.

From which, thus, therefore, those who are intent on *brahman* should always abide with the mental state of *brahman*, alone. To convey this, he gives the example of Brahmā and so forth with **a second**. In which way, Brahmā and so forth, in that same way, Sanaka and so forth and in which way Sanaka and so forth, in that way, Śuka and so forth; thus, the unbroken tradition is shown by this. Because of the worthiness of the practice of Brahmā and others, this *rājayoga*,

which culminates in *samādhi*, is the best and is always to be practiced by those desiring liberation; this is echoed here.

kārye kāraṇatāyātā kāraṇe na hi kāryatā |
kāraṇatvaṃ tato gacchet kāryābhāve vicārataḥ || 135 ||

The notion of cause has come in the effect,
[But] surely, the notion of effect is not in the cause.

Therefore, through inquiry,
In the absence of the effect, the notion of cause should go away.

Thus, having explained that *rājayoga* together with its parts, as accepted by him, he concludes with inquiry into Vedānta, which has the other name of Sāṃkhya, as explained earlier, with the five verses, beginning with **in the effect**. **In the effect** means in the transformed reality that has the form of a pot, or cloth, and so forth. **The notion of cause**, which has the form of clay, or thread, and so forth, that are the foundation for all products, **has come**, i.e., arrived. But **in the cause**, the notion of effect, **surely** does **not** exist; this is well known. **Therefore**, from cause, **in the absence of the effect, the notion of cause should go away**. Now if you were to ask, how can there be the absence of effect in a cause? To answer this, he says **through inquiry**. Just as in this example, in the same way, in an effect such as ether, there is the notion of cause, which exists as the ground for daily activity that appears through thoughts such as “That is ether.” The notion of cause, which is *brahman* in the form of truth, knowledge, and so forth has come, or arrived, in the cause, i.e., in *brahman*, but the notion of effects, such as ether and so forth, surely

does not exist. From this, with respect to the ultimate reality, in the absence of ether and so forth, *brahman* is even still the cause. He says **surely not** for the purpose of the example.

atha śuddhaṃ bhaved vastu yad vai vācām agocaram |
draṣṭavyaṃ mṛdghaṭeṇaiva drṣṭāntena punaḥ punaḥ || 136 ||

Then certainly that pure reality should exist,
Which is beyond the sphere of speech.
It is to be seen again and again,
Through the example of clay and the pot itself.

After that, what then? To answer this, he says **then**. **Then**, after that, that **pure reality should exist**, in the cessation of the cause-and-effect relationship, which is **beyond the sphere of speech** and mind. The word **certainly**¹⁹¹ is for the purpose of highlighting the fact that this is well known through scriptures which say things such as “From which words turn back.” Now you might say that because of the momentariness of this intelligence, one day from inquiry it is in that way and then again it appears in another way still; to answer this he says **it is to be seen**.

anenaiva prakāreṇa vṛttir brahmātmikā bhavet |
udeti śuddhacittānāṃ vṛttijñānaṃ tataḥ param || 137 ||

By this way exactly, the mental state should exist,

¹⁹¹ The printed edition says *hi*; however, this appears to be a corruption, as all other manuscripts say *vai* in both the verse and commentary.

Which has the nature of *brahman*.

After that, for those whose minds are purified,

Cognition of [this] mental state arises.

To explain this inquiry, which has not only the means of cognition alone, but also the means of meditation, too, he says **by this way. By this way exactly, for those whose minds are purified, cognition of this mental state arises. After that, the mental state, which has the nature of brahman should exist.** This is the arrangement of words,¹⁹² but the meaning is surely clear.

kāraṇaṃ vyatirekeṇa pumān ādau vilokayet |

anvayena punas taddhi kārye nityaṃ prapaśyati || 138 ||

A person should look first for the cause,

By means of the logic of discontinuity.

Surely after that, through the logic of continuity,

One should constantly perceive that [cause] in the effect.

He elaborates on that very inquiry with the two verses beginning with **cause. First**, i.e., initially, one should regard the **cause, by means of logical discontinuity** in the absence of an effect.

After that, one should constantly perceive that [cause], through logical continuity, i.e., by extension, even **in the effect**.

¹⁹² This and the previous sentences representing the arrangement of words is missing in Manuscripts A, B, and C. I have instead taken the meaning according to the word order in the verse, which is best summarized by the *Bodhadīpikā*: The mental state of *brahman* and after that the realization of *brahman* is taught. (*brahmayṛttiṃ tad anantaram brahmasākṣātkāram pratipādayati*). The point is that the mental state of *brahman* exists before the actual cognition of *brahman*.

kārye hi kāraṇaṃ paśyetaścaṭ kāryaṃ visarjayet |
kāraṇatvaṃ tato gacched avaśiṣṭaṃ bhaven munih || 139 ||

Surely, one should see the cause in the effect,

And after that, one should dismiss the effect.

Then causality should go away.

The sage may become the remainder [i.e., himself alone].

Alternatively, one should regard it in this way, thus he says **in the effect**. First, one should regard **in the effect, the cause** alone. After that, **one should dismiss** that **effect**. When the effect has been abandoned, one should not reflect—**causality** by itself, alone, **should go away**. Thus, in the abandoning of cause and effect, the remainder is merely being and consciousness. **The sage**, who has the characteristic of thinking, **may become** himself alone.

bhāvitāṃ tīvravegena yad vastu niścayātmanā |
pumāns taddhi bhaved chīgraṃ jñeyaṃ bhramarakīṭavat || 140 ||

Surely, a person who has conceived an object,

With intense determination and resolution,

Quickly should become that [object],

To be understood like the wasp and the insect.

Now you might say, by means of the direct cognition produced by inquiry, the sage should certainly attain the state of *brahman*; however, for one who has indirect cognition how should this be? Anticipating this doubt, he explains that by intense conception, even one with indirect cognition should attain the state of *brahman*, with the example beginning with **has conceived**. Even though this mode of awareness is by indirect cognition, when truly there is the cessation of the obstruction related to the performer of conception, the obstruction related to an object of certain knowledge does not come back. Nonetheless, with resolution, by a person endowed with understanding that is yoked in resolution, that **object**, i.e., *brahman*, which is being, consciousness, and bliss, with intense determination day and night, with the mental state in the form of *brahman*, is **conceived**, i.e., thought of; that object is to be cognized. **A person** who is fit to cognize *brahman* by direct awareness, **quickly**, i.e., soon, **should become** [that object], through the conception of *brahman* as not different from the self; the idea is a person becomes the form of *brahman*. The word **surely** is in the sense of being well known among the learned. There he gives the example, which is well known among all people, with **like the wasp and the insect**. Having been led by the wasp from somewhere and while still living, brought into his own hive, that insect, likewise because of fear, by meditation on the wasp, becomes that very wasp; he says it is like that.

adrśyaṃ bhāvarūpaṃ ca sarvaṃ eva cidātmakam |

*sāvadhānatayā nityaṃ svātmānaṃ bhāvayed budhaḥ*¹⁹³ || 141 ||

The invisible, the visible, and even the whole [world],

¹⁹³ The *Bodhadīpikā* and *Vivaraṇa* have an alternate version of the fourth *pāda*, also noted by the *Vṛ* as a variant reading: *svātmānaṃ caiva bhāvayet* = and one should contemplate as his own self, alone.

Whose nature is consciousness.

A wise person should contemplate as his own self,

With great attentiveness always.

If in the example explained in the previous verse, from the strength of conception alone, one might become the otherness of another, then because the universe is an illusory form of *brahman*, which has the form of *brahman*, by the conception of *brahman*, one might become that form. What then is to be said? With this intention he explains the conception of the self as everything, with **the invisible**. **The invisible** is beyond the range of sight, **the visible** is what is right before the eyes, and **the whole world** is the universe. Or else the invisible has the form of the seer and the existent is the seen. Because of the word **and**, the seeing of this is the whole world, consisting of the three categories, also appearing by reason of the delusion of being different from the self. **Whose nature is consciousness**, whose intrinsic form is merely the bursting forth of the non-qualified, is one's own self, alone. **A wise person**, who is intent on the cognition of non-duality, **with great attentiveness**, i.e., with mental states that are steady **always, should contemplate** this whole world; the meaning is that at all times one should see that "I am *brahman* alone."

drśyaṃ hy adrśyatām nītvā brahmākāreṇa cintayet |
vidvān nityasukhe tiṣṭhed dhiyā cidrasapūrṇayā || 142 ||

Surely, having led the visible to invisibility,

A wise person should consider it with the aspect of *brahman*.

[Then] he should remain in eternal happiness,
With his mind full of the delight of consciousness.

This alone he explains with **the visible**. **Having led the visible**, i.e., pots and so forth, to **invisibility**, which has the form of consciousness as its support. **Surely** is in the sense of being well known in the world with the aspect of *brahman*. Preceded by the cessation of names and forms, etc., which are arranged and limited; the idea is **one should consider** it with the aspect of the great, i.e., with an unlimited form. Therefore, to tell what next, he says **a wise person**. [With regard to] **full of the delight of consciousness**, delight of consciousness is the delight of consciousness alone, which is the bliss of consciousness; **a wise person should remain with his mind full** with that, **in eternal happiness**, [meaning] in happiness day and night.

ebhir aṅgaiḥ samāyukto rājayoga udāhṛtaḥ |
kiṃcitpakvakaṣāyānām haṭhayogena saṃyutaḥ || 143 ||

Rājayoga has been described,
Together with these parts.
For those whose afflictions have been only partly cooked,
It is joined together with *haṭhayoga*.

Now, to summarize the yoga approved by him that was spoken of, he says **with these**. For those whose afflictions, beginning with attraction, **have been partly**, or a little, **cooked**, i.e., consumed

by fire, this yoga, which is taught in the Upaniṣads, is joined **with haṭhayoga**, i.e., with the well-known *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, which is taught by the followers of Patañjali. The rest is clear.

paripakvaṃ mano yeṣāṃ kevalo 'yaṃ ca siddhidah |
gurudaivatabhaktānāṃ sarveṣāṃ sulabho javāt || 144 ||

And [for those] whose mind is completely cooked,

This [*rājayoga*], alone, bestows attainment.

For all those who are devoted to the teacher and the deity,

It is easy to attain, at once.

To answer the question of for whom this very *rājayoga* is useful, summarizing the purpose of the entire work, he says **completely cooked. Whose mind is completely cooked**—specifically, free from the impurities of attraction and so forth—supplying “**for those**,” i.e., for those of whom the six enemies have been conquered, who are chief among people, **this yoga alone**, which is indifferent to the yoga accepted by the system of Patañjali, accepted by Vedānta, **bestows attainment** by way of the direct cognition of *brahman* as not different from the self, i.e., granting liberation with the characteristic of residing in one’s own intrinsic form. The word **and** is in the sense of restriction; the meaning is and not for others whose minds are not fully cooked. Now you might say that a completely cooked mind is very difficult to attain for you; in expectation of this, also because the means of this are also the internal means, he says **for those who are devoted to the teacher and the deity. At once** [means] very quickly, **for all**, i.e., without regard for caste, stage of life, and so forth; only humans is to be understood from this,

alone, since devotion to the teacher and deity is an internal component. And likewise, the Upaniṣad says: “Of whom there is the highest devotion to god, and in the same way to the teacher, for this great-souled person, surely, these meanings shine forth.”¹⁹⁴ And the *Bhagavadgītā* says “Know this by humble submission...”¹⁹⁵ and “One who possesses faith obtains knowledge...”¹⁹⁶ and so forth. The meaning is this—even for those whose minds are completely cooked, the means are difficult to accomplish, but for those who are devoted to the teacher and deity they become easy to accomplish. From this reason, devotion to the teacher and deity, alone, by the non-opposition to one’s own duty, is to be done by all. This is the highest auspiciousness.

Thus, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* written by the glorious Śaṅkara Bhagavat, the teacher of the highest wandering ascetics, is concluded.

This commentary on the cognition of the eternal self is completed by direct knowledge.

It is a light on *rājayoga* in the work called the *Aparokṣānubhūti*. || 1 ||

Homage to that venerable one, in the form of Śaṅkarācārya,

By whom this knowledge of Vedānta was drawn out from the ocean of the Vedas. || 2 ||

If this Śaṅkara is clearly the shining sun on the day lotus of Vedānta,

Then if it does not rise, how might it appear strung in the *sūtras* of Vyāsa and so forth? || 3 ||

Whatever is esteemed here, that is due to my teacher, alone, surely not me.

And whatever is not esteemed, that is due to me alone, surely not my teacher. || 4 ||

From the grace [of the teacher], which is surely the support of the concept of the word I,

¹⁹⁴ Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.23.

¹⁹⁵ Bhagavadgītā 4.34.

¹⁹⁶ Bhagavadgītā 4.39.

I am that support of the universe, free from cause and effect. || 5 ||

Offered to the lotus feet of that glorious king of teachers,

This *Dīpikā* is that garland strung together by the thread of his compassion. || 6 ||

I am the one who, from merely ignorance of the self, this universe beginning with ether up until the body etc., came into existence, just like one's very own dream and so forth. Now, from cognition of the self, I am that [*brahman*] alone. I am this *brahman*, alone, without a second, the highest happiness, unchanging, without opposition, like the state of waking alone, from the arising of a little true grace from the gods and the teacher. || 7 ||

Thus, the commentary on the *Aparokṣānubhūti* written by the glorious sage Vidyāraṇya, the teacher of the highest wandering ascetics, is concluded.

CHAPTER 3

Pivots of the Text:

Prārabdha (Ripe) *Karma* and *Nididhyāsana* (Contemplation)

3.1 Textual Ideas and Alternative Interpretations

We will now look at alternative interpretations of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, contrasting the dominant reading given in the *Dīpikā* with other commentaries, which view the juxtaposition of the *aṅgas* given in the latter third of the text with the mostly traditional Advaitic core in the first ninety-nine verses, through a somewhat different lens. We will assess the commentarial reception and understanding of this Advaitic incorporation of yoga by examining points of convergence as well as disagreement through focusing on this section on the *aṅgas* as well as the verses leading up to this on *prārabdhakarma*, since the commentaries are largely in concordance on the preceding sections. As we shall see, while the *Dīpikā* considers this section an alternative path (though still an Advaitic one) for slow-minded aspirants, some of the other commentaries take it as merely an extension of the core of the text, seemingly included with the intention of subverting the growing tradition of *haṭhayoga* into its domain. One could view this counterhypothesis as a form of Advaitic imperialism or colonization of yoga; however, it is less of a divergence from traditional Advaita than it might seem and more of a widening of the definition of key terms, such as *nididhyāsana*, contemplation, and therefore an action of inclusivity. This fits in with Halbfass's definition of "inclusivism" according to Hacker as the practice of "claiming for, and thus including in, one's own religion' or world-view what belongs in reality to another, foreign or competing system. It is a subordinating identification of the other, the foreign with parts or preliminary stages of one's own sphere. It is not considered to be a process of additive

annexation; nor is it a form of syncretism or eclecticism. The other, the foreign is not seen as something that could be added to, or combined with, one's own system; instead, it is something a priori contained in it."¹⁹⁷ As we shall see, this is exactly what occurs in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, where *prārabdhakarma* is the reason for this inclusivity and *nididhyāsana* is the means to the “subordinating identification” which allows for the incorporation of the auxiliaries.

3.1.1 A Comparison of Commentaries

The reception and understanding of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, as evidenced by its commentaries, changed significantly over time. These texts can provide a window into the evolving roles of *haṭha* and *rājayoga* and their relationship to Advaita, from the time the *Aparokṣānubhūti* was originally written through the modern period. To understand the importance of this text and this shift in its interpretation, I will look at the latter part of the work in four other commentaries, comparing and contrasting them with the *Dīpikā*. These commentaries are:

- *Vijñānavinodīṭīkā* by a student of Bālagopāla
- *Bodhadīpikā* of Nityānanda
- *Vivarāṇa* by a student of Nityānanda
- *Ṭīkā* of Jagannātha Swāmi (in Marathi)

As we have seen, the *Dīpikā*, given its attribution to Vidyāraṇya, the number of extant witnesses, existence of a published edition, and citation by Vimuktananda in the introduction to his translation, seems to be the most well known and/or considered the most sophisticated.

¹⁹⁷ Halbfass 1988: 411.

According to the NCC, the author of the *Vijñānavinodiniṭīkā* (*Vvṭ*) was also called Bālagopālayati or Bālagopāendra and was a pupil of Bālagopāla, also known as Jagannātha. While Jagannātha is a common name, it could possibly be a reference to the author of the Marathi *Ṭīkā*, mentioned above, found at the Deccan College in Pune. And though perhaps far-fetched, since it is a common name, this could also be a reference to Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, the Sanskrit poet and scholar who received patronage in the court of Shah Jahan during the first half of the seventeenth century, which would probably place his student in the seventeenth century as well. The three manuscripts I have consulted—two from BORI and one from BISM—are dated early nineteenth century and are all in *devanāgarī*. The NCC also lists a manuscript reported by Bhandarkar in Pune which presumably is one of the previous. The first manuscript from BORI (D) has the page numbers in the margins as well as the occasional emendation noted. The second (E) has *Aparo.* on the upper left of the folium versum, and *Rāma* with the page number written on the lower right side, as well as the occasional emendation. The manuscript from BISM (F) has *Śaṅkara* and the page number written on the bottom right of the folium versum of each page; on the upper left it says *Apa. Ṭī.* with the page number as well. The marginalia of the folium rectum are empty throughout and most of the verses are highlighted in light orange. The *Vvṭ* adds an extra verse at 18,¹⁹⁸ but is missing verse 117, so ends up with the same total number.

The colophon of the witness of the *Bodhadīpikā* of Nityānanda from BORI mentions that it was written in Jaipur. It is written in clear *devanāgarī*, with page numbers noted in the margins, which are also used quite extensively for extra text that did not fit on the main part of the page, written facing left and right respectively. According to the NCC there is one other copy listed in the report for the search of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency, reported by

¹⁹⁸ *ātmā caityanyarūpas tu deho jaḍamayo hy asau | tayor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam ataḥ param ||* The self has the form of consciousness, but that body surely is made up of matter. They see oneness of these two. What is miscognition, other than this?

Abaji Vishnu Kathavite in 1901. The *Bodhadīpikā* leaves out the first verse entirely as well as two other verses and adds in a verse (97) from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, which is quoted in the *Dīpikā* on verse 99 (here verse 96), as we shall see. While there is no other more obvious mention of the *Dīpikā* in the text, it seems possible that the *Bodhadīpikā* was drawing on a manuscript of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* that either included—or previously included—the *Dīpikā*.

The only manuscript of the *Vivarāṇa* that I have seen is from BORI and dated 1763 (*śālivāhanaśaka* 1685). Also written in *devanāgarī*, with the words *Śrī Rāma* appearing wherever there is extra space; the margins contain *Rāma*, the page number, as well as emendations. It is unfortunately missing several folios. The NCC lists four other witnesses at Alwar, Nagpur, the Deccan College (although they did not have it, so perhaps this was the one that ended up at BORI), and Lahore, which I have not been able to view, given the global pandemic. Unlike the other commentaries, this one has a definite theological bent, invoking Vāsudeva or Kṛṣṇa throughout, and equating him with *brahman*.

I have only consulted one manuscript of the Marathi *Ṭīkā* of Jagannātha Swāmi from BISM, though there were other extant copies. This might be an interesting avenue of inquiry for a Marathi scholar, but I have had to rely on secondhand translation for this, which I have only been able to attain for a select number of verses. There is also a *Samaślokī* by Vāmana Paṇḍita, which as its name suggests, is a translation into Marathi rather than a commentary, composed in *anuṣṭubh* meter to mirror the text. There are numerous copies of this to be found in Pune. This is quite interesting, because Vāmana Paṇḍita is a very well-known scholar and poet in Maharashtra, most famous for his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*. He was a Vaiṣṇava and follower of Madhvācārya and most of his sixty works, written in the second half of the seventeenth century, reflect that. However, Vāmana took direct initiation from Saccidānanda Bhāratī at Śṛṅgeri Pīṭha,

so it seems quite possible he would have learned the *Aparokṣānubhūti* from him. This transmission at Śrīgeri begs further research and would perhaps provide a more definitive *terminus ad quem* for the text. Unsurprisingly, given the initial invocation to Viṣṇu, it appears that it was common for the *Aparokṣānubhūti* to be taken up by Vaiṣṇavas, with the *Vṛt*, the *Vivarāṇa*, and some versions of the Marathi *Samaślokī* beginning with *śrīrāmaṃ* instead of *śrīhariṃ*.

3.2 Prārabdha (Ripe) Karma

The unique position of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* hinges around a few key verses, which set up the framework for the inclusion of the fifteen *aṅgas* into its Advaitic base. In contrast to the traditional view put forth by Śaṅkara and his followers, that even after cognition of *brahman* one still must work through *prārabdhakarma*, Verse 91 clearly states that “after the arising of cognition of the truth, *prārabdhakarma* no longer exists” (*tattvajñānodayād ūrdhvaṃ prārabdhaṃ naiva vidyate*). The word *prārabdha* is the past passive participle of the verb *prā-ārabh* which means “to begin, undertake” and so literally means that which has “commenced, begun, been undertaken.” It is often translated as “ripe karma,” since it has already been set in motion. Śaṅkara compares it to an arrow that, once released, must continue its course for some time. He says that “because the fruition of the action that is the origin of the body is inevitable, activity of speech, mind, and body is necessary, even when there is the attainment of complete cognition,” arguing that these actions are in fact stronger than cognition.¹⁹⁹ Another common analogy is a potter’s wheel, that keeps spinning even after the potter stops pushing it, until the

¹⁹⁹ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* 1.4.7: *yady apy evaṃ śarīrārambhakasya karmaṇo niyataphalatvāt samyagjñānaprāptāv apy avasyaṃ bhāvinī pravṛttir vānmanaḥkāyānām | labdhavṛtteḥ karmaṇo balīyastvān mukteṣvādīpravṛttivat | tena pakṣe prāptam jñānapravṛttidaurbalyam |*

momentum eventually dies down.²⁰⁰ But the *Aparokṣānubhūti* rejects the scriptures which claim that one has to see this through and experience its fruits even after cognition of *brahman*, arguing that once one has attained cognition this karma disappears, like a dream upon awakening. Nonetheless, Verse 97 explains that the reason this karma exists is “for the purpose of awakening uncognizant people” (*ajñānījanabodhārtham*). I want to now turn to verses 97–99 in the other commentaries to shed light on the importance of this statement. This then provides the perfect segue to the practices laid out beginning with Verse 100—highlighting the reason for their inclusion—which we will look at subsequently.

Since even the body is [part of] the manifold world,

How can *prārabdhakarma* exist?

The scriptures certainly speak of *prārabdhakarma*,

For the purpose of awakening uncognizant people.²⁰¹ || 97 ||

To introduce this verse, the *Vṛ* says: “Now you might say that when the manifold world is non-existent, how can there be *prārabdhakarma*, whose beginning is the body? Anticipating this, he says there is none. Since even the body is [part of] the manifold world, he says it is not thus.”²⁰² He then says the verse is clear. The *Bodhadīpikā* comments: “What [is to be said] with respect to the falseness of the body? To explain the uselessness of the scriptures that teach happiness, suffering, etc., he says ‘even the body.’ If there is falseness even of the body, then how can *prārabdhakarma* exist? The meaning is that that sort of state, whose fruit is born from previous

²⁰⁰ See for example *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 4.1.15.

²⁰¹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 97: *dehasyāpi prapañcatvāt prārabdhāvasthitih kutaḥ | ajñānījanabodhārtham prārabdham vakti vai śrutih ||*

²⁰² *Vṛ* on 97: *nanu prapañcasya śūnyatve dehārambhakam prārabdham katham nāstīty āśaṃkya dehasyaiva prapañcatvān naivam ity āha |*

karma, cannot exist from any cause. There is also the absence of the fruit born from previous karma which is supported by this absence of the body. But the scriptures speak of *prārabdhakarma* for the purpose of awakening uncognizant people and the scriptures do not speak nonsense.”²⁰³ The *Vivarāṇa* is missing this folio. And to recall, the *Dīpikā* says: “The meaning is that the scriptures speak of *prārabdhakarma* for the purpose of awakening uncognizant people. When miscognition, which is the cause of all worldly activity, is destroyed by cognition, how could there be worldly activity for the cognizant? Thus, when there is reference to the uncognizant ones through the word *prārabdha*, it is for the purpose of awakening them.”²⁰⁴ The point here is clearly that once one cognizes *brahman*, *prārabdhakarma* disappears and one will have no need for the remaining verses of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, or the scriptures that speak of this; however, for those who have not yet cognized *brahman*, *prārabdhakarma* still exists and needs to be addressed, and the scriptures that reference it and the rest of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* are written for those uncognizant ones.

The *Vṛt* introduces the next verse with, “Referencing the contents of scriptures, he shows there is no scope for *prārabdhakarma*.”²⁰⁵

And all one’s actions are destroyed,

When that which is the highest and lowest is seen.

The plural is for the purpose of negation of that [*prārabdhakarma*],

Which is also declared clearly by scripture.²⁰⁶ || 98 ||

²⁰³ *Bodhadīpikā* on 94: *kiṃ dehasya mithyātve sukhaduḥkhādipratipādakaśrutivaiyarthyaṃ syād ity āha | dehasyāpī | dehasyāpi mithyātvaṃ cet tarhi kutah prārabdhāvasthitiḥ prāktanakarmajanyaṃ yatphalaṃ tādrśavati sthitiḥ iti na kutopīty arthaḥ dehābhāvātadāśrayībhūtaprāktanakarmajanyaphalābhāvopīti | prārabdhakarmaśrutir yadvakti tat tv ajñānajanabodhanārtham na tu śruter nairarthakyam |*

²⁰⁴ *Dīpikā* on 97: *śrutiḥ ajñānijanabodhārtham prārabdham vaktīty arthaḥ jñānena sarvavyavahārahārāṇe ’jñāne naṣṭe sati jñāninaḥ katham vyavahāra ity ajñānibhir ākṣipte prārabdhād iti tadbodhārtham*

²⁰⁵ *Vṛt* on 98: *śrutyamṭaram āśritya prārabdhakarmano niravakāśatvaṃ darśayati |*

The *Vṛ* then explains: “Highest is a word related to *hiranyagarbha* and so forth; lowest [means] base. From which, when the highest and lowest *brahman* is seen, i.e., when it is being experienced by immediate awareness of *brahman*, the actions of this knower of *brahman*—with the form of accumulated, ripe, and future—are destroyed, i.e., perish. Thus the plural (“actions”), which is declared clearly by the scriptures, is [used] to mean the cessation of that *prārabdhakarma*, i.e., for the purpose of making known its inapplicability; the meaning is it is made known because of the sense of the word.”²⁰⁷ The *Dīpikā* here says: “By the scripture— ‘When that which is the highest and lowest is seen, the knot of the heart is pierced, all doubts are cut away, and one’s actions are destroyed,’²⁰⁸—with regard to actions, the plural is clearly declared for the purpose of the negation of that, i.e., for the purpose of causing the absence of *prārabdhakarma*. Otherwise, with reference to accumulated and future [karma], actions would be declared as twofold, [but] it is not declared in that way. The idea is that the scripture says it is from this, i.e., from direct seeing of the self as *brahman*: by the cutting of the knot between consciousness and inertness, there is the waning of the threefold karma—namely, accumulated, future, and ripe—for the purpose of the highest self, i.e., for the purpose of the awakening of the cognizant.”²⁰⁹

The *Bodhadīpikā* adds: “Now, for those who are yoked to ignorance, consisting of happiness, suffering, etc., it is said by the scripture that this exists for uncognizant people alone;

²⁰⁶ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 98: *kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmīn dr̥ṣṭe parāvare | bahutvaṃ tanniṣedhārthaṃ śrutyā gītaṃ ca yat sphutaṃ ||*

²⁰⁷ *Vṛ* on 98: *paraṃ hairanyagarbhādīpadam avaraṃ nikṣṭaṃ yasmād brahmaṇas tatparāvaram brahma tasmīn dr̥ṣṭe aparokṣatayā ’nubhūyamāne sati | asya brahmavidah karmāṇi saṃcitaprārabdhāgāmīrūpāṇi kṣīyaṃte vīnaśayaṃtīti yatsphuṭaṃ śruty uktam bahutvaṃ asti | tat tasya prārabdhakarmano nirodhārthaṃ nīravakāśatvajñāpanārtham iti gamyate sāmāthyād ity arthah |*

²⁰⁸ *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 2.2.8.

²⁰⁹ *Dīpikā* on 98: “*bhidyate hṛdayagramthiś chīdyamte sarvasaṃśayāḥ | kṣīyaṃte cāsya karmāṇi tasmīn dr̥ṣṭe parāvare*” *iti śrutyā karmāṇīti bahutvaṃ yat sphuṭaṃ gītaṃ tattanniṣedhārthaṃ prārabdhābhāvapratipādanārthaṃ anyathā saṃcitakriyamānāpekṣayā karmanīti dvitvaṃ geyam tathā na gītamato brahmātmāsākṣātkārāt cijjadagramthibhedena saṃcitakriyamānaprārabdhākhyaatrividhakarma kṣīyaṃte paramapurūṣārthaṃ jñānibodhārthaṃ śrutir vaktīti bhāvaḥ |*

to reject that he says, are destroyed. When that which is the highest and lowest, i.e., when the highest self is cognized, all actions of this individual self are destroyed. Immediately after the cognition of the self, there is no occurrence of worldly existence arising from karma for the individual self. The plural [in] ‘and all one’s actions are destroyed’ is for the purpose of the negation of that transmigration, i.e., for the purpose of the destruction of worldly existence alone. It is indicated that what is said is declared clearly by scriptures.”²¹⁰ Again, most of the commentary on this verse is missing in this manuscript of the *Vivaraṇa*, but it does say: “By the connection with *prārabdha* of the two (the highest and lowest), even in the absence of [the statement of] connection, [this correlation] is to be accepted. Therefore, it is established from the cognition of the truth [spoken of] previously, that there is no necessity with any karma, for one seeing inaction in action, who is unchangeable with respect to the body, etc., for one who is devoid of I and mine, etc., absorbed, because actions are the origin of the appearance of the superimposition of the body.”²¹¹

This idea—that not only one’s past and future actions can be destroyed by cognition, but also *prārabdhakarma*—is quite radical and amounts to saying that the arrow let loose just stops and falls to the ground and the potter’s wheel abruptly stops spinning. This defying of the laws of karmic physics has all sorts of implications, in line with the Bhāmatī view,²¹² for if *prārabdhakarma* and its effects cease to exist, and the only ones continuing are the uncognizant ones, then there can be no such thing as *jīvanmukti*, liberation while living. But as we shall see in

²¹⁰ *Bodhadīpikā* on 95: *idānīm ajñānatāprayuktaṃ sukhadukhādikaṃ śrutyā’jñānajanam pratyeva bhavatīty uktā tatkhaṇḍayatīty āha | kṣīyaṃte iti | tasmīn parāvare paramātmāni jñāte ‘sya jīvasya sarvāṇi karmāṇi kṣīyaṃte | ātmajñānānantaram jīvasya karma prayuktasamsāraprāptir na | yadbahutvaṃ saṃsāratvaṃ tanniśedhārtham saṃsāranāśārtham eva kṣīyaṃte cāsya karmāṇi | nisphuṭam eva śrutyā gītam iti dik |*

²¹¹ *Vivaraṇa* on 98: *prārabdhasaṃbandhena tayor api saṃbandhābhāvo ’bhyupeyaḥ tasmāt tattvajñānād ūrdhvaṃ na kenāpi karmaṇā sahabhāvitvaṃ asya karmaṇy akarmadarśino ’vikāriṇo dehādāv ahammamādibhāvaśūnyasya yuktaṃ karmaṇāṃ dehādhyāsābhāsanibaṃdhanatvād iti siddham |*

²¹² See Ram-Prasad 2001: 189–90.

the next verse, there are those who have perhaps had a taste of cognition, but for whom obstacles remain, and it is for them that there is a need for further practice and contemplation.

And [if] this [*prārabdhakarma*] is [still] said by the uncognizant,
Without being able to help it, then they will approach a double untruth,
And abandon the thought of Vedānta.

[Therefore], the scripture [is to be accepted], from which cognition [arises].²¹³ || 99 ||

The *Vṛ* here says: “Then if you were to say we see no use for both reflection and contemplation, the answer is no, because of the arising of obstacles to the attained cognition, whose cause is instability. Indeed, one who is free from obstacles, he, alone, by merely instruction becomes one who has attained his purpose. For him, there is no need for reflection and contemplation. But one who has obstacles, for him there is, indeed, the need for reflection and contemplation. Without doubt, it is contrasting, because of the non-attainment of the understanding that the self is *brahman*. If you were to say this is invented out of thin air (literally, ‘fashioned from one’s own cheek’), the answer is no, because of the very existence of the *sūtras* of the glorious Vyāsa. Surely, the *sūtra* says, ‘[There should be] repetition, many times [of meditation on *brahman*], because [that is] the teaching.’²¹⁴ And from the sayings of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, such as ‘Someone sees this as a wonder,’²¹⁵ it is all unobjectionable.’²¹⁶ The point here is that these texts were

²¹³ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 99: *ucyate 'jñair balāc caitat tadānarthatadvayāgamaḥ | vedāntamatahānaṃ ca yato jñānam iti śrutih ||*

²¹⁴ *Vedāntasūtra* 4.1.1.

²¹⁵ *Bhagavadgītā* 2.29: *āścaryavat paśyati kaścīd enam āścaryavad vadati tathaiva cānyaḥ | āścaryavac cainam anyah śṛnoti śrutvāpy enam veda na caiva kaścīd ||* Someone sees this [self] as a wonder, and another, similarly, speaks of this [self] as a wonder, and yet another, hears of this [self] as a wonder, but someone else, even having heard about this [self], does not know it.

²¹⁶ *Vṛ* on 100: *evaṃ cet tarhi manananididhyāsanayor na prayojanaṃ paśyāma iti cen na | utpannasya jñānasya 'dārḍhyahetūnāṃ pratibandhānāṃ sambhavāt | yas tv apratibandharahitaḥ sa evopadeśamātreṇa*

written for those facing obstacles, who do not immediately cognize the equation of *ātman* and *brahman*, even upon hearing the *mahāvākyas*. For these people, there is a need for repeated practice and contemplation, which is the reason for incorporating the fifteen *aṅgas* as a form of *nididhyāsana* in the remainder of the text.

The *Vivarāṇa* explains, “It was said that cognition of truth, alone, is the means to liberation; from cognition of truth, the fruit of any action is not to be experienced. For the knowers of *brahman*, who see inaction in action, who have attained their purpose, who have nothing remaining to be done, who rejoice in the self, whose intrinsic form is eternal bliss, whose support is like a well that is overflowing on all sides, who have no human aim remaining to be obtained, whose obligation regarding that miscognition in the form of all meaninglessness has ceased, from the experience of *ātman* and *brahman* as undifferentiated.”²¹⁷ The *Vivarāṇa* then goes into a long series of quotes, which are presumably being given as examples of the scriptures from which cognition arises:

And likewise, [*Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.12] says, “If a person should realize ‘I am this self,’ desiring what and for whose desire, might he feel distressed about the body?” Moreover, [*Bhagavad Gītā* 3.18] says, “For him, there is no purpose at all with action, nor with inaction, here in this world. And nor for him is there any dependence, for any purpose at all, on all beings.” [*Bhagavad Gītā* 14.25]: “Equal towards honor and dishonor, equal towards the side of friend or enemy,

kṛtakṛtyo bhavati | na tasya manananididhyāsanāpekṣā | yaś ca tu pratibam̐dhasahitas tasya manananididhyāsanābhyām asty eva prayojanam̐ | nirvicikitsā viparyastā brahmātmabodhasya asiddheḥ | svakapolakalpitaṃ idam̐ iti cen na | śrīmadvyāsasūtrasyaiva vidyamānatvāt | āvṛttir asakṛd upadeśāt | iti hi sūtram̐ | āścāryavat paśyati kaścid enam̐ ity ādibhagavadvacanāc ca sarvam̐ anavadyam̐ |

²¹⁷ *Vivarāṇa* on 99: *tattvajñānasyaiva mokṣopāyatvam̐ uktā na tattvajñānād ūrdhvaṃ kasyacit karmaṇaḥ phalaṃ bhoktavyam̐ asti brahmavidāḥ karmaṇy akarmadarśinaḥ kṛtakṛtyasyākāryaśeṣasyātmārāmasya nityānaṃda-svarūpasya sarvataḥ saṃplutodakasthānīyasyāptāśeṣapumarthasya nivṛttāśeṣānartha-rūpāvidyātatkāryesya nirviśeṣabrahmātmānubhavā[t]*

renouncing all undertakings, he is said to go beyond the *guṇas*.” [*Bhagavad Gītā* 2.55]: “When one lets go of all desires, that arise from the mind, O son of Pṛthā, and is contented by the self, in the self alone, then one is said to have steady wisdom.” [*Bhagavad Gītā* 12.13]: “One who has no hatred for any living creatures, friendly and compassionate, unselfish, free from egotism, equal in suffering and happiness, patient.” [*Bhagavad Gītā* 4.18]: “One who might see inaction in action, and action in inaction, he, among humans, is endowed with understanding, absorbed in yoga, performing all actions.”²¹⁸

Though the next folio is missing, these quotations seem to be cited to suggest that these are examples of the scriptures which teach how one should act, unattached to the fruits of one’s actions, to attain ultimate cognition.

The *Bodhadīpikā* here says, “By the ignorant, without being able to help it, this plurality is maintained; they will approach a double untruth, i.e., they will attain it.”²¹⁹ And to recall, the *Dīpikā* explains: “[...] when there is acceptance of duality with the form of ripe karma, attachment to the lack of liberation is one fault. In the absence of liberation, the second fault has the form of cutting off the tradition of cognition. And there is not only attainment of the two faults alone, but they will also abandon the thought of Vedānta, i.e., abandon the non-duality of the thought of Vedānta. The meaning is that abandoning will occur with the form of grasping

²¹⁸ *Vivaraṇa* on 99: *tathā ca ātmānaṃ ced vijānīyād ayam asmīti puruṣaḥ kim i[c]chan kasya kāmāya śarīram anusamjvared iti śrutiḥ kiṃca naiva tasya kṛtenārtho nākṛteneha kaścana na cāsya sarvabhūteṣu kaścid arthavyapāśraya iti mānāpamānayoḥ tulyas tulyamitrāripakṣayoḥ sarvārambhaparitāgī guṇātītaḥ sa ucyata iti prajāhāti yadā kāmān sarvān pārtha manogatān ātmany evātmanā tuṣṭaḥ sthitaprajñas tadocyata iti adveṣṭā sarvabhūtānām maitraḥ karuṇa eva ca nirmamo nirahaṃkāraḥ samaduḥkhasukhākṣamī karmaṇy akarma yaḥ paśyed akarmaṇi ca karma yaḥ sa buddhimān manuṣyeṣu sa yuktaḥ kṛtsna[karmakṛt]*

²¹⁹ *Bodhadīpikā* on 96: *ajñair balād bahutvam etad yad ucyate | tad anarthadūpāsyaḡamaḥ | prāptir iti |*

prārabdhakarma, because of the acceptance of the truth of duality.”²²⁰ It then goes on to explain that the scripture that should therefore be accepted is: “Realizing that very [self], a wise Brahmin should obtain wisdom. He should not overly consider a lot of words, for that surely causes weariness of the voice.”²²¹ Interestingly, the *Bodhadīpikā* then inserts this verse from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.4.2) as verse 97, perhaps suggesting that the author had a copy of the *Dīpikā*.²²² To explain this verse it says, “Now, because of the unreality of cyclic existence, [and] because of the eternality of cognition of the self, only resolute understanding is proper; thus he instructs, ‘that very [self].’ A wise Brahmin, having realized that very self in the way that was previously spoken of, after that, should obtain wisdom, i.e., a single resolute understanding, in this self alone. [...] The meaning is that contemplating many scriptures is not conducive to ascertainment of the self.”²²³ The point here is that while many scriptures exist, one should only contemplate the ones which lead to realization of the self. And while for those who have fully cognized *brahman*, *prārabdhakarma* will disappear and there will be no more need for scriptures, the uncognizant ones, who still have obstacles, should contemplate the scriptures which will help lead to this realization.

3.3 Inclusion of the *Aṅgas* into the Text

After this brief segue on *prārabdhakarma*, the commentators on the *Aparokṣānubhūti* are then faced with what seems like a daunting task: to explain the shift from the traditional Vedāntic

²²⁰ *Dīpikā* on 99: *prārabdharūpasya dvaitasyāṅgikāre anirmokṣaprasaṅga eko doṣaḥ mokṣābhāve jñānasampradāyocchedarūpo dvitīyo doṣa iti na kevalam doṣadvayasyaiva prāptir api tu vedāntamatahānaṃ ca vedāntamatasvādvaitasya hānaṃ tyāgo bhaviṣyati prārabdhagrahaṇarūpasya dvaitasya yāthārthyād ity arthaḥ*

²²¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.2. The beginning of this passage is quoted in the commentary on verse 97.

²²² *Bodhadīpikā* 97: *tam eva dhīro vijñāya prajñāṃ kurvīta brāhmaṇaḥ | nānudhyāyād bahūn chabdān vāco viglāpanaṃ hi tat ||*

²²³ *Bodhadīpikā* on 97: *idānīm samsārasyānarthakyād ātmajñānasya nityatād ātmany eva niścayātmikābuddhir evocitety upadiśati tam eveti | dhīro brāhmaṇaḥ tam eva pūrvoktaprakāraṅgam ātmānaṃ vijñāya paścāt tasmīn evātmani prajñāṃ niścayātmikāṃ ekāṃ buddhiṃ kurvīta [...] bahuśāstrācintanam ātmaniścayānupayogīty arthaḥ |*

approach taught in the first ninety-nine verses, to what the *Dīpikā* considers an alternative path, suggested in the remaining forty-five verses. The various commentaries take different approaches to understanding this transition and consequently to making sense of its individual components. While one could see this simply as a reinterpretation of the *aṅgas* as Vedāntic attitudes of meditation, philosophically speaking, this requires a novel understanding of the relationship between Yoga and Advaita, or at the very least, a redefinition of the parameters of Advaita, to allow for this juxtaposition and integration.

The *Dīpikā* solves this problem by stating that the first ninety-nine verses follow a traditional Advaitic method for the most qualified aspirant (*mukhyādhikārī*) or A student, and the following forty-five verses describe a more inclusive method for the mediocre aspirant (*mandādhikārī*) or B student. The *Vivarāṇa* breaks down the text into sections (*prakaraṇas*), which is perhaps a useful way to think of the text. The first nine verses give a detailed description of the traditional prerequisites (the fourfold conditions) required for the student of Advaita. The *Vivarāṇa* calls the following verses, ending with verse 16, “the section on inquiry” (*vicāraprakaraṇa*), the last four of which all share the final *pāda*, “such is this inquiry” (*so ’yam īdrśaḥ*). The next section is named “the section on miscognition” (*ajñānaprakaraṇa*), with five of its verses sharing the final *pāda*, “what is miscognition, other than this?”²²⁴ The part ending with verse 40 is called “the section on refuting the doctrine that the self is the body” (*dehātmavādakhaṇḍanaprakaraṇa*), with seven of its verses ending in “how could the body be the self?”²²⁵ The next part, ending with verse 62 is titled “the section on the unreality of the manifold world” (*prapañcāsattvaparakaraṇa*). The part ending with verse 69 is called “the section on illumination of the eternal self” (*nityātmaprakāśaprakaraṇa*). The part ending with

²²⁴ *kim ajñānam ataḥ param*

²²⁵ *kathaṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān*

verse 88 is called “the section on reciprocal superimposition” (*anyonyādhyāsaprakaraṇa*), with five verses sharing the final line of “So too, the self is determined to be the body, by a foolish person”²²⁶ and the following twelve verses sharing the final line of “Similarly, one sees the body as the self, on account of miscognition.”²²⁷ There are unfortunately a few folios missing from this manuscript, but I would conjecture that the section ending in verse 99 is named something like “the section on ripe karma” (*prārabadhakarmaprakaraṇa*) and the final section should have at least one categorization, perhaps entitled “the section on contemplation” (*nididhyāsanaprakaraṇa*).

The *Vṛt* divides the text differently. It considers the first ninety-nine verses to be the section on reflection (*mananaprakaraṇa*) and the remaining verses to be the section on contemplation (*nididhyāsanaprakaraṇa*).²²⁸ It glosses *nididhyāsana* with *anusandhāna*, “inspection,” perhaps trying to connect this together with the first section focused on *vicāra*. By using this division between *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, it is clearly situating itself within an Advaitic paradigm, and perhaps this is an argument for considering this section to be a way of subverting yoga, rather than offering it as an alternative path as the *Dīpikā* suggests. However, as with the other commentaries, it makes a clear distinction that ties *nididhyāsana* to the component parts that are given in verse 100, as we shall see.

3.3.1 The Mediocre Aspirant

As we saw earlier, the *Dīpikā* on verse 100 succinctly sums up the two distinctive paths that are taught:

²²⁶ *vinirñītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmatā*

²²⁷ *tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ*

²²⁸ *Vṛt* on 100: *evam prāg ukta[m] paripāṭhya śataślokannibamadhanamananaprakaraṇaṃ pradarśya | adhunā nididhyāsanaprakaraṇaṃ ārabhate |*

Thus, by the discourse in the text so far, it was explained that the best means to liberation for the most qualified aspirant, preceded by the four means, beginning with detachment, is inquiry into the Upaniṣadic statements alone, by way of knowledge of the direct perception of *brahman* as not different from the self. Now, for the mediocre aspirant, for whom the knowledge of direct perception [of *brahman*] does not arise, even having reflected on this repeatedly, through the obstacles of slow-mindedness and attachment to sense objects and so forth, the teachers introduce the yoga of meditation, together with its means, intending the best method, which is being intent on the quality-less *brahman* alone.²²⁹

Presumably, the most qualified aspirant will have already reached liberation by verse 99. There is no mention of yoga until after this point. The author makes it clear that what is being taught here is *dhyānayoga*, the yoga of meditation, explaining that its constituent parts (*aṅgāni*) are all “means” (*sāadhanāni*) to the original goal of *upāsana*, or intentional attention, on *brahman*. The *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* also glosses the word *aṅga* with *sādhana*, indicating that these components are meant to be utilized for attainment in yoga practice.²³⁰ By analogizing with the process for a sacrifice, the *Dīpikā* makes it clear that all of these constituents are meant to be practiced—one cannot just pick one of the fifteen; instead, they are meant to work together. “Such a number of parts are the particular means to accomplish contemplation, the possessor of parts, just like a pre-

²²⁹ *Dīpikā* on 100: *tad evam etāvataḥ graṁtha saṁdarbheṇa mukhyādhikāriṇo vairāgyādisāadhanacatuṣṭayapūrvakaṁ vedāntavākyavicāra eva pratyagabhinnabrahmāparokṣajñānadvārā mukhyaṁ mokṣakāraṇam ity abhihitam idānīm asakṛdvicāryāpi buddhimāṁdyaviṣayāsaktyādipratibandhenāparokṣajñānam yasya na jāyate tasya maṁdādhikāriṇo nirguṇabrahmopāsanam eva mukhyaṁ sādhanam ity abhipretya sādhanam dhyānayogaṁ pratijānata ācāryāḥ*

²³⁰ Maas 2018: 54, fn. 15.

sacrifice and so forth [are the means] for accomplishing a sacrifice.”²³¹ This novel definition of *nididhyāsana* to indicate all these parts is the key concept upon which this text revolves, as I will discuss in greater detail below. While the intention is the same as *upāsana*, here, unlike in Śaṅkara’s time, *nididhyāsana* is redefined as this secondary method of attainment.

In its preamble to this verse, the *Vṛ* also asks the important question, “Why does this section follow the root text? It is not clear.”²³² It then answers, “For the slow-minded ones, because of the lack of consideration of the superior [method] that is preceding.”²³³

This key verse reads:

Now, surely, for the attainment of what was spoken of previously,
I will explain the fifteen parts.
And yet, by means of all of these,
Contemplation, alone, is always to be practiced.²³⁴ ||100 ||

The *Vivarāṇa* gives a straightforward explanation of what this means and how contemplation is intended to be done in relation to each component. “With respect to that, place is staying in a place in which contemplation is to be done. The meaning is that it is to be considered for cognition of that [*brahman*]. Time is the state of time; the meaning is only that time in which contemplation is to be done for the cognition of that [*brahman*]. Steadiness of gaze is stability of

²³¹ *Dīpikā* on 100: *tat samkhyākāny aṅgāni nididhyasanāṅg[a]sādhakasāadhanaviśeṣān yajñasādhakaprayājādivad ity arthaḥ*

²³² *Vṛ* on 100: *kim asya prakaraṇasya mūlaśāstrānusāritvaṃ sphutanāstīti*

²³³ *Vṛ* on 100: *maṃdamatīnām pūrvāparavimarśarahitavāt |*

²³⁴ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 100: *tripañcāṅgāny atho vakṣye pūrvoktasya hi labdhaye | taiś ca sarvaiḥ sadā kāryaṃ nididhyāsanam eva tu ||*

vision. The meaning of the rest is clear.”²³⁵ The point here is that each of the constituent parts are vehicles for contemplation. Although the name of each part, alone, does not imply cognition of *brahman* and can also represent a more mundane application, they are all redefined here with that intention. And yet, while the text is clearly not advocating putting your foot behind your head, or any other such specific technique, there is a reason that these *aṅgas* are elaborated one at a time. The author could have easily just said that all the auxiliaries of yoga are simply for awareness of *brahman*, but he spends nearly a third of the text going through each specifically.

Given the lack of explanation of the shift in method in verse 100, the commentaries assign a great deal of prominence to the particles used in this verse. The *Dīpikā* notes the importance of the word *atha* (now), “to indicate a different kind of qualified aspirant.”²³⁶ It also comments that the word *tu* (yet) “indicates for the attainment of liberation by means of the different characteristics given in Patañjali’s system. By this he is establishing the eight-part path, because of the non-Vedic-ness of Patañjali’s system, just like Vaiśeṣika, etc.; this is alluded to.”²³⁷ This is the first mention in the commentary of Patañjali, contrasting the intention of the auxiliaries given here, as opposed to in his *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, which is clearly well known, where the ultimate aim is *kaivalya*, aloneness.

The *Vivaraṇa* pays attention to these particles as well, emphasizing that the word *eva* (alone) is used for contrast: “Here, the word “alone” is for the purpose of preventing the other.”²³⁸ It then has a similar but slightly different explanation of the word *tu* (yet): “And the word *tu* is to be understood for the purpose of preventing other activity, because of this

²³⁵ *Vivaraṇa* on 100: *tatra deśo yasmin deśe sthitvā nididhyāsanam kāryam saḥ tasya jñānam apekṣaṇīyam* (emended from *apekṣaṇeyam*) *ity arthaḥ kālateti kālabhāvaḥ kāla evety arthaḥ yasmin kāle kāryam nididhyāsanam saḥ ka iti jñānam drksthitiḥ drṣṭisthairyam śeṣaspaṣṭārthaḥ |*

²³⁶ *Dīpikā* on 100: *atho śabdodhikāribhedārthaḥ*

²³⁷ *Dīpikā* on 100: *tuśabdāḥ pātañjalavailakṣaṇyalakṣaṇena mokṣasya siddhaya iti anenāṣṭāṅgapratipādakam pātañjalam avaidikatvād vaiśeṣikādivad anādeyam iti dhvanitam*

²³⁸ *Vivaraṇa* on 100: *atraivakāro ’nyonyāpaniṣedārthaḥ*

contemplation. Therefore, the meaning is without abandoning other superior practice, while abandoning ordinary activities that are merely for the stability of the body, by explaining the auxiliaries, contemplation alone is to be done.”²³⁹ It seems quite likely that “ordinary activities that are merely for the stability of the body” refers to *haṭhayoga* practices, though there is no explicit mention of any other system. And this statement makes it clear that the *Vivarāṇa* sees the *Aparokṣānubhūti* as redefining these practices to serve the Advaitic goal. The *Vṛ* ends with *tat* instead of *tu*, missing this contrast entirely.

