

The Anglosphere Core as a Pluralistic Security Community

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Abstract

This thesis posits that in the post World War 2 era, a nexus of relationships has given rise to a transnational group of five states that form a Deutschian security community. This Anglospheric security community of the US, UK, Australia and NZ, is examined by utilising Adler and Barnett's security community model. The model is adapted to give greater weight to the role of memes/culture. It finds that it is culture factors (meme-complexes) related to political values and social behaviour that inform the nature, and modus operandi of this Anglospheric security community. The Brexit debate on the UK's future is found to have illuminated these issues by exposing aspects the contradictions between the competing meme-complexes of the wider Anglospheric community and the EU.

The Anglospheric security community's durability and progress is found to be directly related to notions of legitimacy. This conclusion is informed by revisiting Deutsch's original writings on the difference between naturally developing communities and the dangers of policy-elites creating political constructs that run counter to cultural considerations. A values-based meme-complex found to provides not just a common identity but to inform the nature of the Anglospheric security community from which it accrues legitimacy.

It is further posited that the Adler and Barnett model's standard categorisations of pluralistic security community types do not adequately describe certain features of the Anglospheric security community. The research in this thesis has uncovered new institutions and fora and established that members do assist one another in conflict and confirms it to be a tightly-coupled version. However, the Anglospheric security community displays an actorship not implicit in Adler and Barnett's categorisation. This thesis offers the terms 'synergic' and 'hemiplegic' to describe functional and dysfunctional communities. The Anglospheric security community is held to be synergic since it exhibits actorship on defence and security matters externally. In contrast the European Union is held up to be hemiplegic due to endemic problems to function cohesively on external defence issues.

I declare that all parts of this thesis are my own work and that it has not, partially or in entirety, been submitted in substantially the same form elsewhere.

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Chapter 1. Conceptualising the Anglosphere

1.1 Introduction

The term ‘Anglosphere’ is frequently misunderstood and misapplied. It has gained greater currency in the wake of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. As such, it has been applied as a label for the possibility of closer relationships between the UK, the United States and some Commonwealth countries. This interpretation sees the Anglosphere as a political project yet to be achieved. In the UK, those of a Europhile mindset regard any call for such an entity as founded on nostalgic sentimentality.

Distinct from this Brexit-fuelled perspective, is the original, intended meaning that holds a multilayered Anglosphere already exists as a social and cultural network. And crucially, that from within this network, five of the states that display some of the densest Anglospheric characteristics, have so aligned their security and defence relationships as to achieve a presence in international relations. The proposition of an existing Anglosphere entity was given credence by revelations, in 2010, that a ‘Five Eyes’ Intelligence alliance had been operating since 1946.

Despite this revelation, there has been an almost complete absence of interest by International Relations (IR) theorists as to the existence of an Anglospheric core of states operating as a transnational body. The notion has been ignored or dismissed without due consideration of security relationships and their evolution. However, the announcement of the AUKUS security partnership in September 2021, gained public attention and has made the suggestion of an Anglospheric security alignment a little more difficult to ignore.¹

This thesis seeks to address this shortcoming in IR theory and affirm the existence of an Anglospheric core as a factor in international relations. It suggests that this core is best

¹ Anna Gross and Victor Mallet, "French Rage Triggered by Exclusion from Indo-Pacific Deal" *FT*, September 19 2021; Patrick Wintour, "Recall of Ambassadors Indicates Extent of Aukus Anger in France," *Guardian*, September 18 2021.

understood in IR theory as part of the Copenhagen School's utilisation of Adler and Barnett's security community theory, albeit, with important modifications. Adler and Barnett's model has been applied repeatedly to other transnational bodies and its insights are claimed to identify the EU as a 'security community.' Whilst the EU may indeed possess characteristics that suggest a security community, it is arguably dysfunctional in matters of external security and defence and has seen internal dissent including the loss of a large member state.

Security community theory applied in this thesis has of necessity been modified. Firstly, this thesis restores and gives prominence to aspects of Karl Deutsch's original arguments regarding the foundations of security communities and nation-building. This includes elevating Deutsch's stress of culture as the foundational basis of communal identity and suggests cultural affinities are the 'glue' that give real meaning to the Anglosphere. Secondly, it acknowledges the agency of individuals in progressing or impeding the development of security communities.

A third and crucial factor concerns the 'nature' of the security community. The application of the Adler and Barnett model has been shoe-horned to explain and justify the path taken to create the EU. In doing so, the model has ignored Deutsch's warnings that the durability of a security community will likely depend on its legitimacy. The issue of legitimacy assumes a particular significance if the end goal is to fashion a pluralistic community of sovereign states into an amalgamated community. If the driver towards this ever-closer union is elite-driven, and fails to take account of public sentiment, Deutsch warns the outcome is a likely perceived lack of legitimacy and a consequent instability. This thesis argues that this is a danger the Anglosphere core security community has avoided by its adherence to relationships based on trust and a lack of coercion. It remains pluralistic and its constituent parts have not been obliged to surrender sovereign powers to executive bodies with collective decision-making powers over the citizens of each state.

Finally, this thesis suggests the existing category of a 'pluralistic' security community is an inadequate descriptor of the Anglospheric core's behaviour. The mere absence of war is too low a bar as a qualifier, since the Anglosphere core has adopted *proactive* military postures. This thesis proffers the term 'synergic' to describe the activist role of the Anglospheric core security community and 'hemiplegic' to describe one exhibiting paralysis.

1.2 The literature

This literature review is of necessity divided into two parts. First, it is necessary to explore and define what the Anglosphere was intended to mean. The second section identifies the treatment of the Anglosphere in IR theory, explaining why it has been ignored or dismissed and examines the few unsatisfactory instances where IR scholars have deigned to examine it.

1.2.1 The Diamond Age - Coining of a term

The term 'Anglosphere' was coined to denote a post-racial network of English-speaking peoples based on shared outlooks and norms. As such, it stands in sharp contrast to any previous conceptualisations of a racially based 'white' community popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The term was invented by US science fiction writer Neal Stephenson in his 1995 'cyberpunk' novel *The Diamond Age*.² The title is a reference to the technological ages of humankind (Bronze, Iron etc) and the advent of a future 'Diamond' age featuring nanotechnology and cryptocurrency.³ In Stephenson's imagination, the future world is a neo-medieval construct in which Westphalian nation-states have become enfeebled due to both their loss of revenue and control of technology. Society is dominated by tribal communities or 'phyles' operating as guilds each with their own shared cultural values across different territories and cities.⁴ Almost all are racially construed, including two of the three dominant phyles; the Han, and the Hindu. The other dominant phyle, the 'New Atlantean', is not racially construed, but consists of the English-speaking world. It is predominantly drawn from 'the West,' but it includes large numbers of Asians, Africans and other racial groups spread across the globe. They follow rules based on English common law under the legitimising authority of a vestigial British monarchy. They constitute what Stephenson terms 'the Anglosphere.'

² Neal Stephenson, *The Diamond Age* (Spectra, 2003).

³ The choice of name becomes more obvious given the structural similarities between silicon and diamonds and their relevance to nanotechnology. See: Vadym N Mochalin et al., "The Properties and Applications of Nanodiamonds," *Nature nanotechnology* 7, no. 1 (2012); Andrew Dzurak, "Diamond and Silicon Converge," *Nature* 479, no. 7371 (2011).

⁴ This notion has echoes of the Ottoman 'millet' system' that accommodated different laws and cultural idioms of various communities. See: Karen Barkey and George Gavrilis, "The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial Autonomy and Its Contemporary Legacy," *Ethnopolitics* 15, no. 1 (2016).

Stephenson's post-racial Anglosphere reflects his experience and relationship with Silicon Valley, where he has achieved a cult-like status with the IT community for his scientific foresight. He has not just predicted and articulated futuristic concepts, but coined the labels, now adopted, for these technological changes including the terms 'cryptocurrency' and 'metaverse'.⁵ Consequently, Stephenson has served as an advisor to the likes of Amazon's Jeff Bezos and his views have been sought out by academics such as IR theorist Francis Fukuyama.⁶ Stephenson's 'Anglosphere' is a microcosm of Silicon Valley's technological entrepreneurs who include high-profile individuals with diverse racial backgrounds, most notably those of Indian and Taiwanese origin.⁷ This diversity is reflected in Stephenson's depiction of the New Atlantean [Anglosphere] phyle community. In his novel, the main New Atlantean leadership character is of Korean birth, with a knighthood. The term 'Anglosphere' is deliberately applied to stress a move away from any Anglo-saxon racial premise associated with historical notions of 'English-speaking peoples' to one based on shared cultural values.⁸

Outside of fiction, the Anglosphere term was first adopted and given currency by James C. Bennett because of its emphasis on values and norms as opposed to race.⁹ Bennett, an associate of Stephenson, and a technological entrepreneur with an interest in rocket technology, acted as an evangelist for what he termed an 'Anglospheric' network of peoples. In this he was encouraged by Robert Conquest and supported by Conrad Black, the Canadian

⁵ See: Kari Stray, "Sci-Fi Books That Had Told Us About Crypto before Satoshi Did" *Cointelegraph* (2017), <https://cointelegraph.com/news/sci-fi-books-that-had-told-us-about-crypto-before-satoshi-did>; Alex Zhavoronkov, "The Original Inventor of "Metaverse" on Technology, Life, and Books: Interview with Neal Stephenson," *Forbes* (2021), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexzhavoronkov/2021/12/29/the-original-inventor-of-metaverse-on-technology-life-and-books-interview-with-neal-stephenson/?sh=1bc751ad43f5>.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, "Neal Stephenson and Francis Fukuyama Discuss Stephenson's New Book, "Termination Shock"," *American Purpose Newsletter* (2021), <https://www.americanpurpose.com/events/neal-stephenson-and-francis-fukuyama-discuss-stephensons-new-book-termination-shock/>.

⁷ Some notable figures are: JenHsun "Jensen" Huang , CEO of the Nvidia Corporation. (Taiwanese-American); Jerry Chih-Yuan Yang, Co-founder and former CEO Yahoo (Taiwanese-American); Ashar Aziz, Founder & CEO FireEye (Pakistani-American); Osman Rashid Founder & CEO Kno, (British-American Pakistani); Tan Hock Eng, CEO Broadcom Corporation (Malaysian-American).

⁸ The term 'English-Speaking Peoples' was popularised by Churchill in his four volume work of the same name. Winston Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Volume I: The Birth of Britain*, vol. 1 (Cassell, 1962).

⁹ James C Bennett, "An Anglosphere Primer," *Address before the Foreign Policy Research Institute*, www.pattern.com/bennettj-anglosphereprimer.html (2002): 3-5.

media magnate.¹⁰ John O’Sullivan provided a platform for Bennett’s ideas in a series of opinion pieces promoting aspects of an Anglospheric network as a force in international relations.¹¹

1.2.2 A nodal, memetic and post-racial construct

Bennett hoped the term Anglosphere was “concise, [it] goes beyond mere linguistic commonality, and has no racial overtones.” He conceded the term ‘Anglo’ could have pejorative meaning in some parts of the US but hoped that ‘Anglosphere’ and an “Anglospheric perspective reclaims the term from narrow usage and connotation.”¹² Bennett argued the English-speaking peoples were a distinctive culture and were on the way to becoming a distinct community in their own right. For Bennett, the Anglosphere was not and should not be a centralised federal bloc and declared

Anglospherists call on all English-speaking nations to abandon Haushoferian fantasies of geographical blocs: on America to downgrade its hemispherist ambitions, on Britain to rethink its Europeanist illusions, and on Australia to reject its "Asian identity" fallacy.¹³

Rather, the Anglosphere was an informal and natural coming together of peoples facilitated by advances in communications and did would/should cooperate together as a transnational community of peoples and states. This was a variation of Stephenson’s idea of a ‘phyle,’ that is to say, a tribe linked across the globe by common language, culture and values. Bennett stressed this construct is “assuredly not the racialist Anglo-Saxonism dating from the era around 1900 calling for a federated union.”¹⁴ Instead it was a community founded on a “memetic, rather than a genetic, identity.”¹⁵

¹⁰ See: Robert Conquest, "Toward an English-Speaking Union," *The National Interest*, no. 57 (1999).

¹¹ Conrad [Lord] Black, Canadian newspaper entrepreneur with periodicals in the US and UK. John Sullivan: Irish-UK journalist and Editor of the *National Review*.

¹² Bennett, 15.

¹³ Ibid., 3.

¹⁴ Ibid., 3 & 14-15. For an account of Victorian calls for racial unity see: Daniel Hannan, *Inventing Freedom: How the English-Speaking Peoples Made the Modern World* (Broadside Books London, 2013), 308.

¹⁵ Bennett, 3 & 14-15.

The term ‘meme’ was coined by the biologist Richard Dawkins to describe the idea of a non-genetic, cultural replicator. Memes have entered popular language to describe viral theme-based images, videos or texts that spread via social media, but this is just one narrow aspect of its real meaning. According to Dawkins memes determine the relative success or failure of a culture. Genes are in DNA and are transferred biologically, whereas Dawkins regards memes “as physically residing in the brain,” passed on as a pattern of values and norms.¹⁶ In this conceptualisation, language is endowed with a communicative power as a replicator of “cultural transmission.” Thus, Dawkins suggests memes propagate themselves via a meme pool “by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation.”¹⁷ Memes as ideas replicate themselves by the spoken and written world. By way of example, Dawkins points to the idea of God existing as a form of a meme “with high survival value or infective power in the environment provided by human culture.” A fertile meme planted in a mind will “literally parasitise” a brain, “turning it into a vehicle for the meme's propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitise the genetic mechanism of a host cell.”¹⁸

Culture then, can be understood as a collection of memes or meme-complexes that replicate themselves and are likely more resilient than genes.

We were built as gene machines, created to pass on our genes. But that aspect of us will be forgotten in three generations. Your child, even your grandchild, may bear a resemblance to you, perhaps in facial features, in a talent for music, in the colour of her hair. But as each generation passes, the contribution of your genes is halved. It does not take long to reach negligible proportions. Our genes may be immortal but the collection of genes that is any one of us is bound to crumble away.¹⁹

In its widest sense, as described by Dawkins and adopted by Bennett, a meme is a process of imitation, whereby messages are both propagated and adopted to create a ‘meme-complex.’ Cultures can be seen as the accumulation of “mutually-assisting memes” producing a range of ideas, style of architecture, morals, laws, rituals, art and so on. Memes then, are

¹⁶ Richard Dawkins, *The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 165-66.

¹⁷ *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford Univ Press, 2006), 249.

¹⁸ Ibid., 249-50.

replicators, passed on by imitation. In contrast to DNA, ideas can and do survive by memetic transmission.

If you have a good idea, compose a tune, invent a sparking plug, write a poem, it may live on, intact, long after your genes have dissolved in the common pool. Socrates may or may not have a gene or two alive in the world today, as G. C. Williams has remarked, but who cares? The meme-complexes of Socrates, Leonardo, Copernicus and Marconi are still going strong.²⁰

The replication success of particular memes in a given society will be determined by competing memes in the meme-pool. Where a meme forms part of strong meme complex, then challenger memes might struggle to achieve a presence. Thus, a society in which liberal values have been carried forward by memes will likely prove more resistant to memes that are illiberal. Of course, it works the other way too, as Dawkins points out.

An important aspect of selection on any one meme will be the other memes that already happen to dominate the meme pool. If the society is already dominated by Marxist, or Nazi memes, any new meme's replication success will be influenced by its compatibility with this existing background.²¹

In the context of a modern Anglosphere, leading Indian IR academic Professor Madhav das Nalapat describes a similar process to highlight that it is a mental affinity rather than racial affinity that creates a sense of community.²² Das Nalapat asserts the common values of the Anglosphere are propagated through memes not genes, utilising the minds of English-speakers. In other words, it is cultural commonalities not race that acts as a glue. As das Nalapat puts it,

...the intangible has overtaken the physical, there is a need to refine the concept of “Blood” to include not only the more superficial genetic codes that comprise the “Blood of the Body,” but also the abstract virtues and mindsets of the “Blood of the

¹⁹ Ibid., 258.

²⁰ Ibid., 258-59.

²¹ *The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene*, 169.

²² India's first professor of Geopolitics. Former Editor of the Times of India.

Mind.” If we define the Anglosphere as not simply a geographic or even a linguistic entity, but as an entity that encapsulates the type of thought and behaviour that led to Magna Carta, to the movement for the abolition of slavery, to the Industrial Revolution, and to the war against the Nazis’ attempt to conquer continental Europe, then it is a fact that such minds exist not only within the geographical spaces visualised in a Churchillian Anglosphere, but also much farther afield in India for instance...²³

The memes that relate to fundamental values are likely to be of a different order to those memes that relate to other aspects of culture such as music or preferences for sport or cuisine. In other words, a society could be multi-cultural in terms of cuisine, music whatever, but susceptible to, and united by, a values related meme-complex.

Bennett stressed Anglophone influence varied across the world but was strongest in those states where the English language could ensure the communication of the Anglospheric meme-complex in the meme-pool.

The densest nodes of the Anglosphere are found in the United States and the United Kingdom, while Anglophone regions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and South Africa are powerful and populous outliers. The educated English-speaking populations of the Caribbean, Oceania, Africa and India constitute the Anglosphere's frontiers.²⁴

The concept of nodes introduces the notion of a nexus or core. As to what constituted the meme-complex of the Anglosphere Bennett identified a number of factors; some unique, some less so, but together distinctive. These include language, common law, and the emphasis on civil society. The last of these was both a distinguishing feature of Anglophone culture and a fundamental key to understanding the success and durability of democracy in Anglosphere states.²⁵

²³ Madhav Das Nalapat, "India and the Anglosphere," *The New Criterion* 29, no. 5 (2011).

²⁴ Bennett, 2.

²⁵ Points echoed by Churchill. See: Churchill, 1. Preface.

Civil society in Anglosphere communities is “a vast network of networks,” starting with the individual and the families, community organisations, religious congregations, social organisations, and businesses created by individuals coming together voluntarily.²⁶ It was the voluntary nature that Bennett considered important since these continue in a hierachal fashion through regional, national levels, “and create civil societies, which in turn beget civic states.”²⁷ It is precisely this feature and dynamic replicated at an international level that he argued was creating the new Anglosphere communal network between the peoples of Anglophone states. Bennett acknowledges that his thinking has been influenced by David Fischer’s seminal work *Seeds of Albion*. Fischer applies the term ‘folkways’ to describe a memetic cultural process that provides an explanation as to why the US is ‘Anglophone’ despite having a ‘British’ racial composition of less than twenty per cent.²⁸

Essentially, Bennett was advancing the idea of a transnational community of networked individuals of a similar mindset. It followed that those states with the strongest memetic similarities might have a natural inclination to work together. Such a possibility was suggested when the existence of secretive Anglospheric military and security relationships began to emerge in the late 1990s when Tim Legrand discovered “an informal network of Anglosphere public service mandarins...”²⁹ He identified these as having been established in 1989, as the successor to an ongoing series of informal conferences known as the ‘Five Countries Meetings.’ By 2015, Legrand’s research had revealed a raft of informal standing networks which constituted,

one of the oldest, most active, and perhaps most resilient, of transgovernmental alliances active in the global governance space, though it is relatively unknown to the political science literature: ‘Anglosphere’ countries Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. At the heart of this alliance is a manifest

²⁶ James C Bennett, "An Anglosphere Primer" (paper presented at the Address before the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2002), 5.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America*, vol. 1 (America: A Cultural History, 1989), 6-11.

²⁹ Tim Legrand, "Transgovernmental Policy Networks in the Anglosphere," *Public Administration* 93, no. 4 (2015).

historical, cultural and political affinity, which plays out in a complex raft of social, economic and policy relationships amongst and between the Anglosphere states.³⁰

The term ‘lacuna’ is liberally applied in academic writing, but in the context of IR theory, its application to the ‘Anglosphere’ would be justified. The Cold War subsumed the Anglospheric transnational security arrangements into the wider Western bloc. The ending of the Cold War challenged the dominant IR perspectives but in a way that accentuated the problem. Either the realist primacy of states was stressed or the notion of revamped liberal institutional approaches was applied. The latter emphasised a Eurocentric perspective within a narrow transatlantic paradigm. A brief examination of how these perspectives predominated within the IR discipline illustrates the impediment to identifying and analysing the existence of an Anglospheric community.

1.2.3 International Relations Theory blindness

That the notion of an Anglosphere community as factor in international relations did not receive much attention from IR scholars was perhaps not surprising. The tone had been set in 1940 by E.H. Carr, a founding father of IR as a discipline. In *The Twenty Years Crisis*, his seminal contribution to the study of IR, Carr noted the definitive end of ‘Pax Britannica,’ and with its demise, the imminent reordering of the international order. Carr acknowledged that, “the English speaking peoples have formed the dominant group in the world,” but scorned the possibility their supremacy could be maintained.³¹ Although the influence of cultural factors in shaping ‘national interest’ was accommodated in classical realism, an Anglospheric cultural perspective did not form part of Carr’s narrative. There would be no Anglospheric “power unit” or bloc:

...they sometimes console themselves with the dream that British supremacy, instead of passing altogether away, will be transmuted into the higher and more effective form of an ascendancy of the English-speaking peoples. The pax Britannica will be put into commission and become a pax Anglo-Saxonica, under which the British Dominions,

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (Macmillan, 1940), 214.

standing halfway between the mother country and the United States, will be cunningly woven into a fabric of Anglo-American co-operation.³²

Carr's prescriptive treatment of the concept set the parameters of discourse within the IR discipline a narrative was reinforced by the obfuscatory effects of Cold War bipolarity. For liberal internationalists and constructivist IR scholars, the post-World War 2 focus was on explaining the more obvious and visible institutions of 'the West' usually NATO or the evolution of the present day European Union. The fact the UK was part of this process of 'ever-closer union' and a member of NATO, served to deflect analysis away from any multilateral military/security Anglospheric relationships operating within 'the West.'

1.2.4 Theoretical perspectives in the interregnum.

An opportunity for a reassessment of IR thinking occurred following the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union. From 1989 to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, there was a period of flux and uncertainty – an 'interregnum' in which both politicians and IR theorists struggled to make sense of the changed international landscape.³³ The casualty of this changed environment was classical realism, so long the dominant paradigm. In response to this theoretical vacuum, the IR discipline produced a series of new ideas and approaches.³⁴

Francis Fukuyama announced the triumph of the West – of the Western idea.³⁵ John Mearsheimer advanced a neorealist reconceptualisation in *Back to the Future* that reaffirmed the primacy of states intent on maximising power and operating within an anarchical international structure. As such, the roles of non-state actors, internal factors and the existing network of institutions that girded the West were deemed largely irrelevant.³⁶ Kenneth Waltz,

³² Ibid.

³³ The term was coined by Michael Cox et al. who borrowed E H Carr's description of the transition between Lenin's death and Stalin's rise, to describe the 'uneasy balance' between contending forces and ideas. Michael Cox, Ken Booth, and Tim Dunne, "Introduction: The Interregnum Controversies in World Politics, 1989–99," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 5 (1999). See footnotes 8 and 9 and pages 7-8

³⁴ Ibid., 3.

³⁵ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, no. 16 (1989): 1.

³⁶ John J Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-6; Bruce M Russett, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and John J Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security," *International Security* 15, no. 3 (1990). For a rebuttal see: Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the

from the perspective of defensive neorealism, claimed institutions did little more than provide frameworks for states to pursue national interests and had outlived any usefulness. He was unconvinced NATO would survive or the Europeans find a sufficient synthesis of national interests to found a collective defence operation of any meaning.³⁷ From these theoretical perspectives there was no interest in according any significance to the Anglospheric framework identified by Legrand or claims by investigative journalists of secret Anglospheric alliances.

Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations* offered a different perspective, retaining the anarchical structure of realism but replacing the state with nine civilisational blocs said to constitute the future fracture lines in international relations.³⁸ The theory suffered from the monolithic categorisation of the civilisational blocs, assuming a degree of internal cultural homogeneity within them that did not exist.³⁹

Another theoretical approach emerged from the so-called Copenhagen School. Whilst constructivist in nature, it gave due regard to states as principally driven by balance of power considerations. Crucially, it recognised the role of non-state actors and cultural/societal factors.⁴⁰ Its advocates, most notably and consistently Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, argued that state power extended beyond military capability. It included intangibles such as ideology and culture operating through "systems" of states and peoples. These systems were examples of "security complexes" that required an 'unfolding' of their societal components to understand their dynamics. There was a recognition that non-military issues such as the economic, health and environmental sectors were often securitised and highly relevant in

End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 249-77.

³⁷ See: Kenneth N Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International security* 25, no. 1 (2000).

³⁸ Samuel P Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer) (1993).

³⁹ For critical views amplifying this point from different perspectives see: Edward W Said, *The Myth of the "Clash of Civilizations"* (Media Education Foundation, 2002); Barry Buzan, "Civilisational Realpolitik as the New World Order?," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (1997): 182; Timothy Garton Ash, *History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s* (London: Penguin, 2000), 388-89.

⁴⁰ See: Cox, Booth, and Dunne; Stephen Murray Smith et al., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

analysing security complexes.⁴¹ The latter comprised “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot be reasonably analysed apart from one another.”⁴² As such security complexes could be positioned on a scale that ranged from outright enmity to close cooperation. To explain the latter, the Copenhagen School incorporated Adler and Barnett’s revised Deutschian security community model.⁴³

This approach offered the possibility of a theoretical *via media* for both academics and policy-makers concerned with determining what post-Cold War architecture would be conducive for ensuring a stable peace. The Copenhagen School’s approach was welcomed by Gwyn Prins as “a valuable advance” since it addressed the limitations of classical realism and accommodated a complex and highly relevant, range of non-state factors.⁴⁴ Prins sought to emphasise the role non-material factors had played in the downfall of the Soviet Union and overlooked by both classical realism and neglected by the new neorealist theories. Thus, the key insight to explain IR theory’s failure to foresee the collapse was an inability to recognise,

the degree to which individuals armed with ideas and aspirations, proved able to challenge and break the iron grid of structure. How they did this is a question of inductive and cultural rather than deductive and logical study.⁴⁵

Certainly, policy-makers outside of academia absorbed the rationale and language of a ‘security community’ as a way of understanding and restructuring relations between East and West Europe.⁴⁶ Numerous academic papers applied security community theory as a way of

⁴¹ Barry Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), vii,2, 23-47.

⁴² Ibid., 12.

⁴³ Michael Barnett, Emanuel Adler “Studying security communities in theory, comparison, and history” is listed in the biography as forthcoming work. Ibid., 215.

⁴⁴ Gwyn Prins, *The Heart of War: On Power, Conflict and Obligation in the Twenty-First Century* (Routledge, 2003), 116.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 109.

⁴⁶ For example see: The Clinton Administration’s internal document. PRD 36 “US Policy Toward Central & Eastern Europe.” December 6, 1993; Warren Christopher Speech. “In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era” North Atlantic Council NATO HQ December 1, 1994; “Resolution on the OSCE and the Helsinki +40 Process” European Movement Federal Assembly April 27 2015; Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “Does Europe Need a New Security Architecture?” (paper presented at the OSCE Yearbook 2009, 2010). Leonid Kozhara, “Address”. Chairperson-in-

advancing the enlargement of NATO⁴⁷ and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).⁴⁸ Sometimes the emergent Euro-Atlantic security community was seen as a potential synthesis of NATO plus the European Community, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union (WEU).⁴⁹ There was however, no interest in the application of security community theory to defence and security arrangements of Anglosphere members possibly because it remained almost institutionally invisible.

1.2.5 Post 9/11 and the misidentification of fracture lines

The aftermath of the Al Qaeda 9/11 attack on the US that marked the end of the interregnum, did produce an academic focus on an alleged cultural fault-line within the Western security alliance. Although NATO invoked Article V of its Charter, it was termed a moral gesture by the Secretary General and was not a mobilisation.⁵⁰ There was reluctance in some European quarters to act militarily without definitive proof Al Qaeda's culpability.⁵¹ A repeat of the European hesitancy evident in the Balkan Wars, and in the curtailing of Iraq regime's genocidal impulses after the [first] Gulf War, gave rise to US concerns NATO might act as an impediment to swift action in Afghanistan from where Al Qaeda operated.⁵²

In a widely read article, Robert Kagan declared, "it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world..." He added, "they agree on

Office of the OSCE, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Annual Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. June 29, 2013, Istanbul.

⁴⁷ For example: Michael C Williams and Iver B Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity," *Millennium* 29, no. 2 (2000); Holger Mölder, "Nato's Role in the Post-Modern European Security Environment, Cooperative Security and the Experience of the Baltic Sea Region by Holger Mölder," *Baltic Security & Defence Review* 8 (2006).

⁴⁸ Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building Model," *Cambridge Studies in International Relations* 62, no. 1 (1998).

⁴⁹ Pál Dunay et al., *A Lasting Peace in Central Europe?* (Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1995); Andrej Tusicisny, "Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously," *International Political Science Review* 28, no. 4 (2007): 432; Sonia Lucarelli, "Peace and Democracy: The Rediscovered Link. The EU, NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities," *NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Papers* (2002).

⁵⁰ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "White House Keeps Nato in the Dark," *Daily Telegraph*, September 28 2001. Contrary to popular belief, the clause does not commit each member to mutual military assistance but "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." See: Pål Jonson, "The Debate About Article 5 and Its Credibility," *NATO Research Papers*, no. 58, May (2010): 2.

⁵¹ Notably Germany and Belgium. See: Christian Tuschhoff, "Why NATO Is Still Relevant," *International Politics* 40, no. 1 (2003): 103.

⁵² Notably Germany and Belgium. Ibid., 103 & 06.

little and understand one another less and less.”⁵³ It was, he opined, a ‘Mars v Venus’ transatlantic division with Europeans disposed towards a utopian view that regarded force as outmoded. The Europeans were “born again idealists” who could ignore the Hobbesian laws of nature because of the US security umbrella.⁵⁴ The US viewed the world in realist terms and not only considered force necessary, but was prepared to use it.⁵⁵ Charles Kupchan went further suggesting the division was so profound that “the next clash of civilisations will not be between the West and the rest, but between the United States and Europe...”⁵⁶ Insofar as the UK was concerned, Kupchan was explicit, the UK was part of this divergent process, complicit in promoting a European Community leadership role and a unified European defence capability.⁵⁷ These views were representative of a very NATO-centric and binary perspective of ‘the West’ that managed to overlook NATO member Canada, and Australia and New Zealand.

The effect of this binary transatlantic focus was to encourage the notion that the European Community was developing as an alternative to balance against the hegemonic nature of the US. European integrationists pursued the goal of a ‘European Union’(EU) with common security arrangements. These were said to constitute a ‘military revolution’ in the transatlantic relations and military power, marking the emergence of the EU as a security actor independent of the US.⁵⁸ Jacques Delors had once called the European Community an “unidentified political object” that defied categorisation. Now, however, by virtue of its institutions, if not by the self-declared intent of its leaders, a growing body of IR scholars claimed to have identified it as a Deutschian ‘pluralistic’ security community par excellence.⁵⁹ So, for example, in 2012, Charles Kupchan referred to the early stages of market integration in the European Community as “the onset of a security community.”⁶⁰

⁵³ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy review*, no. 113 (2002): 1.

⁵⁴ *Paradise and Power: America Versus Europe in the Twenty-First Century* (Atlantic, 2003), 17.

⁵⁵ Ibid. See also: Michael Cox, "Commentary: Martians and Venutians in the New World Order," *International Affairs* 79, no. 3 (2003).

⁵⁶ Charles A Kupchan, "The End of the West," (2002): 1.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁵⁸ Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, *Europe's Military Revolution* (Centre for European Reform London, 2001).

⁵⁹ For example: Alex Warleigh-Lack states the EU is *inter alia* a security community as conceived by the Copenhagen School. Alex Warleigh-Lack, "The EU, Asean and Apec in Comparative Perspective," in *Europe and Asia*, ed. P Murray (Palgrave, 2008), 34. Other examples include: Elke Krahmann, "The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe," “*One Europe or Several?*” *Programme* 36/01 (2001): 4-5; Frank Möller, "Capitalizing on Difference: A Security Community or/as a Western Project," *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 3 (2003); Hans Mouritzen, "Peace for

An earlier attempt was made to extend the security community model to analyse 'the West' in general. Robert Jervis, then President of American Political Science Association, used his 2001 Presidential address to suggest the existence of a 'Western' pluralistic security community encompassing the US, Western Europe and Japan. This seminal intervention sought to identify the internal challenges to this 'Western' security community and questioned how relationships might develop given the dominance of one power (the US) within it.⁶¹ Prins agreed with this enquiry, noting Jervis "reanimates Karl Deutsch's concept of the security community" but suggested it should be pushed further and address "whether our assumptions about the security communities which we think we have at the moment, and particularly in Europe, are reliable?"⁶²

So far as the US was concerned on the issue of reliability, the answer was no. As discussed above, NATO invoked Article V, but NATO's Rapid Reaction Forces was not utilised by the US in the Afghanistan invasion phase. A factor was the hesitancy of some European leaders to commit forces and a US wish to avoid the entanglements of possibly stultifying consultation.⁶³ Instead, the US took up two offers of support. The first, and most substantial contribution, came from the UK. The second came in the form of a much smaller but significant contribution from Australia after their invocation of Article IV of the ANZUS

the Wrong Reason? Towards a European Security Community: A Rejoinder to Möller," *ibid.*; Andrew. Cottey, *Security in the New Europe* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Andrea Ellner, "Regional Security in a Global Context: A Critical Appraisal of European Approaches to Security," *European security* 17, no. 1 (2008); Magnus Ekengren, "From a European Security Community to a Secure European Community Tracing the New Security Identity of the EU," in *Globalization and Environmental Challenges*, ed. Brauch H.G. et al (Berlin: Springer, 2008); Victor Mauer, "The European Union: From Security Community Towards Security Actor," in *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies* (Routledge, 2009), 387-97; Vincent Laporte, *The European Union-an Expanding Security Community?* (College of Europe Bruges, 2012).

⁶⁰ Charles A Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 217.

⁶¹ Robert Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001," *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (2002).

⁶² Gwyn Prins, "9/11 and the Raiders of the Lost Ark," *Cornell International Law Journal* 35, no. 3, Art. 11 (2002): 624.

⁶³ Richard Beeston, "Nato Allies' Backing Has No Guarantee," *The Times*, September 14 2001.

Suzanne Daley, "Nation Challenged: The Allies; Nato Quickly Gives the U.S. All the Help That It Asked: Doesn't Expect to Be Directly Involved in Group Military Action.," *NY Times*, October 5 2001.

Treaty.⁶⁴ Consequently, the force assembled to invade Afghanistan was a US operation supported by UK and Australian military forces.

Only after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the exposure of deep rifts amongst the transatlantic alliance did the first signs of an Anglospheric perspective emerge. And not amongst IR theorists, but rather strategists and historians. In 2004, Douglas Stuart, a professor at the US Army College, declared “relations between Washington and key European allies are on life support,” and adopted both the terminology and conceptualisation of James Bennett. Stuart argued the case for “a new transatlantic dialogue” between the US, Canada and the UK founded on long-standing common values and a willingness to protect them.⁶⁵ Another Canadian academic, David Haglund adopted an Anglospheric approach too, suggesting Canada was unlikely to be out of step with its two long-standing security partners in the 'English-speaking' world, the UK and the US (to say nothing of its 'strategic cousin,' Australia). He cautioned, Canada's tilt towards 'Old Europe' might be a temporary reconceptualisation of Canada's own geopolitical situation that would see Canada realign with its Anglospheric Atlantic partners.⁶⁶

1.2.6 Anglosphere existence repudiated

The notion of an Anglospheric grouping of states and its relevance to international relations did not excite the interest of IR academics despite the AUSUKUS composition of the invasion forces deployed in Afghanistan. Even the revelation of an Anglospheric five state SIGINT alliance in 2010 was ignored. There were a few exceptions, one of which was an article by Owen Harries, a former Foreign Policy Advisor to the Australian Frasier

⁶⁴ Australian PM John Howard, witnessed the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon from his hotel window. On his return to Canberra two days later, the Australian Cabinet agreed the mutual aid clause of the treaty should be invoked. See:Anthony H Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons* (CSIS, 2003), 40.

⁶⁵ Douglas Stuart, "NATO's Anglosphere Option," *International Journal* 60, no. 1 (2005): 181-82.

⁶⁶ David G Haglund, "Relating to the Anglosphere: Canada, 'Culture', and the Question of Military Intervention," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no. 2 (2005): 179-80. Haglund was correct. Canada had secretly become involved in the Iraq invasion as explored later. See:US State Dept, "Canada Won't Join Military Action against Iraq without Another UNSC Resolution," ed. US State Dept (Washington DC: WikiLeaks, 2003).

Government and the co-founding editor of the National Interest journal.⁶⁷ Harries adopted a realist perspective, dismissing the idea of a future anglospheric arrangements. His article “An Anglosphere Illusion” dismissed the existence of a security alliance in the past, present or future as “fanciful.”⁶⁸

Another challenge to the possibility of a Anglospheric perspective came from Alex Danchev who repudiated the idea of shared values between the US and UK. Quoting Nietzsche, Danchev argued that the idea of a transatlantic community was inspired by a mythical past, only given credence by its “evangelist in Chief” Winston Churchill.⁶⁹ Danchev argued there had been an “evaporation” of the moral basis of the entire transatlantic alliance based on values. Europeans (including the UK) had peaceful values and no external defence or security ambitions and asserted “Americans are bowling alone.” Danchev’s examples of European reluctance to use force actually revealed the UK had deployed alongside the US. Danchev obscured this revelation by placing a qualification in a single footnote explaining it was too wearisome to add “except the UK” in each case mentioned.⁷⁰ Warren Kimball published a highly critical open letter to Danchev. declaring himself baffled by a single catch-all footnote “that exempts the British from the category of Europeans,” and thereby repudiated Danchev’s central assertions.⁷¹

The only other attempt to engage with the notion of an existing Anglosphere was made by Dylan Kissane. Kissane adopted a realist perspective and sought to explore whether an Anglospheric military core of five states identified as (Australia, Canada, NZ, the UK and the US) existed. Utilising Correlates of War (CoW) data, Kissane undertook a comparative exercise using war and alliance datasets from 1900 to 1997.⁷² His intent was to expose any Anglospheric institutional framework and determine whether mutual aid in conflict was in

⁶⁷ The other co-founder was Irving Kristol considered the founder of neoconservatism. The National Interest inclined towards realist and neoconservative US positions not necessarily reliant on entangling alliances.

⁶⁸ Owen Harries, “The Anglosphere Illusion,” *The National Interest*, no. 63 (2001).

⁶⁹ Alex Danchev, “How Strong Are Shared Values?,” in *The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations*, ed. Samuel Wells and Ludger Kuhnhardt (Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2005), 12.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Footnote 13.

⁷¹ Warren Kimball, “Dangerously Contagious? The Anglo-American Special Relationship,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 7, no. 3 (2005): 439.

⁷² Correlates of War, “Correlates of War Project,” (Michigan: CoW, 1963).

any way exceptional. Kissane concluded that Anglospheric solidarity is very “patchy,” and “there seems nothing very special about the ‘special relationships’ the Anglosphere claims.”⁷³

A cursory overview of the research reveals fundamental methodological flaws that undermine Kissane’s conclusions. His assumption that the paucity of positive wartime relationships between Dominion states and the UK and US in the first half of the twentieth century is indicative of a lack of a security relationship is mistaken. The Dominion states were not sovereign, but part of the same British Imperial body politic and security structure and therefore not separately identified in the data. Furthermore, Kissane’s reliance on minor regional conflicts also constitute weak grounds for demonstrating a lack of mutual concern. There was no consideration that Anglosphere states might not require mutual aid and in some circumstances decline it due to perceived spheres of influence and responsibilities..

Kissane’s conclusion that the lack of a formal treaty framework confirms the non-existence of an Anglospheric core is also suspect. Since, the Dominions were not sovereign, Britain made external defence imperial treaties that are included under the UK data. The Dominions and the UK were bound by imperial arrangements, first under the auspices of an Imperial Defence Committee and post-sovereignty by ongoing informal allegiances, again not recorded in data. To compound the problem, the datasets only include declared formal treaties between the five sovereign states for the entire period. Just a cursory review of government records and literature reveals the existence of other alliance type arrangements, some secretive, others open, but not included in the CoW database.⁷⁴

1.2.7 Anglosphere as a racialised construct

Whereas Kissane argued there was no factual grounds for believing in the existence of a core Anglospheric community as evidenced by the lack of an institutional alliance framework or by any strong solidarity in war, another IR scholar, Srdjan Vucetic applied a theoretical Critical Race perspective. He concluded the five states of Australia, Canada, New Zealand,

⁷³ Dylan Kissane, "Anglosphere United? Examining and Explaining 20th Century War Time Alliances in the English Speaking World," *Dynamics, Resistance & Conflict, Centre d'Etudes Franco-Américain de Management, Tours, France* (2010): 1.

⁷⁴ Two examples are NORAD and the Five Powers Defence Agreement

the UK and the US) constituted a “racialised community in global society.”⁷⁵ In other words, Vucetic rejected Bennett’s adoption the term Anglosphere to mean a post-racial community and asserted it did exist, but as a modern day manifestation of nineteenth century ideas about Anglo-saxon racial kinship.

Vucetic suggests the elevation of non-white people to positions of power will doom the five-state Anglo-saxon Anglosphere since “genealogy is the most important aspect of the Anglosphere’s racialised history.”⁷⁶ It is not clear what evidence Vucetic is relying on to suggest the modern Anglosphere is a racialised construct, but he contends any diversity might be a “ mirage” and racial Anglo-saxons are “at the top”.⁷⁷

the political elites around in the newly constituted liberal-multi-cultural Anglosphere democracies embraced cultural diversity, but not so tightly as to irrevocably upset the ‘traditional’ cultural hierarchy that has for so long kept the descendants of historical Anglo-saxons at the top.⁷⁸

It is not clear however, that the “descendants of historical Anglo-saxons” are “at the top.” Individuals who are not the “descendants of historical Anglo-saxons” occupy or have occupied some of the most senior positions in commerce and in the political establishment of the US and other four Anglosphere core states. Compared to the US, the UK probably has a more diverse group of individuals “at the top.” In 2021, the UK’s cabinet includes ministers of Indian, Pakistani, Mauritian, Ghanian, Nigerian, Jewish, Kurdish and Turkish origin. It is also true of Vucetic’s adopted Canada, which has had Sikh origin Defence Minister and other Ministers from Afghan, Hong Kong Chinese and Indian backgrounds.⁷⁹

When during the Covid pandemic in 2021, President Macron attacked “les Anglo-Saxon” states’ unwillingness, to share vaccines, the policy-makers “at the top” were US Trade Representative Katherine Tai of Chinese-Taiwanese origin, the Canadian Minister of Trade,

⁷⁵ Srdjan Vucetic, "The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations" (PhD diss, Ohio State University, 2008), 9.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 155-56.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 133.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 132.

Mary Ng of Chinese-Hong Kong origin and the UK Business Minister, Dr Kwasi Kwarteng of Ghanaian origin.⁸⁰ When Macron attacked the “Anglo-saxon” tech giants,⁸¹ he was referring to companies headed by CEOs of Indian, Iranian, Jewish-European origins, and often with mixed race families.⁸² Vucetic, however, appears unsure of his conclusions and suggests it might not be race per se that creates the Anglosphere's identity, but other unidentified factors. This, he says, is a standpoint that “would reverse the claims” he has made about the racialised identity of the Anglosphere.⁸³

1.3 Placing the Anglosphere in IR Theory

1.3.1 The Adler and Barnett Model

As discussed earlier, the Copenhagen School incorporated a version of Deutschian security communities as revised by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett.⁸⁴ They utilised the basic definition of a security community as laid out in Deutsch's work *Political Community and the North Atlantic* as, a group of people who had become integrated, felt a “sense of community” and had dependable expectations of peaceful change.⁸⁵ There are a number of refinements made to the original theory by Adler and Barnett.

Firstly, they abandoned Deutsch's obsessive emphasis on the measurement of communication ('cybernetics') and it not is restored in this thesis having been described with justification as a “fetish”.⁸⁶ Secondly, Adler and Barnett accepted the notion of two types of

⁷⁹ Anirudh Bhattacharyya, "A Mighty Minority: How Sikhs Rose to Political Prominence in Canada," *Hindustan Times*, October 22 2017; Suryatapa Bhattacharya, "Meet the South Asian Canadians in Trudeau's New Cabinet" *Wall Street Journal*, November 15 2015.

⁸⁰ Tim McNulty, "Vaccine Row: Kwasi Kwarteng Refuses to Commit UK to Sharing Covid Jab Doses with EU," *Daily Express*, March 30 2021.

⁸¹ Mehreen Khan, "Macron Slams 'Anglo-Saxon' Tech Giants for Distorting Competition," *FT*, September 29 2017.

⁸² For example: Twitter, Amazon, Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Uber.

⁸³ Vucetic, 125.

⁸⁴ Karl W Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (NJ: Princeton University, 1968).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 123-24.

⁸⁶ Isaiah. Berlin, "History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History," *History and Theory* 1 (1960); Miroslav Hroch, "Three Encounters with Karl W. Deutsch," *Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review* 48, no. 06 (2012): 1117. Although the advent of the internet opens up the

security community: —‘pluralistic’ and ‘amalgamated.’ A ‘pluralistic security community’ consisting of sovereign states who cooperate but retain their independence, and an ‘amalgamated’ version that was deemed to come into existence when previously autonomous states unified into a sovereign entity.

Adler and Barnett also refined Deutsch’s theory to include an approximate three stage developmental pattern of pluralistic security communities termed as social constructivist and path-dependent.⁸⁷ These are; Nascent, Ascendant and Mature and should not be implied as suggesting a fixed linear progression.

The Nascent condition does not necessarily feature a conscious attempt to create a security community. Rather, governments consider how they might arrange their relationships to enhance mutual security with various diplomatic, bilateral, multilateral exchanges and interactions. Deutsch is invoked to describe “trigger” mechanisms that lead to the organisational changes such as a mutually perceived security threat. Thus, a ‘nascent’ security community is virtually indistinguishable from a strategic alliance.⁸⁸ A shared identity might exist between participating states, but is not necessary at this formative point. However, pre-existing associations based on “cultural, political, and ideological homogeneity” can facilitate the creation of “new organisations and institutions and a desire or expectation of a security community.”⁸⁹

In the 'Ascendant' condition it is possible to identify “increasingly dense networks, new military institutions and organisations.”⁹⁰ Mutual trust is constantly reinforced, and procurement decisions reflect interdependent military postures, and states begin to share intelligence information. Any structures created to ensure verification cease to be relevant and fade away. These developments are said to create the basis of a collective identity and whether it exists can be ascertained by evaluating the narratives utilised by individuals and institutions within the respective states.

possibility of mapping social communications and the spread of memes. This chimes with a point made by James Bennett about network communities.

⁸⁷ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities*, vol. 62 (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 17 & 49.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 50.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 51.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 53.

The ‘Mature’ condition reflects not just the improbability of war but a changed perspective whereby the member states see themselves as operating within a collective identity in contradistinction to other states. Consequently, policies are pursued in a context of shared norms and become more coordinated. Disagreements might occur, but these are resolved through peaceful means and self-restraint. Significantly, there is a differentiation between those inside and those outside of the community. There is a move towards “self-identification” that “frequently has a corresponding ‘other’.” This Mature phase is reflected in a process of multilateral decision-making through an ‘architecture’ of “common and consensual mechanisms.”⁹¹

Adler and Barnett also introduced the idea of ‘tightly coupled’ and ‘loosely coupled’ as a feature of the mature pluralistic security community. The loosely coupled category consists of a transnational region, “composed of sovereign states” who expect no mutual bellicose actions and exercise self-restraint. A tightly coupled variant features a “mutual aid” system of collective arrangements, enhanced by a system of rules resembling “something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational and national institutions and some form of a collective security system.”⁹² This thesis posits that these sub-categorisations are unsatisfactory, as discussed later.

1.3.2 Issues with Adler and Barnett - back to basics

The contemporary understanding of security community theory requires refinement if it is to explain successfully the viability of security communities. In particular, the Adler and Barnett model has suffered from its overuse in explaining the EU and its adoption by academic advocates of the EU seeking to prescribe a roadmap for ‘ever-closer union.’ This is partially due to the emphasis Adler and Barnett’s model has placed on certain factors, but also by attempts to ‘shoehorn’ the theory to explain the EU. Missing from the equation or downplayed is the importance of culture, elitism and following from those, the issue of legitimacy and with it, effectiveness and durability. The model requires a return to certain Deutschian roots.

⁹¹ Ibid., 55.

⁹² Ibid., 30.

1.3.3 Culture as a factor

The ‘updating’ of security community theory in the 1990s by Adler and Barnett downplayed Deutsch’s views on the importance of cultural ‘communication’. This is a reflection of a common bias away from culture by IR theoreticians. Prins, for example, warns that considering culture in IR can be provocative. He quotes Nicholas Rengger’s cautionary observation warning

Culture is one of those terms that often prompts international relations scholars to reach for their revolvers because it represents everything the good, positivistically-trained specialist should hate.⁹³

However, both Prins and Rengger put culture front and centre, despite it being, “an obviously loose concept that defies rigour and precision and is open to endless interpretation... its significance to world politics cannot be doubted”.⁹⁴ Deutsch’s earlier work stressed the role of communications in shaping an identity that preceded the creation of a nation with institutions.⁹⁵ In this, he pre-empted Benedict Anderson’s idea of a nation being an imagined community that had come into being by the creation of a communication process thereby facilitating the popularisation of an idea or ideas amongst the people.⁹⁶ Anderson was keen to stress the difference between ‘imagined’ and ‘imaginary.’ A community or nation is imagined,

you can’t touch the Dutch nation... it’s not symbolic [but] it’s actually understood to be real. There really is a Dutch nation out there. But on the other hand, the only way you can approach it is through the imagination.⁹⁷

According to Deutsch it was the communication of cultural factors that were critical in creating the imagined community asserting

⁹³ Prins, *The Heart of War: On Power, Conflict and Obligation in the Twenty-First Century*, 109.

⁹⁴ N.J Rengger, *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World* (Clarendon Press, 1992), 85.

⁹⁵ See: Hroch, 1115-29.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

it is identity of political antecedents; the procession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.⁹⁸

These terms echo Fischer's Idea of 'Folkways' and Bennett's more recent idea of a 'network' community as referred to earlier.⁹⁹ Deutsch had strong views on the fallibility of security communities that do not reflect a communal consciousness, but rather are brought into being as a set of institutions aiming for the creation of a 'civic' identity and therefore rest on shallow foundations. This was a problem that Deutsch argued could result from the actions of elite vanguards and this aspect of his thinking has been most unwelcome from advocates of attempting to fashion new security communities with ambitions to extend beyond cooperation and pluralism to a more amalgamated form.

1.3.4 Elites and Vanguardism

Adler and Barnett admonish Deutsch for failing to take into account "institutional agents... political elites and even charismatic individuals¹⁰⁰" and argue elites "are most critical for the development of new forms of social and political organisation that are tied to the development of a security community."¹⁰¹ Deutsch had rejected the idea of elites as single bloc or class and stressed the importance of accountability.¹⁰² There was no

all-purpose elite" but rather "a pluralistic array of specialised elites connected by a complex network of communication and bargaining, and more widely accountable to a more highly educated and politically more active population.¹⁰³

Perhaps unintentionally, Adler and Barnett's emphasis on elites has been to encourage the application of Adler and Barnett's model to explain the 'success' of the European political

⁹⁷ Benedict Anderson, interview by Anil Ramadas, 1994.

⁹⁸ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication; an Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (NY: MIT, 1953), 5.

⁹⁹ Fischer, 1.

¹⁰⁰ Adler and Barnett, 62, 43.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 44.

¹⁰² Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968), 63-65.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 64 & 66.

elite in creating a EU security community¹⁰⁴ and further conflation the theory with two other theoretical approaches; neo-functionalism and neo-federalism.¹⁰⁵ All saw in the so-called ‘Monnet Method,’ a blueprint for new transnational communities in general whereby a conscious, “spill-over” from an elite-led institutional-functional approach could create, a post-national civic identity.¹⁰⁶

Deutsch did not regard elites as a monolithic bloc, but recognised that an array of elite groupings could successfully adopt policies and push these through against popular scepticism. In this context, Deutsch warned the process of accountability has a long way to go in most democracies.¹⁰⁷ For Deutsch, it was not enough for a democratic government’s actions to be seen as ‘legal,’ and proceed accordingly, rather it must be cognisant of the need for legitimacy. The same requirement can be said to apply to a security community if it assumes executive functions, supplants the governments of its constituent states and introduces laws. In the context of a pluralistic security community of sovereign states, Deutsch warned of the dangers of an elite faction pushing ahead of public sentiment.¹⁰⁸ A new body politic will lack legitimacy if it ignores the social contract between ruled and ruler. As Maurice Cranston paraphrases in considering Rousseau’s Social Contract,

Man can be both ruled and free if they rule themselves... For what is a free man but a man that rules himself? A people will be free if it retains sovereignty over itself.¹⁰⁹

The creation of a pluralistic security community with an executive body seen to be unaccountable would run the risk of usurping the general will.¹¹⁰ According to Rousseau’s thinking, the acquiescence of governments in surrendering sovereignty to a new communal body with executive powers would violate the social contract between ruled and ruler.

¹⁰⁴ See list of previous academic on the EU as a security community.

¹⁰⁵ See: (Mitrany, 1943) & Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces* (Palgrave, 2006), 13-15.

¹⁰⁶ See: Martin Holland, "Jean Monnet and the Federal Functional Approach to European Union," in *Visions of European Unity* (Routledge, 2019); Renaud Dehouze, "Rediscovering Functionalism," *What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity?* (2000).

¹⁰⁷ Deutsch, 64 & 66.

¹⁰⁸ Karl W Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (NY: Knopf, 1969), 124.

¹⁰⁹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract (1762)," ed. Maurice Cranston (Penguin, 1968), 29.

¹¹⁰ Or as Rousseau would term an Executive of governmental authority, “the magistracy”.

The body politic, or sovereign, owes its being to the sanctity of the contract alone, it cannot commit itself, even in treaties with foreign powers, to anything that would derogate from the original act of association; it could not for example, alienate a part of itself or submit to another sovereign. To violate the act which has given it existence would be to annihilate itself; and what is nothing can produce nothing.¹¹¹

This leads Deutsch to warning about the possibility of elites adopting vanguardist policies to achieve greater communal unity, but in a manner that can undermine the legitimacy of their objective. Deutsch's research led him to conclude that communal values are most effective politically

when they were not merely held in abstract terms, but when they were incorporated into political institutions and in habits of political behaviour which permitted these values to be acted upon in such a way as to strengthen people's attachments to them. This connection between values, institutions and habits we call 'way of life'...¹¹²

In short, Deutsch argues elites who develop political structures that do not reflect communal values and culture can leave the people behind, who begin to feel "disgruntled" and "alienated."¹¹³

1.3.5 Legitimacy and durability

There has been a tendency of adherents of security community theory to accept at face value claims of common cultural values that are not rooted in the historical experience of people but are merely declaratory, aspirational or disingenuous. The example of the EU serves as an occasional comparator, not least because of the frequent use of the security community model to explain it, but also because of the claims it makes of itself and the issues of identity and culture raised in the Brexit debate.

Deutsch stresses the importance of "legitimacy myths" that connect individuals "with some of the general patterns prevailing in the culture of society and with important aspects of

¹¹¹ Rousseau, 63.

¹¹² Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 47.

the personality structures of its members.”¹¹⁴ It begs the question, what meme-complexes or as Deutsch put it, “ways of life” values, are reflected in the EU’s institutions and through which it can be said to acquire legitimacy?

The EU’s claim to a common cultural values based meme-complex is dubious.¹¹⁵ A recognition of this is evidenced by the EU’s adoption of a cultural policy as a conscious attempt to create one.¹¹⁶ Cris Shore has described the EU’s pursuit of a cultural policy as “a project of social engineering uncomfortably reminiscent of other failed modernist ideologies of the twentieth century.” According to Shore, European consciousness was being “developed and diffused from above by a vanguard of EU politicians, bureaucrats and marketing professionals” to create a way of life and identity.¹¹⁷

As early as 1967, Deutsch was unconvinced that institutional ‘spillovers’ were proving effective in creating a European communal identity.¹¹⁸ He highlighted the “slow movement, on a mass opinion level, toward an image of European unity” compared to that of the European elite groupings.¹¹⁹ Without a natural, homogenous ‘way of life’ the construction of the security community is reliant on the creation of institutions that are intended to be immune from democratic impulses that might impede their progress. This modus operandi might be considered justifiable and legitimate or unacceptable depending on the relevant meme-complexes held by different policy-makers and the wider electorates.

The notion of an ‘enlightened’ elite overseeing the fortunes of the wider populace is a meme-complex with a long pedigree. In the context of the EU, Roger Scruton echoes Shore’s point about vanguardism, suggesting

¹¹³ *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, 14.

¹¹⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (NY: Free Press, 1966), 154.

¹¹⁵ See: Jens Meijen, "Exporting European Values? Political Myths of Liberal Democracy and Cultural Diversity in Creative Europe's Literary Translation Projects," *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 26, no. 7 (2020); François Forêt and Oriane Calligaro, "Analysing European Values: An Introduction," in *European Values* (Routledge, 2018).

¹¹⁶ See: Monica. Sassatelli, *Becoming Europeans: Cultural Identity and Cultural Policies* (Springer, 2009).

¹¹⁷ See: Cris. Shore, "'In Uno Plures' (?) EU Cultural Policy and the Governance of Europe " *Cultural Analysis* 5 (2006).

¹¹⁸ Karl Wolfgang. Deutsch, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics*. (NY: Scribner, 1967).

¹¹⁹ Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, 124.

The sense of legitimacy that prevails on the continent, and in France especially, is expressed in the ‘vanguard myth’. This speaks of the legitimate use of power by those — the experts, the intellectuals, the liberators — who have the knowledge required to lead the people to a salvation that they could never achieve on their own.¹²⁰

In contradistinction to this is a distinctly Anglospheric meme-complex that Robert Tombs has called the “Magna Carta myth” to refer to a people-centred, bottom-up approach to governance holding “that ultimately the people decide and elites obey.”¹²¹ It is a catch-all label that incorporates English Common Law, the Magna Carta, 1688 Bill of Rights and arguably the US Declaration of Independence. This narrative of what might be termed a ‘Magna Carta compact’ between people and rulers can and does apply to security communities too. Deutsch refers to different types of security communities and he categorises the 1950s Commonwealth as featuring high legitimacy, with no single command, but relying upon “mutual responsiveness, communication, and cooperation” as opposed to a federal, amalgamated unions where, “we might expect concentration of command... to remain high and even grow...”¹²² In the former example, sovereignty is not surrendered and the social contract remains intact.

The problem for EU vanguardists is that their conception of a European security community is reliant upon a ratchet effect to reduce sovereignty through “ever closer union” rather than a natural process related to the growth of common identity. As Philip Allot puts it,

the EU lacks an idea of itself. It is an unimagined community. In seeking to transcend a set of national societies, its potential development and even survival are threatened if it cannot generate a self-consciousness within the public minds of its constituent societies and in the private minds of the human beings whose social self-constructing it determines.¹²³

¹²⁰ Roger Scruton, *Where We Are: The State of Britain Now*. (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 3.

¹²¹ Robert Tombs, ““Britain and Europe: What Ways Forward?”,” in *Wincott Memorial Lecture*, ed. Sir Richard Lambert (Wincott Foundation, 2016), 17. See also: Tombs, Robert. *The English and their history*. Penguin UK, 2014. 72 & 81 nb. The term ‘Myth’ denotes is symbolic importance rather than any lack of substance. In this sense it constitutes a ‘true’ myth as described by JRR Tolkien and CS Lewis.

¹²² Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Archon, 1970), 27.

¹²³ Philip Allott, *The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 229.

Peter Mair suggests legitimacy has suffered from a two-way “hollowing out.”¹²⁴ Firstly, a feeble European parliament provides false democratic ‘cover’ for an unelected and unaccountable powerful Commission. But secondly, a ‘negative spillover’ has occurred whereby the constituent states are also delegitimised because politicians “pretend they are only running the branch office...” and the result is a democratic void.¹²⁵ As Tombs puts in,

far from being a superstate, [the EU] has become a political black hole into which power and sovereignty disappear: the states lose, but the EU does not gain either the legitimacy or the capacity to solve its financial, economic, social and political problems.¹²⁶

1.3.6 The introduction of ‘synergic’ and ‘hemiplegic’ terminology

To take account of the issues referred to in the last section, this thesis asserts Adler and Barnett’s application of the term ‘tightly-coupled’ does not accurately identify and highlight differences in a community’s security effectiveness outside of its own boundaries. A ‘zone of peace’ and tight coupling is provides no hint of effectiveness or lack thereof the EU. The terms ‘hemiplegic’ or ‘synergic’ are offered as appropriate descriptors of their functionality. Hemiplegic refers to an identifiable security community that is characterised by dysfunctional external security coordination behaviour.¹²⁷ In contrast, a security community might be termed ‘synergic’ if it exhibits a capacity to act in a cohesive manner on external matters.

Thus, the EU is a tightly-coupled security community by virtue of its status as a zone of peace, and since it features a dense web of ‘internal’ laws, institutions and security measures. However it is ‘hemiplegic’ since its military and foreign policy aspirations have failed to be realised and consequently the EU’s external actorship can be characterised as exhibiting a

¹²⁴ Peter Mair, *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy* (Verso Trade, 2013), 117-18.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 117-28.

¹²⁶ Tombs.

¹²⁷ In biology it denotes varying degrees of weakness and lack of control/function in one side of a body.

form of paralysis.¹²⁸ This has been an ongoing pattern since the Plevan Plan and the EU's inability to establish a military capability.¹²⁹ It has been dramatically underlined again by the EU's unwillingness to formulate an independent response to the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, and its inconsistent approach to tensions with China and Russia.¹³⁰ Actual conflict on its borders might 'force' more EU cohesion and a military posture, but the latter is more likely to be expressed via NATO.

1.3.7 Approach Outline

Despite the application of security community to numerous other transnational entities such as ASEAN, the Gulf States, the Nordic states, NATO and the Turkish region, it has not been applied to the Anglosphere core. This thesis applies a version of Adler and Barnett's model to explain the Anglospheric security community in so much as it examines the existence and nature of the institutional framework as evidenced by treaties and informal arrangements and highlights the 'solidarity' of member states in the form of mutual aid in conflicts. It also seeks to address the how and why in terms of its growth and durability.

It makes the following modifications to Adler and Barnett's model, including a stress on:

- * The prime importance of culture and meme-complexes in understanding the viability of security communities and downgrading (but not eliminating) the contemporary emphasis on institutions.
- The role of individuals and agencies in these processes are referenced.

¹²⁸ For example: Judy Dempsey, "Europe's Paralysis over Hard and Soft Power," *Strategic Europe* (2016), <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64884>; Jan Zielonka, *Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe Is Unable to Act in International Politics* (Springer, 1998); Martin Dahl, "The Progress and the Paralysis of European Foreign Policy: A Learning Model for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Cfsp) of the European Union in Internationals Relations," (2001); Carl C Hodge, "Between Ambition and Paralysis: The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the War in the Former Yugoslavia," in *Redefining European Security* (Routledge, 2002); Jeremy Schwarz, "Europe's Paralysis Problem" *The National Interest - The Buzz* (2014), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/europe%E2%80%99s-paralysis-problem-11327>.

¹²⁹ See: Dávid Klemm, "An Attempt to Establish the European Army: The Plevan Plan," *Journal on European History of Law* 7, no. 1 (2016).

- The issue of legitimacy – introduced to the theoretical model as a factor in the durability of a security community.
- Introducing the terms ‘synergic’ and ‘hemiplegic’ to describe the effectiveness of pluralistic security communities beyond a mere absence of war.

Although the focus of this thesis is on the post World War 2 period, it is necessary to provide some background to what might be termed a security community in ‘scaffolding.’ The following chapter briefly examines a period preceding the development of the post-War Anglospheric security community. As such, it looks at the change in relations between what was an imperial security community and the US.

The subsequent chapters trace the development of a ‘synergic’ Anglospheric security community based on the five core states in three stages. These are the post-Word War 2 period until the Suez Crisis, the post-Suez Crisis to the end of the Cold War and, finally, post-Cold War until 2021.

¹³⁰ Flavia Krause-Jackson, "Afghanistan Exposes Europe's Impotence Again," *Bloomberg*, August 21 2021. See: Alberto Cunha, "Post-Brexit EU Defence Policy: Is Germany Leading Towards a European Army?," (2020). which concludes the EU lacks the will and institutions.

Chapter 2. Before the Anglosphere

2.1 Introduction - The process of community identification

The creation of the post World War 2 Anglospheric security community based on five core states cannot be understood without reference to the historical social impulses and attitudes of the people it embraces. In this respect the underlying factors that progress or impede a security community are similar to those relating to the creation of nationhood. This chapter examines how Deutsch's earlier work on nation-building provides some insights into the importance of the common outlooks between the two English-speaking blocs: the US and the British Empire. These provided the basis of the modern five state Anglospheric security community.

The process that leads to a sense of nationhood is described by both Karl Deutsch and Benedict Anderson as being founded upon a process of communication. Both agree that language plays an important part in contributing to a communal identity. For Anderson, the rise of nationalism relied upon the advent of the print media, whereby newspapers and books created 'national' or communal consciousness.¹³¹ For Deutsch, the notion of communication also included print media, but his works stressed the necessity of common traditions and shared heritages kept alive by oral channels of communication, including folk-lore in the form of poems or songs, but also means of communication including the pulpit.¹³² These pre-print methods of communication have a particular relevance to the potency of the Magna Carta compact in the meme-complex of the early English-speaking peoples. The original Magna Carta and any subsequent revisions were, by law, communicated to the general populace in the centuries following its signing. By 1265, the sheriffs of each shire were required to publish and read out the Magna Carta and any revisions twice a year in the shire courts. In 1297, this was extended to include borough meetings plus readings from the pulpits of cathedral churches. The evidence suggests these memes were readily absorbed into the consciousness of the population.

¹³¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso books, 2006), 18, 25-36.

The words of some chapters must have become almost as familiar as the liturgy. Already in 1226, those attending the shire court of Lincoln were able to quote the detailed provisions of the 1225 charter back at the sheriff, thereby holding him to account. At least some of them must have studied the then very recent document attentively.¹³³

The legacy of the Magna Carta compact helped shaped the notion of the 'Rights of Englishmen' as being an 'imagined' 'British' communal identifier. It was not actually 'Anglo-saxon' since it applied also to Wales, Scotland and Ireland.¹³⁴ Little wonder after three centuries of something akin to liturgical repetition, the narrative of a Magna Carta compact had become an especially resilient meme. It was carried across the Atlantic in the minds of the first and subsequent British migrants to the North American colonies. And when the old issues relating to the power of the King erupted into the English Civil War, it played out too in the American colonies too, finally ending with Royalist defeat in the 1655 Battle of Great Severn in Maryland.¹³⁵ It was the English Civil War and the perceived 'confederacy' of an authoritarian church and king against the 'rights of Englishmen' that John Adams, second President of the United States, declared form part of the meme-complex of the colonies.

It was this great struggle that peopled America. It was not religion alone, as is commonly supposed; but it was a love of universal liberty, and a hatred, a dread, a horror, of the infernal confederacy before described, that projected, conducted, and accomplished the settlement of America.¹³⁶

The Magna Carta compact narrative, buttressed by the 1688 Bill of Rights, formed part of political consciousness on both sides of the Atlantic and repeatedly referred to in philosophical pamphlets and incorporated into legal doctrine.¹³⁷ The eventual declaration of independence by the colonies in 1776, represented a fracturing of the English-speaking security community into two. It did not represent an abandonment of the Magna Carta

¹³² See: Deutsch; Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*.

¹³³ George Garnett, *Magna Carta through Eight Centuries*, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015), 1.

¹³⁴ Scots and Welsh attended the original meeting at Runnymede and the slightly later *Magna Carta Hibernae* applied to Ireland.

¹³⁵ See map of the colonies' split between royalist and parliamentary support. Kevin P Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America* (Basic Books, 1999), 59; May Radmila, "The Battle of Great Severn," *Contemporary Review* 274, no. 1598 (1999).

¹³⁶ John Adams, "A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law," *The Works of John Adams* 3 (1765): 447-52.

compact, rather, the colonialists had held up the principles of the Magna Carta against an Imperial system that was no longer seen to represent it. It was not a rejection of Englishness, but rather an assertion of the values associated with 'English' rights.

The restoration of peaceful relations within Anglospheric security community was not inevitable nor pre-ordained. Shared language and ethnicity are no guarantee of cordial relations, as the experience of Spain and its settler colonies in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries illustrate.¹³⁸ However, after the experience with its North American colonies, the process of reducing the monarchy to a more symbolic role in Britain gathered pace.¹³⁹ The Magna Carta was evoked by parliamentarians and Chartists alike to extend the franchise.¹⁴⁰ And as a new patchwork of British colonies developed the British government did not repeat their previous mistakes. Internal self-government by elected assemblies were introduced to the colonies that would become Dominions¹⁴¹ and allowed to acquire more powers as time progressed. As such, there was no rebellion or traumatic break between Britain and the three dominions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand and there remained a high degree of legitimacy associated with the Crown and shared cultural outlooks.¹⁴² The argument could be proffered this was due to the 'whiteness' of the settler colonies, but the unwillingness of the Irish Free State and Union of South Africa to form part of an Anglospheric based security community suggest culture and identity as factors.¹⁴³

Unlike Spain, the British metropole was able to repair its relations with its rebellious former colonies. Indeed, Kevin Phillips argues this was partially because the issues that had

¹³⁷ Roscoe Pound, "In the American Colonies," *Notre Dame Law Review* 20, no. 4 (1945).

¹³⁸ See: Anthony McFarlane, "Rebellions in Late Colonial Spanish America: A Comparative Perspective," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 14, no. 3 (1995); Jay Kinsbruner, *Independence in Spanish America: Civil Wars, Revolutions, and Underdevelopment* (UNM Press, 2000).

¹³⁹ Winston S Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Volume III: The Age of Revolution* (London: Cassell, 1962), 174 & 98-202.

¹⁴⁰ Robert Saunders, "Parliament and People: The British Constitution in the Long Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Modern European History* 6, no. 1 (2008): 74-77.

¹⁴¹ Winston S Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Volume IV: The Great Democracies*, vol. 4 (Cassell, 1962), 82-101.

¹⁴² For a discussion of their constitutional path to independence see: Peter C Oliver, *The Constitution of Independence: The Development of Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹⁴³ For the dominion of Ireland see: Gretchen Friemann, *The Treaty: The Gripping Story of the Negotiations That Brought About Irish Independence and Led to the Civil War* (Merrion Press, 2021). For the role of pre-print identity formation in Boer South Africa see: Eric Ayisi Akrofi, Maria Smit,

separated them were a ‘civil war’ continuum between Magna Carta ‘rights of Englishmen’ demanded by the colonialists and an unaccountable executive.¹⁴⁴ In other words, when it came to the nature of power, both communities shared the same meme-complex about the relationship of their peoples to the authority of the executive. This was not necessarily apparent to all Americans, who continued to see in Britain, all that they despised about monarchial and aristocratic authority that their Magna Carta inheritance ordained they oppose. This anti-imperialist meme complex became a powerful variant that endured in some individuals into the post World War 2 period.

The period between the War of 1812 and *the Great Rapprochement* (1895-1914) represents a period when the US and UK were often “distinctly cool” but thereafter improved.¹⁴⁵ However, the relationship was not entirely negative and where individuals from the two sides encountered one another within a maritime conflict zone, there is evidence that natural affinities came to the fore.¹⁴⁶

2.2 Early British-US Relations

2.2.1 Relations after US Independence

The role Britain paid in re-establishing the US navy shortly after US Independence is frequently overlooked, but the experience established a long tradition of mutual understanding and camaraderie that survived sporadic clashes. Following the 1783 Jay Treaty to resolve their territorial disputes, Britain and the Americans found themselves as informal allies in the so-called Quasi War between France and the US.¹⁴⁷ This was a consequence of a series of French decrees between 1796 to 1798 authorising the seizure of US merchant ships bound for British ports in the West Indies and the British Isles.¹⁴⁸ Having disbanded its navy,

and Stig-Magnus Thors, *Music and Identity: Transformation and Negotiation* (African Sun Media, 2006).

¹⁴⁴ Phillips.

¹⁴⁵ Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Volume IV: The Great Democracies*, 4, 259. For an overview see: Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914* (Atheneum, 1968).

¹⁴⁶ Giving rise to long-standing naval intimacy

¹⁴⁷ Bradford Perkins, *The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805* (Univ of California Press, 1955), 1-6.

¹⁴⁸ “Report of the Secretary of State respecting the depredations committed on the commerce of the United States, since October 1, 1796” *A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S.*

the US relied on British assistance in the form of technology, cannon and gunpowder.¹⁴⁹ A “system of private signals” allowed mutual recognition and joint engagements against French ships.¹⁵⁰ This is not to say this period was free of fractious issues, and although the Royal Navy’s practice of impressment might have been set aside, it was only temporary and its resumption was a factor in the War of 1812.¹⁵¹

This was the last war to be fought between the two sides, but official relations remained distant. The two navies remained in contact by virtue of ongoing maritime travels and despite occasional flare-ups, these interactions frequently led to unofficial cooperation, and in some instances, necessitated breaches of state policy in conflict zones.¹⁵² The career of US Commodore Josiah Tattnall, a veteran of the 1812 War, was one example. In 1832, Tattnall was the commander of a US naval squadron off Mexico, and despite his past experience of the British, offered protection to British merchants caught up in the Mexican Revolution. Tattnall explained his actions as stemming from

the spirit of friendship which has happily of late years characterised the intercourse in all parts of the world of those who speak the English language...[and] that the protection I offered the subjects of Great Britain has been frequently extended in similar instances by His British Majesty’s officers to citizens of the United States.¹⁵³

In 1858, Tattnall was Commodore of the US Navy’s East India Squadron and attempting to facilitate a trade treaty with Imperial China. Since China was engaged in the Second Opium War with Britain and France, Tattnall was under strict instructions to maintain US neutrality.¹⁵⁴ Waiting to travel up the River Peoh, Tattnall witnessed the ambush of a RN

Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774 - 1875 American State Papers, 5th Congress, 1st Session, Foreign Relations: Volume 2, 28

¹⁴⁹ Ian W Toll, *Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the US Navy* (WW Norton & Company, 2008), 18; Michael A Palmer, "Stoddert's War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War with France," (University of South Carolina Press: Columbia, 1987), 34.

¹⁵⁰ Gardner Weld Allen, *Our Naval War with France* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909), 72; Palmer, x; "Anglo-American Naval Cooperation, 1798-1801," *Naval History* 4, no. 3 (1990): 14-20.

¹⁵¹ Perkins, *The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805*, 171.

¹⁵² Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (AZ: Basic Books 2014), 54.

¹⁵³ Mead Smith Karras, *Commodore Josiah Tattnall: From Pirates to Ironclads, Half a Century in the Old Navy* (Bloomington, 2011), 288.

¹⁵⁴ John Y Wong, "The 'Arrow' incident: A Reappraisal," *Modern Asian Studies* 8, no. 3 (1974): 373.

force and its subsequent difficulties under devastating fire. Tatnall felt obliged to assist and despite US neutrality took action under fire to assist.¹⁵⁵

There were other examples too, such as in 1845, when the US sloop *St Louis* gave assistance to British NZ colonists under attack during the Maori Wars.¹⁵⁶ Another instance occurred during the Battle of Shimonoseki Straits of 1863, when the US contingent assisted the Royal Navy. US commander, Pearson was knighted by the British for his actions. Pearson's actions in breaching US neutrality were criticised by the US Government, but by public acclaim, Congress was obliged to change the Constitution to allow Pearson to become the only 'knight' on the US Naval roster.¹⁵⁷

In 1874, both navies cooperated to put down a riot in Hawaii despite both states backing opposing sides.¹⁵⁸ In the 1882 Anglo Egyptian War, the spontaneous cooperation between the two navies was depicted in the front cover of the US magazine *Judge*, with the caption, "John Bull to Uncle Sam, 'Thanks for assistance rendered. You are little, but you're good'."¹⁵⁹ These actions entered the collective consciousness as poems, songs, and newspaper articles extolling the natural bonds between the two peoples.¹⁶⁰ In his history of the US National Anthem, Marc Ferris notes a version parodying the relationship to the tune of the Star-Spangled Banner.¹⁶¹

These examples do not constitute evidence of some preordained future of collaboration. Speaking the same language is hardly a guaranteed precursor of peaceful international relations. However, these British-US naval examples and the songs, literature and media

¹⁵⁵ "The American Minister in China [Reproduction of US Ministerial Letter Printed in New York Times]," *The Times*, November, 2 1859; Erik Goldstein, *Wars and Peace Treaties: 1816 to 1991* (Routledge, 2005), 100; James D Johnston, *China and Japan: Being a Narrative of the Cruise of the US Steam-Frigate Powhatan, in the Years 1857, '58, '59, and '60* (C. Desilver, 1860), 234.

¹⁵⁶ Marc Ferris, *Star-Spangled Banner: The Unlikely Story of America's National Anthem* (JHU Press, 2014), 86.

¹⁵⁷ David F. Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of US. Naval Officers, 1798–1883*. (Naval Institute Press, 1988), 371-72.

¹⁵⁸ Ralph S Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom Volume 3: The Kalakaua Dynasty, 1874 to 1893*, vol. 3 (University of Hawaii Press, 1979).

¹⁵⁹ "John Bull to Uncle Sam: Thanks for Assistance Rendered. You Are Little, but You're Good," *The Judge* (1882), <http://www.navsource.org/archives/12/120991420.jpg>.

¹⁶⁰ "Blood Thicker'n Water. Anniversary of the Occasion When US Flag Officer Uttered His Famous Sentiment and Saved British Lives," *Chicago Tribune*, June, 25 1899.

¹⁶¹ Ferris, 87.

references associated with them illustrate what Deutsch means by the power of communication to create communal feelings, or as Anderson puts it, the possibility of an ‘imagined community.’¹⁶²

2.3 The power of natural affinities

2.3.1 The Great Rapprochement

These examples of spontaneous friendly naval interaction were not in themselves guarantees against war and on occasions the possibility of war was strong.¹⁶³ Relations were strained over the UK’s perceived favouritism towards the Confederacy during the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the UK’s failure to stop the construction of Confederacy naval raiders.¹⁶⁴ Relations improved after arbitration and the Treaty of Washington granting the US compensation.¹⁶⁵

The likelihood of war between the British Empire and the US increased over a serious disagreement over the boundaries of British Guyana and Venezuela in 1895. The US regarded British assertion of its colony’s boundaries as a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. US public opinion was persuaded the British were the villains of the piece. War did not occur because the British agreed to an arbitration agreement in 1896, the start of which marked ‘the Great Rapprochement.’¹⁶⁶

A pattern of arbitration dispute resolution was confirmed by when issues flared up over Venezuela in 1902¹⁶⁷ and again over the Alaskan-British Colombia border in 1903.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶² Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.

¹⁶³ Near misses in North America were the cross-border Fenian Raids, the Caroline Incident, the Pig War (the only casualty was a pig) and the Aroostook War. See: Kathleen Burk, *The Lion and the Eagle: The Interaction of the British and American Empires 1783–1972* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), 109-54.

¹⁶⁴ See: Howard Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations* (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2010).

¹⁶⁵ See: Phillip E Myers, *Dissolving Tensions: Rapprochement and Resolution in British-American-Canadian Relations in the Treaty of Washington Era, 1865–1914* (The Kent State University Press, 2015).

¹⁶⁶ See: Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914*.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 187-93.

Evidence that a security community is emerging is the formation of practices and/or institutions that favour and then entrench arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. The period following 1895, gave witness to just such a pattern in the relations between the British Empire and the US. It did not constitute a security community as such, in that preparations for the possibility of war had not ceased, but conflict became increasingly improbable.¹⁶⁹

Whilst the move towards a pattern of arbitration explains how disputes were resolved, at issue is how and why this path was chosen why it succeeded. A simple explanation is that arbitration was in both US and British interests and it certainly was. Britain felt its supremacy at sea was declining and the US worried about being outmatched by other rising powers. Both had choices as to possible allies. Indeed, in 1902 Britain shocked international opinion by allying with Japan, a non-white and non-European nation, to counter Russia. For two decades Britain and Japan shared intelligence and technology, and coordinated naval strategy.¹⁷⁰ In contrast, British-US relations appeared to be less substantial and limited to dispute resolution and informal strategic understandings.¹⁷¹ However, it was the emergent British-Japanese security community that faltered and then withered.¹⁷² Kupchan suggests that the absence of ‘cultural commonality’ was a factor that explains why the British-Japanese alliance “ultimately eroded and gave way to geopolitical rivalry.”¹⁷³

2.3.2 A ‘communio incidens’ fellowship

In 1898, Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, expressed publicly what many in the British Government were already contemplating and called for an alliance with the US, stressing the commonality of culture and world outlook with the US.

¹⁶⁸ Burk, 150-51.

¹⁶⁹ See: Steven T Ross, *American War Plans, 1890-1939* (Routledge, 2013); Ray S Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, vol. 4 (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), 36; Richard A. Preston, *The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), 172-73.

¹⁷⁰ See: John Chapman, "The Secret Dimensions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1900-1905" in *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922*, ed. Phillips Payson O'Brien (Routledge, 2003).

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, 135-42; Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1884-1907* (A&C Black, 2013).

¹⁷³ Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, 135-42.

Their laws, their literature, their standpoint upon every question are the same as ours: their feeling, their interest in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world are identical to ours. Their law, their literature, their standpoint upon every question are the same as ours; their feeling, their interest in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world are identical to ours.¹⁷⁴

American reception to the suggestion of alliance was generally positive and the US Media noted the British support for the US's expansionist policy towards the Spanish controlled Philippines.¹⁷⁵ Chamberlain's appeal was received less favourably by the major European states. The German analysis was perceptive, recognising not only the communal basis that provided a form of popular legitimacy, but the informal nature of the relationship that gave strength to such an 'alliance.' One of Germany's most widely read newspapers, and purveyor of the official governmental line, *the Hamburgischer Correspondent*, assessed the speech as

a very remarkable synopsis of the views of millions of Britons in the mother country and the colonies [and] are more and more accepting as authoritative for the future development of the foreign policy of Great Britain.¹⁷⁶

This was reminiscent of a remark by Bismarck who had predicted the greatest political factor in future international relations would be "the inherited and permanent fact that North America speaks English."¹⁷⁷ The Hamburgischer Correspondent invoked a phase unfamiliar to English Law, but insightful. It concluded the emerging UK-US relationship should be designated 'a communio incidens' arrangement.¹⁷⁸ The concept forms part of Roman Law, largely confined to Germanic legal corporate law doctrine.¹⁷⁹ In the context of the original

¹⁷⁴ "Mr. Chamberlain in Birmingham. Speech to Birmingham Liberal Unionist Association," *The Times*, May, 14 1898.

¹⁷⁵ "Welcomed in Washington: Chamberlain's Plea for an Alliance Favorably Received in Government Circles," *NY Times*, May, 16 1898.

¹⁷⁶ Hamburgischer Correspondent quoted in Times Berlin Correspondent reporting on reaction to Chamberlain's Speech. "Anglo American Relations," *The Times*, May, 18 1898.

¹⁷⁷ George Louis Beer, *The English-Speaking Peoples: Their Future Relations and Joint International Obligations* (The Macmillan Company, 1917), 186.

¹⁷⁸ "Anglo American Relations." *The Times*, May 18, 1898

¹⁷⁹ Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, *Corporations in and under International Law*, vol. 6 (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 38.

Justinian Roman Law,¹⁸⁰ it relates to obligations not arising from a formal contract or agreement but from a ‘community’ or fellowship.¹⁸¹ The phraseology is particularly apt as a description of a more modern Anglosphere-based approach to cooperation.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, the idea of a ‘fellowship’ was given added potency by burgeoning transatlantic familial ties that included Joseph Chamberlain. His American wife was the daughter of William Crowninshield-Endicott, the Secretary of War in President Cleveland’s first administration.¹⁸² These facilitated Chamberlain’s unofficial talks with US Secretary Richard Olney.¹⁸³ They proved productive and in 1896 Olney stressed the common values of British and Americans,

If there is anything they [the American people] were attached to, it is to ideals and principles which are distinctly English in their origin and development... Nothing would more gratify the mass of the American people to stand shoulder to shoulder with England.¹⁸⁴

Within two years Olney declared Britain and the US President Cleveland’s speech on declared a treaty of arbitration had been

... initiated by kindred peoples, speaking the same tongue and joined together by all the ties of common traditions, common institutions, and common aspirations. The experiment of substituting civilised methods for brute force as the means of settling international questions of right will thus be tried under the happiest auspices...¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ Danilo Ceccarelli Morolli, *A Brief Outline of Roman Law* (Rome: Gangemi editore, 2014), 128-29; Adolf Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law*, vol. 43 (American Philosophical Society, 1968), 400.

¹⁸¹ See Latin definition: Charlton Thomas Lewis and Hugh Macmaster Kingery, *An Elementary Latin Dictionary* (American Book Company, 1915).

¹⁸² See: "Chamberlain Family Guide," (University of Birmingham, 2016); Travis L. Crosby, *Joseph Chamberlain: A Most Radical Imperialist* (Bloomsbury 2011), 119; James Louis Julian Amery Garvin, *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain; Vol 6* (Macmillan & co, 1969), 67.

¹⁸³ Crosby, 119.

¹⁸⁴ Stephen R Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics* (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 42.

¹⁸⁵ Grover Cleveland, "Speech: Message Regarding Treaty with Britain," (1897).

2.3.3 The bonds of friends and families

Joseph Chamberlain's transatlantic marriage was by no means unusual. In fact, transatlantic marriages were a common feature of US-UK political relations, facilitating co-operation and influencing the outlooks of leading politicians.¹⁸⁶ Future Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan were both products of such unions. The popular TV series *Downton Abbey* in which a British aristocrat takes a monied American wife was not a caricature. In 1907, a well-connected British aristocrat, Lady Dorothy Nevill, observed,

at the present day, so close has the union between our-selves and the United States become that Americans are hardly looked upon as foreigners at all, so many people having American relatives... It may with justice be said that it is by the American girl that we have been conquered...¹⁸⁷

This was certainly an exaggeration, but it spoke to an ongoing social interaction between US and British citizens that strengthened the relationship between the two countries.¹⁸⁸ Sometimes the outcomes were tangible and a couple of examples will suffice.

Chequers, the country residence of the British Prime Minister, was a gift to the nation by Viscount Lee and his American wife.¹⁸⁹ Lady Lee was the daughter of the extremely wealthy New York banker, John Godfrey Moore.¹⁹⁰ Lee's career is indicative of the complex network of influential individuals both political and social that gave resilience and depth to relationships between the American and British communities and shaped perspectives. As the British military attaché to Washington, Lee participated in the Spanish-American War in Cuba alongside future US President, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. Lee was granted honorary

¹⁸⁶ More recent examples include: Tony Crossland, former Labour Foreign Secretary (and Eurosceptic); David Owen, former Labour Foreign Secretary (and Eurosceptic). Tony Benn, former Labour Cabinet Minister (and Eurosceptic)

¹⁸⁷ Lady Dorothy Nevill, *Leaves from the Note-Books of Lady Dorothy Nevill*, ed. Ralph Neville (London, Macmillan 1907), 33. Quoted in Richard W Davis, "We Are All Americans Now! Anglo-American Marriages in the Later Nineteenth Century," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 135, no. 2 (1991).

¹⁸⁸ Davis lists hundreds of such high society marriages in his appendices; 176-99.

¹⁸⁹ Their society wedding was in 1898

¹⁹⁰ Richard Jay Hutto, *Their Gilded Cage: The Jekyll Island Club Members* (Indigo Custom Publishing, 2006), 110.

Money from Lee's wife was used to purchase Chequers, and donated it to the British nation for the Prime Minister's country residence.

membership of Roosevelt's 'Rough Riders' and formed an enduring friendship with the formerly Anglophobe Roosevelt.¹⁹¹ Lee's partisan role reflected the supportive attitude of the British Government that supplied the US with intelligence on Spanish activity.¹⁹² Lee would go on to occupy key positions in the Admiralty at crucial junctures when Imperial defence was under review, first as the Civil Lord of the Admiralty in 1903, under Lord Selborne, and later First Lord himself in 1921.

Kevin Phillips in *the Cousins' Wars* highlights the importance of this conflict, remarking, that

historians who dismiss the Spanish-American War as a sad little affair, ignore the unique psychological role it played in reuniting Britain and the United States.¹⁹³

Roosevelt told Lee that the UK's tacit support "worked a complete revolution in my feelings and attitude" and that he now felt "very strongly" that the English-speaking peoples had become "closer together than for a century and a quarter..."¹⁹⁴

The strong personal connection of Lee with Roosevelt was not unique, but was replicated in a series of other transnational personal relationships that David Burton has characterised as a "special relationship of friends."¹⁹⁵ These friends included the diplomat Cecil Spring Rice whom Roosevelt had first met during Spring Rice's appointment to the UK legation to Washington in 1886.¹⁹⁶ It is reminiscent of another more modern example of Lord Harlech's status as a de facto special advisor to President Kennedy.¹⁹⁷ Spring-Rice was to be a permanent feature in UK-US relations up until WW1, acting as a conduit to the wider US political establishment.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹¹ For which Lee received the US Campaign Medal

¹⁹² Richard B Mulanax, *The Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy* (University Press of America, 1994), 69.

¹⁹³ Phillips, 507.

¹⁹⁴ Quoted in J Thompson, *Never Call Retreat: Theodore Roosevelt and the Great War* (Springer, 2014), 10.

¹⁹⁵ David H Burton, "Theodore Roosevelt and His English Correspondents: A Special Relationship of Friends," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 63, no. 2 (1973).

¹⁹⁶ David Henry Burton, *Cecil Spring Rice: A Diplomat's Life* (Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Press, 1990), 37.

¹⁹⁷ Gary Ginsberg, *First Friends: The Powerful, Unsung (and Unelected) People Who Shaped Our Presidents* (Grand Central, 2021), 235-70.

¹⁹⁸ For example: "Balfour on Visit to Col Roosevelt," *Washington Post*, May, 14 1917.

This ‘special relationship of friends’ was reinforced and extended by the Boer War. The War also brought into being new networks, both political and cultural, that built upon existing communal feelings. More than that, the Boer War acted as a catalyst for a fundamental rethink of the Empire’s security; not just between the Britain and the Dominions, but for the Empire and its lack of alliances marked the point at which it became possible to think the Empire might not last forever.¹⁹⁹

2.4 Changing attitudes and alignments

2.4.1 The Boer War: New relationships

The pattern of arbitration, familial social ties and a new focus on common cultural liberal values underpinned by the narrative of the Magna Carta compact allowed a shared purpose to grow. The Spanish-American War had encouraged a more positive outlook of Britain by many ordinary Americans and it had helped forge important high-level political/diplomatic friendships.

