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Thesis Title:

At the Edges of Terror: An Assessment of the Role of Lone Wolf Terrorists, Terrorist Group Participants and Organised Criminals in Contemporary Terrorism

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Abstract

This thesis examines two phenomena often seen as existing on the periphery of terrorism research; 'lone wolf terrorists' and the relationship between terrorism and organised crime (the crime/terror nexus). The thesis contends that rather than being at the periphery of terrorism research when examined together both phenomena provide previously unexplored avenues into understanding contemporary terrorism, and should both be central to any examination of the potential future development of terrorism.

The thesis illustrates through focussed research, case studies, and an expanding modelling concept that the antecedents, actions and attributes of contemporary lone wolf terrorists and participants in crime/ terror nexus relationships have significant similarities. This thesis uniquely examined the crime/terror nexus and lone wolves set within Rapoport's (2003) wave theory. In doing so it draws out previously unacknowledged common factors across what, until now, appear wholly disparate terrorist campaigns.

The thesis contends that consideration as to whether Rapoport's (2003) religious wave is indeed still the existent driver for terrorist behaviour, or if instead we have moved beyond this into the age of what can be best termed a form of 'identity terrorism'. The reappraisal undertaken in this thesis, placing a variety of actors under scrutiny from a new perspective, clearly shows that the crest of Rapoport's (2003) religious wave may have passed, and terrorism appears to have moved into new uncharted waters.

The thesis argues that the newly identified commonalities amongst actors present opportunities for counter terrorism professionals to reconsider the partitioned approach to dealing with adherents to what appear radically different ideologies, and instead focus on the individuals espousing their allegiance. The research suggests looking for more macro counter measures targeted on the prevalent characteristics amongst participants rather than tackling the apparently all important group narrative of each contemporary terrorist campaign.

Candidate Declaration:

One article that contributes to this thesis for a PhD by publication, "Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?", was drawn in part from my Mlitt. Dissertation at the University of St. Andrews. The article contributes to addressing the research question, and supports the additional research contained in the further publications that constitute the thesis.

This thesis is my own work and has not been submitted in any similar form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

This thesis is 80895 words including appendices, bibliography and footnotes. This does not exceed the word limit for a PhD thesis.

Candidate Statement:

From a young age I was always fascinated with organised crime and terrorism, albeit as a youngster purely in respect of news reporting and in fiction.

On joining the police in 1994 these were areas whose reality I was immediately drawn to. In the culture that existed pre the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act I found myself in the position with two years' service as a recruiter and handler for sources reporting on multi kilo drugs operations. This aptitude led to very early recruitment by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) at a local level, and a move with 6 years' service to being a detective targeting high level organised criminality.

During this period I was also seconded to Special Branch, and deployed to numerous operations as a surveillance operative, targeting organised crime and terrorism.

I took forward my first (pre police) degree in Philosophy with a MSc. in Criminal Justice studies, but then paused any further academic work and concentrated on my career.

Promoted to Detective Sergeant I spent six years in the CID, on numerous Major Investigations including counter terrorism and organised crime. I was deployed to Merseyside on numerous occasions over a seven month period and during this time personally engaged with individuals operating at the highest levels of organised criminality in the United Kingdom. During this period in my service I was also directly involved in a live, and nationally significant, counter terrorism operation.

This exposure reignited my desire to develop my wider knowledge of my field, and saw me complete an Mlitt in Terrorism Studies. My dissertation for this qualification drew together my interests in both phenomena my career had focussed on, and was published to significant interest. From here I gained confidence in my academic ability and had a real ongoing drive to learn, and then share my findings. This resulted in the publications contained in this thesis, but in addition wider work in relation to policing in general terms that has seen me published on over 30 occasions.

As my knowledge and publication success grew so too did invitations to events. I have presented my work on a number of occasions, including on behalf of the United Nations

Office for Drugs and Crime, the International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum.

I have been appointed as a member of the Global Network Against Transnational Organised Crime and as an Expert Fellow by the Security Privacy Identity and Trust in the Digital Economy Network, where I have participated as a member of a team who secured a £30,000 grant to research 'Shadow Infrastructure'.

My research and development have significantly impacted on my working life. I have formed multi local authority CONTEST and Social Cohesion groups, with my studies acting as foundations to their structure and principles.

I am a regular invited 'peer reviewer' of journal submissions, book reviewer and mentor students (including serving police officers) while also lecturing on my chosen field at a number of universities on a frequent basis.

Completing this PhD has been very rewarding, and I look forward to taking forward and sharing my research on the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime for years to come. Indeed, since commencing this endeavour I was approached by the editors of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence to contribute to a special issue on contemporary terrorism, and have had my article "Crime, Terror and the Danger of Diasporas" accepted for publication. My thesis has also been accepted as a contribution to the Parntership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research (PaCCS) Snapshots Competition as part of their Serious and Organised Crime Conference to be held in September 2021.

Contents

Chapter 1 Theoretical Underpinnings and Methodology

1.1 Introduction to the Thesis

This PhD research comprises seven publications, reproduced in chapters 2-5 below, that examine two phenomena often seen as existing on the periphery of terrorism research; 'lone wolf terrorists' and the relationship between terrorism and organised crime. For the purposes of this thesis, terrorism is defined as

> "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature." (United Nations, 2004)

'Lone wolf terrorism' is defined as "ideologically driven violence, or attempted violence, perpetrated by an individual who plans and executes an attack in the absence of *collaboration* (*author's italics*) with other individuals or groups" (Becker, 2014, pp. 964).

Organised crime is defined "a criminal syndicate consist(ing) of a system of loosely structured relationship functioning primarily because each participant is interested in furthering his own welfare" (Albini, 1971, pp. 288).

These definitions are adopted as they provide clarity throughout this PhD when conceptualising the relationships that exist between the phenomena. It should be noted from the outset that these definitions are not universally accepted, and this chapter draws out the arguments that exist in respect of these contentions.

The crime/terror nexus described throughout this PhD adopts the format identified by Makarenko (2004) in her illustrated crime-terror continuum model. This model is widely acknowledged as the cornerstone of research into the relationship between terrorism and organised crime and is illustrated thus:

Figure 1, 'The Crime Terror Continuum', Makarenko (2004)



Essentially, the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime are at opposite ends of a line, moving down this line groups from one phenomena form alliances or utilise the tactics of the other; enter a 'black hole', where they are no longer clearly organised criminals or a terrorist group but instead a confluence of the characteristics of both; and may ultimately mutate into a group categorised as being wholly transformed into one which fits the criteria of the other phenomena. This modelling is considered in detail at section 1.4.5 below.

The thesis contends that rather than being at the periphery of terrorism research, studying the phenomena of lone wolf terrorism and the crime/ terror nexus in tandem provides previously unexplored avenues into understanding contemporary terrorism, and should both be central to any examination of the potential future development of terrorism.

The primary research aim of combining the published works is to demonstrate that recent activity within the two edge phenomena of lone wolf terrorism and the relationship between terrorism and organised crime highlight that there is a conceptual gap in the understanding of contemporary terrorism arising from a mischaracterisation of terrorist motivations.

In order to identify and address this conceptual gap, this thesis asks the following research question:

- *Are there commonalities between 'Lone Wolf Terrorists' with participants in Crime/ Terror Nexus relationships, and, if so, what impact do these commonalities have on any classification of contemporary terrorism?*

This research question can be broken down into the following sub-questions:

- *What factors and/or motivations influence individual participation in a 'lone wolf' terrorist attack, and are their actions meaningful in a wider context than that of their own activity?*

- *What factors and/or motivations influence individual participation in a Crime/ Terror nexus relationship, and are the actions of participants meaningful in a wider context than their own activity?*

- *When the factors/motivations are examined together, are recent changes in 'lone wolf terrorist' attacks and Crime/ Terror Nexus relationships, sufficient to support the argument that there has been a shift beyond Rapoport's religious wave?*

The core argument advanced in this PhD is that current knowledge and understanding on contemporary terrorist actors may be mischaracterised through a failure to appreciate the incremental changes that have occurred in terrorist motivation over time; and that these changes may have led to a need to reframe our understanding of terrorist motivation. This mischaracterisation is on the basis that much of the literature on terrorism identifies religious motivation as being the primary terrorist motivation. Prior to 9/11 the move towards religion as the primary motivation for terrorism was apparent (Enders and Sandler, 2000). One simply cannot ignore the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks Al-Qaeda, then at the crest of religiously motivated terrorism, perpetrated described by former Prime Minister Tony Blair as "an event like no other…. that turned the entirety of the world on its axis" (Dimbelby, 2020). The ongoing influence the attacks have on contemporary thought concerning terrorism has been, like the attacks themselves, without precedent. However, this thesis illustrates through a bespoke form of modelling that while post 9/11 there remained religious undertones to terrorism these have faded over time and been replaced by a new form of motivations.

Contemporary scholars still hold the viewpoint that the primary terrorism motivating factor appears to remain religious (and within this characterisation 'jihadist') in nature (Sageman, 2018; Neve et al., 2020; White, 2020, Govier and Boutland, 2020). In 2019, data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program is described as showing that worldwide "28 of 54 state-based conflicts involved IS, al-Qaida, or their affiliates" (Pettersson and Oberg, 2020, pp. 7), who the authors characterise together as 'Jihadist Groups' (Pettersson and Oberg, 2020). Whilst this characterisation and grouping of what appear to be 'fellow travellers' may be considered an accurate reflection of the manifestations of terrorism that were examined in each of the literary works, they fail to appreciate the ongoing changing nature of terrorism.

In his theory Rapoport (2003) outlines terrorist waves as basis to identify and explain terrorist motivations by essentially mapping the occurrence of terrorism along a timeline and equating each classification with a particular motivation. Rapoport begins in the 1880s with an 'anarchist wave', followed by an 'anti-colonial wave' in the 1920's, then a 'new left' wave in the 1960s, before turning into the 'religious wave' which, in theory, is said to still exists today. The theory contends that contemporary terrorism remains in the grip of this 'religious wave', and to the casual observer the pre-eminence of the Islamic State (IS) [1] group in discourse on modern terrorism appears, at first glance, to be supportive of this position.

1. For a full account of the evolution of Islamic State, and the controversy over even its name of reference, including discussion of the alternative titles of 'Daesh' and 'Islamic State in Syria and the Levant', see Stern and Berger (2015). Despite finding their overall research to be of the highest quality my personal view is that as 'Islamic State' is the self-referential term applied by the group that has evolved, and currently occupies large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria, then it is the appropriate one (for the author) to apply when writing regarding them.

However, this fixation on religious motivation creates a conceptual gap by failing to fully deconstruct the nuanced motivation of contemporary terrorist actors. This fixed view appears to have continued, in part, from the extreme nature of the acts of terrorism perpetrated by terrorists groups and followers of IS as the successors to Al-Qaeda.

This thesis recognises that the compartmentalisation of the occurrence of terrorism by reference to a sequence of waves may be a useful way to understand the occurrence of terrorism, but it is contended that this process needs to remain vigilant of the ever changing nature of terrorism. This vigilance requires more than Rapoport's (2003) assertion that 'not all terrorism is the same' by actively being alert to the changing dynamics in terrorism more generally but also within different manifestations of terrorism. This requires more than acceptance that terrorism will change over time but rather iterations of terrorism continually change, and such nuanced ongoing alteration impacts on any attempt to engage in counterterrorism.

The emergence of the IS may be considered one of the biggest convergences of terrorism, lone wolves and organised crime. As an exemplar discussion in this thesis on the group provides evidence of a fundamental change in terrorist behaviours *per se* perhaps presents the most striking example of the dissipation of Rapoport's 'religious wave', and the heralding of a new phase in the development of terrorism.

Sageman (2008) provides a narrative on events, supported by an academic model drawing on Rapoport's (2003) 'Four Waves of Terrorism' theoretical framework, where he identifies similar 'ripples' or 'sub waves' of Jihadi terrorist involvement. Essentially, he dissects Rapoport's religious wave, and identifies sub waves of development within it. This thesis contends that even these sub waves have reached their breakwater, and evidence of this is to be found in the ever decreasing religious credentials of the waves participants outlined below. This dissipation is discussed in detail in chapter 3. Previous research, such as Bakun (2011) and Pedahzur and Perlinger (2011) may have been overshadow the sheer scale of the 9/11 attacks and indeed subsequent attacks that research naturally focused on 'religion' as the primary motivator but this fixation failed to appreciate in more recent years the changes in motivation. We now have to 'update' our thinking on terrorist motivations and be alive to the risk of their changing nature over time, as Rapport's (2003) original research contended, so that dramatic terrorist 'events' do not cloud our judgment.

That's said, in considering the 'religious' Jewish terrorists in the 2000's Pedahzur and Perlinger (2011) noted the counter culture features of participants, and their isolation from the mainstream. This is wholly consistent with the findings of this thesis across apparent terrorist actor's motivations. However the current mischaracterisation of terrorist motivations is premised upon a fixation on the motivation for terrorist acts being religious in nature when there appears to be considerable evidence to show this may no longer be reflective of contemporary terrorists. The thesis demonstrates this mischaracterisation by examining three case studies that illustrate the similarities existing between lone wolf terrorists, IS participants and terrorists participating in crime terror nexus relationships. The degradation of attachment to a clear 'cause' and evidence of individualised motivation is apparent. Through the case studies presented

and the modelling that follows them this thesis engages with identifying, tracking and analysing the motivation of terrorists in a variety of manifestations of terrorism as the basis to argue the dissipation of the religious wave given that religion appears to have little to do with some manifestations of contemporary terrorism.

The difficulty with the mischaracterisation on terrorist motivation is that not only does it impact the development of counterterrorism law and policy, it also impacts on how we recognise and analyse the occurrence of terrorism. If we are truly to understand terrorism then we need to understand the factors and motivations of terrorist actors as a precursor to understanding the contemporary nature of terrorism. Writing immediately after 9/11 Rapoport (2003) appreciated the impact of events but also wrote of the need to keep in mind terrorism's ever changing nature. The scale of 9/11 and the conflicts that followed appear to be having an influence in shaping an ongoing fixation on the continuance of his identified religious wave, as opposed to an appreciation that there is evidence of a potential global shift in terrorism's driving factors. By being alive to the fact that terrorism changes, we are in a stronger position to spot changes which can inform not only the development of counterterrorism law and policy but also it will help inform the analysis of terrorism.

The current research paradigm considers terrorism as a largely cohesive group activity, with reference to Rapoport's wave theory adopting this form of consideration. This thesis shows that contemporary terrorism is an activity being committed by *individuals*. Be they part of an identifiable group or not, with significant questions requiring to be addressed as to whether there is a religious motivation for their actions. This thesis addresses these questions.

1.2 Thesis Outline

The thesis utilises case studies in respect of lone wolf terrorists, IS and the nexus between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland to illustrate the need for consideration of nuance when investigating the motivation of individual terrorist actors.

Chapter 2 draws on the publications "The 2016 'Lone Wolf' Tsunami - Is Rapoport's 'Religious Wave' ending?" (Gallagher, 2017) and "Lone Wolf Terrorists: Examining Motives and Methods of Stand Alone Terrorists" (Gallagher, publication scheduled in 2022).

"The 2016 'Lone Wolf' Tsunami - Is Rapoport's 'Religious Wave' ending?" (Gallagher, 2017) was published by the Journal of Strategic Security, a double blind peer review open access journal published by the Henley-Putnam School of Strategic Security.

This article is currently cited by 13 other authors in publications including the Journal of Business Continuity and Emergency Planning, Contemporary Challenges: The Global Crime, Justice and Security Journal and the Journal of Security Studies.

In this chapter 'lone wolf terrorists' are considered, utilising their activities in 2016 as a focus for consideration, particularly set against Rapoport's first wave, the anarchists. The actor's apparent motivations are illustrated, along with the consequences of their actions. The findings of the case study are clear that the degree of religious motivation

behind their activity is highly questionable, while the links to wider movements, either proclaimed or implied are clear. The actions of the lone wolf terrorists studied appears to indicate changes to terrorist behaviours well beyond the scope of the individual attacks. A specific instance of 'lone wolf terrorist' activity, dismissed by many as irrelevant to the wider consideration of terrorism, is considered in detail as it appears to crystallise the issues of the fluidity of individuality and identity that challenge the continuance of Rapoport's religious wave.

Chapter 3 draws on the publication "'Criminalised' Islamic State Veterans – A Future Major Threat in Organised Crime Development?" (Gallagher, 2016).

This article was published by Perspectives on Terrorism, a double blind peer review open access journal managed by notable terrorism scholars of the Terrorism Research Institute. It has 8000 subscribers.

This article is currently cited by 32 other authors. These publications include the Counter Terrorism Sentinel at the West Point Military Academy, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, the European Journal of Criminology, reporting by the Globesec international security think tank and the Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of International Studies.

In this chapter the thesis moves to specific consideration of the 'Islamic State' (IS) group, the 'inspiration' for many of the 'lone wolf terrorists' discussed in chapter 2. Here the thesis illustrates that despite the group's title and apparent motivations the political territorial ambitions are in fact to the fore, and the individual motivations of its members who have travelled from the democracies merit far greater consideration. It also begins to test the paradigms described, and demonstrates the interdependence of terrorism on organised criminality, casting significant doubt on the 'religious' nature of the IS brand of terrorism. Consideration of the antecedents of IS participants set against earlier members of Rapoport's (2003) religious wave provides strong indications of changes beyond the individual circumstances of each participant, with wider implications for consideration of changes in the background of terrorist actors.

Chapter 4 draws on the publications "Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?" (Gallagher, 2014); "Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit of Profit?" (Gallagher, 2015); "Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime" (Gallagher, 2018); and "Terrorism, Organised Crime and Necessity" (Gallagher, 2019).

"Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?" (Gallagher, 2014) was published by Terrorism and Political Violence, a double blind peer review journal of significant note in the field of terrorism studies.

This article is currently cited by 7 other authors. These publications include Global Crime, The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism and The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism.

This article was featured in the Routledge list of most influential articles on Counter Terrorism and was required reading on the Post Graduate International Organised

Crime Module at the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

The article received coverage on the BBC and featured in articles in the Sunday Times and Jane's Intelligence Review.

The article describes Scotland's historic cultural ties to Northern Ireland, and provides an explanation of the influence of the recent conflict there on Scottish organised crime groups' co-operation with terrorists arising from these cultural ties. The article thereafter illustrates subject matter expert and investigator opinions on the links between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland, supported by interviewees through their access to confidential briefing material on the phenomena.

"Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit of Profit?" (Gallagher, 2015) takes forward the research contained in "Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?" (Gallagher, 2014), and models the evidence obtained alongside research on entrepreneurship.

This chapter was subject to peer review.
"Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime" (Gallagher, 2018) which illustrates the sophisticated interdependencies that exist between both phenomena

This article was written at the request of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague. It was subject to peer review.

It has been cited by 1 author, the publication featuring in the European Journal of Criminology.

"Terrorism, Organised Crime and Necessity" (Gallagher, 2019) focusses on the need for terrorist organisations to retain legitimacy amongst their supportive population sub groups while accessing illicit finance to operate.

This article was written at the request of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague. It was subject to peer review.

This chapter presents a case study considering the relationship between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland, a 'support hub' for Northern Irish related terrorism. This case study may appear initially as being an *ad hoc* selection in contrast to the previous case studies, but it forms an important basis to look in detail at an area *apparently* unaffected by contemporary terrorism. Uniquely it considers long established diaspora communities, and their ongoing role in supporting terrorist aspirations where apparently direct relevance to those involved is very remote. The chapter 'operationalises' established theories on the nexus between terrorism and organised crime, providing new insight into how these relationships form and function. Links between the apparent motivations of terrorist participants considered in chapter 3, IS recruits, are discerned to be at play with participants in terrorism affecting Scotland and by virtue of interdependency Northern Ireland, but also numerous other apparent post terrorist conflict zones. A degradation of participant's motivation is identified, with

links to criminality exposing motivations amongst actors far removed from the original aims of the terrorist conflict. It accomplishes this consideration within Rapoport's (2003) framework, illustrating how the actions of the actors considered assist in understanding the potential move beyond religious terrorism.

Chapter 5 draws on the publications "The 2016 'Lone Wolf' Tsunami - Is Rapoport's 'Religious Wave' ending?" (Gallagher, 2017), "Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?" (Gallagher, 2014); "Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit of Profit?" (Gallagher, 2015); and "'Criminalised' Islamic State Veterans – A Future Major Threat in Organised Crime Development?" (Gallagher, 2016)

In this chapter the thesis moves into a consideration of the results from the case studies, and a focus is made specifically on the decision making processes of terrorists and organised criminals, outlining the factors that affect their decision making. This is achieved through modelling that builds from the influences of individuals initial participation through to post conflict implications. It accomplishes this with specific reference to the perceived entrepreneurial aspects of organised crime, using the work of Baumol (1990), but also expanding the scope of the individual criminal's considerations of 'profit' beyond simply financial gain. It builds on Albini's (1971) initial use of the far reaching term of 'welfare' in terms of criminal success to present a nuanced picture of influences, and potential implications of terrorist and organised crime interactions.

1.3 Contribution to Knowledge

This thesis combines six pieces of the authors published work into a contiguous narrative and makes at least four claims of originality. These are:

- Firstly, this thesis identifies that there is are limited comparative studies examining the changing nature of the motivations of terrorist actors by conducting a study of the relationship between lone wolf terrorists and the nexus between terrorism and organised crime. Kaplan's (1997) "Leaderless Resistance" first brought the 'lone wolf terrorist' concept as we know it today into the academic milieu for consideration. For the nexus between terrorism and organised crime Makarenko's (2004) "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism" is the first academic work that models the interrelationship between actors in the two phenomena of terrorism and organised crime. Although since these pieces of research were published both authors have published further extrapolations of their concepts, Kaplan (writing with Loow and Malkki, 2014) and Makarenko (writing with Mesquita, 2014), neither have fundamentally altered their initial suggestions. Both authors works have been studied and referenced repeatedly, with both pieces of scholarship being acknowledged as corner stone pieces of research with Kaplan (1997) attracting at time of writing 187 citations and Makarenko (2004) 505.

  While Makarenko's work does not reference Rapoport's wave theory, Kaplan (2007) has considered the possibility of the end of terrorism's religious wave,

and its replacement with a 'neo tribalism undertow' with ethnicity as its driving factor, however his suggestions in respect of African based terrorism development did not come to pass.[2]

Although both the concepts of lone wolf terrorism and the nexus between terrorism and organised crime have been studied at length previously, the originality of this thesis is that no other author has suggested that when studies *together* they provide a new and unique perspective on modern terrorism. This unique perspective provides a way to analyse the occurrence of terrorism that can be utilised not only in analysing counterterrorism law and policy but also can help inform its development.

Previous studies (as discussed below) on the links between terrorism and organised crime have focused almost entirely on group analysis, membership of groups, and activities expressed as group processes.

Authors have noted that to continue functioning in any capacity as a terrorist *group* funding is a necessity (Bovenkerek and Chakra, 2006; Clarke and Lee 2008; Stewart, 2010). The reliance in terrorism on organised crime for finance has been made clear by individuals such as Abdullah Ocalan, former leader of the PKK, who has stated that the *organisation* relies heavily on its ties to drug trafficking to finance the purchase of weapons (Roth and Sever, 2007). Similarly, official Irish Police reports make it clear that the Continuity IRA has established working partnerships with Eastern European sex traffickers, sharing smuggling routes with them and being involved in assisting with their criminal enterprises (Byrne, 2010). Indeed, terrorists have acted as illicit commodity brokers to further their own ends, with ETA ensuring the lowering the price of cocaine and guaranteeing commodity delivery to Italy through contacts with Columbian drug cartels in exchange for weapons from the Campania organised crime cartels (Saviano, 2007).

In addition co-operation often takes the form of the provision of smuggling routes by organised criminals to terrorists. Examples of this are the Mexican drug *cartels* allowing Hezbollah to utilise its routes to smuggle persons and narcotics (Perri et al., 2009; Conery, 2009); D-Company providing smuggling routes into India to Al-Qaeda (Clarke and Lee, 2008); the Naples based Camorra Mafia moving Al-Qaeda operatives throughout Europe (Chepesiuk, 2007); and, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan utilising Afghan criminal groups to move Heroin into Russia (Makarenko, 2004). The well documented case of the Medellin cartel employing terrorists of the ELN to carry out car bombings (Jamieson, 2005) illustrates how this use of specialists can lead to two way co-operation, while in Europe the provision of pipe bombs by dissident republicans to drug *gangs* is becoming an ever more common occurrence (Cusack, 2009).

The use of italics above is by way of illustrating how some researchers to date have written of these cartels, groups and gangs as monoliths as opposed to the

[2] The author has discussed this with Kaplan who accepts events have not borne out his development theory.

often loose associations of individuals with an, at times, cohesive (if nefarious) collective identity.

By examining the crime/terror nexus from the standpoint of participating individuals rather than the groups they claim membership of (as has been the norm to date), or allegiance to in the case of lone wolves (by action or indicative deed) common factors across disparate terrorist campaigns become clearer. This make a contribution to knowledge by illustrating that contemporary terrorists such as the apparently wholly divergent examples of IS operatives Khalid and Ibrahim el-Bakraoi (Mendick et. al., 2016); armed and active FARC operatives (Olaya, 2019); the 'far right' motivated Ali Sonboly (Alexander et al., 2016); the killers of Lyra McKee in Northern Ireland (English, 2019); and Ethan Stables who attempted to bomb a gay pride event in London (BBC, 2018) have far more in common than previously thought. Their actions can be seen within the conceptualisation of a new or emerging wave of terrorism, and this presents opportunities to refocus counterterrorism on this emerging threat.

- Secondly, this thesis demonstrates, to a high degree of probability, that there is a wholesale conceptual shift of the collective understanding of the nature of contemporary terrorism. The thesis argues that the implications of individualised terrorist motivation necessitate consideration of a move from the current focus on the religious motivation paradigm to a new conceptualisation that this thesis terms 'identity terrorism'. This make a significant contribution to knowledge by helping to characterise the occurrence of terrorism today and this characterisation is crucial for at least two reasons. It is contended that the development of counterterrorism law and policy needs to be reflective of the occurrence of contemporary terrorism. If law and policy is fixated on a religious understanding of terrorism, it is likely that the development of counterterrorism law and policy will be in some ways defective in managing the threat of terrorism by failing to capture the occurrence of modern terrorism. There is some evidence of this already in respect of this, with particularly insightful examples being that of Sonboly, discussed detail in chapter 2 of this thesis, and attacks such as that of the 'Incel'[3] initiator Alek Miassian which left 10 dead in Toronto, Canada (Chavez, 2018). Furthermore, the academic study of terrorism also needs to take into account the changes in the occurrence of terrorism in order to analyse it in any meaningful way. The academic study of terrorism can only be accurate if it has a full appreciation of its current manifestation, and the ability to move focus as the actors motivations change.

  The thesis assists also in moving forward the dialogue beyond religious terrorism, and provides a reframing for both an academic and practiconer audience. Given the degree to which terrorism is outlined in this thesis as having moved beyond the 'religious' wave, a new argument is presented for a change to the description of 'Jihadist' terrorism, suggesting instead the adoption of the more accurate term of 'Caliphites'. In chapter 2 a clear argument as to why adoption of this distinction demonstrates the political as opposed to religious motivation of these terrorist actors is provided.

[3] 'Involuntary Celibate', an extreme misogynistic worldview.

- Thirdly, this thesis demonstrates the significance of 'profit' requiring far greater consideration during the examination of the *individual motivation* of relevant actors. Previous works such as Bovenkerk and Chakra, 2004; Saviano, 2007; Clarke and Lee 2008; Stewart, 2010; Dishman, 2001; Byrne, 2010 follow a common theme of terrorist groups utilising organised crime methods or working with organised criminals for the terrorist group's purposes. This approach fails to appreciate the factors driving actors in such behaviours, instead simply concentrating on overt group activities. Makarenko's (2004) own crime/terror continuum is based on group dynamics, not the factors and motivations affecting actors within the relevant groups. By acknowledging the many factors and influences on individual actors driving them towards terrorist behaviour, and that may sustain such activity in post conflict situations, we are better able to understand terrorist activity overall. This provides for greater understanding of individual terrorist motivations, the factors influencing their behaviours, again providing previously untapped opportunities for exploration to those engaged in counterterrorism.

- Finally, this thesis adopts a modelling methodology in chapter five as a basis to understand contemporary terrorism which illustrates the factors affecting individual actors in this milieu as well as the potential implications. After extensive research, the author has not been able to find this modelling being used in terrorism in a similar way but advances the use of this modelling on the basis of professional experience. This use of modelling makes a significant contribution to knowledge by illustrating the influences on contemporary terrorists in a manner that allows a clear understanding of how they enter terrorism, exit terrorism and may become dangerous organised criminals thereafter. It also presents the various potential forms relationships in a crime/ terror nexus might take, and common factors within these relevant to lone wolf terrorists. Through this modelling a holistic picture of contemporary terrorism is provided, which also will assist counterterrorism practitioners understanding of terrorist actors, and has the potential to assist in identifying mitigation measures.

1.4 Definitional Issues for Terrorism and Organised Crime and Research Limitations

To understand both contemporary terrorism and organised crime, it is necessary to discuss that neither phenomena have a universally accepted meaning. Central to the arguments advanced in this thesis is that the relationship between contemporary terrorism and organised crime cannot be truly understood without first coming to an appreciation of the applicability of these concepts. There is a distinct lack of consensus in the literature on the definition of both concepts, but given the contentious nature of both, and particularly terrorism this is to be expected.

Both fields have attracted the majority of their academic interest in the period since the 1960's, with significant interest only being applied in the last 20 years.

The main area of contention in respect of defining both concepts relate whether a state can commit crimes or acts of terrorism (Schmid, 2004). This dispute has led to somewhat of a schism within academic study of both phenomena, but particularly within the field of terrorism studies. There are at least two distinct schools of thought

that have emerged; ‘traditional terrorism studies’, which focusses on non-state actors and their activities; and ‘critical terrorism studies’ that takes a ‘deconstructionist’ approach, considering terrorism as a social construct and critiquing the ‘traditional’ counter terrorism approach, instead focussing on the violent actions of states and their agents. Both fields focus on the extreme edge of politics, politically inspired violence, and with politics being synonymous with differing views it is perhaps to be expected that such opposing academic viewpoints have developed.

Millington (2018) captures the issues this question presents well, when he considers the activities of the French Resistance in World War II. With France invaded and occupied between 1940 and 1944 groups of non-state actors carried out acts of sabotage, theft and assassination against the occupying Axis power and French collaborators. From a Nazi perspective, their activities were ‘terrorist’ in nature, and aligned to ‘organised crime’, while to the Allied powers the resistance were ‘freedom fighters’ (although not to all resistance members, some of whom saw themselves as terrorists). An interesting contrast is the Nazi deployment of a plain clothed team of German civilians trained in clandestine techniques to assassinate the USA appointed Chief Burgomaster of Aachen, the first city taken during the Allied advance into Germany (Whiting, 1972). Sageman (2018) recently considered this point in more contemporary terms. As a member of the CIA assisting the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980’s his actions, and those of his allies including the patriarchs of the Haqqani network were considered by the Soviet Union to be those of a terrorist, while for the USA he and the Haqqani’s were freedom fighters. Post the Soviet withdrawal and thereafter 9/11 Sageman’s erstwhile allies the Haqqani network (whose members actions haven’t changed dramatically but his enemy has as it is now the USA) are now considered to be terrorists.

These disagreements play out at the highest levels, and continue to do so, as evidenced by the recent public disagreement amongst the leaders of NATO nations over the definition of what constitutes terrorism (Newswires, 2019).

Perspective can be all when considering violent actions motivated by political considerations.

These differences, both within terrorism studies and in the wider social sphere present a number of reasons as to why a definition has not been arrived at, a situation even acknowledged as problematic by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2005). To date, there have simply been too many competing interests with strong opinions for a consensus to be possible.

For academia, further difficulties result from 80% of terrorism research historically being non primary source based (Schmid and Jongman, 1988), with a notable lack of access to individuals with first-hand experience of the phenomena or its investigation (Silke, 2001), coupled to a lack of access to information other than that is available in an open source format.

1.4.1 Research Limitations

It is acknowledged that there are at least six core limitations of this research.

Firstly, any research conducted on terrorism is limited by the difficulty around the lack of agreed definitions on this subject matter. The absence of agreed definitions on key terms, such as terrorism or organised crime, means that this thesis is effectively having to identify and analyse conceptual gaps in phenomena without a shared understanding. This creates an obvious need for the development and presentation of specific definitions of these key terms. Although there is a strong rationale presented for the definitional approach adopted in this thesis, it is acknowledged that the definitions selected may differ according to individual researchers. This is an issue that has perplexed at the highest level of debate for decades (von Lampe, 2004) with for instance the EU member states in respect of organised crime even concluding that the aim to reach a common definition presented too many problems, and they should pursue joint anti organised crime activity without one. (Van der Heijden, 1996) However, the definitions presented in this thesis have a firm basis in academic literature as well as international and domestic legal standards and as a result may be considered as offering an analytical lens to pursue the research question and argument. Furthermore, they are reflective of the prevailing views amongst those engaged in the study of terrorism and organised crime.

Secondly, any research into terrorism and organised crime is going to be limited by the nature of the subject matter. Both phenomena operate, by their nature, within a secretive environment for the perpetrators and investigators. This limits the analysis by restricting access to primary sources for research purposes. To minimise the impact of this limitation access to investigators was secured and a wide sample of material from a variety of authors across the world is utilised in this thesis to provide as informed a picture of both the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime as possible.

The third limitation arises through the perpetrators of activity in both phenomena being extremely dangerous individuals, limiting access to primary sources due to safety concerns in respect of the researcher's wellbeing. The researcher minimised the impact of this limitation through accessing participants with first-hand experience of both phenomena and primary data for appropriate elements of two of the case studies.

The fourth limitation is in respect specifically of available information on terrorists. Terrorists commonly leave very little evidence of their motivations, reducing the opportunities to gain a full understanding of the factors driving their activities. To minimise the impact of this limitation the author has gathered all available open source reporting in respect of the 2016 sample of lone wolf terrorists at chapter 2. This has provided a dataset utilising all information available, and is wholly similar to evidence available in respect of historic terrorist actors (such as the anarchists) which has been deemed acceptable in terms of previous academic consideration.

Fifthly, although the research overcomes a number of the previous noted shortcomings in terms of terrorism research, in that access to primary source material and those with first-hand experience has been forthcoming, this has to be caveated with the fact that the author may have a certain bias due to professional training and experience as a police officer. In the context of this thesis, and when writing the individual pieces of publication, the author was at all times aware of this bias which goes some distance to address this limitation. The author attempts at all times to approach this subject matter with the dispassionate and detached consideration of academia that is required.

Silke (2001) points out that 97% of terrorism researcher's use opportunity sampling, using research participants the researcher can get access to rather than sampling potential participants systematically; in this regard this thesis falls within the 97%. The officers interviewed were accessible to the author through his position as a police officer. Silke (2001) accepts that given the contentious and dangerous nature of terrorism research such utilisation of contacts is to be expected, from a purely practical point of view.

The author did not however have any prior knowledge of the confidential reports that are referenced during this thesis, nor access to them by virtue of his occupation and access was afforded purely on the basis of the authors request in terms of research.

Finally, it is acknowledged that there may be a methodological weaknesses relating to the use of 'opportunity sampling' as a data collection technique. However, the author has succeeded in accessing individuals with first-hand experience of the phenomena under investigation and access to primary source related material. Like him, as individuals involved in law enforcement they may have their own biases due to the nature of their work. Wherever possible triangulation of their opinions is provided from academic and other open source material. The thesis contends that this access, coupled to the authors' awareness of potential bias and efforts to counter this, provides a sufficient degree of comfort that this research is new, innovative and has a credible evidence base for the conclusions drawn.

Despite these limitations, which could be applied to almost all research into terrorism, it is contended that having an awareness of these limitations as well as the steps taken to address them, particularly access to informed research participants, leaves the discussion with considerable merit and are not sufficient to devalue the conclusions drawn.

1.4.2 The Similarities between Terrorism and Organised Crime

This thesis shows that both terrorism and organised crime are phenomena that share a number of characteristics, not only in relation to academic issues concerning their study, but also their operational mechanisms.

The striking similarities of the operating structure of terrorists and organised criminals, in their style of co-operation and maintenance structures are noted by Robinson (2003) and Asal, Milward, and Schoon (2014). This thesis contends that in common with organised international drug traffickers, modern terrorist groups are highly compartmentalised, resilient and have the ability to make quick necessary changes. Sageman's (2005) observations on the current jihadist terrorist structures directly correlate with the characteristics noted by Robinson (2003), Asal et al. (2014), and Bovenkerk and Chakra (2004). They also accept that the structural similarities are striking, while drawing the reader back to the ever important distinctions of their criminal purpose of organised crime versus the politically motivated violence of terrorism. They also emphasise that this is an important distinction to maintain.

For this thesis, to achieve an understanding of their similarities of these contentious phenomena we must first identify the framework within which in which we

conceptualise each in turn, before turning to previous attempts to understand and model this interaction.

1.4.3 Defining Terrorism

The problems caused by a lack of definition in terrorism research are well documented (Silke, 2001; Schmid, 2004; Sinai, 2007).

Schmid and Jongman have worked on this subject for decades, from their first edition in 1988, to the second almost twenty years later where they conceded that "the search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on" (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 1).

In the first edition research Schmid and Jongman considered 109 definitions of terrorism. From these they produced a potential defection where:

- Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as instrumental *targets of violence*;
- These victims share characteristics resulting in their targeting;
- This contributes to a state of fear (terror) amongst those targeted;
- This is considered as extra normal by observers;
- The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the targeted group;
- And finally, the terror immobilises the targeted group or secures demand compliance or attention from the observers (Schmid and Jongman, 1988)

Their proposed definition was certainly comprehensive, but seen as unwieldy and still did not attract wholesale support. Respondents to their questionnaire raised issues over the symbolic nature of terrorism, not enough emphasis on motive or purpose, the lack of consideration of destruction of property specifically. Some respondents complained the definition was too broad, others that it was too narrow. These polarised opinions led to the authors considering whether "terrorism is a unitary concept" (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 11), which for many academics it is not, as per the discussion in respect of critical terrorism studies above in relation to the role of the state, which Schmid and Jongman (2005) also consider. They though see non state actors as generally falling into a situation where the guilt or innocence of victims is immaterial, while 'state terror' generally involves targeting of individuals or groups for specific reasons Schmid and Jongman (2005). Schmid and Jongman ultimately accept, after providing a full discussion of the objections raised above and their alternative views that they simply will not satisfy all commentators. In respect of the invited responses to Schmid's proposed definition the two factors that attracted the most cross-academic support for inclusion were 83.5% of respondents agreeing that terrorism must include violence or force, and 65% agreed the act must be political in nature. Richardson (1999), a noted academic in the field of terrorism research, who noted that "the term terrorism is being so widely used in so many contexts to become almost meaningless" (Richardson, 1999, pp. 209) is very clear that "the critical feature of terrorism is the deliberate targeting of innocents in an effort to convey a message to another party." (Richardson, 1999, pp. 209)

Corner and Gill (2015) perhaps capture particularly well the divergences of opinion that can occur in terrorism research. They identify a false dichotomy that has emerged between seeing terrorists (in the 1970's) as harbouring significant psychological flaws,

to their being regarded as quite psychologically normal individuals, but also being persons participating instead in complicated (and extreme) group and social dynamics. They found that in 40 years of research the literature has jumped from one extreme position ("they are all mentally ill") to the exact opposite ("by definition, a terrorist cannot be mentally ill"). We return to this issue in detail in chapter 2.