The Marathi *Ṭīkā* follows this verse with, “the yoga made with eight parts.”²⁴⁰ This is interesting because the text itself does not use the word *pañcadā* for fifteen, but instead says *tripaṃcāṅga*. And while the *Dīpikā* explains this as “three times five which means fifteen,”²⁴¹ and the other commentaries clearly concur with this understanding, the only explanation I can see is that the *Ṭīkā* is (unusually) taking “three-five” to mean three plus five or eight. Given that the list does include Patañjali’s eight, it is conceivable that the other parts could be taken as supplemental, as they seem to be here. Even after the full list is given, the *Ṭīkā* reiterates that these are the eight sections or parts of yoga.

To introduce the next verse, the *Vivarāṇa* says: “Now you might ask, because of the cognition of the truth [spoken of] previously, what is the use of practice? To answer this, he says that even when cognition of the truth is produced from the presence of the teacher, without practice, immediacy of ascertainment in the form of the waning of the mental tendencies from the destruction of the mind does not arise.”²⁴² Rather than contrasting the two sections as the

²³⁹ *Vivarāṇa* on 100: *tu śabdaś cāsmāṅ nididhyāsanād anyapravṛtṭiniśedhārtha iti vijñeyaṃ tasmād anyasreyah sādhanam parityajya vinā ca śarīrasthitimātram laukikam api parityajya vakṣyamāṅair aṅgair nididhyāsanam eva kāryam ity arthaḥ*

²⁴⁰ *Ṭīkā* on 100: *aṣṭāṅge miḷunayoga* | I am grateful to Amol Bankar for help with the Marathi translations.

²⁴¹ *Dīpikā* on 100: *tripaṃca triguṇitāni paṃca paṃcadaśety arthaḥ*

²⁴² *Vivarāṇa* on 100: *nanu tattvajñānād ūrdhvaṃ kiṃ abhyāseneti cet guroḥ sakāśāt jātepi tattvajñāne vinābhyāsam nāparokṣatayā manonāśavāsanākṣayarūpo niścaya sambhavati*

other commentaries do, the *Vivarāṇa* sees this verse as tying them together, with practice as an essential part of the process of attainment of awareness of the self. In this verse, the optative form of *nīdhyai* (*nīdidhyāset*) is used with *brahman* as the object of its contemplation:

Without constant practice one may not attain,

The self that is characterized by being and consciousness.

Therefore, one who is desirous of knowing,

Should contemplate *brahman* for a long time, for the highest aim [of liberation].²⁴³ ||101 ||

In its commentary on this verse, the *Dīpikā* explains the path for the inferior student: “The mediocre aspirant, having abandoned all other action in the form of inquiry and intention on [*brahman*] with quality, with its means, through faith, should contemplate the quality-less *brahman* alone, by the method taught by the teacher.”²⁴⁴ It is clear that a distinction is being made between meditation on a gross object, and therefore the eight auxiliaries of yoga as described by Patañjali in terms of external practices, and the *aṅgas* here as elaborated and re-interpreted to all center around contemplation of *brahman*. According to the *Dīpikā*, the mediocre student has given up on the methods taught in the first ninety-nine verses, unlike the *Vivarāṇa*, which says that one should not give up the previous superior methods. However, the *Dīpikā* seems to present a bit of a paradox: why is *saguṇa* (with quality) *brahman* associated with *vicāra* (inquiry), while *nirguṇa* (qualityless) *brahman*—which is traditionally the higher aim—associated with the mediocre student? Perhaps the idea is that the student who combines

²⁴³ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 101: *nityābhyāsād ṛte prāptir na bhavet saccidātmanaḥ | tasmād brahmanididhyāsej jijnāsuḥ śreyase ciraṃ ||*

²⁴⁴ *Dīpikā* on 101: *maṃdādhikāryanyatsarvaṃ karma saṃuṇopāsanavicārarūpaṃ sādhanam ca vihāya śraddhayācāryoktaprakāreṇa nirguṇam brahmaiva nīdidhyāsed*

vicāra with the *nididhyāsana* attained through the fifteen auxiliaries actually attains this higher state. The *Vṛ* glosses *śreyase*—for the highest goal—with *mokṣāya*, liberation, clarifying that ultimately both kinds of aspirants will reach the same goal.

While the *Bodhadīpikā* does not have all that much to add on these two verses,²⁴⁵ it does emphasize that it is through contemplation on the individual self that one obtains realization of the supreme self. “If there is not meditation²⁴⁶ on the self as existence, then there will also not be the attainment of the state of the supreme self.”²⁴⁷ This seems to reinforce the importance of these individual practices as a way of cultivating focus on the *ātman* as a method towards recognizing *brahman*. Each one strengthens the correspondences between microcosm and macrocosm, which will ultimately lead towards cognition of *brahman*.

3.4 *Nididhyāsana*

Before we discuss the *aṅgas* in detail, I want to look at the importance of the word *nididhyāsana*, or “contemplation,” in this text and contextualize that within the wider framework of Advaita, where its transformation in meaning has been pivotal. As we just saw in verse 100, which states that “by means of all of these [auxiliaries], contemplation, alone, is always to be practiced,”²⁴⁸ aside from the concept of *prārabdhakarma*, which sets the stage, this is the key idea around which the inclusion of the *aṅgas* into this text revolves and the sole purpose (as indicated by the word *eva*, alone) for which they are introduced. It will be important to have this understanding as the backdrop as we continue to the next verses, which introduce these auxiliaries individually in detail.

²⁴⁵ Numbered 98–99 here. Note for all of these that the verse numbers in the *Bodhadīpikā* are two less than in the other texts, until after verse 117 where they are three less.

²⁴⁶ Both here and in its commentary on verse 112, the *Bodhadīpikā* uses *cintana* as synonymous with *nididhyāsana*.

²⁴⁷ *Bodhadīpikā* on 99: *sadātmacintanam na cet tarhi paramāitmapadalābhopi na bhaved iti* |

²⁴⁸ *taīś ca sarvaiḥ sadā kāryaṃ nididhyāsanam eva tu*

Nididhyāsana is a noun derived from the desiderative form of the verb *ni\dhyai*, which gives it its meaning of repeated or constant meditation, or the intense desire to contemplate. The well-known threefold path to liberation and the realization of *brahman*, consisting of hearing (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), and contemplation (*nididhyāsana*), originated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*: “Indeed it is the self, O Maitreyī, that is to be seen, to be heard about, to be reflected on, to be contemplated. By seeing, hearing, reflecting, and contemplating the self, all this is known.”²⁴⁹ In his commentary on this passage, Śaṅkara glosses the prefix *ni* as *niścayena*, with certainty.²⁵⁰ For Śaṅkara, *nididhyāsana* was not to be confused with *upāsana*,²⁵¹ or meditation as practice, but was instead a contemplation that follows an initial realization. As Jacqueline Suthren Hirst puts it, Śaṅkara “is quite clear that it [*nididhyāsana*] is of a different nature from those meditations which are the result of the meditator’s will and which identify two different entities in accordance with a scriptural injunction. However, because the texts themselves are not consistent, he cannot and does not wish to draw a neat line by confining *upāsana* to such a process and *nididhyāsana* to contemplation of the Self.”²⁵² She concludes that this may be why Śaṅkara seems reluctant to talk about *nididhyāsana*. It was also always considered a means and not an end in itself, since the final goal was the realization of *brahman*.

For Śaṅkara’s direct disciple, Sureśvara, who was more willing to discuss it, *nididhyāsana* was still clearly not meant to indicate specific meditations. Instead, “what is meant is the meaning heard from scripture, which is also corroborated based on reasoning. This sort of cognition of unity (between what is heard from the text), corroborated by reasonings which are

²⁴⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5, 4.5.6: *ātmaṃ vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi | ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānenedaṃ sarvaṃ viditam |*

²⁵⁰ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* 2.4.5: *tato nididhyāsitavyo niścayena dhyātavyaḥ |*

²⁵¹ While later texts such as the *Upāsanāsārasaṅgraha* refer to the feminine *upāsanā*, Śaṅkara always referred to the neuter *upāsanam* as defined in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* 1.3.4 and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* 1.3.9. See p. 192–3.

²⁵² Suthren Hirst 1996: 65.

caused to be experienced by the teacher of the *śāstra*—that is understood to be *nididhyāsana*.”²⁵³ Both for Śaṅkara and Sureśvara—and this has stayed consistent for future generations—*nididhyāsana* is a practice for those who cannot reach *brahman* immediately, but instead need repeated contemplation to attain that state. What changed through the centuries is the importance of *nididhyāsana* in relation to the other two members of the triad (*śravaṇa* and *manana*), and what this *nididhyāsana* could include, which is what allowed it to become inclusive of other practices in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*.

As succinctly summarized by Dharmarāja in his seventeenth-century *Vedāntaparibhāṣa*, “What is called contemplation (*nididhyāsana*) is that mental operation which, when consciousness is dragged towards objects by a beginningless bad inclination, assists in dragging it away from objects and establishing it in the matter of the self (*ātman*).”²⁵⁴ Unlike the Vivaraṇa school which considers hearing (*śravaṇa*) of the scriptures as the primary method of realizing *brahman*, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is more in line with the Bhāmatī school, which understands thinking (*manana*) and ultimately contemplation (*nididhyāsana*) to be the key to immediate cognition.

As Ram-Prasad explains regarding the Bhāmatī understanding, “If immediacy is determined by the instrument of cognition rather than by content, then the attainment of immediate cognition depends on the subject’s cognitive acts rather than the nature of what is cognised. And if liberating cognition is immediate cognition, its attainment too is a matter of the subject’s instrumentality.”²⁵⁵ He continues: “The placement of contemplation as the culminating mode is significant because it is at the same time a matter of both rigorous thought and spiritual

²⁵³ Schwartz 2017: 347, fn. 2.

²⁵⁴ Dharmarāja VP IX. 22–4, p. 160. Translated in Ram-Prasad 2001: 199. *nididhyāsanaṃ nāma ‘nādidurvāsanayā viṣayeṣv ākṛṣyamānasya cittasya viśayebho ‘pakṛṣyātmaṣayakasthairyānukūlo mānasavyāpāraḥ |*

²⁵⁵ Ram-Prasad 2001: 206–7.

orientation, at least as it is interpreted by the Bhāmatī Advaitins.”²⁵⁶ This is exactly the principle that is being drawn upon in verse 100 of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, when it explains that in order to attain the Advaitic aim spoken of in the previous verses, one should practice contemplation, alone, by means of all of the fifteen parts.²⁵⁷ With each of these different *aṅgas*, it is one’s actions and specifically the control of one’s mental states, that bring one closer to the ultimate realization. Most of the text up until this point can be considered a form of *manana*, “which consists of reflecting on those texts through logical inquiry, such as inferential reasoning, that are in keeping with the Upaniṣads.”²⁵⁸ The subsequent privileging of the third of the traditional Advaitic triad of *manana*, *śravaṇa*, and *nididhyāsana* was a growing trend; however, connecting it to all the auxiliaries is a new idea. Like for the Bhāmatī school, “it is a matter of how the mind is trained, [and] awareness developed”²⁵⁹ and this is exactly what these different aspects are meant to cultivate, repeatedly bringing the mind back to *brahman*. And this is the reason why dualistic Yoga was able to become a natural part of the progression towards the realization of non-duality: it is all about controlling the mind and learning to still its fluctuating states (*cittavṛttinirodha*).

3.4.1 *Nididhyāsana* in Other Texts

This widening definition was not just specific to our text. As Schwartz summarizes, “Some time around the thirteenth century, Advaitins come to conclude that the term of art *nididhyāsana* is pregnant with the wide-ranging semantic possibilities that the wider pan-Indic traditions attribute

²⁵⁶ Ram-Prasad 2001: 207.

²⁵⁷ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 100: *tripañcāṅgāny aho vakṣye pūrvoktasya hi labdhaye | taiś ca sarvaiḥ sadā kāryaṃ nididhyāsanam eva tu ||*

²⁵⁸ Dalal 2014: 187.

²⁵⁹ Ram-Prasad 2001: 205.

to words like *dhyāna*, *yoga*, and *samādhi*.”²⁶⁰ This is a strong divergence from Śaṅkara’s understanding of the concept, where these different ideas of meditation were kept distinct. Schwartz locates this “substantive reimagining of the Vedāntic construal of meditation” in the writings of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, the mid thirteenth-century theologian and commentator on Advaita.²⁶¹ Thought to have lived near Purī, he is known as the initiator of the grammatical tradition of the Sārasvataprakriyā. He also wrote commentaries on the major Advaita texts, mainly with the aim of refuting the dualistic Bhedābheda Vedāntins. While Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya acknowledges that traditional Vedāntic texts have considered yoga practices, such as *samādhi*, to be practiced with worldly goals, rather than as aids to liberation, he diverges from this viewpoint, saying quite simply that these methods should be incorporated, because they are useful.²⁶² Since Vedāntins are meant to only rely upon the highest scripture, “the solution is simple: the canon of acceptable praxis has to be emended. And once the precedent has been put in place to allow for the inclusion of a range of means to realization under the auspices of *nididhyāsana*, provided they prove efficacious, the door is thrown open for Advaita to assimilate, and be assimilated into, the wider world of the Yogins.”²⁶³ This seems to be exactly what happened—once the idea of *nididhyāsana* was slightly widened to include *samādhi* as a useful aid, it was not long before it was enlarged to include all of the auxiliaries of yoga, as helpful steps towards that goal.

Another contributor to this shift, noted by Schwartz, is Pūrṇasarasvatī, a mid-fourteenth-century commentator, most likely from Kerala, who, like the author of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, explicitly draws a connection between *nididhyāsana* and the auxiliaries of yoga. In the

²⁶⁰ Schwartz 2017: 347.

²⁶¹ Schwartz 2017: 365.

²⁶² Schwartz 2017: 369.

²⁶³ Schwartz 2017: 369.

Bhaktimandākinī, his commentary on the hymn, the *Viṣṇupādādikeśāntastotra* (“praise to Viṣṇu from feet to hair”), which he attributes to Śaṅkara, he begins by revisioning the relationship between *nididhyāsana* and *dhyāna* and integrating Advaita and Yoga. After quoting the passage from the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* we saw above, he says:

There is preeminence of contemplation (*nididhyāsana*), which is the mother of the absorption (*samādhi*) that has the form of the experience of oneness with the supreme God, produced by the six parts [of yoga], restraint and so forth.²⁶⁴

The yoga being spoken of here is a *ṣaḍaṅgayoga*, which unlike most other six-part yogas includes *yama* and *niyama*, restraints and observances. This emphasis on *nididhyāsana* was still quite novel in the Advaita tradition at this point, and more in line with opposing interpretations of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta by Vācaspatimiśra and Bhāskara, as Schwartz points out. As he puts it, “in the vision of Pūrṇasarasvatī, we find not only a fusion of the conceptual universes of Patañjalian Yoga and Advaita Vedānta—where *samādhi* rubs elbows with *nididhyāsana*, the *yamas* and *niyamas* with the equation of *Brahman* and *ātman*—but also a fusion of what were originally two distinct soteriological projects. The ‘path of all *śāstras*,’ in his vision, is simultaneously Yoga and Vedānta.”²⁶⁵ And as Anand Venkatkrishnan emphasizes, Pūrṇasarasvatī also incorporates ideas of *bhakti* from the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. His approach is as inclusive as possible, emphasizing that different people learn differently and consequently a variety of methods are needed. “The *Bhaktimandākinī* thus envisions *bhakti* as a combination of several

²⁶⁴ *Bhaktimandākinī*, p. 7: *tatra tāvat ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ iti svavihitasyātmadarśanasya sādhanatayā śrutvā “śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ” iti pratipāditānām śravaṇamananānididhyāsānānām madhye yamādiṣaḍaṅgaṇiṣpādyasya parameśvaraikyānubhavarūpasamādhimātur nididhyāsanasya prādhānyam |*

²⁶⁵ Schwartz 2017: 374.

factors: yogic visualization, Vedāntic allegorization, and aesthetic appreciation.”²⁶⁶ This movement towards inclusiveness and the incorporation of *bhakti* became increasingly pronounced through the centuries and is essential to understanding the transformation of Advaita over time and the origins of modern yoga, as we shall see later.

In a more traditional interpretation, in his *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, Vidyāraṇya instructs that the renunciation for one who desires knowledge (*vividiṣāsamnyāsa*), is undertaken “through the proper practices of listening (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and deep contemplation (*nididhyāsana*),’ particularly with regard to the ‘great statements’ (*mahāvākyas*) of the Upaniṣads that disclose advaitic truth.”²⁶⁷ He clarifies that it is “the direct realization of *brahman*” that is attained by these means.²⁶⁸ This is also known as *tattvajñāna*, realization of the truth. At this point the aspirant is instructed to undertake renunciation for one who knows (*vidvatsamnyāsa*), which help to remove obstacles and latent tendencies so that one can attain *jīvanmukti*, liberation-while-living. Drawing on the *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha*, these two aims are designated as *manonāśa*, the destruction of the mind and *vāsanākṣāya*, the wearing away of the mental impressions. The means to *manonāśa* is said to be yoga, which drawing on the *Yogasūtra*, Vidyāraṇya defines as the cultivation of the control (*nirodha*) which leads to *samādhi* and culminates in the complete cessation of the mental states (*vṛttis*).²⁶⁹ This is, of course, the exact definition of yoga given by Patañjali in *Yogasūtra* 1.2: “Yoga is the stilling of the fluctuations of the mind” (*yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ*). However, the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, gives this specifically as the definition of *prāṇāyāma* in verse 118 (*nirodhaḥ sarvavṛttinām*), rather than for yoga in its entirety.

²⁶⁶ Venkatkrishnan 2015: 59.

²⁶⁷ Madaio 2018: 5.

²⁶⁸ *Jīvanmuktiviveka* 1.2.6: *śravaṇamanananididhyāsanaḥ sādhyam brahmasākṣātkāram*

²⁶⁹ Madaio 2018: 5, fn. 26.

These three traditional aims can also be pursued simultaneously for those practicing *upāsana*. The word *upāsana* comes from the root *upa√ās*, which means “to sit near to, wait upon, serve, worship” which gives *upāsana* its meaning of “adoration, worship” which then comes to mean “meditation.” As defined by Śaṅkara in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* 1.3.4: “And according to the scriptures, *upāsana* is the continuous flow of the same mental image, unmixed with other mental images, and whose scope is supported by what is spoken of in the scriptures. And the meaning of the word *upāsana* is well known in the world by, ‘He honors the teacher,’ ‘He serves the king,’ ‘Surely one who always honors the teacher, and so forth, is said to be one who undertakes *upāsana*.’”²⁷⁰ And as Śaṅkara explains in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*, “What is called *upāsana* is taught by the scriptures in the explanatory section on the objects of *upāsana*, having approached with the mind the intrinsic form of the deity, and so forth, sitting and meditating on it without the intervention of ordinary thoughts, until there is the manifestation of a conception of one’s self as the intrinsic form of that deity, thus like one’s ordinary conception of the self.”²⁷¹

Over time, however, the definition of this word has expanded, and one can see how Śaṅkara’s idea of a “continuous flow of the same mental image” developed into the meditational yoga put forth in the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*. As Madaio explains, “Although Vidyāraṇya does not detail what he specifically means by *upāsana*, the term is generally understood by Advaita Vedāntins as referring to various kinds of venerational and contemplative practices that are engendered by micro-macro correspondences, among other issues. [...] *Upāsana* therefore

²⁷⁰ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* 1.3.4: *upāsanaṃ ca yathāśāstraṃ tulyapratyayasamtatir asaṃkīrṇā cātatpratyaiaih śāstroktālanaviṣayā ca | prasiddhaś copāsanaśabdārtho loke gurum upāste, rājānam upāsta iti, yo hi gurvādīn samtatam upacarati sa upāsta ity ucyate |*

²⁷¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* 1.3.9: *upāsanaṃ nāma upāsyārthavāde yathā devatādisvarūpaṃ śrutyā jñāpyate tathā manasopagamyā āsanaṃ cintanam laukikapratyayāvvyavadhānena yāvat tad devatādisvarūpātmbhīmānābhivyaktir iti laukikātmbhīmānavat |*

provides a range of meanings, and a compelling tradition-internal logic, that facilitates Vidyāraṇya’s integration of yogic practice into Advaita Vedāntin soteriology.”²⁷² Here it is *upāsana* providing this bridge, while *nididhyāsana* keeps its traditional meaning. Over time we see both terms becoming more flexible in their meaning to the point of being completely conflated by yoga teachers and practitioners in the twentieth century.

Not only does this inclusive idea of *upāsana* allow for the integration of yoga, but it also allows for the incorporation of *bhakti*. As Dubois defines it in his study of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta in light of contemporary practice, “Upāsana refers most broadly to the way brāhmaṇas throughout history have envisioned and venerated deities, sacred entities, and natural elements that reveal some aspect of the formless expanse of brahman. [...] In brāhmaṇa sources, particularly upaniṣads, “upāsana” denotes focusing on a deity or supernatural force, such as the sun, food, or vital breath, in a prescribed way; yet the connotation of doing service is never lost.”²⁷³ As we have seen in Śaṅkara’s description above, the taking of a deity as the object of *upāsana* until one fully identifies with and becomes that deity through an uninterrupted flow of identical thoughts is not new—it has just been expanded to include other focal points. As Madaio emphasizes, “This type of *upāsana* practice perhaps anticipates Advaita Vedāntic descriptions of *bhakti* that utilize yogic models of the mind during the early modern period.”²⁷⁴

Another text which emphasizes the efficacy of *nididhyāsana* is the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, “The Crown-Jewel of Discernment,” which although attributed to Śaṅkara, is considered a later composition by scholarly consensus, as evidenced by both its content and the lack of commentaries on it. Similarly to the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, it is an independent philosophical work

²⁷² Madaio 2018: 9–10.

²⁷³ Dubois 2013: 28.

²⁷⁴ Madaio 2018: 10, fn. 50.

(*prakaraṇagrantha*), taught in modern Advaitic settings as an introductory text. Verse 365 speaks of the Advaitic triad, subordinating it to *samādhi*:

One should know that reflection (*manana*),
Is a hundred times [better] than hearing (*śravaṇa*).
And contemplation (*nididhyāsana*) is a hundred thousand times [better] than reflection.
[But] conception-less absorption (*nirvikalpasamādhi*) is infinite.²⁷⁵

Samādhi is then given as a prerequisite for liberation:

By conception-less absorption,
The eternal true nature of *brahman* is clearly understood.
[But] not otherwise, for the mind, whose nature is unsteadiness,
Will become mixed with other conceptions.²⁷⁶

This last line is reminiscent of *Yogasūtra* 1.4: “Otherwise, there is identification with the fluctuations [of the mind].”²⁷⁷ *Samādhi* is being used here as a technique to keep the mind from identifying with the *vṛttis* or turning thoughts. And *nididhyāsana* is considered a preparatory step. Candrasekharabhārati, the thirty-third Śaṅkarācārya of Śṛṅgeri Maṭha, who was the *jagadguru* from 1921–1954, in commenting on the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, equates *nididhyāsana* with *bhakti*. In his reflection on verse 32, which defines *bhakti* as inspection into one’s own intrinsic

²⁷⁵ *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 365: *śruteḥ śataguṇaṃ vidyān mananaṃ mananād api | nididhyāsanaṃ lakṣaguṇaṃ anantaṃ nirvikalpakam ||*

²⁷⁶ *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 366: *nirvikalpakasamādhinā sphuṭaṃ brahmatattvam avagamyate dhruvam | nānyathā calatayā manogateḥ pratyayāntaravimiśritaṃ bhavet ||*

²⁷⁷ *Yogasūtra* 1.4: *vṛttisārūpyam itaratra |*

form (*svasvarūpānusandhāna*), he says that by this *nididhyāsana* is intended.²⁷⁸ In his explanation, this *bhakti*, which arises from *śraddhā* (faith), is the highest means to *nididhyāsana* for a *saṃnyāsin*. He then equates this with yoga. As Sawai explains, “it is apparent that *nididhyāsana* is performed with a controlled mind. *nididhyāsana* includes all the *yoga* processes of concentration. [...] A *saṃnyāsin*’s *yoga* and *nididhyāsana* (profound repeated meditation) may perhaps be distinguished theoretically, but practically they are hard to separate. For a *saṃnyāsin*, there is practically no *nididhyāsana* without *yoga*, and no *yoga* without *nididhyāsana*.”²⁷⁹ Although this clearly was not the original intention, over time, these two practices have become widely accepted as being inseparable, partly through the accepted attribution of texts, such as the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, that clearly were written much later, to Śaṅkara. This ascription has been used to justify the widening of meaning of originally specific terms and the inclusion of more modern practices.

The fifteenth-century *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda, like Vidyāraṇya’s *Pañcadaśī*, adds *samādhi* to the traditional triad. Verse 181 explains that “until the realization that the supreme spirit is of the same nature as one’s individual self, it is necessary to practice hearing, reflection, contemplation, and absorption.”²⁸⁰ *Nididhyāsana* is defined as “a stream of conceptions of the same kind as those of the non-dualism, free from a different kind of conceptions of the body, etc.”²⁸¹ After defining *samādhi* as the realization of the unity of *ātman* and *brahman* the text then gives the eight auxiliaries of yoga as the steps to the attainment of this, quoting or paraphrasing Patañjali’s definitions for the first five parts. As in other texts of this time, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna*, and *samādhi* are then redefined in terms of an increasingly more focused absorption in *brahman*.

²⁷⁸ Sawai 1992: 47.

²⁷⁹ Sawai 1992: 50–51.

²⁸⁰ *Vedāntasāra* 181: *evambhūtasvasvarūpacaitanyasākṣātkāraparyantaṃ śravaṇamanananididhyāsana-samādhyanuṣṭānasyāpekṣitatvāt te ‘pi pradarśyante |*

²⁸¹ *Vedāntasāra* 192: *vijātyadehādipratyayarahitādvitīyavastusajātīyapratyayapravāho nididhyāsanam |*

3.4.2 Modern Meanings

Let us now look at the role of *nididhyāsana* in a more recent text. The nineteenth-century Hindi work, *Vicār-Sāgar*, “The Ocean of Inquiry,” written by the North Indian monk Niścaldās, was referred to by Vivekananda as the book which “has more influence in India than any that has been written in any language within the last three centuries.”²⁸² Michael Allen, in his insightful dissertation on this text, explores the role of *nididhyāsana* for Niścaldās. Although it is not connected to the eight-part path here, it is directly connected to yoga. In this text there are three brothers who represent different types of disciples, each with different capacities for realizing *brahman*. Although for the first brother this preparatory stage is unnecessary, for aspirants who cannot take the direct route, *nididhyāsana* is helpful. In Allen’s translation of the text, “‘He [Patañjali] composed the *Yoga-sūtras* to destroy the taint of the inner faculty in the form of scattering (*vikṣepa*). [...] Thus the *Yoga-śāstra*, too, is a cause of liberation by way of bringing about *nididhyāsana*, which is a means to knowledge.’”²⁸³ As Allen explains, “Two points are clear from this passage: first, the practice of yoga is connected with *nididhyāsana*; second, the practice of yoga aims at the removal of *vikṣepa*. From this one can infer that *nididhyāsana* itself is corrective to *vikṣepa*.”²⁸⁴ This explicit connection of *nididhyāsana* with yoga practice in a text considered to be so fundamentally important, is key to understanding the philosophical underpinnings of the connection between Yoga and Advaita in modern yoga.

As Allen continues, “One might say that different disciples enter the path with different capacities for concentration. Some might need yogic practices to tame their wandering minds, while for others, repetition of the process of inquiry will suffice.”²⁸⁵ Interestingly, one of

²⁸² Allen 2013: 2.

²⁸³ Allen 2013: 200.

²⁸⁴ Allen 2013: 200–201.

²⁸⁵ Allen 2013: 207.

Niścaldās's major sources was Vidyāraṇya's *Pañcadaśī*. Towards the end of the first chapter, Vidyāraṇya explains *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*, defining the latter as:

When the mind is fixed by these two [*śravaṇa* and *manana*] on an undoubted conception, this one-pointedness is said to be *nididhyāsana*.²⁸⁶

He then subordinates the triad to *nirvikalpasamādhi*. And in his translation and commentary on the above verse, Swami Swahananda, the spiritual leader of the Vedanta Society of Southern California from 1976–2002 says, “In Yogasūtra (3.29) *nididhyāsana* is called *dhyāna* and has been described as ‘*pratyaya-ekatānatā dhyānam*’, unbroken knowledge of the object of meditation.”²⁸⁷ In order to make this equation, it has to be assumed that the focus of the one-pointed awareness (*ekatānatā*) is *brahman*, which was clearly not its original intention. For Śāṅkara, *brahman* was never the *viṣaya*. This shift in interpretation, which has become interpolated back into older texts, was a crucial element in the assimilation of Yoga into Advaita. As Allen explains, in Chapter 7 “Vidyāraṇya writes: ‘In one-pointed devotion to the non-dual Brahman, there is no fixed rule, as there is in meditation on a form of God.’ He explains that *nididhyāsana* can take many forms, including ‘thinking or talking of Brahman’; even listening to *itihāsas*, Vidyāraṇya says, can be a form of *nididhyāsana*. On this view, *nididhyāsana* is a general term for sustained concentration on Brahman, which could take the form of either meditation or the process of inquiry itself—or even reading a work such as *The Ocean of*

²⁸⁶ *Pañcadaśī* 1.54: *tābhyāṃ nirvicikitse'rthe cetasaḥ sthāpitasya yat | ekatānatvam etaddhi nididhyāsanam ucyate ||*

²⁸⁷ Swahananda 2015: 27.

Inquiry.”²⁸⁸ And this is exactly what happens in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*. Over time these terms have expanded to justify including new practices, allowing the tradition to naturally evolve.

This is reminiscent of *Yogasūtra* 1.39, which comes at the end of a series of *sūtras*, beginning with 1.33, that give various options for types of meditation which will result in *cittaprasādana*, clarity of mind: “Or from meditation upon anything one desires.”²⁸⁹ This *sūtra* opens the possibility for the object of meditation to anything—internal or external—even *āsana* practice. As Edwin Bryant explains in his commentary on this *sūtra*, relating it to modern yoga, “In his *Tree of Yoga*, Iyengar presents *āsana*, *yogic* posture, as not just the third of the eight limbs of *yoga* but also as a self-contained object of meditation that can itself bring about *samādhi*, the ultimate goal of *yoga*, if approached and undertaken correctly.”²⁹⁰ Bryant continues: “Approaching *āsana* in this way—as a bona fide support for fixing the mind (and one for which many people in the West might be best suited)—is thus fully defensible within Patañjali’s system, *provided it is performed with this intent* rather than some other superficial motive.”²⁹¹ Bryant here refers to the commentary on the *Yogasūtra* attributed to Śāṅkara, the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇam*: “Moreover, as Śāṅkara notes, once the mind has attained steadiness in one area, this steadiness can be readily transferred to other areas. Perhaps more important, once the mind becomes stilled, its *sāttvic* nature can manifest, as a result of which the qualities of *sattva*, insight and lucidity, also gradually manifest. [...] Ultimately, when *sattva* gains prominence, the inclination to cultivate wisdom and enlightenment manifests automatically.”²⁹² Although it is *dhyāna* being referred to here as meditation, similarly, *nididhyāsana* came to mean a variety of things and include different practices over the years, especially if as we saw above,

²⁸⁸ Allen 2013: 207–8.

²⁸⁹ *Yogasūtra* 1.39: *yathābhimatadhyānād vā* |

²⁹⁰ Bryant 2009: 413.

²⁹¹ Bryant 2009: 414.

²⁹² Bryant 2009: 415.

they were increasingly equated. This adaptability and fluidity of interpretation is key to understanding the ability of these traditions to continue to flourish over time, taking on new meanings without any seeming contradiction, at least in practice.

We will now return to the *Aparokṣānubhūti*'s definitions of the *aṅgas*, to see how the text fits into the tradition. As I hope I have made clear, the broadening of the definition of *nididhyāsana* has been essential in Advaita's increasing inclusivity across the board, foreshadowing Radhakrishnan's widespread belief that "Vedānta is not a religion, but religion itself in its most universal and deepest significance" and therefore all-encompassing in its non-duality.²⁹³ It will be helpful to keep this in mind as we look at the specific ways in which the text defines and incorporates these auxiliaries—the eight *aṅgas* of Patañjali, as well as its additional seven—into its fold and how the different commentaries make sense of this assimilation.

²⁹³ Radhakrishnan 1954: 23.

CHAPTER 4

The Incorporation of Yoga into the *Aparokṣānubhūti*

4.1 Restraints (*yama*) and Observances (*niyama*)

The paradigms that are set up in the commentaries on verses 100 and 101 are then played out in detail as the text defines each auxiliary. With each successive component, the commentaries are given the task of reinforcing and explaining this original distinction, making sense of the metaphysics of each component from an Advaitic perspective, while contrasting it with and disparaging the similar sounding elements of the *haṭhayoga* practice that was clearly in vogue at the time the commentaries—and probably the text itself—were written. This integration, and the understanding of how and why the commentaries make sense of this, is crucial to understanding the ways in which modern yoga seamlessly and often unknowingly employs yoga practices towards Advaitic goals. While the *Aparokṣānubhūti* may be attempting to subvert yoga into its domain, this was done in the spirit of inclusivity, and became an important step towards the integration of Yoga and Advaita that occurred later, which we will briefly touch on in Chapter 5.

Verses 102–103 simply list the fifteen auxiliaries, without much comment. Ten are given in the first verse: restraint, observance, renunciation, silence, place, time, posture, the root-lock, equilibrium of the body, and steadiness of the gaze.²⁹⁴ The remaining five are given in verse 103: restraint of the breath, withdrawal of the senses, concentration, meditation on the self, and absorption.²⁹⁵ The *Dīpikā* explains these two verses as the answer to the question, “What are

²⁹⁴ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 102: *yamo hi niyamas tyāgo maunaṃ deśaś ca kālatā | āsanaṃ mūlabandhaś ca dehasāmyaṃ ca drksthitiḥ ||*

²⁹⁵ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 103: *prāṇasaṃyamanaṃ caiva pratyāhāraś ca dhāraṇā | ātmadhyānaṃ samādhiś ca proktāny aṅgāni vai kramāt ||*

these auxiliaries, together by which, contemplation is to be done?”²⁹⁶ reminding us that the purpose of these auxiliaries is *nididhyāsana*. It then says the meaning of the verses is clear.²⁹⁷ The *Vṛ* says, “We will describe the meaning in sequence of the auxiliaries taught by the name restraint and so forth.”²⁹⁸ The *Vivaraṇa* elaborates a bit more, specifically on the auxiliaries that are not part of Patañjali’s eight, which are all in verse 102: “By this, the ten auxiliaries that were spoken of are named. With respect to that, place is in which place, having settled, contemplation is to be done; the meaning is cognition is to be expected for him. Time is the state of time; the meaning is time, alone. In which time, contemplation is to be done, that [leads to] cognition. Steadiness of the gaze is stability of sight. The meaning of the remainder is clear.”²⁹⁹ The *Bodhadīpikā* simply reiterates the list, reminding us of the purpose by concluding that “thus the names are spoken of the fifteen auxiliaries in sequence; the meaning is the means for the attainment of the self.”³⁰⁰

Verse 104 is the first to give a specific definition of one of the fifteen auxiliaries, beginning, just like Patañjali, with *yama*, restraint.

From the realization that “Everything is *brahman*,”

There is the control of the collection of senses.

This is declared to be restraint (*yama*),

²⁹⁶ *Dīpikā* on 102–3: *nanu kāni tāny aṅgāni yaiḥ saha nididhyāsanam kartavyam ity apekṣāyām tāni nirddisati yama iti*

²⁹⁷ *Dīpikā* on 102–3: *dvābhyām uttānārthāvubhā vapi ślokau*

²⁹⁸ *Vṛ* on 103–4: *yamādināmbhiḥ proktāny aṅgāni kramād arthataḥ pradarśayiṣyāma ity uktam |*

²⁹⁹ *Vivaraṇa* on 102–3: *ity anena daśāṅgāny uktāni prava[da]ṃti tatra deśo yasmin deśe sthitvā nididhyāsanam kāryam saḥ tasya jñānam apekṣaneyam ity arthaḥ kālateti kālabhāvaḥ kāla evety arthaḥ yasmin kāle kāryam nididhyāsanam saḥ ka iti jñānam drksthitiḥ drṣṭisthairyam śeṣa spaṣṭārthaḥ |*

³⁰⁰ *Bodhadīpikā* on 100–1: *iti kramaśaḥ pañcadaśāṅgasyātmaprāpakasya kāraṇasya nāmānīty uktānīty arthaḥ |*

To be practiced again and again.³⁰¹ || 104 ||

The *Dīpikā* makes a point to contrast this with the five restraints given in the *Yogasūtra*: “It is declared that this is restraint; the meaning is but not only non-violence, etc.”³⁰² Since he does not give any further explanation, it is clear these would have been well known. The *Vivarāṇa* similarly says: “Now you might say that being that it is said in the Vedāntic texts that restraint has the characteristics of non-violence, etc., with respect to this, how is it said to be incongruous? To answer this, he says there should be no opposition because the true nature of the characteristics of non-violence, etc. is the cognition that the self is *brahman*.”³⁰³ It is notable here that he considers Patañjali’s system to be taught in the texts of Vedānta, which is presumably either a reference to the Yoga Upaniṣads or perhaps to Śaṅkara’s *Yogabhāṣyavivarāṇa*. He also makes the point that this definition of restraint is not a contradiction—non-violence, etc. can be practiced as well, since at heart they are all about the realization of *brahman*.

The *Bodhadīpikā* does not reference Patañjali here or anywhere else in the text. It just says that “from the explanation that the whole universe is *brahman*, there follows the restraint of the collection of senses, such as the eye, and this restraint is spoken of in the scriptures.”³⁰⁴ It adds that “for the purpose of attainment of the self, it is to be practiced again and again by those desiring liberation.”³⁰⁵ The *Ṭīkā* also stresses it for those desiring liberation. The *Vṛ* does not have much to add. The text then defines observance (*niyama*).

³⁰¹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 104: *sarvaṃ brahmeti vijñānād indriyagrāmasaṃyamah | yamo 'yam iti saṃprokto 'bhyasanīyo muhur muhuḥ ||*

³⁰² *Dīpikā* on 104: *ayam yama iti saṃproktaḥ na tu kevalam ahimsādir ity arthaḥ*

³⁰³ *Vivarāṇa* on 104: *nanv ahimsādilakṣaṇo yame vedāntaśāstre ukte saty atra katham viruddham ucyata iti cen na viruddhatvaṃ syāt kasmāt ahimsādilakṣaṇānām brahmātmajñānāṃtarhitatvāt*

³⁰⁴ *Bodhadīpikā* on 102: *sarvaṃ jagad brahmeti vyākhyānād indriyagrāmaṃ saṃyamaś cakṣurādīndriyāṇaṃ daṇḍo yah soyaṃ saṃyamah śāstraprokto bhavati |*

³⁰⁵ *Bodhadīpikā* on 102: *tasmād ātmalabdhye saṃyamo muhur muhur abhyasanīyo mumukṣubhir iti śeṣaḥ |*

The smooth flow of one type [of mental state of *brahman*],
And the disregard of other types [of mental states],
Surely is observance (*niyama*), the highest bliss,
Regularly practiced by the wise.³⁰⁶ || 105 ||

Interestingly, in the same passage I mentioned earlier, where Śaṅkara argues that actions are in fact stronger than cognition, he actually puts forth the potential need for yogic practices to overcome *prārabdhakarma*: “Therefore, a continuous flow of recollection of realization of the self is to be observed with the support of practices such as renunciation and detachment.”³⁰⁷ The use of *niyantavya*, “to be observed,” here seems to be a precursor to the definition of *niyama*, in this verse, which is understood in terms of this continuous flow.

The *Vṛ* explains: “The smooth flow, i.e., the flowing of a stream, is of one type of mental state, such as ‘I am unattached,’ ‘I am *brahman*,’ ‘I am the universal self.’ In that very same way, there is the disregard of other types of mental states, whose sphere is words, etc. To be precise, disregard means the lack of inspection. This alone is observance, [which is] the highest bliss, because it is a means to the supreme spirit. Regularly, like a daily rite, by the wise, i.e., by the discerning, it is practiced. From which, i.e., from this alone; supply ‘it is called’ *niyama*.”³⁰⁸

The *Bodhadīpikā* here says: “it is the smooth flow of one type [of mental state] on this universe; the understanding is that the whole universe is the self, alone. The disregard of other types that are different from the self, i.e., disregard of what is not the universe, this alone is

³⁰⁶ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 105: *sajātīyapravāhaś ca vijātīyatiraskṛtiḥ | niyamo hi parānando niyamāt kriyate budhaiḥ ||*

³⁰⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* 1.4.7: *tasmāt tyāgavairāgyādisādhanabalāvalambenātmavijñānasmr̥tisam̐tatir niyantavyā bhavati*

³⁰⁸ *Vṛ* on 106: *iti sajātīyānām asaṅgoḥam brahmāham asmi sarvātmakoḥamity ādipratyayānām pravāhodhārāvāhikatvatvaṃ | tathaiḥ vijātīyānām śabdādigocarāṇām pratyayānām tiraskṛtiḥ | tiraskāro ananusam̐dhānam iti yāvat | ayam eva niyamaḥ parānaṃdaḥ paramānaṃdadvārabhūtatvāt | niyamān nityakarmeḥ budhair vivekibhiḥ kriyate | yato ata evāyam niyama ity abhidhīyata iti śeṣaḥ |*

observance, [which is] the highest bliss; from this by the wise, observance is always practiced for the purpose of attainment of the self.”³⁰⁹ The *Vivaraṇa* explains, “The smooth flow of a mental state is of one type, whose intrinsic nature is ‘I am existence.’ [...] Other types are beginning with the ego up until the body, with the continuous flow of words such as ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ whose intrinsic form is the not-self; the meaning is the range of speech, mind, and gaze consists of being defined by the opposite from this ‘I am existence.’ [...] Thus, in both cases, the means is from the stability of the self in the self alone. This alone is observance, [which is] the highest bliss, i.e., with the characteristic of unsurpassed bliss. Here the word ‘and’ is directed towards expressing certainty, for the purpose of warding off worldly activity. Surely, from which, i.e., thus from that, this is regularly, i.e., vigilantly, practiced by the wise; the meaning is it is employed by the steadfast.”³¹⁰

To recall, the *Dīpikā* says, “One type means of the highest *brahman* which is not different from the self, and that smooth flow of the mental state of being one [with *brahman*], is the smooth flow of one type. [...] And also, the disregard of other types means different mental states, which are dissimilar to *ātman* and *brahman*, being produced from previous impressions of the world; the meaning is mental states with that form. The disregard of those [mental states] by the memory of fault is the highest abandonment or indifference and this is what is meant by observance.”³¹¹ And while the *Dīpikā* specifically contrasts this understanding to that of

³⁰⁹ *Bodhadīpikā* on 103: *asmin jagati sajātiyapravāha ātmaiva sarvaṃ jagad iti saṃcāraḥ | vijātiyatiraskṛtir ātmabhinnam na jagad iti tiraskāraḥ yatoyam eva niyamaḥ parānaṃdo bhavaty ato budhair niyamaḥ sadā kriyate ātmalābhārtham iti |*

³¹⁰ *Vivaraṇa* on 105: *sajātiyah svarūpaḥ sad aham iti pratyayapravāhas [...] vijātiyohamkārādi dehāmtam ahammamātāspadam sānubamḍham anātmavarūpaṃ sad aham ity asmād viparītaṃ paricchinnātmakam drśyam vānmanasagocaram ity arthaḥ | [...] evam ubhayata ātman yevātmavasthiter upāyo ‘yam eva niyamaḥ parānaṃdo nīratīśayānaṃdalakṣaṇotra cakāro niścaṃyavācīparāk pravṛttinivāraṇārthaḥ hi yasmād evaṃ tasmād ayaṃ niyamādapramattatātaḥ kriyate budhaiḥ sāravadbhiḥ sevyata ity arthaḥ*

³¹¹ *Dīpikā* on 105: *sajātiyaṃ pratyagabhinnam paraṃ brahma tad ekākāro vṛttipravāhaḥ sajātiyapravāhaḥ [...] ca punaḥ vijātiyatiraskṛtir vijātiyaṃ brahmātmavilakṣaṇam jagatpūrvasaṃskārāj jāyamānā tadākārāvṛttir ity arthaḥ | tasya tiraskṛtir doṣasmṛtyā’dhikopekṣā’nādara ity arthaḥ ayaṃ niyama ity arthaḥ |*

Patañjali, saying “And not only cleanliness, etc., is the meaning,”³¹² none of the other commentaries make external reference here.

4.2 Renunciation (*tyāga*), Silence (*mauna*), Place (*deśa*), and Time (*kāla*)

The *Aparokṣānubhūti* now turns to four supplementary *aṅgas*, intervening between the *yamas* and *niyamas* we have just looked at, and *āsana*, which is the third auxiliary in Patañjali’s set of eight.

Renunciation of the form of the manifold world,
From beholding that its nature is consciousness.
Surely that renunciation (*tyāga*) is venerated among the great,
Since it immediately has the nature of liberation.³¹³ || 106 ||

To recall, the *Dīpikā* says, “From beholding that its nature is consciousness, which serves as the foundation of everything, there is the manifestation of things. Consciousness is that *brahman*, which is not inanimate, shining forth only of its own accord, whose intrinsic form is the self. Seeing that, i.e., by inquiry into the essential truth, from that, due to that cause, there is renunciation, which is the disregard of name and form; that alone is renunciation.”³¹⁴ The *Vivarāṇa* concurs, explaining that it is “renunciation of that which has the form of the manifold world, whose intrinsic nature is the not-self, whose names and forms are superimposed by

³¹² *Dīpikā* on 105: *na tu kevalam śaucādir ity arthaḥ |*

³¹³ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 106: *tyāgaḥ prapañcarūpasya cidātmavāvalokanāt | tyāgo hi mahatām pūjyaḥ sadyo mokṣamayo yataḥ ||*

³¹⁴ *Dīpikā* on 106: *sarvādhiṣṭhānabhūtaṃ padārthasphuraṇaṃ tasya cidātmavāvalokanāc cidajaḍaṃ svata eva prakāśamānaṃ brahma tad ātmāsvarūpaṃ yasya tadbhāvas tasyāvālokanam anusaṃdhānaṃ tasmāddhetor yas tyāgaḥ nāmarūpopekṣā sa eva tyāgas |*

ignorance.”³¹⁵ It then quotes verse 20 of the *Dṛgdr̥śyaviveka*, a short text variably attributed to Śaṅkara, Bhāratī Tīrtha, and Vidyāraṇya: “It exists, it shines, [it is] pleasing, form, and name are the five parts. The first three have the form of *brahman*; the last two have the form of the world.”³¹⁶ The *Vivarāṇa* then explains that renunciation of this superimposition is to be done through discernment and contemplation (*vivekena nididhyāsanena ca*). It says that “by the statement ‘its nature is consciousness’ it is to be known that it has the nature of existence, consciousness, and bliss because of the lack of difference in essence among these three words; therefore, the meaning is from the beholding that its nature is existence, consciousness, and bliss. [...] The meaning is that the cessation of the fluctuating states [of the mind occurs] by being intent on the individual self. Therefore, by the gaze consisting of existence, consciousness, and bliss, there is no universe consisting of names and forms, because it is an illusion of consciousness.”³¹⁷ This reference to the stopping of the *vṛttis* seems reminiscent of Patañjali and yet it occurs here through the realization of the oneness of *ātman* and *brahman* which allows the renunciation of the manifold world.

The *Dīpikā* then says, “With respect to that, to explain the cause he says ‘immediately,’ since this renunciation immediately, exactly at the time of inquiry, has the nature of liberation, which has the form of residing in one’s intrinsic form as the highest bliss. That is why it is desired by people who know the truth of the self. The meaning is that this renunciation is very well known. Therefore, this alone, by those desiring liberation is to be done and not another in

³¹⁵ *Vivarāṇa* on 106: *prapaṃcasya rūpaṃ prapaṃcarūpaṃ anātmavarūpaṃ yad adhyastam avidyayā nāmarūpaṃ tasya tyāgo*

³¹⁶ *Vivarāṇa* on 106: *asti bhāti priyaṃ rūpaṃ nāma cety aṃśapaṃcakaṃ ādyatrayaṃ brahmarūpaṃ jagadrūpaṃ tato dvayaṃ iti*

³¹⁷ *Vivarāṇa* on 106: *cidātmety anena saccidānaṃdātmeti draṣṭavyaṃ eteṣu triṣu padeṣu vastvabhedaṭvāt tasmāt saccidānaṃdātmatvāvoloṅkānād ity arthah [...] pratyak pravaṇena vṛt[t]yuparamaṇam ity arthah tasmāt saccidānaṃdātmadṛṣṭyāna kiṃcid asti nāmarūpātmaṃ jagataś cidvivartatvāt iti*

the form of not doing one's own duty; thus, this is the further meaning also to be inferred.”³¹⁸ The *Vṛt* says, “Like renunciation from beholding that a pot has the nature of clay, from beholding that the manifold world has the nature of consciousness, that alone is renunciation. It immediately has the nature of liberation, i.e., assumes the form of liberation, thus, i.e., therefore, it is venerated among the great, i.e., honored by those who have turned inward.”³¹⁹ The *Bodhadīpikā* elaborates, “From beholding that the whole universe has the nature of consciousness, i.e., from the cognition that it has the nature of consciousness alone, seeing everything of the form of the manifold world, i.e., of the universe; that absence of residing in that which has the nature of inertness alone is renunciation. That alone is renunciation, which is venerated among the great, i.e., among those desiring liberation, since this immediately has the nature of liberation, i.e., it is considered to have the nature of bliss.”³²⁰ After defining renunciation and what one should not identify with, the text moves on to what one should identify with, namely silence.