The Boer War acted to strengthen this feeling of ‘fellowship’ and facilitated the creation of new political and social transatlantic networks that sought to emphasise the common values of both peoples. These efforts included a range of literary figures who were to play key roles in creating new political associations. One such figure was Indian-born Rudyard Kipling, who had married Caroline Starr Balestier, a member of a prominent and political American family.²⁰⁰ He had been a resident of Vermont and was already an associate of Roosevelt. On the outbreak of War, Kipling wrote a poem for publication on both sides of the Atlantic.²⁰¹

Das Nalapat refers to the blood of the Anglospheric mind as encapsulating “the type of thought and behaviour that led to Magna Carta” and so did Kipling.²⁰² He evoked the shared Magna Carta legacy against the perceived authoritarianism of the Boer republics that discriminated against non-Boer *uitlanders* who were denied the vote and citizenship.

¹⁹⁹ See: Jan Morris, *Farewell the Trumpets* (London: Faber & Faber, 2012), 95-104.

²⁰⁰ Her grandfather was E. Peshine Smith, a wealthy lawyer in the US State Department.

²⁰¹ It appeared The Times, the Daily Mail, the New York Tribune and the Boston Globe. See: Mary Hamer, "The Old Issue Notes," *The Kipling Society* (2007).

Kipling's poem cast the Boer president Paul Kruger as representative of the 'old issue' of a 'King's tyranny' who denied the people their rights.²⁰³ The verses call for the Magna Carta rights of 'Englishmen' as won "in the eyot ²⁰⁴of Runnymede" and that a King should not be above the law. A few lines convey the gist of the message.

All we have of freedom, all we use or know -
This our fathers bought for us long and long ago.
Ancient Right unnoticed as the breath we draw -
Leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the Law -
Lance and torch and tumult, steel and grey-goose wing^{*205}
Wrenched it, inch and ell* and all, slowly from the King.
Till our fathers 'stablished, after bloody years,
How our King is one of us, first among his peers.
So they bought us freedom - not at little cost-
Wherefore must we watch the King, lest our gain be lost.²⁰⁶

In marked contrast to the attitude of the other European powers who favoured the Boers,²⁰⁷ the US was broadly, if not entirely, sympathetic to the British.²⁰⁸ Support came from American scout Major Frederick Russell Burnham, appointed to head up military field intelligence operations²⁰⁹ and reporting directly to Lord Roberts the British C in C.²¹⁰ Before leaving Alaska to take up his post, Burnham informed the media,

²⁰² Nalapat.

²⁰³ It was originally called 'the King'

²⁰⁴ Eyot - Anglo-saxon for 'small island'.

²⁰⁵ 'Grey-goose wing' - reference to the feathered fletching of an arrow. 'ell' - Middle English for yard.

²⁰⁶ Rudyard Kipling, "The Old Issue," (1899). Grey-goose wing refers to the arrow feathers.

²⁰⁷ Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Volume IV: The Great Democracies*, 4, 292.

²⁰⁸ Edward P Kohn, *This Kindred People: Canadian-American Relations and the Anglo-Saxon Idea, 1895-1903* (McGill-Queen's Press, 2004), 135-41.

²⁰⁹ Robert H MacDonald, *Sons of the Empire: The Frontier and the Boy Scout Movement, 1890-1918* (University Toronto Press, 1993), 82.

²¹⁰ Ibid.; F R Burnham, *Scouting on Two Continents* (New York: Doubleday, 1926), 155; Frederick R Burnham, "The Remarks of Major Frederick R. Burnham," *Historical Society of Southern California* 13, no. 4 (1927): 351. For a general account of intelligence attempts see: Spencer Jones, "Scouting for Soldiers: Reconnaissance and the British Cavalry, 1899—1914," *War in History* 18, no. 4 (2011).

The representative American people very much favour England. Barring the Irish papers who are always noisy, the bulk of the American people have come to realise that in this case Monarchy stands for freedom and Republic for despotism...²¹¹

Burnham was not exaggerating about Americans willing to fight; an estimated several thousand volunteers served in British army units.²¹² These included an entire squadron composed of Texan volunteers, many of whom had served alongside Roosevelt and Viscount Lee as Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War.²¹³

2.4.2 Deepening affinity but no alliance

It was with this wider cultural acknowledgment of the desirability of alignment that in 1903, Prime Minister Balfour felt able to call for a transformational change in foreign policy and an alliance with "this great english-speaking republic."²¹⁴ The Times reported Chamberlain elaborating on this theme to great acclaim from his audience,

We have no secrets from them, we desire to have no secrets from them. (Hear, hear)... The Monroe Doctrine has no enemies in this country that I know of. (Cheers)... We desire no colonisation, we desire no alteration in the balance of power, we desire no acquisition of territory. (Hear, hear)... We welcome any increase of the US upon the great Western Hemisphere. (Hear hear)... I go further and I say that, so far as I am concerned, I believe it would be a great gain for civilisation if the United States of America were more actively to interest themselves by making arrangements by which these constantly recurring difficulties between European powers and certain states in South America could be avoided.²¹⁵

²¹¹ Frederick Burnham quoted in: "Famous American Scout for Lord Roberts' Staff," *Daily Telegraph*, January, 26 1900. In fact, the Hearst newspapers were Anglophobic in stance on most matters and whilst critical, felt unable to support the Boer cause. Support for Britain was not as widespread as Burnham suggested, with populist Democratic Party Jennings Bryan being most vociferous.

²¹² See: Benjamin N Brown, "Americans Who Fought in the Anglo-Boer War" *Military History Journal*

Vol 15, no. No 6 - December (2012).

²¹³ See: Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Great Boer War* (McClure, Phillips, 1902).

²¹⁴ A.S Eisenstadt calls it not quite transformational but marking a new era of Anglo-American diplomacy and relations. See: Abraham Seldin Eisenstadt, *Carnegie's Model Republic: Triumphant Democracy and the British-American Relationship* (SUNY Press, 2012), 143-44.

²¹⁵ "Mr. Balfour in Liverpool," *The Times*, February, 14 1903.

The view that the deepening affinity with the US made war between the two sides improbable and abhorrent were reflected in the post-Boer War review of Imperial defence. The First Lord of the Admiralty Selborne regarded it as “the greatest evil which could befall the British Empire,” adding, “I know of no statesman of any party who would not rejoice... if relations between the British Empire and the United States of America were to ripen into a permanent alliance.”²¹⁶ Selborne’s colleague (and former Rough Rider), Arthur Lee, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty concurred, declaring, “I cannot for a moment contemplate the possibility of hostilities really taking place,” and adding that war would constitute “an act of supreme folly”.²¹⁷

There was no war, but equally there was no alliance either. As Phillips puts it, the US and the British were not allies, but by 1910 they were moving in that direction.²¹⁸ Again, it was not inevitable, just likely, and when the two parts of the English-speaking world were brought together in World War 1, the sense of a communal identity based on liberty and the rule of law, was invoked.

In a speech to commemorate US Independence Day in 1918, Churchill addressed an audience of Americans, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders and placed the Declaration of Independence centre stage as a product of “English soil.”²¹⁹ Although Churchill talks of an English race and an American race, it is to the central meme-complex of liberty to which he returns as the unifying factor. Churchill claims that the inspiration behind policies and constitutions that seek to safeguard citizens “on the one hand from the shame of despotism, on the other from the misery of anarchy on the other...” are “inevitably drawn from the Anglo-saxon mind.”²²⁰ Churchill seeks to suggest that Britain has itself, acted on the principles of the American Declaration of Independence, thereby accruing a high legitimacy to imperial relationships and facilitating fraternal relationships. He refers to a ‘communion,’ that is to say, the sharing of intimate beliefs and feelings, especially on a mental level.

²¹⁶ Melbourne 1904. Quoted in Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815–1908* (University of California Press, 1967), 381.

²¹⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*

²¹⁸ Phillips, 513.

²¹⁹ Winston Churchill, "Independence Day Speech" (paper presented at the A Declaration of Independence, Central Hall, Westminster, July, 4 1918).

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

A great harmony exists between the Declaration of Independence and all we are fighting for now. A similar harmony exists between the principles of that Declaration and what the British Empire has wished to stand for and has at last achieved, not only here at home, but in the great self-governing Dominions through the world. The Declaration of Independence is not only an American document; it follows on Magna Charta and the Petition of Right as the third of the great title deeds on which the liberties of the English-speaking race are founded. By it we lost an Empire, but by it we also preserved an Empire. By applying these principles and learning this lesson we have maintained unbroken communion with those powerful Commonwealths which our children have founded and have developed beyond the seas, and which, in this time of stress, have rallied spontaneously to our aid.²²¹

2.4.3 The acknowledgement of a non-racial identity

The familial and social ties between the American and the British communities continued to develop. There was a growing move away from attempts to present the ‘Anglo-saxonism’ as a racial construct. Instead, the emphasis shifted to recognising the importance of language as a means of conveying common ideas. In 1918, Sir Evelyn Wrench established the English Speaking Union (ESU) in London. The small inaugural meeting of fifteen individuals that initiated the organisation included a representative of the US embassy and three other Americans. Of the other eleven present, the majority were of Celtic origin, including the Anglo-Irish Wrench. The Anglo-Indian-Irish academic, Professor William Macneile Dixon was present. Another Trinity College alma mater attending was the Reverend William Geikie-Cobb, an Anglican liberal with strong views on women's rights. Those of Scottish origin included diplomat and author John Buchan, and city merchant George Mills McKay (who would serve as Treasurer). Others included Welsh diplomat Sir Arthur James Herbert, Sir George Morris Sutton (Former PM of Natal, South Africa), Australian Henry Noyes, and Canadian Sir Campbell Stuart who had raised a Canadian Irish Volunteer brigade in World War One.²²²

²²¹ Churchill Independence Day Speech. In ‘A Declaration of Independence’ public meeting. Central Hall, Westminster, London July 4 1918

²²² Evelyn Wrench, *Struggle, 1914-1920* (I. Nicholson & Watson, Limited, 1935), 487.

Invited to meet Woodrow Wilson on his state visit to London in 1918, Wrench explained to the President, the ESU was a union of people from seven core democracies: the United States, Great Britain and Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland.²²³ Wrench was keen to establish the ESU was not a “narrow attitude” based on race and did not “aim for formal alliances.”²²⁴

Wilson, aware of the cosmopolitan mix of his own countries’ electorate, agreed. His response is often quoted by nay-sayers as evidence of a denunciation of any special relationship between the English-speaking communities.²²⁵ On the contrary, it was a statement by a President of Anglo-saxon racial origin, that it was ideas that mattered and language was only important as a carrier of ideas and a fellowship based on communion. How could the relationship be based on anything else when just a quick glance of American surnames suggested non-Anglo-saxon racial origins.

You must not speak of us who come over here as cousins, still less as brothers; we are neither. Neither must you think of us as Anglo-Saxons, for that term can no longer be rightly applied to the people of the United States. Nor must too much importance in this connection be attached to the fact that English is our common language... there are only two things which can establish and maintain closer relations between your country and mine: they are community of ideals and of interests.²²⁶

Wilson was correct; it was not genes but memes that create a sense of community. If the term ‘cousins’ or ‘brothers’ is to be employed, it can only apply in a memetic sense to a shared familial Anglospheric set of ideas. As Bennett remarks, for example, “‘Innocent until proven guilty’ now belongs to Chang, Gonzales, and Singh, as well as Smith and Jones.”²²⁷ Or to paraphrase Nalapat, “Blood brothers of the mind.”

Wrench understood ESU was about language reinforcing the notion of a non-racial tribe or phyle with common traditions, common ideals, who possessed a common literature, and

²²³ "Greetings at the Embassy," *The Times*, December, 30 1918.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

²²⁵ For example: Michael White, "Special Relationship? Good and Bad Times," *Guardian*, March 3 2009. Aaron Bastani. "Wilson to Lloyd George. The ‘special relationship’ doesn’t exist." @AaronBastani <https://mobile.twitter.com/aaronbastani/status/1306945135238942720>

Peter Hitchens, "The Nonsense of the 'Special Relationship'," *Daily Mail*, November 9 2020.

²²⁶ Woodrow Wilson. Speech, State Banquet Buckingham Palace, London December 27, 1918

²²⁷ Bennett, "An Anglosphere Primer," 15.

believed “in the same conceptions of justice, freedom, order and good government” and should therefore have similar interests.²²⁸

Despite these social developments, the hopes of a post-World War 1 alliance or partnership did not materialise. Governmental relations began to follow a familiar haphazard pattern of positive advances, and then a deterioration as circumstances and personalities changed. Before exploring the interwar period, it is appropriate to examine the impact of the Boer War on Imperial defence arrangements that were to impact relations between the UK and the dominions up to and after WW1.

2.5 New security structures and alignments emerge

2.5.1 The Committee for Imperial Defence and the Dominions

The review of imperial security in the wake of the Boer War went far deeper than a reassessment of relations with the US. The demands of war had exposed imperial defence as being piecemeal and often dysfunctional. The Boer War had not exposed any Dominion failure in communal effort; the strength of the cultural and constitutional links meant their loyalty to ‘the mother country’ was never in doubt. The Dominions had rallied to the cause, each sending large numbers of troops (17,000 Australians, 8,500 Canadians and 8,000 New Zealanders).²²⁹ Rather, the experience suggested a more coordinated and strategic approach to the defence of the Empire was required. Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, concluded, “We have been shamefully unenthusiastic in the way we have treated questions of national defence.”²³⁰ In 1902, Selborne, as Under Secretary for the Colonies, had helped organise a colonial conference to discuss Imperial Defence. From the deliberations of that meeting, Balfour proceeded to establish the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) to replace the

²²⁸ "Greetings at the Embassy."

²²⁹ Morris, 95.

²³⁰ Arthur Jacob Marder, *British Naval Policy, 1880-1905. The Anatomy of British Sea Power* (London: Putnam, 1940), 417. Gwyn Prins "The British Way of Strategy-Making Vital Lessons For Our Times." RUSI Occasional Paper. Univ Buckingham. (2011). 3

Cabinet Defence Committee as a means of establishing effective and informed strategic security advice.²³¹

The CID was consultative and possessed no executive authority, with the Prime Minister as the only permanent member with the authority to invite the attendance of ministers and professional experts. Its purpose was to provide a strategic analysis of Imperial defence and allowed representatives from the self-governing Colonies and Dominions to attend when appropriate.²³² With regard to the relationship with latter, Balfour was keen to stress that the CID had no power to compel attendance or issue the Dominion representatives with instructions.

I hope that when any problem of defence which touches them nearly comes up, and even when they take a closer interest in the problems of imperial defence as a whole, we may have the advantage of their assistance in our councils...

It is only thus by limiting our functions that we can have that authority which I hope we shall more and more gain in the general scheme of Imperial defence, and that our opinions will carry that weight which will be all the more effective because there is behind them no power of coercive authority.²³³

This was the modus operandi that Churchill referred to in his 'Lessons Learned' 1918 Independence Day speech. It represented not just a practical approach to the aspirations of self-government but a cultural mind-set that acknowledged its legitimacy depended upon a non-coercive, 'power-up approach' and a preference for informal working practices.

So, for example, whilst in London for the 1909 and 1911 Imperial Defence Conferences, high-ranking Dominion representatives, were invited to meetings of the CID.²³⁴ In 1912, Asquith informed the Commons that a forthcoming CID would be attended by

²³¹ See: Maurice Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference - Studies in Public Affairs 1920-1946* (Ernest Benn, 1946), 84-85; Andrew Boyd, *British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2020), 107.

²³² Gwyn Prins, "Where There Is No Vision, the People Perish," (London: Public Administration Committee - House of Commons, 2012).

²³³ Balfour Arthur Speech 1904 quoted in Hankey, 84-85; Boyd, 86.

²³⁴ See: Hankey, 84-85; Boyd, 89-90.

representatives from the Dominions and revealed that previously, five Dominion premiers sat with the CID over the course of three days to discuss imperial strategy and defence. Asquith informed the Commons,

I do not think there has ever been in the history of our Imperial development a more momentous or in many ways a more significant occasion...

...We discussed upon those occasions the co-operation of the naval forces of the United Kingdom with those of the Dominions; the status of the Dominion Fleets, the flag to be flown by them, and the representation of the Dominions on the Committee of Imperial Defence; the possibility of their setting up, each of them in their own Dominions, some corresponding body to which strategic questions, naval and military in their relation, might be referred.²³⁵

The Empire was evolving however, and Canada in particular was keen to exert a degree of independence and define more clearly the relationship between 'the mother country' and Dominion. These matters were resolved at the 1926 Imperial Conference and reaffirmed Anglospheric preference for security relationships based on the idea of a 'fellowship.'²³⁶ This pattern reflected the *Communio incidens* principle invoked by the Germans to describe British-US relationships²³⁷. Unlike the British-US relationship, the ties binding Britain and the Dominions were deeper and reinforced by common citizenship, free allegiance to the Crown, for trust-based informality and an avoidance of a restrictive legal 'cage.' The UK-Dominion relationships epitomised the idea of the Magna Carta compact that decisions should not be imposed by a central power from above, rather, it was a 'commonwealth' under a symbolic crown. The idea that various players could make autonomous decisions was expressly enunciated in the Declaration from the 1926 Imperial Conference.

They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs,

²³⁵ Asquith speaking on Committee of Imperial Defence. HC Deb 25 July 1912 vol 41 cc1384-501. <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1912/jul/25/committee-of-imperial-defence>

²³⁶ Nicholas Mansergh, *The Commonwealth Experience: Volume Two: From British to Multiracial Commonwealth* (Macmillan, 1982), 22-31.

²³⁷ As mentioned earlier. Seidl-Hohenveldern, 6, 38.

though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.²³⁸

The Declaration notes that the nature of this sentence might lead “a foreigner... to think that it was devised rather to make mutual interference impossible than to make mutual co-operation easy.”²³⁹ The Declaration says the reverse is true, stating the Commonwealth

depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and progress are among its objects... And though every Dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.²⁴⁰

The Conference also decided that, “to deal with questions of diplomacy and questions of defence, we require also flexible machinery – machinery which can, from time to time, be adapted to the changing circumstances of the world.”²⁴¹ It did adapt too, proving sufficiently flexible to create ad hoc committees. Following a resolution of a 1907 Colonial Conference, it was empowered to summon meetings between Dominion representatives and UK officials if urgent circumstances demanded it. Fears of German rearming led to just such a summons for the convening of the Imperial Defence Conference in 1909.²⁴²

The highly influential and effective Secretary to the CID, Maurice Hankey, outlined how the body evolved to include the Dominion’s High Commissioners in a process of regular consultation on security and defence matters. Hankey stressed the importance of steps taken to standardise imperial military forces, singling out the creation of the Imperial Defence College to train Dominion officers in strategy, and the development of “uniform manuals, patterns of arms, equipment and stores for the sea, land and air forces...” The 1937 Imperial

²³⁸ Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926. Inter-Imperial Relations Committee Report. (I.R./26) Series

https://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/transcripts/cth11_doc_1926.pdf

²³⁹ Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926. Inter-Imperial Relations Committee Report. (I.R./26) Series

²⁴⁰ Ibid. Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926.

²⁴¹ Ibid. Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926.

²⁴² “Imperial Conference on the Subject of the Defence of the Empire,” Minutes and Proceedings, October 1909. TNA Dominions No. 15: CO 886/2/8, [1]–93.

Conference observed these arrangements would ensure each member's own security and enable members, "if so desired, to cooperate with other countries of the Commonwealth."²⁴³

It would be misleading to suggest that there were no disagreements between the Dominions and the UK. One such example was Australia's decision to set aside King George V's choice for Governor General in 1929 and secure the first Australian-born appointment — Sir Issac Isaacs.²⁴⁴ That appointment was significant in another respect too, for it provides another example of the explicit non-racial aspect of 'Anglo-saxonism.' Isaac's ethnicity was of Polish-Jewish origin, but he identified with the values of Anglo-saxonism and expressly the Magna Carta, that according to him provided the

principles which form the base of the social structure of every British community...

The principles themselves cannot be found in express terms in any written Constitution of Australia, but they are inscribed in that great confirmatory instrument, seven hundred years old, which is the groundwork of all our Constitutions – Magna Carta.²⁴⁵

The Commonwealth of Dominions remained attached to Britain because they were 'British communities' in a wider imagined community. A shared cultural outlook that stressed the voluntary and pluralistic aspect of the relationship meant that centralising initiatives did not find favour but close cooperation continued anyway. For example, as WW1 drew to a close, a committee headed by Admiral Wymass tabled a paper for consideration at the 1918 Imperial Conference suggesting a central "Imperial Naval Authority" overseeing a single imperial navy. The Dominion Prime Ministers did not reject the idea out of hand, but pointed out that the ongoing ad hoc coordination of navies under the Admiralty during WWI had proved effective.²⁴⁶ They "asserted that in naval organisation as elsewhere the Empire must follow the principle of association rather than integration."²⁴⁷

²⁴³ See: Hankey, 84-85; Boyd, 134.

²⁴⁴ Mansergh, 30.

²⁴⁵ "The Right Honourable Sir Isaac Isaacs GCB, GCMG, KC," *Australian Constitutional Centre*, https://www.australianconstitutioncentre.org.au/uploads/1/2/0/0/120053113/3._isaac_isaacs.pdf.

²⁴⁶ James A Boutilier, *Rcn in Retrospect, 1910-1968* (UBC Press, 2011), 48-50.

²⁴⁷ Richard A. Preston, *Canada and Imperial Defense: A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organisation, 1867-1919* (University of Toronto Press, 1967), 528.

In the main, the Dominions proved willing to cooperate ‘by association’ not just because it was in their interests, but because those interests were defined by a shared sentiment and heritage. Thus, for example in 1937, the Australian Government concluded

that Australian Defence is inseparably bound up with Empire Defence, and the plans for its own security are inseparable from the plans for the security of the Empire as a whole.²⁴⁸

2.5.2 The CID and Intelligence

The conflict with the Afrikaners in the Boer War exposed British weaknesses in the field of intelligence. According to Major Burnham, it was a cultural deficiency that regarded spying as somewhat ungentlemanly. When he left Alaska to head up the Empire’s scouting operations against the Boers, he concluded his remarks to the press by saying British setbacks had been caused by “an inherent [cultural] aversion of both Americans and British employing spies” and “the Anglo-saxons are very bad at the spy business.”²⁴⁹ This was a fair assessment. In his official history of MI5, Christopher Andrew quotes approvingly the view of Spenser Wilkinson who “compared the War Office’s use of their Intelligence Department (ID) during the Boer War to a man who ‘kept a small brain for occasional use in his waistcoat pocket and ran his head by clockwork’.”²⁵⁰

These inadequacies were recognised and addressed by one of the many sub-committees established by the CID.²⁵¹ The foundations of the modern day intelligence were established in 1909 in the form of the Secret Service Bureau (SSB). The initial operation was modest and consisted of just two staff, RN Commander Mansfield Cumming and Army Captain Vernon

²⁴⁸ Minister for Defence, Sir Archdale Parkhill, to the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey, “The Political & Strategic Considerations relating to Imperial and Local Defence.” April 28, 1937. Paper No 1.

<https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-01/20-summary-of-papers-and-questions-on-defence-submitted-by-delegation-to-imperial-conference>

²⁴⁹ Frederick Burnham quoted in: “Famous American Scout for Lord Roberts’ Staff.”

²⁵⁰ Christopher Andrew, *Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5* (Allen Lane, 2005), 5.

²⁵¹ Richard Deacon, *A History of the British Secret Service* (Granada, 1980), 183.

Kell. This subsequently divided into MI5²⁵², headed by Kell, and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS otherwise known as MI6) headed by Cumming.²⁵³

In terms of SIGINT, however, the British were more adept, but again the organisation was piecemeal with no central control.²⁵⁴ In his official history of GCHQ, Ferris concludes the British “practised every possible form of signals intelligence without knowing it” during the Boer War.²⁵⁵ In 1914, two separate SIGINT operations were formed to intercept German radio traffic. The first formed part of the Naval Intelligence Department operating from ‘Room 40’²⁵⁶ in the Admiralty and the Army’s MI1(b) interception team. In 1919, these were merged to become GC&CS (later GCHQ).²⁵⁷ In addition to these operations, the three armed services would go on to create and operate their own intelligence operations, but were not interdepartmental. However, it is MI5 and MI6 and GC&CS (later GCHQ) that have come to be understood as the British intelligence services.

In this period there was no legal or practical distinction between a citizen born in the British metropole or a British Dominion and staffing reflected this. It is more accurate to refer to a ‘Commonwealth intelligence’ operation, with a network controlled by London but with the staff drawn from the British Commonwealth. For example, in the run-up to America’s entry into World War 1 the de facto head of the Admiralty’s British Intelligence in the US was the Australian-born Captain Guy Gaunt. It was Gaunt’s team who played a critical role in countering anti-British activities in the US before US entry into WW1.²⁵⁸ Gaunt and his team also played a key role in developing relations with Colonel Edward House, President Wilson’s unofficial advisor and also with Robert Lansing, US Secretary of State.²⁵⁹ Later it was the Canadian, William Stephenson, who headed up British Intelligence operations in

²⁵² Originally MO5(g) See:ibid., 184.

²⁵³ Andrew, 3 & 28.

²⁵⁴ Richard J Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (London: HarperCollins, 2010), 14.

²⁵⁵ See: John Ferris, *Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021), 19.

²⁵⁶ Actually Naval Intelligence Department 25 - NID25.

²⁵⁷ Aldrich, 14.

²⁵⁸ For this and Gaunt’s relationship with his Army counterpart see: Thomas F Troy, “The Gaunt-Wiseman Affair: British Intelligence in New York in 1915,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16, no. 3 (2003).

²⁵⁹ David Ramsay, *‘Blinker’ Hall: Spymaster: The Man Who Brought America into World War I* (Spellmount, 2008), 52.

North America and who was to play a key role in intelligence operations in North America both during and after WW2.²⁶⁰

Another characteristic illustrates a different cultural approach to the status of the intelligence services in those Anglosphere states where ‘Anglo-saxon’ liberal influences remain at their strongest. Unlike many of their counterparts in other states, the intelligence services were not a form of secret police empowered to collect and analyse intelligence and then proceed to arrest citizens or foreign agents.²⁶¹ As such, MI5 and MI6 were required to persuade the police to cooperate in raids and arrests.²⁶² This arrangement is consistent with a general antipathy towards centralising and unaccountable authority found in the most Anglospheric states. The exception is the US, where the FBI did have both an intelligence function and policing powers. Nevertheless, the role of the FBI was viewed with suspicion, by the media and some US politicians, including Harry Truman, as discussed later.

2.5.3 Limited US and Britain cooperation during WW One and the interwar period

World War One and the interwar period witnessed something of a drifting parting apart in British and American relations with only the threat of war from Germany and Japan in the 1930s, creating an impetus for greater cooperation, if not alignment. It was in this period however, that Winston Churchill overcame any remaining personal animus towards the US.²⁶³

World War One did facilitate a greater sense of communal feelings between the British community and the US. Wilson’s early adoption of a neutralist position possibly reflected his wish not to antagonise those sections of the US public with Germanic roots, many of whom on the grounds of patriotism favoured the Central powers despite exposure to American values.²⁶⁴ As such, Wilson implored all Americans to remain “impartial in thought as well

²⁶⁰ Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service* (Simon and Schuster, 2002), 50.

²⁶¹ For example the French modern MI5 equivalent, the DGSI, & the Russian FSB.

²⁶² It was Scotland Yard’s irritation at being in the centre of a turf war that led to the 1931 clarification MI5 was the operation they would be working with on domestic UK matters.

²⁶³ For Churchill’s visit to the US in 1929 see: Andrew Roberts, *Churchill: Walking with Destiny* (Penguin, 2018), 337-39.

²⁶⁴ Some Irish favoured Germany out of hatred for Britain. Some Jewish groups favoured Germany in response to Russian anti-Semitic pogroms. See: Joseph Rappaport, *Hands across the Sea: Jewish Immigrants and World War I* (Hamilton Books, 2005).

as in action."²⁶⁵ Although most of his administration and his military were pro-British,²⁶⁶ the exception was his Anglophobic and pacifist Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan.²⁶⁷ Despite his public stance of neutrality, Wilson recognised that his cherished ideals of liberty and democracy required a British victory against the Central powers. As UK Ambassador Spring Rice recorded Wilson was inclined to the pro-British stance of his military.

Everything that I love most in the world is at stake... If they [the Germans] succeed, we shall be forced to take such measures of defense here as would be fatal to our form of Government.²⁶⁸

Wilson's public stance gradually changed to reflect the change in public opinion, particularly so after his narrow re-election in 1916. Public identification with the allied cause was facilitated by reports of German atrocities in Belgium and the torpedoing of civilian ships.²⁶⁹

Despite this Wilson also ruled out an intelligence sharing treaty with the British but in reality intelligence was shared on an unofficial basis.²⁷⁰ Here, it is worth noting the role of the Royal Navy's Naval Intelligence Division (NID) in pioneering the integration of SIGINT derived intelligence with other intelligence sources.²⁷¹ It was from these Royal Navy intelligence operations that the first formal intelligence sharing with the US Navy emerged in 1917 once the US had entered the war.²⁷²

²⁶⁵ Woodrow Wilson, "Message on Neutrality Speech," (Washington DC1914).

²⁶⁶ See: Daniel Malloy Smith, *The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-1920*, vol. 5 (New York: J. Wiley, 1965), 15.

²⁶⁷ Bryan had been the presidential candidate of the Populist Party dedicated to eradicating the "monster" England from American social life. See: A Capet, "The Special Relationship: La Relation Speciale Entre Le Royaume-Uni Et Les Esta-Unis, 1945-1990," *Rouen, Presses de L'Universite de Rouen* (2003): 60-61.

²⁶⁸ Ross Gregory, *The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War* (Norton, 1971), 7.

²⁶⁹ See: "Germany Apologizes for Wwi Massacre," *AP News*, May, 7 2001; John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (Yale University Press, 2001); Gregory, 10&59 & 60-67; Frank Trommler, "The Lusitania Effect: America's Mobilization against Germany in World War I," *German Studies Review* (2009).

²⁷⁰ Alan Harris Bath, *Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence* (University of Kansas Press, 1998), 6.

²⁷¹ The Admiralty's 'Room 40' decoding of the Zimmermann telegram contributed to US entry into war.

²⁷² Boyd, 25-26; Andrew, 105-06.

After WW1, intelligence sharing ceased due to mutual suspicions and rivalry between the two navies.²⁷³ Shortly after the conclusion of WW1, the US Director of Navy Intelligence recognised the rivalry but also acknowledged the bonds of friendship.

The basis of friendship between the two great English-speaking peoples is rivalry and independence of each other, and these are the really true and lasting bases of all friendships... There is no necessity for an alliance between Great Britain and the United States, and there probably never will be one, but, in effect, it exists, or must exist, through conditions which are arising in the world and which will hereafter necessitate that the two countries will stand together; other-wise they may fall together.²⁷⁴

Indeed, in this period, both the US and the UK attempted to intercept one another's communications. In this, the British SIGINT operation, now spearheaded by the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) was the more successful.²⁷⁵ In 1935, tentative political talks about naval cooperation in the Far East did not result in any agreement despite the US accepting that a joint system of collective security in the Pacific was desirable. However, the 1935 Conference did improve upon talks that had taken place at the 1930 Conference and marked a something of a step-change in relations.²⁷⁶ Jeffry Dowart, author of a seminal work on the history of the US Office of Naval Intelligence, regards it as the start of the rapprochement between the two countries.²⁷⁷ Occasional and informal exchanges of intelligence started to occur between the two navies. Following an initiative from UK Foreign Secretary for cooperation in the East, President Roosevelt over-ruled the State Department

²⁷³ Boyd, 25-26.

²⁷⁴ Admiral Albert Parker Niblack, "Forms of Government in Relation to Their Efficiency for War, 1919" in *Classified and unclassified lectures delivered by visiting scholars, flag rank officers, and government officials*, ed. US Naval War College (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval Historical Collection Repository, 1919).

²⁷⁵ John Ferris, *Issues in British and American Signals Intelligence, 1919-1932* (National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2016), 43 & 46.

²⁷⁶ Paul Haggie, *Britannia at Bay: The Defence of the British Empire against Japan, 1931-1941* (Oxford University Press, 1981), 119; Ian Cowman, *Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations in the Pacific, 1937-1941* (Berg Publishing, 1996), 137.

²⁷⁷ Jeffery M Dorwart, *Conflict of Duty: The US Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945* (Naval Inst Press, 1983), 138.

and authorised the secret 'Ingersoll' talks with the British about joint action.²⁷⁸ Roosevelt's actions were supported by Admiral Leahy, a figure who would play a prominent role in post WW2 UK-US relations.²⁷⁹

In 1938, with mutual concerns about Japan, the British decide to treat the US exceptionally, and the exchange of intelligence intensified after the declaration of war in 1939²⁸⁰. This was another milestone in relations, confirming the process of cautious alignment.²⁸¹ Also in 1939, the RN sent a special emissary to meet with US Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Leahy to share RN strategy decisions.²⁸² With the sharing of the Japanese Purple diplomatic cipher by the US and the German Enigma cipher, the relationship matured into a fully fledged wartime SIGINT alliance and provided the basis of the 1946 BRUSA arrangement.²⁸³ As Lawrence Pratt concludes, the 1937 Ingersoll talks might not have constituted

a new 'hands across the sea' period of Anglo-American relations, [but] it was at least an important beginning. For from these first hesitant contacts would spring the entire technical apparatus of co-operation that supported the Anglo-Saxon revival of the war years.²⁸⁴

2.6 World War 2 allies

2.6.1 The British Commonwealth Security Community

²⁷⁸ Pratt describes the State Dept as "not overly anglophile." See: Lawrence Pratt, "The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East of January 1938," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 47, no. 4 (1971): 747.

²⁷⁹ Gregory J Florence, *Courting a Reluctant Ally: An Evaluation of US/UK Naval Intelligence Cooperation, 1935-1941* (Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence College, 2004), 31. For Leahy's role see: Pratt, 751.

²⁸⁰ So named after US Navy Captain Ingersoll (Director of Planning) who Roosevelt tasked with travelling to London to discuss the cooperation. See: Florence, 34-36; Pratt, 754-58.

²⁸¹ See: Haggie.

²⁸² RN Commander T.C. Hampton briefed Leahy on the CID's Cunningham Strategy impact of Far East planning. See: *ibid.*, 143-46.

²⁸³ Boyd, 29.

²⁸⁴ Pratt, 759.

The UK and the Commonwealth functioned as a cohesive political and military entity. Once again, many of the arrangements were based on ad hoc arrangements and personal relationships. It was a point made by Canadian Prime Minister, MacKenzie King who, in an address to the UK Parliament in May 1941 said,

It is true we have not sitting in London continuously, a visible Imperial War Cabinet or Council. But we have, what is much more important, though invisible, a continuing conference of Cabinets of the Commonwealth.²⁸⁵

It was an arrangement that could only work based on trust and the high legitimacy of relationships based on allegiance to the Crown and all that it represented in terms of values and legal relationships, rather than the person of the monarch from which it is legally separate.

2.6.2 British-US Conventional & Intelligence threads of co-operation

When the US joined the war after Pearl Harbour, the relationship between the British and the US crystallised into an alliance. The most obvious sign of the new relationship was the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in January 1942 that brought together the US and British military commanders. The Washington based UK representatives of the UK Chiefs of Staff (CoS) were known as the Joint Staff Mission. To allow the effective functioning on the CCS, the US created the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in February 1942 modelled on the British CoS structure.²⁸⁶ Once operational, the CCS served as the supreme uniformed military command for the Western Allies and, in the view of Rigby, was arguably the most important international organisation of the twentieth century.²⁸⁷

The other area of cooperation was in intelligence, although initially this was rather limited.²⁸⁸ However, by March 1942, the navies of Canada, the UK and their US counterparts

²⁸⁵ Mackenzie King address to both Houses of Parliament, Westminster Hall, May 11 1941. Quoted in: Mansergh.

²⁸⁶ For a comprehensive account see: David Rigby, *Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II* (Naval Institute Press, 2012).

²⁸⁷ Ibid. For a focus on some of the main personalities see: Andrew Roberts, *Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945* (Harper Collins, 2009).

²⁸⁸ Bradley F Smith, *The Ultra-Magic Deals: And the Most Secret Special Relationship 1940-1946* (Presidio Press, 1994), 49,106-13.

had begun discussions sharing intelligence in a more structured fashion. In September 1942, Edward Travis (from GC&CS) travelled to Washington to conclude the 'Travis-Wengler Agreement' on naval intelligence, marking the first cryptanalytic agreement between the UK and the US.²⁸⁹ The Britain-United States Agreement (BRUSA) was signed on May 17 1943, between GC&CS and the US War Department.²⁹⁰ This was a more comprehensive agreement and established an intelligence (SIGINT) partnership that would endure into the twenty-first century.

Of significance in this relationship was the composition of the UK's SIGINT operations. These were an ad hoc conglomerate of imperial and commonwealth assets spread across the globe, dominated and operated by GC&CS (renamed GCHQ in 1946) and "essentially branches of the relevant British organisations."²⁹¹ Such was the lack of domestic dominion control the relationship could be described as "semi-feudal," arrangements that were practical in war but open to challenges in the post-war period as discussed in the next chapter.²⁹²

2.6.3 Atomic collaboration and Anglophobic meme-complexes

Whereas intelligence cooperation between the US and its Commonwealth allies was relatively straight forward during World War Two, this was not the case regarding atomic collaboration. The origins of UK collaboration with the US on atomic research predated the latter's entry into the World War Two. In March 1941, the UK's MAUD committee had concluded that the building of an atomic bomb was feasible and that

that the present collaboration with America should be continued and extended especially in the region of experimental work.²⁹³

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 127 53.

²⁹⁰ Reproduced in John Cary Sims, "The Brusa Agreement of May 17, 1943," *Cryptologia* 21, no. 1 (1997).

²⁹¹ Huw Dylan, *Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain's Joint Intelligence Bureau 1945-1964* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2014), 163.

²⁹² Matthew M Aid and Cees Wiebes, *Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War and Beyond* (Psychology Press, 2001), Chap 3.

²⁹³ Report by M.A.U.D. Committee on the Use of Uranium for a Bomb, M.A.U.D. Committee, Ministry of Aircraft Production, London, July 1941. CSAC 75.5.80/D. 11 Cambridge University: Trinity College Library

George Thomson, the Chairman of the MAUD committee flew to Washington to deliver a copy of the final Report to Bush Dr Vannevar Bush, head of the US Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD).²⁹⁴ To gain Administration support, Bush visited his friend and neighbour, Vice President Henry Wallace, who Bush believed had the appropriate scientific background able “to grasp the subject readily.”²⁹⁵ Wallace and Bush briefed Roosevelt on the British report on October 9, 1942.²⁹⁶ Roosevelt authorised ongoing liaison with the British and created the *Top Policy Group* (TPG) to oversee general policy, to be headed by Wallace and to include Henry Stimson, General Marshall, James Conant and Bush.²⁹⁷ Wallace convened the first meeting of the TPG eight days after Pearl Harbour and the group agreed Section S1 should proceed with the construction of an atomic plant overseen by Bush.²⁹⁸

Despite the onset of war, Wallace was not keen on collaborating with the British. A number of factors had made him Anglophobic including his family’s identification with Irish nationalist causes due to their Scots-Irish origins.²⁹⁹ This had been sustained and developed by the family’s subscription to the Dublin produced *Irish Homestead* journal. Three generations of the Wallace family had a personal, on-going relationship with its editor George W. Russell, a leading Anglo-Irish Nationalist and cultural figure in Ireland.³⁰⁰ The young Henry Wallace stayed with Russell in Dublin in 1912 during which the ‘Home Rule Crisis’

²⁹⁴ Gwyn Prins, *Defended to Death: A Study of the Nuclear Arms Race: From the Cambridge University Disarmament Seminar* (Penguin Books, 1983), 62; Richard G Hewlett and Oscar E Anderson Jr, *History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Volume I. 1939/1946, the New World* (US Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, DC (United States), 1962), 44.

²⁹⁵ , 45; Roger Pielke, "In Retrospect: Science—the Endless Frontier," *Nature* 466, no. 7309 (2010); Francis George Gosling, *The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb* (Diane Publishing, 1999), 9; Mayako Shimamoto, *Henry A. Wallace’s Criticism of America’s Atomic Monopoly, 1945-1948* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 39.

²⁹⁶ Bush to Roosevelt March 9, 1942. Office for Emergency Management, Washington DC. Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (Simon and Schuster, 2012), 377; Stanley Goldberg, "Inventing a Climate of Opinion: Vannevar Bush and the Decision to Build the Bomb," *Isis* 83, no. 3 (1992): 445; Gosling, 10; John C Culver and John Hyde, *American Dreamer: A Life of Henry A. Wallace* (WW Norton & Company, 2001), 267.

²⁹⁷ Rhodes, 377; Culver and Hyde, 267. Wallace had taken a close interest in the fledgling atomic research and been briefed by Bush in July 1941. Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 45.

²⁹⁸ Gosling, 10.

²⁹⁹ Ironically Scots-Irish are usually self-defined ‘British.’

³⁰⁰ There was personal contact with the previous editor too, Anglo-Irish nationalist Horace Plunkett as well as Russell. See: H.C. Wallace, *Our Debt and Duty to the Farmer* (Century Company, 1925); Richard S. Kirkendall, "A Magazine Called Wallaces' Farmer," *The Goldfinch*, February 3 1991, 14-15.

erupted on the streets.³⁰¹ Thus, Wallace recorded he was introduced to “the tremendous passion” of Irish culture and his family’s own Irish blood and identity.³⁰²

Russell also introduced Wallace to Theosophy, a new religion — an eclectic mix of refashioned Buddhist and Hindu ideas — founded by Russian emigre Helena Blavatsky.³⁰³ This in turn led to Wallace become a pupil under Nicolas Roerich, a Russian emigre and Theosophical master. When Wallace met him in 1930, Roerich had just returned from leading a Soviet OPGU intelligence financed expedition to found a new central Asian state, based on a synthesis of Buddhism and communism.³⁰⁴ British intelligence had tracked the expedition on its entry to Tibet and arranged to have it captured and expelled in 1929, earning Roerich’s enmity and paranoia about the British.³⁰⁵ Completely taken in by Roerich, Wallace became his pupil and became persuaded of the need to create a new Theosophical Asian state. Roerich inculcated in Wallace his paranoid fear of the malign influence of the British with their secret agents and their machinations in the 'Great Game' in international affairs. Such was Roerich’s influence, that Wallace, now Secretary of State for Agriculture agreed to appoint Roerich to lead another expedition in 1932, illicitly funded by Wallace’s Department under the guise of a scientific expedition. Roerich’s party had become engulfed in diplomatic intrigue and armed clashes across a swathe of central Asia in another failed endeavour to create a new state. The coded cables from Roerich updating Wallace on the expedition’s secret mission are replete with concerns about the perfidious British, coded named “monkey’s” for their mischievous attitude.³⁰⁶

³⁰¹ See: Henry A Wallace, "Ae: A Prophet out of an Ancient Age," *Colby Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (1955); Gabriel Doherty, *The Home Rule Crisis 1912–14* (Mercier Press Ltd, 2014); Thomas C Kennedy, "" The Gravest Situation of Our Lives": Conservatives, Ulster, and the Home Rule Crisis, 1911–14," *Éire-Ireland* 36, no. 3 (2001).

³⁰² Wallace, 1-2.

³⁰³ Culver and Hyde, 39 & 78.

³⁰⁴ Karolina Hess and Przemysław Sieradzan, "Explorations of the Esoteric Dreams of the Himalayas," in *Światło I Ciemność: Imaginatio*, ed. Monika Rzeczycka (University of Gdańsk: Gdańsk, 2017). For Soviet plans see: Alexandre Andreyev, "Soviet Russia and Tibet: A Debacle of Secret Diplomacy," *The Tibet Journal* 21, no. 3 (1996): 26; Andrei Znamenski, *Red Shambhala: Magic, Prophecy, and Geopolitics in the Heart of Asia* (Quest Books, 2012), 185.

³⁰⁵ Andreyev, 27; Graham J.. White and John Robert Maze, *Henry A. Wallace: His Search for a New World Order* (University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 60; "Prof. Roerich Refused Passport to India," *Times of India*, July 21 1930.

³⁰⁶ Theodore A Wilson, "Parsifal in Politics: Henry Agard Wallace, Mysticism and the New Deal," *Irish Journal of American Studies* 5 (1996): 18.

There was one other and unintended consequence of Russell's influence. It related to the meme of benevolent vanguardism that guided the agrarian cooperationist movement that Russell had pioneered in Ireland. In cooperativism Wallace saw the possibilities for the role of state sponsored managerial technocrats that could introduce modern scientific methods. The outcome would be a new agrarian future of farming collectives with happy and grateful farm workers guided by technocrats.³⁰⁷ An agrarian-based economy lay at the heart of both Russell and his contemporary, W. B. Yeat's vision of a new Irish nation.³⁰⁸ Whilst Roerich had not realised the dream of a Buddhist-Communist agrarian state, Wallace appears to have believed the Soviets had succeeded in creating something similar. In 1944 Wallace visited a Soviet farming collective in Siberia during his term as Vice President and naively believed the NKVD run slave-camp was an idyllic realisation of the dream.³⁰⁹ Two themes were consistent in Wallace's outlooks throughout his career. Firstly, admiration of what he believed was a paternalistic and scientific Soviet vanguardist approach to societal ills and secondly, and suspicions of the British in the 'Great Game' of international politics.

In the early War period, Wallace's role remained central to the progress of the research project, sanctioning expenditure and overseeing general policy.³¹⁰ The TPG appointed General Leslie [Dick] Groves as the executive officer to oversee transfer of Section S-1 to the army-led *Manhattan Project* in September 1942.³¹¹ Wallace, displaying his inherent Angophobia, encouraged Bush's inclination to limit the research partnership with the British. As late as December 21, 1942, Wallace and Bush met to discuss the role of the British. Wallace re-affirmed his view that "technical know-how should not be handed to any country in the world," including the UK.³¹²

Wallace need not have worried about sharing technology. Groves had a xenophobic outlook that included a particular dislike of the British despite his own English ancestry. It stemmed from an enduring meme-complex passed down through his family from the War of

³⁰⁷ For an idea of the vision see: Russell 'The Pleasures of Eating', Irish Homestead, 15 January 1910, 43 Quoted in: Leeann Lane, "'It Is in the Cottages and Farmers' Houses That the Nation Is Born': Ae's 'Irish Homestead' and the Cultural Revival," *Irish University Review* 33, no. 1 (2003).

³⁰⁸ Russell and Yates were both theosophists and pioneers of agrarian cooperativism.

³⁰⁹ Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (Oxford University Press on Demand, 2008), 328.

³¹⁰ See: Shimamoto, 42-43.

³¹¹ Ibid.; Gosling, 35.

³¹² Quoted in Shimamoto, 46.

Independence. Grove's father, a dominating and puritanical chaplain, displayed persistent signs of this Anglophobia stating, "if there is anything that fills me with shame, it is my English blood."³¹³ As Robert Norris puts it in his seminal biography of Groves, strong currents of anti-British nationalism survived from the Revolutionary War to the advent of World War Two.

Chaplain Groves felt it [Anglophobia] deeply and passed it on to his children. This fervent moralistic patriotism clearly shaped young Dick [Leslie], who saw himself as American through and through. These attitudes would be evident in his treatment of British scientists and diplomats the during war.³¹⁴

This meme-complex was reinforced in Chaplain Grove's son, not ameliorated by the younger Groves' experience of America's allies in World War 1. His diary records his experiences as a young soldier in France. The British military he had encountered, were, regardless of class, all hypocrites, and he found English "morals to be rather depraved."³¹⁵ His contempt for the British was only surpassed by other nationalities and races, with the French singled out as completely degenerate and feeble.³¹⁶

Whilst Groves appeared to regard all Dominion staff as 'British,' he was deeply distrustful of other racial groups in the Commonwealth team.³¹⁷ The anti-British meme attributed to the Revolutionary War that Groves had inherited lost none of its potency. As late as the 1960s, Groves, outraged by some comments in the New York press over Vietnam, penned a letter to the city's press traducing New York's patriotism because it had long harboured [Royalist] "Tories".³¹⁸

³¹³ Chaplain Groves, personal letter to Jane Griffith. November 17, 1900. Quoted in: Robert S Norris, "Racing for the Bomb," *General Leslie R. Groves. The Manhattan Project's, Indispensable Man. South Royalton* (2002): 569-70.

³¹⁴ Ibid., 95.

³¹⁵ Ibid., 13.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 95.

³¹⁷ General Leslie R Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project* (NY: Harper & Row, 1962), 144.

³¹⁸ Norris, 535. There had been a community that maintained close cultural and trading links with loyalists in the Canadian maritime provinces. See: Frederick A Hall, "Musical Yankees and Tories in Maritime Settlements of Eighteenth-Century Canada," *American Music* (1987).

In August 1943, the US and UK signed the Quebec Agreement merging Tube Alloys, the British atomic research program, with the Manhattan Project. A UK-US Combined Policy Committee (CPC) was established under the Chairmanship of US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson.³¹⁹ At British insistence, a Canadian representative was included on the CPC reflecting Canadian involvement in Tube Alloys. The UK had partnered with Canada in 1942 and shifted the bulk of research to Canada. Canadian contributions included scientists, the supplying and processing uranium and research on plutonium.³²⁰ The British team included scientists from Australia, New Zealand reflecting the inherent and natural levels of trust that underlay the British Commonwealth.³²¹

Groves delayed any discussion of the administrative arrangements with the British and his compartmentalised research on security grounds preventing their access to other meaningful US research.³²² Groves was to claim later “I did everything to hold back on it [collaboration]. I did not carry out the wishes of our government...”³²³ With little progress, the British team members grew concerned about post-War collaboration and alerted London.³²⁴

2.6.4 Atomic collaboration frustrated

On September 19, 1944, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed the Hyde Park Memorandum for military and commercial post-war atomic collaboration unless terminated by “joint

³¹⁹ John Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84* (Springer, 1984), 17-18.

³²⁰ Sean Johnston, *The Neutron's Children: Nuclear Engineers and the Shaping of Identity* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 30-36; Donald Howard Avery, "Atomic Scientific Co-Operation and Rivalry among Allies: The Anglo-Canadian Montreal Laboratory and the Manhattan Project, 1943-1946," *War in history* 2, no. 3 (1995): 277-79.

³²¹ In terms of its population, NZ contributed a disproportionately level of expertise reflecting the ground-breaking work of New Zealander Lord Ernest Rutherford. See; Rebecca Priestley, *Mad on Radium: New Zealand in the Atomic Age* (Auckland University Press, 2013). Dominion atomic scientists included: Sir Mark Oliphant (Australia), Harrie Massie (Australia), Eric Burhop (Australia). New Zealanders Sir Ernest Marsden, Charles Watson Munroe, K.D. George, W.W. Young, Robin M. Williams, Maurice Wilkins and George Page. See also: Ross Galbreath, "The Rutherford Connection: New Zealand Scientists and the Manhattan and Montreal Projects," *War in History* 2, no. 3 (1995).

³²² Septimus Paul, *Anglo-American Cooperation and the Development of the British Atomic Bomb, 1941-1952* (University of Illinois at Chicago, 1996), 101. See: Norris, 328-29.

³²³ Testimony General Leslie R Groves. Oppenheimer Hearing. Volume IV, US Atomic Energy Commission. April 15, 1954. Washington. 569

³²⁴ Darren Holden, “‘On the Oliphant Deign, Now to Sound the Blast’: How Mark Oliphant Secretly Warned of America’s Post-War Intentions of an Atomic Monopoly,” *Historical Records of Australian Science* 29, no. 2 (2018): 132.

agreement.”³²⁵ It was an executive decision between trusting individuals.³²⁶ Roosevelt later informed Bush that he had been talking “about complete interchange” with the British after the war to keep them strong.³²⁷ Bush was privately concerned that the President was “plunging ahead with postwar planning” but Groves ensured compartmentalisation continued.³²⁸ British scientists began to worry about how compartmentalisation would impact future collaboration with Sir James Chadwick writing from Los Alamos to London to express his concerns in February 1945, warning

We shall have to rely very much on the US authorities, and especially on Groves, to work with us towards collaboration, not merely to accept collaboration if it is forced on them.³²⁹

2.7 Conclusion

The foundation of a security community existed by the end of World War 2. The tensions between Britain and the US had first been eased by a pattern of arbitration, followed by a growing sense of commonality. The Spanish-American War and the Boer War both proved important milestones. They did not lead to alliances, but rather a favourable alignment. Appeals to a false Anglo-saxon racial kinship were unlikely to succeed despite the elasticity of the concept. Instead, there was a growing emphasis towards cultural similarities that emphasised political values associated with liberty. Naturally there were frictions and, as Andrew Roberts notes, that despite Churchill’s belief in the fraternal union of the English-speaking peoples, the interests of the Empire came first.³³⁰ There was however, never any formal nor serious contemplation of plans for war by the UK, although Canada did create

³²⁵ The Hyde Park Memorandum, Sept 1944 (agreement between President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill on control and use of the atomic bomb). TNA CAB 126/183 File no 54

³²⁶ Margaret Gowing, "Britain and the Bomb: The Origin of Britain's Determination to Be a Nuclear Power," *Contemporary Record* 2, no. 2 (1988): 36-40.

³²⁷ Vincent C Jones, *Manhattan, the Army and the Atomic Bomb* (US Government Printing Office, 1985), 566.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ "Chadwick to Anderson," February 22, 1945, Sir R. Campbell and Mr Nevile Butler Papers, Private Collections: Ministers and Officials : TNA FO 800/524, cited in Paul, 108.

³³⁰ Roberts, *Churchill: Walking with Destiny*, 328.

‘Defence Scheme No. 1’ in 1921 but abandoned it by 1928. The US Red Plan was officially shelved in 1939.³³¹

Not to be lost in all of this was the continuance of the imperial security community, increasingly pluralistic and perhaps more effective because of it. The Dominions entered World War 2 of their own volition, but as it neared the end, with high expectations as to their role in a new world order thereafter.

The truth was the conditions for an Anglospheric security community combining US and Commonwealth elements existed predicated upon a commonality of values and outlooks. Greg Kennedy notes the historian’s focus is too often on World War 2 and its solidifying effect on US-Commonwealth relations. The alignment, Kennedy argues, occurred in the interwar period and

was a reality even before it was allowable to even admit such a relationship existed... [brought about] through understanding, networking, intellectual affinity, financial ties, family or blood relations, empathy and mutual fear of deception, but remained only a sentiment, not a formal or public expression of policy.³³²

³³¹ For the background of both plans (with official maps) see: Kevin Lippert, *War Plan Red: The United States' Secret Plan to Invade Canada and Canada's Secret Plan to Invade the United States* (Chronicle Books, 2015). & Steven T Ross, *American War Plans, 1919–1941, Vol. 3, Plans to Meet the Axis Threat, 1939–1940* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992).

³³² Greg Kennedy, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933–1939: Imperial Crossroads* (Routledge, 2013), 2.

Chapter 3 The Nascent Security Community

3.1 Security & Foreign Policy Outlooks

3.1.1 US Policy: competing viewpoints

The Truman administration approached the post-World War 2 period with an optimism imbued by a ‘Wilsonian-universalist’ faith in the promise of a rule-based institutionalism. The realist imperatives that required ‘alliances’ and ‘arrangements’ would be rendered unnecessary by the new UN framework for resolving differences.³³³ According to the new Secretary of State James Byrnes, difficulties with the Soviets could be overcome, albeit facilitated by a robust stand.³³⁴ Even after eight months of Soviet belligerence³³⁵ Byrnes was optimistic,³³⁶ maintaining, “satisfactory solutions can be found” through “patience and firmness.”³³⁷ This grouping’s outlook constituted what Daniel Yergin referred to as a Yalta Axiom, viewing the Soviets as potentially cooperative, despite their totalitarian nature.³³⁸

The Yalta Axiom included a group of ‘New Dealers’ who subscribed to a ‘put peace first’ approach, admiring the Soviet Union, and supporting the possibility of an ongoing fraternal partnership.³³⁹ To this group, any close security collaboration with Britain would be a mistake. The most prominent proponent was Henry Wallace, the former Vice President and, as of January 1946, the new Secretary of Commerce.³⁴⁰ In May 1943, Wallace had informed Churchill that the idea of a post-War US-British Empire security arrangement was offensive

³³³ Arthur M Schlesinger, *The Cycles of American History* (Boston: HMH, 1999), 169.

³³⁴ David Mayers, "Soviet War Aims and the Grand Alliance: George Kennan's Views, 1944-1946," *Journal of contemporary history* 21, no. 1 (1986): 72-73.

³³⁵ Eduard Mark, "The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences," *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 3 (1997): 388.

³³⁶ James Francis Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York: Harper, 1958), 350.

³³⁷ Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton University Press, 1985), 260.

³³⁸ See: Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 11-12.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Jerold A Rosen, "Henry A. Wallace and American Liberal Politics, 1945-1948," *The Annals of Iowa* 44, no. 6 (1978): 467.

and surely implied a belief in “a pure Anglo-Saxon race – Anglo-Saxondom über alles?”³⁴¹ Churchill reasserted the cultural context, stating that Anglo-saxonism “was not a race concept,” but “a concept of common ideals and common history” and “a common heritage worked out over the centuries in England.”³⁴² Wallace, unconvinced would later advise Truman that the UK’s ongoing intent “was to promote an unbreachable break between us and Russia.”³⁴³ Other Truman administration members shared this outlook, concentrated in the Treasury, Commerce and State Departments³⁴⁴ and in the person of Joseph Davies, the former US Ambassador to Moscow during the War and “the favourite villain” of the so-called Riga School.³⁴⁵

Yergin applied the label 'Riga Axiom' to describe a grouping of policy-makers who posited the Soviet Union’s foreign policy was predicated on its Marxist-Leninist ideology. As such they would exhibit an intractable hostility toward ‘bourgeois’ democracy and seek to expand its territory. The Riga Axiom favoured an assertive US internationalist post-war foreign policy reinforced by partners such as Britain.³⁴⁶ Fraser Harbutt suggests this grouping included individuals who “had a strong sense of affinity with, and inheritance from the British, with whom they desired some kind of practical political or military association.”³⁴⁷ It included the future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Dwight Eisenhower whose diary entry on May 26, 1946, records not only his acknowledgement of the Soviet threat but also his appreciation for the UK’s role in advancing shared values of freedom and democracy.

³⁴¹ See Henry Agard Wallace, *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946* (Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 208.

³⁴² See *ibid*. See also: Culver and Hyde, 301.

³⁴³ See: Wallace. Diary entry October 15, 1945

³⁴⁴ See: R Bruce Craig, *Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Spy Case* (University Press of Kansas, 2004), 202-03; Roger James Sandilands, *The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie: New Dealer, Presidential Adviser, and Development Economist* (Duke University Press, 1990), 121 & 34; Philip Arellis and Malcolm C Sawyer, *A Biographical Dictionary of Dissenting Economists* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), 386-87; Christina Shelton, *Alger Hiss: Why He Chose Treason* (Simon and Schuster, 2012), 120-22; James W Muller, *Churchill's "Iron Curtain" Speech Fifty Years Later* (University of Missouri Press, 1999), 62; Wilson D Miscamble, *From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 269.

³⁴⁵ Yergin. [Truman appointed Davies as an Ambassadorial Special Advisor on Soviet Relations and intermediary with the State Department.] See: David Mayers, *The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 160; Norman A Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, and Joseph M Siracusa, *America and the Cold War, 1941-1991: A Realist Interpretation* (ABC-CLIO, 2010), 32.

³⁴⁶ Yergin, 11-12.

³⁴⁷ Fraser J Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 1988), 155-56.

Although in this country we like to curse John Bull, yet Britain has done far more than we to support countries that want to remain free. Britain is crumbling (has been doing so ever since World War I), yet we gloat rather than get scared. The underlying important thing, therefore, is our national lack of understanding that we (our form of government) is under deadly, persistent and constant attack.³⁴⁸

Such sentiments reveal that although the perceived Soviet threat might have ‘triggered’ some members of US policy establishment to agitate for an alliance with the UK, other factors were at play. The World War 2 UK-US Washington based, ‘Combined Chiefs of Staff’ forum had not only institutionalised shared military and intelligence planning, but had created a network of enduring personal relationships. More to the point, Eisenhower’s comments reveal an acknowledgement of shared values. These factors highlight what Adler and Barnett term the “cultural, political, and ideological homogeneity” that facilitate a relationship beyond just a strategic alliance much like the one that existed between the US and Soviets during the War.³⁴⁹ These ‘Riga’ views predominated in the JCS, the Departments of War and Navy and within the State Department; realist dissenters to the State Department’s liberal internationalist line were to be found in its Moscow Embassy staff.

Less contentious than the idea of strong post-War security relations with the UK was the desirability of integral continental defence plans with Canada. This envisaged a greater integration of military arrangements than the existing provisions of the Canadian-US Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD).³⁵⁰

3.1.2 Canadian policy outlook

Close security relations between Canada and the US and the UK were a given, but only to a point. The post-Wold War 2 order promised a framework for peace and an opportunity for Canada to find its own place in the new global order. Whilst Canada had agreed measures with the US to facilitate continental defence, there was an unwillingness to further US defence entanglements. The Head of the Department of External Affairs (DEA), Norman

³⁴⁸ Dwight David Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries* (Easton Press, 1981), 136-37.

³⁴⁹ Adler and Barnett, 62, 62 & 51.

³⁵⁰ Stanley W. Dziuban, "Military Relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-45," in *US Army History of World War II* (Washington: Army Dept., 1959), 355.

Robertson advocated a Canadian role in cementing post-war relations with the Soviets and resisted US demands for cooperation “in defensive measures which the Russians would not consider friendly or neutral.”³⁵¹

To maintain good relations with the Soviets, the Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, Dana Wilgress argued for a degree of indifference to human rights violations and injustices.³⁵² This stance was at odds with the critical tone adopted by the US Ambassador Averill Harriman and his deputy, George Kennan³⁵³ in the US Moscow embassy. In a clash of Riga versus Yalta perspectives, Wilgress accused Kennan of having been “indoctrinated with anti-Soviet ideas as a result of pre-war German propaganda.”³⁵⁴ The Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King shared the Yalta outlook and was not convinced of the need for deeper post-War security arrangements with the US. King’s aversion to closer US security extended to imperial UK entanglement too.³⁵⁵ Although a Yalta mind-set predominated in Canada, there was a more ‘realist’ outlook represented too. The Canadian military, tended to favour closer relations with the US, albeit with the inclusion of the UK on matters of interoperability and research, but no longer subservient to the British.³⁵⁶

In September 1945, Canadian policy-makers attitude’s towards the Soviets underwent a rapid evaluation following the defection of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk operating from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. Gouzenko³⁵⁷ revealed an extensive Soviet spying network within Canada and plans to subvert the viability of western democracies.³⁵⁸ The defection was a seminal event, described as some commentators as the start of the Cold War, the end of

³⁵¹ Robertson to Wilgress, 5 August 1944. Library and Archives Canada (LAC hereafter), DEA Papers, RG25, Series A-3-b, vol 5710, File 7AB(s)

³⁵² See: John W Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957 (Volume 2)* (University of Toronto Press, 1982), 20-22.; Jamie Glazov, *Canadian Policy toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union*, vol. 4 (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2002), 9.

³⁵³ There was a significant Riga minority in the State Dept. See: Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (Routledge, 2017), 426 & 32.

³⁵⁴ Wilgress to Robertson, 14 November 1945. DEA. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (Penguin Books, 2012), 208.

³⁵⁵ Canada. Parliament. Statement by Mr Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada in the House of Commons, January 31 Ottawa 1944.

³⁵⁶ Donald James Goodspeed, *A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada* (E. Cloutier, Queen's printer, 1958), 22.

³⁵⁷ David Levy, *Stalin's Man in Canada: Fred Rose and Soviet Espionage* (Enigma Books, 2011), Chapter 6.

³⁵⁸ Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and David Stafford, *American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations, 1939-2000* (Routledge, 2014), 212-13.

Canadian innocence and axiomatic in creating conditions favouring the formation of Anglospheric tripartite military alliances.³⁵⁹

King grappled with how to deal with the Soviets, unwilling to jeopardise relations, but aghast at the implications for Canada and relations with the US.³⁶⁰ In a move that confirmed Canada's intimate trust in the UK, King confided in UK Foreign Minister Bevin that he now worried that the Soviets were capable of a surprise attack on British Columbia. King determined the Gouzenko Affair must be kept secret from the public and his own cabinet.³⁶¹ If the news got out, the threat of an attack might cause disquiet in Western Canada through which, King speculated, a Soviet invasion of the US would take place. This fear could precipitate a break-up of federal Canada as,

our own people in B.C. and on the prairies would all become very strong for looking to the U.S. for protection that we needed. I said that this would inevitably lead to an annexation movement which might be hard to control.³⁶²

Although this might now appear a far-fetched notion, public sentiment in British North America was more fluid with agitation in the, then separate, Newfoundland Dominion electorate considering union with the US rather than Canada.³⁶³ This echoed King's earlier fears of US pressure for either territory or 'political union.'³⁶⁴ In other words, King feared Canadian absorption into de facto amalgamated security community. For King, the solution was to balance a potentially over-weaning US with the UK but without wider imperial

³⁵⁹ See: Amy W Knight, *How the Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2005).; Robert Bothwell, Ian M Drummond, and John English, *Canada since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism* (University of Toronto Press, 1989), 42; Bruce Craig, "A Matter of Espionage: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and Igor Gouzenko the Canadian Connection Reassessed," *Intelligence and National Security* 15, no. 2 (2000): 212..

³⁶⁰ William Lyon MacKenzie King, *Secret & Confidential Diary Relating to Russian Espionage Activities*, vol. Item 29055, Entries: September 6 to October 31 1945 (Ottawa1945).

³⁶¹ See: Wesley K Wark, "The Evolution of Military Intelligence in Canada," *Armed Forces & Society* 16, no. 1 (1989).

³⁶² Robert Trumbull, "Canadian Diaries Recall Spy Case.," *NY Times*, January 8 1976.

³⁶³ Peter Neary, *Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 1929-1949* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1988), 316.

³⁶⁴ See: Douglas Frederick Forster and John Whitney Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 2 (University of Toronto Press, 1968), 205. Also: James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada Volume Iii: Peacemaking and Deterrence* (University of Toronto Press, 1972).

commitments.³⁶⁵ This was a reinterpretation of a Churchillian theme that saw Canada operating as a ‘golden hinge’ between the US and the UK.³⁶⁶ It became a recurrent theme in the following years with Canada positioning itself as the vital link in a tripartite Anglospheric security community.³⁶⁷ In October 1945, King informed the UK, that the emergent Soviet threat “could not be met by Britain and the Dominions. It could only be met by closer relations and understanding of the US and the British Commonwealth.”³⁶⁸

3.1.3 UK policy outlook

In Britain there was a greater consensus among the policy-making groupings in their assessment of a Soviet threat. The election of a Labour Government in place of the Conservative dominated National wartime coalition did little to change foreign policy outlook.³⁶⁹ The UK’s Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin anticipated the Soviets would become “aggressive and uncooperative” and they therefore committed to foreign policy continuity.³⁷⁰ Their outlook extended to the civil service who agreed with the need to coordinate security with the Commonwealth Dominions and extend this to the US.³⁷¹ A seminal Foreign Office paper by Sir Orme Sargent in 1945 argued the UK was too weak to confront the Soviets alone and needed the United States with

³⁶⁵ Charles F Doran, *Forgotten Partnership: US-Canada Relations Today* (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1984), 33; John W Holmes, *Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship* (University of Toronto Press, 2016), 23.

³⁶⁶ See: John Holland Rose, *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, vol. 2 (CUP Archive, 1929), 399; Clyde Sanger, *Malcolm Macdonald: Bringing an End to Empire* (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1995), 231; Geoffrey J Matthews, *Historical Atlas of Canada: Addressing the Twentieth Century, 1891-1961*, vol. 3 (University of Toronto Press, 1987), 142.

³⁶⁷ See: Wallace Goforth, “Canada: The Strategic ‘Golden Hinge’,” *Public Affairs: A Maritime Quarterly for Discussion of Public Affairs* (1951); Hector Mackenzie, “Delineating the North Atlantic Triangle: The Second World War and Its Aftermath,” *The Round Table* 95, no. 383 (2006).

³⁶⁸ JW Pickersgill and DF Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record, 1945-1946, Vol. 3* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 56; John Herd Thompson and Stephen J Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (University of Georgia Press, 2008), 180-83.

³⁶⁹ Ritchie Ovendale, *The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945-1951* (Routledge, 1985), 16-17; John Bew, *Clement Attlee: The Man Who Made Modern Britain* (Oxford University Press, 2017), 418.

³⁷⁰ Andrew Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53: The Information Research Department* (Routledge, 2004), 34; Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951*, vol. 3 (WW Norton, 1983). Peter Weiler, “British Labour and the Cold War: The Foreign Policy of the Labour Governments, 1945-1951,” *Journal of British Studies* 26, no. 1 (1987): 64.

³⁷¹ Kenneth O Morgan, *Labour in Power 1945-1951* (Oxford, 1984), 86-87.

its “material strength.”³⁷² Support for this view extended to Churchill as leader of the Opposition with whom the Labour Government shared classified information and sought his advice on foreign policy.³⁷³ Thus, prevailing view was the Soviets, still legally wartime allies, represented “the central threat” in the new post-War order.³⁷⁴

Of all the five states that were to form the Anglosphere security community, it was the UK that envisaged what E.H. Carr had sought to dismiss, namely the pursuit of an Anglo-American global security community that would combine the US with the Commonwealth security community.³⁷⁵ However, the UK recognised that in the post-WW2 environment this imperial construct faced the prospect of Dominion decoupling and possible disintegration as former colonies achieved independence. Attlee’s inclinations were to resist the centrifugal forces and push for a ‘Commonwealth Defence Policy’ uniting the UK and the Dominions in a common endeavour.³⁷⁶

The UK’s desire for a US alliance faced obstacles given there was no US consensus on the need to remain in close alignment with the UK. With a Yalta axiom dominating the Truman Administration, there was a danger the US might regard an alignment with the UK as an impediment to better US-Soviet relations. The UK feared Truman’s foreign policy outlook was naïve and ill-informed with his telegrams to them probably drafted by others.³⁷⁷ Even worse, the President appeared to regard himself as a ‘middle-man’ informing the British at Potsdam, he did not want to ‘gang up’ against Stalin. The UK Foreign Office became alarmed at “the Americans’ readiness to do business with Russia rather than with us” and causing a “very serious strain” in UK-US diplomatic relationships.³⁷⁸ The US Secretary of State Brynes

³⁷² "Stocktaking after VE-Day." Memorandum by Sir Orme Sargent. July 11, 1945, TNA, FO 371/50912/5471 John Saville, *The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government, 1945-46* (Verso, 1993), 31-32.

³⁷³ "Churchill to Attlee." May 31, 1945. Churchill Archives Centre (hereafter CAC), CHAR 20/194 a/67-69 David K Fieldhouse, "The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1945-51," *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments* 51 (1945): 89. An example was Attlee’s request for advice on the Atomic issue. See: Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Never Despair, 1945-1965*, vol. 8 (Rosetta Books, 2015), Chapter 8.

³⁷⁴ Saville, 10-80.

³⁷⁵ Carr, 232.

³⁷⁶ Eayrs, 203-28.

³⁷⁷ Baylis, Chap 2, Note19.

³⁷⁸ Gillian Staerck and Michael D Kandiah, *The Role of HM Embassy in Washington*, Icbh Witness Seminar Programme (Centre for Contemporary British History, University of London, 2004), 24.

was labelled “slippery” and an appeaser in the mode of Neville Chamberlain, too willing to accommodate Soviet demands.³⁷⁹ By November 1945, Lord Halifax, the UK Ambassador to Washington warned,

...there exists a stubborn [US] determination to rationalise Soviet actions wherever possible and thereby to reduce the prevailing fear of the Russians in the hope of realising the American dream of one world.³⁸⁰

3.1.4 Australian policy outlook

The Chifley Labor government saw Australia’s security as predicated on three pillars: the British Commonwealth, the latter’s cooperation with the US, and active participation in the UN. In September 1946, Chifley suggested something akin to a post-imperial pluralistic security community had evolved. Chifley asserted

a new conception of the British Commonwealth has emerged: no longer are the Dominions active only in war. Collaboration within the British Commonwealth extends to peace as well as war... with a fuller recognition by the Dominions of their responsibilities, [and] the assignment to Australian machinery of the function of... regional security in the Pacific.³⁸¹

To this end, Australia would maintain security assets “related to measures for cooperation in Empire defence.”³⁸² The strong cultural association Australia felt with the UK meant it saw itself as part of a revamped Commonwealth security community, albeit with Australian regional leadership. Australia had only participated in the occupation forces deployed in Japan on the basis they had command and executive control of the Combined Commonwealth forces.³⁸³ Australia envisaged the UN heralding a new liberal international order providing

³⁷⁹ Alexander Cadogan, *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, Om, 1938-1945* (Putnam, 1972), entry November 25 1945.

³⁸⁰ Schlesinger, 213.

³⁸¹ Chifley Speech (Radio Broadcast) September 2, 1946 Australian Election.

³⁸² Ibid. Chifley Speech (Radio Broadcast)

³⁸³ James Wood, "The Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952," *Australian War Memorial* (1998): 7.

opportunities for it to fulfil its role as an emergent “Middle Power.”³⁸⁴ Australia’s abrasive Herbert Evatt, Minister for the Department of External Affairs (DEA) was keen to develop an assertive regional role via the UN and in an expanded Commonwealth.³⁸⁵

For Australia, the continuation of a post-War Commonwealth security community was predicated on common heritage and values and did not require ‘a trigger.’ There was however, a divergence as to where any threat might come. For Chifley and Evatt, the threat was a resurgent Japan, for Attlee and Bevin it was the containment of Soviet communism. Thus, Chifley and Evatt refused to countenance using Australian troops in the Middle East in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union.³⁸⁶ Attempting to explain his stance Bevin said, “I feel the same way about Russia as you feel about Japan” to which Evatt replied, “Japan is an enemy who tried to destroy us: Russia is our ally, and you have a treaty with her.”³⁸⁷

Evatt’s regional aspirations had caused deep resentment with the Roosevelt administration. The creation of the 1944 ANZAC [Canberra] Pact³⁸⁸ was seen by the US as an attempt to claim Australian primacy for the South West Pacific, a region in which the US had their own interests.³⁸⁹ US Secretary of State Cordell Hull ridiculed the announcement as an attempted “Monroe Doctrine for the South Pacific.”³⁹⁰ Australia’s action revealed “ingratitude to the United States, and arrogant, if not ridiculous self-assertion...”³⁹¹ Disagreements carried over when the Truman Administration repeatedly clashed with Australia over the structure of the new UN.³⁹² In short, the relationship between Australia and

³⁸⁴ See: Dan Halvorson, *Commonwealth Responsibility and Cold War Solidarity* (ANU Press, 2019); Jeffrey Robertson, “Middle-Power Definitions: Confusion Reigns Supreme,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71, no. 4 (2017): 357-58.

³⁸⁵ Herbert Vere Evatt, *The Task of Nations* (Greenwood Press, 1949), 209, 35.

³⁸⁶ Thomas K Robb and David James Gill, *Divided Allies: Strategic Cooperation against the Communist Threat in the Asia-Pacific During the Early Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 2019), 31.

³⁸⁷ Robert O’Shea, “Not Foreign to Each Other: Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conferences 1944-1969” (University of Oxford, 2016), 71.

³⁸⁸ EA Olssen, “The Australia-New Zealand Agreement,” *The Australian Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (1944): 10-22.

³⁸⁹ Carl Bridge, “Allies of a Kind: Three Wartime Australian Ministers to the United States, 1940-46,” in *Australia Goes to Washington*, ed. David Lowe (ANU Press, 2016), 32.

³⁹⁰ Joseph M Siracusa, “The ANZUS Treaty Revisited,” *Security Challenges* 1, no. 1 (2005): 90.

³⁹¹ HA Wolfsohn, “Australian Foreign Policy,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 5, no. 2 (1951): 67.

³⁹² Especially Evatt’s opposition to the proposed Security Council veto and his support for the extension of the General Assembly’s powers. See: Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal, “End of an Era? Anti-Americanism in the Australian Labor Party,” *Australian Journal of Politics & History*

the US became antagonistic with public policy differences and fractious personal relationships.³⁹³

3.1.5 NZ policy outlook

The NZ policy-makers shared Australia's concerns about the threat of a resurgent Japan but took a pessimistic view of the likely success of the UN as a framework for ensuring world peace. Carl Berendsen, NZ Ambassador to Washington confided in the NZ Minister for External Affairs that it "whether we like it or not, it's going to be a 'Great Power' world, in which the Great Powers will not agree."³⁹⁴ They hoped that cooperation with the Soviets might be possible through the UN. However, within months of the UN's establishment, NZ's Prime Minister had become alarmed by the Soviet's use of the veto to neuter the UN's role. Of the three dominions, NZ was the most open to UK guidance in security and defence matters whilst maintaining close relations with Australia.³⁹⁵

3.2 Atomic Reversal

3.2.1 Introduction

The last chapter described the secret 1944 Hyde Park Memorandum between Churchill and Roosevelt that contained an outline commitment to post-war atomic collaboration as well as agreement on consultations over the use of atomic weapons. However, after Roosevelt's death in April 1945, the existence of the agreement was disputed by the US. In these circumstances, high-ranking US officials who did not favour UK-US collaboration used the

56, no. 4 (2010); Peter G Edwards, "Evatt and the Americans," *Australian Historical Studies* 18, no. 73 (1979).

³⁹³ CWP Waters, "Anglo-Australian Conflict over the Cold War: Hv Evatt as President of the UN General Assembly, 1948–49," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22, no. 2 (1994); David Lee, *The Curtin and Chifley Governments, Liberal Internationalism and World Organisation* (Allen & Unwin, 1997), 48–61; Joseph M Siracusa and Glen St John Barclay, "Australia, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945–51: From VJ Day to ANZUS," *Diplomatic History* 5, no. 1 (1981): 39–52.

³⁹⁴ Carl Berendsen, Alister McIntosh, and Ian C McGibbon, *Undiplomatic Dialogue: Letters between Carl Berendsen and Alister McIntosh, 1943–52* (Oxford University Press, USA, 1993), 100.

³⁹⁵ Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935* (Auckland University Press, 2013), 57–60.

situation to delay its realisation.³⁹⁶ Thereafter, the passing of the McMahon Bill effectively ended any hopes the British entertained and atomic collaboration became “the one main exception to the special relationship” which was being established.³⁹⁷ As a consequence the UK was obliged to develop its own atomic capability with the assistance of its Commonwealth partners.

3.2.2 British Commonwealth concerns

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Groves had surreptitiously hampered work with the British Commonwealth team. By September 1945, and with the War officially over, the Commonwealth scientists began to doubt Groves’ assurances that collaboration would continue.³⁹⁸ A meeting had been scheduled for mid-November 1945, between Truman, Attlee, and MacKenzie King. Truman, pressed by Attlee, agreed to UK-US collaboration. Bush, who had prepared the US discussion paper was the only other American present and did not agree with Truman’s concession.³⁹⁹ Bush attempted to stymy progress by gaining Byrnes’ consent to involve Secretary of War Patterson on the grounds this new agreement related to military controlled atomic research rather than the diplomatic approach to the Soviets.⁴⁰⁰ A British and Canadian delegation headed by Sir John Anderson duly met in Patterson’s office. Bush was to be disappointed. With Groves in attendance, the Anglophilic Patterson affirmed there should be a collaborative arrangement, “that would not put the United Kingdom at a disadvantage.”⁴⁰¹ Patterson instructed Groves to draft a final agreement and agree the finer details with the British to replace the Quebec Agreement.

A US team of Joseph Volpe and Gordon Arneson, headed by Groves, met with a British embassy team headed by Anderson.⁴⁰² After long negotiations stretching into the night, the two teams agreed on most aspects except the key issue of information exchange. Groves

³⁹⁶ See: Septimus H Paul, *Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941-1952* (Ohio State University Press, 2000), 670-71.

³⁹⁷ For fuller details see: Wayne Reynolds, “Rethinking the Joint Project: Australia’s Bid for Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1960,” *Historical Journal* (1998).

³⁹⁸ Chadwick to Moon, September 10, 1945, TNA PRO, AB1/485 [Philip Burton Moon was the head of one of the British joint groups at the Manhattan Project.]

³⁹⁹ Johnny Miri, “The Fall of Vannevar Bush: The Forgotten War for Control of Science Policy in Postwar America,” *Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences* 51, no. 4 (2021): 519.

⁴⁰⁰ Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 466.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid., 467-68.

would not agree the wording “full and effective” cooperation. The two teams agreed each should present separate drafts to Secretary of War Patterson the next morning.⁴⁰³ At that meeting, Patterson over-ruled Groves and agreed to the inclusion of “full and effective” in the final document.⁴⁰⁴ Despite the offer of a treaty status that the Groves’ team would draw up, Anderson and the UK Embassy team decided the tripartite CPC could oversee collaboration and have the flexibility to make ad hoc arrangements when necessary.⁴⁰⁵ It is almost certain that Groves’ suggestion for Treaty status was for ulterior motives that would become apparent as considered later.

In his analysis of the collapse on UK-US atomic collaboration, Richard Wevill scrutinises the UK embassy’s role and concludes it is important not “to lose sight of the fact that it failed to identify the biggest single threat to continued collaboration, i.e. General Groves.”⁴⁰⁶ As it was Groves, was able to exploit the passage of the McMahon Bill to frustrate both those of who favoured collaboration with the British and Canadians and those who favoured an approach to information sharing with the Soviet Union. Grove’s nationalist Anglophobia aligned with Wallace’s Anglophobic pro-Soviet fraternalism to produce an unwelcome outcome for the British.

3.2.3 The Wallace Plan

McGeorge Bundy refers to “the Wallace Plan” to describe the position advocated by Wallace at the cabinet meeting called by Truman for the September 21 1945, to discuss US post-War atomic policy.⁴⁰⁷ The outline of Wallace’s plan had been formed within days of Roosevelt’s death. As the former head of the atomic Top Policy Group before the military takeover, Wallace had access to a network of relevant contacts. In April 1945, Wallace secretly met Manhattan Project scientist Dr James Franck and Dr James Compton⁴⁰⁸ to discuss the views of atomic scientists favouring civilian control, international regulation and

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 467. Also see: *FRUS 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters Volume II* “Negotiations with the British and Canadians, November 1–November 16, 1945.” 17 April, 1946.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 467-68.

⁴⁰⁶ Richard Wevill, *Britain and America after World War II* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 133.

⁴⁰⁷ McGeorge Bundy and Lewis Gould, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (India: Random House, 1988), 139 & 41.

⁴⁰⁸ Brian L Villa, “A Confusion of Signals: James Franck, the Chicago Scientisa & Early Efforts to Stop the Bomb,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* XXXI, no. 10 (1975): 38.

research exchange with the Soviet Union.⁴⁰⁹ Wallace encouraged Franck to organise what would become the Atomic Scientists of Chicago and write up a report for Stimson Secretary of War.⁴¹⁰

Wallace was in an authoritative position to advance both the possible civilian applications of atomic research and share research with the Soviet Union. As Secretary of Commerce, he oversaw the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) that historically had included atomic research. Using his network of contacts from his former chairmanship of the TPG, Wallace saw an opportunity to outflank the War Department's attempts to draft post-war legislation. War Secretary Stimson had established the so-called Interim Committee in May 1945, that included a remit for General Royall to draft legislation on post-War atomic regulation with the assistance of attorney William Marbury. The Royall-Marbury draft included input from Groves and would be introduced into congress as the May-Johnson Bill.⁴¹¹ The proposed Bill featured almost the precise opposite of what Wallace believed, with the War Department given carte blanche to direct atomic research and then allow UK collaboration. Wallace decided he would deploy key individuals to assist in congressional opposition to the May-Johnson Bill and take direct steps to facilitate exchanges of scientific research with the Soviet Union via the NBS.

Wallace had identified the atomic scientist Edward U. Condon as an ideal accomplice for his plan. Condon had clashed with Groves whilst engaged at the Manhattan Project and left to head Westinghouse corporation's atomic R&D.⁴¹² Like Wallace, Condon believed in strong fraternal relations with the Soviets and, as a member of the US-Soviet Friendship Society, had already organised exchanges of scientific papers with Soviet scientists.⁴¹³ In June 1945, Condon accepted Stalin's open invitation for US scientists to attend the 220th Anniversary of

⁴⁰⁹ Alice Kimball Smith, "Behind the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* XIV, no. 8 (1958): 294.

⁴¹⁰ Byron S Miller, "Law Is Passed--the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, A," *U. Chi. L. Rev.* 15 (1947): 802.

⁴¹¹ *Defense's Nuclear Agency, 1947-1997*, (Washington DC: US Dept. Defense, 2002), 38; *ibid.*, 802.

⁴¹² Jessica Wang, "Science, Security, and the Cold War: The Case of EU Condon," *Isis* 83, no. 2 (1992): 243.

⁴¹³ Thomas C Lassman, "Government Science in Postwar America: Henry A. Wallace, Edward U. Condon, and the Transformation of the National Bureau of Standards, 1945–1951," *ibid.* 96, no. 1 (2005): 35.

the Soviet Academy of Science in Moscow.⁴¹⁴ On discovering this, Groves had arranged for Condon's passport to be revoked and Condon had only just managed to retain his position at Westinghouse.⁴¹⁵ Condon remained active as an organiser of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago conference scheduled for September 19, 1945, to discuss opposition to the May-Johnson Bill. Attempts by the War Department to cancel it were not successful and Wallace attended in an unofficial capacity with members of his staff to the fury of Generals Royall and Groves.⁴¹⁶ There Wallace met up with Condon, gained Condon's enthusiastic buy-in for his ideas and duly appointed him as provisional Director of the NBS.⁴¹⁷

Leaving the conference, Wallace attended the Cabinet on September 21, where the matter of future US policy on atomic matters was fiercely debated at length. Details of the argument were leaked to the press about Stimson's proposal about an approach to the Soviets to involve them in international regulation. Wallace, however, went beyond the Stimson's proposed tripartite approach and advocated a direct exchange of information with the Soviets.⁴¹⁸ One leak revealed Wallace had spoken of the need for the US to disassociate itself from Britain and by making such a gesture to the Soviets would "end the suspicions with which the Russians are known to regard the intentions of Britain, if not the United States."⁴¹⁹ The article outlined the cabinet divisions,

Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal and Secretary of War Patterson, backed by the full line of generals and admirals opposed the proposal and made their position clear

⁴¹⁴ Nikolai Krementsov, "In the Shadow of the Bomb: US-Soviet Biomedical Relations in the Early Cold War, 1944–1948," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 4 (2007): 46.

⁴¹⁵ Lassman, 35; *Edward Condon's Cooperative Vision: Science, Industry, and Innovation in Modern America* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018), 179. For work with US Navy see: C Cochrane Rexmond, "Measures for Progress: A History of the National Bureau of Standards," *National Bureau of Standards, GPO* (1966): 437; William Lanouette, *Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, the Man Behind the Bomb* (Skyhorse, 2013), 283; Michael A Day, "EU Condon: Science, Religion, and the Politics of World Peace," *Physics in Perspective* 10, no. 1 (2008): 24.

⁴¹⁶ Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6; Jones, 576.

⁴¹⁷ Lassman, "Government Science in Postwar America: Henry A. Wallace, Edward U. Condon, and the Transformation of the National Bureau of Standards, 1945–1951," 35; Day, 25; Cochrane Rexmond, 435; Edward Condon, interview by Charles Weiner, April 27, 1968. Also: See Wallace entry for 26 October 1945

⁴¹⁸ Bundy and Gould, 139.

⁴¹⁹ Felix Belair Jnr, "Plea to Give Soviet Atom Secret, Stirs Debate in Cabinet: No Decision Made on Wallace Plan to Share Bomb Data as Peace Insurance. Armed Forces Opposed" *NY Times*, September 22 1945.

[arguing] it was Russia that needed to make a gesture of good faith [and until then] the USA, Britain and Canada should retain the atomic secret.⁴²⁰

At Wallace's request Condon (not yet confirmed by Congress as NBS Director) drafted an atomic policy memorandum to be presented to Truman on October 15.⁴²¹ The memorandum re-stressed the need for the US to detach itself from Britain and Canada and to create an international organisation to regulate atomic research. When presenting it to Truman, Wallace verbalised the tropes associated with the perfidious Albion meme-complex that Roerich had nurtured about the 'Great Game' and that the British objective,

was to promote an unbreachable break between us and Russia. The President said he agreed. I said Britain's game in international affairs has always been intrigue. The President said he agreed. I said Britain may have plenty of excuse for playing the game the way she does; it may fit into her geographical position, but we must not play her game. The President said he agreed.⁴²²

Thus, encouraged, Wallace continued planning to thwart the War Department's May-Johnson with an alternative bill and began liaising with freshman Senator Brien McMahon.⁴²³ Wallace ally, Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas was lined up to sponsor a new bill in the House.⁴²⁴ Douglas shared Wallace's stance on the need to break the relationship with the British.⁴²⁵ How, she asked in a speech, could the US afford to split the atom but not afford to split itself from the UK and Canada?⁴²⁶

Wallace was keen McMahon assemble a team capable of drafting an alternative bill that would establish civilian control and ensure the military could not block scientific exchanges with the Soviets. He recommended to McMahon that he utilise James R. Newman, the Head

⁴²⁰ Thomas Reynolds, F, "Cabinet Reported Split on Atom Bomb Control: One Faction Wants United Nations to Share Its Secret," *PM*, September 26 1945.

⁴²¹ See: Wallace. Footnote to Diary entry October 15, 1945.

⁴²² See: *ibid.* Diary entry October 15, 1945

⁴²³ "McMahon to Wallace," in *Telephone Logs* (Dept Commerce, 1945).

⁴²⁴ For Wallace support see: John Nichols, *The Fight for the Soul of the Democratic Party: The Enduring Legacy of Henry Wallace's Anti-Fascist, Anti-Racist Politics* (Verso Books, 2020), 92&120.

⁴²⁵ Colleen M O'Connor, "Imagine the Unimaginable: Helen Gahagan Douglas, Women, and the Bomb," *Southern California Quarterly* 67, no. 1 (1985): 45-46; Nichols, 142.

