The Anglosphere Core as a Pluralistic Security Community

Philip M. Pedley

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Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion,
Lancaster University

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Abstract

This thesis posits that in the post World War 2 era, a nexus of relationships has given rise to a transnational group of five states that form a Deutschian security community. This Anglospheric security community of the US, UK, Australia and NZ, is examined by utilising Adler and Barnett’s security community model. The model is adapted to give greater weight to the role of memes/culture. It finds that it is culture factors (meme-complexes) related to political values and social behaviour that inform the nature, and modus operandi of this Anglospheric security community. The Brexit debate on the UK’s future is found to have illuminated these issues by exposing aspects the contradictions between the competing meme-complexes of the wider Anglospheric community and the EU.

The Anglospheric security community’s durability and progress is found to be directly related to notions of legitimacy. This conclusion is informed by revisiting Deutsch’s original writings on the difference between naturally developing communities and the dangers of policy-elites creating political constructs that run counter to cultural considerations. A values-based meme-complex found to provides not just a common identity but to inform the nature of the Anglospheric security community from which it accrues legitimacy.

It is further posited that the Adler and Barnett model’s standard categorisations of pluralistic security community types do not adequately describe certain features of the Anglospheric security community. The research in this thesis has uncovered new institutions and fora and established that members do assist one another in conflict and confirms it to be a tightly-coupled version. However, the Anglospheric security community displays an actorship not implicit in Adler and Barnett’s categorisation. This thesis offers the terms ‘synergic’ and ‘hemiplegic’ to describe functional and dysfunctional communities. The Anglospheric security community is held to be synergic since it exhibits actorship on defence and security matters externally. In contrast the European Union is held up to be hemiplegic due to endemic problems to function cohesively on external defence issues.
I declare that all parts of this thesis are my own work and that it has not, partially or in entirety, been submitted in substantially the same form elsewhere.

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Chapter 1. Conceptualising the Anglosphere

1.1 Introduction

The term ‘Anglosphere’ is frequently misunderstood and misapplied. It has gained greater currency in the wake of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. As such, it has been applied as a label for the possibility of closer relationships between the UK, the United States and some Commonwealth countries. This interpretation sees the Anglosphere as a political project yet to be achieved. In the UK, those of a Europhile mindset regard any call for such an entity as founded on nostalgic sentimentality.

Distinct from this Brexit-fuelled perspective, is the original, intended meaning that holds a multilayered Anglosphere already exists as a social and cultural network. And crucially, that from within this network, five of the states that display some of the densest Anglospheric characteristics, have so aligned their security and defence relationships as to achieve a presence in international relations. The proposition of an existing Anglosphere entity was given credence by revelations, in 2010, that a ‘Five Eyes’ Intelligence alliance had been operating since 1946.

Despite this revelation, there has been an almost complete absence of interest by International Relations (IR) theorists as to the existence of an Anglospheric core of states operating as a transnational body. The notion has been ignored or dismissed without due consideration of security relationships and their evolution. However, the announcement of the AUKUS security partnership in September 2021, gained public attention and has made the suggestion of an Anglospheric security alignment a little more difficult to ignore.¹

This thesis seeks to address this shortcoming in IR theory and affirm the existence of an Anglospheric core as a factor in international relations. It suggests that this core is best

understood in IR theory as part of the Copenhagen School’s utilisation of Adler and Barnett’s security community theory, albeit, with important modifications. Adler and Barnett's model has been applied repeatedly to other transnational bodies and its insights are claimed to identify the EU as a ‘security community.’ Whilst the EU may indeed possess characteristics that suggest a security community, it is arguably dysfunctional in matters of external security and defence and has seen internal dissent including the loss of a large member state.

Security community theory applied in this thesis has of necessity been modified. Firstly, this thesis restores and gives prominence to aspects of Karl Deutsch’s original arguments regarding the foundations of security communities and nation-building. This includes elevating Deutsch’s stress of culture as the foundational basis of communal identity and suggests cultural affinities are the ‘glue’ that give real meaning to the Anglosphere. Secondly, it acknowledges the agency of individuals in progressing or impeding the development of security communities.

A third and crucial factor concerns the ‘nature’ of the security community. The application of the Adler and Barnett model has been shoe-horned to explain and justify the path taken to create the EU. In doing so, the model has ignored Deutsch’s warnings that the durability of a security community will likely depend on its legitimacy. The issue of legitimacy assumes a particular significance if the end goal is to fashion a pluralistic community of sovereign states into an amalgamated community. If the driver towards this ever-closer union is elite-driven, and fails to take account of public sentiment, Deutsch warns the outcome is a likely perceived lack of legitimacy and a consequent instability. This thesis argues that this is a danger the Anglosphere core security community has avoided by its adherence to relationships based on trust and a lack of coercion. It remains pluralistic and its constituent parts have not been obliged to surrender sovereign powers to executive bodies with collective decision-making powers over the citizens of each state.

Finally, this thesis suggests the existing category of a ‘pluralistic’ security community is an inadequate descriptor of the Anglospheric core’s behaviour. The mere absence of war is too low a bar as a qualifier, since the Anglosphere core has adopted proactive military postures. This thesis proffers the term ‘synergic’ to describe the activist role of the Anglospheric core security community and ‘hemiplegic’ to describe one exhibiting paralysis.
1.2 The literature

This literature review is of necessity divided into two parts. First, it is necessary to explore and define what the Anglosphere was intended to mean. The second section identifies the treatment of the Anglosphere in IR theory, explaining why it has been ignored or dismissed and examines the few unsatisfactory instances where IR scholars have deigned to examine it.

1.2.1 The Diamond Age - Coining of a term

The term ‘Anglosphere’ was coined to denote a post-racial network of English-speaking peoples based on shared outlooks and norms. As such, it stands in sharp contrast to any previous conceptualisations of a racially based ‘white’ community popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The term was invented by US science fiction writer Neal Stephenson in his 1995 ‘cyberpunk’ novel The Diamond Age. The title is a reference the technological ages of humankind (Bronze, Iron etc) and the advent of a future 'Diamond' age featuring nanotechnology and cryptocurrency. In Stephenson’s imagination, the future world is a neo-medieval construct in which Westphalian nation-states have become enfeebled due to both their loss of revenue and control of technology. Society is dominated by tribal communities or ‘phyles’ operating as guilds each with their own shared cultural values across different territories and cities. Almost all are racially construed, including two of the three dominant phyles; the Han, and the Hindu. The other dominant phyle, the ‘New Atlantean’, is not racially construed, but consists of the English-speaking world. It is predominantly drawn from ‘the West,’ but it includes large numbers of Asians, Africans and other racial groups spread across the globe. They follow rules based on English common law under the legitimising authority of a vestigial British monarchy. They constitute what Stephenson terms ‘the Anglosphere.’

2 Neal Stephenson, The Diamond Age (Spectra, 2003).
4 This notion has echoes of the Ottoman ‘millet’ system’ that accommodated different laws and cultural idioms of various communities. See: Karen Barkey and George Gavrilis, "The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial Autonomy and Its Contemporary Legacy," Ethnopolitics 15, no. 1 (2016).
Stephenson’s post-racial Anglosphere reflects his experience and relationship with Silicon Valley, where he has achieved a cult-like status with the IT community for his scientific foresight. He has not just predicted and articulated futuristic concepts, but coined the labels, now adopted, for these for technological changes including the terms ‘cryptocurrency’ and ‘metaverse.’ Consequently, Stephenson has served as an advisor to the likes of Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and his views have been sought out by academics such as IR theorist Francis Fukuyama. Stephenson’s ‘Anglosphere’ is a microcosm of Silicon Valley’s technological entrepreneurs who include high-profile individuals with diverse racial backgrounds, most notably those of Indian and Taiwanese origin. This diversity is reflected in Stephenson’s depiction of the New Atlantean [Anglosphere] phyle community. In his novel, the main New Atlantean leadership character is of Korean birth, with a knighthood. The term ‘Anglosphere’ is deliberately applied to stress a move away from any Anglo-saxon racial premise associated with historical notions of ‘English-speaking peoples’ to one based on shared cultural values.

Outside of fiction, the Anglosphere term was first adopted and given currency by James C. Bennett because of its emphasis on values and norms as opposed to race. Bennett, an associate of Stephenson, and a technological entrepreneur with an interest in rocket technology, acted as an evangelist for what he termed an 'Anglospheric' network of peoples. In this he was encouraged by Robert Conquest and supported by Conrad Black, the Canadian

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7 Some notable figures are: JenHsun “Jensen” Huang, CEO of the Nvidia Corporation (Taiwanese-American); Jerry Chih-Yuan Yang, Co-founder and former CEO Yahoo (Taiwanese-American); Ashar Aziz, Founder & CEO FireEye (Pakistani-American); Osman Rashid Founder & CEO Kno, (British-American Pakistani); Tan Hock Eng, CEO Broadcom Corporation (Malaysian-American).


media magnate.\textsuperscript{10} John O’Sullivan provided a platform for Bennett’s ideas in a series of opinion pieces promoting aspects of an Anglospheric network as a force in international relations.\textsuperscript{11}

1.2.2 A nodal, memetic and post-racial construct

Bennett hoped the term Anglosphere was “concise, [it] goes beyond mere linguistic commonality, and has no racial overtones.” He conceded the term ‘Anglo’ could have pejorative meaning in some parts of the US but hoped that ‘Anglosphere’ and an “Anglospheric perspective reclaims the term from narrow usage and connotation.”\textsuperscript{12} Bennett argued the English-speaking peoples were a distinctive culture and were on the way to becoming a distinct community in their own right. For Bennett, the Anglosphere was not and should not be a centralised federal bloc and declared

Anglospherists call on all English-speaking nations to abandon Haushoferian fantasies of geographical blocs: on America to downgrade its hemispherist ambitions, on Britain to rethink its Europeanist illusions, and on Australia to reject its "Asian identity” fallacy.\textsuperscript{13}

Rather, the Anglosphere was an informal and natural coming together of peoples facilitated by advances in communications and did would/should cooperate together as a transnational community of peoples and states. This was a variation of Stephenson’s idea of a ‘phyle,’ that is to say, a tribe linked across the globe by common language, culture and values. Bennett stressed this construct is “assuredly not the racialist Anglo-Saxonism dating from the era around 1900 calling for a federated union.”\textsuperscript{14} Instead it was a community founded on a “memetic, rather than a genetic, identity.”\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{11} Conrad [Lord] Black, Canadian newspaper entrepreneur with periodicals in the US and UK. John Sullivan: Irish-UK journalist and Editor of the \textit{National Review}.
\textsuperscript{12} Bennett, 15.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{15} Bennett, 3 & 14-15.
\end{flushright}
The term ‘meme’ was coined by the biologist Richard Dawkins to describe the idea of a non-genetic, cultural replicator. Memes have entered popular language to describe viral theme-based images, videos or texts that spread via social media, but this is just one narrow aspect of its real meaning. According to Dawkins memes determine the relative success or failure of a culture. Genes are in DNA and are transferred biologically, whereas Dawkins regards memes “as physically residing in the brain,” passed on as a pattern of values and norms.\(^{16}\) In this conceptualisation, language is endowed with a communicative power as a replicator of “cultural transmission.” Thus, Dawkins suggests memes propagate themselves via a meme pool “by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation.”\(^{17}\) Memes as ideas replicate themselves by the spoken and written world. By way of example, Dawkins points to the idea of God existing as a form of a meme “with high survival value or infective power in the environment provided by human culture.” A fertile meme planted in a mind will “literally parasitise” a brain, “turning it into a vehicle for the meme's propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitise the genetic mechanism of a host cell.”\(^{18}\)

Culture then, can be understood as a collection of memes or meme-complexes that replicate themselves and are likely more resilient than genes.

We were built as gene machines, created to pass on our genes. But that aspect of us will be forgotten in three generations. Your child, even your grandchild, may bear a resemblance to you, perhaps in facial features, in a talent for music, in the colour of her hair. But as each generation passes, the contribution of your genes is halved. It does not take long to reach negligible proportions. Our genes may be immortal but the collection of genes that is any one of us is bound to crumble away.\(^{19}\)

In its widest sense, as described by Dawkins and adopted by Bennett, a meme is a process of imitation, whereby messages are both propagated and adopted to create a ‘meme-complex.’ Cultures can be seen as the accumulation of “mutually-assisting memes” producing a range of ideas, style of architecture, morals, laws, rituals, art and so on. Memes then, are

\(^{17}\) *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford Univ Press, 2006), 249.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., 249-50.
replicators, passed on by imitation. In contrast to DNA, ideas can and do survive by memetic transmission.

If you have a good idea, compose a tune, invent a sparking plug, write a poem, it may live on, intact, long after your genes have dissolved in the common pool. Socrates may or may not have a gene or two alive in the world today, as G. C. Williams has remarked, but who cares? The meme-complexes of Socrates, Leonardo, Copernicus and Marconi are still going strong.20

The replication success of particular memes in a given society will be determined by competing memes in the meme-pool. Where a meme forms part of a strong meme complex, then challenger memes might struggle to achieve a presence. Thus, a society in which liberal values have been carried forward by memes will likely prove more resistant to memes that are illiberal. Of course, it works the other way too, as Dawkins points out.

An important aspect of selection on any one meme will be the other memes that already happen to dominate the meme pool. If the society is already dominated by Marxist, or Nazi memes, any new meme’s replication success will be influenced by its compatibility with this existing background.21

In the context of a modern Anglosphere, leading Indian IR academic Professor Madhav das Nalapat describes a similar process to highlight that it is a mental affinity rather than racial affinity that creates a sense of community.22 Das Nalapat asserts the common values of the Anglosphere are propagated through memes not genes, utilising the minds of English-speakers. In other words, it is cultural commonalities not race that acts as a glue. As das Nalapat puts it,

…the intangible has overtaken the physical, there is a need to refine the concept of “Blood” to include not only the more superficial genetic codes that comprise the “Blood of the Body,” but also the abstract virtues and mindsets of the “Blood of the

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19 Ibid., 258.
20 Ibid., 258-59.
21 The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene, 169.
22 India’s first professor of Geopolitics. Former Editor of the Times of India.
Mind.” If we define the Anglosphere as not simply a geographic or even a linguistic entity, but as an entity that encapsulates the type of thought and behaviour that led to Magna Carta, to the movement for the abolition of slavery, to the Industrial Revolution, and to the war against the Nazis’ attempt to conquer continental Europe, then it is a fact that such minds exist not only within the geographical spaces visualised in a Churchillian Anglosphere, but also much farther afield in India for instance…

The memes that relate to fundamental values are likely to be of a different order to those memes that relate to other aspects of culture such as music or preferences for sport or cuisine. In other words, a society could be multi-cultural in terms of cuisine, music whatever, but susceptible to, and united by, a values related meme-complex.

Bennett stressed Anglophone influence varied across the world but was strongest in those states where the English language could ensure the communication of the Anglospheric meme-complex in the meme-pool.

The densest nodes of the Anglosphere are found in the United States and the United Kingdom, while Anglophone regions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and South Africa are powerful and populous outliers. The educated English-speaking populations of the Caribbean, Oceania, Africa and India constitute the Anglosphere's frontiers.

The concept of nodes introduces the notion of a nexus or core. As to what constituted the meme-complex of the Anglosphere Bennett identified a number of factors; some unique, some less so, but together distinctive. These include language, common law, and the emphasis on civil society. The last of these was both a distinguishing feature of Anglophone culture and a fundamental key to understanding the success and durability of democracy in Anglosphere states.

24 Bennett, 2.
Civil society in Anglosphere communities is “a vast network of networks,” starting with the individual and the families, community organisations, religious congregations, social organisations, and businesses created by individuals coming together voluntarily. It was the voluntary nature that Bennett considered important since these continue in a hierarchal fashion through regional, national levels, “and create civil societies, which in turn beget civic states.” It is precisely this feature and dynamic replicated at an international level that he argued was creating the new Anglosphere communal network between the peoples of Anglophone states. Bennett acknowledges that his thinking has been influenced by David Fischer’s seminal work *Seeds of Albion*. Fischer applies the term ‘folkways’ to describe a memetic cultural process that provides an explanation as to why the US is ‘Anglophone’ despite having a ‘British’ racial composition of less than twenty per cent.

Essentially, Bennett was advancing the idea of a transnational community of networked individuals of a similar mindset. It followed that those states with the strongest memetic similarities might have a natural inclination to work together. Such a possibility was suggested when the existence of secretive Anglospheric military and security relationships began to emerge in the late 1990s when Tim Legrand discovered “an informal network of Anglosphere public service mandarins…” He identified these as having been established in 1989, as the successor to an ongoing series of informal conferences known as the ‘Five Countries Meetings.’ By 2015, Legrand’s research had revealed a raft of informal standing networks which constituted,

one of the oldest, most active, and perhaps most resilient, of transgovernmental alliances active in the global governance space, though it is relatively unknown to the political science literature: ‘Anglosphere’ countries Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. At the heart of this alliance is a manifest

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26 James C Bennett, "An Anglosphere Primer" (paper presented at the Address before the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2002), 5.
27 Ibid.
The Anglospheric Security Community

historical, cultural and political affinity, which plays out in a complex raft of social, economic and policy relationships amongst and between the Anglosphere states.\textsuperscript{30}

The term ‘lacuna’ is liberally applied in academic writing, but in the context of IR theory, its application to the ‘Anglosphere’ would be justified. The Cold War subsumed the Anglospheric transnational security arrangements in to the wider Western bloc. The ending of the Cold War challenged the dominant IR perspectives but in a way that accentuated the problem. Either the realist primacy of states was stressed or the notion of revamped liberal institutional approaches was applied. The latter emphasised a Eurocentric perspective within a narrow transatlantic paradigm. A brief examination of how these perspectives predominated within the IR discipline illustrates the impediment to identifying and analysing the existence of an Anglospheric community.

1.2.3 International Relations Theory blindness

That the notion of an Anglosphere community as factor in international relations did not receive much attention from IR scholars was perhaps not surprising. The tone had been set in 1940 by E.H. Carr, a founding father of IR as a discipline. In \textit{The Twenty Years Crisis}, his seminal contribution to the study of IR, Carr noted the definitive end of ‘Pax Britannica,’ and with its demise, the imminent reordering of the international order. Carr acknowledged that, “the English speaking peoples have formed the dominant group in the world,” but scorned the possibility their supremacy could be maintained.\textsuperscript{31} Although the influence of cultural factors in shaping ‘national interest’ was accommodated in classical realism, an Anglospheric cultural perspective did not form part of Carr’s narrative. There would be no Anglospheric “power unit” or bloc:

…they sometimes console themselves with the dream that British supremacy, instead of passing altogether away, will be transmuted into the higher and more effective form of an ascendancy of the English-speaking peoples. The pax Britannica will be put into commission and become a pax Anglo-Saxonica, under which the British Dominions,

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Edward Hallett Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis} (Macmillan, 1940), 214.
standing halfway between the mother country and the United States, will be cunningly woven into a fabric of Anglo-American co-operation.32

Carr’s prescriptive treatment of the concept set the parameters of discourse within the IR discipline a narrative was reinforced by the obfuscatory effects of Cold War bipolarity. For liberal internationalists and constructivist IR scholars, the post-World War 2 focus was on explaining the more obvious and visible institutions of ‘the West’ usually NATO or the evolution of the present day European Union. The fact the UK was part of this process of ‘ever-closer union’ and a member of NATO, served to deflect analysis away from any multilateral military/security Anglospheric relationships operating within ‘the West.’

1.2.4 Theoretical perspectives in the interregnum.

An opportunity for a reassessment of IR thinking occurred following the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union. From 1989 to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, there was a period of flux and uncertainty – an ‘interregnum’ in which both politicians and IR theorists struggled to make sense of the changed international landscape.33 The casualty of this changed environment was classical realism, so long the dominant paradigm. In response to this theoretical vacuum, the IR discipline produced a series of new ideas and approaches.34

Francis Fukuyama announced the triumph of the West – of the Western idea.35 John Mearsheimer advanced a neorealist reconceptualisation in Back to the Future that reaffirmed the primacy of states intent on maximising power and operating within an anarchical international structure. As such, the roles of non-state actors, internal factors and the existing network of institutions that girded the West were deemed largely irrelevant.36

32 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 3.
from the perspective of defensive neorealism, claimed institutions did little more than provide frameworks for states to pursue national interests and had outlived any usefulness. He was unconvinced NATO would survive or the Europeans find a sufficient synthesis of national interests to found a collective defence operation of any meaning. From these theoretical perspectives there was no interest in according any significance to the Anglospheric framework identified by Legrand or claims by investigative journalists of secret Anglospheric alliances.

Huntington’s *Clash of Civilisations* offered a different perspective, retaining the anarchical structure of realism but replacing the state with nine civilisational blocs said to constitute the future fracture lines in international relations. The theory suffered from the monolithic categorisation of the civilisational blocs, assuming a degree of internal cultural homogeneity within them that did not exist.

Another theoretical approach emerged from the so-called Copenhagen School. Whilst constructivist in nature, it gave due regard to states as principally driven by balance of power considerations. Crucially, it recognised the role of non-state actors and cultural/societal factors. Its advocates, most notably and consistently Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, argued that state power extended beyond military capability. It included intangibles such as ideology and culture operating through “systems” of states and peoples. These systems were examples of “security complexes” that required an ‘unfolding’ of their societal components to understand their dynamics. There was a recognition that non-military issues such as the economic, health and environmental sectors were often securitised and highly relevant in

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38 Samuel P Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer) (1993).


analysing security complexes. The latter comprised “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot be reasonably analysed apart from one another.” As such security complexes could be positioned on a scale that ranged from outright enmity to close cooperation. To explain the latter, the Copenhagen School incorporated Adler and Barnett’s revised Deutschian security community model.

This approach offered the possibility of a theoretical via media for both academics and policy-makers concerned with determining what post-Cold War architecture would be conducive for ensuring a stable peace. The Copenhagen School’s approach was welcomed by Gwyn Prins as “a valuable advance” since it addressed the limitations of classical realism and accommodated a complex and highly relevant, range of non-state factors. Prins sought to emphasise the that role non-material factors had played in the downfall of the Soviet Union and overlooked by both classical realism and neglected by the new neorealist theories. Thus, the key insight to explain IR theory’s failure to foresee the collapse was an inability to recognise,

the degree to which individuals armed with ideas and aspirations, proved able to challenge and break the iron grid of structure. How they did this is a question of inductive and cultural rather than deductive and logical study.

Certainly, policy-makers outside of academia absorbed the rationale and language of a ‘security community’ as a way of understanding and restructuring relations between East and West Europe. Numerous academic papers applied security community theory as a way of

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42 Ibid., 12.
43 Michael Barnett, Emanuel Adler “Studying security communities in theory, comparison, and history” is listed in the biography as forthcoming work. Ibid., 215.
advancing the enlargement of NATO\textsuperscript{47} and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).\textsuperscript{48} Sometimes the emergent Euro-Atlantic security community was seen as a potential synthesis of NATO plus the European Community, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union (WEU).\textsuperscript{49} There was however, no interest in the application of security community theory to defence and security arrangements of Anglosphere members possibly because it remained almost institutionally invisible.

1.2.5 Post 9/11 and the misidentification of fracture lines

The aftermath of the Al Qaeda 9/11 attack on the US that marked the end of the interregnum, did produce an academic focus on an alleged cultural fault-line within the Western security alliance. Although NATO invoked Article V of its Charter, it was termed a moral gesture by the Secretary General and was not a mobilisation.\textsuperscript{50} There was reluctance in some European quarters to act militarily without definitive proof Al Qaeda’s culpability.\textsuperscript{51} A repeat of the European hesitancy evident in the Balkan Wars, and in the curtailing of Iraq regime’s genocidal impulses after the [first] Gulf War, gave rise to US concerns NATO might act as an impediment to swift action in Afghanistan from where Al Al Qaeda operated.\textsuperscript{52}

In a widely read article, Robert Kagan declared, “it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world…” He added, “they agree on ________________________________


\textsuperscript{52} Notably Germany and Belgium. Ibid., 103 & 06.
little and understand one another less and less." It was, he opined, a ‘Mars v Venus’
transatlantic division with Europeans disposed towards a utopian view that regarded force as
outmoded. The Europeans were “born again idealists” who could ignore the Hobbesian laws
of nature because of the US security umbrella. The US viewed the world in realist terms
and not only considered force necessary, but was prepared to use it. Charles Kupchan went
further suggesting the division was so profound that “the next clash of civilisations will not
be between the West and the rest, but between the United States and Europe…” Insofar as
the UK was concerned, Kupchan was explicit, the UK was part of this divergent process,
complicit in promoting a European Community leadership role and a unified European
defence capability. These views were representative of a very NATO-centric and binary
perspective of ‘the West’ that managed to overlook NATO member Canada, and Australia and
New Zealand.

The effect of this binary transatlantic focus was to encourage the notion that the European
Community was developing as an alternative to balance against the hegemonic nature of the
US. European integrationists pursued the goal of a ‘European Union’ (EU) with common
security arrangements. These were said to constitute a ‘military revolution’ in the transatlantic
relations and military power, marking the emergence of the EU as a security actor
independent of the US. Jacques Delors had once called the European Community an
“unidentified political object” that defied categorisation. Now, however, by virtue of its
institutions, if not by the self-declared intent of its leaders, a growing body of IR scholars
claimed to have identified it as a Deutschian ‘pluralistic’ security community par
excellence. So, for example, in 2012, Charles Kupchan referred to the early stages of
market integration in the European Community as “the onset of a security community.”

55 Ibid. See also: Michael Cox, "Commentary: Martians and Venutians in the New World Order,"
International Affairs 79, no. 3 (2003).
57 Ibid., 4.
58 Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, Europe's Military Revolution (Centre
59 For example: Alex Warleigh-Lack states the EU is inter alia a security community as conceived
by the Copenhagen School. Alex Warleigh-Lack, "The EU, Asean and Apec in Comparative
Perspective," in Europe and Asia, ed. P Murray (Palgrave, 2008), 34. Other examples include: Elke
Krahmann, "The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe," "One Europe or
Several?" Programme 36/01 (2001): 4-5; Frank Möller, "Capitalizing on Difference: A Security
Community or/as a Western Project," Security Dialogue 34, no. 3 (2003); Hans Mouritzen, "Peace for
An earlier attempt was made to extend the security community model to analyse ‘the West’ in general. Robert Jervis, then President of American Political Science Association, used his 2001 Presidential address to suggest the existence of a ‘Western’ pluralistic security community encompassing the US, Western Europe and Japan. This seminal intervention sought to identify the internal challenges to this 'Western' security community and questioned how relationships might develop given the dominance of one power (the US) within it. Prins agreed with this enquiry, noting Jervis “reanimates Karl Deutsch's concept of the security community” but suggested it should be pushed further and address “whether our assumptions about the security communities which we think we have at the moment, and particularly in Europe, are reliable?”

So far as the US was concerned on the issue of reliability, the answer was no. As discussed above, NATO invoked Article V, but NATO’s Rapid Reaction Forces was not utilised by the US in the Afghanistan invasion phase. A factor was the hesitancy of some European leaders to commit forces and a US wish to avoid the entanglements of possibly stultifying consultation. Instead, the US took up two offers of support. The first, and most substantial contribution, came from the UK. The second came in the form of a much smaller but significant contribution from Australia after their invocation of Article IV of the ANZUS

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Treaty. Consequently, the force assembled to invade Afghanistan was a US operation supported by UK and Australian military forces.

Only after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the exposure of deep rifts amongst the transatlantic alliance did the first signs of an Anglospheric perspective emerge. And not amongst IR theorists, but rather strategists and historians. In 2004, Douglas Stuart, a professor at the US Army College, declared “relations between Washington and key European allies are on life support,” and adopted both the terminology and conceptualisation of James Bennett. Stuart argued the case for “a new transatlantic dialogue” between the US, Canada and the UK founded on long-standing common values and a willingness to protect them. Another Canadian academic, David Haglund adopted an Anglospheric approach too, suggesting Canada was unlikely to be out of step with its two long-standing security partners in the 'English-speaking' world, the UK and the US (to say nothing of its 'strategic cousin,' Australia). He cautioned, Canada’s tilt towards ‘Old Europe’ might be a temporary reconceptualisation of Canada's own geopolitical situation that would see Canada realign with its Anglospheric Atlantic partners.

1.2.6 Anglosphere existence repudiated

The notion of an Anglospheric grouping of states and its relevance to international relations did not excite the interest of IR academics despite the AUSUKUS composition of the invasion forces deployed in Afghanistan. Even the revelation of an Anglospheric five state SIGINT alliance in 2010 was ignored. There were a few exceptions, one of which was an article by Owen Harries, a former Foreign Policy Advisor to the Australian Frasier

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64 Australian PM John Howard, witnessed the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon from his hotel window. On his return to Canberra two days later, the Australian Cabinet agreed the mutual aid clause of the treaty should be invoked. See:Anthony H Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons* (CSIS, 2003), 40.


Government and the co-founding editor of the National Interest journal.67 Harries adopted a realist perspective, dismissing the idea of a future anglospheric arrangements. His article “An Anglosphere Illusion” dismissed the existence of a security alliance in the past, present or future as “fanciful.”68

Another challenge to the possibility of a Anglospheric perspective came from Alex Danchev who repudiated the idea of shared values between the US and UK. Quoting Nietzsche, Danchev argued that the idea of a transatlantic community was inspired by a mythical past, only given credence by its “evangelist in Chief” Winston Churchill.69 Danchev argued there had been an “evaporation” of the moral basis of the entire transatlantic alliance based on values. Europeans (including the UK) had peaceful values and no external defence or security ambitions and asserted “Americans are bowling alone.” Danchev’s examples of European reluctance to use force actually revealed the UK had deployed alongside the US. Danchev obscured this revelation by placing a qualification in a single footnote explaining it was too wearisome to add “except the UK” in each case mentioned.70 Warren Kimball published a highly critical open letter to Danchev. declaring himself baffled by a single catch-all footnote “that exempts the British from the category of Europeans,” and thereby repudiated Danchev’s central assertions.71

The only other attempt to engage with the notion of an existing Anglosphere was made by Dylan Kissane. Kissane adopted a realist perspective and sought to explore whether an Anglospheric military core of five states identified as (Australia, Canada, NZ, the UK and the US) existed. Utilising Correlates of War (CoW) data, Kissane undertook a comparative exercise using war and alliance datasets from 1900 to 1997.72 His intent was to expose any Anglospheric institutional framework and determine whether mutual aid in conflict was in

67 The other co-founder was Irving Kristol considered the founder of neoconservatism. The National Interest inclined towards realist and neoconservative US positions not necessarily reliant on entangling alliances.
69 Alex Danchev, "How Strong Are Shared Values?," in The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations., ed. Samuel Wells and Ludger Kuhnhardt (Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2005), 12.
70 Ibid., Footnote 13.
any way exceptional. Kissane concluded that Anglospheric solidarity is very “patchy,” and “there seems nothing very special about the ‘special relationships’ the Anglosphere claims.”

A cursory overview of the research reveals fundamental methodological flaws that undermine Kissane’s conclusions. His assumption that the paucity of positive wartime relationships between Dominion states and the UK and US in the first half of the twentieth century is indicative of a lack of a security relationship is mistaken. The Dominion states were not sovereign, but part of the same British Imperial body politic and security structure and therefore not separately identified in the data. Furthermore, Kissane’s reliance on minor regional conflicts also constitute weak grounds for demonstrating a lack of mutual concern. There was no consideration that Anglosphere states might not require mutual aid and in some circumstances and decline it due to perceived spheres of influence and responsibilities.

Kissane’s conclusion that the lack of a formal treaty framework confirms the non-existence of an Anglospheric core is also suspect. Since, the Dominions were not sovereign, Britain made external defence imperial treaties that are included under the UK data. The Dominions and the UK were bound by imperial arrangements, first under the auspices of an Imperial Defence Committee and post-sovereignty by ongoing informal allegiances, again not recorded in data. To compound the problem, the datasets only include declared formal treaties between the five sovereign states for the entire period. Just a cursory review of government records and literature reveals the existence of other alliance type arrangements, some secretive, others open, but not included in the CoW database.

1.2.7 Anglosphere as a racialised construct

Whereas Kissane argued there was no factual grounds for believing in the existence of a core Anglospheric community as evidenced by the lack of an institutional alliance framework or by any strong solidarity in war, another IR scholar, Srdjan Vucetic applied a theoretical Critical Race perspective. He concluded the five states of Australia, Canada, New Zealand,

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74 Two examples are NORAD and the Five Powers Defence Agreement
the UK and the US) constituted a “racialised community in global society.”

Vucetic rejected Bennett’s adoption the term Anglosphere to mean a post-racial community and asserted it did exist, but as a modern day manifestation of nineteenth century ideas about Anglo-saxon racial kinship.

Vucetic suggests the elevation of non-white people to positions of power will doom the five-state Anglo-saxon Anglosphere since “genealogy is the most important aspect of the Anglosphere’s racialised history.” It is not clear what evidence Vucetic is relying on to suggest the modern Anglosphere is a racialised construct, but he contends any diversity might be a “mirage” and racial Anglo-saxons are "at the top".

the political elites around in the newly constituted liberal-multi-cultural Anglosphere democracies embraced cultural diversity, but not so tightly as to irrevocably upset the ‘traditional’ cultural hierarchy that has for so long kept the descendants of historical Anglo-saxons at the top.

It is not clear however, that the “descendants of historical Anglo-saxons” are “at the top.” Individuals who are not the “descendants of historical Anglo-saxons” occupy or have occupied some of the most senior positions in commerce and in the political establishment of the US and other four Anglosphere core states. Compared to the US, the UK probably has a more diverse group of individuals “at the top.” In 2021, the UK’s cabinet includes ministers of Indian, Pakistani, Mauritian, Ghanian, Nigerian, Jewish, Kurdish and Turkish origin. It is also true of Vucetic’s adopted Canada, which has had Sikh origin Defence Minister and other Ministers from Afghan, Hong Kong Chinese and Indian backgrounds.

When during the Covid pandemic in 2021, President Macron attacked “les Anglo-Saxon” states’ unwillingness, to share vaccines, the policy-makers “at the top” were US Trade Representative Katherine Tai of Chinese-Taiwanese origin, the Canadian Minister of Trade,

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75 Srdjan Vucetic, "The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations" (PhD diss, Ohio State University, 2008), 9.
76 Ibid., 155-56.
77 Ibid., 133.
78 Ibid., 132.
Mary Ng of Chinese-Hong Kong origin and the UK Business Minister, Dr Kwasi Kwarteng of Ghanaian origin. When Macron attacked the “Anglo-saxon” tech giants, he was referring to companies headed by CEOs of Indian, Iranian, Jewish-European origins, and often with mixed race families. Vucetic, however, appears unsure of his conclusions and suggests it might not be race per se that creates the Anglosphere's identity, but other unidentified factors. This, he says, is a standpoint that “would reverse the claims” he has made about the racialised identity of the Anglosphere.

1.3 Placing the Anglosphere in IR Theory

1.3.1 The Adler and Barnett Model

As discussed earlier, the Copenhagen School incorporated a version of Deutschian security communities as revised by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. They utilised the basic definition of a security community as laid out in Deutsch’s work *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (NJ: Princeton University, 1968). There are a number of refinements made to the original theory by Adler and Barnett.

Firstly, they abandoned Deutsch’s obsessive emphasis on the measurement of communication (‘cybernetics’) and it not is restored in this thesis having been described with justification as a “fetish”. Secondly, Adler and Barnett accepted the notion of two types of...
security community: —‘pluralistic’ and ‘amalgamated.’ A ‘pluralistic security community’ consisting of sovereign states who cooperate but retain their independence, and an ‘amalgamated' version that was deemed to come into existence when previously autonomous states unified into a sovereign entity.

Adler and Barnett also refined Deutsch’s theory to include an approximate three stage developmental pattern of pluralistic security communities termed as social constructivist and path-dependent. These are; Nascent, Ascendant and Mature and should not be implied as suggesting a fixed linear progression.

The Nascent condition does not necessarily feature a conscious attempt to create a security community. Rather, governments consider how they might arrange their relationships to enhance mutual security with various diplomatic, bilateral, multilateral exchanges and interactions. Deutsch is invoked to describe “trigger” mechanisms that lead to the organisational changes such as a mutually perceived security threat. Thus, a ‘nascent’ security community is virtually indistinguishable from a strategic alliance. A shared identity might exist between participating states, but is not necessary at this formative point. However, pre-existing associations based on “cultural, political, and ideological homogeneity” can facilitate the creation of “new organisations and institutions and a desire or expectation of a security community.”

In the 'Ascendant’ condition it is possible to identify “increasingly dense networks, new military institutions and organisations.” Mutual trust is constantly reinforced, and procurement decisions reflect interdependent military postures, and states begin to share intelligence information. Any structures created to ensure verification cease to be relevant and fade away. These developments are said to create the basis of a collective identity and whether it exists can be ascertained by evaluating the narratives utilised by individuals and institutions within the respective states.

possibility of mapping social communications and the spread of memes. This chimes with a point made by James Bennett about network communities.

88 Ibid., 50.
89 Ibid., 51.
90 Ibid., 53.
The ‘Mature’ condition reflects not just the improbability of war but a changed perspective whereby the member states see themselves as operating within a collective identity in contradistinction to other states. Consequently, policies are pursued in a context of shared norms and become more coordinated. Disagreements might occur, but these are resolved through peaceful means and self-restraint. Significantly, there is a differentiation between those inside and those outside of the community. There is a move towards “self-identification” that “frequently has a corresponding ‘other’.” This Mature phase is reflected in a process of multilateral decision-making through an ‘architecture’ of “common and consensual mechanisms.”

Adler and Barnett also introduced the idea of ‘tightly coupled’ and ‘loosely coupled’ as a feature of the mature pluralistic security community. The loosely coupled category consists of a transnational region, “composed of sovereign states” who expect no mutual bellicose actions and exercise self-restraint. A tightly coupled variant features a “mutual aid” system of collective arrangements, enhanced by a system of rules resembling “something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational and national institutions and some form of a collective security system.” This thesis posits that these subcategorisations are unsatisfactory, as discussed later.

1.3.2 Issues with Adler and Barnett - back to basics

The contemporary understanding of security community theory requires refinement if it is to explain successfully the viability of security communities. In particular, the Adler and Barnett model has suffered from its overuse in explaining the EU and its adoption by academic advocates of the EU seeking to prescribe a roadmap for ‘ever-closer union.’ This is partially a due to the emphasis Adler and Barnett’s model has placed on certain factors, but also by attempts to ‘shoehorn’ the theory to explain the EU. Missing from the equation or downplayed is the importance of culture, elitism and following from those, the issue of legitimacy and with it, effectiveness and durability. The model requires a return to certain Deutschian roots.

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91 Ibid., 55.
92 Ibid., 30.
1.3.3 Culture as a factor

The ‘updating’ of security community theory in the 1990s by Adler and Barnett downplayed Deutsch’s views on the importance of cultural ‘communication’. This is a reflection of a common bias away from culture by IR theoreticians. Prins, for example, warns that considering culture in IR can be provocative. He quotes Nicholas Rengger’s cautionary observation warning:

Culture is one of those terms that often prompts international relations scholars to reach for their revolvers because it represents everything the good, positivistically-trained specialist should hate.\(^{93}\)

However, both Prins and Rengger put culture front and centre, despite it being, “an obviously loose concept that defies rigour and precision and is open to endless interpretation… its significance to world politics cannot be doubted”.\(^{94}\) Deutsch’s earlier work stressed the role of communications in shaping an identity that preceded the creation of a nation with institutions.\(^{95}\) In this, he pre-empted Benedict Anderson’s idea of a nation being an imagined community that had come into being by the creation of a communication process thereby facilitating the popularisation of an idea or ideas amongst the people.\(^{96}\) Anderson was keen to stress the difference between ‘imagined’ and ‘imaginary.’ A community or nation is imagined,

you can’t touch the Dutch nation… it’s not symbolic [but] its actually understood to be real. There really is a Dutch nation out there. But on the other hand, the only way you can approach it is through the imagination.\(^{97}\)

According to Deutsch it was the communication of cultural factors that were critical in creating the imagined community asserting


\(^{95}\) See: Hroch, 1115-29.

\(^{96}\) Ibid.
it is identity of political antecedents; the procession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. 98

These terms echo Fischer's Idea of ‘Folkways' and Bennett's more recent idea of a 'network' community as referred to earlier. 99 Deutsch had strong views on the fallibility of security communities that do not reflect a communal consciousness, but rather are brought into being as a set of institutions aiming for the creation of a 'civic' identity and therefore rest on shallow foundations. This was a problem that Deutsch argued could result from the actions of elite vanguards and this aspect of his thinking has been most unwelcome from advocates of attempting to fashion new security communities with ambitions to extend beyond cooperation and pluralism to a more amalgamated form.

1.3.4 Elites and Vanguardism

Adler and Barnett admonish Deutsch for failing to take into account “institutional agents… political elites and even charismatic individuals” 100 and argue elites “are most critical for the development of new forms of social and political organisation that are tied to the development of a security community.” 101 Deutsch had rejected the idea of elites as single bloc or class and stressed the importance of accountability. 102 There was no all-purpose elite” but rather “a pluralistic array of specialised elites connected by a complex network of communication and bargaining, and more widely accountable to a more highly educated and politically more active population. 103

Perhaps unintentionally, Adler and Barnett’s emphasis on elites has been to encourage the application of Adler and Barnett’s model to explain the ‘success’ of the European political

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99 Fischer, 1.
100 Adler and Barnett, 62, 43.
101 Ibid., 44.
102 Ibid., 64.
103 Ibid., 64 & 66.
elite in creating a EU security community\textsuperscript{104} and further conflation the theory with two other theoretical approaches; neo-functionalism and neo-federalism.\textsuperscript{105} All saw in the so-called ‘Monnet Method,’ a blueprint for new transnational communities in general whereby a conscious, “spill-over” from an elite-led institutional-functional approach could create, a post-national civic identity.\textsuperscript{106}

Deutsch did not regard elites as a monolithic bloc, but recognised that an array of elite groupings could successfully adopt policies and push these through against popular scepticism. In this context, Deutsch warned the process of accountability has a long way to go in most democracies.\textsuperscript{107} For Deutsch, it was not enough for a democratic government’s actions to be seen as ‘legal,’ and proceed accordingly, rather it must be cognisant of the need for legitimacy. The same requirement can be said to apply to a security community if it assumes executive functions, supplants the governments of its constituent states and introduces laws. In the context of a pluralistic security community of sovereign states, Deutsch warned of the dangers of an elite faction pushing ahead of public sentiment.\textsuperscript{108} A new body politic will lack legitimacy if it ignores the social contract between ruled and ruler. As Maurice Cranston paraphrases in considering Rousseau’s Social Contract,

Man can be both ruled and free if they rule themselves… For what is a free man but a man that rules himself? A people will be free if it retains sovereignty over itself.\textsuperscript{109}

The creation of a pluralistic security community with an executive body seen to be unaccountable would run the risk of usurping the general will.\textsuperscript{110} According to Rousseau’s thinking, the acquiescence of governments in surrendering sovereignty to a new communal body with executive powers would violate the social contract between ruled and ruler.

\textsuperscript{104} See list of previous academic on the EU as a security community.
\textsuperscript{105} See: (Mitrany, 1943) & Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces (Palgrave, 2006), 13-15.
\textsuperscript{107} Deutsch, 64 & 66.
\textsuperscript{110} Or as Rousseau would term an Executive of governmental authority, “the magistracy”.
The body politic, or sovereign, owes its being to the sanctity of the contract alone, it cannot commit itself, even in treaties with foreign powers, to anything that would derogate from the original act of association; it could not for example, alienate a part of itself or submit to another sovereign. To violate the act which has given it existence would be to annihilate itself; and what is nothing can produce nothing.  

This leads Deutsch to warning about the possibility of elites adopting vanguardist policies to achieve greater communal unity, but in a manner that can undermine the legitimacy of their objective. Deutsch's research led him to conclude that communal values are most effective politically when they were are not merely held in abstract terms, but when they were incorporated into political institutions and in habits of political behaviour which permitted these values to be acted upon in such a way as to strengthen people’s attachments to them. This connection between values, institutions and habits we call 'way of life'…

In short, Deutsch argues elites who develop political structures that do not reflect communal values and culture can leave the people behind, who begin to feel “disgruntled” and “alienated.”

1.3.5 Legitimacy and durability

There has been a tendency of adherents of security community theory to accept at face value claims of common cultural values that are not rooted in the historical experience of people but are merely declaratory, aspirational or disingenuous. The example of the EU serves as an occasional comparator, not least because of the frequent use of the security community model to explain it, but also because of the claims it makes of itself and the issues of identity and culture raised in the Brexit debate.

Deutsch stresses the importance of “legitimacy myths” that connect individuals “with some of the general patterns prevailing in the culture of society and with important aspects of

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111 Rousseau, 63.
112 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, 47.
the personality structures of its members.” It begs the question, what meme-complexes or as Deutsch put it, “ways of life” values, are reflected in the EU’s institutions and through which it can be said to acquire legitimacy?

The EU’s claim to a common cultural values based meme-complex is dubious. A recognition of this is evidenced by the EU’s adoption of a cultural policy as a conscious attempt to create one. Cris Shore has described the EU’s pursuit of a cultural policy as “a project of social engineering uncomfortably reminiscent of other failed modernist ideologies of the twentieth century.” According to Shore, European consciousness was being “developed and diffused from above by a vanguard of EU politicians, bureaucrats and marketing professionals” to create a way of life and identity.

As early as 1967, Deutsch was unconvinced that institutional ‘spillovers’ were proving effective in creating a European communal identity. He highlighted the “slow movement, on a mass opinion level, toward an image of European unity” compared to that of the European elite groupings. Without a natural, homogenous ‘way of life’ the construction of the security community is reliant on the creation of institutions that are intended to be immune from democratic impulses that might impede their progress. This modus operandi might be considered justifiable and legitimate or unacceptable depending on the relevant meme-complexes held by different policy-makers and the wider electorates.

The notion of an ‘enlightened’ elite overseeing the fortunes of the wider populace is a meme-complex with a long pedigree. In the context of the EU, Roger Scruton echoes Shore’s point about vanguardism, suggesting

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113 Nationalism and Its Alternatives, 14.
119 Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives, 124.
The sense of legitimacy that prevails on the continent, and in France especially, is expressed in the ‘vanguard myth’. This speaks of the legitimate use of power by those — the experts, the intellectuals, the liberators — who have the knowledge required to lead the people to a salvation that they could never achieve on their own.\textsuperscript{120}

In contradistinction to this is a distinctly Anglospheric meme-complex that Robert Tombs has called the “Magna Carta myth” to refer to a people-centred, bottom-up approach to governance holding “that ultimately the people decide and elites obey.”\textsuperscript{121} It is a catch-all label that incorporates English Common Law, the Magna Carta, 1688 Bill of Rights and arguably the US Declaration of Independence. This narrative of what might be termed a ‘Magna Carta compact’ between people and rulers can and does apply to security communities too. Deutsch refers to different types of security communities and he categorises the 1950s Commonwealth as featuring high legitimacy, with no single command, but relying upon “mutual responsiveness, communication, and cooperation” as opposed to a federal, amalgamated unions where, “we might expect concentration of command… to remain high and even grow…”.\textsuperscript{122} In the former example, sovereignty is not surrendered and the social contract remains intact.

The problem for EU vanguardists is that their conception of a European security community is reliant upon a ratchet effect to reduce sovereignty through “ever closer union” rather than a natural process related to the growth of common identity. As Philip Allot puts it, the EU lacks an idea of itself. It is an unimagined community. In seeking to transcend a set of national societies, its potential development and even survival are threatened if it cannot generate a self-consciousness within the public minds of its constituent societies and in the private minds of the human beings whose social self-constructing it determines.\textsuperscript{123}

Peter Mair suggests legitimacy has suffered from a two-way “hollowing out.” Primarily, a feeble European parliament provides false democratic ‘cover’ for an unelected and unaccountable powerful Commission. But secondly, a ‘negative spillover’ has occurred whereby the constituent states are also delegitimized because politicians “pretend they are only running the branch office…” and the result is a democratic void. As Tombs puts in, far from being a superstate, [the EU] has become a political black hole into which power and sovereignty disappear: the states lose, but the EU does not gain either the legitimacy or the capacity to solve its financial, economic, social and political problems.

1.3.6 The introduction of ‘synergic’ and ‘hemiplegic’ terminology

To take account of the issues referred to in the last section, this thesis asserts Adler and Barnett’s application of the term ‘tightly-coupled’ does not accurately identify and highlight differences in a community’s security effectiveness outside of its own boundaries. A ‘zone of peace’ and tight coupling is provides no hint of effectiveness or lack thereof the EU. The terms ‘hemiplegic’ or ‘synergic’ are offered as appropriate descriptors of their functionality. Hemiplegic refers to an identifiable security community that is characterised by dysfunctional external security coordination behaviour. In contrast, a security community might be termed ‘synergic’ if it exhibits a capacity to act in a cohesive manner on external matters.

Thus, the EU is a tightly-coupled security community by virtue of its status as a zone of peace, and since it features a dense web of ‘internal’ laws, institutions and security measures. However it is ‘hemiplegic’ since its military and foreign policy aspirations have failed to be realised and consequently the EU’s external actorship can be characterised as exhibiting a

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125 Ibid., 117-28.
126 Tombs.
127 In biology it denotes varying degrees of weakness and lack of control/function in one side of a body.
form of paralysis.128 This has been an ongoing pattern since the Plevan Plan and the EU’s inability to establish a military capability.129 It has been dramatically underlined again by the EU’s unwillingness to formulate an independent response to the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, and its inconsistent approach to tensions with China and Russia.130 Actual conflict on its borders might ‘force’ more EU cohesion and a military posture, but the latter is more likely to be expressed via NATO.

1.3.7 Approach Outline

Despite the application of security community to numerous other transnational entities such as ASEAN, the Gulf States, the Nordic states, NATO and the Turkish region, it has not been applied to the Anglosphere core. This thesis applies a version of Adler and Barnett’s model to explain the Anglospheric security community in so much as it examines the existence and nature of the institutional framework as evidenced by treaties and informal arrangements and highlights the ‘solidarity’ of member states in the form of mutual aid in conflicts. It also seeks to address the how and why in terms of its growth and durability.

It makes the following modifications to Adler and Barnett’s model, including a stress on:

* The prime importance of culture and meme-complexes in understanding the viability of security communities and downgrading (but not eliminating) the contemporary emphasis on institutions.

• The role of individuals and agencies in these processes are referenced.

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• The issue of legitimacy – introduced to the theoretical model as a factor in the durability of a security community.

• Introducing the terms ‘synergic’ and ‘hemiplegic’ to describe the effectiveness of pluralistic security communities beyond a mere absence of war.

Although the focus of this thesis is on the post World War 2 period, it is necessary to provide some background to what might be termed a security community in ‘scaffolding.’ The following chapter briefly examines a period preceding the development of the post-War Anglospheric security community. As such, it looks at the change in relations between what was an imperial security community and the US.

The subsequent chapters trace the development of a ‘synergic’ Anglospheric security community based on the five core states in three stages. These are the post-Word War 2 period until the Suez Crisis, the post-Suez Crisis to the end of the Cold War and, finally, post-Cold War until 2021.

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Chapter 2. Before the Anglosphere

2.1 Introduction - The process of community identification

The creation of the post World War 2 Anglospheric security community based on five core states cannot be understood without reference to the historical social impulses and attitudes of the people it embraces. In this respect the underlying factors that progress or impede a security community are similar to those relating to the creation of nationhood. This chapter examines how Deutsch’s earlier work on nation-building provides some insights into the importance of the common outlooks between the two English-speaking blocs: the US and the British Empire. These provided the basis of the modern five state Anglospheric security community.

The process that leads to a sense of nationhood is described by both Karl Deutsch and Benedict Anderson as being founded upon a process of communication. Both agreed that language plays an important part in contributing to a communal identity. For Anderson, the rise of nationalism relied upon the advent of the print media, whereby newspapers and books created ‘national’ or communal consciousness. For Deutsch, the notion of communication also included print media, but his works stressed the necessity of common traditions and shared heritages kept alive by oral channels of communication, including folk-lore in the form of poems or songs, but also means of communication including the pulpit. These pre-print methods of communication have a particular relevance to the potency of the Magna Carta compact in the meme-complex of the early English-speaking peoples. The original Magna Carta and any subsequent revisions were, by law, communicated to the general populace in the centuries following its signing. By 1265, the sheriffs of each shire were required to publish and read out the Magna Carta and any revisions twice a year in the shire courts. In 1297, this was extended to include borough meetings plus readings from the pulpits of cathedral churches. The evidence suggests these memes were readily absorbed into the consciousness of the population.

The words of some chapters must have become almost as familiar as the liturgy. Already in 1226, those attending the shire court of Lincoln were able to quote the detailed provisions of the 1225 charter back at the sheriff, thereby holding him to account. At least some of them must have studied the then very recent document attentively.\(^\text{133}\)

The legacy of the Magna Carta compact helped shaped the notion of the 'Rights of Englishmen' as being an 'imagined' 'British' communal identifier. It was not actually 'Anglo-saxon' since it applied also to Wales, Scotland and Ireland.\(^\text{134}\) Little wonder after three centuries of something akin to liturgical repetition, the narrative of a Magna Carta compact had become an especially resilient meme. It was carried across the Atlantic in the minds of the first and subsequent British migrants to the North American colonies. And when the old issues relating to the power of the King erupted into the English Civil War, it played out too in the American colonies too, finally ending with Royalist defeat in the 1655 Battle of Great Severn in Maryland.\(^\text{135}\) It was the English Civil War and the perceived ‘confederacy’ of an authoritarian church and king against the 'rights of Englishmen' that John Adams, second President of the United States, declared form part of the meme-complex of the colonies.

It was this great struggle that peopled America. It was not religion alone, as is commonly supposed; but it was a love of universal liberty, and a hatred, a dread, a horror, of the infernal confederacy before described, that projected, conducted, and accomplished the settlement of America.\(^\text{136}\)

The Magna Carta compact narrative, buttressed by the 1688 Bill of Rights, formed part of political consciousness on both sides of the Atlantic and repeatedly referred to in philosophical pamphlets and incorporated into legal doctrine.\(^\text{137}\) The eventual declaration of independence by the colonies in 1776, represented a fracturing of the English-speaking security community into two. It did not represent an abandonment of the Magna Carta

\(^{132}\) See: Deutsch; Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*.


\(^{134}\) Scots and Welsh attended the original meeting at Runnymede and the slightly later *Magna Carta Hibernae* applied to Ireland.


compact, rather, the colonialists had held up the principles of the Magna Carta against an Imperial system that was no longer seen to represent it. It was not a rejection of Englishness, but rather an assertion of the values associated with ‘English’ rights.

The restoration of peaceful relations within Anglospheric security community was not inevitable nor pre-ordained. Shared language and ethnicity are no guarantee of cordial relations, as the experience of Spain and its settler colonies in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries illustrate. However, after the experience with its North American colonies, the process of reducing the monarchy to a more symbolic role in Britain gathered pace. The Magna Carta was evoked by parliamentarians and Chartists alike to extend the franchise. And as a new patchwork of British colonies developed the British government did not repeat their previous mistakes. Internal self-government by elected assemblies were introduced to the colonies that would become Dominions and allowed to acquire more powers as time progressed. As such, there was no rebellion or traumatic break between Britain and the three dominions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand and there remained a high degree of legitimacy associated with the Crown and shared cultural outlooks. The argument could be proffered this was due to the ‘whiteness’ of the settler colonies, but the unwillingness of the Irish Free State and Union of South Africa to form part of an Anglospheric based security community suggest culture and identity as factors.

Unlike Spain, the British metropole was able to repair its relations with its rebellious former colonies. Indeed, Kevin Phillips argues this was partially because the issues that had

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143 For the dominion of Ireland see: Gretchen Friemann, *The Treaty: The Gripping Story of the Negotiations That Brought About Irish Independence and Led to the Civil War* (Merrion Press, 2021). For the role of pre-print identity formation in Boer South Africa see: Eric Ayisi Akrofi, Maria Smit,
separated them were a ‘civil war’ continuum between Magna Carta 'rights of Englishmen' demanded by the colonialists and an unaccountable executive. In other words, when it came to the nature of power, both communities shared the same meme-complex about the relationship of their peoples to the authority of the executive. This was not necessarily apparent to all Americans, who continued to see in Britain, all that they despised about monarchial and aristocratic authority that their Magna Carta inheritance ordained they oppose. This anti-imperialist meme complex became a powerful variant that endured in some individuals into the post World War 2 period.

The period between the War of 1812 and the Great Rapprochement (1895-1914) represents a period when the US and UK were often “distinctly cool” but thereafter improved. However, the relationship was not entirely negative and where individuals from the two sides encountered one another within a maritime conflict zone, there is evidence that natural affinities came to the fore.

2.2 Early British-US Relations

2.2.1 Relations after US Independence

The role Britain paid in re-establishing the US navy shortly after US Independence is frequently overlooked, but the experience established a long tradition of mutual understanding and camaraderie that survived sporadic clashes. Following the 1784 Jay Treaty to resolve their territorial disputes, Britain and the Americans found themselves as informal allies in the so-called Quasi War between France and the US. This was a consequence of a series of French decrees between 1796 to 1798 authorising the seizure of US merchant ships bound for British ports in the West Indies and the British Isles. Having disbanded its navy,


144 Phillips.


146 Giving rise to long-standing naval intimacy


148 “Report of the Secretary of State respecting the depredations committed on the commerce of the United States, since October 1, 1796” A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S.
the US relied on British assistance in the form of technology, cannon and gunpowder. A “system of private signals” allowed mutual recognition and joint engagements against French ships. This is not to say this period was free of fractious issues, and although the Royal Navy’s practice of impressment might have been set aside, it was only temporary and its resumption was a factor in the War of 1812.

This was the last war to be fought between the two sides, but official relations remained distant. The two navies remained in contact by virtue of ongoing maritime travels and despite occasional flare-ups, these interactions frequently led to unofficial cooperation, and in some instances, necessitated breaches of state policy in conflict zones. The career of US Commodore Josiah Tattnall, a veteran of the 1812 War, was one example. In 1832, Tattnall was the commander of a US naval squadron off Mexico, and despite his past experience of the British, offered protection to British merchants caught up in the Mexican Revolution. Tattnall explained his actions as stemming from

the spirit of friendship which has happily of late years characterised the intercourse in all parts of the world of those who speak the English language...[and] that the protection I offered the subjects of Great Britain has been frequently extended in similar instances by His British Majesty’s officers to citizens of the United States.

In 1858, Tattnall was Commodore of the US Navy’s East India Squadron and attempting to facilitate a trade treaty with Imperial China. Since China was engaged in the Second Opium War with Britain and France, Tattnall was under strict instructions to maintain US neutrality. Waiting to travel up the River Peoh, Tattnall witnessed the ambush of a RN

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force and its subsequent difficulties under devastating fire. Tatnall felt obliged to assist and despite US neutrality took action under fire to assist.155

There were other examples too, such as in 1845, when the US sloop *St Louis* gave assistance to British NZ colonists under attack during the Maori Wars.156 Another instance occurred during the Battle of Shimonoseki Straits of 1863, when the US contingent assisted the Royal Navy. US commander, Pearson was knighted by the British for his actions. Pearson’s actions in breaching US neutrality were criticised by the US Government, but by public acclaim, Congress was obliged to change the Constitution to allow Pearson to become the only ‘knight’ on the US Naval roster.157

In 1874, both navies cooperated to put down a riot in Hawaii despite both states backing opposing sides.158 In the 1882 Anglo Egyptian War, the spontaneous cooperation between the two navies was depicted in the front cover of the US magazine *Judge*, with the caption, “John Bull to Uncle Sam, ‘Thanks for assistance rendered. You are little, but you’re good’.”159 These actions entered the collective consciousness as poems, songs, and newspaper articles extolling the natural bonds between the two peoples.160 In his history of the US National Anthem, Marc Ferris notes a version parodying the relationship to the tune of the Star-Spangled Banner.161

These examples do not constitute evidence of some preordained future of collaboration. Speaking the same language is hardly a guaranteed precursor of peaceful international relations. However, these British-US naval examples and the songs, literature and media

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161 Ferris, 87.
references associated with them illustrate what Deutsch means by the power of
communication to create communal feelings, or as Anderson puts it, the possibility of an
‘imagined community.’

2.3 The power of natural affinities

2.3.1 The Great Rapprochement

These examples of spontaneous friendly naval interaction were not in themselves
guarantees against war and on occasions the possibility of war was strong. Relations were
strained over the UK’s perceived favouritism towards the Confederacy during the American
Civil War (1861-1865) and the UK’s failure to stop the construction of Confederacy naval
raiders. Relations improved after arbitration and the Treaty of Washington granting the US
compensation.

The likelihood of war between the British Empire and the US increased over a serious
disagreement over the boundaries of British Guyana and Venezuela in 1895. The US regarded
British assertion of its colony’s boundaries as a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. US public
opinion was persuaded the British were the villains of the piece. War did not occur because
the British agreed to an arbitration agreement in 1896, the start of which marked ‘the Great
Rapprochement.’

A pattern of arbitration dispute resolution was confirmed by when issues flared up over
Venezuela in 1902 and again over the Alaskan-British Colombia border in 1903.

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162 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.
163 Near misses in North America were the cross-border Fenian Raids, the Caroline Incident, the
Pig War (the only casualty was a pig) and the Aroostook War. See: Kathleen Burk, The Lion and the
Eagle: The Interaction of the British and American Empires 1783–1972 (Bloomsbury Publishing,
2018), 109-54.
164 See: Howard Jones, Blue & Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign
Relations (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2010).
165 See: Phillip E Myers, Dissolving Tensions: Rapprochement and Resolution in British-
American-Canadian Relations in the Treaty of Washington Era, 1865–1914 (The Kent State
University Press, 2015).
167 Ibid., 187-93.
Evidence that a security community is emerging is the formation of practices and/or institutions that favour and then entrench arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. The period following 1895, gave witness to just such a pattern in the relations between the British Empire and the US. It did not constitute a security community as such, in that preparations for the possibility of war had not ceased, but conflict became increasingly improbable.\textsuperscript{169}

Whilst the move towards a pattern of arbitration explains how disputes were resolved, at issue is how and why this path was chosen why it succeeded. A simple explanation is that arbitration was in both US and British interests and it certainly was. Britain felt its supremacy at sea was declining and the US worried about being outmatched by other rising powers. Both had choices as to possible allies. Indeed, in 1902 Britain shocked international opinion by allying with Japan, a non-white and non-European nation, to counter Russia. For two decades Britain and Japan shared intelligence and technology, and coordinated naval strategy.\textsuperscript{170} In contrast, British-US relations appeared to be less substantial and limited to dispute resolution and informal strategic understandings.\textsuperscript{171} However, it was the emergent British-Japanese security community that faltered and then withered.\textsuperscript{172} Kupchan suggests that the absence of ‘cultural commonality’ was a factor that explains why the British-Japanese the alliance “ultimately eroded and gave way to geopolitical rivalry.”\textsuperscript{173}

2.3.2 A ‘communio incidens’ fellowship

In 1898, Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, expressed publicly what many in the British Government were already contemplating and called for an alliance with the US, stressing the commonality of culture and world outlook with the US.

\textsuperscript{168} Burk, 150-51.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Kupchan, \textit{How Enemies Become Friends}, 135-42.
Their laws, their literature, their standpoint upon every question are the same as ours: their feeling, their interest in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world are identical to ours. Their law, their literature, their standpoint upon every question are the same as ours; their feeling, their interest in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world are identical to ours.\textsuperscript{174}

American reception to the suggestion of alliance was generally positive and the US Media noted the British support for the US’s expansionist policy towards the Spanish controlled Philippines.\textsuperscript{175} Chamberlain’s appeal was received less favourably by the major European states. The German analysis was perceptive, recognising not only the communal basis that provided a form of popular legitimacy, but the informal nature of the relationship that gave strength to such an ‘alliance.’ One of Germany’s most widely read newspapers, and purveyor of the official governmental line, the Hamburgischer Correspondent, assessed the speech as a very remarkable synopsis of the views of millions of Britons in the mother country and the colonies [and] are more and more accepting as authoritative for the future development of the foreign policy of Great Britain.\textsuperscript{176}

This was reminiscent of a remark by Bismarck who had predicted the greatest political factor in future international relations would be “the inherited and permanent fact that North America speaks English.”\textsuperscript{177} The Hamburgischer Correspondent invoked a phase unfamiliar to English Law, but insightful. It concluded the emerging UK-US relationship should be designated ‘a communio incidens’ arrangement.\textsuperscript{178} The concept forms part of Roman Law, largely confined to Germanic legal corporate law doctrine.\textsuperscript{179} In the context of the original

\textsuperscript{174} Mr. Chamberlain in Birmingham. Speech to Birmingham Liberal Unionist Association.,” \textit{The Times}, May, 14 1898.
\textsuperscript{175} "Welcomed in Washington: Chamberlain's Plea for an Alliance Favorably Received in Government Circles," \textit{NY Times}, May, 16 1898.
\textsuperscript{176} Hamburgischer Correspondent quoted in Times Berlin Correspondent reporting on reaction to Chamberlain’s Speech. "Anglo American Relations," \textit{The Times}, May, 18 1898.
\textsuperscript{177} George Louis Beer, \textit{The English-Speaking Peoples: Their Future Relations and Joint International Obligations} (The Macmillan Company, 1917), 186.
\textsuperscript{178} "Anglo American Relations." The Times, May 18, 1898
Justinian Roman Law,\textsuperscript{180} it relates to obligations not arising from a formal contract or agreement but from a ‘community’ or fellowship.\textsuperscript{181} The phraseology is particularly apt as a description of a more modern Anglosphere-based approach to cooperation.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, the idea of a ‘fellowship’ was given added potency by burgeoning transatlantic familial ties that included Joseph Chamberlain. His American wife was the daughter of William Crowninshield-Endicott, the Secretary of War in President Cleveland’s first administration.\textsuperscript{182} These facilitated Chamberlain’s unofficial talks with US Secretary Richard Olney.\textsuperscript{183} They proved productive and in 1896 Olney stressed the common values of British and Americans,

If there is anything they [the American people] were attached to, it is to ideals and principles which are distinctly English in their origin and development… Nothing would more gratify the mass of the American people to stand shoulder to shoulder with England.\textsuperscript{184}

Within two years Olney declared Britain and the US President Cleveland’s speech on declared a treaty of arbitration had been

… initiated by kindred peoples, speaking the same tongue and joined together by all the ties of common traditions, common institutions, and common aspirations. The experiment of substituting civilised methods for brute force as the means of settling international questions of right will thus be tried under the happiest auspices…\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{183} Crosby, 119.
\textsuperscript{184} Stephen R Rock, \textit{Appeasement in International Politics} (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 42.
\textsuperscript{185} Grover Cleveland, "Speech: Message Regarding Treaty with Britain," (1897).
2.3.3 The bonds of friends and families

Joseph Chamberlain’s transatlantic marriage was by no means unusual. In fact, transatlantic marriages were a common feature of US-UK political relations, facilitating co-operation and influencing the outlooks of leading politicians. Future Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan were both products of such unions. The popular TV series *Downton Abbey* in which a British aristocrat takes a monied American wife was not a caricature. In 1907, a well-connected British aristocrat, Lady Dorothy Nevill, observed,

> at the present day, so close has the union between our-selves and the United States become that Americans are hardly looked upon as foreigners at all, so many people having American relatives… It may with justice be said that it is by the American girl that we have been conquered…

This was certainly an exaggeration, but it spoke to an ongoing social interaction between US and British citizens that strengthened the relationship between the two countries. Sometimes the outcomes were tangible and a couple of examples will suffice.