Horowitz (1987) explains this divergence, writing that "no given social system has a monopoly on the use of political terrorism, and therefore no social system can claim virtue in one form of terrorism over another" (Horowitz, 1987, pp. xviii).

For academia this perhaps eloquently illustrates, as with the French resistance and Mujahedeen examples provided above at section 1.4, the almost transitory nature of what is considered to be terrorism at any given time.

The factors identified as most prominent in Schmid's work, those of violence and political purpose, do appear to be the closest to general acceptance. Lacquer (1999) notes the advice to students of terrorism on the subject of a definition that has been "received from philosophers and theologians, psychologists and even economists" (Lacquer, 1999, pp. 5). He further notes that only violence, or the threat of violence, appears to be the common trait and sees the ever changing nature of terrorism as being fundamental to the issues around its defining, although in response to Schmid's work he sees nothing having been obtained in terms of understanding of terrorism through continued focus on definitional issues.

Some academics, such as Lutz and Lutz (2008) see it as essential that for an act to be considered as terrorism it must have been committed by an identifiable organisation. This is a factor this thesis considers in detail at chapter 2, and suggests such a conceptualisation is misplaced as it neither fits with Rapoport's (2003) commonly accepted anarchist terrorist wave nor instances of contemporary terrorism subject to analysis in the case study considered there.

The definitional issues stretch well beyond academia alone. The dispute amongst NATO leaders mentioned above is an excellent comparator point for considering the issues that arise over defining terrorism in the operational realm.

Turkey and its allies disagree over the status of the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). Turkey classifies the group (it could be argued for domestic political reasons) as a terrorist body, while their fellow NATO members view the YPG as allies in their proxy struggle against the incumbent Syrian regime.

For Turkey terrorism is defined as follows:

> "The first criterion concerns the modus operandi: the Law stipulates that terrorism involves the use of coercion, violence, terror, intimidation or threats. The second criterion concerns the purposes for which the act is perpetrated. These are listed in the aforementioned article:
> -any act designed to impair the basic characteristics of the Republic, as specified in the Constitution, or the country's political, legal, secular and economic systems;

-any act designed to violate territorial or national integrity, and any act designed to jeopardize the existence of the Republic of Turkey;
-any act designed to impair or weaken government authority;
-any act designed to destroy fundamental rights and freedoms;
-any act designed to impair domestic and international security, public order or public health.
The final criterion is that, in order to be considered as a terrorist act, the act must have been committed by a person or persons belonging to an organization.

Terrorist offenders are defined by Article 2of Turkey's Counter Terrorism Law."

(Committee of Experts on Terrorism, 2013)

For the UK the definition in law is as follows:

"Terrorism Act 2000, Section 1

(1)In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where—

(a) the action falls within subsection (2),

(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government **[**or an international governmental organisation**]** or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious **[**racial**]** or ideological cause.

(2)Action falls within this subsection if it—

(a)involves serious violence against a person,

(b)involves serious damage to property,

(c)endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,

(d)creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

(e)is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3)The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

(4)In this section—

(a)"action" includes action outside the United Kingdom,

(b)a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,

(c)a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and

(d)"the government" means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom." (UK Government, 2020)

The UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) summarise this as "Terrorism is the use or threat of action, both in and outside of the UK, designed to influence any international government organisation or to intimidate the public. It must also be for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause." (Crown Prosecution Service, 2020a)

For the United States of America terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as

> "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85)" (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2005)

While both the definitions from the USA and UK are similar, it is clear they differ greatly from that adopted by Turkey, which has a very wide reach into areas of state authority and continuation. Turkey's modern history, and the terrorism it has faced from the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) (Roth and Server, 2007) provide a backdrop to the rationale for such inclusion, however it is factors such as this and the merits, or not, of the PKK's cause that bring such differences to the fore.

As a starting point in terms of defining terrorism, for the purpose of this thesis it is suggested that the reader considers the definition of the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (United Nations, 2004), which condemned terrorist acts as:

> "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature." (United Nations, 2004)

This comprehensive definition, utilised and agreed upon by many if not universally, appears to bridge this issues that exist in the study or terrorism, allowing as it does for both state and non-state activities to be considered through its framing. Similar to the UK and USA definitions determination of the perpetrators as being associated to a stipulated terrorist group for acts to be considered terrorist in nature does not feature, allowing for wide and flexible determination by those in the criminal justice sphere.

However, in contrast to the UK and USA definitions that of the UN successfully removes a significant element of the 'political' viewpoint of the assessor of the act, as far as one can from such a contentious topic, through its very direct inclusion of "*are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature*". This inclusion removes the judgement from an argument over the merits of cause, and instead frames it in terms of behaviours that are unacceptable in any civilised society, no matter the motivation of the perpetrator.

This definition also allows application to international organisations as potential victims of terrorism, as opposed to solely nation states. The nature of modern terrorism, and attacks on Non-Governmental Organisations by terrorist non state actors demonstrates such inclusion has merit.

As will be demonstrated later in this thesis, this comprehensive definition (in tandem with the referenced definitions from the UK and USA) also allows for the inclusion of the 'lone wolf' actors this thesis examines in detail and contends are of far more significant import than current research allows.

1.4.4 Defining Organised Crime

The basic premise for the existence of an organised crime group (OCG) is that they are a collection of individuals who

> "engage in many different types of economic activities, both legal and illegal. Their ability to enforce their rule within a specific geographic or economic area requires that they have the means to use force and therefore providing protection is an element common to all (organised crime groups) irrespective of their other economic activities" (Skaperdas, 2001, pp. 179)

The market is which these OCG's operate

> "can roughly be divided into two main categories: (a) the market of goods and services which are *forbidden* and (b) the markets of *permitted* goods and services which are offered or handled by means of law breaking" (Van Duyne, 2004, pp. 342)

Organised bands of individuals involved in actions that are commonly considered as organised criminality meeting Skaperdas' (2001) criteria providing Van Duyne's (2004) 'category (a)' services have existed since ancient times, with 'gangs' carrying out extortion and kidnappings for ransom occurring certainly as far back as the Romans (Tatum, 1999) and in Medieval times with the notorious 'Assassins for Hire' of the Nizaris (Bartlett, 2002). These criminal enterprises 'professionalised' with modernity, with Sicilian small scale extortion groups, such as the émigré 'Black Hand' whose members arrived in the United States at the end of the 19th Century (Dash, 2009) metastasising during the period of the Falsted Act's imposed prohibition on the sale of alcohol ('forbidden' goods) into hierarchical Mafia groups, with national and international links (Johnson, 1962). This 'professionalisation', and the development of modern states and regulations largely saw the emergence of Van Duyne's (2004) 'category b' organised criminality, in the form of sophisticated cross border tax evasion and such.

Scholars turned their attention to organised crime in the 1960's, and although early definitions focussed on the known hierarchical organised crime type these mafia groups in the United States of America typified (Cressey, 1969), definitions evolved, with Albini providing the following:

> "Rather than a criminal secret society, a criminal syndicate consists of a system of loosely structured relationships functioning primarily because each participant is interested in furthering his own welfare"
>
> (Albini, 1971, pp. 288)

Albini was seen as controversial at the time, as historical experience to that date suggested the hierarchies of the described United States Mafia or Chinese Triad's (Newark, 2011) were the norm. In addition, the United States had just enacted (in 1970) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO), to specifically target those engaged in recognisable criminal enterprises (Schneider, 2014). It envisages decapitation of crime groups through the use of the legislation to target leaders. However, ongoing research, the demise of mafia cohesion through successful law enforcement interdiction (Skaperdas, 2001) and policing developments have seen Albini's (1971) definition now widely accepted in academic and policing circles, particularly through the end of the cold war and the 'globalisation' accompanied by widespread insecurity the world has experienced since.

In the UK these changes have seen Organised Crime currently defined as "planned and co-ordinated criminal behaviour and conduct by people working together on a continuing basis" (Crown Prosecution Service, 2020b). However, although they focus on this as a working definition "there is no legal definition of serious and organised crime" (National Crime Agency, 2016, pp. 5). The CPS note, significantly for this thesis, and in tandem with Albini's use of the term 'welfare' above, that in respect of participants "their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain" and that "organised crime in this and other countries recognises neither national borders nor national interests." (Crown Prosecution Service, 2020b).

Through this globalising effect, and reflecting Albini's views, organised crime organisational dynamics are acknowledged as having changed dramatically, with the hierarchy of the initially identified groups such as the Sicilian mafia having transformed with "most organised crime groups now operating as loose networked affiliations" (Perri et al, 2009, pp. 27). In the UK it has been noted that

> "Membership of OCG's are usually fluid, particularly among those groups active over longer periods. Individuals may belong to more than one group, or groups may network for mutual benefit if they perceive each other to be reputable. Outsiders are often vouched for by existing OCG members" (National Crime Agency, 2016, pp. 7)

In Northern Europe, in particular, "legal and criminal business patterns develop pragmatically along trusted networks of friends and connections" (Van Duyne, 1996, pp. 344) while in the United States "Criminal organisations…. are best viewed as shifting coalitions, normally local or regional in scope." (Schneider, 2014)

Ridley notes that the collapse of the Soviet Union has led, in Europe, to the fundamental altering of old crime hierarchies as "smaller, equally ruthless organised crime groups have become apparent forming confederations of associations based upon ethnic and linguistic affinity…. (with) individual groups of criminals operating, either continuously or from time to time, in some form of loose association of neo-vertical criminal structures." (Ridley, 2008, pp. 28) In agreement Stanislawski and Herman note

that criminal organisations have begun to evolve from hierarchical structures with a small cadre of leaders at the top to more network-based groups whose functions and activities are more dispersed (Stanislawski and Herman, 2004).

With this 'fluidity' there has been a gradual acceptance that targeting apparent 'bosses' or 'captains' does not eliminate an organisation, as was intended through legislation such as RICO, where thousands have been prosecuted but others quickly step forward to assume loose leadership roles.

1.4.5 Defining the Intersection - The Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime

Given the apparent similarities between the functioning within phenomena of terrorism and organised crime, and the acknowledged links that often occur between each, previous works, such as those discussed below, have been undertaken by both government and academia to understand these links. Both are commonly seen as phenomena of great risk to a state's safety and governance, and so only through gaining an understanding of this particularly potentially dangerous confluence of actors involved in illegal activity can it be combatted.

While Makarenko's (2004) 'crime/ terror' continuum illustrated at Figure 1 is illustrative of the relationship between the phenomena other, albeit similar, descriptions have been provided. Rollins, Wyler and Rosen (2010) reporting to the United States Congress, identify 3 areas where potential overlap between the phenomena may occur:

- Through shared tactics and methods;
- Through the process of transformation from one group to another over time;
- Through short-term or long-term transaction based service for hire activities between groups.

A similar consideration of this model is illustrated by Jamieson:

"(A) The self-financing of terrorist groups by typical 'organised crime-type activities
(B) Pragmatic Collaboration between terrorist and organised crime groups for mutually beneficial ends
(C) The use of terrorism by organised crime groups for political purposes"

(Jamieson, 2005, pp. 165).

In considering the starting point of Makarenko's scale, which encompasses Jamieson's Point B, Madsen (2009) examines how terrorists would conceivably purchase forged documents while organised crime groups would in turn perhaps purchase explosives from terrorists. He identifies that there may be advantages and disadvantages for both parties of such arrangements, with the advantages enhancing operational capabilities for the terrorists while the disadvantages perhaps lead to dissolution of the arrangement or a group moving on down Makarenko's scale (A or C in Jamieson's options) as expertise is moved 'in house' within a group.

Makarenko's model challenges the clear distinctions between the phenomena that Madsen (2009) and Jamieson (2005) retain, a position supported by the Rollins and Wyler (2013). Here there is an acknowledgment that globalisation, advances in

technology, trade, the finance industry and the advent of cybercrime has led many organised crime and terrorist groups adapting "more readily to new market niches and establish(ing) more fluid alliances with external individuals and groups" (Rollins and Wyler, 2013, pp. 1). Their report cites the ransom and hostage plot carried out in Algeria in 2013 as a significant example, with Moktar Belmoktar as the plot leader being an illegal actor with close and long-standing links to both organised crime and Islamist groups.

As Figure 1 makes clear, Makarenko views the relationship between terrorism and organised crime as being highly nuanced, and transitory. In her view, the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime are at opposite ends of a line, moving down this line when they form alliances or utilise the tactics of the other; enter a 'black hole', where they are no longer clearly organised criminals or a terrorist group but instead manifest a confluence of the characteristics of both; and may ultimately mutate into a group categorised as being wholly transformed into one which fits the criteria of the other phenomenon.

Examples from reality demonstrating this transition within terrorist groups (Point 2 for Makarenko, stage A for Jamieson) are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which increasingly become involved in criminal activity, either or initially to fund their cause whereas circumstances alter they mutate into post-terrorism organisations, and who now largely operate as criminal organisations driven by profit (Byrne, 2009). These organisations have assuredly fallen into Makarenko's 'black hole', her point 4, and become mutated organisations, no longer serving their original purpose and utilising tactics of both phenomena.

A shift from conflict to criminality is not a new phenomenon. The first African American gang to emerge in the street of Los Angeles was filled with veterans of World War II (Valdermar, 2007). More recently, Volkov (2002) identified that a number of Soviet veterans from the decade lone 1979-1989 Afghan conflict became involved in organised crime as their country transformed in the post-Soviet era. Glenny (2008) notes the number of veterans of the Balkan conflicts who fill some of the upper echelons of European organised crime. Similarly, McDermott (2013) refers to the very same phenomenon following the disbanding of the paramilitary United Self Defence Force of Colombia (AUC), while Naim (2013) cites a similar transformation of members of the Mexican military into Zeta's narco-traffickers. These authors all note how each organisations member's skill sets, honed through brutal conflict, lent themselves particularly well to the management of other illicit activities.

1.5 Rapoport's Four Waves and Contemporary Terrorism

Accepting the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 definition as a basis for considering terrorism, we find that it does not exclude the actions of an individual as being regarded as those of a terrorist. It is the *Mens Rea*, the perpetrators intent in carrying out their actions, which is of significant importance.

Although the definition of 'lone wolf' terrorism has been debated at length, the definition provided by Becker (2014) arguably appears the most comprehensive, defining it as "ideologically driven violence, or attempted violence, perpetrated by an

individual who plans and executes an attack *in the absence of collaboration* (author's italics) with other individuals or groups." (Becker, 2014, pp. 964) Within this definition are 3 key elements that this thesis contends are essential to understanding lone wolf terrorism.

The first is that it is 'ideologically driven', the act has a purpose beyond the act itself. As the thesis will show the perpetrators understanding of this motivation can be very questionable, however this dubiety over understanding has existed since the inception of modern terrorism, as will be illustrated with the consideration of Rapoport's first wave, the 'Anarchists' that follows. The second key element is 'violence or attempted violence', as essential element of all forms of terrorism, as discussed above. The final key element is the absence of collaboration, which this thesis contends is fundamental to understanding the lone wolf as an individual actor but allows conceptualisation to be potentially inclusive rather than exclusive. I.E. we are referring to individuals *acting* without confederates but that does not mean they may not have common interests or goals, however much their intellectual counterparts may not be directly influencing activity. The thesis goes into some detail on this point, which is accepted as being contentious.

Lynch (2017) appears to have captured the nub of the problem that exists for many when we consider lone wolf terrorism (and terrorism *per se*) in noting that

> "in an effort to understand terrorism, particularly for those individuals who work with the perpetrators of political violence, it is vital that we separate the notion of terrorism from the terrorist. Terrorism is a highly politicized term, a pejorative label applied unevenly across groups…. the terrorist actor must be understood and considered in his/her local context in conjunction with the entirety of their social network, personal background, ideological affiliations and offending history. In effect, practitioners must deal with what is in from of them, and not be seduced by the hysteria (understandably so) that so often accompanies terrorism and terrorist events." (Lynch, 2017, pp. 80-81)

The FBI foresaw this danger of this changing culture as early as 2004, with its Strategic Plan containing the observation that, "the most significant domestic terrorism threat over the next five years will be the lone actor or lone wolf terrorist." (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004). As the case study of chapter 2 demonstrates these predictions were prescient, and to be borne out to a terrible degree in the following decade.

1.5.1 Wave Theory and the Lone Wolf

As discussed, Rapoport's work on the evolution of terrorism establishes the theory that terrorism exists across the world in four waves since the 1880s (Rapoport, 2003).

As outlined, Rapoport contends that these waves began with the Anarchist wave, which lasted for approximately forty years. It was followed in the 1920's by an anti-colonial wave, which lasted to the 1960's, then a new left wave which in turn faded as the religious wave crested, and it is this wave which, in theory, is said to still exist today.

For Rapoport these waves were captured within the geopolitical tide of the times. The terrorist participants embraced the zeitgeist at the razor's edge of contemporary radical

thought. The initial anarchist wave, which is considered in more detail below, diminished/declined during the carnage of World War I. As the world adjusted following its conclusion, colonial struggles succeeded it. It took place against a background of significant international reorganization and technological innovation, which some have described as being the initial phase of globalisation. It is not surprising that the change in world politics that resulted led to the focus of radical political thought moving, and saw the focus of terrorism mirror the change. As colonial struggles concluded, largely successfully, and radical politics moved on to the new left, so too did terrorist motivations. The collapse of the Soviet Union, bastion of Communism and backer of many leftist terrorist sponsor nations, contributed significantly to the demise of the new left wave and the rise of the religious wave. So too did the unforeseen consequences of democratic nations support provided to the Mujahedeen's struggle with the Soviet's in Afghanistan.

It was from Afghanistan, and the 9/11 plotters who found safe haven there, that a general disregard for lone wolves emanated.

> "After 9/11 lone wolf terrorism suddenly seemed like a distraction from more serious threats… Security services built up organograms of terrorist groups. Analysts focused on individual terrorists only insofar as they were connected to bigger entities. Personal relations – particularly friendships based on shared ambitions and battlefield experiences, as well as tribal or familial links – were mistaken for institutional ones, formally connecting individuals to organisations and placing them under a chain of command." (Burke, 2017)

The 'War on Terror' was framed around combatting organisations such as Al-Qaeda, not individual actors and consequently counter terrorism became focussed on organisational defeat in this war. Arguably, military conceptualisation of a collective 'enemy' took central stage rather than a law enforcement perspective of an 'offender', often tackled on an individual basis whether part of a grouping of offenders or not.

However, if we instead step back from this arguably militaristic conceptualisation and instead return to the history of terrorism, we find that in the past it was more the norm to readily accept that the actions of an individual can be regarded as acts of terrorism. This was the case in Rapoport's first wave of the anarchists, where the world come to consider acts of terror as propaganda by deed.

There have been lone individuals, not substantive groups, throughout history who have carried out acts of politically inspired violence, one of the most notable perhaps being Leon Czolgosz, the assassin of US President William McKinley in 1901. The unfortunate President McKinley was not alone in being a targeted United States President, either before or since. Attacks on United States President's that followed, and their similarities but ultimately substantial motivational differences, provide further examples of interest to the thesis.

Lee Harvey Oswald is perhaps the most controversial 'lone wolf' actor of the last seventy years. Speculation of Oswald's status as a sole actor continues to rage today, with many documents relating to the investigation of his assassination of President John F. Kennedy only recently being released, and some still withheld (Harnden, 2017). In

1981 an attempt on the life of another US President, Ronald Reagan, was perpetrated by John Hinckley Junior. President Reagan was wounded, but survived.

What differs about these three ultra-high profile assailants beyond anything else is their motive. It is interesting to contrast these three instances to begin to question when lone wolf action steps into terrorism.

Czolgosz is widely accepted by academics and historians as being part of a very loose anarchist wave of terrorism that lasted between 1880's and 1910's (Rapoport, 2003). A crumpled newspaper found in the assassin's pocket covering the story of King Umberto's murder by another 'anarchist terrorist' is utilised as an indicator for his wider politically fuelled anarchist inspired motivation (Burleigh, 2008).

The inability of Cobbler Leon Leuathier to make a functioning bomb and instead sitting down in restaurant then stabbing a fellow diner (who turned out to be Serbian ambassador) and the assassination of Elizabeth, Empress of Austria are seen, with the murder of King Umberto of Italy and President McKinley, as examples of anarchist terrorism, but with accepted weak ties between the perpetrators, and their apparent shared 'anarchist cause' being the link between them (Bell, 1987).

Each of these anarchist–actions did though have one element in common. They are all reasonably construed as extreme acts to drive forward a political goal. How widely understood, or agreed, that goal was amongst the perpetrators is highly debatable. The perpetrators had virtually no interaction. Additionally, although in wider society they were perceived to be acting to achieve a common goal, it is extremely questionable as to whether the perpetrators had a shared understanding of a common purpose.

It may have been the case that for the general public "improved telegraphy and successive newspaper editions updating the cycle of atrocity, arrest, trial, speeches from the dock, imprisonment or execution meant (they) could quite justifiably conclude that the activities of the bomb-throwing maniacs were being coordinated on behalf of sinister objectives across Europe or North America" (Burleigh, 2008, pp. 21) but Burleigh (2008) cautions that evidence suggests any real degree of co-ordination was limited.

Jensen (2009) shares Burleigh's caution around any significant degree of anarchist cooperation. He also notes that despite the anarchist's actions notoriety, casualties from their actions were relatively light. During the period between 1880 and 1914, they killed 160 and injured 500. These largely uncoordinated actions had succeeded though in the objective of sowing terror. The new means of publicity meant that others, such as Czolgosz, at least knew of the likely level of international coverage their actions would bring. The anti-colonial wave, and that of the new left, saw acts of such individual terror decrease dramatically. Terrorist actions were coordinated and group led. Indeed, between January 1, 1968 and May 1, 2007 there were only 72 acts of lone wolf terrorism, a mean of 1.84 per year (Spaaij, 2010).

However, of particular note it was during this period, Louis Beam, the right wing writer, published 'Leaderless Resistance', to which Kaplan (1997) drew initial academic attention. Beam called in 1983 (published in 1992) for individual autonomous action against the United States Federal Government. This 'call to arms' fell largely on deaf

ears amongst those in the far right he sought to agitate at the time. However, it was from this call ultimately that the lone wolf term has been coined. It is not a difficult mental adjustment to retrospectively term the actions of the anarchists described above in such a manner.

Oswald, best described as a 'misfit and sociopath', would have been in no doubt as to the significance of the actions he was undertaking, and their world-wide implications. His time as a very odd Marxist in the US Marines, and then in the Soviet Union, have given rise to all form of conspiracy theories as to his direction and orders. However recent coverage suggests it was far more likely that any agency such as the KGB who may have been attempting to utilise his services for wider goals would have eventually realized his fragile mental state meant he was an individual who could not have been controlled (Harden, 2017). Oswald's actions occurred against the backdrop of the worldwide leftist inspired wave of terrorism, which Rapoport (2003) illustrates as taking place between the 1960's and 1980's.

The shooting of President Reagan differs greatly from the actions undertaken by Czolgosz and Oswald. With both Czolgosz and Oswald their motivations have been examined, and with historical enquiry and hindsight, placed within a conceptualization of the wider political struggles of their time, with terrorist acts at the razor's edge of extreme anarchist and new left political activity respectively. What is of fundamental difference with Hinckley Jr. from the other two Presidential attackers is that his motivation, which has been examined at length, stemmed from an obsession with the actress Jodie Foster and his intent was to in some perverse way draw her attention to him. Hinckley Jr. had suffered significant mental health issues prior to carrying out the shooting (Associated Press, 2016). This thesis contends that Czolgosz and Oswald's actions can be construed as terrorist in nature, while Hinckley Jr.'s is not. Motivation is key.

Discussion often turns to failing mental health as an explanation for a significant amount of lone wolf activity, and consequent attempts to bracket together Czolgosz, Oswald, Hinckley Jr. and individuals such as Stephen Paddock, of infamy for the shooting in Las Vegas which killed 58 and injured 500 (Levenson, 2017).

This view appears fundamentally flawed as it fails to grasp the central concepts at work in respect of lone wolf terrorist inspired activity. Czolgosz and Oswald's actions have been determined to have fallen within the sphere of influence of the wider political struggles of their times, with motive intimated from these. Paddock has been found to have no discernible motive whatsoever, although plenty of issues.

A paradigm shift in how we conceptualise lone wolf terrorist activity and the role of mental health may be necessary, and this thesis addresses this. Paddock may have had difficulties in terms of his mental wellbeing, however his actions had no apparent political meaning or inspiration. In this thesis the author seeks to address the necessity of a paradigm shift in the concept of terrorism (including in particular 'terrorism inspired' acts) and mental health. Without this we are likely doomed to see ever increasing numbers of terrorist inspired outrages committed by those acting alone.

1.6 Methodology

The thesis follows the 'pragmatic' approach originating with Peirce's conception and developed by other philosophers such as James, Schiller and Dewey to the position where a pragmatic approach outlines a "position which lays emphasis on results as a test of satisfactoriness" (Uromson and Ree, 1991, pp. 257). In this thesis, the pragmatic approach addresses the research question by adopting a practical approach to the 'social affairs' (terrorism and organised crime) under investigation (Burch, 2018). It does so with an acknowledgement of the research limitations above at section 1.4.

The thesis utilises a mixed methodological approach, this being

> "the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration." (Johnson et al., 2007, pp. 123)

This definition was arrived at by Johnson *et al.* following a technique similar to that of Schmid and Jongman (1988) described at section 1.4.3, where Johnson *et al.* similarly analysed definitions, in their case 19 of mixed methodological approaches, identified the common characteristics of breadth and/or corroboration, and drew together what they perceived to be the best encompassing definition. They did so while acknowledging that "definitions can and will usually change over time as the approach or 'research paradigm' continues to grow" (Johnson et al., pp.112), a feature their field has in common with both terrorism and organised crime, as described above. This works for this thesis as it allows for case studies informed by confidential reporting, and practitioner opinions, to be considered alongside a case study using content analysis allowing a true 'rich picture' to emerge where differing methodologies combine to produce a compelling answer to the research question posed.

The evidence gathered in the thesis comprises of a case study and survey methodology as the basis to address the research question identified earlier in this chapter in breadth and depth. Through this approach the thesis contains an appropriate degree of triangulation of evidence, "the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (Denzin, 1978, pp. 291) thereby avoiding any inherent difficulties that might arise from adopting a 'paradigm' stance of utilising only quantitative or qualitative methods that results in 'inappropriate certainty' that may come from a single method approach (Robson, 2002).

A case methodology involves either the examination of many units or cases where they look for general patterns in the mass of numbers, or selects a few key cases to illustrate an issue, with both methods being utilised over one time period or across time periods (Neumann, 2007). It allows for research of complex issues, testing causality, and has utility in that it can be applied across a variety of academic disciplines (Harrison et al., 2017), through aggregated research where 'all' of the potential sources within a data set are considered, or 'intensive', where only one subject is studied in depth to provide tentative ideas about a social phenomenon. The main weakness of case studies is identified as being that "some observed and measured data may afterwards prove to be irrelevant, while some relevant properties are erroneously left out in the initial modelling." (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 20).

Swanborn's (2010) approach is an acceptance of this weakness, which he argues should be mitigated against through a thorough research basis, commenting that "we do not make any scientific progress if we keep thinking in terms of 'we must observe the whole', instead of thinking in terms of properties or variables." (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 20)

This main weakness is accompanied by a perceived secondary weakness in the form of the potential bias of the investigator(s) in data selection (mitigation of this potential limitation for this thesis is discussed in detail at section 1.4.).

The study of 'lone wolf terrorism' lent itself particularly well to examining every case over a set time period 'aggregated case study work', in the researcher's determination one year, 2016. This allowed for contrast with a relevant time periods set within Rapoport's (2003) general wave theory to illustrate similarities and divergence. It also provided the opportunity for an 'intensive' case study of one identifiable example of particular import, to expand the tentative ideas about the social phenomena of 'lone wolf terrorist' changes that appeared to be emerging.

While this provides an excellent oversight of particular aspects of the instances of 'lone wolf terrorism' in question, it is reliant upon the information made available in the public domain. Such information is, as discussed above, constrained by the 'secretive' nature of terrorism investigation and provision of information to the public; particularly where prosecutions do not result due to the death of the perpetrator as can often be the case with 'lone wolf terrorists'. Through adopting the case study methodology all potential cases of lone wolf terrorist activity were gathered and subject to analysis. By applying the definition of terrorism from 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 definition described at section 1.4.3 to these cases they could be included or excluded from the data set.

To compliment this case methodology, a variety of interview formats were adopted relevant to the subjects utilised. The use of interviews is acknowledged as a flexible and adaptable way of finding things out that can provide rich and illuminating material (Robson, 2002) that allows for nuance and, in this thesis, professional judgement and experience of the participants to be gathered.

For the interviews, "an important data gathering technique involving verbal communication between the researcher and the participant…commonly used in survey designs and in exploratory and descriptive studies" (Fox, 2009, pp. 4) a variety of methods were used.

Given the difficulties around researching both the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime, as discussed, such material is unusual. Unstructured, semi structured and a fully structured survey were utilised for different aspects of the case study as appropriate to the subject group, and nature of the discussions being facilitated.

In designing all three approaches the author took account of Bell's (1987) recommendation that one starts with straightforward questions to put subjects at ease, and gain their full participation in the process.

The author is an experienced interviewer, comfortable in commencing conversation on a variety of topics and thereby putting subjects as ease; an essential quality in conducting any face to face research interview (Singleton and Straits, 2012)

Open ended questions were utilised were possible in order that the subjects can "express (their) thoughts freely, spontaneously and in (their) own language" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981, pp. 243)

Individual interviews were used exclusively for the discussion of the confidential reporting, as

> "they are appropriate where we may expect a variety of different stories to be told concerning a setting or context, and where we are interested to learn about this variety. They are also appropriate where the topic to be discussed is sensitive" (Fox, 2009, pp. 8).

This approach also applied to a number of the general interviews.

To gain the participation of the subjects in more junior positions engaged in relevant investigations on a daily basis provided the 'group story' (Morgan, 1988), and also afforded an opportunity for the subjects to be confident in expressing their observations on this sensitive subject matter while accompanied by their peers.

The common errors in interviews occur through deviation from written instructions; rephrasing questions; recording errors and interpretation errors (Fox, 2009). As the author conducted the interviews personally the first two common errors were avoided through the use of the drafted question set where appropriate. Recording errors were mitigated through the use of a recording device, with the participant's written permission, which was later utilised for transcription purposes. Where participants did not agree to recordings being made comprehensive notes were taken, which were checked for accuracy with the participants. Interpretation errors were mitigated as far as possible by clarifying answers with all participants on interview conclusions.

For the survey to achieve maximum participation Youngman's (1982) recommendations were utilised: explicit purpose, question spacing, text size, consistent layout, clear differentiation between instructions and questions and space for coding, with a limited question set as "excessive size can only reduce response rates" (Youngman, 1982, pp. 22).

In summary, the study utilises empirical methods (Watkins and Burton, 2017) of content analysis (Robson, 2002), Delphi principles (Brown, 1968) and purposive sampling in an endeavour to address the research question within the widely accepted conceptual framework of Rapoport's (2003) wave theory of terrorist development.

The Case Study on Lone Wolf terrorists relies on content analysis, using as its basis open source reporting from 2016. From this year the details of every potential lone wolf attack were gathered, providing a basis for comparison and analysis of factors of note pertaining to the actors involved.

The Case Study on IS participants utilises initial Delphi method principles to provide a starting point of credible opinion on potential behaviours utilising recently retired subject matter experts. The sample were consulted by the author through a questionnaire, distributed via email.

The researcher was satisfied that consulting with the expert group by means of a questionnaire rather than establishing a focus group would embrace the principle of Delphi (Brown, 1968) in avoiding the psychological factors associated with group work. Given also the hypothetical nature of the request to the participants where the researcher was relying on their background to provide general expertise in the field rather than exposure to particular cases or incidents, it was felt that obtaining consensus would be inappropriate, and a second round of contact was therefore not undertaken. This conforms to Wouldenberg's (1991) reservations on the questionable value of consensus when dealing with expert groups, and its dangers that group pressure may be resulting in conformity.

The Case Study on terrorism and organised crime in Scotland is "an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence" (Yin, 1994).

As discussed above, gaining access to anyone involved in such activities within the scope of the 'initial nexus' between terrorism and organised crime would be extremely difficult. By virtue of both activities nature their participants, terrorists and organised criminals, are secretive. A lack of prosecutions also necessarily entails a lack of individuals in custody and potentially accessible to a research project, notwithstanding security issues over access to the convicted. The safety of any researcher has also to be considered.

With all of this in mind purposive sampling (Neumann, 2007), where the researcher selects their own sample for the enquiry being conducted, was determined as the most practical and effective means of conducting qualitative research in this subject area. Access to Scottish based senior intelligence officers, analysts and investigators was available to the researcher, all of whom could be interviewed or participate in focus groups.

By utilising all three approaches a rich picture emerges, combining factual evidence gathered within set parameters with the opinions of professionals engaged in the field, supported by confidential reporting they have access to. These two pillars provide a strong basis for evidence based consideration of current theoretical modelling that exists in respect of both phenomena.

Perhaps most tellingly from the review conducted, the connections between terrorism and organised crime described in the current literature are almost exclusively organisational. There is little consideration of the individual actors involved in these relationships, or the factors determining the participant's decision making.

A rather perverse mirror imaging occurs in respect of lone wolves, where consideration is all about the individual, and not on their potential role within Terrorism *per se*, and particularly within Rapoport's framework. There has been little work on the effect the actions of these lone terrorist actors have on terrorist groups, and vice versa. This thesis

contends there has been a far more symbiotic relationship than has previously been acknowledged and that motivation forms a central part to understanding the occurrence of terrorism.

To address this apparent significant gap in academic work to date it is necessary to identify areas within the potential connections between the phenomena or the wider milieu of Terrorist activity that would benefit from a level of research appropriate to this thesis.

An area within the potential connections between terrorism and organised crime that was viewed as particularly lending itself to this level of research was the initial amalgam of the crime/ terror nexus, the point of 'first contact'. For Makarenko (2004) this is point one on the 'Crime Terror Continuum', for Jamieson (2005), point B of his model, where pragmatic collaboration occurs to suit both parties. For ease and clarity, these two separately described points of intersection will be collectively referred to in this thesis as the 'initial nexus'.

Information regarding the functioning of such a relationship, beyond the existence of the relationship itself, is scarce. It does not appear that it has been a primary area of research focus and when incidences may occur, they would be likely known primarily to law enforcement bodies, which may retain the information for obvious operational benefit. It is certainly the case that there are few prosecutions resulting from such relationships, although the earlier referenced United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) interdiction of a Mali based al-Qaeda operative highlights law enforcement activity in the area (Sherwell, 2010).

Chapter 2 Case Study: Lone Wolves

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is formed from the following publications:

"The 2016 'Lone Wolf' Tsunami - Is Rapoport's 'Religious Wave' ending?" (Gallagher, 2017) which provided consideration of the development of the lone wolf concept and illustrated the scale of lone wolf activity in 2016 through a year focussed case study.

"Lone Wolf Terrorists: Examining Motives and Methods of Stand Alone Terrorists" (Gallagher, publication scheduled in 2022), which takes the forward the work in "The 2016 'Lone Wolf' Tsunami - Is Rapoport's 'Religious Wave' ending?" (Gallagher, 2017) using further examples, and examines the significant differences that exist between a lone actor multiple victim killer and a terrorist lone wolf.

2.2 "The Lone Wolf Tsunami: Is Rapoport's Religious Wave Ending?", *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol. 10, No. 2

Introduction

"While no one can predict the future course of terrorism with confidence, the history of terrorism counsels us to think broadly but at the same time exercise caution." (Jenkins, 1999, pp. x)

Jenkins words above provide a good touchstone when considering potential developments in terrorism, particularly given the era defining events of 9/11 that followed two short years after they were written, the consequences of which continue to overshadow world events today. However, it is from this basis that I intend to approach this article. I ask that the reader considers recent publications both in academia and from law enforcement that indicate that terrorism may again be entering a new phase; a wave with striking historic echoes in terms of the modus operandi of participants, but on a wholly different scale, and with driving factors far removed from those of the past. The scope of this article limits discussion specifically to the lone wolf manifestation of terrorist action; however, extrapolation to wider consideration of terrorism's manifestations could be undertaken in future. In addition, it is through consideration of participants in terrorist groups that, to a degree, shines a light on what is happening amongst their lone wolf fellow travellers.

Individualised Terrorism

To begin this consideration we must first determine whether terrorism can be an individual act. The study of terrorism is bedevilled by the inability of all interested parties, for a host of reasons, to arrive at an agreed definition (Schmid, 2004). However, for the purpose of this article I ask that the reader considers the definition of the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, which condemned terrorist acts as:

> "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature." (United Nations, 2004)

The definition does not exclude the actions of an individual as being regarded as those of a terrorist. It is the Mens Rea, the perpetrators intent in carrying out their actions, which is of significant import. Lone wolf terrorism's definition has been debated at length, but that provided by Becker appears the most persuasive, defining it as "ideologically driven violence, or attempted violence, perpetrated by an individual who

plans and executes an attack in the absence of *collaboration* (*italics mine*) with other individuals or groups." (Becker, 2014, pp. 964)

The FBI was alert to its potential contemporary consequential impact as early as 2004, with its Strategic Plan containing the observation that, "The most significant domestic terrorism threat over the next five years will be the lone actor or lone wolf terrorist." (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004) As the FBI predicted, there were many instances of lone wolf terrorism in the years that followed, both in the United States, and in other Western Nations. The most infamous until 2016 remained the actions of Andreas Behring Breivik, who on July 22 2011 detonated a car bomb in Oslo, Norway then undertook a shooting spree at a Labor Youth summer camp, killing 77 in total; Breivik was inspired by anti-Islamic far right rhetoric, sighting much of this in a self-published manifesto immediately prior to his actions (Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014).

Wave Theory and the Lone Wolf

David Rapoport's (2003) seminal work on the evolution of terrorism establishes the theory that terrorism has rolled across the world in four waves since the 1880's. Rapoport outlines these waves as beginning with the *Anarchist wave*, which lasted for approximately forty years. It was followed in the 1920's by an *Anti-colonial wave*, which lasted to the 1960's, then a *New left wave* which in turn faded as the *Religious wave* crested, and it is this wave which, in theory, is said to still exists today.

For Rapoport these waves were captured within the geo political tide of the times. The terrorist participants embraced the zeitgeist at the razor's edge of contemporary radical thought. The initial Anarchist wave, which I consider in more detail below, petered out during the carnage of the First World War. As the world adjusted following its conclusion, colonial struggles succeeded it. It took place against a background of significant international reorganization and technological innovation, which some have described as being the initial phase of globalization. It is not surprising that the change in world politics that resulted led to the focus of radical political thought moving, and saw the focus of terrorism mirror the change. As colonial struggles concluded, largely successfully, and radical politics moved on to the New left, so too did terrorist motivations. The collapse of the Soviet Union, bastion of Communism and backer of many leftist terrorist sponsor nations, contributed significantly to the demise of the New left wave and the rise of the Religious wave. So too did the unforeseen consequences of western support provided to the Mujahedeen's struggle with the Soviet's in Afghanistan.