⁴²⁶ "Minutes of Independent Citizens' Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions," in *Conference on Atomic Energy* (The Town House [Hotel], 1600 Wilshire Boulevard, Hollywood 1945). Also: O'Connor, 40.

of the Science Division in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR)⁴²⁷. Newman was the official liaison point between the OWMR and Wallace's Department, with direct access to Truman.⁴²⁸ Wallace had already used Newman to brief Truman against the May-Johnson Bill.⁴²⁹ Newman was duly appointed by McMahon, who in turn made Condon the official scientific advisor to the McMahon's committee, establishing Wallace's two placements as the nucleus of the small team drafting a new Bill.⁴³⁰ To assist in McMahon's media communications, Wallace provided the services of his speechwriter.⁴³¹

Wallace's concerns about the general modus operandi of the British prompted him to take a more direct action to secure fraternal relations with the Soviets. A discrete conversation with Robert Oppenheimer, (the Manhattan Project Director), led Wallace to believe there were rumours Roosevelt had planned to allow sharing of atomic information to the Soviets but had been thwarted by the British.⁴³² Wallace was now even more convinced that

British policy clearly is to provoke the maximum distrust between the United States and Russia and thus prepare the groundwork for World War III...⁴³³

Wallace decided to take action to forestall this British plot and arranged a meeting with the Soviet Embassy through Edwin S. Smith director of the US-Soviet Friendship Society.⁴³⁴ On October 24, Wallace met with Anatoly Gorsky, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, and the station chief of the NKGB (the foreign intelligence branch of the NKVD).⁴³⁵ Gorsky's

⁴²⁷ "Wallace to Mcmahon," in *Telephone Logs* (Dept of Commerce, 1945). For OWMR see: Herman Miles Somers, *Presidential Agency: Owmr, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion*, vol. 21 (Harvard University Press, 1950).

⁴²⁸ United States. National Archives, Records Service, and H.L. Calkin, *Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion* (National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1951), 26.

⁴²⁹ Nelson W Polsby, *Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation* (Yale University Press, 1985), 27; Nathan S Atkinson, "Public Exclusions: Garrison State Rhetoric and the Domestic Control of Atomic Energy, 1945–46," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 20, no. 1 (2017): 14.

⁴³⁰ Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 441; Condon; Wang, 244. Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 489.

⁴³¹ John Simpson, "Some Personal Notes," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 37, no. 1 (1981): 29.

⁴³² Wallace. Diary entry October 19, 1945

⁴³³ Ibid. Diary entry October 19 1945

⁴³⁴ Due to worries about his loyalties, Roosevelt had refused to reappoint Smith to his government role as a commissioner for the US National Labor Relations Board. See:Harvey Klehr et al., "The Secret World of American Communism," *Labour*, no. 39 (1997): 99.

⁴³⁵ Allen Weinstein, Alexander Vassiliev, and Bill Wallace, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—the Stalin Era* (Random House New York, 1999), 284. Gorsky operated under the alias of Gromov. See: Kathryn S Olmsted, *Red Spy Queen: A Biography of Elizabeth Bentley* (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2002), 73.

superior in the Lubyanka was Commissar Vsevolod Merkulov, a member of what Robert Conquest called the ‘Beria gang’ of Georgians⁴³⁶ and coordinating Soviet attempts to gain information on the Manhattan Project.⁴³⁷

Wallace’s message relayed to Gorsky for Stalin was a simple one — there were two groups in the US Government; one led by him, that believed “the well-being... of all mankind depends on good relations between” the US and the Soviet Union.⁴³⁸ Opposing this was a group committed to “the idea of a dominating Anglo-saxon bloc consisting mainly of the US and England.” Wallace explained that the President “...too easily falls under the influence of people around him.” And the two groups were “fighting for Truman’s soul (his literal expression).”⁴³⁹ Wallace advised the Anglo-saxon group was stronger and said the Soviets “could help [his] smaller group considerably, and we don’t doubt... your willingness to do this.”⁴⁴⁰ Wallace wanted Gorsky to inquire whether Moscow would welcome an official US invitation for Soviet scientists to visit and review atomic research.⁴⁴¹

On receipt of Gorsky’s report, Merkulov forwarded it to Foreign Minister Molotov, who immediately returned it with the scrawled message, “Comrade Merkulov! It must be sent to Comrade Stalin!”⁴⁴² However, the Soviet’s ability to exploit Wallace’s initiative was almost immediately curtailed by the unravelling of their US spying operations.⁴⁴³

In the meantime, Wallace proceeded with his plan to break the US from the UK and reorientate it with the Soviets. He spoke to Truman privately after the Cabinet meeting on October 26, 1945, and reiterated again “the dangers of the US playing a one-sided game on

⁴³⁶ Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment*, 432; Donald Rayfield, *Stalin and His Hangmen: An Authoritative Portrait of a Tyrant and Those Who Served Him* (Penguin UK, 2005).

⁴³⁷ Jerrold L Schecter and Leona Schecter, *Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History* (Potomac Books, Inc., 2002), 315-17; Michael D Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 10.

⁴³⁸ Gorsky to Merkulov. NKGB cable October 27, 1945 quoted in Weinstein, Vassiliev, and Wallace, 284-85. (The first page of Gorsky’s cable to Moscow is reproduced See Henry Wallace meets the station chief. Between pages 196-197)

⁴³⁹ Gorsky to Merkulov. NKGB cable October 27, 1945 quoted in *ibid*. The use of brackets are the NKVD’s.

⁴⁴⁰ Gorsky to Merkulov. NKGB cable October 27, 1945 Ronald Radosh, “When the Left Longed for Russian Political Interference,” *Daily Beast* (2017), <https://www.thedailybeast.com/when-the-left-longed-for-russian-political-interference>.

⁴⁴¹ Weinstein, Vassiliev, and Wallace, 284-85.

⁴⁴² Molotov to Merkulov. undated October 1945 quoted in *ibid*., 284.

⁴⁴³ In addition, the Gouzenko defection in Canada during September 1945 had been a worrying development.

the side of the British.”⁴⁴⁴ Wallace sought Presidential approval for bringing some fifty Soviet scientists to the US. Truman thought this a “perfectly splendid idea.”⁴⁴⁵

Wallace did not regard the ‘Washington Declaration,’ a tripartite Canada-UK-US attempt to engage with the Soviets on regulation as an obstacle to his plan.⁴⁴⁶ There was some liberal dissent that the Washington Declaration was an ‘Anglo-saxon’ initiative rather than a sole US initiative, but it appeared to affirm Soviet inclusion via the UN.⁴⁴⁷ Besides, Newman and Condon were making progress with the drafting of an alternative to the May-Johnson Bill.⁴⁴⁸ Condon’s briefing of Senators was winning them round to the desirability of a new Bill to create a civilian Atomic commission with the military (and Groves) removed.⁴⁴⁹ Civilian control offered the possibility of a positive atomic partnership with the Soviet Union. Of course, Wallace was unaware of the secret UK-US arrangement Truman had authorised. On the latter point, he need not have worried, Groves had the matter in hand.

3.2.4 The British Frustrated

The British were satisfied with both the public tripartite position and the secret Groves-Anderson agreement on collaboration signed-off by Truman.⁴⁵⁰ Groves did not approve, his ideal outcome would be circumstances in which the military retained control, rejected approaches to the Soviets but was also forced to forgo collaboration with the UK and Canada. Groves hoped the McMahon Bill could be so amended to deliver those objectives. Until those circumstances could be created, Groves played for time with the British.

Delaying final collaboration arrangements did not represent a problem for Groves. He had replaced Harvey Bundy as the secretary to the CPC and headed the US team on the CPC sub-committee finalising the finer points of the agreement.⁴⁵¹ Joseph Volpe, a lawyer on Groves’ staff and party to drafting the original Groves-Anderson memorandum, articulated the US

⁴⁴⁴ Wallace.diary entry 26 October 1945

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.diary entry 26 October 1945

⁴⁴⁶ Baylis, 46-48.

⁴⁴⁷ Andrew Brown, "The Neutron and the Bomb: A Biography of Sir James Chadwick," (1997).

⁴⁴⁸ James L Gormly, "The Washington Declaration and the “Poor Relation”: Anglo-American Atomic Diplomacy, 1945–46," *Diplomatic History* 8, no. 2 (1984): 136; Wallace, Nov 16 1945.

⁴⁴⁹ Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 448-50.

⁴⁵⁰ Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952*, vol. 1 (Springer, 1974), 774-77 & 85-86.

⁴⁵¹ Jones, 572; Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 478.

teams sense of unease and dishonour in following Groves' go-slow instruction. A sense of deceit pervaded their mood according to Volpe,

And I must say that it was not just a frustrating experience. At times it was almost humiliating. Humiliating in the sense that... at the highest levels of our government, namely the President of the United States and the Prime Minister, agreement had been reached that we would cooperate. And that at our level, we were forced to drag our feet on the subject. And in a sense really play games to mark time in which to avoid an agreement. And I must say I... at times I felt very uncomfortable in meetings with the British.⁴⁵²

Gordon Arneson, a member of the US team was also uncomfortable with the deceit. He recalled Groves

was very much opposed to give them [the British] any help after the war, particularly on the nuclear power side. I remember sitting in meetings with the British on his instructions to sit tight, don't give an inch. And we didn't give an inch.⁴⁵³

After nearly three months wrangling, CPC sub-committee finally agreed a UK-US Memorandum of Agreement to be put to the February 1946 meeting of the CPC, chaired by Byrnes. Groves now sought to turn the State Department against UK collaboration by representing the agreed draft Memorandum as a threat to US efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to join in an international regulatory system. Although the UK had declined the offer of treaty status, Groves' needed to have raise legal doubts about the possible treaty status of the Memorandum before it was signed. Groves secured a damning legal opinion. He wrote to Byrnes two days before the CPC meeting with the news he had just received legal advice that the secret UK-US Memorandum, "could well be considered as tantamount to a military alliance."⁴⁵⁴ Groves suggested such an arrangement would surely need to be registered under new UN Treaty registration rules and thus once exposed would undermine Soviet trust in US intentions and damage the State Department's efforts to secure a regulatory deal with them.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵² Joseph Jnr Volpe, March 3, 1986, interview 1.

⁴⁵³ Gordon Arneson, March, 2ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Groves quoted in: J.E. Helmreich, *Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943-1954* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 111. Also see: Richard Gott, "The Evolution of the Independent British Deterrent," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 39, no. 2 (1963): 241; Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 478.

⁴⁵⁵ Helmreich, 111.

In discussing the terms of the Memorandum the UK had confided in Groves that it wished to proceed with the construction of an atomic pile in the UK. Groves now approached Eisenhower, Chairman of the JCS and presenting himself as a supporter of continued tripartite collaboration, advised chances of collaboration would be advanced if the British pile was in Canada due to security concerns.⁴⁵⁶ Having obtained Eisenhower's agreement that a Canadian site made sense, Groves then informed Byrnes that Eisenhower was against UK proposals.⁴⁵⁷ At the February CPC, Brynes and Bush informed the British there could be no actions that "could in any way compromise the success of discussion with the United Nations," and further UK-US discussions would be required.⁴⁵⁸ As Gowing puts it, Groves' priming, permitted Byrnes to give full expression to what Chadwick called his "obstructive and evasive abilities."⁴⁵⁹ The result was another delay with Groves put in charge of drawing up a full UK-US executive agreement.⁴⁶⁰

Thus empowered, Groves' next move was to approach Dean Acheson. Acheson was an anglophile who in 1939 thought Pax Britannica had been the bulwark against totalitarianism its collapse meant the Soviets had now supplanted the Nazis as the threat to common values.⁴⁶¹ Acheson was leading the State Department's attempts to create an international regulatory atomic framework to include the Soviets. He had involved David Lilienthal, TVA director (and future head of the Atomic Energy Commission) in this task and they were within days of presenting the Acheson-Lilienthal Report that was to finally determine Administration policy.⁴⁶² Groves now played up the existence of the legal threat posed by the draft executive memorandum, portraying himself as "a very scared man," upset at having made promises to British and being unable to keep them. Lilienthal diary entry recorded, "This is the mess we are in," Groves said, quite upset; "you have to get us out of it."⁴⁶³ Of course, the so-called mess had been deliberately concocted by Groves and he had already

⁴⁵⁶ Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Volume 1: Policy Making* (Macmillan, 1988), 98.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ Groves, 405.

⁴⁵⁹ Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Volume 1: Policy Making*, 98.

⁴⁶⁰ *FRUS General: Political and Economic Matters Volume II* [#35 Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee] December 4, 1945.

⁴⁶¹ Yergin, 277.

⁴⁶² Bundy and Gould, 142-43; Yergin, 237.

⁴⁶³ David E Lilienthal *The Journals of David E Lilienthal: The Atomic Energy Years*, vol. 2 (Harper & Row, 1964), 26.

secured Byrnes' support in delaying collaboration. Lilienthal, oblivious to the ulterior motive, thought Groves' intervention was admirable, coming,

on the very eve of our presentation of a plan for joint international development. Nothing could be more timely, in the sense our report may become the basis for international discussion and therefore stave off just such things as this USA-UK joint enterprise which might permanently forestall international action.⁴⁶⁴

Privy to Groves' legal advice, it fell to Acheson to be candid with the British who had been supporting his international plan. Acheson informed them on March 5, 1946, there could be no collaboration.

If it were carried out by some shenanigan of an exchange of notes, to evade the plain provision of the UNO Charter requiring summaries of agreements between nations be submitted to that body, that evasion would be fatal and wouldn't work. They [the UK] must resign themselves to the fact that, although we made the agreement, we simply could not carry it out; things like that happen in government of the US due to the loose way things are handled...⁴⁶⁵

With British and Canadian collaboration stalled, Groves focussed on changing the nature of the McMahon Bill to elevate military control and restrict sharing atomic technology with any state. Groves leveraged the Gouzenko spy scandal to heighten security concerns in the Senate and during testimony to a closed session of the Senate in late February 1946, revealed (then classified) the arrest of Alan Nunn in London for spying. Nunn had been part of the British-Canadian team and according to Groves guilty of passing US atomic bomb secrets to the Soviets.⁴⁶⁶ Groves would later admit that Nunn had only general knowledge of atomic research and could not have passed on bomb secrets.⁴⁶⁷

As Robert Teigrob says Groves then "took an active role in the release and shaping of the story."⁴⁶⁸ Groves leaked his Senate testimony to Washington correspondent Frank McNaughton pointing up the dangers to security if the military were not involved and the

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Quoted in Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 145-46.

⁴⁶⁶ Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 501-02.

⁴⁶⁷ Lester Brune, *Chronology of the Cold War: 1917-1992* (Routledge, 2020).

⁴⁶⁸ Robert Teigrob, *Warming up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea* (University of Toronto Press, 2009), 63.

dangers of trusting the British, not to mention the Soviets.⁴⁶⁹ The story spread rapidly. On March 20 the NY Times ran the story on front page with the headline. "Groves bares leak in US Atom Plant as Letter Tells Bomb 'Know-How' of May, Seized British Scientist."⁴⁷⁰ The article reflected a change of mood Grove's leaks had produced on the floor of the senate.⁴⁷¹ As Hewlett puts it "the roof fell in."⁴⁷² Senators of a Riga mindset rallied behind a Vandenberg amendment to incorporate a military liaison committee on the civilian run Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and forbid the exchange of atomic information.

Suffice to say Wallace and the atomic scientists were incensed by the resurrection of military control and the provisions to stop exchanges with the Soviets. They hit back by mobilising a public campaign against a "garrison state."⁴⁷³ Wallace said the amendment could deliver the nation into

military fascism... I hope that the American people rise up in their wrath and let the Senate know what their actions mean.⁴⁷⁴

Eventually, there was a compromise, but not one that was any comfort to the UK. The Vandenberg amendment itself was amended so that the military was represented by the 'civilian' Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the army retained control of fissionable materials and the collection and evaluation of atomic weapons elsewhere.⁴⁷⁵

When the British examined the circumstances and the final McMahon document they identified Groves as the person who had created the text that prevented collaboration. Eisenhower informed Lilienthal

They blame Groves for going behind their backs and having that provision against exchange of information put into the McMahon Act, even pointing to the line which

⁴⁶⁹ Paul, 99.

⁴⁷⁰ Anthony Leviero, "Groves Bares Leak in U.S. Atom Plant: Senate Is Shocked as Letter Tells Bomb 'Know-How' of May, Seized British Scientist," *NY Times*, March 20 1946.

⁴⁷¹ See John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New Dehli: Prentice-Hall India, 1960), 277-78 & 92-94.

⁴⁷² Hewlett and Anderson Jr, 501.

⁴⁷³ Atkinson, 18.

⁴⁷⁴ Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg and Joe Alex Morris, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Greenwood, 1974), 255-57.

singles out ‘industrial uses,’ which shows on the face of it that whoever got that line inserted had the background that only Groves and two or three others had... they are deeply upset by it.⁴⁷⁶

3.2.5 British appeals rejected

The British sought to rescue their post war atomic relationship, pinning their hopes on the April CPC meeting. To their astonishment, Byrnes denied ever having seen the Groves Anderson Memorandum despite having chaired CPC meetings where it was discussed.⁴⁷⁷ The confirmation of non-cooperation at this level represented a huge shock to the British establishment, not least Attlee. Three cables from Attlee to Truman in April 1946 brought forth a reply that none of the previous agreements obliged the US to collaborate with the UK and that the UK would be unwise to build its own atomic energy plants.⁴⁷⁸ As Gowing comments the UK had trusted Roosevelt’s word on secret agreements, but it soon became clear that Truman “would not be bound by” such agreements he made “unless Congress endorsed them.”⁴⁷⁹ Nevertheless, Attlee appealed again on behalf of the UK and Canada stressing,

our three Governments stand in a special relationship to one another in the [atomic research] field is a matter of record... It is surely not inconsistent with its purpose that the co-operation begun during the war should continue during the peace unless and until it can be replaced by a wider system.⁴⁸⁰

Truman was not to be swayed and Attlee realised there was little point persisting.⁴⁸¹ As Ovendale concludes, only after the Suez Crisis and the recalibration of UK-US relations would nuclear cooperation be fully restored.⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁵ Michael E Parrish, *Citizen Rauh: An American Liberal's Life in Law and Politics* (University of Michigan Press, 2010), 80.

⁴⁷⁶ Lilienthal 2, 219.

⁴⁷⁷ Michael F Hopkins, *Dean Acheson and the Obligations of Power* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 67.

⁴⁷⁸ Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Volume 1: Policy Making*. Appendices: 78,124,126

⁴⁷⁹ *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952*, 1, 342.

⁴⁸⁰ Quoted in: Alfred Goldberg, "The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 40, no. 3 (1964): 413-14.

⁴⁸¹ Herken, 146.

3.3 The atomic Commonwealth

3.3.1 Introduction

In terms of a developing security community based on an Anglospheric core, the US decision on atomic collaboration represented a definitive step backwards. It also serves to illustrate the high levels of trust that existed between the UK and elements in the Commonwealth. Disadvantaged in attempts to develop atomic capabilities by the turn of events with the US, the UK turned to the resources of Commonwealth partners in a mutual endeavour for security. It is worth re-stressing that the Commonwealth enjoyed a common legal identity expressed through common citizenship and a common head of state.⁴⁸³ Cooperation was an outcome of informal, consensual arrangements that could usually accommodate growing nationalistic impulses.

3.3.2 Commonwealth collaboration

The Attlee Government decided that the UK must possess atomic weapons if it was to remain a serious power.⁴⁸⁴ Unlike the predominant view of the Truman Administration they had concluded the Soviet Union had the resources to produce atomic bombs, and as Bundy put it, using “their general sense of Great Power’s behaviour to guide them” believed it would do so.⁴⁸⁵ US behaviour had raised questions over its future reliability as an ally for Britain and its Commonwealth. Attlee explained his concerns years later saying,

If we had decided not to have it, we would have put ourselves entirely in the hands of the Americans. That was a risk a British Government should not take... At that time nobody could be sure the Americans would not revert to isolationism.⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸² Ritchie Ovendale, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Macmillan International Higher Education, 1998), 11.

⁴⁸³ Canadian citizenship was introduced in 1947.

⁴⁸⁴ Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Volume 1: Policy Making*, 209.

⁴⁸⁵ Bundy and Gould, 192.

⁴⁸⁶ Quoted in Kenneth Harris, *Attlee* (W.W. Norton & Co., 1982), 288.

Defence was seen in Commonwealth terms with the Chief of Staff Committee (COS) warning that “to delay production pending the outcome of negotiations regarding international control might well prove fatal to the security of the British Commonwealth.”⁴⁸⁷

The behaviour of the US had raised Canadian concerns too. The Canadian General Staff (CGS) noted the US had initially been neutral in two wars Canada had been engaged in. Although they had no wish to form part of centralised ‘imperial’ security community, they recognised the risk of US unreliability could be mitigated by facilitating an atomic UK capability. The levels of trust were such they took it as read that this would provide automatic Commonwealth protection. In October 1945, the CGS warned Canada must take defensive steps because

...other nations will in due course possess the secret of its [the bomb’s] manufacture... This seems to lend emphasis to the urgent necessity ... of ensuring that the secret of the manufacture of the A[tom] b[omb] itself is known to us or the UK so that we may have the advantage... in a war without the assistance of the US.⁴⁸⁸

The Australian Government had also been keen that the UK took steps to ensure the Commonwealth developed its own research capability with Evatt informing Attlee in October 1945

It is unnecessary for me to stress the advantages of a Commonwealth effort in this supremely important field of research. In Australia we are anxious that this should be started; if it is not, however, we shall be forced to enter the field on our own. The contributions we could make to an Empire scheme are significant. Primary research and development might best be carried out in the United Kingdom, but we could send skilled scientists to assist in this purpose.⁴⁸⁹

Evatt’s support for a UK base clashed with MacKenzie King’s preference for the UK and Canada

⁴⁸⁷ Quoted in Matthew Jones, *The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Volume I: From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964* (Routledge, 2017), 8. source: Major General Leslie C. Hollis minute for Attlee, October 10, 1945, PREM 8/116, and as COS 1449/5 annexed to COS(45)246th mtg, October 10, 1945, CAB 79/40, TNA

⁴⁸⁸ “The Atomic Bomb: Effect of Its Discovery on Canadian Army Strategic Planning—Preliminary Considerations.” October 24, 1945. Quoted in Brian Buckley, *Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy: Fate, Chance, and Character* (McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 2000), 42.

to establish a large Commonwealth [atomic] plant in Canada which could supply the other parts of the Empire, and to the research laboratories of which teams for the various Dominions and Britain could come for research work.⁴⁹⁰

This envisaged utilising the existing UK-British team at Montréal Laboratory established in 1942, and directed by UK scientist John Cockcroft. By September 1945, an operational atomic reactor had been constructed at Chalk River, Ontario.⁴⁹¹ There was some British support for this with Chadwick arguing had its own plant geared to plutonium production and it was logical to use existing facilities in Canada rather than create new ones in the UK.⁴⁹²

In fact, there were already practical difficulties to this possibility given the US had secured Canadian uranium supplies and could dictate terms of supply.⁴⁹³ Both the Canadians and British scientists had recognised this as early as 1943. C.J. McKenzie, the head of the Canadian Project, warned that despite a desire to help the Commonwealth, the US relationship constrained them, and if forced to take sides, the Canadian Government "will undoubtedly refuse to take any action which will antagonise the American Government, as the effects of a breach would be too serious."⁴⁹⁴

3.3.3 A UK or Canadian research base

As early as January 1945, Oliphant, himself an Australian, had been urging the withdrawal of key members of the British Manhattan team to Britain so as to form a nucleus of a British research effort.⁴⁹⁵ The potential US restrictions on uranium supplies led to Commonwealth efforts to find other sources in Australia and NZ. In February 1945, the head of the NZ Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) enquired how geological surveys were progressing.

⁴⁸⁹ Evatt to Attlee, 14th October 1945, CAB 130/3, also in PREM 8/112 TNA

⁴⁹⁰ King, MacKenzie quoted in Buckley, 41.

⁴⁹¹ See: Avery.

⁴⁹² Chadwick to Rickett, September 10, 1945, AB 1/381 TNA

⁴⁹³ Reynolds, 854-55.

⁴⁹⁴ "High Commissioner to Canada to the Lord President," July 5, 1943, TNA PRO, AB 1/376;

"Note to Talk with Dean Mackenzie" May 14, 1943 TNA PRO, AB 1/374 & ibid., 855.

⁴⁹⁵ Oliphant, 'Notes on T.A.' 9th January 1945, TNA CAB 126/181

I trust the search (for Uranium and Thorium) is proceeding well. The work is very important from an Empire point of view as many tons will be wanted in the next few years and Uncle Sam has a stranglehold on the Canadian ores.⁴⁹⁶

Mackenzie King did not appreciate the feelings of mistrust towards the US extended to Commonwealth scientists who were wary of any dependence of the existing British-Canadian research base on the US. Oblivious to these concerns, King overplayed the importance off the Canadian operation by stressing Britain had no atomic plants of its own “and the for the next year or so will be dependent entirely on our development for... by-products.”⁴⁹⁷ The risks of future US pressure on Canada not to assist the UK was elevated by US plans to incorporate Canada into its continental defence plans. This would “not only tie up uranium, but would also effectively control the atomic programme as a whole.”⁴⁹⁸

Oliphant believed it was vital the UK remove itself from any possibility of US entanglement by ruling out Canada as the base of future research. As such, it was necessary to persuade John Cockcroft the highly respected head of the joint UK-Canadian Montreal operation. Cockcroft’s practical experience in establishing the Chalk River reactor would be of critical importance in building a reactor in the UK. Oliphant wrote to Cockcroft urging him to return to assist in the efforts to build an atomic reactor in the UK

...it is a matter of vital practical importance to this country and the Empire, and our future as a real factor in the world of industry and politics depends on our position in T[ube] A[lloys].⁴⁹⁹

In October 1945, Attlee announced a research and experimental facility would be established at Harwell, near Oxford.⁵⁰⁰ Although the formal decision to pursue an independent atomic deterrent was not made until 1947, this decision signalled an intent to create the means to do.⁵⁰¹ By November Cockcroft agreed to head up the Harwell operation, a decision that came as a bitter blow to the Canadians who regarded him as a key asset for their

⁴⁹⁶ Memo for Minister SIR, February 15th 1945, AAOQ W3424 Box 5 74/2/1 Part 1

⁴⁹⁷ Quoted in Buckley, 41.

⁴⁹⁸ Reynolds, 855.

⁴⁹⁹ Letter Marcus Oliphant to John Cockcroft, September, 14, 1945, CAC, CKFT25/27, 1.

⁵⁰⁰ Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952*, 1, 205.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., 442.

operations.⁵⁰² In an initial overreaction, the Canadians declared, “Canada would have no other alternative than to tie in with the United States.”⁵⁰³ In fact Canada would supply fissile material to the UK once the Chalk River reactor finally produced plutonium in 1951.⁵⁰⁴

3.3.4 Commonwealth atomic R&D

The UK Government considered the possibility of a coordinated Commonwealth atomic project but was stymied by the Quebec agreement. The involvement of the Commonwealth states would constitute sharing with third party states.⁵⁰⁵ Unlike the BRUSA SIGINT arrangement the Dominions were not favoured second parties but considered third parties and their involvement would require US consultation and consent.⁵⁰⁶ Given the (then) likely provisions of the McMahon Act, this was unlikely to be granted. This did not mean the Commonwealth was rendered irrelevant. On the contrary Dominion individuals (since they were ‘British’ citizens) could still be involved and both Australia and New Zealand (the largest national grouping after UK and Canadians) had significant numbers of scientists in the Montreal operation.⁵⁰⁷ A close working relationship with the Australia government also offered both the possibility of uranium supplies and suitable test sites, arrangements that would not breach the Quebec provisions of sharing ‘secrets.’⁵⁰⁸ The suggestion of the construction of an atomic plant was taken up by New Zealand scientists who supported the construction of a UK ‘pile’ in NZ as a possible contribution to a dispersed Commonwealth strategy.⁵⁰⁹

Despite these various work arounds, the UK remained keen to amend the restrictive clause of the Quebec Agreement that prohibited third party sharing. It succeeded in this

⁵⁰² Ibid., 205. Robert Bothwell, "Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited," (1988): 125.

⁵⁰³ MacKenzie quoted in Reynolds, 855. Also Buckley, 61.

⁵⁰⁴ Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952*, 1, 421-22.

⁵⁰⁵ See Baylis, 24.

⁵⁰⁶ See: Galbreath, 308.

⁵⁰⁷ Priestley, 58-59.

⁵⁰⁸ Lorna Arnold, *A Very Special Relationship* (HMSO, 1987).

⁵⁰⁹ Heavy water production in NZ was considered for British defence needs. See: Rebecca Priestley, "Ernest Marsden's Nuclear New Zealand: From Nuclear Reactors to Nuclear Disarmament" (paper presented at the Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, 2006), 28.

objective by 1948 by the so-called *modus vivendi* with the US.⁵¹⁰ This allowed the UK some latitude to share atomic research with the Dominions.⁵¹¹ The price was high and included the UK's abandonment of its Quebec veto clause over US use of nuclear weapons.⁵¹²

Atomic research aside, the UK was keen to work with Australia to develop a strategic partnership of direct relevance to the atomic weapons programme. The relationship was confirmed at the February 1946 Prime Minister's Conference in London. It included research into guided missile systems and the development of an industrial weapons base for Australia. It had the enthusiastic backing of the Chifley Labor Government, Sir Frederick Sheldon and the military. An 'Informal Commonwealth Conference on Defence Science' (ICCDS) was called in June 1946 by Sir Henry Tizard.⁵¹³ The Commonwealth delegates were informed by Tizard that they could all expect to benefit from atomic research within ten years should they make specialist personnel available (again the emphasis was on individuals). Tizard explained that the

The British Commonwealth was an example of how nations, while still retaining their own sovereignty, could yet set aside these boundaries and work together for the common good. In the past, concentration in time of war had been a source of strength, but this era was passing and there was a tendency to disperse both population and scientific brains for the more successful prosecution of the war.⁵¹⁴

The subsequent Evetts Report was to lead to the creation of the sprawling Salisbury-Woomera site overseen by the CUKAC (the Combined United Kingdom-Australian Long Range Weapons Committee).⁵¹⁵ This became the centre of operations for the development of series of bombs and missiles headed by Evett who was succeeded by New Zealander Alan Butement.⁵¹⁶ Research included work on the Blue Steel, Black Knight and Blue Streak

⁵¹⁰ Reproduced in Baylis, 51-56.

⁵¹¹ Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Volume 1: Policy Making*, 245-56; Galbreath, 316-17.

⁵¹² See: Baylis, 42-43.

⁵¹³ Attlee to Tizard, May 3 1946 TNA, PREM 8, 753

⁵¹⁴ Henry Tizard. Informal Commonwealth Conference on Defence and Science. 1st meeting, June 3, 1946 . TNA DO35/1759/ICCDS

⁵¹⁵ Peter Morton, *Fire across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint Project 1946-1980* (Canberra: Australian Dept of Defence 1989), 17-27.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid., 20.

missiles, the latter the UK's highly advanced rocket system designed to carry its nuclear deterrent.⁵¹⁷

The UK's decision in 1947 to proceed with a bomb required a new specialist team with key Dominion personnel from the Manhattan Project involved. It was headed by British physicist William Penney who began recruiting a British atomic bomb team that included Australian and New Zealand scientists.⁵¹⁸ In 1948, the British Chiefs of staff tabled their requirement for 200 bombs by 1957.⁵¹⁹

The need for suitable testing sites became of increasing importance and in 1951, joint UK-Australian efforts identified the Monte Bello Islands as the site for atomic testing.⁵²⁰ New Zealand supplied logistical support for atomic tests with Prime Minister Holland asserting they were necessary for Commonwealth defence and "New Zealand will be helping to ensure that the United Kingdom remains in the forefront in the field of nuclear research."⁵²¹ The joint Australia-UK collaboration on various systems continued throughout the period, allowing the UK to pursue atomic weapons and delivery systems and emphasise the high levels of trust enjoyed between the UK and Australia.⁵²²

3.3.5 Nuclear weapons in Commonwealth Defence

The importance of the UK acquisition of atomic weapons was highlighted by the UK's 1952 *Global Strategy Paper* produced by the British CoS. This seminal paper established the primary importance of a nuclear deterrence and made the UK the first state to base its

⁵¹⁷ See: John Boyes, *Blue Streak: Britain's Medium Range Ballistic Missile* (Fonthill Media, 2019).

⁵¹⁸ Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Volume 1: Policy Making*, 6-7; Galbreath, 316.

⁵¹⁹ Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952*, 1, 442-43.

⁵²⁰ Morton, 20; Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952*, 1, 476 & 78.

⁵²¹ Quoted in: Priestley, "Ernest Marsden's Nuclear New Zealand: From Nuclear Reactors to Nuclear Disarmament'," 31.

⁵²² See; Morton. & Reynolds.

security planning almost entirely upon a declaratory policy of nuclear deterrence.⁵²³ In terms of strategic thinking, it would mark a degree of convergence with the approach the US.

Indeed, Freedman contends it constituted a message from the UK CoS to the US rather than to their own Government.⁵²⁴ The UK paper was not initially well-received by the Truman Administration.⁵²⁵ However, within six months, similar sentiments underlay the Eisenhower Administration's *New Look* strategy that also emphasised retaliatory nuclear strikes.⁵²⁶

The 1952 Global Strategy Paper was predicated on the UK acquiring nuclear weapons capability⁵²⁷. By October 1952, the UK had assembled a test bomb using plutonium from Windscale with a shortfall made up by Canada. The test (Operation Hurricane), carried out at the Monte Bello, Australian site was successful.⁵²⁸ Churchill (by now Prime Minister again) informed the Commons of the outcome and the likely impact on relations with the US.

I do not doubt that it will lead to a much closer American interchange of information than has hitherto taken place... There are a very large number of people in the United States concerned with this matter who have been most anxious for a long time that Britain should be kept better informed.⁵²⁹

There was too a recognition of Australia's contribution with Churchill recording the Government's,

indebtedness for all the help received from Australia. Not only did the Australian Commonwealth allow us to use their territory for the test, but all branches of their Government, and particularly the Navy, Army and Air Force, gave us most valuable collaboration in the preparation and execution of this most important experiment.⁵³⁰

⁵²³ Andrew J Pierre, *Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970* (Oxford University Press, USA, 1972), 87; Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (Springer, 2003), 75.

⁵²⁴, 75.

⁵²⁵ Jones, 24.

⁵²⁶ Andrew M Johnston, "Mr. Slessor Goes to Washington: The Influence of the British Global Strategy Paper on the Eisenhower New Look," *Diplomatic History* 22, no. 3 (1998).

⁵²⁷ Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and Nuclear Weapons* (Springer, 1980), 3; Baylis, 67-68.

⁵²⁸, 70.

⁵²⁹ Winston Churchill Atom Bomb Test, Australia
HC Deb 23 October 1952 vol 505 cc1268-71

⁵³⁰ Winston Churchill Atom Bomb Test, Australia
HC Deb 23 October 1952 vol 505 cc1268-71

The Australians input continued, motivated by the same sentiments expressed in the UK's Global Strategy Paper and viewed themselves as a part of a Commonwealth security community with possible access to nuclear weapons.⁵³¹ As the self-perceived lead Commonwealth regional military power, Australia had looked favourably on developing a nuclear weapons capability since 1946.⁵³² Chifley had authorised the creation of the new facilities at a new National University of Australia (ANU) and the creation of Atomic Energy Commission.⁵³³ The objective was a research programme to produce weapon grade plutonium and create a heavy water atomic pile. This all occurred with the active involvement of the UK. They released Oliphant from the UK to head up the ANU Department, and further agreed to his request to release Sir Ernest Titterton from Harwell to become foundation Chair of Nuclear Physics at the ANU and donated a cyclotron for the fledgling facility.⁵³⁴

The UK's first 'Blue Danube' nuclear bombs were received by the RAF in November 1953, and incorporated into training and maintenance schedules.⁵³⁵ However, the RAF was dependent on the development of a new V-bomber class aircraft for delivery of the bombs. It was not until 1955 that the first 'Valiant' bombers were received.⁵³⁶ A squadron was declared operational in January 1956, and later in that year a successful bombing run at the Australian Marling range confirmed their effectiveness.⁵³⁷

Unfortunately for the UK, this was not the end of the atomic story. The atomic bomb would soon be superseded by the US testing of a hydrogen bomb at the Bikini atoll in October 1952.⁵³⁸ The destructive potential was many times greater than the atomic bombs in the UK's possession if made deliverable. Penney believed his team could reproduce the US

⁵³¹ Memo from Athol Townley, Minister for Air, to Philip McBride, Minister for Defence. September 12, 1956. NAA A1945/13 186- 5-3, p. 1; Extracts from Notes of Meeting in Cabinet Room, March 15, 1957, NAA A1945/13,186- 5-3

⁵³² Evatt to Chifley, Cable E32, 'Overseas Trip - 1945'. November 15, 1945. NAA 395. Vol 8.

⁵³³ Approved in 1946 but not operational until the 1950. See: TR Ophel, "A History of Accelerators in Australia," *Nuclear Instruments and Methods*, no. ANU-P/1207 (1996).

⁵³⁴ Gowing and Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952*, 1, 160-61.

⁵³⁵ Humphrey Wynn, *The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces: Their Origins, Roles and Deployment 1946-1969; a Documentary History* (Stationery Office, 1997), 92.

⁵³⁶ Ibid., 115.

⁵³⁷ Jones, 25.

⁵³⁸ Arnold, 76.

hydrogen bomb in four to five years.⁵³⁹ In 1954, the UK Cabinet authorised the necessary research for thermonuclear bombs and missile heads.⁵⁴⁰

3.4 Partial restoration of UK-US atomic relationship

3.4.1 US remorse and the basis for future collaboration

A sense of hurt pervaded the British and military establishments after the rupture in collaboration.⁵⁴¹ It was heightened by a sense that this behaviour was, to use a British expression, ‘not cricket.’ In the list of cultural values that Bennett identified as featuring “a common historical narrative” of Anglospheric nations was “‘a man’s word is his bond’ are taken for granted.”⁵⁴² This did not mean that the concept of ‘a man’s word is his bond’ was exclusive to Anglosphere nations, or that it was all pervading meme-complex within it. On the contrary, Groves, Byrnes, Bush and Truman had demonstrated it was not. However, the sense of that the US had fallen short extended to a number of American policy-makers with knowledge of the secret agreements. Many would continue to serve in US administrations and act to rectify what they considered a violation of their value system that had not been reflected by the policy outcomes of their governmental institutions.

Acheson, who had talked about the ‘loose way’ the US does things, was deeply unhappy. The feeling of having wronged the UK remained with Acheson who was to say later that the matter of the US

...failing to keep its word and performing its obligations... was repulsive to me. The analogy of a nation to a person is not sound in all matters of moral conduct; in this case however, it seemed pretty close.⁵⁴³

Gordon Arneson and Joseph Volpe, the two members of Groves’ team involved in discussions were also uncomfortable. Volpe believed that any British feelings of betrayal

⁵³⁹ Jones, 26 & 29.

⁵⁴⁰ Arnold, 76.

⁵⁴¹ Pierre, 76.

⁵⁴² Bennett, "An Anglosphere Primer," 2.

⁵⁴³ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, vol. 4418 (WW Norton & Company, 1970), 164.

“were certainly justified” more so because “of the relationship that existed during the war.”⁵⁴⁴ Both would go on to serve in roles where they could influence the relationship with the UK. In 1948, Arneson became the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs to the Secretary’s of State in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (1948 to 1954).⁵⁴⁵ Volpe served as legal counsel to the civilian US Atomic Energy Commission under the chairmanship of David Lilienthal.⁵⁴⁶

Averell Harriman who had served as US Ambassador to Moscow and London would replace Henry Wallace in the Department of Commerce in October 1946. He regarded the McMahon Act as “shameful” and even more so because “the British had given us everything they had during the war.”⁵⁴⁷ Averill’s reference was to the 1940 ‘Tizard Mission’ to the US. Tizard’s personal journey across the Atlantic with his briefcase of scientific secrets was described by J.B. Baxter as “the most valuable cargo ever brought to our shores.”⁵⁴⁸ They included the UK’s research on jet propulsion, a series of defense systems related to the cavity magnetron (including radar) and so significant they were credited with changing the course of the war.⁵⁴⁹

Eisenhower too, was disgusted at what had transpired, later informing his shocked Presidential staff he regarded the passage of McMahon Act as “one of the most deplorable incidents in American history of which he personally felt ashamed.”⁵⁵⁰ Even McMahon himself, when shown a copy of the secret Quebec Agreement by Churchill in 1952, expressed his regret and claimed if he had known about the secret commitments he would not have agreed to make the Act so restrictive.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁴ Volpe.

⁵⁴⁵ Gordon Arneson, March, 2ibid.

⁵⁴⁶ Joseph Jnr Volpe, March 3ibid., interview 1.

⁵⁴⁷ William Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946* (Random House Incorporated, 1975), 551.

⁵⁴⁸ James Phinney Baxter, “Scientists against Time,” (1946). Also: Edward George Bowen, *Radar Days* (CRC Press, 1998), Chapter 10.

⁵⁴⁹ See: Stephen Phelps, *The Tizard Mission: The Top-Secret Operation That Changed the Course of World War II* (Westholme Yardley, PA, 2010); Robert V Pound, “From Radar to Nuclear Magnetic Resonance,” *More Things in Heaven and Earth* (1999); David Zimmerman, “The Tizard Mission and the Development of the Atomic Bomb,” *War in History* 2, no. 3 (1995): 1.

⁵⁵⁰ Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, vol. 4 (London: Macmillan, 1971), 324.

⁵⁵¹ Michael L Dockrill and John W Young, *British Foreign Policy, 1945-56* (Springer, 1989), 41. Norman Craven Brook Baron Normanbrook, *Action This Day: Working with Churchill* (London: Macmillan, 1968), 122.

3.4.2 US domestic attempts to make amends

On becoming Chairman of the newly constituted AEC, David Lilienthal soon became concerned by the extent of US deceit and the consequent anguish. He thought the British

were dealt a raw deal, after their partnership contribution during the war, to be shut out permanently after the war. It was snide and unworthy of the United States.⁵⁵²

With Anglophilic leanings Lilienthal was encouraged by colleagues with both civilian and military backgrounds to see matters from the British perspective and perhaps find ways to assist. At a meeting with June 12, 1947 with George Marshall, by then Secretary of State, Lilienthal was informed,

how exceeding vulnerable the British are, compared to ourselves and others; how well they realise it... how important it is to try to understand their feelings.⁵⁵³

On June 16, 1947, Lilienthal received a visit from General Fred Anderson from the JCS Planning Unit who wished to speak to him on the advice of Admiral Nimitz. Anderson, who had worked alongside Maitland Wilson and Ismay in World War 2, explained he had returned from a “secret mission” to London and become dismayed by the feelings of bitterness from his British colleagues.⁵⁵⁴ Lilienthal wrote,

Although he was a professional soldier, you could see this experience had quite shaken him. At the end of our talk about other things, he looked at me in a gravely concerned manner and again urged that we do something to explain the British were being kept from [atomic] energy tomorrow.⁵⁵⁵

In July 1947, Lilienthal met with Eisenhower and raised the issue of relations with the UK, explaining that “they felt our denial to them of exchange of atomic information was

⁵⁵² David E Lilienthal, *The Road to Change 1955-1959*, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal (NY: Harper & Row, 1964), 22.

⁵⁵³ Lilienthal 2, 199.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid., 203.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., 203-04.

harsh and unfair.”⁵⁵⁶ Eisenhower agreed and said it was Groves who was to blame. Eisenhower then referred to the common Magna Carta tradition (Bill of Rights) heritage of the British and Americans and dismissed worries about Britain (and some Commonwealth countries) having ‘socialist’ governments.⁵⁵⁷

The two countries that believe in a Bill of Rights ought to stick together. They do believe in a Bill of Rights, and whatever form of social organisation they feel they have to go to in order to make their economic machinery work, they won’t give that up and that is the real test.⁵⁵⁸

Lilienthal agreed and suggested they should look to change the McMahon Act. The two men then turned to the issue of Anglophobia and Eisenhower responded by referring to recent attacks on him and the “belting the Chicago Tribune had given him as an Anglophile.”⁵⁵⁹ Lilienthal agreed the anti-British sentiment was still strong and had witnessed it himself in Chicago. Lilienthal thought it quite strange, that in the South, “with the highest percentage of Anglo-saxon population,” Senator Tom Stewart’s anti-British speeches about the War of Independence were attracting “great applause almost as if the Revolutionary War had just been fought.”⁵⁶⁰ They moved on to discuss the problem with Groves, his general behaviour and the fact the British had identified him as the person responsible for the rupture.⁵⁶¹

They concluded any attempted restitution for the British would require the removal of Groves as Head of Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Command and from the AEC’s Military Liaison Committee. Thus, in September 1947 in anticipation of talks with the British, Lilienthal and Eisenhower began to manoeuvre for Groves’ removal.⁵⁶² By the end of 1947, the US had initiated talks with the UK to discuss the Quebec Agreement and take steps to counter domestic US opposition to collaboration.⁵⁶³ To placate US ‘nationalists,’ talks were justified on the basis it was in the national interest to obtain the UK’s share of uranium and remove the UK veto on the use of atomic weapons, a principal concern of some US senators.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid., 218.

⁵⁵⁷ An issue raised by the pro-churchill Bernard Baruch. See: Robert M Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership* (Columbia University Press, 1981), 137.

⁵⁵⁸ Lilienthal 2, 219.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., 220.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., 218-19.

⁵⁶² Ibid., 237.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., 259-60 & 66.

On January 7, 1948, a CPC meeting agreed a *modus vivendi* whereby the US agreed to the exchange of certain non-weapons related information.⁵⁶⁴ This time Groves would be unable to frustrate matters, for on the same date, Eisenhower engineered Groves' resignation.⁵⁶⁵

The importance of the modus vivendi can be exaggerated, indeed that is the position taken by Gowing, but Baylis asserts it did "in some respects break the log jam and allow the flow of critical information."⁵⁶⁶ However, disagreements "still existed in political circles in the US."⁵⁶⁷ A further attempt to deepen collaboration failed. A meeting between the White House executive and Senate at Blair House in July 1949, did however, reveal the strength of the Anglophile grouping.⁵⁶⁸ Among the eight representatives of the executive alongside the President and pushing for greater cooperation were Acheson, Lilienthal, Eisenhower, Volpe and Arneson. Truman's script had been prepared by Arneson and stressed the common history of the US with Canada and the UK in developing the bomb.⁵⁶⁹ Powerful senators objected, Vandenberg stating that the US had done "so much for the English it was now up to them to do something for us."⁵⁷⁰ Any hopes for an advance were dashed by news of the arrest of British scientist Karl Fuchs in London on spying charges raising questions of security.⁵⁷¹

3.4.3 Limited cooperation

Progress was slow thereafter; the return of Churchill to power and the election of Eisenhower in 1953 produced limited cooperation due to the legal restrictions of the McMahon Act. However, Cold War tensions and John Foster Dulles' bias towards nuclear weapons as part of a 'New Look' facilitated some changes.⁵⁷² The US American Atomic Energy Act of 1954 allowed exchanges with allies regarding external characteristics of

⁵⁶⁴ Baylis, 42.

⁵⁶⁵ Lilienthal 2, 236.

⁵⁶⁶ Baylis, 43.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid., 44.

⁵⁶⁸ "Record of the Meeting at Blair House," July 14, 1949, #172. *FRUS, 1949 National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy. Vol I*

⁵⁶⁹ Richard G Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Volume II. 1947/1952, Atomic Shield* (US Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, DC (United States), 1972), 301-12.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid., 301-02. "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation," July 18, 1949, #d175 *FRUS, 1949 National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy. Vol I*

⁵⁷¹ Ibid., 314; Timothy J Botti, *The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958*, vol. 64 (Praeger, 1987), 61; Baylis, 45.

⁵⁷² Freedman, *Britain and Nuclear Weapons*, 2-4.

atomic weapons.⁵⁷³ The 1955 bilateral UK-US and Canada-US arrangements were markedly more privileged than any general ‘dissemination’ agreement with the non-Anglosphere NATO allies⁵⁷⁴. It was also in this period that a degree of preliminary collaboration was initiated by Admiral Rickover by stretching the legal definitions of the Acts with Executive consent and approval. The consequent transfer of submarine propulsion technology is dealt with in chapter 4.

3.5 Establishing an intelligence Security Community

3.5.1 The Travis Initiative

The British took the initiative to ensure the 1943 BRUSA SIGINT intelligence sharing arrangement with the US could be repurposed as a post-WW2 alliance. The UK’s SIGINT operations were an ad hoc conglomerate of imperial and commonwealth assets spread across the globe, dominated and operated by GCHQ. With the looming defeat of the Axis powers, demobilisation and the likely assertion of Dominion sovereignty had the potential to wreck the viability of future GCHQ’s operations since they “were essentially branches of the relevant British organisations.”⁵⁷⁵

The effectiveness of any post-war SIGINT operation would be dependent on a global network of intercept stations.⁵⁷⁶ Britain could continue to operate SIGINT facilities those territories it still directly controlled, and with the dominions on board, would be able to entice the US to join them to maintain continued global reach.⁵⁷⁷ This, however, was reliant on the

⁵⁷³ John Patrick George Freeman, *Britain’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957–68* (Springer, 1986), 89; Freedman, *Britain and Nuclear Weapons*, 7.

⁵⁷⁴ See: Baylis, 85-87; Sean M Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War* (Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 87-88; Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish, *US-UK Nuclear Cooperation after 50 Years*, vol. 30 (CSIS, 2008), 8.

⁵⁷⁵ Dylan, 163.; Aid and Wiebes, Chap 3.

⁵⁷⁶ Aldrich, 148-49.

⁵⁷⁷ Richard J Aldrich and Michael F Hopkins, *Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World* (Routledge, 2013); Richard J Aldrich, “The Value of Residual Empire: Anglo-American Intelligence Cooperation in Asia after 1945,” *Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World* (1994): 247-48.

willingness of Dominion governments to establish national agencies and then participate in a communal effort.⁵⁷⁸

On March 14, 1945, a high-level British team headed by Sir Edward Travis embarked on a world-wide tour to assess the possibilities of continued post-WW2 operations.⁵⁷⁹ Travis' first visits were to Australia and NZ to discuss future operations with the relevant intelligence personnel. Given the fragmented nature and internal rivalries of the US SIGINT assets, they held separate meetings with the Army, Navy and State Department.⁵⁸⁰ With those talks underway, his second in command, Rear Admiral Rushbrooke flew to Ottawa to brief Canadian counterparts.⁵⁸¹

3.5.2 US domestic turmoil

The US Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (ANCIB) was keen to continue their SIGINT collaboration with the focus on the Soviet Union, their wartime 'ally'.⁵⁸² The nature of the closely guarded SIGINT operations meant there was little knowledge of the ANCIB's existence and activities beyond Roosevelt himself.⁵⁸³ This secrecy served Roosevelt and the military well, insulating the SIGINT alliance from growing Cabinet and more public arguments about the activities of other intelligence activities. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in particular had been singled out for its proposals for a post-War centralised intelligence service. Its report to Roosevelt had been leaked to US isolationist media outlets in February 1945 as part of a institutional turf war involving the FBI. The *Chicago Tribune* denounced the OSS as a US 'Gestapo' operation.⁵⁸⁴ Congressional uproar

⁵⁷⁸ Philip Murphy, "Exporting a British Intelligence Culture: The British Intelligence Community and Decolonisation, 1945-1960" (paper presented at the unpublished conference paper, Political Studies Association, 2004), 2.

⁵⁷⁹ Christopher Andrew, "Anglo-American-Soviet Intelligence Relations," in *The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-45*, ed. Ann Lane Lane, & Temperley, Howard (Springer, 1995), 129 & fn86.; Dorril, 52.

⁵⁸⁰ See: Christopher Andrew, "Bletchley Park in Post-War Perspective," in *The Bletchley Park Codebreakers*, ed. Michael Smith (Biteback Publishing, 2011), Chapter 23.

⁵⁸¹ "Anglo-American-Soviet Intelligence Relations," 129.

⁵⁸² Smith, 202-03; Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, 75.

⁵⁸³ See: James F Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947*, vol. 1 (Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State, 1996), 4.

⁵⁸⁴ The Chicago Tribune, the NY Daily News and the Washington Times Herald were each individually owned by three cousins who pursued an aggressive anti-Roosevelt and isolationist line. See: Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (Yale University Press, 2014), 33; Greg Bradsher, "'Fake News' 1942: President Roosevelt and the Chicago Tribune," *The Text Message*

ensued.⁵⁸⁵ Roosevelt had been obliged to place any consideration of plans for a central intelligence operation on hold until April 5, 1945.⁵⁸⁶ Whilst the JSC welcomed this setback to OSS plans, they were concerned with the media's line of attack and aghast at the notion the FBI should become the lead intelligence agency. Media stories had castigated the OSS for being in the 'pockets' of the British and the military worried about accusations of their being too close to the UK should the SIGINT arrangements become known.⁵⁸⁷

Roosevelt's death transformed the situation. Within hours of his passing on April 12, 1945, Attorney General Biddle made an unsuccessful pre-emptive move to persuade Truman to consolidate all intelligence activity under his own Department of Justice administered FBI. Utilising more leaks, the anti-Roosevelt press titles resumed the attack with a series of anti-British stories. The OSS was asserted to be "an arm of the British Intelligence Service."⁵⁸⁸ Truman professed himself concerned about the development of a US 'Gestapo' and announced international spying was "un-American."⁵⁸⁹ The new President also received advice from Harold D. Smith, Director of the Budget Bureau, who suggested all intelligence services could be terminated or cut back.⁵⁹⁰ Truman requested Smith draw up plans to "liquidate the war agencies and reconvert the government to peace."⁵⁹¹ The SIGINT arrangements and activity were not identified since the very existence of it operation was highly secret. Roosevelt had excluded Truman from all high-level foreign/security policy

(2018), https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/2018/02/01/fake-news-1942-president-roosevelt-and-the-chicago-tribune/#_ftn3. [Access date 20th March 2021 applies to this and all websites listed hereafter]

⁵⁸⁵ Stephen E Ambrose and Richard H Immerman, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Univ. Press of Mississippi, 1999), 164.

⁵⁸⁶ For a detailed account see: John Whiteclay Chambers, "Postwar Period: End of the OSS and Return to the Park Service," *OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II* (2008), <https://www.nps.gov/articles/postwar-period-end-of-the-oss-and-return-to-the-park-service.htm>.

⁵⁸⁷ The JCS had put forward their own plan (JIC 239/5) to Roosevelt they deemed wise to withdraw following the uproar. This plan included representation of the State Department alongside the Army and War Departments. See: "Founding of the National Intelligence Structure August 1945–January 1946," *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1945–1950, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*.

⁵⁸⁸ Jeffreys-Jones, 31.

⁵⁸⁹ Richard Dunlop, *Donovan: America's Master Spy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), 468; Richard H Immerman, *The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA* (John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 12.

⁵⁹⁰ Chambers.

⁵⁹¹ Richard E Schroeder, *The Foundation of the CIA: Harry Truman, the Missouri Gang, and the Origins of the Cold War* (University of Missouri Press, 2017), 84.

matters in general and the former Vice President had displayed little interest in such matters and certainly had no comprehension of a SIGINT operation.⁵⁹²

Of immediate concern to the military was the arrival in the Whitehouse of Truman's Vice-Presidential staff. These largely consisted of low calibre cronies from Missouri who formed part of Truman's drinking and poker-playing circle.⁵⁹³ The wartime Whitehouse Truman and his staff now occupied included the highly restricted 'Map Room' where SIGINT information was received and had been disseminated to Roosevelt. To the horror of the military, the new President announced that his Vice-Presidential "Military Aide," Colonel Harry Vaughan would be his new Presidential Military Aide. Usually such aides would be trusted serving Army officers, however Vaughan was an ill-disciplined Reserve soldier who had served with Truman in World War 1 and was now a constant companion.⁵⁹⁴ Vaughan was a member of Truman's daily poker-playing circle who played for money and was considered the 'court jester' for his wise-cracking antics.⁵⁹⁵ More disturbing however, was his lax ethical behaviour and involvement with criminal elements for financial gain. Vaughan was a regular associate of John F. Maragon, former black-boot boy involved in illegal activities with foreign importers and smugglers.⁵⁹⁶ On arriving at the Whitehouse, on April 13 the day after Roosevelt's death, one of Vaughan's first actions was to issue a White House pass to Maragon enabling him to operate from Vaughan's Whitehouse office.⁵⁹⁷ And within the first few weeks of his arrival Vaughan was using his Whitehouse position for financial gain.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹² Roy Jenkins describes Truman as "...unbriefed, but untroubled by any attempt to brief him." See: Roy Jenkins, *Truman* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011), 82. For failure to brief see: Paul Kengor, "The Vice President, Secretary of State, and Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 2 (2000): 173. For Truman's candid admission see: Harry S Truman, *Year of Decisions 1945* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1955), 194.

⁵⁹³ Iwan Morgan and Mark White, *The Presidential Image: A History from Theodore Roosevelt to Donald Trump* (IB Tauris, 2020), 79-80; Miscamble, 152 & 88.

⁵⁹⁴ Andrew J Dunar, "The Truman Scandals and the Politics of Morality," (1997): 2,22,41; Robert Sharon Allen, Robert-S Allen, and William V Shannon, *The Truman Merry-Go-Round* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1950), 87.

⁵⁹⁵ Morgan and White, 79-80; Miscamble, 152 & 88.

⁵⁹⁶ Dunar, 47; James Boylan, "Truman Dogged by Charges of "Favoritism and Influence", " *American Heritage* 66, no. 2 (2021), <https://www.americanheritage.com/truman-dogged-charges-favoritism-and-influence#4>.

⁵⁹⁷ Dunar, 45&47.

⁵⁹⁸ Boylan. 5.

Army Chief of Staff General Marshall took immediate steps to make the Whitehouse [SIGINT] Map Room completely off-limits to Vaughan and other staff.⁵⁹⁹ Instructions were issued to ensure that all Whitehouse staff must not open any sealed folder given to the President and marked “For President’s Eyes only.” Marshall’s first intelligence briefing on April 17, reveals the military’s concern of a leak about US SIGINT operations and politely requests contents not be shared with the likes of Vaughan,

the intelligence came from a purely British source⁶⁰⁰, which incidentally involves some 3,000 people and we have bound ourselves to confine its circulation to a specific and very limited group of people. Therefore, I request that this be ‘For Your Eyes Only.’⁶⁰¹

The military remained cautious, concerned by Truman’s tendency to sign off or endorse policies without seeking further advice often resulted in vacillation, sudden reversals and policy confusion.⁶⁰² This was compounded by Truman’s susceptibility to congressional and public pressure that included growing demands for US demobilisation of military assets even before the defeat of Japan.⁶⁰³ An anti-British media theme continued in the press throughout May 1945 directed at the OSS.⁶⁰⁴ Insulated from this, the military had decided to respond favourably to Travis’ proposals and on August 21, they agreed the US should seek to extend collaboration with the British whilst attempting to ensure any talks about a post-WW2 ANCIB SIGINT operation would not leak.⁶⁰⁵

⁵⁹⁹ Vaughan was eventually investigated as an influence peddler. See: William Safire, *Safire's Political Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁶⁰⁰ Smith, 196. Marshall to Truman. 17th April 1945, 18/333, Marshall Papers, Lexington, Virginia. (Lexington: Marshall Library)

⁶⁰¹ Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (Harper Collins, 1996), 150-51.

⁶⁰² Athan Theoharis, "The Truman Presidency: Trial and Error," *The Wisconsin Magazine of History* (1971): 52; Jerald A Combs, *The History of American Foreign Policy from 1895* (Routledge, 2015), 122.

⁶⁰³ See: Michael D Pearlman, "Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb," (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 121. Truman boasted of demobilisation efforts to gain popularity. See Nicole L Ansloover, *Harry S. Truman: The Coming of the Cold War* (Routledge, 2013), 81. For an example of dumping military hardware see: Thomas McKelvey Cleaver, *Mig Alley: The US Air Force in Korea, 1950–53* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 33.

⁶⁰⁴ Walter Trohan, "British Control of OSS Bared in Congress Probe," *Washington Times-Herald*, May 19 1945.

⁶⁰⁵ Thebaud to Marshall & King. “Memorandum from Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB) Re: Signals Intelligence” August 22, 1945. National Security Agency archives (hereafter NSA). Thomas L Burns *The Origins of the National Security Agency 1940 - 1952 Post War Period*, vol. 1, US Cryptology History V (Washington1990), 25.

This was a dangerous political environment for the JCS; media leaks favouring the FBI, the stirring of public sentiment against both spying and collaboration with the British, a Bureau committed to cost-cutting, compounded by a weak President inclined to sign off on proposals without full consideration and the presence of new ‘staff’ in the Whitehouse of dubious character. With these mounting pressures, the Army and Navy set aside their rivalry and acted to protect SIGINT activities and the UK relationship. Avoiding Smith, Biddle and Vaughan, Truman was presented with a drafted Order designating any US SIGINT activity as ‘secret’ which he duly signed without query.⁶⁰⁶ Bradley-Smith regards this as a seminal decision since the JCS’s SIGINT activities “could be carried through secretly under the president’s war powers” if they had been delayed, “and the glow of victory had been allowed to pale, Congress might have become inquisitive and meddlesome.”⁶⁰⁷ More to the point there was a danger of further leaks and a repeat of the opposition Wallace was stirring over atomic post-war collaboration.

A threat of SIGINT exposure still existed in Smith’s Budget Bureau plan for recommended OSS closure that was scheduled for Executive decision on September 4, 1945.⁶⁰⁸ A further draft executive order from Smith laid out the division of OSS assets and charged the Department of State with overseeing the creation of a single overarching intelligence agency involving the FBI.⁶⁰⁹ The Chairman of the JCS was Admiral Leahy, who also served as Truman’s Chief of Staff and acted to protect UK-US SIGINT activities. The JCS made urgent representations to their cabinet representatives on State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). So briefed the Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Navy Secretary James Forrestal and acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson immediately informed the President of the need for continued SIGINT collaboration with the British.⁶¹⁰ On September 12, 1945, Truman was warned of the “possible hostile intentions of foreign nations” and advised we “recommend you authorise continued collaboration between the

⁶⁰⁶ US White House, Executive Order 28 August 1945. ABC 311.51 (10/25/42) Rg 165, Mr, NA (1945).

⁶⁰⁷ Smith, 208.

⁶⁰⁸ Michael Warner, *The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency* (Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, 2002), 113.

⁶⁰⁹ Glenn W. LaFantasie, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, FRUS 1945-1950 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 1-5.

United States and the United Kingdom.”⁶¹¹ Faced with the unanimous opinion of three Cabinet members, Truman duly acceded. A single sentence secret order sanctioned his military chiefs to collaborate with the British.⁶¹²

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are hereby authorised to direct the Chief of Staff, US Army, Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to continue collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the US Army and Navy and the British, and to extend, modify, or discontinue this collaboration, as determined to be in the best interests of the United States.⁶¹³

This event can be seen as a pivotal day in US intelligence, pre-empting authorisation of Smith’s imminent reorganisation draft.⁶¹⁴ Just eight days later, on September 20, 1945, Smith obtained Truman’s signature on an Executive Order to dismantle the OSS.⁶¹⁵ He presented Truman with an additional separate letter charging the State Department to take the lead in creating a federal intelligence institution.⁶¹⁶ Although this was unwelcome news to the JCS whose own plans for wider intelligence reorganisation were sidelined, the earlier September 12, Executive Order insulated SIGINT operations and the negotiations with the UK proceeded.⁶¹⁷ Admiral Leahy, JCS Chairman authorised General Vandenberg, the chairman of State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIB) to sign the revised BRUSA terms on March 5, 1946.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁰ Thomas L Burns, *The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA: 1940-1952* (Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2005), 23. Acheson was the Dept of State representative on the SWNCC and inducted into the secret SIGINT arrangements.

⁶¹¹ Gordon Thomas, *Secret Wars: One Hundred Years of British Intelligence inside MI5 and MI6* (Macmillan, 2009), 112.

⁶¹² Thomas R Johnson, *American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989* (Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1995), 16.

⁶¹³ Burns, 23.

⁶¹⁴ See: Philip HJ Davies, *Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective* (ABC-CLIO, 2012), 175-76.

⁶¹⁵ “Executive Order 9621-Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions.” September 20, 1945, document #14, in *FRUS, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*.

⁶¹⁶ Thomas F Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, Md.: Aletheia Books, 1981), 302-03.

⁶¹⁷ The military also acted to protect OSS intelligence assets by what Warner calls “artful ambiguity.” These formed the basis of the Central Intelligence Group.

⁶¹⁸ “Joint Meeting of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board. Summary.” November 1, 1945. US National Security Archives (hereafter NSA) 30-31

3.5.3 The splintering Commonwealth security community

The focus of this thesis is on the five core states that comprise the Anglospheric security community. However, it is worth briefly examine the other Dominions of note that comprised the Commonwealth in the immediate post-War period and their lack of inclusion; South Africa, and the later creation of the Dominions of India and Pakistan in 1947.

Hanley and the CID worried about the reliability of South Africa even before World War 2 and with good reason.⁶¹⁹ As referred to earlier, the British had fought and won the Boer War had been fought, but competing Afrikaner meme-complexes stressing religious and racial illiberalism remained strong.⁶²⁰ The more liberal values and culture of the English-speaking electorate were despised by a large proportion of Afrikaners. As late as 1953, one academic was still complaining that the British in Africa

with their liberal traditions and nascent revolutionary and democratic political ideas, and humanism had left a legacy of religious disaffection which even today causes nothing but trouble and sorrow.⁶²¹

Thus, the future direction and identification of South Africa in a post-War security community based on ‘Anglo-saxon’ values was precarious. It depended upon sufficient so-called “sell-out” Afrikaners aligning with the English-speaking community. Jan Smuts had managed to achieve this, winning a narrow parliamentary vote to bring South Africa into World War 2.⁶²² In the immediate post-War period, the UK worried about a swing away from

https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa/joint_mtg_1nov45.pdf Also Burns, 43. (2005) & Burns 1, 52. (1990)

⁶¹⁹ See: Hankey, 84-85. & Boyd, 137.

⁶²⁰ See; Eric P Louw, "Afrikaner's Nationalism's Holy Day: From Commemoration through Hegemony to Delegitimation," in *National Days: Constructing and Mobilising National Identity*, ed. D. McCrone and G. McPherson (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 89-104; Jela Dobosová, "Calvinism in the Context of the Afrikaner Nationalist Ideology," *Asian and African Studies* 18, no. 2 (2009); Sheila Patterson, *The Last Trek: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation* (Routledge, 2004), 179-88; T Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion*, vol. 11 (Univ of California Press, 1975), 11-12.

⁶²¹ Patterson, 14.

⁶²² See: Richard Steyn, *Seven Votes: How WWII Changed South Africa Forever* (Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2020), 81; Mansergh, 206.

Smuts, but was assured the polls appeared to be in his favour by 1947.⁶²³ However, in 1948, Smuts was defeated by hardline Afrikaners, many of whom had been members of armed pro-Nazi paramilitaries.⁶²⁴ There was consequently an immediate wariness between the new Afrikaner Government and the UK. Indicative of the explicit ‘clash’ of values was MI5’s unwillingness to assist in the creation of security service in South Africa in 1949 since it would be used against “black races.”⁶²⁵

Although the UK had envisaged the inclusion of a single sub-continental India in an Anglospheric security community, the fracture into Pakistan and India prevented this. It soon became clear that the hostilities between the two states made this unlikely.⁶²⁶ The most immediate problem was the issue of Kashmir which resulted in immediate fighting and the recurring threat (and actual) conflict between the two Dominions.⁶²⁷ To include one or the other in intelligence matters ran the risk of offending either and the possibility of intelligence being misused to further Kashmiri issues. A further complication was India’s lead role in the non-aligned movement and status as a Republic – both threatening the coherence of the Commonwealth.⁶²⁸ The latter point was accommodated but there was no hope of India agreeing to a form of mutual defence⁶²⁹, not least because Nehru was sympathetic to Marxism.⁶³⁰ The ultimate compromise was to save the Commonwealth but reduce its military and security dimensions to the older Dominion states.⁶³¹

The Commonwealth SIGINT Organisation therefore focussed on integrating elements of the old imperial network into the BRUSA arrangement based on a coalition of the willing and dependable.

⁶²³ "The Political Situation in South Africa: Prospects at the coming General Elections", 22 March 1948. TNA, CO 936/2/4

⁶²⁴ See: Steyn; David Harrison, *The White Tribe of Africa* (Univ of California Press, 1981), 125.

⁶²⁵ Andrew, *Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5* 444.

⁶²⁶ See: Anita Inder Singh, "Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-49," *Journal of Contemporary History* 20, no. 3 (1985).

⁶²⁷ Rakesh Ankit, *The Kashmir Conflict: From Empire to the Cold War, 1945-66* (Routledge, 2016).

⁶²⁸ See: Harsh V Pant and Julie M Super, "India's 'Non-Alignment' conundrum: A Twentieth-Century Policy in a Changing World," *International Affairs* 91, no. 4 (2015); Mansergh, 169-70.

⁶²⁹ See: UK conclusions. COS(49)53rd meeting, 8 April 1949, DEFE 4/21 & , 233.

⁶³⁰ Ibid., 226.

⁶³¹ Although Pakistan joined the UK in CENTO and SEATO albeit it furtherance of territorial issues. Ibid., 168.

3.5.4 Creating the Commonwealth SIGINT Organisation (CSO)

The role of the CSO is barely mentioned in the history of the modern Five Eyes alliance, but it gives shape to its institutional pedigree. It also speaks to the level of trust that such an organisation could be so quickly refashioned and on an informal basis. In the UK-US negotiations, the US agreed to a provision for the inclusion of Commonwealth countries as second parties to the Agreement, with GCHQ acting as the conduit.⁶³² Unlike any other state, the dominions “would not be termed third parties” but treated as indirect parties to the agreement via the UK (the UK and US were second parties to each other).⁶³³ In order to participate in the SIGINT arrangement with the US, the dominions would need to establish domestic SIGINT agencies and thereafter sign-up to the terms of the final BRUSA terms.

Travis arranged a two-week Commonwealth SIGINT Conference in London starting on February 22, 1946, for members of each Dominion’s military establishments. The Conference agreed that existing GCHQ SIGINT transnational activity to be split between the UK and the participating Dominions to agreed geographical areas of responsibility.⁶³⁴

The Conference recognised the special US interest in establishing relations with Canada and agreed that talks should be advanced in Ottawa, Washington and London.⁶³⁵ The UK agreed to transfer tasks “to start the new Canadian agency off” and loan senior GCHQ personnel to the new agency.⁶³⁶ To continue Commonwealth SIGINT operations in the Pacific, the conference recommended the creation of a “multi-national signals intelligence centre” based in Melbourne, comprising the UK, Australia and NZ, each with “an equal role.”⁶³⁷ With these provisos, the conference agreed to the creation of a Commonwealth SIGINT organisation (CSO) under “the broad direction” of the UK.⁶³⁸ Consequently at the inaugural meeting of the BRUSA committee on March 11, 1946, the UK Chairman was able

⁶³² “British-US Communication Intelligence Agreement. Top Secret “Cream,” March 5, 1946. NSA.

⁶³³ Johnson, 17.

⁶³⁴ See: Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, 95.

⁶³⁵ See: “Joint Meeting of ANCIB and ANCIIC,” October 29, 1945, [BRUSA]. TNA HW80/01; Kurt F Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence, 1939-51* (UBC Press, 2009), 134fn 76.

⁶³⁶ NK O’Neill and KJ Hughes, *History of CBNRC, Volume I* (Ottawa, 1987), 2-3.

⁶³⁷ David Filer, “Signals Intelligence in New Zealand During the Cold War,” *Security and Surveillance History series* (2019): 1.

⁶³⁸ Ibid.

to inform his US colleagues the dominions had “agreed to abide” by the various security regulations.⁶³⁹

Following Travis’ preliminary work, Attlee called a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in April/May 1946 to create secure political acceptance for the initiation of the CSO concept.

3.5.5 Securing Canadian agreement

Canada’s inclusion in the CSO and the BRUSA arrangement was achieved despite Canadian suspicions of a revamped ‘Imperial Defence’ system. A subservient Canadian role in a wider imperial system ran counter to their vision of a new post-war role in which Canada, whilst still pro-British, would find a voice and security through the new United Nations.⁶⁴⁰ These sentiments led to rapid implementation of plans for a “breakneck” demobilisation of its armed forces in May 1945.⁶⁴¹ However, the discovery of an extensive Soviet spying operation in North America caused Canadian political policy-makers to reconsider security in general and the merit of continued SIGINT activities.⁶⁴²

On October 15, 1945, Travis met his US counterparts and discussed the participation of the Commonwealth. Travis was of the view that “the exclusion of Canada from the proposed agreement would be embarrassing to all concerned” and parties agreed that British Dominions should be included “within the *scope* of the Agreement.”⁶⁴³ Travis then flew to Ottawa to persuade his Canadian colleagues to progress the approval of a Canadian SIGINT operation informing the Canadians of progress in the BRUSA negotiations and reaffirming

⁶³⁹ "Minutes of Inauguration Meeting", March 11, 1946. London US-British Signal Intelligence Technical Conference. TNA, OGA, EO 1.4.(B) Item 7 Page 2.

⁶⁴⁰ Eayrs, 151-65.

⁶⁴¹ Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (McClelland & Stewart Limited, 2007), 229. For more examples see: "35,000 Men Scheduled for Occupation Force: Discharge for 65,000 Fliers," *Globe and Mail*, May 2 1945. and Stanley Sandler, *Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia*, vol. 1 (ABC-CLIO, 2002), 149.

⁶⁴² Peter St John, "Canada's Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community 1940-45," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 4, no. 4 (1984): 16-17. and Martin Rudner, "The Historical Evolution of Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capability: Cold War SIGINT Strategy and Its Legacy," *Journal of Intelligence History* 6, no. 1 (2006): 66-67.

⁶⁴³ "Joint Meeting of Army-Navy Intelligence Board & Army Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee", October, 15 1945. [Tripartite Meeting]. SS-93 34716. NSA

they “would like [Canada] to fit into [the] general plan.”⁶⁴⁴ In Ottawa, Travis secured agreement that the UK would represent Canada in the negotiations and returned to Washington.⁶⁴⁵ By November the UK and the US had outlined a draft plan that would include the Dominions with special provision for Canada.⁶⁴⁶

The following month General Foulkes, the British-born Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff (CCoS), drafted a report for the Canadian Government, arguing that “as a member of the British Commonwealth and... as an essential economic and military partner of the US,” Canada should “share the fruit of intelligence activities of the two other powers” and this would be “enhanced by Canada’s making a contribution to the pool.”⁶⁴⁷

In anticipation of the Commonwealth SIGINT Conference in April/May 1946, the CCoS had signed off their recommendation for a revamped Canadian SIGINT effort on March 28, 1946, and secured the approval of their Government.⁶⁴⁸ The UK agreed to supply the necessary equipment for a revamped Canadian-run British Commonwealth SIGINT operation as “part of the co-operative U.K.-U.S.-Canada programme in the field of interception.”⁶⁴⁹ The CANUK arrangements set out the very close collaboration plan to “synchronise” SIGINT activities.⁶⁵⁰

3.5.6 Securing Australian agreement & NZ involvement

Despite the very close Commonwealth relationship, there were UK concerns about some left-leaning members of the Australian Government. This, however, paled into insignificance when contrasted to the distrust exhibited by the US, and it threatened to wreck the foundations of the wider SIGINT alliance.

⁶⁴⁴ See: N.A. Robertson to Hume. Quoted in: Jensen, 132.

⁶⁴⁵ Rudner, 70; Jensen, 166.

⁶⁴⁶ “Outline of British-U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement.” ANCIB-London Signal Intelligence Board. JVC-39. November 1, 1945. NSA, 1945

⁶⁴⁷ Wark, 88-89.

⁶⁴⁸ Harold A Skaarup, *Out of Darkness-Light: A History of Canadian Military Intelligence*, vol. 2 (IUniverse, 2005), Chapter 5.

⁶⁴⁹ The CANUK arrangements are detailed in a telegram to Travis copied in to Foulkes by the DEA. See: Pearson to Foulkes “Hydra Communications - Policy,” November 29, 1946. Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC) RG24, 1250-36 Vol. 1

⁶⁵⁰ “Hydra Project: Note of Arrangements Between the Directorate, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, Canadian Army, And the Directorate of Special Communications, Great Britain” Hydra Communications - Policy, LAC, RG24, 1250-36 Vol. 1.

Travis clearly had reservations quite early on as to the attitude of both Ben Chifley, the Australian Prime Minister, and Herbert Evatt, the External Affairs Minister. Following his March 1945 tour to evaluate the potential for a post-WW2 SIGINT operation, Travis had concluded any preparatory groundwork for an Australian operation must avoid Evatt.⁶⁵¹ The proposal to refashion GCHQ's Australasian operations as an Australian federal operation would require the support of Sir Frederick Shedden, the trusted Secretary to the War Cabinet and "indisputably" the most powerful Australian bureaucrat.⁶⁵² Shedden was cooperative, agreed the outline concept and confirmed that Australia could be represented by GCHQ in BRUSA negotiations.⁶⁵³

Following progress with the BRUSA talks in March 1946, Shedden briefed Chifley on the broad outlines of the CSO and the merits of Australia's participation⁶⁵⁴. Chifley, now onside, attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference the following month. NZ was content to continue as part of UK-Australian SIGINT operations.

3.5.7 Launching the Commonwealth Signit Organisation (CSO)

In the October 1946 Travis travelled to Australia and NZ to progress arrangements and the following month convened a further London Commonwealth SIGINT Conference to establish the working parameters of the new organisation and the steps needed to create the Australian Defence Signals Bureau (DSB), envisaged as a largely British run operation to include NZ and headed by the former deputy of GCHQ's Far East Combined Bureau.⁶⁵⁵

With the Canadian operation in place, the inauguration of the CSO was dependent on Australian sign-off. On November 12, 1947, an Australian Cabinet Committee formally authorised Australian participation, allowing the formation of a post-imperial UK-Dominion

⁶⁵¹ Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, *The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941–45* (Springer, 1996), 129. Andrew, "Bletchley Park in Post-War Perspective."

⁶⁵² To understand the full extent of Shedden's influence see: David Horner, "Sir Frederick Shedden: The Forerunner," in *The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins: Australian Government Administration in the Post-War Reconstruction Era*, ed. Samuel Furphy (ANU Press, 2015).

⁶⁵³ See: Peter Golding, *An Unqualified Success: The Extraordinary Life of Allan Percy Fleming* (Australia: Rosenberg, 2013), Chap 9; Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, 92–94.

⁶⁵⁴ Horner, 120.

SIGINT operation based on informal bilateral arrangements between the participating parties.⁶⁵⁶

3.5.8 Granting full ‘second party’ Dominion status

A UK-US SIGINT Conference in 1948 appears to add Canada as an ad hoc ‘indirect’ second party to the BRUSA arrangement by virtue of its membership of the CSO.⁶⁵⁷ In reality, a tripartite relationship existed before then; under nominal UK oversight, CANUKUS meetings complemented UKUS meetings when necessary.⁶⁵⁸ Progress towards a direct Canada-US agreement stalled because of the implications of the Gouzenko spy issue and over Canadian-US disagreements on technical issues.⁶⁵⁹ A direct US-Canada relationship on equivalent UKUS terms was eventually realised in 1949.⁶⁶⁰ By 1950 tripartite meetings were being held in Washington to allocate tasks and with the UK diverting copies of US Arctic intelligence data to Canada with US consent.⁶⁶¹

The admission of Australia into BRUSA was as an indirect second party (via the UK) and the Australian SIGINT operation was heavily dependent on GCHQ’s operations. The US acknowledged the nature of the ‘Australian’ operation in their US UKUSA planning notes in 1961.

⁶⁵⁵ See:Aid and Wiebes, 76.

⁶⁵⁶ For a more detailed account see: Nicky Hager, *The Origins of Signals Intelligence in New Zealand*, Centre for Peace Studies (Wellington: Auckland University, 1995), 17-18; Ian Elvins Pfennigwerth, *Missing Pieces: The Intelligence Jigsaw and RAN Operations 1939-71* (Sea Power Centre-Australia, Department of Defence, 2008), 239-40; Nicky Hager, *Secret Power* (Craig Potton, 1996), 61; Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire* (Abrams, 2014), 151.

⁶⁵⁷ In 1948 BRUSA appendices reflected the change to SIGINT work undertaken by UK & Canada. See: “Tabular Comparison of Appendices to US-British COMINT Agreement.” As approved at 1946 and 1948 US-Technical COMINT Conferences. Edited by Section 3. Appendix H.

Also: “British Technical COMINT Conference of 15th-26th July 1948 for the Implementation of the US-British COMINT Agreement.” Appendices. NSA

⁶⁵⁸ O’Neill and Hughes, 5.

⁶⁵⁹ The US terminated talks about the possibility of a Canadian-US SIGINT agreement in October 1945 until such time security could be guaranteed. See:Johnson, 18; Matthew M Aid, *The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency* (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2009), 13.

⁶⁶⁰ Crean to Cabell letter. May 27, 1949, Communications Research Committee [Canada] LAC, Ottawa.

⁶⁶¹ O’Neill and Hughes, 7-8.

The Melbourne SIGINT (MSIC) is, in contrast to the Communications Branch at Ottawa, not a purely national centre. It is and will continue to be a joint UK-Australia-New Zealand organisation, manned by an integrated staff.⁶⁶²

Even when Australia (DSD) and NZ (New Zealand Combined Signals Organisation) achieved direct second party status within BRUSA around 1955-56, the operations still featured a strong UK presence.⁶⁶³ The long delay in achieving direct second party status for Australia was due to a profound lack of US confidence in Australian domestic security. As discussed earlier, it was compounded by deteriorating personal relations amongst the US-Australian political-makers.

This roots of mistrust related to a US SIGINT project codenamed Venona, which by 1947 had succeeded in decoding a backlog of WW2 Soviet diplomatic cables. It identified a leak of sensitive material from within the Australian Department of External Affairs (DEA) to the Soviet Embassy in Canberra. The US informed their UK counterparts but demanded the discovery be kept from the Australians to avoid alerting active Soviet spies. The US blocked full inclusion of Australia in SIGINT arrangements.⁶⁶⁴ Aiming to ensure a discreet investigation, the UK tipped off the Australian Chiefs of Staff and they in turn pressured Shedden for action, but without results principally because Australia had no MI5 equivalent to conduct enquiries.⁶⁶⁵

Attlee intervened directly, seeking to avoid any involvement with Evatt as the minister heading the DEA and dispatched Sir Percy Sillitoe, Head of MI5 to meet Chifley in February 1948. US insistence that Venona must not be revealed compromised Sillitoe's ability to offer convincing evidence. He informed a sceptical Chifley that there were indications of a Soviet operation "along the lines of the Canadian case, though not necessarily of that size."⁶⁶⁶ Chifley remained unconvinced and informed Attlee in April 1948 that "in the absence of full particulars" he had concluded that the suggestion of spying was likely to be Soviet

⁶⁶² "Final Recommendation of the Technical Conference 11-27 March 1946. Technical Conference for the Implementation of the US-British Communications Intelligence Agreement. Top Secret "Cream". NSA

⁶⁶³ See: NSA, *Cryptologic Almanac 50th Anniversary: Six Decades of Second Party Relations.*, Declassified and Approved for Release by the NSA, February 27 (2007). and Filer, 2.

⁶⁶⁴ Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, 82.

⁶⁶⁵ Golding, Chap 9.

⁶⁶⁶ Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, 86.

disinformation, and believed existing precautions were sufficient.⁶⁶⁷ With no progress, the US informed the UK they would cease sharing technical defence information with the UK until Australian security was addressed.⁶⁶⁸

Attlee pressed upon Chifley of the level of US mistrust and the paramount need to address the issue of internal security.⁶⁶⁹ In July 1948, an irritated Chifley met the UK Defence Minister in London and agreed to consider the creation of a domestic counter-intelligence resource with the assistance of MI5.⁶⁷⁰ More pressure was required before Chifley finally announced the establishment of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in March 1949 with a brief to investigate the Soviet spy network.⁶⁷¹ Chifley remained unconvinced and complained in cabinet that “the prejudice in American circles against Australian security” had become a “psychological” problem.⁶⁷²

At this point the conditions for the development of an intelligence based security community involving both Australia and the US were becoming less auspicious. With Chifley’s consent, Attlee arranged for Shedden to meet Truman personally to reassure the President by explaining the robust nature of the newly implemented Australian internal security arrangements.⁶⁷³ Attlee wrote to Truman expressing his hope that “full and frank” discussions would lead to a solution.⁶⁷⁴ In Washington, Shedden met a “wall of distrust” and made no headway.⁶⁷⁵ A CIA briefing report for Shedden’s visit warned that security remained a concern and highlighted Communist sympathies in the Labor and Trade Union movement,

⁶⁶⁷ Daniel WB Lomas, *Intelligence, Security and the Attlee Governments, 1945–51: An Uneasy Relationship?* (Manchester University Press, 2016), 233-34.

⁶⁶⁸ Frank Cain, *The Australian Security Intelligence Organization: An Unofficial History* (Psychology Press, 1994), 39-41.

⁶⁶⁹ Director of Intelligence Office (McDonald) to Secretary of the US Air Force, Operations. “Conversations with British Representatives Concerning British Collaboration with Australia and NZ on Communications Intelligence Activities.” January 2, 1948, USAF, Air Force Plans Project Decimal File, 1942–1954, Box 741A

⁶⁷⁰ Frank Cain, “Venona in Australia and Its Long-Term Ramifications,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 2 (2000): 234-35.

⁶⁷¹ Cain, *The Australian Security Intelligence Organization: An Unofficial History*, 54.

⁶⁷² “Exchange of Information with the United States.” Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street S.W.1 (London). April 27, 1949. TNA, CAB 130/46. #1613

⁶⁷³ Cain, *The Australian Security Intelligence Organization: An Unofficial History*, 69.

⁶⁷⁴ Phillip Deery, “Science, Security and the Cold War: An Australian Dimension,” *War & Society* 17, no. 1 (1999): 93.

⁶⁷⁵ Shedden to Chifley, “Restoration of Flow of Classified Information,” May 10, 1949. National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), A5954, 1795/1 For a detailed account of Shedden’s reception Cain, *The Australian Security Intelligence Organization: An Unofficial History*, 65-75.

noting Evatt's brother had been the President of "a Communist Front Organisation."⁶⁷⁶ These security concerns were overlaid by a US perception that the Australian Government harboured a general feeling of ill-will towards the US. The US chargé to Australia reported the Labor Government,

was extremely jealous of the independent position of Australia, suspicious of what it regards as American economic imperialism, and determined not to be pushed around, and yet, the Labor Government operated on the complacent assumption that when the next war comes, if it does, the United States will bail them out just as it did last time.⁶⁷⁷

Trust was eroding and wider shared outlooks in danger of dissolving. With the US perceived as being obstructive, Chifley grew increasingly angry, threatening to pull the Australian troop contingent out of occupied Japan.⁶⁷⁸ When it seemed possible that the US might resume sharing intelligence sharing with the UK, but exclude Australia, Chifley raged the US and UK should be told, "go to Hades, repeat Hades, and let us know the date they are going."⁶⁷⁹

The viability of security communities depends on the participants to overcome disagreements and it is likely that common outlooks and the relationship with the UK would have facilitated a solution ultimately. Either way, the issue was resolved by the Australian 1949 Federal Election resulting in a victory for the opposition led by Robert Menzies.⁶⁸⁰ Menzies advocated a tough line on communism and was committed to ally Australia "firmly with the UK and US" in "the coming inevitable shooting war with the Soviet Union."⁶⁸¹ As such, it could be seen as the reassertion of the Australian electorate's identification with and desire for an Anglospheric arrangement that included the US. In office, Menzies accelerated the ASIO investigations into the Australian Venona spy network, addressing US concerns and

⁶⁷⁶ CIA, Report: Communist Influence in Australia, Ore-9-49. 1949 Washington, ii,5 & 7.

⁶⁷⁷ Joseph M Siracusa, *Diplomacy: A Very Short Introduction*, vol. 242 (Oxford University Press, 2010), 92.

⁶⁷⁸ Peter Wilson, "Ben Chifley Threatened to Pull out of Japan," *Australian*, April 4 2011.

⁶⁷⁹ Chifley to Shedden 377, Cablegram 3004, Canberra, July 15, 1949, NAA, A5954, 1795/3

⁶⁸⁰ Frank Cain, "Australian Intelligence Organisations and the Law: A Brief History," *UNSWLJ* 27 (2004): 302-03.

⁶⁸¹ See: Laurence W Maher and Laurence Maher, "The Lapstone Experiment and the Beginnings of Asio," *Labour History*, no. 64 (1993): 114; Robert Menzies, *Election Speech - Liberal/Country Coalition*, ed. Australian Election Speeches (Melbourne1949).

allowing the inclusion of Australia into the BRUSA Agreement.⁶⁸² The inclusion of Australia and NZ into the SIGINT arrangements during 1955-56 had created the first significant Anglosphere Core quintilateral security arrangement.

3.5.9 Creating other intelligence fora

The SIGINT arrangements constitute the most obvious example of an Anglospheric security related structure, however, other relationships developed too. In parallel with the CSO, the UK encouraged the creation of Commonwealth intelligence bureaux focussed on military intelligence and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) each run by the constituent member states.⁶⁸³ By 1948, the London Joint Intelligence Bureau acted as the nodal point for an international Commonwealth Joint Intelligence Bureaux coordinating the Commonwealth JIB operations (CJIB).⁶⁸⁴ The key facilitator was Sir Kenneth Strong, another significant member of the military establishment during WW2, having served as Assistant Chief of Intelligence to Eisenhower.⁶⁸⁵ With his pro-American outlook, Strong encouraged links between the UK JIB and the US and later the constituent national agencies of CJIB and the US Joint Intelligence Committee (JIIC) that included the JCS and the CIA.⁶⁸⁶ The establishment of a permanent NZ operation in 1950 within the CJIB resulted in an arrangement whereby each CJIB member had direct relations with their US counterparts in a loose quintilateral arrangement.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸² Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, 98.

⁶⁸³ "Visit to Singapore, Australia and New Zealand by the Director Joint Intelligence Bureau," February 5, 1947 TNA, CAB 176/14. Hager, *The Origins of Signals Intelligence in New Zealand*, 20; Huw Dylan, "The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World," *Intelligence and National Security* 27, no. 1 (2012): 36.

⁶⁸⁴ "The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World," 37.

⁶⁸⁵ Kenneth Campbell, "General Eisenhower's J-2: Major General Kenneth Strong, British Army Intelligence," *American Intelligence Journal* 17, no. 3/4 (1997).

⁶⁸⁶ "Interchange of Intelligence with the U.S.A." 11 April 1946. TNA CAB 176/10.

The JIIC later became the Joint Watch Committee. See: "Fact Sheet - IAC Watch Committee." FRUS, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, November 8, 1951. Document #91. For evidence of continued Anglospheric liaison see: "Proposed Visit of the Secretary of the U.S. Watch Committee" May 7, 1953. TNA, CAB, 159/13.

⁶⁸⁷ Hager, *The Origins of Signals Intelligence in New Zealand*, 21. See also: David Filer, "The Joint Intelligence Office, the Joint Intelligence Bureau and the External Intelligence Bureau, 1949–1980," *Security and Surveillance History series* 3 (2016); Michael S Goodman, "The Foundations of Anglo-American Intelligence Sharing," *The National Intelligence Council* 59, no. 2 (2015).