Chequers, the country residence of the British Prime Minister, was a gift to the nation by Viscount Lee and his American wife. Lady Lee was the daughter of the extremely wealthy New York banker, John Godfrey Moore. Lee’s career is indicative of the complex network of influential individuals both political and social that gave resilience and depth to relationships between the American and British communities and shaped perspectives. As the British military attaché to Washington, Lee participated in the Spanish-American War in Cuba alongside future US President, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. Lee was granted honorary

186 More recent examples include: Tony Crossland, former Labour Foreign Secretary (and Eurosceptic); David Owen, former Labour Foreign Secretary (and Eurosceptic). Tony Benn, former Labour Cabinet Minister (and Eurosceptic).


188 Davis lists hundreds of such high society marriages in his appendices; 176-99.

189 Their society wedding was in 1898.


Money from Lee’s wife was used to purchase Chequers, and donated it to the British nation for the Prime Minister’s country residence.
membership of Roosevelt’s ‘Rough Riders’ and formed an enduring friendship with the formerly Anglophobe Roosevelt. Lee’s partisan role reflected the supportive attitude of the British Government that supplied the US with intelligence on Spanish activity. Lee would go on to occupy key positions in the Admiralty at crucial junctures when Imperial defence was under review, first as the Civil Lord of the Admiralty in 1903, under Lord Selborne, and later First Lord himself in 1921.

Kevin Phillips in *the Cousins’ Wars* highlights the importance of this conflict, remarking, that

historians who dismiss the Spanish-American War as a sad little affair, ignore the unique psychological role it played in reuniting Britain and the United States.

Roosevelt told Lee that the UK’s tacit support “worked a complete revolution in my feelings and attitude” and that he now felt “very strongly” that the English-speaking peoples had become “closer together than for a century and a quarter…”

The strong personal connection of Lee with Roosevelt was not unique, but was replicated in a series of other transnational personal relationships that David Burton has characterised as a “special relationship of friends.” These friends included the diplomat Cecil Spring Rice whom Roosevelt had first met during Spring Rice’s appointment to the UK legation to Washington in 1886. It is reminiscent of another more modern example of Lord Harlech’s status as a de facto special advisor to President Kennedy. Spring-Rice was to be a permanent feature in UK-US relations up until WW1, acting as a conduit to the wider US political establishment.

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191 For which Lee received the US Campaign Medal
193 Phillips, 507.
198 For example: "Balfour on Visit to Col Roosevelt.,” *Washington Post*, May, 14 1917.
This ‘special relationship of friends’ was reinforced and extended by the Boer War. The War also brought into being new networks, both political and cultural, that built upon existing communal feelings. More than that, the Boer War acted as a catalyst for a fundamental re-think of the Empire’s security; not just between the Britain and the Dominions, but for the Empire and its lack of alliances marked the point at which it became possible to think the Empire might not last forever.199

2.4 Changing attitudes and alignments

2.4.1 The Boer War: New relationships

The pattern of arbitration, familial social ties and a new focus on common cultural liberal values underpinned by the narrative of the Magna Carta compact allowed a shared purpose to grow. The Spanish-American War had encouraged a more positive outlook of Britain by many ordinary Americans and it had helped forge important high-level political/diplomatic friendships.

The Boer War acted to strengthen this feeling of ‘fellowship’ and facilitated the creation of new political and social transatlantic networks that sought to emphasise the common values of both peoples. These efforts included a range of literary figures who were to play key roles in creating new political associations. One such figure was Indian-born Rudyard Kipling, who had married Caroline Starr Balestier, a member of a prominent and political American family.200 He had been a resident of Vermont and was already an associate of Roosevelt. On the outbreak of War, Kipling wrote a poem for publication on both sides of the Atlantic.201

Das Nalapat refers to the blood of the Anglospheric mind as encapsulating “the type of thought and behaviour that led to Magna Carta” and so did Kipling.202 He evoked the shared Magna Carta legacy against the perceived authoritarianism of the Boer republics that discriminated against non-Boer uitlanders who were denied the vote and citizenship.

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200 Her grandfather was E. Peshine Smith, a wealthy lawyer in the US State Department.
Kipling’s poem cast the Boer president Paul Kruger as representative of the ‘old issue’ of a ‘King’s tyranny’ who denied the people their rights. The verses call for the Magna Carta rights of ‘Englishmen’ as won “in the eyot of Runnymede” and that a King should not be above the law. A few lines convey the gist of the message.

All we have of freedom, all we use or know -
This our fathers bought for us long and long ago.
Ancient Right unnoticed as the breath we draw -
Leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath the Law -
Lance and torch and tumult, steel and grey-goose wing* Wrenched it, inch and ell* and all, slowly from the King.
Till our fathers ‘stablished, after bloody years,
How our King is one of us, first among his peers.
So they bought us freedom - not at little cost-
Wherefore must we watch the King, lest our gain be lost.

In marked contrast to the attitude of the other European powers who favoured the Boers, the US was broadly, if not entirely, sympathetic to the British. Support came from American scout Major Frederick Russell Burnham, appointed to head up military field intelligence operations and reporting directly to Lord Roberts the British C in C. Before leaving Alaska to take up his post, Burnham informed the media,

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202 Nalapat.
203 It was originally called ‘the King’
204 Eyot - Anglo-saxon for ‘small island’.
205 ‘Grey-goose wing’ - reference to the feathered fletching of an arrow. ‘ell’ - Middle English for yard.
206 Rudyard Kipling, "The Old Issue," (1899). Grey-goose wing refers to the arrow feathers.
209 Robert H MacDonald, Sons of the Empire: The Frontier and the Boy Scout Movement, 1890-1918 (University Toronto Press, 1993), 82.
The representative American people very much favour England. Barring the Irish papers who are always noisy, the bulk of the American people have come to realise that in this case Monarchy stands for freedom and Republic for despotism…

Burnham was not exaggerating about Americans willing to fight; an estimated several thousand volunteers served in British army units. These included an entire squadron composed of Texan volunteers, many of whom had served alongside Roosevelt and Viscount Lee as Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War.

2.4.2 Deepening affinity but no alliance

It was with this wider cultural acknowledgment of the desirability of alignment that in 1903, Prime Minister Balfour felt able to call for a transformational change in foreign policy and an alliance with “this great English-speaking republic.” The Times reported Chamberlain elaborating on this theme to great acclaim from his audience,

We have no secrets from them, we desire to have no secrets from them. (Hear, hear)… The Monroe Doctrine has no enemies in this country that I know of. (Cheers)… We desire no colonisation, we desire no alteration in the balance of power, we desire no acquisition of territory. (Hear, hear)… We welcome any increase of the US upon the great Western Hemisphere. (Hear hear)… I go further and I say that, so far as I am concerned, I believe it would be a great gain for civilisation if the United States of America were more actively to interest themselves by making arrangements by which these constantly recurring difficulties between European powers and certain states in South America could be avoided.

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211 Frederick Burnham quoted in: "Famous American Scout for Lord Roberts’ Staff," Daily Telegraph, January, 26 1900. In fact, the Hearst newspapers were Anglophobic in stance on most matters and whilst critical, felt unable to support the Boer cause. Support for Britain was not as widespread as Burnham suggested, with populist Democratic Party Jennings Bryan being most vociferous.


215 "Mr. Balfour in Liverpool," The Times, February, 14 1903.
The view that the deepening affinity with the US made war between the two sides improbable and abhorrent were reflected in the post-Boer War review of Imperial defence. The First Lord of the Admiralty Selborne regarded it as “the greatest evil which could befall the British Empire,” adding, “I know of no statesman of any party who would not rejoice… if relations between the British Empire and the United States of America were to ripen into a permanent alliance.” Selborne’s colleague (and former Rough Rider), Arthur Lee, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty concurred, declaring, “I cannot for a moment contemplate the possibility of hostilities really taking place,” and adding that war would constitute “an act of supreme folly”.

There was no war, but equally there was no alliance either. As Phillips puts it, the US and the British were not allies, but by 1910 they were moving in that direction. Again, it was not inevitable, just likely, and when the two parts of the English-speaking world were brought together in World War 1, the sense of a communal identity based on liberty and the rule of law, was invoked.

In a speech to commemorate US Independence Day in 1918, Churchill addressed an audience of Americans, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders and placed the Declaration of Independence centre stage as a product of “English soil.” Although Churchill talks of an English race and an American race, it is to the central meme-complex of liberty to which he returns as the unifying factor. Churchill claims that the inspiration behind policies and constitutions that seek to safeguard citizens “on the one hand from the shame of despotism, on the other from the misery of anarchy on the other…” are “inevitably drawn from the Anglo-saxon mind.” Churchill seeks to suggest that Britain has itself, acted on the principles of the American Declaration of Independence, thereby accruing a high legitimacy to imperial relationships and facilitating fraternal relationships. He refers to a 'communion,' that is to say, the sharing of intimate beliefs and feelings, especially on a mental level.

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217 Quoted in ibid.
218 Phillips, 513.
220 Ibid.
A great harmony exists between the Declaration of Independence and all we are fighting for now. A similar harmony exists between the principles of that Declaration and what the British Empire has wished to stand for and has at last achieved, not only here at home, but in the great self-governing Dominions through the world. The Declaration of Independence is not only an American document; it follows on Magna Carta and the Petition of Right as the third of the great title deeds on which the liberties of the English-speaking race are founded. By it we lost an Empire, but by it we also preserved an Empire. By applying these principles and learning this lesson we have maintained unbroken communion with those powerful Commonwealths which our children have founded and have developed beyond the seas, and which, in this time of stress, have rallied spontaneously to our aid.  

2.4.3 The acknowledgement of a non-racial identity

The familial and social ties between the American and the British communities continued to develop. There was a growing move away from attempts to present the ‘Anglo-saxonism’ as a racial construct. Instead, the emphasis shifted to recognising the importance of language as a means of conveying common ideas. In 1918, Sir Evelyn Wrench established the English Speaking Union (ESU) in London. The small inaugural meeting of fifteen individuals that initiated the organisation included a representative of the US embassy and three other Americans. Of the other eleven present, the majority were of Celtic origin, including the Anglo-Irish Wrench. The Anglo-Indian-Irish academic, Professor William Macneile Dixon was present. Another Trinity College alma mater attending was the Reverend William Geikie-Cobb, an Anglican liberal with strong views on women's rights. Those of Scottish origin included diplomat and author John Buchan, and city merchant George Mills McKay (who would serve as Treasurer). Others included Welsh diplomat Sir Arthur James Herbert, Sir George Morris Sutton (Former PM of Natal, South Africa), Australian Henry Noyes, and Canadian Sir Campbell Stuart who had raised a Canadian Irish Volunteer brigade in World War One.

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Invited to meet Woodrow Wilson on his state visit to London in 1918, Wrench explained to the President, the ESU was a union of people from seven core democracies: the United States, Great Britain and Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland. Wrench was keen to establish the ESU was not a “narrow attitude” based on race and did not “aim for formal alliances.”

Wilson, aware of the cosmopolitan mix of his own countries’ electorate, agreed. His response is often quoted by nay-sayers as evidence of a denunciation of any special relationship between the English-speaking communities. On the contrary, it was a statement by a President of Anglo-saxon racial origin, that it was ideas that mattered and language was only important as a carrier of ideas and a fellowship based on communion. How could the relationship be based on anything else when just a quick glance of American surnames suggested non-Anglo-saxon racial origins.

You must not speak of us who come over here as cousins, still less as brothers; we are neither. Neither must you think of us as Anglo-Saxons, for that term can no longer be rightly applied to the people of the United States. Nor must too much importance in this connection be attached to the fact that English is our common language… there are only two things which can establish and maintain closer relations between your country and mine: they are community of ideals and of interests.

Wilson was correct; it was not genes but memes that create a sense of community. If the term ‘cousins’ or ‘brothers’ is to be employed, it can only apply in a memetic sense to a shared familial Anglospheric set of ideas. As Bennett remarks, for example, “‘Innocent until proven guilty’ now belongs to Chang, Gonzales, and Singh, as well as Smith and Jones.”

Or to paraphrase Nalapat, “Blood brothers of the mind.”

Wrench understood ESU was about language reinforcing the notion of a non-racial tribe or phyle with common traditions, common ideals, who possessed a common literature, and

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223 "Greetings at the Embassy," The Times, December, 30 1918.
224 Ibid.
226 Peter Hitchens, "The Nonsense of the 'Special Relationship'," Daily Mail, November 9 2020.
believed “in the same conceptions of justice, freedom, order and good government” and should therefore have similar interests.\textsuperscript{228}

Despite these social developments, the hopes of a post-World War 1 alliance or partnership did not materialise. Governmental relations began to follow a familiar haphazard pattern of positive advances, and then a deterioration as circumstances and personalities changed. Before exploring the interwar period, it is appropriate to examine the impact of the Boer War on Imperial defence arrangements that were to impact relations between the UK and the dominions up to and after WW1.

2.5 New security structures and alignments emerge

2.5.1 The Committee for Imperial Defence and the Dominions

The review of imperial security in the wake of the Boer War went far deeper than a reassessment of relations with the US. The demands of war had exposed imperial defence as being piecemeal and often dysfunctional. The Boer War had not exposed any Dominion failure in communal effort; the strength of the cultural and constitutional links meant their loyalty to ‘the mother country’ was never in doubt. The Dominions had rallied to the cause, each sending large numbers of troops (17,000 Australians, 8,500 Canadians and 8,000 New Zealanders).\textsuperscript{229} Rather, the experience suggested a more coordinated and strategic approach to the defence of the Empire was required. Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, concluded, “We have been shamefully unenthusiastic in the way we have treated questions of national defence.”\textsuperscript{230} In 1902, Selborne, as Under Secretary for the Colonies, had helped organise a colonial conference to discuss Imperial Defence. From the deliberations of that meeting, Balfour proceeded to establish the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) to replace the

\textsuperscript{228} "Greetings at the Embassy."
\textsuperscript{229} Morris, 95.
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Cabinet Defence Committee as a means of establishing effective and informed strategic security advice.231

The CID was consultative and possessed no executive authority, with the Prime Minister as the only permanent member with the authority to invite the attendance of ministers and professional experts. Its purpose was to provide a strategic analysis of Imperial defence and allowed representatives from the self-governing Colonies and Dominions to attended when appropriate.232 With regard to the relationship with latter, Balfour was keen to stress that the CID had no power to compel attendance or issue the Dominion representatives with instructions.

I hope that when any problem of defence which touches them nearly comes up, and even when they take a closer interest in the problems of imperial defence as a whole, we may have the advantage of their assistance in our councils…

It is only thus by limiting our functions that we can have that authority which I hope we shall more and more gain in the general scheme of Imperial defence, and that our opinions will carry that weight which will be all the more effective because there is behind them no power of coercive authority.233

This was the modus operandi that Churchill referred to in his ‘Lessons Learned’ 1918 Independence Day speech. It represented not just a practical approach to the aspirations of self-government but a cultural mind-set that acknowledged its legitimacy depended upon a non-coercive, ‘power-up approach’ and a preference for informal working practices.

So, for example, whilst in London for the 1909 and 1911 Imperial Defence Conferences, high-ranking Dominion representatives, were invited to meetings of the CID.234 In 1912, Asquith informed the Commons that a forthcoming CID would be attended by

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233 Balfour Arthur Speech 1904 quoted in Hankey, 84-85; Boyd, 86.

234 See: Hankey, 84-85; Boyd, 89-90.
representatives from the Dominions and revealed that previously, five Dominion premiers sat with the CID over the course of three days to discuss imperial strategy and defence. Asquith informed the Commons,

I do not think there has ever been in the history of our Imperial development a more momentous or in many ways a more significant occasion…

We discussed upon those occasions the co-operation of the naval forces of the United Kingdom with those of the Dominions; the status of the Dominion Fleets, the flag to be flown by them, and the representation of the Dominions on the Committee of Imperial Defence; the possibility of their setting up, each of them in their own Dominions, some corresponding body to which strategic questions, naval and military in their relation, might be referred.²³⁵

The Empire was evolving however, and Canada in particular was keen to exert a degree of independence and define more clearly the relationship between ‘the mother country’ and Dominion. These matters were resolved at the 1926 Imperial Conference and reaffirmed Anglospheric preference for security relationships based on the idea of a ‘fellowship.’²³⁶ This pattern reflected the Communio incidens principle invoked by the Germans to describe British-US relationships²³⁷. Unlike the British-US relationship, the ties binding Britain and the Dominions were deeper and reinforced by common citizenship, free allegiance to the Crown, for trust-based informality and an avoidance of a restrictive legal ‘cage.’ The UK-Dominion relationships epitomised the idea of the Magna Carta compact that decisions should not be imposed by a central power from above, rather, it was a ‘commonwealth’ under a symbolic crown. The idea that various players could make autonomous decisions was expressly enunciated in the Declaration from the 1926 Imperial Conference.

They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs,

²³⁷ As mentioned earlier. Seidl-Hohenveldern, 6, 38.
though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.\textsuperscript{238}

The Declaration notes that the nature of this sentence might lead “a foreigner… to think that it was devised rather to make mutual interference impossible than to make mutual co-operation easy.”\textsuperscript{239} The Declaration says the reverse is true, stating the Commonwealth depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and progress are among its objects… And though every Dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.\textsuperscript{240}

The Conference also decided that, “to deal with questions of diplomacy and questions of defence, we require also flexible machinery – machinery which can, from time to time, be adapted to the changing circumstances of the world.”\textsuperscript{241} It did adapt too, proving sufficiently flexible to create ad hoc committees. Following a resolution of a 1907 Colonial Conference, it was empowered to summon meetings between Dominion representatives and UK officials if urgent circumstances demanded it. Fears of German rearming led to just such a summons for the convening of the Imperial Defence Conference in 1909.\textsuperscript{242}

The highly influential and effective Secretary to the CID, Maurice Hankey, outlined how the body evolved to include the Dominion’s High Commissioners in a process of regular consultation on security and defence matters. Hankey stressed the importance of steps taken to standardise imperial military forces, singling out the creation of the Imperial Defence College to train Dominion officers in strategy, and the development of “uniform manuals, patterns of arms, equipment and stores for the sea, land and air forces…” The 1937 Imperial

\textsuperscript{238} Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926. Inter-Imperial Relations Committee Report. (I.R./26) Series

\textsuperscript{239} Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926. Inter-Imperial Relations Committee Report. (I.R./26) Series

\textsuperscript{240} Ibid. Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926.

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid. Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926.

\textsuperscript{242} “Imperial Conference on the Subject of the Defence of the Empire,” Minutes and Proceedings, October 1909. TNA Dominions No. 15: CO 886/2/8, [1]–93.
Conference observed these arrangements would ensure each member’s own security and enable members, “if so desired, to cooperate with other countries of the Commonwealth.”

It would be misleading to suggest that there were no disagreements between the Dominions and the UK. One such example was Australia’s decision to set aside King George V’s choice for Governor General in 1929 and secure the first Australian-born appointment — Sir Issac Issacs. That appointment was significant in another respect too, for it provides another example of the explicit non-racial aspect of ‘Anglo-saxonism.’ Isaac’s ethnicity was of Polish-Jewish origin, but he identified with the values of Anglo-saxonism and expressly the Magna Carta, that according to him provided the principles which form the base of the social structure of every British community...

The principles themselves cannot be found in express terms in any written Constitution of Australia, but they are inscribed in that great confirmatory instrument, seven hundred years old, which is the groundwork of all our Constitutions – Magna Carta.

The Commonwealth of Dominions remained attached to Britain because they were ‘British communities’ in a wider imagined community. A shared cultural outlook that stressed the voluntary and pluralistic aspect of the relationship meant that centralising initiatives did not find favour but close cooperation continued anyway. For example, as WW1 drew to a close, a committee headed by Admiral Wymass tabled a paper for consideration at the 1918 Imperial Conference suggesting a central “Imperial Naval Authority” overseeing a single imperial navy. The Dominion Prime Ministers did not reject the idea out of hand, but pointed out that the ongoing ad hoc coordination of navies under the Admiralty during WWI had proved effective. They “asserted that in naval organisation as elsewhere the Empire must follow the principle of association rather than integration.”

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243 See: Hankey, 84-85; Boyd, 134.
244 Mansergh, 30.
In the main, the Dominions proved willing to cooperate ‘by association’ not just because it was in their interests, but because those interests were defined by a shared sentiment and heritage. Thus, for example in 1937, the Australian Government concluded that Australian Defence is inseparably bound up with Empire Defence, and the plans for its own security are inseparable from the plans for the security of the Empire as a whole.\(^ {248}\)

2.5.2 The CID and Intelligence

The conflict with the Afrikaners in the Boer War exposed British weaknesses in the field of intelligence. According to Major Burnham, it was a cultural deficiency that regarded spying as somewhat ungentlemanly. When he left Alaska to head up the Empire’s scouting operations against the Boers, he concluded his remarks to the press by saying British setbacks had been caused by “an inherent [cultural] aversion of both Americans and British employing spies” and “the Anglo-saxons are very bad at the spy business.”\(^ {249}\) This was a fair assessment. In his official history of MI5, Christopher Andrew quotes approvingly the view of Spenser Wilkinson who “compared the War Office’s use of their Intelligence Department (ID) during the Boer War to a man who ‘kept a small brain for occasional use in his waistcoat pocket and ran his head by clockwork’.”\(^ {250}\)

These inadequacies were recognised and addressed by one of the many sub-committees established by the CID.\(^ {251}\) The foundations of the modern day intelligence were established in 1909 in the form of the Secret Service Bureau (SSB). The initial operation was modest and consisted of just two staff, RN Commander Mansfield Cumming and Army Captain Vernon


249 Frederick Burnham quoted in: “Famous American Scout for Lord Roberts’ Staff.”


Kell. This subsequently divided into MI5\textsuperscript{252}, headed by Kell, and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS otherwise known as MI6) headed by Cumming.\textsuperscript{253}

In terms of SIGINT, however, the British were more adept, but again the organisation was piecemeal with no central control.\textsuperscript{254} In his official history of GCHQ, Ferris concludes the British “practised every possible form of signals intelligence without knowing it” during the Boer War.\textsuperscript{255} In 1914, two separate SIGINT operations were formed to intercept German radio traffic. The first formed part of the Naval Intelligence Department operating from ‘Room 40’\textsuperscript{256} in the Admiralty and the Army’s MI1(b) interception team. In 1919, these were merged to become GC&CS (later GCHQ).\textsuperscript{257} In addition to these operations, the three armed services would go on to create and operate their own intelligence operations, but were not interdepartmental. However, it is MI5 and MI6 and GC&CS (later GCHQ) that have come to be understood as the British intelligence services.

In this period there was no legal or practical distinction between a citizen born in the British metropole or a British Dominion and staffing reflected this. It is more accurate to refer to a ‘Commonwealth intelligence’ operation, with a network controlled by London but with the staff drawn from the British Commonwealth. For example, in the run-up to America’s entry into World War 1 the de facto head of the Admiralty’s British Intelligence in the US was the Australian-born Captain Guy Gaunt. It was Gaunt’s team who played a critical role in countering anti-British activities in the US before US entry into WW1.\textsuperscript{258} Gaunt and his team also played a key role in developing relations with Colonel Edward House, President Wilson’s unofficial advisor and also with Robert Lansing, US Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{259} Later it was the Canadian, William Stephenson, who headed up British Intelligence operations in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{252} Originally MO5(g) See:ibid., 184.
\item \textsuperscript{253} Andrew, 3 & 28.
\item \textsuperscript{255} See: John Ferris, \textit{Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency} (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021), 19.
\item \textsuperscript{256} Actually Naval Intelligence Department 25 - NID25.
\item \textsuperscript{257} Aldrich, 14.
\item \textsuperscript{258} For this and Gaunt’s relationship with his Army counterpart see: Thomas F Troy, "The Gaunt-Wiseman Affair: British Intelligence in New York in 1915," \textit{International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence} 16, no. 3 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{259} David Ramsay, \textit{’Blinker’ Hall: Spymaster: The Man Who Brought America into World War I} (Spellmount, 2008), 52.
\end{itemize}
North America and who was to play a key role in intelligence operations in North America both during and after WW2.260

Another characteristic illustrates a different cultural approach to the status of the intelligence services in those Anglosphere states where ‘Anglo-saxon’ liberal influences remain at their strongest. Unlike many of their counterparts in other states, the intelligence services were not a form of secret police empowered to collect and analyse intelligence and then proceed to arrest citizens or foreign agents.261 As such, MI5 and MI6 were required to persuade the police to cooperate in raids and arrests.262 This arrangement is consistent with a general antipathy towards centralising and unaccountable authority found in the most Anglospheric states. The exception is the US, where the FBI did have both an intelligence function and policing powers. Nevertheless, the role of the FBI was viewed with suspicion, by the media and some US politicians, including Harry Truman, as discussed later.

2.5.3 Limited US and Britain cooperation during WW One and the interwar period

Word War One and the interwar period witnessed something of a drifting parting apart in British and American relations with only the threat of war from Germany and Japan in the 1930s, creating an impetus for greater cooperation, if not alignment. It was in this period however, that Winston Churchill overcame any remaining personal animus towards the US.263

World War One did facilitate a greater sense of communal feelings between the British community and the US. Wilson’s early adoption of a neutralist position possibly reflected his wish not to antagonise those sections of the US public with Germanic roots, many of whom on the grounds of patriotism favoured the Central powers despite exposure to American values.264 As such, Wilson to implored all Americans to remain “impartial in thought as well

261 For example the French modern MI5 equivalent, the DGSI, & the Russian FSB.
262 It was Scotland Yard’s irritation at being in the centre of a turf war that led to the 1931 clarification MI5 was the operation they would be working with on domestic UK matters.
as in action."\(^{265}\) Although most of his administration and his military were pro-British,\(^{266}\) the exception was his Anglophobic and pacifist Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan.\(^{267}\) Despite his public stance of neutrality, Wilson recognised that his cherished ideals of liberty and democracy required a British victory against the Central powers. As UK Ambassador Spring Rice recorded Wilson was inclined to the pro-British stance of his military.

> Everything that I love most in the world is at stake... If they [the Germans] succeed, we shall be forced to take such measures of defense here as would be fatal to our form of Government.\(^{268}\)

Wilson’s public stance gradually changed to reflect the change in public opinion, particularly so after his narrow re-election in 1916. Public identification with the allied cause was facilitated by reports of German atrocities in Belgium and the torpedoing of civilian ships.\(^{269}\)

> Despite this Wilson also ruled out an intelligence sharing treaty with the British but in reality intelligence was shared on an unofficial basis.\(^{270}\) Here, it is worth noting the role of the Royal Navy’s Naval Intelligence Division (NID) in pioneering the integration of SIGINT derived intelligence with other intelligence sources.\(^{271}\) It was from these Royal Navy intelligence operations that the first formal intelligence sharing with the US Navy emerged in 1917 once the US had entered the war.\(^{272}\)

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\(^{271}\) The Admiralty's ‘Room 40’ decoding of the Zimmermann telegram contributed to US entry into war.

\(^{272}\) Boyd, 25-26; Andrew, 105-06.
After WW1, intelligence sharing ceased due to mutual suspicions and rivalry between the two navies.\textsuperscript{273} Shortly after the conclusion of WW1, the US Director of Navy Intelligence recognised the rivalry but also acknowledged the bonds of friendship.

The basis of friendship between the two great English-speaking peoples is rivalry and independence of each other, and these are the really true and lasting bases of all friendships… There is no necessity for an alliance between Great Britain and the United States, and there probably never will be one, but, in effect, it exists, or must exist, through conditions which are arising in the world and which will hereafter necessitate that the two countries will stand together; other-wise they may fall together.\textsuperscript{274}

Indeed, in this period, both the US and the UK attempted to intercept one another’s communications. In this, the British SIGINT operation, now spearheaded by the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) was the more successful.\textsuperscript{275} In 1935, tentative political talks about naval cooperation in the Far East did not result in any agreement despite the US accepting that a joint system of collective security in the Pacific was desirable. However, the 1935 Conference did improve upon talks that had taken place at the 1930 Conference and marked a something of a step-change in relations.\textsuperscript{276} Jeffry Dowart, author of a seminal work on the history of the US Office of Naval Intelligence, regards it as the start of the rapprochement between the two countries.\textsuperscript{277} Occasional and informal exchanges of intelligence started to occur between the two navies. Following an initiative from UK Foreign Secretary for cooperation in the East, President Roosevelt over-ruled the State Department

\textsuperscript{273} Boyd, 25-26.

\textsuperscript{274} Admiral Albert Parker Niblack, "Forms of Government in Relation to Their Efficiency for War, 1919 " in \textit{Classified and unclassified lectures delivered by visiting scholars, flag rank officers, and government officials}, ed. US Naval War College (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval Historical Collection Repository, 1919).


and authorised the secret ‘Ingersoll’ talks with the British about joint action.\textsuperscript{278} Roosevelt’s actions were supported by Admiral Leahy, a figure who would play a prominent role in post WW2 UK-US relations.\textsuperscript{279}

In 1938, with mutual concerns about Japan, the British decide to treat the US exceptionally, and the exchange of intelligence intensified after the declaration of war in 1939\textsuperscript{280}. This was another milestone in relations, confirming the process of cautious alignment.\textsuperscript{281} Also in 1939, the RN sent a special emissary to meet with US Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Leahy to share RN strategy decisions.\textsuperscript{282} With the sharing of the Japanese Purple diplomatic cipher by the US and the German Enigma cipher, the relationship matured into a fully fledged wartime SIGINT alliance and provided the basis of the 1946 BRUSA arrangement.\textsuperscript{283} As Lawrence Pratt concludes, the 1937 Ingersoll talks might not have constituted a new 'hands across the sea' period of Anglo-American relations, [but] it was at least an important beginning. For from these first hesitant contacts would spring the entire technical apparatus of co-operation that supported the Anglo-Saxon revival of the war years.\textsuperscript{284}

2.6 World War 2 allies

2.6.1 The British Commonwealth Security Community

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{279} Gregory J Florence, \textit{Courting a Reluctant Ally: An Evaluation of US/UK Naval Intelligence Cooperation, 1935-1941} (Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence College, 2004), 31. For Leahy’s role see: Pratt, 751.
\textsuperscript{280} So named after US Navy Captain Ingersoll (Director of Planning) who Roosevelt tasked with travelling to London to discuss the cooperation. See: Florence, 34-36; Pratt, 754-58.
\textsuperscript{281} See: Haggie.
\textsuperscript{282} RN Commander T.C. Hampton briefed Leahy on the CID’s Cunningham Strategy impact of Far East planning. See: ibid., 143-46.
\textsuperscript{283} Boyd, 29.
\textsuperscript{284} Pratt, 759.
\end{footnotesize}
The UK and the Commonwealth functioned as a cohesive political and military entity. Once again, many of the arrangements were based on ad hoc arrangements and personal relationships. It was a point made by Canadian Prime Minister, MacKenzie King who, in an address to the UK Parliament in May 1941 said,

It is true we have not sitting in London continuously, a visible Imperial War Cabinet or Council. But we have, what is much more important, though invisible, a continuing conference of Cabinets of the Commonwealth.  

It was an arrangement that could only work based on trust and the high legitimacy of relationships based on allegiance to the Crown and all that it represented in terms of values and legal relationships, rather than the person of the monarch from which it is legally separate.

2.6.2 British-US Conventional & Intelligence threads of co-operation

When the US joined the war after Pearl Harbour, the relationship between the British and the US crystallised into an alliance. The most obvious sign of the new relationship was the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in January 1942 that brought together the US and British military commanders. The Washington based UK representatives of the UK Chiefs of Staff (CoS) were known as the Joint Staff Mission. To allow the effective functioning on the CCS, the US created the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in February 1942 modelled on the British CoS structure. Once operational, the CCS served as the supreme uniformed military command for the Western Allies and, in the view of Rigby, was arguably the most important international organisation of the twentieth century.  

The other area of cooperation was in intelligence, although initially this was rather limited. However, by March 1942, the navies of Canada, the UK and their US counterparts

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had begun discussions sharing intelligence in a more structured fashion. In September 1942, Edward Travis (from GC&CS) travelled to Washington to conclude the ‘Travis-Wengler Agreement’ on naval intelligence, marking the first cryptanalytic agreement between the UK and the US.\(^{289}\) The Britain-United States Agreement (BRUSA) was signed on May 17 1943, between GC&CS and the US War Department.\(^{290}\) This was a more comprehensive agreement and established an intelligence (SIGINT) partnership that would endure into the twenty-first century.

Of significance in this relationship was the composition of the UK’s SIGINT operations. These were an ad hoc conglomerate of imperial and commonwealth assets spread across the globe, dominated and operated by GC&CS (renamed GCHQ in 1946) and “essentially branches of the relevant British organisations.”\(^{291}\) Such was the lack of domestic dominion control the relationship could be described as “semi-feudal,” arrangements that were practical in war but open to challenges in the post-war period as discussed in the next chapter.\(^{292}\)

2.6.3 Atomic collaboration and Anglophobic meme-complexes

Whereas intelligence cooperation between the US and its Commonwealth allies was relatively straightforward during World War Two, this was not the case regarding atomic collaboration. The origins of UK collaboration with the US on atomic research predated the latter’s entry into the World War Two. In March 1941, the UK’s MAUD committee had concluded that the building of an atomic bomb was feasible and that

that the present collaboration with America should be continued and extended especially in the region of experimental work.\(^{293}\)

\(^{289}\) Ibid., 127 53.
\(^{291}\) Huw Dylan, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain's Joint Intelligence Bureau 1945-1964 (Oxford University Press, USA, 2014), 163.
\(^{292}\) Matthew M Aid and Cees Wiebes, Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War and Beyond (Psychology Press, 2001), Chap 3.
\(^{293}\) Report by M.A.U.D. Committee on the Use of Uranium for a Bomb, M.A.U.D. Committee, Ministry of Aircraft Production, London, July 1941. CSAC 75.5.80/D. 11 Cambridge University: Trinity College Library
George Thomson, the Chairman of the MAUD, committee flew to Washington to deliver a copy of the final Report to Bush Dr Vannevar Bush, head of the US Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD).\footnote{Gwyn Prins, \textit{Defended to Death: A Study of the Nuclear Arms Race: From the Cambridge University Disarmament Seminar} (Penguin Books, 1983), 62; Richard G Hewlett and Oscar E Anderson Jr, \textit{History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Volume I. 1939/1946, the New World} (US Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, DC (United States), 1962), 44.} To gain Administration support, Bush visited his friend and neighbour, Vice President Henry Wallace, who Bush believed had the appropriate scientific background able “to grasp the subject readily.”\footnote{Bush to Roosevelt March 9, 1942. Office for Emergency Management, Washington DC. Richard Rhodes, \textit{The Making of the Atomic Bomb} (Simon and Schuster, 2012), 377; Stanley Goldberg, "Inventing a Climate of Opinion: Vannevar Bush and the Decision to Build the Bomb," \textit{ Isis} 83, no. 3 (1992): 445; Gosling, 10; John C Culver and John Hyde, \textit{American Dreamer: A Life of Henry A. Wallace} (WW Norton & Company, 2001), 267.} Wallace and Bush briefed Roosevelt on the British report on October 9, 1942.\footnote{Gosling, 10.} Roosevelt authorised ongoing liaison with the British and created the \textit{Top Policy Group} (TPG) to oversee general policy, to be headed by Wallace and to include Henry Stimson, General Marshall, James Conant and Bush.\footnote{Rhodes, 377; Culver and Hyde, 267. Wallace had taken a close interest in the fledgling atomic research and been briefed by Bush in July 1941. Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 45.} Wallace convened the first meeting of the TPG eight days after Pearl Harbour and the group agreed Section S1 should proceed with the construction of an atomic plant overseen by Bush.\footnote{Gosling, 10.}

Despite the onset of war, Wallace was not keen on collaborating with the British. A number of factors had made him Anglophobic including his family’s identification with Irish nationalist causes due to their Scots-Irish origins.\footnote{Ironically Scots-Irish are usually self-defined ‘British.’} This had been sustained and developed by the family’s subscription to the Dublin produced \textit{Irish Homestead} journal. Three generations of the Wallace family had a personal, on-going relationship with its editor George W. Russell, a leading Anglo-Irish Nationalist and cultural figure in Ireland.\footnote{There was personal contact with the previous editor too, Anglo-Irish nationalist Horace Plunkett as well as Russell. See: H.C. Wallace, \textit{Our Debt and Duty to the Farmer} (Century Company, 1925); Richard S. Kirkendall, "A Magazine Called Wallaces’ Farmer," \textit{The Goldfinch}, February 3 1991, 14-15.} The young Henry Wallace stayed with Russell in Dublin in 1912 during which the ‘Home Rule Crisis’
erupted on the streets. Thus, Wallace recorded he was introduced to “the tremendous passion” of Irish culture and his family’s own Irish blood and identity.

Russell also introduced Wallace to Theosophy, a new religion — an eclectic mix of refashioned Buddhist and Hindu ideas — founded by Russian emigre Helena Blavatsky. This in turn led to Wallace become a pupil under Nicolas Roerich, a Russian emigre and Theosophical master. When Wallace met him in 1930, Roerich had just returned from leading a Soviet OGPU intelligence financed expedition to found a new central Asian state, based on a synthesis of Buddhism and communism. British intelligence had tracked the expedition on its entry to Tibet and arranged to have it captured and expelled in 1929, earning Roerich’s enmity and paranoia about the British. Completely taken in by Roerich, Wallace became his pupil and became persuaded of the need to create a new Theosophical Asian state. Roerich inculcated in Wallace his paranoid fear of the malign influence of the British with their secret agents and their machinations in the ‘Great Game’ in international affairs. Such was Roerich’s influence, that Wallace, now Secretary of State for Agriculture agreed to appoint Roerich to lead another expedition in 1932, illicitly funded by Wallace’s Department under the guise of a scientific expedition. Roerich’s party had become engulfed in diplomatic intrigue and armed clashes across a swathe of central Asia in another failed endeavour to create a new state. The coded cables from Roerich updating Wallace on the expedition's secret mission are replete with concerns about the perfidious British, coded named “monkey’s” for their mischievous attitude.

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302 Wallace, 1-2.

303 Culver and Hyde, 39 & 78.


There was one other and unintended consequence of Russell’s influence. It related to the meme of benevolent vanguardism that guided the agrarian cooperationist movement that Russell had pioneered in Ireland. In cooperativism Wallace saw the possibilities for the role of state sponsored managerial technocrats that could introduce modern scientific methods. The outcome would be a new agrarian future of farming collectives with happy and grateful farm workers guided by technocrats.\(^\text{307}\) An agrarian-based economy lay at the heart of both Russell and his contemporary, W. B. Yeat's vision of a new Irish nation.\(^\text{308}\) Whilst Roerich had not realised the dream of a Buddhist-Communist agrarian state, Wallace appears to have believed the Soviets had succeeded in creating something similar. In 1944 Wallace visited a Soviet farming collective in Siberia during his term as Vice President and naively believed the NKVD run slave-camp was an idyllic realisation of the dream.\(^\text{309}\) Two themes were consistent in Wallace's outlooks throughout his career. Firstly, admiration of what he believed was a paternalistic and scientific Soviet vanguardist approach to societal ills and secondly, and suspicions of the British in the ‘Great Game’ of international politics.

In the early War period, Wallace’s role remained central to the progress of the research project, sanctioning expenditure and overseeing general policy.\(^\text{310}\) The TPG appointed General Leslie [Dick] Groves as the executive officer to oversee transfer of Section S-1 to the army-led Manhattan Project in September 1942.\(^\text{311}\) Wallace, displaying his inherent Anglophobia, encouraged Bush’s inclination to limit the research partnership with the British. As late as December 21, 1942, Wallace and Bush met to discuss the role of the British. Wallace re-affirmed his view that “technical know-how should not be handed to any country in the world,” including the UK.\(^\text{312}\)

Wallace need not have worried about sharing technology. Groves had a xenophobic outlook that included a particular dislike of the British despite his own English ancestry. It stemmed from an enduring meme-complex passed down through his family from the War of


\(^{308}\) Russell and Yates were both theosophists and pioneers of agrarian cooperativism.

\(^{309}\) Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford University Press on Demand, 2008), 328.

\(^{310}\) See: Shimamoto, 42-43.

\(^{311}\) Ibid.; Gosling, 35.

\(^{312}\) Quoted in Shimamoto, 46.
Independence. Grove’s father, a dominating and puritanical chaplain, displayed persistent signs of this Anglophobia stating, “if there is anything that fills me with shame, it is my English blood.” As Robert Norris puts it in his seminal biography of Groves, strong currents of anti-British nationalism survived from the Revolutionary War to the advent of World War Two.

Chaplain Groves felt it [Anglophobia] deeply and passed it on to his children. This fervent moralistic patriotism clearly shaped young Dick [Leslie], who saw himself as American through and through. These attitudes would be evident in his treatment of British scientists and diplomats during the war.

This meme-complex was reinforced in Chaplain Grove’s son, not ameliorated by the younger Groves’ experience of America’s allies in World War I. His diary records his experiences as a young soldier in France. The British military he had encountered, were, regardless of class, all hypocrites, and he found English “morals to be rather depraved.”

His contempt for the British was only surpassed by other nationalities and races, with the French singled out as completely degenerate and feeble.

Whilst Groves appeared to regard all Dominion staff as ‘British,’ he was deeply distrustful of other racial groups in the Commonwealth team. The anti-British meme attributed to the Revolutionary War that Groves had inherited lost none of its potency. As late as the 1960s, Groves, outraged by some comments in the New York press over Vietnam, penned a letter to the city’s press traducing New York’s patriotism because it had long harboured [Royalist] “Tories.”

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314 Ibid., 95.
315 Ibid., 13.
316 Ibid., 95.
In August 1943, the US and UK signed the Quebec Agreement merging Tube Alloys, the British atomic research program, with the Manhattan Project. A UK-US Combined Policy Committee (CPC) was established under the Chairmanship of US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. At British insistence, a Canadian representative was included on the CPC reflecting Canadian involvement in Tube Alloys. The UK had partnered with Canada in 1942 and shifted the bulk of research to Canada. Canadian contributions included scientists, the supplying and processing uranium and research on plutonium. The British team included scientists from Australia, New Zealand reflecting the inherent and natural levels of trust that underlay the British Commonwealth.

Groves delayed any discussion of the administrative arrangements with the British and his compartmentalised research on security grounds preventing their access to other meaningful US research. Groves was to claim later “I did everything to hold back on it [collaboration]. I did not carry out the wishes of our government…” With little progress, the British team members grew concerned about post-War collaboration and alerted London.

2.6.4 Atomic collaboration frustrated

On September 19, 1944, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed the Hyde Park Memorandum for military and commercial post-war atomic collaboration unless terminated by “joint

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agreement." It was an executive decision between trusting individuals. Roosevelt later informed Bush that he had been talking “about complete interchange” with the British after the war to keep them strong. Bush was privately concerned that the President was “plunging ahead with postwar planning” but Groves ensured compartmentalisation continued. British scientists began to worry about how compartmentalisation would impact future collaboration with Sir James Chadwick writing from Los Alamos to London to express his concerns in February 1945, warning

We shall have to rely very much on the US authorities, and especially on Groves, to work with us towards collaboration, not merely to accept collaboration if it is forced on them.

2.7 Conclusion

The foundation of a security community existed by the end of World War 2. The tensions between Britain and the US had first been eased by a pattern of arbitration, followed by a growing sense of commonality. The Spanish-American War and the Boer War both proved important milestones. They did not lead to alliances, but rather a favourable alignment. Appeals to a false Anglo-saxon racial kinship were unlikely to succeed despite the elasticity of the concept. Instead, there was a growing emphasis towards cultural similarities that emphasised political values associated with liberty. Naturally there were frictions and, as Andrew Roberts notes, that despite Churchill’s belief in the fraternal union of the English-speaking peoples, the interests of the Empire came first. There was however, never any formal nor serious contemplation of plans for war by the UK, although Canada did create

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325 The Hyde Park Memorandum, Sept 1944 (agreement between President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill on control and use of the atomic bomb). TNA CAB 126/183 File no 54
327 Vincent C Jones, Manhattan, the Army and the Atomic Bomb (US Government Printing Office, 1985), 566.
328 Ibid.
‘Defence Scheme No. 1’ in 1921 but abandoned it by 1928. The US Red Plan was officially shelved in 1939.\textsuperscript{331}

Not to be lost in all of this was the continuance of the imperial security community, increasingly pluralistic and perhaps more effective because of it. The Dominions entered World War 2 of their own volition, but as it neared the end, with high expectations as to their role in a new world order thereafter.

The truth was the conditions for an Anglospheric security community combining US and Commonwealth elements existed predicated upon a commonality of values and outlooks. Greg Kennedy notes the historian’s focus is too often on World War 2 and its solidifying effect on US-Commonwealth relations. The alignment, Kennedy argues, occurred in the interwar period and was a reality even before it was allowable to even admit such a relationship existed… [brought about] through understanding, networking, intellectual affinity, financial ties, family or blood relations, empathy and mutual fear of deception, but remained only a sentiment, not a formal or public expression of policy.\textsuperscript{332}


\textsuperscript{332} Greg Kennedy, \textit{Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933-1939: Imperial Crossroads} (Routledge, 2013), 2.
Chapter 3 The Nascent Security Community

3.1 Security & Foreign Policy Outlooks

3.1.1 US Policy: competing viewpoints

The Truman administration approached the post-World War 2 period with an optimism imbued by a ‘Wilsonian-universalist’ faith in the promise of a rule-based institutionalism. The realist imperatives that required ‘alliances’ and ‘arrangements’ would be rendered unnecessary by the new UN framework for resolving differences. According to the new Secretary of State James Byrnes, difficulties with the Soviets could be overcome, albeit facilitated by a robust stand. Even after eight months of Soviet belligerence Byrnes was optimistic, maintaining, “satisfactory solutions can be found” through “patience and firmness.” This grouping’s outlook constituted what Daniel Yergin referred to as a Yalta Axiom, viewing the Soviets as potentially cooperative, despite their totalitarian nature.

The Yalta Axiom included a group of ‘New Dealers’ who subscribed to a ‘put peace first’ approach, admiring the Soviet Union, and supporting the possibility of an ongoing fraternal partnership. To this group, any close security collaboration with Britain would be a mistake. The most prominent proponent was Henry Wallace, the former Vice President and, as of January 1946, the new Secretary of Commerce. In May 1943, Wallace had informed Churchill that the idea of a post-War US-British Empire security arrangement was offensive.

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339 Ibid.
and surely implied a belief in “a pure Anglo-Saxon race – Anglo-Saxondom über alles?”341 Churchill reasserted the cultural context, stating that Anglo-saxonism “was not a race concept,” but “a concept of common ideals and common history” and “a common heritage worked out over the centuries in England.”342 Wallace, unconvinced would later advise Truman that the UK’s ongoing intent “was to promote an unbreachable break between us and Russia.”343 Other Truman administration members shared this outlook, concentrated in the Treasury, Commerce and State Departments344 and in the person of Joseph Davies, the former US Ambassador to Moscow during the War and “the favourite villain” of the so-called Riga School.345

Yergin applied the label 'Riga Axiom' to describe a grouping of policy-makers who posited the Soviet Union’s foreign policy was predicated on its Marxist-Leninist ideology. As such they would exhibit an intractable hostility toward ‘bourgeois’ democracy and seek to expand it territory. The Riga Axiom favoured an assertive US internationalist post-war foreign policy reinforced by partners such as Britain.346 Fraser Harbutt suggests this grouping included individuals who “had a strong sense of affinity with, and inheritance from the British, with whom they desired some kind of practical political or military association.”347 It included the future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Dwight Eisenhower whose diary entry on May 26, 1946, records not only his acknowledgement of the Soviet threat but also his appreciation for the UK’s role in advancing shared values of freedom and democracy.

342 See ibid. See also: Culver and Hyde, 301.
343 See: Wallace. Diary entry October 15, 1945
346 Yergin, 11-12.
Although in this country we like to curse John Bull, yet Britain has done far more than we to support countries that want to remain free. Britain is crumbling (has been doing so ever since World War I), yet we gloat rather than get scared. The underlying important thing, therefore, is our national lack of understanding that we (our form of government) is under deadly, persistent and constant attack.\(^{348}\)

Such sentiments reveal that although the perceived Soviet threat might have ‘triggered’ some members of US policy establishment to agitate for an alliance with the UK, other factors were at play. The World War 2 UK-US Washington based, ‘Combined Chiefs of Staff” forum had not only institutionalised shared military and intelligence planning, but had created a network of enduring personal relationships. More to the point, Eisenhower's comments reveal an acknowledgement of shared values. These factors highlight what Adler and Barnett term the “cultural, political, and ideological homogeneity” that facilitate a relationship beyond just a strategic alliance much like the one that existed between the US and Soviets during the War.\(^{349}\) These 'Riga' views predominated in the JCS, the Departments of War and Navy and within the State Department; realist dissenters to the State Department’s liberal internationalist line were to be found in its Moscow Embassy staff.

Less contentious than the idea of strong post-War security relations with the UK was the desirability of integral continental defence plans with Canada. This envisaged a greater integration of military arrangements than the existing provisions of the Canadian-US Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD).\(^{350}\)

3.1.2 Canadian policy outlook

Close security relations between Canada and the US and the UK were a given, but only to a point. The post-Wold War 2 order promised a framework for peace and an opportunity for Canada to find its own place in the new global order. Whilst Canada had agreed measures with the US to facilitate continental defence, there was an unwillingness to further US defence entanglements. The Head of the Department of External Affairs (DEA), Norman


\(^{349}\) Adler and Barnett, 62, 62 & 51.

Robertson advocated a Canadian role in cementing post-war relations with the Soviets and resisted US demands for cooperation “in defensive measures which the Russians would not consider friendly or neutral.”[^351]

To maintain good relations with the Soviets, the Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, Dana Wilgress argued for a degree of indifference to human rights violations and injustices.[^352] This stance was at odds with the critical tone adopted by the US Ambassador Averill Harriman and his deputy, George Kennan[^353] in the US Moscow embassy. In a clash of Riga versus Yalta perspectives, Wilgress accused Kennan of having been “indoctrinated with anti-Soviet ideas as a result of pre-war German propaganda.”[^354] The Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King shared the Yalta outlook and was not convinced of the need for deeper post-War security arrangements with the US. King’s aversion to closer US security extended to imperial UK entanglement too.[^355] Although a Yalta mind-set predominated in Canada, there was a more ‘realist’ outlook represented too. The Canadian military, tended to favour closer relations with the US, albeit with the inclusion of the UK on matters of interoperability and research, but no longer subservient to the British.[^356]

In September 1945, Canadian policy-makers attitude’s towards the Soviets underwent a rapid evaluation following the defection of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk operating from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. Gouzenko[^357] revealed an extensive Soviet spying network within Canada and plans to subvert the viability of western democracies.[^358] The defection was a seminal event, described as some commentators as the start of the Cold War, the end of

[^351]: Robertson to Wilgress, 5 August 1944. Library and Archives Canada (LAC hereafter), DEA Papers, RG25, Series A-3-b, vol 5710, File 7AB(s)
[^353]: There was a significant Riga minority in the State Dept. See: Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (Routledge, 2017), 426 & 32.
Canadian innocence and axiomatic in creating conditions favouring the formation of Anglospheric tripartite military alliances.\(^{359}\)

King grappled with how to deal with the Soviets, unwilling to jeopardise relations, but aghast at the implications for Canada and relations with the US.\(^{360}\) In a move that confirmed Canada’s intimate trust in the UK, King confided in UK Foreign Minister Bevin that he now worried that the Soviets were capable of a surprise attack on British Columbia. King determined the Gouzenko Affair must be kept secret from the public and his own cabinet.\(^{361}\)

If the news got out, the threat of an attack might cause disquiet in Western Canada through which, King speculated, a Soviet invasion of the US would take place. This fear could precipitate a break-up of federal Canada as,

our own people in B.C. and on the prairies would all become very strong for looking to the U.S. for protection that we needed. I said that this would inevitably lead to an annexation movement which might be hard to control.\(^{362}\)

Although this might now appear a far-fetched notion, public sentiment in British North America was more fluid with agitation in the, then separate, Newfoundland Dominion electorate considering union with the US rather than Canada.\(^{363}\) This echoed King’s earlier fears of US pressure for either territory or ‘political union.’\(^{364}\) In other words, King feared Canadian absorption into de facto amalgamated security community. For King, the solution was to balance a potentially over-weaning US with the UK but without wider imperial

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\(^{362}\) Robert Trumbull, "Canadian Diaries Recall Spy Case.," *NY Times*, January 8 1976.


commitments.\textsuperscript{365} This was a reinterpretation of a Churchillian theme that saw Canada operating as a ‘golden hinge’ between the US and the UK.\textsuperscript{366} It became a recurrent theme in the following years with Canada positioning itself as the vital link in a tripartite Anglospheric security community.\textsuperscript{367} In October 1945, King informed the UK, that the emergent Soviet threat “could not be met by Britain and the Dominions. It could only be met by closer relations and understanding of the US and the British Commonwealth.”\textsuperscript{368}

3.1.3 UK policy outlook

In Britain there was a greater consensus among the policy-making groupings in their assessment of a Soviet threat. The election of a Labour Government in place of the Conservative dominated National wartime coalition did little to change foreign policy outlook.\textsuperscript{369} The UK’s Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin anticipated the Soviets would become “aggressive and uncooperative” and they therefore committed to foreign policy continuity.\textsuperscript{370} Their outlook extended to the civil service who agreed with the need to coordinate security with the Commonwealth Dominions and extend this to the US.\textsuperscript{371} A seminal Foreign Office paper by Sir Orme Sargent in 1945 argued the UK was too weak to confront the Soviets alone and needed the United States with

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its “material strength.” Support for this view extended to Churchill as leader of the Opposition with whom the Labour Government shared classified information and sought his advice on foreign policy. Thus, prevailing view was the Soviets, still legally wartime allies, represented “the central threat” in the new post-War order.

Of all the five states that were to form the Anglosphere security community, it was the UK that envisaged what E.H. Carr had sought to dismiss, namely the pursuit of an Anglo-American global security community that would combine the US with the Commonwealth security community. However, the UK recognised that in the post-WW2 environment this imperial construct faced the prospect of Dominion decoupling and possible disintegration as former colonies achieved independence. Attlee’s inclinations were to resist the centrifugal forces and push for a ‘Commonwealth Defence Policy’ uniting the UK and the Dominions in a common endeavour.

The UK’s desire for a US alliance faced obstacles given there was no US consensus on the need to remain in close alignment with the UK. With a Yalta axiom dominating the Truman Administration, there was a danger the US might regard an alignment with the UK as an impediment to better US-Soviet relations. The UK feared Truman’s foreign policy outlook was naïve and ill-informed with his telegrams to them probably drafted by others. Even worse, the President appeared to regard himself as a ‘middle-man’ informing the British at Potsdam, he did not want to ‘gang up’ against Stalin. The UK Foreign Office became alarmed at “the Americans’ readiness to do business with Russia rather than with us” and causing a “very serious strain” in UK-US diplomatic relationships.

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376 John Saville, 10-80.
377 Carr, 232.
was labelled “slippery” and an appeaser in the mode of Neville Chamberlain, too willing to accommodate Soviet demands.\textsuperscript{379} By November 1945, Lord Halifax, the UK Ambassador to Washington warned,

\ldots there exists a stubborn [US] determination to rationalise Soviet actions wherever possible and thereby to reduce the prevailing fear of the Russians in the hope of realising the American dream of one world.\textsuperscript{380}

3.1.4 Australian policy outlook

The Chifley Labor government saw Australia’s security as predicated on three pillars: the British Commonwealth, the latter’s cooperation with the US, and active participation in the UN. In September 1946, Chifley suggested something akin to a post-imperial pluralistic security community had evolved. Chifley asserted

a new conception of the British Commonwealth has emerged: no longer are the Dominions active only in war. Collaboration within the British Commonwealth extends to peace as well as war… with a fuller recognition by the Dominions of their responsibilities, [and] the assignment to Australian machinery of the function of… regional security in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{381}

To this end, Australia would maintain security assets “related to measures for cooperation in Empire defence.”\textsuperscript{382} The strong cultural association Australia felt with the UK meant it saw itself as part of a revamped Commonwealth security community, albeit with Australian regional leadership. Australia had only participated in the occupation forces deployed in Japan on the basis they had command and executive control of the Combined Commonwealth forces.\textsuperscript{383} Australia envisaged the UN heralding a new liberal international order providing

\textsuperscript{379} Alexander Cadogan, \textit{The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, Om, 1938-1945} (Putnam, 1972), entry November 25 1945.
\textsuperscript{380} Schlesinger, 213.
\textsuperscript{381} Chifley Speech (Radio Broadcast) September 2, 1946 Australian Election.
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid. Chifley Speech (Radio Broadcast)
opportunities for it to fulfil its role as an emergent “Middle Power.” Australia’s abrasive Herbert Evatt, Minister for the Department of External Affairs (DEA) was keen to develop an assertive regional role via the UN and in an expanded Commonwealth.

For Australia, the continuation of a post-War Commonwealth security community was predicated on common heritage and values and did not require ‘a trigger.’ There was however, a divergence as to where any threat might come. For Chifley and Evatt, the threat was a resurgent Japan, for Attlee and Bevin it was the containment of Soviet communism. Thus, Chifley and Evatt refused to countenance using Australian troops in the Middle East in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union. Attempting to explain his stance Bevin said, “I feel the same way about Russia as you feel about Japan” to which Evatt replied, “Japan is an enemy who tried to destroy us: Russia is our ally, and you have a treaty with her.”

Evatt’s regional aspirations had caused deep resentment with the Roosevelt administration. The creation of the 1944 ANZAC [Canberra] Pact was seen by the US as an attempt to claim Australian primacy for the South West Pacific, a region in which the US had their own interests. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull ridiculed the announcement as an attempted “Monroe Doctrine for the South Pacific.” Australia’s action revealed “ingratitude to the United States, and arrogant, if not ridiculous self-assertion…” Disagreements carried over when the Truman Administration repeatedly clashed with Australia over the structure of the new UN. In short, the relationship between Australia and

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the US became antagonistic with public policy differences and fractious personal relationships.\textsuperscript{393}

3.1.5 NZ policy outlook

The NZ policy-makers shared Australia’s concerns about the threat of a resurgent Japan but took a pessimistic view of the likely success of the UN as a framework for ensuring world peace. Carl Berendsen, NZ Ambassador to Washington confided in the NZ Minister for External Affairs that it “whether we like it or not, it’s going to be a ‘Great Power’ world, in which the Great Powers will not agree.”\textsuperscript{394} They hoped that cooperation with the Soviets might be possible through the UN. However, within months of the UN’s establishment, NZ’s Prime Minister had become alarmed by the Soviet’s use of the veto to neuter the UN’s role. Of the three dominions, NZ was the most open to UK guidance in security and defence matters whilst maintaining close relations with Australia.\textsuperscript{395}

3.2 Atomic Reversal

3.2.1 Introduction

The last chapter described the secret 1944 Hyde Park Memorandum between Churchill and Roosevelt that contained an outline commitment to post-war atomic collaboration as well as agreement on consultations over the use of atomic weapons. However, after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, the existence of the agreement was disputed by the US. In these circumstances, high-ranking US officials who did not favour UK-US collaboration used the

\textsuperscript{56} no. 4 (2010); Peter G Edwards, "Evatt and the Americans," \textit{Australian Historical Studies} 18, no. 73 (1979).


situation to delay its realisation. Thereafter, the passing of the McMahon Bill effectively ended any hopes the British entertained and atomic collaboration became “the one main exception to the special relationship” which was being established. As a consequence the UK was obliged to develop its own atomic capability with the assistance of its Commonwealth partners.

3.2.2 British Commonwealth concerns

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Groves had surreptitiously hampered work with the British Commonwealth team. By September 1945, and with the War officially over, the Commonwealth scientists began to doubt Groves’ assurances that collaboration would continue. A meeting had been scheduled for mid-November 1945, between Truman, Attlee, and MacKenzie King. Truman, pressed by Attlee, agreed to UK-US collaboration. Bush, who had prepared the US discussion paper was the only other American present and did not agree with Truman’s concession. Bush attempted to stymy progress by gaining Byrnes’ consent to involve Secretary of War Patterson on the grounds this new agreement related to military controlled atomic research rather than the diplomatic approach to the Soviets. A British and Canadian delegation headed by Sir John Anderson duly met in Patterson’s office. Bush was to be disappointed. With Groves in attendance, the Anglophile Patterson affirmed there should be a collaborative arrangement, “that would not put the United Kingdom at a disadvantage.” Patterson instructed Groves to draft a final agreement and agree the finer details with the British to replace the Quebec Agreement.

A US team of Joseph Volpe and Gordon Arneson, headed by Groves, met with a British embassy team headed by Anderson. After long negotiations stretching into the night, the two teams agreed on most aspects except the key issue of information exchange. Groves

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398 Chadwick to Moon, September 10, 1945, TNA PRO, AB1/485 [Philip Burton Moon was the head of one of the British joint groups at the Manhattan Project.]
400 Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 466.
401 Ibid.
402 Ibid., 467-68.
would not agree the wording “full and effective” cooperation. The two teams agreed each should present separate drafts to Secretary of War Patterson the next morning. At that meeting, Patterson over-ruled Groves and agreed to the inclusion of “full and effective” in the final document. Despite the offer of a treaty status that the Groves’ team would draw up, Anderson and the UK Embassy team decided the tripartite CPC could oversee collaboration and have the flexibility to make ad hoc arrangements when necessary. It is almost certain that Groves’ suggestion for Treaty status was for ulterior motives that would become apparent as considered later.

In his analysis of the collapse on UK-US atomic collaboration, Richard Wevill scrutinises the UK embassy’s role and concludes it is important not “to lose sight of the fact that it failed to identify the biggest single threat to continued collaboration, i.e. General Groves.” As it was Groves, was able to exploit the passage of the McMahon Bill to frustrate both those of who favoured collaboration with the British and Canadians and those who favoured an approach to information sharing with the Soviet Union. Grove’s nationalist Anglophobia aligned with Wallace’s Anglophobic pro-Soviet fraternalism to produce an unwelcome outcome for the British.

3.2.3 The Wallace Plan

McGeorge Bundy refers to “the Wallace Plan” to describe the position advocated by Wallace at the cabinet meeting called by Truman for the September 21 1945, to discuss US post-War atomic policy. The outline of Wallace’s plan had been formed within days of Roosevelt’s death. As the former head of the atomic Top Policy Group before the military takeover, Wallace had access to a network of relevant contacts. In April 1945, Wallace secretly met Manhattan Project scientist Dr James Franck and Dr James Compton to discuss the views of atomic scientists favouring civilian control, international regulation and

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403 Ibid.
404 Ibid., 467. Also see: FRUS 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters Volume II “Negotiations with the British and Canadians, November 1–November 16, 1945.” 17 April, 1946.
405 Ibid., 467-68.
406 Richard Wevill, Britain and America after World War II (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 133.
research exchange with the Soviet Union. Wallace encouraged Franck to organise what would become the Atomic Scientists of Chicago and write up a report for Stimson Secretary of War.

Wallace was in an authoritative position to advance both the possible civilian applications of atomic research and share research with the Soviet Union. As Secretary of Commerce, he oversaw the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) that historically had included atomic research. Using his network of contacts from his former chairmanship of the TPG, Wallace saw an opportunity to outflank the War Department’s attempts to draft post-war legislation. War Secretary Stimson had established the so-called Interim Committee in May 1945, that included a remit for General Royall to draft legislation on post-War atomic regulation with the assistance of attorney William Marbury. The Royall-Marbury draft included input from Groves and would be introduced into congress as the May-Johnson Bill. The proposed Bill featured almost the precise opposite of what Wallace believed, with the War Department given carte blanche to direct atomic research and then allow UK collaboration. Wallace decided he would deploy key individuals to assist in congressional opposition to the May-Johnson Bill and take direct steps to facilitate exchanges of scientific research with the Soviet Union via the NBS.

Wallace had identified the atomic scientist Edward U. Condon as an ideal accomplice for his plan. Condon had clashed with Groves whilst engaged at the Manhattan Project and left to head Westinghouse corporation’s atomic R&D. Like Wallace, Condon believed in strong fraternal relations with the Soviets and, as a member of the US-Soviet Friendship Society, had already organised exchanges of scientific papers with Soviet scientists. In June 1945, Condon accepted Stalin’s open invitation for US scientists to attend the 220th Anniversary of

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the Soviet Academy of Science in Moscow. On discovering this, Groves had arranged for Condon’s passport to be revoked and Condon had only just managed to retain his position at Westinghouse. Condon remained active as an organiser of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago conference scheduled for September 19, 1945, to discuss opposition to the May-Johnson Bill. Attempts by the War Department to cancel it were not successful and Wallace attended in an unofficial capacity with members of his staff to the fury of Generals Royall and Groves. There Wallace met up with Condon, gained Condon’s enthusiastic buy-in for his ideas and duly appointed him as provisional Director of the NBS.

Leaving the conference, Wallace attended the Cabinet on September 21, where the matter of future US policy on atomic matters was fiercely debated at length. Details of the argument were leaked to the press about Stimson's proposal about an approach to the Soviets to involve them in international regulation. Wallace, however, went beyond the Stimson’s proposed tripartite approach and advocated a direct exchange of information with the Soviets. One leak revealed Wallace had spoken of the need for the US to disassociate itself from Britain and by making such a gesture to the Soviets would “end the suspicions with which the Russians are known to regard the intentions of Britain, if not the United States.”

The article outlined the cabinet divisions, Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal and Secretary of War Patterson, backed by the full line of generals and admirals opposed the proposal and made their position clear.

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416 Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6; Jones, 576.
418 Bundy and Gould, 139.
[arguing] it was Russia that needed to make a gesture of good faith [and until then] the USA, Britain and Canada should retain the atomic secret. 420

At Wallace’s request Condon (not yet confirmed by Congress as NBS Director) drafted an atomic policy memorandum to be presented to Truman on October 15. 421 The memorandum re-stressed the need for the US to detach itself from Britain and Canada and to create an international organisation to regulate atomic research. When presenting it to Truman, Wallace verbalised the tropes associated with the perfidious Albion meme-complex that Roerich had nurtured about the ‘Great Game’ and that the British objective,

was to promote an unbreachable break between us and Russia. The President said he agreed. I said Britain’s game in international affairs has always been intrigue. The President said he agreed. I said Britain may have plenty of excuse for playing the game the way she does; it may fit into her geographical position, but we must not play her game. The President said he agreed. 422

Thus, encouraged, Wallace continued planning to thwart the War Department’s May-Johnson with an alternative bill and began liaising with freshman Senator Brien McMahon. 423 Wallace ally, Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas was lined up to sponsor a new bill in the House. 424 Douglas shared Wallace’s stance on the need to break the relationship with the British. 425 How, she asked in a speech, could the US afford to split the atom but not afford to split itself from the UK and Canada? 426

Wallace was keen McMahon assemble a team capable of drafting an alternative bill that would establish civilian control and ensure the military could not block scientific exchanges with the Soviets. He recommended to McMahon that he utilise James R. Newman, the Head

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422 See: ibid. Diary entry October 15, 1945
423 "McMahon to Wallace," in Telephone Logs (Dept Commerce, 1945).
Newman was the official liaison point between the OWMR and Wallace’s Department, with direct access to Truman. Wallace had already used Newman to brief Truman against the May-Johnson Bill. Newman was duly appointed by McMahon, who in turn made Condon the official scientific advisor to the McMahon’s committee, establishing Wallace’s two placements as the nucleus of the small team drafting a new Bill. To assist in McMahon’s media communications, Wallace provided the services of his speechwriter.