Accepting then that the actions of an individual can be regarded as acts of terrorism it is worthwhile to turn to Rapoport's first wave that of the anarchists, to consider acts of terror that came to be regarded as propaganda by deed. A number of incidents of individual action are regarded as having wholly political motivations. Examples include

- The 1881 shooting of a stranger by Emile Florion after he could not find republican politician Leon Gambetta
- The inability of Cobbler Leon Leuathier to make a functioning bomb and instead sitting down in restaurant and stabbing a fellow diner (who turned out to be Serbian ambassador)

- The assassinations of Elizabeth, Empress of Austria, King Umberto of Italy and President McKinley are examples of anarchist terrorism yet there are weak links between the perpetrators (Bell, D.H., 1987)

In the case of McKinley's assassin, Leon Czolgosz, the crumpled newspaper found in the assassin's pocket covering the story of King Umberto's murder suggested his wider motivation.

Each of these anarchist–actions did though have one element in common. They were extreme acts to drive forward a political goal. How widely understood, or agreed, that goal was amongst the perpetrators is highly debatable. The perpetrators had virtually no interaction. Additionally, although in wider society they were perceived to be acting to achieve a common goal, it is highly debatable as to whether the perpetrators had a shared understanding of a common purpose.

It may have been the case that for the general public "improved telegraphy and successive newspaper editions updating the cycle of atrocity, arrest, trial, speeches from the dock, imprisonment or execution meant (they) could quite justifiably conclude that the activities of the bomb-throwing maniacs were being coordinated on behalf of sinister objectives across Europe or North.. America" but Burleigh (2008) cautions that evidence suggests any real degree of co-ordination was limited.

Jensen (2009) shares Burleigh's caution around any significant degree of anarchist cooperation. He also notes that despite the anarchist's actions notoriety, casualties from their actions were relatively light. During the period between 1880 and 1914, they killed 160 and injured 500. These largely uncoordinated actions had succeeded though in the objective of sowing terror. The new means of publicity meant that others, such as Czolgosz, at least knew of the likely level of international coverage their actions would bring. The Anti–colonial wave, and that of the New left, saw acts of such individual terror decrease dramatically. Terrorist actions were coordinated and group led. Indeed, between January 1, 1968 and May 1, 2007 there were only 72 acts of lone wolf terrorism, a mean of 1.84 per year (Spaaij, 2010).

However, of particular note it was during this period, Louis Beam, the right wing writer, published 'Leaderless Resistance', to which Kaplan (1997) drew initial academic attention. Beam called in 1983 (published in 1992) for individual autonomous action against the United States Federal Government. This 'call to arms' fell largely on deaf ears amongst those in the far right he sought to agitate at the time. However, it was from this call ultimately that the lone wolf term has been coined. It is not a difficult mental adjustment to retrospectively term the actions of the anarchists described above in such a manner.

The Dissipation of the Religious Wave

Each of Rapoport's waves had its formation, its crest, and its breakwater. I believe that the Religious Wave may be entering its 'breakwater' phase. We may be seeing a giving way to perhaps a new and even more dangerous wave. This wave appears to contain a particularly modern twist within its manifestation, *The Terror of the Individual*. This article demonstrates the need to employ a degree of delineation between the lone wolf terrorism that occurred during the religious wave and The Terror of the Individual.

Recent developments indicate an evolution beyond what has previously been seen as lone wolf religious inspired terrorism.

Initially, it is necessary to consider Rapoport's fourth religious wave in detail. In terms of terrorist organizations it is essential we identify the factors that evidence its graduated dissipation, and that we are moving into a period of change. This is manifesting itself most noticeably amongst those on the edges of, or wholly unaffiliated to, groups; the lone wolves.

It is work by Marc Sageman (2008) that initially subdivided the fourth wave that has existed since the 1980's, identifying sub-waves of Jihadi terrorist devolvement within the Religious wave. So far Sageman, and his successors, have identified an inspirational first sub-wave. Members of this initial sub-wave brought the cause of a worldview that there is an international oppressed Muslim community. This message succeeded in drawing religiously inspired foreigners to join the Mujahedeen and participate, or assist, in the conflict in Afghanistan following the invasion by the Soviet Union. This first sub-wave includes the original members of Al-Qaeda, such as Osama Bin Laden.

The second sub-wave was constituted by elite Middle Eastern origin expatriates who attended Western Universities and then, following contact with first wave members and supporters, became involved in the conflicts such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir; or self-staring operations such as 9/11. Sageman (2004) previously identified that these members of the global Salafi jihad were generally middle class, educated young men from caring and religious families, the large majority were married, many with children and no hardened criminals detected amongst their ranks. The third sub-wave of home-grown Jihadists emerged in the wake of the Iraq War and was largely sought out by a variety of inspirers to encourage participation. Richard Reed, the infamous failed shoe bomber serves as a good example and is of a different background to the self-starters of the second wave.

Those currently becoming involved in jihadist activities, for Rik Coolsaet (2016) the fourth sub-wave, have backgrounds far removed from the pioneers of Al Qaeda. The largely middle class/intellectual credentials of second wave jihadists have been replaced with recruits drawn from "immigrant gangs (that mix) jihadism with gangsta criminality" (Burke, 2015, pp. 207). Van San's (2015) study of 35 Belgian and Dutch foreign fighters for IS found that half were converts to Islam, all aged between 18 and 30, and none holding a University education (Van San, 2015).

What is of particular note is that after each of the sub-waves there is a noticeable decline of 'religiosity' of the participants. As 'jihadist terrorism' has evolved the level of individual religious scholarship and background amongst participants has decreased. This is a development not missed by the analysts of Europol, who see the current situation as being perhaps best described as an 'extremist social trend' rather than radicalization in terms of the involvement of the religion of Islam as a motivating factor (Europol, 2016). Belgian Anti-terrorist Police Superintendent Alain Grignard sums up the current situation as that "previously we were mostly dealing with radical Islamists, individuals radicalized toward violence by extremist interpretation of Islam but now we're increasingly dealing with what are best described as 'Islamized Radicals'." (Cruickshank, 2015)

Meanwhile, French anti-terrorism Judge Marc Trevidic illustrates the profile of fourth wave participants as consisting of 'ninety percent…who leave do it for personal reasons: they are looking for a fight, or for adventure, or revenge, because they do not fit in society...*Religion is not the engine of this movement and that's precisely its strength (italics mine)'*(Coolsaet, 2016). These observations are of potentially massive significance. Can it be argued that the fourth sub-wave is indeed a core part of Rapoport's religious wave? Instead should it perhaps now be acknowledged that we are, as with earlier wave dissipations moving to the 'breakwater' of the Religious wave? The decrease in 'Religiosity' appears indicative of a wider change. The 'extremist social trend' is far wider than jihadism alone. It appears that at least the Western world is now progressing into terrorism's fifth wave, and that this wave is starting to see a tsunami of attacks perpetrated by individuals, mirroring changes in terrorist groups' antecedents. Taking Becker's definition of a lone wolf as one that can be accepted and applied the mean of 1.84 attacks per year noted by Spaaij above has been shattered in 2016.

Known lone wolf Terrorist Attacks in 2016

In Germany, there are numerous examples to consider:

- Ali Sonboloy, the Munich shooter lured youths to a Munich shopping Mall to obtain free burgers, having made increasingly vitriolic posts on social media against migrant communities, and ultimately altering his profile on one platform to a photograph of Anders Breivik (Alexander et. al., 2016).
- There are the Reichsburgers, individuals who refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the state and drive vehicles into traffic police officers, set fire to the homes of asylum seekers, and shoot police officers carrying out evictions and confiscations (Pancevski, 2016).
- The 17-year-old Afghan asylum seeker who attacked fellow passengers on a train while armed with an axe and a knife (Lyman, 2016).
- The 27-year-old Syrian refugee who detonated a bomb at a wine bar in Ansbach, killing only himself, but wounding 15 civilians, and was later found to have recorded a message on his mobile telephone pledging his allegiance the Islamic State (Palazzo, 2016).
- A 27-year-old mentally disturbed German national who stabbed 4 at Grafing Train Station while shouting "Allah Akbar." (Dearden, 2016)
- The 53 year old female Muslim convert who attacked police with knives in Mulwhile crying "Allah Akbar," and who had the flags of the Islamic State in her home though no other ties to the group.(News Agency, 2016)
- The Tunisian asylum seeker who ploughed a truck into a Berlin Christmas market, with responsibility later claimed by IS, but only a recorded pledge from the attacker indicating any significant degree of contact (Simon et. al., 2016)

In Belgium, the following examples present:

- Two police officers were attacked by man wielding a machete and shouting "Allah Akbar" in the Belgian city of Charleroi (Dearden and Foster, 2016).

- On October 5 2016, three police officers were attacked by a man wielding a machete in the Schaerbeek neighbourhood of Brussels, Belgium (Samuel, 2016).

In France:

- Mohammed Lakouaiej-Bouhal, a Tunisian national who held French residency, hired a lorry, armed with a pistol, fake pistol, grenade and replica assault rifles then ploughed into crowds of fireworks onlookers during Bastille day celebrations in Nice. He died in a shootout with police. IS claimed responsibility for the attack (Rubbin and Breeden, 2017).
- A 29 Year Old French Citizen of Tunisian Descent, unemployed for several years, utilised a motor vehicle to twice ram a group of 4 soldiers guarding a Mosque. Stated he wanted to kill troops and 'Jihadist' propaganda was found on his home computer (Al Jazeera, 2016).
- Larossi Abballa, 25, a French Citizen of Moroccan Descent, with previous prison history and association to terrorist groups stabbed two police officers to death, entered their home, and live streamed an 11 minute video on the IS news agency Amaq, before police intervention. In the video he urged Muslims in France to target police officers, prison guards, journalists, politicians and mayors for attacks. He said he was heeding a call by IS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani. IS claimed responsibility for the attack (BBC, 14/06/2016).
- Sallah Ali, homeless, aged 20 of Moroccan origin, while wearing a fake suicide vest attacked police officers with a meat cleaver, while shouting "Allahu Akhbar". He was shot dead by police, after injuring one officer. He was carrying an ISIS flag, and a statement of intent was found on his body pledging allegiance to IS, claiming he was avenging coalition incursions in Syria. The attack took place on the anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo attack, in which 12 died and 11 were injured (The Journal, 2016).

In the United States, examples include

- Dylann Roof attacked a church service after publishing a white supremacist manifesto (Alexander, 2016).
- On January 7, 2016, in West Philadelphia, in the late evening, a gunman shot Philadelphia police officer Jesse Hartnett, who was driving a marked police car. Hartnett survived, despite being shot multiple times in the left arm. He was able to get out of his car to shoot the fleeing suspect, Edward Archer. Later in the hospital, Archer claimed that he pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) (Berman, 2016).
- Forty-nine people were killed when a lone-wolf gunman entered the Pulse gay nightclub. Hostages were taken and the perpetrator, Omar Mateen, was shot dead by local specialist police units in an attempt to storm the building. The FBI classified the attack as an act of "domestic terrorism" motivated by "Islamic leanings."(Ellis et. al., 2016)
- Ahmad Khan Rahami set pipe bombs and a pressure cooker bomb in New Jersey and Manhattan (Associated Press in New York, 2016).

- Abdul Razak Ali Artan rammed his car into a group of students at the Ohio State University. Artan then proceeded to stab several others with a knife, with the Islamic State claiming responsibility for the attack.(Williams et. al., 2016)

In Australia:

- A 59-year-old dog walker was attacked by a knife wielding Muslim man, suffering from Schizophrenia crying "Allah Akbar" in suburban Sydney. He was later found to have self-identified with the Islamic State, and have made social media posts in respect of previous international lone wolf incidents .(Olding, 2016)
- A 29-year-old French citizen killed a 21-year-old female British backpacker while shouting "Allah Akbar." One British man was critically injured, an Australian man suffered non-life-threatening injuries, and the attacker also killed a dog (Chen, 2016).

In the UK:

- Thomas Mair shot and stabbed to death the Member of Parliament Jo Cox in the days preceding the EU Referendum, crying 'Britain First' as he did so.(Casciani and De Simone, 2016)
- A 66-year-old man, stabbed four women outside a supermarket in Hampton, while shouting Arabic Terms and referencing the previous murder by Islamists of British Soldier Lee Rigby (Quinn and Gayle, 2016).

The diversity of causes outlined above is obvious. While many attacks appear linked to jihadism open source reporting indicates that the religiosity of the attackers undertaking them is highly suspect. The far right attacks have no 'religious' overtones whatsoever.

While the anarchists killed 160 and injured 500 over approximately a 34 year wave, in 2016 lone wolves involved in the incidents above have, by tallying open source reporting, killed and injured similar numbers in one year (171 and 780 respectively). Lethality apart (and the availability of automatic weapons to today's actor is acknowledged), the comparison in respect of methodology and target selection between current lone wolves and those of the anarchist past are striking. Where they diverge is that the anarchists sought to gain publicity for their actions, and draw attention to the cause through targeting significant public individuals. Such targeting today, although it would likely similarly attract massive public attention, is not undertaken, nor is it necessary to gain worldwide media exposure. Today's voracious 24 News cycle ensures that, in the West, all acts of terrorism receive significant coverage: the international nature of the referencing of the articles above is testament to this.

In line with the work of Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) I see from the open source reporting of these incidences of lone wolf terrorism actions where there may have been reference to wider terrorist groups or ideologies, particularly the prevalence of pledges of allegiance to Islamic State, but no *collaboration* (in keeping with Becker's definition above). The actors are instead acting independently based on rhetoric embedded in wider social movements. Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) reference the myriad of factors that drive independent actors including way of thinking, rationale, motivation, but also psychology, social factors, political opportunities, existential attractions, and plain old

excitement. They note in respect of Breivik that "his ideology, world view, and narratives emerged from a large, sometimes radical, and relatively new anti-Islamic social movement. It is thus impossible to understand the Norwegian terrorist attacks without seeing how their rationale was embedded in anti-Islamic rhetoric." (Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014,)

Lone wolf terrorism had previously been seen as exception to social movement theory. In common with many academic authors I view this classification as incorrect. I find myself in agreement with Kaplan et. al. , who write that "lone wolves, however lonely they seem to be, are much part of a larger community of likeminded actors." (Kaplan, Loow and Malkki, 2014) For Kaplan et. al. (2014) the internet is a key enabler in driving these individuals to develop their ideas into action, through interaction with likeminded individuals they have no direct contact with. Aiken (2016) captures this well in describing individual's online presences as bolder, less inhibited, and judgement impaired. It is Naim (2013) who captures though that it is not the internet alone that is at work in driving radical behaviours. There are far wider societal changes at work, to which the internet is simply a contributory factor, to a degree a catalyst. The wider changes in society, which he describes as the 'More and Mobility' revolutions have had the effect of "vastly broaden(ing) the cognitive, even emotional impact of more access to resources and the ability to move, learn, connect and communicate more broadly and inexpensively than ever before." (Naim, 2013, pp. 65)

A former Al-Qaeda member, Jesse Morton, in considering the attraction of terrorism per se articulates the motivation of members as not being a reaction to foreign policy but instead "a pre-existing anger and animosity, whether it is to do with child abuse or trauma, a lack of integration and assimilation, or socio-economic grievances. The foreign policy grievance is simply something that allows them to release tensions held deep within them" (Stanford, 2016).

This observation ties in well with identified notions of extreme thrill seeking (Pazzanese, 2015). This is coupled to a form of (perverse) redemption for past-perceived misdeeds, identified amongst contemporary terrorists (Watts, 2016).

In returning to Naim (2013), he sees within the Mentality revolution the politics of the individual with a grievance. Individuals can now access twisted ideologies that were previously inaccessible, creating on many occasions a bespoke ideology tied to their own particular grievances and foibles. They may not fully understand this ideology, but can latch onto in ways never possible before. The significant societal changes Naim highlights echo the conditions that Burleigh (2008) describes as at work during the Anarchist wave, as illustrated above. For increased telegraphy, see perhaps the spread of the internet, in turn for successive newspaper cycles see the spread of live 24-hour news coverage on a plethora of platforms.

The tie to mental health in respect of recent developments cannot be understated. It is estimated that approximately 30 percent of lone actors have mental health issues (Gardner, 2016). The problem with properly assessing the scale of this aspects impact on terrorism is that the vast majority of incidents that would fit a lone wolf definition are not defined or prosecuted as acts of terrorism. Often, although not exclusively (Mair, the murderer of the British MP Jo Cox being a prime example) this is due to attribution to the mental health of the perpetrator.

Spaaij (2010), writing at a time when he saw no evidence of the lethality of lone wolf terrorism being on the increase, examined the cases of five lone wolf terrorists at length. He found they all suffered from a variable degree of social ineptitude, with 3 of the 5 diagnosed with personality disorders and 4 of the 5 experiencing severe depression during their lives. He also noted that lone wolf terrorists create their own ideologies that combine personal frustration, and aversion with broader political, social, or religious aims.

In the United Kingdom alone killings by those deemed to have mental health–issues have climbed by 92 percent, with 423 people killed by mental health patients in the last 7 years (Hudson, 2016).

Fiona Petty (2016) describes killings by the mentally ill as an unintended consequence of more liberal mental health treatment regimes. In respect of terrorism and killings by those she describes as '*lonely* wolves,' she sees such individuals as not having 'slipped through the net', but instead suggests that resources and treatment are so scarce that there is no net to slip through. Such self-evident truths are not, in her view, "popular or comfortable in western civilized society." (Petty, 2016) In engaging with Islamic State and other radical viewpoints online "the lonely can find solace in internet sites offering self-esteem, a reason for living and above all rewards they can only dream of… our values and belief systems cannot understand this rationale but we need to stop bleating about their ideology being so abhorrent and tackle the issue that it has indeed been so successful." (Petty, 2016)

Bhui et al. (2014) see a spiral at play here. Their ground-breaking study into depression and sympathy for violent protest and terrorism showed a direct correlation between weakened social cohesion, depression, and support for extreme views. It also identified a self-perpetuating pattern, with increased violence and terrorist acts leading to increased breakdown of social capital, depression, and higher sympathy for extreme acts.

Gardner (2016) notes the observation from British Secret Service contacts that those suffering from mental health difficulties are likely to be screened out by established terrorist groups. The prevalence of those at liberty in Western societies, coupled to their obvious part in the incidents listed above cannot be dismissed. Mental illness is not a full explanation for the rise in lone wolf cases, however it has to be acknowledged as a contributory factor. Following Bhui et al.'s argument of a potential spiral at play it may become of ever-increasing relevance, particularly seen against the context of the increase in killings as a whole by those suffering mental health difficulties.

This is not to say the influence of groups on individuals is a one-way street. "Death to traitors, freedom for Britain," echoes of the phrases Thomas Mair shouted when appearing in court charged with murdering the British MP Jo Cox have appeared as tag lines on the Google listing for National Action, a (recently proscribed terrorist) organization in the United Kingdom (Gadher, 2016).

This interrelationship between lone wolves and established groups should be seen as symbiotic. Lone wolves carry out acts linked, however indirectly to a terrorist groups cause and perhaps motivated by it, which the group then claims as its own and appeals

for more similar lone actors to come forward. Terrorist groups may not have wanted a lone wolf as a member (should they ever have attempted to join, which many won't have) but they appear only too keen to take kudos from their actions, no matter how indirect their role in inspiring them may have been. IS provides perfect illustration.

So what of the future?

Accepting there has been some form of sea change in behaviours, and that as Europol note and the 2016 examples above suggest, these appear to be being carried out by those at the extreme of a social trend rather than terrorism by individuals pursuing religious goals leads one to question what is actually going on.

Kaplan and Costa (2015) consider the pull of IS in terms of their notion of New Tribalism, an undertow within Rapoport's fourth wave, where adherents of terrorist groups members have common bonds of kinship or shared history/ideals and aim to establish a lost (or mythical) Golden Age. For Kaplan and Costa IS are exemplars of this phenomena, with their drive to re-establish the Caliphate. The bonds of kinship here and shared history/ideals do not need to be physical, as Speckhard illustrates with her interviews of jihadists showing a shared fictive kinship in defence of a global population of those ascribing to the Muslim faith (Speckhard, 2012).

IS continues to lose territory and it may well be that as time progresses their adherents and successors become more aligned to the notion of the Caliphate per se and statehood for those with common cause now exiled, as opposed to the religiosity alone of the groups doctrine. Such a move would certainly fit with the decrease in the religiosity of IS members. Notably, as the Religiosity of the participants in Jihadist terrorism has decreased the number of lone wolves who find themselves able to describe themselves as fellow travellers, and ascribe allegiance, has risen.

Recent political changes (Brexit, the election of President Trump, the ascendance of far right political parties in Austria, France, and the Netherlands) indicate an increase in populism right across the Western world. The possibility of a backlash as the newly elected change policy direction, and introduce measures at odds with the consensus which has largely existed (for the West) since the end of the Cold War cannot be discounted. The likelihood of such a backlash sits well with Ekblom's notion of co-evolutionary developments in terrorism, counter terrorism and the politics of the extreme, where significant change in direction by one party is atypically met by a counter reaction, sometimes more violent and impactive than that which it has been engendered by, from those in opposition (Ekblom, 2015).

We need to remember Jenkins words from the start of this article, and it may well be neither of the issues that draw terrorist support. What seems evident is that individuals are going to be acting in a far more independent manner, and that whatever their cause *The Terror of the Individual* is a pervasive threat that must be addressed.

Conclusion

This article demonstrates that there is evidence that the religious wave identified by Rapoport is drawing to a close, and that actors with extreme social agendas are

emerging who it has not, as yet, been possible to properly frame the geo political context their actions fit within.

These emerging actors have much in common with those of Rapoport's first wave, the Anarchists, however their lethality appears significantly greater so far than all lone wolves who have gone before. Indeed, only time will tell if we are going to experience a new wave, or if instead we are about to witness a loop, with the next phase of terrorist actions continuing to mirror, to a degree, their anarchist ancestors.

In terms of policy implications the author strongly believes that a focus should be given to the emerging tactics of lone wolves to identify everyday weapons of mass destruction (such as the use of trucks and such), and become proactive in instigating mitigating measures. At present law enforcement agencies are simply reacting to the relatively simple innovations lone wolves are undertaking. There is an obvious need to gain greater understanding of the symbiotic and enabling relationship that appears to exist between terrorist groups and 'lone wolves', no matter the degree of collaboration.

Finally, there has to be an unequivocal acceptance that mental health is a factor in lone wolf terrorism, and that the actions of those who are ill need to be seen as those of a terrorist when appropriate. Only through this acceptance will a true picture of the terrorist threat that is faced be possible, and will there be the possibility for international progress in identifying treatment and preventative measures for those who are ill. If not, we may well face a descent into the spiral identified by Bhui, which will see the actions of lone wolves grow exponentially. The author accepts that such a change in tack will require a considerable refocusing of resource in a number of disciplines, including but not limited to, social work, mental health, counterterrorism, and criminal justice. However, the prevalence of mental health issues amongst terrorist participants cannot be ignored, and moving this dialogue into a more mainstream acceptance of the issue is the only way progress can be made.

2.3 "Lone Wolf Terrorists: Examining Motives and Methods of Stand Alone Terrorists", within Dunbar, E. (Ed.), Indoctrination to Hate, California, USA: ABC Clio

Introduction

This chapter considers the concept of 'Individualised Terrorism', arguing for greater attention to be paid to individuals undertaking terrorist attacks rather than solely concentrating on terrorist groups. Using the Anarchist's for comparison purposes the chapter highlights the resonance of current 'lone wolf' activity with the disparate and very loosely linked collective that constituted their historical counterparts.

The chapter draws attention to the geographical spread of recent attacks, the disparate causes of participants, and identifies factors contributing to the ongoing changes to terrorisms dynamics, including the role of the internet and the mental health of the lone wolf terrorist.

The chapter concludes by suggesting the increased incidence of lone wolf terrorism is likely to continue, and recommends greater alignment between police, psychiatry and social work in an effort to identify the triggers that can evidence the likelihood of highly individualised 'terrorist inspired' activity.

Individualised Terrorism

There is a great deal of consternation presently around acts of terrorism, mental health and mass casualty events. Identifying what constitutes an act of terrorism can be difficult, and controversial. This is not helped by the lack of an agreed definition of a terrorist act. [4] The most comprehensive definition appears to be that of the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, which condemned terrorist acts as:

> "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature."[5] (United Nations, 2004)

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4 For discussion of this debate in detail see Alex P. Schmid (ed.), "Statistics on Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Trends in Global Terrorism *"Forum on Crime and Society, 4*, no. 1 and 2 (2004), available at: *https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Forum/V05-81059_EBOOK.pdf*

5 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566, 2004, available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1566-2004-on-threats-to-international-peace-and-security-caused-by-terrorist-acts/

The definition clearly does not exclude the actions of an individual as being regarded as those of a terrorist. It is the Mens Rea, the perpetrators intent in carrying out their actions, which is of the most significant import. Nowhere is this truer than when we consider lone wolf terrorism, a phenomena whose definition has been debated at length. That provided by Becker appears the most persuasive, defining it as "ideologically driven violence, or attempted violence, perpetrated by an individual who plans and executes an attack in the absence of *collaboration* (*italics mine*) with other individuals or groups."[6] (Becker, 2014, pp. 964)

Orla Lynch (2017) has recently perfectly captured the nub of the problem that exists for many when we look at lone wolf terrorism (and terrorism per se) in noting that

> "In an effort to understand terrorism, particularly for those individuals who work with the perpetrators of political violence, it is vital that we separate the notion of terrorism from the terrorist. Terrorism is a highly politicized term, a pejorative label applied unevenly across groups…. the terrorist actor must be understood and considered in his/her local context in conjunction with the entirety of their social network, personal background, ideological affiliations and offending history. In effect, practitioners must deal with what is in front of them, and not be seduced by the hysteria (understandably so) that so often accompanies terrorism and terrorist events" (Lynch, 2017, pp. 79 - 80)

Significant conceptual issues within the study of terrorism have contributed to these difficulties. Corner and Gill (2015) consider these in some detail, identifying a false dichotomy that has emerged in academia and beyond between seeing terrorists (in the 1970's) as harbouring significant psychological flaws, to their being regarded as quite psychologically normal individuals, but also being persons participating instead in complicated (and extreme) group and social dynamics. They found that in 40 years of research 'the literature has jumped from one extreme position ("they are all mentally ill") to the exact opposite ("by definition, a terrorist cannot be mentally ill"). This chapter supports their research finding that those with mental health difficulties can certainly be involved in terrorist behaviour, however not perhaps within the rigid concepts that are currently applied. Such concepts need to be challenged.

Presidents and Anarchists

There have been lone individuals throughout history who have carried out acts of politically inspired violence. One of the most notable is Leon Czolgosz, the assassin of US President William McKinley in 1901. The unfortunate President McKinley was not alone in being a targeted United States President, either before or since. Lee Harvey Oswald is perhaps the most controversial 'lone wolf' actor of the last seventy years. Speculation of Oswald's status as a sole actor continues to rage today, with many documents relating to the investigation of his assassination of President John F. Kennedy only recently being released, and some still withheld (Harden, 2017). In 1981 an attempt on the life of another US President, Ronald Reagan, was perpetrated by John Hinckley Junior. President Reagan was wounded, but survived.

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6 For an excellent discussion of the difficulties of defining lone wolf-terrorism see Ramon Spaaij and Mark S. Hamm, "Key Issues and Research Agendas in Lone Wolf Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 38, no. 3 (2015): 167-178. Doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.986979.

What differs about these three ultra-high profile assailants beyond anything else is their *motive*. It is interesting to contrast these three instances to begin to question when lone actions step into lone wolf terrorism.

Czolgosz is widely accepted by academics and historians as being part of a very loose anarchist wave of terrorism that lasted between 1880's and 1910's (Rapoport, 2003). A crumpled newspaper found in the assassin's pocket covering the story of King Umberto's murder by another 'anarchist terrorist' is utilized as an indicator for his wider politically fuelled anarchist inspired motivation (Burleigh, 2008).

The inability of Cobbler Leon Leuathier to make a functioning bomb and instead sitting down in restaurant then stabbing a fellow diner (who turned out to be Serbian ambassador) and the assassination of Elizabeth, Empress of Austria are seen, with the murder of King Umberto of Italy and President McKinley, as examples of anarchist terrorism, but with accepted weak ties between the perpetrators, and their apparent shared anarchist cause' being the link between them (Bell, 1987).

Each of these anarchist–actions did though have one element in common. They are all reasonably construed as extreme acts to drive forward a political goal. How widely understood, or agreed, that goal was amongst the perpetrators is highly debatable. The perpetrators had virtually no interaction. Additionally, although in wider society they were perceived to be acting to achieve a common goal, it is extremely questionable as to whether the perpetrators had a shared understanding of a common purpose.

It may have been the case that for the general public "improved telegraphy and successive newspaper editions updating the cycle of atrocity, arrest, trial, speeches from the dock, imprisonment or execution meant (they) could quite justifiably conclude that the activities of the bomb-throwing maniacs were being coordinated on behalf of sinister objectives across Europe or North.. America" (Burleigh, 2008, pp. 21) but Burleigh (2008) cautions that evidence suggests any real degree of co-ordination was limited.[7]

Jensen shares Burleigh's caution around any significant degree of anarchist cooperation. He also notes that despite the anarchist's actions notoriety, casualties from their actions was relatively light (Jensen, 2009). During the period between 1880 and 1914, they killed 160 and injured 500. These largely uncoordinated actions had succeeded though in the objective of sowing terror. The new means of publicity meant that those amongst their number, such as Czolgosz, knew of the likely level of international coverage their actions would bring.

Oswald, best described as a 'misfit and sociopath', would have been in no doubt as to the significance of the actions he was undertaking, and the world-wide implications. His time as a very odd Marxist in the US Marines, and thereafter in the Soviet Union, have given rise to all form of conspiracy theories as to his direction and orders. However recent coverage suggests it was far more likely that any agency such as the KGB who may have been attempting to utilize his services for wider goals would have eventually

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7 Michael Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism* (London: Harper Collins, 2008), 79.

realized his fragile mental state meant he was an individual who could not have been controlled (Harnden, 2017). Oswald's actions occurred against the backdrop of a worldwide leftist inspired wave of terrorism, which David Rapoport (2003), in his seminal work on Terrorism's waves, has illustrated as taking place between the 1960's and 1980's.

The shooting of President Reagan differs greatly from the actions undertaken by Czolgosz and Oswald. With both Czolgosz and Oswald their motivations have been examined, and with historical enquiry and hindsight, placed within a conceptualization of the wider political struggles of their time, with terrorist acts at the razor's edge of extreme anarchist and new left political activity respectively. What is of fundamental difference with Hinckley Jr. from the other two Presidential attackers is that his motivation, which has been examined at length, stemmed from an obsession with the actress Jodie Foster and his intent was to in some perverse way draw her attention to him. Hinckley Jr. had suffered significant mental health issues prior to carrying out the shooting (Associated Press, 2016).

Discussion often turns to failing mental health as an explanation for a significant amount of lone wolf activity, and consequent attempts to bracket Czolgosz, Oswald, Hinckley Jr. and individuals such as Stephen Paddock, of recent infamy for the shooting in Las Vegas which killed 58 and injured 500, together (Levenson, 2017). The author believes this is fundamentally wrong, and fails to grasp the central concepts at work in respect of terrorist inspired lone wolf activity. Czolgosz and Oswald's actions have been determined to have fallen within the sphere of influence of the wider political struggles of their times, with motive intimated from these. Paddock has been found to have no discernible motive whatsoever, although plenty of issues.

A reset of how we conceptualize lone wolf terrorist activity and the role of mental health is necessary. Paddock may have had difficulties in this area; however his actions had no apparent political meaning or inspiration. Sageman (2017) has recently contended that the same applies to lone wolf suffering from mental disorders, and that their actions have no further group meaning. In this chapter the author seeks to challenge this view, demonstrating clearly the differences between individuals such as Paddock and those engaged in lone wolf terrorist activity, which certainly does influence terrorist group behaviours. To address this there will be a necessary of a paradigm shift in the concept of terrorism (including particularly terrorism inspired acts) and mental health, but one far removed from the stereotyped 'sadistic madman' favoured in the 1970's Corner and Gill (2015) allude to as having then existed. Reality is far more nuanced. Without this change in outlook and understanding we are likely doomed to see ever increasing numbers of terrorist inspired outrages committed by those acting alone.

Understanding Where We Are Now

Between 1968 and 2007 there were 72 acts of what we now consider to be 'lone wolf' terrorism.[8] The vast majority of terrorist attacks during this period were committed by

[8] Spaaij, R. (2010). The enigma of lone wolf terrorism: An assessment. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 33, 854-870. Specifically within this article see discussion of the RAND-MIPT Terrorist Knowledge Base. The database contains information on attacks that have occurred in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Czech Republic, Portugal, Russia, Canada, United States and Australia.

groups whose members largely acted in concert, with identifiable aims. These ranged from the extreme left politics of Badder Meinhoff or the startling atrocities of Al Qaeda and its call to Jihad, most obviously evidenced by the 9/11 Hijackers.

However, towards the end of the period the FBI (2004) had already foreseen significant likely changes in modus operandi of those involved in political violence. As early as 2004 its Strategic Plan contained the observation that, "The most significant domestic terrorism threat over the next five years will be the lone actor or lone wolf terrorist." (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004)[9]

As the FBI predicted, there were many instances of lone wolf terrorism in the years that followed, both in the United States, and in other Western Nations. The most infamous atrocity until 2016 remained the actions of Andreas Behring Breivik, who on July 22 2011 detonated a car bomb in Oslo, Norway then undertook a shooting spree at a Labor Youth summer camp, killing 77 in total.

Breivik was inspired by anti-Islamic far right rhetoric, sighting much of this in a self-published manifesto immediately prior to his actions (Berntzen, L.E., & Sandberg, S., 2014). Breivik's actions heralded an unprecedented rise in lone wolf activity, which rose to a recent crescendo in 2016 when more than 20 attacks resulted in 171 people killed and 780 injured in 'lone wolf' incidents (Gallagher, 2017). Accepting the availability today of automatic weapons, the sheer volume of attacks and lethality is still startling. The variety of causes apparently driving the attacks has been unprecedented, from the Reichsburgers in Germany (individuals who refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the state and drive vehicles into traffic police officers, set fire to the homes of asylum seekers, and shoot police officers carrying out evictions and confiscations)[10] to the agent of carnage claiming Islamic State (IS) allegiance who drove his stolen truck into tourists in Nice (BBC, Nice attacks: What we know about the Bastille Day killings, 2016).

The year 2017 has been just as grim with the west, with some examples of terrorist related lone wolf activity perpetrated being:

- French policeman Xavier Jugele was shot dead, and 2 colleagues injured on the famous Champs Elysees in Paris by a Kalashnikov wielding Frenchman of Muslim descent although who had never been seen at his local Mosque, who had numerous convictions for violence. A note defending Islamic State was found near his body (Henely, 2017).
- A Polish Born 'Britain First' supporter giving Nazi Salutes, stating he wanted to 'Kill Muslims', shouting 'White Power' and driving his motor vehicle over an Asian restaurateur. When arrested he was found in possession of 'Britain First' flyers and Nazi memorabilia. He suffers from depression (Roberts, 2017).

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9 Federal Bureau of Investigation, "*FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009*," (Washington D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004), available at: *http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/fbi-strategic-plan-2004-2009/p14808*.

10 Bojan Pancevski, "Rise of 'new Reich army' sparks alarm in Germany", *The Sunday Times*, October 30 2016, available at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rise-of-new-reich-army-sparks-alarm-in-germany-xmd7jc9b7

- A Bangladeshi born resident of New York attempted to carry out a suicide bombing on the underground trains in Manhattan. He pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, posting on Facebook 'Trump you failed to protect your nation' (Baker, A., & Weiser, B., 2017).
- Adrian Russell Ajao, a Muslim convert also known as Khalid Masood, hired a car in Birmingham and drove to Westminster Bridge, mowing down members of the public and after crashing his vehicle ran from it armed with knives murdering police officer Keith Palmer who was guarding the UK parliament, before Ajao was fatally shot by police. He killed 5, and injured 50. Ajao had an extensive record of petty criminality BBC (07/04/2017)
- A Palestinian Asylum seeker ran amok in a Hamburg supermarket, shouting 'Allahu Akhbar' as he stabbed people with a knife he had grabbed in the store, killing 1 and injuring 6. He told police afterwards it as an Islamic terror attack; however police had doubts over this as he psychologically ill. He had earlier been investigated for potential extremist beliefs, but it was concluded that he suffered from a psychological illness and should receive treatment. He never got any (Huggler, 2017).
- A 17 year old white (non-Muslim) teenager from the small Welsh town of Rhondda Cynon Taff, with no known connection to any extremist organization, changed his Instagram profile picture to the flag of Islamic State then armed himself with a hammer and a kitchen knife while planning to carry out a lone attack at a Justin Bieber concert in Cardiff. He had written a martyrdom letter, but was caught by police before he could see through his plan (BBC ,27/11/2017)
- In Stockholm a failed asylum seeker who expressed sympathies with IS stole a lorry and drove it into members of the public, killing 4 (Euronews, 2017).
- Darren Osbourne, a 47 year old resident of Cardiff, drove to the Finsbury Park Mosque in London (famous as a previous hot bed of radical activity) and thereafter ran over a crowd of worshipers, killing 1 and injuring 11. He was heard to shout 'I want to kill all Muslims!' He had a history of mental illness, and in the weeks prior to the attack he had attempted suicide and asked to be placed within a mental health facility (Ward et. al., 2017).
- Republican Senator Steve Scalise was shot along with 4 others at a Baseball event just outside Washington, by James Hodgkinson, who was killed by police. Hodgkinson had posted Anti Republican and Anti Trump messages on Social Media (Allen, 2017).
- An Armenian male who wanted to avenge Islamist linked attacks in Paris attempted to drive his 4x4 vehicle into a crowd of Mosque goers in the city, but was thwarted by barriers. (AFP, 2017)
- A 25 year old local man, Andrew Schneck, was found and arrested while planting explosives in Houston against a 112 year old statue of a Confederate officer, Lieutenant Dick Dowling. Schneck's stated motive was that 'He didn't like the guy' (Barned-Smith et. al., 2017).
- Ethan Stables, a 19 year old man was found in possession of explosives for the purposes of terrorism, and is to stand trial for undertaking reconnaissance on a Gay Pride Evening in a local pub (BBC, 08/12/2017).
- Using 2 hire vehicles a Somali asylum seeker ran over and stabbed a police officer in Edmonton, then mounted a second attack where he drove his

vehicle into 4 members of the public. An IS flag was found in one of the vehicles (Associated Press, 2017).