The wise should always be that silence (*mauna*),

Which is attainable by *yogīs*,

From which words turn back, together with the mind,

Without being able to reach it.³²¹ || 107 ||

³¹⁸ *Dīpikā* on 106: *tatra hetuḥ sadya iti yatoyam tyāgaḥ sadyonusamdhānakāla eva mokṣamayāḥ paramānaṃdasvarūpāvasthānarūpaḥ ata evātmataṭṭvavidāmiṣṭatvād atiprasiddhoyam tyāga ity arthaḥ | tasmād ayam eva mumukṣuṇā kartavyo nānyaḥ kevalasvakarmādyakaraṇarūpa iti bhāvaḥ evam agrepy ūhyam |*

³¹⁹ *Vṛt* on 107: *mṛdātmatvāvalokanāt ghaṭasya tyāga iva prapaṃcasya cidātmatvāvalokanād yas tyāgaḥ sa eva | sadyo mokṣamayo mokṣarūpeṇa pariṇamate yatas tato mahatām pūjyaḥ aṃtarmukhaiḥ sevya ity arthaḥ*

³²⁰ *Bodhadīpikā* on 104: *cidātmatvāvalokanāt sarvaṃ jagac cidātmaiveti jñānāt prapaṃcarūpasya jagataḥ sarvaṃ drśyamānaṃ jaḍātmaṃkam eveti vasaṇābhāvo yaḥ sa tyāgo bhavati | sa eva tyāgo mahatā[m] mumukṣuṇām p[ū]jyo bhavati yataḥ sadyoyam tyāgo mokṣamaya ānaṃdamayas sammato 'stīti |*

³²¹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 107: *yasmād vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha | yan maunaṃ yogibhir gamyaṃ tad bhavet sarvadā budhaḥ ||*

The *Dīpikā* says, “From the absence of action of the kind which is the grounds for the application of words, that is beyond the range of mind and speech, which it is not possible to speak of, there is that silence that is *brahman*. And nonetheless, by *yogīs* it is attainable, [meaning] by the *yogīs* relying on cognition, it is reachable through the state of non-difference from the self. That alone is the well-known silence in the form of *brahman* which the wise, or discerning, should always be—the meaning is from the inquiry in the form of ‘I am that’ and so forth.”³²² The *Bodhadīpikā* concurs that it is “not possible to speak” (*vaktuṃ na śaknuvaṃti*) of this silence. The *Vivarāṇa* says “the wise or discerning are those of pure character, obtained by the sequence of practices beginning with detachment and by whom the favor of the teacher has been received.”³²³ It then says they “always, i.e., without interruption, unbroken by place, time, and so forth, should cultivate, i.e., devote oneself to that silence.”³²⁴ Both the *Vivarāṇa* and the *Vṛ* have *bhajet* rather than *bhavet* here, meaning that one should “cultivate” rather than “become” that silence. The *Vṛ* says, “From which, i.e., from the one taste of consciousness, [meaning] from the presence of *brahman*, words or speech together with the mind turn back, i.e., disappear, without having reached it. Moreover, by the method that was spoken of, the well-known silence of *brahman*, is attainable, i.e., understandable, by *yogīs*, i.e., by the cognizant ones for whom all the senses have ceased. The meaning is the wise or learned should cultivate, i.e., be devoted to always, or constantly, only that which is well known with the form of the silence of the highest *brahman* and not any other.”³²⁵

³²² *Dīpikā* on 107: *śabdapravṛttinimittajātikriyāder abhāvāt manovācām agocaram yan maunam vaktam aśakyam yad brahma tathāpi yogibhir gamyam jñānayogibhiḥ pratyagabhinnatvena prāpyam tat prasiddham eva brahmarūpaṃ maunam sarvadā budho vivekī bhavet tad aham asmīty anusamādadhyaḍ ity arthaḥ |*

³²³ *Vivarāṇa* on 107: *budho vivekī śuddhasattvo vairāgyādisādhanakrameṇalabdhāgamācāryaprasādas*

³²⁴ *Vivarāṇa* on 107: *tan maunam sarvadā nairamṭaryeṇa deśakālādyanavachinnatayety arthaḥ bhajet seveta*

³²⁵ *Vṛ* on 108: *iti yasmāc cidekarasād brahmaṇaḥ sakāśān manasā saha | aprāpya vāco vacāmsi nivartante parābhavaṃti | kiṃca prasiddhabrahmamaunam uktaṛītyā yogibhir nirvṛtasakaleṃdriyajñānibhir gamyam jñeyam tat prasiddham eva parambrahmamaunarūpaṃ buddho vidvān sarvadā samtataṃ bhajet seven nānyad ity arthaḥ |*

The *Dīpikā* then gives a reason for the next two verses, which are also about silence: “Now, you might say that this inquiry into *brahman* as not different from the self appears like the fourteenth part in the form of meditation; anticipating this doubt, because of the self-evidence, he defines silence again in another way with the one and a half [verses] beginning with ‘words’”³²⁶:

Since words turn back,
By whom is it possible to describe that?
If the manifold world were to be described,
Even that is beyond words.³²⁷ || 108 ||

Or thus, that should be silence,
Which is known as the innate state of worthy people.
But silence by [restraining] speech is enjoined for the ignorant ones,
By those who know *brahman*.³²⁸ || 109 ||

The *Dīpikā* continues, “Just as *brahman* is beyond the domain of speech because of the absence of grounds for the application of words, in that way, even the manifold world, consisting of the categories of names and forms, etc., because of the non-endurance of the conceptualization of being or non-being, is beyond speech.”³²⁹ And the *Vivarāṇa* explains, “After that alone, he

³²⁶ *Dīpikā* on 108–9: *nanv idaṃ pratyagabhinnabrahmānusaṃdhānaṃ dhyānarūpaṃ caturdaśam aṅgaṃ pratīyate ity āśaṃkya svārasyaṭ prakārāṃtareṇa maunam eva lakṣayati sārddhena vāca iti*

³²⁷ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 108: *vāco yasmān nivartante tad vaktuṃ kena śakyate | prapañco yadi vaktavyaḥ so 'pi śabdavivarjitaḥ ||*

³²⁸ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 109: *iti vā tad bhaven maunaṃ satāṃ sahaśaṃjñitam | girā maunaṃ tu bālānāṃ prayuktaṃ brahmavādibhiḥ ||*

³²⁹ *Dīpikā* on 108: *śabdapravṛttinimittābhāvād brahma yathāvāgaviśayaṃ tathā nāmarūpajātyādiprapaṃcopi sadasadādivikalpāsahatvādvāgatītaḥ |*

specifies with two verses. Since words for *brahman* turn back by the method that was previously spoken of—here also the mind is understood from the previous statement, [meaning] together with the mind they go to cessation, without being able to reach this—by whom is it possible to describe that? The meaning is not by anyone.”³³⁰

Regarding the second verse, the *Dīpikā* says, “By the way that was spoken of previously, he says that should be silence, which has the form of discarding internal conflict about *brahman* and the world. In expectation of the question of whom, he says of worthy people, and this is well known. Of the worthy, i.e., of worthy people, it is well known with the name of the innate state. Now you might say the well-known silence is the control of speech alone; anticipating this he answers with the half [verse] beginning with ‘by speech.’”³³¹ The *Vṛ* gives more explanation for the last line of the second verse: “The word ‘but’ is for the purpose of explaining the different characteristics of this silence from both types of silence that were previously spoken of. It is enjoined or prescribed for the ignorant ones, i.e., those with slow intellect, by those who know *brahman*, i.e., those who know the truth; the meaning is that that silence is not spoken of for those who know *brahman*.”³³² The *Vivaraṇa* concurs, explaining that these ignorant ones are those who have not ascended to yoga (*anārūḍhāyogānām*). It concludes: “Therefore, the seeing of *ātman* and *brahman* with nothing remaining to be done, devoid of the conception of authority and so forth, that alone is well known as silence. One should cultivate this alone is the syntactical

³³⁰ *Vivaraṇa* on 108: *punas tad eva viśinaṣṭi ślokadvayena yasmād brahmaṇo vāco nivarttaṃte pūrvoktanyāyena manopy atra grāhyam pūrvoktatvāt manasā saha nivṛttim yāti ayam aprāpyeti tad vaktum kena śakyate na kenāpy ity arthah*

³³¹ *Dīpikā* on 109: *ity uktaprakāreṇa brahmajagator vivādadyāgarūpaṃ vā tanmaunaṃ bhavet | keśām ity ākāṃkṣāyām satām cedam prasiddham ity āha satām iti satpuruṣānām saha jasthitināmā prasiddham ity arthah | nanu vānniyamanam eva prasiddham maunam iti ced ata āhārdhena gireti |*

³³² *Vṛ* on 110: *tuśabdaḥ pūrvoktobhayavidhamaunavaiḥṣṇyadyotanārtho asya maunasya bālānām mūḍhabuddhīnām brahmavādibhis tattvavidbhiḥ prayuktaṃ prayojitaṃ na brahmavidām tan maunaṃ uktaṃ ity arthah |*

connection of the section.”³³³ Again in this verse, there is a clear distinction being made between the Advaitic direct realization of *brahman* and the inferior methods which work through external means, such as simply not speaking.

The *Bodhadīpikā* inverts the order of verses 109 and 110, here 107 and 108, drawing on its explanation of place to explain this final verse on silence. “Moreover, because of the very place without people that was previously spoken of it is explained that silence, that is cognition of the self exists, with ‘or in this way.’ Or in this way, having settled oneself in a place without people alone, which is known as the innate state, only that silence, born in oneself, alone, consisting of cognition, should be silence for worthy people. But not the silence of the ignorant, produced by speech, consisting of lack of cognition; supply ‘it is said by those who know *brahman*.”³³⁴ Here is the verse on place, which generally follows:

That solitary state is regarded as place (*deśa*),

In which people do not exist,

At the beginning, in the end, and in the middle,

By which this whole universe is continuously pervaded.³³⁵ || 110 ||

The *Dīpikā* tersely says “Here, the absence in terms of the three times for people, related to experience, is to be known through self-awareness and not through awareness from the scriptures

³³³ *Vivaraṇa* on 109: *girām iti girāmaunaṃ tu bālānām anārūḍhāyogānām prayuktam iti sambandah tasmāt pramātrādīpratyaśūnyam yadbrahmātmadarśanam akāryaśeṣam tad eva maunaṃ iti siddham etad eva bhajed iti prakaraṇānvayah*

³³⁴ *Bodhadīpikā* on 107: *kiṃca pūrvoktanirjanadeśād evātmajñānām maunaṃ bhavātīti pratipādayati | iti veti | iti vā nirjanadeśātmasthivaiva sahasamjñitam svayam evopannaṃ yan maunaṃ tad eva jñānātmakam maunaṃ satām bhaved iti | na tu bālānām girā prayuktam ajñānātmakam ya nmaunaṃ tan neti brahmavādibhir uktam iti śeṣaḥ |*

³³⁵ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 110: *ādāvante ca madhye ca jano yasmin na vidyate | yenedam satatam vyāptam sa deśo vijanaḥ smṛtaḥ ||*

or the mundane world, because that would be in conflict.”³³⁶ The *Bodhadīpikā* explains further: “In which, i.e., in *brahman*, at the beginning—at birth—no people exist, and in the middle—in maintenance—no people exist, and in the end—at death—no people exist, by reason of the falseness of the universe; that solitary state alone, is regarded as place, whence, i.e., by means of which this whole universe is continuously pervaded by the self. Therefore, the whole universe, consisting of the elements, is the self alone. From this, only that solitary state which is the self is place, which exists for the purpose of stability of the great, but not a solitary place devoid of worldly people.”³³⁷ The *Vṛ* corroborates that place is not meant to indicate a literal withdrawal from the world, saying “and not a mountain cave and such places” (*na girikaṃdarādikam*).

The *Vivarāṇa* elaborates: “By which reality this unreal universe—whose sphere is the concept of the unreal, gross and subtle, cause and effect—is pervaded, just as the appearance of a snake with a rope or just as the appearance of silver with mother-of-pearl, in that manner, the arising, stability, and end of the concept of the unreal does not arise without the concept of the real; therefore, by that alone it is continuously pervaded and thus it is shown that there is no disappearance of that reality.”³³⁸ The *Vivarāṇa* also qualifies that place is regarded in this way by the seers of *ātman* and *brahman* (*brahmātmadarśibhiḥ*). The text then goes on to define time.

Non-duality, which consists of unbroken bliss,

Surely is indicated by the word time (*kāla*).

³³⁶ *Dīpikā* on 110: *atra janasya traikālikābhāva ānubhaviḥ svapratītyājñeyah na tu laukikaśāstrīyapratītibhyām virodhād iti bhāvaḥ spaṣṭam anyat |*

³³⁷ *Bodhadīpikā* on 107: *jagato mithyātvena yasmin brahmaṇi ādau janmani kaścij jano na vidyate na vā madhye pālāne kaścīd vidyate na vānte maraṇe kaścīd vidyate | sa eva nirjano deśaḥ smṛtaḥ yato yenātmanedaṃ jagat satataṃ vistāritaṃ bhavati tasmād bhūtātmakaṃ sarvaṃ jagad ātmaivāto nirjano ya ātmā sa eva deśo mahatāṃ sthity arthaṃ bhavati na tu vyāvahārikajanaśūnyaikānta ity arthaḥ |*

³³⁸ *Vivarāṇa* on 110: *yena satedam asad asatpratyayagocaraṃ sthūlasūkṣmaṃ kāryakāraṇaṃ vyāptaṃ tat yathā rajjvā sarpābhāso yathā vā śuktyā rajatābhāso tadvat nāsatpratyayasotpattisthityāṃtaḥ satpratyayam vinā sambhavaty atas tenaiva satataṃ vyāptaṃ iti na tirodhānaṃ tasya vastuna iti darśitaṃ*

Because it brings forth, in an instant,
All beings, beginning with Brahmā.³³⁹ || 111 ||

The *Dīpikā* again tersely says, “Having begun in an instant, because it brings forth; the meaning is because it is the support for creation, sustenance, and dissolution.”³⁴⁰ The *Bodhadīpikā* says, “In an instant, from a small measure of time, because it brings forth, i.e., because it produces completion of all beings, beginning with Brahmā, that alone is non-duality, which is indicated by time, which consists of unbroken bliss; time is the highest self of worthy people. But time is not a trifling moment of worldly merit.”³⁴¹ The *Vṛt* says, “Time is the state with the form beginning with an instant up until the dissolution of all beings, beginning with Brahmā; the meaning is *brahman* alone. Because time has an unbroken form, it is the non-duality of unbroken bliss; the intention is that time is to be honored as *brahman* alone.”³⁴² The *Vivaraṇa* qualifies that “the meaning is all beings from Brahmā to inanimate objects, i.e., everything subtle and gross.”³⁴³ It further elaborates: “The bliss that is distinguished as unbroken, without a second, that alone is indicated by the word time; that is the syntactical meaning. With respect to that, what is called bliss is unsurpassed happiness with the form of *ātman* and *brahman*. The cause with respect to the blissfulness of that is unbroken; thus, it is shown also in the three times it is unrestricted, devoid of arising and destruction. It should not be the bliss of the intoxication of the arising and

³³⁹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 111: *kalanāt sarvabhūtānām brahmādīnām nimeṣataḥ | kālāśabdena nirdiṣṭo hy akhaṇḍānandako 'dvayaḥ ||*

³⁴⁰ *Dīpikā* on 111: *nimeṣata ārabhya kalanāt sargasthitipralayādhāratvād ity arthaḥ |*

³⁴¹ *Bodhadīpikā* on 109: *nimeṣātpalamātratoḥ brahmādīn ārabhya sarveṣām bhūtānām kalanāt samāptikaraṇāt | nirdiṣṭo yah kālāḥ sa evādvayo 'khaṇḍānaṃdaḥ paramātmā satām kālo bhavati | na tu tu[c]cho vyavahārikapunyaḥ*

³⁴² *Vṛt* on 112: *sarvabhūtānām brahmādīnām nimeṣādipralayāṃtarūpenāvasthā kālatā brahmaṇa evety arthaḥ | kālasyākhaṇḍarūpatvād akhaṇḍānaṃdādvayaṃ brahmaiva kāla iti sevyam ity āśayaḥ |*

³⁴³ *Vivaraṇa* on 111: *tāni brahmādīstihāvarāṃtāni sthūlasūkṣmāni sarvāni ity arthaḥ*

destruction of reality.”³⁴⁴ The point again here is being made to distinguish the understanding of time as *brahman* from other mundane definitions. We now return to the familiar sequence of the auxiliaries of Patañjali.

4.3 Posture (*āsana*)

In which, with complete ease,

Unceasing meditation on *brahman* may arise.

One should know that as *āsana*,

And not any other posture that destroys ease.³⁴⁵ ||112 ||

The *Vṛt* supports this reading with: “as there is ease, in that way, only, forever, i.e., always; for this there is meditation on *brahman*, i.e., inspection on *brahman* [...] that alone is the posture of *brahman*, which has the form of ease.”³⁴⁶ It also suggests the other postures are from the *yogaśāstras*, such as *garuḍāsana*.³⁴⁷ The *Vivaraṇa* also takes it this way: “The meaning is: In which posture, situated forever, by reason of the unbrokenness—i.e., by the undivided state—of being the self. Meditation on *brahman* is being intent on the self as *brahman* alone. ‘With complete ease,’ means one should be free from distractions. That posture should be known as the

³⁴⁴ *Vivaraṇa* on 111: *akhaṁdādvitīyaviśiṣṭo ya ānaṁdaḥ sa eva kāla śabdena nirdiṣṭa iti sambandhaḥ tatrānaṁdo nāma niratiśayaṁ sukhaṁ brahmātmarūpaṁ tasyānaṁdatve hetur akhaṁda iti kālatrayepy abādhita utpattivināśaśūnya iti darśitaṁ yadvastūtpattivināśamattasyānaṁdatvaṁ na syāt*

³⁴⁵ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 112: *sukhenaiva bhaved yasminn ajasraṁ brahmacintanam | āsanam tad vijānīyān netarat sukhanāśanam ||*

³⁴⁶ *Vṛt* on 113: *sukham yathā bhavati tathaivajasraṁ sarvadā tasya brahmaṇas cintanam brahmacintanam brahmānusandhānam [...] tad eva sukharūpaṁ brahmāsanam iti vijānīyāt |*

³⁴⁷ *Vṛt* on 113: *netaraḥ garuḍāsanādi [...] itarasya yogaśāstroktāsanasya sukhanāśakatvān*

easeful posture.”³⁴⁸ It goes on to say that a posture that destroys ease is one that is the cause of distractions (*vikṣepakāraṇam*).

The *Bodhadīpikā* also takes it this way; however, it makes the point to contrast the supreme happiness which posture is meant to evoke with sensual pleasure. “In which, with complete ease, unceasingly, i.e., continuously, there might be meditation on *brahman*—and there should not be interruption in the middle by anything—that posture, alone, should be known among those who cognize *brahman*. Any other that creates sensual pleasure, destroying the happiness of the bliss of *brahman*, is not considered posture by those who cognize *brahman*, with reference to the bliss of the supreme self and because of the emptiness of sensory happiness.”³⁴⁹ The *Ṭīkā* similarly but succinctly says, “in which ease occurs continuously, of the type of meditation on *brahman*.”³⁵⁰

As we saw in Chapter 2, the *Dīpikā* interprets this first line differently: “He describes posture with ‘in happiness, never’ (*sukhe naiva*). In which happiness, i.e., in *brahman* whose form is happiness, anxious thought, i.e., worry about what is to be done and what is not to be done, may never be.”³⁵¹ This leads to the translation: “One should know that posture (*āsana*) as the eternal *brahman*, in which happiness there may never be anxious thought.” While this doesn’t substantially change the ultimate meaning, the former translation seems a much more obvious and likely choice, which does cast a bit of a shadow of doubt on the reliability of the *Dīpikā* as a whole.

The *Aparokṣānubhūti* then specifies one acceptable posture:

³⁴⁸ *Vivaraṇa* on 112: *yasminn āsane sthitāvajasram akhaṇḍatayā’parichinnātmatayety arthaḥ brahmaciṃtanam brahmaivātmaniṣṭhā sukhenaiṣa vikṣeparāhityena bhavet tad āsanam sukhāsanam vijāniyāt*

³⁴⁹ *Bodhadīpikā* on 110: *yasmin sukhenājasram nirantaram brahmacintanam bhaven na tu vyavadhānam madhye kenacit syāt | tad evāsanam brahmajñāninām vijāniyāt vaiṣayikasukhakāraṇam brahmānandasukhanāśakam itarad yad āsanam tad āsanam brahmajñāninā na bhavati | paramātmānaṃdāpekṣayā vaiṣayikasukhasya tucchatvād iti |*

³⁵⁰ *Ṭīkā* on 112: *sukheṣi ghaṇḍe nirantara, brahmaciṃtaprakāra*

³⁵¹ *Dīpikā* on 112: *āsanam lakṣayati sukhenaiṣeti yasmin sukhe sukharūpe brahmaṇi ciṃtanam karttavyākarttavyaciṃtā naiva bhavet*

That [posture] in which the seers are completely absorbed,

Which is established as the beginning of all beings,

The imperishable support of the universe,

That, certainly, is known as the posture of the seers (*siddhāsana*).³⁵² || 113 ||

Siddhāsana is considered the posture par excellence in the *haṭhayoga* texts of the time, but, as always, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* has its own spin. Regarding the one posture that is specified, the *Dīpikā* says “And that posture is established or else *siddhāsana* is the posture of the seers. Whether it is a *karmadhāraya* or a *tatpuruṣa* compound, it is *brahman* alone; that is the meaning.”³⁵³ The fourth *pāda* of the *Vṛ* has a slightly variant reading, that “one should practice *siddhāsana*.”³⁵⁴ Its commentary specifies why *siddhāsana* is an accepted posture and alludes to the idea that there were quite a lot of other postures being practiced at this time.

Now you might say, in the case of the postures beginning with *garuḍāsana*, that are spoken of in the yoga texts, there is also the destruction of ease. With respect to that he speaks of *siddhāsana*. Because of the absence of the destruction of ease, that posture is accepted; thus, to answer the objection he says because *siddhāsana* has the intrinsic nature of *brahman* alone.³⁵⁵

³⁵² *Aparokṣānubhūti* 113: *siddham yat sarvabhūtādi viśvādhiṣṭhānam avyayam | yasmin siddhāḥ samāviṣṭās tad vai siddhāsanaṃ viduḥ ||*

³⁵³ *Dīpikā* on 113: *siddham ca tadāsanam cāthavā siddhānām āsanam siddhāsanam iti karmadhārayatatpuruṣa-samāsābhyāṃ brahmaivety arthaḥ |*

³⁵⁴ *Vṛ* on 114: *tasmin siddhāsanaṃ bhajet*

³⁵⁵ *Vṛ* on 114: *nanu yogaśāstrokṭānām garuḍāsanādīnām sukhanāśakatvepi tatrokta siddhāsanasya sukhanāśakatvābhāvāt tad āsanam aṅgīkāryam ity āśamkyam evaṃ brahmasvarūpasyaiva siddhāsanatvād ity āha |*

Like the *Dīpikā*, the *Vṛt* is contrasting the yoga taught in this text with other contemporary yoga of the time. To my knowledge, the earliest reference to *garuḍāsana* (eagle posture) is in Vijñānabhikṣu’s fifteenth- to sixteenth-century *Yogasārasaṃgraha*. It is also mentioned in the eighteenth-century *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā*.

The first line of this verse in the *Bodhadīpikā* ends with the variant “non-dual” (*advayam*), rather than “eternal, ever” (*avyayam*), which would mean the non-dual cause or beginning of all beings, i.e., *brahman*. “For the purpose of the bliss of the self, the self, alone, is truly the seat, but not those seats, made of a blanket and so forth, that consist in inertness.”³⁵⁶ While the seat made of a blanket (*kambalāsana*) does not seem to be in modern currency, there is a reference to it in the *Śivagītā*—“When a person is seated on a woolen blanket, he obtains all desires.”³⁵⁷ This text goes on to reference other possible seats, such as deer skin, tiger skin, *kuśa* grass, etc. The *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā* also says one should sit “on a thick seat, made of *kuśa* grass, a deer-skin, a tiger skin, or a woolen blanket.”³⁵⁸ If this is indeed what the *Bodhadīpikā* is referring to then it is making the point that *āsana* does not refer to the inert object one is sitting on, but rather the self that is sitting, which is the true support.

The *Vivaraṇa* explains: “and that beginning of all beings, the support of the universe, the self-evident *brahman*, that, alone, which is nothing but bliss, should be *siddhāsana*.”³⁵⁹ It also glosses *brahman* with Vāsudeva, reinforcing the sectarian spin it gives to the text as a whole. The *Ṭīkā* adds that it is perfect (*paripūrṇa*).

³⁵⁶ *Bodhadīpikā* on 111: *ātmanāṃdārtham ātmaivāsanaṃ samyak na tu jaḍātmakadehādeḥ kambalādikāsanaṃ ity arthaḥ* |

³⁵⁷ *Śivagītā* 16.39ab: *sarvān kāmān avāpnoti manuṣyaḥ kambalāsane* |

³⁵⁸ *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā* 5.33abcd: *kuśāsane mṛgājine vyāghrājine ca kambale | sthūlāsane samāsīnaḥ prāṇmukho vāpy udānmuḥkaḥ* |

³⁵⁹ *Vivaraṇa* on 113: *sarvabhūtādir viśvādhiṣṭhānaṃ ca yat svataḥsiddhaṃ brahman ity ānaṃdaghanaṃ tad eva siddhāsanaṃ bhavet*

4.4 The Root-Lock (*mūlabandha*)

The three component parts following this are considered techniques of *āsana* in other yoga systems, for example, *mūlabandha*, the root-lock. As always in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, it is redefined here in terms of *brahman*:

That which is the root of all the elements,
On which the binding of consciousness is rooted.
The root-lock (*mūlabandha*) is always to be attended to,
That is appropriate for *rājayogīs*.³⁶⁰ || 114 ||

The commentaries mostly concur that the elements referred to are the five beginning with ether. According to the *Dīpikā*:

That which is the root of all the elements beginning with ether, which is the primary cause, is *brahman*. Likewise, the binding of consciousness [means] the cause of the binding of consciousness, even that whose root, i.e., whose support—because of the absence of separate existence—has miscognition as its root. Or else the binding of consciousness is restraining in one place, and also that on which it is rooted; the meaning is for whom it is the cause of the attainment of *brahman*.³⁶¹

³⁶⁰ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 114: *yan mūlaṃ sarvabhūtānāṃ yanmūlaṃ cittabandhanam | mūlabandhaḥ sadā sevyo yogyo 'sau rājayoginām ||*

³⁶¹ *Dīpikā* on 114: *ākāśādisarvabhūtānāṃ yan mūlam ādikāraṇaṃ brahma tathā cittabandhanaṃ cittasya bandhakāraṇaṃ mūlā'jñānaṃ tad api yanmūlaṃ yadāśrayaṃ prthaksattāsūnyatvād iti yad vā cittasya bandhanaṃ ekatralakṣye nigrahas tad api yanmūlaṃ yasya brahmaṇaḥ prāptinimittam ity arthaḥ |*

The *Dīpikā* then explains “for *rājayogīs*” as “for those whose *rājayoga* has the quality of a mental state that is not agitated, even in mundane engagement; the idea is for those who are endowed with fully cooked knowledge.”³⁶² The *Vṛ* adds that “that *mūlabandha* is appropriate for those whose minds are completely fully cooked and not for others, i.e., *haṭhayogīs*. The meaning is that for those, the authority is only binding to esoteric centers in the body, such as *golhāṭa*.³⁶³”³⁶⁴

The *Bodhadīpikā* agrees that the root is the cause, which is *brahman*. It then says, “the binding of consciousness is when there is binding of the distractions of consciousness; the root that is the cause is *brahman* alone; therefore, for *rājayogīs*, the kings among *yogīs*, this root-lock is always to be practiced. To be precise, when the root, which consists of bliss, is bound in *brahman*, that attachment is the root-lock.”³⁶⁵ The *Vivaraṇa* instead glosses *sarvabhūtānām* as “gross and subtle, moving and unmoving,” taking it as “all beings” rather than “elements” but like the other commentaries glosses *mūlam*, root, with *kāraṇam*, cause.³⁶⁶ It continues: “The root has the intrinsic form of the self, which is *brahman*, which is called *Vāsudeva*; that alone is the root-lock, which is the root of the binding of consciousness. That root-lock is to be served, unbroken by place, time, etc.”³⁶⁷ The *Ṭīkā* similarly says it is the root of the whole world and adds that it is powerful.³⁶⁸

³⁶² *Dīpikā* on 114: *rājayoginām vyavahārepy avikṣiptacittatālakṣaṇo rājayogas tadvatām jñānaparipākayuktānām*

³⁶³ Mallinson 2007 suggests this is probably a variant of the microcosmic Kolhāpur. It is mentioned in the c. 13th C. Marāthī *Vivekadarpaṇ*, see p. 209–210 n. 259.

³⁶⁴ *Vṛ* on 115: *asau mūlabandho rājayoginām atyaṃtaparipakvacittānām yogyo nānyeṣām haṭhayoginām teṣām golhāṭanādibandhana evādhikāra ity arthaḥ |*

³⁶⁵ *Bodhadīpikā* on 112: *sarvabhūtānām yan mūlam kāraṇam brahma punas citta-bandhanam cittavikṣepasya bandhane yanmūlam kāraṇam brahmaiva tasmād rājayoginām yogirājānām ayaṃ mūlabandhaḥ sadā sevyo bhavati mūle ānaṃdamaye brahmaṇi bandho ‘nurāgo mūlabandha ita yāvat |*

³⁶⁶ *Vivaraṇa* on 114: *yat sarvabhūtānām sthūlasūkṣmāṇām carācarāṇām mūlam kāraṇam*

³⁶⁷ *Vivaraṇa* on 114: *brahmātmavārūpaṃ vāsudevākhyam mūlam sa eva mūlabandhas citta-bandhana ity asau mūlabandhaḥ sevyo deśakāladyanavachinnaḥ*

³⁶⁸ *Ṭīkā* on 114: *je sarvalokāce ase mūle | te citta-bandhani prabaḷa |*

4.5 Equilibrium of the Body (*dehasāmya*)

The next component also has physical connotations in other yoga systems, and the verse alludes to that:

One should know equilibrium of the limbs of the body,

Is being absorbed in the constant *brahman*.

If there is not this, there is no equilibrium at all,

[Then] it is [merely] straightening [of the body], like a dried-up tree.³⁶⁹ || 115 ||

The *Dīpikā* goes into some detail in explaining this:

Now, he defines equilibrium of the body, with “of the limbs of the body.” Of all the body parts, which are mapped on to *brahman*, that are uneven by their nature, by seeing the equilibrium of their foundation [which is *brahman*], one should know, i.e., understand, as equilibrium in the constant *brahman*. Here, supplying the words, “if one still has unevenness of the limbs,” then the meaning is if one cannot be absorbed, one does not reside with the form of the constant *brahman*. Here, supply, “then”—when there is [merely] straightening of the body parts, i.e., uprightness and motionlessness, like a dried-up tree—there will be no equilibrium at all.³⁷⁰ The idea is that this connection is because of the inherent unevenness of the parts of the body.³⁷¹

³⁶⁹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 115: *aṅgānām samatām vidyāt same brahmaṇi līyate | no cen naiva samānatvaṃ rjutvaṃ śuṣkavṛkṣavat ||*

³⁷⁰ The wording of the verse is quite terse here and while one would like a relative/correlative clause in the form of “then” (*tarhi*) to go with the “if” (*cet*), there is no manuscript evidence to show that any other versions of this verse

The *Vṛt* keeps it much simpler: “From the strength of the conception of the self as everything, if there is absorption in *brahman*, i.e., the essence is equal in the body, then, at that time, there is the perception of absorption. One should know this as equilibrium of the limbs of the body. If it is not thus, there is no equilibrium at all of the limbs. Moreover, equilibrium of the head and neck, etc., is just straightening by the absence of movement, like of a dried-up tree, alone. The idea is that this does not cause liberation.”³⁷² The reference to keeping the head and neck even is at least as old as the *Bhagavadgītā*, occurring in the instructions for meditation in Chapter 6 (verse 13): “Holding the body, head, and neck straight, unmoving and steady, gazing at the tip of one’s nose and not looking in any direction.”³⁷³ While in the *Gītā* this is accompanied by the instruction to concentrate on the self, later yoga texts give this instruction as part of *āsana* practice, without the internal specification. The verse also refers to gaze (*dr̥ṣṭi*), which is the next step in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*.

The *Vivaraṇa* refers to this as well: “Of the limbs of the body, i.e., of the parts, equilibrium, or straightness, with this characteristic of a straight body, head, and neck, which is created by practice, is equilibrium. Then one should know, i.e., understand, when that is done, this is being absorbed in the one essence; the intention is going to absorption in the constant *brahman*, [meaning] in existence, consciousness, and bliss.”³⁷⁴ To explain the second line it says,

exist, so one has to assume authorial intent rather than manuscript corruption, which the commentaries have done their best to help explain.

³⁷¹ *Dīpikā* on 115: *aṅgānām brahmany adhyastānām svabhāvaviśamānām adhiṣṭhānasamatvadṛṣṭyā samatām vidyāj jānīyāt cet same brahmaṇi aṅgavaiśamyam ity atrādhyāhārah tac cen nolīyate samabrahmarūpatayāna tiṣṭhatīty arthaḥ tarhīty atra śeṣaḥ śuṣkavr̥kṣavad aṅgānām r̥jutvaṃ saralatvaṃ acamaḥcalatvaṃ ca yat tat samānatvaṃ naiva bhaved iti sambandhaḥ aṅgānām viśamasvabhāvatvād iti bhāvaḥ |*

³⁷² *Vṛt* on 116: *sarvātmabhāvanābālād dehasamarase brahmaṇi līnaś cet tadānīm tallayatvaṃ bhānaṃ | dehāṅgānām samatvaṃ iti vijānīyāt | naivaṃ cen naiva samānatvaṃ aṅgānām kiṃtu śirogr̥vādisāmyaṃ śuṣkavr̥kṣasyeva cāṃcalyābhāvena r̥jutvaṃ eva naitan mokṣakāraṇam iti bhāvaḥ |*

³⁷³ *Bhagavadgītā* 6.13: *samaṃ kāyaśirogr̥ivaṃ dhārayann acalaṃ sthiraḥ | samprekṣya nāsikāgraṃ svaṃ diśaś cānavalokayan ||*

³⁷⁴ *Vivaraṇa* on 115: *aṅgānām avayavānām samānatā r̥jutā samaṃ kāyaśirogr̥ivam etallakṣaṇayā ’bhyāsena kṛtā tāṃ samānatām iti tadā vidyāj jānīyāt yadā sā kṛtakā same brahmaṇi saccidānandaikas rasavilīyate layaṃ yāti ayam abhiprāyaḥ*

“If there is not this, there is no equilibrium at all. What then is done? It would be just straightening [of the body], like a dried-up tree. Just as straightness is made of a dried-up tree, with an axe, etc., similarly, it is done by people; therefore, seeing the undivided self, that alone is equilibrium; the idea is if there is not this, there should not be success.”³⁷⁵

The *Bodhadīpikā* has a rather odd variant reading at the beginning of this verse: *jaṅgānām* rather than *aṅgānām* (of the limbs/body), which he glosses as *jagatām*, “of the universe.” This leads to a different interpretation: “The equilibrium, or oneness, of the universe should be known as having the form of ‘I, alone, am the whole universe.’ One should know that that alone is equilibrium of the body. From which, when there is equilibrium of the whole universe, one is absorbed in the constant *brahman*. When it is known to be of this sort, then equilibrium is equilibrium of the body. Moreover, with respect to that, straightening in the body has the softness of dried-up wood. Just as dried-up wood is soft, in that way alone is the body, because of its being prone to excess.”³⁷⁶ It seems the idea is that dried-up wood can crumble, as can the body if it is merely physical straightening. The Marathi *Ṭīkā*, somewhat confusingly (although perhaps more poetically) says: “equilibrium of the body is like a stringed instrument, for one whose fluctuating states are all of *brahman*; one should not be like a dried-up tree for preserving the body.”³⁷⁷

4.6 Gaze (*dr̥ṣṭi*)

The final extra element related to posture has to do with where one focuses one’s vision.

³⁷⁵ *Vivaraṇa* on 115: *no cen naiva samānatvaṃ yat kṛtakaṃ tat kiṃ tarhi tat rjutvaṃ śuṣkavr̥kṣavat yathā śuṣko vṛkṣas tasya kuṭhārādīnā rjutvaṃ kriyate janais tadvat tasmād yad aparichinnāmdarśanaṃ tad eva samānatvaṃ no cet kṛtakṛtyatā na syād iti bhāvaḥ*

³⁷⁶ *Bodhadīpikā* on 113: *jaṅgānām jagatām yat samatām ekatām vidyāt sarvaṃ jagad aham evety ākārakaṃ yaj jānīyāt tad eva dehasāmyaṃ yataḥ sarvaṃ jagat same vakasin brahmaṇi līyate iti | yasyaitādr̥śaṃ jñāne cet tarhi | samānatvaṃ dehasāmyaṃ bhavati | kiṃca tasya śarīre rjutvaṃ komalatvaṃ yat tac chuṣkakāṣṭhavat | yathā śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭhaṃ komalaṃ tathaiva tasya śarīram iti nirdayatvāt |*

³⁷⁷ *Ṭīkā* on 115: *aṅgāci sama | tātecī | samabrahmavṛtti jāci | nalage pariśuṣkakāṣṭhācī | deha dhāraṇī ghetalī |*

Having made one's gaze full of knowledge,
One should see the universe as full of *brahman*.
That gaze (*dṛṣṭi*) is the most exalted,
Not looking at the tip of the nose.³⁷⁸ || 116 ||

Or where there may be the cessation,
Of seer, seeing, and seen.
There, alone, the gaze is to be directed,
Not looking at the tip of the nose.³⁷⁹ || 117 ||

With reference to the first verse, the *Dīpikā* clarifies: “Gaze is a state of the internal faculty (i.e., the mind), which is full of knowledge. Having made [one's gaze] of the form of undivided *brahman*, one should see the universe as completely full of *brahman*. The meaning is only this mental state is allowed: ‘This whole [universe] is *brahman*, alone.’”³⁸⁰ This is the clearest description of *dṛṣṭi* according to Advaita; and in fact, the only possible conception allowed, because a gazing point other than *brahman* would lead to a fundamental philosophical contradiction. Any other visual state would be necessarily predicated on duality, even if its focal point is internal, which is why this is being contrasted with the gaze towards the tip of the nose. And yet, as with the other *aṅgas*, the text does not say that *dṛṣṭi* is unnecessary. Instead, it redefines it in Advaitic terms, which means it must be predicated on *brahman*, alone. Regarding

³⁷⁸ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 116: *dṛṣṭim jñānamayīm kṛtvā paśyed brahmanamayaṃ jagat | sā dṛṣṭiḥ paramodārā na nāsāgrāv alokinī* ||

³⁷⁹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 117: *draṣṭṛdarśanadrśyānām virāmo yatra vā bhavet | dṛṣṭis tatraiva kartavyā na nāsāgrāv alokinī* ||

³⁸⁰ *Dīpikā* on 116: *dṛṣṭim aṃtahkaraṇavṛttim jñānamayīm akhaṃdabrahmākārām kṛtvā jagat sarvaṃ brahmanamayaṃ paśyet brahmevedaṃ sarvaṃ ity etāvan mātraiva vṛttih kārya |*

the second verse, the *Dīpikā* adds: “Where—in which true form of *brahman*—there may be the cessation, i.e., the dissolution of all the triads beginning with the seer, there—in that alone, in the sense of what exceeds the manifold world—the gaze, which is a state of the internal faculty, is to be directed, not looking at the tip of the nose.”³⁸¹

The *Vṛt*, which is missing the second verse, notes that “tip of the nose means the root and tip of the nose indicates the place in the middle of the eyebrows.”³⁸² It continues: “And the *rājayoga* that is taught in the yoga texts is well known with the different characteristics of *tāraka* and *amanaska*, etc. Surely, this [other] *rājayoga* is approved of by Vedānta, intended as only the gaze on *brahman*, thus its own purpose is to be spread.”³⁸³ The mention of this division between *tāraka* (“liberating”) and *amanaska* (“no-mind”) in reference to Vedānta probably refers to the *Advayatāraka Upaniṣad* and/or the *Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇa Upaniṣad* (which draw on earlier *haṭha* texts, such as the *Amanaska*) which focus on visualization practices. In his commentary on the *Advayatāraka Upaniṣad*, which is a more concise text, Upaniṣad Brahmayogin says that it explains the fundamental aspects of *rājayoga*. The *Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇa Upaniṣad* is quite possibly an expanded version of the *Advayatāraka Upaniṣad* and embeds these teachings in a greater discussion of *haṭhayoga* and an eight-part path which resembles that of Patañjali. While these texts agree that *tāraka* is earlier and *amanaska* is later, they differ somewhat in their definitions. In the *Advayatāraka Upaniṣad*, *tāraka* is said to be *mūrti*, meaning that it has a focal point, while *amanaska* is *amūrti*, without a focal point, and more internal, while in the *Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇa Upaniṣad*, these are both *tāraka* and their result is beyond. For our purpose here, what is most interesting is that both describe practices of visualization that involve three

³⁸¹ *Dīpikā* on 117: *yatra yasmin brahmasvarūpe dṛṣṭyādisarvatipuṣṭinām virāmo layo bhavet tatra tasminn eva prapañcātīte dṛṣṭir aṃtaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ kartavyā na nāsikāgrāvalokinīty arthaḥ |*

³⁸² *Vṛt* on 117: *nāsāyā agraṃ mūlaṃ nāsāgraṃ bhrūmadhyaṃ sthānam iti yāvat |*

³⁸³ *Vṛt* on 117: *yas tu rājayogaḥ yogaśāstre prañītaḥ | satārakāmanaskādivailakṣaṇyena prasiddhaḥ | ayaṃ hi vedāntābhīmato rājayogo brahmadṛṣṭimātraṃ vivakṣitam iti svābhiprāyaṃ prathayitum |*

focal points (*lakṣya*) that are considered internal gaze (*antardṛṣṭi*) and the seeing of various lights and colors, with the aim of oneness with *brahman*.

The *Bodhadīpikā* has an interesting variant reading in the fourth *pāda* of both verses: “which is looking at various scriptures” (*nānāśāstravilokinī*). To explain this second line it says, “That alone is gaze, which is the most divine, or exalted, i.e., creating exceeding bliss because it is looking at various scriptures, i.e., being absorbed in several Vedānta texts establishing *brahman*.”³⁸⁴ This alignment of the yogic gaze with traditional Advaitic methods is yet another instance of redefining these *haṭhayoga* techniques in terms of *brahman*. It seems this must again be referring to the Yoga Upaniṣads. In its commentary on the second verse, it adds on to this: “And how does that gaze become full of knowledge, looking at various scriptures? When seeing the thought of various scriptures, it is not the gaze of the eye, because of the weakness of that.”³⁸⁵ It is again emphasizing that these *aṅgas* are meant to transcend physicality. This variant speaks both to the inferiority of *haṭhayoga* practices, while also reinforcing the power of the Vedānta texts.

The *Vivaraṇa* succinctly explains the inferiority of an external gaze: “Not the one looking at the tip of the nose, because of the bondage of the self to the body from that. Therefore, the seeing of the self as *brahman* with no distinction, that alone is stability of gaze and that alone is to be practiced by those who are discerning.”³⁸⁶ The *Ṭīkā* concurs, saying that “fools will hold the tip of the nose.”³⁸⁷

³⁸⁴ *Bodhadīpikā* on 114: *saiva dṛṣṭiḥ paramādivyodārātīvānandadāyinī yato nānāśāstravilokinī brahmapratīpādakānekavedāntaśāstrāvagāhinī bhavatīty arthaḥ |*

³⁸⁵ *Bodhadīpikā* on 115: *sā ca dṛṣṭiḥ kathaṃ bhūtānānāśāstravilokinī jñānātmikā | na tu cakṣurindriyadrṣṭis tasyā nānāśāstramatāvalokane 'sāmarthyāt |*

³⁸⁶ *Vivaraṇa* on 116: *na nāsāgravilokinī tasyāḥ dehātmanibaṃdhanatvāt tasmān nirviśeṣaṃ brahmātmadarśanaṃ yat tad eva dṛṣṭisthairyaṃ tad evābhyasanīyaṃ vivekataḥ*

³⁸⁷ *Ṭīkā* on 116: *nāsāgradharaṇeṃ mūdhāmsī*

4.7 Breath Control (*prāṇāyāma*)

The *Vṛ* introduces this verse by noting its distinction: “To tell the different characteristics of *prāṇāyāma*, from the *prāṇāyāma* that is taught in the yoga texts he says:”³⁸⁸

From the understanding that all the states of the mind and so forth,

Are *brahman* alone,

That control of all the mental states,

Is called breath control (*prāṇāyāma*).³⁸⁹ || 118 ||

The *Dīpikā* elaborates the difference between this *prāṇāyāma* and that of Patañjali: “Because of the dependence of the breath on the mind, by the very control of the mind there is the control of the breath, but not only by control of the breath, which is accepted in Patañjali’s system, is there control of the mind, because of the absence of dependence on that.”³⁹⁰ The *Vṛ* agrees, saying “not by the practice of yoga” (*na yogarītyā*). It has *sarvadṛṣṭīnām* rather than *sarvavṛttīnām* in the third *pāda*, perhaps trying to tie it more directly to the gazing points discussed in the previous verse rather than states of mind, and glosses *nirodhaḥ* with *upaśamaḥ*, cessation, adding that this is called *prāṇāyāma* by Vedāntins.³⁹¹

The *Bodhadīpikā* glosses the first compound with “in the eleven sense organs.”³⁹² It then says: “Forming the thought that everything is *brahman*, alone; that yogic restraint, or contraction, alone, of all the mental states, i.e., of all the activities of the senses, is called breath control by

³⁸⁸ *Vṛ* on 118: *prāṇāyāmasya yogaśāstroktāt prāṇāyāmāt vailakṣyaṇyam āha |*

³⁸⁹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 118: *cittādisarvabhāveṣu brahmatvenaiva bhāvanāt | nirodhaḥ sarvavṛttīnām prāṇāyāmaḥ sa ucyate ||*

³⁹⁰ *Dīpikā* on 118: *manodhīnatvāt prāṇasya manonirodhenaiiva prāṇanirodhaḥ na tu prāṇanirodhenaiiva pātañjalābhīmatena mano nirodhas tadadhīnatvābhāvād |*

³⁹¹ *Vṛ* on 118: *sarvadṛṣṭīnām yo nirodhaḥ upaśamaḥ sa prāṇāyāma ucyate vedāntibhir iti śeṣaḥ |*

³⁹² *Bodhadīpikā* on 116: *ekādaśe indriyeṣu*

the *yogīs*.”³⁹³ The commentators all take this *prāṇāyāma* to involve control of the mental states, echoing Patañjali’s definition of yoga in *Yogasūtra* 1.2, rather than his description of breath control in *Yogasūtra* 2.49 as “the regulation of the inhalation and exhalation.”³⁹⁴

The *Vivaraṇa* concurs, contrasting this *prāṇāyāma* with that of *haṭhayoga*. “The control of the mental states, from the cognition of the self as *brahman*, that alone is *prāṇāyāma*, breath control, and not any other that is uncontrolled, with the characteristics of *haṭhayoga*, because of the artificiality of that.”³⁹⁵ Again, the emphasis here is on the naturalness of awareness of the self as opposed to external techniques of control. Two further verses are then given on *prāṇāyāma*.

The negation of the manifold world,

Is the breath called exhalation.

The mental state, “I am *brahman*, alone,”

Is the breath called inhalation.³⁹⁶ || 119 ||

After that, the fixedness of that mental state,

Is called retention (*kumbhaka*).