Wallace’s concerns about the general modus operandi of the British prompted him to take a more direct action to secure fraternal relations with the Soviets. A discrete conversation with Robert Oppenheimer, (the Manhattan Project Director), led Wallace to believe there were rumours Roosevelt had planned to allow sharing of atomic information to the Soviets but had been thwarted by the British. Wallace was now even more convinced that

British policy clearly is to provoke the maximum distrust between the United States and Russia and thus prepare the groundwork for World War III…

Wallace decided to take action to forestal this British plot and arranged a meeting with the Soviet Embassy through Edwin S. Smith director of the US-Soviet Friendship Society. On October 24, Wallace met with Anatoly Gorsky, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, and the station chief of the NKGB (the foreign intelligence branch of the NKVD). Gorsky's
superior in the Lubyanka was Commissar Vsevolod Merkulov, a member of what Robert Conquest called the ‘Beria gang’ of Georgians and coordinating Soviet attempts to gain information on the Manhattan Project.

Wallace’s message relayed to Gorsky for Stalin was a simple one — there were two groups in the US Government; one led by him, that believed “the well-being… of all mankind depends on good relations between” the US and the Soviet Union. Opposing this was a group committed to “the idea of a dominating Anglo-saxon bloc consisting mainly of the US and England.” Wallace explained that the President “…too easily falls under the influence of people around him.” And the two groups were “fighting for Truman’s soul (his literal expression).” Wallace advised the Anglo-saxon group was stronger and said the Soviets “could help [his] smaller group considerably, and we don’t doubt… your willingness to do this.” Wallace wanted Gorsky to inquire whether Moscow would welcome an official US invitation for Soviet scientists to visit and review atomic research.

On receipt of Gorsky’s report, Merkulov forwarded it to Foreign Minister Molotov, who immediately returned it with the scrawled message, “Comrade Merkulov! It must be sent to Comrade Stalin!” However, the Soviet’s ability to exploit Wallace’s initiative was almost immediately curtailed by the unravelling of their US spying operations.

In the meantime, Wallace proceeded with his plan to break the US from the UK and reorientate it with the Soviets. He spoke to Truman privately after the Cabinet meeting on October 26, 1945, and reiterated again “the dangers of the US playing a one-sided game on

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438 Gorsky to Merkulov. NKGB cable October 27, 1945 quoted in Weinstein, Vassiliev, and Wallace, 284-85. (The first page of Gorsky’s cable to Moscow is reproduced See Henry Wallace meets the station chief. Between pages 196-197)
439 Gorsky to Merkulov. NKGB cable October 27, 1945 quoted in ibid. The use of brackets are the NKVD’s.
441 Weinstein, Vassiliev, and Wallace, 284-85.
442 Molotov to Merkulov. undated October 1945 quoted in ibid., 284.
443 In addition, the Gouzenko defection in Canada during September 1945 had been a worrying development.
the side of the British.” Wallace sought Presidential approval for bringing some fifty Soviet scientists to the US. Truman thought this a “perfectly splendid idea.”

Wallace did not regard the ‘Washington Declaration,’ a tripartite Canada-UK-US attempt to engage with the Soviets on regulation as an obstacle to his plan. There was some liberal dissent that the Washington Declaration was an ‘Anglo-saxon’ initiative rather than a sole US initiative, but it appeared to affirm Soviet inclusion via the UN. Besides, Newman and Condon were making progress with the drafting of an alternative to the May-Johnson Bill. Condon’s briefing of Senators was winning them round to the desirability of a new Bill to create a civilian Atomic commission with the military (and Groves) removed. Civilian control offered the possibility of a positive atomic partnership with the Soviet Union. Of course, Wallace was unaware of the secret UK-US arrangement Truman had authorised. On the latter point, he need not have worried, Groves had the matter in hand.

3.2.4 The British Frustrated

The British were satisfied with both the public tripartite position and the secret Groves-Anderson agreement on collaboration signed-off by Truman. Groves did not approve, his ideal outcome would be circumstances in which the military retained control, rejected approaches to the Soviets but was also forced to forgo collaboration with the UK and Canada. Groves hoped the McMahon Bill could be so amended to deliver those objectives. Until those circumstances could be created, Grooves played for time with the British.

Delaying final collaboration arrangements did not represent a problem for Groves. He had replaced Harvey Bundy as the secretary to the CPC and headed the US team on the CPC sub-committee finalising the finer points of the agreement. Joseph Volpe, a lawyer on Groves’ staff and party to drafting the original Groves-Anderson memorandum, articulated the US

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444 Wallace, diary entry 26 October 1945
445 Ibid., diary entry 26 October 1945
446 Baylis, 46-48.
449 Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 448-50.
teams sense of unease and dishonour in following Groves' go-slow instruction. A sense of 
deceit pervaded their mood according to Volpe,

And I must say that it was not just a frustrating experience. At times it was almost 
humiliating. Humiliating in the sense that... at the highest levels of our government, 
namely the President of the United States and the Prime Minister, agreement had been 
reached that we would cooperate. And that at our level, we were forced to drag our 
feet on the subject. And in a sense really play games to mark time in which to avoid 
an agreement. And I must say I... at times I felt very uncomfortable in meetings with 
the British.452

Gordon Arneson, a member of the US team was also uncomfortable with the deceit. He 
recalled Groves

was very much opposed to give them [the British] any help after the war, particularly on the nuclear power side. I remember sitting in meetings with the British on his instructions to sit tight, don't give and inch. And we didn't give an inch.453

After nearly three months wrangling, CPC sub-committee finally agreed a UK-US Memorandum of Agreement to be put to the February 1946 meeting of the CPC, chaired by Byrnes. Groves now sought to turn the State Department against UK collaboration by representing the agreed draft Memorandum as a threat to US efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to join in an international regulatory system. Although the UK had declined the offer of treaty status, Groves’ needed to have raise legal doubts about the possible treaty status of the Memorandum before it was signed. Groves secured a damning legal opinion. He wrote to Byrnes two days before the CPC meeting with the news he had just received legal advice that the secret UK-US Memorandum, “could well be considered as tantamount to a military alliance.”454 Groves suggested such an arrangement would surely need to be registered under new UN Treaty registration rules and thus once exposed would undermine Soviet trust in US intentions and damage the State Department’s efforts to secure a regulatory deal with them.455

453 Gordon Arneson, March, 2ibid.
455 Helmreich, 111.
In discussing the terms of the Memorandum the UK had confided in Groves that it wished to proceed with the construction of an atomic pile in the UK. Groves now approached Eisenhower, Chairman of the JCS and presenting himself as a supporter of continued tripartite collaboration, advised chances of collaboration would be advanced if the British pile was in Canada due to security concerns. Having obtained Eisenhower’s agreement that a Canadian site made sense, Groves then informed Byrnes that Eisenhower was against UK proposals. At the February CPC, Brynes and Bush informed the British there could be no actions that “could in any way compromise the success of discussion with the United Nations,” and further UK-US discussions would be required. As Gowing puts it, Groves’ priming, permitted Byrnes to give full expression to what Chadwick called his “obstructive and evasive abilities.” The result was another delay with Groves put in charge of drawing up a full UK-US executive agreement.

Thus empowered, Groves’ next move was to approach Dean Acheson. Acheson was an anglophile who in 1939 thought Pax Britannica had been the bulwark against totalitarianism its collapse meant the Soviets had now supplanted the Nazis as the threat to common values. Acheson was leading the State Department’s attempts to create an international regulatory atomic framework to include the Soviets. He had involved David Lilienthal, TVA director (and future head of the Atomic Energy Commission) in this task and they were within days of presenting the Acheson-Lilienthal Report that was to finally determine Administration policy. Groves now played up the existence of the legal threat posed by the draft executive memorandum, portraying himself as “a very scared man,” upset at having made promises to British and being unable to keep them. Lilienthal diary entry recorded, "This is the mess we are in,” Groves said, quite upset; “you have to get us out of it.” Of course, the so-called mess had been deliberately confected by Groves and he had already

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457 Ibid.
458 Groves, 405.
461 Yergin, 277.
462 Bundy and Gould, 142-43; Yergin, 237.
secured Byrnes’ support in delaying collaboration. Lilienthal, oblivious to the ulterior motive, thought Groves’ intervention was admirable, coming,

on the very eve of our presentation of a plan for joint international development. Nothing could be more timely, in the sense our report may become the basis for international discussion and therefore stave off just such things as this USA-UK joint enterprise which might permanently forestall international action.464

Privy to Groves’ legal advice, it fell to Acheson to be candid with the British who had been supporting his international plan. Acheson informed them on March 5, 1946, there could be no collaboration.

If it were carried out by some shenanigan of an exchange of notes, to evade the plain provision of the UNO Charter requiring summaries of agreements between nations be submitted to that body, that evasion would be fatal and wouldn’t work. They [the UK] must resign themselves to the fact that, although we made the agreement, we simply could not carry it out; things like that happen in government of the US due to the loose way things are handled…465

With British and Canadian collaboration stalled, Groves focussed on changing the nature of the McMahon Bill to elevate military control and restrict sharing atomic technology with any state. Groves leveraged the Gouzenko spy scandal to heighten security concerns in the Senate and during testimony to a closed session of the Senate in late February 1946, revealed (then classified) the arrest of Alan Nunn in London for spying. Nunn had been part of the British-Canadian team and according to Groves guilty of passing US atomic bomb secrets to the Soviets.466 Groves would later admit that Nunn had only general knowledge of atomic research and could not have passed on bomb secrets.467

As Robert Teigrob says Groves then “took an active role in the release and shaping of the story.”468 Groves leaked his Senate testimony to Washington correspondent Frank McNaughton pointing up the dangers to security if the military were not involved and the

464 Ibid.
466 Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 501-02.
468 Robert Teigrob, Warming up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States’ Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea (University of Toronto Press, 2009), 63.
The dangers of trusting the British, not to mention the Soviets. The story spread rapidly. On March 20 the NY Times ran the story on front page with the headline. “Groves bares leak in US Atom Plant as Letter Tells Bomb 'Know-How' of May, Seized British Scientist.” The article reflected a change of mood Grove’s leaks had produced on the floor of the senate. As Hewlett puts it “the roof fell in.” Senators of a Riga mindset rallied behind a Vandenberg amendment to incorporate a military liaison committee on the civilian run Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and forbid the exchange of atomic information.

Suffice to say Wallace and the atomic scientists were incensed by the resurrection of military control and the provisions to stop exchanges with the Soviets. They hit back by mobilising a public campaign against a “garrison state.” Wallace said the amendment could deliver the nation into military fascism… I hope that the American people rise up in their wrath and let the Senate know what their actions mean.

Eventually, there was a compromise, but not one that was any comfort to the UK. The Vandenberg amendment itself was amended so that the military was represented by the ‘civilian’ Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the army retained control of fissionable materials and the collection and evaluation of atomic weapons elsewhere.

When the British examined the circumstances and the final McMahon document they identified Groves as the person who had created the text that prevented collaboration. Eisenhower informed Lilienthal

They blame Groves for going behind their backs and having that provision against exchange of information put into the McMahon Act, even pointing to the line which

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469 Paul, 99.
472 Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 501.
473 Atkinson, 18.
singles out ‘industrial uses,’ which shows on the face of it that whoever got that line inserted had the background that only Groves and two or three others had… they are deeply upset by it.\footnote{476}

3.2.5 British appeals rejected

The British sought to rescue their post war atomic relationship, pinning their hopes on the April CPC meeting. To their astonishment, Byrnes denied ever having seen the Groves Anderson Memorandum despite having chaired CPC meetings where it was discussed.\footnote{477} The confirmation of non-cooperation at this level represented a huge shock to the British establishment, not least Attlee. Three cables from Attlee to Truman in April 1946 brought forth a reply that none of the previous agreements obliged the US to collaborate with the UK and that the UK would be unwise to build its own atomic energy plants.\footnote{478} As Gowing comments the UK had trusted Roosevelt’s word on secret agreements, but it soon became clear that Truman “would not be bound by” such agreements he made “unless Congress endorsed them.”\footnote{479} Nevertheless, Attlee appealed again on behalf of the UK and Canada stressing,

our three Governments stand in a special relationship to one another in the [atomic research] field is a matter of record… It is surely not inconsistent with its purpose that the co-operation begun during the war should continue during the peace unless and until it can be replaced by a wider system.\footnote{480}

Truman was not to be swayed and Attlee realised there was little point persisting.\footnote{481} As Ovendale concludes, only after the Suez Crisis and the recalibration of UK-US relations would nuclear cooperation be fully restored.\footnote{482}

\footnote{476} Lilienthal 2, 219.
\footnote{479} \textit{Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952}, 1, 342.
\footnote{481} Herken, 146.
3.3 The atomic Commonwealth

3.3.1 Introduction

In terms of a developing security community based on an Anglospheric core, the US decision on atomic collaboration represented a definitive step backwards. It also serves to illustrate the high levels of trust that existed between the UK and elements in the Commonwealth. Disadvantaged in attempts to develop atomic capabilities by the turn of events with the US, the UK turned to the resources of Commonwealth partners in a mutual endeavour for security. It is worth re-stressing that the Commonwealth enjoyed a common legal identity expressed through common citizenship and a common head of state. Cooperation was an outcome of informal, consensual arrangements that could usually accommodate growing nationalistic impulses.

3.3.2 Commonwealth collaboration

The Attlee Government decided that the UK must possess atomic weapons if it was to remain a serious power. Unlike the predominant view of the Truman Administration they had concluded the Soviet Union had the resources to produce atomic bombs, and as Bundy put it, using “their general sense of Great Power’s behaviour to guide them” believed it would do so. US behaviour had raised questions over its future reliability as an ally for Britain and its Commonwealth. Attlee explained his concerns years later saying,

If we had decided not to have it, we would have put ourselves entirely in the hands of the Americans. That was a risk a British Government should not take… At that time nobody could be sure the Americans would not revert to isolationism.

483 Canadian citizenship was introduced in 1947.
485 Bundy and Gould, 192.
Defence was seen in Commonwealth terms with the Chief of Staff Committee (COS) warning that “to delay production pending the outcome of negotiations regarding international control might well prove fatal to the security of the British Commonwealth.”

The behaviour of the US had raised Canadian concerns too. The Canadian General Staff (CGS) noted the US had initially been neutral in two wars Canada had been engaged in. Although they had no wish to form part of centralised ‘imperial’ security community, they recognised the risk of US unreliability could be mitigated by facilitating an atomic UK capability. The levels of trust were such they took it as read that this would provide automatic Commonwealth protection. In October 1945, the CGS warned Canada must take defensive steps because

…other nations will in due course possess the secret of its [the bomb’s] manufacture… This seems to lend emphasis to the urgent necessity … of ensuring that the secret of the manufacture of the A[atom] b[omb] itself is known to us or the UK so that we may have the advantage… in a war without the assistance of the US.

The Australian Government had also been keen that the UK took steps to ensure the Commonwealth developed its own research capability with Evatt informing Attlee in October 1945

It is unnecessary for me to stress the advantages of a Commonwealth effort in this supremely important field of research. In Australia we are anxious that this should be started; if it is not, however, we shall be forced to enter the field on our own. The contributions we could make to an Empire scheme are significant. Primary research and development might best be carried out in the United Kingdom, but we could send skilled scientists to assist in this purpose.

Evatt’s support for a UK base clashed with MacKenzie King’s preference for the UK and Canada.

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487 Quoted in Matthew Jones, The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Volume I: From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964 (Routledge, 2017), 8. Source: Major General Leslie C. Hollis minute for Attlee, October 10, 1945, PREM 8/116, and as COS 144/9 annexed to COS(45)246th mtg, October 10, 1945, CAB 79/40, TNA

to establish a large Commonwealth [atomic] plant in Canada which could supply the other parts of the Empire, and to the research laboratories of which teams for the various Dominions and Britain could come for research work.\textsuperscript{490}

This envisaged utilising the existing UK-British team at Montréal Laboratory established in 1942, and directed by UK scientist John Cockcroft. By September 1945, an operational atomic reactor had been constructed at Chalk River, Ontario.\textsuperscript{491} There was some British support for this with Chadwick arguing had its own plant geared to plutonium production and it was logical to use existing facilities in Canada rather than create new ones in the UK.\textsuperscript{492}

In fact, there were already practical difficulties to this possibility given the US had secured Canadian uranium supplies and could dictate terms of supply.\textsuperscript{493} Both the Canadians and British scientists had recognised this as early as 1943. C.J. McKenzie, the head of the Canadian Project, warned that despite a desire to help the Commonwealth, the US relationship constrained them, and if forced to take sides, the Canadian Government “will undoubtedly refuse to take any action which will antagonise the American Government, as the effects of a breach would be too serious.”\textsuperscript{494}

3.3.3 A UK or Canadian research base

As early as January 1945, Oliphant, himself an Australian, had been urging the withdrawal of key members of the British Manhattan team to Britain so as to form a nucleus of a British research effort.\textsuperscript{495} The potential US restrictions on uranium supplies led to Commonwealth efforts to find other sources in Australia and NZ. In February 1945, the head of the NZ Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) enquired how geological surveys were progressing.

\textsuperscript{489} Evatt to Attlee, 14th October 1945, CAB 130/3, also in PREM 8/112 TNA
\textsuperscript{490} King, MacKenzie quoted in Buckley, 41.
\textsuperscript{491} See: Avery.
\textsuperscript{492} Chadwick to Rickett, September 10, 1945, AB 1/381 TNA
\textsuperscript{493} Reynolds, 854-55.
\textsuperscript{494} ”High Commissioner to Canada to the Lord President,” July 5, 1943, TNA PRO, AB 1/376;
 ”Note to Talk with Dean Mackenzie” May 14, 1943 TNA PRO, AB 1/374 & ibid., 855.
\textsuperscript{495} Oliphant, ‘Notes on T.A.’ 9th January 1945, TNA CAB 126/181
I trust the search (for Uranium and Thorium) is proceeding well. The work is very important from an Empire point of view as many tons will be wanted in the next few years and Uncle Sam has a stranglehold on the Canadian ores.\textsuperscript{496}

Mackenzie King did not appreciate the feelings of mistrust towards the US extended to Commonwealth scientists who were wary of any dependence of the existing British-Canadian research base on the US. Oblivious to these concerns, King overplayed the importance of the Canadian operation by stressing Britain had no atomic plants of its own “and the for the next year or so will be dependent entirely on our development for… by-products.”\textsuperscript{497} The risks of future US pressure on Canada not to assist the UK was elevated by US plans to incorporate Canada into its continental defence plans. This would “not only tie up uranium, but would also effectively control the atomic programme as a whole.”\textsuperscript{498}

Oliphant believed it was vital the UK remove itself from any possibility of US entanglement by ruling out Canada as the base of future research. As such, it was necessary to persuade John Cockcroft the highly respected head of the joint UK-Canadian Montreal operation. Cockcroft’s practical experience in establishing the Chalk River reactor would be of critical importance in building a reactor in the UK. Oliphant wrote to Cockcroft urging him to return to assist in the efforts to build an atomic reactor in the UK

...it is a matter of vital practical importance to this country and the Empire, and our future as a real factor in the world of industry and politics depends on our position in T[upe] A[lloys].\textsuperscript{499}

In October 1945, Attlee announced a research and experimental facility would be established at Harwell, near Oxford.\textsuperscript{500} Although the formal decision to pursue an independent atomic deterrent was not made until 1947, this decision signalled an intent to create the means to do.\textsuperscript{501} By November Cockcroft agreed to head up the Harwell operation, a decision that came as a bitter blow to the Canadians who regarded him as a key asset for their

\textsuperscript{496} Memo for Minister SIR, February 15th 1945, AAOQ W3424 Box 5 74/2/1 Part 1
\textsuperscript{497} Quoted in Buckley, 41.
\textsuperscript{498} Reynolds, 855.
\textsuperscript{499} Letter Marcus Oliphant to John Cockcroft, September, 14, 1945, CAC, CKFT25/27, 1.
\textsuperscript{500} Gowing and Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, 1, 205.
\textsuperscript{501} Ibid., 442.
operations.\footnote{502}{Ibid., 205. Robert Bothwell, "Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited," (1988): 125.} In an initial overreaction, the Canadians declared, “Canada would have no other alternative than to tie in with the United States.”\footnote{503}{MacKenzie quoted in Reynolds, 855. Also Buckley, 61.} In fact Canada would supply fissile material to the UK once the Chalk River reactor finally produced plutonium in 1951.\footnote{504}{Gowing and Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, 1, 421-22.}

3.3.4 Commonwealth atomic R&D

The UK Government considered the possibility of a coordinated Commonwealth atomic project but was stymied by the Quebec agreement. The involvement of the Commonwealth states would constitute sharing with third party states.\footnote{505}{See Baylis, 24.} Unlike the BRUSA SIGINT arrangement the Dominions were not favoured second parties but considered third parties and their involvement would require US consultation and consent.\footnote{506}{See:Galbreath, 308.} Given the (then) likely provisions of the McMahon Act, this was unlikely to be granted. This did not mean the Commonwealth was rendered irrelevant. On the contrary Dominion individuals (since they were ‘British’ citizens) could still be involved and both Australia and New Zealand (the largest national grouping after UK and Canadians) had significant numbers of scientists in the Montreal operation.\footnote{507}{Priestley, 58-59.} A close working relationship with the Australia government also offered both the possibility of uranium supplies and suitable test sites, arrangements that would not breach the Quebec provisions of sharing ‘secrets.’\footnote{508}{Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship (HMSO, 1987).} The suggestion of the construction of an atomic plant was taken up by New Zealand scientists who supported the construction of a UK ‘pile’ in NZ as a possible contribution to a dispersed Commonwealth strategy.\footnote{509}{Heavy water production in NZ was considered for British defence needs. See: Rebecca Priestley, "Ernest Marsden’s Nuclear New Zealand: From Nuclear Reactors to Nuclear Disarmament” (paper presented at the Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, 2006), 28.}

Despite these various work arounds, the UK remained keen to amend the restrictive clause of the Quebec Agreement that prohibited third party sharing. It succeeded in this
objective by 1948 by the so-called *modus vivendi* with the US. This allowed the UK some latitude to share atomic research with the Dominions. The price was high and included the UK’s abandonment of its Quebec veto clause over US use of nuclear weapons.

Atomic research aside, the UK was keen to work with Australia to develop a strategic partnership of direct relevance to the atomic weapons programme. The relationship was confirmed at the February 1946 Prime Minister’s Conference in London. It included research into guided missile systems and the development of an industrial weapons base for Australia. It had the enthusiastic backing of the Chifley Labor Government, Sir Frederick Sheddon and the military. An ‘Informal Commonwealth Conference on Defence Science’ (ICCDS) was called in June 1946 by Sir Henry Tizard. The Commonwealth delegates were informed by Tizard that they could all expect to benefit from atomic research within ten years should they make specialist personnel available (again the emphasis was on individuals). Tizard explained that the

The British Commonwealth was an example of how nations, while still retaining their own sovereignty, could yet set aside these boundaries and work together for the common good. In the past, concentration in time of war had been a source of strength, but this era was passing and there was a tendency to disperse both population and scientific brains for the more successful prosecution of the war.

The subsequent Evetts Report was to lead to the creation of the sprawling Salisbury-Woomera site overseen by the CUKAC (the Combined United Kingdom-Australian Long Range Weapons Committee). This became the centre of operations for the development of series of bombs and missiles headed by Evett who was succeeded by New Zealander Alan Butement. Research included work on the Blue Steel, Black Knight and Blue Streak

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510 Reproduced in Baylis, 51-56.
512 See:Baylis, 42-43.
513 Attlee to Tizard, May 3 1946 TNA, PREM 8, 753
514 Henry Tizard. Informal Commonwealth Conference on Defence and Science. 1st meeting, June 3, 1946. TNA DO35/1759/ICCDS
516 Ibid., 20.
missiles, the latter the UK’s highly advanced rocket system designed to carry its nuclear deterrent.\textsuperscript{517}

The UK’s decision in 1947 to proceed with a bomb required a new specialist team with key Dominion personnel from the Manhattan Project involved. It was headed by British physicist William Penney who began recruiting a British atomic bomb team that included Australian and New Zealand scientists.\textsuperscript{518} In 1948, the British Chiefs of staff tabled their requirement for 200 bombs by 1957.\textsuperscript{519}

The need for suitable testing sites became of increasing importance and in 1951, joint UK-Australian efforts identified the Monte Bello Islands as the site for atomic testing.\textsuperscript{520} New Zealand supplied logistical support for atomic tests with Prime Minister Holland asserting they were necessary for Commonwealth defence and “New Zealand will be helping to ensure that the United Kingdom remains in the forefront in the field of nuclear research.”\textsuperscript{521} The joint Australia-UK collaboration on various systems continued throughout the period, allowing the UK to pursue atomic weapons and delivery systems and emphasise the high levels of trust enjoyed between the UK and Australia.\textsuperscript{522}

3.3.5 Nuclear weapons in Commonwealth Defence

The importance of the UK acquisition of atomic weapons was highlighted by the UK’s 1952 \textit{Global Strategy Paper} produced by the British CoS. This seminal paper established the primary importance of a nuclear deterrence and made the UK the first state to base its

\textsuperscript{517} See: John Boyes, \textit{Blue Streak: Britain’s Medium Range Ballistic Missile} (Fonthill Media, 2019).

\textsuperscript{518} Gowing and Arnold, \textit{Independence and Deterrence: Volume 1: Policy Making}, 6-7; Galbreath, 316.


\textsuperscript{520} Morton, 20; Gowing and Arnold, \textit{Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952}, 1, 476 & 78.

\textsuperscript{521} Quoted in: Priestley, "Ernest Marsden’s Nuclear New Zealand: From NuclearReactors to Nuclear Disarmament", 31.

\textsuperscript{522} See; Morton. & Reynolds.
security planning almost entirely upon a declaratory policy of nuclear deterrence. In terms of strategic thinking, it would mark a degree of convergence with the approach the US. Indeed, Freedman contends it constituted a message from the UK CoS to the US rather than to their own Government. The UK paper was not initially well-received by the Truman Administration. However, within six months, similar sentiments underlay the Eisenhower Administration’s *New Look* strategy that also emphasised retaliatory nuclear strikes.

The 1952 Global Strategy Paper was predicated on the UK acquiring nuclear weapons capability. By October 1952, the UK had assembled a test bomb using plutonium from Windscale with a shortfall made up by Canada. The test (Operation Hurricane), carried out at the Monte Bello, Australian site was successful. Churchill (by now Prime Minister again) informed the Commons of the outcome and the likely impact on relations with the US.

> I do not doubt that it will lead to a much closer American interchange of information than has hitherto taken place... There are a very large number of people in the United States concerned with this matter who have been most anxious for a long time that Britain should be kept better informed.

There was too a recognition of Australia's contribution with Churchill recording the Government’s,

> indebtedness for all the help received from Australia. Not only did the Australian Commonwealth allow us to use their territory for the test, but all branches of their Government, and particularly the Navy, Army and Air Force, gave us most valuable collaboration in the preparation and execution of this most important experiment.

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524 , 75.

525 Jones, 24.


528 , 70.

529 Winston Churchill, Atom Bomb Test, Australia

HC Deb 23 October 1952 vol 505 cc1268-71

530 Winston Churchill, Atom Bomb Test, Australia

HC Deb 23 October 1952 vol 505 cc1268-71
The Australians input continued, motivated by the same sentiments expressed in the UK’s 
Global Strategy Paper and viewed themselves as a part of a Commonwealth security 
community with possible access to nuclear weapons. As the self-perceived lead 
Commonwealth regional military power, Australia had looked favourably on developing a 
nuclear weapons capability since 1946. Chifley had authorised the creation of the new 
facilities at a new National University of Australia (ANU) and the creation of Atomic Energy 
Commission. The objective was a research programme to produce weapon grade 
plutonium and create a heavy water atomic pile. This all occurred with the active 
involvement of the UK. They released Oliphant from the UK to head up the ANU 
Department, and further agreed to his request to release Sir Ernest Titterton from Harwell to 
become foundation Chair of Nuclear Physics at the ANU and donated a cyclotron for the 
fledgling facility.

The UK’s first ‘Blue Danube’ nuclear bombs were received by the RAF in November 
1953, and incorporated into training and maintenance schedules. However, the RAF was 
dependent on the development of a new V-bomber class aircraft for delivery of the bombs. It 
was not until 1955 that the first ‘Valiant’ bombers were received. A squadron was declared 
operational in January 1956, and later in that year a successful bombing run at the Australian 
Marling range confirmed their effectiveness.

Unfortunately for the UK, this was not the end of the atomic story. The atomic bomb 
would soon be superseded by the US testing of a hydrogen bomb at the Bikini atoll in 
October 1952. The destructive potential was many times greater than the atomic bombs in 
the UK’s possession if made deliverable. Penney believed his team could reproduce the US
hydrogen bomb in four to five years.\textsuperscript{539} In 1954, the UK Cabinet authorised the necessary research for thermonuclear bombs and missile heads.\textsuperscript{540}

3.4 Partial restoration of UK-US atomic relationship

3.4.1 US remorse and the basis for future collaboration

A sense of hurt pervaded the British and military establishments after the rupture in collaboration.\textsuperscript{541} It was heightened by a sense that this behaviour was, to use a British expression, ‘not cricket.’ In the list of cultural values that Bennett identified as featuring “a common historical narrative” of Anglospheric nations was “‘a man's word is his bond’ are taken for granted.”\textsuperscript{542} This did not mean that the concept of ‘a man’s word is his bond’ was exclusive to Anglosphere nations, or that it was all pervading meme-complex within it. On the contrary, Groves, Byrnes, Bush and Truman had demonstrated it was not. However, the sense of that the US had fallen short extended to a number of American policy-makers with knowledge of the secret agreements. Many would continue to serve in US administrations and act to rectify what they considered a violation of their value system that had not been reflected by the policy outcomes of their governmental institutions.

Acheson, who had talked about the ‘loose way’ the US does things, was deeply unhappy. The feeling of having wronged the UK remained with Acheson who was to say later that the matter of the US

\[\ldots\text{failing to keep its word and performing its obligations… was repulsive to me. The analogy of a nation to a person is not sound in all matters of moral conduct; in this case however, it seemed pretty close.} \textsuperscript{543}\]

Gordon Arneson and Joseph Volpe, the two members of Groves’ team involved in discussions were also uncomfortable. Volpe believed that any British feelings of betrayal

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{539} Jones, 26 & 29.
\item \textsuperscript{540} Arnold, 76.
\item \textsuperscript{541} Pierre, 76.
\item \textsuperscript{542} Bennett, "An Anglosphere Primer," 2.
\item \textsuperscript{543} Dean Acheson, \textit{Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department}, vol. 4418 (WW Norton & Company, 1970), 164.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
“were certainly justified” more so because “of the relationship that existed during the war.”

Both would go on to serve in roles where they could influence the relationship with the UK. In 1948, Arneson became the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs to the Secretary’s of State in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (1948 to 1954). Volpe served as legal counsel to the civilian US Atomic Energy Commission under the chairmanship of David Lilienthal.

Averell Harriman who had served as US Ambassador to Moscow and London would replace Henry Wallace in the Department of Commerce in October 1946. He regarded the McMahon Act as “shameful” and even more so because “the British had given us everything they had during the war.” Averill’s reference was to the 1940 ‘Tizard Mission’ to the US. Tizard’s personal journey across the Atlantic with his briefcase of scientific secrets was described by J.B. Baxter as “the most valuable cargo ever brought to our shores.” They included the UK’s research on jet propulsion, a series of defense systems related to the cavity magnetron (including radar) and so significant they were credited with changing the course of the war.

Eisenhower too, was disgusted at what had transpired, later informing his shocked Presidential staff he regarded the passage of McMahon Act as “one of the most deplorable incidents in American history of which he personally felt ashamed.” Even McMahon himself, when shown a copy of the secret Quebec Agreement by Churchill in 1952, expressed his regret and claimed if he had known about the secret commitments he would not have agreed to make the Act so restrictive.

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544 Volpe.
545 Gordon Arneson, March, 2ibid.
546 Joseph Jnr Volpe, March 3ibid., interview 1.
3.4.2 US domestic attempts to make amends

On becoming Chairman of the newly constituted AEC, David Lilienthal soon became concerned by the extent of US deceit and the consequent anguish. He thought the British were dealt a raw deal, after their partnership contribution during the war, to be shut out permanently after the war. It was snide and unworthy of the United States.\textsuperscript{552}

With Anglophile leanings Lilienthal was encouraged by colleagues with both civilian and military backgrounds to see matters from the British perspective and perhaps find ways to assist. At a meeting with June 12, 1947 with George Marshall, by then Secretary of State, Lilienthal was informed,

how exceeding vulnerable the British are, compared to ourselves and others; how well they realise it… how important it is to try to understand their feelings.\textsuperscript{553}

On June 16, 1947, Lilienthal received a visit from General Fred Anderson from the JCS Planning Unit who wished to speak to him on the advice of Admiral Nimitz. Anderson, who had worked alongside Maitland Wilson and Ismay in World War 2, explained he had returned from a “secret mission” to London and become dismayed by the feelings of bitterness from his British colleagues.\textsuperscript{554} Lilienthal wrote,

Although he was a professional soldier, you could see this experience had quite shaken him. At the end of our talk about other things, he looked at me in a gravely concerned manner and again urged that we do something to explain the British were being kept from [atomic] energy tomorrow.\textsuperscript{555}

In July 1947, Lilienthal met with Eisenhower and raised the issue of relations with the UK, explaining that “they felt our denial to them of exchange of atomic information was

\textsuperscript{553} Lilienthal 2, 199.
\textsuperscript{554} Ibid., 203.
\textsuperscript{555} Ibid., 203-04.
harsh and unfair.”

Eisenhower agreed and said it was Groves who was to blame. Eisenhower then referred to the common Magna Carta tradition (Bill of Rights) heritage of the British and Americans and dismissed worries about Britain (and some Commonwealth countries) having ‘socialist’ governments.

The two countries that believe in a Bill of Rights ought to stick together. They do believe in a Bill of Rights, and what ever form of social organisation they feel they have to go to for in order to make their economic machinery work, they won’t give that up and that is the real test.

Lilienthal agreed and suggested they should look to change the McMahon Act. The two men then turned to the issue of Anglophobia and Eisenhower responded by referring to recent attacks on him and the “belting the Chicago Tribune had given him as an Anglophile.” Lilienthal agreed the anti-British sentiment was still strong and had witnessed it himself in Chicago. Lilienthal thought it quite strange, that in the South, “with the highest percentage of Anglo-saxon population,” Senator Tom Stewart’s anti-British speeches about the War of Independence were attracting “great applause almost as if the Revolutionary War had just been fought.” They moved on to discuss the problem with Groves, his general behaviour and the fact the British had identified him as the person responsible for the rupture.

They concluded any attempted restitution for the British would require the removal of Groves as Head of Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Command and from the AEC’s Military Liaison Committee. Thus, in September 1947 in anticipation of talks with the British, Lilienthal and Eisenhower began to manoeuvre for Groves’ removal. By the end of 1947, the US had initiated talks with the UK to discuss the Quebec Agreement and take steps to counter domestic US opposition to collaboration. To placate US ‘nationalists,’ talks were justified on the basis it was in the national interest to obtain the UK’s share of uranium and remove the UK veto on the use of atomic weapons, a principal concern of some US senators.

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556 Ibid., 218.
558 Lilienthal 2, 219.
559 Ibid., 220.
560 Ibid.
561 Ibid., 218-19.
562 Ibid., 237.
563 Ibid., 259-60 & 66.
On January 7, 1948, a CPC meeting agreed a *modus vivendi* whereby the US agreed to the exchange of certain non-weapons related information.\(^{564}\) This time Groves would be unable to frustrate matters, for on the same date, Eisenhower engineered Groves’ resignation.\(^{565}\)

The importance of the modus vivendi can be exaggerated, indeed that is the position taken by Gowing, but Baylis asserts it did “in some respects break the log jam and allow the flow of critical information.”\(^ {566}\) However, disagreements “still existed in political circles in the US.”\(^ {567}\) A further attempt to deepen collaboration failed. A meeting between the White House executive and Senate at Blair House in July 1949, did however, reveal the strength of the Anglophile grouping.\(^ {568}\) Among the eight representatives of the executive alongside the President and pushing for greater cooperation were Acheson, Lilienthal, Eisenhower, Volpe and Arneson. Truman’s script had been prepared by Arneson and stressed the common history of the US with Canada and the UK in developing the bomb.\(^ {569}\) Powerful senators objected, Vandenberg stating that the US had done “so much for the English it was now up to them to do something for us.”\(^ {570}\) Any hopes for an advance were dashed by news of the arrest of British scientist Karl Fuchs in London on spying charges raising questions of security.\(^ {571}\)

### 3.4.3 Limited cooperation

Progress was slow thereafter; the return of Churchill to power and the election of Eisenhower in 1953 produced limited cooperation due to the legal restrictions of the McMahon Act. However, Cold War tensions and John Foster Dulles’ bias towards nuclear weapons as part of a ‘New Look’ facilitated some changes.\(^ {572}\) The US American Atomic Energy Act of 1954 allowed exchanges with allies regarding external characteristics of

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\(^{564}\) Baylis, 42.  
\(^{565}\) Lilienthal 2, 236.  
\(^{566}\) Baylis, 43.  
\(^{567}\) Ibid., 44.  
\(^{570}\) Ibid., 301-02. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation,” July 18, 1949, #d175 *FRUS, 1949 National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy. Vol I*  
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atomic weapons. The 1955 bilateral UK-US and Canada-US arrangements were markedly more privileged than any general ‘dissemination’ agreement with the non-Anglosphere NATO allies. It was also in this period that a degree of preliminary collaboration was initiated by Admiral Rickover by stretching the legal definitions of the Acts with Executive consent and approval. The consequent transfer of submarine propulsion technology is dealt with in chapter 4.

3.5 Establishing an intelligence Security Community

3.5.1 The Travis Initiative

The British took the initiative to ensure the 1943 BRUSA SIGINT intelligence sharing arrangement with the US could be repurposed as a post-WW2 alliance. The UK’s SIGINT operations were an ad hoc conglomerate of imperial and commonwealth assets spread across the globe, dominated and operated by GCHQ. With the looming defeat of the Axis powers, demobilisation and the likely assertion of Dominion sovereignty had the potential to wreck the viability of future GCHQ’s operations since they “were essentially branches of the relevant British organisations.”

The effectiveness of any post-war SIGINT operation would be dependent on a global network of intercept stations. Britain could continue to operate SIGINT facilities those territories it still directly controlled, and with the dominions on board, would be able to entice the US to join them to maintain continued global reach. This, however, was reliant on the

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575 Dylan, 163.; Aid and Wiebes, Chap 3.
576 Aldrich, 148-49.
willingness of Dominion governments to establish national agencies and then participate in a communal effort.\footnote{578 Philip Murphy, "Exporting a British Intelligence Culture: The British Intelligence Community and Decolonisation, 1945-1960" (paper presented at the unpublished conference paper, Political Studies Association, 2004), 2.}

On March 14, 1945, a high-level British team headed by Sir Edward Travis embarked on a world-wide tour to assess the possibilities of continued post-WW2 operations.\footnote{579 Christopher Andrew, "Anglo-American-Soviet Intelligence Relations," in \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941–45}, ed. Ann Lane Lane, & Temperley, Howard (Springer, 1995), 129 & fn86.; Dorril, 52.} Travis’ first visits were to Australia and NZ to discuss future operations with the relevant intelligence personnel. Given the fragmented nature and internal rivalries of the US SIGINT assets, they held separate meetings with the Army, Navy and State Department.\footnote{580 See:Christopher Andrew, "Bletchley Park in Post-War Perspective," in \textit{The Bletchley Park Codebreakers}, ed. Michael Smith (Biteback Publishing, 2011), Chapter 23.} With those talks underway, his second in command, Rear Admiral Rushbrooke flew to Ottawa to brief Canadian counterparts.\footnote{581 "Anglo-American-Soviet Intelligence Relations," 129.}

3.5.2 US domestic turmoil

The US Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (ANCIB) was keen to continue their SIGINT collaboration with the focus on the Soviet Union, their wartime ‘ally’.\footnote{582 See:James F Schnabel, \textit{The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947}, vol. 1 (Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State, 1996), 4.} The nature of the closely guarded SIGINT operations meant there was little knowledge of the ANCIB’s existence and activities beyond Roosevelt himself.\footnote{583 Smith, 202-03; Aldrich, \textit{GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency}, 75.} This secrecy served Roosevelt and the military well, insulating the SIGINT alliance from growing Cabinet and more public arguments about the activities of other intelligence activities. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in particular had been singled out for its proposals for a post-War centralised intelligence service. Its report to Roosevelt had been leaked to US isolationist media outlets in February 1945 as part of a institutional turf war involving the FBI. The \textit{Chicago Tribune} denounced the OSS as a US ‘Gestapo’ operation.\footnote{584 The Chicago Tribune, the NY Daily News and the Washington Times Herald were each individually owned by three cousins who pursued an aggressive anti-Roosevelt and isolationist line. See:Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, \textit{The CIA and American Democracy} (Yale University Press, 2014), 33; Greg Bradsher, "'Fake News' 1942: President Roosevelt and the Chicago Tribune," \textit{The Text Message...}
Roosevelt had been obliged to place any consideration of plans for a central intelligence operation on hold until April 5, 1945. Whilst the JSC welcomed this setback to OSS plans, they were concerned with the media’s line of attack and aghast at the notion the FBI should become the lead intelligence agency. Media stories had castigated the OSS for being in the ‘pockets’ of the British and the military worried about accusations of their being too close to the UK should the SIGINT arrangements become known.

Roosevelt’s death transformed the situation. Within hours of his passing on April 12, 1945, Attorney General Biddle made an unsuccessful pre-emptive move to persuade Truman to consolidate all intelligence activity under his own Department of Justice administered FBI. Utilising more leaks, the anti-Roosevelt press titles resumed the attack with a series of anti-British stories. The OSS was asserted to be “an arm of the British Intelligence Service.” Truman professed himself concerned about the development of a US ‘Gestapo’ and announced international spying was “un-American.” The new President also received advice from Harold D. Smith, Director of the Budget Bureau, who suggested all intelligence services could be terminated or cut back. Truman requested Smith draw up plans to “liquidate the war agencies and reconvert the government to peace.” The SIGINT arrangements and activity were not identified since the very existence of it operation was highly secret. Roosevelt had excluded Truman from all high-level foreign/security policy

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587 The JCS had put forward their own plan (JIC 239/5) to Roosevelt they deemed wise to withdraw following the uproar. This plan included representation of the State Department alongside the Army and War Departments. See: “Founding of the National Intelligence Structure August 1945–January 1946,” *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1945–1950, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*.

588 Jeffreys-Jones, 31.


590 Chambers.

matters in general and the former Vice President had displayed little interest in such matters and certainly had no comprehension of a SIGINT operation.  

Of immediate concern to the military was the arrival in the Whitehouse of Truman’s Vice-Presidential staff. These largely consisted of low calibre cronies from Missouri who formed part of Truman’s drinking and poker-playing circle. The wartime Whitehouse Truman and his staff now occupied included the highly restricted ‘Map Room’ where SIGINT information was received and had been disseminated to Roosevelt. To the horror of the military, the new President announced that his Vice-Presidential “Military Aide,” Colonel Harry Vaughan would be his new Presidential Military Aide. Usually such aides would be trusted serving Army officers, however Vaughan was an ill-disciplined Reserve soldier who had served with Truman in World War I and was now a constant companion. Vaughan was a member of Truman’s daily poker-playing circle who played for money and was considered the ‘court jester’ for his wise-cracking antics. More disturbing however, was his lax ethical behaviour and involvement with criminal elements for financial gain. Vaughan was a regular associate of John F. Maragon, former black-boot boy involved in illegal activities with foreign importers and smugglers. On arriving at the Whitehouse, on April 13 the day after Roosevelt’s death, one of Vaughan’s first actions was to issue a White House pass to Maragon enabling him to operate from Vaughan’s Whitehouse office. And within the first few weeks of his arrival Vaughan was using his Whitehouse position for financial gain.

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595 Morgan and White, 79-80; Miscamble, 152 & 88.


597 Dunar, 45&47.

598 Boylan. 5.
Army Chief of Staff General Marshall took immediate steps to make the Whitehouse [SIGINT] Map Room completely off-limits to Vaughan and other staff. Instructions were issued to ensure that all Whitehouse staff must not open any sealed folder given to the President and marked “For President’s Eyes only.” Marshall’s first intelligence briefing on April 17, reveals the military’s concern of a leak about US SIGINT operations and politely requests contents not be shared with the likes of Vaughan,

the intelligence came from a purely British source, which incidentally involves some 3,000 people and we have bound ourselves to confine its circulation to a specific and very limited group of people. Therefore, I request that this be ‘For Your Eyes Only.’

The military remained cautious, concerned by Truman’s tendency to sign off or endorse policies without seeking further advice often resulted in vacillation, sudden reversals and policy confusion. This was compounded by Truman’s susceptibility to congressional and public pressure that included growing demands for US demobilisation of military assets even before the defeat of Japan. An anti-British media theme continued in the press throughout May 1945 directed at the OSS. Insulated from this, the military had decided to respond favourably to Travis’ proposals and on August 21, they agreed the US should seek to extend collaboration with the British whilst attempting to ensure any talks about a post-WW2 ANCIB SIGINT operation would not leak.

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599 Vaughan was eventually investigated as an influence peddler. See: William Safire, Safire’s Political Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2008).
This was a dangerous political environment for the JCS; media leaks favouring the FBI, the stirring of public sentiment against both spying and collaboration with the British, a Bureau committed to cost-cutting, compounded by a weak President inclined to sign off on proposals without full consideration and the presence of new ‘staff’ in the Whitehouse of dubious character. With these mounting pressures, the Army and Navy set aside their rivalry and acted to protect SIGINT activities and the UK relationship. Avoiding Smith, Biddle and Vaughan, Truman was presented with a drafted Order designating any US SIGINT activity as ‘secret’ which he duly signed without query. Bradley-Smith regards this as a seminal decision since the JCS’s SIGINT activities “could be carried through secretly under the president’s war powers” if they had been delayed, "and the glow of victory had been allowed to pale, Congress might have become inquisitive and meddlesome.” More to the point there was a danger of further leaks and a repeat of the opposition Wallace was stirring over atomic post-war collaboration.

A threat of SIGINT exposure still existed in Smith’s Budget Bureau plan for recommended OSS closure that was scheduled for Executive decision on September 4, 1945. A further draft executive order from Smith laid out the division of OSS assets and charged the Department of State with overseeing the creation of a single overarching intelligence agency involving the FBI. The Chairman of the JCS was Admiral Leahy, who also served as Truman’s Chief of Staff and acted to protect UK-US SIGINT activities. The JCS made urgent representations to their cabinet representatives on State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). So briefed the Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Navy Secretary James Forrestal and acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson immediately informed the President of the need for continued SIGINT collaboration with the British. On September 12, 1945, Truman was warned of the “possible hostile intentions of foreign nations” and advised we “recommend you authorise continued collaboration between the

606 US White House, Executive Order 28 August 1945. ABC 311.51 (10/25/42) Rg 165, Mr, NA (1945).
607 Smith, 208.
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United States and the United Kingdom."\textsuperscript{611} Faced with the unanimous opinion of three Cabinet members, Truman duly acceded. A single sentence secret order sanctioned his military chiefs to collaborate with the British.\textsuperscript{612}

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are hereby authorised to direct the Chief of Staff, US Army, Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to continue collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the US Army and Navy and the British, and to extend, modify, or discontinue this collaboration, as determined to be in the best interests of the United States.\textsuperscript{613}

This event can be seen as a pivotal day in US intelligence, pre-empting authorisation of Smith’s imminent reorganisation draft.\textsuperscript{614} Just eight days later, on September 20, 1945, Smith obtained Truman’s signature on an Executive Order to dismantle the OSS.\textsuperscript{615} He presented Truman with an additional separate letter charging the State Department to take the lead in creating a federal intelligence institution.\textsuperscript{616} Although this was unwelcome news to the JCS whose own plans for wider intelligence reorganisation were sidelined, the earlier September 12, Executive Order insulated SIGINT operations and the negotiations with the UK proceeded.\textsuperscript{617} Admiral Leahy, JCS Chairman authorised General Vandenberg, the chairman of State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIB) to sign the revised BRUSA terms on March 5, 1946.\textsuperscript{618}

\textsuperscript{610} Thomas L Burns, \textit{The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA: 1940-1952} (Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2005), 23. Acheson was the Dept of State representative on the SWNCC and inducted into the secret SIGINT arrangements.

\textsuperscript{611} Gordon Thomas, \textit{Secret Wars: One Hundred Years of British Intelligence inside MI5 and MI6} (Macmillan, 2009), 112.

\textsuperscript{612} Thomas R Johnson, \textit{American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989} (Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1995), 16.

\textsuperscript{613} Burns, 23.

\textsuperscript{614} See: Philip HJ Davies, \textit{Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective} (ABC-CLIO, 2012), 175-76.

\textsuperscript{615} “Executive Order 9621-Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions.” September 20, 1945, document #14, in \textit{FRUS, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment}.


\textsuperscript{617} The military also acted to protect OSS intelligence assets by what Warner calls “artful ambiguity.” These formed the basis of the Central Intelligence Group.

\textsuperscript{618} “Joint Meeting of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board. Summary.” November 1, 1945. US National Security Archives (hereafter NSA) 30-31
3.5.3 The splintering Commonwealth security community

The focus of this thesis is on the five core states that comprise the Anglospheric security community. However, it is worth briefly examine the other Dominions of note that comprised the Commonwealth in the immediate post-War period and their lack of inclusion; South Africa, and the later creation of the Dominions of India and Pakistan in 1947.

Hanley and the CID worried about the reliability of South Africa even before World War 2 and with good reason. As referred to earlier, the British had fought and won the Boer War had been fought, but competing Afrikaner meme-complexes stressing religious and racial illiberalism remained strong. The more liberal values and culture of the English-speaking electorate were despised by a large proportion of Afrikaners. As late as 1953, one academic was still complaining that the British in Africa

with their liberal traditions and nascent revolutionary and democratic political ideas, and humanism had left a legacy of religious disaffection which even today causes nothing but trouble and sorrow.

Thus, the future direction and identification of South Africa in a post-War security community based on ‘Anglo-saxon’ values was precarious. It depended upon sufficient so-called “sell-out” Afrikaners aligning with the English-speaking community. Jan Smuts had managed to achieve this, winning a narrow parliamentary vote to bring South Africa into World War 2. In the immediate post-War period, the UK worried about a swing away from

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619 See: Hankey, 84-85. & Boyd, 137.
621 Patterson, 14.
Smuts, but was assured the polls appeared to be in his favour by 1947. However, in 1948, Smuts was defeated by hardline Afrikaners, many of whom had been members of armed pro-Nazi paramilitaries. There was consequently an immediate wariness between the new Afrikaner Government and the UK. Indicative of the explicit ‘clash’ of values was MI5’s unwillingness to assist in the creation of security service in South Africa in 1949 since it would be used against “black races.”

Although the UK had envisaged the inclusion of a single subcontinental India in an Anglospheric security community, the fracture into Pakistan and India prevented this. It soon became clear that the hostilities between the two states made this unlikely. The most immediate problem was the issue of Kashmir which resulted in immediate fighting and the recurring threat (and actual) conflict between the two Dominions. To include one or the other in intelligence matters ran the risk of offending either and the possibility of intelligence being misused to further Kashmiri issues. A further complication was India’s lead role in the non-aligned movement and status as a Republic – both threatening the coherence of the Commonwealth. The latter point was accommodated but there was no hope of India agreeing to a form of mutual defence, not least because Nehru was sympathetic to Marxism. The ultimate compromise was to save the Commonwealth but reduce its military and security dimensions to the older Dominion states.

The Commonwealth SIGINT Organisation therefore focussed on integrating elements of the old imperial network into the BRUSA arrangement based on a coalition of the willing and dependable.

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623 n“The Political Situation in South Africa: Prospects at the coming General Elections”, 22 March 1948. TNA, CO 936/2/4
625 Andrew, Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 444.
629 See: UK conclusions. COS(49)53rd meeting, 8 April 1949, DEFE 4/21 & , 233.
630 Ibid., 226.
631 Although Pakistan joined the UK in CENTO and SEATO albeit it furtherance of territorial issues. Ibid., 168.
3.5.4 Creating the Commonwealth SIGINT Organisation (CSO)

The role of the CSO is barely mentioned in the history of the modern Five Eyes alliance, but it gives shape to its institutional pedigree. It also speaks to the level of trust that such an organisation could be so quickly refashioned and on an informal basis. In the UK-US negotiations, the US agreed to a provision for the inclusion of Commonwealth countries as second parties to the Agreement, with GCHQ acting as the conduit.\(^632\) Unlike any other state, the dominions “would not be termed third parties” but treated as indirect parties to the agreement via the UK (the UK and US were second parties to each other).\(^633\) In order to participate in the SIGINT arrangement with the US, the dominions would need to establish domestic SIGINT agencies and thereafter sign-up to the terms of the final BRUSA terms.

Travis arranged a two-week Commonwealth SIGINT Conference in London starting on February 22, 1946, for members of each Dominion’s military establishments. The Conference agreed that existing GCHQ SIGINT transnational activity to be split between the UK and the participating Dominions to agreed geographical areas of responsibility.\(^634\)

The Conference recognised the special US interest in establishing relations with Canada and agreed that talks should be advanced in Ottawa, Washington and London.\(^635\) The UK agreed to transfer tasks “to start the new Canadian agency off” and loan senior GCHQ personnel to the new agency.\(^636\) To continue Commonwealth SIGINT operations in the Pacific, the conference recommended the creation of a “multi-national signals intelligence centre” based in Melbourne, comprising the UK, Australia and NZ, each with “an equal role.”\(^637\) With these provisos, the conference agreed to the creation of a Commonwealth SIGINT organisation (CSO) under “the broad direction” of the UK.\(^638\) Consequently at the inaugural meeting of the BRUSA committee on March 11, 1946, the UK Chairman was able

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\(^632\) “British-US Communication Intelligence Agreement. Top Secret "Cream,” March 5, 1946. NSA.
\(^633\) Johnson, 17.
\(^634\) See: Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, 95.
\(^635\) See: "Joint Meeting of ANCIB and ANICC", October 29, 1945, [BRUSA]. TNA HW80/01; Kurt F Jensen, Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence, 1939-51 (UBC Press, 2009), 134fn 76.
\(^638\) Ibid.
to inform his US colleagues the dominions had “agreed to abide” by the various security regulations.639

Following Travis’ preliminary work, Attlee called a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in April/May 1946 to create secure political acceptance for the initiation of the CSO concept.

3.5.5 Securing Canadian agreement

Canada’s inclusion in the CSO and the BRUSA arrangement was achieved despite Canadian suspicions of a revamped ‘Imperial Defence’ system. A subservient Canadian role in a wider imperial system ran counter to their vision of a new post-war role in which Canada, whilst still pro-British, would find a voice and security through the new United Nations.640 These sentiments led to rapid implementation of plans for a “breakneck” demobilisation of its armed forces in May 1945.641 However, the discovery of an extensive Soviet spying operation in North America caused Canadian political policy-makers to reconsider security in general and the merit of continued SIGINT activities.642

On October 15, 1945, Travis met his US counterparts and discussed the participation of the Commonwealth. Travis was of the view that “the exclusion of Canada from the proposed agreement would be embarrassing to all concerned” and parties agreed that British Dominions should be included “within the scope of the Agreement.”643 Travis then flew to Ottawa to persuade his Canadian colleagues to progress the approval of a Canadian SIGINT operation informing the Canadians of progress in the BRUSA negotiations and reaffirming

640 Eayrs, 151-65.
643 "Joint Meeting of Army-Navy Intelligence Board & Army Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee”, October, 15 1945. [Tripartite Meeting]. SS-93 34716. NSA
they “would like [Canada] to fit into [the] general plan.” In Ottawa, Travis secured agreement that the UK would represent Canada in the negotiations and returned to Washington. By November the UK and the US had outlined a draft plan that would include the Dominions with special provision for Canada.

The following month General Foulkes, the British-born Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff (CCoS), drafted a report for the Canadian Government, arguing that “as a member of the British Commonwealth and… as an essential economic and military partner of the US,” Canada should “share the fruit of intelligence activities of the two other powers” and this would be “enhanced by Canada’s making a contribution to the pool.”

In anticipation of the Commonwealth SIGINT Conference in April/May 1946, the CCoS had signed off their recommendation for a revamped Canadian SIGINT effort on March 28, 1946, and secured the approval of their Government. The UK agreed to supply the necessary equipment for a revamped Canadian-run British Commonwealth SIGINT operation as “part of the co-operative U.K.-U.S.-Canada programme in the field of interception.” The CANUK arrangements set out the very close collaboration plan to “synchronise” SIGINT activities.

3.5.6 Securing Australian agreement & NZ involvement

Despite the very close Commonwealth relationship, there were UK concerns about some left-leaning members of the Australian Government. This, however, paled into insignificance when contrasted to the distrust exhibited by the US, and it threatened to wreck the foundations of the wider SIGINT alliance.

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645 Rudner, 70; Jensen, 166.
647 Wark, 88-89.
649 The CANUK arrangements are detailed in a telegram to Travis copied in to Foulkes by the DEA. See: Pearson to Foulkes “Hydra Communications - Policy,” November 29, 1946. Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC) RG24, 1250-36 Vol. 1
650 “Hydra Project: Note of Arrangements Between the Directorate, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, Canadian Army, And the Directorate of Special Communications, Great Britain” Hydra Communications - Policy, LAC, RG24, 1250-36 Vol. 1.
Travis clearly had reservations quite early on as to the attitude of both Ben Chifley, the Australian Prime Minister, and Herbert Evatt, the External Affairs Minister. Following his March 1945 tour to evaluate the potential for a post-WW2 SIGINT operation, Travis had concluded any preparatory groundwork for an Australian operation must avoid Evatt.\(^{651}\) The proposal to refashion GCHQ’s Australasian operations as an Australian federal operation would require the support of Sir Frederick Shedden, the trusted Secretary to the War Cabinet and “indisputably” the most powerful Australian bureaucrat.\(^{652}\) Shedden was cooperative, agreed the outline concept and confirmed that Australian could be represented by GCHQ in BRUSA negotiations.\(^{653}\)

Following progress with the BRUSA talks in March 1946, Shedden briefed Chifley on the broad outlines of the CSO and the merits of Australia’s participation.\(^{654}\) Chifley, now onside, attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference the following month. NZ was content to continue as part of UK-Australian SIGINT operations.

3.5.7 Launching the Commonwealth Signit Organisation (CSO)

In the October 1946 Travis travelled to Australia and NZ to progress arrangements and the following month convened a further London Commonwealth SIGINT Conference to establish the working parameters of the new organisation and the steps needed to create the Australian Deference Signals Bureau (DSB), envisaged as a largely British run operation to included NZ and headed by the former deputy of GCHQ’s Far East Combined Bureau.\(^{655}\)

With the Canadian operation in place, the inauguration of the CSO was dependent on Australian sign-off. On November 12, 1947, an Australian Cabinet Committee formally authorised Australian participation, allowing the formation of a post-imperial UK-Dominion

\(^{651}\) Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, *The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941–45* (Springer, 1996), 129. Andrew, "Bletchley Park in Post-War Perspective."


\(^{654}\) Horner, 120.
SIGINT operation based on informal bilateral arrangements between the participating parties.656

3.5.8 Granting full ‘second party’ Dominion status

A UK-US SIGINT Conference in 1948 appears to add Canada as an ad hoc ‘indirect’ second party to the BRUSA arrangement by virtue of its membership of the CSO.657 In reality, a tripartite relationship existed before then; under nominal UK oversight, CANUKUS meetings complemented UKUS meetings when necessary.658 Progress towards a direct Canada-US agreement stalled because of the implications of the Gouzenko spy issue and over Canadian-US disagreements on technical issues.659 A direct US-Canada relationship on equivalent UKUS terms was eventually realised in 1949.660 By 1950 tripartite meetings were being held in Washington to allocate tasks and with the UK diverting copies of US Arctic intelligence data to Canada with US consent.661

The admission of Australia into BRUSA was as an indirect second party (via the UK) and the Australian SIGINT operation was heavily dependent on GCHQ’s operations. The US acknowledged the nature of the ‘Australian’ operation in their US UKUSA planning notes in 1961.

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655 See:Aid and Wiebes, 76.
656 For a more detailed account see: Nicky Hager, The Origins of Signals Intelligence in New Zealand, Centre for Peace Studies (Wellington: Auckland University, 1995), 17-18; Ian Elvins Pfennigwerth, Missing Pieces: The Intelligence Jigsaw and RAN Operations 1939-71 (Sea Power Centre-Australia, Department of Defence, 2008), 239-40; Nicky Hager, Secret Power (Craig Potton, 1996), 61; Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire (Abrams, 2014), 151.
658 O’Neill and Hughes, 5.
659 The US terminated talks about the possibility of a Canadian-US SIGINT agreement in October 1945 until such time security could be guaranteed. See:Johnson, 18; Matthew M Aid, The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2009), 13.
661 O’Neill and Hughes, 7-8.
The Melbourne SIGINT (MSIC) is, in contrast to the Communications Branch at Ottawa, not a purely national centre. It is and will continue to be a joint UK-Australia-New Zealand organisation, manned by an integrated staff.  

Even when Australia (DSD) and NZ (New Zealand Combined Signals Organisation) achieved direct second party status within BRUSA around 1955-56, the operations still featured a strong UK presence. The long delay in achieving direct second party status for Australia was due to a profound lack of US confidence in Australian domestic security. As discussed earlier, it was compounded by deteriorating personal relations amongst the US-Australian political-makers.

This roots of mistrust related to a US SIGINT project codenamed Venona, which by 1947 had succeeded in decoding a backlog of WW2 Soviet diplomatic cables. It identified a leak of sensitive material from within the Australian Department of External Affairs (DEA) to the Soviet Embassy in Canberra. The US informed their UK counterparts but demanded the discovery be kept from the Australians to avoid alerting active Soviet spies. The US blocked full inclusion of Australia in SIGINT arrangements. Aiming to ensure a discreet investigation, the UK tipped off the Australian Chiefs of Staff and they in turn pressured Shedden for action, but without results principally because Australia had no MI5 equivalent to conduct enquiries.

Attlee intervened directly, seeking to avoid any involvement with Evatt as the minister heading the DEA and dispatched Sir Percy Sillitoe, Head of MI5 to meet Chifley in February 1948. US insistence that Venona must not be revealed compromised Sillitoe’s ability to offer convincing evidence. He informed a sceptical Chifley that there were indications of a Soviet operation “along the lines of the Canadian case, though not necessarily of that size.” Chifley remained unconvinced and informed Attlee in April 1948 that “in the absence of full particulars” he had concluded that the suggestion of spying was likely to be Soviet

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664 Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, 82.
665 Golding, Chap 9.
666 Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, 86.
disinformation, and believed existing precautions were sufficient. With no progress, the US informed the UK they would cease sharing technical defence information with the UK until Australian security was addressed.

Attlee pressed upon Chifley of the level of US mistrust and the paramount need to address the issue of internal security. In July 1948, an irritated Chifley met the UK Defence Minister in London and agreed to consider the creation of a domestic counter-intelligence resource with the assistance of MI5. More pressure was required before Chifley finally announced the establishment of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in March 1949 with a brief to investigate the Soviet spy network. Chifley remained unconvinced and complained in cabinet that “the prejudice in American circles against Australian security” had become a “psychological” problem.

At this point the conditions for the development of an intelligence based security community involving both Australia and the US were becoming less auspicious. With Chifley’s consent, Attlee arranged for Shedden to meet Truman personally to reassure the President by explaining the robust nature of the newly implemented Australian internal security arrangements. Attlee wrote to Truman expressing his hope that “full and frank” discussions would lead to a solution. In Washington, Shedden met a “wall of distrust” and made no headway. A CIA briefing report for Shedden’s visit warned that security remained a concern and highlighted Communist sympathies in the Labor and Trade Union movement,

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669 Director of Intelligence Office (McDonald) to Secretary of the US Air Force, Operations. “Conversations with British Representatives Concerning British Collaboration with Australia and NZ on Communications Intelligence Activities.” January 2, 1948, USAF, Air Force Plans Project Decimal File, 1942–1954, Box 741A
672 "Exchange of Information with the United States.” Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street S.W.1 (London). April 27,1949. TNA, CAB 130/46. #1613
675 Shedden to Chifley, “Restoration of Flow of Classified Information.” May 10, 1949. National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), A5954, 1795/1 For a detailed account of Shedden’s reception
noting Evatt’s brother had been the President of “a Communist Front Organisation.” These security concerns were overlaid by a US perception that the Australian Government harboured a general feeling of ill-will towards the US. The US chargé to Australia reported the Labor Government,

was extremely jealous of the independent position of Australia, suspicious of what it regards as American economic imperialism, and determined not to be pushed around, and yet, the Labor Government operated on the complacent assumption that when the next war comes, if it does, the United States will bail them out just as it did last time.677

Trust was eroding and wider shared outlooks in danger of dissolving. With the US perceived as being obstructive, Chifley grew increasingly angry, threatening to pull the Australian troop contingent out of occupied Japan.678 When it seemed possible that the US might resume sharing intelligence sharing with the UK, but exclude Australia, Chifley raged the US and UK should be told, “go to Hades, repeat Hades, and let us know the date they are going.”679

The viability of security communities depends on the participants to overcome disagreements and it is likely that common outlooks and the relationship with the UK would have facilitated a solution ultimately. Either way, the issue was resolved by the Australian 1949 Federal Election resulting in a victory for the opposition led by Robert Menzies.680 Menzies advocated a tough line on communism and was committed to ally Australia “firmly with the UK and US” in “the coming inevitable shooting war with the Soviet Union.”681 As such, it could be seen as the reassertion of the Australian electorate’s identification with and desire for an Anglospheric arrangement that included the US. In office, Menzies accelerated the ASIO investigations into the Australian Venona spy network, addressing US concerns and

678 Peter Wilson, "Ben Chifley Threatened to Pull out of Japan," *Australian*, April 4 2011.
679 Chifley to Shedden 377, Cablegram 3004, Canberra, July 15, 1949, NAA, A5954, 1795/3
allowing the inclusion of Australia into the BRUSA Agreement. The inclusion of Australia and NZ into the SIGINT arrangements during 1955-56 had created the first significant Anglosphere Core quintilateral security arrangement.

3.5.9 Creating other intelligence fora

The SIGINT arrangements constitute the most obvious example of an Anglospheric security related structure, however, other relationships developed too. In parallel with the CSO, the UK encouraged the creation of Commonwealth intelligence bureaux focussed on military intelligence and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) each run by the constituent member states. By 1948, the London Joint Intelligence Bureau acted as the nodal point for an international Commonwealth Joint Intelligence Bureaux coordinating the Commonwealth JIB operations (CJIB). The key facilitator was Sir Kenneth Strong, another significant member of the military establishment during WW2, having served as Assistant Chief of Intelligence to Eisenhower. With his pro-American outlook, Strong encouraged links between the UK JIB and the US and later the constituent national agencies of CJIB and the US Joint Intelligence Committee (JIIC) that included the JCS and the CIA. The establishment of a permanent NZ operation in 1950 within the CJIB resulted in an arrangement whereby each CJIB member had direct relations with their US counterparts in a loose quintilateral arrangement.

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682 Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, 98.
684 "The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World," 37.
3.6 Fulton: Imagining the Community

3.6.1 Introduction

The agreement to collaborate on SIGINT was not in itself indicative of an emergent security community of any depth. The SIGINT arrangements with the UK stood in contrast to the general thrust of the Truman administration’s demobilisation stance and the unravelling of Roosevelt’s commitments.\(^{688}\) The attempt to continue atomic collaboration had faltered and there remained an element of US thinking indifferent or hostile to an alliance with ‘imperialist Britain’, including a President who appeared agnostic.

For a security community to develop it requires a feeling of ‘we-ness’ and often an external threat to act as a trigger.\(^{689}\) As discussed in the previous chapter, there was a strong meme-complex based on ‘English-speaking’ values that could facilitate continued post-War cooperation if properly invoked. Although in opposition, Churchill commanded great respect in the US and could be wielded in the struggle to shape opinion; stressing the Soviet threat whilst elevating the common traditions and values upon which a strategic alliance could be built.