3.6 Fulton: Imagining the Community

3.6.1 Introduction

The agreement to collaborate on SIGINT was not in itself indicative of an emergent security community of any depth. The SIGINT arrangements with the UK stood in contrast to the general thrust of the Truman administration's demobilisation stance and the unravelling of Roosevelt's commitments.⁶⁸⁸ The attempt to continue atomic collaboration had faltered and there remained an element of US thinking indifferent or hostile to an alliance with 'imperialist Britain', including a President who appeared agnostic.

For a security community to develop it requires a feeling of 'we-ness' and often an external threat to act as a trigger.⁶⁸⁹ As discussed in the previous chapter, there was a strong meme-complex based on 'English-speaking' values that could facilitate continued post-War cooperation if properly invoked. Although in opposition, Churchill commanded great respect in the US and could be wielded in the struggle to shape opinion; stressing the Soviet threat whilst elevating the common traditions and values upon which a strategic alliance could be built.

3.6.2 The 'Long Telegram' and the deployment of Kennan

In early February 1946, Stalin delivered an anti-western speech declaring that capitalism and communism could not coexist.⁶⁹⁰ For many in US policy and opinion forming circles, these speeches laid bare Soviet intentions.⁶⁹¹ As such, the speeches acted as a 'trigger,' highlighting an external threat and facilitating calls for the kind of military alliances that underpin a security community. The US Chargé de Affairs in Moscow, George Kennan,

⁶⁸⁸ In particular, lend-lease and nuclear collaboration.

⁶⁸⁹ For a discussion on "we-ness" see: Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 6. For we-ness "triggers" see Adler and Barnett, 62, 7 & 50.

⁶⁹⁰ Albert L Weeks, *Myths of the Cold War: Amending Historiographic Distortions* (Lexington Books, 2014), 121-25; William J Daugherty, "Truman's Iranian Policy, 1945-1953: The Soviet Calculus," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 15, no. 4 (2002): 580; Richard Rhodes and Lorna Arnold, "Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb," *Nature* 376, no. 6540 (1995): 233-35.

⁶⁹¹ Robert L Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* (UNC Press Books, 2017), 181-94.

responded with the “long telegram,” warning of Soviet objectives and tactics and thereby initiating a shift among elements of US policy-makers.⁶⁹² Kennan highlighted a Soviet attempt to divide the UK and US.

Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk amongst the British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not ignited....⁶⁹³

Keenan argued it was imperative for “our public” to be “educated to the realities of the Russian situation: I cannot over-empathise the importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be mainly done by Government.”⁶⁹⁴ Kennan’s report galvanised the realist ‘Riga’ elements within the Truman administration, but it did not dramatically shift Administration foreign policy.⁶⁹⁵ Forrestal distributed copies of the report within his department and made plans to utilise Keenan in the US.⁶⁹⁶ The Report was not universally accepted in the military, and for example General Lucius Clay took exception to its “British line” and advocated an “America First” stance.⁶⁹⁷ Forrestal was not deterred and proceeded to second Keenan to General Hoyt Vanderberg (US signatory to BRUSA), now heading the embryonic CIA (Central Intelligence Group⁶⁹⁸). Keenan was thereafter deployed to engage military and civilian opinion formers.⁶⁹⁹

Those of a Riga mindset appreciated that public opinion was susceptible to the views of ‘Peace Now’ sentiments espoused by the likes of Henry Wallace who favoured fraternal

⁶⁹² Andrew J Falk, *Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940-1960* (University of Massachusetts Press, 2010), 72; James R Arnold and Roberta Wiener, *Understanding US Military Conflicts through Primary Sources [4 Volumes]* (ABC-CLIO, 2015), 279.

⁶⁹³ US Embassy Moscow, “Keenan to US Sec State: Moscow Via War [the ‘Long Telegram’] 8963, February 22, ,” (1946), 14.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁵ See: Elizabeth Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism* (University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 31-34.

⁶⁹⁶ Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (Simon and Schuster, 1997), 486; Mayers, *The Ambassadors and America’s Soviet Policy*, 161.

⁶⁹⁷ Yergin, 212.

⁶⁹⁸ Michael Warner, “The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group,” (Washington DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1996), 117.

⁶⁹⁹ See: David Felix, *Kennan and the Cold War: An Unauthorized Biography* (Transaction Publishers, 2015), 47-49; Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life*, 231-32; Lori Lyn Bogle, *The Cold War: National Security Policy Planning from Truman to Reagan and from Stalin to Gorbachev*, vol. 2 (Taylor & Francis, 2001), 1337; Donald E Davis and Eugene P Trani, *Distorted Mirrors*:

friendship with the Soviets. They recognised that without a decisive shift in public opinion in favour of closer British-US conventional security arrangements, Truman would not likely endorse an alignment. The imminent demise of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CSS) once World War 2 was officially declared ended would unravel the wartime mechanisms that facilitated collaboration. A more dramatic intervention would be required to bring about a change in US public attitudes to the Soviet threat and kindle Anglospheric communal feelings.

3.6.3 Fulton Manœuvres and the “Sinews of Peace”

Just one month following the Long Telegram, Churchill delivered his ‘Sinews of Peace’ speech at Fulton, Missouri. He professed a desire for peace with the Soviets, but referred to an ‘Iron Curtain’ descending on Europe and called for close and ongoing ‘fraternal’ alliances of the English-speaking peoples as a defensive response. In crafting the speech, Churchill involved various British, Canadian and US policy-makers and such it constituted a conscious effort to articulate a security community based on common cultural outlooks with support of the UK Government.⁷⁰⁰

3.6.4 British support for a security community

In another example of the special relationship of friends the war had created, Frank Roberts, the British chargé d'affaires in Moscow was an intimate of Keenan.⁷⁰¹ Kennan provided Roberts with a ‘in confidence’ copy of his telegram for transmission to London.⁷⁰² When the Foreign Office requested a British viewpoint on the Soviet situation, Roberts echoed Kennan’s points, emphasising the need to maintain a special relationship with the US.⁷⁰³

Americans and Their Relations with Russia and China in the Twentieth Century (University of Missouri Press, 2009), 145-46.

⁷⁰⁰ Ramsden suggests it was contrived. See: John Ramsden, *Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and His Legend since 1945* (Columbia University Press, 2002), 156.

⁷⁰¹ Ovendale, *The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945-1951*, 38.

⁷⁰² Roberts to Warner (FO) 2nd March 1946. TNA, FO 371 56840 N3369/971/38

⁷⁰³ Sean Greenwood, "Frank Roberts and the Other Long Telegram: The View from the British Embassy in Moscow, March 1946," *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 1 (1990): 114.

There is evidence that the broad content of Churchill's proposals were condoned by the UK Government who adopted a policy of 'plausible denial' should the reaction be unfavourable.⁷⁰⁴ Attlee and Bevin frequently consulted Churchill on foreign policy matters.⁷⁰⁵ Of relevance was the Bevin's request for advice on matters pertaining to US-UK divergences over Japan, Churchill responded by outlining the need for intimate relations with the US and the institutional form it should take.

The long-term advantage to Britain and the Commonwealth is to have our affairs so interwoven with those of the United States in external and strategic matters, that any idea of war between the two countries utterly impossible and that in fact, however the matter may be worded, we stand or fall together...

The Joint Association of the Great British Commonwealth and the United States in the large number of islands and bases will make it indispensable to preserve indefinitely the organisation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. From this should flow, the continued interchange of military and scientific information and Intelligence, and also, I hope, similarity and interchangeability of weapons, command manuals of instruction for the armed forces, inter-related plans for the war mobilisation of civil industry, and finally, interchange of officers at schools and college...

In all necessary action you should count on me, if I can be of any use.⁷⁰⁶

Bevin's memo to Attlee on February 13, 1946, outlines a distinct shift in UK tactics that accords with the modus operandi expressed in the Fulton speech just three weeks later,

I believe an entirely new approach is required, and that it can only be based upon a very close understanding between ourselves and the Americans. My idea is that we should start with an integration of British and American armaments and an agreement restricting undesirable competition between our respective armament industries.⁷⁰⁷

⁷⁰⁴ Ramsden, 168.

⁷⁰⁵ See: "Mr. Churchill Goes to Fulton," *Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech fifty years later* (1999): 36.

⁷⁰⁶ Churchill to Bevin, 13 November 1945. Quoted in Gilbert, 8, Chap 9.

⁷⁰⁷ Bevin to Attlee, 13 February 1946. TNA, FO 800/451, Folder 44, Def/46/3

Attlee's biographer, John Bew, concludes the UK Government was aware of the speech's contents, and Arnold and Weiner conclude Attlee had "quietly cleared" the speech.⁷⁰⁸ Churchill had meetings at the British Embassy in which Halifax made drafting suggestions.⁷⁰⁹

3.6.5 North American support for a security community

The ramifications of the Gouzenko Affair ensured Canadian support for a tripartite security arrangement beyond just BRUSA.⁷¹⁰ Any other moves that stressed their role as a 'hinge' between the US and UK were to be welcomed but still resting on the past consensual approach of Commonwealth cooperation. Lester Pearson, then Ambassador to Washington, assisted in changes to the speech and in a call between King and Churchill, the Canadian PM made the suggestions incorporating references to his own Ogdensburg [PJBD] Treaty speech duly incorporated as the modus operandi for future military 'fraternal associations.'⁷¹¹

Prior to Churchill's Fulton speech, both Admiral Leahy (Truman's Chief of Staff) and Secretary of State, Byrnes visited the British Embassy to read the speech and make suggestions. Leahy was "enthusiastic" and Byrnes "excited," no changes were considered necessary.⁷¹² Truman, having read a mimeographed reproduction of the speech given to him by Churchill on their shared train journey to Fulton declared it admirable.⁷¹³ Later Truman was to disingenuously deny he had read the 'original' speech (just a stencil copy) and not expressed an opinion on the original at any point.⁷¹⁴

3.6.6 North American reaction

The reaction of the Canadian policy-establishment was positive. King praised Churchill's speech, reaffirming that the Ogdensburg Treaty's informal nature was the correct basis for

⁷⁰⁸ See See Bew, 418; Arnold and Wiener, 280; Yergin, 175.

⁷⁰⁹ See: Ramsden, *Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and His Legend since 1945*, 170-71; Harbutt, 180.

⁷¹⁰ David Bercuson, "'A People So Ruthless as the Soviets': Canadian Images of the Cold War and the Soviet Union, 1946-1950," *Canada and the Soviet Experiment: Essays on Canadian Encounters with Russia and the Soviet Union* (1991): 91-92.

⁷¹¹ Pickersgill and Forster, 189.

⁷¹² Jacob R. Weaver, "The Rhetoric of Cold War: Churchill's 1946 Fulton Speech," *Churchill Project* (2018), https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/rhetoric-churchill-fulton-address/#_ftn57.

⁷¹³ Ramsden, "Mr. Churchill Goes to Fulton," 42.

new alliances. King telephoned Churchill, and finding Truman was present, spoke to him, endorsed the speech and stressed, “we must all work very closely together... the US, the UK, Canada and other parts... what Churchill said was very opportune”⁷¹⁵

In Moscow, both Canadian Ambassador Wilgress and his deputy Smith, had recanted their previous naiveté adopted an increasing hardline approach.⁷¹⁶ A month after Fulton Wilgress was warning that the Soviets would attempt to systemically exploit “the lack of cohesion between the Anglo-Saxon powers and... the vagaries of United States foreign policy.”⁷¹⁷ In the aftermath of Gouzenko and Fulton, there was a dramatic negative shift in public attitudes in favour of new security arrangements to fend off a perceived Soviet to Soviets threat.⁷¹⁸

In the US the reactions to the speech from the ‘peace camp’ were predictable with headlines such as “Churchill Harms Peace” and “Churchill’s Call For World Domination.”⁷¹⁹ Wallace denounced the speech calling it “loaded with dynamite.”⁷²⁰ Liberal senators accused Churchill of aligning “himself with the old Chamberlain Tories who strengthened the Nazis as part of their anti-Soviet crusade.” Moreover, an alliance “would cut the throat” of the UN and the idea of balancing ‘blocs’ represented “a thing of the past”.⁷²¹

Truman declined to associate himself with the idea of an alliance.⁷²² Byrnes attempted to backtrack too, leading to a sarcastic response in Cabinet from a frustrated Forrestal.⁷²³ Only Leahy remained solid, referring to the authority of Anglospheric states’ resting on a moral

⁷¹⁴ See: Harbutt, 180; Ramsden, *Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and His Legend since 1945*; Pickersgill and Forster, 280; Byrnes, 349.

⁷¹⁵ See: Pickersgill and Forster, 207-08; Spalding, Chapter 2,fn12.

⁷¹⁶ Bercuson; David Davies, *Canada and the Soviet Experiment: Essays on Canadian Encounters with Russia and the Soviet Union, 1900-1991* (Canadian Scholars' Press, 1992), 89-103 & 41-43; Glazov, 4, 11.

⁷¹⁷ Wilgress to Reid, 24 April 1946, DCER Vol. XII, Ottawa. 2055-2056

⁷¹⁸ JL Granatstein, “Changing Alliances: Canada and the Soviet Union, 1939-1945,” *Canada and the Soviet Experiment: Essays on Canadian Encounters with Russia and the Soviet-Union* (1994): 85.

⁷¹⁹ “Churchill Harms Peace,” *NYT*, March 19 1946; “Churchill’s Call for World Domination,” *Chicago Sun*, March 6 1946.

⁷²⁰ “Speech ‘Shocking’ to Wallace,” *NYT*, March 8 1946 1946; Yergin, 175.

⁷²¹ “Sniping at Russia Attacked by Ickes,” *NYT*, March 15 1946. For an overview see: Muller.

⁷²² See Ovendale, *The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945-1951*, 39; Harry S Truman and Winston Churchill, *Defending the West: The Truman-Churchill Correspondence, 1945-1960* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 160.

⁷²³ Pickersgill and Forster, 280.

legitimacy, or as he put it, “the righteousness of power in the English speaking world.”⁷²⁴ Forrestal’s favoured correspondent, Arthur Krock noted that although the President claimed not to know the contents of the speech

it can be confidently assumed that Mr. Truman was willing to have this trial balloon sent up, reserving judgement what to think and do about it until he had the opportunity to see how it fared in troubled skies...⁷²⁵

The ‘trial balloon’ served to demonstrate that a body of liberal sentiment was wholeheartedly against any alliance with the British. To make matters worse on March 6, Acheson had been obliged to inform the British that the agreements with Truman on nuclear collaboration were worthless.⁷²⁶ Truman initiated a secret meeting with Sovietophile Joseph Davies, assuring him he was working for peace and would soon reach out to the Soviet Union. In late March 1946 Truman instructed his new Ambassador to Moscow, Walter Bedell Smith, to convey a secret message inviting Stalin to the US.⁷²⁷ Smith duly informed a bemused Stalin that Truman believed, “there was no nation in the world with whom we were more interested in arriving at the basis of understanding than that of Russia.”⁷²⁸

The view of the JCS on Truman’s reliability is revealed in a message sent by Maitland-Wilson to the British CoS in the aftermath of Churchill’s visit. Maitland-Wilson reported his US counterparts were adamant there must be a continuation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CSS) arrangement and informal collaboration on security until circumstances changed.⁷²⁹ These would change in August/September of 1946, following Field Marshal Montgomery’s North American tour.

⁷²⁴ Yergin, 176.

⁷²⁵ Arthur Krock, "Washington Splits over Churchill," *NY Times*, March 13 1946.

⁷²⁶ See previous chapter

⁷²⁷ Without State Dept. knowledge, see: J Philipp Rosenberg, "The Cheshire Ultimatum: Truman's Message to Stalin in the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis," *The Journal of Politics* 41, no. 3 (1979): 937.

⁷²⁸ "Truman Invited Stalin to Make Fulton Speech," *NY Times*, February 6 1948. For Bedell Smith’s account see: Daniel KR Crosswell, *Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith* (University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 20-21.

⁷²⁹ Julian Lewis, *Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-47* (Routledge, 2002), iv.

3.7 The Birth of a Tripartite Nexus: Séquoia

3.7.1 Informal collaboration - US-UK

Informal military collaboration with Britain continued. One such example was the arrangement between US Airforce Chief, General Spaatz and his British counterpart and wartime colleague Air Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder.⁷³⁰ The “Spaatz-Tedder” agreement in June/July 1946 allowed for the stationing of US aircraft equipped with atomic weapons in UK bases.⁷³¹ Samuel Hamrick highlights the importance of the social links binding the military-policy makers as a collegial network of US and British air force professionals bound together by their wartime service and years of mutual cooperation and trust...⁷³² The motivations of Spaatz and the JCS included a belief that the UK and Canada would form part of a security community in the near future.⁷³³ Simon Duke has suggested these arrangements were sanctioned without the authority of either Government and in contradiction to the official policy that the USAF was leaving Britain.⁷³⁴ However, as Ball has revealed, an examination of the Berlin Crisis and plans for mobilisation reveals that both the US Ambassador and the UK Cabinet were aware of these arrangements at least by 1948.⁷³⁵ In short, an invisible security arrangement existed based on shared outlooks, threat perceptions and personal relationships.

3.7.2 The Canadian dimension

Less contentious within the US political establishment was the need for enhanced US homeland security and the Arctic approaches would necessarily involve increased cooperation with Canada. A Canada-US Planning Committee had been established to explore the possibility of a joint defensive system of early warning bases, communications facilities,

⁷³⁰ Ken Young, "The American Bomb in Britain: US Air Forces' Strategic Presence, 1946–64," (2016): 17.

⁷³¹ Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe* (Oxford University Press on Demand, 1989), 294-95.

John Baylis, *Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 69-70.

⁷³² Samuel J Hamrick, *Deceiving the Deceivers: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, and Guy Burgess* (Yale University Press, 2008), 175.

⁷³³ Simon Duke, *US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: A Matter for Joint Decision?* (Springer, 1986), 26.

⁷³⁴ Ibid.

⁷³⁵ Simon J Ball, "Military Nuclear Relations between the United States and Great Britain under the Terms of the McMahon Act, 1946–1958," *The Historical Journal* 38, no. 2 (1995): 442.

garrisons and a command structure.⁷³⁶ This ‘Basic Security Plan’ was endorsed by the Canadian military in June 1946, but details leaked and the media denounced the plan as endangering Canada and constituted “a virtual ultimatum from the US,” that, “would mean Canada had, in effect, abdicated sovereignty along her northern border.”⁷³⁷ Put in these terms the idea proved unpopular with Canadian public opinion.⁷³⁸

In the context of security community theory, Canada could be seen as a part of two overlapping security communities or ‘zones of peace’ – a declining imperial network and a north American community. Whilst the Basic Security Plan arguably made military sense, its bilateralism conjured up the spectre of US domination.⁷³⁹ Mackenzie King worried Canada would be unable to avoid US policies that would result in taking “Canada out of the orbit of the British Commonwealth of Nations into their own [US] orbit.”⁷⁴⁰ As outlined earlier, from King’s perspective, geopolitical considerations required the inclusion of the UK within a new security community to ‘balance’ against the US in a ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ acting as the ‘hinge’ or pivot between the other two partners.⁷⁴¹

The CCoS presentation to King and Cabinet members succeeded in not just highlighting the inadequacy of Canada’s military defences, but also (unintentionally) the subsequent Canadian subservience to the US that the Basic Plan entailed. King recorded,

I drew out how the whole business had been worked out between the planning committee here and opposite numbers in Washington. That up to the present the British had not been brought into the matter excepting something of the kind was underway. I said there must be the fullest exchange of views with the British on the whole matter of defence. It was perfectly clear that the UK, the US, and Canada must

⁷³⁶ See: Eayrs, 381-88.

⁷³⁷ KR Wilson, “Canada ‘Another Belgium’ in U.S. Air Bases Proposal? Hear Washington Insists Dominion’s Northern Frontier Be Fortified - ‘Atomic Age Maginot Line’ Is Feared”, *Financial Post*, June 29 1946.

⁷³⁸ Dziuban, 337.

⁷³⁹ In SC Theory terminology this might lead to an ‘amalgamated’ version or at the very least a lop-sided ‘pluralistic’ type.

⁷⁴⁰ John Whitney Pickersgill and Donald F Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record: 1939-1944*, vol. 1 (University of Toronto Press, 1960), 241. For a further elaboration see: Eayrs, Chap 6.

⁷⁴¹ See: David G Haglund, “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: (Geo) Political Metaphor and the Logic of Canadian Foreign Policy,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 29, no. 2 (1999): 215,

all work together... The great thing was for Canada to be the *link* that would keep the other two great powers united.⁷⁴²

Later, when matters progressed, King was to say, “Canada itself is getting to be the pivot — the pivotal point of union between these two great countries.”⁷⁴³ When King was in London in May 1946, he had unofficial discussions with Montgomery, the designate Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS).⁷⁴⁴ In the same month, a British Cabinet Defence Committee proposal had been finalised and advocated a British Canadian approach to the US to bring about a tripartite standardisation of equipment and military doctrine.⁷⁴⁵ King agreed that Montgomery should visit Canada and meet with his military. In September 1946, Montgomery flew to Canada for talks with the CCoS on closer integration between Britain and Canada.⁷⁴⁶ During these discussions, it was decided to ‘kick-start’ wider collaboration with the US by securing a Presidential meeting and possible endorsement for tripartite military collaboration. This would involve Montgomery acting as a representative for Canada and holding out the prospect of PJBD progress on US bases in Canada, an issue on which US State Department was desirous for progress and on which King had stalled.⁷⁴⁷ Foulkes laid out how the plan would work, advising King,

19-24. Also Canadian Cabinet: “Canada-US Joint Defence: planning policy.” Items 12 & 13 Page 4, 20th June 1946. RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2638, Item Number: 7046

⁷⁴² Pickersgill and Forster, 627.

⁷⁴³ Eayrs, 349.

⁷⁴⁴ Office of Prime Minister [Canada] to Mackenzie King. “Meeting with Field Marshall Montgomery in London.” May 19, 1946. Canadian Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter DHH), C212641

⁷⁴⁵ “Item 7. Standardisation of Equipment between the UK, US and Canada.” May 8, 1946. TNA, CAB 79/48/2, DCOS (46) 147(Final)

⁷⁴⁶ Bernard Law Montgomery, “Viscount Montgomery of Alamein,” *The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery of Alamein, KG* (1958): 401,42 -43; Jack Brayley, “Monty Has Talk with H.Q. Staff,” *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, August 29 1946; “Philosophy of Soldier Described by Montgomery,” *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, August 29 1946.

⁷⁴⁷ This ploy succeeded as the State Department believed the Canadians would immediately proceed with the PJBD base proposals. “Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman,” October 26, 1946. *FRUS, 1946, the British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe, Volume V*.

we thought there would be no harm in your saying to the Field Marshall that he might intimate in Washington that he had approached the Canadian authorities informally and learned that they were in general agreement with the UK's views.⁷⁴⁸

Foulkes arranged a meeting for Montgomery with King who, in line with his idea of balancing the US, gave his consent and authority to intimate that there could be progress on the Arctic bases.⁷⁴⁹ Montgomery was now able to proceed to the US, able to tempt the State Department and therefore Truman with the possibility of progress on Arctic bases whilst gaining consent for tripartite military standardisation.⁷⁵⁰

Montgomery informed the British CoS that the meetings with his Canadian counterparts had gone well and asked, “if there was any Whitehall objection to my discussing the matter [standardisation] in Washington.”⁷⁵¹ Montgomery received a reply (on September 5) from the British Chiefs of Staff in Whitehall, giving an ‘okay’ to raise the matter of standardisation with Eisenhower.

3.7.3 UK-US Discussions

Montgomery arrived in the US on September 10 and made aware that Forrestal and Patterson were fully supportive. The suggestion was Montgomery should raise ‘standardisation’ directly with the President in the Oval Office.⁷⁵² This would avoid Patterson and Forrestal becoming embroiled in a countermove by Wallace and Presidential indecision. This meeting was likely arranged by Admiral Leahy on the basis Montgomery could help progress the stalled US proposals for Arctic bases with Canada. At the Whitehouse meeting, Montgomery suggested that, having discussed matters with Eisenhower and King, both agreed the time was right to begin discussions “covering the whole field of defence” adding, “if the Heads of State would merely give their approval, the military staffs would get on with

⁷⁴⁸ Heaney to King, “Memorandum for the Prime Minister, Re Standardisation of military equipment between the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.” September 5, 1946. WLM King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol 307. 1 & 2

⁷⁴⁹ Douglas, Abbott [Minister National Defence - Canada]. “Notes re conversation at Laurier House between the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Montgomery, Lt General Foulkes and the Minister of National Defence, 9th September 1946: Charles Foulkes, WLM King Papers.

⁷⁵⁰ This recommendation came with the proviso the bases be temporary and include Canadian staff. See: “Minutes of the 362nd meeting of the CSC,” September 5, 1946. DHH File 112.3M2 (D331)

⁷⁵¹ Montgomery, 401.

the job at once." Truman replied, "That's okay by me."⁷⁵³ Truman's consent was not indicative of a profound personal shift in favour of UK-US military collaboration. Unbeknown to Forrestal, Patterson and the JCS, Truman had just authorised Byrnes to offer the Soviets a bilateral twenty-five-year treaty of joint defence against Germany.⁷⁵⁴

Within hours of the Presidential sanction, Montgomery, Patterson and Forrestal met to lay-out topics for substantive Anglo-US talks scheduled for September 16.⁷⁵⁵ Before this could happen however, the political fall-out they had sought to avoid occurred. Its outcome was to prove definitive. Montgomery's attempt to present the military arrangements as little more than the adoption of US standards for UK troops' barracks and regulations was not entirely successful. Although the US media accepted the low-key 'standardisation' characterisation, other parties were not convinced. The Soviets declared it "definite military alliance or agreement."⁷⁵⁶ The news caused shock in France, with the New York Times reporting "the impression here [in Paris] was this implied a permanent military cooperation of the two English-speaking powers."⁷⁵⁷

Truman sought to downplay matters, "there was nothing, so far as I know, significant about it except a friendly gesture between two allies."⁷⁵⁸ As with the Fulton Speech, Truman was playing it both ways. A day before the Montgomery visit, Wallace had met the President to discuss a speech at a forthcoming electoral rally on September 12. Wallace intended to stray in foreign and security matters and energise Democrats by repudiating the notion of a Soviet threat and talking up British 'imperialism.' According to Wallace, the President not only endorsed the sentiments, but declared them in-line with Administration policy. He

⁷⁵² Ibid., 404.

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁴ Joseph Davies Diaries September 10, 1946 quoted in: Larson, 228. This secret offer was put to Molotov on September 20, 1946 and rejected by Stalin soon after. See Vladimir Olegovich Pechatnov, *The Allies Are Pressing on You to Break Your Will...: Foreign Policy Correspondence between Stalin and Molotov and Other Politburo Members, September 1945-December 1946*, vol. 26 (Cold War International History Project, Wodrow Wilson International Center ..., 1999), 4.

⁷⁵⁵ Sidney Shallot, "Montgomery to Install Methods of US Staff in British Army," *NY Times*, September 12 1946; "Montgomery Route on US Trip Is Given," ibid., September 4 1946.

⁷⁵⁶ The matter was raised by Stalin when meeting Montgomery in January 1947. "Report to Washington on Montgomery's Conversation with Stalin," January 17, 1947, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Wilson Centre

⁷⁵⁷ "Paris Is Startled by Montgomery - Plan for Standardising US and British Armies Held Evidence Joint Policy," *NY Times*, September 13 1946.

⁷⁵⁸ United States. President and Harry S Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman: 1945-1953* (US Government Printing Office, 1961), 216.

confided he still hoped Stalin would visit the US and insisted he definitely did not have a “get tough” policy with the Soviets.⁷⁵⁹

3.7.4 The Wallace attack and the counter-attack

Wallace duly delivered his speech framing his remarks as an attack on the Republican presidential nominee, Governor Thomas Dewey, but the criticism was equally applicable to Byrnes’ now more robust approach to the Soviets.⁷⁶⁰ Wallace sought to repudiate both the notion of a mutually perceived Soviet threat and the notion that shared customs and traditions should automatically lead to a UK-US security alliance. He declared the US should not ‘save’ the British Empire and added,

Governor Dewey has expressed himself as favoring an alliance of mutual defense with Great Britain as the key to our foreign policy. This may sound attractive because we both speak the same language and many of our customs and traditions have the same historical background. Moreover, to the military men, the British Isles are our advanced air base against Europe.

Certainly, we like the British people as individuals. But to make Britain the key to our foreign policy would be, in my opinion, the height of folly. We must not let the reactionary leadership of the Republican party force us into that position. We must not let British balance-of-power manipulations determine whether and when the United States gets into war.

⁷⁵⁹ As with the Fulton speech Truman claimed he had not read it. Wallace rejected this at the time and continued to do so thereafter. See: Wallace to Truman, April 8 1949, Harry S Truman Papers: President’s Secretary File, HSTL. Box 141. For a detailed account of Truman’s contortions on this matter see Arnold A Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Stanford University Press, 2002), 175-77.

⁷⁶⁰ See: David Pike, "Cultural Politics in Soviet-Occupied Germany 1945-46," *Journal of Contemporary History* 24, no. 1 (1989). For Soviet failure to fulfil agreement to treat Germany as one economic unit see: Associated Press Radiophoto, "Text of Secretary Byrnes' Speech on U. S. Policy in Germany; Mr. Byrnes Delivering Address at Stuttgart," *NY Times*, September 7 1946. "US Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Eighth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris."

July 9, 1946, #254. *FRUS, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II.*

Make no mistake about it—the British imperialistic policy in the Near East alone, combined with Russian retaliation, would lead the United States straight to war unless we have a clearly defined and realistic policy of our own.⁷⁶¹

The speech was delivered whilst Byrnes was negotiating with the Soviets in Paris and caused consternation in the State Department.⁷⁶² Byrnes threatened immediate resignation unless Truman corrected policy.⁷⁶³ There followed a prolonged and embarrassing public attempt by Truman to both explain his endorsement of the speech and simultaneously distance himself from it.⁷⁶⁴ Support for Byrnes came from Patterson and Forrestal, both had clashed with Wallace on atomic research and other security issues.⁷⁶⁵ Truman's dissembling was perceived as foolish and deceitful by both sets of antagonists and the wider media.⁷⁶⁶

With the media focus on the Wallace-Byrnes spat and Truman's contortions, the UK-US military talks proceeded as planned aboard the USS *Séquoia* disguised as a mundane social event. It was agreed on the need for joint strategic planning for the possibility of war, standardisation, and combined action between the UK, the US and Canada.⁷⁶⁷ As the talks concluded, Wallace launched another attack, leaking a letter he had sent to the President and accusing elements within the military of wanting to initiate a pre-emptive attack on the Soviet Union.⁷⁶⁸ In a joint letter to the President, Patterson and Forrestal rejected the accusation.⁷⁶⁹ Truman remained keen to keep Wallace in the Cabinet, meeting him secretly to request he no

⁷⁶¹ James Roark, et. al, *The American Promise* (NY: Bedford/St.Martin's, 2005), 957-58.

⁷⁶² Harold Callander, "Byrnes Deeply Disturbed by Wallace's Policy Talk: Truman under Fire for It: Confusion in Paris, US, Other Delegates Upset by Apparent Shift in Views," *NY Times*, September 14 1946.

⁷⁶³ James Forrestal and Walter Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries* (Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015), entries 10th & 12th September.

⁷⁶⁴ Rosen, 469-73; Culver and Hyde, 419-28.

⁷⁶⁵ For public clashes see: "Wallace Says U.S. Force Should Quit Iceland Base," *NY Times*, March 22 1946 1946; Sidney Shallet, "Forrestal Pleads for Strong Nation: Until UNO Is on Firm Footing, He Asserts, Aggressors Must Know We Are Ready to Fight - 'Head in Sand' Precedent - Takes Issue with Wallace," *ibid.*, March 24 1946; Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal* (Naval Institute Press, 2012), 258.

⁷⁶⁶ For a full account of the episode see: Miscamble, 299-301; Culver and Hyde, 419-31; "Mr Wallace's Contribution," *NY Times*, September 14 1946. Frank S Adams, "Forrestal Voices Praise of Byrnes: "Annoyed" by Wallace Incident," *ibid.*, September 18 1946.

⁷⁶⁷ Montgomery, 404; "Joint Chiefs of Staff Plan," *Telegraph*, September 19 1946, 6.

⁷⁶⁸ Robert J Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948*, vol. 1 (University of Missouri Press, 1996), 225.

⁷⁶⁹ "Services Deny Charge: Patterson, Forrestal See 'No Basis' for 'Preventive War' Allegation," *NY Times*, September 19 1946.

longer speak on foreign affairs. Truman assured Wallace that he was no imperialist and would be granting a loan to help the Soviets.⁷⁷⁰

Forrestal increased the pressure via journalist Arthur Krock who published a biting commentary piece in his New York Times column. The article highlighted the offence to the British by keeping Wallace in place,

The parallel thinking, and similar objectives of the British in the quest with the United States for lasting peace have constituted the only restraint on Soviet Russia. Mr. Wallace assailed British policy as ‘imperialism’ with which we must not be associated and explained all Russian moves as ‘retaliation.’ Since he has not been disavowed as a Cabinet officer by the President, the British have reason to doubt our eventual course in world affairs and to feel they cannot be sure who speaks for the administration.⁷⁷¹

With the US State Department still up in arms, Forrestal administered the coup de grâce on the September 19. The New York Times records Forrestal “unleashing all the blistering sarcasm at his command” in an “extemporaneous address that won him an ovation from 1,200 industrialists and high-ranking navy officers.”⁷⁷² The next day with Truman cornered, Wallace was forced to resign, a significant victory for the elements within the administration that favoured closer relations with the British and a harder line against the Soviets.⁷⁷³ Wallace would attempt to rally liberal opinion standing against Truman for President in 1948. The excruciatingly embarrassing ‘guru letters’ between him and his Theosophical ‘Master’ was revealed by a journalist at the campaign launch.⁷⁷⁴ This, and the revelation Wallace had thought a Soviet slave-camp was an idyllic farm collective, plus his campaign’s association with American communists, ensured he received a derisory 2.4% of the vote.⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁷⁰ , 1, 225.

⁷⁷¹ Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: Some Casualties before the Truce Came a List of Damages Eye to Eye with Moscow," *NY Times*, September 20 1946. Krock was A Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and Forrester's Princeton classmate. He acted as a conduit for the promotion of various stories including coverage of George Kennan's anti-Soviet warnings. See: Eric Alterman, *Sound and Fury: The Making of the Punditocracy* (Cornell University Press, 2019), 41&44.

⁷⁷² Adams.

⁷⁷³ Yergin, 253-54.

⁷⁷⁴ Wilson, 23-24; Culver and Hyde, 482.

⁷⁷⁵ , 339 & 501-03.

Ovendale asserts the Séquoia event laid the “foundations of post-war Anglo-American relations.”⁷⁷⁶ Mark Clapson records it as a landmark event that “strengthened the special relationship between Britain and the US at the dawn of the Cold War.”⁷⁷⁷ Actually, it represented a reimagining of special relationships for all three Atlantic states. An *Economist* editorial talked of the emergence of something approximating if not equating to a security community or as they termed it “an Atlantic Commonwealth,” based on material and cultural foundations:

There is no need to quibble about the exact relative degrees of mutual dependence; the fact is that the whole Atlantic Commonwealth is strategically interdependent and the position of either of its two major partners would be immeasurably weaker if it could not rely, in a crisis, on the other. This is the material argument and the moral argument is no weaker. However many backslidings there may be on one side or another, the American and British peoples do share a tradition of life and a belief in such things as liberty and toleration and law.⁷⁷⁸

The Séquoia meeting represents the military colloquy to the UK-US intelligence arrangement, allowing the development of the *trilateral* cornerstone of what would become the five-nation Anglospheric Security community. Trevor Royle concludes, “As a result of this day’s work, a series of highly classified political and military discussions were initiated, and from these sprang the Western Union, which came into being in 1948, followed by NATO a year later.”⁷⁷⁹

3.7.5 Building the institutions

Aside from the continuance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the immediate commencement of joint planning, the next few years saw the institutional framework of the tripartite security community take shape (Table 1).

⁷⁷⁶ Ritchie Ovendale, *British Defence Policy since 1945*, vol. 1 (Manchester University Press, 1994), viii.

⁷⁷⁷ Mark Clapson, *The Routledge Companion to Britain in the Twentieth Century* (Routledge, 2009), 144.

⁷⁷⁸ “Byrnes and Wallace,” *The Economist*, September 21 1946.

⁷⁷⁹ Trevor Royle, *Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier’s General* (St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 173.

Agreement	1942	1946	1947	1948	1949	1951
Combined Communications Electronics Board	UKUS					CAN
ABCA Armies (ABC Armies)			CANUKUS			
CANUKUS Navies Agreement			CANUKUS			
Air & Space Interoperability Council (Airforces)				CANUKUS		
Commonwealth SIGINT Organisation (CSO)		AUSCAUK (NZ)*				
BRUSA (UK-USA Agreement) SIGINT		UKUS			CAN	
NATO					CANUKUS	

Table 1 The Atlantic Triangle foundations of the emergent Anglosphere Security Community 1946 - 1951

*NZ part of combined UK-AUS operations

In these arrangements, the creation of NATO was an Anglospheric initiative. The strategy adopted was for Britain to persuade and cajole the Europeans into a military alliance, which could dovetail or be subsumed into a tripartite military alliance of Canada, the UK and the US.⁷⁸⁰ Bevin's efforts culminated in the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948. In parallel, the 'ABC' partners began the "ultra, ultra secret," 'Pentagon meetings' held between March 22, and April 1, 1948.⁷⁸¹

The intention was to fashion the outline of a broader treaty to subsume the western European alliance. The US suggested the use of the Rio Treaty template.⁷⁸² This was combined with elements of the draft Brussels Treaty supplied by the British.⁷⁸³ ABC military planning between April 12 and 21, 1948 formulated the military strategy to be adopted.⁷⁸⁴ The 'ABC' politicians and diplomats proceeded to create the 'Western Union' with the intention of drawing this into the new treaty. The creation of NATO resulted shortly after with the UK as part of the Western Union, meeting Canada and the US to discuss terms. The leadership of NATO reflected Anglospheric dominance in terms of structure and

⁷⁸⁰ Ennio Di Nolfo, *The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: A Historical Reappraisal* (Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 181.

⁷⁸¹ Theodore Achilles, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, December 18, 1972, Truman Library.

⁷⁸² The Rio Treaty had been signed in 1947 and was a hemispheric mutual defence treaty between the US and South American states. See Table 23 Appendices

⁷⁸³ Achilles, 14.

⁷⁸⁴ W McIntyre, *Background to the Anzus Pact: Policy-Makers, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55* (Springer, 1994), 108.

appointments.⁷⁸⁵ The coordination and role of the tripartite group's intelligence activity within NATO are revealed in declassified BRUSA minutes.⁷⁸⁶

Agreement	1940	1942	1944	1949	1950	1951	1955	1956
Perm Board of Joint Defence	CANUS							
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS)		UKUS		Ceased				
Burns-Templer Agreement Military Intelligence*					UKUS			
Canada-United States Ministerial Defence Committee						CANUS		
Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defence UK US							UKUS	
Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defence CAN US							CANUS	
Canberra Pact (ANZAC)			AUSNZ					
Defence Production Sharing Agreement								CANUS

Table 2 Anglosphere Nexus Bilateral Military Agreements in existence between 1946 - 1956

*Provision for Commonwealth sharing

By 1950, the lack of institutional non-SIGINT intelligence liaison between the US and the UK had been addressed. Bedell Smith, in his new position as Director of CIA, had requested closer relations with the UK's JIC and by default the Commonwealth Joint Intelligence Bureaux.⁷⁸⁷ This process was facilitated by the 1950 Burns-Templer Agreements that covered all aspects of classified information between the US and UK.⁷⁸⁸ There was provision for information sharing for [Dominion] Commonwealth members via the UK if appropriate, with

⁷⁸⁵ Ronald B Manderson-Jones, *The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations and Western European Unity 1947-56* (London School of Economics and Political Science, 1972), 75.

⁷⁸⁶ "BRUSA, Arrangements For Exchange & Dissemination." March 19, 1953 TNA, GCHQ File HW 80 10/8) Para 4. 2

⁷⁸⁷ Michael S Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis* (Routledge, 2014), 209.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

the US recognising “the special relationship between the UK and the other Commonwealth nations.”⁷⁸⁹

3.8 Pacific Framework: Imperfect Coalescence

3.8.1 Introduction

After initially resisting the need for close security arrangements, the US began to reconsider its strategy. The success of the PCR and its backing for communist regimes under the guise of self-determination created a shared threat for the Anglosphere states active in the region. The region saw the first example of a post-WW2 conflict in which all five parties participated in Korea. The US regarded Indochina as a French responsibility, and the Malaysian area as a Commonwealth responsibility and the initial security architecture reflected that.

3.8.2 Regional Security: US Disinterest

The three Commonwealth states with Indo-Pacific sovereign territories envisaged new a quadrilateral defence agreement involving the US. Chifley and Evatt drafted a Commonwealth-US plan that was endorsed by NZ and the UK at the May 1946 Commonwealth Defence meeting but when Bevin presented the plan, it was summarily rejected. Brynes stated, “the United States is not interested in establishing any system of regional defence in the South West Pacific...”⁷⁹⁰ Chifley tried a direct approach to Truman but without success.⁷⁹¹ Evatt’s attempts were repeatedly rebuffed by the State Department and the JCS concurred, insisting that the US should not be distracted by peripheral military issues and classed Australia and NZ as “an area without priority.”⁷⁹²

⁷⁸⁹ “Documents Relating to the Exchange of Classified Military Information Between the United States and the United Kingdom,” January 27, 1950. #702. *FRUS, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III. 1618-1628*. Extended in 1953 see: “Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay),” December 4, 1953. #125. *FRUS, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2*.

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⁷⁹⁰ Quoted in: Paul Orders, *Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Challenge of the United States, 1939–46: A Study in International History* (Springer, 2002), 171.

⁷⁹¹ Robb and Gill, 29.

⁷⁹² Ibid., 29,51.

In the absence of a strong regional threat, the US policy-makers were comfortable with a set of relationships that constituted the bare minimum threshold for the existence of a regional security community. The trigger for changed US attitudes was the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist regime on the mainland and the spectre of communist advances sponsored by the People's Republic of China (PRC).

3.8.3 Commonwealth Regional Security

The US rejection of an integrated Anglospheric regional defence pact in Asia ensured that the institutions that evolved remained centred on three Commonwealth nations – Australia, the UK and NZ. The Australian and NZ security strategy was predicated on the notion of 'Forward Defence' entailing a commitment to defend "British territory and communications."⁷⁹³ Correspondence between Chifley and Attlee led to the ANZAM agreement, formalised in 1947 after extensive collaboration amongst UK and Australian Chiefs of Staff and Shedden.⁷⁹⁴ ANZAM was founded on a mixture of semi-formal defence and security arrangements made possible by deep-rooted, habitual trust. This was true of both Australia and NZ, but particularly the latter, whose commitment to the UK remained a constant.⁷⁹⁵ The Malayan Emergency heralded an intensification of regional CSO intelligence operations and an increase in the Australian and NZ contribution to SIGINT bases in Singapore, Hong Kong, Perth and Darwin.⁷⁹⁶

⁷⁹³ Orders, 174.

⁷⁹⁴ Shedden to Chifley. Top Secret and Personal. "Co-Operation in British Commonwealth Defence, Discussion with Field Marshal Montgomery." July 9, 1947. NAA, A5954/1, 855/2

⁷⁹⁵ For Australia see: Alan Renouf, *The Frightened Country* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1979), 14. For assertions of NZ's 'mother-daughter' UK relationship see: David Capie, "New Zealand and the World: Imperial, International and Global Reactions," in *The New Oxford History of New Zealand*, ed. Giselle Byrnes (Oxford University Press, 2009).

⁷⁹⁶ Pfennigwerth, 199.

Agreement	1946	1947	1948	1949	1951	1954	1955	1956
Commonwealth SIGINT Organisation (CSO)		AUSCAN NZUK						
Commonwealth Joint Intelligence Bureaux			AUSCAN NZUK					
ANZAM Agreement				AUSNZ UK				
ANZUS					AUSNZ US			
SEATO*						AUSNZUK US		
Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve							AUSNZUK	
UK-USA Agreement (BRUSA)	UKUS			CAN				AUSNZ

Table 3 Security Arrangements ≥ Anglosphere Core Pacific 1946-56

* SEATO included non Anglosphere Core states


Although policy issues between the US and Australia impeded progress towards a quadrilateral strategic alliance, other informal military relationships had developed. In June 1949, the US, Australian and NZ militaries created staff missions in one another's capitals, replicating the UK-US arrangements.⁷⁹⁷

In March 1951, an informal ANZAM agreement was reached between Admiral Radford (US Navy) and the Admiral Collins (RAN) representing the AUSUKNZ navies.⁷⁹⁸ This arrangement preceded ANZUS by six months and provided an ongoing mechanism for RN collaboration with the USN with an ANZAM region being a primary AUSUKNZ responsibility (Map 1) The so-called "Malayan Area" corresponds with a wider, non-naval US State Department perspective as to respective Anglospheric

⁷⁹⁷ Burton to Makin [393], Dispatch 1/49, Canberra, June 1, 1949, 'Secret'. NAA, A1068, DL47/5/2A; Burton to Makin [390], Dispatch 1/48, Canberra, August 23, 1948. A1068, DL47/5/2A

⁷⁹⁸ Andrew Forbes and Michelle Lovi, "Radford/Collins Agreement" *Australian Maritime Issues* 2006: *SPC-A Annual Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs* No.19 (2007): 46-67.

responsibilities.



Map 1 The ANZAM maritime Zone circa 1952⁷⁹⁹

3.8.4 The Korean War Catalyst

The Korean War acted as a catalyst for the inclusion of Australian and NZ in US security calculations. The US agreed to the Australian-led DSB joining the BRUSA SIGINT arrangements as direct second party (with NZ gaining access via the DSB).⁸⁰⁰ This marked the effective the merging of the CSO into the ‘Five Eyes’ arrangements. British Commonwealth elements no longer relied upon the UK for second party status, and as such, the relationship was now a bilateral “UK-US Agreement.” In the context of security community theory, this was significant, representing an extension of trust and intimate collaboration with Australia and by extension NZ, in one of the most sensitive and areas of security.

⁷⁹⁹ “The Future of ANZAM” C.O.S. (52) 684 December 17, 1952 TNA, DEFE 5/43, 7

⁸⁰⁰ The DSB included NZ and UK personnel.

See: “UKUSA Agreement.” Appendix J, Annexure J1, October 10, 1956.TNA, GCHQ File HW 80/11

The Korean War also highlighted a developing behavioural pattern observable in elements of Canadian policy-makers to remain (or publicly appear) to avoid too tight an embrace. It emphasises the pluralistic nature of the Anglospheric security. Deeper security entanglements were avoided by a reliance on the diplomatic opportunities afforded by a liberal internationalist foreign policy. The Korean War, however, was a UN-endorsed endeavour and difficult for Canada to sidestep. However, both the Canadian military and political policy-makers wanted to avoid integration into US military formations and deployed as part of the Commonwealth First Division, under Australian command as the lead regional Commonwealth state.⁸⁰¹

3.8.5 ANZUS and UK exclusion

During the course of this war the US re-evaluated its need for regional allies and for a formal alliance with Australia and NZ. The State Department noted “the close identity of views between the United States and Australia on matters of fundamental importance.”⁸⁰² The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender told Truman that World War 2 and Korea showed Australia “could be counted upon in an emergency to give the utmost of her manpower and equipment to meet all new crises.”⁸⁰³ Spender had hopes a formal relationship with the US would replicate the kind of intimate co-operation the Australians enjoyed in the Commonwealth. He informed Dulles,

I know you won’t mind me saying directly that we in this country are a metropolitan power in the Pacific and we hope that our view will be predominate.⁸⁰⁴

Thus, the Australians saw ANZUS as a means of achieving protection and institutionalising consultation. This was almost exactly the opposite as to what the US envisaged.

⁸⁰¹ John C Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British and American Empires* (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2006), 114.

⁸⁰² “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)” April 10, 1954. #734. *FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1*.

⁸⁰³ Notes of Meeting between Spender and Truman, September 15, 1950, US National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, 611.43/9-1550

⁸⁰⁴ Spender to Dulles. March 8, 1951, National Library of Australia (hereafter NLA), Spender Papers, Box 1,

In the case of the trilateral arrangement with Australia and New Zealand... any organisation thereunder will not have the right to demand knowledge of and to participate in planning.⁸⁰⁵

Although New Zealand regarded US protection as "the greatest prize," there were serious reservations about the nature of a formal pact.⁸⁰⁶ The NZ CoS believed such a pact would exist to serve US interests and, "only in connection with arrangements in the Philippines and Japan..." As such NZ did not regard the ANZUS Treaty as heralding a significant change, it represented "nothing new in the relationship of the three countries."⁸⁰⁷ In his statement to the NZ parliament, the NZ External Affairs Minister stressed both "New Zealand and Australia have special obligations in defence as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations" and as such it would be necessary for future UK membership or consultation.⁸⁰⁸

Australian and NZ hopes that the ANZUS treaty draft could include a clause to allow their formal collaboration with NATO was vetoed by Dulles.⁸⁰⁹ Soon after the creation of ANZUS, Montgomery and Ismay championed a NATO-ANZUS tie as part of globalised NATO.⁸¹⁰ Support for this came from the Canadian military with Foulkes lobbying the DEA for the creation of a NATO Standing Group covering South Asia and ANZUS if the US could be so persuaded.⁸¹¹

The US was not interested in such a trans-regional NATO and nor did it want the UK involved in ANZUS. US motives were based on an unwillingness to be associated with colonial powers. By way of explanation, the US suggested UK inclusion would necessitate inviting France, Portugal and the Netherlands. The UK Foreign Secretary complained at their exclusion from emergent regional security institutions that would surely impede cooperation and, given their physical territorial presence asserted, "we are most certainly a Pacific

⁸⁰⁵ Dulles to Acheson, April 13, 1951 Quoted in Andrew Kelly, ANZUS and the Early Cold War: Strategy and Diplomacy between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1945-1956 (2018), fn48.

⁸⁰⁶ See: Ian McGibbon, "New Zealand's Intervention in the Korean War," (June-July, 1950), 282; Siracusa and Barclay.

⁸⁰⁷ Notes on the Defence Aspects of the Japanese Peace Settlement, January 30, 1951, Documents on New Zealand's External Relations (hereafter DNZER), Vol. III, 558-563.

⁸⁰⁸ NZ Hansard, Doidge Statement, 13 July 1951, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol. 294, 1951 (Wellington).

⁸⁰⁹ Watt to McIntosh. Cablegram, Canberra, June 18, 1951. NAA, A1838, 532/11 Part IV

⁸¹⁰ Antonio Varsori, *Europe 1945–1990s: The End of an Era?* (Palgrave, 2016), 95-96.

⁸¹¹ Foulkes to Wilgress, February 9, 1953, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, Part II.

power.”⁸¹² The UK military complained about the “absurdity” of ANZAM and ANZUS being separate organisations and the need for “an integrated regional planning organisation in peace.”⁸¹³ In 1953 Dulles rebuffed another attempt to include the UK by informing his Antipodean allies that excluding the UK was necessary to avoid any US defence responsibilities for Malaya and threatened that UK inclusion would render the ANZUS arrangement valueless in practice.⁸¹⁴

It was ANZAM, not ANZUS, which then developed the institutions necessary for operational activity following the October 1953 tripartite ‘Melbourne Discussions’ of the three Commonwealth militaries. A command structure and sub-committees specialising in intelligence and operational planning was created.⁸¹⁵ In 1955, a mobile ‘Far East Strategic Reserve’ (FESR) of joint Commonwealth forces to be used “to counter a Cold War threat wherever it may occur” including Malaya was established.⁸¹⁶ This stood in contrast to ANZUS that had no such structure or reserve and featured a Council that was not consultative, but rather served as means to communicate US policy to its allies.⁸¹⁷

3.8.6 The lack of ‘united action’ & SEATO

Following the deteriorating French position in Vietnam, the US began to look to the UK for mutual aid in an envisaged US intervention. Eisenhower mooted UK membership of ANZUS or the possibility of a new NATO-type regional alliance. Whilst the UK was interested in such security arrangements, they were not inclined to join an alliance created for

⁸¹² Spender Memorandum, 19 April 1951, in Kelly, fn41.

⁸¹³ “The Future of ANZAM.” December 2, 1952. TNA, DEFE 4/58, JP (52)126. The memo also notes US military reluctance to countenance UK involvement probably due to the UK’s military’s reluctance to endorse the tactical use of atomic weapons. For a detailed account of UK attitudes on US use of atomic weapons see: Matthew Jones, “Great Britain, the United States, and Consultation over Use of the Atomic Bomb, 1950—1954,” *Historical Journal* (2011).

⁸¹⁴ Unattributed memorandum for Prime Minister - “ANZUS.” October 6, 1953. TNA, PREM 11/404

⁸¹⁵ LD MacLean, *ANZIM to ANZUK, an Historical Outline of ANZAM* (Department of Defence, 1992), 7-8.

⁸¹⁶ Raffi Gregorian, *The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War Strategy in the Far East, 1947–1954* (Springer, 2002), 133; Karl Hack, *Defence and Decolonisation in South-East Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-1967* (Routledge, 2013), 81; Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966* (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 74-6, 90-163; Christopher Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and Borneo, 1949-1966* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2003).

⁸¹⁷ See: Andrew Kelly, *ANZUS and the Early Cold War: Strategy and Diplomacy between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1945-1956* (2018), 94-98.

the immediate deployment of troops and escalate a dangerous situation.⁸¹⁸ In any case, the UK Foreign Secretary Eden was pursuing a diplomatic solution via the Geneva Conference discussions.⁸¹⁹

Dulles' approach to the UK sought to stress the threats to British interests and in particular to their Commonwealth dominion allies.⁸²⁰ He wanted immediate agreement on a so-called plan for 'united action' to shore up the French in Indochina. Dulles regarded the Commonwealth as a familial affair, in which a motherly UK would be obliged to protect her off-spring and those off-spring could be made to feel most unsafe.⁸²¹ At a meeting of the NSC on April 6, Dulles explained his thinking that,

The chance may now be at hand, at long last, to win the British to our side. The peril in Southeast Asia might forge the needed unity because of the British stake in Malaya is so great and because Britain's two children, Australia and New Zealand, are likewise imperilled.⁸²²

To increase pressure on the UK, he hoped to use Australia and New Zealand,⁸²³ All three had been reminded the US "would not be disposed to commit our forces to defend British and Commonwealth interests in Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand when the British, Australians, and New Zealanders simply sat on their hands."⁸²⁴ This was diplomatic hardball, and accords with Adler and Barnett's proposition that strong states nudge and coerce others within a security community. The 'united action' that Dulles sought was not forthcoming,

⁸¹⁸ "Secretary of State to the Department of State," April 13, 1954. #741 *FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part I*.

⁸¹⁹ For a detailed analysis of US-UK differences see: Arthur Combs, "The Path Not Taken: The British Alternative to US Policy in Vietnam, 1954–1956," *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 1 (1995).

⁸²⁰ Eisenhower suggested expanding ANZUS to include the UK, France as part of a Five Power arrangement or by including other SE Asian states. See: "Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council," March 25, 1954. #646 *FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part I*. For need to have UK on board see: "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," March 30, 1954. *Ibid. FRUS #658*

⁸²¹ Categorising Australia and NZ as 'children' of Britain's family was a recurring theme. See: Kelly, 34.

⁸²² "Memorandum of Discussion at the 192d Meeting of the NSC," Tuesday, April 6, 1954. #705. *FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part I*.

⁸²³ Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones, *Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 122.

⁸²⁴ "Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State," April 5, 1954. #698 *FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part I*.

primarily due to UK concerns as to where military action might lead.⁸²⁵ Predictability of an ally is, according to security community theory, is vital to the maintenance of trust and this was in danger of being undermined. Australia and New Zealand, although anxious about retaining US protection, expressed similar reservations, resulting in Eisenhower referring to an Australian “collapse.”⁸²⁶

Although there had been no ‘united action’ in Vietnam, Dulles’ attempts to create a regional security structure in the region did bear fruit. A treaty was eventually signed in September 1954 and SEATO came into force in February 1955. SEATO was something of an unsatisfactory compromise with its numerous participants sharing different threat perceptions, and unlike NATO, the treaty contained no mutual defence clause.⁸²⁷ Also, unlike NATO, there was no military command structure, strategic planning or standing forces.⁸²⁸ It was SEATO’s inadequacies that led the UK to create the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (ADMA) as a Commonwealth security guarantee to Malaya and Singapore.⁸²⁹

It was a rather unsatisfactory outcome. There was a security community of sorts in that all for Anglosphere states were of course culturally similar, shared threat perceptions but failed to develop working political military structures that facilitated greater cooperation. A number of factors suggest themselves as relevant and all would come to the fore in Suez. Firstly, there was the issue of personalities, in particular Dulles and Eden, and secondly, a divergence on tactics to deal with nationalist anti-colonialist movements. Both would come to the fore in Suez.

⁸²⁵ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” April 1, 1954. *FRUS* *Ibid.* #670

⁸²⁶ The risk of US deployment of atomic weapons was a fear and discussed at an Emergency Cabinet Meeting on April 25, 1954. TNA, CAB 129/C(54)155. See: James Waite, *The End of the First Indochina War: A Global History*, vol. 3 (Routledge, 2012).

⁸²⁷ Anthony Short, *The Origins of the Vietnam War* (Routledge, 2014). For a detailed account of Australia’s position see Gregory James Pemberton, “Australia, the United States, and the Indochina Crisis of 1954,” *Diplomatic History* 13, no. 1 (1989).

⁸²⁸ Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton* (Columbia University Press, 1994), 68.

⁸²⁹ The US did not want a military command and planning framework but rather a mechanism for bringing in allies to a war. See: US Senate, vol. 93-2, March 6, 1974, S. Res 174, U.S. Commitment to SEATO, Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington DC), 46-47.

⁸²⁹ Anthony James Gregor, *In the Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia*, vol. 382 (Hoover Press, 1989), 13-14.

3.9 Suez - Coalescence Interregnum

3.9.1 Introduction

The Suez Crisis provides evidence for two contradictory aspects of the emergent Anglospheric security community. On the one hand, its ability to overcome disagreements speaks to the strength of relationships. This aspect is addressed in the next chapter in an examination of the post-Crisis ramifications. This section seeks to understand how such a crisis occurred given the pre-existing relationships. Rather than illustrating what Deutsch refers to as “the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages and actions, quickly [and] adequately,” the events point to a comprehensive dysfunction at the governmental level.⁸³⁰

The Suez Crisis suggests the US behaviour constituted the coercion of a weaker state within the security community. And whilst the Crisis raised questions of trust regarding the UK’s covert diplomatic manoeuvres, other Anglosphere Core member policy-establishments exhibited similar trust concerns in respect of Dulles’ behaviour. Also, within the US there was a marked division of opinion as to threat level represented by Nasser with the US security-military element sharing similar views to the UK.

3.9.2 Communication of UK Military Plans

The behaviour of the UK-US political policy-makers in the events leading up to the invasion was characterised by miscommunication and deceit. One element was Eden’s participation in the Sèvres Protocol, a device to provide a *casus belli* for Anglo-French intervention. There was, however, no lack of communication of the UK’s determination to use military force if diplomatic measures failed. This is a point made by Keith Kyle,

With Suez one must distinguish between the large part of the crisis, in which the planning in London was for a possible invasion of Egypt... and what happened in the last week of October. There was no secret about the first within the restricted group of civil servants from the departments concerned with the planning who had the security clearance ‘Terrapin,’ and no concealment in principle from the Americans... The

Sèvres Protocol and the collusion with Israel were totally different, cutting out all but a handful of British civil servants... and scandalising the US administration.⁸³¹

US policy-makers had been kept informed of the possibility of and preparation for war.⁸³² As far as the US military was concerned, there was no miscommunication. The process of informal institutionalisation of military relationships that had begun after Montgomery's 1946 initiative was now well-established. By 1955 authorisation had been granted for the US military "to collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations" for intervention in the event of armed conflict between Israel and Arab states.⁸³³ An attempt by Dulles to thwart formal "combined planning" because of the possibility of a leak was reversed at the insistence of the JCS and a series of detailed planning sessions had ensued.⁸³⁴

Any doubt that the US military was not aware of UK plans is dispelled by reference to the meeting NSC August 30 minutes. These confirm the JCS were aware of the mobilisation of British and French forces and aware of the general strategy the British would employ. In fact, it appears the JCS were informed of actual deployments as they occurred due to ongoing secret briefings by senior British military personnel from all three armed services.⁸³⁵

Political policy-makers were present at the same August 30 NSC meeting where the JSC discussed UK plans. Dulles himself informed the participants that the British and French were continuing their military preparations and said they were extremely serious in their intention to resort to military force. Dulles outlined his discussions with Eden who had told him the British Government would be making a decision on the use of force around

⁸³⁰ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 140.

⁸³¹ Keith Kyle, interview by Gillian Staerck and Michael D Kandiah, 10th July, 2004. Transcript 31

⁸³² Memorandum of Discussion at the 295th Meeting of the NSC," August 30, 1956, #149 *FRUS, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI*. For explicit Eden-Eisenhower communication see: James George Eayrs, *The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey* (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), 41.

⁸³³ See: Kenneth W Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-56*, vol. 6 (Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), 168.

⁸³⁴ *Ibid.*, 171-73.

⁸³⁵ Michael Cohen, *Strategy and Politics in the Middle East, 1954-1960: Defending the Northern Tier* (Routledge, 2004), 164-65.

September 10, that, “once made, would be irrevocable.”⁸³⁶ It is possible Dulles thought the British were bluffing given his belief in the art of brinkmanship.⁸³⁷

3.9.3 Shared threat perception of Nasser

Knowledge, however, does not imply consent or empathy for their allies’ plight. However, there did appear to be a degree of unanimity expressed by both the UK and US policy-establishments as to the nature of Nasser’s threat to western ‘allied’ interests and the efficacy of war as a possible means of confronting him.

In the UK, the opposition Labour Party warned Nasser wanted to create an “Arab Empire” and that Nasser’s behaviour was reminiscent of Mussolini and Hitler.⁸³⁸ These sentiments were shared by senior members of the US political establishment. The Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Radford repeatedly referred to Nasser as another Hitler who must be stopped.⁸³⁹ Admiral Burke declared, “Nasser must be broken.”⁸⁴⁰ Dulles himself referred to Canal seizure as part of “a long term program” of expansion that challenged “the balance of power and future of Western Europe.”⁸⁴¹ On another occasion Dulles described Nasser’s writing as an “Arab *Mein Kampf*” and Eisenhower described Nasser’s rhetoric as “much like Hitler’s.”⁸⁴² The issue dividing the Anglosphere policy-makers was not the threat, but how and when the threat should be contained or neutralised.⁸⁴³

3.9.4 Divisions between the US military and political establishment

⁸³⁶ Ibid. *FRUS*, [295th Meeting NSC] #149 325-332

⁸³⁷ James Shepley, “How Dulles Averted War,” *Life* 16 (1956): 77.

⁸³⁸ The comparisons of Nasser to Hitler initially spanned the UK political establishment. See: Hansard (UK) HC. Hugh Gaitskell, Leader of the Opposition, 2nd August 1956, Vol 557. Col. 1613. Mark Phythian, *The Labour Party, War and International Relations, 1945-2006* (Routledge, 2007), 52-53; R Gerald Hughes, *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945* (A&C Black, 2014), 51.

⁸³⁹ “Memorandum of Discussion at the 292d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 9, 1956, #72. *FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Volume XVI*. Ibid. *FRUS*, [295th Meeting NSC] #149.

⁸⁴⁰ Condit, 6, 178-83.

⁸⁴¹ Ibid. *FRUS*, [292d Meeting NSC] 167

⁸⁴² Henry William Brands Jr, “What Eisenhower and Dulles Saw in Nasser: Personalities and Interests in US-Egyptian Relations,” *American-Arab Affairs*, no. 17 (1986).

⁸⁴³ Eden claimed he and Dulles met to discuss a covert plan to remove Nasser. The US note of the meeting states the matter discussed was “not to be committed in writing.” For a more detailed account

The Crisis was precipitated by the US decision to withdraw funding for the Aswan Dam on July 19, 1956. A week later, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal intending to use the tolls to finance the dam. The JSC informed the Secretary of State for Defence that the canal seizure was “militarily detrimental” to the US and its allies, and the canal must be returned to “friendly authority” as soon as possible. The JSC concluded the UK should consider taking military action. This was followed by another JCS memo to bring to the attention of the Secretary of State,

...the possible and even probable repercussions which could result from permitting the ascendancy of Nasser as a “champion of Arab nationalism.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to bring to the attention of the Secretary of Defense the possible and even probable repercussions which could result from permitting the ascendancy of Nasser as a “champion of Arab nationalism” ... if subsequent events of similar nature occur, the United States will find it necessary to take active steps to change the course of events. By such time the cumulative problem could be vastly greater than today.⁸⁴⁴

At this point a clear divide is visible between the US military and Dulles, who having been shown the memorandum said, he did not appreciate ‘political’ advice from the JCS and nor did the president, who Dulles stated, “welcomes any thought anybody has, but in the main he looks to the Sec.[himself] for judgment in political matters and to the military for various consequences.”⁸⁴⁵

The JCS were not to be dislodged from their viewpoint. The JCS recommended public endorsement of UK-French military action with US political, logistical and economic support, and in the event of third-party intervention, the offer of military support.⁸⁴⁶ At the August 30, NSC meeting, the JCS again argued for “strong public, political and logistic support” with possible US supportive engagement.⁸⁴⁷

of UK-US collaboration on Nasser in 1956, see: Douglas Little, "Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East," *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 5 (2004): 680-81.

⁸⁴⁴ “Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay),” August 7, 1956. #68. *FRUS, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI*.

⁸⁴⁵ Ibid. *FRUS*, #68 [Anderson-Dulles Telephone] 155. Footnote 4

⁸⁴⁶ Robert J Watson, "Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960, Vol. IV of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense," (1997): 54; Condit, 6, 178.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid. *FRUS*, [295th Meeting NSC] #149 330

In contrast to the JCS, both Dulles and Eisenhower were inconsistent.⁸⁴⁸

The minutes of the NSC on held on August 9, records Dulles had posing the question as to the appropriate US course of action in the event of Anglo-French military intervention, “should we try to stop use of force by the British and French? He did not favour this course, but it should be considered. How much help should we give the British and French?” The minutes record Eisenhower’s response, the President said,

...Egypt had gone too far. He asked how Europe could be expected to remain at the mercy of the whim of a dictator. Admiral Radford said Nasser was trying to be another Hitler. The President added that Nasser’s prestige would be so high, if he got away with the Canal seizure, that all the Arabs would listen to him.⁸⁴⁹

Four weeks later, Dulles was still professing himself sympathetic to the dilemma the UK and France found themselves in regarding the abrogation of the Suez Canal Treaty because “they would be finished as first-rate powers if they didn’t somehow find a means to check Nasser and nullify his schemes.”⁸⁵⁰

Security community theory holds that communication, in the sense the various parties are able to ‘read’ the other side’s intentions and likely reactions, is a key factor in their success. The build-up to the crisis occurred during the Presidential election and the need to avoid war created a policy that appeared to be predicated on prolonging the diplomatic process with little end in sight.⁸⁵¹ Adlai Stevenson, Eisenhower’s Democratic Party rival for the presidency, criticised the policy as “on again, off-again” diplomacy.⁸⁵² Thus, there was a UK failure to understand the vicissitudes of Eisenhower’s re-election campaign that promoted his

⁸⁴⁸ For an account of Eisenhower and Dulles’ contradictory briefing to Congressional leaders see: Steven L Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan*, vol. 1 (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 72.

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid. *FRUS*, [292d Meeting NSC], #72. 174

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid. *FRUS*, [295th Meeting NSC], #149. 329

⁸⁵¹ Dale Jr. Edwin L, “Dulles Counsels Patience on Suez. Says Egyptians Will Suffer Economic Ills That Will Make Them Reasonable,” *NY Times*, September 27 1956.

⁸⁵² “Transcript of Stevenson’s News Conference on Hiss, Suez and Other Subjects,” *ibid.*, September 18. For a detailed analysis of Dulles’ machinations and public pronouncements up to the Suez invasion see: Benjamin Nimer, “Dulles, Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy,” *Western Political Quarterly* 12, no. 3 (1959).

credentials as ‘the Peace Candidate.’⁸⁵³ Steven Freiberger suggests that Dulles sympathised with the UK but re-election considerations meant he pursued “a purposely ambiguous policy — and in many instances a duplicitous one” seeking to delay war until after the re-election of Eisenhower.⁸⁵⁴ These electoral factors lead Steven Spiegel to conclude, “it was no wonder that Eden and French premier Mollet were confused.”⁸⁵⁵

From a UK perspective, the US had become distracted and irresolute in the pursuit of common strategic interests. Eden felt aggrieved and perplexed at the failure of the US to back British and French diplomatic efforts in their dispute over the Egyptian seizure of the Canal. When Eisenhower warned Eden that military force would play badly with world opinion, Eden concluded the US was “an unreliable ally.”⁸⁵⁶

3.9.5 US internal confusion

Whereas Dulles and Eisenhower were inconsistent, the behaviour of the US military was undeviating in its support of the British-French invasion. The attitude of the senior members of the JCS was so persistent that Dulles removed them from further deliberations, relying instead on direct, informal communication with Admiral Burke. Burke continued to push for active support for the British and French. Burke knew the British had a shortage of landing craft and implored Dulles,

...for God's sake, let's give them the craft. Give them ours. They're over there. They've got to make things successful.⁸⁵⁷

Up to and during the crisis Burke was privy to discussions with the UK's Chief of Naval Staff, Louis Mountbatten.⁸⁵⁸ It is possible that the support of senior elements of the US

⁸⁵³ Russell Baker, "President's Talk to Stress Peace: Wednesday Address to Be on Single TV Network," *NY Times*, September 16 1956; "Eisenhower Backs Foreign Contacts: Would Aid Understanding by 'People-to-People'," *ibid.*, September 12; "President's Talk to Stress Peace: Wednesday Address to Be on Single TV Network," *ibid.*, September 16; Douglas Dales, "Eisenhower Called 'Voice of Peace': Javits Tells Fordham Rally No One Commands Respect the President Does Backing of Youth Sought," *ibid.*, September 25.

⁸⁵⁴ Steven Z Freiberger, *Dawn over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957* (Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 160.

⁸⁵⁵ Spiegel, 1, 72.

⁸⁵⁶ Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (CN Potter, 1967), 12.

⁸⁵⁷ Quoted in Keith Kyle, "Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East," *Tauris* (2011): 181.

⁸⁵⁸ Watson, 61.

military establishment encouraged their opposite numbers in spite of the advice coming out of the UK Washington Embassy that the Administration was not supportive.⁸⁵⁹

Despite the political and economic pressure applied by Eisenhower and Dulles and Eden's sudden capitulation, there is some evidence that they wanted the British to succeed whilst being seen to oppose it. The Dulles comment delivered to Eisenhower after the ceasefire is quixotic, "The British having gone in should not have stopped until they toppled Nasser."⁸⁶⁰ This was despite Dulles having addressed the UN on November 2 and insisted upon an immediate ceasefire.⁸⁶¹ It seems likely that Dulles shared the UK objective of removing Nasser, but did not want to be associated with it so as to maintain US influence with non-aligned states. The pressure applied to the UK to withdraw occurred whilst Dulles was hospitalised and directed by Administration members less sympathetic to the UK.⁸⁶² Eden capitulated too soon. After the event, Dulles asked the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, "Selwyn, why did you stop? Why didn't you go through with it and get Nasser down?" These sentiments serve to underline the US need for 'outraged' plausible denial whilst secretly requiring the UK to maintain a robust stance. Suez represented not so much a break down in trust, but rather a failure in what security community theory regards as 'easy' communications between allies.⁸⁶³

⁸⁵⁹ The extent of UK-US collaboration is difficult to determine. Mountbatten destroyed records to support a favourable account of his role in the Crisis. See: Adrian Smith, "Rewriting History? Admiral Lord Mountbatten's Efforts to Distance Himself from the 1956 Suez Crisis," *Contemporary British History* 26, no. 4 (2012). Kyle refers to Mountbatten's "well attested habit of improving the historical record." Kyle, "Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East," 136.

⁸⁶⁰ "Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Secretary Dulles' Room, Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, November 12, 1956. #570 *FRUS, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI*.

⁸⁶¹ "Eisenhower Backs Foreign Contacts: Would Aid Understanding by 'People-to-People'." The Eisenhower Administration stance was deemed to be winning votes in the election campaign. See: W.H Lawrence, "Reaction in Nation: Foreign Events Help President Democrats Win over Some Gain for President - Seen Peace a Major Issue," *ibid.*, November 2 1956.

⁸⁶² Nigel Ashton, *Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955–59* (Springer, 1996), 102. For his medical emergency see: Theodore N Pappas and Christopher G Willett, "John Foster Dulles, His Medical History and Its Impact on Cold War Politics," *Journal of medical biography* 28, no. 4 (2020).

⁸⁶³ Matthew F Holland, *America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), 120.

3.9.6 Australia and New Zealand

The informal tripartite bond between the UK, Australia, and New Zealand remained strong. At the time of Suez, all three states were engaged in a common effort against the communist insurgency in Malaya. Menzies was particularly supportive of the UK taking military action against Nasser if deemed necessary and was prepared to offer naval and air force contingents.⁸⁶⁴ The Australian military, whilst reticent to mobilise forces to the Middle East, supported the view the Suez Canal was of vital strategic importance.⁸⁶⁵ Menzies warned the US Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, that Nasser's action was illegal "and unless his prestige could be materially diminished they, [both the US and the UK] would be exposed to trouble after trouble in the Middle East."⁸⁶⁶ In short, Australia and NZ believed Nasser was a serious threat.

Australia was aware of the possibility of a UK intervention and was supportive. The matter was discussed by the Defence Committee with a recommendation that Australia should commit a small naval and air contribution if requested.⁸⁶⁷ NZ had voiced strong support for the idea of military action, announcing, "Where Britain stands, we stand; where she goes we go, in good times and bad."⁸⁶⁸ The inclusion of HMNZ Royalist in the Suez operation was later represented as an 'oversight' due a training assignment with the RN in the Mediterranean and upon discovery was withdrawn in a supposed assertion of sovereignty.⁸⁶⁹ In fact, the Royalist's deployment was explicitly sanctioned, with the rider that the NZ Prime Minister, "is most anxious that this offer should not be known on any account and, if challenged intends to deny it."⁸⁷⁰

⁸⁶⁴ Menzies to Casey, Fadden and McBride. July 29, 1956. NAA, A1838, 163/4/7/3/3 Part 1

⁸⁶⁵ "Australian Strategic Interests in the Middle East." August 9, 1956. NAA. A5954, 1410/1

⁸⁶⁶ Robert Menzies, *Afternoon Light: Some Memories of Men and Events* (Cassell Australia, 1967), 149-50.

⁸⁶⁷ "Defence Committee Report to Menzies," August 9, 1956, NAA, A5954, 1410/1

⁸⁶⁸ New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (hereafter NZPD). Suez Canal - Ministerial Statement, August 7, 1956, Vol. 309.

⁸⁶⁹ A false narrative has emerged that the NZ Government had no knowledge and the Royalist deployment and the vessel's withdrawal constituted a display of sovereign power. See: RNZN, "Royalist," *National Museum of the Royal New Zealand Navy*, <https://navymuseum.co.nz/explore/by-collections/ships/royalist-dido-class-cruiser/>.

⁸⁷⁰ Kyle, "Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East," 159.

In the United Nations General Assembly vote, a US tabled motion for an immediate ceasefire found the UK (with France) isolated by sixty-four votes to five against and six abstentions. The five votes supporting the UK included Australia and NZ, whilst Canada ranked among the abstentions.⁸⁷¹

3.9.7 Canada

Canada's position was significant in a number of respects, detaching itself from the more 'muscular' activity of her Anglosphere allies in favour of leveraging diplomatic approaches in the pursuit of common objectives. This stance was apparent in the years preceding the Crisis itself. Unlike the other members of the Anglosphere Core, Canada did not perceive Nasser as a threat. Pearson himself did not regard Nasser as another Hitler, but as "a most impressive and attractive personality."⁸⁷² Canadian public servants took the view it was time for the US and UK to invite the Soviet Union into talks to resolve Middle Eastern tensions. An approach by Pearson to the US suggesting Nasser was not a problem and encouraging talks with Moscow was given short shrift by Dulles and Eisenhower⁸⁷³.

After the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and the UK's mooting of military action, Canada was unequivocal in its opposition to it. Thereafter, the UK avoided any substantive discussions on the matter.⁸⁷⁴ Canada's attitude during the run up to the Crisis (and after) it won the admiration of India's Nehru who had attempted to reconcile the interests of the UK with Arab nationalism even to the point of defending the existence of British sovereign bases in Egypt.⁸⁷⁵ Arguably, Canada's position helped preserve the integrity of the wider Commonwealth given India shock at the UK's "unabashed aggression and deception."⁸⁷⁶

⁸⁷¹ Nutting. @132}

⁸⁷² Pearson, "Memorandum for Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs", October 20, 1955, DCER, Vol 21: 1236

⁸⁷³ Greg Donaghy, "The Politics of Accommodation: Canada, the Middle East, and the Suez Crisis, 1950–1956," *International Journal* 71, no. 2 (2016): 317-18.

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid., 321-22.

⁸⁷⁵ Zorawar Daulet Singh, "India's Role During the 1956 Suez Crisis: Between Peacemaking and Postcolonial Solidarity," *India Review* 17, no. 5 (2018): 3.

⁸⁷⁶ Lok Sabha Speech, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), 536.

3.10 Summary: The Nascent Anglosphere

By 1956, the outline of the modern Anglosphere was discernible in the security and military arrangements between the five core states. The Nascent security community consisted of a refashioned Commonwealth bloc linked to the US through revitalised UK-US intelligence arrangements. These had been facilitated by the strong personal WW2 relationships between members of the political and military establishments, shared threat perceptions all under pinned by common cultural outlooks and experiences.

The development of the Anglosphere Core's SIGINT arrangements chart the tentative steps towards a functioning quintilateral structure. The evolution of the BRUSA-UK/US is representative of a general trend in the nascent phase of the security community. The first stage reveals the drawing together of a British-led Commonwealth bloc and the US as illustrated in Diagram 1.




Diagram 1. BRUSA SIGINT 1946-47 (Bilateral UK-US)

The process of merger between the two blocs was facilitated by the development of direct relationships between the US and Canada. (Diagram 2) Again, the SIGINT arrangements illustrate a general trend towards tripartite CANUKUS security relationships in this period.




Diagram 2. BRUSA SIGINT 1948-50 (Trilateral UK/CAN-US)

By 1956 the SIGINT arrangements had emerged as a distinct quintilateral formal arrangement. (Diagram 3). It was mirrored by informal exchanges of information between non-SIGINT intelligence between the five core states (the Joint Intelligence Bureaux).




Diagram 3. CSO-US SIGINT 'merger' 1955-56 (Five Eyes)

The cooperation over intelligence was not matched by quintilateral defence arrangements. As with the initial intelligence arrangements, the military fora were focussed on an Atlantic CANUKUS defence triangle. The lack of a shared threat perception by US in the Asian theatre impeded the inclusion of AUSNZ within a global Anglospheric arrangement.




Diagram 4 The Anglosphere Military 'Atlantic Triangle' 1946-56

The AUSNZ links remained Commonwealth based with only loose US associations through ANZUS and SEATO that lacked command structures. This established a pattern of bifurcation of the Anglospheric footprint in the region, aspects of which would endure.

Chapter 4 The Ascendant Anglosphere: 1957-1991

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the Suez Crisis and the inability of either party to read correctly one another's intentions. This did not occur in the run up to and during the Suez Crisis. However, the durability of a security community is measured by its ability to overcome disagreements and shocks by the willingness of individual policy-makers to listen and adapt behaviour in response to partner's grievances and needs.

In the four years after Suez, UK and US leaders demonstrated a willingness to refashion relationships and created new Anglospheric institutions. These were predominately bilateral in nature involving UK-US and Canada-US dyads. They attempted to address issues of communication, rebuild trust, and restart the relationship on a sounder footing.

Of particular note was the Working Group machinery established in this period. This plethora of Working Groups were essentially bilateral UK-US groupings but included Australia and NZ on matters pertaining to South East Asia. The drawing together of the Anglospheric security community development was punctuated by dissension and dysfunction reflecting a US adherence to anti-colonialist posturing by the US State Department. This anti-colonial virtue-signalling was particularly pronounced in the Middle East and South East Asia and was reflected in stunted alliance structures, and a reluctance to give (or be seen to give) mutual aid in both diplomatic and conflict situations. It was a factor contributing to the UK's decision to pivot from the region, disrupting the dynamic of the entire Indo-Pacific theatre and laying the foundations for a new Anglosphere security architecture that included regional Commonwealth members.

The period from Suez to the end of the Cold War also provides evidence of a strengthening relationship at work at a variety of levels. The removal of 'colonialism' as an

issue between the UK and US and a sense of US isolation after Vietnam, facilitated greater UK-US cooperation as the US itself grappled with the realities of global power. Both the US and the UK reduced their presence in Indo-China, but both retained strong relationships with Australia and NZ. And in the Falklands conflict, the US chose its Anglosphere partner in preference to Monroe Doctrine alternatives. By the end of the Cold War a discernible quintilateral Anglospheric security community was in evidence.

4.2 Post-Suez Outlooks & Outcomes

4.2.1 US Reactions

One important factor in the formation and durability of a security community is the strength of what Deutsch referred to as a cognitive sense of ‘we-feeling.’⁸⁷⁷ Significant elements of the US wider policy-establishment identified with the UK, believing its threat assessment of Nasser had been correct and the US had let down an ally. George Kennan declared himself perplexed. US foreign policy was, based on “empty legalism” resulting in “a fateful inability to maintain intimate communication with our friends, and a style of diplomatic action directed at grandstanding.” Whilst acknowledging the Anglo-French action was “ill-considered” he asserted, “we bear a heavy measure of responsibility for the desperation” that caused the military action.⁸⁷⁸ Leading IR academic, Hans Morgenthau, was moved to write to NY Times in November 1956 to declare US behaviour to be “one of the most calamitous episodes in the history of US diplomacy,” that inflicted “irreparable damage upon” the UK (and France).⁸⁷⁹ Former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson was indignant with the US decision to force the UK to withdraw since Nasser, “defeated, humiliated and ripe for oblivion, was given victory, unprecedented and complete.”⁸⁸⁰

⁸⁷⁷ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 129.

⁸⁷⁸ “Kennan Disputes US Policy in UN,” *NY Times*, November 4 1956.

⁸⁷⁹ Hans Morgenthau, “Diplomatic Calamities Seen, Basic Assumptions of Our Policy Said to Have Failed Test,” *ibid.*, November 13, Letters.

⁸⁸⁰ Douglas Brinkley, *Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953-71* (Yale University Press, 1992), 43-45.

Water Lippmann's views illustrate just how far perceptions of the UK had changed. In 1946 Lippmann acknowledged shared values, but highlighted Britain's imperial baggage asserting, that US appeal was that it was neither a totalitarian state nor a colonial power and could only retain influence with "Asiatic peoples" by not joining forces with "the British Empire, but must retain its separate influence".⁸⁸¹ After Suez, Lippmann's perception had changed, and he railed at the damage to UK-US relations and the "appeasement" of Nasser, "an implacable enemy" with a plan to "become master of the Arab world."⁸⁸² However, for Dulles, the Cold War battle for hearts and minds meant too close a public association with the old European colonial powers might fatally compromise any US attempt to lead a bloc of emergent nations:

For many years now, the United States has been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our old and valued relations with our British and French allies on the one hand, and on the other trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from colonialism... in view of the overwhelming Asian and African pressure upon us, we could not walk this tightrope much longer. Unless we now assert and maintain this leadership, all of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the USSR. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist policies.⁸⁸³

The weakness of this approach was whether the US could find reliable allies with a proven military capacity to fill the vacuum created by the weakening of the colonial powers. US military leaders, sympathetic to the UK's Suez objectives had long warned the US must be 'on guard' in that in pursuit of good relations with Arab nationalists the US did not "worsen our relations with the UK so as to unduly weaken or dissolve the main strength of the free world."⁸⁸⁴

⁸⁸¹ Walter Lippmann, "Syndicated Column," *Chicago Sun*, March 6 1946.

⁸⁸² William I Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* (Simon and Schuster, 2018), 322.

⁸⁸³ "Memorandum of Discussion at the 302d Meeting of the NSC," November 1, 1956, #455. *FRUS, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI*.

⁸⁸⁴ NSC 155/1, July 14, 1953, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series Eisenhower Library (GOP, 1953), 35.

More to the point, aside from self-determination, little in the way of the liberal values of the Anglosphere was manifest in the political ideologies these new states espoused. The hegemonic aspirations of Nasser threatened to replace traditional regimes with socialist dictatorships supported by Soviet arms.⁸⁸⁵ Nasser's status soared to "mythic proportions," and garnered support across the Arab world.⁸⁸⁶ For non-aligned states, the Suez Crisis did not elevate the US, but rather suggested Nasser had achieved a major success "by playing the superpowers against each other."⁸⁸⁷

Eisenhower's Cabinet acknowledged they had inherited a problem, declaring that "we should tolerate no monkey-business from Nasser" and "the monkey was presently going to come off the back of the British and be put on our own back."⁸⁸⁸ They concluded the US would need UK advice on how to operate in the Middle East region. The regional vacuum they had inadvertently created required US action. The enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine was the response, offering military and economic aid to Middle Eastern states threatened by aggression and categorised by Nasser as "a device to re-establish imperial control."⁸⁸⁹

Nixon, who had sought to equate Egyptian with the American War of Independence changed position and led appeals for economic assistance for the UK and acknowledged history might record that "neither we nor our allies were without fault in our handling of the events."⁸⁹⁰ The language adopted by the US was not only conciliatory towards the UK, but the terminology was replete with evidence of what Deutsch termed 'we-ness,' invoking familial and friendship references. The analogy of the family was utilised by the US policy-

⁸⁸⁵ Michael Doran, *Ike's Gamble: America's Rise to Dominance in the Middle East* (Simon and Schuster, 2017), 11.

⁸⁸⁶ Brinkley, 45.

⁸⁸⁷ Antonio Donno and Daniele De Luca, "Eisenhower, Dulles and US Policy toward Israel & the Middle East Crisis at Suez," in *Paths Not Taken: Speculations on American Foreign Policy and Diplomatic History, Interests, Ideals, and Power*, ed. Jonathan M Nielson and Walter LaFeber (California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000), 149.

⁸⁸⁸ "Memorandum of Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the National Security Council," Washington, November 30, 1956 #626. 1956. *FRUS, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI*,

⁸⁸⁹ "Despatch from the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State," May 27, 1960. #258 *FRUS, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII*,

⁸⁹⁰ William Blair, "Nixon Hails Break with Allies' Policies," *NY Times*, November 2 1956; "Nixon Proposes US Aid to Britain," *ibid.*, December 7.

makers. Eisenhower told Eden that Suez should not become between the US and the UK “after all, it is like a family spat.”⁸⁹¹ Writing to Churchill in November 1956, Eisenhower wanted the incident “washed off the slate,” adding “nothing saddens me more than the thought that I and my old friends of years have met a problem concerning which we do not see eye-to-eye. I shall never be happy until our old-time closeness has been restored.”⁸⁹² Dulles invoked familial terms, claiming Suez “was an essentially a violent family squabble, but not one which was likely to end in a divorce.”⁸⁹³

4.2.2 Canada as the Anglosphere’s ‘honest’ broker

Canada reprised the ‘hinge’ role, acting as the Anglosphere ‘facilitator,’ to end UK-US rift “as expediently as possible.”⁸⁹⁴ In refusing to endorse Franco-British military plans, they initially incurred Eden’s wrath, but were now well-placed to secure a compromise UN resolution and a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) that provided the UK with an exit. Although Canadian action won it wider Commonwealth support, notably India, its motives and perceived association with the UK did not impress Nasser who viewed the Canadians as part of the same imperial bloc.⁸⁹⁵ Indeed, such cynicism was probably justified. In those Middle Eastern states where UK Embassies were obliged to close due to the deterioration in relations, Canada took over diplomatic representation, acting as the UK’s eyes and ears.⁸⁹⁶ There is no definitive proof that this included intelligence activity, but some staff had

⁸⁹¹ “Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower in Washington and Prime Minister Eden,” November 7, 1956. #536 *FRUS, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI*

⁸⁹² Eisenhower to Churchill, November 27, 1956. Quoted in: Gilbert, 8, 1222-23.

⁸⁹³ “Memorandum of Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the NSC,” November 30, 1956. #626. *Ibid.* 1221

⁸⁹⁴ Marc J O'Reilly, “Following Ike? Explaining Canadian-US Co-Operation During the 1956 Suez Crisis,” *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 35, no. 3 (1997): 87.

⁸⁹⁵ Lester B Mike Pearson, “The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. Vol. 2: 1948-1957,” (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 262.

⁸⁹⁶ See: Janice Cavell, “Suez and After: Canada and British Policy in the Middle East, 1956–1960,” *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 18, no. 1 (2007).

intelligence backgrounds.⁸⁹⁷ This was a function Canada would replicate for its Anglosphere partners in future crises.⁸⁹⁸

Suez highlighted the conflicting, schizophrenic nature of Canadian sentiment that could veer towards support for the UK, and then a more detached stance, the latter reflecting the Quebec factor and an attachment to liberal internationalism. In this instance, wider elements of Canadian society took issue with the St Laurent Government's failure to openly support the UK.⁸⁹⁹ The bulk of the [English-language] media were hostile to the Government. Some elements of the media argued Canada's correct 'hinge' role should have been to align the US behind the UK and castigated the government for the collapse of the alliance.⁹⁰⁰ These sentiments were shared by members of the political establishment, including opposition leader John Diefenbaker, who was to win the 1957 federal election and adopt a stronger Commonwealth orientated stance.⁹⁰¹

4.2.3 UK options: Europe or Commonwealth?

The resumption of close relations with the US was not necessarily a foregone conclusion so far as UK political policy-makers were concerned. The close wartime relationship between Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan, the new Prime Minister - the invisible bonds of familial glue — would certainly act as a binding agent.⁹⁰² However, in the immediate aftermath of Suez, the UK gave consideration to embarking on much closer relations with France and the planned European Common Market.⁹⁰³ The UK Cabinet considered a 'Grand Design,' a proposal to create a European group within NATO "almost as powerful as America and

⁸⁹⁷ Ian MacLeod, "Ambassador 1962-63 Cairo. John Starnes: Spymaster, Diplomat at Centre of Cold War Intrigue," *Ottawa Citizen*, January 12 2015.