These are only some of the examples of lone wolf terrorist activity in 2017, but the group act as an excellent indicator of the diversity of locations, actors and causes involved in this phenomenon across the West. Open source indications from the authorities involved are that all of these individuals acted alone, with some having documented mental health issues. Their causes range from the extreme right to the extreme left, by way of examples of allegiance to the aims of IS and Homophobia.

However, gaining a true picture of lone wolf activity is extremely difficult. Not all of the examples above have been termed terrorist incidents. This results from a failure, particularly on the part of authorities, to accept and move on from significant conceptual problems around *terrorist inspired* activity. This is perhaps best highlighted in an unusual case from 2016, which it is worth considering in detail.

Ali Sonboly – The Identity Terrorist

Ali Sonboly, the son of 1990's Iranian refugees to Germany, and had undergone 2 months inpatient psychiatric treatment in 2015, suffered from depression and was being treated as an outpatient (BBC, 24/07/2016). Sonboly was described as a bullied loner by a classmate. He was 18 when he armed himself with a Glock pistol, obtained via the dark web, and carried out a shooting at a Munich shopping centre on July 22 2016 that left 9 dead and 27 injured.

The dead, were lured to a McDonald's in the centre through a hacked Facebook account post with the promise of a free meal, and appeared to have been targeted for their non-indigenous German ethnicity. When challenged during the attack by a local resident, who threw a beer bottle and shouted "Fucking Foreigners", Sonboly shouted back at him 'I am German!' Sonboly shot himself prior to capture by the police. He had not been on any intelligence service's database prior to the attack.

Munich Chief of Police Hubertus Andrae pointed out that the attack occurred on the fifth anniversary of Breivik's far right inspired Norwegian lone wolf atrocity, and informed the media of material in Sonboly's possession making the connection between the two incidents to him "obvious" (Shuster, 2016). This is supported further from information provided by his classmates, who stated that Sonboly had changed his WhatsApp messaging service profile picture to that of Breivik.

However Andrae ruled out the act was one of terrorism, as there was no *political motive* (Nagesh, 2016). It is also interesting to note that in the confusion of the original incident, when it was thought that Sonboly had been shouting "Allahu Akbar" during his shooting spree (it now is almost certain he hadn't been) Andre stated 'Even if he would have said this, it would not automatically indicate anything. Not everyone who uses this saying, which is now famous around the world, is automatically linked to ISIS' (Shuster, 2016).

This was in furtherance of comments made by German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere in relation to another attack in Germany during 2016 where an axman on a train attacked fellow passengers shouting "Allahu Akbar", and was later found to have

made a suicide video where he pledged allegiance to IS, and vowed to kill non-believers. De Maiziere saw such an attack as inhabiting a 'grey area between a rampage and terrorism, that is was an Amoklauf (running amok) as there was no clear political motive (Shuster, 2016).

A further note in respect of Sonboly's antecedents is that during 2015 he visited the site of a 2009 German mass shooting event, taking photographs, and there was a book on mass shootings found in his home.

Speaking after the shooting the then newly appointed UK Foreign Secretary (now Prime Minister) Boris Johnson said 'If, as seems very likely, this is another terrorist incident, then I think it proves once again that we have a global phenomenon and a global sickness that we have to tackle both at the source – in the areas where the cancer is incubated in the Middle East – and also of course around the world. We have to ask ourselves, what is going on? How is the switch being thrown in the minds of these people?'(Wintour, 2016).

When it was ascertained that the attack was not IS inspired Johnson was castigated for his comments by opposition party Members of the UK Parliament.

A neighbour of the Sonboly family said after the attack said 'I don't think we should go crazy over it. This could happen anywhere' (Schmidt, 2016).

Sonboly's Attack as a Rosetta stone for the Lone Wolf Issue Faced Today

Let us return briefly to the case of Czolgosz for some historical context. Scholars today widely accept his actions to have been part of the 'Anarchist Wave' that swept the world prior to World War I. And how is his motivation discerned? From his choice of victim, and a crumpled piece of paper referencing a similar action.

We have almost a century of hindsight by which to conceptualize and frame Czolgosz's actions. We do not have this degree of detachment with which to judge Sonboly and his 2017 peer group identified above, however by deconstructing their actions we can hopefully go some way to achieving this.

Let us consider the evidence:

- Sonboly chose to carry out his action on the anniversary of Breivik's far right inspired attack.
- Sonboly selected a young ethnically diverse group to send his hacked Facebook post to, and bring into the target area for his attack.
- Sonboly altered his WhatsApp profile image to that of Breivik prior to the attack.
- When challenged about his antecedents Sonboly shouted 'I am German!'
- Sonboly suffered from mental illness so severe he had been hospitalized, and had ongoing issues with depression.

When mirrored to Czolgosz's accepted 'evidence' of anarchist involvement, the similar 'evidence' of association to wider motivation of the part of Sonboly looks persuasive, but to what terrorist group is Sonboly aligning himself as a lone wolf? Doesn't his own

status as the son of Iranian refugees logically cut him off from alignment to the far right? There are direct parallels to the white non-Muslim IS supporting 17 year old from Rhondda Cynon Taff referenced above, who for reasons known only to himself has chosen this very odd alignment. It is in these considerations that we need to work in tandem with Lynch's contention, i.e. we need to concentrate on the terrorist, not their chosen 'brand' of terrorism or their apparent illogical decisions on alignment.

We are currently experiencing a world-wide alteration of individual and national world views. In line with the work of Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) the open source reporting of these incidences of lone wolf terrorism actions where there may have been reference to wider terrorist groups or ideologies, particularly the prevalence of pledges of allegiance to Islamic State shows no *collaboration*, in keeping with Becker's definition above. The actors are instead acting independently through their choices, and their actions, based on rhetoric embedded in existing wider social movements they have *chosen* to embrace.

It is the author's contention that both Andrae and De Maiziere are wrong in their belief that the chant of 'Allaua Akhbar' is irrelevant, and that the actions of the axe wielding assailant are Amoklauf, actors running amok with no political motive. Such actors are expressing the 'battle cry' of their chosen vehicle to commit acts of terror and very explicitly stating their allegiance.

Is Islamic State Really a 'Religious Terrorism' Based Organization?

Given the current prevalence of lone wolves displaying allegiance to IS it seems only proper to give this group, and its adherents, a further degree of consideration. The actions of Islamic State and its removed 'lone wolf' adherents are wholly political. The very name of the organization, which contains the term 'State', makes its political intentions of nation building clear. It spent it's time governing areas of Syria and Iraq attempting, with limited success, to 'nation build', even if the nation it was attempting to build bore little resemblance to modern societies we know today. Simply put, the individuals carrying out attacks invoking how great their God is have not been consumed by Religious Fervour alone.

The main draw is in fact an abstract ideal of a Caliphate, a utopia where they have come to believe they could hold in high regard. This all too easy to accept fantasy represents the lost golden age when the Middle and Near East were the prominent world powers. The decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire and the brutal regimes that followed held such nostalgia in check through their imposed personality cults, such as those of Sadat, Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein and the Assad hegemony. As these have ebbed, or been destroyed, by the interventions of the west or the Arab spring the natural counter narrative from history of the Caliphate has risen, through its adoption by Islamic State to be the dominant political agenda at the razors edge of thought for actors from or with ties and sympathies towards those in the region.

The actors we have seen, like the anarchists, likely do not properly understand the geo politics of their actions, and certainly not the religion they purport to be acting on behalf of. But they do understand they are aligning themselves to a radical movement, atoning (perversely) for past misdeeds or casting themselves as heroes, a status they would never attain legitimately in the societies where they reside.

We cannot escape the ties to Islam that exist, as there has been no separation between faith and state as occurred hundreds of years ago in the West, but instead see this relationship and narrative as a serious ancillary issue to the main goal sought. Such a focus brings into stark relief the difference between the vast majority of Western Muslims and these extremists. While the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the west simply want to live in the societies they call home while observing their religion, the extremists seek significant *political* change, using their association to religion as a convenient explanation and excuse for their actions. The association to Islam provides a supposed higher purpose, and one that suffer from mental health issues or other extreme self-esteem problems seem to find all too easy to immerse themselves within.

If we accept this is the case then surely it is not a major intellectual hurdle to be overcome in applying the term 'Caliphites' to these terrorists we face. This seems far more appropriate than 'Radical Islamists'.

Lone Wolf Driving Factors – Individualised Terrorism

The same factors for the 'Caliphites' apply equally to those on the far right and left as we have identified above. The list of attackers from 2017 does not include well-adjusted successful individuals who are functioning without difficulty in western societies. It is a collection of those on the fringes, those who through their own actions, mental health or circumstances as the very small number of refugees who cannot adapt find themselves excluded from mainstream society.

Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) reference the myriad of factors that drive independent actors including way of thinking, rationale, motivation, but also psychology, social factors, political opportunities, existential attractions, and plain old excitement. They note in respect of Breivik that "his ideology, world view, and narratives emerged from a large, sometimes radical, and relatively new anti-Islamic social movement. It is thus impossible to understand the Norwegian terrorist attacks without seeing how their rationale was embedded in anti-Islamic rhetoric." (Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014, pp. 772) Lone wolf terrorism had previously been seen as exception to social movement theory. In common with many recent academic authors the evidence presented in this chapter tends to suggest this classification as incorrect. Instead it appears agreement with Kaplan et al. is more warranted, when they write that "lone wolves, however lonely they seem to be, are much part of a larger community of likeminded actors" (Kaplan, Loow & Malkkie, 2014, pp. 4). For Kaplan et al. the internet is a key enabler in driving these individuals to develop their ideas into action, through interaction with likeminded individuals they have no direct contact with. Aiken (2016) captures this well in describing individual's online presences as being bolder, less inhibited, and judgment impaired.

Kaplan and Costa consider the pull of IS in terms of their notion of New Tribalism, where adherents of terrorist groups members have common bonds of kinship or shared history/ideals and aim to establish a lost (or mythical) Golden Age. For Kaplan and Costa (2015) IS are exemplars of this phenomena, with their drive to re-establish the Caliphate. The bonds of kinship here and shared history/ideals do not need to be physical, as Speckhard illustrates with her interviews of jihadists showing a shared

fictive kinship in defence of a global population of those ascribing to the Muslim faith (Speckhard, 2012).

What more significant allegiance can a participant in the early 21st century internet age make than alter their profile image to that to the cause to which they ascribe? There is no obvious bitter irony in Sonboly's choice of Breivik as his 'face to the world' being expressed through the WhatsApp messenger service. In line with the other evidence above it seems all to close, and perhaps far more telling, form of statement of common purpose than Crozgyn's crumpled paper. In writing of Palestinian youths revolting against Israeli settlements Ehrenreich writes of one activist who has changed his Facebook profile picture to the roadway where 2 of his friends were shot dead by security forces. He is making a bold statement via the means available to him, social media, of his viewpoint (Ehrenreich, 2016).

It is Naim (2013) who captures though that it is not the internet alone that is at work in driving radical behaviours. There are far wider societal changes at work, to which the internet is simply a contributory factor, to a degree a catalyst. The wider changes in society, which he describes as the 'More and Mobility' revolutions have had the effect of "vastly broaden(ing) the cognitive, even emotional impact of more access to resources and the ability to move, learn, connect and communicate more broadly and inexpensively than ever before" (pp. 65).

A former Al-Qaeda member, Jesse Morton, in considering the attraction of terrorism per se articulates the motivation of members as not being a reaction to foreign policy but instead "a pre-existing anger and animosity, whether it is to do with child abuse or trauma, a lack of integration and assimilation, or socio-economic grievances. The foreign policy grievance is simply something that allows them to release tensions held deep within them." (Stanford, 2016, para 9).

This observation ties in well with identified notions of extreme thrill seeking (Pazzanese, 2015). This is coupled to a form of (perverse) redemption for past-perceived misdeeds, identified amongst contemporary terrorists (Watts, 2016), and again fits perfectly with Lynch's contention of analysing the terrorist rather than their chosen cause.

This is where Boris Johnson, UK Foreign Secretary, is actually completely right when he described Sonboly's actions as part a 'global phenomenon' and asks the wholly legitimate questions 'What is going on? How is the switch being thrown in the minds of these people?'

Naim perhaps captures this brilliantly is his conceptualization of the Mentality revolution, which encompasses the politics of the individual with a grievance. Individuals can now access twisted ideologies that were previously inaccessible, creating on many occasions a bespoke ideology tied to their own particular grievances and foibles. They may not fully understand this ideology, which explains the dichotomy around Sonboly's allegiance and that of the 17 year old of Rhondda Cynon Taff, but can latch onto in ways never possible before. The significant societal changes Naim highlights echo the conditions that Burleigh describes as at work during the Anarchist wave, as illustrated above. For increased telegraphy, see perhaps the spread of the

internet, in turn for successive newspaper cycles see the spread of live 24-hour news coverage on a plethora of platforms.

The tie to mental health in respect of recent developments cannot be understated. It is estimated that approximately 30 percent of lone actors have mental health issues (Gardner, 2016). With Sonboly and Osborne (mentioned above who undertook the Finsbury Park Mosque attack) we have from open source reporting the extent of mental health difficulties experienced by these actors. The problem with properly assessing the scale of this aspects impact on terrorism is that the vast majority of incidents that would fit a lone wolf definition are not defined or prosecuted as acts of terrorism. Often, although not exclusively (Mair, the murderer of the British MP Jo Cox in 2016 being a prime example) this is due to attribution to the mental health of the perpetrator.

Spaaij, writing in 2010 at a time when he saw no evidence of the lethality of lone wolf terrorism being on the increase, examined the cases of five lone wolf terrorists at length. He found they all suffered from a variable degree of social ineptitude, with 3 of the 5 diagnosed with personality disorders and 4 of the 5 experiencing severe depression during their lives. He also noted that lone wolf terrorists create their own ideologies that combine personal frustration, and aversion with broader political, social, or religious aims.

In the United Kingdom alone killings by those deemed to have mental health–issues have climbed by 92 percent, with 423 people killed by mental health patients in the last 7 years (Hudson, 2016). Fiona Petty (2016) describes killings by the mentally ill as an unintended consequence of more liberal mental health treatment regimes. In respect of terrorism and killings by those she describes as '*lonely* wolves,' she sees such individuals as not having 'slipped through the net', but instead suggests that resources and treatment are so scarce that there is no net to slip through. Such self-evident truths are not, in her view, "popular or comfortable in western civilized society." (Petty, 2016) In engaging with Islamic State and other radical viewpoints online "the lonely can find solace in internet sites offering self-esteem, a reason for living and above all rewards they can only dream of… our values and belief systems cannot understand this rationale but we need to stop bleating about their ideology being so abhorrent and tackle the issue that it has indeed been so successful" (Petty, 2016).

Bhui et al. (2014) see a spiral at play here. Their ground-breaking study into depression and sympathy for violent protest and terrorism showed a direct correlation between weakened social cohesion, depression, and support for extreme views. It also identified a self-perpetuating pattern, with increased violence and terrorist acts leading to increased breakdown of social capital, depression, and higher sympathy for extreme acts.

In December 2017 the Archbishop of Canterbury, the UK's most senior clergyman, drew stark attention to this weakening social cohesion, stating that 'We live in a country where an overarching story, which is the framework for explaining life, has more or less disappeared. We have a world of unguided and competing narratives, where the only common factor is the inviolability of personal choice, which means that…. Confidence in any personal sense of ultimate values has vanished'[11]

[11] Olivia Rudgard, "Schools 'fail to fight extremism'", Sunday Telegraph, December 12 2017

It is perhaps not surprising then that with a seismic shift in values that the most vulnerable in society are finding themselves seeking extreme ways in which to act out the unfettered viewpoints they have reached. Viewpoints that were until recent times the norm have been found to be wholly socially unacceptable.

A good touchstone is perhaps the area of LGBT rights and politics. Felix Ngole, a post graduate social work student had placed posts on his personal Facebook account quoting biblical excerpts identifying homosexuality as sinful. He found himself off of his course, and losing a judicial appeal, when it was judged that he could hold these opinions in private but due to his intended profession was not allowed to express them in public (Grierson, 2017). By contract in the UK state funded Action for Trans Health, which has provided advice to parliamentary enquiries on transgender issues has called for the abolition of legal gender, and end to birth certificates and in respect of police participation in a Gay Pride event posted on its website that 'the only good 10,000 cops is 10,000 dead cops' (Gilligan, 2017).

Without questioning in any way the efficacy of either point of view (and there are no doubt significant issues around such extreme views being tolerated) it is clear to see that the atmosphere for debate is charged, and that the role of the internet identified by Aikman is at play. When the mental health of those experiencing these extreme views is precarious it becomes easier to grasp how they can be easily tipped into 'inspired' terrorist action.

This perhaps captures perfectly the situation in Houston, with the attempted statue destruction referenced above. The long deceased Lt. Dick Dowling had a street in Houston named after him, in addition to his statue. This was recently changed from Dowling to Emancipation Avenue. There is no middle ground in such a move; there is a wholly sharp move from one long established and apparently largely uncontested norm to a new, currently socially acceptable norm with no transition debate.

Such radical changes (for right or wrong) were arguably at the root of the rioting in Charlottesville in 2017, which saw the far right and Antifa face off leaving one dead and many injured. It is not difficult to see how Schneck, in carrying out his action, became aligned to the wider now FBI terrorist designated Antifa goals of eradicating the countries perceived glorification of its Confederate past.

In Norway the head of their national police force, Janne Kristiansen, acknowledged that even the Stasi in the surveillance heavy days of East Germany could have stopped Breivik (Meyer, 2013), there needs to be an acknowledgement that more needs to be done. In Denmark there has been a more ready acceptance of the influence of mental health over terrorism related behaviour, seeing the enhancement of an already established legislated police, social services and psychiatric (PSP) information sharing service (Sestoft et al. 2017). Here a descent into radicalization towards terrorist behaviour is seen and accepted as one more potential outcome of mental health difficulties. There is no taboo or bamboo wall separating services, and the mystique of 'terrorism', that for many cloaks it in some special status, is removed. Once again, we are looking at the terrorist, not terrorism. There is nothing mysterious or glamorous about those in the 2017 list of lone wolf participants above.

In acknowledging this, and ensuring there is legislated information sharing, the Danes are far ahead of many of their Western counterparts. This is far removed from the tactics of East Germany's infamous Stasi, and far more like the actions of a supportive and sensible 21st century democracy acknowledging a new, reasonably low level threat, it faces. The Danes are working in tandem with the findings of Corner and Gill, whose study into lone wolf terrorists found clearly that 'the empirical evidence suggests mental health professionals may have a role in preventing lone actor terrorist attacks' (Corner and Gill, 2015, p. 10).

The 2017 incidents above were carried out by those acting alone, rather than those who are acting in direct concert with others. An explanation of this can be found in Gardner's noting of the observation from British Secret Service contacts that those suffering from mental health difficulties are likely to be screened out by established terrorist groups (Gardner, 2016). (It has been speculated on that similar screening may have been behind Oswald's ejection from the USSR) The prevalence of those at liberty in Western societies suffering from often extreme mental illness, coupled to their obvious part in the incidents listed above cannot be dismissed. Mental illness is not a full explanation for the rise in lone wolf cases; however it has to be acknowledged as a contributory factor. Following Bhui et al.'s argument of a potential spiral at play it may become of ever-increasing relevance, particularly seen against the context of the increase in killings as a whole by those suffering mental health difficulties.

This is not to say the influence of groups on individuals is a one-way street. "Death to traitors, freedom for Britain," echoes of the phrases Thomas Mair shouted when appearing in court charged with murdering the British MP Jo Cox have appeared as tag lines on the Google listing for National Action, a (recently proscribed terrorist) organization in the United Kingdom (Gadher, 2016).

This interrelationship between lone wolves and established groups should be seen as symbiotic. Lone wolves carry out acts linked, however indirectly to a terrorist groups cause and perhaps motivated by it, which the group then claims as its own and appeals for more similar lone actors to come forward. Terrorist groups may not have wanted a lone wolf as a member (should they ever have attempted to join, which many won't have) but they appear only too keen to take kudos from their actions, no matter how indirect their role in inspiring them may have been. IS provides perfect illustration.

Analogous to this, and a worrying herald of things to come, might just be the apparently senseless acts of an increasing number of youths in Palestine.

"Something new was happening. Fully half of the alleged attackers killed in October (2016) were under twenty years old. All but one was under thirty…. Knowing that it would almost certainly mean their deaths, young Palestinians were acting alone or in pairs, striking out at Israeli soldiers with the limited means available to them: kitchen knives, scissors, screwdrivers. Sometimes they tried to hit them with cars….There existed no movement for them to join, armed or unarmed, no viable collective response to a situation….even the Israeli intelligence services admitted the attacks were spontaneous and uncoordinated" (Ehrenreich, 2016, pp. 364-365).

One youth prior to their attack which left 2 dead posted on Facebook, "I ask that the political parties do not claim responsibility for my attack. My death was for my nation and not for you" (Ehrenreich, 2016, p. 365).

The attacks are spontaneous, the attackers self-starters. They are making what they perceive to be rational choices to act based on the (grim) individual world view they have formed. And they are using social media as their means of proclaiming their driving rationale.

Those on the fringes of our societies are acting, and it appears that those in these fringes are increasing. Significant difficulties with lone wolves may lie ahead, and the FBI's prediction of 2004 might come to be true. In spades.

Conclusions

The neighbour of the Sonboly family said after the attack said 'This could happen anywhere.' [12] From the examples above they appear to be right. Part of preserving societies in the face of terrorism though involves preserving what your core principles are, in defying the actions that are trying to change the function of your society to the extreme viewpoint of the terrorist. Consequently, Janne Kristiansen was right in the aftermath of Breivik's attack to caution against any move towards an Orwellian surveillance society to counter the threat faced, which although alarming is a far way removed from an existential threat to the continued functioning of western democracies. The lone wolves, despite their media impact, remain small in number. So too do individuals such as Paddock, the Las Vegas shooter. However while the actions of Paddock are an apparently inexplicable aberration in modern western society those acting in a similar vein inspired by terrorism are not. Paddock's actions are not part of a wider cause, contributing to an extreme political outlook's influence and notoriety. The actions of the lone wolves outlined above no doubt are. The fact that we are still referencing the unaligned and generally unconnected anarchists today, a hundred years after the height of their terror, is testament to this.

Acknowledging that society has changed dramatically, and that those on its fringes (particularly whose with mental health issues) are having difficulty in accepting new norms and are part of a 'blowback', however questionable their understanding of their role, would be a massive step forward. When they see a terrorist cause, and can read of its beliefs and actions it is not difficult to conceptualize how they can see alignment as in some way beneficial, as a means to escape the marginalization they find themselves within. Their individualised 'enrolment' provides them with Kaplan's 'fictive kinship', a membership of elite they could not otherwise obtain. The fact that they will see the actions of other similar lone wolves lionized by groups, as is the current situation, can only enhance this symbiotic relationship.

Denmark, with its PSP approach seems to have embraced this necessary acknowledgement through legislated inter agency co-operations between law enforcement, social work and psychiatry. This seems a very sensible step.

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[12] Janek Schmidt, "Munich shooting: killer was bullied teen loner obsessed with mass murder", 2016

The low tech tactics adopted by the lone wolf actors above illustrate that we cannot 'design out' this problem. Kitchen knives are not going to become unavailable. The need is to address the circumstances that are giving rise to extreme action, rather than the extreme action that is being taken. Similarly, the utilization of social media by the lone wolves above, and their use of the internet to gain (some form) of insight to causes they align themselves to cannot be understated. We live with a variety of individuals who are being inspired to action by terrorism they see occurring, and the causes espoused, no matter whether the actor was the intended recipient of the 'message' being delivered to inspire or not.

Authorities need to build some form of assessment around this. If an individual is utilizing the image of a terrorist as their face to the world, as Sonboly did soon after visiting the sight of mass shootings as a tourist, we need to be in a position to react and question such activity. The 'How' of these remains to be seen, however the problem needs to be addressed. If we apply a 20th century analogy, were a resident of a western city last century to have put a poster of a known terrorist in their front window there is little doubt the police would have started to ask questions of this. Is a profile picture on social media today so different?

IS remains the biggest current inspiration for lone wolf actors. The adoption of 'Caliphites' proposed above may not capture every nuance of the goals of IS inspired terrorists, but the degree to which they understand their common goals (in tandem with their anarchist predecessors) is questionable. The use of 'Caliphites' provides the ability for all to draw a clear distinction between the enemy we face, and the peace loving Muslim populations at large, who simply want to live in their countries as they are, adhere to their religion, and exist in harmony with their neighbours. Our Muslim population face the current threat IS and it's like pose as much as anyone else (as casualties at many incidents show), and it helps no one to continue to fail to draw clear lines of delineation. The 'Caliphites', like the Anarchists before them, seek radical *political* change through the establishment of Nations. Using this term would assist in identifying those who are aligned to the problem, as opposed to the general population at large.

Recent political changes (Brexit, the election of President Trump, the ascendance of far right political parties in Austria, France, and the Netherlands) indicate an increase in populism across the Western world. The possibility of a backlash as the newly elected change policy direction, and introduce measures at odds with the consensus which has largely existed (for the West) since the end of the Cold War cannot be discounted. The likelihood of such a backlash sits well with Ekblom's (2015) notion of co-evolutionary developments in terrorism, counter terrorism and the politics of the extreme, where significant change in direction by one party is atypically met by a counter reaction, sometimes more violent and impactive than that which it has been engendered by, from those in opposition. The LGBT situation outlined in this chapter perhaps captures this perfectly.

Societies change, adapt and develop. This is how human interactions evolve. However, the more radical change the more radical the potential counter reactions the change may engender. Globalisation has led to unparalleled change for the modern western world. We live in an era of unforeseeable individual choice, and technological advancement where social media has become incredibly important – particularly although not

exclusively to the young. If we do not look more closely at those on the fringes, those most reluctant or unable to embrace these changes, we are doomed to see an ever increasing individualised counter reaction until we do.

Chapter 3 Case Study: Terrorism, Organised Crime and the Islamic State

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is formed from the publication "'Criminalised' Islamic State Veterans – A Future Major Threat in Organised Crime Development?" (Gallagher, 2016) which illustrated the evidence of terrorist degradation and the potential dangers inherent in those acquiring illicit skills returning to their European democratic countries of origin.

3.2 "'Criminalised' Islamic State Veterans – A Future Major Threat in Organised Crime Development?", Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 10, No. 5

Introduction

This article seeks to address the question of the probability of criminalised western Islamic State (IS) veterans returning from conflict in the Middle East and becoming involved again in serious crime in the west, with an enhanced skill set acquired during there IS participation.

'Islamic State'[1] is the latest evolution of Tawid wa al-Jihad, the group founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that first came to prominence during the insurgency in Iraq following the US invasion of the country in 2003. It is a radical Islamist group currently in control of large swathes of territory across Iraq and Syria. Islamic State (IS) are widely acknowledged as a terrorist group, and have been designated as such by Governments across the West. They utilise mass execution, religious persecution and hostage taking to further their goals, in addition to a sophisticated propaganda machine serviced through use of the internet, and wider media. Their aim is the ongoing governance of a Caliphate, with a single religious and political leadership encompassing lands previously held under perceived similar governance into the late Middle Ages.

The movement of actors from the West into this newly established 'Caliphate' as active participants in its activities is new, and follows the establishment of strong indigenous Muslim communities in the West, a consequence of the migration of peoples over the intervening centuries, particularly post the Second World War, to service the need for additional workers for low skilled jobs; an aspect that has seen population divergence far removed from western states of the medieval past. The actors who move between these worlds, the Muslim diaspora in the West and the self-styled 'Caliphate', those regarded as 'radicalised' toward jihad, and specifically those with a criminal background, are the subject of consideration in this article.

A description of the Crime/Terror Nexus is provided with illustrative examples. The article then moves on to consider previous jihadist participants backgrounds, utilising Sageman's wave position for theoretical context. The focus thereafter is on the largely Islamic State inspired 'fourth wave' of jihadi participants, and consideration of the veracity of the religious credentials sighted as the basis for the 'call to action' participants experience. The article then considers the potential implications to organised crime behaviours in origin countries should 'jihadists' with previous criminal experience return to their communities with an enhanced criminal 'skill set'. This consideration is supported with the findings from a consultation conducted with a group of relevant recently retired professionals.

The article concludes with analysis of the research outlined, and suggests practical policy considerations for the future.

Terrorism and Organised Crime – Links and Similarities

The period following the collapse of the Soviet Union saw the advent of the phenomena of 'globalisation' and the situation developing where for 'a myriad (of) criminal, terrorist, or otherwise malevolent state actors… frontiers are irrelevant and governments are an increasingly ineffective hindrance that they attack, undermine, or ignore'. [2]

These changes have led to increased opportunities for interaction between illegal actors and groups that were in many cases impossible previously, with ever increasing ease of transportation and communication assisting this process, coupled to terrorist groups embarking on increasing forays into criminal activity to self-finance.

Examples of terrorism's overall reliance on organised crime for finance has been made clear. Examples of the, at times, symbiotic relationship include the Continuity IRA's relationship with Eastern European sex traffickers, [3]; ETA at one time ensuring the lowering the price of cocaine and guaranteeing commodity delivery to Italy through contacts with Columbian drug cartels in exchange for weapons from the Campania organised crime cartels [4].; and Hezbollah's use of Mexican Drug Cartel's smuggling routes [5].

The strikingly similar operating structures of terrorist and organised crime groups have previously been noted by both Robinson [6] and Asal et. al. [7], who found that organised international drug traffickers have much in common with modern terrorist groups. The membership of groups operating within both phenomena is highly compartmentalised, resilient and have the ability to make quick necessary changes to adapt to altered circumstances beyond their control. They will also be opportunistic, and seek out new connections for benefits beyond the immediate goals of their groups.

In terms of definition Bovenkerek and Chakra [8] caution that the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime are very distinct, accepting that although structural similarities are obvious, the ever important distinctions of their criminal purpose of organised crime versus the politically motivated violence of terrorism are important distinction to maintain.

On an intellectual level terrorism and organised crime have previously been perceived as having little in common 'since the former is based on ideological, religious or political principles, while the latter on profit motives' [9].

Jamieson [10] agrees that both phenomena need to be seen as distinct concepts, while the authors acknowledge that either phenomenon can utilise the methods and tactics of the other, and do. For Madsen, in analysing groups it is important to remain focussed on *motivation*, as 'the intent for specific acts committed by two groups might overlap, their motivations do not' [11]. As Dishman also observes, 'simply put, drug barons and revolutionary leaders do not walk the same path to success. Terrorists may commit kidnappings or extort local businesses, but their fundamental goal remains to shape or alter the political landscape in some manner. Transnational criminal organisations may also employ terrorism as a tactical weapon, but their end game is to avoid prosecution and make money' [12].

Makarenko's crime terror continuum model [13], is the cornerstone of research into the relationship between terrorism and organised crime, and challenges the clear distinctions between the phenomena that many others make. She sees the relationship between the two as far more nuanced, and transitory.

The phenomena of terrorism and organised crime are at opposite ends of a line, moving down this line when they form alliances or utilise the tactics of the other; enter a 'black hole', where they are no longer clearly organised criminals or a terrorist group but instead a confluence of the characteristics of both; and may ultimately mutate into a group categorised as being wholly transformed into one which fits the criteria of the other phenomena.

Example of this are terrorist groups such as FARC and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), who have increasingly became involved in criminal activity, initially to fund their cause however as circumstances altered they mutated into post-terrorism organisations, who now largely operate as criminal organisations driven by profit [14]. These organisations have fallen into Makarenko's 'black hole', becoming mutated organisations, no longer serving their original purpose and utilising tactics of both phenomena. Excellent examples of organised crime's move to the use of terror tactics for political are the earlier mentioned Camorra adoption of the bombing tactics of the ELN, and the 'Red Commando' of Brazil embracing terror tactics purportedly supported by radical socialist ideology in furtherance of illicit gain [15].

In terms of movement from conflict to criminality Glenny [16] noted the number of veterans of the Balkan conflicts who fill the upper echelons of Eastern European organised crime. Similarly McDermott [17] writes of the very same phenomena following the disbandment of the paramilitary United Self Defence Force of Colombia (AUC), while Naim sights the similar transformation of members of the Mexican military into the Zetas narco-traffickers [18]. These authors all note how each organisations member's skill sets, honed through brutal conflict, lent themselves particularly well to the management of all that is illicit.

Organised Criminal involvement with AQ

To understand the current level of criminal co-operation IS are undertaking it is necessary to gain an understanding of the recent history of 'Jihadi Terrorism'. Marc Sageman [19] provides a narrative on events, supported by an academic model drawing on David Rappaport's seminal 'Four Waves of Terrorism' theoretical framework [20], where he identifies similar waves of Jihadi terrorist involvement.

The 'inspirational' first wave, who brought the cause of a world view of an international oppressed Muslim community to the fore were the religiously inspired foreigners drawn to join Mujahedeen and participate or assist in the conflict in Afghanistan following the invasion by the Soviet Union. This wave includes the original members of Al-Qaeda, such as Osama Bin Laden.

The second wave was constituted by 'elite' Middle Eastern origin expatriates who attended Western Universities and then, following contact with first wave members and supporters, became involved in the conflicts such as Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir; or self-staring operations such as 9/11.

Sageman's previously identified that these 'members of the global Salafi jihad were generally middle class, educated young men from caring and religious families', the large majority were married, many with children and no 'hardened' criminals detected amongst their ranks; and few with connections to petty crime. [21].

Good examples of such wave participants, beyond Mohammed Attah and the 9/11 conspirators, are for instance the 'Glasgow Airport' attackers, Khafeel Ahmed who was a PhD educated Engineer, while Bilal Abdullah was a Medical Doctor. Both Ahmed and Abdullah had travelled to the west, been educated and lived in the UK without obvious issue.

The 'third wave' of home grown Jihadists emerged in the wake of the Iraq War and were largely sought out by a variety of 'inspirers' to encourage participation. Richard Reed, the infamous failed 'shoe bomber' serves as a good example. Reed is perhaps the archetypal criminal convert to Islam of this period (he served three years in prison for a string of burglaries prior to conversion) [22], recruited and utilised by Jihadist leadership. Reed is of a very different background to the self-starters of the second wave.

Police opinion in respect of these 'third wave' jihadists like Reed was that although a small proportion had a background in minor criminality, such ties were quickly cut by participants, and seen as to be expunged from their sphere of social interactions [23].

This is not to say Al Qaeda and its contemporaries did not participate in criminal activities, at this time nor have (ex) criminals amongst their ranks. They did. There are many examples of participation in criminality. On the international scale, when Al Qaeda's front organisations they channelled donations from wealthy supporters through were designated by international bodies as financiers of terrorism they became involved with international drug dealing networks [24]. At the operational level South African organised crime groups are known to have supplied forged documents to Al Qaeda members [25].

However, following Makarenko's scale, being a terrorist who utilises criminality to further their political ends (point 2) is far removed from being a terrorist who embraces crime for their own gain (point 4).

The recruitment of Reed, and similar individuals [26], showed perhaps a dilution of the requirements and expectations for participation in the struggle. The need or expectation of a solid understanding of the religious authorised drivers was waning, and while the rhetoric of the call to conflict continued to contain the semblance of that which had inspired the mujahedeen of the first wave, the depth of understanding amongst those taking up arms was reducing.

Of particular note in relation to these three 'waves' is that after each there is a noticeable decline of 'religiosity' of the participants. As 'jihadist terrorism' the level of individual religious scholarship and background amongst participants has decreased. This is a development not missed by the analysts of Europol [27], who see the current situation as being perhaps best described as an 'extremist social trend' rather than 'radicalisation' in terms of the involvement of Islam as a motivating factor.

'The Fourth Wave' – The 'Criminal' Jihadists

Those now becoming involved in jihadist activities have backgrounds far removed from the 'pioneers' of Al Qaeda. The largely 'middle class/ intellectual' credentials of 'second wave' jihadists have been replaced with recruits drawn from "immigrant gangs (that mix) jihadism with gangsta criminality" [28]. Van San's (2015) study of 35 Belgian and Dutch foreign fighters for IS found that half were converts to Islam, all aged between 18 and 30, and none holding a University education [29].

Similarly to the breeding ground for organised crime described above, Sageman has found that 'in relation to modern terrorism, expatriate communities are the recruiting ground of the current jihad against the west, the influence of friendship, kinship, shared isolation through expatriate experience has led to 'seventy percent of the terrorists join(ing) the jihad as expatriates' [30].

In extending Sageman's model, Rik Coolsaet [31] sees the 'fourth wave' of the jihad as being upon us and consisting of those who are reacting to the success of the establishment of Islamic State, with the 'third wave'' reaction to the post Iraq war conflict having now largely run its course.

Belgian Anti-terrorist Police Superintendent Alain Grignard sums up the current situation as that "previously we were mostly dealing with 'radical islamists' – individuals radicalized toward violence by extremist interpretation of Islam – but now we're increasingly dealing with what are best described as 'Islamized Radicals'" [32].

Indeed, Watts illustrates this well noting that "ISIS has turned al Qaeda's recruitment pattern on its head- to spectacular effect…. Unlike al Qaeda, which heavily screened members to weed out potential spies or those with criminal pasts ISIS, at least at its height in 2015, took in any foreigners that volunteers, giving the disenfranchised a new home, purpose and direction." [33]

Such a situation is summed up in a manner that might be regarded as comic were its context not so serious, in the behaviour of jihadists Yusuf Sarwar and Mohammed Ahmed who purchased copies of 'Islam for Dummies' and 'The Koran for Dummies' before their departure to Syria to join an al-Qaeda off shoot in Syria in 2013 [34]. They had returned to the UK from their 'adventure' by the following year, and are now both serving 13 year prison sentences.

French anti-terrorism Judge Marc Trevidic illustrates the profile of 'fourth wave' participants as consisting of 'ninety percent… who leave do it for personal reasons: they are looking for a fight, or for adventure, or revenge, because they do not fit in society...Religion is not the engine of this movement and that's precisely its strength.'[35].

In drilling into this 'ninety percent' A UK Special Branch source was recently quoted as stating that 'the so-called jihad in Iraq and Syria has been particularly inviting to some young British Muslims who are already involved in violent crime in this country' [36], with Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley explicitly stating that IS are seeking to recruit from criminal elements [37], and that 'young people who

were getting drawn into gang crime, particularly those with troubled histories, are now turning to (IS)' [38]. Such a path, in a case of petty criminal behaviour, was that taken by Mashdur Choudhury a petty fraudster who travelled to Syria with friends from Portsmouth to join IS [39] and Jafar Turay, wanted ex-gang member of Willesden, north-west London who remains in Syria [40]. It is also a path followed by Ebrahim B. (so named under German privacy laws), a member of IS, who in considering his reasoning for membership stated that 'If I had been picked up by a rocker gang in Jamaica of by Hell's Angels in America or something, I would have gone along with it.' [41] and Abdelhamid Abaaoud, presumed leader of the French and Belgian IS inspired attacks of 2015, who described himself as a 'Terrorism Tourist' with selfies taken of his activities on his mobile phone [42].

Enrolment in IS by westernised, disaffected and disillusioned Muslim diaspora youth fits very well with the new paradigm of the 'More, Mentality and Mobility' revolution identified by Moises Naim [43], and the loose and fragile transmission of ideology, methods and allegiances that he has identified as at large across globalised modern societies.