And this is restraint of breath among the awakened ones,

Though for the uncognizant ones, it is [just] tormenting the nose.³⁹⁷ || 120 ||

³⁹³ *Bodhadīpikā* on 116: *sarvaṃ brahmaiveti bhāvanam kṛtvā sarvavṛttināṃ sarvasmin sarve indriyapavṛttināṃ yogirodhaḥ saṃkocāḥ sa eva prāṇāyāmo yogibhir ucyaṭe ity arthaḥ |*

³⁹⁴ *Yogasūtra* 2.49: *tasmin sati śvāsapraśvāsayor gativicchedaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ |*

³⁹⁵ *Vivaraṇa* on 118: *tasmāt brahmātmajñānāt yo vṛttinirodhaḥ sa eva prāṇāyāmaḥ niramkuśo nānyo haṭhayogalakṣaṇas tasya kṛtakatvāt |*

³⁹⁶ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 119: *niṣedhanam prapañcasya recakākyah samīraṇaḥ | brahmaivāsmīti yā vṛtti pūraḥ vāyur īritāḥ ||*

³⁹⁷ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 120: *tatas tadvṛttinaiścalyaṃ kumbhakaḥ prāṇasaṃyamāḥ | ayaṃ cāpi prabuddhānām ajñānāṃ ghrāṇapīḍanam ||*

Regarding the first verse, the *Dīpikā* simply says, “He defines that breath control by the way that is accepted by him, by the three divisions, beginning with exhalation, with the one and a half verses beginning with negation. The meaning is clear.”³⁹⁸ The *Bodhadīpikā* says, “The mental state that has the form of the negation of the manifold world, that becomes the very falseness of the whole universe; that alone, in breath control, is the breath called exhalation, i.e., it is told as the breath. After that the mental state with the form of ‘I am *brahman*, alone,’ in breath control, is the breath called inhalation; supply it is declared by the *yogīs*.”³⁹⁹ The *Bodhadīpikā* is missing the second verse. Regarding exhalation, the *Vṛt* glosses “negation” (*niṣedha*) with “abandoning” (*tyāga*). With regard to inhalation, it explains: “The idea is from the perception of fullness in the self.”⁴⁰⁰ It then defines *kumbhaka* as “the fixedness of that very mental state, unbroken by other mental states, in that alone, i.e., in *brahman* and *ātman*.”⁴⁰¹ In regard to the beginning of the second verse, the *Dīpikā* says, “By after that, the disregard for the not-self, inquiry into the self, and the firmity of that [mental state] is referred to by the word exhalation, etc.; this is the intended meaning.”⁴⁰²

The *Vivaraṇa* says “the breath called exhalation is the negation with the mental state, ‘not this, not that’ by means of seeing the uselessness—i.e., the abandoning of ‘I’ and ‘mine’—of the manifold world, i.e., of the supposition of the body, etc., whose cause is the superimposition of

³⁹⁸ *Dīpikā* on 119: *amum prāṇāyāmaṃ svābhimatena recakādivibhāgatrayeṇa lakṣayati sārddhena niṣedhanam iti spaṣṭam |*

³⁹⁹ *Bodhadīpikā* on 117: *prapaṃcasya niṣedhanam sarvaṃ jagan mithyaiva bhavātīy ākārīkā yā vṛttīḥ saiva prāṇāyāme recakākhyah samīraṇo vāyuh kathito bhavati | paścād brahmaivā]smītyākārīkā yā vṛttis saiva prāṇāyāme pūrako vāyur īritah pratipādito yogibhir iti śeṣah |*

⁴⁰⁰ *Vṛt* on 119: *ātmani pūrṇatvabhānād iti bhāvaḥ |*

⁴⁰¹ *Vṛt* on 120: *tataś ca tasminneva brahmātmani tasyā eva vṛtter yā niścala tā vijātīyāvṛtṭyanamtaritatvaṃ sā kumbhakah prāṇāyāma ity arthah |*

⁴⁰² *Dīpikā* on 120: *tata iti anātmopekṣā’ātmanusaṃdhānataddārḍhyāni recakādiśabdavācīyānīti bhāvārthah |*

worldly objects with the thought of the self as divided, i.e., of becoming the not-self.”⁴⁰³ “The breath called inhalation,” on the other hand, has “the characteristic of the inquiry of ‘I am that *brahman* alone,’ whose intrinsic form is the witness of all mental images of unbroken bliss, illuminating all mental images, with the mental images of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ gone.”⁴⁰⁴ The exhalation and inhalation are again contrasted as “the non-grasping of the manifold world consisting of names and forms” and “the grasping that ‘I am that *brahman*,’ with the intrinsic form of existence, consciousness, and bliss” and it is explained that cessation of other mental states occurs by means of these two mental states.⁴⁰⁵ And according to the *Vivarāṇa*, “the restraint of the breath which is retention is the fixedness of that very state. Here, breath is the characteristic of the individual self. The restraint of that is the destruction of individual self-ness. The meaning is that when there is cessation by means of the two states, there is the approach of the self-evident intrinsic form.”⁴⁰⁶

Regarding the final line of the second verse, the *Dīpikā* says, “Among the awakened ones, by the complete absence of incapability and so forth; the meaning is among the enlightened ones who are endowed with knowledge of the self, who possess knowledge through direct experience beyond doubt. Supplying ‘it is appropriate,’ then among the uncognizant ones, what kind is there? To answer this, he says for the uncognizant ones.”⁴⁰⁷ The *Vivarāṇa* further explains, “Now you might say that it is said by *yogīs* that the restraint of the breath has the

⁴⁰³ *Vivarāṇa* on 119: *prapañcasya parichinnātmadhiyā viṣayādhyāsanimitdadehādyadhyastasyānātmabhūtasya netinetīyatadvṛtīyā niṣedhanam[a]narthakyadarśanadvāreṇāhaṃ mamādityāgaḥ sa recaka ityākhyā yasya saḥ samīraṇo vāyur īrita iti vyavahitena saṃbaṃdhaḥ*

⁴⁰⁴ *Vivarāṇa* on 119: *tato ‘luptānaṃdasarvapratyayasākṣisvarūpaṃ sarvapratyayaprakāśakaṃ yadbrahma tat brahmaivāsmīty anusamdhānāśīlāyā nirgatāhamamādipratyaḥ [...] sā pūrako vāyur īritaśca*

⁴⁰⁵ *Vivarāṇa* on 119: *evaṃ nāmarūpātmakasya prapañcasyārthasūnyatvenāgrahaṇaṃ yayā vṛtīyā sā recakākhyāprāṇāvṛtīḥ yayā ca saccidāmaṃdasvarūpaṃ brahma tadahaṃ astīti grahaṇaṃ sā pūrakākhyāprāṇāvṛtīḥ ityanena vṛttidvayanīrodha uktaḥ*

⁴⁰⁶ *Vivarāṇa* on 119: *tad eva vṛttinaiścalyaṃ yat sa eva prāṇasaṃyamah kumbhaka atra prāṇo jīvalakṣaṇas tasya saṃyamo jīvatvanāśaḥ ubhayavṛttivirāme svataḥsiddhasvarūpābhigamanam ity arthaḥ*

⁴⁰⁷ *Dīpikā* on 120: *prabuddhānāṃ prakarṣeṇāsaṃbhāvānādirahitātvena buddhānāṃ ātmabodhayuktānāṃ niḥsaṃdehā’parokṣajñānīnāṃ ityarthaḥ | yogya ityadhyāhāraḥ tarhyajñānāṃ kīdṛśa ity ata āha ajñānāṃ iti |*

characteristic of approaching the thousand-petaled lotus by the sequence of cessation of inhalation and exhalation of the breath, so why is it opposed here? Anticipating that, he says ‘this.’ ‘Though’ it is said by the *yogīs*, nonetheless, this is restraint of the breath among the awakened ones, i.e., those who have ascended through discernment between words and meaning, through the sequence beginning with purification of *sattva*. By the word ‘and’ it is determined among those who are very awakened. This, itself, is the opposite from the tormenting of the nose etc., which is being afflicted among the uncognizant ones, who are desirous of ascending; thus, by this, the previous method for that is indicated, and therefore for the awakened ones, it is well known that this alone is the maker of the highest bliss.”⁴⁰⁸

4.8 Sensory withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*) and Concentration (*dhāraṇā*)

We are now back in sequence with Patañjali’s auxiliaries, moving on to the more internal methods starting with sensory withdrawal:

Having seen the self in all sense objects,
There is the submerging in consciousness of the mind.
That is to be known as sensory withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*),
To be practiced by those desiring liberation.⁴⁰⁹ || 121 ||

⁴⁰⁸ *Vivaraṇa* on 120: *nanu prāṇāpānanirodhakrameṇa vāyoh sahasradalābhigamanalakṣaṇaḥ prāṇāsaṃyamāyo yogibhir ucyate iha kasmād viruddham ity āsaṃkyāha ayam iti apīti yogibhir ucyate tathāpi ayam prāṇasaṃyamāḥ prabuddhānām sat[t]vaśuddhyādikrameṇa padapadārthavivekārūḍhānām cakāreṇa niścitotiprabuddhānām ayam eveti anyo ghrāṇādīpīdanād yo niṣādyamānaḥ so ’jñānām ārūrūḥṣūṇām ity anena tasya pūrvavidhānaḥ s[ū]citaḥ bhavati tasmāt prabuddhānām ayam eva paramānaṃdakara iti siddhaḥ*

⁴⁰⁹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 121: *viṣayeṣv ātmatām dṛṣṭvā manasaś citi majjanam | pratyāhāraḥ sa vijñeyo ’bhyasanīyo mumukṣubhiḥ ||*

The *Dīpikā* explains: “In all objects, i.e., in pots and such things, or else in sound and the other [sense objects], by way of positive and negative concomitance, having seen—or repeatedly reflected on—the self with the essential properties of being, luminosity, and dearness, there is the submerging in consciousness of the mind, i.e., of the internal faculty, by the freedom from inquiry into action and names and forms. The staying in one’s true form, which is consciousness, that is sensory withdrawal. And then what? He says it is to be practiced.”⁴¹⁰ The *Vṛt* says, “Having seen, i.e., having known the self, [meaning] the pure consciousness that is the support, in all sense objects, i.e., in sound, touch, form, taste, and smell—with respect to that, making one the state of the mind with the intrinsic form of consciousness—that is to be known, i.e., to be cognized as sensory withdrawal; the meaning is it is also to be practiced again and again (*muhur muhur*) by those desiring liberation.”⁴¹¹

Both the *Bodhadīpikā* and the *Vivarāṇa* have this “again and again” (*muhur muhur*) at the end of the final *pāda*, rather than “by those desiring liberation” (*mumukṣubhir*), though the latter is included in the *Bodhadīpikā*’s explanation of the verse as seen above. Additionally, in the second *pāda* the *Bodhadīpikā* has “with the mind, the submerging in consciousness” (*manasā cittamajjanam*), while the *Vivarāṇa* has “the submerging of the mind there” (*manasas tatra majjanam*). The *Bodhadīpikā* explains, “Having seen, i.e., having known with the mind, the self in all sense objects, [meaning] the whole universe is the self alone, after that, the submerging in consciousness, i.e., the purification of the internal organ, alone, is to be known as sensory

⁴¹⁰ *Dīpikā* on 121: *viṣayeṣu ghaṭādiṣu yad vā śabdādiṣu anvayavyatirekābhyām ātmatām sattāsphurattāpriyatā-mātratām dr̥ṣṭvānusamdhāya manasoṃtaḥkaraṇasya citimajjanam nāmarūpakriyānusamdhānarāhityena citsvarūpatayāvasthānaṃ sa pratyāhāraḥ tataḥ kim ata āha abhyasanīya iti |*

⁴¹¹ *Vṛt* on 121: *viṣayeṣvātmātām śabdaspārśarūparasagamdheṣu adhiṣṭhānacīnmātratvam dr̥ṣṭvā jñātvā sthitasya manasā citsvarūpatayā tatraikībhāvaḥ sa pratyāhāra iti vijñeyo jñātavyo mokṣakāṃkṣibhir muhur muhur abhyasanīyopīty arthaḥ |*

withdrawal; therefore, for the purpose of the bliss of the self, that is to be practiced again and again; supply ‘by those desiring liberation.’”⁴¹²

The *Vivaraṇa* says, “The meaning is having seen, i.e., having known the self, [meaning] the state of the self by the self, in all sense objects, such as sound, [or] in the play of the mind, expanding into names and forms, by means of the non-grasping of what is created by the mind, i.e., names and forms.”⁴¹³ It continues with an objection and answer: “Now if you were to say that with respect to this the abandoning of names and forms is improper, because of the teaching that everything is the self, we would say no, this is a fault. From which, i.e., from hearing that names and forms are the forms of the universe, therefore everything is the self, by this too there is the abandoning of names and forms, thus, it is asked, how does the highest truth arise? The self, whose intrinsic form is existence, consciousness, and bliss, which is unbroken, without a second, devoid of differences such as belonging to oneself, the witness of all images, beyond the sphere of all images, self-knowing, also because the self is the authority, beyond an object, whose intrinsic form is the transformation of the self, that alone is everything; thus, by the grasping of correct knowledge, the very non-existence of everything is to be approached. Therefore, the very seeing of another than the self is the seeing of the self.”⁴¹⁴ This leads to the conclusion: “Therefore, thus, having seen the self in all objects, i.e., holding in the mind, with respect to that, the submerging of the mind in the self, repeatedly, by practice, i.e., by the state of

⁴¹² *Bodhadīpikā* on 118: *manasā viṣayeṣu saṃsāreṣu ātmatām sarvaṃ jagad ātmaiveti drṣṭvā jñātvā paścāc cittamajjanam aṃtaḥkaraṇasodhanam yat tad eva pratyāhāro vijñeyah tasmād ātmānaṃdārthaṃ sa pratyāhāro muhur muhur abhyasanīyo mumukṣubhir iti śeṣah |*

⁴¹³ *Vivaraṇa* on 121: *viṣayeṣu śabdādiṣu manovilasiteṣu nāmarūpamātravijṛmbhaṇeṣv ātmanātmanobhāva ātmatām ātmātvam ity arthaḥ drṣṭvā jñātvā manahkṛtānām nāmarūpāṇām agrahaṇena*

⁴¹⁴ *Vivaraṇa* on 121: *nanu atra nāmarūpāṇām tyāgo anupapannah sarvaṃ ātmeti śāsanād iti cen nāyam doṣah kasmān nāmarūpasya jagadrūpatvaśravaṇāt tasmāt sarvaṃ ātmety anenāpi nāmarūpasya tyāga evaṃ saṃbhavati paramārthataḥ katham ity ucyate ātmā saccidānaṃdasvarūpākhaṇḍādviṭīyah svagatādibhedaśū[n]yah sarvapratyayasākṣī sarvapratyayāviṣayah svatojña pramātratvād ātmanopy aṣṭaya ātmāpariṇāmasvarūpaḥ sa eva sarvaṃ iti pramānagrahaṇena sarvasyāsātvam evābhuyupeyaṃ bhavati tasmād ātmanonyasyādarśanam evātmadarśanam*

making it the self; the meaning is that is to be known, i.e., to be understood, as sensory withdrawal. [...] This alone is to be practiced again and again, i.e., without break.”⁴¹⁵

We then turn towards *dhāraṇā*, concentration, which is basically a more refined version of the same practice.

Wherever the mind goes,
From seeing *brahman* there,
And only that fixing of the mind,
Is regarded as the highest concentration (*dhāraṇā*).⁴¹⁶ || 122 ||

Interestingly, the *Dīpikā* makes reference to a practice of *dhāraṇā* on the *cakras* here:

Now you might say that it is well known that the fixing of the mind in one place—on one of the six *cakras* beginning with the [root] support—is concentration; to answer this he says “that.” That concentration in this case which has the characteristic that was spoken of is regarded as the highest, i.e., the most excellent; the idea is that it is accepted by those who have understanding of the truth. But the other, accepted by Patañjali’s system, is like the others beginning with breath control, in every case; this is the meaning of the two particles “and

⁴¹⁵ *Vivarāṇa* on 121: *tasmād evaṃ viśayeṣv ātmatvaṃ dṛṣṭvā manasi dhṛtvā tatrātmani manaso majjanam asakṛd abhyāsenātmākāratāyā sa pratyāhāro vijñeyo vijānīyād ity arthaḥ [...] ayam evābhyasanīyo muhur muhur akhaṇḍanayety etat*

⁴¹⁶ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 122: *yatra yatra mano yāti brahmaṇas tatra darśanāt | manaso dhāraṇaṃ caiva dhāraṇā sā parā matā ||*

only” (*ca eva*), which illuminate the accomplishment of the experience of those who are learned in Vedānta.⁴¹⁷

He is reading a lot into the particles here, given that there is no explicit mention of any other system. However, given the inclusion of all eight *aṅgas* of Patañjali with their very different definitions, it makes sense to think that some contrast must be intended.

The *Vṛ* explains: “The yoga texts say that: wherever and whatever its sense objects in the form of sound and so on, when the mind—that part of the inner organ that always has the nature of wandering outwards—is controlled, that is liberation.”⁴¹⁸ It then contrasts this with the highest concentration that is explained here in which one, as previously, sees *brahman* alone. The use of the word *darśana*—which is usually used for the dualistic seeing of a god or holy person—in relation to *brahman*, again presents a complete impossibility for the classic Advaitin, but seems to be used here in the spirit of inclusivity. The *Bodhadīpikā* glosses *dhāraṇā* with *dhairya*, “stability” or “steadiness,” but otherwise does not have much to add, nor does the *Ṭīkā*, and this folio of the *Vivaraṇa* is missing.

4.9 Meditation (*dhyāna*) and Absorption (*samādhi*)

The word *dhyāna* is derived from √*dhyai*, the same root as for *nididhyāsana*, and is given by Patañjali as the seventh auxiliary of his *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, where he defines it as “the one-pointedness of the mind on a mental image.”⁴¹⁹ Vidyāraṇya cites this *sūtra* in the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, along

⁴¹⁷ *Dīpikā* on 122: *nanv ādhārādiṣaṭcakraṃmadhye ekatra manaso dhāraṇam dhāraṇeti prasiddham ata āha seti sātrotkalakṣaṇā dhāraṇā parotkṛṣṭā matā tattvabodhavatām ity arthaḥ | anyā tu pātāñjalābhimatā prāñyāmādivad apareti bhāvaḥ ca evety avyayadvayaṃ vedāntavidvadanubhavaprasiddhiṃ dyotayati*

⁴¹⁸ *Vṛ* on 122: *yatra yatra yasmin yasmin viṣaye śabdādirūpe mano aṃtaḥkāraṇabhāgaḥ sarvadā bahiḥ pracāraśīlo yasmin niruddho muktir iti yogaśāstre ucyate |*

⁴¹⁹ *Yogasūtra* 3.2: *tatra pratyayaikatānatā dhyānam |*

with the *sūtras* defining *dhāraṇā* and *samādhi*, the sixth and eighth parts, elaborating that “*dhāraṇā* exists when the wise person focuses and concentrates the wandering conceiving (*saṃkṛp*) mind solely on the self. ‘Fixedness on one thought’ means mental flow (*pravāha*) on a single object – reality (*tattva*). This flow is of two kinds: interrupted (*vicchidyā*) and continuous (*saṃtati*).”⁴²⁰ These correspond with *dhyāna* and *samādhi*. So, for Vidyāraṇya, *dhyāna* is considered an interrupted flow of one-pointedness on the self, whereas *samādhi* is unbroken. In our text, once again, both *dhyāna* and *samādhi* are defined in terms of cognition of *brahman*, but also with increasingly singular focus.

Remaining steady, without holding onto anything,
By means of the superior mental state, “I am *brahman* alone,”
Is known by the word meditation (*dhyāna*),
Giving the highest bliss.⁴²¹ || 123 ||

The *Dīpikā* says, “By means of the superior mental state, which is always existing, i.e., that mental state which is not fit for rejection by any other means of knowledge, by that mental state, without holding onto anything, by the state of being free of inquiry into the body, and so forth, remaining steady; the meaning is staying or residing.”⁴²² Once again, rather than allowing for any number of possible *pratyayas* or “mental images” as the support for this meditation, it is reconceptualized as centering on *brahman* alone.

⁴²⁰ Fort 1999: 383.

⁴²¹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 123: *brahmaivāsmīti sadvṛtṭyā nirāḷambatayā sthitiḥ | dhyānaśabdena vikhyātā paramānandadāyini ||*

⁴²² *Dīpikā* on 123: *sadvṛtṭyā satī pramāṇāṃtarabādhāyogyā vṛttis tayā vṛtṭyā nirāḷambatayā dehādyanusaṃdhānārāhityena sthitiḥ avasthānam ity arthaḥ |*

The *Bodhadīpikā* says, “By means of the mental state consisting of the conception of *brahman* always, without holding onto anything, from which the self is one alone, without a second, from this remaining steady without support. That alone, by the word meditation on the self, is known by *yogīs*, i.e., described. After that it is giving the highest bliss; the idea is that it gives the happiness of the supreme self.”⁴²³ The *Vṛt* adds: “Having made the range consist of the superior reality, ‘I am *brahman* alone, consisting of everything,’ remaining steady, without an object, is known by the word meditation. It gives the well-known highest bliss; the meaning is among those who know *brahman*, it gives the highest bliss.”⁴²⁴ The folios for both this and the next verse on *samādhi* are missing in the *Vivaraṇa*.

By means of the unchanging mental state,

Again, with the form of *brahman*,

Forgetting mental states completely,

[That] is absorption (*samādhi*), which is the same as cognition [of *brahman*].⁴²⁵ || 124 ||

The *Dīpikā* says, “By means of the unchanging [is] by the state of the internal faculty which is free of close inspection of the sense objects. The word ‘again’ is only to connect with the form of *brahman*, which is completely free of impressions of the manifest world, i.e., empty of mental states in the form of the meditator and the thing to be meditated on. Forgetting mental states [means] not reflecting on duality; the meaning is that absorption is the fifteenth part. [...] With

⁴²³ *Bodhadīpikā* on 120: *yā sarvatra brahmabhāvanātmikāvṛttis tayā punar nirālaṃbatayā yatodvīṭy[e]na eka evātmātovālabanaśūnyatayā yā sthitiḥ | saivātmadyānaśabdena yogi[bhi]r vyākhyātā varṇitā punas sā paramānaṃdadāyini paramātmāno yatsukhaṃ tatsukhaṃ dadātīty arthaḥ |*

⁴²⁴ *Vṛt* on 123: *sarvātmakaṃ brahmaivāham asmīti sadvastugocarīkṛtyā nirviṣayatayā sthitiḥ dhyānaśabdena vikhyātā | prasiddhāparamānaṃdaṃ dadātīti paramānaṃdadāyiniṭi brahmavitsv ity arthaḥ |*

⁴²⁵ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 124: *nirvikāratayā vṛtṭyā brahmākāratayā punaḥ | vṛttivismaraṇaṃ samyak samādhir jñānaśaṃjñākāḥ ||*

this intention he qualifies absorption, which is the same as cognition [of *brahman*]. [...] And it is said: ‘Absorption is the arising of awareness of the oneness of the individual and highest self.’⁴²⁶⁴²⁷ The *Bodhadīpikā* elaborates with a metaphor: “With the form of *brahman*, i.e., composed of *brahman*, by means of the unchanging [mental state], [which is] devoid of change, again, forgetting mental states, i.e., forgetfulness of the mental state of ‘I’ by the continuous piercing to be practiced by the meditator, that alone is absorption, which is the same as cognition [of *brahman*], like wood is consumed by fire. Just as wood burnt by fire is broken apart, and also the fire is destroyed; after that, in the absence of both, ashes alone remain. In that very same way, it is said by the *yogīs*, that the *yogī* effecting absorption, in the absence of the continuous piercing to be practiced by the meditator, existing in non-duality, remains in the self alone.”⁴²⁸

The *Vyṭ* says, “When abiding with the form of *brahman* arises by means of the unchangeability of the mental state, for the knower of *brahman* who is remaining with that unchanging mental state, by the decrease of [other] mental states gradually there is the forgetting of [those] mental state[s]; that also becomes firm by the cooking of the foundation. That alone is said to be absorption, which is the same as cognition [of *brahman*]. The idea is that with regard to that kind of absorption, of cognition of the oneness of *ātman* and *brahman* without distinction, there is no disparity, because both have one form. It is said absorption is the arising of understanding of oneness with the highest self.”⁴²⁹

⁴²⁶ *Yoga Darśana Upaniṣad* 10.1.

⁴²⁷ *Dīpikā* on 124: *nirvikāratayā viṣayānusamdhānarahitatayāmtahkaraṇavṛtṭyā punar anantaram eva brahmākāratayā yat samyak prapaṃcasamskārahitaṃ dhyātrdhyeyākāravṛtṭisūnyam vṛttivismaraṇam dvaitānanusamdhānam sa samādhiḥ paṃcadaśam aṅgam ity arthaḥ | [...] ity āśayena samādhiṃ viśinaṣṭi jñānasamjñaka [...] uktaṃca “samādhiḥ samvidutpattiḥ parajīvaikatām prati” iti |*

⁴²⁸ *Bodhadīpikā* on 121: *brahmākāratayā brahmarūpatayā nirvikāratayā vikārasūnyatayā punar vṛttivismaraṇam dhyātrdheyasamvedhenāhamvṛtṭer vismṛtir yā saiva samādhiḥ jñānasamjñakā samādhir bhavātītikāṣṭhāgnidagdhavat | yathāgninā dagdham kāṣṭham bhinnam agnir api bhinnah paścād ubhayābhāve bhasmaiva tiṣṭhati | tathaiva dhyātrdheyasamvedhābhāve dvaitaḥ san svayam eva yogī tiṣṭhatīti kṛtvā samādhir ity ucyate yogibhir iti |*

⁴²⁹ *Vyṭ* on 124: *brahmākāratayā sthite nirvikāratayā vṛtṭeḥ saṃpadyate tayā nirvikāravṛtṭyā sthitasya brahmavido vṛtṭisāithilyena śanaiḥ śanaiḥ vismaranam vṛtṭer bhavati tad api niṣṭāparipākena drḍham bhavati tad eva*

The *Vivarāṇa* introduces the next verse on the continued practice of *samādhi*: “Now, by the auxiliaries that were previously spoken of, showing that what was called the bliss of absorption is to be practiced earnestly, he brings it together with ‘this.’”⁴³⁰

And one should practice this [contemplation] properly,
Which is unmanufactured bliss,
Until it is under control and in an instant, for a person who is absorbed,
It should arise of its own accord.^{431 432} || 125 ||

The *Dīpikā* says, “Now, to explain the purpose for which this contemplation, together with its parts, was spoken of, he says ‘this.’ Unmanufactured bliss is that which reveals the bliss that is one’s intrinsic form; the idea is that this is contemplation. From the syllable ‘and’ the inquiry into Vedānta according to one’s intellectual capacity is also [indicated].”⁴³³ The *Bodhadīpikā* adds, “Again, for the very purpose of what was previously said, he describes absorption with further explanation by ‘and this.’ The *yogī* should practice this unmanufactured bliss, i.e., eternal bliss or bliss of the self, properly, i.e., correctly, until in an instant under control of a person,

jñānasamjñīkaḥ samādhir ity ucyate | na tādrśasamādhyapekṣayā nirvikalpakabrahmātmaikatvajñānasya kiṃcid vaiṣamyam ubhayor ekarūpatvād iti bhāvah | tad uktaṃ | samādhiḥ samvidutpatih parañivaikyatām prati |

⁴³⁰ *Vivarāṇa* on 125: *atha pūrvoktair angaiḥ prokto yaḥ samādhyānaṃdaḥ sa ādarād abhyasānīya iti darśayan sann upasaṃharati imaṃ*

⁴³¹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 125: *imañ cākṛtrim ānandaṃ tāvat sādhu samabhyaset | vaśyo yāvat kṣaṇāt puṃsaḥ prayuktaḥ san bhavet svayam ||*

⁴³² The *Vṛt* and *Vivarāṇa* end with *svayam bhajet*, meaning [a person] should experience it spontaneously.

⁴³³ *Dīpikā* on 125: *idānīm yad arthaṃ sāmgaṃ idaṃ nididhyāsanam uktaṃ tad āha imam iti akṛtrim ānaṃdaṃ svarūpabhūtānaṃdābhivyamjakaṃ nididhyāsanam ity arthaḥ cakārād yathābuddhi vedāntavicāram apīti*

[meaning] of a *yogī* yoked through practice, the bliss of the self should arise of its own accord, i.e., of its own power.”⁴³⁴

The *Vṛt* reminds us of the connection to the *aṅgas*: “One should practice this unmanufactured bliss properly by means of the fifteen auxiliaries until it is independent of practices, [meaning] up until it is full of qualities such as humility, i.e., completely firm; the intended meaning is that without practice, bliss does not become manifest.”⁴³⁵ It continues, “In that very instant, easily and without effort, for a person, i.e., for a wise person, absorption should become under control, and also until practicing that without interruption, a person who is absorbed, i.e., being in controlled absorption, should experience it spontaneously. The meaning is likewise, one should experience unmanufactured bliss.”⁴³⁶ The *Vivarāṇa* adds, “This bliss of absorption, which was previously spoken of, is unmanufactured, i.e., not to be brought about by an agent, etc., [meaning] the inner [self] alone is to be approached, with no action remaining and nothing remaining to be done; the meaning is the bliss of one’s own self.”⁴³⁷ And it concludes, “The meaning is that person should experience it completely of its own accord, i.e., one should experience it with the state of one’s own intrinsic nature.”⁴³⁸

The *Bodhadīpikā* introduces the next verse with, “Moreover, he explains the great wonder of the intrinsic form of absorption with, ‘after that.’”⁴³⁹

⁴³⁴ *Bodhadīpikā* on 122: *punaḥ pūrvoktārtham eva samādhiṃ vyākhyānamtareṇa varṇayati imaṃ ceti | yogī tāv[a]d imam akṛtrim ānaṇdanityam ātmānaṇdam sādhu samyag abhyaset yāvatkṣaṇaparyamtaṃ puṃso yoginobhyāsenā prayuktotha ātmānaṇda svayam eva vaśyaḥ svādhīno bhavet |*

⁴³⁵ *Vṛt* on 125: *imam akṛtrim ānaṇdam asādhanaparataṃtraṃ yāvat prāpnoti puruṣas tāvat paryamtaṃ sādhu amānitvādiguṇasampannaḥ samyak dṛḍham pañcadaśabhir aṅgair abhyāsed abhyāsaṃ vinā nānaṇdāvirbhāva ity āśayaḥ |*

⁴³⁶ *Vṛt* on 125: *kṣaṇād evā’nāyāsenā aprayatnena ca yāvat paryamtaṃ puṃso vivekinaḥ samādhir vaśyo bhavet tāvad abhyasya tad anaṇtaram api prayukto vaśyasamādhiḥ san svayam puruṣo bhajet | tathaivā’kṛtrimānaṇdam anubhūyād ity arthaḥ |*

⁴³⁷ *Vivarāṇa* on 125: *pūrvokto yaḥ samādhyānaṇdas tam akṛtrim akartṛkārakādyasādhyam kevalam pratyag abhigamyam akriyāśeṣam cākāryaśeṣam svātmānaṇdam ity arthaḥ*

⁴³⁸ *Vivarāṇa* on 125: *svato bhajet saḥ puruṣaḥ pratyak svarūpatvenānubhūyed ity arthaḥ tāvad abhyased iti sambandhaḥ*

⁴³⁹ *Bodhadīpikā* on 123: *kiṃca samādhisvarūpasyātivāścaryam pratipādayati tata iti |*

After that, the king of *yogīs* is free from practices,

And becomes perfected.

That intrinsic form of this [*yogī*],

Is not an object of mind or speech.^{440 441} || 126 ||

The *Dīpikā* says, “Thus, he tells the fruit for one who is practicing in this way with ‘after that.’ Free from practices is without repetition of these practices; this is the meaning. The idea is that the true form of this *yogī* is well known in Vedānta as *brahman* alone.”⁴⁴² The *Bodhadīpikā* says, “After that, i.e., by that absorption alone, the king of *yogīs* is free from practices and becomes perfected. The means, such as posture, that were previously spoken of, for obtainment of the self, even by those he becomes free, from which the self is *brahman* alone.”⁴⁴³

The *Vṛt* says, “After that, i.e., following that, the highest of practitioners being satiated by obtaining the taste of the nectar of the highest bliss, becoming perfected, free from the distinction between practice and accomplishment, becomes the king of *yogīs*, i.e., the lord of yoga. The meaning is for him the practice of absorption, i.e., the effort, does not exist again, because for the lord of yoga, the intrinsic nature of [the identity of] *ātman* and *brahman* has been obtained. To explain that the intrinsic nature of that [*yogī*] is beyond speech and mind he says, ‘the intrinsic nature of that [*yogī*],’ which is clear.”⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴⁰ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 126: *tataḥ sādhananirmuktaḥ siddho bhavati yogirāt | tatsvarūpaṃ na caitasya viśayo manaso girām ||*

⁴⁴¹ The *Bodhadīpikā* has the last line as *tatsvarūpaṃ naiva tasya viśayo manaso girāḥ*. And the *Vṛt* and the *Vivaraṇa* both have *tatsvarūpaṃ na vai tasya viśayo manaso girām*. But neither variant changes the meaning significantly from the *Dīpikā*’s *caitasya = ca etasya*.

⁴⁴² *Dīpikā* on 126: *evam abhyasataḥ phalam āha tata iti sādhananirmuktaḥ sādhanābhyāsarahita ity arthaḥ etasya yogīnaḥ tadvedāntaprasiddham svarūpaṃ brahmaiveti bhāvaḥ |*

⁴⁴³ *Bodhadīpikā* on 123: *tatas tenaiva samādhinā yogirāt sādhananirmuktaḥ siddho bhavati | ātmalabdhye pūrvoktāni | yān yāsanādīni karaṇāni tair api rahito bhavati yatasvayaṃ brahmaiveti |*

⁴⁴⁴ *Vṛt* on 126: *tatas tadanamṭaram sādhakottamaḥ paramānamdāmṛtarasālābhena tṛptaḥ san siddho bhūtvā sādhanasādhyaparamārsarahito yogirāt yogīśvaro bhavati | na punas tasya samādhyabhyāsaḥ prayāso vidyata ity*

The *Vivarāṇa* says, “After that, completely by that method, after the experience of the intrinsic form of the undifferentiated highest bliss, free from practices, without any action, i.e., being without purpose, seeing inaction in action, [he] becomes perfected. From continued effort up until awareness of one’s own self, and self-attained from the experience of one’s intrinsic form, who becomes perfected? Anticipating this question, he says ‘the king of *yogīs*.’”⁴⁴⁵ He then gives the characteristics of this king of *yogīs*, both in his own words and through quotations. “One who has attained self-rule by yoga, beginning with tranquility and restraint, or kingship in the midst of *yogīs*, being satisfied everywhere in one’s own self alone, contented by the bliss of the self, whose one refuge is the lord, and likewise [*Bhagavad Gītā* 6.47 says]: ‘Even among all the *yogīs*, one whose inner self has gone to me, who, full of faith, honors me, is thought to be the most devoted to me.’ [And *Bhagavad Gītā* 12.14 says]: ‘The *yogī*, who is always content, self-controlled, with firm resolve, whose mind and intellect are fixed on me, devoted to me, he is beloved to me.’ [And *Bhagavad Gītā* 7.3 says], ‘Among thousands of humans, only one strives for perfection. Even among those who are striving and who have become perfected, only one truly knows me.’ Thus, it is said in the *Bhagavad Gītā* that surely the highest yoga is absorption of the mind, therefore one who possesses this characteristic is the king of *yogīs*; he becomes perfected is the syntactical connection.”⁴⁴⁶

arthaḥ | yogīśvarasyā'dhigatabrahmātmāsvārūpatvāt | tatsvarūpaṃ vānmānasā'gocaram ity āha | tatsvarūpaṃ iti spaṣṭam |

⁴⁴⁵ *Vivarāṇa* on 126: *tataḥ samyak prakāreṇa nirviṣeṣaparamānaṃdasvarūpānubhavād ūrdhvaṃ sādhananirmuktaḥ sādhanān nirmukto'kiṃcītkarma vyārthaḥ san karmaṇyakarmadarśiḥ siddho bhavati pravṛtteḥ svātmāvabodhāvadhivāt svataḥsiddhaḥ svarūpānubhavāc ca kaḥ siddho bhavatīty āśaṃkyāha yogirāt*

⁴⁴⁶ *Vivarāṇa* on 126: *śamadamādiyogena saṃprāptasvarājyaḥ yogināṃ madhye rājateti vā sarvatra vitṛptaḥ san svasminneva svānaṃdasamtuṣṭo bhagavadekaśaraṇaḥ tathā ca yogi[nā]m api sarveṣāṃ madgatenāṃtarātmanā śraddhāvān bhajate yo māṃ sa me yuktatamo mata iti samtuṣṭaḥ satataṃ yogī yatātmā dṛḍhaniścayaḥ mayyarpitamanobuddhir yo madbhaktaḥ same priya iti manuṣyāṇāṃ sahasreṣu kaścid yatati siddhaye yatatām api siddhānāṃ kaścin māṃ vetti tattvata iti bhāgavatoktaṃ paro hi yogo manasaḥ samādhir iti ca tasmāt ya etal lakṣaṇaḥ sa yogirāt siddho bhavatīti saṃbandhaḥ*

4.10 Obstacles

The *Aparokṣānubhūti* then goes on to explain the potential obstacles to this continuous state of absorption.

But while practicing absorption,
Obstacles certainly arise against one's will.

Lack of inquiry, laziness,
Desire for pleasures.⁴⁴⁷ || 127 ||

Sleepiness, inertia, and distraction,
Tasting of bliss and emptiness.

Thus, by one who has knowledge of *brahman*,
This multitude of obstacles is to be abandoned slowly.⁴⁴⁸ || 128 ||

While the *Dīpikā* does not have much to say about the obstacles to absorption, the *Vṛ* describes each one individually and then explains them in terms of the *guṇas*. “These obstacles of the mind, which is bound by *rajas* and *tamas*, certainly arise for everyone, by the predominance of *rajas* and *tamas*, because of the subordination of *sattva*. By the perfection of the pure *sattvaguna*, absorption without conceptualization, which is not easy to attain, is attainable. Therefore, by everyone, liberation ought to be gone to; such is the intention.”⁴⁴⁹ It seems reminiscent of the

⁴⁴⁷ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 127: *samādhau kriyamāṇe tu vighnāny āyānti vai balāt | anusandhānarāhityam ālasyam bhogalālasam ||*

⁴⁴⁸ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 128: *layas tamaś ca vikṣepo rasāśvādaś ca śūnyatā | evaṃ yad vighnabāhulyaṃ tyājyaṃ brahmavidā śanaiḥ ||*

⁴⁴⁹ *Vṛ* on 128: *ete vighnārajastamobhyāṃ pratibaddhamanaso avaśyaṃ bhāvinaḥ | sarveṣāṃ api rajastamaḥpradhānyena sattvasyopasarjanāc chuddhasattvagūṇasampannaiḥ prāpyo nirvikalpasamādhir na sulabhas tataḥ sarvena muktīm gaṃtum arhatīty āśayaḥ |*

Bhagavadgītābhāṣya to describe these obstacles in terms of the *guṇas*, though it is curious that the aim is perfection of *sattva* rather than to become *nirguṇa*, beyond the qualities. The *Vṛ* then explains the last line: “The meaning is that the cessation of the multitude of obstacles, obtained by the succession of mental impressions from beginningless time, does not occur quickly from *haṭhayoga*. One who has knowledge of *brahman* from hearing and reflecting, without doubt has cognition of the immediate *brahman*.”⁴⁵⁰ This reminds us of the path laid out in the first ninety-nine verses and contrasts it with the fifteen-part path that was just described. The *Bodhadīpikā* does not have much of note to add here.

The *Vivarāṇa* has quite a lot to say about this verse. It differentiates between external obstacles that arise due to misfortune such as a thief or a tiger or climatic distress such as flood or drought, causing one to abandon the place of practice, and the internal obstacles described here which manifest in the mind.⁴⁵¹ Most of the obstacles are defined in terms of the first one, lack of inquiry. It also adds a ninth obstacle, *tejas*, in the seventh position, meaning here that the eyes become the support and there is a false semblance of brightness, or perhaps meaning impatience. It then has *svāda*, tasting, in the eighth position, which the commentary glosses with *rasāsvāda*, tasting of bliss, which is the seventh obstacle in the earlier texts. It concludes by explaining that this multitude of obstacles is to slowly be overcome “by one-pointedness of the mind, i.e., by meditation and so forth” and not “by hearing, etc., which is to be abandoned by creating a continuous flow [of the mental state of being one with *brahman*].”⁴⁵² The *Ṭīkā* also has *tejas* in the seventh position and then substitutes *sveda*, sweating, in the eight position. It

⁴⁵⁰ *Vṛ* on 128: *na sahasā anādikālavāsanāparamparayāprāptasya vighnabāhulyasya haṭhān na nivṛttisaṃbhava ity arthaḥ | brahmavideti śravaṇamananābhyāṃ nirvicikitsāparokṣabrahamajñānīnety arthaḥ |*

⁴⁵¹ *Vivarāṇa* on 128: *tatra vighnāni bāhyāṃtarāṇy utpadyamānāni saṃti tatrābāhyāny ativr̥ṣṭyānāvṛṣṭīrāṣṭraviplavavyāghracorādy upadravasam̐bhāvakāni bhavanti yarhi tarhi tān deśān parityajāpagatasādhanāvalambanena kāryobhyāsa iti draṣṭavyaṃ prasamgataḥ iha tv āṃtarāṇi manasi prādurbhavitavyāny ucyante*

⁴⁵² *Vivarāṇa* on 128: *evaṃ yad uktaṃ tat vighnabāhulyaṃ bahutvasya bhāvo bāhulyaṃ śanaiḥ ekāṃtena manasā dhyānādīnā ekāgrasvabhāve na śravaṇādīnā pravāhikaranena tyājyaṃ iti saṃbandhaḥ*

says that “one will attain inspection by abandoning attachment to pleasures and laziness.”⁴⁵³ And interestingly, the author of the *Samaślokī* may have had access to both texts, for while the verse is the original, the Marathi version has *tejas*, followed by a new addition, *cāñcalya*, or unsteadiness.

4.11 *Rāja* and *Haṭhayoga*

The next fourteen verses return to expressing a more traditional Advaitic view, on which the commentaries mostly concur. We will therefore skip to the end of the text, where, in one of its most novel contributions, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* names the preceding section of fifteen *aṅgas*, “*rājayoga*”:

Rājayoga has been described,

Together with these parts.

For those whose afflictions have been only partly cooked,

It is joined together with *haṭhayoga*.⁴⁵⁴ || 143 ||

The *Dīpikā* notes that the afflictions (*kaṣāya*) begin with attraction (*rāga*), unlike Patañjali’s *kleśas*, which begin with not knowing (*avidyā*). The last *pāda* of this verse—“it is joined together with *haṭhayoga*”—even gives an option for the C student. While one might consider the whole preceding text as continuous, simply divided into a section on *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, and these last verses as just an add-on for the B student, I think that would be missing the point as explained in the *Dīpikā* on verse 100 (see above), which clearly considers the first 99 verses as

⁴⁵³ *Ṭīkā* on 128: *anusamdhānāce ghaḍe tyāgaṇe | bhogāsakti āṇi āḷasa |*

⁴⁵⁴ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 143: *ebhir aṅgaiḥ samāyukto rājayoga udāhṛtaḥ | kiñcitpakvakaṣāyāṇām haṭhayogena samyutaḥ ||*

a traditional Advaitic path for the most qualified aspirant and the subsequent verses on the *aṅgas* for the mediocre aspirants. Once again here, this verse is giving yet another option for those who have made it this far through the text without attaining realization, and thereby includes the *haṭhayogīs* into its fold. In explaining this verse, the *Dīpikā* comments: “Of whom the afflictions, beginning with attraction, have been partly, or a little, cooked, i.e., consumed by fire, this yoga, which is taught in the Upaniṣads, is joined with *haṭhayoga*, i.e., with the well-known *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, which is taught by the followers of Patañjali.”⁴⁵⁵ This is one of the most striking statements in this commentary—the equation of *haṭhayoga* with Patañjali’s *aṣṭāṅgayoga*. Also, of note, is the assertion that this is spoken of in Vedānta, which would presumably be referring to the Yoga Upaniṣads. As I mentioned earlier, this is another indication that the commentary was probably written quite a bit after Vidyāraṇya.

The *Vṛt* concurs, saying, “it should be joined with that *haṭhayoga* in the form of restraints, such as *prāṇāyāma*, as taught by Patañjali, for the cause of liberation.”⁴⁵⁶ This is the first time that the *Vṛt* mentions Patañjali and it too equates his yoga with *haṭhayoga*. This begs the question of whether this was a common association or whether the author of the *Vṛt* was familiar with the *Dīpikā*, which seems unlikely given that there is no reference to it, either explicit or not. It is also interesting that he gives *prāṇāyāma* as his example of the eight *aṅgas* and calls it a restraint (*nigraha*), even though it is the fourth auxiliary. The *Ṭikā* does not have much to add, saying that “the *rājayogī* dwells, yoked to these aspects of knowledge, but one whose afflictions are not fully cooked, should practice *haṭhayoga*.”⁴⁵⁷

The *Bodhadīpikā* however, says that “with *haṭhayoga* means by the yoga that is taught in the work called the *Haṭhapradīpikā*—for the attainment of the self—and it is joined with that

⁴⁵⁵ *Dīpikā* on 143: *haṭhayogena pātamañjaloktena prasiddhenāṣṭāṅgayogena saṃyuto 'yaṃ vedāmtokto yoga*

⁴⁵⁶ *Vṛt* on 143: *prāṇāyāmaḍinigrāharūpo yo haṭhayogaḥ patañjalinaḥ praṇītas tena saṃyukto mokṣahetuḥ*

⁴⁵⁷ *Ṭikā* on 143: *aisī jñānāṃgayukti aseṃ | te rājayogi vīlasēṃ | kaṣāyajāce pakva nase | tyāne haṭhayoga karāvā |*

practice, for those whose afflictions are partly cooked, i.e., for those of whom the impurities of the mind are somewhat cooked because of great affliction, for the attainment of the self. The *Haṭhpradīpikā*, which cooks this, is for those who are excessively foolish. Thus, with reference to my work, by the ease of attaining there is the attainment of the self.”⁴⁵⁸ This indicates a shift in the reception of this work for *haṭhayoga* to now be referring to the *Haṭhpradīpikā*, rather than the *Yogasūtra*, as in the *Dīpikā*.

The *Vivarāṇa* says, “For those whose afflictions have been only partly cooked; the meaning is that they are burnt with the mind. And this yoga is joined, i.e., to be brought together, with *haṭhayoga*. With respect to that, what is called *haṭhayoga* is because of the seeing of faults created in many births, i.e., from past impressions. By the emphasis on the purpose of being cooked, i.e., being conducive to that for one whose mind has not gone to tranquility, by engaging in postural practice, and so forth, beginning from *mulādhāracakra*, by the yoga of the control of the inhalation and exhalation, by the division of the *cakras* in sequence, by engagement in meditation on Om, etc., by meditation on the thousand-petaled *cakra*; by action from force, that tranquility with seed, alone, is *haṭhayoga*. The meaning is that by that stability of the mind, by the emphasis on the aim of being cooked, produced by discernment, there might be the highest bliss.”⁴⁵⁹ Here in the *Vivarāṇa*, rather than mentioning a text, the reference is to a form of *haṭhayoga*, based in posture, breath control, and the *cakras*, which clearly must have been well known at the time. While the preceding commentary spoke of the inferiority and artificiality of

⁴⁵⁸ *Bodhadīpikā* on 140: *kiṃca haṭhayogena haṭhpradīpākhyaḡraṃthoktena yogenātmaprāptaye ya kiñcit samyutaṃ sādhanam taṭpakvakaṣāyāṇāṃ paripakvāṃtaḡkaraṇamalānāṃ bhavati mahākleṣatayātmaprāptir bhavaty etatpratipāko haṭhpradīpo ‘tīvamūdhānāṃ bhavatīty apekṣayānena madīyagraṃthena sulabhatayātmaprāptir bhavatīty*

⁴⁵⁹ *Vivarāṇa* on 143: *yeṣāṃ teṣāṃ kiṃcid apakvakaṣāyāṇāṃ apakvamanasāṃ ity arthas tv ayaṃ yogo haṭhayogena samyutaḡ samyojyas tatra haṭhayogo nāmānekajaṇmakṣtadoṣadārṣṭyāt saṃskārāt śṛtārthānavadhāraṇena tanniṣṭhaṃ san nopasamaṃ gataṃ ya nmanas tasya manas āsanādiyuktena mūlādhārād ārabhya prāṇāpānasamyamayogena kramataṣ cakrabhedena praṇavādyupāsanaṃyuktatvena sahasra[dale]bhigamanena haṭh[ā]tkārenopasamaḡ sabījaḡ sa eva haṭhayogas tena manasaḡ sthairyeṇa śṛtārthāv[a]dhāraṇenotpannena vivekena paramānaṃdaḡ syād ity arthaḡ*

these methods, here it is conceded that they could be employed supplementarily for those who need it. It seems that the text is trying to be as inclusive as possible and while clearly acknowledging the superiority of the Advaitic methods, it recognizes that for some, even the overtly dualistic methods of *haṭhayoga* can be a starting point.

The *Dīpikā* introduces the final verse, “by summarizing the purpose of the entire work, to answer the question of for whom this *rājayoga*, alone, is useful”⁴⁶⁰:

And for those whose mind is completely cooked,

This [*rājayoga*], alone, bestows attainment.

For all those who are devoted to the teacher and the deity,

It is easy to attain, at once.⁴⁶¹ || 144 ||

The *Dīpikā* explains this specification in detail: “Whose mind is completely cooked—specifically, free from the impurities of attraction and so forth—supplying ‘for those,’ i.e., for those of whom the six enemies have been conquered, who are chief among people alone, indifferent to the yoga accepted by the system of Patañjali, this yoga, which is accepted by Vedānta, bestows attainment by way of the direct cognition of *brahman* as not different from the self, i.e., granting liberation with the characteristic of residing in one’s own intrinsic form. The word ‘and’ is in the sense of restriction; the meaning is that it is not for others whose minds are not fully cooked.”⁴⁶² So while the previous verse allowed for some optional supplementary

⁴⁶⁰ *Dīpikā* on 144: *ayaṃ rājayoga eva keṣāṃ yogya ity ākāṃkṣāyāṃ sarvagraṃthārtham upasamharan*

⁴⁶¹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 144: *paripakvaṃ mano yeṣāṃ kevalo 'yaṃ ca siddhidāḥ | gurudaivatabhaktānāṃ sarveṣāṃ sulabho javāt ||*

⁴⁶² *Dīpikā* on 144: *yeṣāṃ manaḥ paripakvaṃ rāgādimalarahitam iti yāvat teṣāṃ ity adhyāhāraḥ teṣāṃ jītāriṣadvargānāṃ puruṣadhuramdharānāṃ kevalaḥ pātanjālābhimatayoganirapekṣaḥ ayaṃ vedāntābhimato yogāḥ siddhidāḥ pratyagabhinnabrahmāparokṣajñānavārā svasvarūpāvasthānalakṣaṇamuktipradaḥ cakāro 'vadhāraṇe nānyeṣāṃ aparipakvamanasāṃ ity arthaḥ |*

practices, this one concludes the text by reminding the reader of the ultimate aim. The use of the word “indifferent” (*nirapekṣa*) in relation to Patañjali’s yoga is interesting here, because it indicates that the superior students are aware of these methods, but not seduced by them. The inferior students who are taken in by these dualistic methods clearly have a much longer path to the ultimate realization.

The *Vṛt* adds, “For those who are foremost among people, whose mind is completely cooked, free from attraction, etc., by living in the *gurukula*, and so forth, with those of the same sect, that *rājayoga*, alone, which is indifferent to the followers of *haṭhayoga*, bestows attainment.”⁴⁶³ This is the first mention of the importance of being in a community of like-minded aspirants, which perhaps indicates the early modern tendency to glorify and archaicize the traditional context for these teachings. The *Vṛt* also glosses “the deity” with *īśvara*.

The *Ṭīkā* comments that “*rājayoga* is useful to the one whose mind is completely cooked.”⁴⁶⁴ And it indicates the commonality of the two paths: “the progress of *jñānayoga* and the eight aspects of *yoga* will happen through pure devotion and service to the teacher.”⁴⁶⁵ Presumably, it is assumed that its audience is familiar with Patañjali’s yoga though he is not mentioned by name. And unlike in the other commentaries, both the Advaitic path of *jñānayoga* and the eight-part path—here identified with *rājayoga*—share the methods of devotion and service to the teacher. This perhaps is indicative of the growing importance of *bhakti* in relation to both the Advaitic and yogic methods.

The *Vivarāṇa* also takes the opportunity here to bring this full circle, referring back to the specifications from the beginning of the text. “For those whose mind is completely cooked, i.e.,

⁴⁶³ *Vṛt* on 144: *paripakvaṃ rāgādirahitaṃ mano gurukulavāsādinā sādharmaṇa yeṣāṃ puruṣadhaureyāṇāṃ teṣāṃ yaṃ rājayogaḥ kevalo haṭhayogasahāyā'napekṣaḥ siddhidaḥ |*

⁴⁶⁴ *Ṭīkā* on 144: *jyāṃce manāparipakva hoyā | tyāsi rājayoga kāmāsiye |*

⁴⁶⁵ *Ṭīkā* on 144: *sadguruci nikhaḷabhakti | teca jñānayogācī unnati gurusevestava ghaḍatī | āṣṭa amge yogāci |*

cooked to the highest degree by means of purification of the *sattvaguna*, by the perfection of the four means beginning with detachment, who have attained stability in the turning back of the senses, for them alone, by the accumulation of inaction, this *rājayoga* that was previously spoken of is easy to attain, i.e., not very hard. And that, by inquiry, at once bestows attainment. The word ‘and’ has the meaning of the word ‘alone,’ i.e., this, alone, bestows attainment. The syntactical arrangement is that by the quieting of all desires, it bestows the highest bliss. Now if you were to say that by abandoning *haṭhayoga* and so forth, for those whose mind is fully cooked, stability is attained, he says ‘for all those who are devoted to the teacher and the deity.’ [...] For all those whose minds are fully cooked, this *rājayoga*, alone, with the very characteristics that were previously spoken of, bestows attainment—and not by *haṭhayoga*—together with hearing, etc. For superior discerning people, *haṭhayoga* is an obstacle, because of its artificiality.”⁴⁶⁶ So while the previous verse conceded that *haṭhayoga* could be employed as a last resort for the mediocre student, it is seen as a hindrance for the superior student.

The *Bodhadīpikā* on the other hand, makes the point that the goal here is the same as in the *haṭhayoga* texts, even if the means might be different. “For the purpose of attaining the self that is enjoined in several yoga texts, beginning with the *Haṭhapradīpikā*, preceded by the setting aside of practices that produce several afflictions, by the practice of the means that are taught in this work alone, by the ease of attainment, there is the attainment of existence, consciousness,

⁴⁶⁶ *Vivaraṇa* on 144: *eteṣāṃ manaḥ paripakvaṃ prakarṣeṇa pakvaṃ satvaśuddhidvāreṇa vairāgyādisādhanaacatuṣṭayasampannatvena viṣayebhyaḥ parāvṛttaṃ sthairyam gataṃ teṣāṃ kevalo 'kriyā samuccayatvenāyaṃ rājayogaḥ pūrvoktaḥ sulabho nātikarkaśāyā so javād vicāreṇa siddhid[a]ś cakāra evakārārtho 'yam eva siddhidāḥ sakalakāmopaśamanena paramānamdaprada ity anvayaḥ | nanu haṭhayogādirāhityena keṣāṃ manaḥ paripakvaṃ san sthairyam gataṃ iti cet gurudaivatabhaktānāṃ [...] ye teṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ paripakvamanasāṃ ayam eva rājayogaḥ pūrvoktalakṣaṇaḥ kevalaḥ siddhido na haṭhayogena saha śravaṇādi tat parāṇāṃ vivekavatāṃ tasya haṭhayogasyāṃtarāyatvāt kṛtakatvāt*

and bliss. Thus, wise people should contemplate.”⁴⁶⁷ So basically it concedes that the *haṭhayoga* texts may be a good entry point, but that the methods taught in the *Aparokṣānubhūti* are superior. And while none of the commentaries suggest this, it is also possible that these last two verses are a later addition, intending to help broaden the scope of practitioners, which might allow for an earlier date for the text itself.

The terminology found in the final two verses of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, referring to those whose afflictions have been only partially cooked (*kiñcītpakvakaṣāyāñām*) and therefore may need *haṭhayoga*, and those whose minds are completely cooked or fully mature (*paripakva*) and therefore ready for *rājayoga*, is also found in the *Yogabīja*. Here, Lord Śiva is speaking to the Goddess: “And people are thought to be twofold: uncooked and fully cooked. The uncooked are without yoga, but people become cooked through yoga. The person who is cooked by the fire of yoga is energetic and free from anguish. But it is to be known that the uncooked person should be dull, earthy, and produce suffering.”⁴⁶⁸ The text goes on to say that one who is uncooked or immature, even if they might control their senses through meditation, may still be subject to afflictions such as hot, cold, disease, etc. It teaches that unless the breath is completely controlled through *prāṇāyāma*, the mind will remain agitated.⁴⁶⁹ This is the inverse of what we have seen in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, where it is only the inferior student who needs these extra methods. By including a reference to this, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is responding to the methods in vogue at the time, finding a way to include all practitioners in its teachings.

⁴⁶⁷ *Bodhadīpikā* on 141: *haṭhapradīpād[y]ānekaśāstraprayuktātmaprāptyartham anekakleśataradāyakasādhanatiraskārapūrvakatayānenaiḥ gramihoktasādhānābhyāsenā sulabhatayā saccidānamdalābho bhavatiṭy evaṃ sudhiyovibhāvayaṃtu |*

⁴⁶⁸ *Yogabīja* 31–2: *apakvāḥ paripakvās ca dvividhā dehinaḥ smṛtāḥ | apakvā yogahīnās tu pakvā yogena dehinaḥ || pakvaṃ yogāgninā deham ajaḍaṃ śokavarjitam | jaḍaṃ tu pārthivaṃ jñeyam apakvaṃ duḥkhadaṃ bhavet ||*

⁴⁶⁹ *Yogabīja* 33–35: *dhyānastho 'sau tathāpy evaṃ indriyair vivaśo bhavet | niyamyā tāny ato gāḍhaṃ tathāpy anyaiḥ prabādhyate || śītoṣṇasukhaduḥkhādyair vyādhibhir mānavais tathā | anyair nānāvidair jīvaiḥ śāstrāgniḥśāstrāgnīyamārutaiḥ | śarīraṃ pīḍyate taiḥ tu cittam saṃkṣobhyate tataḥ || tathā prāṇavipattau tu kṣobam āyāti mārutaiḥ | tato duḥkhaśatair vyāptam cittam prakṣubhyate nṛṇām ||*

Given that this text is generally taught in an Advaitic context, the incorporation of Yoga into Vedānta is clearly its novel contribution. Another line of inquiry would be to try to find out how this text was taught at Śringeri and look at manuscripts found closer to that region, such as in Mysore. It would also be helpful to have a better idea of the dating of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* and its commentaries, through further manuscript research, which would provide a window into the acceptance of yoga practices into Advaita over time, as well as the changing definitions of *haṭha* and *rājayoga*.