⁸⁹⁸ See: Don Munton and Miriam Matejova, "Spies without Borders? Western Intelligence Liaison, the Tehran Hostage Affair and Iran's Islamic Revolution," *Intelligence and National Security* 27, no. 5 (2012): 475-79.

⁸⁹⁹ O'Reilly, 87. A Gallup poll found 43% supported the invasion and 40% opposed. See: Dale C Thomson, *Louis St. Laurent, Canadian* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 183.

⁹⁰⁰ James Eayrs, "Canadian Policy and Opinion During the Suez Crisis," *International Journal* 12, no. 2 (1957): 105.

⁹⁰¹ Phillip Buckner, *Canada and the End of Empire* (Vancouver: ubc Press, 2007), 68.

⁹⁰² Macmillan was the UK Cabinet representative of Eisenhower's HQ Staff during allied operations against Vichy France in N Africa.

⁹⁰³ Established by the Treaty of Rome March 25, 1957.

perhaps in friendly rivalry with her.”⁹⁰⁴ The new group would share in British nuclear weapons technology, now more advanced in certain respects than that of the US.⁹⁰⁵

Macmillan’s memoirs hint at a possible British post-Suez policy trajectory towards the US more akin to that pursued by France. On becoming UK Prime Minister, in January 1957, Macmillan recorded his feelings as follows

I was not at all in the mood, nor were any of my colleagues, to appear in a white sheet, or put ourselves, however great the prize, in a humiliating posture. We felt that we had been let down, if not betrayed, by the vacillating and delaying tactics that [Foster] Dulles had pursued in the earlier stages of the Suez crisis and by the viciousness with which he and his subordinates had attacked us after the Anglo-French operation... I was in no mood to make the first approach.⁹⁰⁶

However, even before Macmillan’s succession to the premiership in January 1957, the Cabinet rejected the European tilt, arguing the UK’s ties with both the US and the Commonwealth would be undermined.⁹⁰⁷ The US made the first approach soon after Macmillan’s ascension to the premiership. The resultant Bermuda Conference in March 1957 facilitated progress in several important areas, including both cooperation on Western European security and nuclear collaboration as discussed later.

4.2.4 Forward Defence and “Kangaroo Imperialism.”

The Australians had inherited British overseas territories and shared with the UK a similar exasperation with what they perceived as misplaced US idealism at the pace of self-determination. The left-wing Foreign Minister of Australia, Evatt believed his country’s administration of trustee territories to be exemplary, complained of the “constant carping criticism by representatives of governments” whose own nationals did not enjoy “equivalent

⁹⁰⁴ “The Grand Design (co-operation with Western Europe), Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.” January 5, 1957. TNA, CAB 129/84, CP (57) 6. 175

⁹⁰⁵ Nick J Crowson, *Britain and Europe: A Political History since 1918* (Routledge, 2010), 73.

⁹⁰⁶ Macmillan, 4, 240.

⁹⁰⁷ “Europe: Political and Military Association.” Cabinet Meeting. January 8, 1957. TNA, CAB 129/84, CM (57) 3rd Conclusions.

rights and privileges.”⁹⁰⁸ The Australian Minister for Territories expressed similar exasperation at “glib” calls for what amounted to premature self-government.⁹⁰⁹ Australia’s ambassador to Washington in 1958 thought the US policy establishment naïve and moralistic. As such, the US they were unaware “of what devastating consequences may flow from” the pursuit of impractical anti-colonialist policies. In the ambassador’s opinion Suez was a prime example, the US “shouted” about

their love of freedom, (you’d think they invented the damn thing), so that when events don’t quite work out as they have come to believe, they get all upset.⁹¹⁰

The adoption of perceived US ‘neutralism’ towards colonial powers had grave implications for the security of Australia. Menzies informed his Cabinet that Nasser

is full of himself. He has pulled noses over the Canal and is looking for fresh worlds to conquer... [The UK] know that unless Nasser is cut back to size, you will have a new Empire in the Middle East... you must not underestimate Nasser. He’s had a victory over great powers.⁹¹¹

Australia’s security strategy was predicated on the ‘Forward Defence’ of South East Asia to prevent communist expansion into Australasia.⁹¹² Of particular concern was the island of New Guinea, split between Australian administered Papua New Guinea, and Dutch New Guinea. Indonesia’s President Sukarno coveted Dutch New Guinea so as to create an *Indonesia Raya* (greater Indonesia). Sukarno, backed by a large indigenous communist party, was prepared to accept assistance from the PRC and the Soviet Union to achieve his territorial aims. To Menzies, Sukarno’s grandstanding resembled a form of Nasserism.⁹¹³ Australia doubted Sukarno’s promises his claims were limited to Dutch New Guinea and feared Australian Papua New Guinea might be threatened.⁹¹⁴ After Suez, Menzies worried

⁹⁰⁸ Quoted in Michael Leifer, “Australia, Trusteeship and New Guinea,” *Pacific Affairs* 36, no. 3 (1963): 251-52.

⁹⁰⁹ Henry S Albinski, “Australia and the Dutch New Guinea Dispute,” *International Journal* 16, no. 4 (1961): 377.

⁹¹⁰ Beale to Casey, July 7, 1958, NAA, A1983/1, item 16

⁹¹¹ Australian Cabinet Notebook. November 30, 1956. NAA, A11099, 1/23.

⁹¹² See: Stephan Frühling, “The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” in *A History of Australian Strategic Policy since 1945*, ed. Stephan Frühling (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2009), 163-66.

⁹¹³ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “Troubled Birth of Malaysia,” *Foreign Affairs* 41 (1962): 676.

⁹¹⁴ Albinski, 367.

about US reliability, noting they had “taken neutrality… to great lengths — for all we know they are preparing for the obsequies now.”⁹¹⁵ Australian support of Dutch plans for an independent New Guinea state, as opposed to absorption into *Indonesia Raya*, provoked Indonesian accusations of “Kangaroo imperialism.”⁹¹⁶

4.2.5 Clash of attitudes

The UK was proceeding towards realising the self-determination principles contained in the Atlantic Charter. However, until the UK had relinquished its colonial possessions, it was an easy target for opponents to label it as imperialist. It was not a label the US wanted to be associated with and as such the issue of 'colonialism' had the potential to fracture the Anglospheric security cooperation outside Europe.

The imperialist charge remained despite a rapid process of de-colonisation. The process was largely peaceful and friendly relatively peacefully so that all restrictive policing was eliminated. By 1960, there was no emergency legislation in any of the colonial territories for the first time in twenty years. Once stability and democratic institutions had been established, independence was granted, so that between 1959 and 1961, fifteen new independent states had been created. In 1945, 630 million people had lived in UK-dependent territories, but by 1961 this had been reduced to 23 million.⁹¹⁷ Moreover, states were free to join the Commonwealth or decline as Burma and Arabs states did.

Ironically, it was the consequences of self-determination that occasionally created new tensions between the UK and the US if the outcome produced leaders who were sympathetic to-communist outlooks. These new leaders were not necessarily adherents of Magna Carta type values and had no intention of allowing civic society to develop, but favoured ‘democratic centralist’ vanguardism. This was illustrated in Guiana, where Rusk expressed

⁹¹⁵ Australian Cabinet Notebook, December 11, 1957. NAA, A11099, 1/36.

⁹¹⁶ Hiroyuki Umetsu, "Australia's Response to the West New Guinea Dispute, 1952–53," *The Journal of Pacific History* 39, no. 1 (2004): 61.

⁹¹⁷ Vernon Bogdanor, "Iain Macleod and Decolonisation" (paper presented at the Gresham College Lectures, Museum of London, November 13 2012), 6.

US irritation at the popularity of the left-wing leader Cheddi Jagan, informing the UK that the US could “not put up with an independent British Guiana.”⁹¹⁸

The reply from UK Foreign Secretary, Home encapsulates the essential contradiction between US ‘self-determination’ rhetoric and the demands of realpolitik,

it was your historic role to have been for years the first crusader and prime mover in urging colonial emancipation. The communists are in the van. Why? Amongst other things because premature independence is a gift to them.⁹¹⁹

As to the notion of removing Jagan, Home asked, “How would you suggest that this can be done in a democracy?”⁹²⁰ The US answer in Guiana, and other ex-colonial situations, was an increased US appetite to rely upon covert operations.⁹²¹

Rusk’s worries and Home’s reference to Jagan’s communism were not without substance. Since the 1960s claims that Jagan had no communist linkages were the dominant narrative until the early twenty-first century. However, in 2014, the opening of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic archives established he had been attempting to acquire weapons and had secured finance.⁹²² The vanguardist meme-complex associated with this Marxist-Leninist one-party state that had just executed "Trotskyist-zionist-titoist-bourgeois-nationalist traitors" and sent thousands of citizens to labour camps appeared to offer some attraction to Jagan's own mind-set.⁹²³

⁹¹⁸ Quoted in: Robert Rabel, “" We Cannot Afford to Be Left Too Far Behind Australia": New Zealand's Entry into the Vietnam War in May 1965," *Journal of the Australian War Memorial*, no. 32 (1999): 93.

⁹¹⁹ Home to Rusk. February 26, 1962, TNA, PREM 11/366.

⁹²⁰ Ibid. Home to Rusk. For a full account of the diplomatic fallout see: Stephen G Rabe, *US Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story* (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2006), 94-98.

⁹²¹ This included CIA operations in Indonesia (1957-58), the Congo (1960), Cuba & Dominican Republic (1961), S Vietnam (1963), Bolivia & Brazil (1964)

⁹²² Jan Koura and Robert Waters, "Cheddi Jagan and Guyanese Overtures to the East: Evidence from the Czech National Archives " *Insight & Analysis* CWIHP E-Dossier Series, no. 54 (2014); "Czechoslovakia and British Guiana," in *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World: Aid and Influence in the Cold War*, ed. Philip E Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva (Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 75-88.

⁹²³ Richard J Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century—and After* (Routledge, 2002), 262.

Colonialism remained an area of friction within the security community and centred on this central contradiction between wanting the UK to decolonise but maintain the security measures that could be seen as imperialistic. For the US, the risk of any allegation that they were in collusion with colonial powers was to be minimised. The natural affiliation and alignment the US felt towards the UK must be tempered by a need to limit certain aspects of the relationship and be seen to do so. This not only allowed the US to refute charges of being ‘in cahoots’ with colonialists but countered any jealously such close public arrangements might engender with NATO allies.

Initially, the US engagement in what Nixon termed, “the once colonial areas” was limited and there was a US tendency to play to the non-aligned bloc to burnish anti-colonial credentials.⁹²⁴ This was at variance with their growing unwillingness to accept self-determination outcomes as characterised by covert operations and a growing military activism in South East Asia.⁹²⁵ This practice provoked much irritation in the UK. Macmillan’s response to Rusk’s letter about Guiana captured the UK’s incredulity at the perceived lack of US self-awareness and hypocrisy in general.

How can the Americans continue to attack us in the UN on colonialism and then use expressions like these which are pure Machiavellianism? Of course, it’s nice to feel that they are partners with us and have such confidence in you as to send a letter of this kind, but it does show a degree of cynicism which I thought Dean Rusk would hardly put his name to.⁹²⁶

Suez ushered in a period in which US policy-makers were obliged to confront the realities associated with the accelerated departure of colonial powers. Nevertheless, the US State Department tended to stress the importance of anti-colonialism and adopt a somewhat sanctimonious approach when the UK used robust measures to exert order on fractious territories before departure. The tendency of the US to blow ‘hot and cold’ towards their Anglosphere allies were in evidence in the aftermath of the Bermuda conference where the high hopes of an initial reset were not realised until a second reset meeting in the October.

⁹²⁴ Blair.

⁹²⁵ For a full list of US interventions see: William Blum, *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II* (Zed Books, 2003).

⁹²⁶ Macmillan to Foreign Secretary, February 21, 1962, TNA, PREM 11/366

The course of events between March and October 1957 are symptomatic of a recurring pattern of internal Anglosphere core global engagement, distancing, and hubris.

4.3. Relationship Reset - the Common Declaration

4.3.1 Introduction

This section explores the progress made in establishing new working relationships soon after the Suez Crisis. As Table 4 illustrates there was a complimentary deepening of bilateral initiatives between 1957 and 1961 consisting of UK-US arrangements and Canada-US arrangements. A further UK-US arrangement, the Technical Cooperation Committee rapidly became a trilateral arrangement with the inclusion of Canada. The ‘Interdependence’ Working Groups institutionalised informal bilateral collaboration with the UK urging their extension to include Australia and NZ on regional issues.

4.3.2 Faltering start in Bermuda

The Bermuda Conference represented an opportunity for UK and US political makers to reset the relationship. As elaborated in the section on atomic cooperation, the Eisenhower-Macmillan meetings had been preceded by productive high-level defence talks about US-UK nuclear collaboration.⁹²⁷ On the need for general cooperation, there was some initial progress. The UK stressed its commitment to a global alliance with the US based “in part on sentiment but also, of course, on interest” and Macmillan acknowledged the UK would be “the junior partner,” but thought, “the US would not care to try to do it alone.”⁹²⁸ Eisenhower agreed there should be common objectives and joint plans for Middle East policy, and said the US wanted “if anything to build them [the UK] up again in the Middle East.”⁹²⁹

⁹²⁷ “Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Bermuda,” March 22, 1957. #274. *FRUS, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII.* and “Memorandum of a Conversation, President Eisenhower’s Quarters, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda,” March 22, 1957, #275. *Ibid.*

⁹²⁸ “Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda,” March 21, 1957. #268 *Ibid.*

⁹²⁹ “Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda,” March 21, 1957 #270. *Ibid.*

It was agreed to establish close collaboration and a communiqué was drafted to announce the rapprochement, but at the last-minute references to the resumption of a close working relationship were removed. There was a difference of opinion between Eisenhower and Dulles as to how public this UK-US relationship should be. Dulles wished to avoid any references and records that might reveal the true nature of the relationship. However, a leak to the NY Times revealed that a series of twenty-five “agreements, directives and reports” and “planning groups” had been agreed for future UK-US planning at Eisenhower’s suggestion. The news report noted British insistence that the agreements consist of written memoranda despite the initial objection “of certain members of the US delegation.” The report suggested the UK wished to avoid the misunderstandings associated with Dulles’ previous behaviour “where he had told them one thing in London and done another.”⁹³⁰ Dulles denied the arrangements at a press conference.⁹³¹

The report in the NY Times was significant in several respects, pointing to a lack of trust by UK policy-makers towards Dulles with respect to his modus operandi. Dulles was wedded to the notion that US interests would not be served by a global public association with the UK. Despite signed memoranda, it appears that instead of establishing ‘planning groups’ the State Department merely exchanged views with the UK.⁹³² These do not appear to have been of much consequence since both undertook unilateral actions in the Middle East without informing the other; the US attempted a Syrian coup, and the UK took action military in the Gulf. Aside from re-establishing cordial relations, there was little institutional evidence of the “increasingly dense networks” that Adler and Barnett hold up as examples of an ‘Ascendant’ security community.⁹³³

⁹³⁰ Drew Middleton, “US & Britain to Pool Planning and Intelligence,” *NY Times*, March 26 1957. The remark was a reference to the circumstances surrounding the creation of SEATO See: Charles O Lerche, “The United States, Great Britain, and Seato a Case Study in the Fait Accompli,” *The Journal of Politics* 18, no. 3 (1956).

⁹³¹ “Secretary Dulles’ News Conference,” March 26, 1957. Dept. State News Release no. PR 175.

⁹³² “Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State,” September 5, 1957, #384. *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹³³ Adler and Barnett, 62, 51.

4.3.3 UK unilateral action

Underlying the lack of cohesion in UK-US policy, the UK continued to act unilaterally in the Middle East; assisting the Sultan of Oman against Nasser backed rebels.⁹³⁴ The British were worried that even a small-scale military operation would risk “the disapproval and opposition of the United States.”⁹³⁵ This assessment was correct; Dulles favoured covert, deniable actions against hostile Arab elements and avoidance of public backing of the UK. In a deteriorating military situation, the Omanis requested and received British military assistance in 1957. Dulles described the decision to deploy UK ground troops “a mystery,” informed Eisenhower that the intervention risked alienating Arab opinion and that, “a small scale Suez might be in the making.”⁹³⁶ Once again, the essential element of communication and the ability to confidently predict the behaviour of allies threatened to retard and reverse relations amongst political policy-makers.

UK military intervention proved effective, drawing the ire of ten Arab states who, on August 12, 1957, called for a UN Security Council meeting to condemn the intervention. The US was confronted with the choice of supporting their ally or adopting a conciliatory approach to those sections of Arab opinion they still wooed. They inclined to the latter course. The likelihood of an American UN abstention infuriated the British. In an impromptu visit to the State Department, British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia made the point with “some emotion,” that such a course of action at the UN, “would be extremely harmful to Anglo-US relations.”⁹³⁷ Macmillan noted in his diary

The Americans are behaving outrageously to us about Oman. They haven’t the courage to vote against inscribing the item at the Security Council.⁹³⁸

Dulles asserted the US could not vote with the UK because, “countries like the Philippines, Thailand, etc., will be thrown back again into the Arab-Asian bloc.”⁹³⁹ For the

⁹³⁴ See: JE Peterson, “Britain and ‘the Oman War’: An Arabian Entanglement,” *Asian Affairs* 7, no. 3 (1976).

⁹³⁵ Macmillan, 4, 271.

⁹³⁶ “Editorial Note,” Undated #155 *FRUS, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹³⁷ “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) and the British Ambassador (Caccia), August 15, 1957 #157. *FRUS, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹³⁸ Macmillan, 4, 276.

Americans, abstention was a concession to the British. It was another attempt to walk the tightrope — to distance themselves from the British but not side wholeheartedly with Arab nationalist sentiment.⁹⁴⁰ On August 20, 1957, the Security Council voted not to include the item on their agenda by a narrow margin of 5 to 4 with the UK supported by Australia and the US abstaining.⁹⁴¹ Eisenhower told Macmillan,

we can recognize that the common goals which we have cannot always be best achieved by our necessarily always taking a uniform public position.⁹⁴²

4.3.4 The failure of US unilateralism: Operation Wakeful

The most significant catalyst for a greater willingness to engage with the UK came about as a consequence of a US unilateral action. In April 1957, Eisenhower authorised Operation WAKEFUL, a covert CIA operation to plan for the overthrow of the Syria Government. By July 1957, the US had concluded that Syria was drifting into the Soviet camp.⁹⁴³ Unlike previous covert operations such as the 1953 CIA/MI6 *Operation Boot* in Iran, this was to be a unilateral affair without the British.⁹⁴⁴

On August 12, 1957, the very same day that the US were voicing criticism of UK intervention in support of Oman, the Syrian Government unmasked an American “plot.” The pro-US Syrian conspirators were arrested, the US Embassy surrounded by troops, and three senior ranking US staff expelled.⁹⁴⁵ To compound the disaster, any pro-US Syrian military

⁹³⁹ “Editorial Note.” [Dulles-Lodge Conversation August 20, 1957] #162. *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹⁴⁰ “Editorial Note,” Ibid #162. [in Lodge-Dulles Oman] *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*,

⁹⁴¹ Peterson, 294.

⁹⁴² “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” August 19, 1957. #160 *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹⁴³ See: “Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State,” May 17, 1957. #351. 618 and “Despatch From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State,” July 29, 1957. Ibid. #354.

⁹⁴⁴ Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence* (Scarecrow Press, 2014), 610.

⁹⁴⁵ For a full account see: Douglas Little, “Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958,” *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 1 (1990). For US Embassy reaction see: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State. August 13, 1957. #355. *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

leaders were replaced with pro-Soviet officers.⁹⁴⁶ The US now found itself in need of UK diplomatic support and aghast at a perceived Soviet advance. A furious Eisenhower questioned whether the US had the expertise to operate effectively within the region.⁹⁴⁷

Dulles telegrammed a personal message to his UK counterpart Selwyn Lloyd expressing a desire to “exchange views” on Syria and consider the necessity of taking, “some serious risks to avoid even greater risks...”⁹⁴⁸ In response Macmillan sent his Private Secretary to Washington, who with Caccia, met Dulles on the September 2, 1957.⁹⁴⁹ By September 5, the language employed by Dulles was invoking familial terms to describe the UK referring to the British as our ‘cousins,’ indicative of Deutsch’s ‘we-feeling’ in the development of trust.⁹⁵⁰

Encouraged, Dulles sent a cable to Macmillan urging renewed cooperation on Syria and hinting at military collaboration.

We must work together in this matter. Any positive action, once begun, must, even at great risk, be pushed through to a success. Speed and simplicity are very important elements. It is not possible to fit all alternatives into neat slots. Whatever is planned will be different.⁹⁵¹

The familial tone was repeated when, a few days later, Dulles briefed the President on the progress of the talks,

...we have maintained close contact with the United Kingdom. There is genuine, intimate and effective cooperation, stemming directly from Macmillan—this is the first instance ... as Secretary [of State] wherein we have had anything like this attitude.⁹⁵²

⁹⁴⁶ “Special National Intelligence Estimate,” September 3, 1957. #383. *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹⁴⁷ “Excerpt Fulton Lewis Junior, at 7.00pm over [Radio] WGMS (Washington & the Mutual Network.)” August 21, 1957. Freedom of Information Act Electronic [CIA] Reading Room (hereafter FOIA-CIA).

⁹⁴⁸ “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the UK,” August 21, 1957. #367 *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹⁴⁹ “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House,” September 2, 1957, #380 *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹⁵⁰ “Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State,” September 5, 1957. #384. *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹⁵¹ “Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Macmillan,”

September 5, 1957. *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

⁹⁵² “Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House,” September 7, 1957. #388 *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*.

The emergence of a stronger collective identity had begun to spread within the US policy establishment with familial references and evidence of ‘we-ness’ in policy-maker narratives. The intelligence briefings reflected more inclusive language towards the UK as the change in perceptions solidified. Internal US assessments by Allen Dulles’ CIA for the US Joint Advisory Committee started to refer to the US and the UK as a conjoined actor as distinct from other allies and mutual adversaries.⁹⁵³

4.3.5 The Syria Working Group: Engineering Invasion

The US had decided they were “definitely in favour of a ‘retrieving’ operation in Syria,” and wanted UK commitment.⁹⁵⁴ The intent was to create a situation whereby UK-US covert operations engineered circumstances for pro-western regional states to intervene. It was important for the US to retain its anti-colonialist credentials by not being seen to intervene. Eisenhower was to see the irony, recalling the US position on Suez, “less than a year before, supporting the principle that military force was not a justifiable means for settling of disputes; the United States had taken drastic action in the United Nations.”⁹⁵⁵

To effect the circumstances for a Syrian regime change, a secret ministerial bilateral UK-US Working Group (WG) was established and produced ‘Preferred Plan’ for false flag operations to provide an excuse for intervention by pro-Western members of the CENTO alliance.⁹⁵⁶

⁹⁵³ “Probable Soviet Action in Various Contingencies Affecting Syria.” Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-9-57 September 24, 1957. FOIA-CIA 033985. Doc: CIA-RDP98-00979R000400520001-0

⁹⁵⁴ Peter Catterall, “The Macmillan Diaries Vol. II, Prime Minister and after, 1957-66,” (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2011), 57.

⁹⁵⁵ Dwight Eisenhower, D, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, Doubleday (NY: Doubleday, 1965), 198.

⁹⁵⁶ Lerche, 362. Matthew Jones, “The ‘Preferred Plan’: The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957,” *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 3 (2004): 401-02. Duncan Sandys, Final Report of the Joint U.S.-U.K. Working Group on Syria, Duncan Sandys Papers (Dsnd) 6/35, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge.

Macmillan appears to have favoured restraint, but did not wish to extinguish US enthusiasm for action in the region given UK concerns about Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait.⁹⁵⁷ Macmillan conferred with the Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada and NZ. All responded favourably to the idea of conjoined action with the US. Menzies commended Macmillan for “establishing confidential contact with the Americans,” and agreed, “it would be wrong for us to hold back now because the Americans have not been sufficiently understanding and helpful in the past.”⁹⁵⁸

By the end of September 1957, the ‘Preferred Plan’ was dropped in favour of the much more modest ‘Containment Plus’ plan due to regional partner states revising their willingness to invade Syria.⁹⁵⁹ To control covert operational activities, a joint ‘Psychological Working Group’ was established meeting

on an approximately weekly basis to discuss co-ordination of output, to exchange policy guidance and research documents and to assess the psychological implications of current and planned policies.⁹⁶⁰

4.3.6 Institutionalised Consultation

The Syria meetings were succeeded by further bilateral preparatory ministerial meetings. These culminated in the Eisenhower-Macmillan ‘Washington Talks’ in late October. The US appetite for closer relations had been given a further impetus by the launch of the ‘Sputnik’ satellite on October 4, 1957. The launch was seen as a technological Soviet advance of such magnitude it was represented as a “Pearl Harbor,” convincing members of the US policy-establishment and the wider public of the need for allies.⁹⁶¹ The stage had been set for what Adler and Barnet refer to a process of “increasingly dense networks” and institutions, thereby

⁹⁵⁷ Beirut to FO, August 19, 1957. TNA, FO 371/128223. Foreign Office to Washington, Sept. 29, 1957. TNA, PREM, 11/2521. Macmillan, 4, 279-81.

⁹⁵⁸ Menzies to Macmillan. 19 September 1957 quoted in *ibid.*, 283.

⁹⁵⁹ Foreign Office to Washington, Sept. 29, 1957. TNA, PREM, 11/2521. See also: Douglas M Gibler, *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*, vol. 2 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 675.

⁹⁶⁰ “Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices,” September 25, 1957. #404 *FRUS, 1955–1957, near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII*. 717-fn6

⁹⁶¹ Yanek Mieczkowski, *Eisenhower's Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige* (Cornell University Press, 2013), 62-63.

edging the security community into a new phase and made effective by strong personal affinities and outlooks.⁹⁶²

The US intelligence community was supportive of closer UK ties. CIA Director Allen Dulles confirmed the US and UK "...never stopped exchanging information even in the worst days and this could now be expanded in the new atmosphere."⁹⁶³ Russell Baker, a Washington journalist with connections to the CIA and the State Department, referred to the UK's new status.⁹⁶⁴ Baker noted,

Washington is aware again, that it is good to have friends and that London has long been the most reliable. Something like humility, and not in the current debased sense of the word has been restored to the Washington atmosphere... Prognosis of the United States-British alliance at this stage is difficult.... The last few weeks suggest a new period of evolution, breaking the old deteriorative drift, may be underway, producing new forms binding Washington and London anew through mutual necessity.⁹⁶⁵

The Washington Talks concluded at the end of October 1957 with a public announcement of a joint "Common Declaration on interdependence" by Eisenhower and Macmillan:

The arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defense and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is now out of date. The countries of the free world are interdependent and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part we have agreed that our two countries will henceforth act in accordance with this principle.⁹⁶⁶

It was stressed 'interdependence' could be extended to other allies, including NATO, to placate concerns about a "US-UK directorate." A Memorandum of Understanding was signed to establish cooperation on every aspect of military technology and bring together scientists

⁹⁶² Adler and Barnett, 62, 51.

⁹⁶³ "Anglo-American Discussions" October 24, 1957. TNA, PREM 11/2329, PM(W)5(7) 2nd mtg.

⁹⁶⁴ David P Hadley, *The Rising Clamor: The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War* (University Press of Kentucky, 2019), 72-73.

⁹⁶⁵ Baker Russell, "State of Western Alliance: Changed Atmosphere," *NY Times*, October 25 1957.

⁹⁶⁶ "Text of U.S.-British Declaration," *ibid.*, October 26, 1957.

and military personnel in a common effort. The UK was keen to involve Canada and, after the conclusion of the Washington talks, Macmillan flew on to Ottawa to brief the Canadian Cabinet.⁹⁶⁷ The Canadians “expressed themselves, for their part, most ready to subscribe to the principle of interdependence and to join in the common effort necessary to make it effective.”⁹⁶⁸ The Tripartite Technical Cooperation Programme (TTCP) was established thereafter, overseeing an array of standing Working Groups each with different research foci.⁹⁶⁹ At the conclusion of his October 1957 North American trip, Macmillan wrote to Dulles,

I shall go home not only content but, what is more, rather excited. For it is really a great adventure on which we are embarked, and with God’s will we may hope to leave behind us something really firm and fruitful.⁹⁷⁰

The secret Working Group system the Bermuda Conference had envisaged now came into effect, aiming to align UK-US foreign policy, propaganda and covert activity.⁹⁷¹ Priority was given to initiating a standing Syria Working Group based in Washington to bring together State Department and CIA staff with MI6 and British Embassy staff.⁹⁷² For the first time since the World War 2 a series of semi-formal UK-US planning mechanisms had been established and at a senior level.⁹⁷³ The UK urged that both Australia and NZ should be included in Working Groups covering SE Asia. This constituted a significant development and extended the institutionalised communicative practices associated with the development of a security community to Australia and New Zealand. The precise activities of these Working Groups remain obscure, but a declassified Cabinet Briefing Paper reveals the titles

⁹⁶⁷ Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs, and to Cabinet. “Visit of PM Macmillan.” June 23, 1958. LAC No.181-58

⁹⁶⁸ “‘New Start’ in Relations with America,” *Daily Telegraph*, October 30 1957.

⁹⁶⁹ Later renamed ‘The Technical Cooperation Programme.’. See: John Baylis, *Anglo-American Relations since 1939: The Enduring Alliance* (Manchester University Press, 1997), 94.

⁹⁷⁰ Ivan Pearson, “The Syrian Crisis of 1957, the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’, and the 1958 Landings in Jordan and Lebanon,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 1 (2007): Footnote 82.

⁹⁷¹ “Staff Study Prepared in the Department of State,” October 30, 1957. #270 *FRUS, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII*.

⁹⁷² Jones, “The ‘Preferred Plan’: The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957,” 405.

⁹⁷³ Richard J Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and the Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London, 2001), 585.

(and therefore the approximate remit) of joint Working Groups as of June 1958.⁹⁷⁴ They are listed in the memorandum as:

- “A.) Defence, Research and Development Co-operation
- B.) Institutional WG
- C.) Syria and Middle East WG
- D.) Algeria Working Group
- E.) Horn of Africa
- F.) Information Policy WG (To include Australia & NZ in SE Asia focus)
- G.) Hong Kong WG
- H.) Economic WG
- I.) Indonesia WG (Includes Australia in membership)”⁹⁷⁵

In addition to these standing Working Groups, other ad hoc groups were established to deal with very specific issues and problems, such as one to craft US/UK policy in support of the new ‘Arab Union’ of Iraq and Jordan.⁹⁷⁶

The UK hoped the practice of regular meetings would establish a pattern of bureaucratic intimacy so ingrained that semi-formal Working Groups would become redundant. Until that occurred, it was important that they remained secret to avoid

giving our friends and other allies the impression of an exclusive Anglo-American directorate, [that was attempting] to dispose of all the world’s problems. [The existence of] regular machinery for systematic consultation over a wide range of problems [would be unwelcome, but] the formal machinery for dealing with political problems may gradually be abandoned in favour of informal consultation...⁹⁷⁷

The UK’s intention was to favour

⁹⁷⁴ Titles such as “Information policy” and later “Psychological policy” are pseudonyms for propaganda and covert activities. See memo ref SPA section of MI6: “Psychological Warfare in War – Composition, Organisation, and Functions of SPA”: Attached, copy of Minute from Mr J.A. Drew, Ministry of Defence, to Major General R.W. Macleod, Dated 9th May 1958', TNA, FO 1110/1102

⁹⁷⁵ Top Secret “Briefing to Prime Minister, Summary of Progress in Washington Working Groups.” TNA, FO Annex B, June 1958. 1-3

⁹⁷⁶ “Memorandum of Conversation,”

June 9, 1958, #105. *FRUS, 1958–1960, near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII.*

⁹⁷⁷ “Security of Working Group Procedure, Annex a,” March 10, 1959 TNA, FO H88.

the fullest use of normal channels of communication — i.e. The Foreign Office, United States Embassy and British Embassy-State Department [supplementing these with] Working Group Machinery... where Washington Departments other than the State Department (e.g., CIA and Pentagon) are involved.⁹⁷⁸

The new modus operandi could be “extended” to the “widest possible circle within both government machines” until US-UK consultation became a “habitual reaction to any problem.”⁹⁷⁹ Exposure of the Working Group structure could be construed as a ‘special relationship’ and an “Anglo-Saxon clique” by Western allies. There would not be an adverse reaction from Canada, Australia and New Zealand, “their anxiety is the reverse,” namely that the US and UK would diverge.⁹⁸⁰

4.4 Nuclear rapprochement

4.4.1 Introduction

The other significant development of note was progress on the issue of UK-US nuclear cooperation with the signing of the bilateral Mutual Defence Agreement in 1958.⁹⁸¹ It is described as Baylis “as without doubt” one of the most important UK-US agreements facilitating the most intimate exchange of atomic information that was without parallel between the US and any other state.⁹⁸²

In contrast to Truman, Eisenhower wanted cooperation and progress or as Andrew Pierre puts it, thought “frankness and trust” were paramount, “and the bonds of the alliance were more meaningful than the abstract concern regarding the spread of nuclear capabilities.”⁹⁸³

⁹⁷⁸ “The Effects of Anglo-American Interdependence on the Long-Term Interests of the U.K.” April 10, 1958. TNA, CAB. 129/92 Ext. 218a (FO) C(58) 77

⁹⁷⁹ “The Effects of Anglo-American Interdependence on the Long-Term Interests of the U.K.” April 10, 1958. TNA, CAB. 129/92 Ext. 218a (FO) C(58) 77

⁹⁸⁰ *Ibid* 7.

⁹⁸¹ John Baylis, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdependence,” *Journal of strategic studies* 31, no. 3 (2008): 435-36.

⁹⁸² *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84*, 90-91.

⁹⁸³ Pierre, 143-44.

Eisenhower informed his officials not “to be too lawyer like. A great alliance requires, above all, faith and trust on both sides.”⁹⁸⁴

The very act of nuclear sharing... created an environment in which American trust in the British Government deepened so that American officials discussed a wider range of military and political topics more frankly with their British counterparts than with officials of other friendly nations.⁹⁸⁵

4.4.2 Transfer of nuclear propulsion technology - Submarines

This goodwill translated into agreements to allow the purchase component parts of weapons systems and the transfer of advanced submarine reactor technology to the UK.⁹⁸⁶ As a consequence the UK was able to deploy its first nuclear--powered submarine, HMS Dreadnought, several years ahead of schedule.⁹⁸⁷

In fact, collaboration on nuclear propulsion had been initiated before the 1958 Act. Before collaboration with the UK had been impeded by the antagonistic attitude of Groves, this time Admiral Hyman Rickover, the key individual driving the US nuclear submarine R&D programs, would advance another key aspect of the Anglospheric security community. Rickover, unlike Groves was not a ‘WASP’ but a Jewish immigrant from Czarist controlled Poland. And again, unlike Groves, he had personal experience of untrammelled government authority, witnessing arbitrary arrests and pogroms.⁹⁸⁸

It is not necessary to speculate if Rickover was attracted to the philosophical aspects of the Anglospheric Magna Carta compact and, if so, how. Rickover provided explicit answers to those questions himself. Too often accounts of Rickover character focus on his unsentimental and unbending pursuit of a nuclear-powered US submarine force, without appreciating his belief systems and outlook. This is to ignore the importance he placed on his

⁹⁸⁴ Ibid., 219.

⁹⁸⁵ Ibid., 143-44.

⁹⁸⁶ Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84*, 91. Freeman, 89.

⁹⁸⁷ Steve Ludlam, "The Role of Nuclear Submarine Propulsion," in *US-UK Nuclear Cooperation after 50 Years*, ed. Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish (Washington DC: CSIS, 2008), 255.

⁹⁸⁸ Hyman George Rickover, "The Education of Hyman Rickover," *Washington Post* 1983.

learning of the English language and its role in allowing him to access new Anglospheric meme-complexes with respect to heritage and values.

On learning English, Rickover developed a voracious appetite for reading in history, politics, diplomacy and philosophy. On entering the US Naval academy this reading extended to military affairs including the traditions and heritage of both the US and Royal Navy Commanders.⁹⁸⁹ Rickover would later stress the difference between just acquiring skills as opposed to absorbing new ideas and values (meme-complexes).

...The mind does not develop through practicing manual skills or following habit. Mastery of the english language has a quite different effect on one's intellectual capacities from that which comes from [say] mastering typewriting. Knowledge of history increases one's comprehension of world events...⁹⁹⁰

Rickover became receptive to and understanding of Anglospheric memes stressing liberty and curtailment of arbitrary power. Rickover shared with Eisenhower an acute understanding of the distinction between totalitarian regimes and democracies, but also of the importance of the Magna Carta and the English 1698 Bill of Rights to the US and British view of democracy.

In Magna Carta the king promises he "will not" do the things listed in the charter; the English Bill of Rights of 1689 says the king "ought not" to do them, but our own Bill uses the words "shall" and "shall not".⁹⁹¹

He believed it was this Magna Carta conception, replicated and strengthened in the US constitution, that answered the conundrum of legitimacy of the state, asserting that the basic

problem of power was a problem of how to reconcile civilization with individual liberty. Rousseau lamented that 'man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains'⁹⁹²

⁹⁸⁹ Francis Duncan, *Rickover: The Struggle for Excellence* (Plunkett Lake Press, 2021), xxii.

⁹⁹⁰ Vice Admiral Hyman George Rickover, *Education and Freedom* (NY: Dutton & Co, 1960), 4.

⁹⁹¹ Hyman George Rickover, "Speech: Democracy and Bureaucracy," in *Fund for the Republic Symposium* (Los Angeles1963), 564.

⁹⁹² *Ibid.*, 563.

However, Rickover asserted that the ‘bottom-up’ principles encapsulated by the Magna Carta addressed this problem by establishing the notion of a “command addressed by the people to their government; of a principal to his agent.”⁹⁹³ Rickover was also mindful of those who would subvert this process by the advocacy of forms of vanguardism (benevolent or otherwise) that “defines democracy as government of the people, on behalf of the people, and in the interest of the people.”⁹⁹⁴ Whilst associated with ‘false democracies’ in Eastern Europe, Rickover asserted bureaucracies in Western states could also eventually subvert the wishes of the electorate and adopt policies without popular support and thereby undermine governmental legitimacy.

A democracy is a delicate and fragile construction. For it to exist, the people must believe in their Government and in their institutions. When any special group, as for instance a business minority takes advantage of the Government, the faith of the people is undermined.⁹⁹⁵

Given his Anglophilic outlook, it is perhaps not surprising that Rickover developed affinities with the Royal Navy during World War 2 recognised in the award of the Order of the British Empire.⁹⁹⁶ It was also not entirely surprising therefore, that Rickover was willing to skirt around some legal restrictions of the McMahon Act to engage with the British on their atomic research before official contact began in 1956. As Admiral Bruce Demars, former Director of US Navy Nuclear Propulsion highlighted, collaboration was a two-way effort and started earlier.⁹⁹⁷

You have to remember that Rickover started dealing with the UK in a really unauthorised way in 1953. You finally get congressional approval in 1958, so he had operated on his own for about five years [. . .] moving things ahead.⁹⁹⁸

⁹⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁴ Hyman Rickover. “The decline of the individual.” Speech to U.S. Navy on the occasion of the Golden Anniversary Celebration at Longview, Washington June 30, 1973

⁹⁹⁵ Hyman Rickover. “Testimony”. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, US Ninetieth Congress Second Session, November 14, 1968 US Congress.

⁹⁹⁶ Thomas B Allen and Norman Polmar, *Rickover: Father of the Nuclear Navy* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1981), 673.

⁹⁹⁷ Rickover was interested in the lower noise output of UK propulsion tests. See: Mackby and Cornish, 30, 368.

When in 1956 Rickover had his first meeting with British First Sea Lord, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, the nuclear powered USS Nautilus had undertaken a successful maiden voyage a year earlier.⁹⁹⁹ The prospects for collaboration were enhanced by the good personal chemistry between the two men.¹⁰⁰⁰ It was to be the start of a strong personal relationship that was said by Lord Hood to be, “the decisive factor in our cooperation” and in advancing the UK’s plans for nuclear powered submarines.¹⁰⁰¹

By 1958, after another inspection tour of the UK’s R&D sites, Rickover concluded the Royal Navy’s timescale to produce a nuclear-powered submarine was unlikely to be met. He made a decision, informing Harry Mandil, his Technical Director,

England has been a real friend and ally of America for generations. We should help them... by giving them outright a submarine reactor plant and the supporting technology.¹⁰⁰²

Rickover informed Mountbatten the Royal Navy’s schedule could be met, but only by adopting the US designed S5W nuclear plants in their submarines and setting aside the UK’s developmental prototype. It was a prospect that raised UK fears of being dependent on the US and losing “all the advantage of having to work out the design of the reactor for ourselves.”¹⁰⁰³

At its heart was an issue of trust. Mountbatten decided Rickover could be trusted and proceeded to inform his “horrified” colleagues on the UK’s special nuclear committee of his view. Rickover was then invited to address the committee and who informed them whatever the decision he would assist, but the most expedient and economic course was for Rolls

⁹⁹⁸ Admiral Bruce DeMars, USN "A Naval Reactors Perspective on a Half-Century of Submarine Cooperation" (paper presented at the A Half-Century of US-UK Submarine Cooperation, UN Navy Cold War Gallery Museum, 2015).

⁹⁹⁹ See: Robert Hill, *Admiral Hyman G. Rickover USN and the UK Nuclear Submarine Propulsion Programme* (Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Power Industries Division, 2005), para 39.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ludlam, 250.

¹⁰⁰¹ Quoted in Philip Zeigler, "Mountbatten: A Biography," (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 558.

¹⁰⁰² Quoted in: Theodore Rockwell, *The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a Difference* (iUniverse, 2002), 273.

¹⁰⁰³ Hill, para 84.

Royce to contract with Westinghouse and obtain both an American reactor and technical support.¹⁰⁰⁴

Only one reactor was duly supplied to “kick-start” Royal Navy’s deployment of nuclear-powered submarines; on-going supply was not envisaged by either side so as to avoid stifling British innovation and creating dependence.¹⁰⁰⁵ In January 1958, Duncan Sandys acknowledged US support, writing, “Thank you for lending Admiral Rickover.”¹⁰⁰⁶ The 1958 UK-USA Agreement provided the necessary legal cover for this substantial exchange to occur.¹⁰⁰⁷ In 1960, the UK’s first nuclear submarine, HMS Dreadnought was launched, powered by a US Westinghouse S5W reactor.¹⁰⁰⁸

By way of contrast was Rickover’s response to the suggestion that as part of the Eisenhower Administrations *New Look* Strategy, the British success could be replicated with France. Rickover objected strongly, arguing the relationship with the British was ‘special’ and must not be replicated.¹⁰⁰⁹ It was a decision that confirmed French views there was indeed an emergent Anglospheric security community with a nuclear dimension. The French media referred to

the creation of an Anglo-U.S. atomic directorate [that] can only make more apparent and more burdensome the hegemony of the English-speaking peoples at the heart of the Atlantic Alliance.¹⁰¹⁰

Some eighty years later, in 2021, a similar transfer to nuclear submarine technology from the UK and US to Australia would again give rise to French anger directed at ‘les Anglo-saxons.’

¹⁰⁰⁴ Sir John Treacher, "Life at Full Throttle: From Wardroom to Boardroom," (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2007), 93.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Mackby and Cornish, 30, 253.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Sandys to McElroy, “Minister’s Running Folder for January 1958,” January, 31 1958, CCA, DSND 4 / 6 / 9

¹⁰⁰⁷ Hill, paras113-15.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Duncan, Chapter 8.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Rockwell, 274.

¹⁰¹⁰ Quoted in JJohn Newhouse, *De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons* (Viking Adult, 1970), 57-58.

4.4.3 The Skybolt-Polaris Crisis

In an illustration of the erratic path of UK-US nuclear relations, the issue of trust was to come to fore again and very quickly. The issue this time related to US promises on the supply of a suitable weapons delivery system. As Baylis puts it, "the crisis not only disrupted the Anglo-American alliance but brought it once again almost to breaking point."¹⁰¹¹ Nunnerley refers to it as "one of the great confrontations in the history of Anglo-American relations."¹⁰¹² However, as with Suez, of equal importance was not just the fact a crisis occurred, but that the two main constituent elements of the Anglospheric security community were able to resolve their differences.

The circumstances related to agreement that the US would offer the UK the sophisticated American Skybolt system in return for a Polaris submarine base in Scotland.¹⁰¹³ Skybolt would replace the UK's own Blue Streak missile delivery platform that was looking dubious on both costs and vulnerability.¹⁰¹⁴ With Skybolt secured, Blue Streak was abandoned.¹⁰¹⁵

In the event of any problems preventing the production of Skybolt, Macmillan had persuaded Eisenhower to give the UK an option on the new Polaris submarine-launched missile system.¹⁰¹⁶ However, Eisenhower had been "unwilling to enter a definite agreement until the outcome of negotiations" for a possible Polaris equipped NATO was concluded.¹⁰¹⁷ Despite the UK's experience of the Truman Administration's behaviour, the UK once again took the US promise on trust. As Macmillan put it with inter-governmental negotiations, "there was always a problem of how far to formalise legal or semi-legal contracts and how far to rest on what might be called a 'gentleman's agreement.'"¹⁰¹⁸ Macmillan "felt certain" the agreement would be honoured¹⁰¹⁹ whether it came in Eisenhower's time or not.

¹⁰¹¹ Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84*, 103.

¹⁰¹² David Nunnerley, *President Kennedy and Britain* (St. Martin's Press, 1972), 149.

¹⁰¹³ Harold Macmillan, *Memoirs: Pointing the Way 1959-1961* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 252.

¹⁰¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 251.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 251-53. Although it remained under discussion as a European satellite launching system.

¹⁰¹⁶ Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84*, 99-100.

¹⁰¹⁷ Macmillan, *Memoirs: Pointing the Way 1959-1961*, 252.

¹⁰¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 255.

¹⁰¹⁹ *Ibid.*

In 1962 Robert McNamara, President Kennedy's new Defence Secretary, abruptly cancelled the Skybolt system and publicly denigrating the system on the grounds of cost and accuracy, but in doing so failed to appreciate the political ramifications for the UK.¹⁰²⁰ At a stroke the delivery system for UK's future nuclear deterrence had gone. It was what Lawrence Freedman termed "a remarkable example of miscommunication between close allies."¹⁰²¹ The result was "the most perilous crisis between the two allies since the Suez affair."¹⁰²² The British Defence Minister Peter Thornycroft was outraged and told McNamara, "We have cancelled other projects, we have made ourselves absolutely dependent on you."¹⁰²³

That such a miscommunication should have occurred at first sight appears remarkable. Kennedy valued his close relationship with Macmillan.¹⁰²⁴ He had been unable "to establish a close rapport with other allies."¹⁰²⁵ This personal relationship was intensified by the so-called 'two David's'; British ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore and American ambassador to Britain, David Bruce.¹⁰²⁶ The Kennedy-Gore relationship preceded their time in office. Ormsby-Gore described their interactions as "almost like a family discussion when we all met."¹⁰²⁷ Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who served as Special Assistant to the President, wrote

The President found the ambassador a companion for every mood . . . Their long, relaxed, confidential talks together... gave Kennedy probably his best opportunity to clarify his own purpose in world affairs.¹⁰²⁸

¹⁰²⁰ Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84*, 99-100; Frank Costigliola, "Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult," *Political Science Quarterly* 110, no. 1 (1995): 119; McGeorge Bundy, "Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years," (1988): 471-72.

¹⁰²¹ Freedman, *Britain and Nuclear Weapons*, 15.

¹⁰²² Henry Brandon, "Skybolt: The Full inside Story of How a Missile Nearly Split the West," *Sunday Times*, December 23 1962.

¹⁰²³ Richard E Neustadt, *Report to Jfk: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective* (Cornell University Press, 1999), 72.

¹⁰²⁴ Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84*, 104.

¹⁰²⁵ Nunnerley, 158.

¹⁰²⁶ Alistar Horne, "The Macmillan Years and Afterwards," in *The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945*, ed. Wm Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 91.

¹⁰²⁷ *Ibid.*

These relationships were predicated on a shared appreciation of a cultural heritage that was not racial in outlook, after all Kennedy was of Irish Catholic heritage. He had made reference to the ancient heritage of the Magna Carta in speeches as a Senator and in his inaugural speech declared,

the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage.¹⁰²⁹

The “torch” passed was a fitting metaphor for the memetic continuation of non-racial Anglo-saxon values. It is in recognition of Kennedy’s advocacy of these Magna Carta values that the British memorial to Kennedy sits at the site of the Magna Carta signing in Runnymede.

Despite these exceptionally shared values and close personal ties, the new crisis threatened a rift. A bilateral meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan, already scheduled for December 1962 in Bermuda, was transformed from “friendly wintertime parley” into an unpredicted summit “of unusual intensity and complexity.”¹⁰³⁰ Macmillan was to recall, “the discussions were the most violently contested than in any previous meeting.”¹⁰³¹

Macmillan did not hold back, “President Eisenhower had assured me that if necessary in the future, we might rely on obtaining Polaris.”¹⁰³² Initially the US resisted, offering other US alternatives gifting the unfinished Skybolt system for British development.¹⁰³³ Macmillan however, would not back down — a promise had been made by the US and a compromise was not acceptable.¹⁰³⁴

¹⁰²⁸ Arthur M Schlesinger Jr and A Thousand Days, *If Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 379.

¹⁰²⁹ John F. Kennedy Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961. Washington DC

¹⁰³⁰ Bundy, 471.

¹⁰³¹ Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day, 1961-1963*, vol. 6 (London: Macmillan, 1973), 360.

¹⁰³² *Ibid.*, 357.

¹⁰³³ Freedman, *Britain and Nuclear Weapons*, 16; Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-84*, 103.

¹⁰³⁴ Neustadt, 91; Saki Dockrill, *Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?* (Springer, 2002), 30.

Of note is the apparent lack of knowledge of the recent record of US promises to the UK and it echoes Acheson's comments about the 'very loose way' the US ran its business. To Macmillan it appeared that Kennedy and McNamara "seemed strangely ignorant of the immediate past."¹⁰³⁵ Bundy, who was present as National Security Adviser, was to later comment, Macmillan "could have included others amongst us."¹⁰³⁶

Macmillan informed Kennedy that Churchill had told him in 1940 that logic said Britain and its Empire could not win the war, "but, they had gone on." The same attitude prevailed now and if Polaris was not now on offer, then Britain "will go on and make it eventually and be free."¹⁰³⁷ If the Polaris US promise could not be honoured, then the UK understood. "Let us part as friends... if there must be a parting let it be done with honour and dignity," adding Britain would not however Welch on its agreements.¹⁰³⁸

Bundy, present at the meetings, believed Kennedy had not, until that moment understood the depth of feeling in the UK.

friendly countries can go down parallel tracks without any clear sense of where they are heading. So they find themselves at least at a point of intersection, if not of collision... I think he always understood that—that's one reason why in the Skybolt affair when he finally understood what the political consequence was to an Englishman, he was so prompt and energetic in construction of remedies.¹⁰³⁹

Kennedy offered Polaris but as part of a multinational NATO based force, keen not to isolate the French who would resent favouritism and fears of an Anglo-saxon bloc.¹⁰⁴⁰ This was unacceptable to Macmillan since it struck at the heart of an independent nuclear deterrent. A compromise stressed the role of the UK Polaris fleet within a NATO multinational force.¹⁰⁴¹ However, it contained a vital clause that asserted, "HMG may decide

¹⁰³⁵ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day, 1961-1963*, 6, 360.

¹⁰³⁶ Bundy, 491.

¹⁰³⁷ Neustadt, 91.

¹⁰³⁸ Nunnerley, 158.

¹⁰³⁹ McGeorge Bundy, interview by Richard E Neustadt, March - May 1964.

¹⁰⁴⁰ For a review see: Jones, *The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Volume I: From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964*, 336-405; Bundy, "Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years," 492-93.

¹⁰⁴¹ Neustadt, 134. See: Costigliola.

that supreme national interests are at stake" and thereby deploy the force accordingly.¹⁰⁴² This gave the UK considerable latitude given the UK's extended to its interests and territories outside of Europe. Indeed, Macmillan cited the defence of Kuwait as an example.¹⁰⁴³ The UK Foreign Secretary, Lord Home obtained explicit US consent that a RN Polaris force could be deployed to the Indo-Pacific so long as suitable controls were in place.¹⁰⁴⁴

4.5. Interdependence and Working Groups in practice

4.5.1 Working Groups and Canada

Diefenbaker's relationship with the US and Kennedy was not as positive as his predecessors. The Eisenhower period had seen some strong advances in cooperation building on the theme of interdependence with the US attempting to replicate the ethos behind the UK-US Working Groups. The US moved to institutionalise Canada-US bilateral collaboration both at a high level, but also "at the operating level."¹⁰⁴⁵ In July 1958, Eisenhower and Dulles attended a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet and called for regular informal meetings.¹⁰⁴⁶ Another meeting between Dulles, the Canadian Cabinet and Chiefs of staff discussed extending defence coordination beyond the existing remit of the PJBD.¹⁰⁴⁷ The most significant outcome was the formalisation of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) structure in May 1958 and the creation of a ministerial Canada-US Committee on Joint Defence.¹⁰⁴⁸

¹⁰⁴² See: Neustadt, 96.

¹⁰⁴³ Andrew Priest, *Kennedy, Johnson and NATO: Britain, America and the Dynamics of Alliance, 1962-68* (Routledge, 2006), 48.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Record of Meeting with President Kennedy December 19 1962, TNA PRO PREM 11/4229

¹⁰⁴⁵ "Memorandum of Discussion at the 376th Meeting of the NSC," August 14, 1958. #291.

FRUS, 1958-1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII Part 1,

¹⁰⁴⁶ "Memorandum of Conversation," July 9, 1958, #283 *FRUS, 1958-1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII Part 1*

¹⁰⁴⁷ "Memorandum of Conversation," July 10, 1958, #287. *FRUS, 1958-1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1*; "Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Canadian Affairs (Byrns) to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Parsons)," August 7, 1958. #290. *FRUS, 1958-1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1*.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Still classified. See: "Draft Summary Record of the First Meeting of the U.S.-Canada Committee on Joint Defense," December 15, 1958, #292. *FRUS, 1958-1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1*.

The nature of the CANUS security relationship met all the criteria of a 'self-contained' regional security community. At issue was how pluralistic the arrangements would be. Whilst the logic of a coordinated North American continental missile and warning system made strategic sense, Canadian political policy-makers feared a loss of sovereignty. As such, their response to US overtures was consistently cautious and tended to seek ways of ameliorating US dominance by reference to Canada the Commonwealth, or in the case of NORAD, stressing the possibility of a NATO context.¹⁰⁴⁹ In contrast, the Canadian military policy establishment was less concerned about sovereignty issues and in 1957 had participated in a US controlled command structure and HQ. As the nature of this arrangement became clear, Canada's External Affairs Minister, Sidney Smith, insisted that the matter be discussed and formalised at Governmental level, declaring. "It is a matter of orderly practice for governments to record in diplomatic exchanges important decisions affecting their relations."¹⁰⁵⁰ After extensive negotiations, the NORAD structure was established outside of NATO and with agreed Canadian input.¹⁰⁵¹ The UK's collaboration in the establishment of one NORAD's principal early warning stations in England provided another example of tripartite security collaboration.¹⁰⁵²

Agreement	1957	1958	1961	1989	1991
Interdependence Working Groups	UKUS		Ceased		
NORAD		CANUS*			
US-UK Mutual Defence		UKUS			
Canada-United States Ministerial Committee		CANUS			
General Security Agreement			UKUS		
BATUS					CANUK

Table 4 Atlantic Triangle Main Military-Security Arrangements created 1957 - 1991

*UK involved in forward radar system

¹⁰⁴⁹ Canada Privy Council, Canadian Cabinet "Minutes of US-Canada Ministerial Meeting," July 7, 1958 LAC, RG2. Series a-5-a, Volume 1898 Access Code: 90. 3

¹⁰⁵⁰ Quoted in Joseph T Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958* (UBC Press, 1987), 108.

¹⁰⁵¹ See: Anne Denholm Crosby, "The Origins of NORAD: Institutionalizing Canadian/US Military Cooperation," in *Dilemmas in Defence Decision-Making* (Springer, 1998).

There was a limit to Canadian willingness to develop the relationship and Diefenbaker's orientation was to the Commonwealth. The US was keen to revive and extend a series of bilateral fora "to facilitate the exchange of information, and joint planning, with respect to non-military defense activities."¹⁰⁵³ Canada, ever conscious of not being an adjunct to its larger neighbour, would stress its relationship to the Commonwealth. The US noted Canadian Ministers sometimes voice the viewpoint "not solely of their own Government, but of the British Commonwealth as a whole," and, "it has shown itself assertively nationalistic in its economic relations with the United States and strongly pro-Commonwealth."¹⁰⁵⁴

The UK and Commonwealth connection continued to serve as a counterweight to the US. Diefenbaker agitated for a strong Commonwealth trade and economic policy. At a 1962 Commonwealth Prime Ministers he spoke out against the UK's dalliance with Common Market membership as an unwelcome threat to unity and was supported by Nehru and Ayub Khan (Pakistan) meeting.¹⁰⁵⁵ Again, it is worth briefly mentioning that Diefenbaker of neither English nor French Canadian origins, identified so strongly with the notions of underpinning the Commonwealth as well as the institution itself. Indeed, he was a persistent, explicit and vocal advocate of the Magna Carta heritage and oversaw the introduction of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights that sought to entrench these in law.¹⁰⁵⁶

The wider Commonwealth also provided a vehicle for Canada's liberal internationalist agenda, thereby working to ensure the durability of pro-western states after decolonisation. Canada's enthusiasm for the Commonwealth-led Columbo [Aid] Plan reflected this

¹⁰⁵² See: Graham Spinardi, "Golfballs on the Moor: Building the Fylingdales Ballistic Missile Early Warning System," *Contemporary British History* 21, no. 1 (2007).

¹⁰⁵³ See: "National Security Council Report," December 30, 1958. #293. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1.*

¹⁰⁵⁴ "Paper Prepared in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs," January 2, 1959. #295. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1.*

¹⁰⁵⁵ Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for DEA. "Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference," February 5th, 1958, LAC, No.50123-B-40. Also James Ellison, *Britain and the Creation of the European Community 1955-58* (London: Springer, 2000), 131.;

Arnaud Wapler to Maurice Couve de Murville .Ministère des Affaires étrangères ; Commission de Publication des DDF (sous la dir.). *Documents diplomatiques français. Volume II: 1962, 1er juillet-31 décembre. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1999.* 195-197.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Edward McWhinney, "The New Canadian Bill of Rights," *The American Journal of Comparative Law* (1961).

agenda.¹⁰⁵⁷ It is worth noting that the nature of Canada's material was principally non-militaristic but also disguised semi-covert military aid in support of emergent pro-Western democratic Commonwealth states.¹⁰⁵⁸

4.5.2 Working Group UK-US Planning for Syrian Intervention

The US appetite for joint action in the Middle East in the wake of the failed CIA instigated coup focussed on the removal of the Syrian regime.¹⁰⁵⁹ Macmillan warned of a possible domino effect, leading to the collapse of Lebanon and Jordan that in turn Iraq.¹⁰⁶⁰ This was prophetic. By May 1958, the pro-western Lebanese Government was besieged by armed Nasserite opponents and the US was forced to consider intervention with UK military support.¹⁰⁶¹ US-UK military planning was initiated for a joint intervention.¹⁰⁶²

When tensions eased in the Lebanon, the UK feared the lull was temporary and supported military readiness.¹⁰⁶³ Keen to ensure continued dominion support, the UK shared details of the nature and scope of the UK-US intervention planning with Australia, Canada and NZ.¹⁰⁶⁴ Thinking the crisis in the Levant had passed, Dulles manoeuvred to curtail UK-US intervention planning, visiting the British Ambassador in person in "a most private and confidential way" sought to, "warn him [Caccia] that some of our people, not just in Washington but elsewhere, had the impression that we [the US] were being crowded by our British colleagues into intervention in Lebanon." Caccia was "indignant," asserting "all they

¹⁰⁵⁷ See: Justin Massie and Stéphane Roussel, "Preventing, Substituting or Complementing the Use of Force? Development Assistance in Canadian Strategic Culture," *Rethinking Canadian Aid* (2014): 155. Keith Spicer, "Clubmanship Upstaged: Canada's Twenty Years in the Colombo Plan," *International Journal* 25, no. 1 (1970).

¹⁰⁵⁸ Greg Donaghy, "The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952–1971," *Canadian Military History* 4, no. 1 (1995); John G Diefenbaker, "Address on What the Commonwealth Represents," (1962).

¹⁰⁵⁹ Eisenhower, 197.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Alistair Horne, *Harold Macmillan: 1957-1986*, vol. 2 (Viking Adult, 1989), 41.

¹⁰⁶¹ "Confidential Annex", May 13, 1958. CC 42(58)1, Pt 1, TNA, CAB 128/32 252-253

¹⁰⁶² Operation Blue Bat, see: "Editorial Note," #40. FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI.

¹⁰⁶³ Min.2, "Lebanon." May 15, 1958. TNA, CAB 128/32/43, CC (58)

¹⁰⁶⁴ Min.6, "Lebanon." May 21, 1958. TNA, CAB 195/17/30, CC 43(58)6.

wanted to do was to plan against the contingency, and that our [the US] people seemed indisposed even to sit down with them for planning purposes.”¹⁰⁶⁵

That Dulles had chosen to act as a confidant, offering secret, supportive advice to the UK, might appear to represent a breakthrough in communication and trust. However, it was more likely a personal and disingenuous attempt to pose as a goodwill confidant, but with the objective of forestalling potentially successful UK progress with the US military policy-establishment.¹⁰⁶⁶

Of significance was the reaction, or rather lack of it to a subsequent leak in the US media that a joint UK-US intervention was under consideration. Macmillan worried about the impact writing “news of the proposed Anglo-American military help has leaked in Washington!” Of note, the leak about a possible association with ‘imperialistic’ UK did not attract negative comment. As such, the reaction marked an important change in the US domestic ‘Overton Window’ towards the UK.¹⁰⁶⁷ Macmillan recorded “this dangerous time bomb, which I feared would explode with devastating effects, appeared to be a dud.”¹⁰⁶⁸

The possibility of military action was instead seen through a prism of Arab imperialism with media references to Nasser attempting a Lebanese ‘Anschluss’ in pursuit of his “great Midwestern Arab Empire.”¹⁰⁶⁹ This is not to say that the UK was free of toxic colonial associations. Rather they remained a factor for Dulles and the State Department conflicted by the need for a close but discreet partnership whilst simultaneously attempting to be seen as acting at a distance.

¹⁰⁶⁵ “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Caccia),” May 21, 1958. #45. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI*.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Dulles exhibits a pattern of behaviour consistent with a wish to evade public association with the UK (or colonial powers). See: “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Minister of the British Embassy (Lord Hood),” July 14, 1958. #134. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI*. For Dulles’ wish UK to stop French participation see:

“Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State,” July 15, 1958. #136. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI*. Also “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,” July 17, 1958. #187. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI*.

¹⁰⁶⁷ The ‘Overton Window’ is the spectrum of ideas the public is willing to consider and accept and shifts with trends of social thought and norms over time.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, 4, 507-08.; Dana Adams Schmidt, “US and Britain Map a Joint Plan in Lebanon Crisis,” *NY Times*, May 20 1958.

¹⁰⁶⁹ See: Richard J McAlexander, “Couscous Mussolini: US Perceptions of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 1958 Intervention in Lebanon and the Origins of the US–Israeli Special Relationship,” *Cold War History* 11, no. 3 (2011).

4.5.3 Working Group UK-US Levant Intervention

In July 1958, events conspired to test the boundaries of UK-US cooperation. On the US side, the episode reveals an abiding wish by Dulles to avoid public association with the UK in ‘colonial areas.’ On the Commonwealth side, it revealed an enduring post-Suez mistrust of elements of the US political policy-establishment.

The circumstances were unforeseen and followed pro-western Iraq’s attempts to thwart a Nasserite coup in Jordan by mobilising an army unit resulted in a coup against the Iraqi monarchy.¹⁰⁷⁰ Confusion reigned with Nasserite elements now appearing to be in the ascendancy in Iraq, Jordan and the Lebanon. Lebanese President Camille Chamoun appealed for immediate assistance to prevent his government’s overthrow. Dulles informed Eisenhower “he was not certain what to do,” but declared Iraq was “primarily a UK responsibility,” but favoured “a quick US action in Lebanon.”¹⁰⁷¹

The CIA, having been involved in plans with the UK, supported wider action, including intervention in Iraq to avoid a chain-reaction against western interests.¹⁰⁷² Urgent UK-US Working Group discussions explored the possibility of a joint intervention in Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait and Iraq, with Dulles seeing Lebanon as the most pressing problem.¹⁰⁷³

The UK was worried the US would draw back from mutual plans to redress the wider situation once order was restored in Lebanon. Macmillan determined there must be no misunderstanding “about the scale and purpose about the joint intervention in the Middle East.”¹⁰⁷⁴ In fact, Eisenhower had taken Dulles’ advice to insulate the US and suggested UK

¹⁰⁷⁰ “Jordan Army Coup Attempt Reported,” *Daily Telegraph*, July 2 1958.

¹⁰⁷¹ “Editorial Note,” [Undated] #109. *FRUS, 1958–1960, near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII*.

¹⁰⁷² “Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles,” July 14, 1958. #110. *FRUS, 1958–1960, near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII*.

¹⁰⁷³ “Memorandum of Conversation,” Washington, July 17, 1958, #348. *FRUS, 1958–1960, near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII*.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Middle East Cabinet Meeting Minutes, July 14, 1958. TNA, CAB 128/32/56, CC 55(58)6

troops be held ready for a separate unilateral Iraqi-Jordanian intervention.¹⁰⁷⁵ Eisenhower agreed wider plans must still be contemplated, but “as of this moment,” congressional consent complicated matters. Macmillan now worried at what might unravel, stressed that the ‘consequences’ of any intervention must be carried through.¹⁰⁷⁶ The UK was indicating it was reluctant to be involved in a separate, more logically difficult inland action that could leave them stranded, facing opprobrium and deflecting attention from US action. Having just authorised a unilateral intervention in Lebanon twenty minutes earlier, Eisenhower became alarmed,

Now just a minute so that there is no misunderstanding. Are you of the belief that unless we have made up our minds in advance to carry this thing on through to the Persian Gulf, that we had better not go in the first place?¹⁰⁷⁷

Macmillan assured Eisenhower of UK reliability but stressed the US must not cut and run, informing him “we are prepared to face these risks if it is a part of a determination by both of us to face the issues and be prepared to protect Jordan with the hope of restoring the situation in Iraq.”¹⁰⁷⁸ The Working Group had discussed joint plans for a wider intervention, but Dulles appeared to be limiting their public involvement to Lebanon and pushing the UK towards intervention in Jordan and maybe Iraq, with the US keeping a distance. Other members of the US policy-establishment detected a lack of US clarity. Nixon informed Dulles he was worried about US “vacillation” and urged continued commitment to a wider UK-US plan arguing Lebanon and Jordan were of themselves insignificant.¹⁰⁷⁹

Macmillan expressed his concerns to a sympathetic Menzies, stating “frankly what I fear is that having set their hands to the plough, they will now have second thoughts.”¹⁰⁸⁰

¹⁰⁷⁵ “Memorandum of a Conference with the President,” July 14, 1958. #127. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI*. 218–226. Also, “Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, July 14, 1958. #128. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI*.

¹⁰⁷⁶ “Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan,” July 14, 1958. #131. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI*.

¹⁰⁷⁷ *Ibid.* “Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan,” July 14, 1958. #131. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI*.

¹⁰⁷⁸ “Foreign Office Telegram No. 44477 to Washington.” July 15, 1958. TNA, FO 371/134130

¹⁰⁷⁹ *FRUS, 1958–1960, near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII*, [118]. Dulles-Nixon Telephone Conversation].

¹⁰⁸⁰ “Macmillan to Menzies.” No 64 UK High Commission, Canberra to CRO, July 17, 1958. TNA, PREM 11/2407

Macmillan took counsel from the Canadians too. Diefenbaker duly informed his cabinet and raised suspicions of Dulles' acting duplicitously, saying

the UK did not intend to be caught in the same position, on this occasion, as they were over Suez, when Mr Dulles had undertaken to assist the UK and France. From the conversation he had had with President Eisenhower and from his assessments of UK moves in the past few hours, he was sure the UK would not take any step until they were certain of the US position.¹⁰⁸¹

On July 16, SIGINT data provided irrefutable evidence of a Nasser-backed coup against King Hussein scheduled for the next day.¹⁰⁸² Macmillan, unwilling to risk another Suez misunderstanding, decided, "we must wait one more day and try to keep the Alliance" and despatched his foreign minister to Washington to gain explicit US consent.¹⁰⁸³ With that consent affirmed, the UK proceeded with troop deployment to Jordan as "a parallel intervention."¹⁰⁸⁴ The US provided air cover, logistical assets and ensured use of Israel airspace.¹⁰⁸⁵ Both New Zealand and Australia declared their support for the actions.¹⁰⁸⁶

4.5.4 Canadian diplomatic assistance

Macmillan was keen to have the Canadians reprise their role as the Anglosphere's 'intercessor' after the invasion and suggested the US keep Canadian PM John Diefenbaker updated.¹⁰⁸⁷ Eisenhower duly informed Diefenbaker, allowing the Diefenbaker to attempt to marshal opinion in support of intervention and create the conditions for a revamped UN force

¹⁰⁸¹ Canadian Cabinet Meeting. July 15, 1958. LAC, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series a-5-a, Volume 1899 Access Code: 90. Item 17272.

¹⁰⁸² David Easter, "Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and Conflicts, 1956–67," *Intelligence and National Security* 28, no. 6 (2013): 835-37.

¹⁰⁸³ "Middle East." July 16, 1958. 3. TNA, CAB 195/17 CC(58) 58

¹⁰⁸⁴ Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, 4, 519. Stephen Blackwell, *British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955–1958* (Routledge, 2013), 4-5.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ritchie Ovendale, "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958," *The International History Review* 16, no. 2 (1994).

¹⁰⁸⁶ NZPD. "Middle East Crisis - Ministerial Statement" Second Session, July 24, 1958. 32nd Parliament NZHR, Vol. 317 837; "Lebanon - Statement by the Minister for External Affairs, the Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey" National Library Australia (NLA) July 17, 1958. Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol 29. No 7. Vol. 29 - 7, DEA, Canberra: 436-438

¹⁰⁸⁷ "Middle East." July 16, 1958. TNA, CAB 195/17 CC(58) 58. 2

to take over if necessary once the situation was stabilised.¹⁰⁸⁸ The secret Canadian instructions to their UN Ambassador demonstrate advance knowledge of the landings.¹⁰⁸⁹

The Canadians duly performed their role in the UN with Diefenbaker portraying his Government as not having been aware of the planned actions, but once underway, Canada had “no alternative,” but to support the interventions.¹⁰⁹⁰ This was consistent with Canada’s projected role of the Anglosphere’s ‘honest broker’ that disguised a partisan role in defence of Anglosphere interests by means of diplomacy and peace-keeping.¹⁰⁹¹ As envisaged, the role of the UN was to prove critical. Avoidance of censure was important, but more significant was the creation of a mechanism to allow a withdrawal of US and UK forces made possible with the assistance of Canada.¹⁰⁹²

4.5.5 Working Group Indonesia: non-functional planning

US policy in SE Asia was predicated on the 1957 NSC plan that recognised a UK sphere of influence centred on the newly independent ‘Federation of Malaysia’ and the UK territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei earmarked for imminent decolonisation. The plan stated the US should follow parallel lines with the UK, but ever conscious of being tarred as imperialists warned, “care should be taken to avoid becoming identified in the public mind” if local people thought British actions were obstructionist.¹⁰⁹³

¹⁰⁸⁸ “Extract from Cabinet Conclusions - Crisis In Lebanon And Jordan,” July 15, 1958. LAC. Volume #25 - 340. Chapter II, Middle East, Part 5. Section B

¹⁰⁸⁹ “Secretary of State for DEA to UN Permanent Representative to UN,” Telegram ME-174 LAC, DEA/50162-a-40, July 15, 1958.

¹⁰⁹⁰ “Dulles, Lloyd Confer,” *Edmonton Journal*, July 17 1958. Canadian Cabinet Minutes, July 17, 1958, Section 4 & 5, LAC, PCO RG2, Series a-5-a, Volume 1899 Access Code: 90 Item 17279.

¹⁰⁹¹ For a detailed exposition of this interpretation see Sean M Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970* (Vanwell, 2002). Also see: Eisenhower’s letter of thanks to Diefenbaker. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Letter to John G. Diefenbaker,” July 14, 1958. Diefenbaker Centre Canada, Series XII, Personal and Confidential, Vol. 7, File 232, 004274.

¹⁰⁹² “Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State,” August 18, 1958. #278. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI*.

¹⁰⁹³ “Operations Coordinating Board Outline Plan, February 27, 1957,” #463. *FRUS, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII*.

In September 1957, Eisenhower authorised covert action to support Indonesian rebels.¹⁰⁹⁴ President Sukarno's non-aligned stance and his reliance on the Communist Party suggested a drift to towards the PRC.¹⁰⁹⁵ Despite the Common Declaration, the US did not involve the UK in its Indonesian plan. Nor was the operation revealed at the October 4 ANZUS Council by the Allen Dulles (CIA) or [Foster] Dulles to their Antipodean allies.¹⁰⁹⁶ This, despite an allusion by Australia's Foreign Minister that Australia might be willing to assist in any plans to support the rebels.¹⁰⁹⁷ US unwillingness to include Australia was consistent with Dulles' avoidance of military association with a 'colonialist' power in a non-European region, even if they shared objectives.¹⁰⁹⁸

Like the failed Syrian coup, US unilateralism ran into a problem. On December 7, Eisenhower authorised secret US marine landings, but their naval convoy required the use of the UK's Singapore's facilities en route. The US planners had not realised that Crown Colonies featured self-government and Singapore's Assembly was dominated by left-leaning parties.¹⁰⁹⁹ The UK retained responsibility for foreign policy and defence but could not accede to the arrival of a large US naval force without pre-planning so as to avoid arousing popular anger.¹¹⁰⁰ With Singapore denied, the US operation was unable to proceed to the consternation of both Dulles brothers, who were unable to comprehend why the UK could not immediately acquiesce. Foster Dulles took the matter up with the UK at a forthcoming NATO Paris meeting on December 19.¹¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁹⁴ For a comprehensive account of Operation HAIK see: Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, *Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999).

¹⁰⁹⁵ Sukarno adopted 'Guided' Democracy with communist and nationalist support. See: Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2007).

¹⁰⁹⁶ Audrey Kahin and George McTurnan Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (University of Washington Press, 1997), 120.

¹⁰⁹⁷ "United States Minutes of ANZUS Council Meeting," October 4, 1957, #273. *FRUS, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII*.

¹⁰⁹⁸ For a detailed account of Australian support of the Dutch and opposition to Indonesian expansion see: Hanno Weisbrod, "Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea," *The Australian Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (1967).

¹⁰⁹⁹ Barbara Leitch LePoer and Nena Vreeland, "Singapore: A Country Study," (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress Washington DC, 1991), 37-42.

¹¹⁰⁰ Kahin and Kahin, 124.

¹¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 124-26.

4.5.6 Working Group Indonesia (AUS-UK-US) Activation

Dulles' debacle was entirely avoidable since the US was pushing at an open door and, once briefed, the UK Ambassador and MI6 in Washington fully backed covert intervention. The UK Commissioner-General in Singapore, who had been obliged to deny the US convoy docking, was himself urging London that “the time had come to plan secretly with the Australians and Americans” for a “bold policy” to support the rebels.¹¹⁰²

At the UK’s insistence, the joint Working Groups had been framed to allow Australian and NZ participation in certain foreign policy areas. Macmillan was keen to involve the Australians, writing to Menzies to broach the situation in Indonesia and Menzies agreed action should be taken to support the rebels, utilising Singapore as a hub.¹¹⁰³ Meeting on the fringes of the NATO meeting, the UK and US agreed to the Indonesia Working Group should be activated to organise covert action and should include Australia but the US excluded NZ on the grounds of secrecy.¹¹⁰⁴ By February 1958, the Working Group had secured “substantial agreement on the main lines of Western policy,” and the UK Cabinet authorised the UK’s Malay territories for US covert operations.¹¹⁰⁵ Operations ceased in May 1958 after the Indonesians captured a CIA pilot, resulting in a policy of US accommodation with Sukarno that was to put it at odds with the UK.¹¹⁰⁶

4.5.7 Future quadrilateral institutions frustrated

Whilst covert actions were ongoing, the UK attempted to establish an informal means for ongoing quadrilateral meetings for military regional planning, to allow “frank and full discussions on what our forces are doing and can do” in the region. Macmillan suggested SEATO was inadequate for that purpose.¹¹⁰⁷

¹¹⁰² “R Scott to FO” December 12, 1957. TNA, FO 371/129531.

¹¹⁰³ Secret Message to Menzies from Macmillan, December 12th, 1957. NAA, A6706, C/S 34

¹¹⁰⁴ Matthew Jones, “‘Maximum Disavowable Aid’: Britain, the United States and the Indonesian Rebellion, 1957-58,” *The English Historical Review* 114, no. 459 (1999): 1193.

¹¹⁰⁵ “Notes for Discussion of Indonesia in Cabinet.” [SEAD] 5 February 1958. TNA, FO 371/135847; “Colonial Secretary to Various Governors (North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore)”, Top Secret. February 28, 1958. TNA, FO 371/135848,

¹¹⁰⁶ Kahin and Kahin, 182-84.

¹¹⁰⁷ “Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower,” April 18, 1958. #13. *FRUS, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI.*

At the UK-US bilateral ‘interdependence’ talks the UK again pushed for AUSNZUKUS military talks to establish “how all four can operate as a joint force if something should break out in that area, who would command, and, how operations would be conducted.”¹¹⁰⁸ Eisenhower stated the priority was having “Australia and New Zealand included in our [UK-US] defense planning” in SE Asia. Dulles, ever eager to avoid the risks of institutional arrangements that might become public, succeeded in delaying discussion by advising “we should do some political thinking before we get too far along with the military work.”¹¹⁰⁹ There are no available records of any military talks occurring and no planning fora emerged.

This lack of quadrilateral regional progress was in spite of Eisenhower’s support for closer Anglosphere relations in general. The President regarded the high-level Working Groups as performing “beautiful work.” Indeed, by March 1959 Eisenhower had become so enamoured of Anglosphere cooperation, he suggested to his advisors that,

it might be a good idea to begin to try to get Britain and Canada, Australia and New Zealand all together with us in one great government. If that could be done there could be an end to worrying about a number of little things that can cause divisions among independent nations.¹¹¹⁰

This hope was to be unrealised with the Anglosphere core political policy-establishments failing to develop quintilateral political fora. Significant changes occurred within intelligence however, where something resembling the Working Group structure emerged.

The embryonic Indonesian Working Group failed to develop into a regional mechanism involving the four states due to the US pursuit of ‘creative ambiguity’ and policy unencumbered by the input of allies. This was manifested in a failure to develop regional military structures that could facilitate strategic planning and cohesion. The resultant

¹¹⁰⁸ “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,” June 9, 1958, #15. June 9, 1958 *FRUS, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI*.

¹¹⁰⁹ Ibid. “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,” June 9, 1958, #15. June 9, 1958. *FRUS, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI*.

¹¹¹⁰ “Notes on the Legislative Leadership Meeting,” March 24, 1959. #363. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2*.

dysfunction retarded the development of Anglosphere Core Security Community cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

4.6 South East Asia - Regional Dysfunction

4.6.1 Introduction

The US promotion of its anti-colonialist antecedents was particularly pronounced in SE Asia during the late 1950s and early 1960s. This manifested itself in a US unwillingness to embroil itself in quadrilateral Anglospheric military planning. The pursuit of US ‘creative ambiguity’ towards Indonesia’s conflict with its Anglosphere core allies produced long-lasting effects. Australia and NZ responded to US unreliability with military contributions to the Vietnamese war effort to underline the validity of ANZUS. By the 1960s, the UK acted on the logic of US anti-colonialism criticism. Having ensured the independence of its former territories and contained the Indonesian Nationalist-Communist threat, it sought to withdraw ‘East of Suez.’

4.6.2 US and ANZAM Cohabitation

Under US direction, the focus of SEATO was the communist threat to Indochina and Thailand. The Treaty furnished the US with legal cover for intervention in Indochina.¹¹¹¹ It did not extend its military operations to the ANZAM security area, operated by Australia, NZ and the UK.¹¹¹² Table 5 illustrates the bifurcation of Anglosphere military arrangements.

Within the designated ANZAM region lay the ‘Malayan Area’ containing the British-controlled territories plus the newly independent Federation of Malaya. The latter had signed the 1957 AMDA defence arrangement to ensure continued UK military support against

¹¹¹¹ Richard A Falk, *The Vietnam War and International Law, Volume 1* (Princeton University Press, 2017), 229-32.

¹¹¹² “Appendix B [Map] - Future of ANZAM.” December 17, 1952 C.O.S. (52) 684, TNA, DEFE 5/43

communist insurgents.¹¹¹³ Within the Malayan Area of ANZAM the three AUSUKNZ militaries contributed to Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR) based in the UK Crown Colony of Singapore, to support Malaya and available as contribution to the wider SEATO effort.¹¹¹⁴

Australia and NZ sought security by involvement in both SEATO and ANZAM. Their ANZUS links to the US provided a rationale for involvement in US SEATO-led operations, whilst ANZAM ensured AUSNZ involvement in UK-led operations in the Malay territories. US unwillingness to be associated with security in the ANZAM Malay area created an institutional vacuum. US expectations that Malaya would join SEATO were not realised with Malaya regarding the alliance as ineffective.¹¹¹⁵ Thus, areas of the ANZAM Zone were effectively detached from SEATO support. US political policy-makers showed no appetite for resolving this situation either by sanctioning involvement of its military in ANZAM meetings or reimagining a planning capacity for ANZUS and including the UK. However, regional Commonwealth support was expected in US-led SEATO operations.

The Radford-Collins agreement continued to provide a loose framework for Anglospheric quadrilateral naval collaboration outside of SEATO. Although this was not a treaty there was provision for conjoined wartime operations and an explicit US commitment to defend “British [Commonwealth] territory in the Central Pacific outside the ANZAM area... against seaborne threat to these territories...”¹¹¹⁶ On the one hand the defence arrangements reveal strong indicators of a regional Anglospheric Security Community, but the attitude of the US towards the ANZAM “Malay Area” expose its limitations.

¹¹¹³ Malaya considered itself an indirect member of SEATO via the AMDA. See: Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations*, vol. 2 (Routledge, 2004), 82-83.

¹¹¹⁴ Wyn Rees, *Anglo-American Approaches to Alliance Security, 1955-60* (Springer, 1996), 124-25. Department Veterans Affairs Australia, "Australians on Operations," ANZAC Portal (2020), <https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/wars-and-missions/malayan-emergency-1948-1960/australians-operations>.

¹¹¹⁵ “Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Mission at the United Nations,” September 16, 1957. #170. *FRUS, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI*.

Kin Wah Chin, *The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971* (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 30-33.

¹¹¹⁶ Forbes and Lovi, 48. N.B. ‘British’ means AUSUKNZ territories.

Agreement	1949	1951	1954	1957	1971	1975	1977	1985	Exclusive
ANZAM - ANZUK	AUSNZUK					Dissolved			YES
ANZUS		AUSNZUS						US - NZ obligations suspended	NO
SEATO			AUSNZUK US			Defunct	Dissolved		YES
Anglo Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA)				AUSNZUK	Dissolved				YES
Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA)					AUSNZUK				NO*

Table 5 Anglosphere Core Military-Security Arrangements in existence between 1957 - 1991 Indo-Pacific

*Includes additional Anglosphere non-core states Malaysia & Singapore

In the context of UK-US relations in the region, the focus is on the lack of UK military engagement in Vietnam. The more pertinent issue was the lack of US support for the Commonwealth's efforts in Malaysia. Although the UK received significant Australian and NZ mutual aid, it bore the biggest military burden.¹¹¹⁷ Initially, this dwarfed the US regional commitment in terms of troops. In December 1964, two years into the *Konfrontasi* between Sukarno's nationalist-communists, Commonwealth forces stood at 60,000.¹¹¹⁸ At the same point, US personnel commitment to Vietnam stood at 23,000¹¹¹⁹ (although would soon change as the military situation deteriorated). The UK-led efforts to counter the *Konfrontasi* were sustained without US mutual aid and at great financial cost. The UK's difficulties were compounded by US equivocation and an unwillingness to engage in coordinated planning with its Anglosphere allies.

In the wider theatre of the fight against the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao, the UK did assist the US. It was involved in a secret Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR) SEATO operation to construct and operate Thai jungle bases used to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail.¹¹²⁰ Also, both Australia and the UK had small numbers of special force 'trainers'

¹¹¹⁷ Brendan Taylor, *Australia as an Asia-Pacific Regional Power: Friendships in Flux?* (Routledge, 2008), 144. & "Further Australian Military Assistance for the Defence of Malaysia." February 3, 1965. NAA: A1209, 1964/6804.

¹¹¹⁸ "Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations," January 15, 1965. #98. *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.*

¹¹¹⁹ Andrew Wiest and Chris McNab, *The Vietnam War* (Cavendish Square Publishing, LLC, 2016), 252.

¹¹²⁰ "Operation Crown" was initiated under Macmillan and continued by Wilson.

engaged in the initial phase of the Vietnam War.¹¹²¹ There is additional evidence that the UK provided SAS ‘trainers’ and special forces personnel were sometimes embedded in allied combat units. Similarly, RAF personnel wore RAAF uniform insignia on combat-related missions. The ‘embedding’ of personnel was an early manifestation of a modus operandi that was to become prevalent in the twenty-first century, as discussed later.¹¹²²

4.6.3 Failure to develop cohesive structure

One of the essential features of a security community is the existence of machinery that allows for ease of communication. Given the dysfunctional nature of SEATO, there was no quadrilateral Anglospheric regional forum for political or military planning.¹¹²³ Australia and NZ hoped ANZUS might form the basis of a secret Anglospheric arrangement given “the varying background and reliability of the other [SEATO] members.” Australia’s DEA Minister, Richard Casey, hoped it would

serve as a cover for what would in effect be SEATO strategic planning—its true purpose not being publicly known—and that ‘make believe’ planning be undertaken bilaterally by the U.S. with each of the other four countries.¹¹²⁴

New Zealand also suggested a small quadripartite “sub-committee” under SEATO or ANZUS.¹¹²⁵ According to the US, including the UK would create a “White Man’s Pact” that might be seen as “cloaking some new form of Imperialism.”¹¹²⁶

For Macmillan see: “Proposed Airfield at Mukdahan,” Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Oct 17, 1963. TNA CAB 148/15/6. For military activities under Wilson see: “Summary Record of Meeting,” June 2, 1964, #69. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos.* 126 Priscilla Roberts, “The British Royal Air Force: Operations over Laos against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1962,” *CWIHP Working Papers Series* (2018), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-british-royal-air-force-operations-over-laos-against-the-ho-chi-minh-trail-1962>. For confirmation of ANZUK activity see: Mark Burton, “New Medal to Be Awarded for Service in Thailand,” news release, January 16, 2003, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-medal-be-awarded-service-thailand>.

¹¹²¹ Sylvia Ellis, *Britain, America, and the Vietnam War* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 2. Mike Gravel, *The Pentagon Papers*, 5 vols., vol. 2 (Beacon Press, 1971), 128-59.

¹¹²² Robert Fleming, “A Jungle Too Far: Britain and the Vietnam War,” (National Army Museum, 2013).

¹¹²³ France supported neutralism. Pakistan was focussed on Kashmir. The US regarded as SEATO planning as “unrealistic”. See: Memorandum of Conversation,” September 28, 1962. #36. *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia.*

¹¹²⁴ “US Minutes of ANZUS Meeting,”

October 11, 1954 #379. *FRUS, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1.*

Tripartite political consultation under ANZUS did not materialise, fulfilling Australia's fear ANZUS might become a "one-man standing group."¹¹²⁷ The mandatory 'Annual Council' failed to meet on schedule, with no meetings between October 1959 and May 1962. During this period, the US planned and executed its initial Vietnam operations.¹¹²⁸ Even as the Vietnamese conflict was reaching crisis point in 1964, the US perceived ANZUS meeting as a mechanism to deliver a "timely notification" of US policy changes rather than a forum for consultation.¹¹²⁹

4.6.4 Mutual Aid not forthcoming

The UK proposed to grant independence to its remaining Malay territories (Singapore and on those on Borneo) and have them join the existing independent Commonwealth state of Malaya in a 'greater Malaysia' federation. This was opposed by Sukarno with the support of the numerically huge Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) who formed an integral part of his regime's power-base.¹¹³⁰ Despite promising he had no territorial ambitions after absorbing Dutch New Guinea, Sukarno claimed now claimed Malay Borneo and asserted a greater Malaysian Federation was a "neo-colonial plot."¹¹³¹ Consequently, the US began to backtrack on whole-hearted support for the UK's independence plans as they sought to accommodate Sukarno and ensure Indonesia did not align with the Sino-Soviet communist bloc.¹¹³²

¹¹²⁵ Ibid [379. ANZUS Meeting] *FRUS, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1.* 942.

¹¹²⁶ J.W. Morrison to D.B. Pitblado, "Attachment Statements Indicating the Attitude of the Australian, New Zealand and United States Governments." November 21, 1952 TNA, PREM 11/403.

¹¹²⁷ "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)," September 5, 1954. #350. *FRUS, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1.* 849 <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v12p1/d350>

¹¹²⁸ Gravel, 2, 1-39.

¹¹²⁹ "Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara," August 26, 1964. #65. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.*

¹¹³⁰ The claimed 20 million adherents made it the most powerful Communist Party outside the Communist bloc. See: Guy J Parker, "The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia," *Rand Corporation Memorandum Series*, no. February (1969).

¹¹³¹ "Sukarno Explains His Stand," *NY Times*, February 15 1963.

¹¹³² See: "Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy," February 17, 1963. #329. *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia.*

To maintain its influence with Sukarno, the US continued with what it privately acknowledged was a policy of “creative ambiguity” towards Indonesia and the Malay dispute.¹¹³³ Creative ambiguity is the diametric opposite of the good communication practice said to underlie a sound Security Community. By its nature, the US Indonesia policy necessitated ongoing dissembling and equivocation, playing down or ignoring Sukarno’s “Crush Malaysia,” threats and his use of communist insurgents to attack US allies.¹¹³⁴ Kennedy administration political policy-makers acknowledged this policy constituted “kowtowing,” but persisted despite the US military warning a delay that forcing the UK to delay the creation of Malaysia would be seen as “vacillation,” embolden Sukarno, “placing the Singapore base in jeopardy,” and causing the UK to be “caught in a colonial dilemma.”¹¹³⁵

The outcome of another quadrilateral meeting in October failed to change US State department policy. The British were perplexed that the State Department was not listening to UK warnings that non-aligned greater Indonesia could the force the UK out of the region with disastrous consequences for the US and its Anglosphere allies.