3.6.2 The ‘Long Telegram’ and the deployment of Kennan

In early February 1946, Stalin delivered an anti-western speech declaring that capitalism and communism could not coexist.\(^{690}\) For many in US policy and opinion forming circles, these speeches laid bare Soviet intentions.\(^{691}\) As such, the speeches acted as a ‘trigger,’ highlighting an external threat and facilitating calls for the kind of military alliances that underpin a security community. The US Chargé de Affairs in Moscow, George Kennan,

\(^{688}\) In particular, lend-lease and nuclear collaboration.

\(^{689}\) For a discussion on “we-ness” see: Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 6. For we-ness “triggers” see Adler and Barnett, 62, 7 & 50.


responded with the “long telegram,” warning of Soviet objectives and tactics and thereby initiating a shift among elements of US policy-makers.\(^{692}\) Kennan highlighted a Soviet attempt to divide the UK and US.

Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk amongst the British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not ignited….\(^{693}\)

Keenan argued it was imperative for “our public” to be “educated to the realities of the Russian situation: I cannot over-emphasise the importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be mainly done by Government.”\(^{694}\) Kennan’s report galvanised the realist ‘Riga’ elements within the Truman administration, but it did not dramatically shift Administration foreign policy.\(^{695}\) Forrestal distributed copies of the report within his department and made plans to utilise Keenan in the US.\(^{696}\) The Report was not universally accepted in the military, and for example General Lucius Clay took exception to its “British line” and advocated an “America First” stance.\(^{697}\) Forrestal was not deterred and proceeded to second Keenan to General Hoyt Vanderberg (US signatory to BRUSA), now heading the embryonic CIA (Central Intelligence Group\(^{698}\)). Keenan was thereafter deployed to engage military and civilian opinion formers.\(^{699}\)

Those of a Riga mindset appreciated that public opinion was susceptible to the views of ‘Peace Now’ sentiments espoused by the likes of Henry Wallace who favoured fraternal


\(^{693}\) US Embassy Moscow, "Keenan to US Sec State: Moscow Via War [the 'Long Telegram'] 8963, February 22, ," (1946), 14.

\(^{694}\) Ibid.


\(^{697}\) Yergin, 212.


friendship with the Soviets. They recognised that without a decisive shift in public opinion in favour of closer British-US conventional security arrangements, Truman would not likely endorse an alignment. The imminent demise of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CSS) once World War 2 was officially declared ended would unravel the wartime mechanisms that facilitated collaboration. A more dramatic intervention would be required to bring about a change in US public attitudes to the Soviet threat and kindle Anglospheric communal feelings.

3.6.3 Fulton Manœuvres and the “Sinews of Peace”

Just one month following the Long Telegram, Churchill delivered his ‘Sinews of Peace’ speech at Fulton, Missouri. He professed a desire for peace with the Soviets, but referred to an ‘Iron Curtain’ descending on Europe and called for close and ongoing ‘fraternal’ alliances of the English-speaking peoples as a defensive response. In crafting the speech, Churchill involved various British, Canadian and US policy-makers and such it constituted a conscious effort to articulate a security community based on common cultural outlooks with support of the UK Government.⁷⁰⁰

3.6.4 British support for a security community

In another example of the special relationship of friends the war had created, Frank Roberts, the British chargé d'affaires in Moscow was an intimate of Keenan.⁷⁰¹ Kennan provided Roberts with a ‘in confidence’ copy of his telegram for transmission to London.⁷⁰² When the Foreign Office requested a British viewpoint on the Soviet situation, Roberts echoed Kennan’s points, emphasising the need to maintain a special relationship with the US.⁷⁰³

⁷⁰⁰ Ramsden suggests it was contrived. See: John Ramsden, Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and His Legend since 1945 (Columbia University Press, 2002), 156.
⁷⁰¹ Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945-1951, 38.
⁷⁰² Roberts to Warner (FO) 2nd March 1946. TNA, FO 371 56840 N3369/971/38
There is evidence that the broad content of Churchill’s proposals were condoned by the UK Government who adopted a policy of ‘plausible denial’ should the reaction be unfavourable.\(^{704}\) Attlee and Bevin frequently consulted Churchill on foreign policy matters.\(^{705}\) Of relevance was the Bevin’s request for advice on matters pertaining to US-UK divergences over Japan, Churchill responded by outlining the need for intimate relations with the US and the institutional form it should take.

The long-term advantage to Britain and the Commonwealth is to have our affairs so interwoven with those of the United States in external and strategic matters, that any idea of war between the two countries utterly impossible and that in fact, however the matter may be worded, we stand or fall together…

The Joint Association of the Great British Commonwealth and the United States in the large number of islands and bases will make it indispensable to preserve indefinitely the organisation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. From this should flow, the continued interchange of military and scientific information and Intelligence, and also, I hope, similarity and interchangeability of weapons, command manuals of instruction for the armed forces, inter-related plans for the war mobilisation of civil industry, and finally, interchange of officers at schools and college…

In all necessary action you should count on me, if I can be of any use.\(^{706}\)

Bevin’s memo to Attlee on February 13, 1946, outlines a distinct shift in UK tactics that accords with the modus operandi expressed in the Fulton speech just three weeks later,

I believe an entirely new approach is required, and that it can only be based upon a very close understanding between ourselves and the Americans. My idea is that we should start with an integration of British and American armaments and an agreement restricting undesirable competition between our respective armament industries.\(^{707}\)

\(^{704}\) Ramsden, 168.


\(^{706}\) Churchill to Bevin, 13 November 1945. Quoted in Gilbert, 8, Chap 9.

\(^{707}\) Bevin to Attlee, 13 February 1946. TNA, FO 800/451, Folder 44, Def/46/3
The Anglospheric Security Community

Attlee’s biographer, John Bew, concludes the UK Government was aware of the speech’s contents, and Arnold and Weiner conclude Attlee had “quietly cleared” the speech.\(^{708}\) Churchill had meetings at the British Embassy in which Halifax made drafting suggestions.\(^{709}\)

3.6.5 North American support for a security community

The ramifications of the Gouzenko Affair ensured Canadian support for a tripartite security arrangement beyond just BRUSA.\(^{710}\) Any other moves that stressed their role as a ‘hinge’ between the US and UK were to be welcomed but still resting on the past consensual approach of Commonwealth cooperation. Lester Pearson, then Ambassador to Washington, assisted in changes to the speech and in a call between King and Churchill, the Canadian PM made the suggestions incorporating references to his own Ogdensburg [PJBD] Treaty speech duly incorporated as the modus operandi for future military ‘fraternal associations.’\(^{711}\)

Prior to Churchill’s Fulton speech, both Admiral Leahy (Truman’s Chief of Staff) and Secretary of State, Byrnes visited the British Embassy to read the speech and make suggestions. Leahy was “enthusiastic” and Byrnes “excited,” no changes were considered necessary.\(^{712}\) Truman, having read a mimeographed reproduction of the speech given to him by Churchill on their shared train journey to Fulton declared it admirable.\(^{713}\) Later Truman was to disingenuously deny he had read the ‘original’ speech (just a stencil copy) and not expressed an opinion on the original at any point.\(^{714}\)

3.6.6 North American reaction

The reaction of the Canadian policy-establishment was positive. King praised Churchill’s speech, reaffirming that the Ogdensburg Treaty’s informal nature was the correct basis for

\(^{708}\) See See Bew, 418; Arnold and Wiener, 280; Yergin, 175.
\(^{709}\) See: Ramsden, Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and His Legend since 1945, 170-71; Harbutt, 180.
\(^{711}\) Pickersgill and Forster, 189.
\(^{713}\) Ramsden, "Mr. Churchill Goes to Fulton,” 42.
new alliances. King telephoned Churchill, and finding Truman was present, spoke to him, endorsed the speech and stressed, “we must all work very closely together… the US, the UK, Canada and other parts… what Churchill said was very opportune.”

In Moscow, both Canadian Ambassador Wilgress and his deputy Smith, had recanted their previous naiveté adopted an increasing hardline approach. A month after Fulton Wilgress was warning that the Soviets would attempt to systemically exploit “the lack of cohesion between the Anglo-Saxon powers and… the vagaries of United States foreign policy.” In the aftermath of Gouzenko and Fulton, there was a dramatic negative shift in public attitudes in favour of new security arrangements to fend off a perceived Soviet to Soviets threat.

In the US the reactions to the speech from the ‘peace camp’ were predictable with headlines such as “Churchill Harms Peace” and “Churchill’s Call For World Domination.” Wallace denounced the speech calling it “loaded with dynamite.” Liberal senators accused Churchill of aligning “himself with the old Chamberlain Tories who strengthened the Nazis as part of their anti-Soviet crusade.” Moreover, an alliance “would cut the throat” of the UN and the idea of balancing ‘blocs’ represented “a thing of the past.”

Truman declined to associate himself with the idea of an alliance. Byrnes attempted to backtrack too, leading to a sarcastic response in Cabinet from a frustrated Forrestal. Only Leahy remained solid, referring to the authority of Anglospheric states' resting on a moral

714 See: Harbutt, 180; Ramsden, Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and His Legend since 1945; Pickersgill and Forster, 280; Byrnes, 349.

715 See: Pickersgill and Forster, 207-08; Spalding, Chapter 2, fn 12.

716 Bercuson; David Davies, Canada and the Soviet Experiment: Essays on Canadian Encounters with Russia and the Soviet Union, 1900-1991 (Canadian Scholars' Press, 1992), 89-103 & 41-43; Glazov, 4, 11.

717 Wilgress to Reid, 24 April 1946, DCER Vol. XII, Ottawa. 2055-2056


721 "Sniping at Russia Attacked by Ickes," NYT, March 15 1946. For an overview see: Muller.


723 Pickersgill and Forster, 280.
legitimacy, or as he put it, “the righteousness of power in the English speaking world.” Forrestal’s favoured correspondent, Arthur Krock noted that although the President claimed not to know the contents of the speech

it can be confidently assumed that Mr. Truman was willing to have this trial balloon sent up, reserving judgement what to think and do about it until he had the opportunity to see how it fared in troubled skies…

The ‘trial balloon’ served to demonstrate that a body of liberal sentiment was wholeheartedly against any alliance with the British. To make matters worse on March 6, Acheson had been obliged to inform the British that the agreements with Truman on nuclear collaboration were worthless. Truman initiated a secret meeting with Sovietophile Joseph Davies, assuring him he was working for peace and would soon reach out to the Soviet Union. In late March 1946 Truman instructed his new Ambassador to Moscow, Walter Bedell Smith, to convey a secret message inviting Stalin to the US. Smith duly informed a bemused Stalin that Truman believed, “there was no nation in the world with whom we were more interested in arriving at the basis of understanding than that of Russia.”

The view of the JCS on Truman’s reliability is revealed in a message sent by Maitland-Wilson to the British CoS in the aftermath of Churchill’s visit. Maitland-Wilson reported his US counterparts were adamant there must be a continuation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CSS) arrangement and informal collaboration on security until circumstances changed. These would change in August/September of 1946, following Field Marshal Montgomery’s North American tour.

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724 Yergin, 176.
726 See previous chapter
3.7 The Birth of a Tripartite Nexus: Séquoia

3.7.1 Informal collaboration - US-UK

Informal military collaboration with Britain continued. One such example was the arrangement between US Airforce Chief, General Spaatz and his British counterpart and wartime colleague Air Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder. The “Spaatz-Tedder” agreement in June/July 1946 allowed for the stationing of US aircraft equipped with atomic weapons in UK bases. Samuel Hamrick highlights the importance of the social links binding the military-policy makers as a collegial network of US and British air force professionals bound together by their wartime service and years of mutual cooperation and trust… The motivations of Spaatz and the JCS included a belief that the UK and Canada would form part of a security community in the near future. Simon Duke has suggested these arrangements were sanctioned without the authority of either Government and in contradiction to the official policy that the USAF was leaving Britain. However, as Ball has revealed, an examination of the Berlin Crisis and plans for mobilisation reveals that both the US Ambassador and the UK Cabinet were aware of these arrangements at least by 1948. In short, an invisible security arrangement existed based on shared outlooks, threat perceptions and personal relationships.

3.7.2 The Canadian dimension

Less contentious within the US political establishment was the need for enhanced US homeland security and the Arctic approaches would necessarily involve increased cooperation with Canada. A Canada-US Planning Committee had been established to explore the possibility of a joint defensive system of early warning bases, communications facilities,

731 Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe (Oxford University Press on Demand, 1989), 294-95.
733 Samuel J Hamrick, Deceiving the Deceivers: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, and Guy Burgess (Yale University Press, 2008), 175.
735 Ibid.
garrisons and a command structure.\textsuperscript{736} This ‘Basic Security Plan’ was endorsed by the Canadian military in June 1946, but details leaked and the media denounced the plan as endangering Canada and constituted “a virtual ultimatum from the US,” that, “would mean Canada had, in effect, abdicated sovereignty along her northern border.”\textsuperscript{737} Put in these terms the idea proved unpopular with Canadian public opinion.\textsuperscript{738}

In the context of security community theory, Canada could be seen as a part of two overlapping security communities or ‘zones of peace’– a declining imperial network and a north American community. Whilst the Basic Security Plan arguably made military sense, its bilateralism conjured up the spectre of US domination.\textsuperscript{739} Mackenzie King worried Canada would be unable to avoid US policies that would result in taking “Canada out of the orbit of the British Commonwealth of Nations into their own [US] orbit.”\textsuperscript{740} As outlined earlier, from King’s perspective, geopolitical considerations required the inclusion of the UK within a new security community to ‘balance’ against the US in a ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ acting as the ‘hinge’ or pivot between the other two partners.\textsuperscript{741}

The CCoS presentation to King and Cabinet members succeeded in not just highlighting the inadequacy of Canada’s military defences, but also (unintentionally) the subsequent Canadian subservience to the US that the Basic Plan entailed. King recorded,

\begin{quote}
I drew out how the whole business had been worked out between the planning committee here and opposite numbers in Washington. That up to the present the British had not been brought into the matter excepting something of the kind was underway. I said there must be the fullest exchange of views with the British on the whole matter of defence. It was perfectly clear that the UK, the US, and Canada must
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{736} See: Eayrs, 381-88.
\textsuperscript{738} Dziuban, 337.
\textsuperscript{739} In SC Theory terminology this might lead to an ‘amalgamated’ version or at the very least a lop-sided ‘pluralistic ’ type.
all work together… The great thing was for Canada to be the link that would keep the other two great powers united.\textsuperscript{742}

Later, when matters progressed, King was to say, “Canada itself is getting to be the pivot — the pivotal point of union between these two great countries.”\textsuperscript{743} When King was in London in May 1946, he had unofficial discussions with Montgomery, the designate Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS).\textsuperscript{744} In the same month, a British Cabinet Defence Committee proposal had been finalised and advocated a British Canadian approach to the US to bring about a tripartite standardisation of equipment and military doctrine.\textsuperscript{745} King agreed that Montgomery should visit Canada and meet with his military. In September 1946, Montgomery flew to Canada for talks with the CCoS on closer integration between Britain and Canada.\textsuperscript{746} During these discussions, it was decided to ‘kick-start’ wider collaboration with the US by securing a Presidential meeting and possible endorsement for tripartite military collaboration. This would involve Montgomery acting as a representative for Canada and holding out the prospect of PJBD progress on US bases in Canada, an issue on which US State Department was desirous for progress and on which King had stalled.\textsuperscript{747} Foulkes laid out how the plan would work, advising King,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{742}] Pickersgill and Forster, 627.
\item[\textsuperscript{743}] Eayrs, 349.
\item[\textsuperscript{744}] Office of Prime Minister [Canada] to Mackenzie King. “Meeting with Field Marshall Montgomery in London.” May 19, 1946. Canadian Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter DHH), C212641
\item[\textsuperscript{745}] “Item 7. Standardisation of Equipment between the UK, US and Canada.” May 8, 1946. TNA, CAB 79/48/2, DCOS (46) 147(Final)
\item[\textsuperscript{747}] This ploy succeeded as the State Department believed the Canadians would immediately proceed with the PJBD base proposals. “Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman,” October 26, 1946. \textit{FRUS, 1946, the British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe, Volume V}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
we thought there would be no harm in your saying to the Field Marshall that he might intimate in Washington that he had approached the Canadian authorities informally and learned that they were in general agreement with the UK’s views.  

Foulkes arranged a meeting for Montgomery with King who, in line with his idea of balancing the US, gave his consent and authority to intimate that there could be progress on the Arctic bases. Montgomery was now able to proceed to the US, able to tempt the State Department and therefore Truman with the possibility of progress on Arctic bases whilst gaining consent for tripartite military standardisation.

Montgomery informed the British CoS that the meetings with his Canadian counterparts had gone well and asked, “if there was any Whitehall objection to my discussing the matter [standardisation] in Washington.” Montgomery received a reply (on September 5) from the British Chiefs of Staff in Whitehall, giving an ‘okay’ to raise the matter of standardisation with Eisenhower.

3.7.3 UK-US Discussions

Montgomery arrived in the US on September 10 and made aware that Forrestal and Patterson were fully supportive. The suggestion was Montgomery should raise ‘standardisation’ directly with the President in the Oval Office. This would avoid Patterson and Forrestal becoming embroiled in a countermove by Wallace and Presidential indecision. This meeting was likely arranged by Admiral Leahy on the basis Montgomery could help progress the stalled US proposals for Arctic bases with Canada. At the Whitehouse meeting, Montgomery suggested that, having discussed matters with Eisenhower and King, both agreed the time was right to begin discussions “covering the whole field of defence” adding, “if the Heads of State would merely give their approval, the military staffs would get on with

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748 Heaney to King, “Memorandum for the Prime Minister, Re Standardisation of military equipment between the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.” September 5, 1946. WLM King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol 307. 1 & 2


750 This recommendation came with the proviso the bases be temporary and include Canadian staff. See: “Minutes of the 362nd meeting of the CSC,” September 5, 1946. DHH File 112.3M2 (D331)

751 Montgomery, 401.
the job at once.” Truman replied, “That’s okay by me.” Truman’s consent was not indicative of a profound personal shift in favour of UK-US military collaboration. Unbeknown to Forrestal, Patterson and the JCS, Truman had just authorised Byrnes to offer the Soviets a bilateral twenty-five-year treaty of joint defence against Germany.754

Within hours of the Presidential sanction, Montgomery, Patterson and Forrestal met to lay-out topics for substantive Anglo-US talks scheduled for September 16.755 Before this could happen however, the political fall-out they had sought to avoid occurred. Its outcome was to prove definitive. Montgomery’s attempt to present the military arrangements as little more than the adoption of US standards for UK troops’ barracks and regulations was not entirely successful. Although the US media accepted the low-key ‘standardisation’ characterisation, other parties were not convinced. The Soviets declared it “definite military alliance or agreement.”756 The news caused shock in France, with the New York Times reporting “the impression here [in Paris] was this implied a permanent military cooperation of the two English-speaking powers.”757

Truman sought to downplay matters, “there was nothing, so far as I know, significant about it except a friendly gesture between two allies.”758 As with the Fulton Speech, Truman was playing it both ways. A day before the Montgomery visit, Wallace had met the President to discuss a speech at a forthcoming electoral rally on September 12. Wallace had met the President to discuss a speech at a forthcoming electoral rally on September 12. Wallace had met the President to discuss a speech at a forthcoming electoral rally on September 12. Wallace intended to stray in foreign and security matters and energise Democrats by repudiating the notion of a Soviet threat and talking up British ‘imperialism.’ According to Wallace, the President not only endorsed the sentiments, but declared them in-line with Administration policy. He

752 Ibid., 404.
753 Ibid.
754 Joseph Davies Diaries September 10, 1946 quoted in: Larson, 228. This secret offer was put to Molotov on September 20, 1946 and rejected by Stalin soon after. See Vladimir Olegovich Pechatnov, The Allies Are Pressing on You to Break Your Will... Foreign Policy Correspondence between Stalin and Molotov and Other Politburo Members, September 1945-December 1946, vol. 26 (Cold War International History Project, Wodrow Wilson International Center …, 1999), 4.
756 The matter was raised by Stalin when meeting Montgomery in January 1947. “Report to Washington on Montgomery’s Conversation with Stalin,” January 17, 1947, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Wilson Centre
confided he still hoped Stalin would visit the US and insisted he definitely did not have a “get tough” policy with the Soviets.\textsuperscript{759}

3.7.4 The Wallace attack and the counter-attack

Wallace duly delivered his speech framing his remarks as an attack on the Republican presidential nominee, Governor Thomas Dewey, but the criticism was equally applicable to Byrnes’ now more robust approach to the Soviets.\textsuperscript{760} Wallace sought to repudiate both the notion of a mutually perceived Soviet threat and the notion that shared customs and traditions should automatically lead to a UK-US security alliance. He declared the US should not ‘save’ the British Empire and added,

Governor Dewey has expressed himself as favoring an alliance of mutual defense with Great Britain as the key to our foreign policy. This may sound attractive because we both speak the same language and many of our customs and traditions have the same historical background. Moreover, to the military men, the British Isles are our advanced air base against Europe.

Certainly, we like the British people as individuals. But to make Britain the key to our foreign policy would be, in my opinion, the height of folly. We must not let the reactionary leadership of the Republican party force us into that position. We must not let British balance-of-power manipulations determine whether and when the United States gets into war.

\textsuperscript{759} As with the Fulton speech Truman claimed he had not read it. Wallace rejected this at the time and continued to do so thereafter. See: Wallace to Truman, April 8 1949, Harry S Truman Papers: President’s Secretary File, HSTL. Box 141. For a detailed account of Truman’s contortions on this matter see Arnold A Offner, \textit{Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953} (Stanford University Press, 2002), 175-77.

Make no mistake about it—the British imperialistic policy in the Near East alone, combined with Russian retaliation, would lead the United States straight to war unless we have a clearly defined and realistic policy of our own.\footnote{James Roark, et. al, *The American Promise* (NY: Bedford/St.Martin's, 2005), 957-58.}

The speech was delivered whilst Byrnes was negotiating with the Soviets in Paris and caused consternation in the State Department.\footnote{Harold Callander, "Byrnes Deeply Disturbed by Wallace's Policy Talk: Truman under Fire for It: Confusion in Paris, US, Other Delegates Upset by Apparent Shift in Views," *NY Times*, September 14 1946.} Byrnes threatened immediate resignation unless Truman corrected policy.\footnote{James Forrestal and Walter Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries* (Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015), entries 10th & 12th September.} There followed a prolonged and embarrassing public attempt by Truman to both explain his endorsement of the speech and simultaneously distance himself from it.\footnote{Rosen, 469-73; Culver and Hyde, 419-28.} Support for Byrnes came from Patterson and Forrestal, both had clashed with Wallace on atomic research and other security issues.\footnote{For public clashes see: "Wallace Says U.S. Force Should Quit Iceland Base," *NY Times*, March 22 1946 1946; Sidney Shallet, "Forrestal Pleads for Strong Nation: Until UNO Is on Firm Footing, He Asserts, Aggressors Must Know We Are Ready to Fight - 'Head in Sand' Precedent - Takes Issue with Wallace," ibid., March 24 1946; Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal* (Naval Institute Press, 2012), 258.} Truman's dissembling was perceived as foolish and deceitful by both sets of antagonists and the wider media.\footnote{For a full account of the episode see: Miscamble, 299-301; Culver and Hyde, 419-31; "Mr Wallace’s Contribution," *NY Times*, September 14 1946. Frank S Adams, "Forrestal Voices Praise of Byrnes: “Annoyed” by Wallace Incident," ibid., September 18 1946.}

With the media focus on the Wallace-Byrnes spat and Truman’s contortions, the UK-US military talks proceeded as planned abroad the USS Séquoia disguised as a mundane social event. It was agreed on the need for joint strategic planning for the possibility of war, standardisation, and combined action between the UK, the US and Canada.\footnote{Montgomery, 404; "Joint Chiefs of Staff Plan," *Telegraph*, September 19 1946, 6.} As the talks concluded, Wallace launched another attack, leaking a letter he had sent to the President and accusing elements within the military of wanting to initiate a pre-emptive attack on the Soviet Union.\footnote{Robert J Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948*, vol. 1 (University of Missouri Press, 1996), 225.} In a joint letter to the President, Patterson and Forrestal rejected the accusation.\footnote{“Services Deny Charge: Patterson, Forrestal See 'No Basis' for 'Preventive War' Allegation,” *NY Times*, September 19 1946.} Truman remained keen to keep Wallace in the Cabinet, meeting him secretly to request he no
longer speak on foreign affairs. Truman assured Wallace that he was no imperialist and would be granting a loan to help the Soviets.  

Forrestal increased the pressure via journalist Arthur Krock who published a biting commentary piece in his New York Times column. The article highlighted the offence to the British by keeping Wallace in place,

The parallel thinking, and similar objectives of the British in the quest with the United States for lasting peace have constituted the only restraint on Soviet Russia. Mr. Wallace assailed British policy as ‘imperialism’ with which we must not be associated and explained all Russian moves as ‘retaliation.’ Since he has not been disavowed as a Cabinet officer by the President, the British have reason to doubt our eventual course in world affairs and to feel they cannot be sure who speaks for the administration.

With the US State Department still up in arms, Forrestal administered the coup de grâce on the September 19. The New York Times records Forrestal “unleashing all the blistering sarcasm at his command” in an “extemporaneous address that won him an ovation from 1,200 industrialists and high-ranking navy officers.” The next day with Truman cornered, Wallace was forced to resign, a significant victory for the elements within the administration that favoured closer relations with the British and a harder line against the Soviets. Wallace would attempt to rally liberal opinion standing against Truman for President in 1948. The excruciatingly embarrassing ‘guru letters’ between him and his Theosophical ‘Master’ was revealed by a journalist at the campaign launch. This, and the revelation Wallace had thought a Soviet slave-camp was an idyllic farm collective, plus his campaign’s association with American communists, ensured he received a derisory 2.4% of the vote.

770, 1, 225.
771 Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: Some Casualties before the Truce Came a List of Damages Eye to Eye with Moscow," NY Times, September 20 1946. Krock was A Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and Forrester’s Princeton classmate. He acted as a conduit for the promotion of various stories including coverage of George Kennan’s anti-Soviet warnings. See: Eric Alterman, Sound and Fury: The Making of the Punditocracy (Cornell University Press, 2019), 41&44.
772 Adams.
773 Yergin, 253-54.
774 Wilson, 23-24; Culver and Hyde, 482.
775, 339 & 501-03.
Ovendale asserts the Séquoia event laid the “foundations of post-war Anglo-American relations.” Mark Clapson records it as a landmark event that “strengthened the special relationship between Britain and the US at the dawn of the Cold War.” Actually, it represented a reimagining of special relationships for all three Atlantic states. An *Economist* editorial talked of the emergence of something approximating if not equating to a security community or as they termed it “an Atlantic Commonwealth,” based on material and cultural foundations:

There is no need to quibble about the exact relative degrees of mutual dependence; the fact is that the whole Atlantic Commonwealth is strategically interdependent and the position of either of its two major partners would be immeasurably weaker if it could not rely, in a crisis, on the other. This is the material argument and the moral argument is no weaker. However many backslidings there may be on one side or another, the American and British peoples do share a tradition of life and a belief in such things as liberty and toleration and law.

The Séquoia meeting represents the military colloquy to the UK-US intelligence arrangement, allowing the development of the *trilateral* cornerstone of what would become the five-nation Anglospheric Security community. Trevor Royle concludes, “As a result of this day’s work, a series of highly classified political and military discussions were initiated, and from these sprang the Western Union, which came into being in 1948, followed by NATO a year later.”

3.7.5 Building the institutions

Aside from the continuance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the immediate commencement of joint planning, the next few years saw the institutional framework of the tripartite security community take shape (Table 1).

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In these arrangements, the creation of NATO was an Anglospheric initiative. The strategy adopted was for Britain to persuade and cajole the Europeans into a military alliance, which could dovetail or be subsumed into a tripartite military alliance of Canada, the UK and the US.\textsuperscript{780} Bevin’s efforts culminated in the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948. In parallel, the ‘ABC’ partners began the “ultra, ultra secret,” ‘Pentagon meetings’ held between March 22, and April 1, 1948.\textsuperscript{781}

The intention was to fashion the outline of a broader treaty to subsume the western European alliance. The US suggested the use of the Rio Treaty template.\textsuperscript{782} This was combined with elements of the draft Brussels Treaty supplied by the British.\textsuperscript{783} ABC military planning between April 12 and 21, 1948 formulated the military strategy to be adopted.\textsuperscript{784} The ‘ABC’ politicians and diplomats proceeded to create the ‘Western Union’ with the intention of drawing this into the new treaty. The creation of NATO resulted shortly after with the UK as part of the Western Union, meeting Canada and the US to discuss terms. The leadership of NATO reflected Anglospheric dominance in terms of structure and

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Commonwealth SIGINT Organisation (CSO) & AUSCAUK (NZ)* &       &       &       &       &       \\
BRUSA (UK-USA Agreement) SIGINT & UKUS &       &       & CAN &       &       \\
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\caption{The Atlantic Triangle foundations of the emergent Anglosphere Security Community 1946 - 1951}
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\textsuperscript{780} Ennio Di Nolfo, \textit{The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: A Historical Reappraisal} (Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 181.
\textsuperscript{781} Theodore Achilles, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, December 18, 1972, Truman Library.
\textsuperscript{782} The Rio Treaty had been signed in 1947 and was a hemispheric mutual defence treaty between the US and South American states. See Table 23 Appendices
\textsuperscript{783} Achilles, 14.
appointments. The coordination and role of the tripartite group’s intelligence activity within NATO are revealed in declassified BRUSA minutes.

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Table 2 Anglosphere Nexus Bilateral Military Agreements in existence between 1946 - 1956

* Provision for Commonwealth sharing

By 1950, the lack of institutional non-SIGINT intelligence liaison between the US and the UK had been addressed. Bedell Smith, in his new position as Director of CIA, had requested closer relations with the UK’s JIC and by default the Commonwealth Joint Intelligence Bureaux. This process was facilitated by the 1950 Burns-Templer Agreements that covered all aspects of classified information between the US and UK. There was provision for information sharing for [Dominion] Commonwealth members via the UK if appropriate, with

786 “BRUSA, Arrangements For Exchange & Dissemination.” March 19, 1953 TNA, GCHQ File HW 80 10/8) Para 4. 2
788 Ibid.
3.8 Pacific Framework: Imperfect Coalescence

3.8.1 Introduction

After initially resisting the need for close security arrangements, the US began to reconsider its strategy. The success of the PCR and its backing for communist regimes under the guise of self-determination created a shared threat for the Anglosphere states active in the region. The region saw the first example of a post-WW2 conflict in which all five parties participated in Korea. The US regarded Indochina as a French responsibility, and the Malaysian area as a Commonwealth responsibility and the initial security architecture reflected that.

3.8.2 Regional Security: US Disinterest

The three Commonwealth states with Indo-Pacific sovereign territories envisaged new a quadrilateral defence agreement involving the US. Chifley and Evatt drafted a Commonwealth-US plan that was endorsed by NZ and the UK at the May 1946 Commonwealth Defence meeting but when Bevin presented the plan, it was summarily rejected. Brynes stated, “the United States is not interested in establishing any system of regional defence in the South West Pacific…”\footnote{Quoted in: Paul Orders, \textit{Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Challenge of the United States, 1939–46: A Study in International History} (Springer, 2002), 171.} Chifley tried a direct approach to Truman but without success.\footnote{Robb and Gill, 29.} Evatt’s attempts were repeatedly rebuffed by the State Department and the JCS concurred, insisting that the US should not be distracted by peripheral military issues and classed Australia and NZ as “an area without priority.”\footnote{Ibid., 29,51.}

In the absence of a strong regional threat, the US policy-makers were comfortable with a set of relationships that constituted the bare minimum threshold for the existence of a regional security community. The trigger for changed US attitudes was the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist regime on the mainland and the spectre of communist advances sponsored by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

3.8.3 Commonwealth Regional Security

The US rejection of an integrated Anglospheric regional defence pact in Asia ensured that the institutions that evolved remained centred on three Commonwealth nations – Australia, the UK and NZ. The Australian and NZ security strategy was predicated on the notion of ‘Forward Defence’ entailing a commitment to defend “British territory and communications.”

Correspondence between Chifley and Attlee led to the ANZAM agreement, formalised in 1947 after extensive collaboration amongst UK and Australian Chiefs of Staff and Shedden. ANZAM was founded on a mixture of semi-formal defence and security arrangements made possible by deep-rooted, habitual trust. This was true of both Australia and NZ, but particularly the latter, whose commitment to the UK remained a constant. The Malayan Emergency heralded an intensification of regional CSO intelligence operations and an increase in the Australian and NZ contribution to SIGINT bases in Singapore, Hong Kong, Perth and Darwin.

793 Orders, 174.
796 Pfennigwerth, 199.
Although policy issues between the US and Australia impeded progress towards a quadrilateral strategic alliance, other informal military relationships had developed. In June 1949, the US, Australian and NZ militaries created staff missions in one another’s capitals, replicating the UK-US arrangements.\footnote{Burton to Makin [393], Dispatch 1/49, Canberra, June 1, 1949, 'Secret'. NAA, A1068, DL47/5/2A; Burton to Makin [390], Dispatch 1/48, Canberra, August 23, 1948. A1068, DL47/5/2A}

In March 1951, an informal ANZAM agreement was reached between Admiral Radford (US Navy) and the Admiral Collins (RAN) representing the AUSUKNZ navies.\footnote{Andrew Forbes and Michelle Lovi, "Radford/Collins Agreement " \textit{Australian Maritime Issues 2006: SPC-A Annual Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No.19} (2007): 46-67.} This arrangement preceded ANZUS by six months and provided an ongoing mechanism for RN collaboration with the USN with an ANZAM region being a primary AUSUKNZ responsibility (Map 1) The so-called “Malayan Area” corresponds with a wider, non-naval US State Department perspective as to respective Anglospheric
responsible.

Map 1 The ANZAM maritime Zone circa 1952

3.8.4 The Korean War Catalyst

The Korean War acted as a catalyst for the inclusion of Australian and NZ in US security calculations. The US agreed to the Australian-led DSB joining the BRUSA SIGINT arrangements as direct second party (with NZ gaining access via the DSB). This marked the effective merging of the CSO into the ‘Five Eyes’ arrangements. British Commonwealth elements no longer relied upon the UK for second party status, and as such, the relationship was now a bilateral “UK-US Agreement.” In the context of security community theory, this was significant, representing an extension of trust and intimate collaboration with Australia and by extension NZ, in one of the most sensitive and areas of security.

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799 “The Future of ANZAM” C.O.S. (52) 684 December 17, 1952 TNA, DEFE 5/43, 7
800 The DSB included NZ and UK personnel. See: “UKUSA Agreement.” Appendix J, Annexure J1, October 10, 1956. TNA, GCHQ File HW 80/11
The Korean War also highlighted a developing behavioural pattern observable in elements of Canadian policy-makers to remain (or publicly appear) to avoid too tight an embrace. It emphasises the pluralistic nature of the Anglospheric security. Deeper security entanglements were avoided by a reliance on the diplomatic opportunities afforded by a liberal internationalist foreign policy. The Korean War, however, was a UN-endorsed endeavour and difficult for Canada to sidestep. However, both the Canadian military and political policy-makers wanted to avoid integration into US military formations and deployed as part of the Commonwealth First Division, under Australian command as the lead regional Commonwealth state.  

3.8.5 ANZUS and UK exclusion

During the course of this war the US re-evaluated its need for regional allies and for a formal alliance with Australia and NZ. The State Department noted “the close identity of views between the United States and Australia on matters of fundamental importance.”  

The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender told Truman that World War 2 and Korea showed Australia “could be counted upon in an emergency to give the utmost of her manpower and equipment to meet all new crises.” Spender had hopes a formal relationship with the US would replicate the kind of intimate co-operation the Australians enjoyed in the Commonwealth. He informed Dulles,

I know you won’t mind me saying directly that we in this country are a metropolitan power in the Pacific and we hope that our view will be predominate.

Thus, the Australians saw ANZUS as a means of achieving protection and institutionalising consultation. This was almost exactly the opposite as to what the US envisaged.

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803 Notes of Meeting between Spender and Truman, September 15, 1950, US National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, 611.43/9-1550
804 Spender to Dulles. March 8, 1951, National Library of Australia (hereafter NLA), Spender Papers, Box 1,
In the case of the trilateral arrangement with Australia and New Zealand… any organisation thereunder will not have the right to demand knowledge of and to participate in planning.\textsuperscript{805}

Although New Zealand regarded US protection as “the greatest prize,” there were serious reservations about the nature of a formal pact.\textsuperscript{806} The NZ CoS believed such a pact would exist to serve US interests and, “only in connection with arrangements in the Philippines and Japan…” As such NZ did not regard the ANZUS Treaty as heralding a significant change, it represented “nothing new in the relationship of the three countries.”\textsuperscript{807} In his statement to the NZ parliament, the NZ External Affairs Minister stressed both “New Zealand and Australia have special obligations in defence as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations” and as such it would be necessary for future UK membership or consultation.\textsuperscript{808}

Australian and NZ hopes that the ANZUS treaty draft could include a clause to allow their formal collaboration with NATO was vetoed by Dulles.\textsuperscript{809} Soon after the creation of ANZUS, Montgomery and Ismay championed a NATO-ANZUS tie as part of globalised NATO.\textsuperscript{810} Support for this came from the Canadian military with Foulkes lobbying the DEA for the creation of a NATO Standing Group covering South Asia and ANZUS if the US could be so persuaded.\textsuperscript{811}

The US was not interested in such a trans-regional NATO and nor did it want the UK involved in ANZUS. US motives were based on an unwillingness to be associated with colonial powers. By way of explanation, the US suggested UK inclusion would necessitate inviting France, Portugal and the Netherlands. The UK Foreign Secretary complained at their exclusion from emergent regional security institutions that would surely impede cooperation and, given their physical territorial presence asserted, “we are most certainly a Pacific
power. The UK military complained about the “absurdity” of ANZAM and ANZUS being separate organisations and the need for “an integrated regional planning organisation in peace.” In 1953 Dulles rebuffed another attempt to include the UK by informing his Antipodean allies that excluding the UK was necessary to avoid any US defence responsibilities for Malaya and threatened that UK inclusion would render the ANZUS arrangement valueless in practice.

It was ANZAM, not ANZUS, which then developed the institutions necessary for operational activity following the October 1953 tripartite ‘Melbourne Discussions’ of the three Commonwealth militaries. A command structure and sub-committees specialising in intelligence and operational planning was created. In 1955, a mobile ‘Far East Strategic Reserve’ (FESR) of joint Commonwealth forces to be used “to counter a Cold War threat wherever it may occur” including Malaya was established. This stood in contrast to ANZUS that had no such structure or reserve and featured a Council that was not consultative, but rather served as means to communicate US policy to its allies.

3.8.6 The lack of ‘united action’ & SEATO

Following the deteriorating French position in Vietnam, the US began to look to the UK for mutual aid in an envisaged US intervention. Eisenhower mooted UK membership of ANZUS or the possibility of a new NATO-type regional alliance. Whilst the UK was interested in such security arrangements, they were not inclined to join an alliance created for

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812 Spender Memorandum, 19 April 1951, in Kelly, fn41.
814 Unattributed memorandum for Prime Minister - “ANZUS.” October 6, 1953. TNA, PREM 11/404
815 LD MacLean, *ANZIM to ANZUK, an Historical Outline of ANZAM* (Department of Defence, 1992), 7-8.
the immediate deployment of troops and escalate a dangerous situation. In any case, the UK Foreign Secretary Eden was pursuing a diplomatic solution via the Geneva Conference discussions.

Dulles’ approach to the UK sought to stress the threats to British interests and in particular to their Commonwealth dominion allies. He wanted immediate agreement on a so-called plan for ‘united action’ to shore up the French in Indochina. Dulles regarded the Commonwealth as a familial affair, in which a motherly UK would be obliged to protect her off-spring and those off-spring could be made to feel most unsafe. At a meeting of the NSC on April 6, Dulles explained his thinking that,

The chance may now be at hand, at long last, to win the British to our side. The peril in Southeast Asia might forge the needed unity because of the British stake in Malaya is so great and because Britain’s two children, Australia and New Zealand, are likewise imperilled.

To increase pressure on the UK, he hoped to use Australia and New Zealand. All three had been reminded the US “would not be disposed to commit our forces to defend British and Commonwealth interests in Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand when the British, Australians, and New Zealanders simply sat on their hands.” This was diplomatic hardball, and accords with Adler and Barnett’s proposition that strong states nudge and coerce others within a security community. The ‘united action’ that Dulles sought was not forthcoming,

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820 Eisenhower suggested expanding ANZUS to include the UK, France as part of a Five Power arrangement or by including other SE Asian states. See: “Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council,” March 25, 1954. #646 FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1. For need to have UK on board see: “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” March 30, 1954. Ibid. FRUS #658
821 Categorising Australia and NZ as ‘children’ of Britain’s family was a recurring theme. See: Kelly, 34.
primarily due to UK concerns as to where military action might lead.\textsuperscript{825} Predictability of an ally is, according to security community theory, is vital to the maintenance of trust and this was in danger of being undermined. Australia and New Zealand, although anxious about retaining US protection, expressed similar reservations, resulting in Eisenhower referring to an Australian “collapse.”\textsuperscript{826}

Although there had been no ‘united action’ in Vietnam, Dulles’ attempts to create a regional security structure in the region did bear fruit. A treaty was eventually signed in September 1954 and SEATO came into force in February 1955. SEATO was something of an unsatisfactory compromise with its numerous participants sharing different threat perceptions, and unlike NATO, the treaty contained no mutual defence clause.\textsuperscript{827} Also, unlike NATO, there was no military command structure, strategic planning or standing forces.\textsuperscript{828} It was SEATO’s inadequacies that led the UK to create the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (ADMA) as a Commonwealth security guarantee to Malaya and Singapore.\textsuperscript{829}

It was a rather unsatisfactory outcome. There was a security community of sorts in that all for AnglospHERE states were of course culturally similar, shared threat perceptions but failed to develop working political military structures that facilitated greater cooperation. A number of factors suggest themselves as relevant and all would come to the fore in Suez. Firstly, there was the issue of personalities, in particular Dulles and Eden, and secondly, a divergence on tactics to deal with nationalist anti-colonialist movements. Both would come to the fore in Suez.

\textsuperscript{825} The risk of US deployment of atomic weapons was a fear and discussed at an Emergency Cabinet Meeting on April 25, 1954. TNA, CAB 129/C(54)155. See: James Waite, \textit{The End of the First Indochina War: A Global History}, vol. 3 (Routledge, 2012).
\textsuperscript{827} Seyom Brown, \textit{The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton} (Columbia University Press, 1994), 68.
\textsuperscript{828} The US did not want a military command and planning framework but rather a mechanism for bringing in allies to a war. See: US Senate, vol. 93-2, March 6, 1974, S. Res 174, U.S. Commitment to SEATO, Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington DC), 46-47.
3.9 Suez - Coalescence Interregnum

3.9.1 Introduction

The Suez Crisis provides evidence for two contradictory aspects of the emergent Anglospheric security community. On the one hand, its ability to overcome disagreements speaks to the strength of relationships. This aspect is addressed in the next chapter in an examination of the post-Crisis ramifications. This section seeks to understand how such a crisis occurred given the pre-existing relationships. Rather than illustrating what Deutsch refers to as “the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages and actions, quickly [and] adequately,” the events point to a comprehensive dysfunction at the governmental level.³³⁰

The Suez Crisis suggests the US behaviour constituted the coercion of a weaker state within the security community. And whilst the Crisis raised questions of trust regarding the UK’s covert diplomatic manoeuvres, other Anglosphere Core member policy-establishments exhibited similar trust concerns in respect of Dulles’ behaviour. Also, within the US there was a marked division of opinion as to threat level represented by Nasser with the US security-military element sharing similar views to the UK.

3.9.2 Communication of UK Military Plans

The behaviour of the UK-US political policy-makers in the events leading up to the invasion was characterised by miscommunication and deceit. One element was Eden’s participation in the Sèvres Protocol, a device to provide a casus belli for Anglo-French intervention. There was, however, no lack of communication of the UK’s determination to use military force if diplomatic measures failed. This is a point made by Keith Kyle,

With Suez one must distinguish between the large part of the crisis, in which the planning in London was for a possible invasion of Egypt… and what happened in the last week of October. There was no secret about the first within the restricted group of civil servants from the departments concerned with the planning who had the security clearance ‘Terrapin,’ and no concealment in principle from the Americans… The
Sèvres Protocol and the collusion with Israel were totally different, cutting out all but a handful of British civil servants... and scandalising the US administration.\textsuperscript{831}

US policy-makers had been kept informed of the possibility of and preparation for war.\textsuperscript{832} As far as the US military was concerned, there was no miscommunication. The process of informal institutionalisation of military relationships that had begun after Montgomery's 1946 initiative was now well-established. By 1955 authorisation had been granted for the US military “to collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations” for intervention in the event of armed conflict between Israel and Arab states.\textsuperscript{833} An attempt by Dulles to thwart formal “combined planning” because of the possibility of a leak was reversed at the insistence of the JCS and a series of detailed planning sessions had ensued.\textsuperscript{834}

Any doubt that the US military was not aware of UK plans is dispelled by reference to the meeting NSC August 30 minutes. These confirm the JCS were aware of the mobilisation of British and French forces and aware of the general strategy the British would employ. In fact, it appears the JCS were informed of actual deployments as they occurred due to ongoing secret briefings by senior British military personnel from all three armed services.\textsuperscript{835}

Political policy-makers were present at the same August 30 NSC meeting where the JSC discussed UK plans. Dulles himself informed the participants that the British and French were continuing their military preparations and said they were extremely serious in their intention to resort to military force. Dulles outlined his discussions with Eden who had told him the British Government would be making a decision on the use of force around

\textsuperscript{830} Deutsch, \textit{Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience}, 140.
\textsuperscript{831} Keith Kyle, interview by Gillian Staerck and Michael D Kandiah, 10th July, 2004. Transcript 31
\textsuperscript{833} See: Kenneth W Condit, \textit{History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-56}, vol. 6 (Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), 168.
\textsuperscript{834} Ibid., 171-73.
The Anglospheric Security Community

September 10, that, “once made, would be irrevocable.”\textsuperscript{836} It is possible Dulles thought the British were bluffing given his belief in the art of brinkmanship.\textsuperscript{837}

3.9.3 Shared threat perception of Nasser

Knowledge, however, does not imply consent or empathy for their allies’ plight. However, there did appear to be a degree of unanimity expressed by both the UK and US policy-establishments as to the nature of Nasser’s threat to western ‘allied’ interests and the efficacy of war as a possible means of confronting him.

In the UK, the opposition Labour Party warned Nasser wanted to create an “Arab Empire” and that Nasser’s behaviour was reminiscent of Mussolini and Hitler.\textsuperscript{838} These sentiments were shared by senior members of the US political establishment. The Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Radford repeatedly referred to Nasser as another Hitler who must be stopped.\textsuperscript{839} Admiral Burke declared, “Nasser must be broken.”\textsuperscript{840} Dulles himself referred to Canal seizure as part of “a long term program” of expansion that challenged “the balance of power and future of Western Europe.”\textsuperscript{841} On another occasion Dulles described Nasser’s writing as an “Arab Mein Kampf” and Eisenhower described Nasser’s rhetoric as “much like Hitler’s.”\textsuperscript{842} The issue dividing the Anglosphere policy-makers was not the threat, but how and when the threat should be contained or neutralised.\textsuperscript{843}

3.9.4 Divisions between the US military and political establishment

\begin{itemize}
\item[Ibid. \textit{FRUS, [295th Meeting NSC]} #149 325-332]
\item[\textsuperscript{836} James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," \textit{Life} 16 (1956): 77.]
\item[\textsuperscript{838} “Memorandum of Discussion at the 292d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 9, 1956, #72. \textit{FRUS, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI.} Ibid. \textit{FRUS, [295th Meeting NSC]} #149.]
\item[\textsuperscript{839} Condit, 6, 178-83.]
\item[\textsuperscript{840} Ibid. \textit{FRUS, [292d Meeting NSC]} 167]
\item[\textsuperscript{842} Eden claimed he and Dulles met to discuss a covert plan to remove Nasser. The US note of the meeting states the matter discussed was “not to be committed in writing.” For a more detailed account]
\end{itemize}
The Crisis was precipitated by the US decision to withdraw funding for the Aswan Dam on July 19, 1956. A week later, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal intending to use the tolls to finance the dam. The JSC informed the Secretary of State for Defence that the canal seizure was “militarily detrimental” to the US and its allies, and the canal must be returned to “friendly authority” as soon as possible. The JSC concluded the UK should consider taking military action. This was followed by another JCS memo to bring to the attention of the Secretary of State,

…the possible and even probable repercussions which could result from permitting the ascendancy of Nasser as a “champion of Arab nationalism.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to bring to the attention of the Secretary of Defense the possible and even probable repercussions which could result from permitting the ascendancy of Nasser as a “champion of Arab nationalism” … if subsequent events of similar nature occur, the United States will find it necessary to take active steps to change the course of events. By such time the cumulative problem could be vastly greater than today.844

At this point a clear divide is visible between the US military and Dulles, who having been shown the memorandum said, he did not appreciate ‘political’ advice from the JCS and nor did the president, who Dulles stated, “welcomes any thought anybody has, but in the main he looks to the Sec.[himself] for judgment in political matters and to the military for various consequences.”845

The JCS were not to be dislodged from their viewpoint. The JCS recommended public endorsement of UK-French military action with US political, logistical and economic support, and in the event of third-party intervention, the offer of military support.846 At the August 30, NSC meeting, the JCS again argued for “strong public, political and logistic support” with possible US supportive engagement.847

844 “Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay),” August 7, 1956. #68. FRUS, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI.
845 Ibid. FRUS, #68 [Anderson-Dulles Telephone] 155. Footnote 4
847 Ibid. FRUS, [295th Meeting NSC] #149 330
In contrast to the JCS, both Dulles and Eisenhower were inconsistent.\footnote{For an account of Eisenhower and Dulles’ contradictory briefing to Congressional leaders see: Steven L Spiegel, \textit{The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan}, vol. 1 (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 72.}

The minutes of the NSC on held on August 9, records Dulles had posing the question as to the appropriate US course of action in the event of Anglo-French military intervention, “should we try to stop use of force by the British and French? He did not favour this course, but it should be considered. How much help should we give the British and French?” The minutes record Eisenhower’s response, the President said,

…Egypt had gone too far. He asked how Europe could be expected to remain at the mercy of the whim of a dictator. Admiral Radford said Nasser was trying to be another Hitler. The President added that Nasser’s prestige would be so high, if he got away with the Canal seizure, that all the Arabs would listen to him.\footnote{Ibid. \textit{FRUS}, [292d Meeting NSC]. #72. 174}

Four weeks later, Dulles was still professing himself sympathetic to the dilemma the UK and France found themselves in regarding the abrogation of the Suez Canal Treaty because “they would be finished as first-rate powers if they didn’t somehow find a means to check Nasser and nullify his schemes.”\footnote{Ibid. \textit{FRUS}, [295th Meeting NSC]. #149. 329}

Security community theory holds that communication, in the sense the various parties are able to ‘read’ the other side’s intentions and likely reactions, is a key factor in their success. The build-up to the crisis occurred during the Presidential election and the need to avoid war created a policy that appeared to be predicated on prolonging the diplomatic process with little end in sight.\footnote{Dale Jr. Edwin L, "Dulles Counsels Patience on Suez. Says Egyptians Will Suffer Economic Ills That Will Make Them Reasonable," \textit{NY Times}, September 27 1956.} Adlai Stevenson, Eisenhower’s Democratic Party rival for the presidency, criticised the policy as “on again, off-again” diplomacy.\footnote{"Transcript of Stevenson's News Conference on Hiss, Suez and Other Subjects," ibid., September 18. For a detailed analysis of Dulles’ machinations and public pronouncements up to the Suez invasion see: Benjamin Nimer, "Dulles, Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy," \textit{Western Political Quarterly} 12, no. 3 (1959).} Thus, there was a UK failure to understand the vicissitudes of Eisenhower’s re-election campaign that promoted his
credentials as ‘the Peace Candidate.’ Steven Freiberger suggests that Dulles sympathised with the UK but re-election considerations meant he pursued “a purposely ambiguous policy — and in many instances a duplicitous one” seeking to delay war until after the re-election of Eisenhower. These electoral factors lead Steven Spiegel to conclude, “it was no wonder that Eden and French premier Mollet were confused.”

From a UK perspective, the US had become distracted and irresolute in the pursuit of common strategic interests. Eden felt aggrieved and perplexed at the failure of the US to back British and French diplomatic efforts in their dispute over the Egyptian seizure of the Canal. When Eisenhower warned Eden that military force would play badly with world opinion, Eden concluded the US was “an unreliable ally.”

3.9.5 US internal confusion

Whereas Dulles and Eisenhower were inconsistent, the behaviour of the US military was undeviating in its support of the British-French invasion. The attitude of the senior members of the JCS was so persistent that Dulles removed them from further deliberations, relying instead on direct, informal communication with Admiral Burke. Burke continued to push for active support for the British and French. Burke knew the British had a shortage of landing craft and implored Dulles,

…for God’s sake, let’s give them the craft. Give them ours. They’re over there. They’ve got to make things successful.

Up to and during the crisis Burke was privy to discussions with the UK’s Chief of Naval Staff, Louis Mountbatten. It is possible that the support of senior elements of the US

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855 Spiegel, 1, 72.
858 Watson, 61.
military establishment encouraged their opposite numbers in spite of the advice coming out of the UK Washington Embassy that the Administration was not supportive.\textsuperscript{859}

Despite the political and economic pressure applied by Eisenhower and Dulles and Eden’s sudden capitulation, there is some evidence that they wanted the British to succeed whilst being seen to oppose it. The Dulles comment delivered to Eisenhower after the ceasefire is quixotic, “The British having gone in should not have stopped until they toppled Nasser.”\textsuperscript{860} This was despite Dulles having addressed the UN on November 2 and insisted upon an immediate ceasefire.\textsuperscript{861} It seems likely that Dulles shared the UK objective of removing Nasser, but did not want to be associated with it so as to maintain US influence with non-aligned states. The pressure applied to the UK to withdraw occurred whilst Dulles was hospitalised and directed by Administration members less sympathetic to the UK.\textsuperscript{862} Eden capitulated too soon. After the event, Dulles asked the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, “Selwyn, why did you stop? Why didn’t you go through with it and get Nasser down?” These sentiments serve to underline the US need for ‘outraged’ plausible denial whilst secretly requiring the UK to maintain a robust stance. Suez represented not so much a break down in trust, but rather a failure in what security community theory regards as ‘easy’ communications between allies.\textsuperscript{863}

\textsuperscript{859} The extent of UK-US collaboration is difficult to determine. Mountbatten destroyed records to support a favourable account of his role in the Crisis. See: Adrian Smith, "Rewriting History? Admiral Lord Mountbatten's Efforts to Distance Himself from the 1956 Suez Crisis," \textit{Contemporary British History} 26, no. 4 (2012). Kyle refers to Mountbatten’s “well attested habit of improving the historical record.” Kyle, "Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East," 136.

\textsuperscript{860} “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Secretary Dulles’ Room, Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, November 12, 1956. #570 FRUS, 1955–1957, \textit{Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI}.

\textsuperscript{861} "Eisenhower Backs Foreign Contacts: Would Aid Understanding by 'People-to-People'." The Eisenhower Administration stance was deemed to be winning votes in the election campaign. See: W.H Lawrence, "Reaction in Nation: Foreign Events Help President Democrats Win over Some Gain for President - Seen Peace a Major Issue," ibid., November 2 1956.


\textsuperscript{863} Matthew F Holland, \textit{America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower} (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), 120.
3.9.6 Australia and New Zealand

The informal tripartite bond between the UK, Australia, and New Zealand remained strong. At the time of Suez, all three states were engaged in a common effort against the communist insurgency in Malaya. Menzies was particularly supportive of the UK taking military action against Nasser if deemed necessary and was prepared to offer naval and air force contingents.\textsuperscript{864} The Australian military, whilst reticent to mobilise forces to the Middle East, supported the view the Suez Canal was of vital strategic importance.\textsuperscript{865} Menzies warned the US Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, that Nasser’s action was illegal “and unless his prestige could be materially diminished they, [both the US and the UK] would be exposed to trouble after trouble in the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{866} In short, Australia and NZ believed Nasser was a serious threat.

Australia was aware of the possibility of a UK intervention and was supportive. The matter was discussed by the Defence Committee with a recommendation that Australia should commit a small naval and air contribution if requested.\textsuperscript{867} NZ had voiced strong support for the idea of military action, announcing, “Where Britain stands, we stand; where she goes we go, in good times and bad.”\textsuperscript{868} The inclusion of HMNZ Royalist in the Suez operation was later represented as an ‘oversight’ due a training assignment with the RN in the Mediterranean and upon discovery was withdrawn in a supposed assertion of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{869} In fact, the Royalist’s deployment was explicitly sanctioned, with the rider that the NZ Prime Minister, “is most anxious that this offer should not be known on any account and, if challenged intends to deny it.”\textsuperscript{870}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{864} Menzies to Casey, Fadden and Mcbride. July 29, 1956. NAA, A1838, 163/4/7/3/3 Part 1  \\
\textsuperscript{865} “Australian Strategic Interests in the Middle East.” August 9, 1956. NAA. A5954, 1410/1  \\
\textsuperscript{866} Robert Menzies, \textit{Afternoon Light: Some Memories of Men and Events} (Cassell Australia, 1967), 149-50.  \\
\textsuperscript{867} “Defence Committee Report to Menzies,” August 9, 1956, NAA, A5954, 1410/1  \\
\textsuperscript{868} New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (hereafter NZPD). Suez Canal - Ministerial Statement, August 7, 1956, Vol. 309.  \\
\textsuperscript{869} A false narrative has emerged that the NZ Government had no knowledge and the Royalist deployment and the vessel’s withdrawal constituted a display of sovereign power. See: RNZN, "Royalist," \textit{National Museum of the Royal New Zealand Navy}, https://navymuseum.co.nz/explore/by-collections/ships/royalist-dido-class-cruiser/.  \\
\textsuperscript{870} Kyle, "Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East," 159.
\end{flushleft}
In the United Nations General Assembly vote, a US tabled motion for an immediate ceasefire found the UK (with France) isolated by sixty-four votes to five against and six abstentions. The five votes supporting the UK included Australia and NZ, whilst Canada ranked among the abstentions.\textsuperscript{871}

3.9.7 Canada

Canada’s position was significant in a number of respects, detaching itself from the more ‘muscular’ activity of her Anglosphere allies in favour of leveraging diplomatic approaches in the pursuit of common objectives. This stance was apparent in the years preceding the Crisis itself. Unlike the other members of the Anglosphere Core, Canada did not perceive Nasser as a threat. Pearson himself did not regard Nasser as another Hitler, but as “a most impressive and attractive personality.”\textsuperscript{872} Canadian public servants took the view it was time for the US and UK to invite the Soviet Union into talks to resolve Middle Eastern tensions. An approach by Pearson to the US suggesting Nasser was not a problem and encouraging talks with Moscow was given short shrift by Dulles and Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{873}

After the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and the UK’s mooting of military action, Canada was unequivocal in its opposition to it. Thereafter, the UK avoided any substantive discussions on the matter.\textsuperscript{874} Canada’s attitude during the run up to the Crisis (and after) it won the admiration of India’s Nehru who had attempted to reconcile the interests of the UK with Arab nationalism even to the point of defending the existence of British sovereign bases in Egypt.\textsuperscript{875} Arguably, Canada’s position helped preserve the integrity of the wider Commonwealth given India shock at the UK’s “unabashed aggression and deception.”\textsuperscript{876}

\textsuperscript{871} Nutting.@132}
\textsuperscript{872} Pearson, “Memorandum for Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs”, October 20, 1955, DCER, Vol 21: 1236
\textsuperscript{874} Ibid., 321-22.
\textsuperscript{875} Zorawar Daulet Singh, "India’s Role During the 1956 Suez Crisis: Between Peacemaking and Postcolonial Solidarity," \textit{India Review} 17, no. 5 (2018): 3.
\textsuperscript{876} Lok Sabha Speech, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), 536.
3.10 Summary: The Nascent Anglosphere

By 1956, the outline of the modern Anglosphere was discernible in the security and military arrangements between the five core states. The Nascent security community consisted of a refashioned Commonwealth bloc linked to the US through revitalised UK-US intelligence arrangements. These had been facilitated by the strong personal WW2 relationships between members of the political and military establishments, shared threat perceptions all underpinned by common cultural outlooks and experiences.

The development of the Anglosphere Core’s SIGINT arrangements chart the tentative steps towards a functioning quintilateral structure. The evolution of the BRUSA-UK/US is representative of a general trend in the nascent phase of the security community. The first stage reveals the drawing together of a British-led Commonwealth bloc and the US as illustrated in Diagram 1.

Diagram 1. BRUSA SIGINT 1946-47 (Bilateral UK-US)
The process of merger between the two blocs was facilitated by the development of direct relationships between the US and Canada. (Diagram 2) Again, the SIGINT arrangements illustrate a general trend towards tripartite CANUKUS security relationships in this period.

Diagram 2. BRUSA SIGINT 1948-50 (Trilateral UK/CAN-US)

By 1956 the SIGINT arrangements had emerged as a distinct quintilateral formal arrangement. (Diagram 3). It was mirrored by informal exchanges of information between non-SIGINT intelligence between the five core states (the Joint Intelligence Bureaux).
The cooperation over intelligence was not matched by quintilateral defence arrangements. As with the initial intelligence arrangements, the military fora were focused on an Atlantic CANUKUS defence triangle. The lack of a shared threat perception by US in the Asian theatre impeded the inclusion of AUSNZ within a global Anglospheric arrangement.

Diagram 4 The Anglosphere Military ‘Atlantic Triangle’ 1946-56
The AUSNZ links remained Commonwealth based with only loose US associations through ANZUS and SEATO that lacked command structures. This established a pattern of bifurcation of the Anglospheric footprint in the region, aspects of which would endure.
Chapter 4 The Ascendant Anglosphere: 1957-1991

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the Suez Crisis and the inability of either party to read correctly one another’s intentions. This did not occur in the run up to and during the Suez Crisis. However, the durability of a security community is measured by its ability to overcome disagreements and shocks by the willingness of individual policy-makers to listen and adapt behaviour in response to partner’s grievances and needs.

In the four years after Suez, UK and US leaders demonstrated a willingness to refashion relationships and created new Anglospheric institutions. These were predominately bilateral in nature involving UK-US and Canada-US dyads. They attempted to address issues of communication, rebuild trust, and restart the relationship on a sounder footing.

Of particular note was the Working Group machinery established in this period. This plethora of Working Groups were essentially bilateral UK-US groupings but included Australia and NZ on matters pertaining to South East Asia. The drawing together of the Anglospheric security community development was punctuated by dissension and dysfunction reflecting a US adherence to anti-colonialist posturing by the US State Department. This anti-colonial virtue-signalling was particularly pronounced in the Middle East and South East Asia and was reflected in stunted alliance structures, and a reluctance to give (or be seen to give) mutual aid in both diplomatic and conflict situations. It was a factor contributing to the UK’s decision to pivot from the region, disrupting the dynamic of the entire Indo-Pacific theatre and laying the foundations for a new Anglosphere security architecture that included regional Commonwealth members.

The period from Suez to the end of the Cold War also provides evidence of a strengthening relationship at work at a variety of levels. The removal of ‘colonialism’ as an
issue between the UK and US and a sense of US isolation after Vietnam, facilitated greater UK-US cooperation as the US itself grappled with the realities of global power. Both the US and the UK reduced their presence in Indo-China, but both retained strong relationships with Australia and NZ. And in the Falklands conflict, the US chose it Anglosphere partner in preference to Monroe Doctrine alternatives. By the end of the Cold War a discernible quintilateral Anglospheric security community was in evidence.

4.2 Post-Suez Outlooks & Outcomes

4.2.1 US Reactions

One important factor in the formation and durability of a security community is the strength of what Deutsch referred to as a cognitive sense of ‘we-feeling.’ Significant elements of the US wider policy-establishment identified with the UK, believing its threat assessment of Nasser had been correct and the US had let down an ally. George Kennan declared himself perplexed. US foreign policy was, based on “empty legalism” resulting in “a fateful inability to maintain intimate communication with our friends, and a style of diplomatic action directed at grandstanding.” Whilst acknowledging the Anglo-French action was “ill-considered” he asserted, “we bear a heavy measure of responsibility for the desperation” that caused the military action. Leading IR academic, Hans Morgenthau, was moved to write to NY Times in November 1956 to declare US behaviour to be “one of the most calamitous episodes in the history of US diplomacy,” that inflicted “irreparable damage upon” the UK (and France). Former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson was indignant with the US decision to force the UK to withdraw since Nasser, “defeated, humiliated and ripe for oblivion, was given victory, unprecedented and complete.”

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Water Lippmann’s views illustrate just how far perceptions of the UK had changed. In 1946 Lippmann acknowledged shared values, but highlighted Britain’s imperial baggage asserting, that US appeal was that it was neither a totalitarian state nor a colonial power and could only retain influence with “Asiatic peoples” by not joining forces with “the British Empire, but must retain its separate influence”. After Suez, Lippmann’s perception had changed, and he railed at the damage to UK-US relations and the "appeasement" of Nasser, “an implacable enemy” with a plan to “become master of the Arab world.” However, for Dulles, the Cold War battle for hearts and minds meant too close a public association with the old European colonial powers might fatally compromise any US attempt to lead a bloc of emergent nations:

For many years now, the United States has been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our old and valued relations with our British and French allies on the one hand, and on the other trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from colonialism… in view of the overwhelming Asian and African pressure upon us, we could not walk this tightrope much longer. Unless we now assert and maintain this leadership, all of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the USSR. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist policies.

The weakness of this approach was whether the US could find reliable allies with a proven military capacity to fill the vacuum created by the weakening of the colonial powers. US military leaders, sympathetic to the UK’s Suez objectives had long warned the US must be ‘on guard’ in that in pursuit of good relations with Arab nationalists the US did not “worsen our relations with the UK so as to unduly weaken or dissolve the main strength of the free world.”

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883 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 302d Meeting of the NSC,” November 1, 1956, #455. FRUS, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI.
884 NSC 155/1, July 14, 1953, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series Eisenhower Library (GOP, 1953), 35.
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More to the point, aside from self-determination, little in the way of the liberal values of the Anglosphere was manifest in the political ideologies these new states espoused. The hegemonic aspirations of Nasser threatened to replace traditional regimes with socialist dictatorships supported by Soviet arms.\textsuperscript{885} Nasser’s status soared to “mythic proportions,” and garnered support across the Arab world.\textsuperscript{886} For non-aligned states, the Suez Crisis did not elevate the US, but rather suggested Nasser had achieved a major success “by playing the superpowers against each other.”\textsuperscript{887}

Eisenhower’s Cabinet acknowledged they had inherited a problem, declaring that “we should tolerate no monkey-business from Nasser” and “the monkey was presently going to come off the back of the British and be put on our own back.”\textsuperscript{888} They concluded the US would need UK advice on how to operate in the Middle East region. The regional vacuum they had inadvertently created required US action. The enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine was the response, offering military and economic aid to Middle Eastern states threatened by aggression and categorised by Nasser as “a device to re-establish imperial control.”\textsuperscript{889}

Nixon, who had sought to equate Egyptian with the American War of Independence changed position and led appeals for economic assistance for the UK and acknowledged history might record that “neither we nor our allies were without fault in our handling of the events.”\textsuperscript{890} The language adopted by the US was not only conciliatory towards the UK, but the terminology was replete with evidence of what Deutsch termed ‘we-ness,’ invoking familial and friendship references. The analogy of the family was utilised by the US policy-

\textsuperscript{885} Michael Doran, \textit{Ike’s Gamble: America’s Rise to Dominance in the Middle East} (Simon and Schuster, 2017), 11.
\textsuperscript{886} Brinkley, 45.
makers. Eisenhower told Eden that Suez should not become between the US and the UK “after all, it is like a family spat.” Writing to Churchill in November 1956, Eisenhower wanted the incident “washed off the slate,” adding “nothing saddens me more than the thought that I and my old friends of years have met a problem concerning which we do not see eye-to-eye. I shall never be happy until our old-time closeness has been restored.” Dulles invoked familial terms, claiming Suez "was an essentially a violent family squabble, but not one which was likely to end in a divorce."