We can, nonetheless, get some sense of this, by observing the differences in the commentaries and their reference points. As we have seen, the *Dīpikā* and *Vṛt* have Patañjali as their reference point, and the *Ṭīkā* probably does as well (though not by name). However, the *Bodhadīpikā* refers to the *Haṭhapradīpikā*, while the *Vivaraṇa*, through a Vaiṣṇava lens, seems to refer to a version of yoga taught in the Yoga Upaniṣads. The elaboration of *rājayoga* as an aid to the traditional Advaitic path, as well as the begrudging acceptance of *haṭhayoga* if necessary, indicates a movement away from Śaṅkara and towards a way of simultaneously disparaging and assimilating the practices that were in currency at the time. Though the commentaries clearly differ in what exactly this is, their intentions as well as their means seem similar. The method is always to turn inward and see or experience *brahman* rather than an external version of each practice.

CHAPTER 5

Contemporary and Modern Contexts and Confluences

5.1 Contemporary Texts and Subverting the Paradigm

The *Aparokṣānubhūti* was not the only text of its time to integrate Yoga and Advaita or to attempt to bring together previously distinct and often potentially conflicting strands of thought. Alongside it, there arose new works on *haṭhayoga*, which synthesized Yoga, Tantra, and Advaita, paying less attention to philosophical details, while increasingly privileging the physical aspects. Many of these texts, such as the *Haṭhapradīpikā* and Yoga Upaniṣads were compilations of earlier works. We can see from the later commentaries on the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, that this way of thinking was in direct competition with the more Advaitic syntheses. Even these texts, however, always privileged *rājayoga* over *haṭhayoga*, despite being differently defined. We will now take a brief look at these contemporary texts to understand the milieu from which the *Aparokṣānubhūti* and its commentaries emerged and to determine how our text fits into this historical evolution. To locate it alongside these texts is not to count its continuity or suggest that it is a yoga text; rather, it is to contrast its originality and understand what it was responding to during the period in which it was written. The paradox, as we shall see, is that while it was not a yoga text in its time, today it can often be seen as such.

5.1.1 Origins of *Haṭhayoga*

Early *haṭhayoga* texts have origins in Tantra, where yoga is not synonymous with *samādhi*, but is instead defined as union of the self with Śiva. The earliest known mention of this is in the c. fifth- to sixth-century C.E. *Pañcārthabhāṣya*, which is Kauṇḍinya's commentary on the c.

second-century C.E. *Pāśupatasūtra* of the ascetic Atimārga tradition, the earliest work of initiatory Śaivism.⁴⁷⁰ Like Advaita, these tantric texts look down on the methods whose end goal is *samādhi*. Kauṇḍinya even went so far in criticizing Patañjali’s yoga to say that “those who have won supposed release through Samkhya-Yoga, indeed all creatures from the god Brahmā down to the animals, are considered ‘beasts.’”⁴⁷¹ The eighth-century Pāśupata text, the *Īśvaragītā*, however, is kinder and solves the problem by introducing two types of yoga. The first, called the yoga of non-existence (*abhāyayoga*), refers to the dualistic discernment and disjunction (*viyoga*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as described by Patañjali, here considered as preparatory for the second method, called the great yoga (*mahāyoga*) of the supreme lord,” or “the yoga of *brahman*.”⁴⁷² These two are then combined in its definition of yoga: after listing the eight auxiliaries of Patañjali it says “yoga is the one-pointed state of the mind on me from the stilling of other mental states.”⁴⁷³ So while the *Īśvaragītā* agrees that the mind must be stilled, this ultimately is done through meditating on the oneness of the self with God. Unlike the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, these texts derive the meaning of yoga, not from the root \sqrt{yuj} meaning “to be yoked or absorbed in,” but from a different root \sqrt{yuj} meaning “to unite.” This becomes the common understanding, for example in the tenth-century *Vimānārcanākalpa*, which defines yoga in an Advaitic way as “the union of the individual self and the supreme self.”⁴⁷⁴

The term *haṭhayoga*, literally translated as “yoga by force,” however, is actually first seen in Vajrayāna (tantric Buddhist) texts, specifically in the c. third-century *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.⁴⁷⁵ All evidence points to this origin, rather than in tantric Śaivism. In the eighth to twelfth century C.E.,

⁴⁷⁰ Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 124–5.

⁴⁷¹ Nicholson 2013: 494.

⁴⁷² See *Īśvaragītā* 11.6-8: *śūnyaṃ sarvanirābhāsaṃ svarūpaṃ yatra cintyate | abhāyayogaḥ sa prokto yenātmānaṃ prapaśyati || yatra paśyati cātmānaṃ nityānandaṃ nirañjanam | mayaikyam sa mahāyogo bhāṣitaḥ parameśvaraḥ || ye cānye yogināṃ yogāḥ śrūyante granthavistare | sarve te brahmayogasya kalām nārhanti ṣodaśim ||*

⁴⁷³ *Īśvaragītā* 11.12ab: *mayy ekacittatā yogo vṛtyantaranirodhataḥ |*

⁴⁷⁴ Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 130.

⁴⁷⁵ See Mallinson 2020: 2–3 for a detailed exploration of the subject.

from which seventeen Vajrayāna texts that mention *haṭhayoga* have been found to date, it is mainly used to denote “an unspecified method of preventing ejaculation during sexual ritual.”⁴⁷⁶ This then is combined with breath control in some texts. From the beginning, this “is seen as a method of last resort, or rejected altogether.”⁴⁷⁷ However, “this Vajrayāna *haṭhayoga* was the source of the term’s use to denote an increasing range of physical yoga methods in non-Buddhist texts composed from about the twelfth century onwards.”⁴⁷⁸ *Haṭhayoga* soon came to represent a tradition mainly intended for celibate male ascetics. In older Śaiva texts, the term *kaṣṭa* “painful” *yoga* was used to describe a similar method, associated with *mudrās*, *prāṇāyāma*, meditation, and so forth, and generally rejected in favor of simpler, less painful methods.⁴⁷⁹ So while, as Mallinson concludes, the term *haṭhayoga* itself derived from Vajrayāna sources, this contrast between difficult, torturous yoga and simpler, more direct methods of realization had existed for a long time in other traditions as well.

The fourteenth-century *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, written by Vidyāraṇya, the purported author of the *Dīpikā*, in its process of explaining the renunciant path to an Advaitic liberation-while-living, makes its views on the relative merits of *haṭha* versus a gentler (*mṛdu*) yoga, very clear. It correlates this gentle yoga with “the teaching of equanimity and happiness towards enemies, friends, etc.,” and *haṭhayoga* with “the personal effort of breath control, sense withdrawal, and so forth,” explaining that by the former method “one might quickly coax [the mind],”⁴⁸⁰ but by

⁴⁷⁶ Mallinson 2020b: 2.

⁴⁷⁷ Mallinson 2020: 7.

⁴⁷⁸ Mallinson 2020: 9.

⁴⁷⁹ See Mallinson 2020: 10.

⁴⁸⁰ *Jīvanmuktiviveka* 1.3.27: *capalasya paśor bandhanāya dvāvupāyau bhavataḥ | haritatṛṇadarśanam kaṇḍūyanādikaṃ vākpāruṣyaṃ daṇḍādibhir bhartsanam ceti | tatrādyena sahasā praveśyate dviṭīyetas tato dhāvañ chanaiḥ śanaiḥ praveśyate | tathā śatrumitrādisamatvasukhabodhanam prāṇāyāmapratyāhārādīpuruṣa-prayatnaś cety etau dvau cittaśāntyupāyau | tatrādyena mṛduyogena śīghram lālayet | dviṭīyena haṭhayogena drāg iti na lālayet kiṃtu śanaiḥ śanaiḥ |*

the latter it will happen very slowly.⁴⁸¹ A bit later, the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* quotes *Bhagavadgītā* 6.34, saying that “this statement by Arjuna is related to *haṭhayoga*: ‘Surely, the mind is unsteady, O Kṛṣṇa, agitating, powerful, and unswerving. I think it is very difficult to control, like the wind.’”⁴⁸² Vasiṣṭha then quotes the *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha* to say that the mind must be tamed with the correct methods, “like a bad elephant in rut with a goad.”⁴⁸³ These references to earlier texts appear to read this distinction between a forceful and more easeful yoga backward, to make them more relevant to the new categorizations that were becoming standard. This again begs the question of whether the final verses of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* could have been a later addition. Additionally, one might expect more similarity between the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* and the *Dīpikā* if it were indeed written by Vidyāraṇya.

5.1.2 *Haṭha*-oriented Texts

One of the earliest *haṭhayoga* texts, the c. fourteenth-century *Yogabīja*, which combines Śaiva yoga with Vedāntic philosophy, defines yoga as the union of dualities—from the upward and downward breaths to the individual and supreme self—combining the microcosmic, the macrocosmic, and the ultimate.⁴⁸⁴ The *Yogabīja* also links together yoga and cognition, saying one cannot exist without the other:

⁴⁸¹ This reference to virtuous behavior toward various categories of people as a way of soothing the mind seems a reference to *Yogasūtra* 1.33: *maitrīkaruṇāmuditopekṣānām sukhaduḥkhaṇyāpūṇyaviṣayāñām bhāvanātaś cittaprasādanam* | From the cultivation of friendship towards the happy, compassion towards the suffering, joy toward the virtuous, and indifference toward the non-virtuous, there is clarity of mind. Here it is being given as a means of gentle yoga as opposed to more embodied practices which are categorized as *haṭha* and considered inferior.

⁴⁸² *Jīvanmuktiviveka* 3.1.16: *yat tv arjunenoktam | cañcalaṃ hi manaḥ kṛṣṇa pramāthi balavad dṛḍham | tasyāhaṃ nīgrahaṃ manye vāyor iva suduṣkaram* || [*BhG* 6.34] *iti | tad vacanaṃ haṭhayogaviṣayaṃ* |

⁴⁸³ *Jīvanmuktiviveka* 3.1.17–18: *ata eva vasiṣṭha āha: upaviśyopaviśyaikacittakena muhur muhuḥ | na śakyate mano jetuṃ vinā yuktim aninditām* || [*LYV* 5.10.126] *aṅkuṣeṇa vinā matto yathā duṣṭamataṅgajāḥ* | [*LYV* 5.10.127ab] *vijetuṃ śakyate naiva tathā yuktyā vinā manaḥ* || [cf. *LYV* 5.10.126cd]

⁴⁸⁴ *Yogabīja* 79–80ab *yo apānāprāṇayor yogah svarajoretasos tathā | sūryacandramasor yogo jīvātma-paramātmanoḥ* || *evaṃ tu dvandvajālasya saṃyogo yoga ucyate* |

Without yoga, how can there be cognition,
Which bestows liberation, O Goddess?
But also, yoga without cognition, is not enough,
As an action for liberation.⁴⁸⁵

A similar verse is included in the much later *Yogatattva Upaniṣad*, with the conclusion that “one desiring liberation, should steadily practice both yoga and cognition.”⁴⁸⁶ This represents the converse of the Advaitic incorporation of Yoga that we have seen in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, with Yoga here attempting to include Advaitic ideas.

The fourteenth-century *Śivasamhitā*, born out of the southern Śrīvidyā tradition, is in the form of a dialogue between Śiva and Pārvatī. Śiva, also identified as *īśvara* here, makes clear from the first verse that the ultimate truth is the realization of oneness: “There is one eternal cognition, without beginning or end; no other true thing exists. The variation which exists in this world certainly appears through the superimposition of the senses onto cognition and not at all otherwise.”⁴⁸⁷ After acknowledging that many different ideas are taught in various texts, he asserts that this one teaching is the best. The *Śivasamhitā* quotes our foundational verse from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* as well: “And the scripture says: ‘Indeed it is the self that is to be seen, to be heard about.’ And that is to be served with great effort—it bestows liberation and [realization] of the one source.”⁴⁸⁸ While the text does not use *nididhyāsana* as the umbrella term to include practices as we have seen elsewhere, it does draw on this key statement to explain the

⁴⁸⁵ *Yogabīja* 17: *yogahīnaṃ kathāṃ jñānaṃ mokṣadaṃ bhavatīśvari | yogo 'pi jñānahīnas tu na kṣamo mokṣakarmaṇi ||*

⁴⁸⁶ *Yogatattva Upaniṣad* 14cd–15: *yogahīnaṃ kathāṃ jñānaṃ mokṣadaṃ bhavati dhruvam || yogo hi jñānahīnas tu na kṣamo mokṣakarmaṇi | tasmā jñānaṃ ca yogaṃ ca mumukṣur dṛḍham abhyaset ||*

⁴⁸⁷ *Śivasamhitā* 1.1: *ekaṃ jñānaṃ nityaṃ ādyantaśūnyaṃ nānyat kiṃcid vartate vastu satyam | yadbhedo 'sminn indriyopādhinā vai jñānasyāyaṃ bhāsate nānyathaiva ||*

⁴⁸⁸ *Śivasamhitā* 1.32: *ātmā vā're tu draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavya iti ca śrutiḥ | sāvāse tu prayatnena muktidā hetudāyini ||*

ultimate truth. It quotes the classic Advaitic examples of mistaking a rope for a snake or silver for mother-of-pearl and explains the false nature of duality and reinforces the oneness of *ātman* and *brahman*. However, the *Śivasamhitā* then explains the evolution of the universe from ignorance into the five elements through the power of *māyā*. The rest of the text teaches practices to help one rediscover non-duality. In the fifth and final chapter, on meditation, there is a verse that is reminiscent of the *vicāra*, inquiry, that is one of the main themes in the *Aparokṣānubhūti* (particularly verse 12), yet here it draws together the ideas of yoga, oneness, and *bhakti*.

What is bondage? And whose is liberation?

Surely, the *yogī* should always see unity.

One who does this constantly is set free,

Here there is no doubt.

He, alone, is a *yogī*, devoted to me,

Honored in all the worlds.⁴⁸⁹

These *haṭhayoga* texts became increasingly inclusive over time to appeal to a wider audience. The final verses of the *Śivasamhitā* speak of the householder path, perhaps containing the key for why these philosophies have been synthesized and simplified: to make the practice more accessible to those who are living in the world.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁹ *Śivasamhitā* 5.213: *ko bandhaḥ kasya vā mokṣa ekaṃ paśyēt sadā hi saḥ | etat karoti yo nityaṃ sa mukto nātra saṃśayaḥ | sa eva yogī madbhaktaḥ sarvalokeṣu pūjitaḥ ||*

⁴⁹⁰ *Śivasamhitā* 5.259–60: *grhasthānāṃ bhavet siddhir īśvarārādhanena vai | yogakriyābhiyuktānāṃ tasmāt saṃyatate grhī || gehe sthitā putradārādipūrṇe saṃgaṃ tyaktvā cāntare yogamārgē | siddheś cihnaṃ vīkṣya paścād grhasthaḥ krīdet so vai me mataṃ sādhayitvā ||* For householders, intent on the practice of yoga, there may be success by worshipping the Lord. Therefore, a householder engages in the challenge. Situated in a house filled with children, a wife, and so forth, and abandoning attachment on the inside, and then seeing the sign of success on the path of yoga, the householder may amuse himself, having completed my instruction.

The c. thirteenth-century Vaiṣṇava *Dattātreya yogaśāstra*, which defines *samādhi* as the state of identity between the individual and supreme self,⁴⁹¹ includes practitioners of all sects and religions as long as they have faith and devotion.⁴⁹² This text teaches both an eightfold system as well as a more *haṭha*-oriented one.⁴⁹³ The *aṣṭāṅgayoga* mentioned here is ascribed to Yājñavalkya and has the same eight auxiliaries as Patañjali's system. The intention is clearly to make the teachings more inclusive, a trend which continued to grow. By the time of the eighteenth-century *Haṭhābhyāsapaddhati*, anyone afflicted by the pain of cyclic existence, including women, those attached to sense objects, fallen from caste or reckless, can learn from its teachings.⁴⁹⁴ One can see how this development over time charted the way for the popularity of modern yoga.

The thirteenth-century *Vasiṣṭhasaṃhitā* also describes an *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, similar to that of Patañjali, except with ten *yamas* and *niyamas*. It integrates *kuṇḍalinīyoga* within a Vedic and Vaiṣṇava context, following the *bhedābhedavādin* philosophy, rather than Advaita.⁴⁹⁵ While its components are given concrete definitions, its goal of *samādhi* is understood in terms of the oneness of *ātman* and *brahman*. Though it is not explicitly linked to *rājayoga*, this eight-part yoga is considered the path of cognition and is described by Vasiṣṭha to his son in this way:

Know that cognition consists of yoga,

And yoga abides in the self.

That yoga consists of eight auxiliaries.

⁴⁹¹ *Dattātreya yogaśāstra* 126ab: *samādhiḥ samatāvasthā jīvātmaparamātmanoḥ |*

⁴⁹² *Dattātreya yogaśāstra* 41–42ab: *brāhmaṇaḥ śramaṇo vāpi bauddho vāpyārḥato 'thavā | kāpāliko vā cārvākaḥ śraddhayā sahitaḥ sudhīḥ || yogābhyāsarato nityaṃ sarvasiddhim avāpnuyāt |*

⁴⁹³ *Dattātreya yogaśāstra* 130cd–131: *kavimārgo 'yam uktas te sāmkrte 'ṣṭāṅgayogataḥ || siddhānām kapilādīnām mataṃ vakṣye tataḥ param | abhyāsabhedato bhedaḥ phalaṃ tu samam eva hi ||*

⁴⁹⁴ Birch 2015: 10.

⁴⁹⁵ Mallinson 2014: 235.

It is said to be the duty of all.⁴⁹⁶

These auxiliaries are elaborated in detail, with multiple options for each, to make this yoga practice available to a wider audience. For example, *brahmacarya*, the fourth restraint both for Patañjali and in this text, is described by Vasiṣṭha first as the abandoning of sexual activity everywhere and then qualified for householders as having sex with one's own wife at the right time of the month. It is further defined as serving the guru.⁴⁹⁷ One of the unique *niyamas* here is *siddhāntaśravaṇa*, defined as contemplation of Vedānta.⁴⁹⁸ While the first four auxiliaries are said to be external, the last four are internal and although specific practices are elaborated for each, it is made increasingly clear that the goal is realization of *brahman*. At the ultimate stage, *samādhi*, which is said to “destroy the noose of existence” (*bhavapāśavināśanam*), is defined in Advaitic terms: “*Samādhi* is the state of identity of the individual and supreme self. *Samādhi* is taught as the individual self abiding in the supreme self.”⁴⁹⁹ It is made clear that the preceding auxiliaries are considered prerequisites.⁵⁰⁰ The next series of verses explain that *samādhi* can arise in various ways, from meditating on the self “as bliss, cognition of truth, infinite, *brahman*, beyond the qualities,”⁵⁰¹ to “the supreme self in the heart lotus with the form of Vāsudeva.”⁵⁰² It is evident in these texts that both Vedāntic and sectarian methods are given side by side,

⁴⁹⁶ *Vasiṣṭhasaṃhitā* 1.31: *jñānaṃ yogātmakaṃ vidधि yogaś cātmani tiṣṭhati | sa yogo 'ṣṭāṅgasamyuktaḥ sarvadharma sa ucyate ||*

⁴⁹⁷ *Vasiṣṭhasaṃhitā* 1.43–45: *karmanā manasā vācā sarvabhūteṣu sarvadā | sarvatra maithunatyāgaṃ brahmacaryaṃ pracakṣate || ṛtāv ṛtau svadāreṣu saṃgatiś ca vidhānataḥ | brahmacaryaṃ ca tat proktaṃ grhasthāśramavāsinām || śuśruṣā ca guror nityaṃ brahmacaryaṃ itīritam ||*

⁴⁹⁸ *Vasiṣṭhasaṃhitā* 1.60: *siddhāntaśravaṇaṃ proktaṃ vedāntabhāvanaṃ tu vai ||*

⁴⁹⁹ *Vasiṣṭhasaṃhitā* 4.59: *samādhiḥ samatāvasthā jīvātmaparamātmanoh | paramātmasthitih prokto samādhiḥ pratyag ātmanah ||*

⁵⁰⁰ *Vasiṣṭhasaṃhitā* 4.58: *yamādiguṇasampanno jitavāyur jitendriyah | dhāraṇādhyānasamyuktaḥ samādhiṃ kuru putraka ||* Endowed with the qualities of restraint and so forth, with breath controlled and senses conquered, joined in concentration and meditation, practice *samādhi*, my dear son.

⁵⁰¹ *Vasiṣṭhasaṃhitā* 4.61: *dhyāyann ātmānam ānandaṃ satyajñānam anantakam | brahma nirguṇam atraiva samādhiṃ samavāpnuyāt ||*

⁵⁰² *Vasiṣṭhasaṃhitā* 4.62: *hr̥tpadme paramātmānaṃ vāsudevaṃ savigraham | dhyāyann ātmānam atraiva samādhiṃ samavāpnuyāt ||*

basically equating *brahman* with Śiva or Viṣṇu as the case may be. Unlike in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, the previous auxiliaries are concrete methods to prepare the aspirant for *samādhi*, rather than focusing on *brahman* from the beginning, and meditation on *brahman* is just one method for attaining *samādhi*, which is the final goal here, rather than a penultimate step.

5.1.3 Rāja-oriented Texts

While the term *rājayoga* is not found in the earlier Śaiva Tantras, Birch hypothesizes that “the term was coined, probably in the eleventh century, as part of an attempt to integrate yogas from different traditions into a hierarchical scheme in which a Śaiva interpretation of *samādhi* and liberation-in-life was pre-eminent.”⁵⁰³ Some of the texts I have mentioned, such as the *Dattātreya yogaśāstra* and the *Yogabīja*, used a system of four yogas, including *mantrayoga* and *layayoga* as well, while still emphasizing *rājayoga* as superior. The *Śivasamhitā* also lists the four, adding that the fourth, *rājayoga*, should be free from the state of duality.⁵⁰⁴

Like in the *Dīpikā*, in this text it is the characteristics of the student that determine which type of yoga is appropriate. Four different kinds of aspirant are described in detail and are prescribed these different types of yoga respectively with *haṭha* penultimate to *rājayoga*. As Birch concludes, “It seems likely that Mantra-, Laya- and Haṭhayoga were superfluous to students of extraordinary capability who could achieve Rājayoga without an auxiliary practice.”⁵⁰⁵ He notes that this discussion and a similar one in the Nāth Śaiva text, the *Amarauḡhaprabodha*—the first non-Buddhist text to use the word *haṭhayoga*—seem to be

⁵⁰³ Birch 2019b: 5.

⁵⁰⁴ *Śivasamhitā* 5.12: *mantrayogo haṭhaś caiva layayogas tṛtīyakaḥ | caturtho rājayogaḥ syāt sa dvidhābhāvavarjitah ||*

⁵⁰⁵ Birch 2020: 453.

inspired by the eleventh-century Vajrayāna work, the *Amṛtasiddhi*, though this text does not actually use the term *haṭhayoga*. In the *Amarauḥaprabodha*, “the physical techniques became a forceful yoga that could straighten *kuṇḍalinī*, like beating a snake with a stick,”⁵⁰⁶ while in contrast, *rājayoga* is defined in Patañjali’s terms as “being free from the fluctuating states of the mind,”⁵⁰⁷ though there is no other mention of his system. However, Patañjali’s definition of yoga—*cittavṛttinirodha*—was in common currency by this point, in various contexts, often simply as a synonym for *samādhi*.⁵⁰⁸

Like the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, although articulated a bit differently, the c. fourteenth-century *Yogatārāvalī*, also attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, defines *rājayoga* as being beyond all of the auxiliaries of yoga. “There are no gazing points, no binding of the mind, no place or time, no stopping of the breath, no exertion of concentration or meditation, when *rājayoga* is thriving.”⁵⁰⁹ This verse is preceded by practical instructions on various elements including *nāḍīs*, *cakras*, *bandhas*, *kuṇḍalinī*, and *prāṇāyāma*. *Rājayoga* is explained as being a result of practicing *kevalakumbhaka*, pure breath retention, and the highest state is designated as *yoganidrā*, which here is synonymous with *nirvikalpāsamādhi*. This is defined as dissolution of the mind and a state where one has been freed from karma. According to Birch, most of the *Yogatārāvalī*’s teachings on *rājayoga* seem to come from the twelfth-century *Amanaska*, the earliest known text on *rājayoga*.⁵¹⁰ This text is focused on *samādhi*, synonymous here with the no-mind state (*amanaska*), considering all other practices and techniques to be superfluous and even obstacles. It says this can easily be attained by *śāmbhavīmudrā*, which the *Yogatārāvalī* calls

⁵⁰⁶ Birch 2019b: 5.

⁵⁰⁷ *Amarauḥaprabodha* 3d: *yaś cittavṛttirahitaḥ sa tu rājayogaḥ* |

⁵⁰⁸ See Birch 2013b: 411.

⁵⁰⁹ *Yogatārāvalī* 14: *na drṣṭīlakṣyāṇi na cittabandho na deśakālau na ca vāyurodhaḥ* | *na dhāraṇādhyānapariśramo vā samedhamāne sati rājayoge* |

⁵¹⁰ Birch 2015: 5.

amanaskamudrā.⁵¹¹ The other main technique mentioned is *nādānusandhāna*, immersion of the mind in the internal sound. While the *Yogatārāvalī* seems to draw on the *Amanaska* and refers to *haṭhayoga* texts as a whole, so must postdate at least the earlier ones, it is still traditionally considered to be written by Śaṅkara as evidenced in a published translation by TKV and Kausthub Desikachar, the son and grandson of Krishnamacharya. But unlike the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, where *samādhi* is defined as cognition of *brahman* and yet is still just a practice or state on the way to the ultimate, ever-present realization of *brahman*, here there is no mention of *brahman* or a higher goal.

5.1.4 New Syntheses

In the well-known fifteenth-century *Haṭhapradīpikā*, which draws on the *Yogatārāvalī* as one of its many source texts, *samādhi* is given as a synonym for *rājayoga* as well as *jīvanmukti*. It is defined as the oneness of the self and the mind, analogously to the unity of salt and water when mixed together,⁵¹² which may derive from the c. thirteenth-century *Vivekamārtaṇḍa*. Here, this state of equilibrium and definition of *samādhi* is then further extended to the oneness of the *jīvātman*, the individual self, and the *paramātman*, the universal self.⁵¹³ It is also said to be “the destroyer of death, the means to happiness, and the best creator of the bliss of *brahman*,”⁵¹⁴

⁵¹¹ See Birch 2015: 5.

⁵¹² *Haṭhapradīpikā* 4.5: *salile saindhavaṃ yadvat sāmyaṃ bhajati yogataḥ | tathātmanasor aikyaṃ samādhir abhidhīyate ||*

⁵¹³ *Haṭhapradīpikā* 4.7: *tatsamaṃ ca dvayor aikyaṃ jīvātmaparamātmanoḥ | pranaṣṭasarvasaṃkalpaḥ samādhiḥ so 'bhidhīyate ||*

⁵¹⁴ *Haṭhapradīpikā* 4.2: *athedānīm pravakṣyāmi samādhikramam uttamam | mṛtyughnaṃ ca sukhopāyaṃ bramānandakaraṃ param ||*

which probably derives from the thirteenth-century *Gorakṣaśataka*.⁵¹⁵ This is followed by a description of a specific practice of breath retention.

It is clearly stated that the purpose of *haṭhayoga* is for attaining *rājayoga*; however, the importance of *haṭhayoga* has grown by this point and according to Svātmārāma, at least, they are seen as mutually dependent.

Rājayoga is not attained without *haṭha*,
And *haṭha* is not attained without *rājayoga*.
Therefore, one should practice the pair,
Until the final accomplishment.⁵¹⁶

The fourfold system mentioned earlier was here simplified into a twofold method to attain liberation through the practice of physical yoga and *haṭhayoga* became the only means to reach *rājayoga*.⁵¹⁷ Though the *Haṭhapradīpikā* was a compilation, its real success was in synthesizing various traditions together into a comprehensive system, validated by the way in which later texts drew upon and elaborated on its method. The *Jyotsnā* commentary on this verse, after explaining the importance of the mutual interdependence of *haṭha* and *rājayoga*, mentions the *Aparokṣānubhūti*: “The practice of *rājayoga* will be explained in the fourth chapter in the form of *unmanī*, *śāmbhavīmudrā*, and so forth. In the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, it is told in the form of fifteen

⁵¹⁵ *Gorakṣaśataka* 63cd–64ab: *athedānīm pravakṣyāmi samādhikramam uttamam || mṛtyughnaṃ sukhadopāyaṃ brahmānandakaram sadā* | Now I will teach the best sequence for *samādhi*. It is the destroyer of death, the means to bestowing happiness, and always creates the bliss of *brahman*.

⁵¹⁶ *Haṭhapradīpikā* 2.76: *haṭhaṃ vinā rājayogo rājayogaṃ vinā haṭhaḥ | na sidhyati tato yugmam ā niṣpatteḥ samabhyaset* ||

⁵¹⁷ See Birch 2020: 455.

auxiliaries.”⁵¹⁸ While there is no further mention of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* in the *Jyotsnā*, it must have been in common currency for Brahmānanda to mention it, without elaboration, as one of the explanations of *rājayoga*. Since there is no other citation of it, despite drawing on a multitude of other texts, it seems to be known to represent a different viewpoint. The word *aparokṣa* is used elsewhere in the commentary, with this definition: “the cognition produced by the sayings of Vedānta, because it removes the covering, is immediate awareness, alone.”⁵¹⁹ Perhaps there is no other mention of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* because it is considered to belong to the category of Advaita and less immediately relevant to the *haṭha* or *rājayoga* being described here.

A later text that integrates these ideas is the eighteenth-century *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā*, written in the form of a dialogue between Gheraṇḍa and Caṇḍakāpālin. It is even more focused on the physical practices, describing a sevenfold yoga, consisting of *ṣaṭkarma* (cleansing actions), *āsana* (postures), *mudrā* (bodily seals), *pratyāhāra* (sensory withdrawal), *prāṇāyāma* (breath control), *dhyāna* (meditation), and *samādhi* (absorption). It calls this “the yoga of the body,” using the word *ghaṭa* which literally means “pot” or “vessel.” However, from the very first verse it is made clear that Caṇḍakāpālin in asking for this teaching recognizes that it is “the cause of cognition of the truth,”⁵²⁰ although it is not until the seventh and final chapter on *samādhi* that *brahman* is specifically spoken of, beginning with the *mahāvākya*, “I am *brahman*.”⁵²¹ A further verse concludes that one should “know that everything is *brahman* and see everything in the self,”⁵²² but it is explained that this arises from the practice of various *mudrās* and *prāṇāyāma*.

⁵¹⁸ *Jyotsnā* on 2.76: *rājayogasādhanam caturthopadeśe vakṣyamāṇam unmanīsāmbhavīmudrādirūpam aparokṣānubhūtāv uktaṃ pañcadaśāṅgarūpam |*

⁵¹⁹ *Jyotsnā* on 4.15: *vedāntavākyaṅjanyam ca jñānam āvarāṇanivartakatvād aparokṣam eva |*

⁵²⁰ *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā* 1.2: *ghaṭasthayogaṃ yogeśa tattvajñānasya kāraṇam | idānīm śrotum icchāmi yogeśvara vada prabho ||*

⁵²¹ *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā* 7.4: *ahaṃ brahma na cānyo ’smi brahmaivāhaṃ na śokabhāk | saccidānandarūpo ’haṃ nityam uktaḥ svabhāvavān ||* I am *brahman* and no other. I am *brahman* alone and do not experience sorrow. I have the form of being, consciousness, and bliss. I am eternally liberated, abiding in my own natural state.

⁵²² *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā* 7.19ef: *sarvaṃ brahma vijānīyāt sarvaṃ paśyati cātmani ||*

The realization of oneness is also interwoven with other more tantric ideas, such as sexual union as a way of attaining the supreme self. The text then inverts the equation to say that this bliss leads to the realization of *brahman* and that produces non-dual *samādhi*.⁵²³ Unlike in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, where *samādhi*, like the other *aṅgas*, is defined in terms of *brahman*, and yet is still just a stage on the path, here, as in most other yoga texts, *samādhi* is considered both a practice and the final goal.

5.2 Yoga Compendiums with Quotations from the *Aparokṣānubhūti*

Aside from the *haṭhayoga* texts, which continued to be written, expanding upon practice-related components such as number of *āsanas* and techniques, after the *Haṭhapradīpikā*, a new genre of compendiums on yoga arose as well. These incorporated teachings on *haṭha* and *rājayoga* with Patañjali's yoga and various Brahmanical texts, such as the *Bhagavadgītā* and Purāṇas, without much concern for philosophical differences. Unlike the *haṭhayoga* texts which seem to be practice manuals, written solely in *śloka* meter in simplistic and instructional Sanskrit, these later works are more scholarly and nuanced and bring the Advaita philosophy back into the equation. They include Godāvarimiśra's sixteenth-century *Yogacintāmaṇi*, Śivānandasarasvatī's seventeenth-century work of the same name, Bhavadeva's seventeenth-century *Yuktabhavadeva*, Sundaradeva's eighteenth-century *Haṭhasaṅketacandrikā* and the Yoga Upaniṣads.⁵²⁴

The authors of most of these works were quite learned and had a Vedāntic inclination. The texts “were part of a concerted effort among some erudite Brahmans to make Haṭhayoga's physical practices an integral part of the Brahmanical view of yoga [...] often presenting the physical practice as a way of purifying the mind that would then lead to the realization of

⁵²³ *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā* 7.13: *ānandamayāḥ saṃbhūtvā aikyaṃ brahmaṇi saṃbhavet | ahaṃ brahmeti cādvaitasamādhis tena jāyate ||*

⁵²⁴ See Birch 2020: 463–5.

vedantic truths.”⁵²⁵ In an effort to bring the *haṭhayogīs* into their fold, rather than disparaging their practices, they tried to incorporate them, widening their traditions and philosophical viewpoints, in a process which has eventually led to the modern intermixing of practices and ideas. As Birch explains: “By the eighteenth century, this literary activity appears to have peaked, but the momentum behind it carried the notion of Haṭhayoga into the royal courts of Mysore and Jodhpur in the nineteenth century, and placed it firmly at the centre of postural practice in the twentieth century.”⁵²⁶ Although there was very little new composition after that point, the ideas continued to be woven together through practice and carried on by the living *paramparā* (transmission).

The Yoga Upaniṣads synthesize together various schools of thought, weaving the dualistic tradition of Yoga with the non-dualistic tradition of Advaita, generally with the aim of the oneness of *ātman* and *brahman*. Most relevant to our purposes, the first chapter of the *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* directly quotes the entire section of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* on *rājayoga* with its fifteen auxiliaries. The preceding verses give the reasons for why these practices seem necessary—to overcome the poisons of existence and duality. “Greed, delusion, fear, pride, desire, anger, and sin, heat and cold, hunger and thirst, intentions and doubts [do not exist]. There is no arrogance about one’s social status, nor accumulation of the knots of liberation. There is no fear, no happiness or suffering, likewise no honor or disgrace, for one who is liberated from these states. What is to be understood is *brahman*, the highest state.”⁵²⁷ The commentary states that “the yoga of fifteen auxiliaries is the practice for the understanding of the

⁵²⁵ Birch 2020: 470.

⁵²⁶ Birch 2020: 472.

⁵²⁷ *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* 1.12cd–14: *lobhaṃ mohaṃ bhayaṃ darpaṃ kāmaṃ krodhaṃ ca kilbiṣam || śītoṣṇe kṣutpīpāse ca saṅkalpakavikalpakam | na brahmakuladarpaṃ ca na muktigranthisañcayam || na bhayaṃ na sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ tathā mānāvamānayoḥ | etadbhāvavinirmuktaṃ tadgrāhyaṃ brahma tatparam ||*

highest *brahman*”⁵²⁸ and also, “by the practice of yoga, there is existence in *brahman*.”⁵²⁹ The text then dives straight into the list of the fifteen auxiliaries beginning with verse 102 of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, which is verse 15 here, through verse 142, which is verse 51 here.

While the text is included nearly verbatim, there are a few small differences of note. In the verse on *mūlabandha*, the root-lock, it is said to be the root of all the worlds (*lokānām*), rather than the elements (*bhūtānām*).⁵³⁰ Additionally, some versions of the text say that it is appropriate for those who discourse on *brahman* (*brahmavādīnām*), i.e., Vedāntins, rather than for *rājayogīs*, as our text says. However, the commentary explains that it is appropriate for *rājayogīs* and not for *haṭhayogīs*. The commentary on equilibrium of the limbs of the body gives a helpful gloss: “Equilibrium of the body, beginning with the gross one, is the state of dissolution in the constant *brahman*, not just straightening like a pillar.”⁵³¹ The use of the word *stambhavat*, like a pillar or post, sheds light on the somewhat ambiguous original: like a dried-up tree (*śuṣkavr̥kṣavat*), emphasizing the qualities of rigidity or lifelessness. Also, like the Marathi *Ṭṭkā*, the obstacles listed in the seventh and eighth position are *tejas* and *sveda*, impatience and sweating, so perhaps there is some relationship between them.

Toward the end, a few verses are omitted and combined. Verse 49 is 136ab plus 137cd of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*:

Then that pure reality surely should exist,

Which is beyond the sphere of speech.

⁵²⁸ comm. on *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* 1.14, p. 51: *parabrahmāvagatisādhanam pañcadaśāṅgayogaḥ*

⁵²⁹ comm. on *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* 1.38, p. 55: *yogābhyāsenā brahmabhavanam*

⁵³⁰ *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* 1.27 ≈ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 114: *yanmūlaṃ sarvalokānām yanmūlaṃ cittabandhanam | mūlabandhaḥ sadā sevyo yogyo 'sau rājayoginām ||*

⁵³¹ comm. on *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* 1.28, p. 54: *sthūlādidehānām samabrahmaṇi vilayabhāvaḥ samatā na hi stambhavat r̥jutety arthaḥ |*

After that, the supreme mental state should exist,

Which has the nature of *brahman*.⁵³²

Omitted here is the Upaniṣadic example of clay and the pot found in the second half of the first verse in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*.⁵³³ Leaving out verses 138 and 139, verse 50 of the *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* then combines 140ab with 142ab, with 142cd forming verse 51, which is only half a *śloka* and ends the chapter.

One who has conceived an object,

With intense determination and with resolution,

Surely, having led the visible to invisibility,

Should consider it with the aspect of *brahman*.

Then the wise one should remain in eternal happiness,

With his mind full of the delight of consciousness.”⁵³⁴

Again, part of what is omitted is the example, here of the wasp and the insect.⁵³⁵ The text just gets straight to the point, without getting lost in examples. The final verses of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, which speak of *haṭha* and *rājayoga* are also omitted. This adds to the argument that the final two verses of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* may have been a later addition, included to help the text appeal to a wider audience and bring it into a new context. Perhaps the

⁵³² *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* 1.49 ≈ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 136ab, 137cd: *atha śuddhaṃ bhaved vastu yadvai vācām agocaram | udeti śuddhacittānām vṛtījñānam atah param ||*

⁵³³ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 136cd: *draṣṭavyaṃ mṛdghaṭenaiva drṣṭāntena punaḥ punaḥ ||*

⁵³⁴ *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* 1.50–51 ≈ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 140ab–142: *bhāvitam tīvrayogena yadvastu niścayātmakam | drśyam hy adrśyatām nītvā brahmākāreṇa cintayet || vidvān nityam sukhe tiṣṭhed dhiyā cidrasapūrṇayā |*

⁵³⁵ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 140cd: *pumāns taddhi bhavec chīgraṃ jñeyam bhramarakīṭavat ||*

omission of these verses here implies there was at least a version of the text without the final verses that the *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* drew from, rather than that it chose not to mention them.

The *Nādabindu Upaniṣad* describes a Vedāntic style of *nādayoga*, drawing heavily on the *Haṭhapradīpikā* as well as the *Aparokṣānubhūti*.⁵³⁶ These latter verses explain that “After the arising of cognition of the truth, the ripe karma no longer exists, because the body and such things are unreal, just like a dream upon awakening.”⁵³⁷ Similarly, “When the form of the rope is recognized, the appearance of the snake no longer remains. So, too, when the support is known, the manifold world disappears.”⁵³⁸ At this point, however, unlike the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, which goes on to elaborate the fifteen *aṅgas*, the *Nādabindu Upaniṣad* then describes the practice of *nādayoga*, leading to the realization of *brahman* and liberation.

The fourth chapter of the *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad* quotes from an earlier section of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, drawing from verses 43–75. The omissions are worth noting as they are almost all verses which refer to other texts, presumably because Upaniṣads are not meant to quote other texts. Verses 47 and 48 quote the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*; verse 54 quotes the *Īśa Upaniṣad*, while verses 55, 65, and 66 again refer to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Also missing is verse 63cd. Instead, *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad* 18cd–19ab quotes *Mokṣopāya* 3.7.41 to say:

Just as the son of a barren woman does not exist,

Just as there is no water in a desert,

⁵³⁶ Verses 21–22ab of the *Nādabindu Upaniṣad* come from 89–90b of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*; verses 22cd–29ab are from 91–97 (*Aparokṣānubhūti* 90cd is omitted); and 29cd is from the *Muktikā Upaniṣad* (1.1, 43ab).

⁵³⁷ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 91 = *Nādabindu Upaniṣad* 22cd–23ab: *tattvajñānodayād ūrdhvaṃ prārabdhaṃ naiva vidyate | dehādīnām asattvāt tu yathā svapno vibodhataḥ ||*

⁵³⁸ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 96: *rajjurūpe pariñāte sarpakhaṇḍam na tiṣṭhati | adhiṣṭhāne tathā jñāte prapañcaḥ śūnyatām gataḥ || Nādabindu Upaniṣad* 27cd–28ab: *rajjukhaṇḍe pariñāte sarparūpaṃ na tiṣṭhati || adhiṣṭhāne tathā jñāte prapañce śūnyatām gate |* Here, this last line must be read in conjunction with 28cd: *dehasyāpi prapañcatvāt prārabdhāvasthitiḥ kutaḥ ||* So, too, when the support is known [and] the manifold world disappears, where is the stability of *prārabdhakarma*, since even the body is part of the manifold world?

Just as there is no tree in the sky,
In that same way there is no permanence of the universe.⁵³⁹

Verses 71cd–73 are also absent, and the chapter concludes with *Aparokṣānubhūti* 74ab joined with 75cd:

Wood is thought to be only a house,
And iron is thought to be only a sword.
Similarly, one sees the body as the self,
On account of miscognition.⁵⁴⁰

There is no other reference to the *Aparokṣānubhūti* in the subsequent chapters of the *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad*; instead, it goes straight into a chapter about practices for realizing *brahman*, discussing *cakras*, *kuṇḍalinī*, *nāda*, *bindu*, *mudrā*, and *bandha*. Here, unlike in the *Tejobindu Upaniṣad*, the more philosophical portion of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is drawn upon to support a different, more *haṭhayoga*-oriented sequence of practices, rather than the fifteen auxiliaries.

Approaching the *Aparokṣānubhūti* from a different angle, the eighteenth-century *Haṃsaviḷāsa*, like the *Dīpikā* on our text, identifies Patañjali with *haṭhayoga*, rather than *rājayoga*. The *Haṃsaviḷāsa* quotes many other texts at great length, by name, including the *Bhagavadgītā*, *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, *Haṭhapradīpikā*, and the *Aparokṣānubhūti*. The first mention of our text is in reference to the qualities of the best aspirant, where it cites many of the verses

⁵³⁹ *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad* 18cd–19ab: *yathā vandhyāsuto nāsti yathā nāsti marau jalam || yathā nāsti nabhovṛkṣas tathā nāsti jagatsthitiḥ |*

⁵⁴⁰ *Yogaśikha Upaniṣad* 24 ≈ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 74ab, 75cd: *grhatvena hi kāṣṭhāni khaḍgatvena hi lohatā | tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānāyogataḥ ||*

from the beginning of the text on the *sādhana*catuṣṭaya, the four means for practice.⁵⁴¹ The *Aparokṣānubhūti* then comes up again in the ninth chapter, which is part of a section that examines competing systems of philosophy. It begins by explaining that some people think Patañjali’s teachings are true because they liberate from karma.⁵⁴² It then states that a soul is limited when bound by karma, but becomes Sadāśiva if liberated. As Somdev Vasudeva explains, “Haṃsamiṭṭhu next asserts that the Pātañjala system therefore seeks to forcibly free the limited soul from all karma and thereby enable it to become Sadāśiva. This perceived element of force in Patañjali’s *karmanivṛtti* permits Haṃsamiṭṭhu to identify the Pātañjala system with Haṭhayoga, or ‘forcible’ yoga.”⁵⁴³ As we have seen in other texts, this forceful *haṭhayoga* is generally looked down upon in relation to more gentle, spontaneous forms of yoga. Vasudeva suggests that when Haṃsamiṭṭhu says he studied Upaniṣads in Benares, he is probably including the Yoga Upaniṣads, which is how we have seen them mentioned in the commentaries on the *Aparokṣānubhūti*. And it seems “that Haṃsamiṭṭhu’s milieu had already conflated Patañjali’s system with Haṭhayoga,”⁵⁴⁴ meaning that this identification was not original.

The text then lists the fifteen auxiliaries of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, including Patañjali’s eight. It goes through these different auxiliaries, quoting descriptions and explanations from various sources, particularly the *Haṭhapradīpikā*. It begins with a version of Patañjali’s five restraints and observances and then gives instruction from the *Haṭhapradīpikā* on the means to the destruction or success of yoga. While its definition of renunciation (*tyāga*) as “non-attachment with mind and body to saṃsāric things,”⁵⁴⁵ may derive from the *Aparokṣānubhūti* or

⁵⁴¹ *Haṃsaviḷāsa*, p. 33–4

⁵⁴² *Haṃsaviḷāsa*, p. 43: *kintacchāstram iti praśnāḱāṅkṣācecchruṇu śrīmatā patañjalīnā proktaṃ yattat sacchāstram itītare kṛtino brubate kutaḥ karmamocanāt vāt |*

⁵⁴³ Vasudeva 2011: 132.

⁵⁴⁴ Vasudeva 2011: 133.

⁵⁴⁵ *Haṃsaviḷāsa* p. 44: *manasā śarīreṇa ca sarvathā sām̐sārikavastuṣvasaṅgatātyāgaḥ |*

Tejobindu Upaniṣad, its definition of place (*deśa*), is straight out of the *Haṭhapradīpikā*, describing the location of a *yogī*'s hut in a solitary and peaceful place. The description of posture is mainly from *Haṭhapradīpikā* 34–35 with slight variation, listing four postures, with *siddhāsana*, as is common, emphasized as best.

More relevant to us, its commentary on equilibrium of the limbs of the body (*dehasāmyam*), which the *Aparokṣānubhūti* defines as “being absorbed in the constant *brahman*,” is actually more equivalent to the contrasting position which our text says is “just straightening [of the body], like a dried-up tree.”⁵⁴⁶ The *Haṃsavilāsa* says equilibrium is making all of the parts of the body, i.e., the hands and feet, immobile like a rock.⁵⁴⁷ It then says that one should remain still even if intensely tormented by mosquitos, flies, or ants.⁵⁴⁸ In relation to the next auxiliary, gaze (*drṣṭi*), the *Aparokṣānubhūti* says that “having made one’s gaze full of knowledge, one should see the universe as full of *brahman*,” continuing on to contrast this with those who look at the tip of the nose or even a few verses later, those who are “tormenting the nose.”⁵⁴⁹ Again, the description in the *Haṃsavilāsa* is more in line with this opposing method: “The gaze, from force, piercing in-between the two eyebrows, is to be fixed on one’s own nose, alone.”⁵⁵⁰ Given that *Haṃsamīṭṭhu* is clearly opposed to these methods, he is emphasizing their forceful aspects.

The *Haṃsavilāsa* also adds quite a few auxiliaries, such as cleansing actions (*ṣaṭkarma*), breath retentions (*kumbhaka*), purification of the *nāḍīs*, and *mudrās*. It explains that the point of

⁵⁴⁶ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 115: *aṅgānām samatām vidyāt same brahmaṇi līyate | no cen naiva samānatvaṃ rjutvaṃ śuṣkavṛkṣavat ||*

⁵⁴⁷ *Haṃsavilāsa* p. 45: *drṣyatpratīkṛtir iva hastapādādyavayavavrātāṃ stabdhīkṛtya samatayā ’vasthānaṃ dehasāmyam |*

⁵⁴⁸ *Haṃsavilāsa* p. 45: *tatkṛte maśakamakṣikāpipīlikādibhirgāḍhaṃ bādhitō’pi dhairyena tadavadhūrya tathaiva stheyam |*

⁵⁴⁹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 116: *drṣṭiṃ jñānamayīm kṛtvā paśyed brahmamayaṃ jagat | sā drṣṭiḥ paramodārā na nāsāgrāv alokinī || 120cd: ajñānām ghrāṇapīḍanam ||*

⁵⁵⁰ *Haṃsavilāsa* p. 45: *drṣṭir haṭhād bhruvor antarannirbhidya svanāsāgra eva niveśanīyā |*

these is to pierce the six *cakras* and raise the *kuṇḍalinī* upwards, again stressing that it should be done forcibly (*haṭhāt*).⁵⁵¹ While sensory withdrawal is defined somewhat in line with the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, concentration and meditation again take their lead from the *Haṭhapradīpikā*. When the text gets to *samādhi*, after quoting quite a few verses from the *Haṭhapradīpikā* that make it clear that *haṭhayoga* is merely for the sake of *rājayoga*, it clarifies: “What was said? That because Patañjali’s teachings cause the individual self to attain *rājayoga*, having freed it from accumulated, ripe, and present karma from force, they are true? The brilliant *rājayoga* is accomplished by the individual self without forceful actions. What is the use of these difficult exertions? O beautiful woman, *rājayoga* has been brought to light, seen, and heard by naturally honest, good people. From this, the teachings of Patañjali are not included with true teachings.”⁵⁵²

And a bit later, after quoting verses 127–128ab of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, which describe the obstacles to practicing absorption, it says: “My dear, whatever is achieved by agitation, there is not even a little natural excellence there. From this, the teaching of Patañjali is improper. *Rājayoga*, fulfilled with little effort, is taught by wise people.”⁵⁵³ As Vasudeva explains, the *rājayoga* that Haṃsamitṭhu is building up to “is conceived of as an esoteric sensual rapture (*rahasyarāsa*) superior to the ‘incomplete’ Rāsālilā extolled in devotional Vaiṣṇava circles. [...] Its superiority lies in the admission of sexual practices.”⁵⁵⁴ This is clearly a very different

⁵⁵¹ *Haṃsavilāsa* p. 47: *evam ādhanekakarmabhir haṭhānmūlādadhārasthitām adhomukhī tām kuṇḍalinī ṛjvīkṛtya śūnyapadavyā śatpadmāni bhedayitvā ūrdhvamānīya dvādaśāntasthītasya śrīparamaśaivasyābhyāsaṃ svayaṃ cāpi tiṣṭhet |*

⁵⁵² *Haṃsavilāsa* p. 49: *kim uktam | sañcitaprārabdham kriyamāṇebhyaḥ karmabhyo haṭhād jīvaṃ mocayitvā rājayogaṃ prāpayati pātañjalam ity atah kim sat | vinaiva haṭhakarmajīvenaivam eva śrīrājayogaṃ āsādyate kim etair utkāṭaprayāsaiḥ | sundari! sahasaralāiḥ sadbhī rājayogaḥ prāduṣkṛto drṣṭaḥ śrūtaś ca, atah pātañjalaśāstra sacchāstratvena nāṅgikṛtam iti |*

⁵⁵³ *Haṃsavilāsa* p. 51: *priye | yadyad calena niṣpāditaṃ na tatra kiñcitsvārasyam ity atah pātañjalamatam asamañjasam | svalpāyāsena pūrṇarājayogaḥ sūcitaḥ sajjanair iti |*

⁵⁵⁴ Vasudeva 2011: 139.

conception of this royal yoga than we have seen in most other texts, and yet it builds upon the elaboration of *rājayoga* in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*.