The US did not appear to understand that the British bases in Malaysia were essential to continued UK military presence... sometimes they [the US] even seem to think that they are a hangover from the colonial era and thus just a political irritant in the area that cannot be justified... If we [the Anglosphere allies] allow Indonesia to dominate the Philippines and Malaysia, these countries will be no longer available for our purpose and our footholds in SE Asia will be limited to an increasingly isolated Thailand and shaky positions in Laos and Vietnam.¹¹³⁶

¹¹³³ “Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the NSC Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” August 26, 1964. #66. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines*.

¹¹³⁴ See: Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), fn34.

¹¹³⁵ See “Special National Intelligence Estimate,” February 20, 1963. #330. *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia*. For US self-described “kowtowing” see: “President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan.” August 3, 1963. #333. *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia*.

¹¹³⁶ FO memo quoted in: Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia*, 220.

The UK did agree to a short delay to accommodate US insistence that democratic Malaya must attend talks with the dictatorial Sukarno to discuss relinquishing territory.¹¹³⁷ Australia considered US policy was “encouraging Sukarno to demand one concession after another,” and NZ declared US policy was “leading to a Far Eastern Munich.”¹¹³⁸ Of relevance here is Deutsch’s dictum that the strength of a Security Community can be judged by the “capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages and actions, quickly, adequately...”¹¹³⁹

Another characteristic of a ‘tightly coupled’ security community is one in which mutual aid can be expected as part of an informal or informal arrangement. This was in doubt. Australia and NZ worried that assisting the UK in Borneo might lead to their forces being attacked by Indonesian irregulars. They sought reassurance that the ANZUS Treaty would lead to US support in that eventuality. US under Secretary of State, Averill Harriman, informed Australia and NZ at an ANZUS meeting that he

did not think that the United States would let Australia down but... could make no commitments... this was a grey area between the two countries.¹¹⁴⁰

It was hardly a steadfast declaration of intent. In further discussions the US suggested ANZUS would only apply to attacks on forces in Australian territory.¹¹⁴¹

The new state of Malaysia came into being on September 16, 1963, following UN confirmation that it was the wish of the Borneo populace to join the new federation of Malaysia. In response, Indonesian backed communist mobs attacked and burned the UK and

¹¹³⁷ “President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy,” September 27, 1963. #336. *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia*.

¹¹³⁸ Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia*, 220-21.

¹¹³⁹ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 140-41.

¹¹⁴⁰ Memorandum for the Australian Ambassador (Beale),” October 4, 1963. #338. *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia*.

¹¹⁴¹ “Memorandum of Conversation,” October 4, 1963. #340. *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia*.

Malaysian embassies in Jakarta.¹¹⁴² Within days there was an intensification of Indonesian raids of communist volunteers led by regular troops into the Borneo territories of Malaysia.

4.6.5 Unsustainable creative ambiguity

The inherent contradiction at the heart of the State Department's 'creative ambiguity' policy, namely US support for Indonesia whilst ignoring its attacks on UK forces protecting a democratic state, was becoming unsustainable. In London, the media reported on allegations in the US Congress that the US was supplying spares for Indonesian planes being used against the UK.¹¹⁴³ The *Daily Telegraph* declared that for the US "to strengthen the warlike sinews of Indonesia makes no sense at all" and called for "political co-ordination in South East Asia."¹¹⁴⁴ Parliamentary reaction was stronger, former diplomat Lord Colyton, protested "the unseemly behaviour on the part of an ally in SEATO" and asked, "what would the US say if we were to supply spare parts for aircraft to be used by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam against American forces helping to defend the territory?" Lord Boothby resorted to hyperbole, asserting, "the US are, in fact, if not in intention, waging war against us..."¹¹⁴⁵

Sukarno sought to establish how robust US support was for Malaysia and was not discouraged by the ambiguous reply. He was informed the US was not "militarily defending Malaysia... although escalation... could result in [the] ANZUS Treaty being invoked." Asked if the US was "taking sides," the US answered it was not.¹¹⁴⁶ Encouraged, Sukarno authorised plans to extend operations to the Malay Peninsula.¹¹⁴⁷ Sukarno stepped up the rhetoric and publicly declared Malaysia would be completely crushed by January 1965.¹¹⁴⁸

Australia and NZ faced a decision on whether they should assist the UK and Malaysia in the Borneo Malay territories beyond the Malaya Peninsula. The Australian military re-

¹¹⁴² "Special Report - Sukarno and the Communists," October 23. 1964. CIA Reading Room, OCI No. 0354/64A Copy No. 5 p7

¹¹⁴³ "Plane Spares for Indonesia," *Daily Telegraph*, November 13 1963.

¹¹⁴⁴ "Illogical Logistics," *Daily Telegraph*, November 14 1963.

¹¹⁴⁵ "Anger at U.S. Supplies to Indonesia," *Daily Telegraph*, November 15 1963.

¹¹⁴⁶ "Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State," May 9, 1964, #47. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines*.

¹¹⁴⁷ John G Butcher and Robert Edward Elson, *Sovereignty and the Sea: How Indonesia Became an Archipelagic State* (NUS Press, 2017), 127.

emphasised the importance of holding retaining Malaysia as a buffer in South East Asia.¹¹⁴⁹ Anxious not to commit without US involvement, Menzies again sought US agreement for quadripartite planning, but was rebuffed by Rusk and McNamara.¹¹⁵⁰ As the likelihood of more clashes grew, Menzies approached the US military to suggest conjoined ANZUS-ANZAM planning but without success.¹¹⁵¹

The situation escalated when Indonesian began military action on the Malay Peninsula and clashed with NZ troops.¹¹⁵² NZ's Defence Minister warned Sukarno's promises about having no more territorial ambitions were worthless, he was "a little Hitler" and "we now know that his word is not be trusted."¹¹⁵³ Matters escalated further when the Indonesia challenged the right of a passage of a UK aircraft carrier through the Sunda Straits in international waters. The State Department response remained ambivalent, more anxious that the UK did not overreact to the attacks with Rusk warning, the UK had no "limited liability" adding, "if they want us involved, they must find out whether that is possible and, again, take nothing for granted." With unintended irony, given the US stalling on such meetings, Rusk said there must be "the fullest and most precise understanding between Heads of Government."¹¹⁵⁴

The UK were irritated and informed Rusk that they "did not expect a blank check from the United States," adding, "it was hardly necessary for the United States to warn... [them] not to take the United States for granted since it always took Britain for granted."¹¹⁵⁵ NZ, whose forces had been attacked, expected the US, their ANZUS partner, to be receptive to quadripartite talks to agree a joint strategy. The response to Prime Minister Holyoke was

¹¹⁴⁸ Reuters, "Malaysia End by 1965, Says Soekarno," *Telegraph*, May 21 1964.

¹¹⁴⁹ "Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, Defence Committee," July 14, 1964. NAA, A1945, 83/2/9,

¹¹⁵⁰ Home to Menzies. "Military Planning with Americans on Overt Indonesian Aggression." August 17, 1964. NAA, A1209, 1964/6804.

¹¹⁵¹ Draft Menzies to Home. August 27, 1964 NAA: A1209, 1964/6804 (pp 124-228).

¹¹⁵² "Confrontation in Borneo," *NZ History* (2020), <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/confrontation-in-borneo>.

¹¹⁵³ NZPD. Hon DJ Eyres Min Defence - Debate International Affairs 34th Parliament NZHR, Hansard Vol 339, August 27, 1964. 1652.

¹¹⁵⁴ "Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom," September 2, 1964. #68.

FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.

¹¹⁵⁵ *Ibid* [68. DOS to US Embassy in the UK] See footnote 6. 150

FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.

disappointing; the US was not receptive to a high-level meeting, nor willing to consult. Holyoake informed Menzies, the US are

willing to be informed of tripartite [ANZAM] planning... but are not prepared to actually engage in quadripartite planning.¹¹⁵⁶

4.6.6 Commonwealth mutual aid to Malaysia & Vietnam

By October 1964, the UK had enlisted the support of not just Australia and NZ in Malaysia, but also Canada, albeit in a non-combatant role.¹¹⁵⁷ With UK encouragement, Canada responded to Malaysian requests for military hardware and training.¹¹⁵⁸ This was undertaken despite Canadian Cabinet concerns such assistance involvement might involve Canada in wider commitments.¹¹⁵⁹ The Canadian Military Mission arrived in Malaysia on October 23.¹¹⁶⁰ Any hopes the Canadians entertained that their non-combatant role would be viewed impartially by the non-aligned Sukarno regime were soon shattered. The Indonesians denounced and “othered” the Canadians using racist terminology, “a Canadian is not Canadian... a Canadian is British,” and Canada was added to the official list of “imperialists with white skins,” that also included the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the US.¹¹⁶¹

By the end of October 1964, NZ and Australian forces had both encountered and engaged Indonesian troops and in January 1965, the Menzies agreed to a deployment of Australian

¹¹⁵⁶ Holyoake to Home/Menzies, October 2, 1964. NAA: A1209, 1964/6804 79.

¹¹⁵⁷ Australia had persuaded Canada to assist with Malaya’s civil service in 1959. See: Memorandum by Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Secret, “Conversation between Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Prime Minister Menzies,” May 21, 1959. LAC, Vol 26 - HBR. 152

¹¹⁵⁸ Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin, *Canada among Nations, 2008: 100 Years of Canadian Foreign Policy*, vol. 10 (McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 2009), 284.

¹¹⁵⁹ M. Cadieux, “Memorandum for the Minister,” 26 August 1964, LAC, DEA File 27-20-5.

¹¹⁶⁰ British Pathé, *Malaysia: Malaysia-Canada Military Aid Talks*, British Pathé Historical Collection (London: Reuters, 1964).

¹¹⁶¹ Bothwell and Daudelin, 10.

forces in the Far Eastern Strategic Reserve to assist across Malaysia.¹¹⁶² Holyoake followed a month later deploying ground troops, naval assets and special forces.¹¹⁶³

The Australia and NZ contributions were made with a degree of resignation. The Australian assertions in the post-War period that they should always be the lead Commonwealth regional power were relegated as the crisis escalated. Menzies informed the UK

our obligations in the South East Asia area are tending to run in two directions. In addition to our commitment to assist you in the discharge of your defence obligations to Malaysia, we feel a deep concern over the situation developing in Vietnam and a strong desire to help our American allies in that theatre...¹¹⁶⁴

In contrast to the indecision of whether to commit troops to support the UK, the US request was dealt with promptly. Menzies claimed "it did not take five minutes to decide that when it came to the point of action we would be in it"¹¹⁶⁵ The promptness of the decision reflected the view of both Australian political and military policy-makers, that it was a necessary corollary of their strategic objective to keep the US engaged in the region.¹¹⁶⁶ The US pursuit of creative ambiguity over the *Konfrontasi* had unintentionally served US interests well in respect of Australia and to a lesser extent NZ.¹¹⁶⁷ The initial US equivocation over the applicability of the ANZUS Treaty for ANZAC forces under attack in Malaysia underlined the necessity of 'paying the premium' on US mutual aid requests underlining the coercive power a core state can exert within a security community.¹¹⁶⁸

¹¹⁶² "Use of Australian Forces against Indonesian Trained Infiltrators in Malaya," April 8, 1969. NAA: A5827, Volume 4/Agendum 126. 1197 & KM Archer, "Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia No. 51-1965," (Canberra: Australia, Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1965).

¹¹⁶³ "Confrontation in Borneo".

¹¹⁶⁴ McEwen to Wilson. January 19, 1965, NAA A1209, 1964/6804. 16.


¹¹⁶⁵ Garry Woodard, "Two Australian Wars, Two Prime Ministers: Australia's Virtual Vietnam, and Lessons for Today," *NAPSNet Policy Forum* (2013), <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Two-Australian-wars-two-prime-ministers.pdf>.

¹¹⁶⁶ See: Coral Bell, *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1988).; Glen St John Barclay, *A Very Small Insurance Policy: The Politics of Australian Involvement in Vietnam, 1954-1967* (Univ of Queensland Pr, 1988).

¹¹⁶⁷ For NZ's hesitation see: Garry Woodard, *Asian Alternatives* (MUP Academic, 2004). Also Rabel.

¹¹⁶⁸ Commonwealth of Australia. House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates. August 6, 1964. Volume 339, p 1152; Thomas Bruce Millar, *Australia in Peace and War: External Relations, 1788-1977* (Australian National University Press, 1978), 209.

The policy of creative ambiguity avoided accelerating Indonesia's drift into the communist camp, but at the price of subjecting Commonwealth forces to Indonesian-communist aggression. By the end of 1964, the situation in Vietnam had rapidly deteriorated and the US found itself in need of UK mutual aid.



Map 2 Anglosphere Core States in South East Asia Conflicts 1957-1991

The less than whole-hearted support for UK military efforts in ANZAM and exclusion of the UK from military planning in Indo-China now presented the US with a problem. It was a point acknowledged by Bundy.

The reciprocal price of this would be stronger support on our side for Malaysia and perhaps closer participation in naval and air deployments designed to cool off Sukarno... It is hard to treat a thing [Vietnam] as our problem for 10 years and then try to get other people to take on a share of it, just because it is getting worse...¹¹⁶⁹

US non-involvement in the ongoing *Konfrontasi* was now matched by a new UK Labour Government's resolve not to become embroiled in Vietnam. Prime Minister Wilson pointed

out to President Johnson that some 50,000 UK troops were engaged in the UK's own Malaysian 'Cold War.'¹¹⁷⁰ Despite US disappointment with the UK's lack of large-scale involvement, diplomatic support proved to be robust with the US considering the UK, "the honourable exception" amongst Europe states.¹¹⁷¹

4.7. Retrenchment and recalibration

4.7.1 Introduction

As the US sought to confront communist expansion, the disagreements became particularly pronounced among the Anglospheric core political policy-makers. The crisis in SE Asia underlined the different approaches between the more muscular US approach and Canada's emphasis on diplomacy. The resulting antagonism manifested itself during the 1962 Cuban Crisis and the worsening situation in Vietnam in 1965.

A second and more profound event was the UK's announcement of plans for a military withdrawal 'East of Suez.' This was motivated by the financial burden of supporting military activity whilst its economy weakened and, as it saw it, a failure to enjoy whole-hearted US endorsement of its policies because of the UK's colonial associations. The consequent UK retrenchment was to facilitate a recalibration of roles leading to an enhancement of the SC's regional structures in the Arabian Peninsula and Pacific regions.

4.7.2 US equivocation in the Gulf

As mentioned in response to US requests for assistance in Vietnam, the UK referred to their commitments in Malaysia, but also Aden.¹¹⁷² To protect the Aden base, the UK had

¹¹⁶⁹ "Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President," December 5, 1964. #438. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam*, 1964.

¹¹⁷⁰ Leszek Buszynski, *SEATO, the Failure of an Alliance Strategy* (Singapore University Press, 1983), 120-22.

¹¹⁷¹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Simon and Schuster, 2011), 137.

¹¹⁷² "Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson," London, July 29, 1965, #246. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe*.

created Federation of South Arabia (FSA) from a collection of sheikhdoms under British protection. In 1962, the royalist regime in neighbouring North Yemen had been overthrown by revolutionary republicans and backed by military support from Nasser and the Soviets was attempting to overthrow the FSA. The UK, with Saudi and Jordanian support, sought to assist North Yemeni Arab royalists and engaged in robust covert military action.¹¹⁷³

In line with its anti-colonial stance and efforts to woo Nasser, the US State department frequently carped at UK policy.¹¹⁷⁴ The State Department's policy attracted domestic criticism. The NY Times suggested the State Department's position was "a friction" in the "total framework of Anglo-American cooperation."¹¹⁷⁵

An unsympathetic US administration attitude persisted with NSC member Robert Komer opining that Rusk was

manfully fobbing off UK pressures... If LBJ thought we ought to be brutal in telling UK not to commit us over Malaysia, same analogy holds good for the Middle East.¹¹⁷⁶

In another NSC memorandum, Komer opined, "the Brits are grossly over-reacting" about Aden and the threat from subversive elements, "more talk than anything else." If the UK

¹¹⁷³ See: Scott A Smitson, *The Road to Good Intentions: British Nation-Building in Aden* (Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2010), 14-17.

¹¹⁷⁴ See: W Taylor Fain, "'Unfortunate Arabia': The United States, Great Britain and Yemen, 1955–63," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12, no. 2 (2001): 135-47.

For examples see: "Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)" March 30, 1964. #324. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*; "Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff to President Johnson," April 29, 1964. #334 *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*; The US refers to the UK reverting to an 'Eden' stance in adopting a strong military position.

"Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State," May 8, 1964, #336. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*. accommodation to Nasser see: Douglas Little, "Gideon's Band: America and the Middle East since 1945," *Diplomatic History* 18, no. 4 (1994): 533.

¹¹⁷⁵ Max Frankel, "Foreign Policy Issues," *NY Times*, March 4 1963. For US request to UK to be accommodating see: "Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom," August 28, 1964. #349. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*.

¹¹⁷⁶ "Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)," September 10, 1964. #351. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*.

insisted on a robust joint stance against Nasser, then Komer suggested a “gentleman’s agreement” to follow “divergent” lines.¹¹⁷⁷

With the State Department’s persistent indifference to their position, the UK made a direct appeal to Senator Walter Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in May 1964. Fulbright was informed by UK Minister Duncan Sandys that the UK was disappointed that the US appeared reluctant to come out “firmly and clearly in support of their friends” for fear of offending African and Asian opinion.¹¹⁷⁸ The UK made little headway. By September 1964, UK Foreign Secretary informed the Cabinet that open support from the US was unlikely since it was “not prepared to be too closely associated with our activities in the area and in particular our connection with reactionary Arab regimes.”¹¹⁷⁹ In the same month, the UK warned its Anglospheric regional allies that if Nasser’s efforts made the base at Aden untenable, stating “the possibility of supplying Singapore and maintaining Singapore would be gravely affected.”¹¹⁸⁰

4.7.3 Commonwealth Polaris defence of Australia

In February 1965, the UK Chief’s of Staff envisaged a new Anglospheric security structure that would project UK power from bases in Australia. They advised the UK Government,

... if SEATO were to break down and the Commonwealth Forces had to leave the mainland of South-East Asia, the role of the United Kingdom forces in this area would be to assist in the close defence of Australasia... the composition of these forces would have to be decided in conjunction with the ANZUS powers. The improvement of defence facilities in Western Australia and the Northern Territories would... be a prudent insurance against developments in the future, and provide an alternative base for United Kingdom and allied forces in case of need.¹¹⁸¹

¹¹⁷⁷ “Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” April 28, 1964. #333. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula.*

¹¹⁷⁸ “Note of the Commonwealth Secretary’s Talks with Senator Fulbright.” May 5, 1964, Sandys Papers, CAC, DSND 8/21.

¹¹⁷⁹ “An Anglo-American Balance Sheet.” September 2, 1964, TNA, CAB 129/118

¹¹⁸⁰ “Notes on Carrington Meeting.” September 21, 1964 Canberra NAA, A1209, 1964/6804 85

¹¹⁸¹ Base Facilities in Australia

UK Chiefs Of Staff Committee Memorandum

In their recommendations, the UK Chief's of Staff stressed the moral commitment to Commonwealth allies, "in any event, and even if our forces were withdrawn from Malaysia, as partners in the Commonwealth and particularly in ANZAM we would remain obliged to help in the defence of Australasia."¹¹⁸²

The Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, sought to fashion some form of nuclear Anglospheric regional security community. Between 1965 to 1967, various formulations were discussed in meetings with Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and President Johnson. Wilson included reports of his discussions to Menzies and Holyoake and met Lester Pearson to discuss it in person.¹¹⁸³

As it was, Australia was not keen on the concept since a Commonwealth force suggested the possibility of a dilution in US commitment to the region.¹¹⁸⁴ Nor did Australia want the UK to use nuclear forces as a cover for a withdrawal of conventional forces from the area, but supported Wilson's push for greater coordination with the US in the region.¹¹⁸⁵

Wilson continued to explore an East of Suez Commonwealth nuclear force as late as 1967, seeking to utilise ANZAM but possibly including Singapore and Malaysia¹¹⁸⁶. However, McNamara informed him the US would not support any plan to redeploy Polaris if it was just a ploy to reduce the UK's regional commitment.¹¹⁸⁷

In the end, a financial crisis and fears a non-European commitment would damage the UK's application to join the Common Market meant the idea of Commonwealth force was dropped.¹¹⁸⁸

February 8 1965, TNA: DEFE 25/105

¹¹⁸² "Base Facilities in Australia", UK Chiefs Of Staff Committee Memorandum, London, 8 February 1965. TNA DEFE 25/105

¹¹⁸³ Matthew Jones and John W Young, "Polaris, East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 6 (2010): 856-58.


¹¹⁸⁴ Position Paper, 'Nuclear Arrangements in Asia' (Woodard), 7 June 1965, NAA 625/4/6, A1838/361

¹¹⁸⁵ Record of meeting (Wilson/Menzies), 1 July 1965, TNA DEFE 11/637

¹¹⁸⁶ PRO PREM 13/1906, Record of Conversation, June 2 1967

¹¹⁸⁷ Record of conversation (Wilson/Johnson), 2 June 1967, TNA FCO 46/28

¹¹⁸⁸ This was an explicit reason. See government documents cited in: Jones and Young, 865-66. also Pierre, 299.



Map 3 East of Suez: The relevance of Aden to the UK's Indo-Pacific presence

4.7.4 Aden and East of Suez

In 1965, the perceived lack of US diplomatic support and a financial burden aggravated by a sterling crisis, UK policy-makers to consider the practicalities of closing the Aden base post-haste.¹¹⁸⁹ The US became alarmed at the impact on the Anglosphere's security, since the base gave "the British the possibility of moving forces quickly to various areas of potential trouble," that the US did not have. The British response was they were no longer prepared to play as "mercenaries for the Free World."¹¹⁹⁰ Just two months later, faced with escalating internal internecine violence, the UK informed the US of the base's closure and withdrew from Aden in 1967.¹¹⁹¹

¹¹⁸⁹ Hugh Hanning, "Britain East of Suez-Facts and Figures," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 42, no. 2 (1966): 253.; "Defence review: report to ministers", Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, November 8, 1965, TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/4

¹¹⁹⁰ "Memorandum of Conversation," October 19, 1965. #66. *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula.*

¹¹⁹¹ "British Talks: Nasser-Faisal Relations; Yemen; South Arabia; Persian Gulf." *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula.*

The UK defence review regarding the UK's East of Suez role was indicative of a domestic train of thought that the costs of regional engagements in terms of blood and treasure were too high.¹¹⁹² The announcement in January 1968 that the UK was to extend the review to the Persian Gulf and withdraw from all forces East of Suez by 1971 was greeted by with alarm by both by its three Anglosphere Core regional allies. UK withdrawal would create a gap in the Anglosphere Core Security Community's regional coverage of the Indo-Pacific.

4.7.5 The removal of the colonial 'impediment'

The withdrawal announcement forced an abrupt change in the US policy establishment behaviour and attitude. A variety of factors converged to bring about a changed US perception. As the conflicts in Indochina escalated; the US was now beginning to appreciate the difficulties associated with overseas engagements. Something of a role reversal was also occurring; the US now felt it was the object of unfair opprobrium because it was "looked on in many places as the point of the spear of the Cold War."¹¹⁹³ Moreover, US now perceived the UK's colonial past as a positive, since it meant

that in many parts of the world, the British have ties as a result of which they can act; they are acceptable, but the US would not be.¹¹⁹⁴

The 'anti-colonialist' public stance that formed part of the US pitch to the non-aligned bloc was rendered irrelevant if the colonial power in question did as asked and quit the scene. The US sought to delay the accelerated UK withdrawal from the Gulf; belatedly arguing the UK's military presence was essential.¹¹⁹⁵

¹¹⁹² Matthew Jones, "A Decision Delayed: Britain's Withdrawal from South East Asia Reconsidered, 1961–68," *The English Historical Review* 117, no. 472 (2002): 570-71.

¹¹⁹³ "Memorandum of Conversation," January 27, 1966, #255. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe*. 5

¹¹⁹⁴ *Ibid* [#255.]

¹¹⁹⁵ "Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk," January 9, 1968. #122. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*.

The second factor was the abrupt sense of US military isolation and the potential loss of a mentor and confidant who possessed global experience.¹¹⁹⁶ US criticism of the UK's past pugilistic attitude in Malaysia and Aden was forgotten. Instead pleas were made for the UK to "be Britain," since the British were "the teachers" who "set the example," and had, "helped us make decisions of will in WW2 and in the post-war period" and the results would be disastrous if "the teacher abandoned the field."¹¹⁹⁷ The President himself despaired of the impact if the UK quit its role within the Anglospheric alliance, warning that "our own capability and political will could be gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts all alone."¹¹⁹⁸

In response, the UK redirected the US' own anti-colonialist narrative to defend their withdrawal, arguing any UK role outside of Europe would be "the dying legacy of an imperial power." Past UK interventions "in other parts of the world had simply looked colonial."¹¹⁹⁹ The 'White Man's Club' trope formerly employed by the US to justify UK exclusion from an 'ANZUS plus' agreement was referenced to explain the proposed withdrawal from Malaysia.¹²⁰⁰ The UK opined it could see a time when "no white face" would welcome in SE Asia, an unwelcome allusion to problems in Vietnam.¹²⁰¹ UK Defence Minister, Denis Healey, summed up the irony,

The United States, after trying for thirty years to get Britain out of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, was now trying desperately to keep us in... during the Vietnam war it did not want to be the only country killing coloured people on their own soil.

¹¹⁹⁶ The US had begun to feel this after Suez, "In the past the British had been our most dependable ally. Now there was the danger of our becoming isolated..." Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Reinhardt)," September 11, 1958. #351. *FRUS, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2*.

¹¹⁹⁷ "Memorandum of Conversation," January 11, 1968, #288 *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe*.

¹¹⁹⁸ "Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson," January 11, 1968. #289. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe*.

¹¹⁹⁹ "Memorandum of Conversation,"

December 7, 1964, #236. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe*.

¹²⁰⁰ For a contemporaneous US reference see: "Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Johnson," January 20, 1966. #253. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe*.

¹²⁰¹ David Goldsworthy, *Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain's Empire* (Melbourne University Publish, 2002), 167.. Also: Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 20, 1967. #21. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs*.

Moreover, it had at last come to realise that Britain had an experience and understanding in the Third World, which it did not possess itself.¹²⁰²

In the Gulf, internal US documents acknowledged that the UK possessed “centuries of close association... And cannot be improved upon... should it be necessary to replace the UK in this thankless role...” it would be preferable to encourage other regional allies rather than the US attempt it.¹²⁰³ The commonly held view of US policy-makers was that an Anglospheric security community needed the UK’s active involvement. The US must act to “enhance the credibility of their [the UK’s] role, thereby maximising its size and duration, while profiting from British assets and experience through periodic consultations and intelligence exchanges.”¹²⁰⁴

4.7.6 ANZAM re-invented

Australia and NZ’s objective was the maintenance of a UK commitment to the Malaysian area that formed part of their Forward Defence strategy. The expulsion of Singapore by Malaysia as a constituent part of their federation convinced the UK it needed to find an alternative base in Australia. The UK believed it had an enduring “moral obligation” to defend Australia and New Zealand and had explored this option with the Australians since 1962.¹²⁰⁵ But as David Goldsworthy writes, “it was not a British Expeditionary force, but a regional presence,” that its allies wanted.¹²⁰⁶ Consequently Australian-NZ policy was directed at forestalling a UK regional withdrawal.¹²⁰⁷ They promoted the creation of a ‘ANZUS Plus UK’ arrangement, with a tripartite ‘ANZAM’ still in the Malaysian area. The UK was assured

¹²⁰² Denis Healey, *The Time of My Life* (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), 280-81.

¹²⁰³ C. Simon Smith, “Anglo-American Relations & End of Empire in the Far East and Persian Gulf,” in *Challenging Retrenchment: The United States, Great Britain and the Middle East 1950-1980*, ed. Tore T Petersen (Trondheim: Tapir Academic Press, 2010), 39.

¹²⁰⁴ “Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff,” [undated] #57. *FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972*.

¹²⁰⁵ Mark Gjessing, *Anglo-Australian Naval Relations, 1945-1975: A More Independent Service* (Springer, 2018), 57-59.

¹²⁰⁶ Goldsworthy, 166.

¹²⁰⁷ See: Andrea Benvenuti, “The British Are “Taking to the Boat”: Australian Attempts to Forestall Britain’s Military Disengagement from Southeast Asia, 1965-1966,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 20, no. 1 (2009).

that both Australia and NZ accepted that as they grew in strength, they must play an increasing part in regional defence.¹²⁰⁸

The ANZUS objective of keeping the UK engaged in the region was facilitated by an unanticipated victory of the Conservatives led by Edward Heath in the 1970 General Election. In opposition, Heath had indicated that UK commitments to Anglospheric defence would be reviewed, telling a US audience the proposed UK withdrawal of forces was an abdication that he could not accept. Mutual defence was not an

artificial relationship to be created or abandoned at will... [it was] the product of history, based on our strong ties of common heritage, language, common laws and common endeavours.”¹²⁰⁹

Although Euro-centric in outlook, Heath asserted that there was a “natural relationship” rather than a special relationship with the US. In terms of Anglospheric security commitments, Heath told parliament,

I do not believe our military effort can or should be confined to Europe... we shall deploy forces in the Indian Ocean area and in Malaysia and Singapore.¹²¹⁰

This revised approach would dovetail with US attempts to involve the UK in its reconfiguration of an Anglospheric security framework in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring both allies now ran in parallel if not always overlapping lines.¹²¹¹

The idea of UK bases in Australia was given up in favour of the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) to replace the AMDA, whereby the UK, Australia and NZ committed to retain an interest in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore.¹²¹² A tripartite military formation,

¹²⁰⁸ Record of Meeting between Wilson and Holt - Far East Defence, June 13, 1967 TNA, FCO 46/56

¹²⁰⁹ Louis Heren, "Heath Tells US Not to Write Britain Off," *Times*, May 26 1969.

¹²¹⁰ Edward Heath, HC Deb 02 March 1971 Vol 812 Cc1410-549.

¹²¹¹ Smith, 38.

¹²¹² For a detailed analysis see: Andrea Benvenuti and Moreen Dee, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements and the Reappraisal of the British and Australian Policy Interests in Southeast Asia, 1970-75," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (2010).

ANZUK replaced the Commonwealth Reserve based in Malaya and Singapore.¹²¹³ To ensure FPDA success, the Nixon Administration gave private assurances of US support to the Australians via ANZUS should FPDA obligations cause difficulties in the event of external hostilities.¹²¹⁴ Australian deployment was construed as a “contribution to wider regional security in relation to communist pressures.”¹²¹⁵

Nixon’s Guam Doctrine; the ‘asianization’ of regional defence allowed for eventual US disengagement from Vietnam by 1973 and rendered SEATO obsolescent. The retreat of both Australia’s ‘powerful friends’ rendered their Forward Defence strategy unworkable and Australia adopted a policy of self-reliance based on the positioning of forces in Australia.¹²¹⁶ The ANZUK arrangements ended with the bulk of the Australia’s contingent withdrawing in 1974, followed by the UK a year later. As the Singapore and Malaysian contingents built up their military capability, the FPDA might have been expected to go the way of SEATO; it survived, albeit in a low operational mode, with the ANZUK commitment to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore still remaining.¹²¹⁷

4.7.7 Canadian semi-detachment

Canada was absent from the Anglosphere core’s engagement in conflicts after the Suez Crisis to the end of the Cold War. A liberal internationalist role favoured peace-keeping military deployments over combat. This policy saw both Diefenbaker and his successor Lester Pearson at odds with US foreign policy during the Cuban Crisis and the duration of the Vietnam conflict.

Although the Cuban Crisis was not a conflict as such, it merits a mention in the context of the CANUS military dynamic that stood in contrast to the poor relationships between

¹²¹³ Chin Kin Wah, *The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA*, vol. 23 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974).

¹²¹⁴ UK High Commission Canberra to FCO London, “Australian Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington,” May 16, 1969. TNA FCO 24/398. Also Daniel Wei Boon Chua, *US-Singapore Relations, 1965-1975: Strategic Non-Alignment in the Cold War* (NUS Press, 2017), 128.

¹²¹⁵ “Five Power Conference-June 1969,” Cabinet Submission No. 622. June 11, 1969. NAA, A5868/622

¹²¹⁶ Hugh White, “Four Decades of the Defence of Australia: Reflections on Australian Defence Policy over the Past 40 Years,” in *History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy*, , ed. Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (Canberra: ANU ePress, 2007), 163-68.

corresponding political policy-makers. Mistrust was engendered by Canada's pursuit of liberal internationalism and a wish to maintain sovereignty.¹²¹⁸ It was encapsulated by Diefenbaker's refusal to break relations with Communist Cuba and endorse the US economic embargo.¹²¹⁹ President Kennedy and Diefenbaker had both come to regard each other's policies on Cuba as "unbalanced."¹²²⁰ These differences were to come to head with the discovery Soviet missiles had been secretly deployed to Cuba.

When Kennedy escalated US military readiness from DEFCON 5 to DEFCON 3 on October 22, 1962, he assumed Canada would automatically do the same.¹²²¹ However, NORAD protocols required Canadian consultation and Diefenbaker took exception to the lack of notice, refusing to match the alert status.¹²²² The Canadian Government only followed suit on October 24, when Kennedy raised the alert to DEFCON 2, the highest readiness level before declaration of actual hostilities.¹²²³ Diefenbaker's equivocation was also partially a consequence of a misjudged attempt to place itself as a facilitator for a UN fact-finding initiative to de-escalate the crisis.¹²²⁴

Although this episode is commonly represented as something of a nadir in Canadian-US relations from the perspective of security community theory, it provides evidence of a strong, shared communal identification with the US by the Canadian military. Without Diefenbaker's knowledge, US and Canadian military commanders had met in Halifax on October 17 and the Canadian military had agreed to deploy their maritime assets to track Soviet submarines

¹²¹⁷ Benvenuti and Dee, 121.

¹²¹⁸ For a discussion of Diefenbaker's foreign policy outlooks see: Jason Zorbas, "A Red Tory in Foreign Affairs: Analyzing John G. Diefenbaker's Foreign Policies from an Ideological Perspective," *CPSA Papers* (2010), <https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Zorbas.pdf>.

¹²¹⁹ John M Kirk and Peter McKenna, "Deciphering Canada's Cuba Policy since 1959," *International Journal of Cuban Studies* (2010): 63.; Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, "Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Pacific Historical Review* 48, no. 2 (1979): 161-62.

¹²²⁰ Brad Gladman and Peter Archambault, "Advice and Indecision Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Canadian Military History* 23, no. 1 (2014): 14.

¹²²¹ Knowlton Nash, *Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing across the Undefended Border* (McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1990), 186.

¹²²² Ghent, 163-64.

¹²²³ Gladman and Archambault, 14.; Andrew Pye, "The Royal Canadian Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *History* (2009): 10.

¹²²⁴ This is suggested in the Canadian Governments archival account. Janice Cavell, "Introduction Vol 29," *Global Affairs Canada* (2014), <https://www.international.gc.ca/history-histoire/dcer-drrec/volumes/29/introduction.aspx?lang=eng.> Also see: Ghent, 164.

heading to Cuba.¹²²⁵ The deployment was justified under the auspices of a NATO anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise so as to permit the loading of ammunition and Canadian adherence to US directed commands.¹²²⁶ It can be argued that in following this action, the Canadian military exceeded their terms of reference.¹²²⁷ Canadian ASW assets played a partisan and critical role from October 17 thereafter.¹²²⁸ To maintain secrecy, Canadian units were not displayed on the USN's status maps in Washington and the Canadian naval attaché in Washington was tasked with ensuring the USN's most senior officers were aware of the politically sensitive nature of Canada's contribution.¹²²⁹ The subterfuge was unsustainable as the crisis escalated towards an imminent DEFCON2 alert and the Canadian military were obliged to secure political cover. On October 23, Canadian Defence Minister Douglas Harkness unilaterally agreed the Canadian military should "begin planning as if the alert had been declared, but to do so discreetly."¹²³⁰ A day later, the Canadian cabinet were informed and did agree to follow the US line, but the equivocation and fractiousness damaged the political relationship. It was the start of a poisonous process of "muddled perceptions, stifled communications, and disappointed expectations."¹²³¹ Going forwards, the incident contributed to a feeling in the US political policy-establishment that Canada was a shaky partner, and this was a perception that would persist.¹²³²

There was relatively mild CANUS antagonism over Vietnam under the Diefenbaker Government.¹²³³ The relationship became more fractious over Vietnam and given colourful emphasis by the infamous physical altercation between President Johnson and Canadian Premier 'Mike' Pearson. This followed the latter's Temple University speech suggesting for a

¹²²⁵ Peter T Hayden, "Canadian Involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis Re-Reconsidered," *The Northern Mariner* no. VII No. 2 (2007): 56.

¹²²⁶ See: Cary Baker and Bert L. Campbell, *The Canadair Argus: The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Maritime Hunter* (Bryler Publications, 2011), 63.

¹²²⁷ Hayden, 60. See also: "The Canadian Navy in the 1960s," (2017), <https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/services/history/naval-service-1910-2010/years-of-crisis.html>.

¹²²⁸ 56-57.

¹²²⁹ Tony German, *The Sea Is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy* (McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1990), 270; Baker and Campbell.

¹²³⁰ Hayden, 128.

¹²³¹ For source quote: Richard E Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1970), 71.

¹²³² Gladman and Archambault, 12.

¹²³³ See: Nash, 150.

pause in US bombing.¹²³⁴ Although these point to strained personal relationships, it is important not to overlook the routine, ongoing levels of cooperation over Vietnam that occurred in terms of diplomacy and intelligence below the level of personalities in the CANUS political policy-establishments. Indeed, James Eayrs referred to Canada's behaviour as "an apprenticeship in complicity."¹²³⁵

Whilst Canada may have continued to be supportive of the US behind the scenes, this did not translate into any appetite for participation in the recalibration of Anglospheric activity in the Pacific. There was a historic lack of Canadian interest in Asia.¹²³⁶ This was reflected in the paucity of military resources devoted to the Pacific with naval activity limited to a small zone adjoining the British Columbia coast and extending to part of Alaska.¹²³⁷ Such was the alleged leisurely nature of routine operations it acquired the nickname of 'the yacht club' within the RCN.¹²³⁸ During the Pierre Trudeau government elements of the political policy-establishment did consider a security tilt towards the Pacific but as part of a 'Canada First' policy and at the expense of NATO commitments.¹²³⁹ Given the perspective of Canadian political policy-makers and the military resources available, it was Canada would not play an integral part in the Anglospheric plans for a revamped military presence in Pacific areas. However, the Trudeau period witnessed a shift from the general Atlanticist paradigm that had previously characterised Canadian perspectives. There was a noticeable movement towards diplomatic and trade initiatives directed at the Pacific.¹²⁴⁰ Canada was

¹²³⁴ See: Charles Ritchie, "The Day the President of the United States Struck Fear and Trembling into the Heart of Our Pm," January 1 1974.

¹²³⁵ James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Indochina-Roots of Complicity* (University of Toronto Press,, 1983), Chapter 9.

¹²³⁶ Patrick James, "Grand, Bland or Somewhat Planned? Toward a Canadian Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region" *Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute* 7, no. 21 (2014), https://www.cgai.ca/grand_bland_or_somewhat_planned.

¹²³⁷ David Zimmerman, *Maritime Command Pacific: The Royal Canadian Navy's West Coast Fleet in the Early Cold War* (UBC Press, 2016).@7 and map}

¹²³⁸ Ibid. @4}

¹²³⁹ Jack Lawrence Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (University of Toronto press, 1991), 24-25 & 159, 266; Jeff Salot, "Trudeau's Cabinet Divided in 1969," *Globe and Mail*, February 10 2000.

¹²⁴⁰ See: Greg Donaghy, "Pierre Trudeau and Canada's Pacific Tilt, 1945–1984," *International Journal* 74, no. 1 (2019).

not a one-ocean country... We're beginning to realize that this Pacific seaboard is more important to Canadians than we realized in the past.¹²⁴¹

This would have important future implications as discussed in chapter 4.

4.7.8 Reconstructing the wider Indo-Pacific Region

A ‘subterranean’ network of military policy-makers persisted despite of disagreements in approaches amongst the political policy-establishments during the conflicts in South East Asia. The militaries acted to encourage the political policy-makers to take remedial action, having given some attention to military planning in the wider Indo-Pacific region.¹²⁴² The US JCS had recognised the Aden situation was precarious and engaged in informal talks with the UK about new bases capable of supporting Anglospheric operations in the Indo-Pacific region.¹²⁴³ These talks attracted the support of US political policy-makers during both the Johnson and Nixon administrations.¹²⁴⁴ Nixon and Heath initiated a ‘joint study group’ to work on the Indo-Pacific. A renewed UK-US intimacy developed. Kissinger authorised the attendance of UK representative, John Thomson at an internal US ‘Review Meeting’ of the NSC, the JCS, the CIA and the State Department to discuss strategy on the Indo-Pacific.¹²⁴⁵ Thomson was the UK Cabinet’s Head of [Intelligence] Assessments.¹²⁴⁶ Kissinger later commented on the unique nature of this scenario, acknowledging this “view of our bureaucracy in action could only be shown to our British friends,” and, “he could never invite officials from other countries to such a meeting.”¹²⁴⁷

¹²⁴¹ Trudeau, Pierre. “The Relation of Defence Policy to Foreign Policy,” Statements and Speeches, April 12, 1969 (69/8).

¹²⁴² Memorandum From the JCS to Secretary of Defense McNamara,” April 10, 1968. #47 *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*.

¹²⁴³ “Paper Prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Moorer),” February 11, 1970. #39. *FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972*.

¹²⁴⁴ “Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Navy (Ignatius),” October 27, 1967. #46. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*.

¹²⁴⁵ “Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting,” December 9, 1970. #50. *FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972*.

¹²⁴⁶ See biographical details in: Sir John Thomson, interview by Catherine Manning, 20 July 2016. British Diplomatic Oral History Programme. CAC.

¹²⁴⁷ “Memorandum of Conversation,” December 10, 1970, #51. *FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972*.

Thereafter, the UK and US embarked upon regular informal discussions on Indo-Pacific with both parties keen on “the future inclusion of Australia/New Zealand in Indian Ocean discussions.”¹²⁴⁸ A 1975 meeting agenda item refers to an Australian proposal relating to Diego Garcia. Although this was primarily a UK-US bilateral arrangement, the UK involved Australia and NZ through a tripartite intelligence operation; the ANZUK JIC.¹²⁴⁹ This body prepared intelligence analysis for UK-US discussion and expanded to include Australia and NZ participation.¹²⁵⁰ The outcome ensured “a broad understanding on common goals and activities in the Indian Ocean area...”¹²⁵¹

By 1972, the UK and US agreed to the establishment of a base on the UK island of Diego Garcia in the newly created ‘British Indian Ocean Territory’ (BIOT).¹²⁵² In recognition of US base rights, the UK received significant discounts on the supply of US nuclear weapons provided under the terms of the UK-US Defence Treaty (1958). President Carter, who had served under Rickover, on nuclear submarines, affirmed the nuclear relationship by securing agreement for the storage of nuclear weapons in the UK and an agreement to supply the UK with trident nuclear weapons.¹²⁵³

During the next two decades, Diego Garcia was transformed into a huge military base.¹²⁵⁴ Massive infrastructure upgrades to its naval and air force capabilities were supplemented by the construction of SIGINT facilities to feed into the Five Eyes Intelligence gathering

¹²⁴⁸ Thomson to various. “Anglo/US Consultations,” March 20, 1975. TNA, FCO 8/2469.

¹²⁴⁹ “Central Intelligence Machinery Division of Cabinet Office Records and Other Intelligence-Related Cabinet Office Records.” UK: Cabinet Office Knowledge and Information Management Unit, 2010. A8

¹²⁵⁰ “Next Round of Anglo-US Consultations on the Indian Ocean.” March 12, 1975. TNA, FCO 8/2469. 24

¹²⁵¹ “Backchannel Message Tohak74/WH40189 From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” January 16, 1974, #229. *FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976*.

¹²⁵² “Diego Garcia Agreement between USA and HM Government.” TNA, FCO 83/134, 1972.

¹²⁵³ See: “Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State Muskie,” June 30, 1980. #129. *FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula*. Also Thomas K Robb, *Jimmy Carter and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 103-05.

¹²⁵⁴ Selig S Harrison and K Subrahmanyam, *Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and American Perspectives* (Oxford University Press, 1989).@92}

operations.¹²⁵⁵ Under the guise of ANCANZ Navies and the FPDA arrangements, the base supported exercises for the Anglosphere allies.¹²⁵⁶ The base was utilised extensively in the 1991 Gulf War.¹²⁵⁷

4.7.9 Extension of tripartite fora

The participation of Australia and NZ in the Vietnam conflict removed any US obstacles to their inclusion in the military interoperability fora. This was a process endorsed by the political policy-establishment, keen that any regional imbalance caused by the UK's tilt from the region be addressed by the inclusion of Australia and NZ in Anglosphere Core military fora.

Agreement	1957	1960	1963	1964	1965	1969	1972	1980	1991
CCEB						AUS	NZ		
ABCA Armies			AUS		NZ *				
Air & Space Interoperability Council				AUS	NZ				
Technical Cooperation Prog.	CANUK US				AUS	NZ			
AUSCANNZUKUS (navies)		AUS						NZ	
Heads of Assessment Partnership (Intel)	AUSCAN NZUKUS								
Heads of Defence Intelligence Panel	AUSCAN NZUKUS								
CAZAB Counter Intelligence				AUSCAN NZUKUS					

Table 6 Anglosphere Core Multilateral Military-Security Agreements between 1957 – 1991

Dark Grey shading signifies point at which the arrangement became quintilateral (*NZ Observer Status only)

¹²⁵⁵ Peter Sand, *United States and Britain in Diego Garcia: The Future of a Controversial Base* (Springer, 2009), 31-41.; Roger Z George and Robert D Kline, *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 192.

¹²⁵⁶ For a full list of deployments see: John Roberts, *Safeguarding the Nation: The Story of the Modern Royal Navy* (Seaforth Publishing, 2009), Chapters 4&5.

¹²⁵⁷ See: Victor J Tossini, "The British Indian Ocean Territory – an Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier in the Form of Diego Garcia," *ukdj* (2018), <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-british-indian-ocean-territory-an-unsinkable-aircraft-carrier-in-the-form-of-diego-garcia/>.

This meant that all five Anglosphere Core members were involved in setting interoperability standards that fed into NATO, despite Australia and NZ not being parties to the NATO treaty. The five Anglosphere Core members were now involved in joint exercises for the purposes of testing new, cutting edge command and communications systems. This intensified the depth and width of collaboration through the exchange of personnel and the posting of officers to the Washington based fora and Working Groups. In addition, the quintilateral SIGINT arrangements had expanded to include semi-formal, habitual-natural arrangements for the sharing of wider aspects of intelligence involving senior personnel from other internal Anglosphere Core agencies and their counterparts.¹²⁵⁸ Still at an embryonic stage at this point, the repeated interactions between the military meant it was military-security policy personnel that developed a sense of communal identity in advance of political policy-makers, as would become evident during the next few decades.

4.7.10 The Carter Doctrine

The Carter Doctrine was declared in January 1980 in response to Iranian regime change and the threat posed to the Persian Gulf after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.¹²⁵⁹ Due to the relatively light US military footprint, the Doctrine required an immediate military commitment from allies, specifically NATO and Japan.¹²⁶⁰ Seeking NATO support, US Under Secretary of State, Robert Komer argued the crisis was global and “our response must be global as well, whether or not it is managed under NATO’s aegis.”¹²⁶¹ Japan was not eager to commit and NATO equivocated.¹²⁶² France criticised US efforts, whilst the EEC worried a robust response would damage detente. Carter’s NATO proposals for a Rapid Defence capability were met with “a wall of silence” and a long-running debate over NATO “out of area operations.”¹²⁶³

¹²⁵⁸ For example in 2011 the former director of MI5 reveals the close working relationship of CAZAB intelligence forum members. Stella Rimington, *Open Secret: The Autobiography of the Former Director-General of MI5* (Random House, 2011), 205-07; Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 49.

¹²⁵⁹ See: Bruce R Kuniholm, “The Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Corollary, and Prospects for United States Policy in Southwest Asia,” *International Journal* 41, no. 2 (1986).

¹²⁶⁰ Richard Burt, “Carter Concedes U.S. Alone Can’t Defend Persian Gulf,” *NY Times*, January 30 1980.

¹²⁶¹ “Pentagon Aide Says Allies Let U.S. Carry Burden,” *NY Times*, February 10 1980.

¹²⁶² Wallace J Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 231.

This attitude contrasted with the response from the Anglosphere allies. UK Prime Minister Thatcher informed Carter, “I fully agree with your analysis. A central principal of great strategic importance is at stake...”¹²⁶⁴ RN vessels were immediately deployed to the Mediterranean to allow US vessels to redeploy to the Gulf.¹²⁶⁵ Later, a large-scale joint US-UK naval exercise took place in the Gulf. In response to US requests, the UK established a permanent RN presence in the Indo-Pacific, focussed on the Gulf. Two other outcomes with significance for present-day Anglospheric security structures related to the leveraging of existing facilities.¹²⁶⁶ Direct talks between Carter and Thatcher resulted in agreement to further revamp and extend the Diego Garcia as a base for controlling the Indo-Pacific.

The Carter Administration began to use ANZUS as a forum for consultation, thereby elevating it to a level the Australians and New Zealanders had strived for since its inception. All the participants of the July 1979 Ministerial Meeting agreed the Treaty symbolised “a deeper and wider association between the three societies, which embodied similar values and shared similar aspirations.” The ANZUS ministerial meetings were, “not only meetings of allies, but of close friends of long standing...” Meetings “took place in an informal atmosphere which enabled ministers to exchange views freely... on foreign policy and defence matters.” And in an oblique reference to the Anglospheric quadrilateral arrangements to which all three belonged, declared, there existed among ANZUS members, “effective military cooperation, the flow of high technology and the free exchange of information and strategic intelligence...”¹²⁶⁷

With NATO embroiled in internal disputes, the US sought to extend ANZUS operations westward to include the wider Indo-Pacific and the Persian Gulf.¹²⁶⁸ Unlike the NATO response, the discussions of the 1980 ANZUS Ministerial meeting were marked by warm reciprocal expressions of appreciation,

¹²⁶³ Charles Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West* (Routledge, 2011), 180-83.

¹²⁶⁴ Thatcher to Carter, “Afghanistan.” January 26, 1980. THCR 3/1/5 F84.

¹²⁶⁵ Thies, 231.

¹²⁶⁶ “No.10 Record of Conversation, M. Thatcher Plenary Meeting with President Carter.” December 17, 1979. TNA, PREM 19/127. and George Clarke, “Lord Carrington Hopes Britain Will Join in U S Military Action If Needed to Protect Gulf,” *Times*, February 7 1980 1980.

¹²⁶⁷ “ANZUS Council Canberra,” July 5, 1979, #498. Vol. 23: American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980. Vol 23.

¹²⁶⁸ Jacob Bercovitch, *ANZUS in Crisis* (Springer, 1988), 37.

Minister Peacock [Australian External Affairs] and Secretary Vance (US Secretary of State) noted that the ANZUS forum was completely open and candid. Minister Talboys [NZ External Affairs] commented that the meetings were like an extension of departmental talks. Talboys said he greatly appreciated the feeling of being consulted.¹²⁶⁹

President Carter, disappointed by NATO and EEC allies, expressed his appreciation for Australian and NZ for collaboration and general support, stating “it was reassuring, at a time of challenge, to have close friends with whom such close consultations could be held.” He added he wished that the US had this same sort of easy relationship with its European allies who were “constantly complaining that they had not been told enough, or consulted fully.”¹²⁷⁰ In another meeting with NZ, Brzezinski, Carter’s Secretary of State felt moved to evoke a feeling of ‘we-ness’ directly, declaring “that there is an ‘automatic’ feeling for the closeness between the US and New Zealand, and Australia as well.” He asserted these feelings “had roots in our shared World War 2 experience where we fought side by side.” Brzezinski informed Australia and NZ “we expect you to be with us, and we expect to be with you.”¹²⁷¹

4.7.11 FPDA Reinvigorated - ANZUS curtailed

US-Australian military collaboration deepened, giving the ANZUS alliance more of a bilateral nature. In 1976, the US suggested increased cooperation (including SIGINT) and RAN visits to Diego Garcia.¹²⁷² Thereafter, Diego Garcia has been an Australian transit point as part of Anglospheric operations.¹²⁷³ Australia’s new status in the Anglosphere Core Security Community in the eyes of the US was reflected in a variety of subsidiary bilateral

¹²⁶⁹ “Memorandum of Conversation,” February 27, 1980, #271. *FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific*.

¹²⁷⁰ See: Roberts, Chapter 6. Plus the UK established the Gulf Armilla Patrol. See: {Cable, 1989 #038.

¹²⁷¹ “Memorandum of Conversation,” February 25, 1980, #270. *FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific*.

¹²⁷² “Memorandum of Conversation,” June 8, 1976, #61. *FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976*.

¹²⁷³ For example, participation in Battle Group Delta operations 1985-86 and the Gulf War.

agreements and initiatives including defence-space stations, missile launching bases and research.¹²⁷⁴

In 1980, as part of the Anglosphere Core Security Community's response to the US appeals to support the Carter Doctrine, the Anglospheric FPDA was revisited. Singapore and Malaysia signalled their willingness to reinstate and upgrade military operations. With NZ consent, the Australians informed the UK they were "most anxious" to meet this request.¹²⁷⁵ The UK informed Australia it would be willing to "revitalise" the FPDA¹²⁷⁶ leading to growing interoperability between the five Commonwealth states.

One noteworthy detrimental change to regional Anglospheric activity occurred in 1984. NZ participation in the ANZUS arrangements was terminated by the Lange Government's decision to curtail visits by and exercises with nuclear powered and/or armed vessels.¹²⁷⁷ The US gave notice of the suspension of its obligations to NZ under the Treaty.¹²⁷⁸ This however, did not impact NZ's involvement in the other Anglosphere Core security community fora and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. As such, this provides an example of the military substrata networks continuing despite the more public disagreements as confirmed by the subsequent publishing of internal cables via Wikileaks as discussed in the section covering the post-Cold War period.

4.8 Communal identification and natural interaction

4.8.1 Introduction

¹²⁷⁴ For a list of agreements and bases see: Sara Bobroff, *US Treaties & Other International Agreements Pertaining to Telecommunications*, Office of Telecommunications (Washington: US Dept. of Commerce, 1974), 14-16.

¹²⁷⁵ Fraser to Thatcher, "Five Power Defence Arrangements." September 11, 1980. TNA, PREM 19/156 f26 (T172/80)

¹²⁷⁶ Thatcher to Fraser, "Five Power Defence Arrangements." September 17, 1980. TNA, PREM 19/156 F13 (T177/80)

¹²⁷⁷ NZ policy was ambiguous. See: Michael McKinley, "Labour, Lange and Logic: An Analysis of New Zealand's ANZUS Policy," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 39, no. 3 (1985): 133-34.

¹²⁷⁸ Marion Nash, *Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1981-1988* (Washington DC: Office of the Legal Adviser, DOS, 1981), 1279-81.

Towards the end of the Cold War period, the Anglospheric security community had begun to display varying degrees of ‘communication density.’ There were in effect two ‘social’ strata: one consisting of the security-military fora and the other comprising more informal relationships at the politico-diplomatic level. It was the former that had developed into a ‘living’ network of individuals engaged in common enterprises, encompassing all levels of the security hierarchy. And of those fora, it was the SIGINT community, the first of its kind to develop into a genuinely quintilateral operation that was the most advanced by the 1970s. However, by the 1980s this was true of the other military institutions too, so that cooperation had become ingrained, centred on shared norms as evidenced by the Falklands and the response of the US Navy.

The politico-diplomatic relationships were less developed, focussed on political policy-makers and not necessarily quintilateral in nature, their status and nature dictated by the location of crises and conflicts. The exception was the UK-US relationship that did develop an ongoing consultative dimension, sometimes advanced or impeded by the nature of Presidential-Prime Ministerial relationship. And if that relationship was deemed as lukewarm by observers, the reality was the ingrained habits and relationships of the ‘perma-bureaucracies’ of each state ensured intimate interaction continued. This represented the culmination of the process of started by semi-formal Working Group arrangements in 1957 and referred to earlier. These structures had dissolved quite quickly but (in-line with the stated UK hopes) helped establish a normative practice of dialogue representing what Adler and Barnett call “common and consensual mechanisms.”¹²⁷⁹ This however should not detract from the multi-layered strands of cultural adhesive that provided these relationships and institutions with strength.

4.8.2 High-Level memetic behaviour patterns

The measures taken to create the new or revitalised and mechanisms facilitated the free flow of communication of views and positions of policy-makers. With values, attitudes and perceptions drawn from the same meme-complexes, the US was open to “profiting from their [the UK’s] experience.” It had become an ingrained behavioural trait of the US policy-establishment. The UK-US Working Group structure appears to have lapsed sometime before

the 1960s, but the process of consultation continued in the Kennedy era. McGeorge Bundy opined, “US-UK relations are not based only on a power calculus, but also on deep community of purpose and long practice of close cooperation,” and claimed there existed “intimate consultation to a degree not publicly known.”¹²⁸⁰

This intimate collaboration continued in the Nixon Administration, the UK was invited to “tell us where you disagree. We will feel free to ask your advice. We want your participation...”¹²⁸¹ This is not to say that consultation formed an omnipresent imperative or necessity, but that in a time of crisis or a situation requiring a second opinion, it was a natural inclination to seek out a UK perspective. Henry Kissinger, the principal US foreign policy advisor during the Nixon-Ford Administrations, affirms consultation with the UK had become habitual on geopolitical and security matters. His analysis highlights those very attributes that Deutsch postulates as so important in assisting in the development of a natural security community; language, common history, culture, and shared values. The most important insight, however, was the nature of the UK-US relationship, that was

in effect, a pattern of consultation so matter-of-factly intimate that it became psychologically impossible to ignore British views. They evolved a habit of meetings so regular that autonomous American action somehow came to be seen to violate club rules. Above all, they used effectively an abundance of wisdom and trustworthiness of conduct so exceptional and successive that American leaders saw it in their self-interest to obtain British advice before making major decisions. It was an extraordinary relationship because it rested on no legal claim: it was formalised by no legal document; it was carried forward by succeeding British governments as if no alternative were conceivable.¹²⁸²

Kissinger concluded the strength of the relationship depended upon “intangibles” that provided natural trust and communication. Arriving at London during Harold Wilson’s UK premiership, Nixon quoted the words of Woodrow Wilson, the first incumbent President to visit the UK in 1918, who had told the British people “friendship must have a machinery,” to

¹²⁷⁹ Adler and Barnett, 62, 55.

¹²⁸⁰ Mcgeorge Bundy to Robert J. Manning, 7 December 7, 1962. NSA, Nsf170a/34

¹²⁸¹ “Memorandum of Conversation,” October 3, 1970. #329. *FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XII, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.* 985-986

ensure “constant friendly intercourse, the means for constant watchfulness over the common interests.”¹²⁸³ Developing this theme, Nixon then evoked Churchill’s emphasis on informal bonds that created fraternal association and said, Churchill,

was not referring to legal obligations but to human intangibles. He was referring to the means of communication to which Woodrow Wilson had referred to 50 years ago. And no two nations in the world more commonly and more closely share the means of communication than do the United States and the United Kingdom. We share a common language. We share the common law. We share great institutions of the Parliament. We share other institutions. Because we share those institutions, we enjoy a means of communication which gives us a special relationship.¹²⁸⁴

Perhaps Nixon was utilising rhetoric, but his evoking of Wilson’s articulation of the importance of ‘machinery’ to foster “constant friendly intercourse” echoes Adler and Barnett. But their conclusion that this leads to ‘social learning’ is surely inadequate. Wilson’s machinery of communication was not suggesting that participants could observe and learn behaviour, but rather in the Deutschian they act as a means of amplifying behaviours associated with pre-existing meme-complexes held in common.

The existence and growth of the Anglosphere Core security community was not just about the personal relationships between President and Prime Minister. Their relationships might accelerate or impede the development of the security community, but common values would likely ensure the Anglospheric security community could, under its own momentum, arrive at common policy outlooks, giving rise to and expression by the plethora of military and security fora.

4.8.3 Closer ‘Five Eyes’ SIGINT operations

The potency of communism in the Far East facilitated a growth in the Anglospheric core SIGINT arrangements to provide a more intensive global reach. Disputes between the

¹²⁸² Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Simon and Schuster, 2011), 90.

¹²⁸³ Richard Nixon, "Remarks at the Airport on Arrival in London," *The American Presidency Project* (1969), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-airport-arrival-london>.

¹²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

political policy-establishment rarely impeded progress, and conflicts usually acted as a catalyst for deeper and more intimate collaboration. During and after the Suez Crisis, the SIGINT collaboration continued unabated.¹²⁸⁵

Cooperation between the Anglosphere Core SIGINT agencies intensified after Suez with both GCHQ and NSA cooperating extensively in the Middle East in the run up to the crisis in the Levant during 1957-58 and again during the Yemeni-Aden Crisis 1962-67.¹²⁸⁶ Joint operations involved personnel from all 'Five Eyes' members. In 1957, work was completed on a joint UK-US SIGINT station on Ascension, a British Overseas Territory in the mid-Atlantic.¹²⁸⁷ By 1960, there were joint CANUKUS operations.¹²⁸⁸ US SIGINT facilities existed alongside UK operations on Mauritius and in Cyprus.¹²⁸⁹ The 1953 BRUSA appendices referred to the US commitment to "coordinate its COMINT operations in the... [South West Pacific] with the [Anglo-Australian] center in Australia as required."¹²⁹⁰ The conflicts in South East Asia accelerated this process. Australia supplied more personnel for the UK-Australian operations in Singapore and Hong Kong and established new SIGINT bases at Darwin and Perth to provide coverage of Indonesian targets.¹²⁹¹ In parallel with Australia's military contribution to US efforts in South East Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, the SIGINT relationship between the US and Australia deepened. A joint intelligence facility was established at Pine Gap, one of the Five Eyes network's most important bases.¹²⁹² The base includes NSA, CIA, and later US military personnel believed to have arrived in September 1990. During the build-up for Operation Desert Storm, the base hosted additional CIA and

¹²⁸⁵ Charles G Cogan, "From the Politics of Lying to the Farce at Suez: What the US Knew," *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no. 2 (1998): 104.

¹²⁸⁶ David Easter, "Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and Conflicts, 1956-67," *ibid.* 28, no. 6 (2013): 832-39.

¹²⁸⁷ David Fontaine Mitchell, *Ascension Island and the Second World War* (Ascension Island Heritage Society, 2011), 24.

¹²⁸⁸ "Text of Statements Read in Moscow by Former US Security Agency Workers.," *NY Times*, September 7 1960.

¹²⁸⁹ David Easter, "GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s," *Intelligence and National Security* 23, no. 5 (2008): 686.

¹²⁹⁰ "UKUSA Agreement, Appendix Q, Annexure Q2", March 19, 1953. TNA, HW 80/10. Para 6 a & b

¹²⁹¹ Pfennigwerth, 199.

¹²⁹² DOS, Joint Defense Facility at Pine Gap, Extending the Agreement of December 9, 1966: US-Australia (1998). Joint Defense Facility at Pine Gap.

other military personnel.¹²⁹³ A year later further joint bases were agreed and saw ongoing expansion.¹²⁹⁴ Some of these were funded on a tripartite AUSUKUS basis.¹²⁹⁵

4.8.4 Shared values and camaraderie

The importance of both habit and trust between security agencies was referred to by a US Congressional Research paper produced in May 2019. In assessing the reasons SIGINT cooperation had continued uninterrupted by political wrangling during and after Suez, it concluded shared values constituted the key explanation.

The strongest, most enduring relationships have weathered differences in policy or lapses in security that have led to temporary setbacks in intelligence cooperation. More formidable to overcome are obstacles to intelligence sharing resulting from fundamental differences in values.¹²⁹⁶

There were however, no fundamental difference in values, and the NSA suggested the relationship was unquestioned, perhaps even attracting an allegiance in its own right:

...one lesson to be learnt from the Suez Crisis is that whether by dint of loyalty or the inertia inherent in any established system or bureaucracy, the Anglo-American Sigint alliance was easily strong enough to continue unabated despite a disruption in the political relationship.¹²⁹⁷

¹²⁹³ Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson, and Richard Tanter, "The Militarisation of Pine Gap: Organisations and Personnel," *Nautilus Institute NAPSNet Special Reports* (2015), <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-militarisation-of-pine-gap-organisations-and-personnel/>.

¹²⁹⁴ Richard Tanter, "Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt (North West Cape)," *ibid.* (2011), <https://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/defence-facilities/naval-communication-station-harold-e-holt-north-west-cape/>.

¹²⁹⁵ For example, the Nurrungar Joint Defence Facility. See Allen Barnes, "Shot in the Arm for Woomera," *The Age*, February 16 1970.

¹²⁹⁶ Michael E DeVine, *United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships: Background, Policy and Legal Authorities, Risks, Benefits* (Congressional Research Service, US Library of Congress, 2019), 16.

¹²⁹⁷ NSA, *The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History*, ed. Henry F Schorreck, vol. 2, Special Series Crisis Collection, US Cryptological History (Washington DC: NSA Office of Archives and History, 1988), 32.

The social implications of deepening interoperability through service on joint bases, work on joint initiatives and operations constituted the living ‘substrata’ of the Security Community. This was replicated in the organisations formed by the other military-security fora, with staff from each country serving at each other’s HQ’s, personnel serving at joint overseas bases, planning and participation in joint exercises, and co-working on numerous joint projects. A NZ Navy Report to its parent Defence Council provides an illustration as to how the ‘camaraderie’ that underpins the Anglospheric SC is fostered. The report reveals an intensive and recurring programme of maritime, land and air exercises bringing together all five Anglosphere allies. Officers were engaged in regular planning, all ranks drilled alongside one another, some were embedded in one another’s military for long durations in joint bases. One such was HMNZS Irirangi, NZ’s primary SIGINT operation that links to Five Eyes bases in Honolulu and Vancouver and was to play a critical part in the Falklands Conflict.¹²⁹⁸

In fact, the Falklands Conflict merits further attention, demonstrating how the consequences of Anglospheric ‘camaraderie’ influenced the behaviour of the military substrata of the Anglosphere core Security community highlighting shared social affinity.

4.8.5 Falklands: Political policy-maker responses

The response from Australia, Canada and NZ to the Falklands invasion crisis was supportive of the UK, with all three recalling their ambassadors from Argentina. Canada offered the least support. Its initial response appeared supportive of the UK but in reality, whilst condemning the invasion, stressed the need for a peaceful resolution.¹²⁹⁹ It adopted a neutralist position on the Falklands’ contested sovereignty, possibly positioning itself as a future mediator.¹³⁰⁰ That would be a charitable view according to Timothy Winegard, who refers to Canadian diplomacy during the Falklands War as emblematic of the “confused, and at times contradictory, components of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s utopic and

¹²⁹⁸ NZ Naval Board of the Defence Council, "NZ Naval Report to the Defence Council - 1982," RNZN Communicators Association, <https://rnzncomms.org/dc-1982/>.

¹²⁹⁹ Andrew Cohen, "Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau Says Canada Will Strongly Protest.." *UPI*, April 3 1982.. For emphasis on no use of force see: Trudeau to Thatcher. "Falkland Islands" April 8, 1982. THCR, 3/1/20 f52 (T67/82)

¹³⁰⁰ Canadian Senate, "A Turning Point in Canada -Argentine Relations?," (Ottawa: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2017), fn39.

idealistic foreign policy.”¹³⁰¹ From a UK perspective, the position of Trudeau was not seen as helpful. As during Suez, the Canadian Government faced pressure from domestic sentiment that ran in favour of a stronger pro-UK stance.¹³⁰² At times Canada did intimate it would supply military aid to the UK if so asked, confident that this would not be requested.¹³⁰³

New Zealand was the first Anglosphere Core state to act, offering immediate military support.¹³⁰⁴ Australia acted within days also condemning Argentina and offering to delay its purchase of a UK aircraft carrier so as to allow its inclusion in the task force.¹³⁰⁵ The NZ offer of ships was declined, but at the UK’s request provided substitute vessels for UK vessels operating in the Indian Ocean.¹³⁰⁶ Responding to the UK’s solicitations, Australia called a meeting of the UN Commonwealth group to coordinate a supportive response.¹³⁰⁷

The US position was initially more nuanced initially publicly. Under the terms of the Rio Treaty the Argentines called a meeting of the OAS placing its US ally in a difficult position.¹³⁰⁸ The initial State Department response was to act as mediator, but once a diplomatic solution was judged unattainable, publicly aligned with the UK.¹³⁰⁹ The US believed a UK defeat would ‘devastate’ the “political coherence and military effectiveness of the Alliance... [and] risk undermining the special relationship...” and it was necessary to support the UK despite the undoubted damage to US relations with Latin America.¹³¹⁰ The most ‘anti-British’ voice in the US administration, Jean Kirkpatrick, acknowledged the

¹³⁰¹ For a full account see: Timothy C Winegard, "Canadian Diplomacy and the 1982 Falklands War," *The International History Review* 35, no. 1 (2013).

¹³⁰² See: Edmund Yorke, "'The Empire Strikes Back'? The Commonwealth Response to the Falklands Conflict," in *The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future*, ed. Stephen Badsey, Mark Grove, and Rob Havers (Routledge, 2004), 179.

¹³⁰³ Alan Bass, "Canadian Military Aid to Britain in the Falklands Dispute..." *UPI*, May 1 1982.

¹³⁰⁴ Muldoon to Thatcher. April 3, 1982. (T59a/82). TNA, PREM 19/614 F138

¹³⁰⁵ John Bagnall, "'Not Britain's Cause Alone': The Commonwealth, Britain, and the Falklands Crisis, 1982–1989," *Global Histories: A Student Journal* 4, no. 1 (2018): 12.

¹³⁰⁶ UK HC Falklands Debate, May 20, 1982. Vol.24, Col 505.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1982-05-20/debates/e348886e-0a6a-486a-b54d-dcc1c6b1122f/FalklandIslands>

¹³⁰⁷ Parsons (UNUK Mission) to FCO Telegram No. 520 22 April 1982. TNA, PREM 19/60.

¹³⁰⁸ Jeane J Kirkpatrick, "My Falklands War and Theirs," *The National Interest*, no. 18 (1989): 18.

¹³⁰⁹ Gordon Connell-Smith, "The Oas and the Falklands Conflict," *The World Today* 38, no. 9 (1982): 340-47.

¹³¹⁰ "Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig," April 27, 1982. #184. *FRUS, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*. 401-402

Administration would not contemplate a UK defeat, stating “they made it clear right from the beginning. That was never a question, period.”¹³¹¹

4.8.6 Falklands: Horizontal agency and community

The most remarkable aspect of the conflict was the communal response of the US Navy. Immediate planning was initiated for the ‘transfer’ of the USS Iwo Jima aircraft carrier to the RN, should the UK lose an aircraft carrier. Ongoing Anglosphere interoperability had reduced technical control issues to a minimum, but to ensure no crewing problems, serving US Navy personnel would be ‘retired’ and immediately re-engaged as UK ‘contract advisors.’ These arrangements were made without the knowledge of the State Department and then taken directly to, and authorised by, the President.¹³¹² The deployment of additional direct military support of US task forces was considered in the event of UK military setbacks.¹³¹³ To assist the UK, the US provided armaments (sidewinder missiles), fuel and intelligence.¹³¹⁴ The intelligence aspect remains classified, but involved the repositioning of a satellite to provide targeting data.¹³¹⁵ US SIGINT intercepts provided detailed intelligence, allowing the UK to construct the entire Argentine order of battle.¹³¹⁶ The base at Ascension was used as a logistics supply centre.¹³¹⁷

Of critical importance was NZ’s intelligence contribution. GCHQ’s coverage of the South Atlantic was extremely limited, however NZ SIGINT operations at Irigangi had the necessary

¹³¹¹ Jeane J Kirkpatrick, interview by Stephen F. (Chair) Knott, 2003.

¹³¹² Sam LaGrone, “Reagan Readied U.S. Warship for ’82 Falklands War,” *USNI News* (2012), <https://news.usni.org/2012/06/27/reagan-readied-us-warship-82-falklands-war-0>. See the account of the US Secretary of the Navy in: John F Lehman, *Command of the Seas* (Scribner Book Company, 1988), 274-75.

¹³¹³ Ibid [#184. U.S. Contingency Planning -Falklands Crisis]

¹³¹⁴ Sylvia Ellis, *Historical Dictionary of Anglo-American Relations*, vol. 10 (Scarecrow Press, 2009), 235.

¹³¹⁵ Dwayne Day, “The Lion and the Vortex,” *Space Review* (2013), <https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2258/1>.

¹³¹⁶ David Ridlon, “Shots in the Dark: British Tactical Intelligence in the Falklands War,” *Military Intelligence* 15, no. 3 (1989): 41.

¹³¹⁷ Jeffrey T Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries-the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand* (Allen & Unwin, 1985), 194-220.

scope and went into “overdrive” to intercept Argentine communications that were duly passed on via the Five Eyes network.¹³¹⁸

The Falklands Conflict reveals the Anglosphere core security community’s characteristics of bottom up organisation. The lower echelons are, if not autonomous, certainly self-directed, transnational, and able to act without receiving orders. Secretary of the US Navy, John Lehman observed,

What observers often miss is that our support was built from the bottom up rather than the top down. There was no need for a political decision to be taken from on high. The structure of the special relationship ensured that the day the crisis broke, personnel from both countries were already working closely together at all levels. There was, one might say, already water flowing through the pipes. Following the Argentine invasion, all we had to do was to open the spigot.¹³¹⁹

From his perspective as a member of the military policy-establishment, Lehman affirms that the effect of interdependence has been to create a living network of people of all ranks, stating,

when it comes to the U.S. military, the special relationship is nothing less than a functional reality. At every rank and at every level, British and American personnel are inextricably linked on an everyday basis. So when, for example, the Falklands crisis broke, the U.S. Navy already had 50 people on exchange duty at British military headquarters at Northwood. The British, meanwhile, had a substantial presence at Norfolk backed up by the naval staff at the British Embassy.¹³²⁰

4.9 Summary: The Ascendant Anglosphere

By 1956, the outline of the modern Anglosphere was discernible in the security and military arrangements between the five core states. The Ascendant Security Community

¹³¹⁸ Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of Signals Intelligence* (Scarecrow Press, 2012), 84-85.

¹³¹⁹ John F Lehman Jr, "Reflections on the Special Relationship," *Naval History* 26, no. 5 (2012).

¹³²⁰ Ibid.

consisted of a refashioned Commonwealth element linked to the US through revitalised UK-US intelligence arrangements that were facilitated by the strong personal World War 2 relationships between members of the various military policy-establishment and shared threat perceptions.

Between the Suez Crisis and the end of the Cold War, the networks of fora linking the Anglosphere Core members had multiplied and thickened. Just as the Korean War had facilitated the merging of Commonwealth SIGINT efforts alongside those of the US into a quintilateral, so the Vietnam conflict persuaded the US of the merits of Australian and NZ inclusion in the existing tripartite military fora. Nor did other aspects of intelligence collaboration remain static. New quintilateral fora of senior personnel emerged to cooperate on all other aspects of intelligence.




Diagram 5 The Anglosphere Military 'Core' 1957-91

The Cold War period after Suez was remarkable in another aspect too since the practical effects of these military and security-based fora was to extend collaboration beyond the military policy-establishment. As such, it was characterised by prolonged social interaction by lower-ranking personnel from the five Anglosphere Core states in deployment to joint

bases, assignment to working groups, participation in joint operations, attendance at conferences, and collaborative R&D projects involving scientists.

This military interdependence was not necessarily matched by institutional developments involving the political policy-establishment. The bilateral CANUS and UKUS Working Groups established a formalised system of consultation that did not necessarily presage frictionless collaboration.

In terms of mutual support in conflict, the pattern is less clear. The fault line that ran through the Anglosphere Core was the divergent approach to the non-aligned Afro-Asian bloc. The US political policy-establishment attempted to insulate themselves from association with the UK's imperial 'baggage' so as to retain influence with ascendant nationalist leaders in the Afro-Asian bloc. There was therefore a US preference for covert rather than overt collaboration and consultation with the UK. In the same period, US policy in the Indo-Pacific became increasingly putative as they sought to counter the threat of communist advances. Australia and NZ sought to bring themselves within the US orbit. In contrast, Canada, content with its Atlantic tripartite relationships, eschewed any meaningful military role in the Pacific. Instead, it followed a non-combative role whilst still supporting its Anglosphere allies through intelligence and by often pursuing covertly partisan diplomatic positions.

Any hopes that the SEATO arrangements might provide the basis for an inner quadrilateral forum for military and political planning for the four Anglosphere Core members did not materialise. The military and political regional relationships were bifurcated.




Diagram 6 The Anglosphere 'Core' Defence 'Alliances' 1957-91

Indeed, by the close of the Cold War, ANZUS had essentially become a bilateral AUSUS arrangement in respect of formal defence responsibilities. This was complimented by AUSNZUK cooperation in the FPDA and revamped UKUS cooperation in the Gulf.

At first sight, the UKUS Working Groups established appear to have contributed little to the institutionalisation of working relationships between the political policy-establishments. This overlooks their role in facilitating a Canadian willingness to deepen bilateral CANUS fora and provided for the UK to pave the way for AUSNZ participation in UKUS discussions. Whilst the UKUS WG's did not survive long, they do appear to have contributed to what Kissinger referred to instinctive UKUS political policy-maker consultation, which was precisely what the UK hoped would happen. Thus, by the end of the Cold War, the institutions and informal arrangements linking the five Anglosphere Core states had deepened.

Chapter 5 The Mature Anglosphere: 1991-2021

5.1 Introduction

The impetus for the development of the Anglosphere security community after the Cold War has been driven by two different threats: terrorism, and the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Anglospheric core nexus thickened, creating a 'Mature' and more tightly coupled security community. It also displayed synergic qualities — the ability to act cohesively to counter external threats. The terrorist threat placed a premium on intelligence, drawing together the national intelligence agencies in common transnational endeavour to establish a community that included all aspects of intelligence, from SIGINT to GEOINT.

A feature of the post-Cold War period has been the public 'outing' of the Anglospheric core state's spying activities and the coining of the term 'Five Eyes,' as a label. It is derived from an intelligence classification restricting secret document to the core members and was adopted to provide an unofficial shorthand name for the Anglospheric intelligence community. However, it now enjoys a semi-official governmental status as a descriptor for the wider governmental informal institutions Anglospheric security community.

There has been increased and consistent mutual aid in the various conflicts since 9/11. Sometimes this has been open, but often it has been surreptitious, disguised by the participation of embedded personnel from one core state in another's forces, or by the covert deployment of special forces. These mutual endeavours have been self-reinforcing, prompting more collaboration and still denser and more extensive transnational networks.

In terms of these networks, the global War on Terror provided a rationale for the securitisation of socio-economic areas of governmental activity and resulted in a dramatic extension of quintilateral fora beyond the military. These new arrangements serve a similar function to the military fora, providing a semi-formal, institutionalised mechanism for the political policy-establishments to discuss strategies, coordinate responses and establish transnational solutions. All these activities involve increasing numbers of Anglosphere core

staff engaged in transnational activities that now extend beyond the high-ranking policy-establishment. Military and security personnel, public servants and scientists are engaged in joint operations, deployed in joint research, work side by side in joint bases, and are embedded in one another's operations. This has given rise to a conscious expression of communal identity reinforced by their use of the 'Five Eyes' or 'Five Nations' label.

The impetus for still greater collaboration amongst the five core states has been provided by the steady rise of the PRC, perceived as both an economic and military threat to Anglospheric values and interests. This mutually perceived threat has encouraged the deepening of Anglosphere core collaboration with an emphasis on ensuring Anglospheric coordination in the Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. It has seen Canada and the UK adopt an active military regional role and is manifesting itself in stronger bilateral military and diplomatic arrangements within the transnational Anglospheric framework. It has been underlined by the announcement of the AUKUS security pact that further strengthens existing relationships.

These developments have undermined the IR discipline's refusal to address the existence of an Anglospheric security community. A further factor in elevating the very idea of an Anglosphere into a wider public consciousness has been the decision of the UK electorate to leave the EU. The Remain-Leave debate focussed on the UK's place in the world in the future and the possibility of an Anglospheric trajectory. Those elements who favoured the UK remaining in the EU sought to portray the Anglosphere as an unattainable vision rather than an existing set of relationships. Moreover, those same elements suggested 'Leave' supporters were motivated by a wish to join a white, racially construed Anglosphere.

In fact, a close examination of the Brexit decision reveals that it was values, not race, that were uppermost in the mind of the Leave-leaning members of the electorate. So in this respect, the Brexit debate served to illuminate the enduring relevance and potency of the Magna Carta compact, a deep-seated Anglospheric meme-complex that crossed racial boundaries. To those members of the electorate giving credence to the values associated with this 'Myth,' the EU was considered as a flawed [security] community, lacking legitimacy and reliant upon a vanguardist cajoling to ensure allegiance.

In the Adler and Barnett model, the EU security community is discernible by its complex array of institutions. However, when a more orthodox Deutschian lens is applied, the institutions fashioned by the vanguardist elite do not accord with the sentiments of elements of its demos. And nor are they meant to, because their purpose is not to reflect those values but to achieve an objective for a perceived 'greater good.' The result has been to both delegitimise the European project and paralyse the European security community's ability to act in a consistent and meaningful manner on external security matters. The Anglospheric security community is more readily discerned by a diffuse array of partnerships, informal agreements, and personal relationships. These are most evident in its ability to work together in a synergic manner in conflicts and on strategic security policy issues, as examined below.

5.2 Anglosphere at War

5.2.1 Introduction

The conflicts in this period reveal increased levels of Anglospheric mutual aid. The cohesive behaviour of the Anglosphere core was evident in the conflicts preceding the 9/11 attacks and was the start of an emerging pattern of a general willingness to contemplate resolute action. A new pugilistic triangle ranged Australia and the UK alongside the US in a series of military conflicts. These military operations frequently received mutual aid from Canada and NZ, often provided covertly and maintained by public denials of involvement.

The behaviour of the various political policy-establishments is examined in the next section. This section focuses on the practical impact of the conflicts on Anglospheric interoperability. With the onset of these conflicts, the Anglosphere militaries became engaged in intense collaborative tactical and strategic planning, spanning two decades and ongoing. The prosecution of war has involved thousands of military personnel of all ranks working together in joint operations and from joint bases. The interoperability measures that the various quintilateral military fora had developed were now tested in actual combat rather than exercises. This experience informed the direction of new R&D for improved joint command and communication systems, tactics, and weapons. As such, the conflicts have served to accentuate cooperation on the personal level, bringing personnel together in the field and in

R&D projects in pursuit of common objectives and engendering a sense of community. This sense of community began to become more manifest with the eventual adoption of the 'Five Eyes' and 'Five Nations' badges and symbols.

5.2.2 The Gulf War

All five Anglosphere core members participated in the Gulf War with NZ making a determined effort to realign itself with its Anglosphere allies following the ANZUS rift with the US.¹³²¹ The provision of NZ transport aircraft was duly noted and appreciated by the US.¹³²² The Gulf War brought together the US and UK together in a military and diplomatic planning role in the form of joint Working Groups.¹³²³ The Gulf War also leveraged a range of Anglosphere core assets, including SIGINT bases in the UK, Australia, and a joint UK-US base in Oman, to provide intelligence to defence planners and ground operations. The Diego Garcia base was heavily utilised.¹³²⁴ This was a role the base was to perform regularly in the War on Terror Conflicts after 9/11.¹³²⁵ The UK military contribution was significant, standing at 45,000 personnel and it was the only US ally out of a thirty-two member coalition that was included in the detailed military planning.¹³²⁶

Operation Desert Fox in 1998 consisted of four-day UK-US bombing raids on Iraq supported by Canadian personnel operating AWAC coverage.¹³²⁷ Declassified Australian Cabinet documents reveal discussions for AUSCANNZ participation to support the UK-US

¹³²¹ J Mohan Malik, "The Gulf War: Australia's Role and Asian-Pacific Responses," *Canberra Papers on Strategy & Defence* (1992): 91.

¹³²² Desmond Bell, *The Intelligence War in the Gulf*, Canberra Papers on Strategy & Defence. (Canberra: Strategic Studies & Defence Centre, 1991), 6&36.; Dora Alves, "US-New Zealand Relations: The National Government of New Zealand," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 11 (1991): 1075-78.

¹³²³ Richard A Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (Simon and Schuster, 2008), 65 & 160.

¹³²⁴ Richard Stewart, *War in the Persian Gulf* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 2010).

¹³²⁵ Marc Robbins, Patricia Boren, and Kristin Leuschner, "The Strategic Distribution System in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom," (Santa Monica CA: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2004), XII.

¹³²⁶ Peter De la Billiere, *Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War* (HarperCollins, 1996), 39-40.

¹³²⁷ Canada.ca, "Operation Southern Watch," *Canada.ca* (2018), <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/middle-east/iraq-1992.html>.

operations in the event of Saddam Hussein not backing down.¹³²⁸ It stood in marked contrast to the lack of action by European allies.

5.2.3 War on Terror participation: Afghanistan

The terror attack on the Pentagon and the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 produced an outpouring of sympathy for the US from across the world, but did not always translate to military assistance. The post-9/11 period represents elevated and sustained Anglosphere core collaboration in conflict.

In the Afghanistan War, the Anglosphere core showed solidarity with the US in the two phases of the Afghanistan conflict; the invasion and the occupation. The invasion phase was a US-led Anglosphere affair.¹³²⁹ In the first phase of the Afghan Conflict, the Anglosphere core states took a robust line. Within two days of the 9/11 senior UK military and intelligence personnel arrived in Washington, including Sir Richard Dearlove SIS Head and No.10 Foreign Policy Advisor.¹³³⁰ A team of forty UK military personnel were already embedded in US CENTCOM, Florida, working on the Iraqi No-Fly Zones since 9/11.¹³³¹ Similarly, the Canadian National Command Element was integrated into CENTCOM.¹³³²

The operation was joined by an Australian contingent headed by a high ranking former Special Forces Brigadier and Senior Officer in the ABCA Armies structure.¹³³³ This was a significant development from the Australian perspective. As discussed in chapter 4, Australia had felt frustration at the lack of US consultation and planning in the South Pacific during the 1960s. Neither SEATO nor ANZUS had developed command and strategic planning

¹³²⁸ Max Blenkin, "Australia Prepared for War in 1998," *Canberra Times*, January 1 2020.

¹³²⁹ Michael R. Gordon, "The Allies: Britain Allots Troops for Afghan Ground Combat, and Australia Is Contributing," *NY Times*, October 27 2001.

¹³³⁰ General Reith, Sir John, "Oral Evidence" *Iraq Inquiry* (2010), <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100518073935/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/100115.aspx#reith>.

¹³³¹ House of Commons Library. (Hereafter HCL) "Lessons of Iraq." March 16, 2004, House of Commons Defence Committee. Third Report of Session 2003–04, HC 57. 32

¹³³² Nancy Teeple, "Canada in Afghanistan: 2001-2010. A Military Chronology," (Ottawa: Defence Research & Development, 2010), 6.

¹³³³ HCL. "Operation Enduring Freedom and the Conflict in Afghanistan." In Research Paper 01/81, edited by International Affairs & Defence Section. London: House of Commons Library, 2001. 31; Tony Wright, "The Road to War," *The Bulletin (Sydney)* (2003).

functions. After 9/11 and Australia's supportive stand, Defence Minister Robert Hill claimed the situation had been transformed. "Australia had joined the inner circle" of the US and UK,

we were given access to American military thinking and planning and we were able to comment, provide ideas and contribute critical judgments at a level that had never occurred previously.¹³³⁴

With the invoking of Article 5 of NATO agreement, Canada said it would support the US invasion with land, sea and air forces and launched Operation Apollo run from CENTCOM.¹³³⁵ NZ's contribution was more modest reflecting its military capacity, but included the offer of Special Forces.¹³³⁶ During the invasion phase, special forces from all five Anglosphere states were committed, and in case of Canada, was allegedly without the knowledge of the Prime Minister.¹³³⁷

The complexities of running a massive military operation consisting of different armed services from different states can be challenging. However, the Anglosphere states had high levels of interoperability, in terms of weaponry, doctrine and, not least, long-standing personal relationships in command positions. The role of the Anglosphere core military forces in ensuring this level of interoperability was critical. This included the work of the CCEB on the net centric command systems that would allow the Anglosphere allies to function effectively. Any breakdowns in military interoperability became the basis of ongoing evaluation and subsequent corrective measures.¹³³⁸

After the invasion, the Anglosphere forces were complemented by NATO forces to assist in terrorist suppression and support the new Afghan government. However in 2021, a political breakdown of an entirely different order occurred between the US and its allies. It was caused by the implementation of the 2020 Doha Agreement between the US and the

¹³³⁴ Ibid.

¹³³⁵ Canada. Parliament. HC. Standing Committee on National Defence. "Canadian Forces in Afghanistan." 2007. 42. HCL. "Operation Enduring Freedom and the Conflict in Afghanistan." October 31, 2001. Research Paper 01/81, edited by International Affairs & Defence Section. 2001. 31 <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP01-81/RP01-81.pdf>

¹³³⁶ NZPD. Helen Clarke [PM] "Terrorist Attacks - NZ Response," September 18, 2001. First Session, 46th Parliament NZHR, Hansard Vol 595.

¹³³⁷ Sean M Maloney, *Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan* (Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 49.

Taliban. The manner of implementation suggests to a US indifference to the plight of all its allies. However a close examination of the facts reveals a more nuanced story and the importance of that must be attached to the role of key individuals at what Deutsch terms 'critical junctures.'

The first point to highlight is the Doha Agreement did not involve US NATO allies or Australia because their deployment of combat troops was non-existent or negligible. In 2014 US forces remained in place but all the other allied NATO and Australian combat troops departed, following France who had pulled out in 2012.¹³³⁹ Residual non-combative troops remained to assist in training and administration known as "Resolute Support."¹³⁴⁰ The UK Prime Minister David Cameron overruled his Chief of Defence, withdrew the bulk of British combat forces and ended UK drone strikes. However, in contrast to other allies, the UK did retain a combat battalion in Kabul to provide armed transport for other non-combat NATO personnel.¹³⁴¹

This meant the vast burden of combat operations to support Afghan armed forces combat operations was carried by the US alone. In February 2020, the Doha Agreement was concluded by the Trump Administration as a means of the US exiting its combat forces whilst attempting to ensure the Afghan Government could maintain its own security. This meant the security of non-combative NATO, EU and other non-governmental personnel assisting in the construction of a civil society in Afghanistan would no longer be protected by US combat forces. The agreed target for withdrawal of May 2021 was dependent on Taliban progress, agreeing that

¹³³⁸ Paul T Mitchell, "Networks in the Coalition Environment," *The Adelphi Papers* 46, no. 385 (2006): 55.