4.2.2 Canada as the Anglosphere’s ‘honest’ broker

Canada reprised the ‘hinge’ role, acting as the Anglosphere ‘facilitator,’ to end UK-US rift “as expediently as possible.” In refusing to endorse Franco-British military plans, they initially incurred Eden’s wrath, but were now well-placed to secure a compromise UN resolution and a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) that provided the UK with an exit. Although Canadian action won it wider Commonwealth support, notably India, its motives and perceived association with the UK did not impress Nasser who viewed the Canadians as part of the same imperial bloc. Indeed, such cynicism was probably justified. In those Middle Eastern states where UK Embassies were obliged to close due to the deterioration in relations, Canada took over diplomatic representation, acting as the UK’s eyes and ears. There is no definitive proof that this included intelligence activity, but some staff had

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893 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the NSC,” November 30, 1956. #626.
intelligence backgrounds. This was a function Canada would replicate for its Anglosphere partners in future crises.

Suez highlighted the conflicting, schizophrenic nature of Canadian sentiment that could veer towards support for the UK, and then a more detached stance, the latter reflecting the Quebec factor and an attachment to liberal internationalism. In this instance, wider elements of Canadian society took issue with the St Laurent Government’s failure to openly support the UK. The bulk of the [English-language] media were hostile to the Government. Some elements of the media argued Canada’s correct ‘hinge’ role should have been to align the US behind the UK and castigated the government for the collapse of the alliance. These sentiments were shared by members of the political establishment, including opposition leader John Diefenbaker, who was to win the 1957 federal election and adopt a stronger Commonwealth orientated stance.

4.2.3 UK options: Europe or Commonwealth?

The resumption of close relations with the US was not necessarily a foregone conclusion so far as UK political policy-makers were concerned. The close wartime relationship between Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan, the new Prime Minister - the invisible bonds of familial glue — would certainly act as a binding agent. However, in the immediate aftermath of Suez, the UK gave consideration to embarking on much closer relations with France and the planned European Common Market. The UK Cabinet considered a ‘Grand Design,’ a proposal to create a European group within NATO “almost as powerful as America and

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899 O'Reilly, 87. A Gallup poll found 43% supported the invasion and 40% opposed. See:Dale C Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, Canadian (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 183.
901 Phillip Buckner, Canada and the End of Empire (Vancouver: ubc Press, 2007), 68.
902 Macmillan was the UK Cabinet representative of Eisenhower’s HQ Staff during allied operations against Vichy France in N Africa.
903 Established by the Treaty of Rome March 25, 1957.
perhaps in friendly rivalry with her." The new group would share in British nuclear weapons technology, now more advanced in certain respects than that of the US.

Macmillan’s memoirs hint at a possible British post-Suez policy trajectory towards the US more akin to that pursued by France. On becoming UK Prime Minister, in January 1957, Macmillan recorded his feelings as follows:

I was not at all in the mood, nor were any of my colleagues, to appear in a white sheet, or put ourselves, however great the prize, in a humiliating posture. We felt that we had been let down, if not betrayed, by the vacillating and delaying tactics that [Foster] Dulles had pursued in the earlier stages of the Suez crisis and by the viciousness with which he and his subordinates had attacked us after the Anglo-French operation… I was in no mood to make the first approach.

However, even before Macmillan’s succession to the premiership in January 1957, the Cabinet rejected the European tilt, arguing the UK’s ties with both the US and the Commonwealth would be undermined. The US made the first approach soon after Macmillan’s ascension to the premiership. The resultant Bermuda Conference in March 1957 facilitated progress in several important areas, including both cooperation on Western European security and nuclear collaboration as discussed later.

4.2.4 Forward Defence and “Kangaroo Imperialism.”

The Australians had inherited British overseas territories and shared with the UK a similar exasperation with what they perceived as misplaced US idealism at the pace of self-determination. The left-wing Foreign Minister of Australia, Evatt believed his county’s administration of trustee territories to be exemplary, complained of the “constant carping criticism by representatives of governments” whose own nationals did not enjoy “equivalent

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904 “The Grand Design (co-operation with Western Europe), Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.” January 5, 1957. TNA, CAB 129/84, CP (57) 6. 175
905 Nick J Crowson, Britain and Europe: A Political History since 1918 (Routledge, 2010), 73.
906 Macmillan, 4, 240.
The Australian Minister for Territories expressed similar exasperation at “glib” calls for what amounted to premature self-government. Australia’s ambassador to Washington in 1958 thought the US policy establishment naïve and moralistic. As such, the US they were unaware “of what devastating consequences may flow from” the pursuit of impractical anti-colonialist policies. In the ambassador’s opinion Suez was a prime example, the US “shouted” about their love of freedom, (you’d think they invented the damn thing), so that when events don’t quite work out as they have come to believe, they get all upset.

The adoption of perceived US ‘neutralism’ towards colonial powers had grave implications for the security of Australia. Menzies informed his Cabinet that Nasser is full of himself. He has pulled noses over the Canal and is looking for fresh worlds to conquer… [The UK] know that unless Nasser is cut back to size, you will have a new Empire in the Middle East… you must not underestimate Nasser. He’s had a victory over great powers.

Australia’s security strategy was predicated on the ‘Forward Defence’ of South East Asia to prevent communist expansion into Australasia. Of particular concern was the island of New Guinea, split between Australian administered Papua New Guinea, and Dutch New Guinea. Indonesia’s President Sukarno coveted Dutch New Guinea so as to create an Indonesia Raya (greater Indonesia). Sukarno, backed by a large indigenous communist party, was prepared to accept assistance from the PRC and the Soviet Union to achieve his territorial aims. To Menzies, Sukarno’s grandstanding resembled a form of Nasserism. Australia doubted Sukarno’s promises his claims were limited to Dutch New Guinea and feared Australian Papua New Guinea might be threatened. After Suez, Menzies worried

910 Beale to Casey, July 7, 1958, NAA, A1983/1, item 16
914 Albinski, 367.
about US reliability, noting they had “taken neutrality… to great lengths — for all we know they are preparing for the obsequies now.”

Australian support of Dutch plans for an independent New Guinea state, as opposed to absorption into Indonesia Raya, provoked Indonesian accusations of “Kangaroo imperialism.”

4.2.5 Clash of attitudes

The UK was proceeding towards realising the self-determination principles contained in the Atlantic Charter. However, until the UK had relinquished its colonial possessions, it was an easy target for opponents to label it as imperialist. It was not a label the US wanted to be associated with and as such the issue of 'colonialism' had the potential to fracture the Anglospheric security cooperation outside Europe.

The imperialist charge remained despite a rapid process of de-colonisation. The process was largely peaceful and friendly relatively peacefully so that all restrictive policing was eliminated. By 1960, there was no emergency legislation in any of the colonial territories for the first time in twenty years. Once stability and democratic institutions had been established, independence was granted, so that between 1959 and 1961, fifteen new independent states had been created. In 1945, 630 million people had lived in UK-dependent territories, but by 1961 this had been reduced to 23 million. Moreover, states were free to join the Commonwealth or decline as Burma and Arabs states did.

Ironically, it was the consequences of self-determination that occasionally created new tensions between the UK and the US if the outcome produced leaders who were sympathetic to-communist outlooks. These new leaders were not necessarily adherents of Magna Carta type values and had no intention of allowing civic society to develop, but favoured ‘democratic centralist’ vanguardism. This was illustrated in Guiana, where Rusk expressed...

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915 Australian Cabinet Notebook, December 11, 1957. NAA, A11099, 1/36.
US irritation at the popularity of the left-wing leader Cheddi Jagan, informing the UK that the US could “not put up with an independent British Guiana.”

The reply from UK Foreign Secretary, Home encapsulates the essential contradiction between US ‘self-determination’ rhetoric and the demands of realpolitik,

it was your historic role to have been for years the first crusader and prime mover in urging colonial emancipation. The communists are in the van. Why? Amongst other things because premature independence is a gift to them.

As to the notion of removing Jagan, Home asked, “How would you suggest that this can be done in a democracy?” The US answer in Guiana, and other ex-colonial situations, was an increased US appetite to rely upon covert operations.

Rusk’s worries and Home’s reference to Jagan’s communism were not without substance. Since the 1960s claims that Jagan had no communist linkages were the dominant narrative until the early twenty-first century. However, in 2014, the opening of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic archives established he had been attempting to acquire weapons and had secured finance. The vanguardist meme-complex associated with this Marxist-Leninist one-party state that had just executed "Trotskyist-zionist-titoist-bourgeois-nationalist traitors" and sent thousands of citizens to labour camps appeared to offer some attraction to Jagan's own mind-set.

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921 This included CIA operations in Indonesia (1957-58), the Congo (1960), Cuba & Dominican Republic (1961), S Vietnam (1963), Bolivia & Brazil (1964)
Colonialism remained an area of friction within the security community and centred on this central contradiction between wanting the UK to decolonise but maintain the security measures that could be seen as imperialistic. For the US, the risk of any allegation that they were in collusion with colonial powers was to be minimised. The natural affiliation and alignment the US felt towards the UK must be tempered by a need to limit certain aspects of the relationship and be seen to do so. This not only allowed the US to refute charges of being ‘in cahoots’ with colonialists but countered any jealously such close public arrangements might engender with NATO allies.

Initially, the US engagement in what Nixon termed, “the once colonial areas” was limited and there was a US tendency to play to the non-aligned bloc to burnish anti-colonial credentials. This was at variance with their growing unwillingness to accept self-determination outcomes as characterised by covert operations and a growing military activism in South East Asia. This practice provoked much irritation in the UK. Macmillan’s response to Rusk’s letter about Guiana captured the UK’s incredulity at the perceived lack of US self-awareness and hypocrisy in general.

How can the Americans continue to attack us in the UN on colonialism and then use expressions like these which are pure Machiavellianism? Of course, it’s nice to feel that they are partners with us and have such confidence in you as to send a letter of this kind, but it does show a degree of cynicism which I thought Dean Rusk would hardly put his name to.

Suez ushered in a period in which US policy-makers were obliged to confront the realities associated with the accelerated departure of colonial powers. Nevertheless, the US State Department tended to stress the importance of anti-colonialism and adopt a somewhat sanctimonious approach when the UK used robust measures to exert order on fractious territories before departure. The tendency of the US to blow ‘hot and cold’ towards their Anglosphere allies were in evidence in the aftermath of the Bermuda conference where the high hopes of an initial reset were not realised until a second reset meeting in the October.

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924 Blair.
926 Macmillan to Foreign Secretary, February 21, 1962, TNA, PREM 11/366
The course of events between March and October 1957 are symptomatic of a recurring pattern of internal Anglosphere core global engagement, distancing, and hubris.

4.3. Relationship Reset - the Common Declaration

4.3.1 Introduction

This section explores the progress made in establishing new working relationships soon after the Suez Crisis. As Table 4 illustrates there was a complimentary deepening of bilateral initiatives between 1957 and 1961 consisting of UK-US arrangements and Canada-US arrangements. A further UK-US arrangement, the Technical Cooperation Committee rapidly became a trilateral arrangement with the inclusion of Canada. The ‘Interdependence’ Working Groups institutionalised informal bilateral collaboration with the UK urging their extension to include Australia and NZ on regional issues.

4.3.2 Faltering start in Bermuda

The Bermuda Conference represented an opportunity for UK and US political makers to reset the relationship. As elaborated in the section on atomic cooperation, the Eisenhower-Macmillan meetings had been preceded by productive high-level defence talks about US-UK nuclear collaboration. On the need for general cooperation, there was some initial progress. The UK stressed its commitment to a global alliance with the US based “in part on sentiment but also, of course, on interest” and Macmillan acknowledged the UK would be “the junior partner,” but thought, “the US would not care to try to do it alone.” Eisenhower agreed there should be common objectives and joint plans for Middle East policy, and said the US wanted “if anything to build them [the UK] up again in the Middle East.”

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928 “Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda,” March 21, 1957. #268 Ibid.

929 “Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda,” March 21, 1957 #270. Ibid.
It was agreed to establish close collaboration and a communiqué was drafted to announce the rapprochement, but at the last-minute references to the resumption of a close working relationship were removed. There was a difference of opinion between Eisenhower and Dulles as to how public this UK-US relationship should be. Dulles wished to avoid any references and records that might reveal the true nature of the relationship. However, a leak to the NY Times revealed that a series of twenty-five “agreements, directives and reports” and “planning groups” had been agreed for future UK-US planning at Eisenhower’s suggestion. The news report noted British insistence that the agreements consist of written memoranda despite the initial objection “of certain members of the US delegation.” The report suggested the UK wished to avoid the misunderstandings associated with Dulles’ previous behaviour “where he had told them one thing in London and done another.” Dulles denied the arrangements at a press conference.

The report in the NY Times was significant in several respects, pointing to a lack of trust by UK policy-makers towards Dulles with respect to his modus operandi. Dulles was wedded to the notion that US interests would not be served by a global public association with the UK. Despite signed memoranda, it appears that instead of establishing ‘planning groups’ the State Department merely exchanged views with the UK. These do not appear to have been of much consequence since both undertook unilateral actions in the Middle East without informing the other; the US attempted a Syrian coup, and the UK took action military in the Gulf. Aside from re-establishing cordial relations, there was little institutional evidence of the “increasingly dense networks” that Adler and Barnett hold up as examples of an ‘Ascendant’ security community.

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933 Adler and Barnett, 62, 51.
4.3.3 UK unilateral action

Underlying the lack of cohesion in UK-US policy, the UK continued to act unilaterally in the Middle East; assisting the Sultan of Oman against Nasser backed rebels. The British were worried that even a small-scale military operation would risk “the disapproval and opposition of the United States.” This assessment was correct; Dulles favoured covert, deniable actions against hostile Arab elements and avoidance of public backing of the UK. In a deteriorating military situation, the Omanis requested and received British military assistance in 1957. Dulles described the decision to deploy UK ground troops “a mystery,” informed Eisenhower that the intervention risked alienating Arab opinion and that, “a small scale Suez might be in the making.” Once again, the essential element of communication and the ability to confidently predict the behaviour of allies threatened to retard and reverse relations amongst political policy-makers.

UK military intervention proved effective, drawing the ire of ten Arab states who, on August 12, 1957, called for a UN Security Council meeting to condemn the intervention. The US was confronted with the choice of supporting their ally or adopting a conciliatory approach to those sections of Arab opinion they still wooed. They inclined to the latter course. The likelihood of an American UN abstention infuriated the British. In an impromptu visit to the State Department, British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia made the point with “some emotion,” that such a course of action at the UN, “would be extremely harmful to Anglo-US relations.” Macmillan noted in his diary

The Americans are behaving outrageously to us about Oman. They haven’t the courage to vote against inscribing the item at the Security Council.

Dulles asserted the US could not vote with the UK because, "countries like the Philippines, Thailand, etc., will be thrown back again into the Arab-Asian bloc.” For the

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935 Macmillan, 4, 271.
937 “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) and the British Ambassador (Caccia), August 15, 1957 #157. FRUS, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII.
938 Macmillan, 4, 276.
Americans, abstention was a concession to the British. It was another attempt to walk the tightrope — to distance themselves from the British but not side wholeheartedly with Arab nationalist sentiment. On August 20, 1957, the Security Council voted not to include the item on their agenda by a narrow margin of 5 to 4 with the UK supported by Australia and the US abstaining. Eisenhower told Macmillan,

we can recognize that the common goals which we have cannot always be best achieved by our necessarily always taking a uniform public position.

4.3.4 The failure of US unilateralism: Operation Wakeful

The most significant catalyst for a greater willingness to engage with the UK came about as a consequence of a US unilateral action. In April 1957, Eisenhower authorised Operation WAKEFUL, a covert CIA operation to plan for the overthrow of the Syria Government. By July 1957, the US had concluded that Syria was drifting into the Soviet camp. Unlike previous covert operations such as the 1953 CIA/MI6 Operation Boot in Iran, this was to be a unilateral affair without the British.

On August 12, 1957, the very same day that the US were voicing criticism of UK intervention in support of Oman, the Syrian Government unmasked an American “plot.” The pro-US Syrian conspirators were arrested, the US Embassy surrounded by troops, and three senior ranking US staff expelled. To compound the disaster, any pro-US Syrian military
leaders were replaced with pro-Soviet officers.946 The US now found itself in need of UK diplomatic support and aghast at a perceived Soviet advance. A furious Eisenhower questioned whether the US had the expertise to operate effectively within the region.947

Dulles telegraphed a personal message to his UK counterpart Selwyn Lloyd expressing a desire to “exchange views” on Syria and consider the necessity of taking, “some serious risks to avoid even greater risks…”948 In response Macmillan sent his Private Secretary to Washington, who with Caccia, met Dulles on the September 2, 1957.949 By September 5, the language employed by Dulles was invoking familial terms to describe the UK referring to the British as our ‘cousins,’ indicative of Deutsch’s ‘we-feeling’ in the development of trust.950

Encouraged, Dulles sent a cable to Macmillan urging renewed cooperation on Syria and hinting at military collaboration.

We must work together in this matter. Any positive action, once begun, must, even at great risk, be pushed through to a success. Speed and simplicity are very important elements. It is not possible to fit all alternatives into neat slots. Whatever is planned will be different.951

The familial tone was repeated when, a few days later, Dulles briefed the President on the progress of the talks,

…we have maintained close contact with the United Kingdom. There is genuine, intimate and effective cooperation, stemming directly from Macmillan—this is the first instance … as Secretary [of State] wherein we have had anything like this attitude.952

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948 “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the UK,” August 21, 1957. #367 FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII.
949 “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House,” September 2, 1957, #380 FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII.
950 “Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State,” September 5, 1957. #384. FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII.
The emergence of a stronger collective identity had begun to spread within the US policy establishment with familial references and evidence of ‘we-ness’ in policy-maker narratives. The intelligence briefings reflected more inclusive language towards the UK as the change in perceptions solidified. Internal US assessments by Allen Dulles’ CIA for the US Joint Advisory Committee started to refer to the US and the UK as a conjoined actor as distinct from other allies and mutual adversaries.\(^{953}\)

### 4.3.5 The Syria Working Group: Engineering Invasion

The US had decided they were “definitely in favour of a ‘retrieving’ operation in Syria,” and wanted UK commitment.\(^{954}\) The intent was to create a situation whereby UK-US covert operations engineered circumstances for pro-western regional states to intervene. It was important for the US to retain its anti-colonialist credentials by not being seen to intervene. Eisenhower was to see the irony, recalling the US position on Suez, “less than a year before, supporting the principle that military force was not a justifiable means for settling of disputes; the United States had taken drastic action in the United Nations.”\(^{955}\)

To effect the circumstances for a Syrian regime change, a secret ministerial bilateral UK-US Working Group (WG) was established and produced ‘Preferred Plan’ for false flag operations to provide an excuse for intervention by pro-Western members of the CENTO alliance.\(^{956}\)

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Macmillan appears to have favoured restraint, but did not wish to extinguish US enthusiasm for action in the region given UK concerns about Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait. Macmillan conferred with the Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada and NZ. All responded favourably to the idea of conjoined action with the US. Menzies commended Macmillan for “establishing confidential contact with the Americans,” and agreed, “it would be wrong for us to hold back now because the Americans have not been sufficiently understanding and helpful in the past.”

By the end of September 1957, the ‘Preferred Plan’ was dropped in favour of the much more modest ‘Containment Plus’ plan due to regional partner states revising their willingness to invade Syria. To control covert operational activities, a joint ‘Psychological Working Group’ was established meeting on an approximately weekly basis to discuss co-ordination of output, to exchange policy guidance and research documents and to assess the psychological implications of current and planned policies.

4.3.6 Institutionalised Consultation

The Syria meetings were succeeded by further bilateral preparatory ministerial meetings. These culminated in the Eisenhower-Macmillan ‘Washington Talks’ in late October. The US appetite for closer relations had been given a further impetus by the launch of the ‘Sputnik’ satellite on October 4, 1957. The launch was seen as a technological Soviet advance of such magnitude it was represented as a “Pearl Harbor,” convincing members of the US policy-establishment and the wider public of the need for allies. The stage had been set for what Adler and Barnet refer to a process of “increasingly dense networks” and institutions, thereby

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958 Menzies to Macmillan. 19 September 1957 quoted in ibid., 283.
The Anglospheric Security Community

edging the security community into a new phase and made effective by strong personal affinities and outlooks.\textsuperscript{962}

The US intelligence community was supportive of closer UK ties. CIA Director Allen Dulles confirmed the US and UK “…never stopped exchanging information even in the worst days and this could now be expanded in the new atmosphere.”\textsuperscript{963} Russell Baker, a Washington journalist with connections to the CIA and the State Department, referred to the UK’s new status.\textsuperscript{964} Baker noted,

Washington is aware again, that it is good to have friends and that London has long been the most reliable. Something like humility, and not in the current debased sense of the word has been restored to the Washington atmosphere… Prognosis of the United States-British alliance at this stage is difficult…. The last few weeks suggest a new period of evolution, breaking the old deteriorative drift, may be underway, producing new forms binding Washington and London anew through mutual necessity.\textsuperscript{965}

The Washington Talks concluded at the end of October 1957 with a public announcement of a joint “Common Declaration on interdependence” by Eisenhower and Macmillan:

The arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defense and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is now out of date. The countries of the free world are interdependent and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part we have agreed that our two countries will henceforth act in accordance with this principle.\textsuperscript{966}

It was stressed ‘interdependence’ could be extended to other allies, including NATO, to placate concerns about a “US-UK directorate.” A Memorandum of Understanding was signed to establish cooperation on every aspect of military technology and bring together scientists

\textsuperscript{962} Adler and Barnett, 62, 51.
\textsuperscript{963} “Anglo-American Discussions” October 24, 1957. TNA, PREM 11/2329, PM(W)5(7) 2nd mtg.
\textsuperscript{966} "Text of U.S.-British Declaration," ibid., October 26, 1957.
and military personnel in a common effort. The UK was keen to involve Canada and, after the conclusion of the Washington talks, Macmillan flew on to Ottawa to brief the Canadian Cabinet. The Canadians “expressed themselves, for their part, most ready to subscribe to the principle of interdependence and to join in the common effort necessary to make it effective.” The Tripartite Technical Cooperation Programme (TTCP) was established thereafter, overseeing an array of standing Working Groups each with different research foci. At the conclusion of his October 1957 North American trip, Macmillan wrote to Dulles,

I shall go home not only content but, what is more, rather excited. For it is really a great adventure on which we are embarked, and with God’s will we may hope to leave behind us something really firm and fruitful.

The secret Working Group system the Bermuda Conference had envisaged now came into effect, aiming to align UK-US foreign policy, propaganda and covert activity. Priority was given to initiating a standing Syria Working Group based in Washington to bring together State Department and CIA staff with MI6 and British Embassy staff. For the first time since the World War 2 a series of semi-formal UK-US planning mechanisms had been established and at a senior level. The UK urged that both Australia and NZ should be included in Working Groups covering SE Asia. This constituted a significant development and extended the institutionalised communicative practices associated with the development of a security community to Australia and New Zealand. The precise activities of these Working Groups remain obscure, but a declassified Cabinet Briefing Paper reveals the titles

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967 Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs, and to Cabinet. “Visit of PM Macmillan.” June 23, 1958. LAC No.181-58
968 “'New Start’ in Relations with America.,” Daily Telegraph, October 30 1957.
971 “Staff Study Prepared in the Department of State,” October 30, 1957. #270 FRUS, 1955–1957, near East Region; Iraq, Volume XII.
(and therefore the approximate remit) of joint Working Groups as of June 1958. They are listed in the memorandum as:

“A.) Defence, Research and Development Co-operation
B.) Institutional WG
C.) Syria and Middle East WG
D.) Algeria Working Group
E.) Horn of Africa
F.) Information Policy WG (To include Australia & NZ in SE Asia focus)
G.) Hong Kong WG
H.) Economic WG
I.) Indonesia WG (Includes Australia in membership)"

In addition to these standing Working Groups, other ad hoc groups were established to deal with very specific issues and problems, such as one to craft US/UK policy in support of the new ‘Arab Union’ of Iraq and Jordan.

The UK hoped the practice of regular meetings would establish a pattern of bureaucratic intimacy so ingrained that semi-formal Working Groups would become redundant. Until that occurred, it was important that they remained secret to avoid giving our friends and other allies the impression of an exclusive Anglo-American directorate, [that was attempting] to dispose of all the world’s problems. [The existence of ] regular machinery for systematic consultation over a wide range of problems [would be unwelcome, but] the formal machinery for dealing with political problems may gradually be abandoned in favour of informal consultation…

The UK’s intention was to favour

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974 Titles such as “Information policy” and later “Psychological policy” are pseudonyms for propaganda and covert activities. See memo ref SPA section of MI6: “Psychological Warfare in War – Composition, Organisation, and Functions of SPA”: Attached, copy of Minute from Mr J.A. Drew, Ministry of Defence, to Major General R.W. Macleod, Dated 9th May 1958’, TNA, FO 1110/1102


976 “Memorandum of Conversation,” June 9, 1958, #105. FRUS, 1958–1960, near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII.

the fullest use of normal channels of communication — i.e. The Foreign Office, United States Embassy and British Embassy-State Department [supplementing these with] Working Group Machinery… where Washington Departments other than the State Department (e.g., CIA and Pentagon) are involved.978

The new modus operandi could be “extended” to the “widest possible circle within both government machines” until US-UK consultation became a “habitual reaction to any problem.”979 Exposure of the Working Group structure could be construed as a ‘special relationship’ and an “Anglo-Saxon clique” by Western allies. There would not be an adverse from reaction from Canada, Australia and New Zealand, “their anxiety is the reverse,” namely that the US and UK would diverge.980

4.4 Nuclear rapprochement

4.4.1 Introduction

The other significant development of note was progress on the issue of UK-US nuclear cooperation with the signing of the bilateral Mutual Defence Agreement in 1958.981 It is described as Baylis “as without doubt” one of the most important UK-US agreements facilitating the most intimate exchange of atomic information that was without parallel between the US and any other state.982

In contrast to Truman, Eisenhower wanted cooperation and progress or as Andrew Pierre puts it, thought “frankness and trust” were paramount, “and the bonds of the alliance were more meaningful than the abstract concern regarding the spread of nuclear capabilities.”983

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978 “The Effects of Anglo-American Interdependence on the Long-Term Interests of the U.K.” April 10, 1958. TNA, CAB. 129/92 Ext. 218a (FO) C(58) 77
979 “The Effects of Anglo-American Interdependence on the Long-Term Interests of the U.K.” April 10, 1958. TNA, CAB. 129/92 Ext. 218a (FO) C(58) 77
980 Ibid 7.
982 *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84*, 90-91.
983 Pierre, 143-44.
Eisenhower informed his officials not “to be too lawyer like. A great alliance requires, above all, faith and trust on both sides.”

The very act of nuclear sharing… created an environment in which American trust in the British Government deepened so that American officials discussed a wider range of military and political topics more frankly with their British counterparts than with officials of other friendly nations.

4.4.2 Transfer of nuclear propulsion technology - Submarines

This goodwill translated into agreements to allow the purchase component parts of weapons systems and the transfer of advanced submarine reactor technology to the UK. As a consequence the UK was able to deploy its first nuclear--powered submarine, HMS Dreadnought, several years ahead of schedule.

In fact, collaboration on nuclear propulsion had been initiated before the 1958 Act. Before collaboration with the UK had been impeded by the antagonistic attitude of Groves, this time Admiral Hyman Rickover, the key individual driving the US nuclear submarine R&D programs, would advance another key aspect of the Anglospheric security community. Rickover, unlike Groves was not a ‘WASP’ but a Jewish immigrant from Czarist controlled Poland. And again, unlike Groves, he had personal experience of untrammelled government authority, witnessing arbitrary arrests and pogroms.

It is not necessary to speculate if Rickover was attracted to the philosophical aspects of the Anglospheric Magna Carta compact and, if so, how. Rickover provided explicit answers to those questions himself. Too often accounts of Rickover character focus on his unsentimental and unbending pursuit of a nuclear-powered US submarine force, without appreciating his belief systems and outlook. This is to ignore the importance he placed on his

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984 Ibid., 219.
985 Ibid., 143-44.
986 Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84, 91. Freeman, 89.
learning of the English language and its role in allowing him to access new Anglospheric meme-complexes with respect to heritage and values.

On learning English, Rickover developed a voracious appetite for reading in history, politics, diplomacy and philosophy. On entering the US Naval academy this reading extended to military affairs including the traditions and heritage of both the US and Royal Navy Commanders. Rickover would later stress the difference between just acquiring skills as opposed to absorbing new ideas and values (meme-complexes).

...The mind does not develop through practicing manual skills or following habit. Mastery of the English language has a quite different effect on one’s intellectual capacities from that which comes from [say] mastering typewriting. Knowledge of history increases one’s comprehension of world events...

Rickover became receptive to and understanding of Anglospheric memes stressing liberty and curtailment of arbitrary power. Rickover shared with Eisenhower an acute understanding of the distinction between totalitarian regimes and democracies, but also of the importance of the Magna Carta and the English 1698 Bill of Rights to the US and British view of democracy.

In Magna Carta the king promises he "will not' do the things listed in the charter; the English Bill of Rights of 1689 says the king "ought not" to do them, but our own Bill uses the words "shall" and "shall not.

He believed it was this Magna Carta conception, replicated and strengthened in the US constitution, that answered the conundrum of legitimacy of the state, asserting that the basic problem of power was a problem of how to reconcile civilization with individual liberty. Rousseau lamented that ‘man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains”

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992 Ibid., 563.
However, Rickover asserted that the ‘bottom-up’ principles encapsulated by the Magna Carta addressed this problem by establishing the notion of a “command addressed by the people to their government; of a principal to his agent.”993 Rickover was also mindful of those who would subvert this process by the advocacy of forms of vanguardism (benevolent or otherwise) that “defines democracy as government of the people, on behalf of the people, and in the interest of the people.”994 Whilst associated with ‘false democracies’ in Eastern Europe, Rickover asserted bureaucracies in Western states could also eventually subvert the wishes of the electorate and adopt policies without popular support and thereby undermine governmental legitimacy.

A democracy is a delicate and fragile construction. For it to exist, the people must believe in their Government and in their institutions. When any special group, as for instance a business minority takes advantage of the Government, the faith of the people is undermined.995

Given his Anglophile outlook, it is perhaps not surprising that Rickover developed affinities with the Royal Navy during World War 2 recognised in the award of the Order of the British Empire.996 It was also not entirely surprising therefore, that Rickover was willing to skirt around some legal restrictions of the McMahon Act to engage with the British on their atomic research before official contact began in 1956. As Admiral Bruce Demars, former Director of US Navy Nuclear Propulsion highlighted, collaboration was a two-way effort and started earlier.997

You have to remember that Rickover started dealing with the UK in a really unauthorised way in 1953. You finally get congressional approval in 1958, so he had operated on his own for about five years [. . .] moving things ahead.998

993 Ibid.
997 Rickover was interested in the lower noise output of UK propulsion tests. See: Mackby and Cornish, 30, 368.
When in 1956 Rickover had his first meeting with British First Sea Lord, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, the nuclear powered USS Nautilus had undertaken a successful maiden voyage a year earlier.\textsuperscript{999} The prospects for collaboration were enhanced by the good personal chemistry between the two men.\textsuperscript{1000} It was to be the start of a strong personal relationship that was said by Lord Hood to be, “the decisive factor in our cooperation” and in advancing the UK’s plans for nuclear powered submarines.\textsuperscript{1001}

By 1958, after another inspection tour of the UK’s R&D sites, Rickover concluded the Royal Navy’s timescale to produce a nuclear-powered submarine was unlikely to be met. He made a decision, informing Harry Mandil, his Technical Director,

\begin{quote}
England has been a real friend and ally of America for generations. We should help them... by giving them outright a submarine reactor plant and the supporting technology.\textsuperscript{1002}
\end{quote}

Rickover informed Mountbatten the Royal Navy’s schedule could be met, but only by adopting the US designed S5W nuclear plants in their submarines and setting aside the UK’s developmental prototype. It was a prospect that raised UK fears of being dependent on the US and losing “all the advantage of having to work out the design of the reactor for ourselves.”\textsuperscript{1003}

At its heart was an issue of trust. Mountbatten decided Rickover could be trusted and proceeded to inform his “horrified” colleagues on the UK’s special nuclear committee of his view. Rickover was then invited to address the committee and who informed them whatever the decision he would assist, but the most expedient and economic course was for Rolls

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\textsuperscript{998} Admiral Bruce DeMars, USN "A Naval Reactors Perspective on a Half-Century of Submarine Cooperation" (paper presented at the A Half-Century of US-UK Submarine Cooperation, UN Navy Cold War Gallery Museum, 2015).

\textsuperscript{999} See: Robert Hill, \textit{Admiral Hyman G. Rickover USN and the UK Nuclear Submarine Propulsion Programme} (Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Power Industries Division, 2005), para 39.

\textsuperscript{1000} Ludlam, 250.


\textsuperscript{1002} Quoted in: Theodore Rockwell, \textit{The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a Difference} (iUniverse, 2002), 273.

\textsuperscript{1003} Hill, para 84.
Royce to contract with Westinghouse and obtain both an American reactor and technical support.\footnote{1004}

Only one reactor was duly supplied to “kick-start” Royal Navy’s deployment of nuclear-powered submarines; on-going supply was not envisaged by either side so as to avoid stifling British innovation and creating dependence.\footnote{1005} In January 1958, Duncan Sandys acknowledged US support, writing, “Thank you for lending Admiral Rickover.”\footnote{1006} The 1958 UK-USA Agreement provided the necessary legal cover for this substantial exchange to occur.\footnote{1007} In 1960, the UK’s first nuclear submarine, HMS Dreadnought was launched, powered by a US Westinghouse S5W reactor.\footnote{1008}

By way of contrast was Rickover’s response to the suggestion that as part of the Eisenhower Administrations New Look Strategy, the British success could be replicated with France. Rickover objected strongly, arguing the relationship with the British was ‘special’ and must not be replicated.\footnote{1009} It was a decision that confirmed French views there was indeed an emergent Anglospheric security community with a nuclear dimension. The French media referred to

the creation of an Anglo-U.S. atomic directorate [that] can only make more apparent and more burdensome the hegemony of the English-speaking peoples at the heart of the Atlantic Alliance.\footnote{1010}

Some eighty years later, in 2021, a similar transfer to nuclear submarine technology from the UK and US to Australia would again give rise to French anger directed at ‘les Anglo-saxons.’

\footnote{1005} Mackby and Cornish, 30, 253.
\footnote{1007} Hill, paras113-15.
\footnote{1008} Duncan, Chapter 8.
\footnote{1009} Rockwell, 274.
\footnote{1010} Quoted in JJohn Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (Viking Adult, 1970), 57-58.
4.4.3 The Skybolt-Polaris Crisis

In an illustration of the erratic path of UK-US nuclear relations, the issue of trust was to come to fore again and very quickly. The issue this time related to US promises on the supply of a suitable weapons delivery system. As Baylis puts it, "the crisis not only disrupted the Anglo-American alliance but brought it once again almost to breaking point." Nunnerley refers to it as "one of the great confrontations in the history of Anglo-American relations." However, as with Suez, of equal importance was not just the fact a crisis occurred, but that the two main constituent elements of the Anglospheric security community were able to resolve their differences.

The circumstances related to agreement that the US would offer the UK the sophisticated American Skybolt system in return for a Polaris submarine base in Scotland. Skybolt would replace the UK's own Blue Streak missile delivery platform that was looking dubious on both costs and vulnerability. With Skybolt secured, Blue Streak was abandoned.

In the event of any problems preventing the production of Skybolt, Macmillan had persuaded Eisenhower to give the UK an option on the new Polaris submarine-launched missile system. However, Eisenhower had been “unwilling to enter a definite agreement until the outcome of negotiations” for a possible Polaris equipped NATO was concluded. Despite the UK’s experience of the Truman Administration’s behaviour, the UK once again took the US promise on trust. As Macmillan put it with inter-governmental negotiations, “there was always a problem of how far to formalise legal or semi-legal contracts and how far to rest on what might be called a ‘gentleman’s agreement.’” Macmillan “felt certain” the agreement would be honoured whether it came in Eisenhower’s time or not.

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1012 David Nunnerley, *President Kennedy and Britain* (St. Martin's Press, 1972), 149.
1014 Ibid., 251.
1015 Ibid., 251-53. Although it remained under discussion as a European satellite launching system.
1018 Ibid., 255.
1019 Ibid.
In 1962 Robert McNamara, President Kennedy’s new Defence Secretary, abruptly cancelled the Skybolt system and publicly denigrating the system on the grounds of cost and accuracy, but in doing so failed to appreciate the political ramifications for the UK. At a stroke the delivery system for UK’s future nuclear deterrence had gone. It was what Lawrence Freedman termed “a remarkable example of miscommunication between close allies.” The result was “the most perilous crisis between the two allies since the Suez affair.” The British Defence Minister Peter Thornycroft was outraged and told McNamara, "We have cancelled other projects, we have made ourselves absolutely dependent on you.”

That such a miscommunication should have occurred at first sight appears remarkable. Kennedy valued his close relationship with Macmillan. He had been unable “to establish a close rapport with other allies.” This personal relationship was intensified by the so-called ‘two David's'; British ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore and American ambassador to Britain, David Bruce. The Kennedy-Gore relationship preceded their time in office. Ormsby-Gore described their interactions as "almost like a family discussion when we all met." Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who served as Special Assistant to the President, wrote

The President found the ambassador a companion for every mood . . . Their long, relaxed, confidential talks together… gave Kennedy probably his best opportunity to clarify his own purpose in world affairs.

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1025 Nunnerley, 158.
1027 Ibid.
These relationships were predicated on a shared appreciation of a cultural heritage that was not racial in outlook, after all Kennedy was of Irish Catholic heritage. He had made reference to the ancient heritage of the Magna Carta in speeches as a Senator and in his inaugural speech declared,

the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage.\textsuperscript{1029}

The “torch” passed was a fitting metaphor for the memetic continuation of non-racial Anglo-saxon values. It is in recognition of Kennedy’s advocacy of these Magna Carta values that the British memorial to Kennedy sits at the site of the Magna Carta signing in Runnymede.

Despite these exceptionally shared values and close personal ties, the new crisis threatened a rift. A bilateral meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan, already scheduled for December 1962 in Bermuda, was transformed from “friendly wintertime parley” into an unpredicted summit “of unusual intensity and complexity.”\textsuperscript{1030} Macmillan was to recall, “the discussions were the most violently contested than in any previous meeting.”\textsuperscript{1031}

Macmillan did not hold back, “President Eisenhower had assured me that if necessary in the future, we might rely on obtaining Polaris.”\textsuperscript{1032} Initially the US resisted, offering other US alternatives gifting the unfinished Skybolt system for British development.\textsuperscript{1033} Macmillan however, would not back down — a promise had been made by the US and a compromise was not acceptable.\textsuperscript{1034}


\textsuperscript{1029} John F. Kennedy Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961. Washington DC

\textsuperscript{1030} Bundy, 471.


\textsuperscript{1032} Ibid., 357.

\textsuperscript{1033} Freedman, \textit{Britain and Nuclear Weapons}, 16; Baylis, \textit{Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84}, 103.

\textsuperscript{1034} Neustadt, 91; Saki Dockrill, \textit{Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?} (Springer, 2002), 30.
Of note is the apparent lack of knowledge of the recent record of US promises to the UK and it echoes Acheson’s comments about the ‘very loose way’ the US ran its business. To Macmillan it appeared that Kennedy and McNamara “seemed strangely ignorant of the immediate past.” Bundy, who was present as National Security Adviser, was to later comment, Macmillan “could have included others amongst us.”

Macmillan informed Kennedy that Churchill had told him in 1940 that logic said Britain and its Empire could not win the war, “but, they had gone on.” The same attitude prevailed now and if Polaris was not now on offer, then Britain “will go on and make it eventually and be free.” If the Polaris US promise could not be honoured, then the UK understood. “Let us part as friends… if there must be a parting let it be done with honour and dignity,” adding Britain would not however welch on its agreements.

Bundy, present at the meetings, believed Kennedy had not, until that moment understood the depth of feeling in the UK.

friendly countries can go down parallel tracks without any clear sense of where they are heading. So they find themselves at least at a point of intersection, if not of collision… I think he always understood that—that’s one reason why in the Skybolt affair when he finally understood what the political consequence was to an Englishman, he was so prompt and energetic in construction of remedies.

Kennedy offered Polaris but as part of a multinational NATO based force, keen not to isolate the French who would resent favouritism and fears of an Anglo-saxon bloc. This was unacceptable to Macmillan since it struck at the heart of an independent nuclear deterrent. A compromise stressed the role of the UK Polaris fleet within a NATO multinational force. However, it contained a vital clause that asserted, “HMG may decide

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1036 Bundy, 491.
1037 Neustadt, 91.
1038 Nunnerley, 158.
1040 For a review see: Jones, The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Volume I: From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964, 336-405; Bundy, "Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years," 492-93.
1041 Neustadt, 134. See: Costigliola.
that supreme national interests are at stake” and thereby deploy the force accordingly. This gave the UK considerable latitude given the UK’s extended to its interests and territories outside of Europe. Indeed, Macmillan cited the defence of Kuwait as an example. The UK Foreign Secretary, Lord Home obtained explicit US consent that a RN Polaris force could be deployed to the Indo-Pacific so long as suitable controls were in place.

4.5. Interdependence and Working Groups in practice

4.5.1 Working Groups and Canada

Diefenbaker’s relationship with the US and Kennedy was not as positive as his predecessors. The Eisenhower period had seen some strong advances in cooperation building on the theme of interdependence with the US attempting to replicate the ethos behind the UK-US Working Groups. The US moved to institutionalise Canada-US bilateral collaboration both at a high level, but also “at the operating level.” In July 1958, Eisenhower and Dulles attended a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet and called for regular informal meetings.

Another meeting between Dulles, the Canadian Cabinet and Chiefs of staff discussed extending defence coordination beyond the existing remit of the PJBD. The most significant outcome was the formalisation of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) structure in May 1958 and the creation of a ministerial Canada-US Committee on Joint Defence.

1042 See: Neustadt, 96.
1044 Record of Meeting with President Kennedy December 19 1962, TNA PRO PREM 11/4229
1046 “Memorandum of Conversation,” July 9, 1958, #283 FRUS, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII Part 1
The nature of the CANUS security relationship met all the criteria of a 'self-contained' regional security community. At issue was how pluralistic the arrangements would be. Whilst the logic of a coordinated North American continental missile and warning system made strategic sense, Canadian political policy-makers feared a loss of sovereignty. As such, their response to US overtures was consistently cautious and tended to seek ways of ameliorating US dominance by reference to Canada the Commonwealth, or in the case of NORAD, stressing the possibility of a NATO context. In contrast, the Canadian military policy establishment was less concerned about sovereignty issues and in 1957 had participated in a US controlled command structure and HQ. As the nature of this arrangement became clear, Canada's External Affairs Minister, Sidney Smith, insisted that the matter be discussed and formalised at Governmental level, declaring. "It is a matter of orderly practice for governments to record in diplomatic exchanges important decisions affecting their relations." After extensive negotiations, the NORAD structure was established outside of NATO and with agreed Canadian input. The UK’s collaboration in the establishment of one NORAD’s principal early warning stations in England provided another example of tripartite security collaboration.

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Table 4 Atlantic Triangle Main Military-Security Arrangements created 1957 - 1991

*UK involved in forward radar system

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There was a limit to Canadian willingness to develop the relationship and Diefenbaker’s orientation was to the Commonwealth. The US was keen to revive and extend a series of bilateral fora “to facilitate the exchange of information, and joint planning, with respect to non-military defense activities.”\textsuperscript{1053} Canada, ever conscious of not being an adjunct to its larger neighbour, would stress its relationship to the Commonwealth. The US noted Canadian Ministers sometimes voice the viewpoint “not solely of their own Government, but of the British Commonwealth as a whole,” and, “it has shown itself assertively nationalistic in its economic relations with the United States and strongly pro-Commonwealth.”\textsuperscript{1054}

The UK and Commonwealth connection continued to serve as a counterweight to the US. Diefenbaker agitated for a strong Commonwealth trade and economic policy. At a 1962 Commonwealth Prime Ministers he spoke out against the UK’s dalliance with Common Market membership as an unwelcome threat to unity and was supported by Nehru and Ayub Khan (Pakistan) meeting.\textsuperscript{1055} Again, it is worth briefly mentioning that Diefenbaker of neither English nor French Canadian origins, identified so strongly with the notions of underpinning the Commonwealth as well as the institution itself. Indeed, he was a persistent, explicit and vocal advocate of the Magna Carta heritage and oversaw the introduction of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights that sought to entrench these in law.\textsuperscript{1056}

The wider Commonwealth also provided a vehicle for Canada’s liberal internationalist agenda, thereby working to ensure the durability of pro-western states after decolonisation. Canada’s enthusiasm for the Commonwealth-led Columbo [Aid] Plan reflected this

agenda. It is worth noting that the nature of Canada’s material was principally non-militaristic but also disguised semi-covert military aid in support of emergent pro-Western democratic Commonwealth states.

4.5.2 Working Group UK-US Planning for Syrian Intervention

The US appetite for joint action in the Middle East in the wake of the failed CIA instigated coup focussed on the removal of the Syrian regime. Macmillan warned of a possible domino effect, leading to the collapse of Lebanon and Jordan that in turn Iraq. This was prophetic. By May 1958, the pro-western Lebanese Government was besieged by armed Nasserite opponents and the US was forced to consider intervention with UK military support. US-UK military planning was initiated for a joint intervention.

When tensions eased in the Lebanon, the UK feared the lull was temporary and supported military readiness. Keen to ensure continued dominion support, the UK shared details of the nature and scope of the UK-US intervention planning with Australia, Canada and NZ. Thinking the crisis in the Levant had passed, Dulles manoeuvred to curtail UK-US intervention planning, visiting the British Ambassador in person in “a most private and confidential way” sought to, “warn him [Caccia] that some of our people, not just in Washington but elsewhere, had the impression that we [the US] were being crowded by our British colleagues into intervention in Lebanon.” Caccia was “indignant,” asserting “all they...
wanted to do was to plan against the contingency, and that our [the US] people seemed indisposed even to sit down with them for planning purposes.”

That Dulles had chosen to act as a confidant, offering secret, supportive advice to the UK, might appear to represent a breakthrough in communication and trust. However, it was more likely a personal and disingenuous attempt to pose as a goodwill confidant, but with the objective of forestalling potentially successful UK progress with the US military policy-establishment.

Of significance was the reaction, or rather lack of it to a subsequent leak in the US media that a joint UK-US intervention was under consideration. Macmillan worried about the impact writing “news of the proposed Anglo-American military help has leaked in Washington!” Of note, the leak about a possible association with ‘imperialistic’ UK did not attract negative comment. As such, the reaction marked an important change in the US domestic ‘Overton Window’ towards the UK. Macmillan recorded “this dangerous time bomb, which I feared would explode with devastating effects, appeared to be a dud.”

The possibility of military action was instead seen through a prism of Arab imperialism with media references to Nasser attempting a Lebanese ‘Anschluss’ in pursuit of his “great Midwestern Arab Empire.” This is not to say that the UK was free of toxic colonial associations. Rather they remained a factor for Dulles and the State Department conflicted by the need for a close but discreet partnership whilst simultaneously attempting to be seen as acting at a distance.

1065 “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Caccia),” May 21, 1958. #45. FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI.


1067 The ‘Overton Window’ is the spectrum of ideas the public is willing to consider and accept and shifts with trends of social thought and norms over time.


4.5.3 Working Group UK-US Levant Intervention

In July 1958, events conspired to test the boundaries of UK-US cooperation. On the US side, the episode reveals an abiding wish by Dulles to avoid public association with the UK in ‘colonial areas.’ On the Commonwealth side, it revealed an enduring post-Suez mistrust of elements of the US political policy-establishment.

The circumstances were unforeseen and followed pro-western Iraq’s attempts to thwart a Nasserite coup in Jordan by mobilising an army unit resulted in a coup against the Iraqi monarchy. Confusion reigned with Nasserite elements now appearing to be in the ascendancy in Iraq, Jordan and the Lebanon. Lebanese President Camille Chamoun appealed for immediate assistance to prevent his government’s overthrow. Dulles informed Eisenhower “he was not certain what to do,” but declared Iraq was “primarily a UK responsibility,” but favoured “a quick US action in Lebanon.”

The CIA, having been involved in plans with the UK, supported wider action, including intervention in Iraq to avoid a chain-reaction against western interests. Urgent UK-US Working Group discussions explored the possibility of a joint intervention in Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait and Iraq, with Dulles seeing Lebanon as the most pressing problem.

The UK was worried the US would draw back from mutual plans to redress the wider situation once order was restored in Lebanon. Macmillan determined there must be no misunderstanding “about the scale and purpose about the joint intervention in the Middle East.” In fact, Eisenhower had taken Dulles’ advice to insulate the US and suggested UK
troops be held ready for a separate unilateral Iraqi-Jordanian intervention. Eisenhower agreed wider plans must still be contemplated, but “as of this moment,” congressional consent complicated matters. Macmillan now worried at what might unravel, stressed that the ‘consequences’ of any intervention must be carried through. The UK was indicating it was reluctant to be involved in a separate, more logistically difficult inland action that could leave them stranded, facing opprobrium and deflecting attention from US action. Having just authorised a unilateral intervention in Lebanon twenty minutes earlier, Eisenhower became alarmed,

Now just a minute so that there is no misunderstanding. Are you of the belief that unless we have made up our minds in advance to carry this thing on through to the Persian Gulf, that we had better not go in the first place? 

Macmillan assured Eisenhower of UK reliability but stressed the US must not cut and run, informing him “we are prepared to face these risks if it is a part of a determination by both of us to face the issues and be prepared to protect Jordan with the hope of restoring the situation in Iraq.” The Working Group had discussed joint plans for a wider intervention, but Dulles appeared to be limiting their public involvement to Lebanon and pushing the UK towards intervention in Jordan and maybe Iraq, with the US keeping a distance. Other members of the US policy-establishment detected a lack of US clarity. Nixon informed Dulles he was worried about US “vacillation” and urged continued commitment to a wider UK-US plan arguing Lebanon and Jordan were of themselves insignificant.

Macmillan expressed his concerns to a sympathetic Menzies, stating “frankly what I fear is that having set their hands to the plough, they will now have second thoughts.”

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1078 “Foreign Office Telegram No. 44477 to Washington.” July 15, 1958. TNA, FO 371/134130

1079 FRUS, 1958–1960, near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, [118. Dulles-Nixon Telephone Conversation].

1080 “Macmillan to Menzies.” No 64 UK High Commission, Canberra to CRO, July 17, 1958. TNA, PREM 11/2407
Macmillan took counsel from the Canadians too. Diefenbaker duly informed his cabinet and raised suspicions of Dulles’ acting duplicitously, saying

the UK did not intend to be caught in the same position, on this occasion, as they were over Suez, when Mr Dulles had undertaken to assist the UK and France. From the conversation he had had with President Eisenhower and from his assessments of UK moves in the past few hours, he was sure the UK would not take any step until they were certain of the US position.1081

On July 16, SIGINT data provided irrefutable evidence of a Nasser-backed coup against King Hussein scheduled for the next day.1082 Macmillan, unwilling to risk another Suez misunderstanding, decided, “we must wait one more day and try to keep the Alliance” and despatched his foreign minister to Washington to gain explicit US consent.1083 With that consent affirmed, the UK proceeded with troop deployment to Jordan as “a parallel intervention.”1084 The US provided air cover, logistical assets and ensured use of Israel airspace.1085 Both New Zealand and Australia declared their support for the actions.1086

4.5.4 Canadian diplomatic assistance

Macmillan was keen to have the Canadians reprise their role as the Anglosphere’s ‘intercessor’ after the invasion and suggested the US keep Canadian PM John Diefenbaker updated.1087 Eisenhower duly informed Diefenbaker, allowing the Diefenbaker to attempt to marshal opinion in support of intervention and create the conditions for a revamped UN force
to take over if necessary once the situation was stabilised. The secret Canadian instructions to their UN Ambassador demonstrate advance knowledge of the landings.

The Canadians duly performed their role in the UN with Diefenbaker portraying his Government as not having been aware of the planned actions, but once underway, Canada had “no alternative,” but to support the interventions. This was consistent with Canada’s projected role of the Anglosphere’s ‘honest broker’ that disguised a partisan role in defence of Anglosphere interests by means of diplomacy and peace-keeping. As envisaged, the role of the UN was to prove critical. Avoidance of censure was important, but more significant was the creation of a mechanism to allow a withdrawal of US and UK forces made possible with the assistance of Canada.

4.5.5 Working Group Indonesia: non-functional planning

US policy in SE Asia was predicated on the 1957 NSC plan that recognised a UK sphere of influence centred on the newly independent ‘Federation of Malaysia’ and the UK territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei earmarked for imminent decolonisation. The plan stated the US should follow parallel lines with the UK, but ever conscious of being tarred as imperialists warned, “care should be taken to avoid becoming identified in the public mind” if local people thought British actions were obstructionist.

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1088 “Extract from Cabinet Conclusions - Crisis In Lebanon And Jordan,” July 15, 1958. LAC. Volume #25 - 340. Chapter II, Middle East, Part 5. Section B
1089 “Secretary of State for DEA to UN Permanent Representative to UN,” Telegram ME-174 LAC, DEA/50162-a-40, July 15, 1958.
1092 “Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State,” August 18, 1958, #278. FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI.
In September 1957, Eisenhower authorised covert action to support Indonesian rebels.\textsuperscript{1094} President Sukarno’s non-aligned stance and his reliance on the Communist Party suggested a drift to towards the PRC.\textsuperscript{1095} Despite the Common Declaration, the US did not involve the UK in its Indonesian plan. Nor was the operation revealed at the October 4 ANZUS Council by the Allen Dulles (CIA) or [Foster] Dulles to their Antipodean allies.\textsuperscript{1096} This, despite an allusion by Australia’s Foreign Minister that Australia might be willing to assist in any plans to support the rebels.\textsuperscript{1097} US unwillingness to include Australia was consistent with Dulles’ avoidance of military association with a ‘colonialist’ power in a non-European region, even if they shared objectives.\textsuperscript{1098}

Like the failed Syrian coup, US unilateralism ran into a problem. On December 7, Eisenhower authorised secret US marine landings, but their naval convoy required the use of the UK’s Singapore’s facilities en route. The US planners had not realised that Crown Colonies featured self-government and Singapore’s Assembly was dominated by left-leaning parties.\textsuperscript{1099} The UK retained responsibility for foreign policy and defence but could not accede to the arrival of a large US naval force without pre-planning so as to avoid arousing popular anger.\textsuperscript{1100} With Singapore denied, the US operation was unable to proceed to the consternation of both Dulles brothers, who were unable to comprehend why the UK could not immediately acquiesce. Foster Dulles took the matter up with the UK at a forthcoming NATO Paris meeting on December 19.\textsuperscript{1101}

\textsuperscript{1096} Audrey Kahin and George McTurnan Kahin, \textit{Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia} (University of Washington Press, 1997), 120.
\textsuperscript{1098} For a detailed account of Australian support of the Dutch and opposition to Indonesian expansion see: Hanno Weisbrod, "Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea," \textit{The Australian Quarterly} 39, no. 2 (1967).
\textsuperscript{1100} Kahin and Kahin, 124.
\textsuperscript{1101} Ibid., 124-26.
4.5.6 Working Group Indonesia (AUS-UK-US) Activation

Dulles’ debacle was entirely avoidable since the US was pushing at an open door and, once briefed, the UK Ambassador and MI6 in Washington fully backed covert intervention. The UK Commissioner-General in Singapore, who had been obliged to deny the US convoy docking, was himself urging London that “the time had come to plan secretly with the Australians and Americans” for a “bold policy” to support the rebels.1102

At the UK’s insistence, the joint Working Groups had been framed to allow Australian and NZ participation in certain foreign policy areas. Macmillan was keen to involve the Australians, writing to Menzies to broach the situation in Indonesia and Menzies agreed action should be taken to support the rebels, utilising Singapore as a hub.1103 Meeting on the fringes of the NATO meeting, the UK and US agreed to the Indonesia Working Group should be activated to organise covert action and should include Australia but the US excluded NZ on the grounds of secrecy.1104 By February 1958, the Working Group had secured “substantial agreement on the main lines of Western policy,” and the UK Cabinet authorised the UK’s Malay territories for US covert operations.1105 Operations ceased in May 1958 after the Indonesians captured a CIA pilot, resulting in a policy of US accommodation with Sukarno that was to put it at odds with the UK.1106

4.5.7 Future quadrilateral institutions frustrated

Whilst covert actions were ongoing, the UK attempted to establish an informal means for ongoing quadrilateral meetings for military regional planning, to allow “frank and full discussions on what our forces are doing and can do” in the region. Macmillan suggested SEATO was inadequate for that purpose.1107

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1102 “R Scott to FO” December 12, 1957. TNA, FO 371/129531.
1103 Secret Message to Menzies from Macmillan, December 12th, 1957. NAA, A6706, C/S 34
1105 “Notes for Discussion of Indonesia in Cabinet.” [SEAD] 5 February 1958. TNA, FO 371/135847; “Colonial Secretary to Various Governors (North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore)”; Top Secret. February 28, 1958. TNA, FO 371/135848,
1106 Kahin and Kahin, 182-84.
1107 “Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower,” April 18, 1958. #13. FRUS, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI.
At the UK-US bilateral ‘interdependence’ talks the UK again pushed for AUSNZUKUS military talks to establish “how all four can operate as a joint force if something should break out in that area, who would command, and, how operations would be conducted.” Eisenhower stated the priority was having “Australia and New Zealand included in our [UK-US] defense planning” in SE Asia. Dulles, ever eager to avoid the risks of institutional arrangements that might become public, succeeded in delaying discussion by advising “we should do some political thinking before we get too far along with the military work.” There are no available records of any military talks occurring and no planning fora emerged.

This lack of quadrilateral regional progress was in spite of Eisenhower’s support for closer Anglosphere relations in general. The President regarded the high-level Working Groups as performing “beautiful work.” Indeed, by March 1959 Eisenhower had become so enamoured of Anglosphere cooperation, he suggested to his advisors that,

it might be a good idea to begin to try to get Britain and Canada, Australia and New Zealand all together with us in one great government. If that could be done there could be an end to worrying about a number of little things that can cause divisions among independent nations.

This hope was to be unrealised with the Anglosphere core political policy-establishments failing to develop quintilateral political fora. Significant changes occurred within intelligence however, where something resembling the Working Group structure emerged.

The embryonic Indonesian Working Group failed to develop into a regional mechanism involving the four states due to the US pursuit of ‘creative ambiguity’ and policy unencumbered by the input of allies. This was manifested in a failure to develop regional military structures that could facilitate strategic planning and cohesion. The resultant

1108 “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,” June 9, 1958, #15. June 9, 1958 FRUS, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI.

1109 Ibid. “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,” June 9, 1958, #15. June 9, 1958. FRUS, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI.

dysfunction retarded the development of Anglosphere Core Security Community cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

4.6 South East Asia - Regional Dysfunction

4.6.1 Introduction

The US promotion of its anti-colonialist antecedents was particularly pronounced in SE Asia during the late 1950s and early 1960s. This manifested itself in a US unwillingness to embroil itself in quadrilateral Anglospheric military planning. The pursuit of US ‘creative ambiguity’ towards Indonesia’s conflict with its Anglosphere core allies produced long-lasting effects. Australia and NZ responded to US unreliability with military contributions to the Vietnamese war effort to underline the validity of ANZUS. By the 1960s, the UK acted on the logic of US anti-colonialism criticism. Having ensured the independence of its former territories and contained the Indonesian Nationalist-Communist threat, it sought to withdraw ‘East of Suez.’

4.6.2 US and ANZAM Cohabitation

Under US direction, the focus of SEATO was the communist threat to Indochina and Thailand. The Treaty furnished the US with legal cover for intervention in Indochina. It did not extend its military operations to the ANZAM security area, operated by Australia, NZ and the UK. Table 5 illustrates the bifurcation of Anglosphere military arrangements.

Within the designated ANZAM region lay the ‘Malayan Area’ containing the British-controlled territories plus the newly independent Federation of Malaya. The latter had signed the 1957 AMDA defence arrangement to ensure continued UK military support against

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communist insurgents.\textsuperscript{1113} Within the Malayan Area of ANZAM the three AUSUKNZ militaries contributed to Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR) based in the UK Crown Colony of Singapore, to support Malaya and available as contribution to the wider SEATO effort.\textsuperscript{1114}

Australia and NZ sought security by involvement in both SEATO and ANZAM. Their ANZUS links to the US provided a rationale for involvement in US SEATO-led operations, whilst ANZAM ensured AUSNZ involvement in UK-led operations in the Malay territories. US unwillingness to be associated with security in the ANZAM Malay area created an institutional vacuum. US expectations that Malaya would join SEATO were not realised with Malaya regarding the alliance as ineffective.\textsuperscript{1115} Thus, areas of the ANZAM Zone were effectively detached from SEATO support. US political policy-makers showed no appetite for resolving this situation either by sanctioning involvement of its military in ANZAM meetings or reimagining a planning capacity for ANZUS and including the UK. However, regional Commonwealth support was expected in US-led SEATO operations.

The Radford-Collins agreement continued to provide a loose framework for Anglospheric quadrilateral naval collaboration outside of SEATO. Although this was not a treaty there was provision for conjoined wartime operations and an explicit US commitment to defend “British [Commonwealth] territory in the Central Pacific outside the ANZAM area… against seaborne threat to these territories…”\textsuperscript{1116} On the one hand the defence arrangements reveal strong indicators of a regional Anglospheric Security Community, but the attitude of the US towards the ANZAM “Malay Area” expose its limitations.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1113} Malaya considered itself an indirect member of SEATO via the AMDA. See: Joseph Chinyong Liow, \textit{The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations}, vol. 2 (Routledge, 2004), 82-83.


\end{footnotesize}
The Anglospheric Security Community

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*Includes additional Anglosphere non-core states Malaysia & Singapore

Table 5 Anglosphere Core Military-Security Arrangements in existence between 1957 - 1991 Indo-Pacific

In the context of UK-US relations in the region, the focus is on the lack of UK military engagement in Vietnam. The more pertinent issue was the lack of US support for the Commonwealth’s efforts in Malaysia. Although the UK received significant Australian and NZ mutual aid, it bore the biggest military burden.\textsuperscript{1117} Initially, this dwarfed the US regional commitment in terms of troops. In December 1964, two years into the Konfrontasi between Sukarno’s nationalist-communists, Commonwealth forces stood at 60,000.\textsuperscript{1118} At the same point, US personnel commitment to Vietnam stood at 23,000\textsuperscript{1119} (although would soon change as the military situation deteriorated). The UK-led efforts to counter the Konfrontasi were sustained without US mutual aid and at great financial cost. The UK’s difficulties were compounded by US equivocation and an unwillingness to engage in coordinated planning with its Anglosphere allies.

In the wider theatre of the fight against the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao, the UK did assist the US. It was involved in a secret Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR) SEATO operation to construct and operate Thai jungle bases used to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail.\textsuperscript{1120} Also, both Australia and the UK had small numbers of special force ‘trainers’


\textsuperscript{1119} Andrew Wiest and Chris McNab, *The Vietnam War* (Cavendish Square Publishing, LLC, 2016), 252.

\textsuperscript{1120} “Operation Crown” was initiated under Macmillan and continued by Wilson.
engaged in the initial phase of the Vietnam War.\footnote{1121} There is additional evidence that the UK provided SAS ‘trainers’ and special forces personnel were sometimes embedded in allied combat units. Similarly, RAF personnel wore RAAF uniform insignia on combat-related missions. The ‘embedding’ of personnel was an early manifestation of a modus operandi that was to become prevalent in the twenty-first century, as discussed later.\footnote{1122}

4.6.3 Failure to develop cohesive structure

One of the essential features of a security community is the existence of machinery that allows for ease of communication. Given the dysfunctional nature of SEATO, there was no quadrilateral Anglospheric regional forum for political or military planning.\footnote{1123} Australia and NZ hoped ANZUS might form the basis of a secret Anglospheric arrangement given “the varying background and reliability of the other [SEATO] members.” Australia’s DEA Minister, Richard Casey, hoped it would serve as a cover for what would in effect be SEATO strategic planning—its true purpose not being publicly known—and that ‘make believe’ planning be undertaken bilaterally by the U.S. with each of the other four countries.\footnote{1124}

New Zealand also suggested a small quadripartite “sub-committee” under SEATO or ANZUS.\footnote{1125} According to the US, including the UK would create a “White Man’s Pact” that might be seen as “cloaking some new form of Imperialism.”\footnote{1126}

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\textsuperscript{1121} Sylvia Ellis, \textit{Britain, America, and the Vietnam War} (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 2.


\textsuperscript{1123} France supported neutralism. Pakistan was focussed on Kashmir. The US regarded as SEATO planning as “unrealistic”. See: Memorandum of Conversation,” September 28, 1962. #36. \textit{FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia}.

Tripartite political consultation under ANZUS did not materialise, fulfilling Australia’s fear ANZUS might become a “one-man standing group.”\textsuperscript{1127} The mandatory ‘Annual Council’ failed to meet on schedule, with no meetings between October 1959 and May 1962. During this period, the US planned and executed its initial Vietnam operations.\textsuperscript{1128} Even as the Vietnamese conflict was reaching crisis point in 1964, the US perceived ANZUS meeting as a mechanism to deliver a “timely notification” of US policy changes rather than a forum for consultation.\textsuperscript{1129}

4.6.4 Mutual Aid not forthcoming

The UK proposed to grant independence to its remaining Malay territories (Singapore and on those on Borneo) and have them join the existing independent Commonwealth state of Malaya in a ‘greater Malaysia’ federation. This was opposed by Sukarno with the support of the numerically huge Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) who formed an integral part of his regime’s power-base.\textsuperscript{1130} Despite promising he had no territorial ambitions after absorbing Dutch New Guinea, Sukarno claimed now claimed Malay Borneo and asserted a greater Malaysian Federation was a “neo-colonial plot.”\textsuperscript{1131} Consequently, the US began to backtrack on whole-hearted support for the UK’s independence plans as they sought to accommodate Sukarno and ensure Indonesia did not align with the Sino-Soviet communist bloc.\textsuperscript{1132}

\textsuperscript{1125} Ibid [379. ANZUS Meeting] \textit{FRUS, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part I. 942.}
\textsuperscript{1127} “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur),” September 5, 1954. #350. \textit{FRUS, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part I. 849}
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v12p1/d350
\textsuperscript{1128} Gravel, 2, 1-39. 
\textsuperscript{1129} “Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara,” August 26, 1964. #65. \textit{FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.}
\textsuperscript{1130} The claimed 20 million adherents made it the most powerful Communist Party outside the Communist bloc. See: Guy J Parker, "The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia," \textit{Rand Corporation Memorandum Series}, no. February (1969).
\textsuperscript{1132} See: “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy,” February 17, 1963. #329. \textit{FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia.}
To maintain its influence with Sukarno, the US continued with what it privately acknowledged was a policy of “creative ambiguity” towards Indonesia and the Malay dispute. Creative ambiguity is the diametric opposite of the good communication practice said to underlie a sound Security Community. By its nature, the US Indonesia policy necessitated ongoing dissembling and equivocation, playing down or ignoring Sukarno’s “Crush Malaysia,” threats and his use of communist insurgents to attack US allies. Kennedy administration political policy-makers acknowledged this policy constituted “kowtowing,” but persisted despite the US military warning a delay that forcing the UK to delay the creation of Malaysia would be seen as “vacillation,” embolden Sukarno, “placing the Singapore base in jeopardy,” and causing the UK to be “caught in a colonial dilemma.”