The seventeenth-century *Yogamārgaparakāśikā* of Yugaladāsa also identifies *haṭhayoga* with Patañjali's *aṣṭāṅgayoga*, giving detailed descriptions of the eight auxiliaries, which have clearly been modernized to include more postures as well as other physical aspects, such as *kriyās*. Narahari's eighteenth-century *Bodhasāra* poetically interweaves Vedānta, Yoga, and various other traditions and practices. It uses the word *aparokṣānubhūti* to mean the goal of Vedānta: "What is considered as immediate awareness [of the self] in Vedānta, that is surely only a transformation of devotion with the characteristic of love."⁵⁵⁵ This illustrates the growing predominance of *bhakti* as an organizing force as we will return to shortly.

5.3 Movement Toward Synthesis

As we have seen, on a continuum from *haṭha* to *rājayoga*, the more a text privileges the latter, the closer it aligns with Vedāntic goals, and therefore the *Aparokṣānubhūti*. However, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is unique in its combination of a traditional Advaitic method with a path of *rājayoga* and its orientation is clearly Advaitic, as opposed to the Yoga texts we have just looked at. Its *rājayoga* of fifteen auxiliaries defines each individual one in terms of *brahman*, rather than considering them as prerequisites and saving that for the final stage. And while *samādhi* is the highest step, it is not the ultimate aim, as obstacles can still arise. Realization comes when these are removed and the state of *brahman* is ever-present. *Haṭhayoga* is mentioned as an afterthought for those who are still struggling. It is evident from later texts that quote the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, both with citation and without, that it was well known and holds a particular place within the tradition.

⁵⁵⁵ *Bodhasāra* 13.10: *aparokṣānubhūtir yā vedānteṣu nirūpitā | premalakṣaṇabhaktes tu pariṇāmaḥ sa eva hi ||*

It becomes increasingly apparent by looking at various texts over time that they were constantly looking for new ways to integrate different disparate elements together to be more inclusive and broaden their audience, subverting their competition into their domain. This distinction between *haṭha* and *rājayoga* for the most part even transcends sectarian lines. While each author may have a clear idea of which method was best, others became potential stepping-stones. The idea that all paths lead to one goal is quite popular in New Age thought, as well as among modern yoga practitioners and teachers, who often end up interweaving various strands of practices with a bit of theory thrown in, with the ultimate Neo-Vedāntic aim of oneness. But this is an oversimplification—there are both many paths and many goals. The increasing trend towards synthesis rather than complete innovation, which is evident in these late medieval and early modern texts, paved the way for the mixing and matching of ideas that gave birth to modern yoga.

5.3.1 Evolution of Ideas and the Influence of *Bhakti*

As I briefly mentioned earlier, one of the driving forces behind these two incompatible non-theistic metaphysics—Yoga and Advaita—becoming compatible, was to make them both theistic. Then attaining God becomes synonymous with attaining *brahman*. Through multiple sleights of hand, without most people even realizing it, these two have merged. Once Advaita became joined with theism and the attainment of unity, rather than the realization of what is already there, Yoga needed no longer be a penultimate tool that may be helpful along the way, but instead became integral as a set of practices leading toward this final goal.

In Śaṅkara's view, you could never do anything, for there was never two. All that happens for him is the removal of miscognition (*ajñāna*), which happens through cognition

(*jñāna*). And this is done at a human level, not a transcendental one. As Ram-Prasad explains, “While *brahman* is an explanatory principle and the nature of self-evident self-consciousness, it is not a moral principle or the source of liberation. That is why the Advaitic theory of liberation is not a soteriology: there is no saviour.”⁵⁵⁶ He continues: “For the strict Advaitin, there is no God who should then be construed as free of sin. There is the universal consciousness and it encompasses, albeit in a different metaphysical status engendered by a primal epistemic error, the life of individuated consciousness. This is why, for all the divinity suggested by the notion of *brahman*, the Advaitic path to liberation is still one walked by the subject unassisted by a higher power.”⁵⁵⁷ However, over time, various interpretations of Śaṅkara led to new forms of Advaita which had different understandings of the role of devotion. Additionally, one aspect of the Vivaraṇa school that comes strongly into play in these later assimilations is “the relationship between text, teacher and seeker.”⁵⁵⁸ The role of the guru becomes fundamentally important in the transmission of the teachings to the student and the ultimate realization. The final line of the last verse of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* clearly states that “For all those who are devoted to the teacher and the deity, [this *rājayoga*] is easy to attain, at once.”⁵⁵⁹ The *Dīpikā* quotes the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* and the *Bhagavadgītā* to justify this turn toward devotion. And it concludes that “this yoga, which is accepted by Vedānta, bestows attainment by way of the direct cognition of *brahman* as not different from the self, i.e., granting liberation with the characteristic of residing in one’s own intrinsic form.”⁵⁶⁰ The infusion of *bhakti* over time helped allow for the changing

⁵⁵⁶ Ram-Prasad 2001: 216.

⁵⁵⁷ Ram-Prasad 2001: 216–217.

⁵⁵⁸ Ram-Prasad 2001: 209.

⁵⁵⁹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 144: *gurudaivatabhaktānām sarveṣām sulabho javāt ||*

⁵⁶⁰ *Dīpikā* on 144: *ayaṃ vedāntābhīmato yogaḥ siddhidāḥ pratyagabhinnabrahmāparokṣajñānavārā svasvarūpāvasthānalakṣaṇamuktipradāḥ*

definitions of the means to recognize *brahman* and some of the key ingredients of Advaita, such as contemplation.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, because of its ability to include other viewpoints within its overarching philosophy, Advaita Vedānta was increasingly prominent both culturally and politically. As Christopher Minkowski emphasizes, “Regarded as the source for a kind of indigenous secularism or pluralism, in which many points of view are allowed to coexist because they are found ultimately to be one in their goals and aspirations, a modernized Advaita became something like the establishment position for the generation that achieved national independence.”⁵⁶¹ But this all-inclusive Advaita was not the Advaita of Śaṅkara—to make sense of the modern integration of Yoga and Advaita we need to understand the developments that happened over time to allow it to become this umbrella for other beliefs and practices, of which the assimilation seen in the *Aparokṣānubhūti* and its commentaries represents an important step. Although many of the texts written around this time seem to just be new syntheses of old ideas, this integrative process itself deserves attention; additionally, there are a wealth of underexplored texts that were composed during this period, many written in the vernaculars.

Most modern scholarship has dismissed medieval and early modern works on Advaita as either lacking in originality, uninteresting, or at best, good at compiling and synthesizing. This is compounded by the false attribution and early dating of texts such as the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, which clearly were written much later, but are denied recognition on their own terms. Most research on Advaita has focused on Śaṅkara, with the majority, led by Paul Hacker, spent on determining what can clearly be attributed to him. These studies put the emphasis on authenticity as a measure of value. They consequently look down at Neo-Vedānta, which is often considered

⁵⁶¹ Minkowski 2011: 205.

“a nationalistic movement dependent on the ‘assimilation’ of Western ideals.”⁵⁶² But as James Madaio emphasizes, “scholarly interest in historical origins and certain high culture forms of ‘traditional’ Advaita Vedānta underrepresents the multivocality and diversity of advaitic theology. And it is precisely the underrepresented periods and text genres which were key sources for ‘Neo-Vedāntins’, such as Vivekananda.”⁵⁶³ Although these scholars and teachers traced their understanding to Śāṅkara, they still drew from many texts written in the intervening years, regardless of attribution.

As we have seen through looking at various commentaries on the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, interpretations of a text and its ideas change through the generations and in the *paramparā*, or transmission, from teacher to student. Negotiation of meaning has always been a dynamic part of the evolution of both philosophy and practice. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Hindu reformers, such as Swami Vivekananda, Swami Dayananda, Radhakrishnan, and the theosophists emphasized Patañjali’s yoga which they equated with *rājayoga*, spreading these ideas on an international scale. This continued with various offshoots into the twentieth century and paved the way for the modern integration of Yoga and Advaita and the more physical yoga practices that have become so popular around the world in recent years.

These Neo-Vedāntic ideas have precursors in scholars such as the sixteenth-century Appaya Dīkṣita. His doxography of Vedānta schools, the *Caturmataleśasamgraha*, clearly asserts the primacy of Advaita over other Vedāntic schools, specifically Śivādvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Dvaita Vedānta. As Jonathan Duquette explains, “Since Advaita presents an ultimate view of reality, pure non-dualism, it can accommodate and integrate, within itself as it were, those schools that present dualist or qualified dualist views. Appaya may well be an early

⁵⁶² Madaio 2017: 3.

⁵⁶³ Madaio 2017: 2.

modern precursor of neo-Hinduism in his belief that Advaita Vedānta embodies the highest truth and best represents the essence of the ‘Hindu’ tradition. However, his religious inclusivism differs from the embracing religious universalism of Radhakrishnan and others in the clear borderlines it still draws between what is authoritative and soteriologically legitimate, and what is not.”⁵⁶⁴ Appaya Dīkṣita did this through rigorous engagement with the classical traditions and complex philosophical reasoning. He represents an essential step in understanding the evolution toward the less discerning inclusivism that became dominant in the modern period.

Another important precursor to Neo-Vedānta was the sixteenth-century Vijñānabhikṣu, who as I have mentioned, understood the goal of his Bhedābheda Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga to be the same. He argued in his *Yogasārasaṃgraha*, “The Compendium on the Essence of Yoga,” that Patañjali’s aim of *kaivalya* does not actually mean complete isolation or aloneness, but is in fact, synonymous with *mokṣa*, liberation, and “while turning away from *prakṛti*, the liberated *puruṣa* is simultaneously turning toward Brahman, returning to its original relation of non-separation.”⁵⁶⁵ For Vijñānabhikṣu, the *puruṣa* is the same as the *jīvātman*, which in opposition to Advaita, he considers to be multiple, even after liberation, defined by him as the dissolution (*laya*) of this individual self into the highest self. He explains that this is no different than Patañjali’s second definition of *kaivalya* in *Yogasūtra* 4.34 as when “the power of consciousness is situated in its own intrinsic form.”⁵⁶⁶ As long as the *puruṣa* is enmeshed in the web of *prakṛti* this is impossible, but after the dissolution of the *guṇas* and the cessation of suffering, the *puruṣa* is no longer separate from *brahman*.⁵⁶⁷ While this may seem like a bit of a stretch, as Nicholson explains, “for Vijñānabhikṣu [...] as he says in his commentary on the

⁵⁶⁴ Duquette 2015: 287.

⁵⁶⁵ Nicholson 2010: 122.

⁵⁶⁶ *Yogasūtra* 4.34: *puruṣārthasūnyānām guṇānām pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpapraṭiṣṭhā vā citiśaktir iti* |

⁵⁶⁷ Nicholson 2010: 120–2.

Sāṃkhyasūtras, to understand each school correctly, one must understand its proper scope.”⁵⁶⁸ Patañjali does not see any need to mention *brahman* because it is beyond the purview of his subject matter, which is the discernment between self and matter. He sees these systems as complementary rather than conflictual. Similarly, he makes it clear that his work pertains to *rājayoga* and that *haṭhayoga* is a separate subject dealt with elsewhere: “Further explanation of posture is not undertaken here because the subject is *rājayoga*. And a full and detailed explanation of posture, purification of the subtle channels and so forth is to be seen in works on *haṭhayoga*.”⁵⁶⁹ This was exactly what Vivekananda later did, looking down on *haṭhayoga* as the domain of entertainers or as merely gymnastics, in contrast to his own elevated *rājayoga*, which was based on Patañjali’s *Yogasūtra*.

I would like to suggest that it was partly this compartmentalization that allowed the different systems to be brought together, prescribing different practices depending on the qualities of the aspirant. The introduction to the Adyar Library’s 1972 edition and translation of the *Haṭhapradīpikā* with Brahmānanda’s *Jyotsnā* commentary by Tookaram Tatya discusses the different types of students, similarly to the *Dīpikā*: “Students of the Yoga-vidyā have been classed under three categories: the Uttama Adhikārin-s, the highest; the Madhyama Adhikārin-s, the intermediate; and the Kaniṣṭha Adhikārin-s, the lowest. Students of different degrees of merit acquired in past lives come under the first two categories. We shall now speak of the Kaniṣṭha Adhikārin-s who have to begin their Yoga in the present life. For these no course of Yoga is possible save the Haṭha-yoga, which they should patiently follow, guided by a competent Guru.”⁵⁷⁰ He then turns to our text as reference for how this should be done: “For, says Śrī

⁵⁶⁸ Nicholson 2010: 122.

⁵⁶⁹ *Yogasārasaṃgraha* p. 39: *āsanasya prapañcas tv atra rājayogaprakaraṇatvān na kriyate | āsanānāḍīsuddhyādayas tu haṭhayogādigrantheṣv aśeṣaviśeṣato draṣṭavyāḥ |*

⁵⁷⁰ Tatya 1972: xiii–xiv.

Śaṅkarācārya in his treatise on Rājayoga, called *Aparokṣānubhūti*: ‘The practice of Haṭhayoga is intended for those whose nature requires to be purged of all impurities.’ Now, since the majority of men are not free from the infirmities of their lower nature, it follows that the majority of students are in need of a first training which would fit them for the pursuit of the higher system of Rāja-yoga: a training which no system is so well adapted to secure as Haṭha-yoga.”⁵⁷¹ Statements such as this make it clear that the *Aparokṣānubhūti* was well known and continued to be used as a framework and justification for the inclusion of *haṭhayoga*, despite its very minor reference to it.

Let us remember, however, that for Śaṅkara, “It is the Veda itself that ‘appoints’ (*adhikṛ*) whoever may be eligible for its instruction. Intelligence, capability, desire for knowledge, and other things, are not sufficient requirements to become a proper *adhikārin*.”⁵⁷² And for Śaṅkara, Patañjali’s yoga was anti-Vedic, because its ultimate aim is dualistic. As he said in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, “By the rejection of the tradition of Sāṅkhya, the tradition of Yoga has also been rejected.”⁵⁷³ It is thus quite clear that the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is a much later text, belonging to the milieu of works dedicated to bringing disparate traditions together, with various motivations. It is these texts, together with the *haṭhayoga* texts, that then informed the twentieth-century teachers of modern yoga, beginning with Krishnamacharya, who integrated them into a physical practice, intertwining the somatic with the spiritual. However, unlike the *haṭhayoga* texts and many of the compilations that followed, rather than ignoring philosophical discrepancies, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* uses sophisticated logic to incorporate Yoga into its traditional Advaitic path.

⁵⁷¹ Tatya 1972: xiii–xiv.

⁵⁷² Duquette 2015: 268.

⁵⁷³ *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on 2.1.3: *sāṅkhyasmṛtipratyākhyānena yogasmṛtir api pratyākhyātā*

5.4 Modern Contexts for *Nididhyāsana* and the *Aparokṣānubhūti*

Modern yoga is neither a surprise nor an aberration, but a continuation of a transformation that has been happening since its inception. This has occurred through a gradual decrease in sophistication, through which, as we have seen, nuance gets traded for appeal to a broader audience. By looking at the widening definition of the term *nididhyāsana*, as illustrated in the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, I have shown how the original specific act of contemplation on *brahman* has come to enfold various other practices over time. I want to take a brief look now at *nididhyāsana* in the context of modern yoga to show how this process has continued. As an increasing number of texts became accepted to have been written by Śāṅkarācārya over time, the philosophy and ideas attributed to him fundamentally changed. Since modern Advaitins and *yogīs* accept that Śāṅkara wrote texts such as the *Vivarāṇa* commentary on the *Yogasūtra*, the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, and the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, the ideas they contain have become part of their practice and understanding of the tradition.

Many of the assumptions of the twentieth century come through how the words are rendered into English and how the texts get translated into modern language. Rammohan Roy, the early nineteenth-century Bengali reformer and one of the first to popularize and translate Vedāntic texts, radically simplified Vedānta into two subjects, the goal and the method—knowledge of *ātman* or *brahman* and “sadhana ‘the means’ of upasana, ‘worship’ of the unmanifest Supreme Being.”⁵⁷⁴ As Elizabeth De Michele observes, “in this radically simplified view of Vedānta we already have, at this early stage, a kind of preview of what will become the essence of twentieth-century Modern Yoga: a strong focus on ‘practice’ justified by a theory of

⁵⁷⁴ Robertson 1995: 88.

‘realization’ (whether of ‘God’ or ‘Self’).”⁵⁷⁵ And in order to make this understanding as inclusive as possible, Neo-Vedānta equated God and *brahman*.

Swami Vivekananda quotes our key passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* in his discourse on Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī, translating *nididhyāsītavya* as “to be meditated on.” He first situates it in their famous dialogue, where Maitreyī asks what she can do to become immortal and Yājñavalkya replies with a series of statements beginning with: “It is not for love of the husband that the husband is beloved, but for love of the Self that the husband is beloved. It is not for love of the wife that the wife is beloved, but for love of the Self that the wife is beloved.”⁵⁷⁶ Vivekananda expands upon this, concluding the dialogue by explaining what he understands to be intended by meditation and therefore *nididhyāsana* here. “For instance, meditate on the earth; think of the earth and at the same time know that we have *That* which is in the earth, that both are the same. Identify the body with the earth, and identify the soul with the Soul behind. Identify the air with the soul that is in the air and that is in me. They are all one, manifested in different forms. To realise this unity is the end and aim of all meditation, and this is what Yajnavalkya was trying to explain to Maitreyi.”⁵⁷⁷ For Vivekananda, it was perfectly fine to take a gross object as the initial object of meditation as a way in to understanding the underlying unity of all things, which for him is the heart of this dialogue. This seems more reminiscent of the way in which *upāsana* was used in earlier times to allow meditation on tangible things, particularly forms of nature, to represent more subtle awareness.

Many of the key figures in modern yoga, particularly Krishnamacharya, were Śrīvaiṣṇavas (rather than Smārta Brahmins), who would have been inherently opposed to

⁵⁷⁵ De Michele 2004: 133.

⁵⁷⁶ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5: *na vā are patyuh kāmāya patih priyo bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya patih priyo bhavati | na vā are jāyāyai kāmāya jāyā priyā bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya jāyā priyā bhavati |*

⁵⁷⁷ Vivekananda 1893.

Advaita Vedānta. And yet they had a strong relationship to Advaitic texts (though they may not have recognized them as such), and to the Advaita that was current at the time of the inception of modern yoga, and these boundaries were often blurred. In speaking of the teachings of Rāmānuja, as they influenced Krishnamacharya, Nevrin says, “Ultimately, devotion (*bhakti*) and true knowledge of God (*brahmajñāna*), being based in Vedāntic scriptures as well as developed through meditation (*upāsana*, *dhyāna*, *nididhyāsana*), are deeply interrelated. Devotion is a continuous meditation accompanied by love, a ‘steady and continuous remembrance’ (*dhruvānusmṛti*), ‘uninterrupted like the flow of oil,’ and with the character of ‘direct knowledge’ (*aparokṣa-jñāna*) or ‘immediate presentation’ (*sākṣāt-kāra*). This devotion is attained by following a strict discipline, consisting of, among other things, correct diet; absence of attachment to desirable objects; virtuous conduct; freedom from excessive dejection and satisfaction; and chanting the divine names, seeking to worship and serve the Lord with joy.”⁵⁷⁸ Note that *upāsana*, *dhyāna*, and *nididhyāsana* are listed together here under the category of meditation. The nuance and particular technical distinctions held for Śaṅkara have been lost over time and in translation. Moreover, devotion (*bhakti*) and knowledge of *brahman* are being joined together as mutually supportive, as we saw with Pūrṇasarasvatī, and they are being supported by practices similar to the restraints and observances (*yama* and *niyama*).

B.K.S. Iyengar, one of Krishnamacharya’s most well-known students, and also a Śrīvaiṣṇava, in his description of the meaning of AUM, mentions the triad: “If he follows the path of devotion (*bhakti-marga*), he will be immersed in hearing the Lord’s name (*Śravaṇa*), meditating upon His attributes (*Manana*), and thinking of His glory (*Nididhyāsana*).”⁵⁷⁹ Here all three components have been re-interpreted through the lens of *bhakti*. Joan White, a student of

⁵⁷⁸ Nevrin 2005: 75–6.

⁵⁷⁹ Iyengar 1981: 116.

Iyengar, explains it thus: “In many of the ancient scriptures, and in great detail in the *Viveka Chudamani* by Adi Shankaracharya, the terms *shravana*, *manana*, and *nididhyasana* are used to describe what is needed to become a good student. The meaning of these words deepens as one’s study matures. To start with, they translate as ‘gaining knowledge by listening to the teacher’ (*shravana*), ‘wiping away doubts and thinking about the teaching’ (*manana*), and ‘an absorbed meditation on the subject’ (*nididhyasana*).”⁵⁸⁰ She then redefines these terms as she’s come to understand them through her own practice. “One’s practice has to depend on one’s ability to transform and change—to continue to listen, to remove self-ignorance through knowledge (*shravana*), to wipe away any doubts with thinking (*manana*), and to contemplate with a growing abidance in oneself and through removal of habitual error (*nididhyasana*).”⁵⁸¹ Although one could argue that she is still referring to an intense contemplation on one’s self, she is talking about these terms mainly with respect to *āsana* practice, which begs the question of whether these terms can actually still apply.

One of Krishnamacharya’s other main students, Pattabhi Jois, was an Advaitin by birth, a *yogī* by training, and a Sanskrit scholar by study. The *Aparokṣānubhūti* was an important inspiration for him, particularly its elaboration of the fifteen auxiliaries and its re-definition of them all in terms of *brahman*. And while it does clearly diverge from Śaṅkara’s Advaita, it captures his essential teaching which Ram-Prasad sums up: “The key idea here is that the individuated consciousness is ultimately not different from universal consciousness. It does not become the latter, it does not attain the status of the latter, it does not enter into a relationship with the latter. It is simply not different from the latter.”⁵⁸² This is the fundamental truth that the *Aparokṣānubhūti* reiterates repeatedly in various ways and which Pattabhi Jois tried to subtly

⁵⁸⁰ Busia 2007: 26.

⁵⁸¹ Busia 2007: 31.

⁵⁸² Ram-Prasad 2001: 179.

incorporate into his teaching of *āsana* practice, quoting verses such as the one which defines *āsana* as “one in which, with complete ease, unceasing meditation on *brahman* may arise, and not any other [posture] that destroys ease.”⁵⁸³ But while he studied these texts for himself and understood the difference between these approaches, in his teaching they merged into one, especially for his students who were generally more interested in practice than theory. Sharath Jois, Pattabhi Jois’ grandson and main disciple, seems to refer to verse 114 from the *Aparokṣānubhūti* on *mūlabandha* when referencing Śaṅkara.⁵⁸⁴ As he says, “If you take Shankaracharya’s books, they always say that you have to do *mula bandha* with the *asanas*. *Asana* is the foundation from which we build up to self-realization.”⁵⁸⁵ It is evident here how easily traditions can change as they are passed on through the generations. When Pattabhi Jois talked about the internal aspects of practice, he meant the ultimate realization of *brahman*, not the root-lock of *haṭhayoga*. However, he used this subtle idea to connect the two, stressing both the engagement of the pelvis as well as its connection to God and a deeper understanding.

Another student of Jois, Nick Evans, seems to refer to verse 116 of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, that mentions *drṣṭi*, the gazing point,⁵⁸⁶ which along with the *bandhas* and breath make up what Pattabhi Jois called *tristhāna*, the three places [of attention], which were fundamental to the Ashtanga yoga he taught. “Shankaracharya was not, from my understanding, opposed to yogic practices, but emphasized that the purpose of yoga was to realize reality to be non-dual. I read one passage where he said the *nasagra*, the *drishti* at the tip of the nose, is everywhere you look.

⁵⁸³ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 112: *sukhenaiva bhaved yasminn ajasraṃ brahma cintanam | āsanam tad vijānīyān netarat sukhanāśanam ||*

⁵⁸⁴ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 114: *yan mūlaṃ sarvabhūtānām yanmūlaṃ cittabandhanam | mūlabandhaḥ sadā sevyo yogyo 'sau rājayoginām ||* That which is the root of all the elements, on which the binding of consciousness is rooted. That root-lock (*mūlabandha*) is always to be attended to. This is appropriate for *rājayogīs*.

⁵⁸⁵ Donahaye and Stern 2010: 183–4.

⁵⁸⁶ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 116: *drṣṭim jñānamayīm kṛtvā paśyed brahmamayaṃ jagat | sā drṣṭiḥ paramodārā na nāsāgrāv alokinī ||* Having made one’s gaze full of knowledge, one should see the universe as full of *brahman*. That gaze (*drṣṭi*) is the most exalted, not looking at the tip of the nose.

The one taste, the formless eternal brahman, is wherever you look.”⁵⁸⁷ It is likely that Evans read the published translation of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* and incorporated that into his understanding of Advaita and consequently yoga. It is clear from interviews with Jois’ main students that though many aspects may have gotten lost or merged in translation, the fundamental Advaitic idea of the oneness of *ātman* and *brahman* was transmitted, and for him, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* was essential in connecting these pieces together. While much more could be said about the details of this transmission, the underlying understanding is clear—it seems a supreme example of Advaita’s triumph that yoga practitioners now think that the *Aparokṣānubhūti* is about Yoga.

5.5 The Reconciliation of Advaita and Yoga

Taking a step back again, we can see that there are many factors that influenced this shift in the understanding and presence of Advaita. Embedded in this change are political and cultural responses from the time of Vidyāraṇya and the Vijayanagara Empire, to the response to the British colonial rule and the Nationalistic movement toward the idea of a Vedāntic universalism, which became part of the Neo-Vedānta taught by Vivekananda and others. This all led to a kind of domesticated esotericism, with different modern social reasons for practice and belief and a re-envisioning, which led to a rewriting and new understanding of texts. This universalism, as is generally the case, was really in part, a divisive inclusivism, spurred by the movement to define Hinduism. As Madaio puts it: “the failure to take seriously developments in medieval and early modern advaitic traditions is paralleled by an inadequate recognition of the ways in which colonial period Hindus recalibrated the apt performance of their inherited tradition in relation to the exigencies of their colonialized and, increasingly, globalized world.”⁵⁸⁸ Without going into

⁵⁸⁷ Donahaye and Stern 2010: 422–3.

⁵⁸⁸ Madaio 2017: 2.

the politics, we have seen how these shifts influenced interpretations of key terminology over time. And these earlier transformations, with the help of the unifying force of *bhakti*, lay the groundwork for modern yoga, giving its creators the freedom to integrate different strands of thought and redefine the meaning of meditation, contemplation, Advaita, and Yoga.

Much of the scholarship on modern yoga is focused on how the physical tradition of *āsana* practice has come to be so popular, tracing its origins to texts on *haṭhayoga* from the last eight hundred years. However, as we have seen, these texts often say very little about religion and philosophy, while influential teachers such as Krishnamacharya and his students were greatly informed by these perspectives. Their understanding and interpretation of tradition reflects a synthesis of various schools of thought that is seen most clearly in the Yoga Upaniṣads, epitomized in the half verse stating that “one desiring liberation should steadily practice both yoga and cognition.”⁵⁸⁹ As we saw earlier, it is in these texts and other contemporaneous ones, that practice and theory came to be fully seen as extensions of each other, and both became integral to the tradition.

The *Aparokṣānubhūti* has come to be accepted and taught as a primer of Advaita Vedānta with good reason. It makes complex ideas simple and accessible and presents them in an abridged way. It teaches the fundamental principles of Advaita and yet also offers alternative methods for those who need them. We can see through the evolution within the commentaries that its interpretation changed based on the other texts and practices in currency. Though originally it was contrasted to Patañjali’s *Yogasūtra*, which its first commentator considered the *haṭhayoga* source text, it came to be compared with texts such as the *Haṭhapradīpikā*. And lest we get too caught up in the yoga section of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, let us remember that it was only introduced to help the B and C students attain what was spoken of previously and already

⁵⁸⁹ *Yogatattva Upaniṣad* 15cd: *tasmā jñānam ca yogaṃ ca mumukṣur dṛḍham abhyaset* ||

realized by the most qualified aspirants. “The best means to liberation,” as the commentary explains, “preceded by the four means, beginning with detachment, is inquiry into the Upaniṣadic statements alone, by way of knowledge of the direct perception of *brahman* as not different from the self.”⁵⁹⁰ And in the course of this inquiry, there is the constant reminder that this body is only meant to be a vehicle to get beyond the body, for example, in the repeated refrain, “how could the body be the self?”⁵⁹¹ Or as one of my favorite verses admonishes:

Listen you fool! Learn about your own self, your spirit,

By scripture and reasoning.

Beyond the body, whose aspect is existence:

So difficult to be seen by someone like you.⁵⁹²

And yet, if *haṭhayoga* is practiced in service of *rājayoga*, and *rājayoga* is for the purpose of Advaitic realization, then yoga is just being used to make it more accessible, subverted into its domain as an instrument to broaden the scope of who might be able to attain this ultimate goal. While the conceptual differences that Śāṅkara articulated do not simply go away because of twenty-first-century assertions, to put it simply: people in c. eighth-century India did not claim that one could be both an Advaitin and a *yogī*, but today they clearly do. In suggesting a hierarchical reading of practices, the *Aparokṣānubhūti* sought to bring together these two streams; however, being sensitive to the conceptual issues, it simultaneously kept them distinct. But in doing so, it played an important role in the reconciling of Advaita and Yoga, a tradition

⁵⁹⁰ *Dīpikā* on 100: ...*mukhyādhikāriṇo vairāgyādisādhanacatuṣṭayapūrvakaṃ vedāṃtavākyavicāra eva pratyagabhinnabrahmāparokṣajñānadvārā mukhyaṃ mokṣakāraṇam ity abhihitam*

⁵⁹¹ *Aparokṣānubhūti* 31–7d: *kathaṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān*

⁵⁹² *Aparokṣānubhūti* 30: *svātmānaṃ śṛṇu mūrkhā tvaṃ śrutyā yuktyā ca puruṣam | dehātītaṃ sadākāraṃ sudurdarśaṃ bhavādrśaiḥ ||*

whose success depended on gradually blurring the philosophical distinctions and making these divergences irrelevant to the living tradition.

APPENDIX A

Sanskrit Text of the *Dīpikā*⁵⁹³

śrīḥ
vedāntaḥ |
atha aparokṣā'nubhūtiḥ |
saṃskṛtaṭīkayā bhāṣānuvādena ca sahitā |

śrīharim paramānandam upadeṣṭāram īśvaram |
vyāpakam sarvalokānām kāraṇam taṃ namāmy aham || 1 ||

saṃ. ṭī. –
śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ ||
svaprakāśaś ca hetur yaḥ paramātmā cidātmakaḥ ||
aparokṣānubhūtyākhyāḥ soham asmi paraṃ sukham || 1 ||
īśagurvātmabhedādyāḥ sakalavyavahārabhūḥ ||
aupādhikāḥ svacinmātra so'parokṣānubhūtikāḥ || 2 ||
tad evam anusaṃdhāya nirvighnām sveṣṭadevatām ||
aparokṣānubhūtyākhyām ācāryoktiṃ prakāśaye || 3 ||
yady apīyam svataḥ spaṣṭā tathāpi svātmasiddhaye ||
yatnoyam sopi saṃkṣepāt kriyate'narthanāśanaḥ || 4 ||
kvāham ulkākaraḥ kvāyam sūryas tejonidhiḥ kila ||
tathāpi bhaktimān kaḥ kiṃ na kuryāt svahitāptaye || 5 ||
tatrācāryāḥ sveṣṭaparadevatā'nusaṃdhānalakṣaṇam maṃgalaṃ nirvighnagraṃthasamāptaye
svamanasi kṛtvā śiṣyaśikṣāyai graṃthādaḥ nibadhnānti śrīharim iti || aham taṃ namāmi
anvayaḥ || atreyaṃ prakriyā padārtho dvividhaḥ ātmā'nātmā ceti tatrātmā dvividhaḥ īśvaro jīvaś
ceti etāv api dvividhaḥ śuddhā'śuddhabhedāt tatrā'śuddhau māyā'vidyopādhitvena
bhedavyavahārahetū śuddhau tvabhedavyavahārahetū tathā'nātmāpi trividhaḥ
kāraṇasūkṣmasthūlabhedāt etad eva śarīratrayam iti vyavahriyate evaṃ cijjadarūpavailakṣaṇyāt
tamaḥprakāśayor iva vibhaktayor ubhayor ātmānātmanor aviveka eva baṃdhakāraṇam tayor
vivekas tu mokṣakāraṇam iti dik || tatra tāvad ahaṃśabdena dehatrayaviśiṣṭatvenāśuddho jīvaḥ
asyaivā'krṣṭatvāt taṃ namāmi taṃ māyātatkāryahantṛtvepi tadāśrayabhūtatvena sarvakāraṇam
vedāntaprasiddham īśvaram etasyaiva sarvotkrṣṭatvāt namāmi namaskaromi
svātmatvenānusaṃdadhāmīty arthaḥ tasyaiva sarvotkrṣṭatvenānusaṃdhānayogyatvam āha
śrīharim iti śrīyam dadhānam ity arthaḥ yad vāsvāśrayatayā śrīyate svīkriyate
pralayasūptyādaḥ sarvabhūtaiḥ ity śrīr jīvatvopādhibhūta'vidyā tāṃ haraty
ātmajñānapradānena nāśayatīti śrīharis taṃ yad vā sa eva sarvādhiṣṭhānatayā śrīr ity ucyate
śrīr eva haris taṃ nanu kim anenā'vidyātatkāryaharaṇenet yāsaṃkya paramapurūṣārthaprāptir
bhavatīti sūcayitum tasya paramānandarūpatām āha paramānaṃdam iti
paramo'vināśitvaniratisāyatvābhyām utkrṣṭa ānaṃdaḥ sukhaviśeṣas tadrūpam ity arthaḥ || tarhi
vaiśayikasukhavaj jaḍaḥ syād ity ata āha upadeṣṭāram iti cāryadvārātmasukhopadeśakam

⁵⁹³ Typed by Ramya for the Haṭha Yoga Project, Nov 2019. Proofread by me.

cidrūpam ity arthaḥ | nanu kevalānamdasya katham upadeṣṭrtvam ity ata āha īśvaram itīṣṭe⁵⁹⁴'sāvīśvaraḥ vicitraśaktivāt sarvasamarthas taṃ namāmīty anvayaḥ | evam api paricchinnatvāt ghaṭādivadanātmatvam syād ity ata āha vyāpakam iti svasattāprakāśābhyām nāmarūpe vyāpnoti savyāpakas taṃ paricchadakasya deśakālāder māyikatvād anantam ity arthaḥ | nanu vyāpyavyāpakabhāvenānantatvam asiddham ity ata āha sarvalokānām kāraṇam iti | abhinnanimittopādānam ity arthaḥ | “satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma ātmanātmānam abhisamviveśa” ity ādiśruteḥ || 1 ||

*aparokṣānubhūtir vai procyate mokṣasiddhaye ||
sadbhir eva prayatnena vīkṣaṇīyā muhur muhuḥ || 2 ||*

saṃ. tī. – idānīm prekṣāvāt pravṛttaye'nubandhacatuṣṭayam darśayan svacikīrṣitam pratijānīte aparokṣeti vai ity avyayena vidvad anubhavaṃ pramāṇayati tathā cāyam arthaḥ vidvad anubhavaprasiddhā yā tattvam asyādimahāvākyaśravaṇajāpratyagabhinnabrahmaviśayā aparokṣānubhūtir akṣāṇām iṃdriyāṇām paramatītam na bhavātīty aparokṣam iṃdriyādhiṣṭhānatatprakāśatvābhyām nityapratyakṣasvaprakāśātmatattvam tasyānubhūtir vṛttyārūḍhākhaṃdatā yad vā aparokṣā cāsāv anubhūtiś cety aparokṣānubhūtir vidyā'paraparyāyo brahmasākṣātkāras tatsādhanagramthopy upaniṣacchabdavad aparokṣānubhūtiśabdenopacaryate jhaṭīty avalokanamātreṇaivottamādhikāriṇām brahmātmasākṣātkārakāraṇam gramthaviśa ity arthaḥ anena nityāparokṣabrahmātmatattvam viśeṣayo darśitaḥ sa procyate prakarṣeṇa tattadāsamkānirākaraṇapūrvakam siddhāntarahasyapradarśanarūpeṇocyate kathyata ity arthaḥ asmābhiḥ pūrvācāryair ity arthādadhyāhāraḥ nanu prāyaḥ prayojanam anuddīśya na maṃdopi pravartata iti nyāyān nāraṃbhaṇīyo gramtha ity āśaṃkyā prayojanam āha mokṣasiddhaya iti mokṣonāma svāvīdyākālpitānātmadehādyaātmatvābhīmānarūpabandhanivṛttidvārā svasvarūpāvasthānam tasya siddhiḥ prāptis tadarthaṃ anena sarvānarthanivṛttidvārā paramānamdāvāptirūpaṃ prayojanam darśitam kiṃlakṣaṇā'parokṣā'nubhūtiḥ sadbhiḥ sādhubhir nityānitya⁵⁹⁵vastuvivekādisādhanacatuṣṭayasampannair mumukṣubhir ity arthaḥ eva śabdān nānyaiḥ karmopāsanādhikāribhir iti bhāvaḥ| muhur muhur nairamṭaryadīrghakālābhyāsa-prayatnena snānabhikṣādāvapy anādaram kṛtvety arthaḥ| vīkṣaṇīyā gurumukhādavagatya vicāraṇīyā anena mumukṣur adhikāri darśitaḥ etenaivārthāt pūrvakāṃdottarakāṃdayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvaḥ saṃbandhaś ca darśito bhavātīti boddhavyam || 2 ||

*svavarṇāśramadharmeṇa tapasā haritoṣaṇāt ||
sādhanā ca bhavet puṃsām vairāgyādicatuṣṭayam || 3 ||*

saṃ. tī. – nanu kāryasya kāraṇādhīnatvāt pūrvoktasādhanacatuṣṭayasya kiṃ kāraṇam ity āśaṃkyāha svavarṇeti atra svaśabdena mukhyagaṇamithyābhedena trividheṣu sākṣiputrādehādīlakṣaṇeṣv ātmasu madhye mithyātmāyogyatvād gṛhyate tasya dehāder brāhmaṇādivarṇabrahmacaryādyāśramaprayuktena dharmeṇa brahmārpaṇakṛta-karmānuṣṭhānājanyenā'pūrveṇa pūrvamīmāṃsāprasiddhena bhāviphālādhārabhūtena puṇyādisābdavācyenety arthaḥ tathā tapasā kṛchracāṃdrāyaṇādinā prāyaścittēnety arthaḥ punaḥ haritoṣaṇād bhagavatprītikarāt sarvabhūtaḍāyālakṣaṇāt karmaviśeṣāt etais tribhiḥ sādhanaiḥ vairāgyādicatuṣṭayarūpaṃ sādhanam mokṣasādhako dharmaviśeṣaḥ puṃsām

⁵⁹⁴ Emended from *iti īṣṭe*.

⁵⁹⁵ Emended from *nityānityam* based on manuscripts.

*prabhavet sambhāvanāyāṃ liṅ yad vaivam anvayaḥ svavarṇāśramadharmarūpeṇa tapasā kṛtvā
yaddharitoṣaṇaṃ tasmād iti yadyapi sādhanacatuṣṭaya vivekādikrameṇa hetuhetumadbhāvas
tathāpi vairāgyasyāsādhāranakāraṇatāṃ dyotayitum ādau grahaṇaṃ kṛtam iti bodhavyam || 3 ||*

*brahmādisthāvarānteṣu vairāgyaṃ viṣayeṣv anu ||
yathaiva kākaviṣṭhāyāṃ vairāgyaṃ taddhi nirmalam⁵⁹⁶ || 4 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – kīdrśaṃ tadvairāgyādicatuṣṭayam ity ākāṃkṣāyāṃ tatsvayam eva vyācaṣṭe brahmādīty
ārabhya vaktavyā sā mumukṣutā ity aṃtena ślokaṣaṭkātmakeṇa graṃthena tatrādau vairāgyasya
lakṣaṇaṃ āha brahmādisthāvarāṃteṣv iti brahmādisthāvarāṃteṣu satyalokādimartyalokāṃteṣu
bhogasādhaneṣu anu karmajanyatvenānityatvaṃ lakṣīkṛtyety arthaḥ vairāgyaṃ icchārāhityaṃ
tatra dṛṣṭāntam āha yathaiyeti yathaiva kākaviṣṭhāyāṃ vairāgyaṃ gardabhādiviṣṭhāyāṃ api
kadācit kasyacit jvaraśāmtyarthaṃ grahaṇecchā bhavati ataḥ kākaviṣṭhāyā grahaṇaṃ
upalakṣaṇaṃ etadvāṃtyādīnāṃ viṣayeṣvicchānudaye vairāgyasya hetugarbhitaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ āha
tad iti⁵⁹⁷ hi yasmāt tadvairāgyaṃ nirmalam rāgādimalarahitam || 4 ||*

*nityam ātmasvarūpaṃ hi dṛśyaṃ tadviparītagam ||
evaṃ yo niścayaḥ samyagviveko vastunaḥ sa vai || 5 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm vairāgyakāraṇaṃ vivekaṃ lakṣayati nityam iti vai prasiddham saḥ vastunaḥ
padārthasya viveko vivecanaviśeṣo jñeyah sa ka ity ata āha evam iti ya evaṃ prakāreṇa samyak
saṃśayādisūnyo niścayaḥ evaṃ katham ity ata āha nityam iti hīti vidvadanubhavaprasiddham
ātmasvarūpaṃ nityam avināśi abādhyam satyam ity arthaḥ “avināśī vā areyam ātmā” iti śruteḥ
dṛśyamānātmasvarūpaṃ tadviparītagam tadātmasvarūpaṃ tasmād viparītatvena gacchati
prāpnoti vyavahārabhūmim iti tathāvidham vināśi bādhyam ity arthaḥ atredam anumānam api
sūcitaṃ bhavati ātmasvarūpaṃ nityam draṣṭṛtvāt yan na nityam tan na draṣṭṛ yathā ghaṭādīti
kevalavyatirekīhetuḥ tathā'nātmasvarūpam anityaṃ dṛśyatvāt yan nānityaṃ tan nadṛśyaṃ
yathātmasvarūpaṃ ity ayam api kevalavyatirekī hetuḥ || 5 ||*

*sadaiva vāsanātyāgaḥ śamoyam iti śabditaḥ ||
nigraho bāhyavṛttīnāṃ dama ity abhidhīyate || 6 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – tad evaṃ vairāgyakāraṇaṃ vivekaṃ vyākhyāya vairāgyakāryaṃ śamādiṣaṭkaṃ
lakṣayati sadaivety āditribhiḥ ślokaīḥ sadaiva sarvasminn api kāle vāsanātyāgaḥ
pūrvasaṃskāropekṣāyaṃ śama ity śabditaḥ aṃtaḥ karaṇanigrahaḥ śamaśabdārthaḥ
bāhyavṛttīnāṃ śrotravāgādīnāṃ nigraho niṣiddhapravṛttitiraskāro dama ity śabdenābhidhīyate
kathyate || 6 ||*

*viṣayebhyaḥ parāvṛttiḥ paramoparatir hi sā ||
sahanaṃ sarvaduḥkhānāṃ titikṣā sā śubhā matā || 7 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – viṣayebhya ity hīti prasiddhebhyaḥ baṃdhakebhyaḥ śabdādibhyaḥ yā parāvṛttir nivṛttir
anīyatvādidoṣadarśanena grahaṇānicchā soparatir ucyata ity arthaḥ kīdrśī setyata āha*

⁵⁹⁶ Emended from *nirmalam* in accordance with all other manuscripts.

⁵⁹⁷ A: *etat || charditavāṃtyādīnāṃ atrahetuḥ hi...*

B: *etaccharditavāṃtyādīnāṃ | atrahetuḥ hi...*

*parameti paramutkr̥ṣṭamātmajñānaṃ yasyāḥ sakāsāj jāyate sā paramā ātmajñānasādhana-
bhūtety arthaḥ anayā sarvakarmasaṃnyāso lakṣyate kiṃca sahanam iti sarvaduḥkhānāṃ
sarvaduḥkhasāadhanānāṃ śītoṣṇādidvaṃdvānāṃ yatsahanaṃ pratīkārānicchā sā śubhā
sukharūpā titikṣā matā viduṣāṃ ity arthaḥ || 7 ||*

*nigamācāryavākyeṣu bhaktiḥ śraddheti viśrutā ||
cittaikāgryantu sallakṣye samādhānam iti smṛtam || 8 ||*

*saṃ. fī. – api ca nigameti nigamācāryavākyeṣu vedaguruvacaneṣu yadvopaniṣad-
vyākhyātrupadeṣeṣu bhaktir bhajanaṃ viśvāsa ity arthaḥ sā śraddheti viśrutā vedāmtaprasiddhā
tu punaḥ sallakṣye “sadeva somyedam agra āsīt” ity ādiśrutilakṣye pratyagabhinne brahmaṇi
cittaikāgryaṃ tadekajijñāsety arthaḥ tatsamādhānam iti smṛtam || 8 ||*

*saṃsārabandhanirmuktiḥ kathaṃ me syāt kadā vidhe ||
iti yā sudṛḍhā buddhir vaktavyā sā mumukṣutā || 9 ||*

*saṃ. fī. – evaṃ śamādiṣam abhidhāyaitatkāryabhūtāṃ mumukṣutāṃ āha saṃsārabaṃdheti iti
yā sudṛḍhā buddhiḥ sā mumukṣutā vaktavyety anvayaḥ sākety ata āha bho vidhe maddaiva yad
vā sarvakartarvidhātarbrahman me mama saṃsārabaṃdhanirmuktir nānāyonisaṃbaṃdha-
nivṛttiḥ kadā kasmin kāle kathaṃ kena prakāreṇa bhaved ity evaṃ rūpā buddhir mumukṣutety
arthaḥ || 9 ||*

*uktasādhānayuktena vicāraḥ puruṣeṇa hi ||
kartavyo⁵⁹⁸ jñānasiddhyartham ātmanaḥ śubham icchatā || 10 ||*

*saṃ. fī. – idaṃ sādhanacatuṣṭayaṃ yad artham apanyastaṃ tad idānīm darśayati ukteti uktāni
brahmādīty ārabhya vaktavyāsā mumukṣutety aṃtagraṃthasaṃdarbheṇa varṇitāni yāni
vairāgyādisāadhanāni jñānopakaranāni tair yuktena puruṣeṇādihikāriṇā dehavatā
manuṣyottamena hīti vidvatprasiddhatvena vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇaḥ yad vā hīty avyayam
evārthe'nyaniṣedhārtha ity arthaḥ | vicāro vivekaḥ kartavya āvartayitavyaḥ⁵⁹⁹ kim artham ity ata
āha jñānasiddhyartham iti ātmano jñānasiddhyartham brahmātmaikyabodhodbhavanāya nanv
ātmajñānasiddhyākāḥ puruṣārtha ity āsaṃkyā mokṣākhyāṃ caturthapurūṣārtharūpaṃ phalaṃ
dyotayata puruṣārtham viśiṇaṣṭi śubham iti śubhaṃ paramānandarūpatvena maṅgalaṃ
mokṣasukhamity arthaḥ icchatā prārthayata ātmanaḥ śubham iti vānvayaḥ || 10 ||*

*notpadyate vinā jñānaṃ vicāreṇānyasādhanaīḥ ||
yathā padārthabhānaṃ hi prakāśena vinā kvacit || 11 ||*

*saṃ. fī. – nanu jñānasiddhyartham vicāra eva kartavya iti niyamaḥ kutaḥ kriyata ity āsaṃkyā
sadrṣṭāmtam āha notpadyata iti vicāreṇa vinā anyasādhanaīḥ karmopāsanālakṣaṇaīḥ
jñānaṃ notpadyate tatra drṣṭāmtam āha yatheti yathā kvacit kasmiṃścid deṣe sūryādiprakāśena
vinā padārthabhānaṃ ghaṭādivastuprakāśo na bhavati hīti sarvajanaprasiddhaṃ ato niyamaḥ
kriyata iti bhāvāḥ || 11 ||*

⁵⁹⁸ Emended from *kartavyo*.

⁵⁹⁹ Emended from *kartavya āvarttayitavyaḥ*.

ko'ham katham idam jātam ko vai kartā'sya vidyate ||
upādānam kim astīha vicārah so'yam īdrśah || 12 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tarhi sa vicārah kīdrśa ity ata āha koham iti aham kartā sukhīty ādivyavahriyamāṇah
kaḥ kiṃsvarūpaḥ tathā idam jagat sthāvarajamgamātmakam katham kasmāj jātam kim
adhiṣṭhānam ity arthaḥ tathā'syapratyakṣādīpramāṇasiddhasya jagataḥ karttotpādakah ko
vidyate vai iti vikalpaṃ dyotayati kiṃ jīvadṛṣṭam karṭṛ kiṃ veśvaraḥ kiṃ vānyad eva kiṃcid iti
vikalpaḥ kiṃ ceha jagati upādānam ghaṭasya mṛdvat kim asti ayam ātmā jagatkāraṇaviśayaḥ
īdrśa evaṃ svarūpo vicārah sa eva jñānasādhanam ity arthaḥ || 12 ||

nāham bhūtagaṇo deho nāham cākṣagaṇas tathā ||
etad vilakṣaṇah kaścid vicārah so'yam īdrśah || 13 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu “caitanyaviśiṣṭah kāyaḥ puruṣah” iti bārhaspatyasūtrād dehākāreṇa pariṇatāni
pṛthivyādicatvāribhūtāny evātmēti cārvākā vadaṃti sa eva kartā sukhītyādi sarvavyavahāra-
mūlam iti sarvajanaprasiddhau satyām ātmaviśayo vicāro na syād ity ata āha nāham iti aham
ahaṃśabdapratyālambanah pratyagātmā bhūtagaṇo yo dehaḥ sa na bhavāmi tasya
ghaṭādivadrśyatvād ity arthaḥ tarhīmdriyagaṇas tvaṃ syā iti cārvākaikadeśimatam utthāpya
dūṣayati nāham iti ca punar akṣagaṇah śrotṛādīmdriyasamghātopy aham na bhavāmi tatheti
padena dehavadīmdriyagaṇasyāpi bhūtavikāratvaṃ darśitam “sa vā eṣa puruṣonarasamayaḥ
annamayam hi somya mana āpomayaḥ prānas tejomayī vāk” ity ādiśrutir ubhayatra pramāṇam
nanu yadi dehadvayaṃ tvaṃ nāsi tarhi sūnyam eva syād ity āśaṃkyāha etad iti etadvilakṣaṇah
etābhyām sthūla sūkṣmadehābhyām viparītadharmakosmi ‘asthūlamanaṇvahasvam’ ity ādi
śruteḥ kaścid iti jātyādirahitatvān manovācām agocaratvaṃ darśitam ayam īdrśah savicāra iti
vyākhyātārthaś caturthaḥ pādaḥ ślokatuṣṭayepi boddhavyaḥ || 13 ||

ajñānāt prabhavam sarvaṃ jñānena pravilīyate ||
saṅkalpo vividhaḥ kartā⁶⁰⁰ vicārah so'yam īdrśah || 14 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tad evaṃ koham ity etan niścītyedānīm katham idam jātam ity asya niścayaḥ kriyate
tatra pṛthivyādibhūtāni kāryatvāt svasvaparamāṇubhyo jāyante iti tārikādayo manyante
karmaṇo jāyante iti mīmāṃsakāḥ pradhānād eveti sāmkyāḥ tad etan nirākurvann āha ajñāneti
sarvaṃ jagad idam nāmarūpātmakam ajñānaprabhavam ajñānāt pūrvoktasvasvarūpāsphuraṇāt
prabhavati tathāvidham ata evaitad virodhinā jñānena svasvarūpasphuraṇena tama iva
prakāśena pravilīyate niśśeṣalīnaṃ bhavatiṭy arthaḥ | ko vai kartety asya nirṇayam āha
saṅkalpa iti⁶⁰¹ vividho nānāprakārah saṅkalpaḥ idam kariṣyāmīty ādilakṣaṇomtaḥkaraṇa
pariṇāmaḥ kāraṇānukūlavypāravān kartā⁶⁰² śeṣam pūrvoktam || 14 ||

etayor yad upādānam ekaṃ sūkṣmaṃ sad avyayam ||
yathaiṃ mrdghaṭādīnām vicārah soyam īdrśah || 15 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – athopādānam kim astīty asya nirṇayam āha etayor iti etayor ajñānasamkalpayor yad
upādānam utpattisthitināśāya kāraṇam tat tu satkālatrayābādhyam brahmaiva nānyadity arthaḥ

⁶⁰⁰ Emended from *karṭtā*.