¹³³⁹ "First Wave of French Soldiers Leave Afghanistan," *France 24 News* (2011), <https://www.france24.com/en/20111019-france-begins-troop-withdrawal-200-soldiers-head-home-afghanistan>; Stephen Erlanger and Rod Norland, "France, Breaking with NATO, Will Speed Afghan Exit," *NY Times* (2012); Laura Smith-Spark, "France Pulls Last Troops from Combat Roles in Afghanistan

Cnn," *CNN World News* (2012), <https://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/15/world/asia/afghanistan-france-troops/index.html>.

¹³⁴⁰ Judith Ireland, "Withdrawal from Afghanistan 'by 2014,'" *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 14 2012; "Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (2015-2021)," *NATO e-library* (2021), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm.

¹³⁴¹ Ben Barry, *Blood, Metal and Dust: How Victory Turned into Defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 452.

the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire [along with] the completion and agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan.¹³⁴²

The US stressed that “the pace of removal for American troops stationed in Afghanistan is conditions based and will depend on how well the Taliban comply with the commitments they have made.”¹³⁴³

That NATO was excluded from this process is not entirely surprising given the US perspective its European allies were not serious about defence in Afghanistan or in Europe. As a consequence Brigadier Ben Barry asserted UK (and NATO) “military influence over US military decision-making was very limited.”¹³⁴⁴ His colleague, Jack Watling at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, agreed stating

I do not think that we had many options in terms of influencing the US. They were putting in the vast majority of the enablers to sustain our presence in Afghanistan and were clear about what their interests demanded.¹³⁴⁵

The UK might have expected to have more influence given that the UK alone had responded positively to a 2019 US for assistance. The UK had agreed to contribute to a new “counterterrorism force to continue dismantling terrorist groups...” as the US drew down its own forces.¹³⁴⁶ During the course of 2019, the UK became more invested in Afghanistan with around 1000 special forces engaged in combat operations and calling in US drone strikes.¹³⁴⁷ The Trump Administration’s determination to reduce force levels occurred without all

¹³⁴² “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan.” February 29, 2020 US State Department. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf>

¹³⁴³ “President Donald J. Trump Is Taking A Historic Step To Achieve Peace In Afghanistan And Bring Our Troops Home.” February 29, 2020, Press ‘Fact Sheet’ Briefing Room, Whitehouse. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-taking-historic-step-achieve-peace-afghanistan-bring-troops-home/>

¹³⁴⁴ Ben Barry, Brigadier (ret), Oral evidence: “Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” November 16, 2021. Defence Committee. HC 699 Q102.

<https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/3037/pdf/>

¹³⁴⁵ Jack Watling (Dr), Royal United Services Institute. Oral evidence: “Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” November 16, 2021. Defence Committee. HC 699 Q102.

¹³⁴⁶ Ibid. ‘Fact Sheet’ Briefing Room, Whitehouse. February 29, 2020

¹³⁴⁷ Kim Sengupta, “British Special Forces Expected to Step into Counter-Terrorism Vacuum after US Pulls out of Afghanistan,” *The Independent*, March 15 2019; Simon Osborne, “Elite British Troops Fight Off 100 ISIS Jihadis in Six-Hour Gun Battle after Ambush,” *Daily Express*, July 8 2019.

conditions being met and stood at 2,500 by January 2021.¹³⁴⁸ By January 2021, there was clear evidence that these roadmap conditions had not been met in respect to the Taliban's extensive links with Al-Qaeda.¹³⁴⁹

With substantial special forces engaged and concerned at a calamitous Afghan collapse, the UK felt the drawdown decisions were ignoring the Taliban's failure to meet the conditions. Consequently, the UK Defence Secretary made repeated attempts to raise their concerns with US Secretary of Defence Mark Esper in the Trump Administration and Lloyd Austin, Biden's Secretary of Defence.¹³⁵⁰

The Biden Administration postponed the May 2021 date for the withdrawal of all forces, but then announced a total drawdown would commence on May 1, 2021 without the Taliban meeting the agreed conditions.¹³⁵¹ September 11, 2021 was announced as the deadline for complete withdrawal.¹³⁵² It was a date of no military relevance in itself, but by sign-posting a retreat, it resulted in an immediate de-stabilisation. On hearing the announcement, the UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, remarked, "the game is up."¹³⁵³ He informed the House of Commons of the UK's various attempts to influence US decision-making.

The timetables, again, were often under review. Originally under the Trump Administration there were conditions. The conditions were supposed to help set the timetable. If the conditions were not met, the timetable would slow up or speed up.

¹³⁴⁸ "Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq." Press Statement, November 17, 2020, Pentagon.

<https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2418641/acting-secretary-miller-announces-troop-levels-in-afghanistan-and-iraq/>

¹³⁴⁹ Gregory Sullivan (Office of Inspector General) to Dept Defense. "*Operation Inherent Resolve.*" January 4, 2021. Treasury, Washington, D.C. <https://oig.treasury.gov/sites/oig/files/2021-01/OIG-CA-21-012.pdf>

¹³⁵⁰ Ben Wallace MP, Secretary of State for Defence, Oral evidence: "Withdrawal from Afghanistan," October 26, 2021. Defence Committee. HC 699 Q1-101 [.https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/2901/pdf/](https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/2901/pdf/)

¹³⁵¹ Rebecca Kheel, "Pentagon: Taliban Has 'Not Met Their Commitments' under Withdrawal Deal," *The Hill* (2021), <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/536385-pentagon-taliban-has-not-met-their-commitments-under-withdrawal-deal>.

¹³⁵² "Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan." April 14, 2021, Speeches & Remarks. Briefing Room, Whitehouse

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-b>

¹³⁵³ Ben Wallace MP, Secretary of State for Defence, Oral evidence: "Withdrawal from Afghanistan," October 26, 2021. Defence Committee. HC 699 Q47

The conditions were then removed by the new Administration, and that again changed the timetables.¹³⁵⁴

The announcement of an end-date combined with a withdrawal of military assets ahead of other personnel resulted in the rapid collapse of Afghan forces and the Afghan government, followed by a chaotic Saigon-style evacuation for remaining NATO forces, under the supervision US and UK combat forces holding the airport in Kabul.¹³⁵⁵

The failure of the UK to effect a change of heart was held up as an example of the UK's lack of influence. In reality, the lack of UK (and NATO) influence was no more or less than that of US policy-makers. The UK Defence Minister's views had not been dismissed by his counterparts. A leak revealed Esper had warned Trump not to pull out troops and was promptly sacked by Trump and the Pentagon 'purged' of opponents.¹³⁵⁶ Austin was equally unsuccessful in convincing Biden.¹³⁵⁷ Nor these concerns confined to the military, a leak to the Wall Street Journal revealed State Department officials utilised the confidential 'dissent cable' mechanism in early July 2021 to warn Secretary of State Anthony Blinken of the impending disaster.¹³⁵⁸ Biden received similar warnings from the CIA and the JCS.¹³⁵⁹

¹³⁵⁴ Ben Wallace MP, Secretary of State for Defence, Oral evidence: "Withdrawal from Afghanistan," October 26, 2021. Defence Committee. HC 699 Q27

¹³⁵⁵ Gwythian Prins, "General Elphinstone's Return: Biden's Appalling Mistake." *Briefings for Britain*. August 20, 2021

¹³⁵⁶ Dan Lamothe, "Defense Secretary Sent Classified Memo to White House About Afghanistan before Trump Fired Him," *Washington Post*, November 14 2020; Jack Deutsch, "Pentagon Purges Leading Advisors from Defense Policy Board," *Foreign Policy* (2020), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/25/pentagon-purges-leading-advisors-from-defense-policy-board/>; Jennifer Steinhauer, "Trump Pentagon Purge Could Accelerate His Goal to Pull Troops from Afghanistan," *NY Times*, November 27 2020.

¹³⁵⁷ Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, and David E Sanger, "Debating Exit from Afghanistan, Biden Rejected Generals' Views," *ibid.*, April 23 2021.

¹³⁵⁸ Vivian Salama, "Internal State Department Cable Warned of Kabul Collapse" *Wall Street Journal*, August 19 2021.

¹³⁵⁹ Mark Mazzetti, Julian E Barnes, and Adam Goldman, "Intelligence Warned of Afghan Military Collapse, Despite Biden's Assurances," *NY Times*, August 17 2021. & Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, "Military Officials Say They Urged Biden against Afghanistan Withdrawal," *ibid.*, September 28.

No person, institution or ally could stop the President's "gut decision" of setting the 9/11 anniversary as the target date rather than being predicated on the security situation.¹³⁶⁰ The point was made by the BBC's Jon Sopel.

America acted unilaterally over Afghanistan - actually maybe that should be Joe Biden acted unilaterally. The administration was not much interested in what the UK thought. Mr Biden, from what I have been told, was not much interested in the red flags being raised by his intel community and military top brass, or by the warnings delivered from London. He wanted out.¹³⁶¹

In the UK there was a flurry of articles announcing the death of the 'special relationship', usually accompanied by linking the situation to Brexit in celebratory confirmation that the UK now had no friends. Thus, Ian Buruma, who saw in Brexit "real fascist rhetoric creeping back into the mainstream", felt confident enough to conclude the Afghan debacle exposed "the fantasy" of a global Britain, that believed,

...unchained from Brussels, Anglo-Saxon freedom would rule once more. Then the U.S. president refused to take his [Boris Johnson'] call.¹³⁶²

What Buruma failed to notice was that Brussels too, had not only been ignored, but was incapable of rising to the occasion, demonstrating again its hemiplegic nature. The UK was willing; the EU was irresolute, as were its member states. Ben Wallace informed the Commons.

We tried a number of like-minded nations. Some said they were keen, but their parliaments weren't. It became apparent pretty quickly that without the United States as the framework nation it had been, these options were closed off.¹³⁶³

¹³⁶⁰ Kevin Liptak et al., "A 'Gut Decision': Inside Biden's Defense of Afghanistan Withdrawal Amid Warnings of Country's Collapse," *CNN* (2021), <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/07/02/politics/afghanistan-biden-withdrawal-security/index.html>.

¹³⁶¹ Jon Sopel, "Afghanistan: US Decision to Withdraw Lays Bare a Not So Special Relationship," *BBC News* (2021), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-58300984>.

¹³⁶² Ian Buruma, "Britain's Special Relationship Fantasy Has Been Exposed: For Years, London Convinced Itself It Was Washington's Close Partner. That's Now Impossible to Believe.," *Foreign Policy* (2021), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/13/britains-special-relationship-fantasy-has-been-exposed/>.

¹³⁶³ Mark Nichol, "Afghanistan Betrayed by NATO's Retreat: Defence Secretary Claims Western Allies Snubbed British Plea to Stay on after US Withdrawal...," *Daily Mail*, August 8 2021.

The EU's serial paralysis did not to deflect those of a pro-European mindset. They adopted phraseology more applicable to the unrealised ambitions of the EU. The FT referred to the "Hollowness of Global Britain" and New Statesman referred to "delusions of Grandeur."¹³⁶⁴ Lord Ricketts former UK Ambassador to France and anti-Brexit announced Britain was now "a ship adrift without a compass."¹³⁶⁵ In fact, the EU security community was more a flotilla adrift and directed by competing national compasses. Not to be deterred, the *Economist* declared the UK needed to turn back to the EU since the US transatlantic link with UK had been downgraded because the US had pivoted its attention to Asia.¹³⁶⁶

Within weeks of these comments, a new tripartite security arrangement – AUKUS – was announced. This security partnership between the US, the UK and Australia confounded the narrative of a UK adrift. Buruma, who just a week earlier had mocked the UK, was suitably annoyed at having been confounded so quickly and suggested maybe de Gaulle was correct about "les Anglo-saxons."¹³⁶⁷

The announcement of AUKUS should not detract from the Biden-led debacle and its strategic importance. In giving testimony to the UK House of Commons, General Petraeus declared it was "a strategic failure." And especially unfortunate at a time when we most want to show our allies and partners around the world that we are a dependable partner...¹³⁶⁸ However, Petraeus sought to put the withdrawal in context as unusual and observed, the Afghanistan decision,

was the result of a conviction formed at the very highest level of our Government some years ago that this was not worth continuing; in that respect, this is a bit of an isolated situation, if you examine it. But, again, the onus is on us to disprove the

¹³⁶⁴ Robert Shrimley, "Afghanistan Fiasco Shows the Hollowness of Global Britain," *FT*, August 18 2021; Peter Ricketts, "The Afghanistan Crisis Has Exposed Global Britain's Delusions of Grandeur," *New Statesman*, August 21 2021.

¹³⁶⁵ Lord Peter Ricketts, "Special Relationship? Afghanistan Has Revealed How Irrelevant the UK Has Become

," *Guardian*, September 3 2021.

¹³⁶⁶ "The Afghanistan Debacle Has Weakened Ties between Britain and America," *Economist* 2021.

¹³⁶⁷ Ian Buruma, "Les Anglo-Saxons," *Orissa Post* (2021), <https://www.orissapost.com/les-anglo-saxons/>.

¹³⁶⁸ David Petraeus (General).

Oral evidence: "Withdrawal from Afghanistan," November, 23, 2021, Defence Committee. HC 699 Q193

<https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/3053/pdf/>

notion that we are not a dependable partner when it comes to issues that really matter.¹³⁶⁹

In that context, Petraeus pointed to the positioning of the US to counter Russia and the PRC as evidence of US willpower to work with allies going forwards.¹³⁷⁰ Nevertheless, there was a distinct feeling in the UK that the US had proved itself unreliable.¹³⁷¹ In the context of the security community thinking, this is evidence again of the dramatic influence a key individual can have on events. This incident was not evidence of any fundamental breach in relationships within the Anglospheric security community. On the contrary, it seems certain that the vast majority of the Anglospheric policy making establishments would be at one in believing Biden's decision to have been catastrophically inept.

5.2.4 War on Terror participation: Iraq

As with the invasion of Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq was primarily an AUSUKUS operation dominated by the US.¹³⁷² A team of forty UK military personnel already worked in CENTCOM HQ headed by General David Wilson, who had served in Kosovo with the US. The personal relationships between the UK-US military policy-establishments were extremely strong. General Sir John Reith, the UK Chief of Operations, had worked with the US Commander Tommy Franks in the Gulf War. Reith's explanation of the nature of the relationship to the Chilcot Inquiry highlights the importance of the social 'glue' as the basis of mutual trust and the role of the UK:

...the Americans very much work on, who they know, do they trust somebody, is he of the right calibre for them to work with. So I forged quite a good relationship with him, and, in fact, he jokingly used to call me his deputy commander and I was very much seen by the Americans as the UK's global combatant commander.¹³⁷³

¹³⁶⁹ Ibid. David Petraeus Q199

¹³⁷⁰ <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf>

¹³⁷¹ Mark Francois MP Oral evidence: "Withdrawal from Afghanistan," November 16, 2021, Defence Committee. HC 699 Q126

¹³⁷² Denmark & Poland agreed to send non-combat troops who arrived towards the end of the invasion. See: Barbie Dutter, "Coalition of 45 Is Claimed as Aussies Join Up," *Daily Telegraph*, March 19 2003.

¹³⁷³ Reith.

A UK military contingent was assumed from the outset, with the UK allocated specific invasion objectives.¹³⁷⁴ The Australian team headed by Gillespie that had been in place for the Afghan invasion was reconstituted and sent back to CENTCOM to participate in the planning.¹³⁷⁵ The Australians had firmly established themselves as trusted allies within the Anglospheric security community.

For domestic public opinion reasons, the Canadian Government publicly announced they would not participate in the invasion of Iraq. In an article debunking Canada's supposed non-participation, the Canadian current affairs publication, *Macleans* asserted,

From the very first days of the U.S.-led Iraq war, Canadians have been deeply involved: setting up crime-fighting units, working as engineers with coalition forces, serving with the UN, flying planes that help guide missile attacks, even fighting.¹³⁷⁶

Canadian involvement was disguised under cover of the ongoing Afghan Operation Enduring Freedom deployment.¹³⁷⁷ Canadian Commodore, Roger Girouard was placed in command of all allied Task Force ships and given responsibility for escorting the US led naval invasion force through the Straits.¹³⁷⁸ Help "at the margins" also involved the continued deployment of Canadian exchange personnel serving in the Australian, UK and US militaries including senior Canadian officers serving on the invasion planning group based in Kuwait. After the invasion, more Canadian military personnel participated in the conflict. Canadian Generals served as senior commanders from 2003 onwards and in periods when Canada was not officially involved.¹³⁷⁹ This included General Walt Natynczyk who received the Canadian

¹³⁷⁴ Ibid. "Oral Evidence Sir Richard Dearing - Private Hearing, June 16, 2010." 42-44

¹³⁷⁵ John Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 214.

¹³⁷⁶ Colin Campbell, "A Dedicated Presence in Iraq," *MacLean's Magazine*, 29 May 2006, 26.

¹³⁷⁷ Wikileaks, "Canada Won't Join Military Action against Iraq without Another UNSC Resolution - 2003 March 17 [US Cable]," *Public Library of US Diplomacy* (2003), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03OTTAWA747_a.html.

¹³⁷⁸ Paul Koring and Daniel Leblanc, "Canadian Will Run Persian Gulf Naval Task Force," *Globe & Mail*, February 11 2003.

¹³⁷⁹ Generals Walt Natynczyk, Peter Devlin, Nicolas Matern

Meritorious Service Cross for “a pivotal role” and a “tremendous contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom.”¹³⁸⁰

NZ adopted a similar tactic to Canada, continuing to operate military assets under the Afghan Enduring Freedom ‘banner.’ Aside from existing naval assets in the theatre, NZ committed its Orion spy plane.¹³⁸¹ NZ contributions continued under the Phase 2 Iraqi operation usually attached to UK or Australian units, during which the UK Defence Secretary appealed for NZ Training support as part of a mission “to be led by English-speaking nations.” He added,

We work well together. We've got good operability. It makes it less complicated... Frankly, we've got used to New Zealand being there alongside us, alongside the US, the UK, Australia, as part of the family.¹³⁸²

In the post-invasion phase, and once there were appropriate NATO and UN mandates, all Anglosphere core forces were involved in Iraq.¹³⁸³ By 2003 there appeared to be a clear ranking of all the multinational allies within the wider coalition. An analysis of coalition cooperation concluded there was

a series of concentric circles of access, with the US at the centre position. The UK occupied the circle closest to the US, followed by other ‘anglo-sphere’ nations, other NATO states, and then the rest of the coalition.¹³⁸⁴

5.2.5 War on Terror: interoperability and relationships

¹³⁸⁰ Canada. Gov. General. "Lieutenant-General Walter J. Natynczyk - Meritorious Service Cross." (2005). Published electronically October 27. <https://www.gg.ca/en/honours/recipients/139-277>.

¹³⁸¹ "Orion to Boost Nz's Effort in War on Terror," *NZ Herald*, March 6 2003.

¹³⁸² Audrey Young, "NZ Asked by Britain to Send 100 Soldiers to Help Train Iraqis," *ibid.*, February 4 2015.

¹³⁸³ For Canada: Bruce Campion-Smith, "Canadian Soldiers in ‘Substantial’ Clashes with Daesh, General Says," *Star*, November 17 2016. For NZ: Henry Cooke, "New Zealand Extends Iraq and Afghanistan Deployments," *NZ Stuff* (2018), <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/107149082/new-zealand-extends-iraq-and-afghanistan-deployments>.

¹³⁸⁴ Mitchell, 60.

Another feature of the War on Terror conflicts has been the large-scale participation of military personnel on exchange programmes with the US-UK militaries in combat operations. Canada, supposedly not involved, sanctioned the involvement of 100 plus military personnel to be engaged in combat operations.¹³⁸⁵ According to allegations in the NZ House of Representatives, there is a continent of NZ SAS integrated in the UK SAS on a permanent 'training' basis.¹³⁸⁶ In terms of military command operations, Canadian and UK Task force HQ's were collocated with US CENTCOM HQ in Florida.¹³⁸⁷ Australia had liaison officers and embedded officers in CENTCOM and the Pentagon. The allied decision to utilise NATO for the post-invasion pacifying operations in Afghanistan and Iraq presented something of a problem for Australia, which found itself making ad hoc arrangements with Brussels based command structures. This provided the impetus for the future integration of Australia (2013) and NZ¹³⁸⁸ (2012) into NATO via individual agreements as 'Strategic Partners.'¹³⁸⁹ Australia and NZ now had two routes into NATO; the Anglosphere military fora that established interoperability standards adopted by NATO, and subsequently inclusion on planning aspects by virtue of Strategic Partner status.

The lessons of Afghanistan resulted in improved interoperability ensuring, "advances in synchronicity, simultaneity, speed, 'jointness', and combined arms all interacted to give the United States, Britain, Australia and the other members of the Coalition the equivalent of 'decisive force,' for the Iraqi conflict."¹³⁹⁰

The Afghan and Iraqi conflicts also acted as a catalyst for greater integration of intelligence systems to ensure more effective strategic and tactical decision-making and tracking. The embedding of intelligence staff during these conflicts was and remains

¹³⁸⁵ Canada. Parliament. HC. Standing Committee on National Defence. "Canadian Forces in Afghanistan." 2007. *Ibid.* 42

¹³⁸⁶ NZPD Richard Prebble, "Request Debate on SAS." October 2, 2001. NZHR, Hansard. Vol 595 2, 443-447.

¹³⁸⁷ Benjamin S Lambeth, *Air Power against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom* (Rand Corporation, 2001), 118.

¹³⁸⁸ NATO, "Relations with Australia," *NATO - Topics* (2020), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48899.htm; "Relations with New Zealand," *NATO - Topics* (2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52347.htm.

¹³⁸⁹ Australian Gov, Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia's Whole of Government Mission (Canberra: Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2016).

¹³⁹⁰ Anthony H Cordesman, *The "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War: Main Report* (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2003), 146.

widespread.¹³⁹¹ In addition to these activities, the US and UK became joined in drone strike activity, working from joint bases in the UK and the US. RAF personnel operate Reaper drones from the Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. There have been UK-US drone attacks in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. An MoU between the US and UK gives each the authority to operate each other's drones. The level of interoperability is such that UK drone operators can handover to a US operator mid-flight and vice versa. The intelligence for drone strikes is regularly provided by the Five Eyes SIGINT operations. In addition, unmanned drones feed back intelligence to the Five Eyes intelligence agencies.¹³⁹² Thus although, for example, Canada was not actually manning drones, Canadian assets were being used to provide the intelligence for drone strikes.¹³⁹³

The conflicts have also driven the research and development agenda of the various military and technical Anglosphere core security community fora. Battlefield conditions demonstrated that not all intelligence systems of member states were compatible with national or transnational Anglosphere core systems, revealing the need for a so-called 'Netcentric solution' and the need for 'jointness' for the Anglosphere core forces.¹³⁹⁴

The War on Terror created and extended Anglospheric security community's military interaction, intensifying feelings of fellowship through common endeavours. Throughout this period, senior officers were embedded in one another's services and would, unless explicitly barred, serve and command in these conflict situations.¹³⁹⁵ Of critical importance, both to military effectiveness and the concept of a 'living' security community, is the social aspect of interoperability. Air Commodore Chris Westwood of the Royal Australian Air Force makes the point.

When people talk interoperability, they often think immediately about the technical interoperability, but personally I think the technical interoperability is actually the

¹³⁹¹ For example see: Blaxland, 209.

¹³⁹² HCL. UK. "The UK's Use of Armed Drones." All Party Parliamentary Group on Drones Inquiry Report. July 6th, 2018.

¹³⁹³ Mathew Fisher, "Canada's Involvement in Drone Warfare Is Nothing New," *National Post*, June 14 2017.

¹³⁹⁴ Anthony H Cordesman, *The Intelligence Lessons of the Iraq War (S)* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 14-15 & 35.

¹³⁹⁵ Blaxland, 12.

easy part... It's the human side of interoperability which is the most important... It's about technology, it's about doctrine, but most of all, it is about relationships.¹³⁹⁶

This is a point made by Paul Mitchell's research into Anglosphere command and communications systems during naval operations during conflict in the Gulf. Mitchell refers to the 'human loop' stressing, "the human element was often decisive in making the growing electronic environment effective."¹³⁹⁷

The impact of ongoing joint operations in battle conditions has been to strengthen the social glue to include not just high-ranking policy-makers but rank-and-file personnel too. The pursuit of interoperability and its test in combat has created trust, cohesion and common identity. The social implications of interoperability during Operation Iraqi Freedom are explored in detail by Steven Paget, who stresses the importance of "human and cultural factors" as "glue" that ensured the Australian, UK and US navies were able to operate together.¹³⁹⁸

The level of military interaction is, of course, not restricted to participation in conflicts and joint exercises but is also reflected postings to joint bases, military missions in one another's capitals and working on joint projects. So, for example, the numbers of UK military personnel posted to the US is sufficiently large to justify having its own "UK Military and Defence Staff in the US" support facilities¹³⁹⁹. This includes provision for families and a twitter feed for communication.¹⁴⁰⁰ A cursory glance at internal military newsletters affirms the strong social bonds and 'we-ness' engendered by these postings and exchanges.¹⁴⁰¹

¹³⁹⁶ Ben Sakrisson, "RIMPAC Air Commander: "Relationships Are Key to Interoperability", "PACOM News" (2014), <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/Article/564376/rimpac-air-commander-relationships-are-key-to-interoperability/>.

¹³⁹⁷ Mitchell, 65.

¹³⁹⁸ Steven Paget, "Mind over Matter? Multinational Naval Interoperability During Operation Iraqi Freedom," *Defense & Security Analysis* 36, no. 1 (2020): 65-85.

¹³⁹⁹ "British Defence Staff United States Information Portal." MOD. <https://www.bdsus.info/>. Accessed 20/9/2020

¹⁴⁰⁰ "UK Military & Defence Staff in US UK Armed Forces & Defence Staff Standing Alongside Our US Counterparts: Working/Training/Fighting/Tweeting Together. @Ukdefus." <https://twitter.com/ukdefus?lang=en>.

¹⁴⁰¹ Santa Gurung, "Exercise Anzac Reflect," *The Wire*, August 2015, 43.

5.3. The 'Five Eyes' Military Fora Community

5.3.1 Introduction

This section provides a brief overview of the evolution of the military fora that had originally started off as bilateral UK-US or tripartite CANUKUS institutions. The post-Cold War conflicts and in particular the War on Terror had accelerated the development of these fora so that by 2018 they were all fully quintilateral. There was not only a deepening of existing military fora but an expansion to address military functions not covered by the existing institutions. In examining these developments, this section seeks to provide an oversight of the status of each of the fora and provide a brief overview of their function and structure by way of illustrating the growing sense of 'we-ness' involving ever-increasing numbers of personnel.

An additional important feature has been the formation of new, bilateral defence arrangements between the Anglosphere core members reflecting deepening relationships within the security community. In contrast to the previous period examined between 1957 and 1991, the post-millennium period has seen the UK and Canada increase their presence in the Pacific region largely in response to the threat represented by the PRC.

5.3.2 Anglosphere core bilateral defence strengthening

An overview of bilateral arrangements between the individual Anglosphere core members reveals a general 'firming up' on aspects of defence related collaboration. All five Anglosphere core members participate in regular exercises hosted by Canada.¹⁴⁰² There is a pronounced Antipodean emphasis to new arrangements. In November 2011 the US declared it would seek to play a larger role in the Pacific and announced new arrangements with Australia to further align the two state's militaries.¹⁴⁰³ This culminated in a 'Joint Posture

¹⁴⁰² Third parties are sometimes invited. See: David Pugliese, "5,000 Soldiers from Petawawa, the U.S., Australia, UK and NZ to Begin Major Exercise," *Ottawa Citizen*, May 12 2017.

¹⁴⁰³ Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament" (paper presented at the Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, November 17 2011).

Agreement' constituting an over-arching framework for still deeper ties, covering missile, US Marine and naval deployments to new Australian bases.¹⁴⁰⁴

The reinvigorated AUS-US relationship was symptomatic of a series of other Anglosphere core bilateral agreements already in play. Of prime importance was the resurrection of the UK-US 'Combined Chiefs of Staff' in 2012, signalling a return to more coordinated UK-US military planning in non-NATO areas.¹⁴⁰⁵ It was the absence of such high-level military planning fora that contributed to UK-US dysfunction in SE Asia during the Cold War period.

The UK's renewed role in the Pacific is reflected in new institutional arrangements, including the AUKMIN (ministerial forum) and a new AUS-UK Defence and Security Agreement that provides a new collaborative framework.¹⁴⁰⁶ This Defence Treaty seeks to build upon joint participation in existing Anglospheric arrangements including FPDA, the military fora, Five Eyes intelligence, research and exercises.¹⁴⁰⁷ The Treaty steps up the existing annual (Exercise Long Look) exchange of military personnel between the UK, Australia and NZ.¹⁴⁰⁸ The 2013 AUS-UK Defence Treaty also hinted at a deeper relationship in respect of shared development of advanced military equipment.¹⁴⁰⁹ Thus, in 2020 Australia and the UK announced an MoU to jointly build and develop the next generation of AUSUK navies frigates.¹⁴¹⁰

¹⁴⁰⁴ See: James Brown, "Australia-US Defence Deal: What It Means," *theinterpreter* (2014), <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-us-defence-deal-what-it-means>. Julia Gillard, "Australia-United States Force Posture Initiatives - Dept of Prime Minister & Cabinet," news release, November 19, 2011, <https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-18272>. Mark E Manyin et al., "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's Rebalancing toward Asia" (2012).

¹⁴⁰⁵ "UK and US Service Chiefs Discuss Future Strategic Challenges," *Gov.uk News* (2013), <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-service-chiefs-discuss-future-strategic-challenges>.

¹⁴⁰⁶ See: Tim Huxley, "The UK Embraces an Expansive Impulse in International Security," *The Interpreter* (2017), <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/more-precision-required-australia-uk-defence-cooperation>.

¹⁴⁰⁷ UK-Australia Defence & Security Treaty, (January 18 2013), Article 2.

¹⁴⁰⁸ "RMAF Base Butterworth," *AirForce* (2019), <https://www.airforce.gov.au/about-us/bases/overseas/rmaf-base-butterworth>.

¹⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.* UK-Australia Defence & Security Treaty

¹⁴¹⁰ Stephen Kuper, "Australia - UK to Co-Operate on Frigate Programs," *Defence Connect* (2020), <https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/maritime-antisub/7047-australia-uk-to-cooperate-on-frigate-programs>.

5.3.3 Anglosphere core trilateral defence strengthening

The UK has acted in concert with the US and Australia, moving to reassert its presence in the region and envisages using facilities in Singapore, Brunei and Australia to accommodate US and UK aircraft carriers and establish bases for AUSUKUS expeditionary strike groups.¹⁴¹¹ Construction and expansion of such bases are underway in Darwin to accommodate the Anglospheric security community's Indo-Pacific projection.¹⁴¹²

On September 15, 2021, these ties were reinforced by announcement of an "enhanced trilateral security partnership" styled 'AUKUS', between Australia, UK, and the US.¹⁴¹³ AUKUS attracted widespread world attention, principally because of the cancellation of a non-nuclear submarine contract with France but also because of the clear Anglospheric challenge to the PRC.

Media coverage of the AUKUS security partnership has tended to highlight the granting of Australian access to technology for the planned deployment of eight nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines. Sharing of nuclear propulsion technology is not undertaken lightly and is indicative of enduring high levels of trust. As discussed the UK has been the only recipient of such US technology previously. The US has referred to a "one-off" transfer but there is a strong possibility that it may be "Britain actually supplying the technology, with America's blessing and support."¹⁴¹⁴ In this sense, the arrangement would be similar to the limited Rickover transfer to the UK aiming to encourage domestic expertise and the creation of a supporting industrial infrastructure. To facilitate this in Australia, the UK is likely to

¹⁴¹¹ MoD, *Mobilising, Modernising & Transforming Defence*, 2018 (London: Ministry of Defence UK, 2018); Stephen Kuper, "Expanding the Royal Navy's Presence in the Indo-Pacific," *Defence Connect* (2019), <https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/4749-expanding-the-royal-navy-s-presence-in-the-indo-pacific>.

¹⁴¹² Andrew Greene, "Secret Plans for New Port Outside Darwin to Accommodate Visiting US Marines," *ABC News* (2019), <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-23/navy-port-us-darwin-glyde-point-gunn-marines-gunn-military/11222606>.

¹⁴¹³ "UK, US & Australia launch new security partnership." September, 15 2021

Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street. London

¹⁴¹⁴ "What Does the Australian Submarine Deal Mean for Non-Proliferation?," *Economist*, September 17 2021.

provide ongoing "assistance with reactor technology, submariner training and possibly design elements from the Royal Navy's Astute-class SSNs."¹⁴¹⁵

The focus on the submarine aspect of the AUKUS partnership has obscured the wider and deeper meaning of the arrangement. The agreement identifies a range of emerging technologies as first-order national security issues. It seeks to ensure areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing are not only advanced, but decoupled from any dependency on the PRC. Tom Tugendhat, chair of the UK Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee said

Bringing together the military industrial complex of these three allies together is a step change in the relationship. We've always been interoperable, but this aims at much more. From artificial intelligence to advanced technology, the US, UK and Australia will now be able to cost save by increasing platform sharing and innovation costs. Particularly for the smaller two, that's game-changing.¹⁴¹⁶

Thus, Australia is seeking support and technical expertise from its two Anglosphere partners to develop a manufacturing base to develop a "Sovereign Guided Weapons" capability and manufacture long-range strike missiles. There will be likely cooperation with the UK and US to produce large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to operate in tandem with manned platforms for intelligence missions.¹⁴¹⁷

The AUKUS arrangement excluded Canada. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau pointed to the emphasis on nuclear submarines as being an area that Canada could not contribute to, but ignored the other collaborative aspects. Canadian opposition leaders, both memetic Anglo-saxons, have demanded that Trudeau take steps to join. Jagmeet Singh, the NPD Party leader, stated "the pact seems like a potential avenue to add more pressure [on China]. Canada was

¹⁴¹⁵ Euan Graham, "Australia's Well-Kept Nuclear-Submarine Secret," *International Institute for Strategic Studies* (2021), <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/09/australia-submarines>.

¹⁴¹⁶ Quoted in: Paul Dempsey, "View from Washington: Aukus Looms over Ai and Quantum," *E&T Engineering and Technology* (2021), <https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2021/09/view-from-washington-aukus-ooms-over-ai-and-quantum/>.

¹⁴¹⁷ "Morrison Government accelerates Sovereign Guided Weapons manufacturing." March 31, 2021 Press Release. Australian Dept Defence.

absent," and Conservative Party Leader Erin O'Toole stating, "Canada's voice has been absent Mr. Trudeau. We should be leaders for our values."¹⁴¹⁸

Historically, Canada's military focus has been on the Atlantic, but this has been a perceptible shift with Canada participating in quadrilateral Pacific activities alongside Anglosphere core partners.¹⁴¹⁹ The signing of the 'Canada-US Asia Pacific Defense Policy Cooperation Framework' as part of the PJBD remit aims to facilitate CANUS reinforcing actions with regional third party allies.¹⁴²⁰ Of particular note are the plans to replace the NORAD system necessitated by technological obsolescence, but also the impact of climate change on the Arctic as a security zone.

The Arctic is particularly problematic for Canada since the projected ice melt exposes its northern frontier to potential incursion. It has a bearing on the Pacific too since it opens up the possibility of new strategic shipping routes from the Atlantic to the Pacific, offering an alternative to the Suez route and links to Australia and NZ. The effect is to reemphasize the strategic importance of 'choke points' that stretch from the US Pacific (Bering Sea) Aleutian Islands off Alaska to the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap near the UK Shetland and Orkney Islands. The perceived regional threat from Russian activity has now been elevated by concerns relating to state sponsored PRC activity. This has taken the form of Chinese commercial projects in Greenland with strategic implications.¹⁴²¹

¹⁴¹⁸ Karen Graham, "Trudeau Faces Criticism from Political Rivals over Canada's Exclusion from the Aukus Pact," *Digital Journal* (2021), <https://www.digitaljournal.com/world/trudeau-faces-criticism-from-political-rivals-over-canadas-exclusion-from-the-aukus-pact/article>.

¹⁴¹⁹ Grant Wyeth, "Canada's Indo-Pacific Pivot," *The Interpreter* (2019), <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/canada-s-indo-pacific-pivot.>; Jasen Moreno Garcia, "U.S., Allied Forces Complete EOD Exercise Hydracrab 2019," *Commander 7th Fleet Media News* (2019), <https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=U.S.%2C+Allied+Forces+complete+EOD+Exercise+HYDRACRAB+2019by+Mass+Communication+Specialist+2nd+Class+Jasen+Moreno-Garcia>.

¹⁴²⁰ Karen Parrish, "U.S., Canada Sign Asia-Pacific Cooperation Framework," *American Forces Press Service* (2013), <https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121215.>; "Canada's Defence Relations in the Asia Pacific Region," *Canada.ca News* (2015), <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2015/05/canada-defence-relations-asia-pacific-region.html>.

¹⁴²¹ Hans Lucht, "Strictly Business?: Chinese Investments in Greenland Raise US Concerns," *Danish Institute for International Studies*, no. DIIS Policy Brief (2018).; Thomas Ayres, "China's Arctic Gambit a Concern for U.S. Air and Space Forces," *Space News* (2020), <https://spacenews.com/op-ed-chinas-arctic-gambit-a-concern-for-u-s-air-and-space-forces/>.

The Canadian response to these changing circumstances has been somewhat half-hearted given fears of US dominance in a sovereign region of Canada. A Canadian led project seeks to develop an air and maritime monitoring system developed in collaboration with the other four Anglosphere core members¹⁴²². However, that does not address the issue of how Russian underwater incursions can be countered without assistance.¹⁴²³ It is possible that the UK can adopt the ‘golden hinge’ role to act as facilitator between Canada and the US. Indeed, there have been authoritative reports that the UK offered to join with Canada in cold-weather exercises “and bring in some of its more advanced capabilities — such as nuclear-powered submarines — to help with surveillance and defence in the Far North.”¹⁴²⁴

There is a significant body of domestic opinion that Canada needs to set out some strategic objectives and then consider joining AUKUS or AUKUS type arrangement.

...many of the areas of AUKUS attention—from quantum computing to underwater surveillance—have long been high priorities for Canada. In fact, nuclear submarines, with their ability to remain underwater for long periods of time, have featured on Canada’s naval wish list, too: for example, in 1987, our White Paper on Defence included a proposal to acquire twelve of them for use under the Arctic ice. So actually, CAUKUS might not sound like such a bad idea after all...¹⁴²⁵

The other aspect of the AUKUS partnership is its impact on NZ. The prospect of Australian nuclear propelled submarines challenges its nuclear free policy. Superficially, this might suggest that NZ feels obliged to become an outlier member of the Anglosphere core. In reality, the long lead time before an Australian nuclear submarine force is launched, enables NZ to virtue signal its 'moral' stance until then. The NZ ban on nuclear-powered ships and

¹⁴²² See: Ernie Regehr, "Replacing the North Warning System: Strategic Competition or Arctic Confidence Building?," *Arctic Security Briefing Papers* (2018), <https://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/Replacing%20the%20North%20Warning%20System-Strategic%20competition%20or%20Arctic%20confidence%20building%20-%20Arctic%20Security%20Briefing%20Paper%2C%20March%201%202018.pdf>.

¹⁴²³ Nick Paton Walsh, "Satellite Images Show Huge Russian Military Buildup in the Arctic," *CNN* (2021), <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/05/europe/russia-arctic-nato-military-intl-cmd/index.html>.

¹⁴²⁴ Murray Brewster, "Britain Offers Canadian Military Help to Defend the Arctic," *CBC News* (2021), <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/britain-uk-canada-arctic-defence-submarines-russia-china-1.6187347>.

¹⁴²⁵ Christopher Ankersen and James Boutilier, "Aukus-Ward: Canada Needs a Strategy before It Starts Worrying About Missing the Boat," *The Forum* (2021), <https://cdainstitute.ca/christopher->

armaments constitute little more than a mutual ritual stance for public consumption with little practical significance in peace-time.¹⁴²⁶ In any case the assumption that nuclear-powered vessels are undesirable compared to say a fleet of ships and submarines powered by 'dirty' diesel is already being questioned.¹⁴²⁷

Those considerations aside, some policy-makers in Wellington are suggesting NZ could be "involved in other parts of the [AUKUS] architecture."¹⁴²⁸ Indeed, this was a point made by retiring UK Chief of Staff, General Nick Carter who suggested that AUKUS was "not designed to be exclusive" and could include NZ.¹⁴²⁹

In fact, there has been a deepening of ties between NZ and the US, reversing the standoff after the ANZUS - nuclear status disagreements that curtailed military cooperation.

Agreement	1996	1999	2007	2010	2012	2013
Protection of Defence Related Information (PDRI)	AUSCAN					
Acquisition & Cross Servicing Agreement		AUSUS				
US-UK Defence Trade Treaty			UKUS			
US-Australian Defence Trade Treaty			AUSUS			
Wellington Declaration on Strategic Partnership				NZUS		
Joint Posture Agreement					AUSUS	
Washington Declaration on Defense					NZUS	
Acquisition & Cross Servicing Agreement Treaty					NZUS	
British-Australian Defence & Security Cooperation Treaty						AUSUK
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) Re-established						UKUS

Table 7 Anglosphere Core Bilateral Military Arrangements between 1992- 2019

ankersen-james-boutilier-aukus-ward-canada-needs-a-strategy-before-it-starts-worrying-about-missing-the-boat/.

¹⁴²⁶ Martin Kay, "Nuclear Ship Ban 'Irrelevant' to US," *NZ Stuff* (2010), <http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/4478949/Nuclear-ship-ban-irrelevant-to-US>.

¹⁴²⁷ "Nuclear Energy Prospects in New Zealand," *World Nuclear Association* (2017), <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/new-zealand.aspx>; Andrew McEwan, "Nuclear New Zealand?," *New Zealand Geographic*, no. 74 (2005), <https://www.nzgeo.com/stories/nuclear-new-zealand/>; Michael Fountaine, "Is It Time for New Zealand to Go Nuclear?," *NZ Herald*, October 5 2021.

¹⁴²⁸ Anthony Galloway, "New Zealand Could Join Aukus Security Pact to Boost Cyber Technologies," *Sydney Morning Herald*, October 26 2021.

¹⁴²⁹ Sir Nicholas Carter, interview by Stacie Pettyjohn, October 19, 2021.

A new Strategic Partnership in 2010 rapidly evolved into a formal NZ-US defence agreement in 2012.¹⁴³⁰ In reality, joint land exercises preceded these agreements but are fully extended to all other services and are accompanied by senior command level discussions.¹⁴³¹

5.3.4 Extension of Anglosphere core military fora

The military fora bring together thousands of military and research personnel on an ongoing basis in the form of management structures, various projects and working groups. As detailed, these have their origins in the military establishment's initiative in the late 1940s as tripartite institutions, but had become quintilateral by 1991 with the exception of the ABCA Armies, of which NZ was only an observer. The process of NZ inclusion into these fora was completed with its full admission to the ABCA Armies Programme (renamed ABCANZ) in 2006.¹⁴³²

With most military functions already covered by the established fora, there was limited scope for new military fora. There were however, two fora additions reflecting the need to address technological innovations in the field of IT defence, and collaboration on logistical capability to facilitate enhanced global projection of military force.

¹⁴³⁰ Audrey Young, "Wellington Declaration Signals US-NZ Thaw Complete," *NZ Herald*, November 3 2010; Robert Ayson and David Capie, "Part of the Pivot? The Washington Declaration and US-NZ Relations," *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, no. 172 (2012), https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb172_1.pdf.

¹⁴³¹ See: "Kiwi Troops Take Part in US Dawn Blitz Exercise," *INews*, 24 June 2013; "U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Makes Rare N.Z. Visit for Security Talks on Pacific," *HomelandSecurityToday.US* (2019), <https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/maritime-security/u-s-pacific-fleet-commander-makes-rare-n-z-visit-for-security-talks-on-pacific/>.

¹⁴³² US Army, *Interoperability*, Army Regulation 34-1 (2020), 21-22.

Organisation	1992	2002	2004	2006	2018
Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC)	AUSCANNZUKUS				
International Computer Network Coordination Working Group (ICCWG)		AUSCANNZUKUS			
ABCANZ Armies (name change reflects NZ full membership)				AUSCANNZUKUS	
Quintilateral Logistics Forum (QLF)			AUSCANNUKUS		NZ

Table 8 Anglosphere Core Multilateral Military Agreements between 1992 -2018

Dark Grey shading signifies point at which the arrangement became quintilateral

Three new quintilateral fora came into existence after the Cold War, providing further specialisation and functional coverage, as detailed in Table 8. A fourth, the QCJWC was created to create a Five Eyes “community of war fighting practitioners with shared values and interests.”¹⁴³³ Reflecting greater technological changes, the ICCWG operates as a specialist off-shoot of the CCEB. The QLF was created to enhance the operation of the Anglosphere Core members “as integrated units when operating in a multinational coalition or NATO context.”¹⁴³⁴

A number of factors combined to increase the scope of functions undertaken by the original fora, some driven by technology such as the securitisation of space (e.g. satellites), weapons (e.g. drones) and communications (e.g. networks and command systems), and others driven by geopolitical factors such as 9/11 and the PRC. Thus, for example, the ASIC documentation reveals it extended its organisation and remit “in order to remain valid in a post-Cold War, post ‘9/11’ international security environment.”¹⁴³⁵ The CCEB reported that security threats and conflict events in the 1990s led to the revitalisation of operations and measures to ensure Anglosphere Core standards and procedures were adopted by other allies.¹⁴³⁶

¹⁴³³ UK MOD, *Developing Joint Doctrine Handbook* (London: MoD, 2013), 2-7.

¹⁴³⁴ US JCS, "QLF Strategic Plan," (Washington DC2013).

¹⁴³⁵ Air and Space Interoperability Council, Governance Document Vol 3: Operating Concept, (Washington: 2014 Version), 2. Quoted in: C.J England, "Air and Space Interoperability Council and the RCAF" (Canadian Forces College, 2016), 3.

5.3.5 Anglosphere military operating fora

The military fora provide a framework for the Anglospheric core militaries to initiate research and implement policy outcomes. Each of these fora exhibit a well-established and similar management hierarchy, with representatives from each core member state operating from a US HQ. For example, the ASIC is headed by a Management Committee consisting of five National Directors and a rotating chairmanship and sitting in ‘permanent session’ at HQ USAF in the Pentagon.¹⁴³⁷ Likewise, the ABCANZ Armies is headed by a Board of Directors overseeing an Executive Council consisting of a Chief of staff and five Vice/Deputy Chiefs of staff.¹⁴³⁸ Similarly, the CCEB features a significant Washington-based operation with a CCEB Board consisting “of a senior Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) representative from each of the member nations” and supported by ‘national’ staff and a permanent secretary.¹⁴³⁹ Other fora including the QLF,¹⁴⁴⁰ the TTCP,¹⁴⁴¹ and the Five Eyes Navies¹⁴⁴² feature similar structures.

The reach of the military fora extends beyond the military policy-establishment involving personnel in an extensive network of projects and tasks standing groups. For example, the ASIC management oversees numerous Working Groups whose titles provide an insight as to their remit. Examples include Agile Combat Support (ACS), Air Mobility (AM), Aerospace Medical Group (ASMG), Command/Control & Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2&ISR), Force Application (FA), Force Protection (FP), and Fuels Group (FG).¹⁴⁴³ The CCEB operates standing ‘Working Groups’ and ‘Tiger Teams’ to address specific issues. In 2012 there were five standing Working Groups, one producing standardisation instructions (known as Allied Communications Publications or ACP’s), the remainder dealing with developing common cyber-communications architecture.¹⁴⁴⁴

¹⁴³⁶ JA Lt. Cmdr Stott, Communications Instructions General. Acp 121 (H) (Combined Communications Electronics Board, 2007).

¹⁴³⁷ England, 28.

¹⁴³⁸ Thomas D Little, "ABCA: A Coalition That Works," *Army Sustainment* 43, no. 5 (2011), https://alu.army.mil/alog/issues/sep0ct11/ABCA_Coalition_Works.html.

¹⁴³⁹ ABCA Armies, *Washington-Based Multifora, Staff Handbook 2012* (Washington DC: ABCA Armies, 2012), 39.

¹⁴⁴⁰ US JCS, 3.

¹⁴⁴¹ US DoD, *The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP)* (Washington DC: DoD, 2018).

¹⁴⁴² US Navy, "Interview with Rear Adm. Kenneth William Deutsch," *CHIPS* (2006).

¹⁴⁴³ See: England.

¹⁴⁴⁴ ABCA Armies, 39.

Overall, these activities involve military Anglosphere core personnel in frequent, ongoing contact with their quintilateral colleagues. An answer to a question in New Zealand parliament concerning the attendance by senior representatives of the Defence Force of these fora, provides an insight as to the scale of collaboration. The tabulated reply runs to ten A4 pages of meetings relating to ABCA Armies, nine pages to AUSCANNZUKUS navies, three pages to ASIC air force, three pages to the CCEB activities and one page relating to ICCWG activities, totalling more than one hundred and fifty meetings over two years. These demonstrate a serious and sustained pattern of interaction.¹⁴⁴⁵ In addition to these standing interactions, the military fora engage in large-scale military exercises to test new weapons, doctrines, IT systems and other enhancements developed by the other fora.¹⁴⁴⁶

5.3.6 Anglosphere military research collaboration fora

The TTCP constitutes the most comprehensive and largest collaborative defence science and technology programme in the world.¹⁴⁴⁷ As such, it functions as the Research and Development operation of the Anglosphere core bringing together military specialists and private companies to research and develop new weapons and systems.¹⁴⁴⁸

In 1995, the TTCP parties signed a revamped MoU at Melbourne committing themselves to continued collaboration in Non-Atomic Military Research and Development (NAMRAD) to establish harmonisation, alignment and sharing of research.¹⁴⁴⁹ The role and scope of the TTCP places it at the cutting edge of military technological innovation and, as such, is

¹⁴⁴⁵ NZPD. 2010/2011 Review of Estimates for Vote Defence Force Supplementary Questions - Q 2.21." 9-39 <https://www.parliament.nz/resource/0000112559>

¹⁴⁴⁶ Clarence Hurren, "The Five Eyes Interoperability Council and Exercise Mobility Guardian 19," *SLDinfo.com* (2019), <https://sldinfo.com/2019/10/the-five-eyes-interoperability-council-and-exercise-mobility-guardian-19/>.

¹⁴⁴⁷ George Galdorisi and Darren Sutton, "Commonwealth Naval Cooperation: Are We Ready for the Next 100 Years?," in *The 2009 'King-Hall' Naval History Conference* (Canberra: RAN, 2009), 16-19.

¹⁴⁴⁸ ABCA Armies, 49-50.

¹⁴⁴⁹ AUSCANNZUKUS, TTCP II MOU. 1995 and 2018 (Washington: Gov's of AUSCANNZUKUS).

involved in highly sensitive research. The TTCP acts to coordinate the Anglosphere core security community's response to emergent threats.¹⁴⁵⁰

TTCP activities are expansive and divided into a ten [Operating] Groups, divided into further Action Groups and Technical Panels.¹⁴⁵¹ Again, for the purposes of appreciating the scale of these operations, each Action Group is headed by a chairman with around twenty-five academic and military personnel from the member states. An example is detailed in a 1980 edition of the US Army R&D magazine that refers to a British Porton Down physicist who had served as the UK's TTCP representative, joining a UK-US research initiative at the US Army Armament Command's Chemical Systems Laboratory.¹⁴⁵²

5.3.7 Inculcating Anglosphere core interoperability standards

The Anglosphere Core military fora's work on interoperability is promoted as a standard to be adopted by other allies, including all NATO members. For example, the CCEB establishes "combined operations C-E policies, doctrines and operating methods and procedures." The C-E Policies unanimously agreed by the five states are published in the form of 'Allied Communications Publications (ACP's) for "universal" application. The ACP policies are "generally adopted by NATO and used world-wide."¹⁴⁵³ In other words, these Anglosphere core standards are introduced to other alliance partners to form the basis of joint exercises. An October 2010 ACP (ACP 121 (I)) provides an example of policy implementation stating that the promulgation is issued under "the direction the CCEB Principals" and "is effective on receipt for CCEB nations and when directed by the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM) for NATO Nations and Strategic Commands."¹⁴⁵⁴ The

¹⁴⁵⁰ For example, the collaboration on quantum technology for marine warfare. See: Daniel Kilman and Brendan Thomas-Noone, "How the Five Eyes Can Harness Commercial Innovation," *Defense One* (2018), <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/how-five-eyes-can-harness-commercial-innovation/150040/>.

¹⁴⁵¹ ABCA Armies, 49-50.

¹⁴⁵² Porton Down the UK's military 7,000-acre R&D site near Salisbury. For this and numerous examples of R&D collaboration see: "US-UK Study New Contaminant Detection Concepts," *Army RD&A*, July-August 1980, 7.

¹⁴⁵³ See: C.E Lt General McKnight, *Military Communications Electronics Board Booklet April 1987* (1987).

¹⁴⁵⁴ Foster P Major, Cceb Letter of Promulgation for Acp 121 (I), Communications Instructions General (2010).

2012 Multifora Handbook states “NATO and many other nations have come to depend upon ACPs for their communication operations.”¹⁴⁵⁵

The QCJWC performs a similar function whereby a common Anglospheric ‘line’ appears to be discussed before NATO discussions on doctrine and ‘Lessons Learned’ meetings.¹⁴⁵⁶ Although not members, Australia and NZ (as Strategic Partners) attend the NATO Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group meetings.¹⁴⁵⁷ Thereafter, Australia and NZ adopt NATO publications on doctrines.¹⁴⁵⁸ These joint doctrines are then used as templates for bilateral arrangements with other allies, thereby ensuring a degree of Anglosphere core interoperability. This is particularly relevant to the Pacific, where Anglosphere core members are both deepening existing military arrangements with third parties or forging new ones.¹⁴⁵⁹ In another example of Anglosphere core lead influence, the Anglospheric security community's military fora decide on the ‘reporting’ codenames of new enemy weapons thereafter adopted by NATO. One recent example was the ASIC designation of the Russian Su-57 as “FELON” now applied across NATO and allied forces.¹⁴⁶⁰

5.3.8 Trust and esprit de corps

The effect of sustained interaction via conferences and project Working Groups provide examples of strong social relationships developing amongst the Anglosphere core's military personnel participants. Following one such ‘Five Eyes Navies’ meetings of senior Flag Officers in 2014, a Canadian Admiral observed,

¹⁴⁵⁵ ABCA Armies, 39.

¹⁴⁵⁶ QCJWC, “Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference Annual Report,” (Washington DC2016), E4-4.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Aaron P Jackson, *Doctrine, Strategy and Military Culture: Military-Strategic Doctrine Development in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 1987-2007* (National Defence (Canada), 2013), 156.

¹⁴⁵⁸ QCJWC, E4-4.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Stephen Kuper, “Japanese and American Marines Build Joint Doctrine with Amphibious Warfare Drills,” *Defence Connect* (2020), <https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/land-amphibious/5635-us-marines-japanese-marines-build-joint-droctrine-with-amphibious-warfare-drills>.

¹⁴⁶⁰ “NATO Codenames Russia’s Su-57,” *T-intell* (2019), <https://t-intell.com/2019/11/07/nato-codenames-russias-su-57/>.

You can surge forces during times of crisis, but you can't surge trust. And the trust we've established here amongst ourselves is very important.¹⁴⁶¹

ABCA Armies social media postings by constituent Anglosphere core armies and their personnel illustrate the level of human interaction and trust-deepening patterns that enduring collaboration facilitates.¹⁴⁶² The large number of working groups suggests ABCA Armies involve considerable numbers of personnel across a range of ranks. These ongoing interactions on common initiatives and tasks are likely to strengthen the sense of community at personal and professional levels.

The role of embedded troops has become more significant, involving not just lower ranks, but senior command positions. This has included an Australian army general, based in Hawaii, with direct command of US troops.¹⁴⁶³ Higher ranks serve in US Central Command and Indo-Pacific Command and Canadian Generals are embedded in the office of Chairman of the US JCS, US Cyber Command, and serve as deputy commanders of various US Corps. Some 1,000 Canadian personnel defence officials serve in a variety of US bases. The US also has senior officers serving in Winnipeg, Ottawa, Halifax and Victoria and other Canadian states.¹⁴⁶⁴

In 2012 President Obama and the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron signed off still closer arrangements, announcing, "by working together more closely, we set an example to others and provide a basis for further collaboration with our Allies and partners."¹⁴⁶⁵ The Press release touches upon the extraordinary extent of cross collaboration involving thousands of personnel of all ranks, serving in all manner of positions, within units or operating bases and in one another's military academies.

¹⁴⁶¹ Jamie Cook, "Five Eyes: Naval Flag Officers Gather for Talks," *Lookout*, November 3 2014.

¹⁴⁶² "ABCANZ Armies, Twitter," <https://twitter.com/hashtag/abcanz>.

¹⁴⁶³ Justin Silvers, "U.S. Army Pacific Holds Ceremony Honoring Australian Generals," *USINDOPACOM News* (2019), <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1725634/us-army-pacific-holds-cerem/>.

¹⁴⁶⁴ William Rear Admiral Truelove, "Canada's Outgoing Defence Attaché: U.S. And Canada Still Have Each Other's Back," *Wilson Centre* (2018), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/canadas-outgoing-defence-attaché-us-and-canada-still-have-each-others-back>.

¹⁴⁶⁵ White House, "Joint Fact Sheet: U.S. And UK Defense Cooperation," *White House Briefings* (2012), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/14/joint-fact-sheet-us-and-uk-defense-cooperation>.

At every level of our defense establishments British and American service men and women train together, learn together, develop capability together and, when called upon, fight together.¹⁴⁶⁶

In September 2020, the principle of interoperability advanced a stage further with the announcement that the newly deployed UK aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth would include a significant US element on board. This consisted of the placement of a US Marine Fighter attack squadron with aviation US Navy sailors on the aircraft carrier as part of an ongoing interoperability exercise establishing “a level of trust and collaboration that goes beyond any other partnership in the world.”¹⁴⁶⁷ This announcement was followed by the announcement that the US Marine fighter squadron will remain as an integral part of the aircraft carrier’s complement.¹⁴⁶⁸ The development is significant in that the integration of UK-US elements as a fighting unit promotes an identity “expressed through the merging of efforts”. That is to say, “the use of force shifts from the [national units] to the collectivity of sovereign states... against external threats.”¹⁴⁶⁹ This is a remarkable state of affairs. The flagship of the Royal Navy is a transnational fighting unit and, as such, is not just a symbolic representation but the embodiment of a unity of purpose that suggests a UK conflict is a US conflict. In another Falklands situation, there would be no need to mobilise US Navy support, as their personnel would already be on the UK flagship.

The esprit de corps has given rise to the increasing use of logos contributing, to the notion of a binding and exclusive sense of community. (Table 9 below) Logos are relevant to the notion of ‘social glue’ that business study theory contends is an important factor in determining the success of international Joint Ventures as covered in the previous section. In business studies, the significance of logos is recognised an essential element of the corporate identity mix: symbols, communications and behaviour.¹⁴⁷⁰

¹⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶⁷ John Vandiver, "Marine F-35s Deploy to UK Carrier in a First among Allies," *Stars & Stripes* (2020), <https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/marine-f-35s-deploy-to-uk-carrier-in-a-first-among-allies-1.647499>.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Ian Storey, "Can the UK Achieve Its Naval Ambitions in the Indo-Pacific?," *The Diplomat* (2020), <https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/can-the-uk-achieve-its-naval-ambitions-in-the-indo-pacific/>.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Adler and Barnett, 62, 56.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Cees Van Riel and John MT Balmer, "Corporate Identity: The Concept, Its Measurement and Management," *European journal of marketing* 31, no. 5-6 (1997): 341.

Symbol	Organisation	Purpose	Members
	Combined Communications Electronics Board CCB>CCEB	Production of standards of all allied 'communications-electronics' (CE). Command, Control, Communications & Computer (C4)	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
	ABCANZ Armies Programme (ABC>ABCANZ)	Integration of armies (Standardisation, training, exchanges)	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
	Five Eyes Air Force Interoperability Council ACC>ASIC>AFIC (Previously Air Space Interoperability Council)	Airforce integration & cooperation. (Standardisation, training, & exchanges)	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
	The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP)	Military systems R&D. Collaboration between industry, academia and military	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
	AUSCANNZUKUS (Also referred to as Five Eyes Navies)	Maritime Information Warfare Organisation. (Standardisation, training, exchanges)	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
None identified	Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC)	Development of joint warfare doctrine. Workshops, VTC's, Conferences	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
	International Computer Network Coordination W. Group (ICCWG)	Works with CCEB with focus on Information Assurance/ Computer Network Defence	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
	Quintalateral Logistics Forum (QLF)	Development of interoperability of logistics in support of shared goals	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand. Nb logo predates NZ joining

Table 9 Anglosphere Core Military Fora 2018

Symbols are explained by reference to anthropology and are a social construct said to represent underlying values and assumptions and assist in integrating cognition and behaviour into shared codes.

Symbols are integral to organisational life. They are not simply by-products of organisation; rather they are elements that structure member's active construction of sense, knowledge, and behaviour.¹⁴⁷¹

In short, organisational symbols are intended to and do engender what the organisational theorist Cees van Riel confirmed as a "we feeling."¹⁴⁷² Artificial symbols are not likely to mean very much if there is a lack of existing commonality. Adler and Barnett refer to myths and symbols working in conjunction together. These military symbols might appear inconsequential but arise from a communal identity based on values with a heritage.

Keep in mind that collective identities entail that people not only identify (positively) with other people's fate but, also, identify themselves, and those other people, as a group in relation to other groups. Such identities are likely to be reinforced by symbols and myths that serve to define the group and its boundaries.¹⁴⁷³

5.4. Communal Intelligence

5.4.1 Introduction

The demands of the War on Terror accelerated the scope of intelligence activity and collaboration expanding beyond SIGINT to include all aspects of intelligence, creating a more institutionalised transnational intelligence community. These intelligence-based operations entered public consciousness following Edward Snowden's disclosures of what became known as 'Five Eyes' agreement'.

5.4.2 Out of the shadows

One effect of 9/11 was to increase the demands on the various intelligence services in the battle to counter terrorism and coordinate responses.¹⁴⁷⁴ This has been enhanced by the perceived threat of the PRC and has ensured the growth in scope of intelligence functions and

¹⁴⁷¹ Neal M Ashkanasy, Celeste PM Wilderom, and Mark F Peterson, *Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate* (Sage, 2004), 72-73.

¹⁴⁷² Cees Van Riel, *Principles of Corporate Communication* (London: Prentice Hall, 1992).

¹⁴⁷³ Adler and Barnett, 62, 47.

¹⁴⁷⁴ "Testing Intelligence," *The Economist*, October 6 2001.

transnational cooperation. The existence and scale of these operations have only comparatively recently become apparent. Until 2010, the UK-USA Agreement was hidden, and its supposed existence considered the stuff of conspiracy theory.¹⁴⁷⁵ The existence of a secret and intrusive Anglospheric ‘Echelon’ SIGINT program was alleged by investigative journalists in the UK,¹⁴⁷⁶ NZ and¹⁴⁷⁷ the US,¹⁴⁷⁸ and began to gain traction in the 1990s.¹⁴⁷⁹ This led the European Parliament to undertake enquiries and affirm the Echelon system was a reality, a conclusion confirmed by leading EU member state governments.¹⁴⁸⁰

Any doubts as to the existence and scope of an Anglospheric SIGINT programme were dispelled when in 2013, former CIA operative, Edward Snowden leaked a tranche of classified documents casting light on “a supra-national intelligence organization.”¹⁴⁸¹ The leaked documents are imprinted with a ‘For Five Eyes Only’ security classification abbreviated to FVEY.¹⁴⁸² As explained earlier, the moniker ‘Five Eyes’ and FEVY have entered popular usage and have been adopted by the Anglosphere core intelligence community itself as a descriptive label.

5.4.3 The Intelligence Community

The term “Five Eyes Intelligence Community” has now become a ‘catch-all’ for a confusing array of national intelligence agencies that cover more than just the SIGINT

¹⁴⁷⁵ The Economist described Echelon as a focus for “conspiracy theorists and campaigners for civil liberties.” “Those Perfidious Anglo Spies,” *The Economist* (2000).

¹⁴⁷⁶ Duncan Campbell, “Somebody’s Listening,” *New Statesman*, August 12 1988.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Hager, *Secret Power*.

¹⁴⁷⁸ James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: Inside the National Security Agency, America’s Most Secret Intelligence Organization* (Granite Hill Publishers, 1983).

¹⁴⁷⁹ Hager, *Secret Power*.

¹⁴⁸⁰ See: Franco Piodi and Iolanda Mombelli, “The Echelon Affair,” (European Parliament Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, 2014). Also Steve Wright, “An Appraisal of Technologies of Political Control. Scientific and Technological Options Assessment Stoa,” (Luxembourg: Directorate General for Research (EU Parliament), 1998), 19-20. & Will Knight, “Dutch Government Acknowledges Echelon Spy Network: Parliamentary Inquiry into Communications Eavesdropping Launched” *ZDNet.com* (2001), <https://www.zdnet.com/article/dutch-government-acknowledges-echelon-spy-network/>.

¹⁴⁸¹ Hubert Siebel, “Transcript: ARD Interview with Edward Snowden,” *Courage Foundation* (2014), <https://edwardsnowden.com/2014/01/27/video-ard-interview-with-edward-snowden/>.

¹⁴⁸² Glenn Greenwald, *No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance State* (NY: New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014), 91.

arrangement.¹⁴⁸³ In terms of cooperation and intimacy, this wider intelligence community conjoined the US with the quadrilateral Commonwealth JIC Bureaux arrangements, placing the US centre-stage. One element was an informal quintilateral body called 'CAZAB' established in 1964 by James Angleton, the CIA Chief of Counterintelligence.¹⁴⁸⁴ Led by the CIA, it acted as an exclusive Anglosphere Core forum for the various counterintelligence agencies.¹⁴⁸⁵

The various heads of the intelligence services meet regularly with their Anglosphere core opposites to coordinate activity. The post-9/11 built upon a system whereby a collective Five Eyes intelligence assessment on international matters was presented to the Anglospheric core policy-establishments on a regular basis. Thus, for example, Margaret Thatcher on assuming the UK premiership was briefed on intelligence and security matters by the UK Joint Intelligence Committee as part of its 'assessment' brief. The UK Government records note,

Also in attendance, as was normal, were representatives of the UK's closest allies, who were present for the discussion of current intelligence and then withdrew.¹⁴⁸⁶

This account would confirm the reports made by a former investigative journalist that a CIA representative attends UK JIC meetings.¹⁴⁸⁷ Cox describes the Anglospheric core's national assessment community as "professionally tight, bound by gravities of trust and confidence" and points to working level practices that display routine collaboration and "a habit of analytical consultation."¹⁴⁸⁸

The role of national assessment took centre stage in the various twenty-first century conflicts. Prior to the trilateral CANUKUS bombing of Iraq during the Clinton

¹⁴⁸³ Richard Taner, "Interoperability," *Nautilus Institute* (2008), <https://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/security-general/interoperability/#five-eyes-fora>.

¹⁴⁸⁴ West, *Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence*, 49.

¹⁴⁸⁵ Rimington, 143-44.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Ian B Beesley and Michael S Goodman, "Margaret Thatcher and the Joint Intelligence Committee," *History of Government* (2012), <https://history.blog.gov.uk/2012/10/01/margaret-thatcher-and-the-joint-intelligence-committee/>.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Stephen Grey, "Why No Questions About the CIA? Observations on the Hutton Inquiry. 29 September 2003," *New Statesman*, September 29 2003.

¹⁴⁸⁸ James Samuel Cox, *Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community* (Citeseer, 2013), 8.

Administration in December 1998, the fusion of UK-US intelligence produced a common perspective.¹⁴⁸⁹ The then UK Foreign Secretary in endorsing the bombing noted in evidence

The United States and the United Kingdom have a unique intelligence relationship which has probably never existed in any period of history, in which on our side we have full transparency and we strive to secure full transparency on their side.

Therefore, it is often difficult when you look at intelligence assessments to spot which raw data was originally gathered by the United Kingdom and which was originally gathered by the United States.¹⁴⁹⁰

Since the Snowden disclosures, there has been a greater willingness for Anglospheric core governments to acknowledge the existence of these relationships and adopt the term ‘Five Eyes’ as the name of the alliance. In 2014, Australia became the first Anglospheric core member to refer explicitly to the alliance when Prime Minister Tony Abbott referred to a “Five Eyes intelligence partnership” during a radio interview.¹⁴⁹¹ This was followed by the first official written reference of a “Five eyes Intelligence community” in the 2016 Australian Defence White Paper.¹⁴⁹² The public announcement of a transnational “Five Eyes” oversight committee by all five Anglosphere core members (see Table 10) was not only an acknowledgement of the name and the existence of such a network, but an attempt by the political policy-establishment to exert some oversight over intelligence activities.¹⁴⁹³

¹⁴⁸⁹ Robin Cook, "Why It Is in the Interests of the Iraqi People to Bomb Saddam," *Telegraph*, February 20 2001.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Robin Cook. “Oral evidence. Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Tuesday 17 June 2003.” HC Q33.

¹⁴⁹¹ Tony Abbot (Prime Minister). “Interview with James Glenday,” *ABC AM*. June 13, 2014. Transcript ID: 23571 Aus. Gov. Dept. PM & Cabinet.

¹⁴⁹² Australian DoD, “Defence White Paper,” (Canberra2016), 122. See also comments by the Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council 2009-14. Chris Kojm, “Intelligence Integration & Reform,” in *Truth to Power: A History of the US National Intelligence Council*, ed. Robert Hutchings and Gregory F Treverton (Oxford University Press, 2019), 175.

¹⁴⁹³ US NCSC, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council,” *Office of DNI* (2017), <https://www.dni.gov/files/ICIG/Documents/Partnerships/FIORC/Signed%20FIORC%20Charter%20with%20Line.pdf>.

Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC)					
 Five Eyes Intelligence Community	Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security of Australia	Office of the Intelligence Commissioner & the National Security & Intelligence Review Agency of Canada	Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants and the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence & Security of NZ	Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office of the UK	Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of the United States.

	Five Eyes:	The Major	Intelligence	Groupings	
	Australia	Canada	NZ	UK	US
National Assessment	Office of National Assessment (ONI)	International Assessment Secretariat (IAS)	National Assessment Bureau (NAB)	Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)	Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
SIGINT	Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)	Community Security Establishment (CSE)	Government Security Communications Bureau (GCSB)	Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)	National Security Agency (NSA)
Security Intelligence (Domestic)	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)	Canadian Security Intelligence Services (CSIS)	NZ Security Intelligence Service (SIS)	The Security Service MIS	Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Human Intelligence (Overseas)	Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)	Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)	NZ Security Intelligence Service (SIS)	Secret Intelligence Service (SIS - MI6)	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Defence Intelligence	Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)	Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFID)	Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS)	Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS)	Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Counter Terrorism Centres	National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC)	Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC)	Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG)	Joint Threat Assessment Centre (JTAC)	National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)	Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO)	Directorate of Geospatial Intelligence (DGI)	GEOINT New Zealand	Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre (DIFC)	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Table 10 The Five Eyes Intelligence Community & FIORC

5.4.4 Intelligence interoperability

The Snowden disclosures also provide an insight into the scale of interaction, with Five Eyes SIGINT ‘Liaison officers’ posted to each member’s capital city and who are in daily contact with their Anglospheric core counterparts.¹⁴⁹⁴ Nor is this collaboration limited to placements of senior staff to capital cities. Large numbers of personnel are deployed in joint bases and embedded in joint working groups in each other’s territories. As an example, the NSA had sixteen Liaison officers based in Canberra to work with the Australian DSD and NZ GCSB.¹⁴⁹⁵ The growth in US personnel at the Pine Gap base is also indicative of greater cooperation and collective action. In 1968, the US provided 12 of the 95 staff, by 2015, there were 800 staff of which half were US personnel.¹⁴⁹⁶ Aside from the level of trust this signifies, the social outcomes are shared outlooks and abiding friendships.¹⁴⁹⁷ In addition to intelligence personnel working alongside one another, there are frequent meetings between the SIGINT agencies and other intelligence agencies under the Five Eyes umbrella.¹⁴⁹⁸

The posting of intelligence ‘Liaison Officers’ is not limited to SIGINT or assessment staff, but extends to the other agencies too, including the defence-led intelligence agencies. The various conflicts fought under the label ‘War on Terror’ have put a premium on intelligence interoperability and cooperation, whether in the form of HUMINT, SIGINT or new developing forms of intelligence such as Geospatial Intelligence and Counter Terrorism coordination. In a very real sense, these intelligence agencies are at war, providing the

¹⁴⁹⁴ US NSA, "The Abc's of Second Party Liaison (Leaked Memo)," *Intercept* (2003), <https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/2830108-consider-this-the-abc-s-of-second-party-liaison/>.

¹⁴⁹⁵ "Sid's Antipodal Colleagues," *Snowden Archive* (2003), https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/SIDsAntipodalColleagues2016-08-10_nsadocs_snowden_doc.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson, and Richard Tanter, *Australia's Participation in the Pine Gap Enterprise* (Nautilus Institute, 2015), 10.

¹⁴⁹⁷ See: US NSA, "DSD Delves into Reverse Engineering," *Snowden Archive* (2005), https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/DSDDelvesintoReverseEngineering2017-09-13_nsadocs_snowden_doc.

¹⁴⁹⁸ "Topic at Second Parties Meeting: Breaking Down the SIGINT-Ia Barriers," *Snowden Archives* (2005), https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/TopicatSecondPartiesMeetingBreakingDowntheSIGINT-IABarriers2017-09-13_nsadocs_snowden_doc.

intelligence for the targeting of enemy combatants and assets by drones, missiles and special forces personnel.¹⁴⁹⁹

In addition to these intelligence agencies, the post-9/11 period has seen a securitisation of a range of non-military issues and the creation of a series of new (non-military) transnational Anglosphere organisations. The focus and remit of these new organisations operate within the securitisation paradigm established by the Five Eyes security agencies. These are examined in the following section.

5.4.5 Special partners: Europe and the Pacific

The Five Eyes intelligence partners have strong links with other allies' SIGINT intelligence operations including the NATO allies but also Japan and South Korea. These are the so-called 'third parties' or 'Tier Band' partners. The status of these relationships depends on the level of trust and the extent information is shared. The relationship may be 'binary' as in a standalone relationship between a 'Third Party' and the Five Eyes group collectively. Alternatively, it may be a multilateral relationship, as in the one between Five Eyes collectively and a 'collective' of other Third Parties meeting in fora. For example, a European dimension is provided by a so-called 'Nine Eyes' forum founded in 1982. This is chaired by the US and consisting of the Five Eyes group plus Denmark, France, Netherlands and Norway. This grouping was extended to include third parties Germany, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Spain - the so-called "fourteen eyes" and officially referred to as "SIGINT Seniors Europe" (SSEUR). European meetings usually take place annually. The possibility of a creating a permanent collaborative space in London was suggested by the US but was rejected by the European non-Five Eyes SIGINT agencies.¹⁵⁰⁰

Collaboration between the Five Eyes SIGINT partnership and other third party SIGINT agencies is an evolving process. A 2013 document leaked by Edward Snowden reveals the list

¹⁴⁹⁹ For example the Geoint agencies in Afghanistan. See: Colonel DHN Thompson, "Meet Canada's Directorate of Geospatial Intelligence," *Pathfinder* 7, no. 2 (2009), <https://www.hndl.org/?view&did=19385>.

¹⁵⁰⁰ US NSA, "Global Collaboration Environment: Director's Talking Points - August 1 2007," *Intercept* (2018), <https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03/01/global-collaboration-environment-directors-talking-points-nsa/>.

of approved third party (Tier B) SIGINT has increased.¹⁵⁰¹ Other third parties include non-European states such as Israel, Japan, South Korea, India, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the UAE. The Five Eyes SIGINT partnership created a similar forum to SSEUR for the Pacific called SIGINT Seniors Pacific (SSPAC) also chaired by the US.¹⁵⁰² At its inception in 2005 it consisted of Five Eyes plus South Korea, Singapore and Thailand.¹⁵⁰³ Japan was offered membership but declined, worried that the existence of the forum might leak.¹⁵⁰⁴ At some point after 2009, France joined. It was preceded by India, who following a joint US-Singaporean-NZ delegation to Delhi, agreed to join in early 2008.¹⁵⁰⁵

Of these third parties, a strong Five Eyes relationship with Singapore has developed. This reflects Singapore's membership of the FPDA and their Anglospheric affinities.¹⁵⁰⁶ Of critical importance is the city state's advanced technological expertise and its status as the focal point for a series of undersea communication cables.¹⁵⁰⁷ Singapore's Security and Intelligence Division has intimate links with the Australian DSD. Singaporean SIGINT capability is considered the most advanced in South East Asia.¹⁵⁰⁸ Given the levels of trust between Singapore and the Five Eye members, it has been claimed the relationship is approaching second party status and will create a Six Eye alliance.¹⁵⁰⁹ This probably reflects a more recent change in status following allegations by two expert academics. In 2001, Desmond Ball and Ross Babbage alleged that Singapore had been spying on Australia for twenty years and had

¹⁵⁰¹ Greenwald, 123.

¹⁵⁰² US NSA, "SIGINT Partnership Agrees to Greater Sharing 8-12-2010," *Intercept* (2018), <https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03/01/sidtoday-2010-08-12-sigint-partnership-agrees-to-greater-sharing/>.

¹⁵⁰³ "Linguistic Resource Sharing in Asia Pacific Takes Step Forward 11-5-2007," *Intercept* (2018), <https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03/01/sidtoday-2007-11-05-linguistic-resource-sharing-in-asia-pacific-takes-step-forward/>.

¹⁵⁰⁴ "SIGINT Seniors Pacific Successes Highlighted at Conference 16-3-2007," *Intercept* (2018), <https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03/01/sidtoday-2007-03-16-sigint-seniors-pacific-successes-highlighted-at-conference/>.

¹⁵⁰⁵ "Nsas's Changing Counterterrorism Relationship with India 06-15-2009," *Intercept* (2018), <https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03/01/sidtoday-2009-06-15-nsas-changing-counterterrorism-relationship-with-india/>.

¹⁵⁰⁶ Anglospheric in respect of use English Common Law, parliamentary system, use of English language.

¹⁵⁰⁷ Philip Dorling, "Australian Spies in Global Deal to Tap Undersea Cables," *The Age*, August 29 2013.

¹⁵⁰⁸ "Singapore, South Korea Revealed as Five Eyes Spying Partners," *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 25 2013.

¹⁵⁰⁹ "Is Singapore Western Intelligence's 6th Eye?," *Asia Sentinel*, December 9 2013.

infiltrated the DSD and conducted spy plane operations.¹⁵¹⁰ These allegations came out in the light of an intended state owned Singapore company takeover of an Australian communications company that would have allowed access to satellites carrying 70% of Australian secret signals traffic.¹⁵¹¹ Government objections were dropped following an agreement with the Singaporeans in 2008 following a “Deed of Agreement” regarding accessing defence data.¹⁵¹²

5.4.6 The no-spying issue

The Snowden disclosures revealed extensive spying on non-Anglosphere core allies and non-allies alike, to the chagrin of many states who might have expected to be excluded from surveillance. *Le Monde*, in conjunction with Snowden, disclosed French cabinet officials such as Christine Lagarde, Emmanuel Glimet, Anne-Marie Idrac, had been targeted.¹⁵¹³ In Africa, surveillance extended to French embassies and African Heads of State.¹⁵¹⁴ Germany was also the target of Five Eyes surveillance.¹⁵¹⁵ The revelations led to demands for a no-spying commitment from the US, similar to what non-members believed existed between the Five Eyes members.¹⁵¹⁶ Aside from these SIGINT intercepts, Five Eyes members had engaged in ongoing and persistent spying on the non-Anglosphere allies. The exposure of a CIA Paris economic operation in 1995 created a major behind the scenes diplomatic incident.¹⁵¹⁷

¹⁵¹⁰ Catherine McGrath, "Claims Singapore Is Spying on Australia," *PM Programme ABC* (2001), <https://www.abc.net.au/pm/stories/s343929.htm>.

¹⁵¹¹ David Legard, "Aussie Media Mogul Savages Singtel Bid Again," *ARN* (2001), https://www.arnet.com.au/article/45358/aussie_media_mogul_savages_singtel_bid_again/.

¹⁵¹² "FIRB Approves Singtel Purchase of Optus," *Australian Defence Magazine*. (2008).

¹⁵¹³ Simon Piel, "Britain Spied on Companies, Diplomats and Politicians in French-Speaking Africa," *Le Monde*, December 8 2016.

¹⁵¹⁴ Ryan Gallagher, "Extensive British Spying Throughout Africa Revealed in Le Monde," *The Intercept* (2016), <https://theintercept.com/2016/12/08/gchq-africa-wto-corporations-surveillance/>.

¹⁵¹⁵ Wikileaks, "NSA Helped CIA Outmanoeuvre Europe on Torture," *Wikileaks* (2015), <https://wikileaks.org/nsa-germany/>.

¹⁵¹⁶ "Merkel to Seek 'No Spy Deal' within EU as Well as with U.S.," *Reuters*, October 25 2013.

¹⁵¹⁷ James Risen, "Downplayed by CIA, Paris Incident Has Wide Impact : France: Economic Spying Affair Faded Quickly from News. Officials Now Admit It Severely Hampered Agency.," *LA Times*, October 11 1995.

Obama denied the US had such a no spying agreement with any other state, raising the question whether the Five Eyes community spy actually on one another.¹⁵¹⁸ Obama was being truthful, but disingenuous in asserting that a no-spying agreement between the Five Eyes members does not exist. It is clear a 'gentleman's agreement' does exist. Internal US documents reveal that Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) authorises spying on every state in the world except fellow Five Eyes members.¹⁵¹⁹ A Presidential Working Group refers to informal arrangements "with a very small number of governments," where there are "understandings on this issue" based on, "decades of familiarity, transparency, and past performance between the relevant policy and intelligence communities."¹⁵²⁰ In other words, the Anglospheric security community operated on trust and informality, as difficult such a concept might be for individuals more attuned to a meme-complex that places an emphasis on legal formalities as the basis of relationships. A Canadian document confirms this interpretation, referring to "a long-standing convention" of the Anglosphere core allies not to spy on one another.¹⁵²¹

The level of integrated collaboration through joint operations and systems would make it difficult if not impossible for the Anglosphere core SIGINT agencies to spy on one another. More significantly, the risk of exposure would shatter trust and the working basis of partnership. An audit of NSA operations by the US Office of the Inspector General (OIG) makes it clear that the level of integration of Five Eyes personnel in the internal workings of the agency is intimate. In fact, the perceived risk was in not integrating further and the OIG made recommendations to address this.¹⁵²²

Outside of the Anglospheric core, a 'gentleman's' no-spying agreement does not exist with the possible exception of Singapore, as discussed. The documents leaked by Snowden

¹⁵¹⁸ Zeke J Miller, "Obama: "There's No Country Where We Have a No Spy Agreement.", " *Time*, February 11 2014.

¹⁵¹⁹ US FISC, "In the Matter of Foreign Governments, Foreign Factions, Foreign Entities and Foreign Based Political Organisations. Dni/Ag 702(G) Certification 2010-a 16 July," (Washington DC2010).

¹⁵²⁰ Richard A Clarke, J Michael Morell, and et al, "Liberty and Security in a Changing World," in *President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies* (White House2013), 175.

¹⁵²¹ Canada. Parliament. "Written Answer Ministry of National Defence to Mr Scott (Toronto Danforth)" Q-771 19 June 2012.

¹⁵²² US NSA, Semi-Annual Report to Congress 1 April 2019 to 30 September 2019 (Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 2019), 5.

confirm a US tiered status of relationships. Below the Five Eyes group are thirty-three states that the US deems “third parties”¹⁵²³ and with whom it has varying degrees of cooperation.¹⁵²⁴ A third party no-spying arrangement does not exist. And third parties are sometimes caught spying on the US. For example, Germany was revealed to have spied on the US.¹⁵²⁵ Similar activity was pursued by France, which was found to have spied on the US, Canada, NZ, and Australia.¹⁵²⁶ Despite the strong US-Israeli security relationship, there are persistent cases and allegations of Israeli spying, including the Pollard case,¹⁵²⁷ the Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman cases,¹⁵²⁸ and more recent allegations.¹⁵²⁹ An internal US National Intelligence Estimate ranks Israel as the third most aggressive intelligence agency against the US.¹⁵³⁰

5.5 Closer Cooperation

5.5.1 Introduction

The post-9/11 period witnessed a rapid expansion of fora and institutions beyond the military and intelligence communities. When George W. Bush and Tony Blair stood together outside the President's ranch in Crawford, Texas, it marked a step change in the nature of the security community. The previous sections have examined the Anglosphere's ability to overcome disagreements, to coalesce on key issues and act together. Referring to the UK, Bush expressed sentiments that explain and underlie the burgeoning fora.

¹⁵²³ Greenwald, 123.

¹⁵²⁴ Note Greenwald conflates Tier B Computer Network collaboration with Third Party Status.

¹⁵²⁵ Maik Baumgärtner, Martin Knobbe, and Jörg Schindler, "German Intelligence Also Snooped on White House," *Der Speigel*, June 22 2017.

¹⁵²⁶ US: Adam Rawnsley, "Espionage? Moi?," *FP Magazine*, July 2 2013.. Canada: Tu Than Ha, "French Spy Software Targeted Canada," *Globe and Mail*, March 21 2014. Australia: Philip Darling, Philip Darling, "French Spying Agency Tapping Australia's Communications," *The Saturday Paper*, July 11 2015. NZ: Michael Field, "France Spying on New Zealand," *Stuff.co.nz* (2013), <http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/europe/8883843/France-spying-on-New-Zealand-report>.

¹⁵²⁷ Stuart E Eizenstat, "Loving Israel. Warts and All," *Foreign Policy* (1990): 97-98.

¹⁵²⁸ Stéphane Lefebvre, "Spying on Friends?: The Franklin Case, AIPAC, and Israel," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 19, no. 4 (2006).

¹⁵²⁹ Jeff Stein, "Israel's Aggressive Spying in the U.S. Mostly Hushed Up," *Newsweek*, May 8 2014.

¹⁵³⁰ Glenn Greenwald and Andrew Fishman, "Netanyahu's Spying Denials Contradicted by Secret NSA Documents," *The Intercept* (2015), <https://theintercept.com/2015/03/25/netanyahus-spying-denial-directly-contradicted-secret-nsa-documents/>.

Today, the bond between our peoples... is stronger than ever. Our nations share more than just a common language and a common history. We also share common interests and a common perspective on the important challenges of our times.¹⁵³¹

This common perspective manifested itself, not just in the deepening military and intelligence fora, but also in the growth of collaboration between all five states on an expanding range of issues throughout the following two decades. The Anglosphere core members have moved to collaborate on a number of perceived security problems, ranging from cyber threats and legal alignment to migration and socio-economic issues. The growth of exclusive quintilateral Anglospheric arrangements appears to start in 2001 with the Five Countries Conference. Following 9/11, there was a sustained expansion of standing conventions focussed on securitised issues outside of the military sphere.

5.5.2 The semi-transparent nexus

Research by Australian academic Tim Legrand into Anglospheric policy coordination produced a ground-breaking paper that revealed the existence of a web of predominantly socio-economic trans-governmental policy fora.¹⁵³² Further research by Legrand in 2015 identified additional fora, but transparency issues prevented Legrand from identifying the names of some organisations. As Legrand says,

with little else to signify the existence of a network, the mundane moniker operates to obscure the networks. Second, even once they are identified, the networks remain opaque. The availability of information of the nature, content and outcomes of the networks is extremely limited. Few have publicly available outcome reports, and these tend to be 'buried' in the recesses of government web portals.¹⁵³³

The tables below update and expand Legrand's work in terms of additional fora, organisational names, structure and inception. The fora are subdivided into two groupings:

¹⁵³¹ "Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair - Crawford, Texas," news release, April 6, 2002, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020406-3.html>.

¹⁵³² Timothy Legrand, "The Merry Mandarins of Windsor: Policy Transfer and Transgovernmental Networks in the Anglosphere," *Policy studies* 33, no. 6 (2012): 523-40.

¹⁵³³ Ibid., 973-91-Table1.

those with a distinctive security aspect usually involving an intelligence element and those of a more socio-economic nature, although intelligence aspects are pervasive. In both categories it is possible, if not likely, that some of these conventions are sub-groups of another and the list is almost certainly not definitive. There is a lack of transparency in respect of minutes and oversight with government press releases frequently removed from websites after short intervals. Additional tables document the known (or best known) start date, thereby illustrating the development of a nexus.

5.5.3 Civilian led security fora

There has been a steady growth in civilian-led security related fora since 2001. The civil services of the five states established the 5CC as a high-level transnational body that has in turn facilitated the formation of the other fora in conjunction with the intelligence community. The 5CC is run by “Agency Heads Committee” consisting of senior Anglosphere core interior ministry civil servants to empowered to provide “programme sign off [and] strategic direction.” As the 5CC agenda and remit expanded, a secretariat was created to that oversee the extensive array of working groups that, by 2011, had risen to eight Working Groups and four “Network” Groups.¹⁵³⁴

In 2017, the existence of the 5CC became a little more transparent with the acknowledgement of a “Five Country Partnership,” centred on ministerial meetings to discuss migration and border security issues but stressed shared values too.

Our five-country partnership, founded after the Second World War and strengthened during the Cold War, is more relevant today than ever as we deal with the relentless threats of terrorism, violent extremism, cyber-attacks, and international instability, while retaining our deep commitment to the shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.¹⁵³⁵

¹⁵³⁴ Jean-Marc Giant, "Overview of the FCC Data Sharing Group," in *Seventh Symposium on ICAO MRTDs, Biometrics & Security Standards* (Montreal2011).

¹⁵³⁵ DHS, "Five Country Ministerial 2017: Joint Communiqué," (2017), <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/28/five-country-ministerial-2017-joint-communiqu>.