The outcome of another quadrilateral meeting in October failed to change US State department policy. The British were perplexed that the State Department was not listening to UK warnings that non-aligned greater Indonesia could the force the UK out of the region with disastrous consequences for the US and its Anglosphere allies.

The US did not appear to understand that the British bases in Malaysia were essential to continued UK military presence… sometimes they [the US] even seem to think that they are a hangover from the colonial era and thus just a political irritant in the area that cannot be justified… If we [the Anglosphere allies] allow Indonesia to dominate the Philippines and Malaysia, these countries will be no longer available for our purpose and our footholds in SE Asia will be limited to an increasingly isolated Thailand and shaky positions in Laos and Vietnam.

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1133 “Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the NSC Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” August 26, 1964. #66. FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.
1134 See: Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge University Press, 2001), fn34.
1136 FO memo quoted in: Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia, 220.
The UK did agree to a short delay to accommodate US insistence that democratic Malaya must attend talks with the dictatorial Sukarno to discuss relinquishing territory.\textsuperscript{1137} Australia considered US policy was “encouraging Sukarno to demand one concession after another,” and NZ declared US policy was “leading to a Far Eastern Munich.”\textsuperscript{1138} Of relevance here is Deutsch’s dictum that the strength of a Security Community can be judged by the “capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages and actions, quickly, adequately…”\textsuperscript{1139}

Another characteristic of a ‘tightly coupled’ security community is one in which mutual aid can be expected as part of an informal or informal arrangement. This was in doubt. Australia and NZ worried that assisting the UK in Borneo might lead to their forces being attacked by Indonesian irregulars. They sought reassurance that the ANZUS Treaty would lead to US support in that eventuality. US under Secretary of State, Averill Harriman, informed Australia and NZ at an ANZUS meeting that he did not think that the United States would let Australia down but… could make no commitments… this was a grey area between the two countries.\textsuperscript{1140}

It was hardly a steadfast declaration of intent. In further discussions the US suggested ANZUS would only apply to attacks on forces in Australian territory.\textsuperscript{1141}

The new state of Malaysia came into being on September 16, 1963, following UN confirmation that it was the wish of the Borneo populace to join the new federation of Malaysia. In response, Indonesian backed communist mobs attacked and burned the UK and

\textsuperscript{1137} “President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy,” September 27, 1963. #336. \textit{FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia}.
\textsuperscript{1140} Memorandum for the Australian Ambassador (Beale),” October 4, 1963. #338. \textit{FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia}.
Malaysian embassies in Jakarta.\textsuperscript{1142} Within days there was an intensification of Indonesian raids of communist volunteers led by regular troops into the Borneo territories of Malaysia.

4.6.5 Unsustainable creative ambiguity

The inherent contradiction at the heart of the State Department’s ‘creative ambiguity’ policy, namely US support for Indonesia whilst ignoring its attacks on UK forces protecting a democratic state, was becoming unsustainable. In London, the media reported on allegations in the US Congress that the US was supplying spares for Indonesian planes being used against the UK.\textsuperscript{1143} The \textit{Daily Telegraph} declared that for the US “to strengthen the warlike sinews of Indonesia makes no sense at all” and called for “political co-ordination in South East Asia.”\textsuperscript{1144} Parliamentary reaction was stronger, former diplomat Lord Colyton, protested “the unseemly behaviour on the part of an ally in SEATO” and asked, “what would the US say if we were to supply spare parts for aircraft to be used by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam against American forces helping to defend the territory?” Lord Boothby resorted to hyperbole, asserting, “the US are, in fact, if not in intention, waging war against us…”\textsuperscript{1145}

Sukarno sought to establish how robust US support was for Malaysia and was not discouraged by the ambiguous reply. He was informed the US was not “militarily defending Malaysia… although escalation… could result in [the] ANZUS Treaty being invoked.” Asked if the US was “taking sides,” the US answered it was not.\textsuperscript{1146} Encouraged, Sukarno authorised plans to extend operations to the Malay Peninsula.\textsuperscript{1147} Sukarno stepped up the rhetoric and publicly declared Malaysia would be completely crushed by January 1965.\textsuperscript{1148}

Australia and NZ faced a decision on whether they should assist the UK and Malaysia in the Borneo Malay territories beyond the Malaya Peninsula. The Australian military re-

\textsuperscript{1142} “Special Report - Sukarno and the Communists,” October 23. 1964. CIA Reading Room, OCI No. 0354/64A Copy No. 5 p7
\textsuperscript{1144} "Illogical Logistics," \textit{Daily Telegraph}, November 14 1963.
\textsuperscript{1145} "Anger at U.S. Supplies to Indonesia," \textit{Daily Telegraph}, November 15 1963.
\textsuperscript{1146} “Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State,” May 9, 1964, #47. \textit{FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.}
emphasised the importance of holding retaining Malaysia as a buffer in South East Asia. Anxious not to commit without US involvement, Menzies again sought US agreement for quadripartite planning, but was rebuffed by Rusk and McNamara. As the likelihood of more clashes grew, Menzies approached the US military to suggest conjoined ANZUS-ANZAM planning but without success.

The situation escalated when Indonesian began military action on the Malay Peninsula and clashed with NZ troops. NZ’s Defence Minister warned Sukarno’s promises about having no more territorial ambitions were worthless, he was “a little Hitler” and “we now know that his word is not be trusted.” Matters escalated further when the Indonesia challenged the right of a passage of a UK aircraft carrier through the Sundra Straits in international waters. The State Department response remained ambivalent, more anxious that the UK did not overreact to the attacks with Rusk warning, the UK had no “limited liability” adding, “if they want us involved, they must find out whether that is possible and, again, take nothing for granted.” With unintended irony, given the US stalling on such meetings, Rusk said there must be “the fullest and most precise understanding between Heads of Government.”

The UK were irritated and informed Rusk that they “did not expect a blank check from the United States,” adding, “it was hardly necessary for the United States to warn… [them] not to take the United States for granted since it always took Britain for granted.” NZ, whose forces had been attacked, expected the US, their ANZUS partner, to be receptive to quadripartite talks to agree a joint strategy. The response to Prime Minister Holyoke was
disappointing; the US was not receptive to a high-level meeting, nor willing to consult. Holyoake informed Menzies, the US are

willing to be informed of tripartite [ANZAM] planning… but are not prepared to actually engage in quadripartite planning.\textsuperscript{1156}

4.6.6 Commonwealth mutual aid to Malaysia & Vietnam

By October 1964, the UK had enlisted the support of not just Australia and NZ in Malaysia, but also Canada, albeit in a non-combatant role.\textsuperscript{1157} With UK encouragement, Canada responded to Malaysian requests for military hardware and training.\textsuperscript{1158} This was undertaken despite Canadian Cabinet concerns such assistance involvement might involve Canada in wider commitments.\textsuperscript{1159} The Canadian Military Mission arrived in Malaysia on October 23.\textsuperscript{1160} Any hopes the Canadians entertained that their non-combatant role would be viewed impartially by the non-aligned Sukarno regime were soon shattered. The Indonesians denounced and “othered” the Canadians using racist terminology, “a Canadian is not Canadian… a Canadian is British,” and Canada was added to the official list of “imperialists with white skins,” that also included the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the US.\textsuperscript{1161}

By the end of October 1964, NZ and Australian forces had both encountered and engaged Indonesian troops and in January 1965, the Menzies agreed to a deployment of Australian...
forces in the Far Eastern Strategic Reserve to assist across Malaysia.\textsuperscript{1162} Holyoake followed a month later deploying ground troops, naval assets and special forces.\textsuperscript{1163}

The Australia and NZ contributions were made with a degree of resignation. The Australian assertions in the post-War period that they should always be the lead Commonwealth regional power were relegated as the crisis escalated. Menzies informed the UK

"our obligations in the South East Asia area are tending to run in two directions. In addition to our commitment to assist you in the discharge of your defence obligations to Malaysia, we feel a deep concern over the situation developing in Vietnam and a strong desire to help our American allies in that theatre…"\textsuperscript{1164}

In contrast to the indecision of whether to commit troops to support the UK, the US request was dealt with promptly. Menzies claimed “it did not take five minutes to decide that when it came to the point of action we would be in it”\textsuperscript{1165} The promptness of the decision reflected the view of both Australian political and military policy-makers, that it was a necessary corollary of their strategic objective to keep the US engaged in the region.\textsuperscript{1166} The US pursuit of creative ambiguity over the Konfrontasi had unintentionally served US interests well in respect of Australia and to a lesser extent NZ.\textsuperscript{1167} The initial US equivocation over the applicability of the ANZUS Treaty for ANZAC forces under attack in Malaysia underlined the necessity of ‘paying the premium’ on US mutual aid requests underlining the coercive power a core state can exert within a security community.\textsuperscript{1168}


\textsuperscript{1166} For NZ’s hesitation see: Garry Woodard, \textit{Asian Alternatives} (MUP Academic, 2004). Also Rabel.

The policy of creative ambiguity avoided accelerating Indonesia’s drift into the communist camp, but at the price of subjecting Commonwealth forces to Indonesian-communist aggression. By the end of 1964, the situation in Vietnam had rapidly deteriorated and the US found itself in need of UK mutual aid.

The less than whole-hearted support for UK military efforts in ANZAM and exclusion of the UK from military planning in Indo-China now presented the US with a problem. It was a point acknowledged by Bundy.

The reciprocal price of this would be stronger support on our side for Malaysia and perhaps closer participation in naval and air deployments designed to cool off Sukarno… It is hard to treat a thing [Vietnam] as our problem for 10 years and then try to get other people to take on a share of it, just because it is getting worse…”

US non-involvement in the ongoing Konfrontasi was now matched by a new UK Labour Government’s resolve not to become embroiled in Vietnam. Prime Minister Wilson pointed
out to President Johnson that some 50,000 UK troops were engaged in the UK’s own Malaysian ‘Cold War.’

Despite US disappointment with the UK’s lack of large-scale involvement, diplomatic support proved to be robust with the US considering the UK, “the honourable exception” amongst Europe states.

4.7. Retrenchment and recalibration

4.7.1 Introduction

As the US sought to confront communist expansion, the disagreements became particularly pronounced among the Anglospheric core political policy-makers. The crisis in SE Asia underlined the different approaches between the more muscular US approach and Canada’s emphasis on diplomacy. The resulting antagonism manifested itself during the 1962 Cuban Crisis and the worsening situation in Vietnam in 1965.

A second and more profound event was the UK’s announcement of plans for a military withdrawal ‘East of Suez.’ This was motivated by the financial burden of supporting military activity whilst its economy weakened and, as it saw it, a failure to enjoy whole-hearted US endorsement of its policies because of the UK’s colonial associations. The consequent UK retrenchment was to facilitate a recalibration of roles leading to an enhancement of the SC’s regional structures in the Arabian Peninsula and Pacific regions.

4.7.2 US equivocation in the Gulf

As mentioned in response to US requests for assistance in Vietnam, the UK referred to their commitments in Malaysia, but also Aden. To protect the Aden base, the UK had

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1170 Leszek Buszynski, SEATO, the Failure of an Alliance Strategy (Singapore University Press, 1983), 120-22.
1171 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Simon and Schuster, 2011), 137.
created Federation of South Arabia (FSA) from a collection of sheikhdoms under British protection. In 1962, the royalist regime in neighbouring North Yemen had been overthrown by revolutionary republicans and backed by military support from Nasser and the Soviets was attempting to overthrow the FSA. The UK, with Saudi and Jordanian support, sought to assist North Yemeni Arab royalists and engaged in robust covert military action.\footnote{See: Scott A Smitson, \textit{The Road to Good Intentions: British Nation-Building in Aden} (Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2010), 14-17.}

In line with its anti-colonial stance and efforts to woo Nasser, the US State department frequently carped at UK policy.\footnote{See: W Taylor Fain, "'Unfortunate Arabia': The United States, Great Britain and Yemen, 1955–63," \textit{Diplomacy and Statecraft} 12, no. 2 (2001): 135–47.} The State Department’s policy attracted domestic criticism. The NY Times suggested the State Department’s position was “a friction” in the “total framework of Anglo-American cooperation.”\footnote{Max Frankel, "Foreign Policy Issues," \textit{NY Times}, March 4 1963. For US request to UK to be accommodating see: “Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” August 28, 1964. \#349. \textit{FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula}.}

An unsympathetic US administration attitude persisted with NSC member Robert Komor opining that Rusk was

manfully fobbing off UK pressures… If LBJ thought we ought to be brutal in telling UK not to commit us over Malaysia, same analogy holds good for the Middle East.\footnote{"Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)" March 30, 1964. \#324. \textit{FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula}; "Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff to President Johnson,” April 29, 1964. \#334 \textit{FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula}; The US refers to the UK reverting to an ‘Eden’ stance in adopting a strong military position.}

In another NSC memorandum, Komor opined, “the Brits are grossly over-reacting” about Aden and the threat from subversive elements, “more talk than anything else.” If the UK
insisted on a robust joint stance against Nasser, then Komer suggested a “gentleman’s agreement” to follow “divergent” lines.1177

With the State Department’s persistent indifference to their position, the UK made a direct appeal to Senator Walter Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in May 1964. Fulbright was informed by UK Minister Duncan Sandys that the UK was disappointed that the US appeared reluctant to come out “firmly and clearly in support of their friends” for fear of offending African and Asian opinion.1178 The UK made little headway. By September 1964, UK Foreign Secretary informed the Cabinet that open support from the US was unlikely since it was “not prepared to be too closely associated with our activities in the area and in particular our connection with reactionary Arab regimes.”1179 In the same month, the UK warned its Anglospheric regional allies that if Nasser’s efforts made the base at Aden untenable, stating “the possibility of supplying Singapore and maintaining Singapore would be gravely affected.”1180

4.7.3 Commonwealth Polaris defence of Australia

In February 1965, the UK Chief’s of Staff envisaged a new Anglospheric security structure that would project UK power from bases in Australia. They advised the UK Government,

… if SEATO were to break down and the Commonwealth Forces had to leave the mainland of South-East Asia, the role of the United Kingdom forces in this area would be to assist in the close defence of Australasia… the composition of these forces would have to be decided in conjunction with the ANZUS powers. The improvement of defence facilities in Western Australia and the Northern Territories would… be a prudent insurance against developments in the future, and provide an alternative base for United Kingdom and allied forces in case of need.1181

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1177 “Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” April 28, 1964. #333. FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
1178 “Note of the Commonwealth Secretary’s Talks with Senator Fulbright.” May 5, 1964, Sandys Papers, CAC, DSND 8/21.
1180 “Notes on Carrington Meeting.” September 21, 1964 Canberra NAA, A1209, 1964/6804 85
1181 Base Facilities in Australia
UK Chiefs Of Staff Committee Memorandum
In their recommendations, the UK Chief’s of Staff stressed the moral commitment to Commonwealth allies, “in any event, and even if our forces were withdrawn from Malaysia, as partners in the Commonwealth and particularly in ANZAM we would remain obliged to help in the defence of Australasia.”

The Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, sought to fashion some form of nuclear Anglospheric regional security community. Between 1965 to 1967, various formulations were discussed in meetings with Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and President Johnson. Wilson included reports of his discussions to Menzies and Holyoake and met Lester Pearson to discuss it in person.

As it was, Australia was not keen on the concept since a Commonwealth force suggested the possibility of a dilution in US commitment to the region. Nor did Australia want the UK to use nuclear forces as a cover for a withdrawal of conventional forces from the area, but supported Wilson’s push for greater coordination with the US in the region.

Wilson continued to explore an East of Suez Commonwealth nuclear force as late as 1967, seeking to utilise ANZAM but possibly including Singapore and Malaysia. However, McNamara informed him the US would not support any plan to redeploy Polaris if it was just a ploy to reduce the UK’s regional commitment.

In the end, a financial crisis and fears a non-European commitment would damage the UK’s application to join the Common Market meant the idea of Commonwealth force was dropped.

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Footnotes:

1182 “Base Facilities in Australia”, UK Chiefs Of Staff Committee Memorandum, London, 8 February 1965. TNA DEFE 25/105
1184 Position Paper, ‘Nuclear Arrangements in Asia’ (Woodard), 7 June 1965, NAA 625/4/6, A1838/361
1185 Record of meeting (Wilson/Menzies), 1 July 1965, TNA DEFE 11/637
1186 PRO PREM 13/1906, Record of Conversation, June 2 1967
1187 Record of conversation (Wilson/Johnson), 2 June 1967, TNA FCO 46/28
1188 This was an explicit reason. See government documents cited in: Jones and Young, 865-66. Also Pierre, 299.
4.7.4 Aden and East of Suez

In 1965, the perceived lack of US diplomatic support and a financial burden aggravated by a sterling crisis, UK policy-makers to consider the practicalities of closing the Aden base post-haste.\textsuperscript{1189} The US became alarmed at the impact on the Anglosphere’s security, since the base gave “the British the possibility of moving forces quickly to various areas of potential trouble,” that the US did not have. The British response was they were no longer prepared to play as “mercenaries for the Free World.”\textsuperscript{1190} Just two months later, faced with escalating internal internecine violence, the UK informed the US of the base’s closure and withdrew from Aden in 1967.\textsuperscript{1191}

\textsuperscript{1189} Hugh Hanning, "Britain East of Suez-Facts and Figures," \textit{International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)} 42, no. 2 (1966): 253.; “Defence review: report to ministers”, Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, November 8, 1965, TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/4


\textsuperscript{1191} “British Talks: Nasser-Faisal Relations; Yemen; South Arabia; Persian Gulf.” \textit{FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula.}
The UK defence review regarding the UK’s East of Suez role was indicative of a domestic train of thought that the costs of regional engagements in terms of blood and treasure were too high.\textsuperscript{1192} The announcement in January 1968 that the UK was to extend the review to the Persian Gulf and withdraw from all forces East of Suez by 1971 was greeted by with alarm by both by its three Anglosphere Core regional allies. UK withdrawal would create a gap in the Anglosphere Core Security Community’s regional coverage of the Indo-Pacific.

4.7.5 The removal of the colonial ‘impediment’

The withdrawal announcement forced an abrupt change in the US policy establishment behaviour and attitude. A variety of factors converged to bring about a changed US perception. As the conflicts in Indochina escalated; the US was now beginning to appreciate the difficulties associated with overseas engagements. Something of a role reversal was also occurring; the US now felt it was the object of unfair opprobrium because it was “looked on in many places as the point of the spear of the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{1193} Moreover, US now perceived the UK’s colonial past as a positive, since it meant

that in many parts of the world, the British have ties as a result of which they can act; they are acceptable, but the US would not be.\textsuperscript{1194}

The ‘anti-colonialist’ public stance that formed part of the US pitch to the non-aligned bloc was rendered irrelevant if the colonial power in question did as asked and quit the scene. The US sought to delay the accelerated UK withdrawal from the Gulf; belatedly arguing the UK’s military presence was essential.\textsuperscript{1195}

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\textsuperscript{1193} “Memorandum of Conversation,” January 27, 1966, #255. \textit{FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe. 5}

\textsuperscript{1194} Ibid [#255. ]

\textsuperscript{1195} “Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk,” January 9, 1968. #122. \textit{FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region: Arabian Peninsula.}
\end{flushleft}
The second factor was the abrupt sense of US military isolation and the potential loss of a mentor and confidant who possessed global experience. US criticism of the UK’s past pugilistic attitude in Malaysia and Aden was forgotten. Instead pleas were made for the UK to “be Britain,” since the British were “the teachers” who “set the example,” and had, “helped us make decisions of will in WW2 and in the post-war period” and the results would be disastrous if “the teacher abandoned the field.” The President himself despaired of the impact if the UK quit its role within the Anglospheric alliance, warning that “our own capability and political will could be gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts all alone.”

In response, the UK redirected the US’ own anti-colonialist narrative to defend their withdrawal, arguing any UK role outside of Europe would be “the dying legacy of an imperial power.” Past UK interventions “in other parts of the world had simply looked colonial.” The ‘White Man’s Club’ trope formerly employed by the US to justify UK exclusion from an ‘ANZUS plus’ agreement was referenced to explain the proposed withdrawal from Malaysia. The UK opined it could see a time when “no white face” would welcome in SE Asia, an unwelcome allusion to problems in Vietnam. UK Defence Minister, Denis Healey, summed up the irony,

The United States, after trying for thirty years to get Britain out of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, was now trying desperately to keep us in… during the Vietnam war it did not want to be the only country killing coloured people on their own soil.

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1196 The US had begun to feel this after Suez, “In the past the British had been our most dependable ally. Now there was the danger of our becoming isolated…” Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Reinhardt),” September 11, 1958. #351. FRUS, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2.
1200 For a contemporaneous US reference see: “Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Johnson,” January 20, 1966. #253. FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe.
Moreover, it had at last come to realise that Britain had an experience and understanding in the Third World, which it did not possess itself.\textsuperscript{1202}

In the Gulf, internal US documents acknowledged that the UK possessed “centuries of close association… And cannot be improved upon… should it be necessary to replace the UK in this thankless role…” it would be preferable to encourage other regional allies rather than the US attempt it.\textsuperscript{1203} The commonly held view of US policy-makers was that an Anglospheric security community needed the UK’s active involvement. The US must act to “enhance the credibility of their [the UK’s] role, thereby maximising its size and duration, while profiting from British assets and experience through periodic consultations and intelligence exchanges.”\textsuperscript{1204}

4.7.6 ANZAM re-invented

Australia and NZ’s objective was the maintenance of a UK commitment to the Malaysian area that formed part of their Forward Defence strategy. The expulsion of Singapore by Malaysia as a constituent part of their federation convinced the UK it needed to find an alternative base in Australia. The UK believed it had an enduring “moral obligation” to defend Australia and New Zealand and had explored this option with the Australians since 1962.\textsuperscript{1205} But as David Goldsworthy writes, “it was not a British Expeditionary force, but a regional presence,” that its allies wanted.\textsuperscript{1206} Consequently Australian-NZ policy was directed at forestalling a UK regional withdrawal.\textsuperscript{1207} They promoted the creation of a ‘ANZUS Plus UK’ arrangement, with a tripartite ‘ANZAM’ still in the Malaysian area. The UK was assured

\textsuperscript{1206} Goldsworthy, 166.
that both Australia and NZ accepted that as they grew in strength, they must play an increasing part in regional defence.\textsuperscript{1208}

The ANZUS objective of keeping the UK engaged in the region was facilitated by an unanticipated victory of the Conservatives led by Edward Heath in the 1970 General Election. In opposition, Heath had indicated that UK commitments to Anglospheric defence would be reviewed, telling a US audience the proposed UK withdrawal of forces was an abdication that he could not accept. Mutual defence was not an artificial relationship to be created or abandoned at will… [it was] the product of history, based on our strong ties of common heritage, language, common laws and common endeavours.”\textsuperscript{1209}

Although Euro-centric in outlook, Heath asserted that there was a “natural relationship” rather than a special relationship with the US. In terms of Anglospheric security commitments, Heath told parliament,

I do not believe our military effort can or should be confined to Europe… we shall deploy forces in the Indian Ocean area and in Malaysia and Singapore.\textsuperscript{1210}

This revised approach would dovetail with US attempts to involve the UK in its reconfiguration of an Anglospheric security framework in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring both allies now ran in parallel if not always overlapping lines.\textsuperscript{1211}

The idea of UK bases in Australia was given up in favour of the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) to replace the AMDA, whereby the UK, Australia and NZ committed to retain an interest in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore.\textsuperscript{1212} A tripartite military formation,

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{1208} Record of Meeting between Wilson and Holt - Far East Defence, June 13, 1967 TNA, FCO 46/56
  \item \textsuperscript{1209} Louis Heren, "Heath Tells US Not to Write Britain Off," \textit{Times}, May 26 1969.
  \item \textsuperscript{1210} Edward Heath, HC Deb 02 March 1971 Vol 812 Cc1410-549.
  \item \textsuperscript{1211} Smith, 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{1212} For a detailed analysis see: Andrea Benvenuti and Moreen Dee, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements and the Reappraisal of the British and Australian Policy Interests in Southeast Asia, 1970-75," \textit{Journal of Southeast Asian Studies} (2010).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
ANZUK replaced the Commonwealth Reserve based in Malaya and Singapore.\textsuperscript{1213} To ensure FPDA success, the Nixon Administration gave private assurances of US support to the Australians via ANZUS should FPDA obligations cause difficulties in the event of external hostilities.\textsuperscript{1214} Australian deployment was construed as a “contribution to wider regional security in relation to communist pressures.”\textsuperscript{1215}

Nixon’s Guam Doctrine; the ‘asianization’ of regional defence allowed for eventual US disengagement from Vietnam by 1973 and rendered SEATO obsolescent. The retreat of both Australia’s ‘powerful friends’ rendered their Forward Defence strategy unworkable and Australia adopted a policy of self-reliance based on the positioning of forces in Australia.\textsuperscript{1216} The ANZUK arrangements ended with the bulk of the Australia’s contingent withdrawing in 1974, followed by the UK a year later. As the Singapore and Malaysian contingents built up their military capability, the FPDA might have been expected to go the way of SEATO; it survived, albeit in a low operational mode, with the ANZUK commitment to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore still remaining.\textsuperscript{1217}

4.7.7 Canadian semi-detachment

Canada was absent from the Anglosphere core’s engagement in conflicts after the Suez Crisis to the end of the Cold War. A liberal internationalist role favoured peace-keeping military deployments over combat. This policy saw both Diefenbaker and his successor Lester Pearson at odds with US foreign policy during the Cuban Crisis and the duration of the Vietnam conflict.

Although the Cuban Crisis was not a conflict as such, it merits a mention in the context of the CANUS military dynamic that stood in contrast to the poor relationships between

\textsuperscript{1213} Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA, vol. 23 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974).


corresponding political policy-makers. Mistrust was engendered by Canada’s pursuit of liberal internationalism and a wish to maintain sovereignty.\textsuperscript{1218} It was encapsulated by Diefenbaker’s refusal to break relations with Communist Cuba and endorse the US economic embargo.\textsuperscript{1219} President Kennedy and Diefenbaker had both come to regard each other’s policies on Cuba as “unbalanced.”\textsuperscript{1220} These differences were to come to head with the discovery Soviet missiles had been secretly deployed to Cuba.

When Kennedy escalated US military readiness from DEFCON 5 to DEFCON 3 on October 22, 1962, he assumed Canada would automatically do the same.\textsuperscript{1221} However, NORAD protocols required Canadian consultation and Diefenbaker took exception to the lack of notice, refusing to match the alert status.\textsuperscript{1222} The Canadian Government only followed suit on October 24, when Kennedy raised the alert to DEFCON 2, the highest readiness level before declaration of actual hostilities.\textsuperscript{1223} Diefenbaker’s equivocation was also partially a consequence of a misjudged attempt to place itself as a facilitator for a UN fact-finding initiative to de-escalate the crisis.\textsuperscript{1224}

Although this episode is commonly represented as something of a nadir in Canadian-US relations from the perspective of security community theory, it provides evidence of a strong, shared communal identification with the US by the Canadian military. Without Diefenbaker’s knowledge, US and Canadian military commanders had met in Halifax on October 17 and the Canadian military had agreed to deploy their maritime assets to track Soviet submarines

\textsuperscript{1217} Benvenuti and Dee, 121.
\textsuperscript{1219} John M Kirk and Peter McKenna, "Deciphering Canada's Cuba Policy since 1959."
\textsuperscript{1221} Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing across the Undefended Border (McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1990), 186.
\textsuperscript{1222} Ghent, 163-64.
heading to Cuba.\textsuperscript{1225} The deployment was justified under the auspices of a NATO anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise so as to permit the loading of ammunition and Canadian adherence to US directed commands.\textsuperscript{1226} It can be argued that in following this action, the Canadian military exceeded their terms of reference.\textsuperscript{1227} Canadian ASW assets played a partisan and critical role from October 17 thereafter.\textsuperscript{1228} To maintain secrecy, Canadian units were not displayed on the USN’s status maps in Washington and the Canadian naval attaché in Washington was tasked with ensuring the USN’s most senior officers were aware of the politically sensitive nature of Canada’s contribution.\textsuperscript{1229} The subterfuge was unsustainable as the crisis escalated towards an imminent DEFCON2 alert and the Canadian military were obliged to secure political cover. On October 23, Canadian Defence Minister Douglas Harkness unilaterally agreed the Canadian military should “begin planning as if the alert had been declared, but to do so discreetly.”\textsuperscript{1230} A day later, the Canadian cabinet were informed and did agree to follow the US line, but the equivocation and fractiousness damaged the political relationship. It was the start of a poisonous process of “muddled perceptions, stifled communications, and disappointed expectations.”\textsuperscript{1231} Going forwards, the incident contributed to a feeling in the US political policy-establishment that Canada was a shaky partner, and this was a perception that would persist.\textsuperscript{1232}

There was relatively mild CANUS antagonism over Vietnam under the Diefenbaker Government.\textsuperscript{1233} The relationship became more fractious over Vietnam and given colourful emphasis by the infamous physical altercation between President Johnson and Canadian Premier ‘Mike’ Pearson. This followed the latter’s Temple University speech suggesting for a

\textsuperscript{1225} Peter T Hayden, “Canadian Involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis Re-Reconsidered,” \textit{The Northern Mariner} no. VII No. 2 (2007): 56.
\textsuperscript{1227} Hayden, 60. See also: "The Canadian Navy in the 1960s," (2017), \url{https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/services/history/ naval-service-1910-2010/years-of-crisis.html}.
\textsuperscript{1228} 56-57.
\textsuperscript{1229} Tony German, \textit{The Sea Is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy} (McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1990), 270; Baker and Campbell.
\textsuperscript{1230} Hayden, 128.
\textsuperscript{1232} Gladman and Archambault, 12.
\textsuperscript{1233} See: Nash, 150.
pause in US bombing. Although these point to strained personal relationships, it is important not to overlook the routine, ongoing levels of cooperation over Vietnam that occurred in terms of diplomacy and intelligence below the level of personalities in the CANUS political policy-establishments. Indeed, James Eayrs referred to Canada’s behaviour as “an apprenticeship in complicity.”

Whilst Canada may have continued to be supportive of the US behind the scenes, this did not translate into any appetite for participation in the recalibration of Anglospheric activity in the Pacific. There was a historic lack of Canadian interest in Asia. This was reflected in the paucity of military resources devoted to the Pacific with naval activity limited to a small zone adjoining the British Columbia coast and extending to part of Alaska. Such was the alleged leisurely nature of routine operations it acquired the nickname of ‘the yacht club’ within the RCN. During the Pierre Trudeau government elements of the political policy-establishment did consider a security tilt towards the Pacific but as part of a ‘Canada First’ policy and at the expense of NATO commitments. Given the perspective of Canadian political policy-makers and the military resources available, it was Canada would not play an integral part in the Anglospheric plans for a revamped military presence in Pacific areas. However, the Trudeau period witnessed a shift from the general Atlanticist paradigm that had previously characterised Canadian perspectives. There was a noticeable movement towards diplomatic and trade initiatives directed at the Pacific. Canada was

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1234 See: Charles Ritchie, "The Day the President of the United States Struck Fear and Trembling into the Heart of Our Pm," January 1 1974.
1237 David Zimmerman, Maritime Command Pacific: The Royal Canadian Navy’s West Coast Fleet in the Early Cold War (UBC Press, 2016).@7 and map}
1238 Ibid.@4} 
not a one-ocean country... We’re beginning to realize that this Pacific seaboard is more important to Canadians than we realized in the past.\textsuperscript{1241}

This would have important future implications as discussed in chapter 4.

\subsection*{4.7.8 Reconstructing the wider Indo-Pacific Region}

A ‘subterranean’ network of military policy-makers persisted despite of disagreements in approaches amongst the political policy-establishments during the conflicts in South East Asia. The militaries acted to encourage the political policy-makers to take remedial action, having given some attention to military planning in the wider Indo-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{1242} The US JCS had recognised the Aden situation was precarious and engaged in informal talks with the UK about new bases capable of supporting Anglospheric operations in the Indo-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{1243} These talks attracted the support of US political policy-makers during both the Johnson and Nixon administrations.\textsuperscript{1244} Nixon and Heath initiated a ‘joint study group’ to work on the Indo-Pacific. A renewed UK-US intimacy developed. Kissinger authorised the attendance of UK representative, John Thomson at an internal US ‘Review Meeting’ of the NSC, the JCS, the CIA and the State Department to discuss strategy on the Indo-Pacific.\textsuperscript{1245} Thomson was the UK Cabinet’s Head of [Intelligence] Assessments.\textsuperscript{1246} Kissinger later commented on the unique nature of this scenario, acknowledging this “view of our bureaucracy in action could only be shown to our British friends,” and, “he could never invite officials from other countries to such a meeting.”\textsuperscript{1247}

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\textsuperscript{1241} Trudeau, Pierre. “The Relation of Defence Policy to Foreign Policy,” Statements and Speeches, April 12, 1969 (69/8).
\textsuperscript{1242} Memorandum From the JCS to Secretary of Defense McNamara,” April 10, 1968. #47 FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
\textsuperscript{1244} “Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Navy (Ignatius),” October 27, 1967. #46. FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
\textsuperscript{1246} See biographical details in: Sir John Thomson, interview by Catherine Manning, 20 July 2016. British Diplomatic Oral History Programme. CAC.
\end{flushright}
Thereafter, the UK and US embarked upon regular informal discussions on Indo-Pacific with both parties keen on “the future inclusion of Australia/New Zealand in Indian Ocean discussions.”\textsuperscript{1248} A 1975 meeting agenda item refers to an Australian proposal relating to Diego Garcia. Although this was primarily a UK-US bilateral arrangement, the UK involved Australia and NZ through a tripartite intelligence operation; the ANZUK JIC.\textsuperscript{1249} This body prepared intelligence analysis for UK-US discussion and expanded to include Australia and NZ participation.\textsuperscript{1250} The outcome ensured “a broad understanding on common goals and activities in the Indian Ocean area…”\textsuperscript{1251}

By 1972, the UK and US agreed to the establishment of a base on the UK island of Diego Garcia in the newly created ‘British Indian Ocean Territory’ (BIOT).\textsuperscript{1252} In recognition of US base rights, the UK received significant discounts on the supply of US nuclear weapons provided under the terms of the UK-US Defence Treaty (1958). President Carter, who had served under Rickover, on nuclear submarines, affirmed the nuclear relationship by securing agreement for the storage of nuclear weapons in the UK and an agreement to supply the UK with trident nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{1253}

During the next two decades, Diego Garcia was transformed into a huge military base.\textsuperscript{1254} Massive infrastructure upgrades to its naval and air force capabilities were supplemented by the construction of SIGINT facilities to feed into the Five Eyes Intelligence gathering

\textsuperscript{1249} "Central Intelligence Machinery Division of Cabinet Office Records and Other Intelligence-Related Cabinet Office Records." UK: Cabinet Office Knowledge and Information Management Unit, 2010. A8
\textsuperscript{1251} “Backchannel Message Tohak74/WH40189 From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” January 16, 1974, #229. \textit{FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976.}
\textsuperscript{1252} "Diego Garcia Agreement between USA and HM Government.” TNA, FCO 83/134, 1972.
\textsuperscript{1254} Selig S Harrison and K Subrahmanyam, \textit{Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and American Perspectives} (Oxford University Press, 1989).@92}
operations. Under the guise of ANCANZ Navies and the FPDA arrangements, the base supported exercises for the Anglosphere allies. The base was utilised extensively in the 1991 Gulf War.

4.7.9 Extension of tripartite fora

The participation of Australia and NZ in the Vietnam conflict removed any US obstacles to their inclusion in the military interoperability fora. This was a process endorsed by the political policy-establishment, keen that any regional imbalance caused by the UK’s tilt from the region be addressed by the inclusion of Australia and NZ in Anglosphere Core military fora.

![Table 6 Anglospheric Core Multilateral Military-Security Agreements between 1957 – 1991](image)

Dark Grey shading signifies point at which the arrangement became quintilateral (*NZ Observer Status only)

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The Anglospheric Security Community

This meant that all five Anglosphere Core members were involved in setting interoperability standards that fed into NATO, despite Australia and NZ not being parties to the NATO treaty. The five Anglosphere Core members were now involved in joint exercises for the purposes of testing new, cutting edge command and communications systems. This intensified the depth and width of collaboration through the exchange of personnel and the posting of officers to the Washington based fora and Working Groups. In addition, the quintilateral SIGINT arrangements had expanded to include semi-formal, habitual-natural arrangements for the sharing of wider aspects of intelligence involving senior personnel from other internal Anglosphere Core agencies and their counterparts. Still at an embryonic stage at this point, the repeated interactions between the military meant it was military-security policy personnel that developed a sense of communal identity in advance of political policy-makers, as would become evident during the next few decades.

4.7.10 The Carter Doctrine

The Carter Doctrine was declared in January 1980 in response to Iranian regime change and the threat posed to the Persian Gulf after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Due to the relatively light US military footprint, the Doctrine required an immediate military commitment from allies, specifically NATO and Japan. Seeking NATO support, US Under Secretary of State, Robert Komer argued the crisis was global and “our response must be global as well, whether or not it is managed under NATO’s aegis.” Japan was not eager to commit and NATO equivocated. France criticised US efforts, whilst the EEC worried a robust response would damage detente. Carter’s NATO proposals for a Rapid Defence capability were met with “a wall of silence” and a long-running debate over NATO “out of area operations.”

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This attitude contrasted with the response from the Anglosphere allies. UK Prime Minister Thatcher informed Carter, “I fully agree with your analysis. A central principal of great strategic importance is at stake…”¹²⁶⁴ RN vessels were immediately deployed to the Mediterranean to allow US vessels to redeploy to the Gulf.¹²⁶⁵ Later, a large-scale joint US-UK naval exercise took place in the Gulf. In response to US requests, the UK established a permanent RN presence in the Indo-Pacific, focussed on the Gulf. Two other outcomes with significance for present-day Anglospheric security structures related to the leveraging of existing facilities.¹²⁶⁶ Direct talks between Carter and Thatcher resulted in agreement to further revamp and extend the Diego Garcia as a base for controlling the Indo-Pacific.

The Carter Administration began to use ANZUS as a forum for consultation, thereby elevating it to a level the Australians and New Zealanders had strived for since its inception. All the participants of the July 1979 Ministerial Meeting agreed the Treaty symbolised “a deeper and wider association between the three societies, which embodied similar values and shared similar aspirations.” The ANZUS ministerial meetings were, “not only meetings of allies, but of close friends of long standing…” Meetings “took place in an informal atmosphere which enabled ministers to exchange views freely… on foreign policy and defence matters.” And in an oblique reference to the Anglospheric quadrilateral arrangements to which all three belonged, declared, there existed among ANZUS members, “effective military cooperation, the flow of high technology and the free exchange of information and strategic intelligence…”¹²⁶⁷

With NATO embroiled in internal disputes, the US sought to extend ANZUS operations westward to include the wider Indo-Pacific and the Persian Gulf.¹²⁶⁸ Unlike the NATO response, the discussions of the 1980 ANZUS Ministerial meeting were marked by warm reciprocal expressions of appreciation,

¹²⁶⁵ Thies, 231.
Minister Peacock [Australian External Affairs] and Secretary Vance (US Secretary of State) noted that the ANZUS forum was completely open and candid. Minister Talboys [NZ External Affairs] commented that the meetings were like an extension of departmental talks. Talboys said he greatly appreciated the feeling of being consulted.1269

President Carter, disappointed by NATO and EEC allies, expressed his appreciation for Australian and NZ for collaboration and general support, stating “it was reassuring, at a time of challenge, to have close friends with whom such close consultations could be held.” He added he wished that the US had this same sort of easy relationship with its European allies who were “constantly complaining that they had not been told enough, or consulted fully.”1270

In another meeting with NZ, Brzezinski, Carter’s Secretary of State felt moved to evoke a feeling of ‘we-ness’ directly, declaring “that there is an ‘automatic’ feeling for the closeness between the US and New Zealand, and Australia as well.” He asserted these feelings “had roots in our shared World War 2 experience where we fought side by side.” Brzezinski informed Australia and NZ “we expect you to be with us, and we expect to be with you.”1271

4.7.11 FPDA Reinvigorated - ANZUS curtailed

US-Australian military collaboration deepened, giving the ANZUS alliance more of a bilateral nature. In 1976, the US suggested increased cooperation (including SIGINT) and RAN visits to Diego Garcia.1272 Thereafter, Diego Garcia has been an Australian transit point as part of Anglospheric operations.1273 Australia’s new status in the Anglosphere Core Security Community in the eyes of the US was reflected in a variety of subsidiary bilateral


1270 See: Roberts, Chapter 6. Plus the UK established the Gulf Armilla Patrol. See: {Cable, 1989 #038.


1273 For example, participation in Battle Group Delta operations 1985-86 and the Gulf War.
agreements and initiatives including defence-space stations, missile launching bases and research.\textsuperscript{1274}

In 1980, as part of the Anglosphere Core Security Community’s response to the US appeals to support the Carter Doctrine, the Anglospheric FPDA was revisited. Singapore and Malaysia signalled their willingness to reinstate and upgrade military operations. With NZ consent, the Australians informed the UK they were “most anxious” to meet this request.\textsuperscript{1275} The UK informed Australia it would be willing to “revitalise” the FPDA\textsuperscript{1276} leading to growing interoperability between the five Commonwealth states.

One noteworthy detrimental change to regional Anglospheric activity occurred in 1984. NZ participation in the ANZUS arrangements was terminated by the Lange Government’s decision to curtail visits by and exercises with nuclear powered and/or armed vessels.\textsuperscript{1277} The US gave notice of the suspension of its obligations to NZ under the Treaty.\textsuperscript{1278} This however, did not impact NZ’s involvement in the other Anglosphere Core security community fora and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. As such, this provides an example of the military substrata networks continuing despite the more public disagreements as confirmed by the subsequent publishing of internal cables via Wikileaks as discussed in the section covering the post-Cold War period.

4.8 Communal identification and natural interaction

4.8.1 Introduction

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\textsuperscript{1274} For a list of agreements and bases see: Sara Bobroff, \textit{US Treaties & Other International Agreements Pertaining to Telecommunications}, Office of Telecommunications (Washington: US Dept. of Commerce, 1974), 14-16.
\textsuperscript{1275} Fraser to Thatcher. “Five Power Defence Arrangements.” September 11, 1980. TNA, PREM 19/156 f26 (T172/80)
\textsuperscript{1276} Thatcher to Fraser, “Five Power Defence Arrangements.” September 17, 1980. TNA, PREM 19/156 F13 (T177/80)
\textsuperscript{1277} NZ policy was ambiguous. See: Michael McKinley, "Labour, Lange and Logic: An Analysis of New Zealand’s ANZUS Policy," \textit{Australian Journal of International Affairs} 39, no. 3 (1985): 133-34.
\end{flushleft}
Towards the end of the Cold War period, the Anglospheric security community had begun
to display varying degrees of ‘communication density.’ There were in effect two ‘social’
strata: one consisting of the security-military fora and the other comprising more informal
relationships at the politico-diplomatic level. It was the former that had developed into a
‘living’ network of individuals engaged in common enterprises, encompassing all levels of
the security hierarchy. And of those fora, it was the SIGINT community, the first of its kind to
develop into a genuinely quintilateral operation that was the most advanced by the 1970s.
However, by the 1980s this was true of the other military institutions too, so that cooperation
had become ingrained, centred on shared norms as evidenced by the Falklands and the
response of the US Navy.

The politico-diplomatic relationships were less developed, focussed on political policy-
makers and not necessarily quintilateral in nature, their status and nature dictated by the
location of crises and conflicts. The exception was the UK-US relationship that did develop
an ongoing consultative dimension, sometimes advanced or impeded by the nature of
Presidential-Prime Ministerial relationship. And if that relationship was deemed as lukewarm
by observers, the reality was the ingrained habits and relationships of the ‘perma-
bureaucracies’ of each state ensured intimate interaction continued. This represented the
culmination of the process of started by semi-formal Working Group arrangements in 1957
and referred to earlier. These structures had dissolved quite quickly but (in-line with the
stated UK hopes) helped establish a normative practice of dialogue representing what Adler
and Barnett call “common and consensual mechanisms.”¹²⁷⁹ This however should not detract
from the multi-layered strands of cultural adhesive that provided these relationships and
institutions with strength.

4.8.2 High-Level memetic behaviour patterns

The measures taken to create the new or revitalised and mechanisms facilitated the free
flow of communication of views and positions of policy-makers. With values, attitudes and
perceptions drawn from the same meme-complexes, the US was open to “profiting from their
[the UK’s] experience.” It had become an ingrained behavioural trait of the US policy-
establishment. The UK-US Working Group structure appears to have lapsed sometime before
the 1960s, but the process of consultation continued in the Kennedy era. McGeorge Bundy opined, “US-UK relations are not based only on a power calculus, but also on deep community of purpose and long practice of close cooperation,” and claimed there existed “intimate consultation to a degree not publicly known.”

This intimate collaboration continued in the Nixon Administration, the UK was invited to “tell us where you disagree. We will feel free to ask your advice. We want your participation… This is not to say that consultation formed an omnipresent imperative or necessity, but that in a time of crisis or a situation requiring a second opinion, it was a natural inclination to seek out a UK perspective. Henry Kissinger, the principal US foreign policy advisor during the Nixon-Ford Administrations, affirms consultation with the UK had become habitual on geopolitical and security matters. His analysis highlights those very attributes that Deutsch postulates as so important in assisting in the development of a natural security community; language, common history, culture, and shared values. The most important insight, however, was the nature of the UK-US relationship, that was in effect, a pattern of consultation so matter-of-factly intimate that it became psychologically impossible to ignore British views. They evolved a habit of meetings so regular that autonomous American action somehow came to be seen to violate club rules. Above all, they used effectively an abundance of wisdom and trustworthiness of conduct so exceptional and successive that American leaders saw it in their self-interest to obtain British advice before making major decisions. It was an extraordinary relationship because it rested on no legal claim: it was formalised by no legal document; it was carried forward by succeeding British governments as if no alternative were conceivable.

Kissinger concluded the strength of the relationship depended upon “intangibles” that provided natural trust and communication. Arriving at London during Harold Wilson’s UK premiership, Nixon quoted the words of Woodrow Wilson, the first incumbent President to visit the UK in 1918, who had told the British people “friendship must have a machinery,” to

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1279 Adler and Barnett, 62, 55.
1280 McGeorge Bundy to Robert J. Manning, 7 December 7, 1962. NSA, Nsf170a/34
ensure “constant friendly intercourse, the means for constant watchfulness over the common interests.” Developing this theme, Nixon then evoked Churchill’s emphasis on informal bonds that created fraternal association and said, Churchill,

was not referring to legal obligations but to human intangibles. He was referring to the means of communication to which Woodrow Wilson had referred to 50 years ago. And no two nations in the world more commonly and more closely share the means of communication than do the United States and the United Kingdom. We share a common language. We share the common law. We share great institutions of the Parliament. We share other institutions. Because we share those institutions, we enjoy a means of communication which gives us a special relationship.

Perhaps Nixon was utilising rhetoric, but his evoking of Wilson’s articulation of the importance of ‘machinery’ to foster “constant friendly intercourse” echoes Adler and Barnett. But their conclusion that this leads to ’social learning’ is surely inadequate. Wilson’s machinery of communication was not suggesting that participants could observe and learn behaviour, but rather in the Deutschian they act as a means of amplifying behaviours associated with pre-existing meme-complexes held in common.

The existence and growth of the Anglosphere Core security community was not just about the personal relationships between President and Prime Minister. Their relationships might accelerate or impede the development of the security community, but common values would likely ensure the Anglospheric security community could, under its own momentum, arrive at common policy outlooks, giving rise to and expression by the plethora of military and security fora.

4.8.3 Closer ‘Five Eyes’ SIGINT operations

The potency of communism in the Far East facilitated a growth in the Anglospheric core SIGINT arrangements to provide a more intensive global reach. Disputes between the

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1284 Ibid.
The Anglospheric Security Community

political policy-establishment rarely impeded progress, and conflicts usually acted as a
catalyst for deeper and more intimate collaboration. During and after the Suez Crisis, the
SIGINT collaboration continued unabated.1285

Cooperation between the Anglosphere Core SIGINT agencies intensified after Suez with
both GCHQ and NSA cooperating extensively in the Middle East in the run up to the crisis in
the Levant during 1957-58 and again during the Yemeni-Aden Crisis 1962-67.1286 Joint
operations involved personnel from all ‘Five Eyes’ members. In 1957, work was completed
on a joint UK-US SIGINT station on Ascension, a British Overseas Territory in the mid-
Atlantic.1287 By 1960, there were joint CANUKUS operations.1288 US SIGINT facilities
existed alongside UK operations on Mauritius and in Cyprus.1289 The 1953 BRUSA
appendices referred to the US commitment to “coordinate its COMINT operations in the…
[South West Pacific] with the [Anglo-Australian] center in Australia as required.”1290 The
conflicts in South East Asia accelerated this process. Australia supplied more personnel for
the UK-Australian operations in Singapore and Hong Kong and established new SIGINT
bases at Darwin and Perth to provide coverage of Indonesian targets.1291 In parallel with
Australia’s military contribution to US efforts in South East Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, the
SIGINT relationship between the US and Australia deepened. A joint intelligence facility was
established at Pine Gap, one of the Five Eyes network’s most important bases.1292 The base
includes NSA, CIA, and later US military personnel believed to have arrived in September
1990. During the build-up for Operation Desert Storm, the base hosted additional CIA and

1285 Charles G Cogan, "From the Politics of Lying to the Farce at Suez: What the US Knew,"
1286 David Easter, "Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and
1287 David Fontaine Mitchell, _Ascension Island and the Second World War_ (Ascension Island
1288 "Text of Statements Read in Moscow by Former US Security Agency Workers.,” _NY Times,
September 7 1960._
1289 David Easter, "GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s,” _Intelligence and National
a & b
1291 Pfennigwerth, 199.
1292 DOS, Joint Defense Facility at Pine Gap, Extending the Agreement of December 9, 1966: US-
other military personnel. A year later further joint bases were agreed and saw ongoing expansion. Some of these were funded on a tripartite AUSUKUS basis.

4.8.4 Shared values and camaraderie

The importance of both habit and trust between security agencies was referred to by a US Congressional Research paper produced in May 2019. In assessing the reasons SIGINT cooperation had continued uninterrupted by political wrangling during and after Suez, it concluded shared values constituted the key explanation.

The strongest, most enduring relationships have weathered differences in policy or lapses in security that have led to temporary setbacks in intelligence cooperation. More formidable to overcome are obstacles to intelligence sharing resulting from fundamental differences in values.

There were however, no fundamental difference in values, and the NSA suggested the relationship was unquestioned, perhaps even attracting an allegiance it its own right:

…one lesson to be learnt from the Suez Crisis is that whether by dint of loyalty or the inertia inherent in any established system or bureaucracy, the Anglo-American Sigint alliance was easily strong enough to continue unabated despite a disruption in the political relationship.

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1295 For example, the Nurrungar Joint Defence Facility. See Allen Barnes, "Shot in the Arm for Woomera," The Age, February 16 1970.


The social implications of deepening interoperability through service on joint bases, work on joint initiatives and operations constituted the living ‘substrata’ of the Security Community. This was replicated in the organisations formed by the other military-security fora, with staff from each country serving at each other’s HQ’s, personnel serving at joint overseas bases, planning and participation in joint exercises, and co-working on numerous joint projects. A NZ Navy Report to its parent Defence Council provides an illustration as to how the ‘camaraderie’ that underpins the Anglospheric SC is fostered. The report reveals an intensive and recurring programme of maritime, land and air exercises bringing together all five Anglosphere allies. Officers were engaged in regular planning, all ranks drilled alongside one another, some were embedded in one another’s military for long durations in joint bases. One such was HMNZS Irirangi, NZ’s primary SIGINT operation that links to Five Eyes bases in Honolulu and Vancouver and was to play a critical part in the Falklands Conflict.\footnote{NZ Naval Board of the Defence Council, "NZ Naval Report to the Defence Council - 1982," RNZN Communicators Association, https://rnzncomms.org/dc-1982/.

\footnote{Andrew Cohen, "Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau Says Canada Will Strongly Protest..." UPI, April 3 1982.. For emphasis on no use of force see: Trudeau to Thatcher. “Falkland Islands” April 8, 1982. THCR, 3/1/20 f52 (T67/82)

\footnote{Canadian Senate, "A Turning Point in Canada -Argentine Relations?," (Ottawa: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2017), fn39.}

In fact, the Falklands Conflict merits further attention, demonstrating how the consequences of Anglospheric ‘camaraderie’ influenced the behaviour of the military substrata of the Anglosphere core Security community highlighting shared social affinity.

4.8.5 Falklands: Political policy-maker responses

The response from Australia, Canada and NZ to the Falklands invasion crisis was supportive of the UK, with all three recalling their ambassadors from Argentina. Canada offered the least support. Its initial response appeared supportive of the UK but in reality, whilst condemning the invasion, stressed the need for a peaceful resolution.\footnote{Canadian Senate, "A Turning Point in Canada -Argentine Relations?," (Ottawa: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2017), fn39.} It adopted a neutralist position on the Falklands’ contested sovereignty, possibly positioning itself as a future mediator.\footnote{Canadian Senate, "A Turning Point in Canada -Argentine Relations?," (Ottawa: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2017), fn39.} That would be a charitable view according to Timothy Winegard, who refers to Canadian diplomacy during the Falklands War as emblematic of the “confused, and at times contradictory, components of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's utopic and
idealistic foreign policy.”

From a UK perspective, the position of Trudeau was not seen as helpful. As during Suez, the Canadian Government faced pressure from domestic sentiment that ran in favour of a stronger pro-UK stance. At times Canada did intimate it would supply military aid to the UK if so asked, confident that this would not be requested.

New Zealand was the first Anglosphere Core state to act, offering immediate military support. Australia acted within days also condemning Argentina and offering to delay its purchase of a UK aircraft carrier so as to allow its inclusion in the task force. The NZ offer of ships was declined, but at the UK’s request provided substitute vessels for UK vessels operating in the Indian Ocean. Responding to the UK’s solicitations, Australia called a meeting of the UN Commonwealth group to coordinate a supportive response.

The US position was initially more nuanced initially publicly. Under the terms of the Rio Treaty the Argentines called a meeting of the OAS placing its US ally in a difficult position. The initial State Department response was to act as mediator, but once a diplomatic solution was judged unattainable, publicly aligned with the UK. The US believed a UK defeat would ‘devastate’ the “political coherence and military effectiveness of the Alliance… [and] risk undermining the special relationship…” and it was necessary to support the UK despite the undoubted damage to US relations with Latin America.

The most ‘anti-British’ voice in the US administration, Jean Kirkpatrick, acknowledged the

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1303 Alan Bass, "Canadian Military Aid to Britain in the Falklands Dispute..." UPI, May 1 1982.
1304 Muldoon to Thatcher. April 3, 1982. (T59a/82). TNA, PREM 19/614 F138
1307 Parsons (UNUK Mission) to FCO Telegram No. 520 22 April 1982. TNA, PREM 19/60.
Administration would not contemplate a UK defeat, stating “they made it clear right from the beginning. That was never a question, period.”

4.8.6 Falklands: Horizontal agency and community

The most remarkable aspect of the conflict was the communal response of the US Navy. Immediate planning was initiated for the ‘transfer’ of the USS Iwo Jima aircraft carrier to the RN, should the UK lose an aircraft carrier. Ongoing Anglosphere interoperability had reduced technical control issues to a minimum, but to ensure no crewing problems, serving US Navy personnel would be ‘retired’ and immediately re-engaged as UK ‘contract advisors.’ These arrangements were made without the knowledge of the State Department and then taken directly to, and authorised by, the President. The deployment of additional direct military support of US task forces was considered in the event of UK military setbacks. To assist the UK, the US provided armaments (sidewinder missiles), fuel and intelligence. The intelligence aspect remains classified, but involved the repositioning of a satellite to provide targeting data. US SIGINT intercepts provided detailed intelligence, allowing the UK to construct the entire Argentine order of battle. The base at Ascension was used as a logistics supply centre.

Of critical importance was NZ’s intelligence contribution. GCHQ’s coverage of the South Atlantic was extremely limited, however NZ SIGINT operations at Irigangi had the necessary

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1313 Ibid [#184. U.S. Contingency Planning - Falklands Crisis]
1316 David Ridlon, "Shots in the Dark: British Tactical Intelligence in the Falklands War."
Military Intelligence 15, no. 3 (1989): 41.
1317 Jeffrey T Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries-the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Allen & Unwin, 1985), 194-220.
The Falklands Conflict reveals the Anglosphere core security community’s characteristics of bottom up organisation. The lower echelons are, if not autonomous, certainly self-directed, transnational, and able to act without receiving orders. Secretary of the US Navy, John Lehman observed,

> What observers often miss is that our support was built from the bottom up rather than the top down. There was no need for a political decision to be taken from on high. The structure of the special relationship ensured that the day the crisis broke, personnel from both countries were already working closely together at all levels. There was, one might say, already water flowing through the pipes. Following the Argentine invasion, all we had to do was to open the spigot.¹³¹⁹

From his perspective as a member of the military policy-establishment, Lehman affirms that the effect of interdependence has been to create a living network of people of all ranks, stating,

> when it comes to the U.S. military, the special relationship is nothing less than a functional reality. At every rank and at every level, British and American personnel are inextricably linked on an everyday basis. So when, for example, the Falklands crisis broke, the U.S. Navy already had 50 people on exchange duty at British military headquarters at Northwood. The British, meanwhile, had a substantial presence at Norfolk backed up by the naval staff at the British Embassy.¹³²⁰

### 4.9 Summary: The Ascendant Anglosphere

By 1956, the outline of the modern Anglosphere was discernible in the security and military arrangements between the five core states. The Ascendant Security Community

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¹³²⁰ Ibid.
The Anglospheric Security Community

consisted of a refashioned Commonwealth element linked to the US through revitalised UK-US intelligence arrangements that were facilitated by the strong personal World War 2 relationships between members of the various military policy-establishment and shared threat perceptions.

Between the Suez Crisis and the end of the Cold War, the networks of fora linking the Anglosphere Core members had multiplied and thickened. Just as the Korean War had facilitated the merging of Commonwealth SIGINT efforts alongside those of the US into a quintilateral, so the Vietnam conflict persuaded the US of the merits of Australian and NZ inclusion in the existing tripartite military fora. Nor did other aspects of intelligence collaboration remain static. New quintilateral fora of senior personnel emerged to cooperate on all other aspects of intelligence.

Diagram 5 The Anglosphere Military ‘Core’ 1957-91

The Cold War period after Suez was remarkable in another aspect too since the practical effects of these military and security-based fora was to extend collaboration beyond the military policy-establishment. As such, it was characterised by prolonged social interaction by lower-ranking personnel from the five Anglosphere Core states in deployment to joint
bases, assignment to working groups, participation in joint operations, attendance at conferences, and collaborative R&D projects involving scientists.

This military interdependence was not necessarily matched by institutional developments involving the political policy-establishment. The bilateral CANUS and UKUS Working Groups established a formalised system of consultation that did not necessarily presage frictionless collaboration.

In terms of mutual support in conflict, the pattern is less clear. The fault line that ran through the Anglosphere Core was the divergent approach to the non-aligned Afro-Asian bloc. The US political policy-establishment attempted to insulate themselves from association with the UK’s imperial ‘baggage’ so as to retain influence with ascendant nationalist leaders in the Afro-Asian bloc. There was therefore a US preference for covert rather than overt collaboration and consultation with the UK. In the same period, US policy in the Indo-Pacific became increasingly putative as they sought to counter the threat of communist advances. Australia and NZ sought to bring themselves within the US orbit. In contrast, Canada, content with its Atlantic tripartite relationships, eschewed any meaningful military role in the Pacific. Instead, it followed a non-combative role whilst still supporting its Anglosphere allies through intelligence and by often pursuing covertly partisan diplomatic positions.

Any hopes that the SEATO arrangements might provide the basis for an inner quadrilateral forum for military and political planning for the four Anglosphere Core members did not materialise. The military and political regional relationships were bifurcated.
Indeed, by the close of the Cold War, ANZUS had essentially become a bilateral AUSUS arrangement in respect of formal defence responsibilities. This was complimented by AUSNZUK cooperation in the FPDA and revamped UKUS cooperation in the Gulf.

At first sight, the UKUS Working Groups established appear to have contributed little to the institutionalisation of working relationships between the political policy-establishments. This overlooks their role in facilitating a Canadian willingness to deepen bilateral CANUS fora and provided for the UK to pave the way for AUSNZ participation in UKUS discussions. Whilst the UKUS WG’s did not survive long, they do appear to have contributed to what Kissinger referred to instinctive UKUS political policy-maker consultation, which was precisely what the UK hoped would happen. Thus, by the end of the Cold War, the institutions and informal arrangements linking the five Anglosphere Core states had deepened.
Chapter 5 The Mature Anglosphere: 1991-2021

5.1 Introduction

The impetus for the development of the Anglosphere security community after the Cold War has been driven by two different threats: terrorism, and the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Anglospheric core nexus thickened, creating a ‘Mature’ and more tightly coupled security community. It also displayed synergic qualities — the ability to act cohesively to counter external threats. The terrorist threat placed a premium on intelligence, drawing together the national intelligence agencies in common transnational endeavour to establish a community that included all aspects of intelligence, from SIGINT to GEOINT.

A feature of the post-Cold War period has been the public ‘outing’ of the Anglospheric core state's spying activities and the coining of the term ‘Five Eyes,’ as a label. It is derived from an intelligence classification restricting secret document to the core members and was adopted to provide an unofficial shorthand name for the Anglospheric intelligence community. However, it now enjoys a semi-official governmental status as a descriptor for the wider governmental informal institutions Anglospheric security community.

There has been increased and consistent mutual aid in the various conflicts since 9/11. Sometimes this has been open, but often it has been surreptitious, disguised by the participation of embedded personnel from one core state in another’s forces, or by the covert deployment of special forces. These mutual endeavours have been self-reinforcing, prompting more collaboration and still denser and more extensive transnational networks.

In terms of these networks, the global War on Terror provided a rationale for the securitisation of socio-economic areas of governmental activity and resulted in a dramatic extension of quintilateral fora beyond the military. These new arrangements serve a similar function to the military fora, providing a semi-formal, institutionalised mechanism for the political policy-establishments to discuss strategies, coordinate responses and establish transnational solutions. All these activities involve increasing numbers of Anglosphere core
The impetus for still greater collaboration amongst the five core states has been provided by the steady rise of the PRC, perceived as both an economic and military threat to Anglospheric values and interests. This mutually perceived threat has encouraged the deepening of Anglosphere core collaboration with an emphasis on ensuring Anglospheric coordination in the Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. It has seen Canada and the UK adopt an active military regional role and is manifesting itself in stronger bilateral military and diplomatic arrangements within the transnational Anglospheric framework. It has been underlined by the announcement of the AUKUS security pact that further strengthens existing relationships.

These developments have undermined the IR discipline’s refusal to address the existence of an Anglospheric security community. A further factor in elevating the very idea of an Anglosphere into a wider public consciousness has been the decision of the UK electorate to leave the EU. The Remain-Leave debate focussed on the UK's place in the world in the future and the possibility of an Anglospheric trajectory. Those elements who favoured the UK remaining in the EU sought to portray the Anglosphere as an unattainable vision rather than an existing set of relationships. Moreover, those same elements suggested 'Leave' supporters were motivated by a wish to join a white, racially construed Anglosphere.

In fact, a close examination of the Brexit decision reveals that it was values, not race, that were uppermost in the mind of the Leave-leaning members of the electorate. So in this respect, the Brexit debate served to illuminate the enduring relevance and potency of the Magna Carta compact, a deep-seated Anglospheric meme-complex that crossed racial boundaries. To those members of the electorate giving credence to the values associated with this 'Myth,' the EU was considered as a flawed [security] community, lacking legitimacy and reliant upon a vanguardist cajoling to ensure allegiance.
In the Adler and Barnett model, the EU security community is discernible by its complex array of institutions. However, when a more orthodox Deutschian lens is applied, the institutions fashioned by the vanguardist elite do not accord with the sentiments of elements of its demos. And nor are they meant to, because their purpose is not to reflect those values but to achieve an objective for a perceived 'greater good.' The result has been to both delegitimise the European project and paralyse the European security community's ability to act in a consistent and meaningful manner on external security matters. The Anglospheric security community is more readily discerned by a diffuse array of partnerships, informal agreements, and personal relationships. These are most evident in its ability to work together in a synergic manner in conflicts and on strategic security policy issues, as examined below.

5.2 Anglosphere at War

5.2.1 Introduction

The conflicts in this period reveal increased levels of Anglospheric mutual aid. The cohesive behaviour of the Anglosphere core was evident in the conflicts preceding the 9/11 attacks and was the start of an emerging pattern of a general willingness to contemplate resolute action. A new pugilistic triangle ranged Australia and the UK alongside the US in a series of military conflicts. These military operations frequently received mutual aid from Canada and NZ, often provided covertly and maintained by public denials of involvement.

The behaviour of the various political policy-establishments is examined in the next section. This section focuses on the practical impact of the conflicts on Anglospheric interoperability. With the onset of these conflicts, the Anglosphere militaries became engaged in intense collaborative tactical and strategic planning, spanning two decades and ongoing. The prosecution of war has involved thousands of military personnel of all ranks working together in joint operations and from joint bases. The interoperability measures that the various quintilateral military fora had developed were now tested in actual combat rather than exercises. This experience informed the direction of new R&D for improved joint command and communication systems, tactics, and weapons. As such, the conflicts have served to accentuate cooperation on the personal level, bringing personnel together in the field and in
R&D projects in pursuit of common objectives and engendering a sense of community. This sense of community began to become more manifest with the eventual adoption of the ‘Five Eyes’ and 'Five Nations' badges and symbols.

5.2.2 The Gulf War

All five Anglosphere core members participated in the Gulf War with NZ making a determined effort to realign itself with its Anglosphere allies following the ANZUS rift with the US. The provision of NZ transport aircraft was duly noted and appreciated by the US. The Gulf War brought together the US and UK together in a military and diplomatic planning role in the form of joint Working Groups. The Gulf War also leveraged a range of Anglosphere core assets, including SIGINT bases in the UK, Australia, and a joint UK-US base in Oman, to provide intelligence to defence planners and ground operations. The Diego Garcia base was heavily utilised. This was a role the base was to perform regularly in the War on Terror Conflicts after 9/11. The UK military contribution was significant, standing at 45,000 personnel and it was the only US ally out of a thirty-two member coalition that was included in the detailed military planning.

Operation Desert Fox in 1998 consisted of four-day UK-US bombing raids on Iraq supported by Canadian personnel operating AWAC coverage. Declassified Australian Cabinet documents reveal discussions for AUSCANNZ participation to support the UK-US

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1323 Richard A Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Simon and Schuster, 2008), 65 & 160.
operations in the event of Saddam Hussein not backing down.\textsuperscript{1328} It stood in marked contrast to the lack of action by European allies.