There is much individualised 'enrolment' for those in the West, where they seek involvement through largely self, or small peer group, 'concept' immersion, rather than cultural involvement. The equivalent of Bloody Sunday, oft seen as PIRAs most effective recruiting sergeant, is not happening on the doorstep of western diaspora Muslim youths, and generally those around them are far removed from the consequences of the wars currently engulfing the Middle East. Their immersion in this conflict comes from some through their associations, be these friends or family, but for others the evening news, from their viewing of YouTube videos and Facebook posts such as the coverage of the violence inflicted on Sunni protestors at Hawijah in 2013 [44]; and ultimately perhaps from an imam's pronouncements sympathetic to the jihadist cause at a mosque they may attend, or from the attentions of 'influencers' such as Zhalid Zerkani [45] in Belgium or Edis Bosnic [46] in Bosnia, who seek to identify and guide the curious towards IS participation .

Weggemans, Bakker and Grol [47] note the particular speed five Dutch individuals in their study of the radicalisation phenomena appeared to move from 'normal' to 'radicalised', and form their intention to participate in jihad. The biographies of the youths show a background in petty crime, with participants from diverse ethnic backgrounds across a number of what could reasonably be regarded as 'bad neighbourhoods'. This same factor is noted by Higgins [48], when he writes the two dozen young men who have gone to fight for IS from the 'grimy' Molebeek district of Brussels, where there were blurred lines between criminality and jihadi violence, directly echoing Sageman's findings discussed above.

Consequently, in the case of those radicalised in such a manner, it would perhaps be more appropriate to consider a variant of Makarenko's scale, applied on an *individual* basis, rather than looking at group dynamics. That is, seeing the journey towards terrorism of those edging toward it at a physical distance from the conflict as a *personal* rather than cultural conceptual path, or as individualised on the part of IS 'recruiters', where they specifically target individuals with such backgrounds.

There are good examples such consideration. One individual who embarked on a personal journey to IS was Aine Davis, who went from being a London drug dealer to a Syrian based jihadist, "like dozens of others" [49]. Davis had access to criminal firearms and drug supply networks in the UK, as his previous convictions show. Then we have Suhaib Majeed, provided online 'tuition' via the internet by IS members in Syria to conduct action in the UK , supported by converts to Islam, Nathan Cuffey and Nyall Hamlett, who were able to utilise their network to obtain a number of firearms to mount operations [50].

The motivation for such individuals wanting to join IS remains to be considered. Jurgen Todenhofer, who famously travelled the Islamic State and has seen the 'governance' conducted by IS first hand, perhaps captures this perfectly in his observation that "they (foreign fighters for IS) are people who were unimportant in the West and now told they are in an apocalyptic last battle between good and evil – heroes in Nike trainers and Jack Wolfskin boots…posing with their brutality and talking openly and proudly about a religious cleansing if they had the power." [51]

This observation ties in well with notions of extreme thrill seeking [52] coupled to a form of (perverse) redemption for past perceived misdeeds, and the ability to create a new identity at odds with that they held in the west [53]. While many Islamic State volunteers appear motivated by a desire to combat the Assad Regime's brutality or a desire to participate on theological grounds, there are many IS defectors who have gone as far as articulating their motivations as material gain and adventure [54], their past criminality demonstrating "a predisposition for nefarious activity and violent conduct prior to heading out for jihad in Syria and Iraq." [55]

Opinion on the Effects of IS Participation

Current publicly articulated western Government and security thinking is largely focussed on the consequences of Davis and his ilk returning to the UK and committing acts of terrorism, rather than considerations of their possible re-integration in an 'enhanced manner' to the world of crime.

Returning to the work of Weggemans, et al. radicalisation in respect of the current Syrian jihad appears to be very quick and unusually so in terms of past transformations of those who become involved in international terrorism. The question inevitably presents as to whether the desire to participate, when confronted with the harsh realities of conflict, will wear off just as quick as it arose?

The act of joining with IS will mean that on their return to their country of origin participants will, if detected, be incarcerated, the recent imprisonment of the brothers Hamza and Mohommod Nawaz who returned from Syria [56] serving as an telling example.

The imprisoned, or those who return and escape detention (but are likely to be ever mindful of the possibility of detection), are hardly likely to find themselves enticing prospects for employers, with a previous background in criminality already serving as a dissuading factor. Their participation in jihad will stay with them, and other than those with funds and sympathy for their cause, or a few charitable institutions that may assist prospects look bleak. So, what could a former drug dealer possibly do with their new

found skills in the use of firearms and explosives, coupled with experience of the management of illicit commodity routes, possibly do to earn a crust? The answer, of a return to crime with a potentially 'enhanced' reputation and relevant skill set, when framed thus, does appear a logical proposition. This is not to say that all those who were involved in criminality and have embarked on jihad will return as enhanced organised criminals. Many will no doubt likely try to support their cause through more peaceful means, some may embark on terrorism in their home state, such as Khalid and Ibrahim el-Bakraoi, both former armed robbers prior to their involvement with IS who participated in the Belgian terror attacks of March 2016 [57] some may slip into obscurity; however, it does seem glaringly obvious that the possibility exists that some, if not a lot, of returning ex organised criminals will return to their previous peccadillo.

These motivations are likely, in some part similar to that of the earlier mentioned Reed. What differs is that Reed was, at the time, unusual. His background is now strikingly similar to the plethora of IS foreign recruits. It is perhaps best then to view that what has changed between Al Qaeda and IS is quite simply that there has been progress, that IS have learned from the efforts of Al Qaeda and developed the areas where they experienced success, with the 'fourth wave' seeing the targeting and embracing of those with dubious backgrounds in criminality. The recruitment of those with a criminal past, whatever their current motivation, appears to be succeeding for them so far.

Testing hypotheses in respect of IS members is an extremely difficult endeavour. IS, by their nature, do not present an easy subject for academic enquiry and, for obvious operational reasons, law enforcement and security bodies are inevitably reluctant to share intelligence they hold.

Expert Opinion on IS Veteran Criminality

To provide a starting point of credible opinion on potential behaviours eight recently retired senior detectives and two senior analytical staff who had recently left the field of law enforcement, all with a background in the investigation of organised crime and many with a shared background in counter terrorism, were consulted through a questionnaire, distributed via email [58]. The aim of this consultation was to gather their views on organised criminals engagement and relationship with IS.

Contact with respondents no longer working in the field avoided a host of issues in terms of confidentiality of operationally sensitive information, however their recent employment ensured that their views could be regarded as a credible source of expert opinion. While engagement with those involved in organised crime may have proved extremely illuminating in terms of the potential impact of Islamic State veterans such a piece of research was deemed beyond the scope of this initial article considering the phenomena. Further work in this regard would no doubt be merited.

The respondents presented significant comment of note.

They were divided on whether individuals with a background in organised crime would become involved in criminal activity should they travel to join IS in the Middle East, with six believing they would. Respondent QH was keen to point out that crimes committed would be to the benefit of IS as opposed to being for personal gain due to

personal danger, while respondent QE disagreeing believing that organised criminals who travel would likely continue to exploit opportunities for personal gain.

Of the six respondents who believed that organised criminals would remain involved in criminal activity while with IS all believed they would seek to expand their criminal networks. Respondent QA cited "recent conflicts in the Balkans, Chechnya and Afghanistan prov(ing) this case" and respondent QD pointing out that such behaviour will be in IS interests to ensure the maintenance of their funding streams. Respondent QC believes that "the associated risk here is high. I would anticipate those engaging in other criminality e.g. human trafficking/ black market firearms, will establish criminal networks particularly to assist with smuggling routes back to the UK and other EU markets."

Seven respondents thought it likely that individuals with an organised criminality background would become disillusioned with IS activities, with a number of respondents sighting such individual's almost intrinsic desire for personal gain being over ridden by the need to fund IS activities and frustrations this will ultimately engender.

Eight respondents believed that if an organised criminal travelled to the Middle East to become involved in IS activity and later returned to their country of origin they would return to organised criminal activity. The respondents were particularly clear on this, using terms of either 'highly likely' or 'inevitable' to describe their belief in this regard.

The 10 respondents were unanimous that exposure to IS activity in the Middle East would make an organised criminal a more dangerous individual on return to their country of origin. In particular QB believed "there would be a tendency to be more violent, ruthless and confident"; QC was of the opinion they "may use their 'skills' and new contacts to further (their) criminal career; QD thought that "their drive, determination to succeed and levels of violence will increase"; QE provided that "If working with IS has been successful and profitable they are very likely to maintain those links and build upon their successes on their return; QF sees such individuals as being "enhanced by new contacts, associates and knowledge of commodities, routes and opportunities"; QG believes that such individuals will be 'more robust, more resilient and more ruthless"; and QH stated that "As well as being more ruthless (they will be) more surveillance aware and will have the ability to construct weapons and firearms. They will also be more adept at making themselves less subject to intelligence development. In short they will be more dangerous and effective".

Seven respondents saw returning organised criminals reputation, and those of any organised crime groups, as likely to be significantly affected by their IS participation. Notoriety, criminal kudos and the general 'connectedness' of the individual were all thought to be likely to enhanced with the intimidatory qualities of groups containing such individuals as members increased significantly.

Participant QB did caution that Organised Crime Group (OCG's) may be very wary of any adverse attention and/or publicity returnees may bring and QE pointed out that the standing of such an OCG would likely suffer in the eyes of the general public.

Participant QG pointed out that although their standing may rise in their OCG those with whom they 'trade' may view groups with such members as "highly dangerous, highly unpredictable and not to be trusted….(with) their motivation towards power and wealth (being) replaced by motivation to terrorist aims".

In concluding their thoughts on the subject participant QI provided the following "I would be very surprised if *established* (my italics) organised criminals left their lucrative business to sign up to fight for their cause. That's not to say they wouldn't but in my opinion it would be the foot soldiers"

Analysis

The founder of IS, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was a career criminal with no theological training [59]. It is perhaps unsurprising that the organisation has sought to capitalise from the outset on the skills a background in criminality brings.

The views of the respondents above are supported by similar previous research, and as Pantucci and Dawson [60] note in relation to returning IS veterans with a criminal past their access to networks will make obtaining weapons far easier. The worsening involvement in organised crime of those individuals involved with IS who lose their thirst for the 'cause' appears a real, and all too dangerous, possibility.

Not only will such returning ex-jihadists likely have access to international criminal networks beyond their previous reach, their experiences will have led to enhancement, in terms of their contacts, methodology, reach and, very importantly, a major commodity for all involved in organised crime, their *reputation* [61].

The new contacts and methods criminals embarking as 'would be' jihadis encounter commence even before they reach Syria. Men like Mohammed Abu Mustafa have been smuggling goods from Turkey into Syria for years; now his commodity, and that of his peers, is people [62]. Mustafa is one of the many organised criminals operating on the Turkish/ Syrian border involved is getting IS's new recruits in theatre; and to these recruits he is an obvious link into serious criminality. Mustafa's embracing of multi commodity endeavour, his branching out into people smuggling, is nothing new. A good parallel example of such criminal entrepreneurship being that following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 many Hong Kong based organised criminals happily got involved in smuggling dissidents out of mainland China, rather than their usual trade in more standard illicit commodities [63].

It is a given that the trade of Mustafa and his ilk can flow both ways across borders, and that commodity traffickers can move people, weapons or goods with likely equal skill. Contact with men such as him could prove an invaluable starting point for disillusioned IS participants seeking new friends with whom to enhance their previous illicit networks.

Movement through Turkey, the international hub for the Heroin trade [64] will no doubt present many tempting opportunities and future networks for exploration to these perhaps reluctant jihadists whether with Mustafa, or his peers. Such networks, and the knowledge of how to utilise them, will be part of the enhanced skill set.

The work of Gill et al. [65] on PIRA is of particular note for potential comparison purposes with IS development. They found that while one would expect PIRA members to have close associations going forward with those they were in close geographic proximity to, this was not the case. It was shared skill sets that led to continuing and ongoing associations across terrorist cells. That is, those involved with drugs or kidnapping associated with others involved in similar crimes, rather than where associations through proximity would be expected. Were this to be repeated in terms of IS participants an enhanced skill set of criminality and new 'contacts in these fields present significant potential areas for concern, with a massive risk of new crime networks or enhancement of those that currently exist as the new skills and actors are introduced. Perhaps a telling example of this type of behaviour to provide illustration would be to remain with PIRA and look to their 'franchising' of bomb making skills to the FARC, post the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland [66].

Participation as a jihadist, whether an individual turns their back on the cause or not, provides an individual with enhancement to one commodity massively important in the circles of organised crime; as stated above, that of their *reputation*.

The benefits are twofold. Mustafa, the people trafficker referenced above, and his compatriots, will have little to fear in terms of law enforcement entrapment through trading with jihadists, repenting or otherwise. They will be safe in the knowledge that no law enforcement body is going to allow their agents to be involved in the extreme behaviours of IS, and so in trading with an individual who has been involved in such the typical need for 'referencing', where criminals keenly establish the bona fides of their business partners before engagement, becomes redundant.

The second benefit comes in terms of the 'kudos' in the right circles of having participated in IS's jihad. Criminals thrive on their reputational enhancement achieved through association with notoriety, James "Whitey" Bulger a Boston based organised criminal and long-time associate of PIRA being a prime example [67]. Those known as decapitators and to have been involved in kidnappings where millions are extorted from national Governments [68] will no doubt be respected and feared in organised criminal circles should they return, in tandem with views previously expressed by senior detectives in relation to 'terrorist kudos' [69].

The cachet of association with a group such as IS in these circles is clear. The recent claims of affiliation to IS by a German kidnapper and 'Lizard Squad' [70], a notorious hackers group involved in denial of service attacks, illustrate this perfectly. When one appreciates the consternation and concern these hackers have caused by their claimed association, it is not difficult at all to extrapolate this into the actual level of fear and respect *known* association to a group such as this will induce in the relatively closed circles of the world organised criminals operate within. This applies equally between an individual who had participated in IS being part of an organised crime group and his relationship with its other members; along with the cachet a group having such members would experience amongst other organised crime groups who it interacted with, or were indeed its rivals. Fear is a common currency amongst those involved in organised crime; fear of retribution for welching on a deal or ripping associates off over an illicit deal often prevents such occurring and extreme violence is employed when necessary to maintain this level of intimidation [71]. The 'fear' of participants that would result from participation in the more extreme elements of IS behaviours is not

difficult to imagine. This is not in any way to say that those currently involved in organised crime and shrinking violets when it comes to extreme violence. Instead, the potential participation of IS veterans simply brings a new dynamic to an already dangerous milieu.

Discussion

The comments from AC Rowley of the Metropolitan Police Service, and those of a Special Branch source of the targeting of criminals by IS chime well with the research of Sageman and Perri, that participants are typically drawn from the same Diaspora communities. Their views are supported by the Weggemans et al study, the findings of Higgins, and a number of cases, that of Aine Davis being a prime example.

The majority of the questionnaire participants believe, as do I on the basis of the research presented, that organised criminals recruited from the West to participate in the IS jihad will become involved in criminality while in the Middle East.

The views of participant QA in respect of post conflict criminal activity echo the referenced findings of Glenny, McDermott and Naim, in that the participants in a violent struggle who support this through criminal activity have a strong propensity to continue the criminal activity once the struggle is over. The 'transferable skills' make this transition seem extremely plausible.

The participant's views also chime with those of Draper in terms of likely OCG participant disillusionment. Accepting that it at the time of writing it does not appear an easy proposition to 'resign' from IS such may well become a possibility as the conflict enters new phases and departure from the conflict zone may accelerate considerably should the offensive against IS prove successful.

The unanimous view amongst the experts of the increased danger potential returnees present should not in any way be overlooked. This observation, coupled with the outlined research, is perhaps the most important point raised in this article. Returning OCG members will likely have far greater skills and capacities that whence they left, and this may present serious future challenges to western law enforcement agencies.

I find myself in agreement with participant QI that it is likely that it will be OCG 'foot soldiers' who find themselves seduced by the lure of IS. I do not however think that this in any way mitigates the potential risk these individuals may pose in future. If one accepts that it is the young OCG members travelling (and returning) these individuals will likely have long criminal careers ahead, careers very different in terms of reach and capability from those of the fellow OCG members they left behind. These individuals will be returning with enhanced reputations in criminal circles, knowledge of international illicit distribution networks and tradecraft tested in the crucible of intense conflict. It may well be the case as participant QG points out that other indigenous OCGs may be wary of these returnees. From the research presented they likely would have good cause to be so, but this may well not be enough not to 'do business'.

It may be a number of years before it becomes clear if these IS veterans will indeed become re-involved in organised criminality; what appears clear though is that the potential seems very likely and the implications may be significant.

Illustrating the Issue

The research and discussion outlined above points to the need to provide an illustration of how the transformation of an individual might occur, building on Makarenko's work in terms of terrorist groups. Figure 2, the 'Radicalisation to Criminalisation' cycle below illustrates this in terms of an individual:

Figure 2: Radicalisation to Re: Criminalisation



From Criminal to Terrorist (and back again)

The model illustrates the potential journeys of individuals becoming involved in IS activities, in particular those with a background in serious crime however with refinement it could equally applied to those who have no such previous history.

The model shows the individual as a potential participant in organised crime activity, and with potential criminal associations.

The move to point A demonstrates the path of radicalisation, as the individual moves from their participation in indigenous crime to instead their involvement in overseas IS activity.

From this juncture the individual potentially moves to point B, criminal activities in support of IS, in tandem organisationally for IS as it has moved along Makarenko's scale illustrated at the earlier figure 2, so now the individual similarly moves. Given their previous bent towards criminality (as discussed earlier) there is a strong possibility that a previous skill set will result in associations with actors of similar history. To illustrate this perhaps think of an organised criminal with pre jihad experience of extortion. Following the theories outlined above there is every likelihood that post radicalisation and arrival with IS they will strike up, or be driven towards, association with similar characters involved in this activity in support of IS and find themselves as participants.

There is every likelihood some will remain at either point A or point B, willing participants in IS activities and remain in their territories undertaking these.

However, for the disillusioned, and those able to negotiate their exit from (or perhaps escape) from IS there is point C, with three apparent potential outcomes. The first, a return to the country of origin and wholesale disengagement, both from IS and there previous life of crime. The second possibility is that of incarceration. Although significant prison sentences await those returning from Syria having participated with IS, essentially coming home and being caught, these prison terms will end. At this juncture the individual will either become wholly disengaged, or instead move into option 3, that of re-engagement in organised crime.

Option 3 is particularly concerning. It suggests a return to previous activity; with the experience and reputation enhancement resulting from IS participation that may carry massive negative connotations in general society but kudos of exceptional worth and operational value in the world of organised crime. One can also easily imagine those finding themselves incarcerated seeing a return to crime as a positive option on release, their criminal reputation enhanced through IS participation likely carrying significant reputational advantage while incarcerated that they can then capitalise on when they move back into external criminal society.

One can also easily see that for those without prior organised crime connections there experience in IS will likely have provided them with this, from their trafficking into the conflict onwards and if it is not there enhanced skill base that draws them to this field on their return it may well be a period of incarceration with its likely consequence of a

realisation through association with their fellow prisoners that they have a valuable skill set and 'standing' that will be sought by some.

Conclusions

This paper seeks to draw attention to the parallels of other terrorist conflicts that have occurred to the current situation with IS, and illustrate the potential dangers of returnees. It is of particular note that the experts contacted for opinion on the issue of IS returnees were unanimous in respect of the danger of these individuals in terms of participation in organised crime. The potential impact on conventional organised crime in western democracies of IS returnees should not be underestimated, and any impact they might have on this sub culture surely merits close monitoring. As indicated above, engagement with organised criminals in respect of the potential impact of IS veterans would likely prove extremely illuminating in gauging their potential impact in this area; this engagement should of course be accompanied by monitoring of organised crime development in the years ahead to ascertain if IS veterans do indeed become (re)involved in serious criminality.

The model that has been provided, Radicalisation to Re-criminalisation, seeks to individualise the path from criminal to terrorist, enhancing the previous work of Makarenko on the Crime-Terror Continuum. It illustrates the key points in this journey and that there is the obvious potential for disengagement. If organised criminals who participate in IS are allowed to return unchecked, and un-shepherded, it is difficult to imagine a situation where they would not slip into their past associations and utilise their new skill sets and contacts. Although it would be nigh on impossible to influence those who return in such circumstances undetected the same cannot be said of those who are detected and incarcerated. For them there are two areas that must be addressed. Ensuring they do not slip back into their IS ideology and inflict attacks on their country of origin is one, and that which is rightly receiving significant attention; however of equal import is ensuring that they do not leave prison with their burnished credentials and enhanced skill set to return to the world of crime to cause significantly greater misery and despair than before they left. Impact can be made on this potential outcome, and it would appear incumbent on law enforcement and penal agencies to ensure such concerns are taken into account.

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Chapter 4 Case Study – Terrorism and Organised Crime in an Environment Peripheral to Conflict: Scotland

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is formed from the following publications:

Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland? (Gallagher, 2014) which describes Scotland's historic cultural ties to Northern Ireland, and provides an explanation of the influence of the recent conflict there on Scottish organised crime groups co-operation with terrorists arising from these cultural ties. The article thereafter illustrates subject matter expert and investigator opinions on the links between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland, supported by interviewees through their access to confidential briefing material on the phenomena.

Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit of Profit? (Gallagher, 2015) which takes forward the research contained in Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland? (Gallagher, 2014), and models the evidence obtained alongside research on entrepreneurship.

Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime (Gallagher, 2018) which illustrates the sophisticated interdependencies that exist between both phenomena

Terrorism, Organised Crime and Necessity (Gallagher, 2019) which focusses on the need for terrorist organisations to retain legitimacy amongst their supportive population sub groups while accessing illicit finance to operate.

4.2 “Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, No. 2

Introduction

Terrorism and Organised Crime are phenomena that share a number of characteristics, both in relation to academic issues concerning their study and also their operational mechanisms. Academically, the same definitional issues that haunt the field of terrorism research bedevil work on organised crime. The problems caused by a lack of definition in terrorism research are well documented (1). Similar issues are also considered at length in relation to organised crime (2), where familiar difficulties regarding the achievement of a consensus, such as competing interests, are cited.

An ‘initial nexus’ between terrorists and organised criminals, could be said to exist where pragmatic collaboration occurs to suit both parties (3), with illegal actors from the distinct phenomena co-operating to further their own ends through mutual endeavour. Indeed, terrorist groups see the utilisation of established criminal networks for their purposes as being ‘cost effective’ (4). Means by which such ‘cost effective’ co-operation could be achieved are potentially the provision of specialist services, an examples being forged or falsified documents, such as passports (5); accountancy; legal advice (6); access to corrupt officials (7); people trafficking/ smuggling (8); and, even arms that may also be provided (9).

Such provision was recently illustrated through cases where it was suspected dissident republicans bought weapons from arms supplying organised criminals in south east Europe (10) and an informant reporting, following the closure of the Reichstag in Berlin, that jihadists already in Germany had sourced to attack on the Reichstag from Balkan organised criminal groups(11).

The well documented case of the Medellin cartel employing terrorists of the ELN to carry out car bombings (12) illustrates how this use of specialists can lead to two way co-operation, while in Europe the provision of pipe bombs by dissident republicans to drug gangs is becoming an ever more common occurrence (13).

Although small, an ‘initial nexus’ of co-operation between organised criminals and terrorists exists in Scotland. This initial nexus relates primarily to Irish related terrorism but there are a very few known connections to international terrorism. The nature of the connections to those involved in Irish related terrorism appears to be social and criminal in nature.

The initial nexus in Scotland primarily exists amongst two sub cultures, these being the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists. Seventeenth century emigration to Ireland from Scotland through the ‘Ulster Plantation’ formed a protestant émigré society there, which has retained close ties with a similar sub culture in Scotland. The obvious recurring travel between locations to participate in Orange Order Parades is a good indicator of this continuing bond amongst the communities. Nineteenth century immigration to Scotland formed a large Roman Catholic expatriate community,

primarily in the west coast of Scotland, where their cultural and religious differences saw them forming a distinct ghetto community.

Both the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists are minority groups within Scotland and although they may not fit current definitions of ethnic minority groups in the typical parameter of 'race', they are both distinct sub cultures within wider Scottish society. Both produce SOCGs and individuals who become involved in Irish related terrorist activity. It is therefore not surprising that the initial nexus has been found here. Individuals involved in either form of activity share common lineage, schooling, culture and associations.

The potential causes of such co-operation, coupled to the changing nature of Scotland's population through mass immigration and any potential implications that might arise from this, make the country an interesting one to research the phenomena of an 'initial nexus' within.

Co-operation between Terrorists and Organised Criminals

Although early definitions of organised crime in the 1960's focussed on the known hierarchical organised crime type, the form of loose network structure emerged as atypical (14), and is generally accepted as the norm. The move to network structures is acknowledged as having been accelerated through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ever increasing pace of globalisation, an excellent example of this movement being highlighted through the Russian origin Solntsevskaya crime group (15).

Terrorism's reliance on organised crime for finance has been made clear by individuals such as Abdullah Ocalan, former leader of the PKK, who has stated that the organisation relies heavily on its ties to drug trafficking to finance the purchase of weapons (16). Similarly, official Irish Police reports make it clear that the Continuity IRA has established working partnerships with Eastern European sex traffickers, sharing smuggling routes with them and being involved in assisting with their criminal enterprises (17). Indeed, terrorists have acted as illicit commodity brokers to further their own ends, with ETA ensuring the lowering the price of cocaine and guaranteeing commodity delivery to Italy through contacts with Columbian drug cartels in exchange for weapons from the Campania organised crime cartels (18).

The operating structure of terrorists and organised criminal groups are acknowledged as being strikingly similar (19), although the distinction of purpose (profit vs. political change) continues to be a point of emphasis.

Co-operation often takes the form of the provision of smuggling routes by organised criminals to terrorists (20). Attempts to establish further co-operative routes have also been subject to law enforcement interdiction as Mali origin Al-Qaeda operatives discovered when engaging with individuals they thought represented FARC, but were in fact agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (21).

Makarenko's (22) model illustrates where these forms of co-operation can in fact lead to a form of metamorphosis, and is illustrated thus:

Figure 1, 'The Crime Terror Continuum', Makarenko (2004)



Where terrorist groups such as FARC and PIRA, increasingly become involved in criminal activity, either or initially to fund their cause whereas circumstances alter they mutate into post-terrorism organisations, who now largely operate as criminal organisations driven by profit (23). These organisations have fallen into Makarenko's 'black hole', her point 4, and become mutated organisations, no longer serving their original purpose and utilising tactics of both phenomena. An excellent examples of organised crime's move to the use of terror tactics for political purpose are the bombing tactics of the ELN in furthering the purposes of the Medellin Cartel (24), and the similar bombing tactics adopted in the past by the Sicilian mafia (25).

An agenda of radical political change may well lead to significant altering of the norms of a state's functioning, to the detriment of the profit of an organised crime enterprise. Terrorist activity in a well-functioning state will bring with it considerable additional law enforcement attention, attention that could, through investigative endeavour, become focussed on those co-operating with the terrorist group. This is a considerable risk factor for any organised criminal embarking on co-operation. Organised crime in any society functions with some form of law enforcement consideration on the part of the criminals, be that from carefully planned avoidance, as noted by Albini (26) in relation to 'successful' Scottish organised criminals, to parasitic co-operative assistance through corruption. Where an organised crime group functions away from protection provided through state corruption any contact with law enforcement can prove devastating. However, were the activities of the terrorist group likely to adversely affect law enforcement agencies abilities to function this may prove beneficial to the organised crime group both in hiding their involvement in the interaction but also in terms of assisting their core functioning. Similarly, knowledge of a terrorists groups activities may become a very useful bargaining tool with law enforcement should an organised crime group's core functioning be compromised; a tactic of holding intelligence on confederates for 'get out of jail' purposes has been utilised by organised criminals for some time, as noted in Albini's study. In addition, many organised criminals can be quite "dull" and despite the illicit nature of the commodity in which they trade be otherwise very risk averse (27). The degree to which such organised

criminals might become involved in any way with terrorists is highly questionable. Just as no terrorist group is identical, neither is any organised crime group.

Jamieson (28) sees co-operative endeavours as inevitable given the specialisations available to both groups, but overall see such co-operations as wholly pragmatic and only likely to last as long as there is a tangible benefit outweighing risk to both sides in the arrangement. Clarke and Lee (29) go further, seeing these partnerships as becoming indissoluble and insightfully question how long Makarenko's scale will hold true, with the conflagration between what once would have been regarded as distinct groupings on such a scale becoming ever closer.

An interesting quote in respect of the interaction, reported to have been made by a senior mafia figure in relation to what level of co-operation his organisation would provide to terrorists is that "The Mafia will help whoever can pay" (30). Also of substantial interest is the suggestion that "British criminal gangs… have admitted terrorist organisations (including PIRA), flushed with cash, into their substantial black markets." (31)

Putting all matters outlined into a conceivable scale of potential co-operation is difficult; however, when one considers that a UK Metropolitan Police Spokesman from the Counter Terrorist Command as saying that two thirds of the organised crime groups in the UK have an involvement with terrorism, this presents a massive potential target group (32).

Exploring the 'Initial Nexus' in Scotland

Point 1 of Makarenko's Crime Terror Continuum illustrates where first co-operation can occur between actors in either phenomena, the 'initial nexus' between terrorists and organised criminals, where pragmatic collaboration occurs to suit both parties. Information regarding the functioning of such a relationship, beyond the existence of the relationship itself, is scarce. It does not appear that it has been a primary area of research focus and when incidences may occur they would be likely known primarily to law enforcement bodies, which may retain the information for obvious operational benefit. It is certainly the case that there are few prosecutions resulting from such relationships, although the United States DEA interdiction of Mali based al-Qaeda operative's highlights law enforcement activity in the area (33).

Subject Matter Expert Interviews

To gain an insight into the current 'initial nexus' in Scotland arrangements were made for interviews to be conducted with senior staff from Scottish law enforcement bodies, handling intelligence regarding serious and organised crime and in addition those with a similar responsibility concerning counter terrorism (34).

During the interviews opinions, based on confidential research and intelligence reports, were gathered in a manner that was suitable for publication in a non-restricted document.

Operating Structures

Participants reported that in terms of structure Serious Organised Crime Groups (SOCGs) are often perceived to be hierarchical. IA (senior intelligence officer) believed that this was sometimes the case often when there are familial or social bonds within the group. However, IA further stated that most SOCGs would best be described as a network and are very fluid in their apparent membership and operating tactics. Members of SOCGs often come and go, at one time being involved in serious disputes and then shortly thereafter participating together in large scale drug purchases. Non-indigenous (non-UK originating) groups have very different and varied structures and operating tactics. They are very difficult for law enforcement to penetrate and this is particularly the case where membership of groups is transient in a given geographic area.

IA believes that terrorist networks with links to Scotland are very structured and would have the potential to access documentation (such as illegitimate passports) through corruption in state officials rather than through approaches to Scottish based SOCGs.

Known Interactions

In relation to terrorism the police's knowledge is greater in respect of Irish related terrorism as this is where, historically, the police have been successful. The subject matter experts agreed that the perceived crossover of SOCG with terrorist nominals of interest is assessed to be fairly small in Scotland but this needs to be seen as indicative in the context of available intelligence. The nexus between SOCG and terrorism remains minimal in the context of current threats. The assessment of the cross over's that have been identified are that they are mainly social in nature, not terrorist related.

IA reported that individuals have been identified with connections to known commodity routes. These individuals were suspected of involvement in drugs importation and also had associations to terrorist investigations. However, the assessed connection was not of a terrorist nature.

IA also reported that there was a known case of an individual within a SOCG being offered a criminal commodity by individuals who were suspected sympathisers of an Asian based terrorist group.

Collectively, the participants stated that the vast majority of cross over between SOCG and terrorist nominals is in relation to Irish related terrorism. Within this cross over by far the largest proportion of cross over related to Loyalist terrorism. There are significant Scottish links to Northern Ireland and this is particularly the case with the west coast. The overall figures for cross over though do indicate nominals of interest across Scotland's central belt. Investigations show that individuals involved in Irish related terrorism have clear links to criminality, although it has not been shown that these activities have direct links to their terrorist activities. It is suspected these activities may be purely for personal gain. Historically, there are loyalist connections to organised crime in Scotland. Weaponry and drugs have gone from the mainland UK to Ireland, from criminal associates not connected to terrorism.

Overall, participants were firmly of the opinion that loyalist terrorism is completely immersed in criminality. Typically, they are involved in counterfeiting, drugs, illegal alcohol and cigarette movement and distribution. They are not as well organised as

Republican terrorists. Participants believed that their methods and composition meant they were more predisposed to have links to organised crime groups and are known to have made extensive use of criminal associates in the past.

IG (senior analyst focussing on terrorism) reported that recent analysis has shown minimal links between republican related terrorism and organised crime in Scotland; however participants felt that this was due to a recent refocusing onto the issue given an upsurge in republican violence in Northern Ireland, where analytical focus had been on other areas previously.

IG further reported that there are known links between republican terrorism and organised crime groups which include drugs, weapons and the counterfeiting of DVD's. Republican terrorists are known to frequent public houses in Scotland that are associated to organised crime groups.

Expert Opinions

IA stated that terrorist connected SOCGs working in Scotland work for money and that they may well keep any terrorist associations and sympathies secret from Scottish based SOCGs they have connections with. IG and IH believed that out with the west coast of Scotland organised crime groups would not have strong opinions either way whether they dealt with loyalist or republican affiliated terrorist groups, as long as they were paid for material they supplied, such as arms.

IA was of the opinion that members of SOCGs are so greedy when pursuing profit that if an association was found to have sympathies to a terrorist group it would be unlikely any moral conscience resulting in disassociation would occur. However, if the terrorist group were active in Scotland, IA thought that this ambivalence may well change.

IA thought that if associates of SOCG were involved in terrorism in Scotland they may well alter their relationship with them but that this would be most likely after any incident had occurred.

IA was definitive in the opinion that some SOCGs are using terrorists for their purposes, utilising individuals with established smuggling routes and inroads into corruption for their criminal purposes, probably without the SOCG knowing of their associates actual backgrounds, instead wrongly believing they are engaged with a similar SOCG. It is very much in SOCGs interests to maintain these relationships. IA stated that there were examples where SOCGs involved in such relationships are of significant standing, well connected and long established.

IA suspects that non-indigenous SOCG linked to terrorism are the main threat, with no 'loyalty' to Scotland and their only purpose being to make money. For IA, it is in this that their threat is greatest.

IG and IH (senior detective in the Counter Terrorism environment) believed that more links between republican terrorists and organised crime will become apparent as investigations continue. Attention to this area declined after the Good Friday agreement and continued to decline after the attacks of September 11th 2001 and 7th July 2005. The

increased activity now ongoing is due to the upsurge in RIRA and related groups attacks.

IG and IH saw republican terrorists and some Scottish based organised criminals as being immersed in each other's cultures and interlinked at various levels. Within an existent sub culture of republicanism that both function within, IG and IH stated that organised criminals raise their standing by having links to republican terrorism.

In relation to the issue of deception, participants were asked to consider how they would see members of an organised crime group reacting if they learned they had been involved in facilitating terrorist activity. They again drew clear distinctions between international and Irish related terrorism. Was the facilitation to have been in relation to international terrorists participants thought that organised crime group members would tend to co-operate with the Police, with a good degree of self-preservation at work.

IH made an analogy with an overarching perception amongst criminals of paedophilia simply being perceived as beyond the pale and an area where the most hardened criminals have co-operated with the Police in the past to bring offenders to justice, and to the treatment other criminals meet out to paedophiles whenever an opportunity presents itself. IH believed that the majority of organised crime group members he has encountered view international terrorist actions in a similar way, carrying some degree of 'wrongness' that cuts across established (if wholly unwritten and in no way tangible) criminal codes of behaviour.

Both IG and IH were of the opinion that Irish related terrorism would engender a very different response; with it being unlikely that co-operation with the authorities would be forthcoming. They believed that in both camps associations that exist are largely parts of wider criminal networks, and would be treated as such in the event of the investigation of organised crime group's activities.

Investigator Opinions

To provide depth to the Scottish information that was provided, an insight into how the 'initial nexus' might function necessitated contact with individuals who could provide an insight into the operations of organised crime. Consequently, interviews and a focus group were organised with a number of detectives with a relevant background (35).

To gather the relevant opinions from these police officers a questionnaire (36) was utilised that addressed the issues of how they understood organised criminals interacted with contacts; thereafter how they envisaged such interaction might function from initial meetings to the provision of specialist services; and, through to their opinions on the workings of an ongoing and mutually understood 'initial nexus' relationship including in the aftermath of a terrorist incident.

Collectively the participants largely believed that with an a serious organised crime group (SOCG) the immediate group – the leader, his deputies and lieutenants would either be in the same family or live in the same geographical area. They would have bonds out with these areas, formed through shared experiences such as schooling and prison. For an organised criminal to have credibility they would need to expand beyond these confines and as they move up the 'criminal ladder' the geographical extent of

their associations increasing with their increasing influence. The leadership of SOCG may travel to meet new associates, usually though with this being with individuals of similar standing in other known SOCGs. This may involve international travel. Participants also saw modern communication methods, such as social networking sites, as a central feature of how contact is now maintained between those involved in organised crime.

The participants also thought that the frequency a SOCG would make new contacts to carry out business with would be dependent on the SOCGs overall growth strategy, although generally they would always be looking at opportunities for interactions that would maximise their profits. While some groups are content to remain small others would seek to expand. Participant ID (senior detective officer) highlighted that many SOCGs make new contacts through using the same suppliers of illicit commodity and the utilisation of the same specialist, such as accountants.

Networking amongst SOCGs occurs laterally between organisations across the UK, largely on a peer to peer basis that would be facilitated if mutual benefits to established businesses were identified by associates. Mobile phone contact would occur initially, but typical venues including social locations such as restaurants, public houses, and gyms. All participants alluded to the importance of incarceration as a networking method, playing a huge part in bringing to together individuals who would not have otherwise met. Participants also pointed out that visitors to prison often also act as couriers of information.

Trust, the essential element to any relationship involving persons taking part in organised crime activities and referred to by all participants, occurs through 'referencing' by trusted and established individuals. It was expected that SOCG members would boast about past exploits and their wider connections, facts the listener would be able to ascertain the veracity of and thereby satisfy themselves as to the status of their new contact, prior to embarking on any involvement with the individual. This is particularly easy if the new relationship is built during a period of incarceration, where the details of the new contacts past are easily checked by research and discussion amongst the wider prison population. All participants thought it likely that an element of testing would be a feature of any new relationship between an SOCG and a contact, with 'dummy' runs of illegal commodity being likely. It was also thought that letting the new contact be party to information as a smokescreen to see if this feeds through law enforcement systems and perhaps results in action by police was a typical method of testing.

Participants could see terrorists approaching organised criminals to support terrorist activity, through counterfeiting, money laundering, safe housing or smuggling of weapons.

Participants thought that a likely possible point of interaction between a terrorist and SOCG would be a 'lone wolf' type such as the recent case in England of Nicky Reilly (37), however rather than constructing explosives such an individual may instead embark upon trying to purchase a firearm from an SOCG.