⁶⁰¹ Emended from *saṅka itilpa*. Both A and B omit this entirely.

⁶⁰² Emended from *karṭtā*.

ata evādhiṣṭhānājñānanirvarttyā'jñānakāryatvena mithyābhūtam api jagat yāvaj jñānodayam rajjusarpādivat saṃsārabhayavyavahārakṣamaṃ bhaved iti bhāvaḥ brāhmaṇaḥ sattve hetuḥ avyayam iti avyayam apakṣayarahitam anenaitatpūrvabhūtā api janmādivikārā nirastāḥ nāśāś ca nirastāḥ ṣaḍabhāvavikārarāhitye hetuḥ ekaṃ sajātīyādibhedaśūnyaṃ tāddhi kuto na drśyate tatrāha sūkṣmam iti sūkṣmaṃ mano vā gādīndriyāgocaraṃ teṣāṃ pravṛttinimittajātikriyādiśūnyatvād ity arthaḥ brahmaṇa upādānatve dr̥ṣṭāmtam āha yathaiyeti yathaiiva mṛtghaṭādīnām upādānaṃ tathaiety arthaḥ evaṃprakāreṇa kāryakāraṇabhedo nāmamātram iti sūcitam || 15 ||

*aham ekopi sūkṣmaś ca jñātā sākṣī sad avyayaḥ ||
tad ahaṃ nātra sandeho vicāraḥ so'yam īdr̥śaḥ || 16 ||*

saṃ. fī. – nanu yadyapi kāryakāraṇabhedo vācāraṃbhaṇamātrastathāpi jīvabrahmaṇor bhedovāstavaḥ syād ity āśaṃkyāha aham iti atra yata ity adhyāhāras tathācāyam arthaḥ yatoham ahaṃpratyayavedyopy ekaḥ sajātīyādibhedaśūnyo manuṣyamātrepy ahaṃ buddher ekatvapratīter ity arthaḥ ca punaḥ sūkṣma īndriyāgocaraḥ punar jñātā'haṃkārādi-prakāśakatvena cetana ity arthaḥ tathā sākṣī sākṣād īndriyārthasannikarṣaṃ vinaivekṣate paśyati prakāśayatīti sākṣī nirvikāra ity arthaḥ ata eva sad avyayaḥ saṃścāsāv avyayaśca vināśapakṣayopalakṣitasarvavikāraśūnya ity arthaḥ yasmād evaṃbhūto'haṃ tat tasmād aham ahaṃpratyayavedyas tat satyajñānādīlakṣaṇaṃ brahma atra saṃdeho nāstīty arthaḥ soyam īdr̥śo vicāra iti || 16 ||

*ātmā viniṣkalo hy eko deho bahubhir āvṛtaḥ ||
taylor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam atah param || 17 ||*

saṃ. fī. – etad eva jīvabrahmaikyajñānapradarśanena draḍhayati ātmety ādipaṃcabhiḥ yato'pratyayavedya ātmā atīta saṃtatabhāvena jāgradādisarvāvasthāsvanuvartata ity ātmā⁶⁰³ avasthātrayabhāvābhāvasākṣitvena satyajñānādisvarūpa ity arthaḥ sa tvam padalakṣyārthopi tatpadalakṣyārtha eva viniṣkalo viśeṣaṇa nirgatakalo niravayava ity arthaḥ anyathā sāvayavatve ghaṭādivadvināśitvāpattir iti bhāvaḥ atra hetuḥ ekaḥ hīti “ekam evādvitīyam” ity ādi śrutiprasiddhiṃ dyotayati nanu tathā liṅgadehopyastīti cen netyāha deha iti deho liṅgadehaḥ sūkṣmaśarīram iti yāvat sabahubhiḥ kalābhiḥ śrotrādibuddhyaṃtābhiḥ saptadaśabhir āvṛta ācchādītas tat saṃghāta ity arthaḥ ata eva liṅgadehasya niravayavatvādyabhāvāt jñānena tatkāraṇā'jñānanivṛtttau nivṛttir anyathā'nirmokṣaprasaṃga iti bhāvaḥ evaṃ ativilakṣaṇye saty api taylor ātmadehayoḥ prakāśatamasor ivaikyam aikātmyaṃ prapaśyanti tārkkikādaya ity arthaḥ ato viparītadarśanāt paramanyadajñānaṃ kim asti etad evājñānam ity arthaḥ viparyayarūpakāryānyathānupapattyā tatkāraṇaṃ mūlā'jñānaṃ kalpyata iti bhāvaḥ || 17 ||

*ātmā niyāmakaś cāntardeho bāhyo niyamyakaḥ ||
taylor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam atah param || 18 ||*

saṃ. fī. – punar vilakṣaṇyam āha ātmeti ātmā niyāmako niyaṃtā ca punar aṃtaḥ paṃcakośāṃtaraḥ dehas tu niyamyah san bāhyaḥ taylor aikyam ity uttarārdham vyākhyātam evaṃ agrepi jñeyam || 18 ||

⁶⁰³ Emended from *atmā*.

ātmā jñānamayaḥ puṇyo deho māmsamayo'suciḥ ||
taylor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam atah param || 19 ||

saṃ. fī. – anyad api vailakṣaṇyam āha ātmeti ātmā jñānamayaḥ prakāsarūpo'ta eva puṇyaḥ
śuddhaḥ dehas tu māmsādivikāravān ata evā'suciḥ etenātmanaḥ sthūladehād api vailakṣaṇyam
uktaṃ bhavati taylor aikyam ity ādi pūrvavat || 19 ||

ātmā prakāśakaḥ svaccho dehas tāmāsa ucyate ||
taylor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam atah param || 20 ||

saṃ. fī. – vailakṣamyāmtaram āha ātmeti ātmā svayaṃprakāśaḥ san sūryādivadanyasarva-
prakāśako'ta eva svacchaḥ prakāśyaguṇadoṣasaṃbhaṃdhaśūnya ity arthaḥ “asaṃgohyayam
puruṣaḥ” iti śruteḥ dehas tu tāmāso ghaṭādivatprakāśyatvena jaḍaḥ taylor aikyaṃ ity ādi
pūrvavat || 20 ||

ātmā nityo hi sadrūpo deho'nityo hy asanmayaḥ⁶⁰⁴ ||
taylor aikyaṃ prapaśyanti kim ajñānam atah param || 21 ||

saṃ. fī. – atra sarvatra paunar uktyaṃ nāśaṃkanīyam ātmano 'laukikatvenātyaṃta-
durbodhatvād eva bahudhā vailakṣaṇyaṃ pradarśyate paramakāruṇikaiḥ śrīmadācāryaiḥ ātmeti
ātmā nityo dhvaṃsāpratiyogī tatra hetuḥ hi yasmāt sadrūpaḥ abādhyasvarūpaḥ dehas tu
dhvaṃsapratyogī atrāpi hetuḥ hi yasmād asanmayo'nityaḥ vikāritvena bādhyogya ity arthaḥ
yasmād evam ātmadehayor atyaṃtavailakṣaṇyaṃ tasmāt taylor aikyadarśanam kevalam ajñānam
iti || 21 ||

ātmanas tat prakāśatvaṃ yat padārthābhāsanam ||
nāgnyādidīptivad dīptir bhavaty āndhyaṃ yato niśi || 22 ||

saṃ. fī. – nanv ātmanaḥ prakāśatvaṃ kiṃ nāmety ata āha ātmana iti ātmanas tat prakāśatvaṃ
boddhavyaṃ kiṃ tad ity ata āha yad iti yat padārthābhāsanam ghaṭapaṭādivastuviśaya-
prakāśa idaṃ tayā nirdiśyamānaviśayadarśanam iti yāvat | tarhy agnyādi prakāśavad vikāritvaṃ
syād ity ata āha nāgnyādidīptivad dīptir iti iyam ātmadīptir agnyādidīptivan na kadācid
utpattivināśādivikāravatīty arthaḥ tatra hetum āha bhavatīti bhavaty āṃdhyam yato niśi yataḥ
kāraṇān niśi rātrāvāgnyādi prakāśa ekasmin deśe saty api tad anyatra lokasyāṃdhyam
rūpagrahākṣamatvaṃ bhavati naitādrśyātmadīptir ekatra vidyamānā caikatrā'vidyamānā
paricchinnā cāsti kiṃtu dīpādirūpasyāgnyādi prakāśasya prakāśikā tadabhāve cāṃdhakārasya
prakāśikā utpattināśarahitā ca sadā sarvatra pūrṇaivāsti yad vā iyam ātmadīptir
agnyādidīptisadrśī na kutaḥ yataḥ kāraṇān niśi rātrāvāṃdhyam āṃdhakārobhavaty
etaḥ⁶⁰⁵ vilakṣaṇā'tmadīptir jñeyā yady ātmadīptir agnyādidīptisadrśī bhavet tarhy agnyādidīptyā
yathāṃdhakārasya nāśo bhavati tathātmadīptyā'pyāṃdhakārasya nāśaḥ syāt paramtv ātmanaḥ
sattāprakāśābhyām sarvatra sarvadā vidyamānatve'py āṃdhakārasya nāśo na bhavaty ata
ātmadīptir agnyādidīptisadrśī na kiṃtu iyam agnyādidīptir bhātidam āṃdhyam bhātīty
ādyākāreṇā'gnyādidīpter āṃdhyasya cānyasya sarvasya ca prakāśikā cāvirodhinyātmadīptiḥ

⁶⁰⁴ Emended from asanmaya.

⁶⁰⁵ Emended from atad.

svaprakāśaivābhyyupetavyā sarvair ātmajñānārūdhair ity arthaḥ tasmād agnyādidīptīnām api dīpikā'nyasādhananirapekṣāyādīptiḥ sa ātmaprakāśa iti bhāvah || 22 ||

deho'ham ity ayaṃ mūḍho dhṛtvā tiṣṭhaty aho janaḥ ||
mamāyam ity api jñātvā ghaṭadrasṭeva sarvadā || 23 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tad evaṃ prakāśya prakāśakatvādilakṣaṇavāilakṣaṇye saty api ātmānātmābheda-
darśinam upasaṃharann ubhayor bhedaṃ spaṣṭayati deha iti aham ahaṃśabda-
pratyayālaṃbanaḥ pratyagātmā'yam idam tayā nirdiśyamāno ghaṭādivat pratyakṣatayā
drśyamāno dehosmīti ubhayor draṣṭṛdrśyayor aikyaṃ kṛtvā mūḍhaḥ svājñānakāryaviparyaya-
mohavyāpto janas tiṣṭhati kṛtakṛtya buddhyā nirvyāpāro bhavatīty arthaḥ etad aho mahad
ajñānam iti bhāvah kiṃ kṛtvāpīty ata āha mameti mama matsaṃbamdhī ayaṃ deha iti
sāmānyato bhedaṃ jñātvāpi ata evāścaryam iti tātparyam ka iva sarvadā ghaṭadrasṭeva yathā
sarvakāle ghaṭadrasṭā puruṣo mamāyam ghaṭa iti jānāti na tv ahaṃ ghaṭa iti kadācid⁶⁰⁶ api
jānātīty arthaḥ || 23 ||

brahmaivāhaṃ samaḥ śāntaḥ saccidānandalakṣaṇaḥ ||
nāhaṃ deho hy asadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 24 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanv etasmīṃs tadbuddhir iti lakṣaṇabhramāparaparyāyamohakāryāliṅgānumeyam
ajñānam īdrk tarhi tannivartakaṃ kim ity ākāṃkṣāyāṃ tadvirodhivād ātmajñānam
evātmā'jñānanivartakaṃ ity abhipretya tallakṣaṇam āha brahmetyādipaṃcabhiḥ | aham
ahaṃśabdapratyayālaṃbanaḥ pratyagātmā brahmaivāsmi etayos tattvaṃ padārthayor aikye
hetugarbhītāni viśeṣaṇānyāha sama iti samaḥ sattāprakāśābhyaṃ sarvābhinnaḥ punaḥ
kiṃlakṣaṇaḥ sāntaḥ nirastasamastopādhitvād vikṣepādivikāraśūnyaḥ punaḥ kiṃ lakṣaṇaḥ
saccidānaṃdalakṣaṇaḥ | saccidānaṃdair anṛtajaḍaduḥkhapratyogibhir lakṣyate
viruddhāṃśatyāgarūpayā bhāgalakṣaṇayā jñāyata iti saccidānaṃdalakṣaṇaḥ | brahmabodhe hi
dvividhaṃ dvāraṃ vidhir niśedhaś ceti tatra satyajñānādisākṣād vācakaśabdaprayogalakṣaṇo
vidhir uktaḥ | idānīm atannirasanalakṣaṇo niśedhaḥ pradarśyate nāham iti aham
ahaṃśabdapratyayālaṃbana ātmā deho nety⁶⁰⁷ anvayaḥ deha ity upalakṣaṇam
prāṇendriyādīnām api hīti vidvajjanaprasiddhaṃ dehāder anātmatve hetum āha asad iti |
asadrūpo sadbādhyam anṛtaṃ tādrūpaṃ svarūpaṃ yasya sa tathāvidha ity evaṃ prakāram
“ahaṃ brahmāsmi” ity ādimahāvākyaṇyā'khaṃḍākārabuddhirūpaṃ jñānam budhair
ātmattattvajñair ucyate kathyata ity arthaḥ | etadvilakṣaṇaḥ sarvojñānābhāsa iti bhāvah || 24 ||

nirvikāro nirākāro niravadyo'ham avyayaḥ ||
nāhaṃ deho hy asadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 25 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanv ahaṃ jāto mṛtaḥ sukhīduḥkḥītyādyane kavikāratvenāhaṃśabda-
pratyayālaṃbanasya pratīyamānatvāt kathaṃ tasya brahmatvam ity ata āha nirvikāra iti aham
ahaṃśabdapratyayālaṃbanaḥ pratyagātmā nirvikārosmīti śeṣaḥ nirgato vikārajanmādayo
yasmāt sa tathāvidhaḥ teṣāṃ dehadharmatvād iti bhāvah | tatra hetuḥ nirākāraḥ
dehādīkārahitaḥ ata eva niravadyo vātapittādijanyādhyātmikādītāpatrayarahita ity arthaḥ |
ata evā'vyayaḥ apakṣayādirahita it yarthah ahaṃ manuṣya ity ādipratīteḥ | kathaṃ

⁶⁰⁶ Emended from *kadacid*.

⁶⁰⁷ Emended from *nety*.

nirvikāratvam iti cet sā pratītiḥ śuktir ajatādivadbādhyatvād bhrāmtir ity āha nāham iti | nāham ity uttarārddham vyākhyātam pūrvaśloke evam uttaratrāpi jñeyam punar uktis tu jñānapratibandhakasya buddhimāmdyaviparyayāder dārḍhyān nāśamkanīyā || 25 ||

*nirāmayo nirābhāso nirvikalpo'hamātataḥ ||
nāham deho hy asadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 26 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – punaḥ kiṃ lakṣaṇam jñānam ity ata āha nirāmaya iti | aham nirāmayaḥ sarvarogarahitaḥ nirābhāso vṛttivyāpyatvepi phalavyāpyatvaśūnyaḥ nirvikalpaḥ kalpanāhīnaḥ ātataś ca vyāpakah || 26 ||

*nirguṇo niškriyo nityo nityamukto'ham acyutaḥ ||
nāham deho hy asadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 27 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – punaḥ kiṃ lakṣaṇam jñānam ity ata āha nirguṇa iti | aham nirguṇo guṇarahitaḥ guṇānām māyāmayatvādity arthaḥ ata eva niškriyaḥ kriyārahitaḥ tathā nityo vināśarahitaḥ ata eva nityamuktaḥ kālatrayepi bandhaśūnyaḥ tatra hetuḥ acyutaḥ apracyutasaccidānamda-svabhāvaḥ || 27 ||

*nirmalo niścalo'nantaḥ śuddho'ham ajaro'maraḥ ||
nāham deho hyasadrūpo jñānam ity ucyate budhaiḥ || 28 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – punar api jñānalakṣaṇam āha nirmala iti | aham nirmalaḥ avidyātakāryalakṣaṇa-malarahitaḥ ata eva niścalaḥ vyāpakatvād ākāśavanniścala ity arthaḥ niścalatve hetuḥ anantaḥ deśakālavastuparicchedaśūnyaḥ śuddhaḥ aśuddhirahitaḥ punar ajaraḥ jarārahitaḥ amaro maraṇarahitaś ca sarvadharmānām dehatrayavartitvād iti bhāvaḥ || 28 ||

*svadehe śobhanaṃ saṃtaṃ puruṣākhyam ca samatam ||
kiṃ mūrkhā śūnyam ātmānam deho'tam karoṣi bhoḥ || 29 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – nanv ātmā pratyakṣadeharūpo na bhavati tarhi śūnyatvam ātmanaḥ syād ity āśaṃkyāha svadehe iti | bho he mūrkhā śūnyavādin svadehe puruṣākhyam puri manuṣyaśarīre uṣati ahamākāreṇa vasatīti puruṣa ity ākhyā nāma yasya taṃ ata eva śobhanaṃ maṃgalaṃ śarīravilakṣaṇatvād atimaṃgalaṃ tathā saṃmatam “ayam ātmā brahma” ity ādivākyanirṇītam cakārāt “uttamaḥ puruṣastvanyaḥ” ity ādismṛtinirṇītam ghaṭadraṣṭṛvaddehadraṣṭṛtvena dehātītam ātmānam satataṃ bhāvaṃ saṃtaṃ sarvavyavahārādhiṣṭhānam śūnyam khapuṣpādivat atyaṃtā'bhāvarūpaṃ kiṃ karoṣi kathaṃ manyase mām anyathā iti bhāvaḥ | kvacit svadeham iti dvitīyāntaḥ pāṭhas tasmin pakṣe dehātmavādyeva vadati uktalakṣaṇam manuṣyadeham tyaktvā samānam anyat || 29 ||

*svātmānam śṛṇu mūrkhā tvam śrutyā yuktyā ca puruṣam ||
dehātītam sadākāram sudurdarśam bhavādrśaiḥ || 30 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu śūnyavādina evābhāvāpatteḥ śūnyam māstu paraṃtv ātmano dehātītatve pramāṇābhāvād deha evātmā syād ity āśaṃkyāha svātmānam iti | bho mūrkhā dehātmavādin cārīvāka tvam svātmānam svakīyam ātmānam puruṣam dehātītam dehātiriktaṃ śrutyā “tasmād

vā etasmād annarasamayādanyomtara ātmā” ity ādikayā punar yuktyā ca ekasmin karṭṛkarmavirodha ity ādirūpayā śrṇu avadhāraya dehātītatve kim ākāra ātmety ata āha sadākāram iti | sadākāram astīty etanmātravyavahāraṅabhūta ākāro yasya taṃ evaṃvidhosti cetkuto na dṛśyata ity ata āha sudurdarśam iti bhavādṛśaiḥ śrutyācārya-śraddhāsūnyaiḥ sudurdarśam sarvathā darśanāyogyam tasyādṛṣṭarūpatvād evety arthaḥ yad vā pūrvaśloktadvitīyāpekṣayā dehātmavādinah samādhānārthoyam ślokaḥ svātmānam iti || 30 ||

ahaṃśabdena vikhyāta eka eva sthitaḥ paraḥ ||
sthūlas tv anekatām prāptaḥ katham syād dehakaḥ pumān || 31 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tad evāha aham ity ādisaptabhiḥ | paraḥ dehād anya ātmā'haṃśabdena śabda ity upalakṣaṇam pratyayasyāpi vikhyātaḥ prasiddhaḥ kiṃlakṣaṇa ity ata āha eka iti eka eva sthita eveti pratyekam avadhāraṇam tuśabdaḥ pūrvoktād ātmanah sthūladehasya vailakṣaṇyadyotakaḥ | sthūlo dehakaḥ deha eva dehakaḥ svārthe kaḥ pratyayaḥ katham pumān puruṣaḥ ātmā syān na kathamcid ity arthaḥ dehasyānātmatve hetum āha anekatām iti anekatām parasparam bhinnatām prāptaḥ evaṃ tamaḥprakāśavadati vilakṣaṇatvepi dehasyātmatvam bruvann atimūḍhatvād upekṣya iti bhāvaḥ || 31 ||

ahaṃ draṣṭṛtayā siddho deho dṛśyatayā sthitaḥ ||
mamāyam iti nirdeśāt katham syād dehakaḥ pumān || 32 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tad evātivailakṣaṇyam darśayati aham iti | aham ahaṃśabdapratyayālabhana ātmā draṣṭṛtayā śabdādiviṣayaprakāśakatayā siddhaḥ śabdaḥ śrṇomīty ādivyavahāreṇa prasiddhaḥ dehas tu dṛśyatayā śabdādivatprakāśyatayā sthitaḥ tatra hetum āha mameti mamāyam deha iti ghaṭādivat svīyasambandhitayā nirdeśāt vyavahārāt evam ubhayor vailakṣaṇye sati katham dehakaḥ pumān syād iti vyākhyātārthaś caturthapādaḥ evam agrepi boddhavyam || 32 ||

ahaṃ vikārahīnas tu deho nityam vikāravān ||
iti pratīyate sāksāt katham syād dehakaḥ pumān || 33 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – punar vailakṣaṇyāmtaram āha aham iti aham vyākhyātārthaḥ vikārahīnaḥ jāyatestīty ādiṣṭvikārahīnaḥ tu vailakṣaṇye deho nityam sarvakālam vikāravān atra kiṃ pramāṇam ata āha itīti iti sāksāt pratyakṣapramāṇena pratīyate anubhūyate evaṃ sati katham syād dehakaḥ pumān iti || 33 ||

yasmāt param iti śrutyā tayā puruṣalakṣaṇam ||
vinirṇītam vimūḍhena katham syād dehakaḥ pumān || 34 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – evaṃ yuktyā dehātmanor vailakṣaṇyam uktvā śrutyāpy āha yasmāt iti | “yasmāt param nāparam asti kiṃcid yasmān āṅīyo na jyāyosti kaścit | vṛkṣa iva stabdho divi tiṣṭhaty ekas tenedaṃ pūrṇam puruṣeṇa sarvam” iti tayā prasiddhayā taittirīyaśrutyā kṛtveti karaṇe tṛtīyā puruṣasyātmāno lakṣaṇam vimūḍhena vigatamūḍhabhāvenāticatureṇa śrutyārtha-vivecanakuśalenety arthaḥ iyaṃ kartari tṛtīyā vinirṇītam vicārya sthāpitam anyat pūrvavat yad vā śrutyeti karṭṛpadam asmin pakṣe vimūḍhenedi dehātmavādinam prati saṃbodhanam vimūḍhānām ina svāmin mūrkhāsiromaṇitvād eva śrutim nādriyasa iti bhāvaḥ || 34 ||

sarvaṃ puruṣa eveti sūkte puruṣasaṃjñite ||
apy ucyate yataḥ śrutyā kathāṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 35 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – na kevalam anayaikayā śrutyā vinirñītaṃ kiṃtv anyayāpīty āha sarvaṃ iti | yato hetoḥ
śrutyā vedākhyaparadevatayā ‘puruṣa evedaṃ sarvaṃ’ iti puruṣasaṃjñite sūktepy ucyate
puruṣalakṣaṇam iti pūrvaslokaḍ adhyāhāraḥ ataḥ kathāṃ syād iti pūrvavat || 35 ||

asaṃgaḥ puruṣaḥ prokto bṛhadāranyake'pi ca ||
anaṃtamalasaṃśliṣṭaḥ kathāṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 36 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – aparayāpi śrutyaiṃvaṃ eva nirñītaṃ ity āha asaṃga iti | “asaṃgo hy ayaṃ puruṣaḥ” iti
śrutyā bṛhadāranyake vājasaneyopaniṣadi puruṣaḥ asaṃgaḥ proktaḥ dehakastv anaṃtamala-
saṃśliṣṭaḥ kathāṃ pumān syād iti || 36 ||

tatraiva ca samākhyātaḥ svayaṃjyotir hi pūruṣaḥ ||
jadaḥ paraprakāśyosau kathāṃ syād dehakaḥ pumān || 37 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tatraivānyaparakāreṇāpi dehātmanor vilakṣaṇyaṃ nirūpitaṃ ity āha tatraiveti |
tatraiva bṛhadāranyaka evety arthaḥ atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃjyotir bhavatīti śrutyā
svayaṃjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ samākhyātaḥ hīti vidvatprasiddhiṃ dyotayati asau ghaṭādivad dṛśyo'ta
eva paraprakāśyas tata eva jado dehakaḥ kathāṃ pumān syād iti vyākhyātam || 37 ||

prokto'pi karmakāṃḍena hy ātmā dehādvilakṣaṇaḥ ||
nityaś ca tatphalaṃ bhūṃkte dehapātād anaṃtaram || 38 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – athāstām idaṃ jñānakāṃḍaṃ karmakāṃḍepi dehātmanor bheda eva nirñīta ity āha
prokta iti | hi yasmāt karmakāṃḍenāpi “yāvajjīvaṃ agnihotraṃ juhuyāt” ity ādirūpeṇa
karmapratipādakena vedabhāgenety arthaḥ ātmā dehādvilakṣaṇaḥ proktaḥ kathāṃ ity ata āha
nitya iti nityatvaṃ ca kuta ity ata āha tad iti dehapātād anaṃtaram tatphalaṃ anityaṃ
karmaphalaṃ yata ātmā bhūṃkte'to nitya ity arthaḥ cakārāt nyāyasāṃkhyādāv apy evaṃ eva
dehātmanor bhedo varṇita iti darśitam || 38 ||

liṅgaṃ cānekaśaṃyuktaṃ calaṃ dṛśyaṃ vikāri ca ||
avyāpakam asadrūpaṃ tat kathāṃ syāt pumān ayam || 39 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanv evaṃ sati vedāṃtinām apasiddhāntaḥ syād ity ata āha liṅgam iti | liṅgaṃ
liṅgaśarīraṃ tatparokṣādidharmaviśiṣṭaṃ ayaṃ nityāparokṣasvabhāvaḥ pumān kathāṃ syān na
kathāṃcid ity arthaḥ cakārāt kāraṇaśarīraṃ api nirākṛtaṃ anayor api bhede liṅgadehasya
vailakṣanyasūcakāni viśeṣaṇāny āha aneketi anekasaṃyuktaṃ devamanuṣyādinānāsthūlaśarīra-
saṃbhaṃdhayuktaṃ yad vā śrotrādibuddhyaṃtasaptadaśakalāśaṃyuktaṃ tathā calaṃ caṃcalaṃ
manaḥ pradhānatvād ity arthaḥ punar dṛśyaṃ mamedam śrotraṃ mamedam mana ity
ādimamatāspadatvenātmana upasarjanabhūtaṃ ca punar vikāri upacayādimat avyāpakam
paricchinnam asadrūpaṃ ātmajñānakabodhyaṃ ca atredam ākūtaṃ yadyapi liṅgaśarīrādhyāse
nātmanaḥ karṭṛtvabhokṭṛtvādibhāvas tathāpy ātmanaḥ svatas tadabhāvajñānenā'dhyāsanivṛttāv
akarṭṛtvābhokṭṛtvādibhāvasiddhir iti vedāṃtināṃ na kiṃcid apasiddhānto'nyavad iti maṃgalam
|| 39 ||

evam dehadvayād anya ātmā puruṣa īśvaraḥ ||
sarvātmā sarvarūpaś ca sarvātītoham avyayaḥ || 40 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm pūrvoktam arthas upasaṃharati evam iti | evaṃ pūrvoktaprakāreṇa
dehadvayāt sthūlasūkṣmalakṣaṇād anyo | bhinna ātmā ko'sāvityata āha puruṣa iti puruṣaḥ
śarīrādhiṣṭhātā tarhi kiṃ jīvaḥ nety āha īśvara iti tatra hetuḥ sarvātmeti tarhy advaitahāniḥ syād
ity ata āha sarvarūpa iti evaṃ sati vikāritvaṃ syād ity ata āha sarvātīta iti etādṛśa ātmā ced asti
tarhi kuto nopalabhyata ity ata āha aham iti ahaṃpratyakṣo'haṃśabdapratyayālaṃbanatvena
sarvadopalabdhisvarūpa ity arthaḥ tarhy ahaṃkāraḥ syān nety āha avyaya iti avyayaḥ
apakṣayādivikārasūnyaḥ ahaṃkārasākṣīti bhāvaḥ || 40 ||

ity ātmadehabhāgena prapaṃcasyaiva satyatā ||
yathoktā tarkaśāstreṇa tataḥ kiṃ puruṣārthatā || 41 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – athedānīm ātmano dehadvayātirikatvapratipādanam anarthakam iti śaṃkate itīti | iti
pūrvoktaprakāreṇa varṇitenātmadehavibhāgena prapaṃcasyaiva satyatā tathoktā yathā
tarkaśāstreṇa tataḥ prapaṃcasatyatvapratipādanāt kiṃ puruṣārthatā kutsitapurūṣārthatvaṃ
bhayanivṛttyabhāvād ity arthaḥ “dvitīyād vai bhayaṃ bhavati” iti śruteḥ || 41 ||

ity ātmadehabhedena dehātmatvaṃ nivāritam ||
idānīm dehabhedasya hy asattvaṃ sphuṭam ucyate || 42 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – bhedajñānasyābhedajñānaṃ prati kāraṇatvād ātmadehavibhāgakathanam
nānarthakam ity āha itīti | iti pūrvoktenātmadehabhedenātmano dehāt pṛthakkaraṇena
dehasyaiva prāptaṃ cārvākamatenātmatvaṃ tannivāritam idānīm uttaragramthena tasya
dehabhedasyāsattvaṃ ātmasattātiriktasattārāhityaṃ sphuṭam spaṣṭam yathā syāt tathā hīti
prasiddham ucyate || 42 ||

caitanyaśaikaṃrūpatvād bhedo yukto na karhicit ||
jīvatvaṃ ca mṛṣā jñeyaṃ rajjau sarpagraho yathā || 43 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tad evāha caitanyasyeti | caitanyasya sarvabhūtabhautikaprapaṃcādhiṣṭhāna-
prakāśasya ghaṭaḥ prakāśate paṭaḥ prakāśate ity ādiṣvekarūpatvād ekākāratvāddhetoḥ karhicit
kasyāṃcid avasthāyām api bhedo na yukto na yathārtha ity arthaḥ tarhi jīvabhedaḥ satyaḥ syād
ity ata āha jīvatvam iti jīvatvaṃ cakāropy arthaḥ mṛṣā mithyā jñeyaṃ tad upādher
evāṃtaḥkaraṇāder māyāmayatvād ity arthaḥ | adhiṣṭhānasatyatvena kalpitasya mithyātvabodhe
dṛṣṭāṃtam āha rajjāv iti yathā rajjau tadajñānāt vakratādisādrśyena maṃdāṃdhakāre
sarpagrahaḥ sarpabuddhir avyutpannasya bhavati na tu vyutpannasya tathaivātmany
ātmājñānāt prakāśasādrśyād aviśeṣaprakāśe cijjadagramthirūpacidābhāsabhramo bhavaty
avivekinām na tu vivekinām iti vedāntasiddhāntarahasyam || 43 ||

rajjavajñānāt kṣaṇenaiva yadvad rajjur hi sarpiṇī ||
bhāti tadvac citiḥ sāksād viśvākāreṇa kevalā || 44 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm pūrvoktam eva dṛṣṭāṃtam vivṛṇvan sarvasyāpi prapaṃcasya brahmarūpatām
āha rajjv iti | kevaleti viśeṣaṇena pūrvāvasthām aparityajyāvasthāntaraprāptilakṣaṇa-

*vivartopādānatvam evoktaṃ nāraṃbhopādānatvaṃ nāpi pariṇāmopādānatvam iti bodhyaṃ
anyat spaṣṭam || 44 ||*

*upādānaṃ prapaṃcasya brahmaṇo'nyan na vidyate ||
tasmāt sarvaprapaṃcoyaṃ brahmaivāsti na cetarat || 45 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – atra hetuṃ darśayan pūrvoktaṃ upasaṃharati upādānaṃ iti | yasmāt
prapaṃcasyākāśādidehāmtasya jagadvistārasya brahmaṇo māyāsabalāc caitanyād
anyatparamāṇavo yad vā prakṛtir upādānaṃ kāraṇaviśeṣo na vidyata iti “tasmād vā etasmād
ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ” ity ādiśruteḥ tasmāddhetor iti spaṣṭam anyat || 45 ||*

*vyāpyavyāpakatā mithyā sarvam ātmeti śāsanāt ||
iti jñāte pare tattve bhedasyāvasaraḥ kutaḥ || 46 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – nanu vyāpyavyāpakatārūpe bhede jāgrati sati kathaṃ prapaṃcasya brahmatety
āśaṃkyāha vyāpyeti | vyāpyamāntaraṃ vyāpakaṃ bāhyaṃ tayor bhāvo mithyā ghaṭākāśādivat
kalpitatvād asann ity arthaḥ tatra pramāṇam āha sarvam iti “idaṃ brahmedaṃ kṣatram iti
prakṛtyedaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā” ity ādiśrutirūpeśvarājñābalād ity arthaḥ tataḥ kim ata āha
itīti iti jñāte ity ādisugamam || 46 ||*

*śrutyā nivāritaṃ nūnaṃ nānātvaṃ svamukhena hi ||
kathaṃ bhāso bhaved anyaḥ sthite cādvayakāraṇe || 47 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – nanu pratyakṣeṇabhāsamāno vyāpyavyāpakabhāvaḥ kathaṃ mithyety āśaṃkyāha
śrutyeti nūnam iti niścaye hīti prasiddhau śrutyā “neha nānāsti kiṃcana” ity ādirūpayety arthaḥ
| nānātvaṃ nivāritaṃ tena ca nānātvānivāraṇenādvayakāraṇe'bhinnanimittopādāne brahmaṇi
sthite sati bhāso vyāpyavyāpakatādipratibhāsāḥ kāryabhūto'nyaḥ svakāraṇātiriktaḥ kathaṃ
bhaven na kathaṃcid ity arthaḥ || 47 ||*

*doṣopi vihītaḥ śrutyā mṛtyor mṛtyuṃ sa gacchati ||
iha paśyati nānātvaṃ māyayā vaṃcito naraḥ || 48 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – kiṃca bhedadṛṣṭer doṣaśravaṇād api kāraṇād abhinnaṃ eva kāryam ity āha doṣa iti |
“mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyuṃ āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati” ity ādirūpayā śrutyety arthaḥ tatra mṛtyor
anaṃtaraṃ mṛtyuṃ jananaṃ paraṃparāṃ ity arthaḥ spaṣṭam anyat || 48 ||*

*brahmaṇaḥ sarvabhūtāni jāyaṃte paramātmanaḥ ||
tasmād etāni brahmaiva bhavaṃtīty avadhārayet || 49 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – tarhi kiṃ kuryād ity ata āha brahmaṇa iti | bṛhattvād aparicchinnatvād brahma
tadrūpāt paramātmanaḥ sarvāni bhūtāni jāyaṃte utpadyaṃte jāyaṃta iti sthitipralayayor apy
upalakṣaṇaṃ “yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyaṃte” ity ādiśruteḥ yasmād evaṃ tasmāddhetor etāni
bhūtāni brahmaiva bhavaṃti san mātrabrahmarūpāṇīty avadhārayen niścīnuyād iti || 49 ||*

*brahmaiva sarva nāmāni rūpāṇi vividhāni ca ||
karmāṇy api samagrāṇi vibhartīti śrutir jagau || 50 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu nānānāmarūpakarmabhedenā vicitrāṇi bhūtāni katham
brahmātmakānītyāśaṃkyāha brahmaiveti “trayaṃ vā idaṃ nāma rūpaṃ karma” iti
brhadāranyakaśrutir jagau gāyanaṃ kṛtavatī svādhikāriṇaḥ śrāvayāmāsety arthaḥ | kim ity ata
āha brahmaiva sarvanāmānyākāśādidehāmtān saṃjñāviśeṣān ca punar vividhāni rūpāṇy
avakāśādidvipadāmtān nānāvīkāraviśeṣān apīśabdaś cārthe rūpagrahaṇaṃ
gaṃdhādīgrahaṇasyāpy upalakṣaṇaṃ samagrāṇi karmāṇy ākāśapradānādīni snānaśaucādīn
kriyāviśeṣān api vibhartti rajjvādikam iva sarpādipratibhāsaṃ dadhāty
adhiṣṭhānadarśanaśūnyān pratidarśayatīty arthaḥ || 50 ||

suvarṇāj jāyamānasya suvarṇatvaṃ ca śāśvatam ||
brahmaṇo jāyamānasya brahmatvaṃ ca tathā bhavet || 51 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – atra lokaprasiddhaṃ drṣṭāntam āha suvarṇeti sugamam || 51 ||

svalpam apy aṃtaram kṛtvā jīvātmaparamātmanoh ||
yaḥ saṃtiṣṭhati mūḍhātmā bhayaṃ tasyābhibhāṣitam || 52 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – evaṃ karṭrakarmādikārakaghaṭasyaikādhiṣṭhānarūpatve siddhepi bhedadarśino
bhayaṃ āha svalpeti | svalpam apy aṃtaram upāsyopāsakarūpaṃ bhedaṃ kṛtvā kalpayitvā yas
tiṣṭhati tasya bhayaṃ bhāṣitam “yadā hy evaiṣa etasminn udaram aṃtaram kurute atha tasya
bhayaṃ bhavati” ity ādiśruty ety arthaḥ || 52 ||

yatrājñānād bhaved dvaitam itaras tatra paśyati ||
ātmatvena yadā sarvaṃ netaras tatra cānv api || 53 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu prakāśatamasor iva parasparaviruddhasvabhāvayor dvaitādvaitayoḥ kuta
ekādhikaraṇatvaṃ ity āśaṃkyāvasthābhedād ity āha yatrete yatra yasyām ajñānāvasthāyām
ajñānena dvaitam iva bhavet tatra tasyām ajñānāvasthāyām “itaro'nyo'nyat paśyati yatra hi
dvaitam iva bhavati tad itara itaram paśyati tad itara itaram jighrati tad itara itaram śrṇoti
tad itara itaram abhivadati tad itara itaram manute tad itara itaram vijānātīti yatra vā'nyad iva
syāt tatrānyonyat paśyed anyonyaj jighredanyo'nyad rasayet” ity ādiśruteḥ caśabdāḥ pūrvoktād
vailakṣaṇyaṃ sūcayati yadā yasmin jñānakāle sarvaṃ ātmatvena bhavet tatra tasmin jñānakāle
itaro'nyavapi kiṃcid apy anyan na paśyati yatra vā “asya sarvaṃ ātmaivābhūt tat kena kaṃ paśyati
tat kena kaṃ jighret” ity ādiśruteḥ sakāryājñānanivṛtyā na dvaitam iti bhāvāḥ || 53 ||

yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni hy ātmatvena vijānataḥ ||
na vai tasya bhaven mohō na ca śoko'dvītīyataḥ || 54 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu dvaitādarśane kaḥ puruṣārtha ity āśaṃkyā tatpratipādikām “yasmin sarvāṇi
bhūtāny ātmaivābhūd vijānataḥ tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvaṃ anupaśyataḥ” iti śrutim
arthaḥ paṭhati yasminn iti | yasminn iva sthāviśeṣe sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmatvenātmabhāvena
vijānataḥ aparokṣeṇa sāksātkurvato'dhikāriṇaḥ puruṣasya tasyeti ṣaṣṭhī saptamyarthe tasminn
avasthāviśeṣe vai niścayena mohō bhramo na bhavec ca punaḥ śoko vyākulatāpi na bhavet
ubhayatra hetuḥ advītīyataḥ tatkāraṇābhāvād ity arthaḥ || 54 ||

ayam ātmā hi brahmaiva sarvātmakatayā sthitaḥ ||

iti nirddhāritam śrutya bṛhadāranyasamsthayā || 55 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – śokakāraṇadvaitābhāve pramāṇam āha ayam iti “sa vā ayam ātmā brahma vijñānamayah” ity ādirūpayety arthaḥ | śeṣam spaṣṭam || 55 ||

anubhūto'py ayam loko vyavahāraḥ samo'pi san ||
asadrūpo yathāsvapna uttarakṣaṇabādhataḥ || 56 ||

svapnojāgarāṇelīkaḥ svapnepi jāgaro nahi ||
dvayam eva laye nāsti layopi hy abhayor na ca || 57 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanv ayam loka eva tatkāraṇe sati katham śokādyabhāva ucyata ity āśaṃkya
sadrṣṭāṃtam āha anubhūta iti spaṣṭam || 56 || drṣṭāṃtam vivṛṇvann uktanyāyam anyatrāpy
atidiśati svapna iti alīko mithyā dvayam svapnajāgarāṇe laye susuptau śeṣam spaṣṭam || 57 ||

trayam evaṃ bhaven mithyā guṇatrayavinirmitam ||
asya draṣṭā guṇātīto nityo hy ekaścid ātmakaḥ || 58 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – uktam upasaṃharan phalitam āha trayam iti trayam jāgradādyavasthātrayam eva
muktaparasparyabhicāreṇa mithyā mithyātve hetuḥ guṇeti guṇatrayavinirmitam
māyākalpitam ity arthaḥ tarhi kiṃ satyam ata āha asyeti asya avasthā trayasya śeṣam spaṣṭam
|| 58 ||

yadvan mṛdi ghaṭabhrāṃtiṃ śuktau vā rajatasthitim ||
tadvad brahmaṇijīvatvaṃ vīkṣyamāṇe na paśyati || 59 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanv avasthātrayam mithyā bhavatu jīvastu satyaḥ syād ity āśaṃkya sadrṣṭāṃtam
uttaram āha yadvad iti brahmaṇi vīkṣyamāṇe ātmatvena sāksātkṛte sati jīvatvaṃ na paśyatīty
anvayaḥ anyat spaṣṭam eva || 59 ||

yathā mṛdi ghaṭo nāma kanake kuṇḍalābhidhā ||
śuktau hi rajatakhyātir jīvaśabdastathā pare || 60 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – ajñānāvasthāyāṃ pratīyamāno yo jāvabrahmabhedaḥ sa nāmamātra iti
bahudrṣṭāṃtair āha yatheti rajatasya khyātir ākhyā nāmeti yāvat pare parabrahmaṇi jīvaśabdastathā
śeṣam spaṣṭam || 60 ||

yathaiva vyomni nīlatvaṃ yathā nīraṃ marusthale ||
puruṣatvaṃ yathā sthāṇau tadvad viśvaṃ cidātmani || 61 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – na kevalam jīva eva nāmamātraḥ kiṃtu sarvaṃ viśvaṃ api brahmaṇi nāmamātram ity
anekadrṣṭāṃtair āha yathaiyeti spaṣṭam || 61 ||

yathaiva śūnye vaitālo gaṃdharvāṇāṃ puraṃ yathā ||
yathākāśe dvicamdratvaṃ tadvat satye jagat sthitiḥ || 62 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nāmamātraprapamcasya mithyātvavāsanādārḍhyāyemamevārthaṃ bahubhir
lokaprasiddhadṛṣṭāṃtaiḥ prapamcayati yathaiḥ sūnya ity āditribhiḥ sūnye nirjane deśe vaiṭālaḥ
akasmād ābhāsamāno bhūtavīśeṣaḥ gaṃdharvapurasī sūnyādhiṣṭhānatvaṃ jñeyam
gaṃdharvanagaraṃ nāma rājanagarākāro nīlapītādimegharacanāvīśeṣaḥ ākāśe spaṣṭam anyat
|| 62 ||

yathātaraṃgakallolair jalam eva sphuraty alam ||
pātrarūpeṇa tāmraṃ hi brahmāṃḍaughais tathātmata || 63 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – yathā taraṃgeti sugamam || 63 ||

ghaṭanāmnā yathā pṛthvī paṭanāmnā hi taṃtavaḥ ||
jagan nāmnā cid ābhāti jñeyam tat tad abhāvataḥ || 64 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – kiṃca ghaṭeti tatra pādātayaṃ spaṣṭam nanu kim anena mithyātvavāsanādārḍhyenety
ata āha jñeyam iti tad abhāvato nāmābhāvatas tadbrahma jñeyam “vācāraṃbhaṇaṃ vikāro
nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam” ity ādiśruteḥ || 64 ||

sarvopi vyavahāras tu brahmaṇā kriyate janaiḥ ||
ajñānān na vijānaṃti mṛd eva hi ghaṭādikam || 65 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu “yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati” ity ādiśrutiyarthadarśanenāvasthātraye
videhamokṣāv uktau na tu jīvanmokṣa ity āśaṃkyāha sarva iti sarvopi laukiko vaidikaś ceti
śeṣaṃ spaṣṭam, ayaṃ bhāvaḥ ajñānanivṛttir evaṃ jīvanmuktir na tu dvaitādarśanam iti || 65 ||

kāryakāraṇatā nityam āste ghaṭamṛdor yathā ||
tathaiva śrutiyuktibhyāṃ prapamcabrahmaṇor iha || 66 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tatra hetuṃ sadṛṣṭāṃtam āha kāryeti “yathā saumyaikena mṛtṭpimḍena sarvaṃ
mṛṇmayam vijñātam syāt” ity ādiśrutiḥ yuktis tu kāryakāraṇayor anyatve ekakāraṇajñānāt
sarvakāryajñānaṃ na syād ity ādi | sugamam anyat || 66 ||

gṛhyamāṇe ghaṭe yadvan mṛttikā yāti vai balāt ||
vīkṣyamāṇe prapamcepi brahmaivā bhāti bhāsuram || 67 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – kāryakāraṇayor ananyatvam eva dṛṣṭāṃtena spaṣṭayati gṛhyamāṇa iti bhāsuram
pramāṇanirapekṣatayaiva bhāsanāśīlam spaṣṭam anyat || 67 ||

sadaivātmā viśuddhosti hy aśuddho bhāti vai sadā ||
yathaiva dvividhā rajjur jñānino'jñānino'niśam || 68 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu brahmaṇi bhāsamāne prapamco na bhāsetetyā śaṃkyāvasthābhedenobhayam
api bhāsata iti sadṛṣṭāṃtam āha sadaiveti tatra jñāninaḥ sadaivātmā viśuddhaḥ
ajñānatatkāryaprapamcamalarahitatvān niṣprapamcosti ajñāninas tu sadaivāśuddho'stīti
bhramād vibhāti vai hīti tat prasiddhau ubhayatrāpi dṛṣṭāṃtaḥ yatheti yathā rajjur jñāninaḥ
sarpābhāvataiyā nirviśatvenābhayaṃkarī ajñāninas tu sarparūpatayā viparītatvena bhayaṃkarīti

*dvividhā bhāti ayaṃ bhāvaḥ brahma yadyapi svayaṃprakāśatvena sadā bhāty eva tathāpi
vṛttyārūḍhatvena puruṣārthopayogīti jñāninaḥ pratibhāti nājnāninaḥ sūryadīpādir iva
cakṣuṣmadamaḍhayor iti dik || 68 ||*

*yathaiva mṛnmayāḥ kuṃbhas tadvad dehopi cinmayāḥ ||
ātmānātmavibhāgo yaṃ mudhaiva kriyate'budhaiḥ || 69 ||*

*saṃ. tī. – nanv ātmā yadi sadaiva niṣprapaṃcatvena bhāti tarhi kim arthaṃ dehātmabhedo
varṇita ity āśaṃkyāvivekino dehavyatiriktātmabodhārthaṃ vivekinas tu vyartha eveti
sadrṣṭāmtam āha yatheti tatrā'budhairitya'kāraprasāṣe mudhaiva kriyate api tu neti
kākuvyākhyānam anyat sarvaṃ sugamam || 69 ||*

*sarpatvena yathā rajjū rajatatvena śuktikā ||
vinirṇītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmātā || 70 ||*

saṃ. tī. – idānīm avivekinaḥ kalpitadehatādātmyaṃ sadrṣṭāmtam āha sarpatveneti || 70 ||

*ghaṭatvena yathā pṛthvī paṭatvenaiva taṃtavaḥ ||
vinirṇītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmātā || 71 ||*

saṃ. tī. – ghaṭatveneti || 71 ||

*kanakaṃ kuṃḍalatvena taramḡatvena vai jalam ||
vinirṇītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmātā || 72 ||*

saṃ. tī. – kanakam iti || 72 ||

*puruṣatve yathā sthāṇur jalatvena marīcikā ||
vinirṇītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmātā || 73 ||*

saṃ. tī. – puruṣatva iti || 73 ||

*gr̥hatvenaiva kāṣṭhāni khaḍgatvenaiva lohatā ||
vinirṇītā vimūḍhena dehatvena tathātmātā || 74 ||*

*saṃ. tī. – gr̥hatveneti sarpatvenety ādi paṃcānām apy eteṣāṃ ślokānām arthaḥ sphuṭatara
evāsty ato na vyākhyānaṃ kṛtam || 74 ||*

*yathā vṛkṣaviparyāso jalād bhavati kasyacit ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 75 ||*

*saṃ. tī. – nanv anyathā nirṇaye kiṃkāraṇam iti cet tad ajñānam eveti sadrṣṭāmtam āha yathā
vṛkṣetyādi dvādaśabhiḥ || 75 ||*

*potena gacchataḥ puṃsaḥ sarvaṃ bhātīva caṃcalam ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 76 ||*

saṃ.ṭī. – poteneti potena naukayā spaṣṭam anyat || 76 ||

*pītatvaṃ hi yathā śubhre doṣād bhavati kasyacit ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 77 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – pītatvam iti || 77 ||

*caḥṣurbhyāṃ bhramaśīlābhyāṃ sarvaṃ bhāti bhramātmakam ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 78 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – caḥṣurbhyāṃ iti || 78 ||

*alātaṃ bhramaṇenaiva vartulaṃ bhāti sūryavat ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 79 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – alātam iti || 79 ||

*mahattve sarvavastūnām anutvaṃ hy atidūrataḥ ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 80 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – mahattva iti hīti sarvalokaprasiddhau || 80 ||

*sūkṣmatve sarvabhāvānām sthūlatvaṃ copanetrataḥ ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 81 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – sūkṣmatve iti || 81 ||

*kācabhūmau jalatvaṃ vā jalabhūmau hi kācatā ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 82 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – kācabhūmāv iti || 82 ||

*yadvad agnau maṇitvaṃ hi maṇau vā vahnitā pumān ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 83 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – yadvad iti || 83 ||

*abhreṣu satsu dhāvatsu somo dhāvati bhāti vai ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 84 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – abhreṣv eti || 84 ||

*yathaiva digviparyāso mohād bhavati kasyacit ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 85 ||*

saṃ. 1̄. – yatheti yathāvṛkṣety ādislokānām sphuṭārthatvāt piṣṭapeṣanātulyatvena na vyākhyānaṃ kṛtam || 85 ||

yathāśaśī jale bhāti caṃcalatvena kasyacit ||
tadvad ātmani dehatvaṃ paśyaty ajñānayogataḥ || 86 ||

saṃ. 1̄. – yathāśaśīti śaśīty upalakṣaṇaṃ sūryādīnām api śeṣaṃ spaṣṭam || 86 ||

evam ātmany avidyāto dehādhyāso hi jāyate ||
evam ātmaparijñānāl līyate ca parātmani || 87 ||

saṃ. 1̄. – evaṃ dvādaśabhiḥ ślokair uktam artham upasaṃharati evam iti evam uktena prakāreṇātmany avidyātaḥ ātmajñānāt dehādhyāso manuṣyoham ity ādibuddhir jāyate bhavati hīti prasiddhau nanv etasya nivṛtṭiḥ kuto bhaved iti ced ātmajñānād evety āhottarārdhena sa iti sa eva dehādhyāsa aivātmaparijñānāt brahmātmaikyāsākṣātkārāt parātmani ajñānatatkāryarahite pratyagabhinne brahmaṇi līyate brahmasvarūpeṇāvatiṣṭhate na hy adhiṣṭhānaṃ vinā'ropitasya svarūpam asti cakārādhyāsakāraṇaṃ ajñānaṃ api līyate iti anyathā'dhyāsalayābhāvād ity arthaḥ na hi kāraṇe sati kāryasya layaḥ sambhavati tasmād ātmajñānād eva sakāraṇakāryādhyāsanivṛttir ity alaṃ pallavitena || 87 ||

sarvam ātmatayā jñātaṃ jagat sthāvarajaṃgamam ||
abhāvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ dehasya cātmatā kutaḥ || 88 ||

saṃ. 1̄. – etad eva vivṛṇoti sarvam iti ātmatā dehasya nety arthaḥ spaṣṭam anyat || 88 ||