5.2.3 War on Terror participation: Afghanistan

The terror attack on the Pentagon and the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 produced an outpouring of sympathy for the US from across the world, but did not always translate to military assistance. The post-9/11 period represents elevated and sustained Anglosphere core collaboration in conflict.

In the Afghanistan War, the Anglosphere core showed solidarity with the US in the two phases of the Afghanistan conflict; the invasion and the occupation. The invasion phase was a US-led Anglosphere affair.\textsuperscript{1329} In the first phase of the Afghan Conflict, the Anglosphere core states took a robust line. Within two days of the 9/11 senior UK military and intelligence personnel arrived in Washington, including Sir Richard Dearlove SIS Head and No.10 Foreign Policy Advisor.\textsuperscript{1330} A team of forty UK military personnel were already embedded in US CENTCOM, Florida, working on the Iraqi No-Fly Zones since 9/11.\textsuperscript{1331} Similarly, the Canadian National Command Element was integrated into CENTCOM.\textsuperscript{1332}

The operation was joined by an Australian contingent headed by a high ranking former Special Forces Brigadier and Senior Officer in the ABCA Armies structure.\textsuperscript{1333} This was a significant development from the Australian perspective. As discussed in chapter 4, Australia had felt frustration at the lack of US consultation and planning in the South Pacific during the 1960s. Neither SEATO nor ANZUS had developed command and strategic planning

functions. After 9/11 and Australia’s supportive stand, Defence Minister Robert Hill claimed the situation had been transformed. “Australia had joined the inner circle” of the US and UK, we were given access to American military thinking and planning and we were able to comment, provide ideas and contribute critical judgments at a level that had never occurred previously.1334

With the invoking of Article 5 of NATO agreement, Canada said it would support the US invasion with land, sea and air forces and launched Operation Apollo run from CENTCOM.1335 NZ’s contribution was more modest reflecting its military capacity, but included the offer of Special Forces.1336 During the invasion phase, special forces from all five Anglosphere states were committed, and in case of Canada, was allegedly without the knowledge of the Prime Minister.1337

The complexities of running a massive military operation consisting of different armed services from different states can be challenging. However, the Anglosphere states had high levels of interoperability, in terms of weaponry, doctrine and, not least, long-standing personal relationships in command positions. The role of the Anglosphere core military fora in ensuring this level of interoperability was critical. This included the work of the CCEB on the net centric command systems that would allow the Anglosphere allies to function effectively. Any breakdowns in military interoperability became the basis of ongoing evaluation and subsequent corrective measures.1338

After the invasion, the Anglosphere forces were complemented by NATO forces to assist in terrorist suppression and support the new Afghan government. However in 2021, a political breakdown of an entirely different order occurred between the US and its allies. It was caused by the implementation of the 2020 Doha Agreement between the US and the
The manner of implementation suggests to a US indifference to the plight of all its allies. However a close examination of the facts reveals a more nuanced story and the importance of that must be attached to the role of key individuals at what Deutsch terms 'critical junctures.'

The first point to highlight is the Doha Agreement did not involve US NATO allies or Australia because their deployment of combat troops was non-existent or negligible. In 2014 US forces remained in place but all the other allied NATO and Australian combat troops departed, following France who had pulled out in 2012. Residual non-combative troops remained to assist in training and administration known as "Resolute Support." The UK Prime Minister David Cameron overruled his Chief of Defence, withdrew the bulk of British combat forces and ended UK drone strikes. However, in contrast to other allies, the UK did retain a combat battalion in Kabul to provide armed transport for other non-combat NATO personnel.

This meant the vast burden of combat operations to support Afghan armed forces combat operations was carried by the US alone. In February 2020, the Doha Agreement was concluded by the Trump Administration as a means of the US exiting its combat forces whilst attempting to ensure the Afghan Government could maintain its own security. This meant the security of non-combative NATO, EU and other non-governmental personnel assisting in the construction of a civil society in Afghanistan would no longer be protected by US combat forces. The agreed target for withdrawal of May 2021 was dependent on Taliban progress, agreeing that

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the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire [along with] the completion and agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan.  

The US stressed that “the pace of removal for American troops stationed in Afghanistan is conditions based and will depend on how well the Taliban comply with the commitments they have made.”

That NATO was excluded from this process is not entirely surprising given the US perspective its European allies were not serious about defence in Afghanistan or in Europe. As a consequence Brigadier Ben Barry asserted UK (and NATO) "military influence over US military decision-making was very limited." His colleague, Jack Watling at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, agreed stating

I do not think that we had many options in terms of influencing the US. They were putting in the vast majority of the enablers to sustain our presence in Afghanistan and were clear about what their interests demanded.

The UK might have expected to have more influence given that the UK alone had responded positively to a 2019 US for assistance. The UK had agreed to contribute to a new “counterterrorism force to continue dismantling terrorist groups…” as the US drew down its own forces. During the course of 2019, the UK became more invested in Afghanistan with around 1000 special forces engaged in combat operations and calling in US drone strikes. The Trump Administration’s determination to reduce force levels occurred without all

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1346 Ibid. ‘Fact Sheet’ Briefing Room, Whitehouse. February 29, 2020

conditions being met and stood at 2,500 by January 2021. By January 2021, there was clear evidence that these roadmap conditions had not been met in respect to the Taliban's extensive links with Al-Qaeda.

With substantial special forces engaged and concerned at a calamitous Afghan collapse, the UK felt the drawdown decisions were ignoring the Taliban’s failure to meet the conditions. Consequently, the UK Defence Secretary made repeated attempts to raise their concerns with US Secretary of Defence Mark Esper in the Trump Administration and Lloyd Austin, Biden's Secretary of Defence.

The Biden Administration postponed the May 2021 date for the withdrawal of all forces, but then announced a total drawdown would commence on May 1, 2021 without the Taliban meeting the agreed conditions. September 11, 2021 was announced as the deadline for complete withdrawal. It was a date of no military relevance in itself, but by sign-posting a retreat, it resulted in an immediate de-stabilisation. On hearing the announcement, the UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, remarked, "the game is up." He informed the House of Commons of the UK's various attempts to influence US decision-making.

The timetables, again, were often under review. Originally under the Trump Administration there were conditions. The conditions were supposed to help set the timetable. If the conditions were not met, the timetable would slow up or speed up.

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The conditions were then removed by the new Administration, and that again changed the timetables.\textsuperscript{1354}

The announcement of an end-date combined with a withdrawal of military assets ahead of other personnel resulted in the rapid collapse of Afghan forces and the Afghan government, followed by a chaotic Saigon-style evacuation for remaining NATO forces, under the supervision US and UK combat forces holding the airport in Kabul.\textsuperscript{1355}

The failure of the UK to effect a change of heart was held up as an example of the UK's lack of influence. In reality, the lack of UK (and NATO) influence was no more or less than that of US policy-makers. The UK Defence Minister's views had not been dismissed by his counterparts. A leak revealed Esper had warned Trump not to pull out troops and was promptly sacked by Trump and the Pentagon 'purged' of opponents.\textsuperscript{1356} Austin was equally unsuccessful in convincing Biden.\textsuperscript{1357} Nor these concerns confined to the military, a leak to the Wall Street Journal revealed State Department officials utilised the confidential 'dissent cable' mechanism in early July 2021 to warn Secretary of State Anthony Blinken of the impending disaster.\textsuperscript{1358} Biden received similar warnings from the CIA and the JCS.\textsuperscript{1359}

\textsuperscript{1355} Gwythian Prins, “General Elphinstone’s Return: Biden’s Appalling Mistake.” Briefings for Britain. August 20, 2021
\textsuperscript{1357} Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, and David E Sanger, "Debating Exit from Afghanistan, Biden Rejected Generals’ Views," ibid., April 23 2021.
\textsuperscript{1358} Vivian Salama, "Internal State Department Cable Warned of Kabul Collapse" Wall Street Journal, August 19 2021.
No person, institution or ally could stop the President's "gut decision" of setting the 9/11 anniversary as the target date rather than being predicated on the security situation. The point was made by the BBC's Jon Sopel.

America acted unilaterally over Afghanistan - actually maybe that should be Joe Biden acted unilaterally. The administration was not much interested in what the UK thought. Mr Biden, from what I have been told, was not much interested in the red flags being raised by his intel community and military top brass, or by the warnings delivered from London. He wanted out.

In the UK there was a flurry of articles announcing the death of the 'special relationship', usually accompanied by linking the situation to Brexit in celebratory confirmation that the UK now had no friends. Thus, Ian Buruma, who saw in Brexit "real fascist rhetoric creeping back into the mainstream", felt confident enough to conclude the Afghan debacle exposed "the fantasy" of a global Britain, that believed,

…unchained from Brussels, Anglo-Saxon freedom would rule once more. Then the U.S. president refused to take his [Boris Johnson’] call.

What Buruma failed to notice was that Brussels too, had not only been ignored, but was incapable of rising to the occasion, demonstrating again its hemiplegic nature. The UK was willing; the EU was irresolute, as were its member states. Ben Wallace informed the Commons.

We tried a number of like-minded nations. Some said they were keen, but their parliaments weren’t. It became apparent pretty quickly that without the United States as the framework nation it had been, these options were closed off.
The EU’s serial paralysis did not deflect those of a pro-European mindset. They adopted phraseology more applicable to the unrealised ambitions of the EU. The FT referred to the "Hollowness of Global Britain" and New Statesman referred to "delusions of Grandeur." Lord Ricketts former UK Ambassador to France and anti-Brexiteeer announced Britain was now “a ship adrift without a compass.” In fact, the EU security community was more a flotilla adrift and directed by competing national compasses. Not to be deterred, the Economist declared the UK needed to turn back to the EU since the US transatlantic link with UK had been downgraded because the US had pivoted its attention to Asia.

Within weeks of these comments, a new tripartite security arrangement – AUKUS – was announced. This security partnership between the US, the UK and Australia confounded the narrative of a UK adrift. Buruma, who just a week earlier had mocked the UK, was suitably annoyed at having been confounded so quickly and suggested maybe de Gaulle was correct about "les Anglo-saxons."

The announcement of AUKUS should not detract from the Biden-led debacle and its strategic importance. In giving testimony to the UK House of Commons, General Patraeus declared it was "a strategic failure." And especially unfortunate at a time when we most want to show our allies and partners around the world that we are a dependable partner…" However, Petraeus sought to put the withdrawal in context as unusual and observed, the Afghanistan decision, was the result of a conviction formed at the very highest level of our Government some years ago that this was not worth continuing; in that respect, this is a bit of an isolated situation, if you examine it. But, again, the onus is on us to disprove the

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1368 David Petraeus (General).
notion that we are not a dependable partner when it comes to issues that really matter.\textsuperscript{1369}

In that context, Petraeus pointed to the positioning of the US to counter Russia and the PRC as evidence of US willpower to work with allies going forwards.\textsuperscript{1370} Nevertheless, there was a distinct feeling in the UK that the US had proved itself unreliable.\textsuperscript{1371} In the context of the security community thinking, this is evidence again of the dramatic influence a key individual can have on events. This incident was not evidence of any fundamental breach in relationships within the Anglospheric security community. On the contrary, it seems certain that the vast majority of the Anglospheric policy making establishments would be at one in believing Biden's decision to have been catastrophically inept.

5.2.4 War on Terror participation: Iraq

As with the invasion of Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq was primarily an AUSUKUS operation dominated by the US.\textsuperscript{1372} A team of forty UK military personnel already worked in CENTCOM HQ headed by General David Wilson, who had served in Kosovo with the US. The personal relationships between the UK-US military policy-establishments were extremely strong. General Sir John Reith, the UK Chief of Operations, had worked with the US Commander Tommy Franks in the Gulf War. Reith’s explanation of the nature of the relationship to the Chilcot Inquiry highlights the importance of the social ‘glue’ as the basis of mutual trust and the role of the UK:

\ldots the Americans very much work on, who they know, do they trust somebody, is he of the right calibre for them to work with. So I forged quite a good relationship with him, and, in fact, he jokingly used to call me his deputy commander and I was very much seen by the Americans as the UK's global combatant commander.\textsuperscript{1373}

\textsuperscript{1369} Ibid. David Petraeus Q199
\textsuperscript{1370} https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf
\textsuperscript{1373} Reith.
A UK military contingent was assumed from the outset, with the UK allocated specific invasion objectives. The Australian team headed by Gillespie that had been in place for the Afghan invasion was reconstituted and sent back to CENTCOM to participate in the planning. The Australians had firmly established themselves as trusted allies within the Anglospheric security community.

For domestic public opinion reasons, the Canadian Government publicly announced they would not participate in the invasion of Iraq. In an article debunking Canada’s supposed non-participation, the Canadian current affairs publication, *Macleans* asserted,

> From the very first days of the U.S.-led Iraq war, Canadians have been deeply involved: setting up crime-fighting units, working as engineers with coalition forces, serving with the UN, flying planes that help guide missile attacks, even fighting.

Canadian involvement was disguised under cover of the ongoing Afghan Operation Enduring Freedom deployment. Canadian Commodore, Roger Girouard was placed in command of all allied Task Force ships and given responsibility for escorting the US led naval invasion force through the Straits. Help “at the margins” also involved the continued deployment of Canadian exchange personnel serving in the Australian, UK and US militaries including senior Canadian officers serving on the invasion planning group based in Kuwait. After the invasion, more Canadian military personnel participated in the conflict. Canadian Generals served as senior commanders from 2003 onwards and in periods when Canada was not officially involved. This included General Walt Natynczyk who received the Canadian

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1379 Generals Walt Natynczyk, Peter Devlin, Nicolas Matern
Meritorious Service Cross for “a pivotal role” and a “tremendous contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

NZ adopted a similar tactic to Canada, continuing to operate military assets under the Afghan Enduring Freedom ‘banner.’ Aside from existing naval assets in the theatre, NZ committed its Orion spy plane. NZ contributions continued under the Phase 2 Iraqi operation usually attached to UK or Australian units, during which the UK Defence Secretary appealed for NZ Training support as part of a mission “to be led by English-speaking nations.” He added,

> We work well together. We've got good operability. It makes it less complicated… Frankly, we've got used to New Zealand being there alongside us, alongside the US, the UK, Australia, as part of the family.

In the post-invasion phase, and once there were appropriate NATO and UN mandates, all Anglosphere core forces were involved in Iraq. By 2003 there appeared to be a clear ranking of all the multinational allies within the wider coalition. An analysis of coalition cooperation concluded there was a series of concentric circles of access, with the US at the centre position. The UK occupied the circle closest to the US, followed by other ‘anglo-sphere’ nations, other NATO states, and then the rest of the coalition.

5.2.5 War on Terror: interoperability and relationships

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1381 "Orion to Boost Nz's Effort in War on Terror," NZ Herald, March 6 2003.
1382 Audrey Young, "NZ Asked by Britain to Send 100 Soldiers to Help Train Iraqis," ibid., February 4 2015.
1384 Mitchell, 60.
Another feature of the War on Terror conflicts has been the large-scale participation of military personnel on exchange programmes with the US-UK militaries in combat operations. Canada, supposedly not involved, sanctioned the involvement of 100 plus military personnel to be engaged in combat operations.1385 According to allegations in the NZ House of Representatives, there is a continent of NZ SAS integrated in the UK SAS on a permanent ‘training’ basis.1386 In terms of military command operations, Canadian and UK Task force HQ’s were collocated with US CENTCOM HQ in Florida.1387 Australia had liaison officers and embedded officers in CENTCOM and the Pentagon. The allied decision to utilise NATO for the post-invasion pacifying operations in Afghanistan and Iraq presented something of a problem for Australia, which found itself making ad hoc arrangements with Brussels based command structures. This provided the impetus for the future integration of Australia (2013) and NZ1388 (2012) into NATO via individual agreements as ‘Strategic Partners.’1389 Australia and NZ now had two routes into NATO; the Anglosphere military fora that established interoperability standards adopted by NATO, and subsequently inclusion on planning aspects by virtue of Strategic Partner status.

The lessons of Afghanistan resulted in improved interoperability ensuring, “advances in synchronicity, simultaneity, speed, ‘jointness’, and combined arms all interacted to give the United States, Britain, Australia and the other members of the Coalition the equivalent of 'decisive force,' for the Iraqi conflict."1390

The Afghan and Iraqi conflicts also acted as a catalyst for greater integration of intelligence systems to ensure more effective strategic and tactical decision-making and tracking. The embedding of intelligence staff during these conflicts was and remains...

1387 Benjamin S Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Rand Corporation, 2001), 118.
widespread. In addition to these activities, the US and UK became joined in drone strike activity, working from joint bases in the UK and the US. RAF personnel operate Reaper drones from the Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. There have been UK-US drone attacks in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. An MoU between the US and UK gives each the authority to operate each other’s drones. The level of interoperability is such that UK drone operators can handover to a US operator mid-flight and vice versa. The intelligence for drone strikes is regularly provided by the Five Eyes SIGINT operations. In addition, unmanned drones feed back intelligence to the Five Eyes intelligence agencies. Thus although, for example, Canada was not actually manning drones, Canadian assets were being used to provide the intelligence for drone strikes.

The conflicts have also driven the research and development agenda of the various military and technical Anglosphere core security community fora. Battlefield conditions demonstrated that not all intelligence systems of member states were compatible with national or transnational Anglosphere core systems, revealing the need for a so-called ‘Netcentric solution’ and the need for ‘jointness’ for the Anglosphere core forces.

The War on Terror created and extended Anglospheric security community's military interaction, intensifying feelings of fellowship through common endeavours. Throughout this period, senior officers were embedded in one another’s services and would, unless explicitly barred, serve and command in these conflict situations. Of critical importance, both to military effectiveness and the concept of a ‘living’ security community, is the social aspect of interoperability. Air Commodore Chris Westwood of the Royal Australian Air Force makes the point.

When people talk interoperability, they often think immediately about the technical interoperability, but personally I think the technical interoperability is actually the

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1391 For example see: Blaxland, 209.
1394 Anthony H Cordesman, The Intelligence Lessons of the Iraq War (S) (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 14-15 & 35.
1395 Blaxland, 12.
The human side of interoperability which is the most important… It’s about technology, it’s about doctrine, but most of all, it is about relationships.1396

This is a point made by Paul Mitchell’s research into Anglosphere command and communications systems during naval operations during conflict in the Gulf. Mitchell refers to the ‘human loop’ stressing, “the human element was often decisive in making the growing electronic environment effective.”1397

The impact of ongoing joint operations in battle conditions has been to strengthen the social glue to include not just high-ranking policy-makers but rank-and-file personnel too. The pursuit of interoperability and its test in combat has created trust, cohesion and common identity. The social implications of interoperability during Operation Iraqi Freedom are explored in detail by Steven Paget, who stresses the importance of “human and cultural factors” as “glue” that ensured the Australian, UK and US navies were able to operate together.1398

The level of military interaction is, of course, not restricted to participation in conflicts and joint exercises but is also reflected postings to joint bases, military missions in one another’s capitals and working on joint projects. So, for example, the numbers of UK military personnel posted to the US is sufficiently large to justify having its own “UK Military and Defence Staff in the US” support facilities1399. This includes provision for families and a twitter feed for communication.1400 A cursory glance at internal military newsletters affirms the strong social bonds and ‘we-ness’ engendered by these postings and exchanges.1401

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1397 Mitchell, 65.


1401 Santa Gurung, "Exercise Anzac Reflect," The Wire, August 2015, 43.
5.3. The ‘Five Eyes’ Military Fora Community

5.3.1 Introduction

This section provides a brief overview of the evolution of the military fora that had originally started off as bilateral UK-US or tripartite CANUKUS institutions. The post-Cold War conflicts and in particular the War on Terror had accelerated the development of these fora so that by 2018 they were all fully quintilateral. There was not only a deepening of existing military fora but an expansion to address military functions not covered by the existing institutions. In examining these developments, this section seeks to provide an oversight of the status of each of the fora and provide a brief overview of their function and structure by way of illustrating the growing sense of ‘we-ness’ involving ever-increasing numbers of personnel.

An additional important feature has been the formation of new, bilateral defence arrangements between the Anglosphere core members reflecting deepening relationships within the security community. In contrast to the previous period examined between 1957 and 1991, the post-millennium period has seen the UK and Canada increase their presence in the Pacific region largely in response to the threat represented by the PRC.

5.3.2 Anglosphere core bilateral defence strengthening

An overview of bilateral arrangements between the individual Anglosphere core members reveals a general ‘firming up’ on aspects of defence related collaboration. All five Anglosphere core members participate in regular exercises hosted by Canada. There is a pronounced Antipodean emphasis to new arrangements. In November 2011 the US declared it would seek to play a larger role in the Pacific and announced new arrangements with Australia to further align the two state's militaries. This culminated in a 'Joint Posture

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1402 Third parties are sometimes invited. See: David Pugliese, "5,000 Soldiers from Petawawa, the U.S., Australia, UK and NZ to Begin Major Exercise.," Ottawa Citizen, May 12 2017.
1403 Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament" (paper presented at the Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, November 17 2011).
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Agreement' constituting an over-arching framework for still deeper ties, covering missile, US Marine and naval deployments to new Australian bases.\textsuperscript{1404}

The reinvigorated AUS-US relationship was symptomatic of a series of other Anglosphere core bilateral agreements already in play. Of prime importance was the resurrection of the UK-US 'Combined Chiefs of Staff' in 2012, signalling a return to more coordinated UK-US military planning in non-NATO areas.\textsuperscript{1405} It was the absence of such high-level military planning fora that contributed to UK-US dysfunction in SE Asia during the Cold War period.

The UK's renewed role in the Pacific is reflected in new institutional arrangements, including the AUKMIN (ministerial forum) and a new AUS-UK Defence and Security Agreement that provides a new collaborative framework.\textsuperscript{1406} This Defence Treaty seeks to build upon joint participation in existing Anglospheric arrangements including FPDA, the military fora, Five Eyes intelligence, research and exercises.\textsuperscript{1407} The Treaty steps up the existing annual (Exercise Long Look) exchange of military personnel between the UK, Australia and NZ.\textsuperscript{1408} The 2013 AUS-UK Defence Treaty also hinted at a deeper relationship in respect of shared development of advanced military equipment.\textsuperscript{1409} Thus, in 2020 Australia and the UK announced an MoU to jointly build and develop the next generation of AUSUK navies frigates.\textsuperscript{1410}

\textsuperscript{1407} UK-Australia Defence & Security Treaty, (January 18 2013), Article 2.
\textsuperscript{1409} Ibid. UK-Australia Defence & Security Treaty
5.3.3 Anglosphere core trilateral defence strengthening

The UK has acted in concert with the US and Australia, moving to reassert its presence in the region and envisages using facilities in Singapore, Brunei and Australia to accommodate US and UK aircraft carriers and establish bases for AUSUKUS expeditionary strike groups.\textsuperscript{1411} Construction and expansion of such bases are underway in Darwin to accommodate the Anglospheric security community's Indo-Pacific projection.\textsuperscript{1412}

On September 15, 2021, these ties were reinforced the by announcement of an “enhanced trilateral security partnership” styled 'AUKUS', between Australia, UK, and the US.\textsuperscript{1413} AUKUS attracted widespread world attention, principally because of the cancellation of a non-nuclear submarine contract with France but also because of the clear Anglospheric challenge to the PRC.

Media coverage of the AUKUS security partnership has tended to highlight the granting of Australian access to technology for the planned deployment of eight nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines. Sharing of nuclear propulsion technology is not undertaken lightly and is indicative of enduring high levels of trust. As discussed the UK has been the only recipient of such US technology previously. The US has referred to a "one-off" transfer but there is a strong possibility that it may be "Britain actually supplying the technology, with America’s blessing and support."\textsuperscript{1414} In this sense, the arrangement would be similar to the limited Rickover transfer to the UK aiming to encourage domestic expertise and the creation of a supporting industrial infrastructure. To facilitate this in Australia, the UK is likely to

\textsuperscript{1413} “UK, US & Australia launch new security partnership.” September, 15 2021 Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street. London
\textsuperscript{1414} "What Does the Australian Submarine Deal Mean for Non-Proliferation? ," Economist, September 17 2021.
provide ongoing "assistance with reactor technology, submariner training and possibly design elements from the Royal Navy’s Astute-class SSNs."

The focus on the submarine aspect of the AUKUS partnership has obscured the wider and deeper meaning of the arrangement. The agreement identifies a range of emerging technologies as first-order national security issues. It seeks to ensure areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing are not only advanced, but decoupled from any dependency on the PRC. Tom Tugendhat, chair of the UK Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee said

Bringing together the military industrial complex of these three allies together is a step change in the relationship. We’ve always been interoperable, but this aims at much more. From artificial intelligence to advanced technology, the US, UK and Australia will now be able to cost save by increasing platform sharing and innovation costs. Particularly for the smaller two, that’s game-changing.

Thus, Australia is seeking support and technical expertise from its two Anglosphere partners to develop a manufacturing base to develop a "Sovereign Guided Weapons" capability and manufacture long-range strike missiles. There will be likely cooperation with the UK and US to produce large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to operate in tandem with manned platforms for intelligence missions.

The AUKUS arrangement excluded Canada. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau pointed to the emphasis on nuclear submarines as being an area that Canada could not contribute to, but ignored the other collaborative aspects. Canadian opposition leaders, both memetic Anglosaxons, have demanded that Trudeau take steps to join. Jagmeet Singh, the NPD Party leader, stated "the pact seems like a potential avenue to add more pressure [on China]. Canada was

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absent,” and Conservative Party Leader Erin O’Toole stating, “Canada’s voice has been absent Mr. Trudeau. We should be leaders for our values.”

Historically, Canada’s military focus has been on the Atlantic, but this has been a perceptible shift with Canada participating in quadrilateral Pacific activities alongside Anglosphere core partners. The signing of the ‘Canada-US Asia Pacific Defense Policy Cooperation Framework’ as part of the PJBD remit aims to facilitate CANUS reinforcing actions with regional third party allies. Of particular note are the plans to replace the NORAD system necessitated by technological obsolescence, but also the impact of climate change on the Arctic as a security zone.

The Arctic is particularly problematic for Canada since the projected ice melt exposes its northern frontier to potential incursion. It has a bearing on the Pacific too since it opens up the possibility of new strategic shipping routes from the Atlantic to the Pacific, offering an alternative to the Suez route and links to Australia and NZ. The effect is to reemphasis the strategic importance of ‘choke points’ that stretch from the US Pacific (Bering Sea) Aleutian Islands off Alaska to the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap near the UK Shetland and Orkney Islands. The perceived regional threat from Russian activity has now been elevated by concerns relating to state sponsored PRC activity. This has taken the form of Chinese commercial projects in Greenland with strategic implications.


The Canadian response to these changing circumstances has been somewhat half-hearted given fears of US dominance in a sovereign region of Canada. A Canadian led project seeks to develop an air and maritime monitoring system developed in collaboration with the other four Anglosphere core members. However, that does not address the issue of how Russian underwater incursions can be countered without assistance. It is possible that the UK can adopt the ‘golden hinge’ role to act as facilitator between Canada and the US. Indeed, there have been authoritative reports that the UK offered to join with Canada in cold-weather exercises “and bring in some of its more advanced capabilities — such as nuclear-powered submarines — to help with surveillance and defence in the Far North.”

There is a significant body of domestic opinion that Canada needs to set out some strategic objectives and then consider joining AUKUS or AUKUS type arrangement.

…many of the areas of AUKUS attention—from quantum computing to underwater surveillance—have long been high priorities for Canada. In fact, nuclear submarines, with their ability to remain underwater for long periods of time, have featured on Canada’s naval wish list, too: for example, in 1987, our White Paper on Defence included a proposal to acquire twelve of them for use under the Arctic ice. So actually, CAUKUS might not sound like such a bad idea after all…

The other aspect of the AUKUS partnership is its impact on NZ. The prospect of Australian nuclear propelled submarines challenges its nuclear free policy. Superficially, this might suggest that NZ feels obliged to become an outlier member of the Anglosphere core. In reality, the long lead time before an Australian nuclear submarine force is launched, enables NZ to virtue signal its 'moral' stance until then. The NZ ban on nuclear-powered ships and

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armaments constitute little more than a mutual ritual stance for public consumption with little practical significance in peace-time.\textsuperscript{1426} In any case the assumption that nuclear-powered vessels are undesirable compared to say a fleet of ships and submarines powered by 'dirty' diesel is already being questioned.\textsuperscript{1427}

Those considerations aside, some policy-makers in Wellington are suggesting NZ could be "involved in other parts of the [AUKUS] architecture."\textsuperscript{1428} Indeed, this was a point made by retiring UK Chief of Staff, General Nick Carter who suggested that AUKUS was “not designed to be exclusive” and could include NZ.\textsuperscript{1429}

In fact, there has been a deepening of ties between NZ and the US, reversing the standoff after the ANZUS - nuclear status disagreements that curtailed military cooperation.

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Table 7 Anglosphere Core Bilateral Military Arrangements between 1992-2019


\textsuperscript{1429} Sir Nicholas Carter, interview by Stacie Pettyjohn, October 19, 2021.
A new Strategic Partnership in 2010 rapidly evolved into a formal NZ-US defence agreement in 2012.\textsuperscript{1430} In reality, joint land exercises preceded these agreements but are fully extended to all other services and are accompanied by senior command level discussions.\textsuperscript{1431}

5.3.4 Extension of Anglosphere core military fora

The military fora bring together thousands of military and research personnel on an ongoing basis in the form of management structures, various projects and working groups. As detailed, these have their origins in the military establishment's initiative in the late 1940s as tripartite institutions, but had become quintilateral by 1991 with the exception of the ABCA Armies, of which NZ was only an observer. The process of NZ inclusion into these fora was completed with its full admission to the ABCA Armies Programme (renamed ABCANZ) in 2006.\textsuperscript{1432}

With most military functions already covered by the established fora, there was limited scope for new military fora. There were however, two fora additions reflecting the need to address technological innovations in the field of IT defence, and collaboration on logistical capability to facilitate enhanced global projection of military force.


Three new quintilateral fora came into existence after the Cold War, providing further specialisation and functional coverage, as detailed in Table 8. A fourth, the QCJWC was created to create a Five Eyes “community of war fighting practitioners with shared values and interests.”

Reflecting greater technological changes, the ICCWG operates as a specialist off-shoot of the CCEB. The QLF was created to enhance the operation of the Anglosphere Core members “as integrated units when operating in a multinational coalition or NATO context.”

A number of factors combined to increase the scope of functions undertaken by the original fora, some driven by technology such as the securitisation of space (e.g. satellites), weapons (e.g. drones) and communications (e.g. networks and command systems), and others driven by geopolitical factors such as 9/11 and the PRC. Thus, for example, the ASIC documentation reveals it extended its organisation and remit “in order to remain valid in a post-Cold War, post ‘9/11’ international security environment.” The CCEB reported that security threats and conflict events in the 1990s led to the revitalisation of operations and measures to ensure Anglosphere Core standards and procedures were adopted by other allies.

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5.3.5 Anglosphere military operating fora

The military fora provide a framework for the Anglospheric core militaries to initiate research and implement policy outcomes. Each of these fora exhibit a well-established and similar management hierarchy, with representatives from each core member state operating from a US HQ. For example, the ASIC is headed by a Management Committee consisting of five National Directors and a rotating chairmanship and sitting in ‘permanent session’ at HQ USAF in the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{1437} Likewise, the ABCANZ Armies is headed by a Board of Directors overseeing an Executive Council consisting of a Chief of staff and five Vice/Deputy Chiefs of staff.\textsuperscript{1438} Similarly, the CCEB features a significant Washington-based operation with a CCEB Board consisting “of a senior Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) representative from each of the member nations” and supported by ‘national’ staff and a permanent secretary.\textsuperscript{1439} Other fora including the QLF,\textsuperscript{1440} the TTCP,\textsuperscript{1441} and the Five Eyes Navies\textsuperscript{1442} feature similar structures.

The reach of the military fora extends beyond the military policy-establishment involving personnel in an extensive network of projects and tasks standing groups. For example, the ASIC management oversees numerous Working Groups whose titles provide an insight as to their remit. Examples include Agile Combat Support (ACS), Air Mobility (AM), Aerospace Medical Group (ASMG), Command/Control & Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2&ISR), Force Application (FA), Force Protection (FP), and Fuels Group (FG).\textsuperscript{1443} The CCEB operates standing ‘Working Groups’ and ‘Tiger Teams’ to address specific issues. In 2012 there were five standing Working Groups, one producing standardisation instructions (known as Allied Communications Publications or ACP’s), the remainder dealing with developing common cyber-communications architecture.\textsuperscript{1444}

\textsuperscript{1436} JA Lt. Cmdr Stott, Communications Instructions General. Acp 121 (H) (Combined Communications Electronics Board, 2007).
\textsuperscript{1437} England, 28.
\textsuperscript{1440} US JCS, 3.
\textsuperscript{1443} See: England.
\textsuperscript{1444} ABCA Armies, 39.
Overall, these activities involve military Anglosphere core personnel in frequent, ongoing contact with their quintilateral colleagues. An answer to a question in New Zealand parliament concerning the attendance by senior representatives of the Defence Force of these fora, provides an insight as to the scale of collaboration. The tabulated reply runs to ten A4 pages of meetings relating to ABCA Armies, nine pages to AUSCANNZUKUS navies, three pages to ASIC air force, three pages to the CCEB activities and one page relating to ICCWG activities, totalling more than one hundred and fifty meetings over two years. These demonstrate a serious and sustained pattern of interaction.\(^{1445}\) In addition to these standing interactions, the military fora engage in large-scale military exercises to test new weapons, doctrines, IT systems and other enhancements developed by the other fora.\(^{1446}\)

5.3.6 Anglosphere military research collaboration fora

The TTCP constitutes the most comprehensive and largest collaborative defence science and technology programme in the world.\(^ {1447}\) As such, it functions as the Research and Development operation of the Anglosphere core bringing together military specialists and private companies to research and develop new weapons and systems.\(^ {1448}\)

In 1995, the TTCP parties signed a revamped MoU at Melbourne committing themselves to continued collaboration in Non-Atomic Military Research and Development (NAMRAD) to establish harmonisation, alignment and sharing of research.\(^ {1449}\) The role and scope of the TTCP places it at the cutting edge of military technological innovation and, as such, is

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\(^{1447}\) George Galdorisi and Darren Sutton, "Commonwealth Naval Cooperation: Are We Ready for the Next 100 Years?," in The 2009 ‘King-Hall’ Naval History Conference (Canberra: RAN, 2009), 16-19.

\(^{1448}\) ABCA Armies, 49-50.

involved in highly sensitive research. The TTCP acts to coordinate the Anglosphere core security community’s response to emergent threats.\textsuperscript{1450}

TTCP activities are expansive and divided into a ten [Operating] Groups, divided into further Action Groups and Technical Panels.\textsuperscript{1451} Again, for the purposes of appreciating the scale of these operations, each Action Group is headed by a chairman with around twenty-five academic and military personnel from the member states. An example is detailed in a 1980 edition of the US Army R&D magazine that refers to a British Porton Down physicist who had served as the UK’s TTCP representative, joining a UK-US research initiative at the US Army Armament Command’s Chemical Systems Laboratory.\textsuperscript{1452}

5.3.7 Inculcating Anglosphere core interoperability standards

The Anglosphere Core military fora’s work on interoperability is promoted as a standard to be adopted by other allies, including all NATO members. For example, the CCEB establishes “combined operations C-E policies, doctrines and operating methods and procedures.” The C-E Policies unanimously agreed by the five states are published in the form of ‘Allied Communications Publications (ACP’s) for “universal” application. The ACP policies are “generally adopted by NATO and used world-wide.”\textsuperscript{1453} In other words, these Anglosphere core standards are introduced to other alliance partners to form the basis of joint exercises. An October 2010 ACP (ACP 121 (I)) provides an example of policy implementation stating that the promulgation is issued under “the direction the CCEB Principals” and “is effective on receipt for CCEB nations and when directed by the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM) for NATO Nations and Strategic Commands.”\textsuperscript{1454} The

\textsuperscript{1451} ABCA Armies, 49-50.
\textsuperscript{1452} Porton Down the UK’s military 7,000-acre R&D site near Salisbury. For this and numerous examples of R&D collaboration see: "US-UK Study New Contaminant Detection Concepts," \textit{Army RD&A}, July-August 1980, 7.
\textsuperscript{1453} See: C.E Lt General McKnight, \textit{Military Communications Electronics Board Booklet April 1987} (1987).
\textsuperscript{1454} Foster P Major, Cceb Letter of Promulgation for Acp 121 (I), Communications Instructions General (2010).
2012 Multifora Handbook states “NATO and many other nations have come to depend upon ACPs for their communication operations.”

The QCJWC performs a similar function whereby a common Anglospheric ‘line’ appears to be discussed before NATO discussions on doctrine and ‘Lessons Learned’ meetings. Although not members, Australia and NZ (as Strategic Partners) attend the NATO Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group meetings. Thereafter, Australia and NZ adopt NATO publications on doctrines. These joint doctrines are then used as templates for bilateral arrangements with other allies, thereby ensuring a degree of Anglosphere core interoperability. This is particularly relevant to the Pacific, where Anglosphere core members are both deepening existing military arrangements with third parties or forging new ones. In another example of Anglosphere core lead influence, the Anglospheric security community's military fora decide on the ‘reporting’ codenames of new enemy weapons thereafter adopted by NATO. One recent example was the ASIC designation of the Russian Su-57 as “FELON” now applied across NATO and allied forces.

5.3.8 Trust and esprit de corps

The effect of sustained interaction via conferences and project Working Groups provide examples of strong social relationships developing amongst the Anglosphere core's military personnel participants. Following one such ‘Five Eyes Navies’ meetings of senior Flag Officers in 2014, a Canadian Admiral observed,

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1455 ABCA Armies, 39.
1458 QCJWC, E4-4.
You can surge forces during times of crisis, but you can’t surge trust. And the trust we’ve established here amongst ourselves is very important.\textsuperscript{1461}

ABCA Armies social media postings by constituent Anglosphere core armies and their personnel illustrate the level of human interaction and trust-deepening patterns that enduring collaboration facilitates.\textsuperscript{1462} The large number of working groups suggests ABCA Armies involve considerable numbers of personnel across a range of ranks. These ongoing interactions on common initiatives and tasks are likely to strengthen the sense of community at personal and professional levels.

The role of embedded troops has become more significant, involving not just lower ranks, but senior command positions. This has included an Australian army general, based in Hawaii, with direct command of US troops.\textsuperscript{1463} Higher ranks serve in US Central Command and Indo-Pacific Command and Canadian Generals are embedded in the office of Chairman of the US JCS, US Cyber Command, and serve as deputy commanders of various US Corps. Some 1,000 Canadian personnel defence officials serve in a variety of US bases. The US also has senior officers serving in Winnipeg, Ottawa, Halifax and Victoria and other Canadian states.\textsuperscript{1464}

In 2012 President Obama and the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron signed off still closer arrangements, announcing, “by working together more closely, we set an example to others and provide a basis for further collaboration with our Allies and partners.”\textsuperscript{1465} The Press release touches upon the extraordinary extent of cross collaboration involving thousands of personnel of all ranks, serving in all manner of positions, within units or operating bases and in one another’s military academies.

\textsuperscript{1461} Jamie Cook, "Five Eyes: Naval Flag Officers Gather for Talks," \textit{Lookout}, November 3 2014.
\textsuperscript{1462} "ABCANZ Armies, Twitter," https://twitter.com/hashtag/abcanz.
At every level of our defense establishments British and American service men and women train together, learn together, develop capability together and, when called upon, fight together.1466

In September 2020, the principle of interoperability advanced a stage further with the announcement that the newly deployed UK aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth would include a significant US element on board. This consisted of the placement of a US Marine Fighter attack squadron with aviation US Navy sailors on the aircraft carrier as part of an ongoing interoperability exercise establishing “a level of trust and collaboration that goes beyond any other partnership in the world.”1467 This announcement was followed by the announcement that the US Marine fighter squadron will remain as an integral part of the aircraft carrier’s complement.1468 The development is significant in that the integration of UK-US elements as a fighting unit promotes an identity “expressed through the merging of efforts”. That is to say, “the use of force shifts from the [national units] to the collectivity of sovereign states… against external threats.”1469 This is a remarkable state of affairs. The flagship of the Royal Navy is a transnational fighting unit and, as such, is not just a symbolic representation but the embodiment of a unity of purpose that suggests a UK conflict is a US conflict. In another Falklands situation, there would be no need to mobilise US Navy support, as their personnel would already be on the UK flagship.

The esprit de corps has given rise to the increasing use of logos contributing, to the notion of a binding and exclusive sense of community. (Table 9 below) Logos are relevant to the notion of ‘social glue’ that business study theory contends is an important factor in determining the success of international Joint Ventures as covered in the previous section. In business studies, the significance of logos is recognised an essential element of the corporate identity mix: symbols, communications and behaviour.1470

1466 Ibid.
1469 Adler and Barnett, 62, 56.
Symbols are explained by reference to anthropology and are a social construct said to represent underlying values and assumptions and assist in integrating cognition and behaviour into shared codes.
Symbols are integral to organisational life. They are not simply by-products of organisation; rather they are elements that structure member’s active construction of sense, knowledge, and behaviour.\textsuperscript{1471}

In short, organisational symbols are intended to and do engender what the organisational theorist Cees van Riel confirmed as a “we feeling.”\textsuperscript{1472} Artificial symbols are not likely to mean very much if there is a lack of existing commonality. Adler and Barnett refer to myths and symbols working in conjunction together. These military symbols might appear inconsequential but arise from a communal identity based on values with a heritage.

Keep in mind that collective identities entail that people not only identify (positively) with other people's fate but, also, identify themselves, and those other people, as a group in relation to other groups. Such identities are likely to be reinforced by symbols and myths that serve to define the group and its boundaries.\textsuperscript{1473}

5.4. Communal Intelligence

5.4.1 Introduction

The demands of the War on Terror accelerated the scope of intelligence activity and collaboration expanding beyond SIGINT to include all aspects of intelligence, creating a more institutionalised transnational intelligence community. These intelligence-based operations entered public consciousness following Edward Snowden's disclosures of what became known as 'Five Eyes’ agreement'.

5.4.2 Out of the shadows

One effect of 9/11 was to increase the demands on the various intelligence services in the battle to counter terrorism and coordinate responses.\textsuperscript{1474} This has been enhanced by the perceived threat of the PRC and has ensured the growth in scope of intelligence functions and

\textsuperscript{1471} Neal M Ashkanasy, Celeste PM Wilderom, and Mark F Peterson, Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate (Sage, 2004), 72-73.
\textsuperscript{1473} Adler and Barnett, 62, 47.
\textsuperscript{1474} "Testing Intelligence," The Economist, October 6 2001.
transnational cooperation. The existence and scale of these operations have only comparatively recently become apparent. Until 2010, the UK-USA Agreement was hidden, and its supposed existence considered the stuff of conspiracy theory. The existence of a secret and intrusive Anglospheric ‘Echelon’ SIGINT program was alleged by investigative journalists in the UK, NZ and the US and began to gain traction in the 1990s. This led the European Parliament to undertake enquiries and affirm the Echelon system was a reality, a conclusion confirmed by leading EU member state governments.

Any doubts as to the existence and scope of an Anglospheric SIGINT programme were dispelled when in 2013, former CIA operative, Edward Snowden leaked a tranche of classified documents casting light on “a supra-national intelligence organization.” The leaked documents are imprinted with a ‘For Five Eyes Only' security classification abbreviated to FVEY. As explained earlier, the moniker ‘Five Eyes’ and FEVY have entered popular usage and have been adopted by the Anglosphere core intelligence community itself as a descriptive label.

5.4.3 The Intelligence Community

The term “Five Eyes Intelligence Community” has now become a ‘catch-all’ for a confusing array of national intelligence agencies that cover more than just the SIGINT

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1475 The Economist described Echelon as a focus for “conspiracy theorists and campaigners for civil liberties.” "Those Perfidious Anglo Spies," The Economist (2000).
1477 Hager, Secret Power.
1479 Hager, Secret Power.
arrangement.\textsuperscript{1483} In terms of cooperation and intimacy, this wider intelligence community conjoined the US with the quadrilateral Commonwealth JIC Bureaux arrangements, placing the US centre-stage. One element was an informal quintilateral body called ‘CAZAB’ established in 1964 by James Angleton, the CIA Chief of Counterintelligence.\textsuperscript{1484} Led by the CIA, it acted as an exclusive Anglosphere Core forum for the various counterintelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{1485}

The various heads of the intelligence services meet regularly with their Anglosphere core opposites to coordinate activity. The post-9/11 built upon a system whereby a collective Five Eyes intelligence assessment on international matters was presented to the Anglospheric core policy-establishments on a regular basis. Thus, for example, Margaret Thatcher on assuming the UK premiership was briefed on intelligence and security matters by the UK Joint Intelligence Committee as part of its ‘assessment’ brief. The UK Government records note, Also in attendance, as was normal, were representatives of the UK’s closest allies, who were present for the discussion of current intelligence and then withdrew.\textsuperscript{1486}

This account would confirm the reports made by a former investigative journalist that a CIA representative attends UK JIC meetings.\textsuperscript{1487} Cox describes the Anglospheric core's national assessment community as “professionally tight, bound by gravities of trust and confidence” and points to working level practices that display routine collaboration and “a habit of analytical consultation.”\textsuperscript{1488}

The role of national assessment took centre stage in the various twenty-first century conflicts. Prior to the trilateral CANUKUS bombing of Iraq during the Clinton

\textsuperscript{1484} West, \textit{Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence}, 49.
\textsuperscript{1485} Rimington, 143-44.
\textsuperscript{1488} James Samuel Cox, \textit{Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community} (Citeseer, 2013), 8.
Administration in December 1998, the fusion of UK-US intelligence produced a common perspective.\footnote{Robin Cook, "Why It Is in the Interests of the Iraqi People to Bomb Saddam," \textit{Telegraph}, February 20 2001.} The then UK Foreign Secretary in endorsing the bombing noted in evidence

\begin{quote}
The United States and the United Kingdom have a unique intelligence relationship which has probably never existed in any period of history, in which on our side we have full transparency and we strive to secure full transparency on their side. Therefore, it is often difficult when you look at intelligence assessments to spot which raw data was originally gathered by the United Kingdom and which was originally gathered by the United States.\footnote{Robin Cook. “Oral evidence. Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Tuesday 17 June 2003.” HC Q33.}
\end{quote}

Since the Snowden disclosures, there has been a greater willingness for Anglospheric core governments to acknowledge the existence of these relationships and adopt the term ‘Five Eyes’ as the name of the alliance. In 2014, Australia became the first Anglospheric core member to refer explicitly to the alliance when Prime Minister Tony Abbott referred to a “Five Eyes intelligence partnership” during a radio interview.\footnote{Tony Abbot (Prime Minister). “Interview with James Glenday,” \textit{ABC AM}. June 13, 2014. Transcript ID: 23571 Aus. Gov. Dept. PM & Cabinet.} This was followed by the first official written reference of a “Five eyes Intelligence community” in the 2016 Australian Defence White Paper.\footnote{Australian DoD, "Defence White Paper," (Canberra2016), 122. See also comments by the Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council 2009-14. Chris Kojm, "Intelligence Integration & Reform," in \textit{Truth to Power: A History of the US National Intelligence Council}, ed. Robert Hutchings and Gregory F Treverton (Oxford University Press, 2019), 175.} The public announcement of a transnational “Five Eyes” oversight committee by all five Anglosphere core members (see Table 10) was not only an acknowledgement of the name and the existence of such a network, but an attempt by the political policy-establishment to exert some oversight over intelligence activities.\footnote{US NCSC, "Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council," \textit{Office of DNI} (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/ICIG/Documents/Partnerships/FIORC/signed%20FIORC%20Charter%20with%20Line.pdf.}
Table 10 The Five Eyes Intelligence Community & FiORC
5.4.4 Intelligence interoperability

The Snowden disclosures also provide an insight into the scale of interaction, with Five Eyes SIGINT ‘Liaison officers’ posted to each member’s capital city and who are in daily contact with their Anglospheric core counterparts.¹⁴⁹⁴ Nor is this collaboration limited to placements of senior staff to capital cities. Large numbers of personnel are deployed in joint bases and embedded in joint working groups in each other’s territories. As an example, the NSA had sixteen Liaison officers based in Canberra to work with the Australian DSD and NZ GCSB.¹⁴⁹⁵ The growth in US personnel at the Pine Gap base is also indicative of greater cooperation and collective action. In 1968, the US provided 12 of the 95 staff, by 2015, there were 800 staff of which half were US personnel.¹⁴⁹⁶ Aside from the level of trust this signifies, the social outcomes are shared outlooks and abiding friendships.¹⁴⁹⁷ In addition to intelligence personnel working alongside one another, there are frequent meetings between the SIGINT agencies and other intelligence agencies under the Five Eyes umbrella.¹⁴⁹⁸

The posting of intelligence ‘Liaison Officers’ is not limited to SIGINT or assessment staff, but extends to the other agencies too, including the defence-led intelligence agencies. The various conflicts fought under the label ‘War on Terror’ have put a premium on intelligence interoperability and cooperation, whether in the form of HUMINT, SIGINT or new developing forms of intelligence such as Geospatial Intelligence and Counter Terrorism coordination. In a very real sense, these intelligence agencies are at war, providing the

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intelligence for the targeting of enemy combatants and assets by drones, missiles and special forces personnel.1499

In addition to these intelligence agencies, the post-9/11 period has seen a securitisation of a range of non-military issues and the creation of a series of new (non-military) transnational Anglosphere organisations. The focus and remit of these new organisations operate within the securitisation paradigm established by the Five Eyes security agencies. These are examined in the following section.

5.4.5 Special partners: Europe and the Pacific

The Five Eyes intelligence partners have strong links with other allies’ SIGINT intelligence operations including the NATO allies but also Japan and South Korea. These are the so-called ‘third parties’ or ‘Tier Band’ partners. The status of these relationships depends on the level of trust and the extent information is shared. The relationship may be ‘binary’ as in a standalone relationship between a ‘Third Party’ and the Five Eyes group collectively. Alternatively, it may be a multilateral relationship, as in the one between Five Eyes collectively and a ‘collective’ of other Third Parties meeting in fora. For example, a European dimension is provided by a so-called ‘Nine Eyes’ forum founded in 1982. This is chaired by the US and consisting of the Five Eyes group plus Denmark, France, Netherlands and Norway. This grouping was extended to include third parties Germany, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Spain - the so-called “fourteen eyes” and officially referred to as “SIGINT Seniors Europe” (SSEUR). European meetings usually take place annually. The possibility of a creating a permanent collaborative space in London was suggested by the US but was rejected by the European non-Five Eyes SIGINT agencies.1500

Collaboration between the Five Eyes SIGINT partnership and other third party SIGINT agencies is an evolving process. A 2013 document leaked by Edward Snowden reveals the list

of approved third party (Tier B) SIGINT has increased.\textsuperscript{1501} Other third parties include non-European states such as Israel, Japan, South Korea, India, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the UAE. The Five Eyes SIGINT partnership created a similar forum to SSEUR for the Pacific called SIGINT Seniors Pacific (SSPAC) also chaired by the US.\textsuperscript{1502} At its inception in 2005 it consisted of Five Eyes plus South Korea, Singapore and Thailand.\textsuperscript{1503} Japan was offered membership but declined, worried that the existence of the forum might leak.\textsuperscript{1504} At some point after 2009, France joined. It was preceded by India, who following a joint US-Singaporean-NZ delegation to Delhi, agreed to join in early 2008.\textsuperscript{1505}

Of these third parties, a strong Five Eyes relationship with Singapore has developed. This reflects Singapore’s membership of the FPDA and their Anglospheric affinities.\textsuperscript{1506} Of critical importance is the city state’s advanced technological expertise and its status as the focal point for a series of undersea communication cables.\textsuperscript{1507} Singapore’s Security and Intelligence Division has intimate links with the Australian DSD. Singaporean SIGINT capability is considered the most advanced in South East Asia.\textsuperscript{1508} Given the levels of trust between Singapore and the Five Eye members, it has been claimed the relationship is approaching second party status and will create a Six Eye alliance.\textsuperscript{1509} This probably reflects a more recent change in status following allegations by two expert academics. In 2001, Desmond Ball and Ross Babbage alleged that Singapore had been spying on Australia for twenty years and had

\textsuperscript{1501} Greenwald, 123.
\textsuperscript{1506} Anglospheric in respect of use English Common Law, parliamentary system, use of English language.
\textsuperscript{1507} Philip Dorling, "Australian Spies in Global Deal to Tap Undersea Cables," \textit{The Age}, August 29 2013.
\textsuperscript{1508} "Singapore, South Korea Revealed as Five Eyes Spying Partners," \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, November 25 2013.
\textsuperscript{1509} "Is Singapore Western Intelligence’s 6th Eye?," \textit{Asia Sentinel}, December 9 2013.
infiltrated the DSD and conducted spy plane operations.\textsuperscript{1510} These allegations came out in the light of an intended state owned Singapore company takeover of an Australian communications company that would have allowed access to satellites carrying 70% of Australian secret signals traffic.\textsuperscript{1511} Government objections were dropped following an agreement with the Singaporeans in 2008 following a “Deed of Agreement” regarding accessing defence data.\textsuperscript{1512}

5.4.6 The no-spying issue

The Snowden disclosures revealed extensive spying on non-Anglosphere core allies and non-allies alike, to the chagrin of many states who might have expected to be excluded from surveillance. \textit{Le Monde}, in conjunction with Snowden, disclosed French cabinet officials such as Christine Lagarde, Emmanuel Glimet, Anne-Marie Idrac, had been targeted.\textsuperscript{1513} In Africa, surveillance extended to French embassies and African Heads of State.\textsuperscript{1514} Germany was also the target of Five Eyes surveillance.\textsuperscript{1515} The revelations led to demands for a no-spying commitment from the US, similar to what non-members believed existed between the Five Eyes members.\textsuperscript{1516} Aside from these SIGINT intercepts, Five Eyes members had engaged in ongoing and persistent spying on the non-Anglosphere allies. The exposure of a CIA Paris economic operation in 1995 created a major behind the scenes diplomatic incident.\textsuperscript{1517}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1512} "FIRB Approves Singtel Purchase of Optus," \textit{Australian Defence Magazine}. (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{1513} Simon Piel, "Britain Spied on Companies, Diplomats and Politicians in French-Speaking Africa," \textit{Le Monde}, December 8 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{1515} Wikileaks, "NSA Helped CIA Outmanoeuvre Europe on Torture," \textit{Wikileaks} (2015), https://wikileaks.org/nsa-germany/.
\item \textsuperscript{1516} "Merkel to Seek 'No Spy Deal' within EU as Well as with U.S.," \textit{Reuters}, October 25 2013.
\end{itemize}
Obama denied the US had such a no spying agreement with any other state, raising the question whether the Five Eyes community spy actually on one another.\textsuperscript{1518} Obama was being truthful, but disingenuous in asserting that a no-spying agreement between the Five Eyes members does not exist. It is clear a 'gentleman's agreement' does exist. Internal US documents reveal that Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) authorises spying on every state in the world except fellow Five Eyes members.\textsuperscript{1519} A Presidential Working Group refers to informal arrangements “with a very small number of governments,” where there are “understandings on this issue” based on, “decades of familiarity, transparency, and past performance between the relevant policy and intelligence communities.”\textsuperscript{1520} In other words, the Anglospheric security community operated on trust and informality, as difficult such a concept might be for individuals more attuned to a meme-complex that places an emphasis on legal formalities as the basis of relationships. A Canadian document confirms this interpretation, referring to “a long-standing convention” of the Anglosphere core allies not to spy on one another.\textsuperscript{1521}

The level of integrated collaboration through joint operations and systems would make it difficult if not impossible for the Anglosphere core SIGINT agencies to spy on one another. More significantly, the risk of exposure would shatter trust and the working basis of partnership. An audit of NSA operations by the US Office of the Inspector General (OIG) makes it clear that the level of integration of Five Eyes personnel in the internal workings of the agency is intimate. In fact, the perceived risk was in not integrating further and the OIG made recommendations to address this.\textsuperscript{1522}

Outside of the Anglospheric core, a ‘gentleman’s’ no-spying agreement does not exist with the possible exception of Singapore, as discussed. The documents leaked by Snowden

\textsuperscript{1518} Zeke J Miller, "Obama: "There's No Country Where We Have a No Spy Agreement."," \textit{Time}, February 11 2014.
\textsuperscript{1519} US FISC, "In the Matter of Foreign Governments, Foreign Factions, Foreign Entities and Foreign Based Political Organisations. Dni/Ag 702(G) Certification 2010-a 16 July," (Washington DC2010).
confirm a US tiered status of relationships. Below the Five Eyes group are thirty-three states that the US deems “third parties” and with whom it has varying degrees of cooperation. A third party no-spying arrangement does not exist. And third parties are sometimes caught spying on the US. For example, Germany was revealed to have spied on the US. Similar activity was pursued by France, which was found to have spied on the US, Canada, NZ, and Australia. Despite the strong US-Israeli security relationship, there are persistent cases and allegations of Israeli spying, including the Pollard case, the Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman cases, and more recent allegations. An internal US National Intelligence Estimate ranks Israel as the third most aggressive intelligence agency against the US.

### 5.5 Closer Cooperation

#### 5.5.1 Introduction

The post-9/11 period witnessed a rapid expansion of fora and institutions beyond the military and intelligence communities. When George W. Bush and Tony Blair stood together outside the President's ranch in Crawford, Texas, it marked a step change in the nature of the security community. The previous sections have examined the Anglosphere’s ability to overcome disagreements, to coalesce on key issues and act together. Referring to the UK, Bush expressed sentiments that explain and underlie the burgeoning fora.

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1523 Greenwald, 123.  
1524 Note Greenwald conflates Tier B Computer Network collaboration with Third Party Status.  
1525 Maik Baumgärtner, Martin Knobbe, and Jörg Schindler, "German Intelligence Also Snooped on White House," *Der Spiegel*, June 22 2017.  
Today, the bond between our peoples… is stronger than ever. Our nations share more than just a common language and a common history. We also share common interests and a common perspective on the important challenges of our times.\footnote{“Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair - Crawford, Texas,” news release, April 6, 2002, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020406-3.html.}

This common perspective manifested itself, not just in the deepening military and intelligence fora, but also in the growth of collaboration between all five states on an expanding range of issues throughout the following two decades. The Anglosphere core members have moved to collaborate on a number of perceived security problems, ranging from cyber threats and legal alignment to migration and socio-economic issues. The growth of exclusive quintilateral Anglospheric arrangements appears to start in 2001 with the Five Countries Conference. Following 9/11, there was a sustained expansion of standing conventions focussed on securitised issues outside of the military sphere.

5.5.2 The semi-transparent nexus

Research by Australian academic Tim Legrand into Anglospheric policy coordination produced a ground-breaking paper that revealed the existence of a web of predominantly socio-economic trans-governmental policy fora.\footnote{Timothy Legrand, "The Merry Mandarins of Windsor: Policy Transfer and Transgovernmental Networks in the Anglosphere," \textit{Policy studies} 33, no. 6 (2012): 523-40.} Further research by Legrand in 2015 identified additional fora, but transparency issues prevented Legrand from identifying the names of some organisations. As Legrand says, with little else to signify the existence of a network, the mundane moniker operates to obscure the networks. Second, even once they are identified, the networks remain opaque. The availability of information of the nature, content and outcomes of the networks is extremely limited. Few have publicly available outcome reports, and these tend to be ‘buried’ in the recesses of government web portals.\footnote{Ibid., 973-91-Table1.}

The tables below update and expand Legrand’s work in terms of additional fora, organisational names, structure and inception. The fora are subdivided into two groupings:
those with a distinctive security aspect usually involving an intelligence element and those of a more socio-economic nature, although intelligence aspects are pervasive. In both categories it is possible, if not likely, that some of these conventions are sub-groups of another and the list is almost certainly not definitive. There is a lack of transparency in respect of minutes and oversight with government press releases frequently removed from websites after short intervals. Additional tables document the known (or best known) start date, thereby illustrating the development of a nexus.

5.5.3 Civilian led security fora

There has been a steady growth in civilian-led security related fora since 2001. The civil services of the five states established the 5CC as a high-level transnational body that has in turn facilitated the formation of the other fora in conjunction with the intelligence community. The 5CC is run by “Agency Heads Committee” consisting of senior Anglosphere core interior ministry civil servants to empowered to provide “programme sign off [and] strategic direction.” As the 5CC agenda and remit expanded, a secretariat was created to that oversee the extensive array of working groups that, by 2011, had risen to eight Working Groups and four “Network” Groups.1534

In 2017, the existence of the 5CC became a little more transparent with the acknowledgement of a “Five Country Partnership,” centred on ministerial meetings to discuss migration and border security issues but stressed shared values too.

Our five-country partnership, founded after the Second World War and strengthened during the Cold War, is more relevant today than ever as we deal with the relentless threats of terrorism, violent extremism, cyber-attacks, and international instability, while retaining our deep commitment to the shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.1535

This was a reference to the Five Country Ministerial (FCM), established in 2015 to provide a degree of ministerial oversight to the expanding activities of the 5CC. The communique listed the areas the Ministers were working on that included migration, refugees, border management/security, aviation security, cybersecurity, and encryption. The role of the 5CC remained intact, controlling the FCM agenda and directing work through a revamped 5CC Agency Heads grouping referred to as ‘FCM Sherpas’, all with Director General status. Beneath the Sherpas, an enlarged Secretariat was renamed the Executive Steering Group (ESG), liaising via monthly teleconferences, and meeting in person annually. The tasks undertaken by the 5CC expanded, spawning more Working Groups and off-shoots and facilitating regular close coordination among the five state's public servants at all levels.

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<td>NZJKUS</td>
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<td>Five Country Ministerial</td>
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**Table 11 Anglosphere Core Civilian Security Fora 1992 - 2018**

Dark Grey shading signifies point at which the arrangement became quintilateral

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1536 Ibid.
1537 "Australian Senate Question 947 (Overseas Travel Undertaken)," in Home Affairs Portfolio (Canberra: Australian Parliament, 2019), 38.
1538 Ibid., 14.
Before the creation of the FCM, some ministerial input existed in the form of the Quintet of Attorneys General established in 2009 and created in response to the legal implications of the five's collaboration on diverse issues. The Quintet usually meets in tandem with the FCM. Ministers discuss a variety of security-related issues and then pass over proposed policies to the Quintet for a legal opinion and ways to adopt common positions. The latter includes obvious national security issues such as including counterterrorism, foreign investment in critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, refugee migration, visa-free travel and information sharing but also covers social issues such as family law and violence, over-representation of ethnic minorities in the criminal justice system, and vulnerable witnesses. In 2016, the FCM expanded to include the immigration remit and the inclusion of Immigration Ministers and Departments within its operations.
The Anglospheric Security Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Five Countries Conference</td>
<td>FCC 5CC</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Nations Consular Colloque</td>
<td>FNCC</td>
<td>Consular sharing coordination</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Nations Passport Conference/Group</td>
<td>M5</td>
<td>Passports</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, US, NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration 5</td>
<td>FELEG</td>
<td>Migration security</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group</td>
<td>US5</td>
<td>Cyber Security</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical 5</td>
<td>US5</td>
<td>Cyber Security</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa 5</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>Cryptocurrencies &amp; Tax Crime</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ + NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usual 5</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>Cryptocurrencies &amp; Tax Crime</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ + NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa 5</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>Cryptocurrencies &amp; Tax Crime</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ + NL</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Critical Five</td>
<td>C5</td>
<td>Infrastructure defence</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Country Ministerial</td>
<td>FCM</td>
<td>General Security</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border 5</td>
<td>B5</td>
<td>Customs coordination</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, US, NZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation Security Five</td>
<td>AS5</td>
<td>Aviation security coordination</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 Anglosphere Core Civilian Security Fora Functions 1992 - 2018
Dark Grey shading signifies point at which the arrangement became quintilateral

Both the Quintet and the 5CC have created or facilitated the creation of new institutionalised bodies in the form of new standalone fora and cross-functional entities. These include the Migration Five (with its own secretariat in NZ), the Border 5, the Critical 5, the Ottawa 5, the Usual 5, the Five Nations Consular Colloque, and the Aviation Security 5. The exact composition and remit of these fora is uncertain with Governments reluctant to provide transparency. Bodies such as Border 5 and Migration 5

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1545 Ibid.
have assumed operating transnational functions in addition to the adoption of common
standards and practices.

There are a plethora of fora and related Working Groups that have moved beyond
discussion to policy co-ordination and implementation. Fora such as Migration 5, although
under the overall 5CC umbrella have in turn created their own specialist working groups such
as the Migration Five Data Sharing Working Groups, and the Immigration and Refugee
Health Working Group.\textsuperscript{1552} Border 5, in turn, has a series of Working Groups including a HR
resources forum and a Deep Dive [Analysis] forum and standing Heads of Intelligence
conference (HINT).\textsuperscript{1553} Other Working Groups associated with the 5CC and FCM framework
are the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) grouping and the FCM Digital Industry
Engagement Senior Official Group.\textsuperscript{1554} Another body that has transitioned from a discussion
based forum to an action orientated operation is FELEG, bringing the FBI together with
equivalent Anglospheric core bodies such as the UK National Crime Agency and the
RCMP.\textsuperscript{1555} It too features quinpartite CEO meetings and Working Groups.\textsuperscript{1556} These are
focussed on sharing intelligence, standardising practice and collaboration on joint
operations.\textsuperscript{1557} As such, interaction occurs on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{1558}

\textsuperscript{1552} For M5 see: Commonwealth of Australia Senate, Question No. 947 Senator Kristina Keneally
14 November (Canberra 2019), 5-11-2017. For Refugee Group see: Martin Belinda and Paul Douglas,
"Intergovernmental Collaboration for the Health and Wellbeing of Refugees Settling in Australia,"
\textsuperscript{1553} Border Force UK, "Border Five Heads of Intelligence Conference (Hint)," \textit{Partner Bulletin}
934/1PartnerBulletinContent_May2013Final.pdf.
\textsuperscript{1554} Kristina Keneally (Senator) November 19, 2019. Senate, Commonwealth of Australia.
Question No. 947. 2019. Q 8-4-2018 & 21-4-18
\textsuperscript{1555} See: "Former Director General of the Uk’s National Crime Agency Joins Arcanum,"
\textit{Arcanum Global Intelligence} (2016), https://arcanumglobal.com/news/former-director-general-of-the-
uk’s-national-crime-agency-joins-arcanum/?pdf-template; UK NCA, "National Crime Agency Annual
\textsuperscript{1557} US FBI, "Cyber Solidarity - Five Nations, One Mission," \textit{FBI News} (2008),
\textsuperscript{1558} NCA, "NCA Director General at Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group," \textit{Gov.uk},
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/875-nca-dg-at-five-eyes-law-enforcement-group-in-
washington.
5.5.4 Anglosphere bilateral ‘Strategic Dialogue’

The growth of quintilateral fora has been accompanied by a recent trend for bilateral ministerial ‘Strategic Dialogue’ arrangements. These supplement the pre-existing strong bilateral exchanges in the form of the UK-US ministerial links, the Canada-US ministerial links, and the Australia-US ministerial links (AUSMIN) detailed previously. These links are long-standing as illustrated by an October 2018 speech in which the UK Foreign Secretary sought to allay post-Brexit fears that the UK would be detached from Europe by announcing he had asked for direct, secure telephone lines to his counterparts in Berlin and Paris. In doing, so he revealed that the only permanent direct secure lines were to the five Foreign Ministers of the Anglospheric security community.\textsuperscript{1559}

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of dyad</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2017</th>
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<tr>
<td>AUSMIN</td>
<td>Australia &amp; UK</td>
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<td>NZUK Strategic Dialogue</td>
<td>NZ &amp; UK</td>
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<td>NZUS Strategic Dialogue</td>
<td>NZ &amp; US</td>
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<tr>
<td>CANUK Strategic Dialogue</td>
<td>Canada &amp; UK</td>
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</table>

\textbf{Table 13 Anglosphere Bilateral Ministerial arrangements 1992-2018}

The new fora provide for face to face bilateral high-level meetings involving the Defence and Foreign Affairs ministers. These links provided the basis for a new transnational ‘Five Eyes Council of Foreign Ministers.’\textsuperscript{1560} A similar new Five Eyes Defence Minister forum met in February 2018.\textsuperscript{1561} This Defence Minister’s forum has since reaffirmed a commitment to enhance collaboration on matters of security and stressed the need to work with “regional partners and institutions in shaping globally and across the Indo-Pacific a stable and secure, economically resilient community, where the sovereign rights of all states are respected.”\textsuperscript{1562}


5.5.5 Civilian-led socio-economic fora

There has also been an expansion of fora dealing with socio-economic related issues, usually non-ministerial comprising the civil service element of the political policy establishment. In their earlier incarnations, the fora tended to be consultative but have evolved to become action orientated.