Participants also pointed out the issue of 'kudos', where while the SOCG can support the terrorists, the terrorists can also support the SOCG, as the SOCGs reputation in

criminal circles could be greatly enhanced through the association. Participant FC (detective investigating serious and organised crime) thought that this type of arrangement would be most likely in relation to Irish Related Terrorism and unlikely with International Terrorism. Participant IF (senior detective officer) had a similar view, and thought that this 'kudos' would be of particular import were an SOCG member to be incarcerated and would benefit in such a situation during incarceration and thereafter in criminal circles from the notoriety of such an association.

IB (senior detective officer) stated that the identification of criminal specialists was extremely difficult, which showed the level of secrecy maintained around such individuals. He referred to the case of Paul Alexander (38), an organised crime 'armourer' and his detection being due to his commission of a road traffic offence resulting in DNA identification. Alexander was previously wholly unknown to the state in a criminal context. Such individuals are very closely guarded with an SOCG unlikely to allow facilitation, instead third or fourth stage removed contact being permitted. Such an individual would be regarded as a unique resource to the SOCG's business.

Any contact would require a very long process and high level of trust, perhaps indeed requiring association from childhood. Participants saw a mutual friend or mutual contact as essential in providing a middle point for a terrorist to access the specialist services available to an organised criminal, with ID (senior detective officer) believing, in agreement with IB above, that although an SOCG may be prepared to allow a contact to do business with their specialist they were unlikely in any circumstances, to allow actual access.

Virtually all participants thought that without doubt if a specialist was being used extensively SOCG members would want to know what level of risk the activity was bringing to their SOCG.

Thereafter in the interviews three key areas of note emerged:

Firstly, all the participants were clear, that an approach by the authorities seeking engagement to thwart the activities of a terrorist group an SOCG were involved with would be most likely to succeed where the SOCG calculated it was in their best interests, be that through early stage intervention mitigating consequence to them or through a reduction in sanction against them. Although levels of established trust and mutually shared backgrounds or cultures would be influential, in co-operation with a terrorist group being exposed to an SOCG, its members, in the words of one participant would "be at their selfish best" and seek to minimise the consequences to themselves and their organisation. Few participants envisaged an SOCG making an approach to the authorities if they learned of a plotted terrorist action, even through an intermediary, unless the level of their own exposure in light of the action was significant. There were thought to be some clear distinctions in relation to the contacts preparation for terrorist activity. If the terrorism was Irish related and concerned activity to occur in Northern Ireland or England participants did not think a Scottish SOCG would object, however if the attacks were to take place in Scotland this would not be tolerated.

This system of calculated risk was however tempered by the second key area of note to emerge, where a number of participants alluded to an intangible 'criminal code' that would have a bearing on a SOCG's engagement with terrorists. Participants believed

that radical views of an associate would be unlikely to affect the relationship, however did state that there is a moral code amongst criminals and made an analogy to sexual offences where what was perceived to be out with norms for criminals would be deemed unacceptable, that there are simply 'unwritten rules'. It was also felt that if the SOCG had been deceived about the true nature of the terrorist group (believing they were simply dealing with another SOCG) then their behaviour may significantly alter on discovering their true nature, particularly if this was through learning of a planned terrorist action, their objective typically being to make money, not generally to kill people. Specifically, participant IB believed that if a bombing occurred this might be the point when an approach from the authorities would succeed. He alluded to the case of an abduction in Edinburgh (39). In this case criminals who it was thought would not co-operate with the Police in fact did, with the 'criminal code' seeing this abduction and the anticipated murder of a boy unconnected to criminality proving to be a 'step too far'.

Thirdly, a number of participants believed that during any risk calculation undertaken by an SOCG the elimination of contacts within terrorist groups to minimise the SOCG exposure would occur, balanced against any financial loss that may result from such an action. It was not thought that the threat of retaliation from the terrorist group would be an immediate concern, rather that minimising potential exposure of the SOCG took immediate priority.

Analysis

'Initial Nexus' Establishment

Culture

The factors necessary for the safe establishment of trust for a working relationship to develop between those involved in terrorism and organised crime, common lineage, schooling, culture and associations, all exist amongst the pro-Republican and pro-Loyalist sub cultures in Scotland, echoing the views of Van Duyne(40), and the participants in this study. Police awareness of these interactions is also understandable. Although particularly the pro-Republicans were an immigrant community one would expect difficult to police this is no longer the case, with over a hundred years passing since first arrival and the overall immigrant community now largely being part of mainstream Scottish society.

Interestingly the participants in the study largely drew clear lines of distinction between Irish related terrorism and international terrorism. They could perceive that the potential cultural and social links of the SOCG members may have an effect on their behaviour, from the 'kudos' association within these sub cultures that can be attained through their background, allied to the underlying sympathy they may hold with a cause.

Within these 'common cultures' there was though a clear opinion from the participants that, echoing Stuart (41), in his observation that the Mafia will engage with anyone they will profit from, so too will Scottish SOCGs; but only where it is in the SOCGs continuing interests. Participants believe that whether an SOCG was pre disposed to either cause in Northern Ireland a faction associated to the other side would be acceptable, as long as payment was forthcoming.

Distance

A clear theme that emerged from the participants was distance: the further removed from the terrorist activity the SOCG was, the easier it would be to provide ongoing co-operation. It was clear from the answers provided that the participants felt that whoever was involved in terrorism, including those connected to Irish related terrorism, while the activity was to have an impact somewhere out with the vicinity of the SOCG they would not be overly concerned but when the actions that were to be undertaken had a more direct impact on the closer societal structures around the SOCG they would be wholly uncomfortable.

This lack of comfort did not, in the opinion of the participants, arise from any morality but instead from the view point that although driven by profit an SOCG would calculate its degree of exposure to law enforcement action and the closer terrorist activity came to the operations of the SOCG the more exposed they would become.

Deception

It emerged that terrorists currently engaging with SOCGs are likely keeping their true purposes a secret, with the SOCGs believing they are engaging with peers rather than those carrying out criminal activity for the funding of terrorism, this behaviour including SOCGs of significant standing. The participants had pointed out that the nature of the composition of SOCGs perhaps lent itself to such an occurrence. A number of the participants felt that were such deceptions to be discovered the murder of the SOCGs contact may well be carried out. Another clear feature that emerged that may explain the position that such action may be warranted, other than to minimise detection, was that although not well known for their moral code SOCG members typically, in line with other criminals, are known to have intangible lines of standards in relation to behaviour. A number of participants referred to this, with their citing the issue of paedophilia as an example of criminal behaviour that even for hardened criminals is seen as beyond the pale. A number of participants believed that terrorist atrocities would be perceived by SOCG members in a similar light. If, as appears to be the case, some are being duped regarding the true nature of their relationships with contacts who are involved in terrorism this becomes even more worthy of consideration as a possibility.

Specialists

As the participants related that SOCGs can gain new contacts through accessing the same specialists, it is worthy of note that such an intersection may well provide an interface with terrorism. Participants related that persons with known connections to terrorism in Scotland have access to corrupt officials, a relationship SOCGs would no doubt wish to benefit from if they were to learn of it. Whichever way this access to specialists was to function the views of the studies participants were clear that were such access to occur it would be controlled; perhaps many degrees removed and likely be well known in terms of purpose by the actor providing access.

Authority Engagement

The participants were clear that if members of a SOCG were going to co-operate with the authorities such co-operation would be on their terms. Engagements with the authorities would perhaps be by proxy and would be an effort at self-preservation, where the SOCG attempted to gain a favourable position with the authorities, as directly observed by Albini (42) in his previous study of organised crime in Scotland. An approach by the authorities was seen as being most likely to succeed when the impact on the SOCG would be at its minimal. For this to be the case the relationship between the two groups would need to be at its early stages, with the level of connection and trust being low and the financial or other loss to the SOCG being minimal. Interestingly, very few of the participants had any reservations around whether the SOCG members would co-operate with the authorities. None put forward the position of the SOCG member adopting a position of ambivalence to the authorities, other than in relation to a likely lack of co-operation from SOCGs who were involved in a relationship with a terrorist connected to Irish related terrorism. Beyond this all thought that a calculated response from the SOCG member would be forthcoming, with their best interests being their sole concern. Of note, the solitary contrary opinion related to SOCGs and terrorist groups from the same sub culture, the implication of this being there may exist some degree of 'loyalty', or at least a stronger affinity, amongst SOCGs and terrorists from the same social background. These stronger ties might impact on the pragmatic desire to co-operate with the authorities when this would be in the immediate best interest of the SOCG. This 'loyalty' could be for a number of reasons, which might include a shared outlook but also equally may be due to a desire to maintain reputation within a common sub culture. Co-operation with the authorities to the detriment of fellow sub culture members would likely have significant negative impact on a SOCGs reputation within their social grouping.

Threat from Non-Indigenous Groups

It was put forward that non-indigenous SOCGs are the main threat in Scotland. This may seem at odds with the information provided to the effect that such groups have no known connections to terrorism and that those in Scotland known to be linked to terrorism have no known associations with such SOCGs. In fact, participants reported that even those with minor criminal convictions have completely disassociated themselves from such activity when becoming involved with terrorist causes. However, from the answers provided by the participants and the literature available the non-indigenous threat argument is a strong one.

Authors, including Perri et al.,(43) point to minority immigrant communities as being difficult to police and also their being fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist participants (44). It was contended that they are only interested in profit, a similar feature ascribed to all SOCGs by Dishman (45), and a number of participants in the study. Where this appears to be particularly insightful though is the illustration of such SOCGs lack of 'loyalty' to Scotland. What this means is not a lack of an embracing of Scottish culture, but rather that with little or no cultural bonds to the country their activities in pursuit of profit could be far more extreme than those of SOCGs with connections to the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists groups. SOCGs members with ties to Irish related terrorism have typically grown up in Scotland and have wide social networks here while recent émigré groups have no such foundation. As the participants in the study alluded

to a growing discomfort amongst SOCG members when their contact brought their activities 'close to home' one can see how such a feeling would certainly be in no way as relevant amongst a recent émigré SOCG. The consequences of a terrorist action in Scotland would have far less impact on their wider social group and their lack of background within the community would make their detection all the more unlikely.

Incarceration

All the participants believed that incarceration was a key point for new interactions to occur. As recent émigré SOCGs become known to law enforcement in their new country of operation, so they may become incarcerated. Through their incarceration they are likely to encounter individuals involved in terrorist causes, likely through work as 'front' funding criminal work. Such interaction may have disastrous consequences for Scotland, as a new type of 'initial nexus', far removed from that of the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists could be formed.

'Initial Nexus' Relationships – A Potential Model

The findings thus far suggest the following template of 'initial nexus' relationships:

'Initial Nexus Relationship A'

Within Relationship A the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from the same cultural background and the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings.

An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated PIRA members and Scottish origin SOCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré community.

Such an association may have strong bonds: trust through common views, shared backgrounds and ease of 'referencing' through common associates or known past activities (criminal or otherwise) would be likely. The 'kudos' element that might occur from such a relationship within the shared sub culture would also be of relevance.

'Initial Nexus Relationship B'

Within Relationship B the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds however the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings.

An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated UVF members and Scottish origin SOCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré community.

There are obvious negative features of such a relationship, such as contrary viewpoints and detrimental opinions of the SOCG or Terrorist group might occur were the details of the relationship to become known in their sub cultures. However, 'trust' gained through known past activities (criminal or otherwise) and shared associations would be very likely.

‘Initial Nexus Relationship C’

Within Relationship C the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of one party only would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping.

An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is non-Scottish origin al Qaeda inspired terrorists and Scottish origin SOCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré community.

Trust and ‘referencing’ in the establishment of such a relationship would likely be difficult.

‘Initial Nexus Relationship D’

Within Relationship D the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of neither party would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping.

An example of a confluence that would meet this criteria are non-Scottish origin al Qaeda inspired terrorists and non-Scottish origin SOCGs, such as Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups.

As with Relationship C trust and ‘referencing’ in the establishment of such a relationship would likely be difficult.

Discussion of ‘Initial Nexus’ Model

Although one can in no way be definitive regarding how SOCGs will behave, as individuals with their own particular foibles and morality constitute each group differently, one can see how the argument that Initial Nexus Relationship D would be more dangerous is one worthy of consideration. The nature of SOCGs businesses, such as the example of Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups, inherently harm the communities in which they are based, through the illicit product they produce but also through the further criminal elements they attract to the business when it is a success and the risks their criminality brings both through disputes that may affect the wider public but also through their methods. The exemplar Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups typically jury rig electrical systems that are massive fire risks with no consideration of those who neighbour properties they are utilising for their businesses. When one takes the status quo elements of SOCG behaviours and couple them with a group whose members have a minimal past in a particular area the common tactics of law enforcement to track an individual are greatly reduced, which non-indigenous SOCG members are very well aware of, and align to this a lack of social connection through a ‘past’, I.E. a lack of family or friends in the host community provides an absence of impact of criminality of the non-indigenous SOCGs behaviour on persons they might feel restrained from allowing be harmed the dangers of ‘Initial Nexus Relationship D’ become all too apparent. It is the added disconnection from the society of operation that provides the increased danger.

The ‘criminal code’ alluded to by a number of the studies participants may also be impactive regarding each of the ‘initial nexus relationships’ listed and understood better within these conceptual frameworks. Perhaps, such a code is, to a degree, in fact an innate link between the criminal and their wider community values, where although their criminality may cross the normal bounds of wider societal behaviour the ‘code’ constrains behaviour within their sub groups. If this were to be the case one can see how such a ‘code’ would impact on interactions with contacts out with the SOCG and have differing effects dependent on which of the relationships, from A to D, the SOCG were engaged in. Deception would also be key, and if the SOCG were to perceive their relationship to be simply a criminal relationship between differing origin SOCGs, while it was instead, through deception, a relationship with terrorists, type C, this could be significantly impactive on the continuing nature of their interactions.

Deception could also be highly impactive on group D associations that might develop in prisons. Many terrorist groups have criminal ‘fronts’, for fundraising and other purposes. Individuals detected for such activity may well be incarcerated for criminal offences, with no detection of their terrorist links being uncovered by the authorities. Such individuals would then enter the prison system being perceived as serious criminals only. Any associations with other serious criminals that then occurred in the prison system would only be seen in this context and possible relationships would be thought of as criminal in nature, and may well appear as such even to the SOCG with whom the relationship has been formed, as discussed above.

Conclusions

Although this study has found there are clear links between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland, these are minimal in the overall context of terrorist and organised crime groups known to exist in Scotland. The links between Terrorist and SOCG in Scotland are largely criminal and social in nature. Where links occur they typically concern terrorist groups linked to Irish related terrorism.

Scottish pro-Republican and pro-Loyalist sub cultures provide a very interesting insight into the potential nature of ‘initial nexus’ relationships between terrorists and organised criminals. The views of the participants, coupled with a review of the literature concerning the subject, suggest that there are four distinct types of relationship that might exist between persons involved in the two phenomena, and have consequent impact on their interactions. The background of SOCG and Terrorist group members appears to have an impact on the nature of any relationships they might become involved in and would, most probably, have an effect beyond bald calculations of risk versus reward that SOCG members would likely involve themselves in during such a relationship. Profit would remain the main driver for any SOCG; however the proximity of danger to the SOCGs area of operations a terrorist group poses would be a factor in their reasoning.

SOCG members may well take executive action against terrorist groups they have been interacting with to preserve their own ends. It is likely SOCGs are being misled in some of their relationships with those they believe to be like groups, who in fact have terrorist related motivations. Discovery of these deceptions may well affect their continuing

engagement, result in action against the deceivers, or assist any attempt by law enforcement to engage with the SOCG to solicit co-operation.

Interactions in prisons may well not be what they might first seem, and there is a need for an open mind as to why non-indigenous SOCG members might be striking up associations, both with indigenous SOCGs and non-indigenous SOCGs from differing cultures. As this research has found, terrorist groups are using criminality as a cover for their actions and may well have members incarcerated through this cover, who would then conceivably continue to further their terrorists groups aims by increasing useful associations.

Terrorists and organised crime groups with no cultural affinity to their area of operation have less restraint upon their actions as the direct impact of their activities will not be felt by persons from within their immediate cultures, sub cultures or own circle of interaction, such as friends or family. This an area of significant danger, that does not appear to have been considered previously as a standalone issue. Its immediacy as a matter for note results from the current changing population composition resulting from immigration, and the diaspora communities that are emerging as a consequence.

Co-operation by an SOCG with the authorities may be forthcoming when an SOCG calculates it is in their interests to make a proactive approach. There are a myriad of factors that would affect such a decision however SOCGs are likely to be clinical in such calculations and may only be held back if they have a cultural affinity with the terrorist group. An approach by the authorities would appear to have most chance of successes, continuing the calculated argument, when the SOCG have the least 'invested in the relationship', both in terms of their position perhaps within their own sub culture but also in terms of monetary or criminal activity exposure.

The natures of the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime make it very likely that participants in both will encounter one another, particularly when incarcerated. This study has found that although such interactions do not appear high in number in Scotland the potential harm to society that can arise from them is considerable. The area of greatest concern that has emerged from this study is that of interaction between non-indigenous terrorist and organised crime groups, whose co-operation may be largely unrestrained, difficult to detect and lead to increased capability for action resulting from the co-operation by both parties.

Endnote References

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17. See Byrne, E. (2010). "Republicans Resurgent", *Intersec, Volume 20, No. 9*, 10-12.

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34. Participant IA is a senior intelligence officer with a national (Scotland) overview, Participant IG is a senior analyst focussing on Terrorism and Participant IH is a senior Detective in the Counter Terrorism environment. The author was confident that given the level of access these individuals held they could provide a clear and informed picture of the Scottish situation. The participants confirmed that they were able to provide such clarity.

35. Participants were five senior detective officers with experience of investigating serious crime, nine detectives and plain clothes officers who investigate organised crime, two detectives who work with Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) reporting on serious and organised crime, and a detective officer with a previous career as a criminal justice social worker.

36. A full copy of the questionnaire utilised will be made available to an applicant, by request to the author. Twenty six questions on set themes were utilised. Firstly, personal opinions of interactions between the phenomena were gathered. Thereafter two scenarios were utilised, the first relating to an SOCG associate being utilised by terrorists; and the second an SOCG learning through a developing relationship that they were engaging with terrorists. It was assessed that given the experience of the participants they could provide informed comment as to the likely behaviours of those involved in serious and organised crime.

37. Information regarding Reilly's behaviour and attack can be found at the Guardian online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/oct/15/uksecurity1, accessed 22/11/11

38. Further detail in respect of Alexander can be found on the BBC Website at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/essex/8345869.stm , accessed 05/10/2011.

39. In the case alluded to a Liverpool based SOCG were duped when supplying £250,000 worth of Heroin to an Edinburgh SOCG. To exact revenge they contacted a Glasgow based SOCG they had social contact with and thereafter both groups travelled to Edinburgh, with the likely intention of abducting and murdering the members of the Edinburgh SOCG. During their activities in Edinburgh they abducted an innocent party, and subsequently attempted to extract a ransom for their safe return.

40. Van Duyne (See note 27 above)

41. Stuart (See note 30 above)

42. Albini (See note 26 above)

43. Perri et al. (See note 20 above)

44. As reported within Sageman, M. (2005). "The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism", *The Journal of International Security Affairs, Spring 2005 - Number 8*, 1-12.

45. Dishman, C. (2001). "Terrorism, Crime and Transformation", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, No. 24*, 43-58.

4.3 "Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit of Profit?", within McElwee, G. and Smith, R. (Eds.) Exploring Criminal and Illegal Enterprise: New Perspectives on Research, Policy & Practice, Bigley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing

Introduction

Organised criminals, in popular culture are often portrayed as über business*men*, working at the limit of entrepreneurial possibilities, pursuing lucrative illicit deals of which the masses can only dream. In these portrayals, perhaps best illustrated in film by Marlon Brando's iconic portrayal of Don Vito Corleone in 'The Godfather', organised criminals possess a multitude of factors affecting their decision making processes. These range from the familial to the global.[13] Beyond fiction, the decision making of those immersed in organised crime is no less complex and consequential. While those involved in organised crime may, as many believe, be amoral entrepreneurs in rampant pursuit of profit the 'economy' they work within is one with considerations far beyond those seeking licit gain.

As organised criminals may be regarded as über business men at the edge of entrepreneurial possibility, at the razors edge of this activity is the extreme of the entrepreneurial/ criminal nexus, specifically that of the 'initial nexus' between organised criminals and terrorists, where decisions in the pursuit of illicit profit may have the greatest consequences of all.

Organised criminals amongst many pursuits, but perhaps most importantly, seek profit and look forward to utilising their ill-gotten gains, typically long into their old age. Terrorists on the other hand are in the main seen as pursuing profit when necessary to fund their cause, and as recent times have shown all too clearly, the modern jihadist often has their dotage as a far removed concern; particularly as they don a suicide vest. Although there are numerous nuances within both phenomena ultimately organised criminals and terrorists are pursuing very different goals with their activities. It is the intersections on the road to their destinations where mutual interests may lead to interaction. The potential of these cross-overs, their impact of the entrepreneurial desires of organised criminals, and the influences governing these relationships are dramatically under researched.

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[13] For Don Vito it is changing preferences of the age, the increasing availability of access to Heroin and whether to facilitate the trade, which sees a multi-faceted decision lead to personal disaster. His refusal precipitates a near successful attempted assassination and gives sharp focus, albeit fictional, to where the world of the organised criminal differs from the atypical boardroom. While the fictional Don Vito may have baulked at his 'red line' in becoming involved in the trade in heroin our modern and all too real organised criminals are faced with what might arguably be far higher tariff decisions.

This chapter seeks to address a key research question concerning the organised crime and terrorist nexus. Taking into account contemporary entrepreneurial research into the behaviours of organised criminals the chapter seeks to explain how, in practical terms, such a relationship *works*; illustrating the factors that affect the decision making processes of the organised criminal, specifically when their endeavours are in support of terrorists. It is divided into four main sections, subdivided by focus on specific areas of note. The first, a 'Literature Review', provides insight into key research concerning organised crime and terrorism, illustrating striking similarities, but also key differences, between the phenomena. The second, 'Entrepreneurial Considerations', illustrates the interface between research into terrorism and organised crime with recent academic entrepreneurial thought. Section three, 'A Potential Model', draws the discussed research together into a decision making model highlighting, particularly from an entrepreneurial perspective, the issues facing those participating in the organised crime and terrorism interface. The model is an attempt to provide greater insight into the thought process behind the functioning of organised crime groups, and through this understanding perhaps devise an enhanced tactical basis to tackle those involved in 'initial nexus' relationships. The chapter then closes on the conclusions that can be drawn from the research to date, and illustrating potential high impact future work to enable progression in our understanding of the calculations of those working at this razors edge of entrepreneurship.

Literature Review

To understand the potential decisions of organised criminals in becoming involved in 'business' relationships with terrorists necessitates gaining an understanding of those involved in organised crime, It is also necessary to gain an insight into work previously undertaken in relation to examine the nexus that exists between terrorists and organised criminals, also presented below.

These previous works provide a developed picture of organised crime functionality, to which the entrepreneurial theories of Baumol (1990) and others in this specific field of research can be brought to bear, providing an overall synthesis of understanding of the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime interaction from an entrepreneurial perspective.

Desroches provides a good starting point in furthering our understanding when he considers top end illegal drug suppliers, writing that 'like business persons engaged in licit markets, dealers are rational actors who focus on profit, seek out economic opportunities, take into consideration the competition, are careful with their money, and attempt to minimise risk' (Desroches, 2007, pp. 830). His position on these 'illicit' entrepreneurs may be equally applied to others involved in serious organised crime, the early definitions of which in the 1960's focussed on the hierarchical known organised crime type, typified by the United States Mafia and studied in depth by Donald Cressey (1969).

However, definitions quickly moved on, with Albini providing the alternative and particularly useful description only two years later:

‘Rather than a criminal secret society, a criminal syndicate consists of a system of loosely structured relationships functioning primarily because each participant is interested in furthering his own welfare’

(Albini, 1971, pp. 288)

Although controversial at the time, Albini’s definition now appears widely accepted in academic circles, particularly following the end of the cold war and the ‘globalisation’ accompanied by widespread insecurity the world has experienced since. Through this globalising effect, and reflecting Albini’s views, organised crime organisational dynamics are acknowledged as having changed dramatically, with the initially hierarchical identified groups, such as the Sicilian mafia, having transformed with ‘most organised crime groups now operating as loose networked affiliations’ (Perri et al, 2009, pp. 27). Ridley notes that the collapse of the Soviet Union has led in Europe to the fundamental altering of old crime hierarchies as ‘smaller, equally ruthless organised crime groups have become apparent forming confederations of associations based upon ethnic and linguistic affinity…. (with) individual groups of criminals operating, either continuously or from time to time, in some form of loose association of neo-vertical criminal structures’ (Ridley, 2008, pp. 28). In agreeing Stanislawski and Herman note that organised crime groups have evolved from hierarchical structures with a small cadre of leaders to more network-based groups, with dispersed functions and activities (Stanislawski and Herman, 2004). In Northern Europe, in particular, ‘legal and criminal business patterns develop pragmatically along trusted networks of friends and connections’ (Van Duyne, 1996, pp. 344). When one considers that the Mafia is believed to be Italy’s biggest business, with a suspect annual turnover of £116 Billion (Squires, 2012) one begins to appreciate the sheer scale some of these criminal enterprises are functioning at.

The collapse of the Soviet Union also ushered in a period of adjustment for many established terrorist organisations as their direct or indirect sources of funding disappeared, forcing them to adapt (Roth and Sever, 2007), as to continue functioning in any capacity for a terrorist group funding is a necessity (Bovenkerek and Chakra, 2006; Clarke and Lee 2008; Stewart, 2010). Globalisation, with its loosening of state control, the end of established patterns of organised crime and terrorism structures, and the loss of conventional sources of terrorist finance has led to increasing opportunities for interaction between relevant illegal actors and groups that never occurred previously, with ever increasing ease of transportation and communication assisting this process (Stanislawski and Herman, 2004; Makarenko, 2004; Jamieson, 2005; Bratton, 2007).

Terrorism’s reliance on organised crime for finance has been made clear by individuals such as Abdullah Ocalan, former leader of the PKK[14], who has stated that the organisation relies heavily on its ties to drug trafficking to finance the purchase of weapons (Roth and Sever, 2007). Similarly, official Irish Police reports make it clear that the Continuity IRA has established working partnerships with Eastern European sex traffickers, sharing smuggling routes with them and being involved in assisting with their criminal enterprises (Byrne, 2010). Indeed, terrorists have acted as illicit commodity brokers to further their own ends, with ETA at one time ensuring the

[14] The PKK, the Kurdistan Workers Party, is listed as a terrorist organisation operating primarily in the south east of Turkey.

lowering the price of cocaine and guaranteeing commodity delivery to Italy through contacts with Columbian drug cartels in exchange for weapons from the Campania organised crime cartels (Saviano, 2007).

Structural Similarities – Organised Crime Groups and Terrorists

To further understand the basis of potential 'business' interaction one particularly needs to note the striking similarities of the operating structure of terrorists and organised criminals.

Their style of co-operating and maintaining operating structures are noted by Robinson (2003), who found that in common with organised international drug traffickers, modern terrorist groups are highly compartmentalised, resilient and have the ability to make quick necessary changes. Sageman's (2005) observations on the current jihadist terrorist structures directly correlate with the characteristics noted by Robinson.

Perri et al. (2009) posit that organised crime has its strongest influence where the rule of law is at its weakest and where law enforcement performance is poor. They also note its particular prevalence where there are significant ethnic minority groups in a community that law enforcement have difficulty policing. Byrne notes that it is in 'regions with weakened social, political and economic controls' (Byrne, 2009, pp. 11), that co-operation is often most obviously prevalent and that where it does exist it is very fluid in nature with the nature of the relationship between groups in no way formal. Although the co-operation may be most overt in weak states it does occur in more stable regions, but particularly in 'parts of otherwise viable states where law and order is absent or compromised, including urban quarters populated by diaspora communities' (Perri et al. 2009). In considering such environments it is not hard to identify these as 'places where the incentives aren't very good for productive entrepreneurship, (where) people with the desire and talent to become entrepreneurs turn to crime' (Shane, 2008).

Of note, in relation to modern terrorism, expatriate communities are the recruiting ground of the current jihad against the west, the influence of friendship, kinship, shared isolation through expatriate experience has led to 'seventy percent of the terrorists join(ing) the jihad as expatriates' (Sageman, 2005, pp. 5).

Forms of Co-operation between Terrorists and Organised Criminals

In gaining an understanding of how any 'business' relationship function might work it is beneficial to consider known examples of organised criminal and terrorist relationships.

Co-operation often takes the form of the provision of smuggling routes by organised criminals to terrorists. Examples of this are the Mexican drug cartels allowing Hezbollah to utilise its routes to smuggle persons and narcotics (Perri et al., 2009; Conery, 2009); Dawood Ibrahim's D-Company providing smuggling routes into India to Al-Qaeda (Clarke and Lee, 2008); the Naples based Camorra Mafia moving Al-Qaeda throughout Europe (Chepesiuk, 2007); and, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan utilising Afghan criminals to move Heroin into Russia (Makarenko, 2004). Attempts to establish further co-operative routes have also been subject to law enforcement interdiction as Mali origin Al-Qaeda operatives discovered when engaging

with individuals they thought represented FARC[15] but were in fact agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (Sherwell, 2010).

Further co-operation is likely, and evidence suggests 'terrorists see it as logical and cost-effective to use the skills, contacts, communications and smuggling routes of established criminal networks rather than trying to gain the requisite experience and knowledge themselves' (Shelley et al., 2005, pp. 62). Specialist services, including the provision of forged or falsified documents, such as passports (Botha, 2011); accountancy; legal advice (Robinson, 2003); access to corrupt officials (Shelley et al., 2005); people trafficking/ smuggling (Wright, 2006); and, even arms may often be provided (Makarenko, 2004). This was recently illustrated through cases where it was suspected 'dissident republicans succeeded in buying 'heavy' weapons from terrorist arms-dealing mobsters in south east Europe' (McArdle, 2010) and an informant reporting, following the closure of the Reichstag in Berlin, that 'two jihadists already located in Germany had sourced equipment they needed for an attack on the Reichstag from criminal groups in the Balkans' (Swami, 2010). The well documented case of the Medellin cartel employing terrorists of the ELN to carry out car bombings (Jamieson, 2005) illustrates how this use of specialists can lead to two way co-operation, while in Europe the provision of pipe bombs by dissident republicans to drug gangs is becoming an ever more common occurrence (Cusack, 2009).

These co-operations can in fact lead to a form of metamorphosis, and to consider where a group stands we have the distinctions outlined by Jamieson thus:

'(A) The self-financing of terrorist groups by typical 'organised crime-type activities
(B) Pragmatic Collaboration between terrorist and organised crime groups for mutually beneficial ends
(C) The use of terrorism by organised crime groups for political purposes'

(Jamieson, 2005, pp. 165).

[15] FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia was formed in 1964 with a Marxist ideology and sought to overthrow the Columbian state through armed struggle, involving terrorist actions. They are a listed terrorist organisation.

A sliding scale of metamorphosis is also referenced by Makarenko (2004), as illustrated below:

Figure 1, 'The Crime Terror Continuum', Makarenko (2004)



The phenomena of terrorism and organised crime are at opposite ends of a line, moving down this line when they form alliances or utilise the tactics of the other; enter a 'black hole', where they are no longer clearly organised criminals or a terrorist group but instead a confluence of the characteristics of both; and may ultimately mutate into a group categorised as being wholly transformed into one which fits the criteria of the other phenomena. Example of this are terrorist groups such as FARC and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), who have increasingly became involved in criminal activity, initially to fund their cause however as circumstances altered they mutated into post-terrorism organisations, who now largely operate as criminal organisations driven by profit (Byrne, 2009). These organisations have fallen into Makarenko's 'black hole', becoming mutated organisations, no longer serving their original purpose and utilising tactics of both phenomena. Excellent examples of organised crime's move to the use of terror tactics for political are the earlier mentioned bombing tactics of the ELN, and the similar bombing tactics adopted by the Sicilian mafia (Jamieson, 2005).

In considering the starting point of Makarenko's scale, which would encompass Jamieson's point B, Madsen (2009) looks at how terrorists would conceivably purchase forged documents while organised crime groups would in turn perhaps purchase explosives from terrorists. He sees advantages and disadvantages to both of such arrangements, the disadvantages perhaps leading to dissolution of the arrangement or a group moving on down Makarenko's scale (A or C in Jamieson's options) as expertise is moved 'in house' within a group.

Motivational Differences

Although these similarities in structure and personnel antecedents are now acknowledged, in terms of definition the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime

are very distinct, as Bovenkerek and Chakra (2006) caution when they accept that although structural similarities are obvious, the ever important distinctions of their criminal purpose of organised crime versus the politically motivated violence of terrorism are important distinction to maintain.

On an intellectual level terrorism and organised crime have little in common 'since the former is based on ideological, religious or political principles, while the latter on profit motives' (Madsen, 2009, pp. 64). Jamieson (2005) agrees that both phenomena need to be seen as distinct concepts, while both authors acknowledge that either phenomenon can utilise the methods and tactics of the other, and do. For Madsen in analysing groups it is important to remain focussed on *motivation*, as 'the intent for specific acts committed by two groups might overlap, their motivations do not' (Madsen, 2009, pp. 78). As Dishman also observes, 'simply put, drug barons and revolutionary leaders do not walk the same path to success. Terrorists may commit kidnappings or extort local businesses, but their fundamental goal remains to shape or alter the political landscape in some manner. Transnational criminal organisations may also employ terrorism as a tactical weapon, but their end game is to avoid prosecution and make money' (Dishman, 2001, pp. 45).

Tensions

The similarities between terrorism and organised crime give an indication of two phenomena that have common features and pose interesting queries as to interaction on encounters, and what can happen when their operating models collide rather than compliment. For instance, just as there are many similarities this is not to say that co-operation will in any way always be the norm. Byrne notes the rivalry that often exists between organised crime groups and terrorists when terrorist groups encroach onto established criminal activity, such as the PKK's bloody participation in the Heroin trade in Turkey (Byrne, 2009) or PIRA's murder of established criminals in its drive to establish hegemony over the Irish drugs market (Cusack, 2006).

Rivalry may not be the only issue causing concern over co-operation to those involved in either phenomenon. An agenda of radical political change may well lead to significant altering of the norms of a state's functioning, to the detriment of the profit of an organised crime enterprise (Jamieson, 2005; Byrne, 2009). Terrorist activity in a well-functioning state will bring with it considerable additional law enforcement attention, attention that could, through investigative endeavour, become focussed on those co-operating with the terrorist group. This is a considerable risk factor for any organised criminal embarking on co-operation (Chepesiuk, 2007). Organised crime in any society functions with some form of law enforcement consideration on the part of the criminals be that from carefully planned avoidance, as noted by Albini (1975) in relation to 'successful' Scottish organised criminals, to parasitic co-operative assistance achieved through corruption. Where an organised crime group functions away from protection provided through state corruption any contact with law enforcement can prove devastating. However, were the activities of the terrorist group likely to adversely affect law enforcement agencies abilities to function this may prove beneficial to the organised crime group both in hiding their involvement in the interaction but also in terms of assisting their core functioning. Similarly, knowledge of a terrorists groups activities may become a very useful bargaining tool with law enforcement should an organised crime group's core functioning be compromised; a tactic of holding

intelligence on confederates for 'get out of jail' purposes has been utilised by organised criminals for some time (Albini, 1975). In addition, many organised criminals can be quite 'dull' and despite the illicit nature of the commodity in which they trade may be otherwise very risk averse (Van Duyne, 1996), although conversely Fairlie suspects that 'the nature of drug dealing makes it likely to be attractive to individuals who are less risk averse, have more entrepreneurial ability and have a preference for autonomy, all else equal' (Fairlie, 1999, pp. 3). Whatever attitude to risk the organised criminal has the degree to which they might become involved in any way with terrorists is highly questionable. Just as no terrorist group is identical, neither is any organised crime group.

Jamieson (2005) sees co-operative endeavours as inevitable given the specialisations available to both groups, but overall believes such co-operations would be wholly pragmatic and only likely to last as long as there is a tangible benefit outweighing risk to both sides in the arrangement. Clarke and Lee (2008) go further, seeing these partnerships as becoming indissoluble and insightfully question how long Makarenko's scale will hold true, with the conflagration between what once would have been regarded as distinct groupings on such a scale becoming ever closer.

An interesting quote in respect of the interaction, reported to have been made by a senior mafia figure in relation to what level of co-operation his organisation would provide to terrorists is that 'the Mafia will help whoever can pay' (Stuart, 2006). Also of substantial interest is the suggestion that 'British criminal gangs … have admitted terrorist organisations (including PIRA), flushed with cash, into their substantial black markets' (Kochan, 2005, pp. 83-84).

Putting all matters outlined into a conceivable scale of potential co-operation is difficult; however, when one considers that Ridley (2008) quotes a UK Metropolitan Police Spokesman from the Counter Terrorist Command as saying that two thirds of the organised crime groups in the UK have an involvement with terrorism, this presents a massive potential target group.

Entrepreneurial Considerations

'Proposition 1:

The rules of the game that determine the relative payoffs to different entrepreneurial activities do change dramatically from one time and place to another.'

(Baumol, 1990, pp. 899)

When one considers that 'resilience to the economic crisis, competent risk management and search for new markets (organised 'business development') are some of the distinctive features of organised crime groups in the last decade' (Kolesikova, 2011, pp. 11) a belief could be formed that organised crime groups sound very like legitimate businesses. They aren't. Just as they have to take account of the threat of law enforcement activity, suffer from an inability to advertise, and must constantly consider the prospect of robbery and violence from rivals (Desroches, 2007), so too they will reflect their member's idiosyncratic circumstances. Criminal entrepreneurs do not exist in a vacuum, or in the traditional 'free market' per se. It is not only the obvious limiting

factors of their illicit trade Desroches references that implicitly arise from its illegality that affect their decision making in differing ways to the licit merchant, but in addition subtle facets of their peculiar 'criminal culture'.

Baumol's 'Proposition One' outlined above is an ideal starting point for the wider considerations that affect entrepreneurs. An excellent example he provides is of a poor but free individual in the Roman Republic, who may consciously make the decision to become a slave. Such a choice, to sacrifice virtually all of ones essence as an individual, intrinsically seems bizarre to a rational 21st century actor. However, in outlining the gains such an individual could potentially make through the patronage of a suitably well-disposed master that may lead to eventual financial security as a 'freedman', versus their precarious circumstances as Roman 'citizen', Baumol captures the massively important issue of the particularity of *culture* in its impact on an entrepreneur and their decisions.

Culture as a Facet of Criminal Entrepreneurship

In his seminal work 'Dark Market' Misha Glenny (2011) considers the most modern typology of organised criminal, the hacker, a fitting historic counterbalance to Baumol's hypothetical Roman freedman. The motivations of these most ultra-modern thieves are fascinating. JiLsi, a hacker of considerable renown and acknowledged master of the 'dark web' where criminality abounds and a 'hit man' can be hired at the click or two of a mouse, is frank in sharing with Glenny that much of his illegal activity was not solely profit focussed but was instead also targeted at the maintenance of his criminal *reputation* amongst his peers.