This was a reference to the Five Country Ministerial (FCM), established in 2015 to provide a degree of ministerial oversight to the expanding activities of the 5CC. The communique listed the areas the Ministers were working on that included migration, refugees, border management/security, aviation security, cybersecurity, and encryption.¹⁵³⁶ The role of the 5CC remained intact, controlling the FCM agenda and directing work through a revamped 5CC Agency Heads grouping referred to as 'FCM Sherpas', all with Director General status.¹⁵³⁷ Beneath the Sherpas, an enlarged Secretariat was renamed the Executive Steering Group (ESG), liaising via monthly teleconferences, and meeting in person annually.¹⁵³⁸ The tasks undertaken by the 5CC expanded, spawning more Working Groups and off-shoots and facilitating regular close coordination among the five state's public servants at all levels.¹⁵³⁹

Organisation	2001	2004	2006	2009	2011	2012	2015	2016	2018
Five Countries Conference 5CC	AUSCAN NZUKUS								
Five Nations Consular Colloque	AUSCAN NZUKUS								
Five Nations Passport Group		AUSCAN NZUKUS							
Migration 5 (M5)		AUSCAN NZUKUS							
Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group (Strategic Alliance Group)			AUSCAN NZUKUS						
Usual 5			AUSCAN NZUKUS						
Quintet Attorneys General				AUSCAN NZUKUS					
Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (Ottawa 5 - J5)					AUSCAN NZUKUS				Met w/o NZ
Critical 5						AUSCAN NZUKUS			
Five Country Ministerial							AUSCAN NZUKUS		
Border 5 (B5)								AUSCAN NZUKUS	
Aviation Security 5									AUSCAN NZUKUS

Table 11 Anglosphere Core Civilian Security Fora 1992 - 2018

Dark Grey shading signifies point at which the arrangement became quintilateral

¹⁵³⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵³⁷ "Australian Senate Question 947 (Overseas Travel Undertaken)," in Home Affairs Portfolio (Canberra: Australian Parliament, 2019), 38.

¹⁵³⁸ Ibid., 14.

¹⁵³⁹ "IRCC Deputy Minister Transition Binder 2019 – Key International Stakeholders," news release, 2019, <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/transparency/transition-binders/deputy-minister-2019/international-stakeholders.html>.

Before the creation of the FCM, some ministerial input existed in the form of the Quintet of Attorneys General established in 2009 and created in response to the legal implications of the five's collaboration on diverse issues.¹⁵⁴⁰ The Quintet usually meets in tandem with the FCM.¹⁵⁴¹ Ministers discuss a variety of security-related issues and then pass over proposed policies to the Quintet for a legal opinion and ways to adopt common positions.¹⁵⁴² The latter includes obvious national security issues such as including counterterrorism, foreign investment in critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, refugee migration, visa-free travel and information sharing but also covers social issues such as family law and violence, over-representation of ethnic minorities in the criminal justice system, and vulnerable witnesses.¹⁵⁴³ In 2016, the FCM expanded to include the immigration remit and the inclusion of Immigration Ministers and Departments within its operations.¹⁵⁴⁴

¹⁵⁴⁰ "Official Communiqué - Quintet of Attorneys-General Meeting," news release, 2018, <https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/quintet-communique.pdf>.

¹⁵⁴¹ It appears the QAG might sometimes attend FCM meetings.

¹⁵⁴² "NZ Contributes to Global Security with Five Country Ministerial and Quintet," news release, August 30, 2018, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-contributes-global-security-five-country-ministerial-and-quintet>.

¹⁵⁴³ See: "Five Country Ministerial and Quintet of Attorneys General Joint Communiqué," February 18, 2016, News Release, US Dept Homeland Security.

¹⁵⁴⁴ Roguski Siân, "Information on Trade & International Relationships in the Immigration Portfolio," NZ Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment (2017), 12.

Organisation	Acronym	Purpose	Members
Five Countries Conference	FCC 5CC	Citizenship	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
Five Nations Consular Colloque	FNCC	Consular sharing coordination	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
Five Nations Passport Conference/Group		Passports	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
Migration 5	M5	Migration security	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group	FELEG	Coordinated law enforcement: cyber fraud, drugs, crime	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
Usual 5	U5	Cyber Security	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
The Quintet of Attorneys General		Legality security direction	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
The Ottawa Five - Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement	J5	Cryptocurrencies & Tax Crime	Australia, Canada, UK, US, (NZ) + NL (2018)
The Critical Five	C5	Infrastructure defence	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
Five Country Ministerial	FCM	General Security	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
Border 5	B5	Customs coordination	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ
Aviation Security Five	AS5	Aviation security coordination	Australia, Canada, UK, US, NZ

Table 12 Anglosphere Core Civilian Security Fora Functions 1992 - 2018

Dark Grey shading signifies point at which the arrangement became quintilateral

Both the Quintet and the 5CC have created or facilitated the creation of new institutionalised bodies in the form of new standalone fora and cross-functional entities. These include the Migration Five (with its own secretariat in NZ),¹⁵⁴⁵ the Border 5, the Critical 5,¹⁵⁴⁶ the Ottawa 5,¹⁵⁴⁷ the Usual 5,¹⁵⁴⁸ the Five Nations Consular Colloque,¹⁵⁴⁹ and the Aviation Security 5.¹⁵⁵⁰ The exact composition and remit of these fora is uncertain with Governments reluctant to provide transparency.¹⁵⁵¹ Bodies such as Border 5 and Migration 5

¹⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.¹⁵⁴⁶ "International Critical Infrastructure Engagement," Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, <https://www.cisa.gov/international-critical-infrastructure-engagement>.¹⁵⁴⁷ Australian Taxation Office, "One Year in, J5 Making a Difference," *Australian Gov Media Centre* (2019), <https://www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/Media-releases/One-Year-In,-J5-Making-a-Difference/>.¹⁵⁴⁸ Christopher Krebs. Oral evidence: "5g: The Impact on National Security, Intellectual Property, and Competition" May 14 2019, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 5.<https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Krebs%20Testimony.pdf>¹⁵⁴⁹ UK. HC. "Global Security: UK-US Relations," Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2009-10, Annex C. <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114we05.htm>¹⁵⁵⁰ US DHS, "Readout from Secretary Nielsen's Trip to Australia for the Five Country Ministerial," *DHS News* (2018), <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/08/30/readout-secretary-nielsen-s-trip-australia-five-country-ministerial>.¹⁵⁵¹ UK Home Office, "Border Five - Freedom of Information Request," (2017), <https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/369108/response/1073968/attach/html/3/IR%2041745.pdf>

have assumed operating transnational functions in addition to the adoption of common standards and practices.

There are a plethora of fora and related Working Groups that have moved beyond discussion to policy co-ordination and implementation. Fora such as Migration 5, although under the overall 5CC umbrella have in turn created their own specialist working groups such as the Migration Five Data Sharing Working Groups, and the Immigration and Refugee Health Working Group.¹⁵⁵² Border 5, in turn, has a series of Working Groups including a HR resources forum and a Deep Dive [Analysis] forum and standing Heads of Intelligence conference (HINT).¹⁵⁵³ Other Working Groups associated with the 5CC and FCM framework are the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) grouping and the FCM Digital Industry Engagement Senior Official Group.¹⁵⁵⁴ Another body that has transitioned from a discussion based forum to an action orientated operation is FELEG, bringing the FBI together with equivalent Anglospheric core bodies such as the UK National Crime Agency and the RCMP.¹⁵⁵⁵ It too features quinpartite CEO meetings and Working Groups.¹⁵⁵⁶ These are focussed on sharing intelligence, standardising practice and collaboration on joint operations.¹⁵⁵⁷ As such, interaction occurs on a daily basis.¹⁵⁵⁸

.html. Also Jacqueline Magnet, "Biometric Data Set to Be Shared with Five Eyes Intelligence Network," *The Australian*, March 4 2017.

¹⁵⁵² For M5 see: Commonwealth of Australia Senate, Question No. 947 Senator Kristina Keneally 14 November (Canberra 2019), 5-11-2017. For Refugee Group see: Martin Belinda and Paul Douglas, "Intergovernmental Collaboration for the Health and Wellbeing of Refugees Settling in Australia," *Public Health Research Practice* 28, no. 1 (2018).

¹⁵⁵³ Border Force UK, "Border Five Heads of Intelligence Conference (Hint)," *Partner Bulletin* (2013), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/204934/1PartnerBulletinContent_May2013Final.pdf.

¹⁵⁵⁴ Kristina Keneally (Senator) November 19, 2019. Senate, Commonwealth of Australia. Question No. 947. 2019. Q 8-4-2018 & 21-4-18

¹⁵⁵⁵ See: "Former Director General of the UK's National Crime Agency Joins Arcanum," *Arcanum Global Intelligence* (2016), <https://arcanumglobal.com/news/former-director-general-of-the-uks-national-crime-agency-joins-arcanum/?pdf-template>; UK NCA, "National Crime Agency Annual Report & Accounts 2015-2016," (London: HoC, 2016), 26.

¹⁵⁵⁶ Chris Dawson, "Australian Crime Commission Annual Report 2014-15," (Canberra: Crime Commission, 2015), 126-27.

¹⁵⁵⁷ US FBI, "Cyber Solidarity - Five Nations, One Mission," *FBI News* (2008), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/march/cybergroup_031708.

¹⁵⁵⁸ NCA, "NCA Director General at Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group," *Gov.uk*, <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/875-nca-dg-at-five-eyes-law-enforcement-group-in-washington>.

5.5.4 Anglosphere bilateral ‘Strategic Dialogue’

The growth of quintilateral fora has been accompanied by a recent trend for bilateral ministerial ‘Strategic Dialogue’ arrangements. These supplement the pre-existing strong bilateral exchanges in the form of the UK-US ministerial links, the Canada-US ministerial links, and the Australia-US ministerial links (AUSMIN) detailed previously. These links are long-standing as illustrated by an October 2018 speech in which the UK Foreign Secretary sought to allay post-Brexit fears that the UK would be detached from Europe by announcing he had asked for direct, secure telephone lines to his counterparts in Berlin and Paris. In doing, so he revealed that the only permanent direct secure lines were to the five Foreign Ministers of the Anglospheric security community.¹⁵⁵⁹

Name of dyad	2010	2013	2017
AUKMIN	Australia & UK		
NZUK Strategic Dialogue		NZ & UK	
NZUS Strategic Dialogue		NZ & US	
CANUK Strategic Dialogue			Canada & UK

Table 13 Anglosphere Bilateral Ministerial arrangements 1992-2018

The new fora provide for face to face bilateral high-level meetings involving the Defence and Foreign Affairs ministers. These links provided the basis for a new transnational 'Five Eyes Council of Foreign Ministers.'¹⁵⁶⁰ A similar new Five Eyes Defence Minister forum met in February 2018.¹⁵⁶¹ This Defence Minister's forum has since reaffirmed a commitment to enhance collaboration on matters of security and stressed the need to work with “regional partners and institutions in shaping globally and across the Indo-Pacific a stable and secure, economically resilient community, where the sovereign rights of all states are respected.”¹⁵⁶²

¹⁵⁵⁹ Japan was also added. See: Jeremy Hunt (Foreign Secretary UK) Speech: “An Invisible Chain” October 31, 2018. FCO Press Release.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/an-invisible-chain-speech-by-the-foreign-secretary>

¹⁵⁶⁰ A de facto Five Eyes Foreign Minister Grouping came into being in 2020. See: Ankit Panda, “Top US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand Officials Discuss Hong Kong,” *The Diplomat* (2020), <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/top-us-uk-australia-canada-new-zealand-officials-discuss-hong-kong/>

¹⁵⁶¹ MoD NZ, Ministerial Overseas Travel 27-11-2017 to 21-01-2019: Hon Ron Mark –Release of Cabinet Documents: [NZ] ACB-18-Min-0092 (Wellington2019).

¹⁵⁶² “Five Eyes Defence Ministers’ Meeting,” *Gov.uk News* (2020), <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/five-eyes-defence-ministers-meeting>.

5.5.5 Civilian-led socio-economic fora

There has also been an expansion of fora dealing with socio-economic related issues, usually non-ministerial comprising the civil service element of the political policy establishment. In their earlier incarnations, the fora tended to be consultative but have evolved to become action orientated.

Organisation	Acronym	Purpose	Members
Belmont Conference		Employment, Training	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand, Ireland
Six Countries (Nations) Conference (Windsor Group)*		Social Security - Health	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand, (+ Ireland)
Senior International Forum	SIF	Military Veterans Health Well-being	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand, Ireland
Quadrilateral Group	Quads	Food standards, plant biosecurity.	Australia, Canada, US, New Zealand
International Census Forum	ICF	National Statistics standards	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand, Ireland
Immigration & Refugee Health Working Group	IRHWG	Immigrant Health Screening	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
International Heads of Child Support Agency Group		Child Support Policies	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
Vancouver Group		Intellectual Property Standards	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
Five Treasuries*	5T	Treasury coordination	Australia, Canada, UK, New Zealand (+Ireland)
Four Countries Conference		Electoral systems & practice	Australia, Canada, UK, New Zealand
The Rev Sec Group		Tax Revenue & Securities protocols	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
International Supervisors Forum	ISF	Anti Money Laundering	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand
Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (Ottawa 5)*	J5	Tax evasion operations	Australia, Canada, UK, US (+NL)
The Anti Trust Cooperation Framework	The Framework	Anti trust	Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand

Table 14 Civilian led 'non security' related Anglosphere Fora Remit

* Members other than Anglosphere Core as denoted

The Six Countries Group (originally the Five Countries Group) and the Belmont Conference have their origins in the 1970s and 80s as occasional discussion groups.¹⁵⁶³ By the turn of the century, the nature of these groupings changed. Between 2007-2009, a meeting

¹⁵⁶³ Different to the 5CC that continues to exist as the 5CC-FCM framework

of the Six Countries Group and the Belmont Conference¹⁵⁶⁴ produced a common policy platform known as the "Windsor Arrangement for Mutual Cooperation On Benefit Fraud."¹⁵⁶⁵

Securitisation of a whole raft of non-military issues has seen a growth in Anglosphere core (Table 14) in response to perceived threats from global terrorism, organised crime and state actors such the PRC, North Korea, Iran and Russia.

¹⁵⁶⁴ AG Dept Human Services, *Annual Report 2008-09* (Canberra: AG, 2009), 36.

¹⁵⁶⁵ "Countries Band Together to Fight Benefit Fraud," *Abeceder News* (2009), www.abeceder.co.uk/newsarticle_4298.php.

Name	1975	1978	1988	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2007	2008	2011	2013	2014	2020
Belmont Conference	AUS CAN US	NZ						IRE						
Six Countries Conference Windsor Grp (i)			AUS CAN NZUK US					IRE?						
Senior International Forum				AUS CAN NZUK US										
Quadrilateral Group (Quads) (ii)					AUS CAN NZUS									
International Census Forum					AUS NZ	CAN UK	US		IRE					
Immigration & Refugee Health Working Grp								AUS CAN NZUK US						
Internat Heads Child Support Agency Group								AUS CAN NZUK						
Vancouver Group (iii)									AUS CAN UK (NZ)		(US)			
Five Treasuries										AUS NZUK		CAN IRE		
Four Countries Conference										AUS CAN NZUK				
Rev-Sec Group										AUS CAN NZUK				
International Supervisors Forum											AUS CAN NZUK US			
J5 (Ottawa 5) (iv)											AUS CAN NZUK US			
Anti Trust Cooperation Framework												AUS CAN NZUK US		

Table 15 Anglosphere Civilian Socio-Economic Fora Progress

(Dark Grey shading signifies point at which the arrangement became quintilateral).

(i) Previously the Five Countries Group until joined by Ireland (not to be confused with the SCC).

(ii) UK & Ireland appear to attend as observer-contributors

(iii) Australia represents NZ & undertakes work for US. (iv) Ottawa 5 became J5, with the Netherlands joining & NZ not participating

Viewed through this lens, the creation of the range Anglosphere bodies listed above fits a pattern — the need for collaboration against a perceived communal threat. Thus, intellectual property theft produced a communal response in the form of the Vancouver Group¹⁵⁶⁶ and public warnings from the Five Eyes Intelligence agencies and the publication of a Joint Five Eyes Research guidance document.¹⁵⁶⁷ Another example is the securitisation of the electoral process through the Four Countries Conference.¹⁵⁶⁸ More recently, all five security agencies of the Anglosphere core have collaborated on electoral security as a group¹⁵⁶⁹

The extension of the Anglosphere core transnational bodies accelerated after 9/11 (See Table 15). It has extended to areas affecting immigration, treasury, census data and the bio-security of food in respect of animal and plant genetics. The effect is to parallel the scale of social interaction and collaboration in the intelligence and military fora.¹⁵⁷⁰ Most recently, a 'Five Eyes' grouping representing the competition agencies created an antitrust 'framework.'¹⁵⁷¹

This trend speaks to a deepening collective response to external threats and an ever-increasing multitude of special relationships across a wide variety of societal issues. These in turn, serve to institutionalise the relationships and provide the framework not just for the development of communal mindset but provide the forum for ongoing social interaction involving not just military personnel but civil servants, scientists, elected politicians. It is worth re-emphasising that institutions rest upon informal voluntary arrangements and have no legal power to create or enforce binding policies on participating states.

¹⁵⁶⁶ IPO, *Artificial Intelligence* (London: Intellectual Property Office, 2019), 9.

¹⁵⁶⁷ NCSC, "Joint Report on Publicly Available Hacking Tools," *Gov.uk*, <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools>.

¹⁵⁶⁸ Tom McIlroy, "Australian Electoral Commission Strengthens Defences against Foreign Hacking," *Financial Review*, April 30 2018.

¹⁵⁶⁹ Sam Trendall, "Five Eyes Cyber Summit – Five Things We Learned," *PublicTechnology.net*, <https://www.publictechnology.net/articles/features/five-eyes-cyber-summit-%E2%80%93-five-things-we-learned>.

¹⁵⁷⁰ For example, the ICF has 6-12 active WG's. See:ONS, "How the Office for National Statistics Is Ensuring the 2021 Census Will Serve the Public," *Gov.uk*, <https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/censustransformationprogramme/census2021outputs/nationalstatisticsaccreditation/howtheofficeformationalstatisticsisensuringthe2021censuswillservethepublic>.

¹⁵⁷¹ Agrawal, "Five Eyes Sign New Framework to Tackle Anti-Competitive Practices," *Medianama* (2020), <https://www.medianama.com/2020/09/223-five-eyes-anti-competition-framework/>.

5.6. The Memetic Anglosphere - Communal identity & Legitimacy

5.6.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters have focussed on the growth of relationships and the rise of various institutions that have developed to give shape to an Anglospheric security community. Focussing too much on structure or even high-level personal relationships can detract from the essential foundations of a security community. These are the shared cultural affinities related to socio-political values. According to Deutsch, they should be reflected in a community's practices and institutions and if they are not, tensions will bring these to the surface.

It is rare that, in the mundane course of everyday political life, philosophical matters relating to fundamental political values rise to the fore in common discourse. The debate concerning the UK's membership of the EU did this, raising questions of legitimacy, the sovereignty of the people and the 'cultural' nature of the EU verses the 'Anglosphere.' The accusations and counteraccusations by 'Leavers' and 'Remainers' about these issues provide insights into the Anglosphere by way of comparison to the EU and the claims made about it.

5.6.2 Memes and Genes: the EU and the Anglospheric security community

In the Brexit debate and its aftermath, supporters of the UK remaining in the EU sought to promote the EU's 'multiculturalism.' An Anglospheric alternative was framed as the electorate's nostalgic wish for racial kinship with a white Anglosphere core. This narrative was flawed since the Europe's multiculturalism is essentially 'Eurocentric.' In the EU, the 'mirage' of the Anglosphere's advancement of people of colour 'to the top' is not replicated. Despite large numbers of non-indigenous immigrants having been established in many member states since the 1950s, people of colour are not visible in the higher echelons of EU society.

This is not to say racial barriers to advancement have been eliminated in the UK and the core Anglosphere states, but the situation is markedly different compared to the EU. In the Anglospheric core, immigrants both of colour and 'whiteness' have advanced to the top in

society. Indeed, it may be that the Anglospheric core is the only place in the world where immigrants are able to advance in society and as such it could be a defining feature — the very characteristic of Stephenson's Neo-Atlantean phyle. The contrast between the EU and the Anglospheric core may not be evident to many monoracial white Europeans, it is not lost on those of non-European origin, especially those from the Commonwealth. In this respect the UK's Brexit decision and the nature of the EU as a comparator, provides interesting insights into the multi-racial, values-based identity of the Anglosphere.

Nalapat advanced the idea of the 'blood of the mind' as the key to understanding the Anglosphere and why his own fellow Indian citizens are drawn to it. In 2011, Nalapat made the point continental Europe excludes those with an Indian ethnicity who "are seldom given an opportunity to compete — on equal terms — with [European] natives." By way of example, Nalapat referenced the experience of Indian born business executive Anshu Jain who suffered widespread opposition to his becoming the CEO of Deutsche Bank on the basis he was a 'non-German.' This experience was in contrast to those of Asian immigrants to the Anglosphere core states, Nalapat observed.

In the academic life of the United States—as indeed in the corporate boardroom—the proportion of those with an ethnic background that is rooted within the Indian subcontinent is no longer derisory. Pepsi's Indira Nooyi and Citi's Vikram Pandit exemplify this, as do the thousands of Indian academics in the United States (and, to a lesser degree, the United Kingdom).¹⁵⁷²

Nalapat's comments reflect a wide Indian perception they are not welcome and are unlikely to advance in Germany. One factor was the anti-Asian slogan "Kinder statt Inder - [our] children not Indians" as part of an education programme to argue German children should be trained to avoid Indian IT engineers emigrating to Germany.¹⁵⁷³ Since Nalapat's, article the racial divergence between the EU and the Anglosphere has widened. The multi-ethnic, non-European character of the US and UK's commercial sectors has increased.¹⁵⁷⁴ In

¹⁵⁷² Nalapat.

¹⁵⁷³ Patrick Bartlett, "Germans Debate Technology V Immigration," *BBC News* (2000), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/704539.stm>.

¹⁵⁷⁴ Suki Sandhu, "Twelve Ceos from the UK, US and Canada's Biggest Listed Companies Are from Ethnic Minorities " *The HR Director* (2020), <https://www.thehrdirector.com/business->

addition to Pepsi and Citi, Indian CEOs run a host of large US listed companies including Google, Microsoft, Adobe, Cantor Fitzgerald, and MasterCard. In the UK, Indian CEOs oversee Diageo, Global SemiConductors, NetApp, plus the London Stock Exchange and the Financial Conduct Authority. In UK academia, thought by Nalapat to trail the US in 2011, the growth of Indian origin tenured academics has seen an exponential growth and by 2020 included 130 professors and 730 senior lecturers/researchers in leading universities.¹⁵⁷⁵

Writing after Brexit in 2020, another Indian based IR academic, C. Raja Mohan endorses Nalapat's observations saying, Indians have "unhesitatingly embraced the English speaking world."¹⁵⁷⁶ Mohan goes on to note that because of

...the relative openness of the Anglosphere, the Indian diaspora is thriving in these nations and is very much part of the political life in the English-speaking world. Kamala Harris will soon be sworn in as US Vice President. Three of Johnson's cabinet rank ministers are Indian and four of Justin Trudeau's ministers are of Indian origin. Indians are among the fastest-growing minorities in Australia and New Zealand. Besides politics, Indians occupy countless positions in the national bureaucracies, private sector, and universities of the Anglosphere.¹⁵⁷⁷

Nalapat's point about far greater obstacles in the EU are borne out. Nalapat might be encouraged by the news that his cited example of the obstacles to an Asian CEO of Deutsche Bank has twice been overcome, but disappointed learn it was only by creating a new co-CEO position occupied by an ethnic German to act as a minder.¹⁵⁷⁸ As Nalapat puts it, ethnicity has been a barrier to heading a "pure German institution."¹⁵⁷⁹

This is symptomatic of a wider problem across the EU and its constituent states in terms of inclusivity. There has, for example, been no political breakthrough for the Turkish

news/diversity-and-equality-inclusion/twelve-ceos-uk-us-canadas-biggest-listed-companies-ethnic-minorities/

¹⁵⁷⁵ Prasun Sonwalkar, "More Indian Academics Join UK Universities," *Hindustan Times*, January 28 2020. Indian academics are firmly established in other Anglosphere states. For example Australia where one example will suffice: The India-Australia Institute run by University of Melbourne with at least fifteen Indian origin staff.

¹⁵⁷⁶ C. Raja Mohan, "Idea of English-Speaking Nations Cooperating with Each Other Offers Possibilities That India Can Take Advantage Of," *The Indian Express*, December 29 2020.

¹⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷⁸ "Speculation About Indian Becoming Deutsche Bank Ceo Triggers Debate in Germany," *The Economic Times*, June 18 2010.

Gastarbeiter communities in Germany.¹⁵⁸⁰ Nor is there any meaningful presence in the upper echelons of French government of France's large colonial muslim population since their arrival in the 1950s.¹⁵⁸¹ There is no Muslim Mayor of Paris unlike London where an English person of Pakistani origin defeated his Black English main challenger. In short, the presence of individuals of non-European ethnicity in senior government positions or in the European Commission is negligible and usually non-existent.¹⁵⁸² Perhaps the most revealing demonstration of the EU's lack of non-white inclusion occurred in the aftermath of the UK's departure from the European Parliament. It exposed white European domination both in terms of MEPs and their support and policy staff.¹⁵⁸³ The negative experience of a newly elected black MEP representing the UK's Green Party underlined the lack of racial diversity and unconscious prejudice in the parliament itself.¹⁵⁸⁴

The racial divide between white Europe and the Anglosphere core states first raised by Nalapat has been accentuated by the progress of not just Indians, but by other non-white ethnic minorities in the UK. The UK's Cabinet in 2021 illustrates that 'Anglo-saxon' racialisation is a wholly inadequate explanation of the UK's inclination towards an Anglospheric future. The composition of UK cabinet as of 2021, is not as Vucetic described a mirage that disguises the genetic "descendants of historical Anglo-saxons [are] at the top."¹⁵⁸⁵ The New York born Prime Minister is of part Turkish - French - German ancestry, the Chancellor is of Punjabi ethnicity, the Home Secretary's family originates from Gurjat, India, the Foreign Secretary is the son of a Jewish-Czech refugee, the Business Secretary is of Ghanaian origin, the Health Minister is of Punjabi Pakistan origin, and the Attorney General, is of Indian and Mauritian parentage. Heading up the UK's COP 26 Climate change efforts as President is Aloo Sharma, a first-generation immigrant from Uttar Pradesh. In addition there,

¹⁵⁷⁹ Nalapat.

¹⁵⁸⁰ Sener Aktürk, "The Turkish Minority in German Politics: Trends, Diversification of Representation, and Policy Implications," *Insight Turkey* (2010).

¹⁵⁸¹ "French Politics' Lack of Diversity ", *EuroNews*, March 23 2012; Rachel Donadio, "France Is Officially Color-Blind. Reality Isn't," *The Atlantic* (2020), <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/07/france-race-racism-grande-ecoles/613924/>.

¹⁵⁸² As of December 2021 Sweden had one Cabinet member of Christian Turkish origin, the Netherlands has one member of Kurd-Turkish origin, France a deeply Catholic member of Armenian-Maltese, Algerian origin. Germany's Cabinet is all-white as was Poland, Italy, Spain and so on.

¹⁵⁸³ Rajnish Singh, "A 'Sad Day' for Racial Diversity in the EU," *The Parliament Magazine (EU)* (2020), <https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/a-sad-day-for-racial-diversity-in-the-eu>.

¹⁵⁸⁴ Nazia Parveen, "Magid Magid Incident Highlights Eu's Race Problem, Say Activists," *The Guardian*, July 4 2019.

¹⁵⁸⁵ Vucetic, 132.

are at least five other more junior Ministers with African (Nigeria and Sierra Leone), Middle Eastern (Kurdish) or Asian (Sri Lanka) ethnicities.¹⁵⁸⁶ The religious views reflected include agnostic, Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist outlooks. These senior politicians look to the Anglosphere, not to the EU for the UK's future.

Despite this and the EU's 'whiteness,' opponents of the UK's departure have sought to portray support for an Anglospheric future as motivated by race and imperial nostalgia.¹⁵⁸⁷ Robert Gildea and French historian called Brexit "the revenge of colonial nostalgia" underpinned by a nationalistic right-wing response to immigration.¹⁵⁸⁸ Danny Dorling and Sally Tomlinson saw attempts to create a non-EU future as "the last gasp of Empire" that included nineteenth century racist eugenics as a factor. According to them, one factor creating current notions of Anglo-saxon racial superiority was the requirement for 1970s Oxfordshire state-school children being "required, once a year, to build Anglo-Saxon houses out of lollipop sticks, with fake thatch on top made from straw."¹⁵⁸⁹ Similar points are made by Satnam Virdee and Brendan McGeever, who refer to the internal 'others' of racialized minorities and migrants by 'English' people who long for empire.¹⁵⁹⁰

According to economist Edoardo Campanella and former Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Marta Dassù,

Nostalgia and nationalism become intimately linked... In the eyes of a hard-core eurosceptic, the EU represents an abrupt break from an uninterrupted history of British progress and glory starting with the introduction of the Magna Carta in 1215.¹⁵⁹¹

¹⁵⁸⁶ As of December 2021 other notable figures are Nadhim Zahawi Covid Vaccine Deployment Born in Iraq. (Kurdish) Min of State; Ranil Jayawardena Under Sec of State International Trade (Sri Lankan India parents); Kemi Badenoch Under Sec of State for Equalities (of Nigerian parents); James Cleverly. Minister of State for Middle East and N Africa Of Sierra Leone parentage; (EX) Nusrat Munir Ul-Ghan Under Sec State Aviation and Marine (born Kasmir Pakistan).

¹⁵⁸⁷ Nicholas Pearce and Michael Kenny, "Brexit and the Anglosphere," *Political Insight* 10, no. 2 (2019): 7.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Robert Gildea, *Empires of the Mind: The Colonial Past and the Politics of the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 231-32.

¹⁵⁸⁹ D Dorling and S Tomlinson, "Brexit and the End of Empire: Rule Britannia," (London: Biteback Publishing Limited, 2019).

¹⁵⁹⁰ Satnam Virdee and Brendan McGeever, "Racism, Crisis, Brexit," *Ethnic and racial studies* 41, no. 10 (2018).

¹⁵⁹¹ Edoardo Campanella and Marta Dassù, "Brexit and Nostalgia," *Survival* 61, no. 3 (2019).

Campanella and Dassù are correct to highlight the importance of the Magna Carta compact in the debate, but wrong in practically any other way. Reworking the quotation (changes in italics) provides a more accurate insight.

Vanguardism and European integration become intimately linked... In the eyes of a hard-core *euroenthusiast*, *Brexit* represents an abrupt break from an uninterrupted history of *EU* progress and glory starting with the introduction of the *Monnet Method* in 1952.

5.6.3 Legitimacy and durability

The centrality of the Magna Carta compact is not limited to 'nostalgic' white British people, but on the contrary is an important part of the meme-complex of the Anglophone communities of any racial origin. Nor is it a nostalgic, and sentimental yearning for an unattainable past, but rather a continuous thread in the history of the English-speaking peoples' desire for practices and institutions that reflect the values associated with the Magna Carta compact. David Fischer in his seminal work cites the importance attached to the Magna Carta by William Penn, who in 1687 ordered its full text reprinted in Philadelphia. Penn had actively recruited German and Dutch Quakers for his expanding colony.¹⁵⁹² He was keen all Pennsylvanians, racial and non-racial Anglo-saxons immigrants alike, should understand

...not to give anything of liberty that at present they do not enjoy, but take up the good example of our ancestors, and understand that it is easy to part with or give away great privileges, but hard to be gained if lost.¹⁵⁹³

As such it is the tradition of 'rights of Englishmen' claimed regardless of gender or race and by political leaders across the Anglosphere in pursuit of their own freedoms and deployed by movements such as Chartists, Suffragettes and individuals such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela.¹⁵⁹⁴

¹⁵⁹² Fischer, 1, 430-31.

¹⁵⁹³ William Penn 1687 quoted in *ibid.*, 587.

¹⁵⁹⁴ For example see: Nelson Mandela's Statement from the Dock at the Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial. Pretoria Supreme Court, 20 April 1964

Contrary to the narrative that race and immigration was the dominant factor behind the 'Leave' vote, the biggest single reason (49%) for wanting to leave the EU was "the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK." And the biggest single reason for wanting to stay in the EU for Remain voters was economic advantage (43%), with only a small number (9%) citing "a strong attachment to the EU and its shared history, culture and traditions."¹⁵⁹⁵ The majority of the non-white electorate voted Remain, apparently convinced by the suggestion that membership of the EU was necessary to preserve their economic well-being, but also to act as a bulwark against the racial prejudice on which Brexit was claimed to be predicated.

Not all members of the UK's minority racial groups were convinced by that narrative, including the 'Anglo-saxons of colour' in the UK cabinet and their senior advisors. Aside from the extremely poor record of the EU on race, it was Anglospheric values that came to the fore. Munira Mirza, a senior policy advisor at No 10 referred to the "historic importance [of the Magna Carta] to world democracy" and suggested it should be sent to Europe as a reminder of democratic values.¹⁵⁹⁶ References to the Magna Carta form a consistent part of the narrative advanced to distinguish the UK from the EU. Member of Parliament Adam Afriyie (of Ghanian origin) asserted,

British history is long and diverse, and it is undeniable—Magna Carta, democracy, the agrarian and industrial revolutions... free trade, the abolition of slavery, emancipation, the defeat of Hitler and fascism, freedom of speech and plurality of media, and, in recent days, thank goodness, race relations and equal opportunities.¹⁵⁹⁷

Suella Braverman, of Mauritian heritage and the UK's Attorney General referred to the fundamental importance of the Magna Carta and the concept of English Common Law in shaping her belief that the UK's future lay outside of the EU.¹⁵⁹⁸

¹⁵⁹⁵ How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday... and why. Lord Ashcroft Polls June 24 2016

¹⁵⁹⁶ Munira Mirza quoted in: Matt Drake, "'Send Magna Carta' Impassioned Brexiteer Claims Charter Would Remind EU About Democracy," *Daily Express*, January 19 2018.

¹⁵⁹⁷ Adam Afriyie. Speech. Black History Month House of Commons Volume 682: October 20, 2020 Hansard

¹⁵⁹⁸ Suella Braverman, "Brexit Reflections from Suella Braverman," *Brexit Central* (2020), <https://brexitcentral.com/brexit-reflections-from-suella-braverman/>.

In short, the ideas behind the Magna Carta compact were seen as articulating an essential difference between the UK and the anti-democratic elitism of the EU. The Political Director of the Huffington Post, Medhi Hasan, a former Europhile, referred to "a crisis of democracy, accountability and legitimacy, with citizens feeling ever less connected to the decision-makers in Brussels and Strasbourg."¹⁵⁹⁹

To talk of a "democratic deficit" at the heart of the EU project would be a gross understatement. If the EU were a nation state and tried to join the EU, it would probably be rejected for not being democratic enough.¹⁶⁰⁰

Black novelist Dreda Say Mitchell, drew attention to the fact that many ethnic minorities had strong reservations about the nature of the EU stating, "I'm not alone: there are plenty of black and minority ethnic votes to be had..." and made the point about legitimacy.

The EU debate isn't about bent bananas or migrants on the take; it's about democracy. There doesn't seem much point in electing MPs if their votes can be overridden by supranational institutions like the EU... I've seen the EU described as "post-democratic". Some of us would prefer the real thing back.¹⁶⁰¹

This insight explains the cleavage between those who see a contradiction in the EU's purported democratic ideals and the reality, as evidenced by its *modus operandi* and institutions. It returns to Deutsch's stress on individuals feeling the need for institutions to reflect those meme-complexes of ideas, values and norms that provide agency and legitimacy to their own actions. If the institutions do not reflect those values, individuals will feel they are in contradiction. In the example of the EU, those who identify with the Vanguard Myth are not conflicted by the democratic deficit because their idea of legitimacy stems from the belief that elites have a responsibility to guide the less fortunate. And in some societies, the people may (because of a dominant meme-complex) accept or even desire such leadership by an elite class (political or priestly) so long as it is essentially paternalistic. But as Deutsch

¹⁵⁹⁹ Medhi Hasan, "I Was a Teenage Europhile – but the Eu's Sadistic Austerity and Lack of Democracy Changed My Mind," *New Statesman* (2014), <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/11/i-was-teenage-europhile-eu-s-sadistic-austerity-and-lack-democracy-changed-my-mind>.

¹⁶⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰¹ Dreda Say Mitchell, "So What If I'm Black and Thinking About Voting for Brexit?," *The Guardian*, March 22 2016.

warns, institutions that do not reflect the dominant meme-complexes of a people, run the risk of de-legitimising and regressing a security community.¹⁶⁰²

In the aftermath of the Brexit debate, those susceptible to the competing Vanguard Myth sought to deploy the sentiments of Edmund Burke's stance of the role of parliament. They invoked his opinion that

your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion¹⁶⁰³

This sentiment, according to some lawyers and many commentators, meant parliament was able to ignore the electorate's decision, if they so judged since they understood the greater good and therefore it justified ignoring the referendum result.¹⁶⁰⁴ However, Burke was no vanguardist arguing that the sovereignty and legitimacy of parliament was invested or loaned, asserting "the people are the masters."¹⁶⁰⁵ In an overlooked point, Burke asserted,

The House of Commons cannot renounce its share of authority. The engagement and pact of society, which generally goes by the name of the constitution, forbids such invasion and such surrender.¹⁶⁰⁶

In other words, a parliamentary representative could not be mandated, but neither could it give away the people's sovereignty or abrogate it.

The justification of vanguardism and the rubbishing of the electorate was commonplace and is explored in detail by Colin Copus and Mick Hume.¹⁶⁰⁷ An article in *The Task - Building Europe from the bottom up* by the German founder of the federalist "Soul for

¹⁶⁰² Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, 14.

¹⁶⁰³ Edmund Burke. Speech to the Electors of Bristol November 3, 1774

¹⁶⁰⁴ Nick Barber, Jeff King, and Tom Hickman, "UCL Laws Academics Praised for the Argument That Led Gina Miller to Victory," *UCL Faculty of Laws* (2017), <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/news/2017/feb/ucl-laws-academics-praised-argument-led-gina-miller-victory>.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Edmund Burke. Speech House of Commons February 11, 1780

¹⁶⁰⁶ Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Letchworth: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1971), 19.

¹⁶⁰⁷ Colin Copus, "The Brexit Referendum: Testing the Support of Elites and Their Allies for Democracy; or, Racists, Bigots and Xenophobes, Oh My!," *British Politics* 13, no. 1 (2018); Mick

Europe” organisation is illustrative. The competence of ordinary UK voters to decide on membership of the EU was dismissed, without any sense of irony (given the article’s title) because the issues involved stretched “far beyond the area of responsibility of those eligible to vote.”¹⁶⁰⁸

This vanguardist approach undermines the EU as a security community by striking at its legitimacy, and therefore, its effectiveness. Cris Shore contrasts the poverty of democracy in the EU with the reality and employs the Hans Christian Anderson fairy story about a child 'calling out' a naked monarch to the astonishment of his court and the relief of his cowed subjects, “the Emperor has no clothes... It is covered at best by only the scantiest democratic fig-leaf.”¹⁶⁰⁹ In short, EU declarations about common values of democracy are not reflected in its structure or modus operandi.

When the President of the EU Commission asserts the EU is founded on “Unsere Seele, unsere Kultur, unsere Vielfalt, unser Erbe - Our soul, our culture, our diversity, our heritage”¹⁶¹⁰ it is difficult to ascertain what that means in practice. Strong vanguardist meme complexes are present in a decidedly mixed democratic heritage and culture. Dawkins makes the point that "an important aspect of selection of any one meme will be the other memes that already happen to dominate the meme pool."¹⁶¹¹ Consequently, societies that have already dominated by vanguardist memes might be resistant to memes that suggest different approaches. This is not to say societies with say a Marxist, Nazi or a strongly hierachal religious heritage will condone their political objectives, but they might unconsciously favour the vanguardism inherent in them as a mechanism to create a 'better' society.¹⁶¹²

Hume, *Revolting!: How the Establishment Are Undermining Democracy and What They're Afraid Of* (Harper Collins UK, 2017).

¹⁶⁰⁸ Bernhard Schneider, "Our Europe the Task – Building Europe from the Bottom Up," *A Soul for Europe* January (2017): 6.

¹⁶⁰⁹ Richard Bellamy, and Dario Castiglione, "The Uses of Democracy: Reflections on the European Democratic Deficit.," in *Democracy in the European Union*, ed. Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum (Routledge, 2002), 65.

¹⁶¹⁰ Ursula von der Leyen Speech. European Parliament Plenary Session in Strasbourg on November 27, 2019

¹⁶¹¹ Dawkins, *The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene*, 169.

¹⁶¹² Ibid.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have featured autocratic clerical-monarchical regimes, Bonapartism (Napoleon III), corporatist-fascism, national socialism, communism, and something approaching a theocracy in Ireland. In the few continental democracies existing in 1939, only Sweden and Switzerland avoided civil strife, invasion and the adoption or imposition of totalitarian regimes.¹⁶¹³

Most of these traditions have featured a political/social elite or a priesthood, creating a strong cultural meme-complex that suggests its applicability in a paternalistic way to achieve objectives perceived as desirable, but likely to be resisted by electorates. The vanguard meme-complex legitimises the actions of those who believe they have an enlightened plan and are duty-bound to lead the way. As such, the EU project advances not as a consequence of democratic endorsements emanating from the people (or demos), but rather on the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*, an unrepeatable, complex body of legal rulings and obligations that constitute a binding ratchet-effect on member states. The former UK Cabinet member, Peter Shore refers to the “quite extraordinary – and deliberate – complexity” of EU Law and “its textual incomprehensibility” that empowers a vanguard and creates legal complexities and obligations that they alone interpret and declare must be obeyed.¹⁶¹⁴

The European Court of Justice; and the Brussels Commission and their long-serving, often expert officials are, interpreting and manipulating all of this, like a priestly caste – similar to what it must have been in pre-Reformation days, when the Bible was in Latin, not English; the Pope, his cardinals and bishops decided the content of canon law and the message came down to the laymen, only when the Latin text was translated into the vernacular by the dutiful parish priest.¹⁶¹⁵

Appointments to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are political — appointees are not required to have a judicial background. They operate in secret, produce only one uniform judgement (without dissenting reports) and allow no appeals.¹⁶¹⁶

¹⁶¹³ See: Stephen J Lee, *European Dictatorships 1918-1945* (Routledge, 2016).

¹⁶¹⁴ Peter Shore, *Separate Ways: The Heart of Europe* (Duckworth, 2000), 82.

¹⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 81-82.

¹⁶¹⁶ Critical views on the judicial activism of the ECJ together with a response can be found in: Gerard Conway, *The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice* (Cambridge

Those Europeans (including Britons) who relate to the principles of the Magna Carta compact, see a deficit revealed in the institutions and practices of the EU that are 'out of sync' with their 'gut' feelings about legitimacy. In the context of the ECJ, its decisions are 'legal,' but not necessarily legitimate. A Deutschian lens illustrates the difference between legal and legitimate. Deutsch selected an extreme example to make his point. The laws of the Third Reich can be said to be 'legal' in the territories it occupied, but regarded as illegitimate by the occupants. Compliance that relies on just coercion and force is ultimately weaker than one that has a legitimacy that comes from the

general value patterns prevailing in the culture of the society, and with important aspects of the personality structures of its members.¹⁶¹⁷

The democratic deficit reflected in the institutions of the EU is compounded by a willingness to set aside the representative governments of member states and install elite-technocratic alternatives.¹⁶¹⁸ The Commission can be assured its actions, and those of the European Central Bank, will be indemnified as 'legal' by the ECJ.¹⁶¹⁹ And to ensure international human rights laws do not interfere with rulings and decisions, the ECJ has first rejected, and then delayed, the EU's ascension to the European Court of Human Rights (a non-EU body) because it argues it undermines the autonomy of EU law.¹⁶²⁰

University Press, 2012), 77-83; "Dissenting Judgment -- the Judges of the European Court Are Pursuing a Politically Motivated Agenda ", *The Law Gazette*, October 18 1995.

¹⁶¹⁷ Deutsch, 152-53.

¹⁶¹⁸ This included the 2011 removals of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreu after his announcement of a referendum, and the removal of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. See: Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, "From a Deficit of Democracy to a Technocratic Order: The Postcrisis Debate on Europe," *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017).. An account of the Greek Syriza Party's struggles is instructive Yanis Varoufakis, *Adults in the Room: My Battle with the European and American Deep Establishment* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017).

¹⁶¹⁹ For example: In 2019 the ECJ backed the ECB's refusal to release policy decision papers relating to the 2013 the Greek financial crisis because it might impact the ECB's "space to think." See: "EU Court Shields ECB from Disclosing Key Document in Greek Crisis," *Euractiv - Reuters*, March 12 2019.

¹⁶²⁰ The ECJ acts to protect its decisions from review. For example it has rejected and delayed the EU's ascension to the European Court of Human Rights since 2014 . See: Adam Lazowski and Ramses A Wessel, "The European Court of Justice Blocks the Eu's Accession to the Echr," *CEPS Commentary* (2015). For an example of an alleged failure to follow rule of law see: Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov and Graham Butler, "Cjeu's Independence and Lawful Composition in Question (Part V)," *Verfassungsblog.de (On matters Constitutional)* (2021), <https://verfassungsblog.de/cjeus-independence-and-lawful-composition-in-question-part-v/>; Steven

Deutsch concluded that for values to be at their most effective, they should not be held just in "abstract terms", but

when they were incorporated into political institutions and in habits of political behaviour which permitted these values to be acted upon in such a way as to strengthen people's attachments to them¹⁶²¹

The essential difference between the EU security community and the Anglospheric security community is the former is attempting to create a federal amalgamated security community without a sense of pre-existing communal identity. It is reliant on a legalistic, institutional process, with democratic obstacles side-stepped to achieve an end-result desired by a self-perceived 'enlightened' vanguard. The Anglospheric security community of the five core states is less ambitious. It acquires its legitimacy because of shared cultural outlooks on the nature of power and has not signed away the sovereignty of its electorates. These preclude consideration of unelected supranational, law making institutions, considered as steps too far. In this sense, it is much less ambitious and more pluralistic, but more effective in respect of security cooperation. The functioning of the Anglospheric security community is more akin to the description of the relations between the each member of the Dominions and the UK as quoted earlier. With the amendment noted, the 1926 conference would read that the Anglospheric security community

depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and progress are among its objects... And though every Dominion [Anglosphere] state is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.¹⁶²²

Barrett, "The Ecj's Credibility Is in Tatters," *The Spectator* (2021), <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-ecj-s-credibility-is-in-tatters>.

¹⁶²¹ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 47-48.

¹⁶²² Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926. Inter-Imperial Relations Committee Report. (I.R./26)

5.7 Summary

The Anglospheric security community became more cohesive in the period after the Cold War, although it attracted little attention either in IR theory or in the public consciousness. The Brexit debate has highlighted the nature and attraction of general Anglospheric relationships, but did not illuminate the existence of the Anglospheric security community.

In fact, the Anglospheric security community based on five core states is identifiable from the post-War period by its structure and actions. Two trigger factors of global terrorism and the PRC ensured these five state relationships progressed in the period after the Cold War. The War on Terror, in response to 9/11, increased the propensity for the five states to participate in conflict. Domestic issues have sometimes necessitated opaque mutual aid achieved by the deployment of covert forces or personnel serving under interoperability programs. The Anglospheric security community has demonstrated a willingness to deploy military force in support of US led operations and this has included the invasion phases of Afghanistan and Iraq rather than just the aftermath.

In tandem with the increased level of mutual aid in conflict there has been a dramatic increase in Anglospheric fora. As military fora and relationships have matured, the desire for cooperation on a range of securitised issues has spawned a range of civilian led fora. By way of illustration the number of civilian-led socio-economic fora have risen from zero in the Nascent Phase, to one in the Ascendant Phase and in excess of twenty-six Anglosphere core fora. A concurrent development has been the public self-awareness of a 'Five Eyes' or 'Five Nations' identity extending beyond the use of symbols by the military to include ministerial level 'summits.'

Whilst the threat of terrorism might have receded, this has not slowed the momentum of deepening Anglosphere core cooperation. The perceived threat of the PRC has served to give greater impetus to security co-ordination. This has drawn both Canada and the UK to address common security issues with their fellow Anglosphere core members in the Pacific and the Arctic. Quintilateral ministerial fora are now reinforced by an institutionalisation of bilateral ministerial working arrangements. This is not to say that elements of the Anglosphere will all continue to cooperate with the same degree of intensity – it is almost certain they will not – a new tripartite hard core based on AUKUS already seems to have emerged. Nor will it

The Anglospheric Security Community

necessarily remain a group of five, but could expand or its members cross over with other Anglospheric states such as Singapore, Malaysia and India.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

6.1 Theoretical Issues

This thesis has identified the institutional outline of an Anglospheric security community. Many of these institutions are detailed for the first time. This is important since it establishes the existence of a framework supporting an informal set of transnational relationships that IR scholars have chosen to ignore or are disinterested in. Many still insist the Anglosphere is imaginary or is only manifested as a single SIGINT alliance and not much else. This attitude prevails amongst many commentators and is particularly strong in the UK for those who seek to deny the possibility of an alternative to membership of the EU. Hopefully, the various relationships both quintilateral and bilateral identified in the preceding chapters will dispel such doubts and claims. The Anglospheric security community is further identified by its mutual aid and mutual cooperation in security matters such as conventional warfare, intelligence and R&D.

This, however, is not the most significant outcome or conclusion of this exercise. The thesis not only identifies an Anglospheric security community but seeks to understand how and why it exists and endures. It concludes that the prospects of a security community can only be understood by adapting the Adler and Barnett model. Reverting to aspects of Deutsch's original works can provide critical explanations and insights.

The desire to construct 'zones of peace' in the interregnum following the Cold War downplayed the importance of identity to the success of a security community. There was only a cursory examination of what constituted a commonality of values and norms or what is described as culture. Claims of such commonality were often taken at face value and analysis quickly moved on to look at building institutions and greater commercial interaction. The development and actorship of the Anglospheric security community suggests that shared cultural values are critical factors in determining whether a security community can exist and function effectively. Deutsch's emphasis on cultural values, more apparent in his works on

nation-building, but also present in his views on security communities, need to be elevated to a key position in the Adler Barnett model when analysing security communities such as the EU.

Deutsch asserted that cultural values (meme-complexes) or “way of life” must be reflected in the institutions and behaviour of either a nation or a security community. If not, a central contradiction can occur between peoples, their state and the transnational security community. This insight goes some way to explaining the long-running tensions between the UK and the EU’s institutions. Deutsch specifically stresses the importance of “legitimacy myths” that connect individuals “with some of the general patterns prevailing in the culture of society and with important aspects of the personality structures of its members.”¹⁶²³ This accords directly with the notion of the Magna Carta compact advanced by Tombs as forming a key element of Anglospheric memetic DNA. In contrast, the EU and its advocates have sought to draw their legitimacy from the nostrum that an enlightened vanguard has the antidote to the fractious system of nation-states.

On this point Deutsch is explicit, warning that elitist vanguardism that either pushes too far ahead of its peoples or ignores them completely in a desire to preserve, create or advance a nation or a security community will ensure the construct lacks legitimacy.¹⁶²⁴ Deutsch emphasises that values are most effective politically when they are more than abstract declarations but are reflected by political institutions and in habits of political behaviour which permit these values to be acted upon in such a way as to strengthen people’s attachments to them.¹⁶²⁵

Applying this observation to the development of the Anglospheric security community, it is clear it has avoided this fate by not attempting to create a straight-jacket of legalistic entrapments designed to force cooperation and make it difficult for member states to step-back. On the contrary, its arrangements are voluntary and pluralistic — in other words, its modus operandi reflects the ideas of its peoples — cooperation based on trust and without institutions that do not encroach on the ‘demos.’ In contrast, the UK’s unease with the nature

¹⁶²³ Deutsch, 154.

¹⁶²⁴ Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, 124.

¹⁶²⁵ *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 133.

of the EU can be attributed to contradiction between the Magna Carta compact meme-complex and a vanguardist and unaccountable EU that 'muddies' the 'contract' between people and executive authority.

The role of cultural values brings into focus the importance of individuals, since it is within each individual's brain that memes reside. Adler and Barnett argue that the role of individuals, particularly 'charismatic' individuals, suffered from a lack of attention in Deutsch's works, but it is an omission that both they and other studies have tended to neglect too.¹⁶²⁶ In fact, Deutsch does concede the central role of individuals to the outcome of events at critical junctures.¹⁶²⁷ Usually though, Deutsch obscures the role of individuals by focussing on the groupings and cohorts in which they operate rather than highlighting their personal roles.¹⁶²⁸ In a thesis such as this that applies a theoretical model to a large timespan and five core states, a comprehensive coverage of all individuals is impossible. Nevertheless, the principle is acknowledged and a focus on a few key individuals has illustrated how competing meme-complexes have motivated individuals to take actions that had a profound impact on the development of the Anglospheric security community. Rather than focussing on just President v Prime Minister relationships, the role of a few less publicly prominent individuals has been examined. Groves, Wallace were examined in some detail as negative influencers, whilst Rickover was an example of the opposite. They served to illustrate another aspect too; namely that identification or lack of it with an Anglosphere of English-speaking peoples stemmed from memes, not genes as returned to later.

Aside from these extra re-introductions to the model, the Adler and Barnett model was useful in providing a framework that could plot the progress (or lack of it) and identify step-changes in collaboration, trust and when mutual threat perceptions acted as a trigger for greater collaboration. Identifying the machinery that can contribute to a security community is certainly a factor is insufficient as a means of establishing its effectiveness, not just in terms of peace, but whether it displays any degree of actorship and external cohesion or as this thesis terms it — synergy.

¹⁶²⁶ Adler and Barnett, 62, 43.

¹⁶²⁷ Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, 77-78.

¹⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*, 65.

Three security-related threads or fibres run through the post World War 2 Anglospheric core security community and provide insights as to the extent of synergy. They can be approximately categorised as conventional military relationships, intelligence relationships and R&D relationships (particularly nuclear). These are bound by a living sheath of cultural relationships and meme-complexes that provide form and strength. These relationships —the social glue —existed before the creation of the Anglospheric security community could be said to exist.

6.2 Meme-complexes - the foundational base

Although the structure of a developing Anglospheric security community can be identified from its thickening institutions, the circumstances that facilitated their growth already existed. Prior to the post World War period, a 'British security community' already existed in the form of imperial/commonwealth arrangements. The relationship between this British 'bloc' and the US was more complicated, but held out the promise of something more substantial. There had been an absence of war since 1815, and a growing reliance on arbitration to resolve issues. However, trust was not firmly established. It was not until 1939 that the US abandoned updating its 1930 Red War Plan for a defensive strike against the British Empire. In truth, the exercise had become theoretical by the mid-1930s, and the 1921 British/Canadians 'Defence Scheme No. 1' had been dropped as early as 1928.¹⁶²⁹ There were also early signs of a willingness to explore limited collaboration on intelligence from around 1935 onwards between the two navies.¹⁶³⁰ Nevertheless, naval competition remained a factor, there was no informal or formal alliance and the very fact defensive war plans existed is not indicative of a pre-existing Anglospheric security community. The conditions for one were, however, favourable.

A further important observation is that the two 'blocs' — the British and American — shared very similar, if not identical, meme-complexes relating to their political values. Indeed, wider cultural similarities had given rise to a strong network of strong social ties. These were reflected in the transatlantic unions of wealthy and influential families through

¹⁶²⁹ Lippert. & Ross, *American War Plans, 1919–1941, Vol. 3, Plans to Meet the Axis Threat, 1939–1940*.

¹⁶³⁰ Dorwart, 138.

marriage. Also of note was the emergence of non-governmental transnational civic organisations. Thus, the weaving of a communal social fabric preceded the political state-level alignment that featured in the nascent stage of the post-War Anglospheric security community.

Adler and Barnett's model has usually been applied to explain or promote a road map for peaceful relations between states that have histories of more recent conflicts and/or different cultural (and usually language) heritage.¹⁶³¹ This has led to a focus on mechanisms or institutions to create both peace and a common identity. As such, there has been a tendency to ignore the importance of cultural issues, or rather accept at face value claims of cultural commonality. Too often claims of communal identity are based on vague pronouncements and not related to long-standing historical meme-complexes. The Anglospheric security community's mechanism were pre-ceeded by feelings 'fellowship.' The existence of a fellowship that might mature into something more profound was recognised by the Germans who believed UK-US relationship should be designated 'a *communio incidens*' arrangement.¹⁶³² In other words, the temptation of security community theorists has been to put the cart before the horse — to focus on institutions as the catalyst for communal feelings.

6.3 Three Stages of Development

The three development stages of a Security Community are delineated and described in chapters 3-5 and combine a historical narrative with a critical analysis. The development of

¹⁶³¹ Carol Weaver, *The Politics of the Black Sea Region: EU Neighbourhood, Conflict Zone or Future Security Community?* (Routledge, 2016); Bal Gopal Shrestha, "Security Community in South Asia: India–Pakistan," (Taylor & Francis, 2013); Naison Ngoma, "Sadc: Towards a Security Community?," *African Security Studies* 12, no. 3 (2003); Morten Bøås, "Nigeria and West Africa: From a Regional Security Complex to a Regional Security Community?," *Einar Braathen, Morten Bøås and Gjermund Saether (eds) Ethnicity Kills* (2000); Jan Zielonka, "Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?," *International affairs* 84, no. 3 (2008); Anja Jetschke, "Institutionalizing ASEAN: Celebrating Europe through Network Governance," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22, no. 3 (2009); Oğuz Dilek, "Constructing Security and Community in the Middle East: A Security Community Approach to the Structure and Agents of the Arab Spring," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 11, no. 42 (2014); Hyug Baeg Im, "Constructing Regional Security Community in East Asia from Difficult Conditions: From Community of Commerce to Community of Nations," *East Asian Community Review* 1, no. 1 (2018); Talmiz Ahmad, Tim Niblock, and Degang Sun, *Conflict Resolution and Creation of a Security Community in the Gulfregion* (JSTOR, 2017).

¹⁶³² "Anglo American Relations."

the Anglospheric security community is shown to exhibit a “variable-geometry.” That is to say, the rate of participation and collaboration varies from state to state. The importance of meme-complexes was most important in the Nascent stage when they formed part of a debate as to the future direction of member states. They became more evident again as a consequence of Brexit when the UK's direction was under discussion. Institutions are examined, not just as an outcome, but also as a means of machinery to give further expression to common outlooks.

6.3.1 Nascent phase: Drawing together

The resumption of an alliance, and in turn, the development of security community between the US and their British Commonwealth counterparts was not a forgone conclusion. Yergin refers to the Yalta and Riga axioms as animating different perspectives as to the relationship the US should pursue with the Soviet Union.¹⁶³³ A Yalta type accommodation with the Soviets would have sidelined US relations with Britain and the Commonwealth. The Riga realists believed the Soviets to be untrustworthy with expansionist objectives incompatible with the US interests and way of life.¹⁶³⁴ In short, the Riga outlook viewed Soviet meme-complexes as incompatible with, and a threat to the US 'way of life.' It was a 'way of life' they understood to be shared with the British and an alignment with the British bloc became their objective.

Churchill's Fulton Speech is more usually remembered for its reference to an Iron Curtain, but as detailed in chapter 3, it formed part of a concerted attempt to re-introduce the notion of what Anderson refers to as “an imagined community.”¹⁶³⁵ Firstly, Churchill sought to evoke the idea of shared values between the British Empire and the US, stressing the rule of law...

...the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the

¹⁶³³ See: Yergin, 11-12.

¹⁶³⁴ See: *ibid.*

¹⁶³⁵ See: Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.

Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence.¹⁶³⁶

When the speech was delivered in March 1946, the distinction between the freedoms of the English-speaking world and the experience of vast majority of other peoples was stark.¹⁶³⁷ The overwhelming majority of non-English-speaking people's existed under authoritarian regimes where the rule of law did not apply. In other words, what Deutsch terms "the way of life" was markedly different and reflected an enduring meme-complex centred on the Magna Carta that provided the basis of a common outlook and identity.

As Dawkins has highlighted, certain meme-complexes might predominate in certain societies and cultures, but that does not mean they are not in fierce competition with others. An emphasis on memes places a focus on individuals, since it is in individual's brains that memes reside, and it is individuals who act in response to them. This includes memes that influence values and outlooks in the formulation of policy and an individual's attitude to the institutions of their society. Unfortunately, this thesis has been unable to delve too deeply into this aspect, given limits of space and the enormity of this task. However, the focus on a few individuals has highlighted how enduring meme-complexes can be carried across generations and, in the case of the Anglosphere, impede or facilitate its development as an imagined community. So, for example, the behaviour of General Groves can be understood in the context of a surviving chauvinistic, Anglophobic meme-complex associated with the US War of Independence. A complimentary Anglophobic meme-complex drew on Irish nationalism and proved particularly attractive to Henry Wallace, who, in a process of self-identification, overcame his British-Scottish genealogy to adopt an Irish memetic connection.

It is a strange feature of the Anglosphere that those North Americans with Anglo-saxon surnames and genealogy have often been the most dismissive of any fraternal association with the British community. In the post-war period, Groves and Wallace were not alone.

¹⁶³⁶ Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of Power" (paper presented at the Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5th March 1946).

¹⁶³⁷ This extended to non Dominion territories too. For example, in British ruled India, there were state and national elections. Common Law rights could be invoked - the writ of Habeas corpus was repeatedly deployed and Indian Courts compelled the release of nationalist campaigners. See: Rohit De, "Emasculating the Executive: The Federal Court and Civil Liberties in Late Colonial India: 1942–1944," in *Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik og Malcolm M. Feeley, Fates of Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony. The Politics of the Legal Complex, Cambridge, New York* (2012).

Truman is another example, as was Admiral Ernest King, who stands in contrasts with the Anglophile Admiral Leahy. King, the epitome of a WASP, was an Episcopalian, descended from British immigrants and displayed a persistent Anglophobia that impeded Commonwealth-US naval cooperation. Admiral Leahy was an Irish-Catholic whose Gaelic-speaking family had fled Ireland after the defeat in the Battle of the Boyne but supportive of closer links. These contradictions continue and serve to underline the fact that it is memes, not genes, or 'the blood of the mind' as das Nalapat would have it, on which the Anglosphere is construed.

Years before Churchill delivered his Fulton Speech in March 1946, it had become clear that the US-British relationship could not be construed as a community of an English 'race.' You should no longer call us cousins, said the ethnically English Anglo-saxon Woodrow Wilson because he represented a country with a population that was 80% non-English.¹⁶³⁸ When Churchill gave his speech at Fulton in 1946, there had been two presidents named Roosevelt, and a string the military men; Eisenhower, Spaatz, Nimitz, Hoyt Vandenberg and later Rickover, whose racial origins were clearly not English Anglo-saxon.

As a consequence, Churchill's imagined community rested on a set of values that the English language had propagated via meme-complexes, not necessarily exclusive to, but certainly enduring and reflected in a way of life. As recounted in chapter 3, three years earlier in 1943, Churchill had expressly rebutted Wallace's racial "Anglo-Saxondom über alles" jibe, stating it "was not a race concept...[but rather] ...a concept of common ideals and common history" and "a common heritage worked out over the centuries in England."¹⁶³⁹

Just as it is possible to discover Anglophobic meme-complexes that shaped the actions of Groves and Wallace, so has it proved possible to identify the beliefs that contributed to Anglophile outlooks of Eisenhower and Rickover. Their views reveal an identification not with race, but with Anglospheric ideas. Rickover, a Polish-Jew, did not regard himself as a racial Anglo-saxon, but through language had become receptive to and come to identify with the ideas of 'Anglo-saxon' meme-complexes.

¹⁶³⁸ Woodrow Wilson. Speech, December 27, 1918. State Banquet Buckingham Palace, London.

¹⁶³⁹ See Wallace, 208. See also: Culver and Hyde, 301.

Another important aspect of Churchill's speech is his emphasis on the importance of informal, pluralistic arrangements held together by voluntary associations. As an example, he pointed to the US-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defence as the template for future cooperation, since this was "more effective than many of those which have often been made under formal alliances."¹⁶⁴⁰ This emphasis on the pluralistic and informal draws upon a natural Anglospheric approach to cooperation that is reminiscent of past security imperial arrangements established by Hankey. It speaks to a recognition of the practical limits of the envisaged Anglospheric security community; a centralised and amalgamated construct is neither advocated nor wanted. In this manner, the relationships suggested by Churchill echoed the 1926 Balfour Declaration on Imperial security. The UK and Dominions noted the informal security arrangements, noting it might lead "a foreigner... to think that it was devised rather to make mutual interference impossible than to make mutual co-operation easy."¹⁶⁴¹ Not so, claimed the Dominion participants, since it

depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and progress are among its objects... And though every Dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.¹⁶⁴²

In this essential respect, the conception of the Anglospheric security community stands in contrast to the aspirations of the European project in which the UK became bound up in. This project aimed to create a one-way process towards 'ever-closer union'.

In the context of the new Anglospheric security community, only three dominions felt able to join in the post World War 2 arrangements. It was a voluntary arrangement and those that declined to join did so by choice.¹⁶⁴³ The reasons as to why are beyond the scope of this research, but have been touched upon and include combinations of different threat perceptions and meme-complexes that ran counter to those of the denser nodes of the

¹⁶⁴⁰ Churchill, "The SineWS of Power."

¹⁶⁴¹ Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926. Inter-Imperial Relations Committee Report. (I.R./26) Series

¹⁶⁴² Ibid. Balfour Declaration. Imperial Conference 1926.

¹⁶⁴³ With the exception of South Africa which was excluded on the basis of its racial policies.

Anglosphere. The fragmentation of the wider Commonwealth security community would benefit from further research.

Whilst shared values can assist in the formation or maintenance of a security community, it is equally clear shared perceptions of external threat can be critical. In the US, those who adopted Yergin's Yalta axiom did not share the concerns of Britain as to the hostile intent of the Soviets. As such, they did not believe alliance arrangements with the British were necessary and might impede their relationship with the Soviets and the prospects of a peaceful post-Word War order. Indeed, in the immediate post-War period, the UK found itself the lone voice in speaking out against the perceived Soviet menace. That is not to say the existing sense of Commonwealth ties were threatened, but the fear of communist expansion and the urgent need for new security relations were not shared by Canada. The trigger for Canada was the Gouzenko spy defection. Australia was keen on security relations but initially disagreed with the threat, reminding Britain that the Soviet Union was an ally and if there was a threat, it came from a resurgent Japan.

From the US perspective, an absence of threat in the southern hemisphere delayed the incorporation of Australia and New Zealand into the new structures. The importance of external triggers is evident in this period. A trigger appeared with the defeat of Nationalist China by the PRC and the latter's sponsorship of other communist movements. Only then did a regional threat perception emerge. Until then, Australia and NZ were members of the intelligence arrangements by virtue of their relationship with the UK. There is a clear correlation between the regional conflicts mapped out in chapters 3 and 4 and the drawing in of Australia and NZ to the previously tripartite military fora. Not to be overlooked in this period was the resilience of the 'old' Commonwealth, particularly in the field of military R&D and cooperation in Korea.

6.3.2 Ascendant phase: Variable geometry

The choice of Suez as marking the transition from Nascent to Ascendant was based upon rupture in trust between the US and the UK. It also marked the point that Canada began to perceive a new mediator role within the Anglospheric core and rely upon a less putative,

more diplomatic orientation to maintain a degree of distance from the Anglosphere core dominant state. Suez was also the point Australia and NZ worried about US intentions and reliability, ultimately fuelling the desire to tie themselves closer to the US by way of securing approval and protection.

Rather than breaking the Anglospheric core, the Crisis re-calibrated the dynamic and reinvigorated political and security collaboration. For many in Britain, the Suez represented a betrayal, and it had come in the aftermath of a perceived US betrayal over Atomic collaboration. This had partially been put right and amends made before Suez. Chapter 4 highlights the importance that many in the higher echelons of the US government had placed in trust and their own failure to honour agreements. The proverb, "An Englishman's word is his bond" conveys a sentiment that is not exclusively Anglospheric but, as Bennett asserted, formed the basis of 'English' commercial transactions since medieval times. As such, it forms part of a strong Anglospheric meme-complex and is evident in Acheson's references to "repulsion," Eisenhower's expression of "shame," and the views expressed by members of Groves' own negotiating team as referred to in chapter 3. These shared Anglospheric approaches to matters of integrity enabled perceived wrongs to be righted and trust to be restored. Had the UK not instinctively understood this of its American ally, then the British might have been more inclined to turn away from the US and favour the proposed alignment with France in late 1956, as mentioned in chapter 4.

One of the most important aspects of a security community is the growth of ingrained good-will or trust. On his visit to the UK, Nixon had quoted Woodrow Wilson's words who had said, "friendship must have a machinery" to ensure "constant friendly intercourse..."¹⁶⁴⁴ The creation of new military (including intelligence) fora established a transnational cadre or 'permanent-bureaucracy' of policy practitioners, that allowed that friendly intercourse to occur and flourish. And what gave 'life' to these mechanisms was the ability of participating individuals to access familiar and shared meme-complexes. Often these mechanisms and the relationships they supported allowed a level of cooperation to proceed under their own momentum, not impeded by political differences of opinions and personality clashes at the governmental level.

¹⁶⁴⁴ Nixon.

These fora were also important in extending the socialisation process to lower-ranking officers who were inducted into the process by postings in one another's security and defence related institutions. As detailed in chapter 3, this process began to extend further down the ranks with personnel posted to joint bases and involved in large-scale joint exercises. It also extended to academic personnel, with scientists attached to joint R&D in conjunction with industry through the TTCP. The declared intent was "interoperability" and the outcome of this ongoing socialisation process was the growth of mutual trust and a shared identity.

A more stuttering process marked the relations between political policy-makers. Chapter 4 reveals fluctuations in the level of political collaboration. The US stance over Suez highlighted a fault line between the US on the one side and the UK (plus to a degree Australia) on the issue of imperialism and decolonisation. Realpolitik demanded that if the US was to maintain influence with the non-aligned states, it must not be seen to act in lockstep with the UK, a view held by Dulles who resorted to duplicitous means to maintain that position.

A glib interpretation would see this conflict as a clash of values between the US arguing for an extension of 'the rights of Englishmen' to Britain's imperial possessions. However, the issue was one of timescale rather than intent. In any case, a process of rapid decolonisation gathered pace, but did not always produce outcomes the US had hoped for. Self-determination did not automatically equate to a realisation of the principles of the Magna Carta compact. All too often, self-determination meant the replacement of a British colonial regime that provided for the rule of law, with a new political leadership, who assumed a vanguardist ideology on achieving power and implemented policies that abrogated the principles of the Magna Carta compact. The letter from Rusk to Home quoted in Chapter 4 captures US frustration at the unintended and unwelcome outcomes of rapid decolonisation.

The lack of UK direct support for the US in Vietnam is usually held up to constitute a significant failure of UK support for the US. This thesis argues that it was the lack of support by the US for the UK's struggle to contain Indonesian aggression that was more important. The US desire to maintain its anti-colonial credentials with the non-aligned bloc contributed to the UK's decision to withdraw East of Suez. Vietnam did serve to push Australia and NZ closer to the US, whilst conversely, Canada sought to distance itself. In this period, the development of the security community affirms it was not path dependent. It was subject to

‘fits and starts’ and even regression. It can be described as multi-speed or exhibiting “variable geometry” with member state’s relationship neither uniform nor fixed. These concepts are not unique to the Anglospheric security community, with the EU described as featuring “variable geometry.”¹⁶⁴⁵

The UK withdrawal from the Indo-pacific in the face of US opposition was a point at which existing relationships could have regressed but, as with Suez, this did not constitute a terminal event. On the contrary, it again contribute to a fundamental rethink. In some respects, it was helpful for it effectively rendered any US posturing about British imperialism redundant. The UK Defence Minister claimed the UK had done what the US had claimed they wanted. The consequence was an increased US appreciation of the UK as an ally in terms of its military, diplomatic soft-power and geopolitical knowledge. The US need for a confidant led to a recalibration of the bilateral relationship and entrenched diplomatic interaction, as affirmed by the arch practitioner of realpolitik, Henry Kissinger.

With the UK absent from South East Asia (and Aden), the need for the US to keep a public distance from the UK evaporated. Indeed, if there was any clash of values within the Anglospheric core, it was over so-called US imperialism in Indo-China as evidenced by Canada’s distancing. The East of Suez withdrawal marked something of a weakening of the UK-AUSNZ security links despite the UK’s continued commitment to the FPDA. The contraction was underlined by the UK’s 1972 entry into the Common Market that seemed to confirm the UK’s new commercial trajectory would be increasingly Eurocentric. However, the moves towards the creation of a European security community founded on a ‘union’ would ultimately bring to the surface issues of identity, pluralism, and the people’s sovereignty and legitimacy.

6.3.3 The Mature Phase: synergic pluralism

In the Mature stage documented in chapter 5, is it possible to discern a greater uniformity of institutional progress involving the relations between the political establishments. Although the number and reach of these institutions have multiplied, it is important to note

¹⁶⁴⁵ For example: Christian Schweiger, "Poland, Variable Geometry and the Enlarged European Union," *Europe-Asia Studies* 66, no. 3 (2014); Mike Goldsmith, "Variable Geometry, Multilevel

they are predicated on informal and voluntary arrangements. There is no central, authoritative body that seeks to usurp and hollow out the democratic practices on which its constituent states are founded.

There is a sense too in which the Anglospheric security community is imagined, not as Bennett put it, in terms of a 'Haushoferian bloc,' but rather as a network of peoples who feel a sense of community. Thus, the Anglospheric institutional relationships are an outgrowth of a set of communally held values and long-standing ties. As such the voluntary nature of these arrangements on which these institutions are founded foster a degree of respect and willingness to resolve matters amicably rather than rely on formal laws or treaties to force acquiescence.

As discussed in chapter 5, the UK's Brexit experience has helped to illustrate the nature of the Anglospheric security community in contrast to the nature of the EU security community. The EU's emphasis on institutions has aimed to create a sense of community that was not naturally existing among its peoples. It has been obliged to 'force the pace' of cooperation by social and political entrapment. The results are palpable. The EU is hemiplegic, able to enforce compliance through laws and directives internally, but remarkably incapable of cohesive actorship in respect of external security or foreign policy. It is not structures that are the issue, but a lack of common outlooks based on values that ever-more institutions and laws cannot address. The Anglospheric community, in contrast, has no need for a raft of centrally imposed laws administered by a central executive to achieve common outlooks and practices, the latter exist already through a common meme-complex. Its institutions exist as an outcome of those and are principally aimed at securing cohesive external security outcomes. It is therefore, synergic, as reflected in its mutual aid, intelligence and in strategic foreign policy stances. This is not to say there are no differences, there are, but there is usually sufficient commonality of outlook to resolve issues and take meaningful, co-ordinated action.

The Brexit debate helped illustrate some essential characteristics about the Anglosphere and the five core states that form a synergic security community.

Governance: European Integration and Subnational," *The politics of Europeanization* (2003).

Whereas relations between the Anglosphere members have suffered crises on more than one occasion, the aftermath has not resulted in bitterness and hostility but rather a desire to rebuild as detailed in chapters 3 and 4. Here, Adler and Barnett's model is insightful in that it stresses the importance of the responsiveness of security community members to the needs of a fellow member. There is an interesting comparison between the Anglospheric security community's approach with the EU's unwillingness to accommodate the UK's Europhile leadership's concerns about sovereignty issues prior to its referendum. Essentially, the EU establishment attitude was 'take it or leave it.'¹⁶⁴⁶ Put to the vote, a narrow majority of UK voters decided to 'leave it' with a consequent fracturing of the EU security community.

The unwelcome result was not received well, and in the aftermath of the exit, the EU's attitude and that of some principal constituent members towards the UK were characterised by rancour, and the exclusion of the UK on matters of common security and threats. Chauvinistic comments were made by the EU in respect of Covid supplies both in respect of their efficacy and EU demands for an allocation.¹⁶⁴⁷

The EU had little to say about repeated French threats to cut power supplies to the UK unless it became more accommodating in respects fishing demands.¹⁶⁴⁸ Similarly, both navies

¹⁶⁴⁶ EU leaders and pro EU commentators regarded the UK concerns as frustrating and illegitimate. See: Andrew Cooper, "David Cameron Failed to Convince European Leaders That the UK Could Vote Leave" (paper presented at the Yes to Europe! The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain, Queen Mary University, London, 2018); Pieter Cleppe, "Merkel's Failures – an Overview," *Brussels Report* (2021), <https://www.brusselsreport.eu/2021/09/23/merkels-failures-an-overview/>; Imke Henkel, "Merkel Has Not Issued an Ultimatum to the UK over Free Movement, but There Is Growing German Frustration at David Cameron's Approach to the EU," *EUROPP* (2014), <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/merkel-has-not-issued-an-ultimatum-to-the-uk-over-free-movement-but-there-is-growing-german-frustration-at-david-camerons-approach-to-the-eu/>; Kylie MacLellan, "Merkel Gives Little Ground to Cameron over EU Reform on Visit," *World News* (2015), <https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-eu-merkel-idINKBN0KG06E20150107>; Joe Murphy, "David Cameron 'Won't Get an EU Deal at Brussels Summit," *Evening Standard*, December 17 2015.

¹⁶⁴⁷ Brian Appleyard, "Scientific Illiterates Have Jabbed AstraZeneca in the Back," *Sunday Times*, August 1 2021; "Europe's 'Anglo-Saxon' Phobia Is Proving Deadly ", *Daily Telegraph*, March 25 2021; Asher McShane, "Ursula Von Der Leyen Threatens to Block 19m AstraZeneca Vaccine Doses from Leaving Europe," *LBC News* (2021), <https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/ursula-von-der-leyen-threatens-block-on-19m-uk-astrazeneca-jabs-leaving-europe/>.

¹⁶⁴⁸ "France Threatens to Cut Off UK's Energy Again in New Fishing Row," *Sky (UK) News* (2021), <https://news.sky.com/story/france-threatens-to-cut-off-uk-s-energy-again-in-new-fishing-row-12426857>.

were deployed to Jersey after a threatened blockade of the islands.¹⁶⁴⁹ The EU was not responsive on the issue of asylum seekers paying traffickers being permitted to cross the French, Dutch and Belgium maritime borders to the UK. It declined talks with the UK to discuss the matter.¹⁶⁵⁰ It had previously threatened that cooperation on migration would be dependent on the UK backing down on unrelated trade issues.¹⁶⁵¹ Bilateral meeting between the UK and the Dutch, and Belgium Governments did produce agreements. France, however, was antagonistic, accusing the UK of operating an official “quasi-slavery” economy drawing in migrants because of the Anglospheric reluctance for state operated ID card controls.¹⁶⁵² There was a perception that the EU and some member states wished to punish the UK for leaving.¹⁶⁵³ Polling within the EU suggests that electorates believe that the EU is punishing the UK for leaving.¹⁶⁵⁴

These are not petty points, but rather flag up the difference between a voluntary security community and an 'insecurity' community with a leadership that relies on legalistic coercion to ensure compliance rather than goodwill.

The Brexit debate served another purpose too, or rather, it should have done. This was to disprove the proposition that the Anglospheric core, set against the EU, was a racist construct. Any objective analysis exposes this claim to be untrue. To put this into context in respect of security, as of 2021, all the EU state's Ministers of Defence and the European Defence Agency Chief Executive are white. Within the Anglospheric security community, three of the five Ministers of Defence in the Anglospheric core are people of colour and the NSA, the prime intelligence agency of the SIGINT alliance, is headed by a US general of Japanese

¹⁶⁴⁹ Tom O'Connor, "U.K. Sending Navy Ships to Counter French Threat of Island Blockade over Fishing Rights," (2021), <https://www.newsweek.com/uk-sending-navy-ships-counter-french-threat-island-blockade-over-fishing-rights-1589034>.

¹⁶⁵⁰ Isabella Nikolic, "EU Is 'Turning a Blind Eye to People Dying': Brussels Is Accused of Playing Politics with Migrant Crisis by Refusing to Enter Talks with UK," *Daily Mail*, August 8 2021.

¹⁶⁵¹ James Crisp, "EU Won't Agree Deal to Take Back Illegal Migrants Unless UK Folds in Trade Deals," *Daily Telegraph*, June 2020 2020.

¹⁶⁵² Jules Darmanin, "France Accuses UK Employers of 'Quasi-Modern Slavery' Amid Channel Migrant Crisis" *Politico (Europe)* (2021), <https://www.politico.eu/article/clement-beaune-france-uk-quasi-modern-slavery-channel-migration-crisis/>.

¹⁶⁵³ Steven Swinford and Matt Dathan, "French Letting Migrants Cross to UK 'as a Punishment for Brexit,'" *The Times*, November 16 2021.

¹⁶⁵⁴ Alisdair Sandford, "Brexit 5 Years On: Europe 'Is Punishing the UK' for Leaving EU: Poll," *EuroNews*, June 26 2021.

ethnicity. This Anglospheric construct has more in common with the Anglosphere as imagined by Stephenson and postulated by Bennett - multi-racial and linked together by memetic DNA.

The communal identity of a wider Anglosphere and has yet to take shape and is partially conflated with the Commonwealth. However, an Anglospheric security community has begun to achieve a degree of popular recognition with the term 'Five Eyes' gaining common currency after 2010. In turn, this has been reflected in the open adoption of the label by not only the various military fora but also the informal civilian structures that emerged and are documented in chapter 5. The latter have grown exponentially in the Mature phase, partially due to the securitisation of socio-economic issues.

Even with the limited amount of public information available, it is clear that these fora form a pattern of development consistent with the Mature stage of a pluralistic security community. Two intertwined factors are likely to ensure these fora deepen still further. The first of these relates to the growing threat perception to Anglospheric values and commercial interests by the rise of the PRC with a particular emphasis on the Pacific. The second relates to the impact of the UK's departure from the EU and its attempt to fashion new trading relations with other partners. Of relevance are the trade deals being negotiated with Australia, Canada and NZ and the Pacific CPTPP.¹⁶⁵⁵ This reaffirms the importance of the Pacific to the UK. The successful outcome of these discussions would likely highlight the relevance of those few quadrilateral AUSCANUSNZ fora on which the UK is not represented. These relate to food and agricultural standards (detailed in chapter 4) and would allow for the UK's interaction with the US, not part of the CPTPP.

The recent announcement of the AUKUS agreement on defence that includes the transfer of nuclear reactor technology is reminiscent of Rickover's assistance to the UK in the 1950s and affirms the very high levels of trust between the three parties. Canada's traditional reluctance to engage seriously with the Pacific has been put aside, and it has joined the other Anglosphere core members in security planning and operations, although how far this will extend us unclear.

6.4 Future research

Whilst security community modelling acknowledges the importance of a core state, there is room for further conceptual analysis of the roles of states within security communities. In this respect, the realist categorisations of state behaviour to explain their actions in the international arena might usefully be adapted to understand their conduct within a security community. The realist concepts of balancing, free-riding and bandwagoning might be usefully adapted to explain state behaviour (over an extended timescale) within the framework of security communities and alliances. In the context of the Anglospheric core security community, such an application of thinking might provide insights to the UK's early attempts to balance against US hegemony before tending towards bandwagoning. It would suggest Canada made early attempts to balance using the UK and then alternate between free-riding and bandwagoning. Australia, fearful of isolation given its more remote geographical position has tended towards bandwagoning with the core state (the US) and NZ has been increasingly drawn to free-riding. The concept might be applied to other members of the wider Anglosphere too with neutral Ireland effectively reliant on the UK.¹⁶⁵⁶ However, in all these cases, a realist perspective alone is inadequate since they suggest a pursuit of a national interest devoid from a cultural imperative that informs how that 'interest' is perceived and the strength or weakness of a 'communal interest.'

Consistent with the idea of variable development is the possibility that the four Commonwealth states within the Anglospheric security community might develop closer social ties that do not involve the US. One such possibility is the suggestion of a CANZUK arrangement to possibly include Visa free travel, transferable employment opportunities, further defence ties and new academic/research opportunities in arrangements similar manner to the provisions of the EEC's Treaty of Rome.¹⁶⁵⁷ The idea of CANZUK arrangement for

¹⁶⁵⁵ Gov.uk. "UK applies to join huge Pacific free trade area CPTPP." January 30, 2021. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-applies-to-join-huge-pacific-free-trade-area-cptpp>

¹⁶⁵⁶ Brian Hutton, "Military Aircraft Breach Irish Airspace During Russian Interception: Aviation Authorities Signal Radar Record after RAF Fighters Confront Long-Range Bombers," *Irish Times*, March 8 2020; Paul Williams, "Secret Defence Pact Allowing RAF Jets in Irish Airspace 'Undermines Our Neutrality', Says TD Berry," *Independent.ie* (2021), <https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/secret-defence-pact-allowing-raf-jets-in-irish-airspace-undermines-our-neutrality-says-td-berry-40526069.html>.

¹⁶⁵⁷ Bob Seely and James Rogers, "Global Britain Programme," *Henry Jackson Society Reports* (2019).; Sebastian Ferguson, "Canzuk: A New Commonwealth Agreement?," *The Lawyers Daily (Canada)* (2021), <https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/24621>.

less internal restrictions on travel, education exchanges and employment appears to have an appeal to with public petitions in each of the four states and the creation of a transnational campaign group headquartered in Vancouver.¹⁶⁵⁸ Further research might contrast the modus operandi and objectives of these groupings with the early and ongoing role of organisations instrumental in generating societal support for European Federalism and the EU.¹⁶⁵⁹

It is important not to forget that the Anglospheric core is an expression of a much wider network of peoples who are influenced by Anglospheric values. These outlooks combined with the 'trigger' effects of a perceived threat from the PRC, may align other Anglospheric states more closely to the existing Anglospheric core security community. This is another area that merits further research.

This research would include India, one of the most significant members of the wider Anglosphere. The leading Indian academic C. Raja Mohan, has highlighted some of the obstacles to closer relations that are present in the Indian political-establishment. They are countered by Anglophile sentiments. There is an approximate parallel between these Indian outlooks and the competing Anglophobic and Anglophile meme-complexes present in the US between the 1930s and the early 1950s. However, Mohan contends that the surviving anti-colonial meme-complex that exists in an element of India's political elite is being rapidly undermined by social and geopolitical considerations. On the first point, the Indian diaspora now form part of the social and political fabric of the Anglospheric core states and maintain links with India. As Mohan asserts, "India is already tied deeply to the Anglosphere, whether Delhi wants it or not."¹⁶⁶⁰ Das Nalapat agrees, stating, "Let me... point out that to the less untrammelled Anglospheric mind, it is not countries coming together as a collective as much as it is individuals coming together..."¹⁶⁶¹

¹⁶⁵⁸ Skinner James, "Latest Poll Shows Significant Public Support for Canzuk Free Movement," *CANZUK International* (2018), <http://www.canzukinternational.com/2018/04/poll-2018.html>.

¹⁶⁵⁹ Such as the European Movement, the Union of European Federalists, the Young European Federalists and the Spinelli Group.

¹⁶⁶⁰ C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Anglosphere," *The Indian Express*, December 29 2020.

¹⁶⁶¹ "The Md Nalapat Interview," *Country Squire Magazine* (2021), <https://countrysquire.co.uk/2021/06/30/the-md-nalapat-interview/>.

As a IR academic, Mohan points up the threat from the PRC as an accelerant that will draw the core five and India together for reasons of commercial security and defence.¹⁶⁶² As discussed previously, the trigger of a mutually shared threat perception is particularly effective when it aligns with entrenched common meme-complexes such as English common law practices and Magna Carta ideals.

Nor is it just India that is likely to coalesce with the core. Further research might look to the growth of Anglospheric alliances outside of the core. In this context, the security relationship between the Anglospheric core and the Commonwealth might be illuminating. Das Nalapat sees the Commonwealth as important, but “a bit unwieldy” and suggests any security building focus should be on those Commonwealth states that are “geopolitically significant” such as South Africa and Kenya [plus] smaller countries in the South Pacific.”¹⁶⁶³ Not to be forgotten in this configuration is the distinctly Anglospheric FPDA, of which Singapore plays a very significant SIGINT role.¹⁶⁶⁴

The focus of this research has been on the five most Anglospheric states within the 'English-speaking community' who have a shared heritage and appreciation of certain memes. However, since memes are purported to behave like viruses and 'infect' receptive brains, it raises the question whether nations not traditionally seen as constituting being part of the English-speaking world can become Anglospheric if enough of its citizens are so inclined. Research in this area would include the Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, perhaps Israel with its common law system, but also states such as Rwanda which are attempting to shift their Francophone cultural orientation to Anglophone.¹⁶⁶⁵ Das Nalapat also raised the possibility of non-Anglosphere states becoming Anglospheric by virtue of their becoming English-speaking and entrenching similar outlooks. In this context, Taiwan's ambitious plan to become an English-speaking country by 2030, with English being the prime language of teaching in the majority of schools by 2024.¹⁶⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶²

¹⁶⁶³ "The Md Nalapat Interview".

¹⁶⁶⁴ "Is Singapore Western Intelligence's 6th Eye?"; Dorling, "Australian Spies in Global Deal to Tap Undersea Cables."

¹⁶⁶⁵ Rwanda adopted English in schools as the medium of education and joined the Commonwealth.

¹⁶⁶⁶ "Education Ministry Unveils English Language Goals

Biilingual Nation: The Ministry Aims to Have Teachers in 60 Percent of Primary and High Schools Use English Only to Teach the Language by 2024 ", *Taipei Times*, September 11 2021.

6.5 Summary

A number of new structures and fora relating to five states that hitherto have not been identified previously have been revealed by this research. These combined with Legrand's research findings and other previously known foras have not been identified before. In addition to these structures, these five core states have displayed high levels of collaboration in sensitive areas of defence-related R&D. They have also exhibited a willingness to exchange military personnel, provide mutual support in conflicts and engage in ongoing, collaborative intelligence operations against other states. In these areas, they have established a degree of actorship hitherto not recognised or categorised in IR studies.

This thesis contends these five core Anglospheric states constitute a pluralistic and tightly-coupled security community but with a difference. That difference is its ability to act in a 'synergic' manner. As such, it is more than just the sum of its parts as it beyonds its external boundaries in a cohesive manner. In other words, the absence of war is a given between its members.

The key aspects in this dynamic is an enduring meme-complex related to a particular notion of the relationship between the people and their governments. It is this meme-complex that resides in the people who make up the Anglospheric core states and continues to do so. It is, however, possible that demographic changes might introduce challenger meme-complexes that prove more successful and change the higher level cultural values. This is unlikely for a number of reasons, not least because the very attraction of the Anglospheric core is its adherence to forms of government and ways of life that are seen as desirable. Thus, the Anglospheric core is an increasingly multi-racial 'phyle' or tribe, united by a higher level cultural meme-complex, under which multi-cultural preferences may flourish. As Bennett concludes

Those who come to use the language and concepts of the Anglosphere (and further their evolution) are the memetic heirs of Magna Carta, the Bills of Rights, and the

Emancipation Proclamation, whatever their genetic heritage. "Innocent until proven guilty" now belongs to Chang, Gonzales, and Singh, as well as Smith and Jones.¹⁶⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶⁷ Bennett, "An Anglosphere Primer," 15.

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