ātmānaṃ satataṃ jānan kālaṃ naya mahādyute ||
prārabdham akhilaṃ bhūṃjan nodvegaṃ kartum arhasi || 89 ||

saṃ. 1̄. – nanu jñānino niṣprapaṃcātmatayā mama kiṃ syāt brahmanyabhojanenānyas tṛṣyatīti ced ata āha ātmānaṃ iti bho mahādyute kāmādiaparābhavena svahitasādhanonmukhas tvaṃ ātmānaṃ pratyagabhinnaṃ satataṃ āsuptimṛtiparyamtaṃ jānan vedāmtavākyair vicārayan kālaṃ nayātikrāmasvavicārasādhyajñānānaṃtaraṃ cākhilaṃ prārabdham caramadehāraṃbhakaṃ karma bhūṃjan sukhaduḥkhābhāsānubhavena kṣapayan samudvegaṃ kartum nārhasīty arthaḥ || 89 ||

utpannepy ātmavijñāne prārabdham naiva muṃcati ||
iti yacchrūyate śāstre tan nirākriyate'dhunā || 90 ||

saṃ. 1̄. – vastutas tu prārabdham eva nāsti kuto bhogaḥ bhogābhāve kuta udvegakāraṇaṃ tad abhāve ca kutastaraṃ tanniṣedhoṣadeśa iti vedāmtasiddhāmtarahasyaṃ vaktum pratijānata ācāryāḥ utpannaḥ iti atreyaṃ prakriyā jagatpratītiḥ tridhā laukikī sāstrīyānubhāvikī ceti tatrādya pāramārthikī dviṭīyā'paramārthikī tṛṭīyā tu pratībhāsikī tāsāṃ nivṛttis tu kramāt vedāmtaśravaṇāditrayasākṣātkāraprārabdhakṣayair bhavati nānyatheti tatreyam pratijñā'nyapratītyabhiprāyeṇeti jñātavyaṃ ślokārthas tu sphuṭa eva || 90 ||

tattvajñānodayād ūrdhvaṃ prārabdham naiva vidyate ||

dehādīnām asattvāt tu yathāsvapno vibodhataḥ || 91 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tad evāha tattveti jñānena sarvavyavahārakāraṇājñānanivṛttau prārabdhabhāva iti ślokārthaḥ | padārthas tu sphuṭa eva || 91 ||

*karmajanmāṃtarīyaṃ yatprārabdham iti kīrtitam ||
tat tu janmāṃtarābhāvāt puṃso naivāsti karhicit || 92 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm prārabdhasabdaṃ vyutpādayann uktam upasaṃharati karmeti tatra karma trividhaṃ saṃcitakriyamāṇaprārabdhabhedāt tanmadhye bhāvidehāraṃbhake saṃcitam tathāvartamāna dehanirvarttyaṃ kriyamāṇaṃ prārabdham tu vartamānadehāraṃbhakaṃ tatra yadyapi saṃcitam janmāṃtarīyaṃ eva tathāpi bhāvi dehasya tat prārabdham eva bhavati tenedaṃ siddham ātmanaḥ svataḥ karṣṭvābhāvāt kālatrayepi janmanāstīti sarvam avadātam || 92 ||

*svapnadeho yathādhyastas tathaivāyaṃ hi dehakaḥ ||
adhyas tasya kuto janma janmābhāve hi tat kutaḥ || 93 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – pūrvoktaṃ dr̥ṣṭāmtaṃ vivṛṇvan sakāraṇajanmābhāve yuktim āha svapneti janmābhāve tat prārabdham kutaḥ spaṣṭam anyat || 93 ||

*upādānaṃ prapaṃcasya mṛd bhāṃḍasyeva kathyate ||
ajñānaṃ caiva vedāṃtais tasmīn naṣṭe kva viśvatā || 94 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu dehādiprapaṃcasya yato vetyādiśruteḥ satyabrahmajanyatvāt kathaṃ prātibhāsikatvam iti ced ucyate upādānaṃ iti atra kāraṇaṃ dvividhaṃ nimittopādānabhedāt tatra nimittaṃ nāmotpattimātrakāraṇaṃ upādānaṃ tūtpattisthitilayakāraṇaṃ tatra vedāṃtaiḥ ‘māyāntu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt’ ity ādibhiḥ prapaṃcasyopādānaṃ ajñānaṃ paṭhyate cakārād brahmāpi atrāyaṃ bhāvaḥ na kevalaṃ brahmaiva jagatkāraṇaṃ nirvikāratvāt nāpi kevalam ajñānaṃ jaḍatvāt tasmād ubhayaṃ milītvāiva jagatkāraṇaṃ bhavatīti “satyānrte mithunīkaroti” ity ādiśruteḥ tatra dr̥ṣṭāmtabhāṃḍasya katarakāder mṛd iva mṛtpiṃḍa iva tatra jalasthāne brahma piṃḍīkaraṇasāmarthyasāmyād ajñānaṃ tu mṛttikāsthāne āvarakatvasāmyāt tatra brahmaṇo'vināśitvād brahmajñānena tasmīn ajñāna eva naṣṭe sati viśvatā jīvajagadīśvarātmakajagadbhāvaḥ kva na kvāpy astīty arthaḥ || 94 ||

*yathā rajjūṃ parityajya sarpaṃ gṛhṇāti vai bhramāt ||
tadvat satyam avijñāya jagat paśyati mūḍhadhīḥ || 95 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – mithunībhāvasyaiva jagatkāraṇatvaṃ sadr̥ṣṭāmtaṃ prapaṃcayati yathā rajjūṃ iti || 95 ||

*rajjurūpe parijñāte sarpakhaṇḍaṃ na tiṣṭhati ||
adhīṣṭhāne tathā jñāte prapaṃcaḥ sūnyatām gataḥ || 96 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm yad uktam tasmīn naṣṭe kva viśvateti tat prapaṃcayan pūrvoktaṃ prārabdhabhāvaṃ sadr̥ṣṭāmtam upasaṃharati sārddhena rajjurūpa iti spaṣṭam || 96 ||

*dehasyāpi prapaṃcatvāt prārabdhāvasthitih kutaḥ ||
ajñānijanabodhārtham prārabdham vakti vai śrutih || 97 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – kiṃ ca dehasyeti nanu jīvanmuktasya jñāninaḥ prārabdhābhāve sati “atra brahma samaśnute” ity ādiśrutih prārabdham kim artham vaktīti ced ucyate arddhena ajñānīti śrutih ajñānijanabodhārtham prārabdham vaktīty arthaḥ jñānena sarvavyavahārahāraṇe jñāne naṣṭe sati jñāninaḥ katham vyavahāra ity ajñānibhir ākṣipte prārabdhād iti tadbodhārtham iti śeṣam spaṣṭam || 97 ||

*kṣīyaṃte cāsya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare ||
bahutvaṃ tanniṣedhārtham śrutyā gītam ca yat sphuṭam || 98 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – kiṃ tarhi jñānibodhārtham vakti śrutir iti ced ucyate kṣīyaṃta iti “bhidyate hṛdayagramthiś chidyamte sarvasaṃśayāḥ || kṣīyaṃte cāsya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare” iti śrutyā karmāṇīti bahutvaṃ yat sphuṭam gītam tat tanniṣedhārtham prārabdhābhāva-pratipādanārtham anyathā saṃcitakriyamāṇāpekṣayā karmaṇīti dvitvaṃ geyam tathā na gītamato brahmātmasākṣātkārāt cijjadagramthibhedena saṃcitakriyamāṇaprārabdhākhyatrividhakarma kṣīyaṃte⁶⁰⁸ paramapurusaṃrtham jñānibodhārtham śrutir vaktīti bhāvah || 98 ||

*ucyate jñair balāc caitat tadānarthadvayāgamah ||
vedāmtamatahānam ca yato jñānam iti śrutih || 99 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – uktavaiparītye bādhakam āha ucyata iti etat prārabdham ajñaiḥ śrutitātparyānabhijñair balād avivekasāmarthyāc ced ucyate yathārthatayā pratipādyate cakārād advayātmānam na paśyaṃti tadā narthadvayāgamō doṣadvayaprāptih tatra prārabdharūpasya dvaitasyāṃgikāre anirmokṣaprasaṃga eko doṣaḥ mokṣābhāve jñānasampradāyocchedarūpo dviṭīyo doṣa iti na kevalam doṣadvayasyaiva prāptir api tu vedāmtamatahānam ca vedāmtamatasya dvaitasya hānam tyāgo bhaviṣyati prārabdhagrahaṇarūpasya dvaitasya yāthārthyād ity arthaḥ tarhi kiṃ pratipattavyam ity ata āha yata iti yato yasyāḥ sakāśāt jñānam bhavati tādṛṣī sā śrutir grāhyeti śeṣaḥ sā śrutis tu “tam eva dhīro vijñāya prajñāṃ kurvīta brāhmaṇaḥ || nānudhyāyād bahūñ chabdān vācoviglāpanam hi tat” iti etad abhiprāyaḥ ka iti collikhyate dhīro vivekī brāhmaṇo brahmabhavitum icchus tam eva vedāmtaprasiddham ātmānam vijñāyā” dāvupadeśataḥ śāstrataś ca jñātvā namtaram prajñāṃ śāstrācāryopadiṣṭaviṣayām aparokṣānubhavaparyamtām jijñāsāparisamāptikarīṃ kurvīta bahūn karmopāsanāpratipādakān śabdān vākyasaṃdarbhānnānudhyāyān na cimtayet tarhi tān brūyāt kiṃ nety āha vāca iti tad dvaitaśāstrapaṭhanam vāco viglāpanam viśeṣeṇa śramakaram hīti sarvānubhavasiddham ity alamṭpallavitena || 99 ||

*tripaṃcāṃgāny atho vakṣye pūrvoktasya hi labdhaye ||
taiś ca sarvaiḥ sadākāryam nididhyāsanam eva tu || 100 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – tad evam etāvataḥ gramhasaṃdarbheṇa mukhyādhikāriṇo vairāgyādisādhanacatuṣṭayapūrvakam vedāmtavākyavicāra eva pratyagabhinnabrahmāparokṣajñānadvārā mukhyaṃ mokṣakāraṇam ity abhihitam idānīm asakṛdvicāryāpi buddhimāṃdyaviṣayāsaktyādi-pratibaṃdhenāparokṣajñānam yasya na jāyate tasya maṃdādhikāriṇo nirguṇabrahmopāsanam

⁶⁰⁸ Emended from *kṣayāṃte*.

eva mukhyaṃ sādhanam ity abhipretya sasādhanam dhyānayogaṃ pratijānata ācāryāḥ
tripaṃceti atho śabdodhikāribhedārthaḥ kvacid ata iti pāṭhas tasmin pakṣe yato maṃdādhikārī
vicāraṃ na labhate'to hetor ity arthaḥ tripaṃca trigunitāni paṃca paṃcadaśety arthaḥ tat
saṃkhyākāny aṃgāni nididhyasanāṃgisādhakasādhanaviśeṣān yajñasādhakaprayājādivad ity
arthaḥ vakṣye vakṣyāmi tair vakṣyamāṇaiḥ sarvair aṃgair nididhyāsanam eva kāryaṃ na tu
tūṣṇīm avasthānam ucitam ity arthaḥ nididhyāsanakartavyapratijñāprajoyanam āha
pūrvoktasyeti pūrvoktasya svarūpāvasthānalakṣaṇamokṣasya siddhaya iti hīti vedāṃta-
prasiddhau tuśabdaḥ pātaṃjalavailakṣaṇyalakṣaṇena mokṣasya siddhaya iti anenāṣṭāṃga-
pratipādakam pātaṃjalam avaidikatvād vaiśeṣikādivadanādeyam iti dhvanitam || 100 ||

nityābhyāsād rte prāptir na bhavet saccidātmanah ||
tasmād brahmanididhyāsej jijnāsuḥ śreyase ciram || 101 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – maṃdādhikāryanyat sarvaṃ karma saguṇopāsanavicārārūpaṃ sādhanam ca vihāya
śraddhayācāryoktaprakāreṇa nirguṇam brahmaiva nididhyāsed ity āha nityeti spaṣṭam || 101 ||

yamo hi niyamas tyāgo maunaṃ deśās ca kālatā ||
āsanam mūlabaṃdhaś ca dehasāmyam ca drksthitiḥ || 102 ||

prāṇasaṃyamanaṃ caiva pratyāhāraś ca dhāraṇā ||
ātmadhyānam samādhiś ca proktāny aṃgāni vai kramāt || 103 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu kāni tāny aṃgāni yaiḥ saha nididhyāsanam kartavyam ity apekṣyāṃ tāni
nirddiśati yama iti dvābhyāṃ uttānārthāv ubhāv api ślokaḥ || 102 || 103 ||

sarvaṃ brahmeti vijñānād indriyagrāmasaṃyamah ||
yamoyam iti saṃprokto'bhyasanīyo muhur muhuḥ || 104 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm eteṣāṃ pratyekaṃ nirdeśakrameṇa svābhimatāni lakṣaṇāny āha sarvam ity
ādyekaviṃśatyā tatra prathamoddiṣṭam yamaṃ tāvad darśayati sarvam iti sarvam
ākāśādidehāntam jagad brahma bādhasāmānādhikaraṇyadvārā sthāṇupuruṣādivad ity arthaḥ
iti vijñānān niścayāddhetor indriyāṇāṃ śrotārdīnām ekādaśakaraṇānām grāmaḥ samūhastasya
saṃyamah samyak śabdādiviśayāṇāṃ vināśitvasātiśayatvaduhkhadatvādidoṣadarśanāt yamo
viśayebhyo nivāraṇam ayaṃ yama iti saṃproktaḥ na tu kevalam ahiṃsādir ity arthaḥ tatas ca
kim ata āha abhyasanīya iti ayaṃ muhur muhur abhyasanīya iti || 104 ||

sajātīyapravāhaś ca vijātīyatiraskṛtiḥ ||
niyamo hi parānaṃdo niyamāt kriyate budhaiḥ || 105 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – evaṃ yamaṃ lakṣayitvā niyamaṃ lakṣayati sajātīyeti sajātīyaṃ pratyagabhinnam
paraṃ brahma tad ekākāro vṛttipravāhaḥ sajātīyapravāhaḥ yad vā sajātīyānām asaṃgoham
avikriyoham ity ādipratyagabhinnabrahmapratyayānām pravāhaḥ ca punaḥ vijātīyatiraskṛtir
vijātīyaṃ brahmātmavilakṣaṇam jagatpūrvasaṃskārāj jāyamānā tadākārāvṛttir ity arthaḥ |
tasya tiraskṛtir doṣasmṛtyā'dhikopekṣā'nādara ity arthaḥ ayaṃ niyama ity arthaḥ | na tu kevalam
śaucādir ity arthaḥ | hīty upaniṣat prasiddhau | nanv anayor upaniṣatprasiddhyā kaḥ puruṣārtha
iti ced ata āha parānaṃda iti tatas ca kim ata āha niyamād ity ādisugamam || 105 ||

tyāgaḥ prapaṃcarūpasya cidātmatvāvalokanāt ||
tyāgo hi mahatām pūjyaḥ sadyo mokṣamayo yataḥ || 106 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm trītyaṃ tyāgaṃ lakṣayati tyāga iti prapaṃcarūpasya prapaṃco
nāmarūpalakṣaṇo rūpyate ghaṭoyam paṭoyam ity adi nāmarūpato nirūpyate vyavahriyate
prakāśyate yena tatprapaṃcarūpaṃ sarvādhiṣṭhānabhūtaṃ padārthasphuraṇaṃ tasya
cidātmatvāvalokanāc cidajādaṃ svata eva prakāśamānaṃ brahma tadātmasvarūpaṃ yasya
tadbhāvas tasyāvalokanam anusamdhānaṃ tasmāddhetor yas tyāgaḥ nāmarūpoppekṣā sa eva
tyāgas tyāgaśabdavācyaḥ “īśāvāsyam idaṃ sarvaṃ” ity ādiśruteḥ hīti vidvadanubhava-
prasiddhau nanv ayam tyāgo na kutrāpi prasiddha ity āśaṃkyāha mahatām pūjya iti tatra hetuḥ
sadya iti yatoyam tyāgaḥ sadyonusamdhānakāla eva mokṣamayaḥ paramānaṃda-
svarūpāvasthānarūpaḥ ata evātmatattvavidāṃ iṣṭatvād atiprasiddhoyam tyāga ity arthaḥ |
tasmād ayam eva mumukṣuṇā kartavyo nānyaḥ kevalasvakarmādyakaraṇarūpa iti bhāvaḥ evam
agrepy ūhyam || 106 ||

yasmād vāco nivartaṃte aprāpya manasā saha ||
yan maunaṃ yogibhir gamyam tad bhavet sarvadā budhaḥ || 107 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – atha maunaṃ lakṣayati yasmād iti śabdapravṛttinimittajātikriyāder abhāvāt
manovācāṃ agocaraṃ yan maunaṃ vaktam āsakyam yad brahma tathāpi yogibhir gamyam
jñānayogibhiḥ pratyagabhinnatvena prāpyam tat prasiddham eva brahmarūpaṃ maunaṃ
sarvadā budho vivekī bhavet tad aham asmīty anusamdadhyād ity arthaḥ || 107 ||

vāco yasmān nivarttaṃte tad vaktuṃ kena śakyate ||
prapaṃco yadi vaktavyaḥ sopi śabdavivarjitaḥ || 108 ||

iti vā tad bhaven maunaṃ satām sahajasaṃjñitam ||
girāmaunaṃ tu bālānāṃ prayuktaṃ brahmavādibhiḥ || 109 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanv idaṃ pratyagabhinnabrahmānusamdhānaṃ dhyānarūpaṃ caturddaśam aṅgaṃ
pratīyate ity āśaṃkyā svārasyāt prakārāṃtareṇa maunaṃ eva lakṣayati sārddhena vāca iti ayam
bhāvaḥ śabdapravṛttinimittābhāvād brahma yathā vāgaviśayaṃ tathā nāmarūpajātyādi-
prapaṃcopi sadasadādivikalpāsahatvādvāgatītaḥ || 108 || itīti ity uktaparakāreṇa brahmajagator
vivādadyāgarūpaṃ vā tan maunaṃ bhavet keṣām ity ākāṃkṣyāṃ satām cedam prasiddham ity
āha satām iti satpuruṣāṇāṃ sahajasthitināmnā prasiddham ity arthaḥ | nanu vānniyamanam eva
prasiddham maunaṃ iti ced ata āhārddhena gireti || 109 ||

ādāvaṃte ca madhye ca jano yasmin na vidyate ||
yenedaṃ satataṃ vyāptaṃ sadeśo vijanaḥ smṛtaḥ || 110 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm deśaṃ lakṣayati ādāv iti atra janasya traikālikābhāva ānubhavikaḥ
svapratītyājñeyaḥ na tu laukikaśāstrīyapratītibhyām virodhād iti bhāvaḥ spaṣṭam anyat || 110 ||

kalanāt sarvabhūtānāṃ brahmādīnāṃ nimeṣataḥ ||
kālasābdena nirddiṣṭo hy akhaṃḍānaṃda advayaḥ || 111 ||

*saṃ. fī. – atha kālaṃ lakṣayati kalanād iti nimeṣata ārabhya kalanāt sargasthiti-
pralayādhāratvād ity arthaḥ śeṣaṃ spaṣṭam || 111 ||*

*sukhenaiva bhaved yasminn ajasraṃ brahmaciṃtanam ||
āsanam tad vijānīyān netarat sukhanāsanam || 112 ||*

*saṃ. fī. – āsanam lakṣayati sukhe naiveti yasmīn sukhe sukharūpe brahmaṇi ciṃtanam
karttavyākarttavyaciṃtā naiva bhavet tad brahmāsanam vijānīyād ity anvayaḥ kīdr̥ṣaṃ brahma
ajasraṃ kālatrayāvasthāyīty arthaḥ sugamam anyat || 112 ||*

*siddham yat sarvabhūtādi viśvādhiṣṭhānam avyayam ||
yasmīn siddhāḥ samāviṣṭās tad vai siddhāsanam viduḥ || 113 ||*

*saṃ. fī. – prasamgād āsanaviśeṣaṃ lakṣayati siddham iti siddham ca tad āsanam cāthavā
siddhānām āsanam siddhāsanam iti karmadhārayatatpuruṣasamāsābhyāṃ brahmaivety arthaḥ
|| 113 ||*

*yan mūlaṃ sarvabhūtānāṃ yanmūlaṃ cittabaṃdhanam ||
mūlabaṃdhaḥ sadāsevyo yogyosau rājayoginām || 114 ||*

*saṃ. fī. – atha mūlabaṃdham lakṣayati yan mūlam iti ākāśādisarvabhūtānāṃ yanmūlam
ādikāraṇam brahma tathā cittabaṃdhanam cittasya baṃdhakāraṇam mūlā'jñānam tad api
yanmūlaṃ yadāśrayaṃ pṛthaksattāsūnyatvād iti yad vā cittasya baṃdhanam ekaṭra lakṣye
nigrahas tad api yanmūlaṃ yasya brahmaṇaḥ prāptinimittam ity arthaḥ sa mūlabaṃdha ity
anvayaḥ rājayogināṃ vyavahārepy avikṣiptacittatālakṣaṇo rājayogas tadvatām
jñānaparipākayuktānām ity arthaḥ śeṣaṃ spaṣṭam || 114 ||*

*aṃgānāṃ samatām vidyāt same brahmaṇi līyate ||
no cen naiva samānatvam r̥jutvaṃ śuṣkavr̥kṣavat || 115 ||*

*saṃ. fī. – idānīm dehasāmyaṃ lakṣayati aṃgānām iti aṃgānām brahmaṇyadhyastānām
svabhāvaviṣamaṇām adhiṣṭhānasamatadr̥ṣṭyā samatām vidyāj jānīyāt cet same brahmaṇi
aṃgavaiṣamyam ity atrādhyāhārah tac cen nolīyate samabrahmarūpatayā na tiṣṭhatīty arthaḥ
tarhīty atra śeṣaḥ śuṣkavr̥kṣavad aṃgānām r̥jutvaṃ saralatvam acamcalatvaṃ ca yat tat
samānatvaṃ naiva bhaved iti sambaṃdhaḥ aṃgānām viśamasvabhāvavād iti bhāvah || 115 ||*

*dr̥ṣṭiṃ jñānamayīm kṛtvā paśyed brahmanamayaṃ jagat ||
sā dr̥ṣṭiḥ paramodārā na nāsāgrāv alokinī || 116 ||*

*saṃ. fī. – idānīm dr̥ksthitiṃ lakṣayati dr̥ṣṭim iti brahmaṇiphalavyāpyatvābhāvepi vṛttivyāpyatvāt
dr̥ṣṭim aṃtaḥkaraṇavṛttim jñānamayīm akhaṃdabrahmākārām kṛtvā jagat sarvaṃ
brahmanamayaṃ paśyēt brahmevedaṃ sarvaṃ ity etāvan mātraiva vṛttiḥ kāryeti bhāvah | spaṣṭam
anyat || 116 ||*

*dr̥ṣṭidarśanadr̥ṣyānām virāmo yatra vā bhavet ||
dr̥ṣṭis tatraiva karttavyā na nāsāgrāv alokinī || 117 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu tathāpi brahmaṇi vṛttipravṛttinimittajātyādyabhāvād imdriyādipratyakṣa-
viṣayasya jagato brahmarūpatvena darśanaṃ kathaṃ syād ity āśaṃkya svārasyāt
pakṣāṃtareṇāha drṣṭīti vā śabdaḥ pakṣāṃtare drṣṭītyādinā śrotrādisarvatripuṭīnām
upalakṣaṇaṃ yatra yasmin brahmasvarūpe drṣṭyādisarvatripuṭīnām virāmo layo bhavet tatra
tasminn eva prapaṃcātīte drṣṭir aṃtaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ kartavyā na nāsikāgrāv alokinīty arthaḥ
|| 117 ||

cittādisarvabhāveṣu brahmatve sarvabhāvanāt ||
nirodhaḥ sarvavṛttīnām prāṇāyāmaḥ sa ucyate || 118 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – atha prāṇāyāmaḥ lakṣayati cittādīti manodhīnatvāt prāṇasya manonirodhenaiva
prāṇanirodhaḥ na tu prāṇanirodhenaiva pātaṃjalābhimatena mano nirodhas
tadadhīnatvābhāvād iti phalitārthaḥ || 118 ||

niṣedhanaṃ prapaṃcasya recakākyāḥ samīraṇaḥ ||
brahmaivāsmīti yā vṛttiḥ pūrako vāyur īritaḥ || 119 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – amuṃ prāṇāyāmaḥ svābhimatena recakādivibhāgatrayeṇa lakṣayati
sārdhdhenaniṣedhanam iti spaṣṭam || 119 ||

tatas tadvṛttinaiścalyaṃ kumbhakaḥ prāṇasamyamaḥ ||
ayaṃ cāpi prabuddhānām ajñānām ghrāṇapīḍanam || 120 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tata iti anātmopekṣā'tmānusaṃdhānataddārḍhyāni recakādiśabdavācyānīti
bhāvārthaḥ | nanv ayaṃ trividhopi prāṇāyāmo na kutrāpi śruta ity apekṣāyām atrādhikāriṇam
āhārdhdhena ayam iti ayam uktalakṣaṇaḥ prāṇāyāmaś cakārād bhedatrayayukta ity arthaḥ |
prabuddhānām prakarṣeṇāsaṃbhāvānādirahitavena buddhānām ātmabodhayuktānām
niḥsaṃdehā'parokṣajñānīnām ity arthaḥ | yogya ity adhyāhāraḥ tarhy ajñānām kīdrśa ity ata
āha ajñānām iti || 120 ||

viṣayeṣv ātmatām drṣṭvā manasaś citi majjanam ||
pratyāhāraḥ sa vijñeyo'bhyasanīyo mumukṣubhiḥ || 121 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm pratyāhāraṃ lakṣayati viṣayeṣviti | viṣayeṣu ghaṭādiṣu yad vā śabdādiṣu
anvayavyatirekābhyām ātmatām sattāsphurattāpriyatāmātratām drṣṭvānusaṃdhāya
manasoṃtaḥkaraṇasya citi majjanam nāmarūpakriyānusaṃdhānarāhityena
citsvarūpatayāvasthānaṃ sa pratyāhāraḥ tataḥ kim ata āha abhyasanīya iti || 121 ||

yatra yatra mano yāti brahmaṇas tatra darśanāt ||
manaso dhāraṇaṃ caiva dhāraṇā sā parāmatā || 122 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – dhāraṇām lakṣayati yatreti yatra yatra yasmin yasmin padārthe mano yāti gacchati
tatra tatra brahmaṇaḥ sattādimātrasya nāmādyupekṣayā darśanād anusaṃdhānān manaso
dhāraṇaṃ brahmaṇy eva sthīrīkaraṇaṃ dhāraṇety arthaḥ | nanv ādhārādiṣaṭcakramadhye
ekatra manaso dhāraṇaṃ dhāraṇeti prasiddham ata āha seti sā'troktalakṣaṇā dhāraṇā

parotkr̥ṣṭā matā tattvabodhavatām ity arthaḥ | anyā tu pātanjālābhimatā prāṇāyāmādivad
apareti bhāvaḥ ca evety avyayadvayaṃ vedāntavidvad anubhavaprasiddhiṃ dyotayati || 122 ||

brahmaivāsmīti sadvṛtṭyā nirālaṃbatayā sthitiḥ ||
dhyānaśabdena vikhyātā paramānaṃdadāyini || 123 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – athātmadhyānaṃ lakṣayati brahmaiveti sadvṛtṭyā satī pramāṇāṃtarabādhāyogyā
vṛttis tayā vṛtṭyā nirālaṃbatayā dehādyanusaṃdhānarāhityena sthitiḥ avasthānam ity arthaḥ
śeṣaṃ spaṣṭam || 123 ||

nirvikāratayā vṛtṭyā brahmākāratayā punaḥ ||
vṛttivismaraṇaṃ samyak samādhir jñānasamjñakaḥ || 124 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – athānyat samādhirūpaṃ paṃcadaśam aṃgam lakṣayati nirvikāratayeti nirvikāratayā
viśayānusaṃdhānarāhitatayāṃtaḥkaraṇavṛtṭyā punar anaṃtaram eva brahmākāratayā yat
samyak prapaṃcasamskārarahitaṃ dhyātr̥dhyeyākāravṛtṭiśūnyaṃ vṛttivismaraṇaṃ
dvaitānanaṃdhānaṃ sa samādhīḥ paṃcadaśam aṃgam ity arthaḥ | nanu vṛtti-
vismaraṇasyājñānarūpatvāt kathaṃ samādhitvam ity āśaṃkya brahmātmaikyabodhābhāve
kevalavṛttivismaraṇasya tathātvepi na brahmajñānasahitasya tathātvam ity āśayena samādhīḥ
viśinaṣṭi jñānasamjñaka itī jñānam itī samjñā yasya sa jñānasamjñakaḥ brahmākārataya
sphuraṇarūpa ity arthaḥ uktaṃ ca “samādhīḥ samvidutpattiḥ parajīvaikatāṃ prati” itī || 124 ||

imaṃ cākṛtrim ānaṃdaṃ tāvat sādhu samabhyaset ||
vaśyo yāvat kṣaṇāt puṃsaḥ prayuktaḥ san bhavet svayam || 125 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm yad arthaṃ sāmgaṃ idaṃ nididhyāsanam uktaṃ tad āha imam itī akṛtrim
ānaṃdaṃ svarūpabhūtānaṃdābhivyāṃjakaṃ nididhyāsanam ity arthaḥ cakārād yathābuddhi
vedāntavicāram apīti spaṣṭam anyat || 125 ||

tataḥ sādhananirmuktaḥ siddho bhavati yogirāt ||
tatsvarūpaṃ na caitasya viśayo manaso girām || 126 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – evam abhyasataḥ phalam āha tata itī sādhananirmuktaḥ sādhanābhyāsarahita ity
arthaḥ etasya yoginaḥ tad vedāntaprasiddhaṃ svarūpaṃ brahmaiveti bhāvaḥ || 126 ||

samādhau kriyamāṇe tu vighnāny āyāṃti⁶⁰⁹ vai balāt ||
anusaṃdhānarāhityam ālasyaṃ bhogalālasam || 127 ||

layas tamaś ca vikṣepo rasāsvādaś ca śūnyata ||
evaṃ yad vighnabāhulyaṃ tyājyaṃ brahmaividā śanaiḥ || 128 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – akhaṃḍaikarasabrahmasvarūpatvenāvasthānalakṣaṇamokṣaphalado'yaṃ
samādhiparyamto yogo gurvanugrahavatāṃ sukarosti tathāpi sukara ity anādarō na kāryaḥ
vighnabāhulyasambhavād ity āha dvābhyāṃ samādhāv itī spaṣṭo'rthaḥ || 127 || laya itī tatra
layo nidrā tamaḥ kāryākāryā'vivekaḥ vikṣepo viśayasphuraṇaṃ rasāsvādo dhanyoham ity

⁶⁰⁹ Emended from vighna āyāṃti based on manuscripts.

ādyānaṃdāmkārāvṛttiḥ ca punaḥ śūnyatā cittadoṣaḥ rāgadveṣāditīvravāsanayā cittasya stabdhībhāvaḥ kaṣāyaḥ kṣubdhatety arthaḥ spaṣṭam anyat || 128 ||

*bhāvavṛttyā hi bhāvatvaṃ śūnyavṛttyā hi śūnyatā ||
brahmavṛttyā hi pūrṇatvaṃ tathā pūrṇatvam abhyaset || 129 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – vṛttir eva baṃdhamokṣakāraṇam ity āha bhāveti bhāvavṛttyā ghaṭādyākāravṛttyā bhāvatvaṃ tanmayatvaṃ bhavatīti śeṣaḥ śūnyavṛttyā abhāvavṛttyā śūnyatā jaḍatety arthaḥ hīti lokaprasiddhau tathā brahmākāravṛttyā pūrṇatvaṃ hīti vidvatprasiddhau tataḥ kim ata āha pūrṇatvam iti || 129 ||

*ye hi vṛttiṃ jahaty enāṃ brahmākhyāṃ pāvanīm parām ||
te tu vṛthaiva jīvaṃti paśubhiś ca samā narāḥ || 130 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm brahmamayīm vṛttiṃ stotuṃ tadvṛtityāgaparānīmdati ye hīti ye enāṃ brahmākhyāṃ vṛttiṃ jahati tyajanti te tu vṛthaiva jīvaṃtīty anvayaḥ spaṣṭam anyat || 130 ||

*ye hi vṛttiṃ vijānaṃti jñātvāpi vardhayaṃti ye ||
te vai satpuruṣādhanāya vaṃdyāste bhuvanatrāye || 131 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – samprati tām eva vṛttiṃ vivarddhayituṃ brahmavṛttiparān satpuruṣān stauti ye hīti spaṣṭam || 131 ||

*yeṣāṃ vṛttiḥ samā vṛddhā paripakvā ca sā punaḥ ||
te vai sadbrahmatām prāptā netare śabdavādinaḥ || 132 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – evaṃ brahmavṛttiparān stutvā'dhunā teṣāṃ brahmaprāptirūpaṃ phalam āha yeṣāṃ iti sugamam || 132 ||

*kuśalā brahmavārttāyāṃ vṛttihīnāḥ surāgiṇaḥ ||
tepy ajñānitayā nūnaṃ punar āyāṃti yāṃti ca || 133 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – tān eva śabdavādinō nīmdati kuśalā iti spaṣṭam || 133 ||

*nimeṣārdham na tiṣṭhaṃti vṛttiṃ brahmamayīm vinā ||
yathā tiṣṭhaṃti brahmādyāḥ sanakādyāḥ śukādayaḥ || 134 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – yata evaṃ tasmād brahmaniṣṭhair brahmavṛttyaiva sarvadā sthātavyam iti sūcayituṃ brahmādīnām udāharaṇam āha nimeṣeti yathā brahmādyās tathā sanakādyāḥ yathā sanakādyās tathā śukādyā iti saṃpradāyo darśitaḥ etena brahmādisevyatvād iti śreṣṭhoyaṃ samādhiparyaṃto rājayogaḥ sarvadā mumukṣubhiḥ sevanīya iti dhvanitam || 134 ||

*kārye kāraṇatāyātā kāraṇe na hi kāryatā ||
kāraṇatvaṃ tato gacchet kāryābhāve vicārataḥ || 135 ||*

saṃ. ṭī. – tad evaṃ svābhīmatam sāṅgam rājayogam abhidhāya pūrvopakrāntam
sāṃkhyāparaparyāyam vedāntavicāram upasaṃharati kārya ity ādīpañcabhiḥ ślokaḥ kāryeti
kārye ghaṭapaṭādirūpe vikāre kāraṇatā mṛttamtvaḍirūpā sarvavikārādhiṣṭhānatā āyātā'nugatā
kāraṇetu kāryatā na hīti prasiddham tataḥ kāraṇāt kāryābhāve kāraṇatvam gacchet nanu
katham kāraṇe kāryābhāva ity ata āha vicārata iti yathāyam dṛṣṭāntas tathākāsādikārye
kāraṇatā ākāsosti bhātīty ādivyavahārahētubhūtā satyajñānādirūpabrahmaṇaḥ kāraṇatā āyātā
anugatā kāraṇe brahmaṇi tu ākāsādikāryatā na hīti ataḥ paramārthataḥ ākāsadyabhāve
brahmaṇaḥ kāraṇatāpi na hīti dārṣṭāntiko'rthaḥ || 135 ||

atha śuddham bhaved vastu yad vai vācām agocaram ||
draṣṭavyam mṛddhaṭenaiva dṛṣṭāntena punaḥ punaḥ || 136 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tataḥ kim ata āha atheti athānamtaram kāryakāraṇabhāvanivṛttau yacchuddham
mano vācām agocaram vastu tad bhavet “yato vāco nivarttamte” ity ādīśrutiprasiddhi-
dyotanārtho hi śabdaḥ | nanu buddheḥ kṣaṇikatvenaikadā tathā vicāritepi punar anyathaiva
bhātīty ata āha draṣṭavyam iti || 136 ||

anenaiva prakāreṇa vṛttir brahmātmikā bhavet ||
udeti śuddhacittānām vṛttijñānam tataḥ param || 137 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – na kevalam ayaṃ vicāro jñānasādhanam evāpi tu dhyānasādhanam apīty āha aneneti
anenaiva prakāreṇa śuddhacittānām vṛttijñānam udeti tataḥ param brahmātmikā vṛttir bhaved
iti yojanā padānām arthas tu sphuṭa eva || 137 ||

kāraṇam vyatirekeṇa pumān ādau vilokayet ||
anvayena punas taddhi kārye nityam prapaśyati || 138 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – tam eva vicāram viśadayati dvābhyām kāraṇam iti ādau prathamam kāraṇam
vyatirekeṇa kāryaviraheṇa vicārayet punas tat kāraṇam anvayenānuvṛtītyā kāryepi nityam
prapaśyatīti || 138 ||

kārye hi kāraṇam paśyet paścāt kāryam visarjayet ||
kāraṇatvam tato gacched avaśiṣṭam bhaven muniḥ || 139 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – athavaivam vicārayed ity āha kāryeti ādau kārye kāraṇam eva vicārayet paścāt
tatkāryam visarjayet nānusaṃdadhyāt kāryavarjane sati kāraṇatvam svata eva gacchet evam
kāryakāraṇavarjane'vaśiṣṭam saccinmātram munir mananaśīlaḥ svayam eva bhaved iti || 139 ||

bhāvitam tīvravegena yad vastu niścayātmanā ||
pumāms taddhi bhavec chīghram jñeyam bhramarakīṭavat || 140 ||

saṃ. ṭī. – nanu vicārajanyāparokṣajñānena muner brahmatvam bhavatu nāma parantu
parokṣajñāninaḥ katham bhaved ity āśaṃkya tīvrahāvanayā parokṣajñāninopi brahmatvam
bhaved iti sadṛṣṭāntam āha bhāvitam iti | ayaṃbhāvaḥ yadyapi parokṣajñānena
pramātrgatāvaraṇanivṛttau satyām api prameyagatam āvaraṇam na nivarttate tathāpi
niścayātmanā niścayayuktābuddhamatā puruṣeṇa yad vastu saccidānamdam brahma

*tivravegenā'harniśaṃ brahmākāravṛtṭyābhāvitam ciṃtitaṃ tad vastu jñeyam aparokṣeṇa jñātum
yogyam brahma śīghram acireṇa pumān bhavet pratyagabhinnabrahmabhāvanayā puruṣo
brahmarūpo bhavatīty arthaḥ hīti vidvatprasiddhau | tatra sarvalokaprasiddhaṃ dṛṣṭāntam āha
bhramarakīṭavad iti | bhramareṇa kutaś cidānīya jīvann eva svakūṭyāṃ praveśito yaḥ kīṭaḥ sa
yathā bhayāt bhramaradhyānena bhramara eva bhavati tadvad iti || 140 ||*

*adrśyaṃ bhāvarūpaṃ ca sarvam eva cidātmakam ||
sāvadhānatayā nityaṃ svātmānaṃ bhāvayed budhaḥ || 141 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – yadi pūrvaslokoktadrṣṭānte bhāvanābalād evānyasyānyatvaṃ bhavet tarhi
brahmavivarttatvena brahmarūpasya viśvasya brahmabhāvanayā tadrūpatā bhaved iti kimu
vaktavyam ity āśayena sarvātmabhāvanām āha adrśyam iti | adrśyaṃ parokṣaṃ bhāvarūpaṃ
pratyakṣaṃ ca sarvaṃ viśvaṃ yad vā adrśyaṃ draṣṭṛrūpaṃ bhāvarūpaṃ dṛśyaṃ cakārād
darśanaṃ etat sarvaṃ tripuṭyātmakam jagad bhrāmtyā"tmabhinnatvena bhāsamānam api
cidātmakam nirviśeśasphuraṇamātrasvarūpaṃ svātmānam eva budhaḥ advaitajñānaniṣṭhaḥ
sāvadhānatayā sthīravṛtṭyā nityaṃ bhāvayet sakalam idam ahaṃ ca brahmaiveiti sarvadā paśyed
ity arthaḥ || 141 ||*

*dṛśyaṃ hy adrśyatām nītvā brahmākāreṇa ciṃtayet ||
vidvān nityasukhe tiṣṭhed dhiyā cidrasapūrṇayā || 142 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – etad eva vivṛṇoti dṛśyam iti dṛśyaṃ ghaṭādikam adrśyatām adhiṣṭhānacidrūpatā nītvā
hīti vidvatprasiddhau brahmākāreṇa kalpitasya paricchinnasya nāmarūpāder nivṛttipūrvakaṃ
bṛhadākāreṇāparicchinnarūpeṇa ciṃtayed ity arthaḥ tataḥ kim ata āha vidvān iti |
cidrasapūrṇayā cid eva rasaś cidrasaś cidānaṃdas tena pūrṇayā dhiyā nityasukhe avināśisukhe
vidvāms tiṣṭhed iti || 142 ||*

*ebhir aṃgaiḥ samāyukto rājayoga udāhṛtaḥ ||
kiṃcitpakvakaśāyānām haṭhayogena saṃyutaḥ || 143 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – idānīm uktaṃ svābhimatayogam upasaṃharati ebhir iti | kiṃcit svalpaṃ pakvāḥ
dagdhāḥ kaśāyā rāgādayo yeṣāṃ teṣāṃ haṭhayogena pātaṃjaloktena prasiddhenāṣṭāṃgayogena
saṃyutoyaṃ vedāntokto yoga iti śeṣaṃ spaṣṭam || 143 ||*

*paripakvaṃ mano yeṣāṃ kevalo 'yaṃ ca siddhidaḥ ||
gurudaivatabhaktānām sarveṣāṃ sulabho javāt || 144 ||*

*saṃ. ṭī. – ayaṃ rājayoga eva keṣāṃ yogya ity ākāṃkṣāyāṃ sarvagraṃthārtham upasaṃharann
āha paripakvam iti | yeṣāṃ manaḥ paripakvaṃ rāgādimalarahitam iti yāvat teṣāṃ ity
adhyāhāraḥ teṣāṃ jīṭārīṣaḍvargānām puruṣadhuraṃdharānām kevalaḥ pātaṃjalābhimata-
yoganirapekṣaḥ ayaṃ vedāntābhimato yogāḥ siddhidaḥ pratyagabhinnabrahmāparokṣa-
jñānadvārā svasvarūpāvasthānalakṣaṇamuktipradaḥ cakāro'vadhāraṇe nānyeṣāṃ
aparipakvamanasām ity arthaḥ nanu paripakvamanas tvam atidurlabham ity ākāṃkṣāyāṃ
asyāpi sādhanatvād atopy aṃtaraṃgāsādhanaṃ āha gurudaivatabhaktānām iti javād atīśīghram
ity arthaḥ sarveṣāṃ iti varṇāśramādinirapekṣaṃ maṇuṣyamātraṃ grahītavyam ata eva
gurudaivatabhakter aṃtaraṃgatvaṃ tathā ca śrutiḥ “yasya deve parābhaktir yathā deve tathā*

*gurau | tasyaite kathitā hy arthāḥ prakāśante mahātmanah” iti | smṛtayaś ca “tadviddhi-
praṇipātena | śraddhāvāllabhate jñānam” it yādyāḥ | ayambhāvah paripakvamasām api
duḥsādhyāni sādhanāni gurudaivatabhaktānām susādhyānibhavaṃtīti hetor gurudaivata-
bhajanam eva svadharmāvirodhena sarvaiḥ kāryam iti paramaṃ maṅgalam || 144 ||*

*|| iti śrīparamahāṃsaparivrājakācāryaśrīmacchaṃkarabhagavatā viracitā'parokṣānubhūtiḥ
samāptā ||*

*pūrṇeyam āparokṣyeṇa nityātmajñānakāśikā |
aparokṣānubhūtyākhyagramtharājapradīpikā || 1 ||
namas tasmai bhagavate śaṃkarācāryarūpiṇe ||
yena vedāṃtavidyeyam uddhṛtāvedasāgarāt || 2 ||
yady ayaṃ śaṃkaraḥ sāksād vedāṃtām bhojabhāskaraḥ ||
nodesyat tarhi kāśeta katham vyāsādisūtritam || 3 ||
atra yat saṃmataṃ kiṃcit tad guror eva mena hi ||
asaṃmataṃ tu yat kiṃcit tan mamaiva guror na hi || 4 ||
yatprasādād ahaṃśabdapratyayālabhano hi yaḥ ||
ahaṃ sa jagad ālabhah kāryakāraṇavarjitah || 5 ||
tasya śrīgururājasya pādābjetusamarpitā |
dīpikāmālikāseyaṃ tatkrpāguṇagumṃhitā || 6 ||
yohaṃ svājñānamātrāj jagad idam abhavaṃkhādidehāṃtam ādau svasvapnādivad eva soham
adhunā svajñānataḥ kevalam ||
brahmaivāsmi advitīyaṃ paramasukham ayaṃ nirvikāraṃ vibādham jāgrat sthānavad eva
devagurusatsvalpaprasādotthitāt || 7 ||*

*iti śrīparamahāṃsaparivrājakācāryaśrīvidyāraṇyamuniviracitā'parokṣānubhūtidīpikā samaptim
agamat ||*

*(*9094 words)*

APPENDIX B

Extra Verses of the *Dīpikā*

tīrthe śvapacagrhe vā naṣṭasmṛtir vā parityajan dehaṃ |
*jñānasamakālasamaye*⁶¹⁰ *kaivalyaṃ yāti vigataśokaḥ*⁶¹¹ || 145 ||⁶¹²

Abandoning the body in an auspicious place, or the house of an outcaste,

Or [even if] the memory is lost,

One who is free from sorrow,

In the moment at the same time as cognition, attains isolation.

Now the greatness of the wise is written by the verse in summary. He says in an auspicious place. In an auspicious place or else in the house of an outcaste, i.e., in the dwelling of a Caṇḍāla, even if the memory is lost, i.e., even without remembering, abandoning the body, one is liberated at the same time as cognition. By cognition, at this very same time, one is liberated. Being one whose sorrow has gone, he attains, i.e., obtains isolation.⁶¹³

⁶¹⁰ Manuscript A has “at the moment of the time of the fruits of cognition” (*jñānaphalakālasamaye*) which seems spurious. The original has “liberated at the same time as cognition” (*jñānasamakālamuktaḥ*), which the commentary on the verse seems to follow.

⁶¹¹ Manuscript B has *hi yataḥ śokaḥ* which makes no sense.

⁶¹² Abhinavagupta. *Paramārthasāra* 83: *tīrthe śvapacagrhe vā naṣṭasmṛtir api parityajan dehaṃ | jñānasamakālamuktaḥ kaivalyaṃ yāti hataśokaḥ ||*

⁶¹³ *atha jñānimahimā saṃgrahaślokena likhyate | tīrtheti | tīrthe 'thavā śvapacagrhe cāṃdālaveśmani naṣṭasmṛtir api smaraṇahīnopi dehaṃ tyajan jñānasamakālamuktaḥ | jñānena etat samakālam eva muktaḥ | apagataśokaḥ san kaivalyaṃ mokṣaṃ yāti | prāpnoti ||*

rathyāntare mūtrapurīṣamadhye caṇḍālagehe niraye śmaśāne |⁶¹⁴

kṛtaprayatno hyakṛtaprayatno dehāvasāne labhate ca mokṣaṃ || 146 ||

Inside a chariot, in the middle of urine and excrement,

In the house of a Caṇḍāla, in hell, or on a burial ground.

Indeed, one who has made effort and one who has not made effort,

At the end of the body, obtains liberation.

He says inside a chariot. Inside a chariot, i.e., on an auspicious path, in the middle of urine and excrement, i.e., in a place filled with urine and feces, in the house of a Caṇḍāla, i.e., in the dwelling of an outcaste, or else at a burial ground—[where] a dead body lives happily, that is a burial ground. There, one who has made effort and one who has not made effort, i.e., even without effort, at the end of the body, i.e., at the death of the body, obtains, i.e., attains liberation.⁶¹⁵

ativādāṃs titikṣeta nāvamanyeta kaṃcana |

*deham enaṃ samāśritya vairāṃ kuryān na kenacit*⁶¹⁶ || 147 ||⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁴ The first line is identical to Abhinavagupta. *Tantrāloka* 28.310ab. Its second line is *sacintako vā gatacintako vā jñānī vimokṣaṃ labhate 'pi cānte* || A wise person absorbed in thought or whose thought is gone, also obtains liberation at the end.

⁶¹⁵ *rathyāntareti* | *rathyāntare puṇyamārge mūtrapurīṣamadhye mūtramalayuktabhūmau* | *cāṇḍālaveśmani aṃtyajagrhe* | *athavā śmaśāne śmaṃ sukhaṃ vartate tat śmaśānam* | *tatra kṛtaprayatnaḥ akṛtaprayatnaḥ prayatnarahitopi dehāvasāne dehasyāvasāne mokṣaṃ labhate prāpnotīti* ||

⁶¹⁶ I am following Manuscript B here. The second line of Manuscript A is: *na caivaṃ deham āśritya vairāṃ kuryāc ca kenacit* ||

⁶¹⁷ This is similar to *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 11.18.31: *ativādāṃs titikṣeta nāvamanyeta kaṃcana* | *deham uddiśya paśu-vad vairāṃ kuryān na kenacit* || Also *Manusmṛti* 6.47: *ativādāṃs titikṣeta nāvamanyeta kaṃcana* | *na cemaṃ deham āśritya vairāṃ kurvīta kenacit* || And in reverse order, *Mahābhārata* 12.269.5cd-6ab: *nedaṃ jīvitam āsādyā vairāṃ kurvīta kenacit* || *ativādāṃs titikṣeta nābhimanyet kathaṃcana* | All have similar meaning.

One should endure insults,
One should not treat anyone with contempt.
Inhabiting this body,
One should not create hostility with anyone.

Moreover, he says insults. One should endure, i.e., bear insults or transgressions. One should not treat anyone, i.e., any person, with contempt. Inhabiting this body, one should not create enmity with anyone.⁶¹⁸

na kuryān na vadet kiṃcit na dhyāyet sādhasādhuṣu |
*ātmārāmo 'nayā vṛtṭyā vicarej jaḍavan muniḥ || 148 ||*⁶¹⁹

One should not act, nor speak,
Nor contemplate anything in terms of good or bad.
The sage whose delight is in the self,
Should wander with this mental state, as if he were dull-witted.

One should not. One should not act anything in terms of good, i.e., agreeable or bad, i.e., disagreeable. One should not speak, nor contemplate. Whose delight is in the self, i.e., whose

⁶¹⁸ *kiṃcātivādān | ativādān atikramān titikṣeta saheta | kiṃcana kimapi nāvamanyate | enaṃ deham āśritya kenacid vairaṃ na kuryāt |* Manuscript A is missing the *na*.

⁶¹⁹ *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 11.11.17.

delight or happiness is in the self, that sage, with this mental state, should wander as if he were dull-witted.⁶²⁰

By this may there be for all, the attainment of one's own self and the cessation of ignorance.

Salutations to the glorious Śaṅkara. The End.⁶²¹

⁶²⁰ *na kuryād iti | kiñcit sādhuṣu priyaṃ asādhuṣu apriyaṃ na kuryāt | na vadet na dhyaeyet | ātmārāmaḥ ātmani ārāmaḥ sukhaṃ yasya sa muniḥ anayā vṛttyā jaḍavac caret |*

⁶²¹ Manuscript B only: *anena sarveṣāṃ svasvarūpaprapṛptikalpitā 'vidyānivṛttiścāstu śrīśaṅkarāya namaḥ | samāptam*

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