In a similar vein, Smith (2009) notes that 'entrepreneurial propensity appears to provide the criminal with an alternative legitimacy' (Smith, 2009, pp. 163). The world in which the organised criminal operates is one with its own rules and conventions, perhaps as alien to the average 21st century citizen as that inhabited by Baumol's Roman freedman.

Recent crimes in Mexico have featured extreme violence, with the heads of rival cartel members often dumped in the most shocking of circumstances[16]. Grillo, when interviewing Mexican Serious and Organised Crime Group member Jose Antonio aka 'frijol', an individual steeped in this activity (personally responsible for armed robbery, murders and drug dealing) gives us a starting point for understanding a mind-set very different to the norm. Frijol lives in a world parallel to most where 'the gang becomes like your home, your family. It is where you find friendship and people to talk to. It is where you feel part of something' (Grillo, 2012).

A scary place for many, but for frijol this is his normality. Similarly the 'dark marketeers', the administrators of illicit web activity, have a very different concept of normality. While they kept an eye out for child porn, drugs and weapons it was not from any sense of moral outrage but instead to minimise law enforcement interest. However, even for these apparently amoral (to the eyes of most) individuals there were rules, with clear concepts of what constituted a 'scumbag' (in their world vision) or a

[16] Details of the extreme and often bizarre violence and intimidation at play in the Mexican drug conflicts is well summarised by the BBC at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18063328

'ripper', 'criminals who refused to adhere to the rules of the underworld' (Glenny, 2011, pp. 158), these (apparently) bizarre rules relating to what was and wasn't acceptable when stealing the credit card details of the law abiding.

In my own previous research (Gallagher, 2014) where I interviewed a number of Detectives involved in the investigation of organised crime there was commonality in their opinion that there is a moral code amongst criminals. Many independently made an analogy to paedophilic offences, where such behaviour was perceived to be out with norms for criminals would be deemed unacceptable, that there are simply 'unwritten rules'. One participant alluded to the case of an abduction in Edinburgh[17]. In this case individuals heavily involved in organised crime that it was thought would not co-operate with the Police in fact did, with the 'criminal code' seeing this abduction and the anticipated murder of a boy unconnected to criminality proving to be a 'step too far'.

These apparent 'red lines' of behaviour may appear to differ between criminal typologies, with those of my Detectives acquaintance taking a different attitude to paedophilia that JiLsi and his cohort. However individual behaviours aside another factor is at work here, that of *distance*. It is not only an 'alternative' moral code, but instead other 'culture specific' factors that might affect the organised criminal's decision making process.

A Potential Model

From the work outlined so far in this chapter it appears there are a number of specific considerations any organised criminal will take into account before entering into and maintaining an 'initial nexus' relationship with a terrorist group. These are as follows:

Distance

In my study (Gallagher, 2014) participants thought there were clear distinctions in relation to contacts between terrorists and organised criminals regarding preparation for terrorist activity. If the terrorism was Irish related and concerned activity to occur in Northern Ireland or England participants did not think a Scottish Organised Crime Group would object, however if the attacks were to take place in Scotland this would not be tolerated.

This has interesting parallels with a number of historic matters relating to commodities now considered illicit, perhaps most telling being the British Government's attitude to the supply of Opium. When Opium was being manufactured in British territories for consumption within the confines of the rival empire of China the British Government was content to gain the revenue received and leave the social ills of the trade to the Chinese. However, when the trade spread to its own colonies and ultimately the shores

[17] In the case alluded to a Liverpool based criminals were duped when supplying £250,000 worth of Heroin to an Edinburgh based crime group. To exact revenge they contacted Glasgow based criminals they had social contact with and thereafter both groups travelled to Edinburgh with the likely intention of abducting and murdering the members of the Edinburgh crime group. During their activities in Edinburgh they abducted an innocent party and subsequently attempted to extract a ransom for their safe return.

of the mainland through the docks in Liverpool attitudes changed dramatically (Newark, 2011).

The kudos for say Turkish diaspora organised criminals working in London may be very different if their network is operating in conjunction with the PKK as opposed to members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). While the PKK may have direct relevance to the members of the diaspora community they inhabit the UVF, whose 'cause' in no way impacts upon their Turkish roots, would be unlikely to. While both might be seen to be 'risky business', from the potential law enforcement focus that can be attracted, the relationship to the PKK might have significant cultural impact, while that with the UVF is simply profit based.

For JiLsi the paedophiles of his encountering are anonymous web abusers, while for the organised criminals of my Detectives experience who lived in generally stagnant communities the paedophiles of their experience were exposed as being on their doorstep; or within their shared prison. JiLsi and his ilk have these abusers far from their area of operation, while those based in conventional rather than virtual communities do not. Action by these organised criminals will be heard of by those who operate who cohabit with them within their 'cultural' environs.

Reputation

Organised Criminals, such as frijol and JiLsi through their networks (or hierarchies) by necessity in pursuit of their illicit enterprises interact with other actors involved in organised crime. Just as there may be said to be certain rules within these interactions so too exists a highly prized and extremely valuable commodity – *reputation*.

Baumol's slave would not progress to become the well rewarded 'freedman' through polishing his master's amphora alone. Baumol's assertion is that if progression comes it will be through acknowledged hard work, and perhaps less savoury sexual favours performed at their master's behest. In the world of the 21st century criminal reputation is obtained and maintained very differently, with violence, or the threat of violence, often present (Desroches, 2007).

Establishing this reputation, which it is likely will be necessary to operate, in addition to being self-rewarding[18] will not be easy. Individuals involved in organised crime activity often share common lineage, schooling, culture and associations; all the factors perceived as necessary for the safe establishment of trust for a working relationship to develop (Van Duyne, 1996).

A further location where establishment of the bona fides of potential criminal partners presents is that of *incarceration*. Common confinement allows for details of any new contacts past to be easily checked by research and discussion amongst the wider prison population. Outside of prison, 'referencing' by trusted and established individuals is a common method enabling the establishment of new ties. It SOCG members boast about past exploits and their wider connections, the listener is able to ascertain the veracity of

[18] As per Smith's (2009) hypothesis.

their tales and thereby satisfy themselves as to the status of their new contact, prior to embarking on any involvement with the individual.

Verifying the details of associates, to avoid being 'ripped off' or arrested, are essential features of the organised criminals business model. When the associates are engaged in terrorism the risks, and 'rewards' within criminal culture, significantly multiply.

Detectives in my study into the interactions between organised criminals and terrorists in Scotland (Gallagher, 2014) raised the issue of 'kudos', their perception being that while the organised criminals can support the terrorists logistically, the terrorists can also support the organised criminals, as the criminals reputation in the circles in which they move could be greatly enhanced through the association. Participant FC (detective investigating serious and organised crime) thought that in Scotland this type of arrangement would be most likely in relation to Irish Related Terrorism and unlikely with International Terrorism. Participant IF (senior detective officer) had a similar view, and thought that this 'kudos' would be of particular import were an organised criminal with this known association be incarcerated. In such a situation during incarceration and thereafter in criminal circles the notoriety of such an association would significantly enhance their 'criminal prestige'.

It seems that such perceptions hold beyond criminals based in Scotland. Swaine (2013), when interviewing a criminal lieutenant of James "Whitey" Bulger, a notorious Boston Gangster who shipped weapons to PIRA, confirms the views of Smith (2009), stating that 'Whitey loved being associated with the IRA and the cause of Irish freedom. I think he liked the legitimacy a political cause gave him'[19] (Swaine, 2013).

Returning to the distance differential for JiLsi and the 'traditional' organised criminals described above it could be rationally argued that action by the traditional organised criminals against a paedophile, a criminal seen to be operating outwith accepted parameters may well positively affect their standing within their criminal community, while for JiLsi such action may escape notice.

Calculated Risk

In my earlier study (Gallagher, 2014) all the participants were clear that an approach by the authorities seeking engagement to thwart the activities of a terrorist group an organised crime group were involved with would be most likely to succeed where the criminals calculated it was in their best interests, be that through early stage intervention mitigating consequence to them or through a reduction in sanction against them. Although levels of established trust and mutually shared backgrounds or cultures would be influential, in co-operation with a terrorist group being exposed to an organised crime group, its members, in the words of one participant would "be at their selfish best", and seek to minimise the consequences to themselves and their organisation. Few participants envisaged organised criminals making an approach to the authorities if they learned of a plotted terrorist action, even through an intermediary, unless the level of their own exposure in light of the action was significant.

[19] James 'Whitey' Bulger operated the White Hill Gang in South Boston for a number of decades, skilfully playing the local police off against the FBI while assisting PIRA through the large scale importation of weapons from the USA to Northern Ireland. He was on the run for 16 years, being ultimately tracked down and convicted of 11 murders in 2013.

Participants also believed that during any risk calculation undertaken by an organised crime group the elimination of contacts within terrorist groups to minimise their exposure would occur, balanced against any financial loss that may result from such an action. It was not thought that the threat of retaliation from the terrorist group would be an immediate concern; rather that minimising potential exposure of the crime group took immediate priority.

Deception

A common feature of criminal relations is deception, with both parties often resorting to masking the true nature of their activities. This may be, for instance to maintain connections in a supply network unknown to competitors e.g. showing close links to one city giving the impression this is where commodity is sourced, while in fact it is (safely) obtained elsewhere. In a relationship with a terrorist group such a form of deception may be undertaken by the terrorists who could purport to simply be an organised crime group to minimise the concerns of partner criminals, operating a criminal fundraising 'front' while funnelling profit to their true terrorist purpose. Obviously, discovery of this deception may have significant affect upon any ongoing illicit business venture.

Similarly, 'discovery' of a terrorist group through actions intended to induce fear, the purpose of terrorist action to drive political change will lead to increased media focus. A bombing campaign or such will draw international media attention on all parts of the operation, a likely feature of the terrorists intent and the very opposite typically of the organised criminals who while happy to operate in their own criminal communities with an appropriate reputation are unlikely to favour their circumstances being known widely.

World Events

Public revulsion at their participation in assisting terrorist action is not the only factor here that may arise from media attention, as the particular predilections of some organised criminals may enjoy this form of public dis-claim, particularly if it gains them kudos amongst their own criminal culture peers or sub culture, such as Bulger experienced through his links to PIRA discussed above. What will likely follow from increased media attention and public revulsion will be political and law enforcement interest, which in a well-functioning society may well prove fatal to the organised crime group, with members arrested and receiving significant periods of incarceration, and legislation enacted to particularly tackle their behaviours.

Finally, while the relationship between the organised criminal and terrorist may play out in the background to their mutual benefit external factors can prove to have seismic consequences. The 1990's President Bush initiated 'War on Drugs' led to the targeting of Colombian drug cartels by that state, with the assistance of the US. As the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs (2014) recently heard this resulted ultimately in their significant disruption but had the unintended consequence of the FARC who provided the cartels with security filling the void and themselves becoming

drug suppliers; the Shining Path group in Peru[20] seeing a similar gap in the market and being resuscitated from a then apparent terminal decline; and also unfortunately the establishment of the Mexican drug cartels represented above by Grillo's exemplar frijol.

Illustrating the Potential Model

As stated above, all organised criminals are individuals, and their particular peccadilloes will affect this decision making process. However, the model below outlines the potential considerations they will have to make, taking Baumol's 'Proposition One' as it's starting point:

[20] The Shining Path are listed as a terrorist group. They commenced operations in Peru in 1980 and had almost disappeared following the capture of their leader in 1992.

Figure 3 – Considerations for an 'Initial Nexus' Relationship



'Individual'	'Reputation'	'Distance'	'Profit'	'Co-operation'
Attitude to Risk Level of personal identification with 'cause' of terrorist group 'Red Lines' on behaviour Desire for notoriety/ adulation	Positive/ Negative affect on Organised Crime Groups standing in 'criminal circles' if association known Positive/ Negative affect on Organised Crime Groups standing in 'relevant wider society' if association known	Impact of terrorist groups actions on immediate society Impact of terrorist groups actions on wider world, and implications	Dependency of Organised Crime Group on funding realised from relationship on the Groups viability. Alternative funding sources if relationship terms altered	Degree of assistance available to Organised Crime Group operations actual/ potential from relationship

Model Discussion

While it would be impossible to capture all idiosyncrasies of an organised criminals decision making process this model seeks to illustrate the main internal and external factors that will influence their decisions in seeking to undertake and maintain this form of 'high tariff' relationship.

External Factors

The main External Factors that will affect the ongoing 'initial nexus' relationship are:

- Increased/ Decreased Law Enforcement Interest – The level of law enforcement activity will be directly commensurate to the actions those participating in the initial nexus can undertake without potential and/or actual interdiction or arrest.
- Media Interest – The amount of media interest will impact on the ability of the initial nexus participants to carry out mutually beneficial activities without public knowledge.
- Deception – The degree to which either party have been misled in an initial nexus relationship will have a bearing on the degree to which they co-operate and discovery of the deception will have a direct impact on continuing trust.
- Changing World Events – From the man made to the natural (such as earthquakes, tsunamis and disease) calamitous world events may prove disastrous or advantageous to any initial nexus relationship.

These external factors will combine to affect the decision making process of the organised criminal.

For the organised crime group themselves the following Internal Factors are of relevance:

- Individual – The psychological makeup of the participants in the organised crime group or in a strictly controlled group, its leader, will have a direct bearing on the relationship. The attitude to risk, personal identification with the particular terrorist cause, any controlling 'red lines' on behaviour and an individual desire for cultural and/or widespread notoriety (or perceived adulation) will all be determining factors.
- Reputation – The degree to which knowledge of the initial nexus relationship has a positive or negative affect on the Organised Crime Groups standing amongst criminal peers and 'relevant wider society'.
- Distance – How closely the terrorist group acts to the location of the organised crime group and their wider 'society' will be of direct relevance to all relationship calculations.
- Profit – The degree to which the organised crime group is dependent on the initial nexus relationship to continue its funding and any alternative revenue streams that are available as a contingency if the relationship is discontinued will be relevant.
- Co-operation: The extent to which the initial nexus relationship impacts upon the organised crime groups operations, through for instance security of commodity routes or expert knowledge of explosives will require to be considered.

Combined these internal and external factors form a balance sheet of competing considerations from which the organised criminal contemplating entering or maintaining an initial nexus relationship with a terrorist group will consider. This model is not exhaustive but shows from the research to date that contemplation of such a relationship does not amount to a purely profit

based calculation. For the organised criminal monetary gain may indeed be the driving factor, but it is far from the only consideration.

Conclusions

Understanding the 'Initial Nexus' from an entrepreneurial perspective

The factors that affect the decision making process of any individual are many. It is the decisions that have the greatest implications that become the hardest. For an organised criminal considering working with terrorists, an 'initial nexus' relationship, the tariff is exceptionally high. Accepting that the organised criminals main pursuit is 'profit', in its widest sense, and acknowledging the nuances of their relationships with their peers and society, as large scale contributing factors to the manner of their operations, the potential impact of working with those seeking an entirely different purpose (that of political change engendered through extreme behaviour) it is not difficult to imagine the mental grind of the calculation to participate in such a relationship or not.

The calculation process of the organised criminal in such a situation will involve many factors, including those out with their control, as the proposed model above illustrates. It is not single entries in this ledger of decision making activity that matter alone, their effect is cumulative and individual circumstance dependent. No two organised criminals or groups will operate the same way in an initial nexus relationship, just as their operational methods will vary widely. However they will all be faced with the same calculation process when considering working with terrorists, to which they will bring their particular circumstances to bear.

Exploiting the detail of this decision making process is perhaps where policy should be focussed by the state, in pursuit of law enforcement gain. The referenced recent hearings by the United States Congress Foreign Affairs Committee illustrate the high level of interest in these relationships, of which little is really substantially known.

Accepting the dangers of the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime interacting, to sway organised criminals away from participating in initial nexus relationships will involve making them wholly unattractive propositions. To do this will necessitate bringing sufficient external pressure onto the illustrated decisions making process. This could be achieved by: ensuring such relationships were reputationally toxic, whatever the circumstances of the criminals particular social groupings; identifying and punishing initial nexus relationships in a draconian manner through targeted legislation; focussing law enforcement intelligence gathering and interdiction efforts on such relationships; and through a targeted focus on the spoils such a relationship brings ensure that any profit resulting from the relationship is squeezed, actively targeted and appropriately seized. If an organised criminal does not profit operationally, reputationally or monetarily from an initial nexus relationship it will follow that he will be most unlikely to pursue one.

Potential for Further Research

Direct interaction with organised crime group members would provide excellent information as to how any 'initial nexus' relationship might function. Ideally, criminals with known cultural affinity to terrorist causes and those without could be identified, in the UK context ideally both in relation to Irish related and international terrorism. Further organised crime group members with no known cultural affinities could also be identified. The views of these individuals could

then be gathered in relation to specific issues around an 'initial nexus' relationship, to test the theory of the model posited above. From this greater insight not only into how relationships might occur would be forthcoming, but also a greater understanding of where the substantial risk of such relationships do indeed lie. Access to such subjects would possibly be best achieved through interaction with those incarcerated or undertaking probationary work, which would give the added benefit of the potential to explore the significance of the criminal justice system, and specifically prisons, to enabling potential terrorist and organised criminal relationships.

An exploration of any 'criminal code' amongst organised crime group members and commonality of standards that might exist would be very interesting; in additional to exploring their entrepreneurial outlook and the bearing these standards might have upon it. Exploring such 'codes' and what effect they might have on association to terrorism and association to terrorism through the organised criminals being deceived seem to be very worthwhile areas for exploration.

4.4 "Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime", ICCT Perspectives Series

Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime

In this Perspective, I aim to illustrate that although the crime-terror nexus has attracted significant attention of late, it is not a new phenomenon and it has past iterations that offer useful lessons for its present form. I reference my own experience as a police officer in Scotland and draw parallels to far older diaspora communities than the populations currently facing scrutiny. Over the following pages, a number of factors are outlined that I believe are crucial to a nexus relationship. The perspective concludes with a look to the future and offers some suggestions for practitioners and policy makers working on this complex topic.

Research in Scotland, Links to Northern Ireland

As a serving police officer with 24 years' experience, my journey into undertaking research on the nexus between terrorism and organised crime began when I read this quote attributed to an American mobster: 'The Mafia will help whoever can pay'. I came across it while undertaking a Master's Degree at St. Andrews, and it felt so at odds with my own experience of investigating organised criminals and the reality of their multi-faceted personalities. Given this, I was moved to look into the matter further, and assess whether the quote stood scrutiny or was problematic as my intuition indicated.

Initially, this interest led me to look at my native Scotland and the nexus that existed between terrorism and organised crime there. What I found, through research, interviews and focus groups, was that a factor of particular importance to understanding potential cooperation between organised criminals and terrorists, were the nation's various diaspora communities. However, these were not communities that had arrived in relatively recent travel from less developed nations, but instead those that had come into existence some hundreds of years previously and which were, and still are, closely linked to Ireland.

Scottish emigration to Ireland took place through the 'plantations' in Ulster of the 1600s, while Irish immigration to Scotland largely occurred in the aftermath of the potato famine of the 1840s, although there has been continuing movement between the islands since. Within these movements there was emigration of some with strong 'loyalist' sentiments, and immigration of others with 'republican' beliefs. For generations, through organisations that span both islands such as the Loyalist 'Orange Order', contact and strong bonds have consistently been maintained. With the onset of Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' in the 1960s, Scotland became a support hub for both communities involved in the struggle. Although arrests were made of individuals connected to the conflict who were using safe houses in Scotland, no terrorist action related to the Troubles ever occurred within Scottish borders.

As the Troubles wore on, both the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA), along with their adversaries in the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), became more heavily involved in criminality as a funding stream. Commencing with the establishment of illegal drinking dens in the areas under their control from 1968 onwards, these groups' fundraising grew increasingly sophisticated, with 'security firms', which were in fact a front for extorting the business community, and controlled illegal gambling becoming the norm. Conversely, however, this immersion in criminality also seeped into both sides'

Scottish support bases, who began to undertake actions for both profit as well as for funding terrorist activities.

With the apparent arrival of peace in Northern Ireland following 1998's Good Friday Agreement, many assumed that these organisations and their support bases would wither and die, but this has been far from the case. Attacks on security forces in Northern Ireland from dissident factions continue, with some speculating much of this is to retain a form of legitimacy for burgeoning crime enterprises. Similar motives appear to be at play among both groups' Scottish support bases. For example, 2012's 'Operation Hairsplitter' was mounted by the Scottish police as a response to dissident republicans' plans to murder dissident Loyalists. The operation aimed to remove firearms from organised criminals in Glasgow and demonstrated that the relationship between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland was still very much alive.

This brief overview illustrates that the 'crime-terror nexus', which has drawn so much attention recently, is certainly not a new phenomenon. Neither is it a connection which can be easily accounted for. In the remainder of this op-ed, I draw upon both my professional background and academic work to present some key things to consider for both researchers and those in the counterterrorism policymaker or practitioner communities.

For money and honour

Organised criminals operate in a risky environment. They have the constant threat of discovery by law enforcement, coupled to their lack of a 'regulatory body'. When deals go bad, or they are ripped off, organised criminals must maintain their reputation or risk others taking advantage of them. For the police officers I spoke with during my research into this matter, and from my own experience, *reputation* rather than cash is the key commodity for an organised criminal. To operate in the murky world of organised crime, you must be trusted not to be an informant or an undercover agent. You must have sufficient kudos to be taken seriously, and not seem like an easy target for those you are dealing with to take advantage of. The threat of potential violence is never far from the surface of interactions in order to retain legitimacy. Additionally, you must be conscious of the level of attention you are drawing to your activities and have sufficient cover to explain the profits you are making.

In short, what my own experience, the opinions of my colleagues, and other authors on the subject highlight, is that those immersed in organised crime (and terrorism for that matter) hold particular 'value sets'. While they may be far-removed from those of the general public who obey the rule of law, they are values and associated norms of expected behaviour nonetheless. This is a point with particular relevance for understanding the crime-terror nexus.

On a number of occasions during my research into organised criminals' relationships with terrorists, the analogy of paedophilia was made. Paedophilia is seen as a wholly unacceptable behaviour in most societies, a crime beyond the pale, and this is a 'value' on which both law-abiding citizens and criminals appear to agree. Prison is an excellent setting to see in action the opinions of other criminals regarding this behaviour. Those convicted of paedophilia are segregated, and during rioting are always targeted for extreme punishment by their fellow inmates. Why? Because they are seen as breaching the societal norms of criminal society, as having broken a form of 'taboo'. Criminals, like anyone else, have governing operating parameters on behaviour, and it seems that this one form of criminality is simply unacceptable to the vast majority, drawing considerable opprobrium. Also, attacking these individuals

positively affects the social standing of those undertaking the attack, providing an uplift in their 'reputation'.

Until approximately 2011, my colleagues in the Scottish police viewed the likeliness of Scottish criminals assisting those involved in international jihadist terrorism akin to criminals assisting a paedophile; in other words, as a 'deal too far'. The cultural distance between Scottish organized criminals and groups such as al-Qaeda meant that, were such a relationship to be discovered, the former would likely suffer catastrophic reputational damage amongst their peers and wider society. All the more so if the terrorists' actions affected those socially connected to the criminals in question. Conversely, however, if the relationship were to involve criminals and terrorists from a shared background, the former's 'stock' might actually rise through benefit of association with 'the cause'. An excellent example of this in relation to the Troubles is James 'Whitey' Bulger, a Boston-based organised criminal whose arms smuggling on behalf of the PIRA made him a feared and respected criminal, and directly impacted on his ability to have an advantageous and manipulative relationship with law enforcement agencies for decades.

Determining factors for a crime-terror nexus

Reputational considerations, therefore, appear to be a key element governing potential crime-terror relationships. But, based on both my own research on this topic and relevant professional experience, both my own and that of my colleagues, several other factors stand out as relevant for determining whether a 'crime-terrorism nexus' can come into being. Although previous examples have focused on terrorism related to the Northern Irish 'Troubles', these observations are partly drawn from, and believed to be relevant to, the contemporary threat posed by groups like the Islamic State (IS) as well.

First of all, there is the **individual dimension** to consider. The psychological makeup of the participants in an organised crime group and the personality and standing of its leader(s) will have a direct bearing on any potential crime-terrorism relationship. Criminals' attitude to risk, their personal identification with the particular terrorist cause, any controlling 'red lines' on behaviour and an individual desire for cultural and/or widespread notoriety (or perceived adulation) will all be determining factors. Closely related are considerations of **reputation**, or the degree to which knowledge of the nexus relationship is perceived as having a positive or negative affect on the organized criminals' standing amongst criminal peers and relevant elements within wider society.

Of similar weight is the consideration of **distance**. How close a potential terrorist partner may operate in relation to the organised criminal group's own society will be of direct relevance to all relationship calculations. We then come to the consideration that started this investigation, namely that of **profit**. A crucial consideration here is the degree to which the organised crime group is dependent on the nexus relationship to continue its funding and whether any alternative revenue streams may be available as a contingency if the relationship is discontinued. Moreover, in maintaining any nexus relationship, the participants need to consider their degree of **co-operation**. Simply put, if the relationship falls apart will this change impact significantly on other elements of criminal operations. For example, will the availability of 'expertise' in relation to explosives or access to a smuggling route be lost?

As with all parties involved in nefarious enterprises, actual or perceived **deception** by one of the nexus partners will have a bearing on the degree to which cooperation is established and

deemed worthwhile. External factors that will impact any nexus relationship include **increased or decreased law enforcement interest** as the level of law enforcement activity will be directly commensurate to the actions those participating in the nexus can undertake without potential or actual interdiction or arrest. Similarly, the amount of **media interest** will impact on the ability of the nexus participants to carry out mutually beneficial activities without public knowledge.

Every terrorist and organised crime group is different, and the weight that each participant in a crime-terror nexus places on these factors will differ. However, in determining the risk of relationships occurring they are a useful starting point.

Diasporas

We have an increasing number of diaspora communities emerging across Europe, and this diversity can, of course, be a fantastic addition to our societies. However, it has to be acknowledged that some elements within these communities have incubated significant terrorist threats. Just as the organised criminals of Glasgow went to the same schools, gyms and social hangouts as some of those involved in Northern Irish terrorism, so too have some criminal individuals within the more recent diaspora communities interacted with extremist elements. The finding that many Western citizens who joined IS as foreign fighters were previously engaged in criminality is well documented. Clearly, the potential ways in which criminal pasts do and do not lead on to terrorism need to be better understood.

In Scotland, the police are making concerted efforts to work closely with and on behalf of all of our communities, for instance by establishing bespoke recruitment assistance programs to encourage diversity within the force. There are also efforts such as the Grey Space[21] Community Tension Monitoring Group, which I established and initially chaired in Renfrewshire and Inverclyde. Its purpose is to bring all of our communities, established and emerging, together and gain trust and understanding amongst community leaders. A Catholic Bishop, Mosque Chairman, LGBT representatives and community leaders from our Polish, African and our more recent refugee populations sit together, forming new bonds and discussing shared concerns. The diversity and cultural influences diaspora communities bring should be harnessed for the betterment of all, while remaining cognizant of the fact that some elements within these communities could harbour dangerous links with extremist elements both domestically and internationally. It is through mutual understanding, trust and cooperation that important first steps towards identifying such potential threats can be made.

Looking ahead

[21] In his book 'The New Threat from Islamic Militancy' Jason Burke discusses Islamic State's desire to annihilate the 'grey zone' that exists between communities, with them espousing a binary world view of 'with us or against us'. I took this concept and met with all the community leaders outlined individually, where they agreed the meeting of minds was what made the pluralist West function well. After we had become a group, and adopted the name I suggested members arrived collectively at the following definition:
'Grey Space exists to foster a community of healthy relationships through mutual collaboration of all its stakeholders and it is noted by the Grey Space Group that community tension is partly natural and not intrinsically bad, since justice is constantly being refined in dynamic societies – and we should expect some tension in healthy communities. For example, community activism and public protest are legitimate and potentially creative activities, though they may cause tensions. People have the right to express opinions and to 'peaceful assembly', providing they are not stirring up hatred. These can often be positive means of promoting social change - it is legal expression and may produce tension.'

So, what of the future? Although the demise of the Islamic State as a territorial entity appears to be well underway, the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq is likely to remain a primary concern. Over the past several years, somewhere between 5000 and 7000 individuals from the West are believed to have travelled to participate in the jihad as foreign fighters. In the UK alone, 400 are thought to have returned, with only 40 prosecuted so far.

Those who travelled to fight in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, whether for jihadist factions or those opposed to them, have likely acquired a skill set uniquely suited to participation in organised crime. They have functioned within organisations with rules far removed from the societal norms of the West, and many will have acquired expertise in the use of firearms and explosives. Their exposure to extreme violence, and to trafficking networks will no doubt be of benefit to potential careers as criminals, while the cachet of having fought for or in opposition to jihadist groups like IS will most probably impact criminal reputations.

The likeliness of these returning foreign fighters using their newfound skill sets for criminal purposes is tied not just to ideological rationales, but the simple need to make a living. Those who remain loyal to the cause are likely to leverage their criminal contacts for terrorist purposes, just as PIRA veterans did. But we should also remain aware of the likelihood that many will become less involved with the cause and instead use their skill set and reputation for criminal purposes. A process seen not just among some PIRA veterans, but also, for instance, among the French paramilitary Secret Army Organisation (OAS) and the Mexican military veterans who went on to found the Los Zetas cartel.

We must be alert to the communities in Europe we now host, and their complicated relationships to the nations from which they emerged. The émigré and immigrant communities of Scotland are now hundreds of years old, and I myself am the product of this immigration. As the Orange Walks and Republican marches continue on Scotland's streets, often commemorating battles in what are now foreign countries over 300 years ago, I can assure you that the diaspora issues that are present today across the West may be with us for some time to come. However, I hope to have shown that whether issues will include cooperation between criminal and terrorist elements depends on a complicated and nuanced calculation.

The development of a crime-terror nexus, or the 'evolution' of terrorists into criminals and vice versa, has been an element in numerous recent intrastate conflicts. However, I do not believe that its development is inevitable. It is perhaps incumbent on policymakers and practitioners to look to history to further research the factors which have contributed to a nexus' emergence and seek to identify and introduce mitigation measures. In addition, the variety of factors at play in determining whether a crime-terror nexus may emerge, discussed in brief above, need further investigation and refinement.

Finally, while the IS-related crime and terror nexus is not in itself unique, the degree of previous criminal history amongst the Western foreign fighter who travelled to join this group, is. This propensity to crime amongst participants causes me, as a policeman and researcher, significant concern and should in my opinion act as a 'red flag' to all involved in organised crime interdiction of potential dangers ahead. Many who travelled to fight for Islamic State were young men. If they ultimately return to a life of organised criminal activity they may cause significant issues for decades to come.

4.5 "Terrorism, Organised Crime and Necessity", ICCT Perspectives Series

Over time there has been much debate over the role organised criminality plays in the commission of Terrorism, and vice versa. In this op-ed I explore the dichotomy that appears to exist between the contention that Organised Criminals and Terrorists are exceptionally similar, against the counter argument that their strategic aims, profit versus political change, making them wholly distinct. I believe that the qualia that certainly evidences their interdependence when under pressure, *necessity*, demonstrates that we should conceptualise both phenomena in far more similar terms than is perhaps currently the case and look to exploit the weaknesses such a close relationship might expose.

Recent work has demonstrated that Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups function as entities in almost identical fashions and draw members from the same social groups. Some authors have also contended that the use of organised crime goes far beyond a mere tactical deployment by a group to achieve funds to further its cause, but is indicative of a metamorphic scale that exists between the two phenomena, while others have been keen to point out a 'hard' philosophical gulf that exists between the two, with the Terrorist seeking political change through violence, or the threat of violence while the Criminal, simply put, seeks to make money.

Definitional issues bedevil the field of Terrorism and its associated study, with there being no internationally accepted definition, however that of the United Nations at least comes close, and is of the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, which condemned terrorist acts as:

"criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature."

Organised Crime does not attract the same degree of debate, with the widely accepted modern definition that arose in the 1970's through the work of Albini being that

"a criminal syndicate consists of a system of loosely structured relationships functioning primarily because each participant is interested in furthering his own welfare."

The gulf between the two may at first glance seem obvious, but it is my contention that this is actually far from the truth, and that you cannot in fact have Terrorism on any scale almost beyond the level of the individual without a dependency, to varying degrees, on some form of organised crime.

The United States of America's Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations proves to be a good spring board to explore this contention. This contains the names of the 67 listed and 12 delisted foreign organisations listed by the US Secretary of State as Terrorist Organisations since 1997. The views of the United States on this designation aside, the

organisations listed in their selves have an interesting commonality. Although their causes are wide and disparate, from the territorial, the political and the religious, they have one common factor. They all functioned through illegally sourced funding, be that from the provision of money by a state acting against the interests of that in which the group is based, to out and out criminality, such as drug dealing or extortion.

The period from the 1960's to the 1980's is referenced in Rapoport's Terrorism wave theory as that of the New Left, where many leftist terrorist groups operating across the world received support from the Soviet Union and its client states in a 'proxy war' against the West.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and consequently its interdependent satellites saw this funding collapse, and many groups disappear. However, many survived and in a perverse sense thrived, such as the FARC. They achieved this through expansion into the burgeoning trade in cocaine, which in parallel saw the parallel drug cartels embrace terrorist tactics in an attempt to subvert government and retain their evolving position of influence over government. These twin developments saw the coining of the term 'Narco Terrorism', and much of the debate that led to the initial philosophical reasoning mentioned above on the nature or organised crime and terrorism. It is in fact estimated that by the first decade of the 21st Century nearly 60% of all cocaine and 90% of the world's opium originated from areas controlled by insurgent groups.
What we need to consider though is not just the fact that groups such as FARC turned to drug trafficking to fund their struggle, but also the why? It is my contention that this is the element we often miss. The 'why?' is, simply put, *necessity*, the mother of all invention.

This reflection on Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) perhaps captures every facet of this underpinning but infrequently asked question, where "Through a large network of front organizations kept in operation by affiliates and supporters, LeT has raised funds from a range of private financiers, Islamic nongovernmental organizations, regional and international businesses (both licit and illicit), and organized crime—in addition to the resources secured from the Pakistani state—to sustain both terrorist and welfare activities simultaneously."

Accepting this as accurate, the description of Let captures factors affecting all the Groups on the US State Department's list, to varying degrees, and that change and alter over time and circumstance often at a Geo political level.

The morality of many aspects of organised crime, from people trafficking to drug dealing, may affect the individual groups' particular focus but without (illegal) outside state sponsorship or internal support fund raising for a group they quite simply cannot continue to operate.

Necessity is a two way proposition in respect of Terrorism in this respect though. Just as it is necessary for perhaps initially 'idealistic' Terrorists, such as the ELN, to get their hands dirty through engagement with crime, so is it necessary to retain engagement with Terrorism to ensure some form of legitimacy with their support base when a group has essentially metamorphosed into a crime gang, as appears to be the case with the New IRA.
When one considers members recent responses to the journalist John Mooney following the murder of the journalist Lyra McKee during rioting in Northern Ireland, this appears to actually be unintentionally articulated in the following statement:

"You ask why we organise armed actions. They are symbolic. Our actions serve one purpose. They let the world know there is an ongoing conflict in Ireland."

When a Terrorist Group such as this have senior members being jailed for extorting money from the owners of chip shops and drug dealers with the attendant negative publicity this brings to retain any form of cause legitimacy action directly related to the pro-generating conflict providing the group's (supposed) purpose becomes essential.

In Ireland, "the criminals (are) now not only as well armed but also as ruthless as the dissidents. In the post ceasefire-era the IRA no longer commanded the previous levels of respect and obedience. The word IRA no longer engendered the same levels of fear amongst those at the higher levels of criminality."

This 'reputational gap' necessitates a counter balance, achieved through perceived continuance of Terrorist acts, no matter where a group's true focus may be. Reputation must be maintained, as without it, just as within the murky world of organised crime per se where no court of arbitration exists, you cannot operate.

Just as it is necessary to maintain funding and reputation, it is similarly necessary to retain a sufficient degree of legitimacy to ensure support from the base within which the group derives its wider ability to operate. If this is lost safe housing and movement become increasingly difficult, as a falloff in overall legitimacy will no doubt lead many previous supporters to greater ambivalence or indeed co-operation with the previously perceived common foe. In considering Terrorist groups who have cultivated social legitimacy, through service provision, it has been noted that they are significantly less likely to participate in crimes such as kidnapping and robbery than those who have not. This research assists in crystallising the argument that where engaging in crime that might harm a group's reputation, achieved through their cultivation of a façade of providing a social good, it is necessary to avoid this or be *seen* to 'punish' transgressors, as strongly appears to be the case in Northern Ireland. The emphasis here is also on seen.

The public illustration of self-reward rather than the furtherance of the cause is likely to be an Achilles heel for any organisation that does not benefit from direct state sponsorship. Time and again Terrorist group members have been identified with their 'hand in the till'. Here there are innumerable examples from history, with Amir Khan's Maratha resistance to the British East India Company in the 19th Century where the loss of legitimate income led to the 'collections' (i.e. extortion) made from the local population coming to be the norm and with the actions of the insurgency being largely directed by the actions of its members in attempting to enrich themselves despite their initial principled cause.

Whether this will be the case for the successor organisations that arise from Islamic State's demise remains to be seen, but it is well known that Radical Islamist (Caliphite) groups are immersed in criminality and continue to be, with funds actually flowing from operatives undertaking criminality in Europe to the bolster the Terrorist's core activities in the Middle East.

As investigations into such develop a focus on this potential exposure of mis-deeds across enforcement agencies would seem wise. Terrorists seeks to win a propaganda battle against the state or force they oppose. The exposure of links to criminality and any identified self-reward will always go a long way to reduce a Terrorists standing in any established or prospective support community with a strong value system tied to any utopian outcome so many Terrorist actors espouse they seek. In my research I have yet to find any Terrorist groups articulated goal of a state where criminality linked to self-enrichment is the desired outcome. The more those

who engage in such are exposed, the more their supporters might question what it really is they are supporting. Were the misappropriation of funds raised in Europe sent to the Middle East to be identified the potential disillusionment and opportunities presented by this are obvious.
In a new way we once again need to 'follow the money', and make sure people (including support networks and those sympathetic to the Terrorist cause) know where and on what it is actually being spent. Terrorism's fundamental necessity to secure funding, and retain legitimacy while it does so, may prove a largely untapped means of counter narrative available to many Governmental bodies.

Chapter 5: Modelling Relationships 'At the Edge of Terror'

5.1 Introduction

This chapter draws together the case studies in chapters 2, 3 and 4 to consider the main research question, are there commonalities between 'Lone Wolf Terrorists' with participants in crime/ terror nexus relationships, and, if so, what impact do these commonalities have on contemporary terrorism?

In light of the discussion in these chapters, there is significant evidence to suggest that there are commonalities now evident across the phenomena; and that these developments that have brought these changes about result in a degradation of previous understanding and commitment to 'causes' across various terrorist actors. These commonalities combine to demonstrate that there may be a conceptual shift in the current understanding of the motivations of terrorist actors. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, a primary focus in the literature to date has been on explaining the motivations of terrorists by examining their religious affiliations and ideologies. It is contended that this focus has failed to appreciate that there appears to be considerable evidence (as explained in chapters 2, 3 and 4) to support a conceptual shift in terrorist motivations where religious affiliation and ideology appears to be increasingly replaced with similar motivations to those actors engaged in organised crime. This fixation on motivation as being associated with religious affiliation and ideology fails to appreciate the changing nature of the motivations of contemporary terrorist actors.