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<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Members</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belmont Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment, Training</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand, Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Six Countries (Nations) Conference (Windsor Group)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Security - Health</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand, (+ Ireland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior International Forum</td>
<td>SIF</td>
<td>Military Veterans Health Well-being</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadrilateral Group</td>
<td>Quads</td>
<td>Food standards, plant biosecurity</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, US, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Census Forum</td>
<td>ICF</td>
<td>National Statistics standards</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration &amp; Refugee Health Working Group</td>
<td>IRH-WG</td>
<td>Immigrant Health Screening</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vancouver Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intellectual Property Standards</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand</td>
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<td>Five Treasuries*</td>
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<td>Treasury coordination</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand (+ Ireland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Four Countries Conference</td>
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<td>Electoral systems &amp; practice</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Rev Sec Group</td>
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<td>Tax Revenue &amp; Securities protocols</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand</td>
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<td>International Supervisors Forum</td>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Anti Money Laundering</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (Ottawa 5)*</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>Tax evasion operations</td>
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<td>The Anti Trust Cooperaion Framework</td>
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<td>Anti trust</td>
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Table 14 Civilian led ‘non security’ related Anglosphere Forum Remit

* Members other than Anglosphere Core as denoted

The Six Countries Group (originally the Five Countries Group) and the Belmont Conference have their origins in the 1970s and 80s as occasional discussion groups.\textsuperscript{1563} By the turn of the century, the nature of these groupings changed. Between 2007-2009, a meeting

\textsuperscript{1563} Different to the 5CC that continues to exist as the 5CC-FCM framework
of the Six Countries Group and the Belmont Conference\textsuperscript{1564} produced a common policy platform known as the "Windsor Arrangement for Mutual Cooperation On Benefit Fraud."\textsuperscript{1565}

Securitisation of a whole raft of non-military issues has seen a growth in Anglosphere core (Table 14) in response to perceived threats from global terrorism, organised crime and state actors such the PRC, North Korea, Iran and Russia.

\textsuperscript{1564} AG Dept Human Services, \textit{Annual Report 2008-09} (Canberra: AG, 2009), 36.
\textsuperscript{1565} "Countries Band Together to Fight Benefit Fraud," \textit{Abeceder News} (2009), www.abeceder.co.uk/newsarticle_4298.php.
### The Anglospheric Security Community

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**Table 15 Anglosphere Civilian Socio-Economic Fora Progress**

(Dark Grey shading signifies point at which the arrangement became quintilateral.)

(i) Previously the Five Countries Group until joined by Ireland (not to be confused with the SCC).
(ii) UK & Ireland appear to attend as observer-contributors
(iii) Australia represents NZ & undertakes work for US. (iv) Ottawa 5 became J5, with the Netherlands joining & NZ not participating.
Viewed through this lens, the creation of the range Anglosphe bodies listed above fits a pattern — the need for collaboration against a perceived communal threat. Thus, intellectual property theft produced a communal response in the form of the Vancouver Group\textsuperscript{1566} and public warnings from the Five Eyes Intelligence agencies and the publication of a Joint Five Eyes Research guidance document.\textsuperscript{1567} Another example is the securitisation of the electoral process through the Four Countries Conference.\textsuperscript{1568} More recently, all five security agencies of the Anglosphere core have collaborated on electoral security as a group\textsuperscript{1569}

The extension of the Anglosphere core transnational bodies accelerated after 9/11 (See Table 15). It has extended to areas affecting immigration, treasury, census data and the bio-security of food in respect of animal and plant genetics. The effect is to parallel the scale of social interaction and collaboration in the intelligence and military fora.\textsuperscript{1570} Most recently, a 'Five Eyes' grouping representing the competition agencies created an antitrust 'framework.'\textsuperscript{1571}

This trend speaks to a deepening collective response to external threats and an ever-increasing multitude of special relationships across a wide variety of societal issues. These in turn, serve to institutionalise the relationships and provide the framework not just for the development of communal mindset but provide the forum for ongoing social interaction involving not just military personnel but civil servants, scientists, elected politicians. It is worth re-emphasising that institutions rest upon informal voluntary arrangements and have no legal power to create or enforce binding policies on participating states.

\textsuperscript{1569} Sam Trendall, "Five Eyes Cyber Summit – Five Things We Learned," \textit{PublicTechnology.net}, https://www.publictechnology.net/articles/features/five-eyes-cyber-summit-%E2%80%93-five-things-we-learned.
\textsuperscript{1570} For example, the ICF has 6-12 active WG’s. See:ONS, "How the Office for National Statistics Is Ensuring the 2021 Census Will Serve the Public," \textit{Gov.uk}, https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/censustransformationprogramme/census2021outputs/nationalstatistics accreditation/howtheofficeformationalstatisticsisensuringthe2021censuswillservethepublic.
5.6. The Memetic Anglosphere - Communal identity & Legitimacy

5.6.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters have focussed on the growth of relationships and the rise of various institutions that have developed to give shape to an Anglospheric security community. Focussing too much on structure or even high-level personal relationships can detract from the essential foundations of a security community. These are the shared cultural affinities related to socio-political values. According to Deutsch, they should be reflected in a community's practices and institutions and if they are not, tensions will bring these to the surface.

It is rare that, in the mundane course of everyday political life, philosophical matters relating to fundamental political values rise to the fore in common discourse. The debate concerning the UK's membership of the EU did this, raising questions of legitimacy, the sovereignty of the people and the 'cultural' nature of the EU verses the 'Anglosphere.' The accusations and counteraccusations by 'Leavers' and 'Remainers' about these issues provide insights into the Anglosphere by way of comparison to the EU and the claims made about it.

5.6.2 Memes and Genes: the EU and the Anglospheric security community

In the Brexit debate and its aftermath, supporters of the UK remaining in the EU sought to promote the EU's 'multiculturalism.' An Anglospheric alternative was framed as the electorate's nostalgic wish for racial kinship with a white Anglosphere core. This narrative was flawed since the Europe's multiculturalism is essentially 'Eurocentric.' In the EU, the 'mirage' of the Anglosphere's advancement of people of colour 'to the top' is not replicated. Despite large numbers of non-indigenous immigrants having been established in many member states since the 1950s, people of colour are not visible in the higher echelons of EU society.

This is not to say racial barriers to advancement have been eliminated in the UK and the core Anglosphere states, but the situation is markedly different compared to the EU. In the Anglospheric core, immigrants both of colour and 'whiteness' have advanced to the top in
society. Indeed, it may be that the Anglospheric core is the only place in the world where immigrants are able to advance in society and as such it could be a defining feature — the very characteristic of Stephenson's Neo-Atlantean phyle. The contrast between the EU and the Anglospheric core may not be evident to many monoracial white Europeans, it is not lost on those of non-European origin, especially those from the Commonwealth. In this respect the UK’s Brexit decision and the nature of the EU as a comparator, provides interesting insights into the multi-racial, values-based identity of the Anglosphere.

Nalapat advanced the idea of the ‘blood of the mind’ as the key to understanding the Anglosphere and why his own fellow Indian citizens are drawn to it. In 2011, Nalapat made the point continental Europe excludes those with an Indian ethnicity who “are seldom given an opportunity to compete — on equal terms — with [European] natives.” By way of example, Nalapat referenced the experience of Indian born business executive Anshu Jain who suffered widespread opposition to his becoming the CEO of Deutsche Bank on the basis he was a ‘non-German.’ This experience was in contrast to those of Asian immigrants to the Anglosphere core states, Nalapat observed.

In the academic life of the United States—as indeed in the corporate boardroom—the proportion of those with an ethnic background that is rooted within the Indian subcontinent is no longer derisory. Pepsi’s Indira Nooyi and Citi’s Vikram Pandit exemplify this, as do the thousands of Indian academics in the United States (and, to a lesser degree, the United Kingdom).¹⁵⁷²

Nalapat's comments reflect a wide Indian perception they are not welcome and are unlikely to advance in Germany. One factor was the anti-Asian slogan “Kinder statt Inder - [our] children not Indians” as part of an education programme to argue German children should be trained to avoid Indian IT engineers emigrating to Germany.¹⁵⁷³ Since Nalapat’s article the racial divergence between the EU and the Anglosphere has widened. The multi-ethnic, non-European character of the US and UK’s commercial sectors has increased.¹⁵⁷⁴

¹⁵⁷² Nalapat.
¹⁵⁷⁴ Suki Sandhu, "Twelve Ceos from the UK, US and Canada’s Biggest Listed Companies Are from Ethnic Minorities " The HR Director (2020), https://www.thehrdirector.com/business-
addition to Pepsi and Citi, Indian CEOs run a host of large US listed companies including Google, Microsoft, Adobe, Cantor Fitzgerald, and MasterCard. In the UK, Indian CEOs oversee Diageo, Global SemiConductors, NetApp, plus the London Stock Exchange and the Financial Conduct Authority. In UK academia, thought by Nalapat to trail the US in 2011, the growth of Indian origin tenured academics has seen an exponential growth and by 2020 included 130 professors and 730 senior lecturers/researchers in leading universities.¹⁵⁷⁵

Writing after Brexit in 2020, another Indian based IR academic, C. Raja Mohan endorses Nalapat’s observations saying, Indians have “unhesitatingly embraced the English speaking world.”¹⁵⁷⁶ Mohan goes on to note that because of

…the relative openness of the Anglosphere, the Indian diaspora is thriving in these nations and is very much part of the political life in the English-speaking world. Kamala Harris will soon be sworn in as US Vice President. Three of Johnson’s cabinet rank ministers are Indian and four of Justin Trudeau’s ministers are of Indian origin. Indians are among the fastest-growing minorities in Australia and New Zealand. Besides politics, Indians occupy countless positions in the national bureaucracies, private sector, and universities of the Anglosphere.¹⁵⁷⁷

Nalapat’s point about far greater obstacles in the EU are borne out. Nalapat might be encouraged by the news that his cited example of the obstacles to an Asian CEO of Deutsche Bank has twice been overcome, but disappointed learn it was only by creating a new co-CEO position occupied by an ethnic German to act as a minder.¹⁵⁷⁸ As Nalapat puts it, ethnicity has been a barrier to heading a “pure German institution.”¹⁵⁷⁹

This is symptomatic of a wider problem across the EU and its constituent states in terms of inclusivity. There has, for example, been no political breakthrough for the Turkish

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¹⁵⁷⁵ Prasun Sonwalkar, "More Indian Academics Join UK Universities," *Hindustan Times*, January 28 2020. Indian academics are firly established in other Anglosphere states. For example Australia where one exampl;e will suffice:: The India-Australia Institute run by University of Melbourne with at least fifteen Indian origin staff.


¹⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

The Anglospheric Security Community

Gastarbeiter communities in Germany. Nor is there any meaningful presence in the upper echelons of French government of France’s large colonial muslim population since their arrival in the 1950s. There is no Muslim Mayor of Paris unlike London where an English person of Pakistani origin defeated his Black English main challenger. In short, the presence of individuals of non-European ethnicity in senior government positions or in the European Commission is negligible and usually non-existent. Perhaps the most revealing demonstration of the EU’s lack of non-white inclusion occurred in the aftermath of the UK’s departure from the European Parliament. It exposed white European domination both in terms of MEPs and their support and policy staff. The negative experience of a newly elected black MEP representing the UK’s Green Party underlined the lack of racial diversity and unconscious prejudice in the parliament itself.

The racial divide between white Europe and the Anglosphere core states first raised by Nalapat has been accentuated by the progress of not just Indians, but by other non-white ethnic minorities in the UK. The UK’s Cabinet in 2021 illustrates that ‘Anglo-saxon’ racialisation is a wholly inadequate explanation of the UK’s inclination towards an Anglospheric future. The composition of UK cabinet as of 2021, is not as Vucetic described a mirage that disguises the genetic "descendants of historical Anglo-saxons [are] at the top." The New York born Prime Minister is of part Turkish - French - German ancestry, the Chancellor is of Punjabi ethnicity, the Home Secretary’s family originates from Gurjat, India, the Foreign Secretary is the son of a Jewish-Czech refugee, the Business Secretary is of Ghanaian origin, the Health Minister is of Punjabi Pakistan origin, and the Attorney General, is of Indian and Mauritian parentage. Heading up the UK’s COP 26 Climate change efforts as President is Aloo Sharma, a first-generation immigrant from Uttar Pradesh. In addition there,

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1582 As of December 2021 Sweden had one Cabinet member of Christian Turkish origin, the Netherlands has one member of Kurd-Turkish origin, France a deeply Catholic member of Armenian-Maltese, Algerian origin. Germany’s Cabinet is all-white as was Poland, Italy, Spain and so on.
1585 Vucetic, 132.
are at least five other more junior Ministers with African (Nigeria and Sierra Leone), Middle Eastern (Kurdish) or Asian (Sri Lanka) ethnicities.\textsuperscript{1586} The religious views reflected include agnostic, Christian, Hindi, Muslim, and Buddhist outlooks. These senior politicians look to the Anglosphere, not to the EU for the UK's future.

Despite this and the EU's 'whiteness,' opponents of the UK's departure have sought to portray support for an Anglospheric future as motivated by race and imperial nostalgia.\textsuperscript{1587} Robert Gildea and French historian called Brexit “the revenge of colonial nostalgia” underpinned by a nationalistic right-wing response to immigration.\textsuperscript{1588} Danny Dorling and Sally Tomlinson saw attempts to create a non-EU future as “the last gasp of Empire” that included nineteenth century racist eugenics as a factor. According them, one factor creating current notions of Anglo-saxon racial superiority was the requirement for 1970s Oxfordshire state-school children being “required, once a year, to build Anglo-Saxon houses out of lollipop sticks, with fake thatch on top made from straw.”\textsuperscript{1589} Similar points are made by Satnam Virdee and Brendan McGeever, who refer to the internal 'others' of racialized minorities and migrants by ‘English’ people who long for empire.\textsuperscript{1590}

According to economist Edoardo Campanella and former Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Marta Dassì,

Nostalgia and nationalism become intimately linked… In the eyes of a hard-core eurosceptic, the EU represents an abrupt break from an uninterrupted history of British progress and glory starting with the introduction of the Magna Carta in 1215.\textsuperscript{1591}

\textsuperscript{1586} As of December 2021 other notable figures are Nadhim Zahawi Covid Vaccine Deployment Born in Iraq. (Kurdish) Min of State; Ranil Jayawardena Under Sec of State International Trade (Sri Lankan India parents); Kemi Badenoch Under Sec of State for Equalities (of Nigerian parents); James Cleverly. Minister of State for Middle Eat and N Africa) Of Sierra Leone parentage; (EX) Nusrat Munir Ul-Ghan Under Sec State Aviation and Marine (born Kasmir Pakistan).
\textsuperscript{1590} Satnam Virdee and Brendan McGeever, "Racism, Crisis, Brexit," \textit{Ethnic and racial studies} 41, no. 10 (2018).
\textsuperscript{1591} Edoardo Campanella and Marta Dassì, "Brexit and Nostalgia," \textit{Survival} 61, no. 3 (2019).
Campanella and Dassù are correct to highlight the importance of the Magna Carta compact in the debate, but wrong in practically any other way. Reworking the quotation (changes in italics) provides a more accurate insight.

_Vanguardism and European integration_ become intimately linked… In the eyes of a hard-core eurounthusiast, Brexit represents an abrupt break from an uninterrupted history of EU progress and glory starting with the introduction of the _Monnet Method_ in 1952.

5.6.3 Legitimacy and durability

The centrality of the Magna Carta compact is not limited to 'nostalgic' white British people, but on the contrary is an important part of the meme-complex of the Anglophone communities of any racial origin. Nor is it a nostalgic, and sentimental yearning for an unattainable past, but rather a continuous thread in the history of the English-speaking peoples' desire for practices and institutions that reflect the values associated with the Magna Carta compact. David Fischer in his seminal work cites the importance attached to the Magna Carta by William Penn, who in 1687 ordered its full text reprinted in Philadelphia. Penn had actively recruited German and Dutch Quakers for his expanding colony. He was keen all Pennsylvanians, racial and non-racial Anglo-saxons immigrants alike, should understand

…not to give anything of liberty that at present they do not enjoy, but take up the good example of our ancestors, and understand that it is easy to part with or give away great privileges, but hard to be gained if lost.1593

As such it is the tradition of ‘rights of Englishmen’ claimed regardless of gender or race and by political leaders across the Anglosphere in pursuit of their own freedoms and deployed by movements such as Chartists, Suffragettes and individuals such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela.1594

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1592 Fischer, 1, 430-31.
1593 William Penn 1687 quoted in ibid., 587.
1594 For example see: Nelson Mandela's Statement from the Dock at the Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial. Pretoria Supreme Court, 20 April 1964
Contrary to the narrative that race and immigration was the dominant factor behind the ‘Leave’ vote, the biggest single reason (49%) for wanting to leave the EU was “the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK.” And the biggest single reason for wanting to stay in the EU for Remain voters was economic advantage (43%), with only a small number (9%) citing “a strong attachment to the EU and its shared history, culture and traditions.”

The majority of the non-white electorate voted Remain, apparently convinced by the suggestion that membership of the EU was necessary to preserve their economic well-being, but also to act as a bulwark against the racial prejudice on which Brexit was claimed to be predicated.

Not all members of the UK’s minority racial groups were convinced by that narrative, including the 'Anglo-saxons of colour' in the UK cabinet and their senior advisors. Aside from the extremely poor record of the EU on race, it was Anglospheric values that came to the fore. Munira Mirza, a senior policy advisor at No 10 referred to the “historic importance [of the Magna Carta] to world democracy” and suggested it should be sent to Europe as a reminder of democratic values. References to the Magna Carta form a consistent part of the narrative advanced to distinguish the UK from the EU. Member of Parliament Adam Afriyie (of Ghanian origin) asserted,

British history is long and diverse, and it is undeniable—Magna Carta, democracy, the agrarian and industrial revolutions… free trade, the abolition of slavery, emancipation, the defeat of Hitler and fascism, freedom of speech and plurality of media, and, in recent days, thank goodness, race relations and equal opportunities.

Suella Braverman, of Mauritian heritage and the UK’s Attorney General referred to the fundamental importance of the Magna Carta and the concept of English Common Law in shaping her belief that the UK’s future lay outside of the EU.

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1595 How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… and why. Lord Ashcroft Polls
June 24 2016
1597 Adam Afriyie. Speech. Black History Month House of Commons Volume 682: October 20, 2020 Hansard
In short, the ideas behind the Magna Carta compact were seen as articulating an essential difference between the UK and the anti-democratic elitism of the EU. The Political Director of the Huffington Post, Medhi Hasan, a former Europhile, referred to "a crisis of democracy, accountability and legitimacy, with citizens feeling ever less connected to the decision-makers in Brussels and Strasbourg."\(^{1599}\)

To talk of a “democratic deficit” at the heart of the EU project would be a gross understatement. If the EU were a nation state and tried to join the EU, it would probably be rejected for not being democratic enough.\(^{1600}\)

Black novelist Dreda Say Mitchell, drew attention to the fact that many ethnic minorities had strong reservations about the nature of the EU stating, “I’m not alone: there are plenty of black and minority ethnic votes to be had…” and made the point about legitimacy.

The EU debate isn’t about bent bananas or migrants on the take; it’s about democracy. There doesn’t seem much point in electing MPs if their votes can be overridden by supranational institutions like the EU… I’ve seen the EU described as “post-democratic”. Some of us would prefer the real thing back.\(^{1601}\)

This insight explains the cleavage between those who see a contradiction in the EU’s purported democratic ideals and the reality, as evidenced by its *modus operandi* and institutions. It returns to Deutsch's stress on individuals feeling the need for institutions to reflect those meme-complexes of ideas, values and norms that provide agency and legitimacy to their own actions. If the institutions do not reflect those values, individuals will feel they are in contradiction. In the example of the EU, those who identify with the Vanguard Myth are not conflicted by the democratic deficit because their idea of legitimacy stems from the belief that elites have a responsibility to guide the less fortunate. And in some societies, the people may (because of a dominant meme-complex) accept or even desire such leadership by an elite class (political or priestly) so long as it is essentially paternalistic. But as Deutsch

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\(^{1600}\) Ibid.

warns, institutions that do not reflect the dominant meme-complexes of a people, run the risk of de-legitimising and regressing a security community.\textsuperscript{1602}

In the aftermath of the Brexit debate, those susceptible to the competing Vanguard Myth sought to deploy the sentiments of Edmund Burke’s stance of the role of parliament. They invoked his opinion that

\begin{quote}
your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion\textsuperscript{1603}
\end{quote}

This sentiment, according to some lawyers and many commentators, meant parliament was able to ignore the electorate’s decision, if they so judged since they understood the greater good and therefore it justified ignoring the referendum result.\textsuperscript{1604} However, Burke was no vanguardist arguing that the sovereignty and legitimacy of parliament was invested or loaned, asserting “the people are the masters.”\textsuperscript{1605} In an overlooked point, Burke asserted,

\begin{quote}
The House of Commons cannot renounce its share of authority. The engagement and pact of society, which generally goes by the name of the constitution, forbids such invasion and such surrender.\textsuperscript{1606}
\end{quote}

In other words, a parliamentary representative could not be mandated, but neither could it give away the people’s sovereignty or abrogate it.

The justification of vanguardism and the rubbishing of the electorate was commonplace and is explored in detail by Colin Copus and Mick Hume.\textsuperscript{1607} An article in \textit{The Task - Building Europe from the bottom up} by the German founder of the federalist “Soul for

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1602} Deutsch, \textit{Nationalism and Its Alternatives}, 14.
\bibitem{1603} Edmund Burke. Speech to the Electors of Bristol November 3, 1774
\bibitem{1605} Edmund Burke. Speech House of Commons February 11, 1780
\bibitem{1607} Colin Copus, " The Brexit Referendum: Testing the Support of Elites and Their Allies for Democracy; or, Racists, Bigots and Xenophobes, Oh My!," \textit{British Politics} 13, no. 1 (2018); Mick
\end{thebibliography}
Europe” organisation is illustrative. The competence of ordinary UK voters to decide on membership of the EU was dismissed, without any sense of irony (given the article’s title) because the issues involved stretched “far beyond the area of responsibility of those eligible to vote.”

This vanguardist approach undermines the EU as a security community by striking at its legitimacy, and therefore, its effectiveness. Cris Shore contrasts the poverty of democracy in the EU with the reality and employs the Hans Christian Anderson fairy story about a child 'calling out' a naked monarch to the astonishment of his court and the relief of his cowed subjects, “the Emperor has no clothes… It is covered at best by only the scantiest democratic fig-leaf.” In short, EU declarations about common values of democracy are not reflected in its structure or modus operandi.

When the President of the EU Commission asserts the EU is founded on “Unsere Seele, unsere Kultur, unser Vielfalt, unser Erbe - Our soul, our culture, our diversity, our heritage” it is difficult to ascertain what that means in practice. Strong vanguardist meme complexes are present in a decidedly mixed democratic heritage and culture. Dawkins makes the point that "an important aspect of selection of any one meme will be the other memes that already happen to dominate the meme pool." Consequently, societies that have already dominated by vanguardist memes might be resistant to memes that suggest different approaches. This is not to say societies with say a Marxist, Nazi or a strongly hierarchal religious heritage will condone their political objectives, but they might unconsciously favour the vanguardism inherent in them as a mechanism to create a 'better' society.


1610 Ursula von der Leyen Speech. European Parliament Plenary Session in Strasbourg on November 27, 2019


1612 Ibid.
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have featured autocratic clerical-monarchial regimes, Bonapartism (Napoleon III), corporatist-fascism, national socialism, communism, and something approaching a theocracy in Ireland. In the few continental democracies existing in 1939, only Sweden and Switzerland avoided civil strife, invasion and the adoption or imposition of totalitarian regimes.¹⁶¹³

Most of these traditions have featured a political/social elite or a priesthood, creating a strong cultural meme-complex that suggests its applicability in a paternalistic way to achieve objectives perceived as desirable, but likely to be resisted by electorates. The vanguard meme-complex legitimises the actions of those who believe they have an enlightened plan and are duty-bound to lead the way. As such, the EU project advances not as a consequence of democratic endorsements emanating from the people (or demos), but rather on the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*, an unrepealable, complex body of legal rulings and obligations that constitute a binding ratchet-effect on member states. The former UK Cabinet member, Peter Shore refers to the “quite extraordinary – and deliberate – complexity” of EU Law and “its textual incomprehensibility” that empowers a vanguard and creates legal complexities and obligations that they alone interpret and declare must be obeyed.¹⁶¹⁴

The European Court of Justice; and the Brussels Commission and their long-serving, often expert officials are, interpreting and manipulating all of this, like a priestly caste – similar to what it must have been in pre-Reformation days, when the Bible was in Latin, not English; the Pope, his cardinals and bishops decided the content of canon law and the message came down to the laymen, only when the Latin text was translated into the vernacular by the dutiful parish priest.¹⁶¹⁵

Appointments to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are political — appointees are not required to have a judicial background. They operate in secret, produce only one uniform judgement (without dissenting reports) and allow no appeals.¹⁶¹⁶

¹⁶¹⁴ Peter Shore, *Separate Ways: The Heart of Europe* (Duckworth, 2000), 82.
¹⁶¹⁵ Ibid., 81-82.
¹⁶¹⁶ Critical views on the judicial activism of the ECJ together with a response can be found in:Gerard Conway, *The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice* (Cambridge
Those Europeans (including Britons) who relate to the principles of the Magna Carta compact, see a deficit revealed in the institutions and practices of the EU that are 'out of synch' with their 'gut' feelings about legitimacy. In the context of the ECJ, its decisions are 'legal,' but not necessarily legitimate. A Deutschian lens illustrates the difference between legal and legitimate. Deutsch selected an extreme example to make his point. The laws of the Third Reich can be said to be 'legal' in the territories it occupied, but regarded as illegitimate by the occupants. Compliance that relies on just coercion and force is ultimately weaker than one that has a legitimacy that comes from the general value patterns prevailing in the culture of the society, and with important aspects of the personality structures of its members.\(^\text{1617}\)

The democratic deficit reflected in the institutions of the EU is compounded by a willingness to set aside the representative governments of member states and install elite-technocratic alternatives.\(^\text{1618}\) The Commission can be assured its actions, and those of the European Central Bank, will be indemnified as 'legal' by the ECJ.\(^\text{1619}\) And to ensure international human rights laws do not interfere with rulings and decisions, the ECJ has first rejected, and then delayed, the EU’s ascension to the European Court of Human Rights (a non-EU body) because it argues it undermines the autonomy of EU law.\(^\text{1620}\)

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\(^\text{1617}\) Deutsch, 152-53.


\(^\text{1619}\) For example: In 2019 the ECJ backed the ECB’s refusal to release policy decision papers relating to the 2013 Greek financial crisis because it might impact the ECB’s “space to think.” See: "EU Court Shields ECB from Disclosing Key Document in Greek Crisis," *Euractiv - Reuters*, March 12 2019.

\(^\text{1620}\) The ECJ acts to protect its decisions from review. For example it has rejected and delayed the EU’s ascension to the European Court of Human Rights since 2014. See: Adam Lazowski and Ramses A Wessel, "The European Court of Justice Blocks the Eu's Accession to the Echr," *CEPS Commentary* (2015). For an example of an alleged failure to follow rule of law see: Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov and Graham Butler, "Cjeu’s Independence and Lawful Composition in Question (Part V)," *Verfassungsblog.de (On matters Constitutional)* (2021), https://verfassungsblog.de/cjeus-independence-and-lawful-composition-in-question-part-v/.; Steven
Deutsch concluded that for values to be at their most effective, they should not be held just in "abstract terms", but

when they were incorporated into political institutions and in habits of political behaviour which permitted these values to be acted upon in such a way as to strengthen people’s attachments to them.\textsuperscript{1621}

The essential difference between the EU security community and the Anglospheric security community is the former is attempting to create a federal amalgamated security community without a sense of pre-existing communal identity. It is reliant on a legalistic, institutional process, with democratic obstacles side-stepped to achieve an end-result desired by a self-perceived 'enlightened' vanguard. The Anglospheric security community of the five core states is less ambitious. It acquires its legitimacy because of shared cultural outlooks on the nature of power and has not signed away the sovereignty of its electorates. These preclude consideration of unelected supranational, law making institutions, considered as steps too far. In this sense, it is much less ambitious and more pluralistic, but more effective in respect of security cooperation. The functioning of the Anglospheric security community is more akin to the description of the relations between the each member of the Dominions and the UK as quoted earlier. With the amendment noted, the 1926 conference would read that the Anglospheric security community

depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and progress are among its objects… And though every Dominion [Anglosphere] state is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.\textsuperscript{1622}

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\textsuperscript{1622} Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926. Inter-Imperial Relations Committee Report. (I.R./26)
5.7 Summary

The Anglospheric security community became more cohesive in the period after the Cold War, although it attracted little attention either in IR theory or in the public consciousness. The Brexit debate has highlighted the nature and attraction of general Anglospheric relationships, but did not illuminate the existence of the Anglospheric security community.

In fact, the Anglospheric security community based on five core states is identifiable from the post-War period by its structure and actions. Two trigger factors of global terrorism and the PRC ensured these five state relationships progressed in the period after the Cold War. The War on Terror, in response to 9/11, increased the propensity for the five states to participate in conflict. Domestic issues have sometimes necessitated opaque mutual aid achieved by the deployment of covert forces or personnel serving under interoperability programs. The Anglospheric security community has demonstrated a willingness to deploy military force in support of US led operations and this has included the invasion phases of Afghanistan and Iraq rather than just the aftermath.

In tandem with the increased level of mutual aid in conflict there has been a dramatic increase in Anglospheric fora. As military fora and relationships have matured, the desire for cooperation on a range of securitised issues has spawned a range of civilian led fora. By way of illustration the number of civilian-led socio-economic fora have risen from zero in the Nascent Phase, to one in the Ascendant Phase and in excess of twenty-six Anglosphere core fora. A concurrent development has been the public self-awareness of a ‘Five Eyes’ or ‘Five Nations’ identity extending beyond the use of symbols by the military to include ministerial level ‘summits.’

Whilst the threat of terrorism might have receded, this has not slowed the momentum of deepening Anglosphere core cooperation. The perceived threat of the PRC has served to give greater impetus to security co-ordination. This has drawn both Canada and the UK to address common security issues with their fellow Anglosphere core members in the Pacific and the Arctic. Quintilateral ministerial fora are now reinforced by an institutionalisation of bilateral ministerial working arrangements. This is not to say that elements of the Anglosphere will all continue to cooperate with the same degree of intensity – it almost certain they will not – a new tripartite hard core based on AUKUS already seems to have emerged. Nor will it
necessarily remain a group of five, but could expand or its members cross over with other Anglospheric states such as Singapore, Malaysia and India.
Chapter 6. Conclusion

6.1 Theoretical Issues

This thesis has identified the institutional outline of an Anglospheric security community. Many of these institutions are detailed for the first time. This is important since it establishes the existence of a framework supporting an informal set of transnational relationships that IR scholars have chosen to ignore or are disinterested in. Many still insist the Anglosphere is imaginary or is only manifested as a single SIGINT alliance and not much else. This attitude prevails amongst many commentators and is particularly strong in the UK for those who seek to deny the possibility of an alternative to membership of the EU. Hopefully, the various relationships both quintilateral and bilateral identified in the preceding chapters will dispel such doubts and claims. The Anglospheric security community is further identified by its mutual aid and mutual cooperation in security matters such as conventional warfare, intelligence and R&D.

This, however, is not the most significant outcome or conclusion of this exercise. The thesis not only identifies an Anglospheric security community but seeks to understand how and why it exists and endures. It concludes that the prospects of a security community can only be understood by adapting the Adler and Barnett model. Reverting to aspects of Deutsch’s original works can provide critical explanations and insights.

The desire to construct ‘zones of peace’ in the interregnum following the Cold War downplayed the importance of identity to the success of a security community. There was only a cursory examination of what constituted a commonality of values and norms or what is described as culture. Claims of such commonality were often taken at face value and analysis quickly moved on to look at building institutions and greater commercial interaction. The development and actorship of the Anglospheric security community suggests that shared cultural values are critical factors in determining whether a security community can exist and function effectively. Deutsch’s emphasis on cultural values, more apparent in his works on
nation-building, but also present in his views on security communities, need to be elevated to a key position in the Adler Barnett model when analysing security communities such as the EU.

Deutsch asserted that cultural values (meme-complexes) or “way of life” must be reflected in the institutions and behaviour of either a nation or a security community. If not, a central contradiction can occur between peoples, their state and the transnational security community. This insight goes some way to explaining the long-running tensions between the UK and the EU’s institutions. Deutsch specifically stresses the importance of “legitimacy myths” that connect individuals “with some of the general patterns prevailing in the culture of society and with important aspects of the personality structures of its members.”\textsuperscript{1623} This accords directly with the notion of the Magna Carta compact advanced by Tombs as forming a key element of Anglospheric memetic DNA. In contrast, the EU and its advocates have sought to draw their legitimacy from the nostrum that an enlightened vanguard has the antidote to the fractious system of nation-states.

On this point Deutsch is explicit, warning that elitist vanguardism that either pushes too far ahead of its peoples or ignores them completely in a desire to preserve, create or advance a nation or a security community will ensure the construct lacks legitimacy.\textsuperscript{1624} Deutsch emphasises that values are most effective politically when they are more than abstract declarations but are reflected by political institutions and in habits of political behaviour which permit these values to be acted upon in such a way as to strengthen people’s attachments to them.\textsuperscript{1625}

Applying this observation to the development of the Anglospheric security community, it is clear it has avoided this fate by not attempting to create a straight-jacket of legalistic entrapments designed to force cooperation and make it difficult for member states to step-back. On the contrary, its arrangements are voluntary and pluralistic — in other words, its modus operandi reflects the ideas of its peoples — cooperation based on trust and without institutions that do not encroach on the ‘demos.’ In contrast, the UK’s unease with the nature

\textsuperscript{1623} Deutsch, 154.
\textsuperscript{1624} Deutsch, \textit{Nationalism and Its Alternatives}, 124.
\textsuperscript{1625} \textit{Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience}, 133.
of the EU can be attributed to contradiction between the Magna Carta compact meme-complex and a vanguardist and unaccountable EU that ‘muddies’ the ‘contract’ between people and executive authority.

The role of cultural values brings into focus the importance of individuals, since it is within each individual’s brain that memes reside. Adler and Barnett argue that the role of individuals, particularly 'charismatic' individuals, suffered from a lack of attention in Deutsch’s works, but it is an omission that both they and other studies have tended to neglect too. In fact, Deutsch does concede the central role of individuals to the outcome of events at critical junctures. Usually though, Deutsch obscures the role of individuals by focussing on the groupings and cohorts in which they operate rather than highlighting their personal roles. In a thesis such as this that applies a theoretical model to a large timespan and five core states, a comprehensive coverage of all individuals is impossible. Nevertheless, the principle is acknowledged and a focus on a few key individuals has illustrated how competing meme-complexes have motivated individuals to take actions that had a profound impact on the development of the Anglospheric security community. Rather than focussing on just President v Prime Minister relationships, the role of a few less publicly prominent individuals has been examined. Groves, Wallace were examined in some detail as negative influencers, whilst Rickover was an example of the opposite. They served to illustrate another aspect too; namely that identification or lack of it with an Anglosphere of English-speaking peoples stemmed from memes, not genes as returned to later.

Aside from these extra re-introductions to the model, the Adler and Barnett model was useful in providing a framework that could plot the progress (or lack of it) and identify step-changes in collaboration, trust and when mutual threat perceptions acted as a trigger for greater collaboration. Identifying the machinery that can contribute to a security community is certainly a factor is insufficient as a means of establishing its effectiveness, not just in terms of peace, but whether it displays any degree of actorship and external cohesion or as this thesis terms it — synergy.

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1626 Adler and Barnett, 62, 43.
1627 Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 77-78.
1628 Ibid., 65.
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Three security-related threads or fibres run through the post World War 2 Anglospheric core security community and provide insights as to the extent of synergy. They can be approximately categorised as conventional military relationships, intelligence relationships and R&D relationships (particularly nuclear). These are bound by a living sheath of cultural relationships and meme-complexes that provide form and strength. These relationships—the social glue—existed before the creation of the Anglospheric security community could be said to exist.

6.2 Meme-complexes - the foundational base

Although the structure of a developing Anglospheric security community can be identified from its thickening institutions, the circumstances that facilitated their growth already existed. Prior to the post World War period, a 'British security community' already existed in the form of imperial/commonwealth arrangements. The relationship between this British 'bloc' and the US was more complicated, but held out the promise of something more substantial. There had been an absence of war since 1815, and a growing reliance on arbitration to resolve issues. However, trust was not firmly established. It was not until 1939 that the US abandoned updating its 1930 Red War Plan for a defensive strike against the British Empire. In truth, the exercise had become theoretical by the mid-1930s, and the 1921 British/Canadians 'Defence Scheme No. 1' had been dropped as early as 1928. There were also early signs of a willingness to explore limited collaboration on intelligence from around 1935 onwards between the two navies. Nevertheless, naval competition remained a factor, there was no informal or formal alliance and the very fact defensive war plans existed is not indicative of a pre-existing Anglospheric security community. The conditions for one were, however, favourable.

A further important observation is that the two 'blocs'—the British and American—shared very similar, if not identical, meme-complexes relating to their political values. Indeed, wider cultural similarities had given rise to a strong network of strong social ties. These were reflected in the transatlantic unions of wealthy and influential families through

1630 Dorwart, 138.
marriage. Also of note was the emergence of non-governmental transnational civic organisations. Thus, the weaving of a communal social fabric preceded the political state-level alignment that featured in the nascent stage of the post-War Anglospheric security community.

Adler and Barnett's model has usually been applied to explain or promote a road map for peaceful relations between states that have histories of more recent conflicts and/or different cultural (and usually language) heritage.1631 This has led to a focus on mechanisms or institutions to create both peace and a common identity. As such, there has been a tendency to ignore the importance of cultural issues, or rather accept at face value claims of cultural commonality. Too often claims of communal identity are based on vague pronouncements and not related to long-standing historical meme-complexes. The Anglospheric security community's mechanism were pre-ceded by feelings 'fellowship.' The existence of a fellowship that might mature into something more profound was recognised by the Germans who believed UK-US relationship should be designated 'a communio incidens’ arrangement.1632 In other words, the temptation of security community theorists has been to put the cart before the horse — to focus on institutions as the catalyst for communal feelings.

6.3 Three Stages of Development

The three development stages of a Security Community are delineated and described in chapters 3-5 and combine a historical narrative with a critical analysis. The development of

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1632 "Anglo American Relations."
the Anglospheric security community is shown to exhibit a “variable-geometry.” That is to say, the rate of participation and collaboration varies from state to state. The importance of meme-complexes was most important in the Nascent stage when they formed part of a debate as to the future direction of member states. They became more evident again as a consequence of Brexit when the UK's direction was under discussion. Institutions are examined, not just as an outcome, but also as a means of machinery to give further expression to common outlooks.

6.3.1 Nascent phase: Drawing together

The resumption of an alliance, and in turn, the development of security community between the US and their British Commonwealth counterparts was not a forgone conclusion. Yergin refers to the Yalta and Riga axioms as animating different perspectives as to the relationship the US should pursue with the Soviet Union. A Yalta type accommodation with the Soviets would have sidelined US relations with Britain and the Commonwealth. The Riga realists believed the Soviets to be untrustworthy with expansionist objectives incompatible with the US interests and way of life. In short, the Riga outlook viewed Soviet meme-complexes as incompatible with, and a threat to the US 'way of life.' It was a 'way of life' they understood to be shared with the British and an alignment with the British bloc became their objective.

Churchill’s Fulton Speech is more usually remembered for its reference to an Iron Curtain, but as detailed in chapter 3, it formed part of a concerted attempt to re-introduce the notion of what Anderson refers to as “an imagined community.” Firstly, Churchill sought to evoke the idea of shared values between the British Empire and the US, stressing the rule of law…

…the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the

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1633 See: Yergin, 11-12.
1634 See: ibid.
Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence.\textsuperscript{1636} When the speech was delivered in March 1946, the distinction between the freedoms of the English-speaking world and the experience of vast majority of other peoples was stark.\textsuperscript{1637} The overwhelming majority of non-English-speaking people's existed under authoritarian regimes where the rule of law did not apply. In other words, what Deutsch terms "the way of life" was markedly different and reflected an enduring meme-complex centred on the Magna Carta that provided the basis of a common outlook and identity.

As Dawkins has highlighted, certain meme-complexes might predominate in certain societies and cultures, but that does not mean they are not in fierce competition with others. An emphasis on memes places a focus on individuals, since it is in individual's brains that memes reside, and it is individuals who act in response to them. This includes memes that influence values and outlooks in the formulation of policy and an individual's attitude to the institutions of their society. Unfortunately, this thesis has been unable to delve too deeply into this aspect, given limits of space and the enormity of this task. However, the focus on a few individuals has highlighted how enduring meme-complexes can be carried across generations and, in the case of the Anglosphere, impede or facilitate its development as an imagined community. So, for example, the behaviour of General Groves can be understood in the context of a surviving chauvinistic, Anglophobic meme-complex associated with the US War of Independence. A complimentary Anglophobic meme-complex drew on Irish nationalism and proved particularly attractive to Henry Wallace, who, in a process of self-identification, overcame his British-Scottish genealogy to adopt an Irish memetic connection.

It is a strange feature of the Anglosphere that those North Americans with Anglo-saxon surnames and genealogy have often been the most dismissive of any fraternal association with the British community. In the post-war period, Groves and Wallace were not alone.

\textsuperscript{1636} Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of Power" (paper presented at the Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5th March 1946).

\textsuperscript{1637} This extended to non Dominion territories too. For example, in British ruled India, there were state and national elections. Common Law rights could be invoked - the writ of Habeas corpus was repeatedly deployed and Indian Courts compelled the release of nationalist campaigners. See: Rohit De, "Emasculating the Executive: The Federal Court and Civil Liberties in Late Colonial India: 1942–1944," i Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik og Malcolm M. Feeley, Fates of Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony. The Politics of the Legal Complex, Cambridge, New York (2012).
Truman is another example, as was Admiral Ernest King, who stands in contrasts with the Anglophile Admiral Leahy. King, the epitome of a WASP, was an Episcopalian, descended from British immigrants and displayed a persistent Anglophobia that impeded Commonwealth-US naval cooperation. Admiral Leahy was an Irish-Catholic whose Gaelic-speaking family had fled Ireland after the defeat in the Battle of the Boyne but supportive of closer links. These contradictions continue and serve to underline the fact that it is memes, not genes, or 'the blood of the mind' as das Nalapat would have it, on which the Anglosphere is construed.

Years before Churchill delivered his Fulton Speech in March 1946, it had become clear that the US-British relationship could not be construed as a community of an English 'race.' You should no longer call us cousins, said the ethnically English Anglo-saxon Woodrow Wilson because he represented a country with a population that was 80% non-English. When Churchill gave his speech at Fulton in 1946, there had been two presidents named Roosevelt, and a string the military men; Eisenhower, Spaatz, Nimitz, Hoyt Vandenberg and later Rickover, whose racial origins were clearly not English Anglo-saxon.

As a consequence, Churchill's imagined community rested on a set of values that the English language had propagated via meme-complexes, not necessarily exclusive to, but certainly enduring and reflected in a way of life. As recounted in chapter 3, three years earlier in 1943, Churchill had expressly rebutted Wallace's racial "Anglo-Saxondom über alles" jibe, stating it “was not a race concept...[but rather] …a concept of common ideals and common history” and “a common heritage worked out over the centuries in England.”

Just as it is possible to discover Anglophobic meme-complexes that shaped the actions of Groves and Wallace, so has it proved possible to identify the beliefs that contributed to Anglophile outlooks of Eisenhower and Rickover. Their views reveal an identification not with race, but with Anglospheric ideas. Rickover, a Polish-Jew, did not regard himself as a racial Anglo-saxon, but through language had become receptive to and come to identify with the ideas of 'Anglo-saxon' meme-complexes.

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1639 See Wallace, 208. See also: Culver and Hyde, 301.
Another important aspect of Churchill's speech is his emphasis on the importance of informal, pluralistic arrangements held together by voluntary associations. As an example, he pointed to the US-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defence as the template for future cooperation, since this was "more effective than many of those which have often been made under formal alliances."\textsuperscript{1640} This emphasis on the pluralistic and informal draws upon a natural Anglospheric approach to cooperation that is reminiscent of past security imperial arrangements established by Hankey. It speaks to a recognition of the practical limits of the envisaged Anglospheric security community; a centralised and amalgamated construct is neither advocated nor wanted. In this manner, the relationships suggested by Churchill echoed the 1926 Balfour Declaration on Imperial security. The UK and Dominions noted the informal security arrangements, noting it might lead “a foreigner… to think that it was devised rather to make mutual interference impossible than to make mutual co-operation easy.”\textsuperscript{1641} Not so, claimed the Dominion participants, since it depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and progress are among its objects… And though every Dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.\textsuperscript{1642}

In this essential respect, the conception of the Anglospheric security community stands in contrast to the aspirations of the European project in which the UK became bound up in. This project aimed to create a one-way process towards 'ever-closer union'.

In the context of the new Anglospheric security community, only three dominions felt able to join in the post World War 2 arrangements. It was a voluntary arrangement and those that declined to join did so by choice.\textsuperscript{1643} The reasons as to why are beyond the scope of this research, but have been touched upon and include combinations of different threat perceptions and meme-complexes that ran counter to those of the denser nodes of the

\textsuperscript{1640} Churchill, "The Sinews of Power."
\textsuperscript{1641} Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926. Inter-Imperial Relations Committee Report. (I.R./26) Series
\textsuperscript{1642} Ibid. Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926.
\textsuperscript{1643} With the exception of South Africa which was excluded on the basis of its racial policies.
Anglophone. The fragmentation of the wider Commonwealth security community would benefit from further research.

Whilst shared values can assist in the formation or maintenance of a security community, it is equally clear shared perceptions of external threat can be critical. In the US, those who adopted Yergin's Yalta axiom did not share the concerns of Britain as to the hostile intent of the Soviets. As such, they did not believe alliance arrangements with the British were necessary and might impede their relationship with the Soviets and the prospects of a peaceful post-World War order. Indeed, in the immediate post-War period, the UK found itself the lone voice in speaking out against the perceived Soviet menace. That is not to say the existing sense of Commonwealth ties were threatened, but the fear of communist expansion and the urgent need for new security relations were not shared by Canada. The trigger for Canada was the Gouzenko spy defection. Australia was keen on security relations but initially disagreed with the threat, reminding Britain that the Soviet Union was an ally and if there was a threat, it came from a resurgent Japan.

From the US perspective, an absence of threat in the southern hemisphere delayed the incorporation of Australia and New Zealand into the new structures. The importance of external triggers is evident in this period. A trigger appeared with the defeat of Nationalist China by the PRC and the latter’s sponsorship of other communist movements. Only then did a regional threat perception emerge. Until then, Australia and NZ were members of the intelligence arrangements by virtue of their relationship with the UK. There is a clear correlation between the regional conflicts mapped out in chapters 3 and 4 and the drawing in of Australia and NZ to the previously tripartite military fora. Not to be overlooked in this period was the resilience of the 'old' Commonwealth, particularly in the field of military R&D and cooperation in Korea.

6.3.2 Ascendant phase: Variable geometry

The choice of Suez as marking the transition from Nascent to Ascendant was based upon rupture in trust between the US and the UK. It also marked the point that Canada began to perceive a new mediator role within the Anglospheric core and rely upon a less putative,
more diplomatic orientation to maintain a degree of distance from the Anglosphere core dominant state. Suez was also the point Australia and NZ worried about US intentions and reliability, ultimately fuelling the desire to tie themselves closer to the US by way of securing approval and protection.

Rather than breaking the Anglospheric core, the Crisis re-calibrated the dynamic and reinvigorated political and security collaboration. For many in Britain, the Suez represented a betrayal, and it had come in the aftermath of a perceived US betrayal over Atomic collaboration. This had partially been put right and amends made before Suez. Chapter 4 highlights the importance that many in the higher echelons of the US government had placed in trust and their own failure to honour agreements. The proverb, "An Englishman's word is his bond" conveys a sentiment that is not exclusively Anglospheric but, as Bennett asserted, formed the basis of 'English' commercial transactions since medieval times. As such, it forms part of a strong Anglospheric meme-complex and is evident in Acheson's references to "repulsion," Eisenhower's expression of "shame," and the views expressed by members of Groves' own negotiating team as referred to in chapter 3. These shared Anglospheric approaches to matters of integrity enabled perceived wrongs to righted and trust to be restored. Had the UK not instinctively understood this of its American ally, then the British might have been more inclined to turn away from the US and favour the proposed alignment with France in late 1956, as mentioned in chapter 4.

One of the most important aspects of a security community is the growth of ingrained good-will or trust. On his visit to the UK, Nixon had quoted Woodrow Wilson's words who had said, “friendship must have a machinery” to ensure “constant friendly intercourse…” The creation of new military (including intelligence) fora established a transnational cadre or ‘permanent-bureaucracy’ of policy practitioners, that allowed that friendly intercourse to occur and flourish. And what gave 'life' to these mechanisms was the ability of participating individuals to access familiar and shared meme-complexes. Often these mechanisms and the relationships they supported allowed a level of cooperation to proceed under their own momentum, not impeded by political differences of opinions and personality clashes at the governmental level.

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1644 Nixon.
These fora were also important in extending the socialisation process to lower-ranking officers who were inducted into the process by postings in one another’s security and defence related institutions. As detailed in chapter 3, this process began to extend further down the ranks with personnel posted to joint bases and involved in large-scale joint exercises. It also extended to academic personnel, with scientists attached to joint R&D in conjunction with industry through the TTCP. The declared intent was “interoperability” and the outcome of this ongoing socialisation process was the growth of mutual trust and a shared identity.

A more stuttering process marked the relations between political policy-makers. Chapter 4 reveals fluctuations in the level of political collaboration. The US stance over Suez highlighted a fault line between the US on the one side and the UK (plus to a degree Australia) on the issue of imperialism and decolonisation. Realpolitik demanded that if the US was to maintain influence with the non-aligned states, it must not be seen to act in lockstep with the UK, a view held by Dulles who resorted to duplicitous means to maintain that position.

A glib interpretation would see this conflict as a clash of values between the US arguing for an extension of ‘the rights of Englishmen’ to Britain's imperial possessions. However, the issue was one of timescale rather than intent. In any case, a process of rapid decolonisation gathered pace, but did not always produce outcomes the US had hoped for. Self-determination did not automatically equate to a realisation of the principles of the Magna Carta compact. All too often, self-determination meant the replacement of a British colonial regime that provided for the rule of law, with a new political leadership, who assumed a vanguardist ideology on achieving power and implemented policies that abrogated the principles of the Magna Carta compact. The letter from Rusk to Home quoted in Chapter 4 captures US frustration at the unintended and unwelcome outcomes of rapid decolonisation.

The lack of UK direct support for the US in Vietnam is usually held up to constitute a significant failure of UK support for the US. This thesis argues that it was the lack of support by the US for the UK's struggle to contain Indonesian aggression that was more important. The US desire to maintain its anti-colonial credentials with the non-aligned bloc contributed to the UK’s decision to withdraw East of Suez. Vietnam did serve to push Australia and NZ closer to the US, whilst conversely, Canada sought to distance itself. In this period, the development of the security community affirms it was not path dependent. It was subject to
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‘fits and starts’ and even regression. It can be described as multi-speed or exhibiting “variable geometry” with member state’s relationship neither uniform nor fixed. These concepts are not unique to the Anglospheric security community, with the EU described as featuring “variable geometry.”

The UK withdrawal from the Indo-pacific in the face of US opposition was a point at which existing relationships could have regressed but, as with Suez, this did not constitute a terminal event. On the contrary, it again contribute to a fundamental rethink. In some respects, it was helpful for it effectively rendered any US posturing about British imperialism redundant. The UK Defence Minister claimed the UK had done what the US had claimed they wanted. The consequence was an increased US appreciation of the UK as an ally in terms of its military, diplomatic soft-power and geopolitical knowledge. The US need for a confidant led to a recalibration of the bilateral relationship and entrenched diplomatic interaction, as affirmed by the arch practitioner of realpolitik, Henry Kissinger.

With the UK absent from South East Asia (and Aden), the need for the US to keep a public distance from the UK evaporated. Indeed, if there was any clash of values within the Anglospheric core, it was over so-called US imperialism in Indo-China as evidenced by Canada’s distancing. The East of Suez withdrawal marked something of a weakening of the UK-AUSNZ security links despite the UK’s continued commitment to the FPDA. The contraction was underlined by the UK’s 1972 entry into the Common Market that seemed to confirm the UK's new commercial trajectory would be increasingly Eurocentric. However, the moves towards the creation of a European security community founded on a 'union' would ultimately bring to the surface issues of identity, pluralism, and the people's sovereignty and legitimacy.

6.3.3 The Mature Phase: synergic pluralism

In the Mature stage documented in chapter 5, is it possible to discern a greater uniformity of institutional progress involving the relations between the political establishments. Although the number and reach of these institutions have multiplied, it is important to note

1645 For example: Christian Schweiger, "Poland, Variable Geometry and the Enlarged European Union," Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 3 (2014); Mike Goldsmith, "Variable Geometry, Multilevel
they are predicated on informal and voluntary arrangements. There is no central, authoritative body that seeks to usurp and hollow out the democratic practices on which its constituent states are founded.

There is a sense too in which the Anglospheric security community is imagined, not as Bennett put it, in terms of a 'Haushoferian bloc,' but rather as a network of peoples who feel a sense of community. Thus, the Anglospheric institutional relationships are an outgrowth of a set of communally held values and long-standing ties. As such the voluntary nature of these arrangements on which these institutions are founded foster a degree of respect and willingness to resolve matters amicably rather than rely on formal laws or treaties to force acquiescence.

As discussed in chapter 5, the UK's Brexit experience has helped to illustrate the nature of the Anglospheric security community in contrast to the nature of the EU security community. The EU's emphasis on institutions has aimed to create a sense of community that was not naturally existing among its peoples. It has been obliged to 'force the pace' of cooperation by social and political entrapment. The results are palpable. The EU is hemiplegic, able to enforce compliance through laws and directives internally, but remarkably incapable of cohesive actorship in respect of external security or foreign policy. It is not structures that are the issue, but a lack of common outlooks based on values that ever-more institutions and laws cannot address. The Anglospheric community, in contrast, has no need for a raft of centrally imposed laws administered by a central executive to achieve common outlooks and practices, the latter exist already through a common meme-complex. Its institutions exist as an outcome of those and are principally aimed at securing cohesive external security outcomes. It is therefore, synergic, as reflected in its mutual aid, intelligence and in strategic foreign policy stances. This is not to say there are no differences, there are, but there is usually sufficient commonality of outlook to resolve issues and take meaningful, co-ordinated action.

The Brexit debate helped illustrate some essential characteristics about the Anglosphere and the five core states that form a synergic security community.

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Governance: European Integration and Subnational," The politics of Europeanization  (2003).
Whereas relations between the Anglosphere members have suffered crises on more than one occasion, the aftermath has not resulted in bitterness and hostility but rather a desire to rebuild as detailed in chapters 3 and 4. Here, Adler and Barnett’s model is insightful in that it stresses the importance of the responsiveness of security community members to the needs of a fellow member. There is an interesting comparison between the Anglospheric security community’s approach with the EU’s unwillingness to accommodate the UK’s Europhile leadership’s concerns about sovereignty issues prior to its referendum. Essentially, the EU establishment attitude was ‘take it or leave it.’

Put to the vote, a narrow majority of UK voters decided to ‘leave it’ with a consequent fracturing of the EU security community.

The unwelcome result was not received well, and in the aftermath of the exit, the EU’s attitude and that of some principal constituent members towards the UK were characterised by rancour, and the exclusion of the UK on matters of common security and threats. Chauvinistic comments were made by the EU in respect of Covid supplies both in respect of their efficacy and EU demands for an allocation.

The EU had little to say about repeated French threats to cut power supplies to the UK unless it became more accommodating in respects fishing demands. Similarly, both navies

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were deployed to Jersey after a threatened blockade of the islands.\textsuperscript{1649} The EU was not responsive on the issue of asylum seekers paying traffickers being permitted to cross the French, Dutch and Belgium maritime borders to the UK. It declined talks with the UK to discuss the matter.\textsuperscript{1650} It had previously threatened that cooperation on migration would be dependent on the UK backing down on unrelated trade issues.\textsuperscript{1651} Bilateral meeting between the UK and the Dutch, and Belgium Governments did produce agreements. France, however, was antagonistic, accusing the UK of operating an official “quasi-slavery” economy drawing in migrants because of the Anglospheric reluctance for state operated ID card controls.\textsuperscript{1652} There was a perception that the EU and some member states wished to punish the UK for leaving.\textsuperscript{1653} Polling within the EU suggests that electorates believe that the EU is punishing the UK for leaving.\textsuperscript{1654}

These are not petty points, but rather flag up the difference between a voluntary security community and an 'insecurity' community with a leadership that relies on legalistic coercion to ensure compliance rather than goodwill.

The Brexit debate served another purpose too, or rather, it should have done. This was to disprove the proposition that the Anglospheric core, set against the EU, was a racist construct. Any objective analysis exposes this claim to be untrue. To put this into context in respect of security, as of 2021, all the EU state's Ministers of Defence and the European Defence Agency Chief Executive are white. Within the Anglospheric security community, three of the five Ministers of Defence in the Anglospheric core are people of colour and the NSA, the prime intelligence agency of the SIGINT alliance, is headed by a US general of Japanese


\textsuperscript{1650} Isabella Nikolic, "EU Is 'Turning a Blind Eye to People Dying': Brussels Is Accused of Playing Politics with Migrant Crisis by Refusing to Enter Talks with UK," Daily Mail, August 8 2021.

\textsuperscript{1651} James Crisp, "EU Won't Agree Deal to Take Back Illegal Migrants Unless UK Folds in Trade Deals," Daily Telegraph, June 2020 2020.


\textsuperscript{1653} Steven Swinford and Matt Dathan, "French Letting Migrants Cross to UK 'as a Punishment for Brexit' ," The Times, November 16 2021.

ethnicity. This Anglospheric construct has more in common with the Anglosphere as imagined by Stephenson and postulated by Bennett - multi-racial and linked together by memetic DNA.

The communal identity of a wider Anglosphere and has yet to take shape and is partially conflated with the Commonwealth. However, an Anglospheric security community has begun to achieve a degree of popular recognition with the term ‘Five Eyes’ gaining common currency after 2010. In turn, this has been reflected in the open adoption of the label by not only the various military fora but also the informal civilian structures that emerged and are documented in chapter 5. The latter have grown exponentially in the Mature phase, partially due to the securitisation of socio-economic issues.

Even with the limited amount of public information available, it is clear that these fora form a pattern of development consistent with the Mature stage of a pluralistic security community. Two intertwined factors are likely to ensure these fora deepen still further. The first of these relates to the growing threat perception to Anglospheric values and commercial interests by the rise of the PRC with a particular emphasis on the Pacific. The second relates to the impact of the UK’s departure from the EU and its attempt to fashion new trading relations with other partners. Of relevance are the trade deals being negotiated with Australia, Canada and NZ and the Pacific CPTPP. This reaffirms the importance of the Pacific to the UK. The successful outcome of these discussions would likely highlight the relevance of those few quadrilateral AUSCANUSNZ fora on which the UK is not represented. These relate to food and agricultural standards (detailed in chapter 4) and would allow for the UK’s interaction with the US, not part of the CPTPP.

The recent announcement of the AUKUS agreement on defence that includes the transfer of nuclear reactor technology is reminiscent of Rickover's assistance to the UK in the 1950s and affirms the very high levels of trust between the three parties. Canada’s traditional reluctance to engage seriously with the Pacific has been put aside, and it has joined the other Anglosphere core members in security planning and operations, although how far this will extend us unclear.
6.4 Future research

Whilst security community modelling acknowledges the importance of a core state, there is room for further conceptual analysis of the roles of states within security communities. In this respect, the realist categorisations of state behaviour to explain their actions in the international arena might usefully be adapted to understand their conduct within a security community. The realist concepts of balancing, free-riding and bandwagoning might be usefully adapted to explain state behaviour (over an extended timescale) within the framework of security communities and alliances. In the context of the Anglospheric core security community, such an application of thinking might provide insights to the UK’s early attempts to balance against US hegemony before tending towards bandwagoning. It would suggest Canada made early attempts to balance using the UK and then alternate between free-riding and bandwagoning. Australia, fearful of isolation given its more remote geographical position has tended towards bandwagoning with the core state (the US) and NZ has been increasingly drawn to free-riding. The concept might be applied to other members of the wider Anglosphere too with neutral Ireland effectively reliant on the UK.1656 However, in all these cases, a realist perspective alone is inadequate since they suggest a pursuit of a national interest devoid from a cultural imperative that informs how that ‘interest’ is perceived and the strength or weakness of a ‘communal interest.’

Consistent with the idea of variable development is the possibility that the four Commonwealth states within the Anglospheric security community might develop closer social ties that do not involve the US. One such possibility is the suggestion of a CANZUK arrangement to possibly include Visa free travel, transferable employment opportunities, further defence ties and new academic/research opportunities in arrangements similar manner to the provisions of the EEC’s Treaty of Rome.1657 The idea of CANZUK arrangement for

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less internal restrictions on travel, education exchanges and employment appears to have an appeal to with public petitions in each of the four states and the creation of a transnational campaign group headquartered in Vancouver.\textsuperscript{1658} Further research might contrast the modus operandi and objectives of these groupings with the early and ongoing role of organisations instrumental in generating societal support for European Federalism and the EU.\textsuperscript{1659}

It is important not to forget that the Anglospheric core is an expression of a much wider network of peoples who are influenced by Anglospheric values. These outlooks combined with the 'trigger' effects of a perceived threat from the PRC, may align other Anglospheric states more closely to the existing Anglospheric core security community. This is another area that merits further research.

This research would include India, one of the most significant members of the wider Anglosphere. The leading Indian academic C. Raja Mohan, has highlighted some of the obstacles to closer relations that are present in the Indian political-establishment. They are countered by Anglophile sentiments. There is an approximate parallel between these Indian outlooks and the competing Anglophobic and Anglophile meme-complexes present in the US between the 1930s and the early 1950s. However, Mohan contends that the surviving anti-colonial meme-complex that exists in an element of India's political elite is being rapidly undermined by social and geopolitical considerations. On the first point, the Indian diaspora now form part of the social and political fabric of the Anglospheric core states and maintain links with India. As Mohan asserts, "India is already tied deeply to the Anglosphere, whether Delhi wants it or not."\textsuperscript{1660} Das Nalapat agrees, stating, “Let me… point out that to the less untrammelled Anglospheric mind, it is not countries coming together as a collective as much as it is individuals coming together…”\textsuperscript{1661}

\textsuperscript{1659} Such as the European Movement, the Union of European Federalists, the Young European Federalists and the Spinelli Group.
\textsuperscript{1660} C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Anglosphere," \textit{The Indian Express}, December 29 2020.
As a IR academic, Mohan points up the threat from the PRC as an accelerant that will draw the core five and India together for reasons of commercial security and defence. As discussed previously, the trigger of a mutually shared threat perception is particularly effective when it aligns with entrenched common meme-complexes such as English common law practices and Magna Carta ideals.

Nor is it just India that is likely to coalesce with the core. Further research might look to the growth of Anglospheric alliances outside of the core. In this context, the security relationship between the Anglospheric core and the Commonwealth might be illuminating. Das Nalapat sees the Commonwealth as important, but “a bit unwieldy” and suggests any security building focus should be on those Commonwealth states that are “geopolitically significant” such as South Africa and Kenya [plus] smaller countries in the South Pacific.

Not to be forgotten in this configuration is the distinctly Anglospheric FPDA, of which Singapore plays a very significant SIGINT role.

The focus of this research has been on the five most Anglospheric states within the 'English-speaking community' who have a shared heritage and appreciation of certain memes. However, since memes are purported to behave like viruses and 'infect' receptive brains, it raises the question whether nations not traditionally seen as constituting being part of the English-speaking world can become Anglospheric if enough of its citizens are so inclined. Research in this area would include the Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, perhaps Israel with its common law system, but also states such as Rwanda which are attempting to shift their Francophone cultural orientation to Anglophone.

Das Nalapat also raised the possibility of non-Anglosphere states becoming Anglospheric by virtue of their becoming English-speaking and entrenching similar outlooks. In this context, Taiwan's ambitious plan to become an English-speaking country by 2030, with English being the prime language of teaching in the majority of schools by 2024.

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1662 "The Md Nalapat Interview".
1663 "Is Singapore Western Intelligence's 6th Eye?.
1664 "Australian Spies in Global Deal to Tap Undersea Cables."
1665 Rwanda adopted English in schools as the medium of education and joined the Commonwealth.
1666 "Education Ministry Unveils English Language Goals Bilingual Nation: The Ministry Aims to Have Teachers in 60 Percent of Primary and High Schools Use English Only to Teach the Language by 2024 ", Taipei Times, September 11 2021.
6.5 Summary

A number of new structures and fora relating to five states that hitherto have not been identified previously have been revealed by this research. These combined with Legrand’s research findings and other previously known fora have not been identified before. In addition to these structures, these five core states have displayed high levels of collaboration in sensitive areas of defence-related R&D. They have also exhibited a willingness to exchange military personnel, provide mutual support in conflicts and engage in ongoing, collaborative intelligence operations against other states. In these areas, they have established a degree of actorship hitherto not recognised or categorised in IR studies.

This thesis contends these five core Anglospheric states constitute a pluralistic and tightly-coupled security community but with a difference. That difference is its ability to act in a ‘synergic’ manner. As such, it is more than just the sum of its parts as it beyonds its external boundaries in a cohesive manner. In other words, the absence of war is a given between its members.

The key aspects in this dynamic is an enduring meme-complex related to a particular notion of the relationship between the people and their governments. It is this meme-complex that resides in the people who make up the Anglospheric core states and continues to do so. It is, however, possible that demographic changes might introduce challenger meme-complexes that prove more successful and change the higher level cultural values. This is unlikely for a number of reasons, not least because the very attraction of the Anglospheric core is its adherence to forms of government and ways of life that are seen as desirable. Thus, the Anglospheric core is an increasingly multi-racial ‘phyle’ or tribe, united by a higher level cultural meme-complex, under which multi-cultural preferences may flourish. As Bennett concludes:

Those who come to use the language and concepts of the Anglosphere (and further their evolution) are the memetic heirs of Magna Carta, the Bills of Rights, and the
Emancipation Proclamation, whatever their genetic heritage. "Innocent until proven guilty" now belongs to Chang, Gonzales, and Singh, as well as Smith and Jones.¹⁶⁶⁷

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