This chapter adopts a 'modelling' approach in order to support the contention that there has been at minimum a partial shift in the motivations of some terrorist actors. This modelling, as explained below, examines the 'edge' phenomena of lone wolf terrorists and terrorist group members engaging with or in criminality, as the basis to prove to a reasonably high standard of probability that the motivations of terrorists are increasingly similar in nature to those actors engaged in criminality. This modelling helps to not only identify the motivations of contemporary terrorism, but can form an important basis to help inform law and policy on counter-terrorism.

It is contended that this conceptual shift, to focus more on the terrorist actor than the cause they espouse to be part of, is necessary as to understand and counter terrorism. We need to understand the drivers affecting its participants. Only in addressing these can you hope to mitigate against terrorist activity. Consequently, a core argument advanced in this chapter is that a model must be applied to understand the changing nature of contemporary terrorism so that factors affecting a nexus relationship can be distilled. This theme can be explained by relying on an iteration of a model initially developed by Markarenko (2004). It can be recalled from chapter one, Markarenko (2004) developed a model that conceptualised the movement of groups through a continuum of terrorist and criminal behaviours. A key strength in this model is identified by Rollins and Wyler (2013) as being its conceptualisation of the fluid nature of this crime/ terror nexus. Jamieson (2005) and Madsen (2009) suggests that Markarenko's (2004) model is limited because the distinctions between the ultimate motivations of terrorists and organised criminals driving their activities remain distinct, that is the political versus 'profit'. However, in the context of this chapter this limitation can be addressed to help draw together the case studies in the previous chapters by accepting a far wider definition of 'profit'

for these actors, as the modelling below demonstrates. The chapter suggests that when modelling is applied on an *individual* basis, rather than the previous scholarly focus on group dynamics, a more nuanced picture emerges in relation to contemporary terrorism with a variety of potential contributory elements.

The application of this model to the results from chapters two to four help demonstrate at least two significant points. Firstly, there are at least eight factors that *may* affect a nexus relationship, namely:

- The Individual
- Culture
- Reputation
- Distance
- Deception
- 'Profit'
- Co-operation
- Incarceration

Secondly, there are four potential make-up of initial nexus relationship:

- Relationship A - The OCG and Terrorist group members are from the same cultural background and the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings.
- Relationship B - The OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds however the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings.
- Relationship C - The OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of one party only would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping.
- Relationship D - The OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of neither party would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping.

That is, through seeing the pathway to terrorism more as a *personal* journey, the factors that may influence individual participants, such as Nexus relationships A to D, become far clearer. Through conceptualising the step into terrorism in this manner the apparent alterations to the characteristics of actors when considered within the framework of Rapoport's (2003) wave theory become ever more striking, as does the posited shift towards 'identity terrorism' as a potential fifth wave.

The chapter achieves this illustrative 'journey' through an 'expanding model' presented in a series of five figures to illustrate the arguments made. 'Expanding modelling' in this thesis takes the form of an initial presentation of societal influences on individuals, and extrapolates this to represent the influences and possibilities that exist in respect of the actors we have considered in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Makarenko's (2004) model is an illustration of the metamorphosis that can occur when a terrorist *group* changes its focus, moving from being focussed on political goals, through carrying out criminal activity to support these goals, then ultimately to full scale immersion in criminality. However, the modelling as presented in this chapter starts from the premise that the *individual* rather than group processes as being of most importance in respect of contemporary terrorism. As the previous chapters have shown, when

we consider the motivations and circumstances of the individual actors rather than the groups and causes they purport to be aligned to a more nuanced picture, often at odds with their claims, emerges. It is contended that any assessment of terrorist motivation should start from the premise of the individual actor and their particular circumstances. This modelling supports the central thesis argument by visually demonstrating that when we consider actors as individuals the commonalities between lone wolf terrorists and participants in a crime/ terror nexus relationship become striking, clearly demonstrating how the factors identified impact on contemporary terrorism. This approach provides a means by which to understand contemporary terrorist actors by being able to discern their motivations, and considered the factors influencing terrorist actors today.

The modelling works through a series of figures and supporting texts. It commences by considering an individual within society and any sub societies (e.g. diaspora communities) they may inhabit. Building from here it next looks at the influence of criminality and organised crime on an individual. It then moves into considering the impact of terrorism on the illustration so far. The modelling then takes this layered approach to provide insight into the trajectory an individual might experience through a shift into terrorist activity and post terrorist activity. Finally, the modelling provides a comprehensive signposting of at least six core factors that may affect a relationship between those involved in organised criminality and terrorism, and four variant forms such a relationship may take based on sub societal determinants. The factors discerned appear a sound basis to help explain the motivations that may influence the actions of a terrorist or terrorist group and give a means of insight into understanding those engaged in 'identity terrorism'.

It is accepted that this proposition draws on the three case studies contained within this thesis, and consequently may not be viewed as having universal application. However, the case studies identified are international in nature and indicative of the most contentious and impactive areas in contemporary terrorism and consequently it is suggested that the observations made are valid for consideration.

This chapter draws on the following publications: Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland? (Gallagher, 2014); Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit of Profit? (Gallagher, 2015); 'Criminalised' Islamic State Veterans – A Future Major Threat in Organised Crime Development? (Gallagher, 2016); and "The Lone Wolf Tsunami: Is Rapoport's Religious Wave Ending?" (Gallagher, 2017)

The chapter is divided into four sections that draw together what has been discerned in the thesis so far. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 outline a compelling case illustrating that recent activity within the two edge phenomena of lone wolf terrorism and the relationship between terrorism and organised crime combine to demonstrate there is a conceptual gap in the understanding of contemporary terrorism.

This chapter provides evidence to explain the conceptual gap that has emerged from a fixed way of thinking about terrorism that tends to characterise the occurrence of terrorism as being primarily motivated by religion. Instead, through consideration in the model outlined evidence of a change in the characteristics of contemporary terrorism indicative of at least a degradation of Rapoport's (2003) religious wave becomes clear; or indeed the possibility of the emergence of a new wave, capturing the current circumstances in respect of contemporary terrorism perhaps best titled that of 'identity terrorism'.

Throughout this chapter the evidence gathered is considered and aggregates towards common identifiable behaviours amongst apparently unconnected actors engaged in contemporary 'identity terrorism'.

Section 5.2 examines the place of a terrorist within 'wide' society and their particular 'sub societies' (the multitude of differing social groups and agencies an actor is part of or engages with), demonstrating the influencing factors that come to bear upon them before we consider their role as 'terrorists', and providing a baseline for considering them as people per se, not simply defined by their role in extreme activities. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the rings of influence on our actors. This section provides further evidence concerning whether the actions of lone wolf terrorists are meaningful in a wider context than that of their own activity, demonstrating that although they may appear to act alone their activities are in fact linked to and influenced by the society in which they function. The chapter achieves this while considering the influencing factors on all fourth wave terrorists, demonstrating the similarities that exist amongst group participants and lone actors.

Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 turn to examine the role of criminality in participation in contemporary terrorism, both pre and post conflict, and assesses the factors that may influence an individual's participation in or a crime/terror nexus relationship. These sections illustrate changes in this phenomena that appear wholly meaningful in terrorism's wider context, and indeed are perhaps indicative of a global shift across contemporary terrorist behaviours, with degradation of actor's motives through increased self-enrichment via criminality being a common factor.

Section 5.3 continues the consideration of individual participation in a crime/ terror nexus relationship, drawing together the research in the thesis to identify common factors of bearing. The evidence that emerges points to a previously unacknowledged commonality of degradation of commitment to terrorist cause amongst group participants, and with this weakening an increasing propensity amongst actors to self-advancement and enrichment, both in financial terms but also in terms of social capital and reputation amongst their sub societies of relevance. This finding significantly advances the evidence of cross cutting factors common to a variety of terrorist campaigns, as many of the groups considered were previously seen as outliers to Rapoport's (2003) wave theory, but instead perhaps appear indicative of a move beyond Rapoport's (2003) fourth wave, and their members appear far more closely aligned in terms of motivation and aspiration to participants in IS than ever acknowledged elsewhere.

Section 5.4 draws the chapter to a conclusion that is does indeed appear that the findings reached are indicative of a wider unacknowledged shift in terrorist behaviour, necessitating a reappraisal of Rapoport's four wave theory.

5.2 Individuals, Society and Sub Societies

5.2.1 Terrorist Actors – Individuals in a Group or Individuals

Firstly, we have to consider the individual terrorist actor, be they a lone wolf terrorist or an individual who is part of a terrorist group. By examining the individual actor, and the influences upon them in a wide social context we begin to see what factors really drive their behaviours, and this helps isolate their motivations in terms of terrorism. This consideration falls within social movement theory, as described in chapter 2, where protest movements coalesce around political ideas that allow individuals to express or act on their moral intuitions and principles

(Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009). As discussed in chapter 2, utilising Becker's (2014) definition allows for the inclusion of lone wolf terrorists in such considerations.

An individual within a democratic country resides within a nation state. This state and its society are composed, to varying degrees, of a multitude of differing social groups and agencies (such as health services, social work, political parties, pressure groups, the police) who interact for the state to function. Each individual has inevitable ties to some social groups that are exclusive to their personal circumstances, be they a descendant of the Irish immigrants to Scotland described in chapter 4, or the South East Asian descendants of the post Second World War migration described in chapter 3. In addition to this status, for immigrant communities their diaspora, there are ties to various religions and additional social groupings such as charities, neighbourhoods and sports clubs. All of these factors, and these 'Sub Societies,' make up the 'identity' of an individual as they operate within this wider 'society', as illustrated in Figure 4.1 below.

Figure 4.1: Individual, Society and Sub Societies



This model may be one applied throughout modernity, however as we discussed in chapter 2 significant change has been afoot, illustrated by Naim (2013) through his concepts of the 'More and Mobility' revolutions have had the effect of

> "vastly broaden(ing) the cognitive, even emotional impact of more access to resources and the ability to move, learn, connect and communicate more broadly and inexpensively than ever before" (Naim, 2013, pp. 65)

Individuals are simply put less of an 'individual' than in times past. They have access to worldwide news and information in a manner wholly exceptional to previous generations, and through social media the ability to connect with actors on this global stage with ease. This appears to be of striking significance when we consider the possibility of an explanation for the actions of the individuals, we considered in the lone wolf terrorists of the 2016 case study in Chapter 2. It is through this prism that we must view the contemporary individual to get a clear picture of their place in our globalised world, and through this can distil a new way to begin to understand their motivations.

The status of the 'majority' from our 2016 sample highlighting recent immigration to a democratic country or membership of a diaspora can be considered significant. This is due to the fact that the connections and the bonds to the society may be weak, or they may have significant loyalties to another culture or milieu. However, this will be considered in more detail later in this chapter when analysing social connectedness, or the lack thereof, and the impact of this.

However, there was little in the case study on lone wolf terrorists in chapter 2 to indicate that those who were the subject of the study had much contact with criminal elements in the societies they function within, certainly not in the preparation of their acts other than our individual example we considered in detail, that of Ali Sonboly.

Even with Sonboly his contact with criminality to source his firearm was at 'arm's length', via the dark web and apparently not through any long-standing friendship or association.

As Gardner (2016) pointed out, utilising the observations of members of the UK Security Service, only some individuals are capable of working with groups in a collaborative manner. Their motivations and goals though may be similar, or even identical, but the degree to which they can be considered understood remains a matter of continuing enquiry as we discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

What is clear from all of the cases presented is that their conception of '*their* society', and their need to act to 'defend' it, is far removed from their fellows. Although there have been a high number of cases of lone wolf terrorist activity when compared to previous years lone wolf attacks are not common-place *per se*. We appear to be seeing an indicator of change through these individuals, as opposed to a mass phenomenon affecting swathes of the general population. The volume of lone wolf attacks appears to herald a move for those with the necessary attributes and triggers to become involved in individualised terrorist activity.

An interesting quote from a Coptic Christian in respect of a resurgence in numbers of their congregation in Egypt despite state oppression during which returning members have been injured perhaps presents an interesting means to consider this, in that "as long as you feel threatened by others your identity will be strong" (Russell, 2014, pp. 243). For the Copts, the tie to a common identity was their association to a religion, as practising members or not. For the lone wolf terrorists as we described in chapter 2, it appears to be something else that is more closely related with, through the evidence available to us, an 'ethereal' identity rather than one rooted in place or physical relationships. Crenshaw (1985) previously wrote of the enhanced 'social status' membership of a cause provides, especially when the terrorists are from ethnic communities with a long history of struggle. Although 'membership' for the lone wolf terrorist sample may be no more than in their own minds that they are part of an 'ongoing struggle'. When you combine this with the above described observations of Naim (2013) and the concerns that it has been posited that increased media coverage and the naming of actors assists in perpetuating acts of terror (White, 2020) it is not much of an intellectual leap to grasp the factors at play.

Media coverage of IS during 2016 was certainly extensive, as was messaging as to why its members were carrying out this activity. The increasing use of 'Allah Akhbar' amongst the Caliphite attackers detailed in chapter 2, appears to be no coincidence, although the degree to which they felt alienated within the 'societies' in which they resided may well have had its influence; and so in reverse with our exemplar discussed at chapter 2, Sonboly, whose actions

can be seen as a form of backlash, however counter intuitive his 'identity selection' with the far right may seem.

Kaplan and Costa (2015) consider the pull of IS in terms of their notion of 'New Tribalism', an undertow within Rapoport's (2013) fourth wave, where adherents of terrorist groups members have common bonds of kinship or shared history/ideals and aim to establish a lost (or mythical) 'Golden Age'. For Kaplan and Costa (2015), IS are exemplars of this phenomena, with their drive to re-establish the Caliphate. The bonds of kinship here and shared history/ideals do not need to be physical, as Speckhard (2012) illustrates with her interviews of 'jihadists' showing a shared fictive kinship in defence of a global population of those ascribing to the Muslim faith.

They appear to have reached a 'breakpoint' where the threat to their 'identity' in the society they operate within has reached a stage where they perceive they *have* to act. How rational that breakpoint is to a reasonable individual is actually immaterial, it is the perception of the actor that is most telling as it drives them to carry out their action in support of their chosen form of 'identity terrorism'.

It is very difficult from the information available to consider their motivating factors of lone wolf terrorists beyond those we can discern from their overt acts, such as manifestos, chants and social media activity. However, in this thesis we have considered research on terrorist groups and organised criminals which may provide some useful parallel and relevant supporting considerations in pursuit of addressing the research question.

5.2.2 Connections to Criminality

For many of the 'travellers' described in chapter 3, who left a democracy to join IS in Syria and Iraq, there is an additional factor in their antecedents that differs from their lone wolf compatriots, their significant contact with criminality. Our model is consequently updated to reflect this for them, as illustrated at Figure .2 below:

Figure 4.2: Individual and Society – Connections to Criminality



For some, such as the IS participants discussed in chapter 3, Aine Davis (Mendick, 2014), Nathan Cuffey and Nyall Hamlett (Bassey, 2014), this contact no doubt puts them, through drug dealing and such, in contact with organised criminality. Others, such as the fraudster Mashdur Choudhury (Mendick and Gardham, 2014) may indeed have network connections, however loosely, to an OCG.

These illustrations could also be used to describe the connections of those we encountered in chapter 4 who are in Scotland and involved in activity in connection with organised criminality linked to a terrorist endeavour. We have to consider the interactions of both the organised criminals and terrorists in terms within wider 'society', and their own 'sub societies' of supporters and detractors, such as those who act as supporters of causes through fund contributions and the like. Many individuals in wider society will be quite unaware these sub strata even exist. This is illustrated at Figure 4.3 below.

The sub society membership, in terms of diaspora communities and such, may equally be applied to the lone wolf terrorists of Chapter 2.

Figure 4.3: Individual and Society – Organised Criminality Connection to Terrorism



5.2.3 From Criminal to Terrorist (and back again)

Figure 4.4 below further expands on this modelling, illustrating the potential journeys of individuals becoming involved in terrorist activities, in particular those with a background in serious crime, however it could equally apply to those who have no such previous history. At the top left, where the cycle commences, the figure includes our modelling so far, with the individual as a potential participant in organised crime activity, and with potential criminal association's pre 'radicalisation'.

The move to point A demonstrates the path of radicalisation, as the individual moves from their participation in crime to instead their involvement in terrorist activity.

From this juncture the individual potentially moves to point B, criminal activities in support of terrorism. This is with the organisational process of engagement in criminality in support of terrorism from Makarenko's (2004) scale illustrated at the earlier Figure 1, chapter 1. Here we illustrate how the individual similarly moves. Given their previous bent towards criminality (as discussed earlier) there is a strong possibility that a previous skill set will result in associations with actors of similar history (as per Gill et al. (2014), see chapter 3).

To illustrate this movement perhaps think of a criminal with pre terrorist participation experience of extortion. Following the theories outlined above, there is every likelihood that post radicalisation and arrival with the terrorist group they will strike up, or be driven towards, association with similar characters involved in this activity in support of their terrorist group and find themselves as participants.

There is every likelihood some will remain at either point A or point B, willing participants in terrorist activities, and remain in their territories undertaking these had they travelled to participate.

However, for the disillusioned, and those able to negotiate their exit from (or perhaps escape) from a conflict zone there is point C, with three apparent potential outcomes. The first, wholesale disengagement (and if having travelled a return from where they had travelled); with this disengagement being both from terrorism and their previous life of crime. The second possibility is that of incarceration. Although significant prison sentences await in any democracy those returning from having participated in terrorism, essentially coming home and being caught, these prison terms will end. At this juncture the individual will either become wholly disengaged, or instead move into option 3, that of re-engagement in organised crime.

Option 3 may be considered as being particularly concerning. It suggests a return to previous activity; with the experience and reputation enhancement resulting from terrorist participation that may carry massive negative connotations in general society, but kudos of exceptional worth and operational value in the world of organised crime, and their particular 'sub societies' of relevance. One can also easily imagine those finding themselves incarcerated seeing a return to crime as a positive option on release, their criminal reputation enhanced through terrorist participation likely carrying significant reputational advantage while incarcerated that they can then capitalise on when they move back into external criminal society.

One can also easily see that for those without prior organised crime connections their experience of terrorist activity will likely have provided them with this. From their trafficking into the conflict onwards, and if it is not their enhanced skill base that draws them to this field on their return it may well be a period of incarceration with its likely consequence of a realisation through association with their fellow prisoners that they have a valuable skill set and 'standing' that will be sought by some.

Figure 4.4: Radicalisation to Re-Criminalisation



5.2.4 Thesis Case Studies as Part of the Modelling of Radicalisation to Re-Criminalisation

The model presented in Figure 4.4 appears to apply to both the Caliphites considered in chapter 3, and the dissident terrorists considered in chapter 4.

In relation to the Caliphites, we have a move from contact with criminality in their home in a democratic state, radicalisation, and then travel to a conflict zone where they engage in terrorist behaviour. Withdrawal may be through disillusionment, through an operational need to flee coalition activity or an instruction to return to the democratic states received from the IS hierarchy.

Any of these three may lead to disengagement, incarceration or a return to 'home' territory and re-engagement with previously known networks. The re-integration with enhanced criminal skill set, reputation and contacts appears an entirely reasonable possibility, and initial early evidence (Neve *et. al.*, 2020) indicates that this has occurred. It is accepted that this is only one study so far, however this initial evidence does support the premise of this route to re-criminalisation as a tenable possibility.

When we consider the model in terms of our longer-term terrorists in Scotland, whose activities are connected to the Northern Ireland conflict, more evidence presents.

Although these individuals have not undertaken journeys commensurate in terms of geography with the Caliphites, they have in an ideological sense. Many, such as the murdered alleged terrorist turned self-enricher Alan Ryan (BBC, 04/09/2012), were part of a terrorist group who have leveraged the kudos of this, and the skills acquired, to undertake organised criminality.

In terms of the enhanced reputation terrorist acts provide consider William Campbell of this milieu, the UVF bomber discussed in chapter 4 who was heavily involved in organised crime profiting both himself and his confederates (McKay, 2008). Campbell emerged from prison to a position of some status in the Scottish Loyalist community, with his funeral being attended by thousands, and a mural and plaque being erected in respect of his life in Belfast.

The modelling in Figure 4.4 seems equally applicable to the veterans of FARC (Byrne, 2009), AUC (McDermott, 2013), and the Shining Path (United States House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014), all of whom undertook actions of organised criminality no doubt assisted by their enhanced skill set acquired through their role in terrorist activity.

This degradation from the terrorist cause to criminality, if we can express it as such is not unique to recent conflicts. It was the case with the terrorists of the 'Organisation Armee Secrete' (OAS), who committed many acts of terror during the Algerian civil war (Horne, 1977) and after its conclusion had members who engaged in bank robberies and high profile thefts (Cummins, 2011). However, as we discussed in chapter 3 in respect of Al Qaeda, it is not the case that terrorists have not engaged in criminality previously. Nor, as with the OAS, is it the case that post conflict for some terrorist participants organised criminality with an enhanced skill set is unique.

What we have at present is simply a completely different scale, through a collision of factors. In relation to the terrorism we have learned of in Scotland, as described by Byrne (2009) and research participant's views described in chapter 4, it has been wholly immersed in criminality

for support purposes. This has continued for so long that as the macro conflict waned the need to maintain a veneer of respectability with support groups has grown. However, the self-enrichment activities of a number of participants have allowed the 'cover' to slip. The scale of the criminality a terrorist group engaged in prior to the end of a conflict, such as the multi-million enterprise of FARC (Olaya, 2019), appears to have a direct bearing on its continuance now. FARC continues to dominate 'no go' areas within Colombia, where it remains involved in drug dealing and kidnappings for ransom (di Salvo, 2020).

This 'criminal continuance' at scale has happened during the dissipation of no other terrorist wave, is in no way connected to religion, and is clearly indicative that in contemporary terms the crime terror nexus and our modelling above is indicative of there being change afoot. It may not be certain that a new wave, be that 'identity terrorism', or a phenomena with a differing moniker is upon us but there does appear clear evidence of a paradigm shift occurring which should at least inform the development and enforcement of counterterrorism policy.

The participants in the fourth religious sub wave, discussed in chapter 3, demonstrate a clear degradation of cause alignment and increasing connection to criminality. When considered against what has happened to the participants in the Northern Ireland conflict, and more widely their fellow wave participants who went down the criminality route such as FARC (Byrne, 2009), the Shining Path (United States House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014) and the AUC (McDermott, 2013), makes similar engagement in post conflict criminality very likely, as observed by participant QA.

As Figure 4.4 demonstrates, the participants in these terrorist groups have, as individuals, moved from a starting point of contact with criminality, via a brutalising conflict where they have engaged in further criminality, and back into their original milieu. As discussed at chapter 1, section 1.4, history indicates the likely result of actors (re)involvement in organised crime. With this approach we arguably have arrived at a model demonstrating developments that show the factors capable of influencing an individual participation in or a crime/terror nexus relationship, and that we can see changes in this phenomena meaningful in terrorism's wider context.

Our modelling needs to consider the circumstantial determinants of such a relationship as this helps understand why some, such as 'Hamza', have indeed become involved in organised criminality on return from the conflict zone, while some have wholly disengaged (Neve et al., 2020).

5.3 Factors Affecting a Nexus Relationship

Having established the framework in which these terrorist pathways to criminality are emerging, it is now worthwhile to consider, based on the evidence obtained, the factors influencing how an *'Initial Nexus'* relationship might be established and maintained, where terrorists work with organised criminals. This has direct bearing on the future that may be encountered through the potential waning of Rapoport's (2003) religious wave we have described above.

5.3.1 Culture

The factors necessary for the safe establishment of trust enabling a working relationship to develop between those involved in terrorism and organised crime, such as common lineage, schooling, culture and associations, all exist amongst the pro-Republican and pro-Loyalist sub cultures in Scotland, echoing the views of Van Duyne (1996), and the participants in the study outlined in chapter 4. They are present in many of the Caliphite groups who had multiple members from the same neighbourhoods depart to take part in the recent conflict in the Middle East (Higgins, 2015; Coolsaet, 2016; Neve et al., 2020). Police awareness of these interactions, particularly when they involved past criminality, is also understandable.

Interestingly, the participants in the study discussed in chapter 4 largely drew clear lines of distinction between Irish related terrorism and international terrorism. They could perceive that the potential cultural and social links of the OCG members may have an effect on their behaviour, from the 'kudos' association within these sub cultures that can be attained through their background, allied to the underlying sympathy they may hold with a cause.

Within these 'common cultures' there was though a clear opinion from the participants that, echoing Stuart (2006) in that the Mafia will engage with anyone they will profit from, so too will Scottish OCGs; but only where it is in the OCGs continuing interests. Participants believed that whether an OCG was pre disposed to either cause in Northern Ireland a faction associated to the other side would be acceptable, as long as payment was forthcoming. This appears equally applicable to an OCG with associations to any factions involved in the recent Middle East conflict in terms of the Caliphites. Extrapolation for this as a consideration in respect of *any* OCG and conflict association appears wholly reasonable.

5.3.2 Distance

A clear theme that emerged from the participant study outlined in chapter 4 is 'distance'; the further removed from the terrorist activity the OCG was, the easier it would be to provide ongoing co-operation. It was clear from the answers provided that the participants felt that when criminals were working with terrorists, including those connected to Irish related terrorism, while their activity was to have an impact somewhere out with the vicinity of the OCG they would not be overly concerned. However, when the actions that were to be undertaken had a more direct impact on the closer societal structures around the OCG they would be wholly uncomfortable.

This lack of comfort did not, in the opinion of the participants, arise from any morality but instead from the view point that although driven by profit an OCG would calculate its degree of exposure to law enforcement action and the closer terrorist activity came to the operations of the OCG the more exposed they would become. Business with Caliphite contacts while an OCG is based back in a democracy may be far easier than if Caliphites intend carrying out terrorist activities in the OCG's own sphere of influence and operation. Again, it seems reasonable that extrapolation of this situation to any OCG relationship may be reasonable, and worthy of future consideration.

5.3.3 Deception

It emerged in the research conducted that terrorists currently engaging with OCGs are likely keeping their true purposes a secret, with the OCGs believing they are engaging with peers

rather than those carrying out criminal activity for the funding of terrorism, this behaviour including OCGs of significant standing. The participants had pointed out that the nature of the composition of OCGs perhaps lent itself to such an occurrence. A number of the participants felt that were such deceptions to be discovered the murder of the OCGs contact may well be carried out. Another clear feature that emerged that may explain the position that such action may be warranted, other than to minimise detection, was that although not well known for their moral code OCG members typically, in line with other criminals, are known to have intangible lines of standards in relation to behaviour. A number of participants referred to this, with their citing the issue of paedophilia as an example of criminal behaviour that even for hardened criminals is seen as beyond the pale.

A number of participants believed that terrorist atrocities would be perceived by OCG members in a similar light. If, as appears to be the case, some are being duped regarding the true nature of their relationships with contacts who are involved in terrorism this becomes even more worthy of consideration as a possibility.

5.3.4 Specialists

As the participants related that OCGs can gain new contacts through accessing the same specialists, it is worthy of note that such an intersection may well provide an interface with terrorism. Participants related that persons with known connections to terrorism in Scotland have access to corrupt officials, a relationship OCGs would no doubt wish to benefit from if they were to learn of it. Whichever way this access to specialists was to function the views of the studies participants were clear that were such access to occur it would be controlled; perhaps many degrees removed and likely be well known in terms of purpose by the actor providing access.

5.3.5 Authority Engagement

The participants were clear that if members of an OCG were going to co-operate with the authorities such co-operation would be on their terms. Engagements with the authorities would perhaps be by proxy and would be an effort at self-preservation, where the OCG attempted to gain a favourable position with the authorities, as directly observed by Albini (1975) in his previous study of organised crime in Scotland. An approach by the authorities was seen as being most likely to succeed when the impact on the OCG would be at its minimal. For this to be the case the relationship between the two groups would need to be at its early stages, with the level of connection and trust being low and the financial or other loss to the OCG being minimal. Interestingly, very few of the participants had any reservations around whether the OCG members would co-operate with the authorities. None put forward the position of the OCG member adopting a position of ambivalence to the authorities, other than in relation to a likely lack of co-operation from OCGs who were involved in a relationship with a terrorist connected to Irish related terrorism. Beyond this all thought that a calculated response from the OCG member would be forthcoming, with their best interests being their sole concern.

Of note, the solitary contrary opinion related to OCGs and terrorist groups from the same sub culture, the implication of this being there may exist some degree of ‘loyalty’, or at least a stronger affinity, amongst OCGs and terrorists from the same social background. These stronger ties might impact on the pragmatic desire to co-operate with the authorities when this would be in the immediate best interest of the OCG. This ‘loyalty’ could be for a number of reasons, which might include a shared outlook but also equally may be due to a desire to

maintain reputation within a common sub culture. Co-operation with the authorities to the detriment of fellow sub culture members would likely have a significant negative impact on a OCGs reputation within their social grouping. This may have future significant bearing as fourth sub wave participant's re-engage with their networks and social groups in democracies. This 'loyalty' may prove particularly dangerous, and see OCGs in the returned terrorists circles prepared to carry out activities that in the past they would have baulked at. This appears a potential alteration of significant import if we are indeed moving past Rapoport's (2003) fourth wave, and the degradation of previous participant's increases.

5.3.6 Threat from Non-Indigenous Groups

It was put forward that non-indigenous OCGs are the main threat in Scotland. This may seem at odds with the information provided to the effect that such groups have no known connections to terrorism and that those in Scotland known to be linked to terrorism have no known associations with such OCGs. The answers provided by the participants and the literature available the non-indigenous threat argument is a strong one.

Authors, including Perri et al (2009) point to minority immigrant communities as being difficult to police and also their being fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist participants (Sageman, 2005). It was contended that organised criminals are only interested in profit, a similar feature ascribed to all OCGs by Dishman (2001), and a number of participants in the study.

Where this appears to be particularly insightful though is the illustration of such OCGs in chapter 4 is lack of 'loyalty' to Scotland. What this means is not a lack of an embracing of Scottish culture, but rather that with little or no cultural bonds to the country their activities in pursuit of profit could be far more extreme than those of OCGs with connections to the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists groups. OCGs members with ties to Irish related terrorism have typically grown up in Scotland and have wide social networks here while recent émigré groups have no such foundation. As the participants in the chapter 4 study alluded to a growing discomfort amongst OCG members when their contact brought their activities 'close to home' one can see how such a feeling would certainly be in no way as relevant amongst a recent émigré OCG. The consequences of a terrorist action in Scotland would have far less impact on their wider social group and their lack of background within the community would make their detection all the more unlikely.

When we consider the sheer volume of immigrant and diaspora actors amongst the lone wolf terrorists identified in 2016 discussed in chapter 2, and the fourth sub wave Caliphites of chapter 3 this lack of 'social connectedness' has increasing resonance.

This is of course in no way to cast diaspora and refugee communities as symptomatic generators of terrorists. These communities around the world number in the hundreds of millions while the number of terrorists remain in the thousands. However, as we have seen in chapter 2 and 3 terrorism appears to be changing, and we cannot ignore these connections; particularly when they have resonance with circumstances hundreds of years old in the shape of the diaspora connected to terrorism in Scotland.

5.3.7 Incarceration

All the participants believed that incarceration was a key point for new interactions to occur. As recent émigré OCGs become known to law enforcement in their new country of operation, so they may become incarcerated. Through their incarceration they are likely to encounter individuals involved in terrorist causes, likely through work as 'front' funding criminal work. Such interaction may have disastrous consequences for Scotland, as a new type of 'initial nexus', far removed from that of the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists could be formed. The Caliphites who return from the conflict zone and do not manage to escape detection are likely to also be incarcerated in their home democracy, where interaction with OCG members is almost inevitable. Again, we have a new factor to consider as we assess the impact of the degradation we see occurring within Rapoport's (2003) religious wave, and the changes it may be bringing about.

These factors, and those discussed throughout the thesis so far, combine to make the model at Figure 4.4 possible as a representation of these influences and findings:

Figure 4.4: Factors affecting the 'Initial Nexus'



5.3.8 Factors affecting the 'Initial Nexus' - Model Discussion

While it would be impossible to capture all idiosyncrasies of an organised criminal's decision making process, this model seeks to illustrate the main internal and external factors that will influence their decisions in seeking to undertake and maintain this form of 'high tariff' relationship.

External Factors

The main External Factors that will affect the ongoing 'initial nexus' relationship are:

- Increased/ Decreased Law Enforcement Interest – The level of law enforcement activity will be directly commensurate to the actions those participating in the initial nexus can undertake without potential and/or actual interdiction or arrest.
- Media Interest – The amount of media interest will impact on the ability of the initial nexus participants to carry out mutually beneficial activities without public knowledge.
- Deception – The degree to which either party have been misled in an initial nexus relationship will have a bearing on the degree to which they co-operate and discovery of the deception will have a direct impact on continuing trust.
- Changing World Events – From the man made to the natural (such as earthquakes, tsunamis and disease) calamitous world events may prove disastrous or advantageous to any initial nexus relationship.

These external factors will combine to affect the decision-making process of the organised criminal.

For the organised crime group themselves the following Internal Factors are of relevance:

- Individual – The psychological makeup of the participants in the organised crime group or in a strictly controlled group, its leader, will have a direct bearing on the relationship. The attitude to risk, personal identification with the particular terrorist cause, any controlling 'red lines' on behaviour and an individual desire for cultural and/or widespread notoriety (or perceived adulation) will all be determining factors.
- Reputation – The degree to which knowledge of the initial nexus relationship has a positive or negative affect on the Organised Crime Groups standing amongst criminal peers and 'relevant wider society'.
- Distance – How closely the terrorist group acts to the location of the organised crime group and their wider 'society' will be of direct relevance to all relationship calculations.
- Profit – The degree to which the organised crime group is dependent on the initial nexus relationship to continue its funding and any alternative revenue streams that are available as a contingency if the relationship is discontinued will be relevant.
- Co-operation - The extent to which the initial nexus relationship impacts upon the organised crime groups operations, through for instance security of commodity routes or expert knowledge of explosives will require to be considered.
- Incarceration – the positive (or negative) impact of interactions occurring through shared incarceration, or the impact on the relationship arising through the incarceration of key participants.

Combined these internal and external factors form a balance sheet of competing considerations from which the organised criminal contemplating entering or maintaining an initial nexus relationship with a terrorist group will consider.

This model is not exhaustive but shows from the research to date that contemplation of such a relationship does not amount to a purely profit based calculation. For the organised criminal monetary gain may indeed be the driving factor, but it is far from the only consideration.

5.3.9 'Initial Nexus' Relationships – Additional Considerations

There are particular nuances to this relationship, this 'initial nexus' between those involved in terrorism and organised crime, which can be drawn out further. These are indicated in Figure 4.5 below.

In this model the following potential make up of these relationships is considered in turn:

'Initial Nexus Relationship A'

Within Relationship A the OCG and Terrorist group members are from the same cultural background and the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings. An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated PIRA members and Scottish origin OCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré community.

Such an association may have strong bonds: trust through common views, shared backgrounds and ease of 'referencing' through common associates or known past activities (criminal or otherwise) would be likely. The 'kudos' element that might occur from such a relationship within the shared sub culture would also be of relevance.

'Initial Nexus Relationship B'

Within Relationship B the OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds however the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings.

An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated UVF members and Scottish origin OCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré community.

There are obvious negative features of such a relationship, such as contrary viewpoints and detrimental opinions of the OCG or Terrorist group might occur were the details of the relationship to become known in their sub cultures. However, 'trust' gained through known past activities (criminal or otherwise) and shared associations would be very likely.

'Initial Nexus Relationship C'

Within Relationship C the OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of one party only would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping. An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is non-Scottish

origin al Qaeda inspired terrorists and Scottish origin OCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré community.

Trust and 'referencing' in the establishment of such a relationship would likely be difficult.

'Initial Nexus Relationship D'

Within Relationship D the OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of neither party would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping.

An example of a confluence that would meet this criteria are non-Scottish origin al Qaeda inspired terrorists and non-Scottish origin OCGs, such as Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups.

As with Relationship C trust and 'referencing' in the establishment of such a relationship would likely be difficult.

Figure 4.5 Variant Initial Nexus Relationship Constructions



'Initial Nexus Relationship A'

Within Relationship A the OCG and Terrorist group members are from the same cultural background and the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings.

'Initial Nexus Relationship B'

Within Relationship B the OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds however the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings.

'Initial Nexus'

'Initial Nexus Relationship C'

Within Relationship C the OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of one party only would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping.

'Initial Nexus Relationship D'

Within Relationship D the OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of neither party would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping.

5.3.10 Variant Initial Nexus Relationship Constructions – Discussion

Although one can in no way be definitive regarding how OCGs will behave, as individuals with their own particular foibles and morality constitute each group differently, one can see how the argument that Initial Nexus Relationship D would be more dangerous is one worthy of consideration.

The nature of OCGs businesses, such as the example of Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups, inherently harm the communities in which they are based, through the illicit commodity they produce but also through the further criminal elements they attract to the business when it is a success and the risks their criminality brings both through disputes that may affect the wider public but also through their methods. The exemplar Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups typically jury rig electrical systems that are massive fire risks with no consideration of those who neighbour properties they are utilising for their businesses. When one takes the status quo elements of OCG behaviours and couple them with a group whose members have a minimal past in a particular area the common tactics of law enforcement to track an individual are greatly reduced, which non-indigenous OCG members are very well aware of, and align to this a lack of social connection through a 'past', i.e. a lack of family or friends in the host community provides an absence of impact of criminality of the non-indigenous OCGs behaviour on persons they might feel restrained from allowing be harmed the dangers of 'Initial Nexus Relationship D' become all too apparent. It is the added disconnection from the society of operation that provides the increased danger.

This 'disconnection from society' appears to pervade the degraded terrorists from the conflict related to Northern Ireland, the Caliphites and the lone wolf terrorists subject of consideration in chapter 2. It appears a common thread of change that links them all, indicative of the changes to the religious wave that appear manifest.

The 'criminal code' alluded to by a number of the research participants may also have an impact regarding each of the 'initial nexus relationships' listed and understood better within these conceptual frameworks. Perhaps, such a code is, to a degree, in fact an innate link between the criminal and their wider community values, where although their criminality may cross the normal bounds of wider societal behaviour the 'code' constrains behaviour within their sub groups. If this were to be the case one can see how such a 'code' would impact on interactions with contacts out with the OCG and have differing effects dependent on which of the relationships, from A to D, the OCG were engaged in. Deception would also be key, and if the OCG were to perceive their relationship to be simply a criminal relationship between differing origin OCGs, while it was instead, through deception, a relationship with terrorists, type C, this could be significantly impactive on the continuing nature of their interactions.

Deception could also be highly impactive on group D associations that might develop in prisons. Many terrorist groups have criminal 'fronts', for fundraising and other purposes. Individuals detected for such activity may well be incarcerated for criminal offences, with no indication of their terrorist links being uncovered by the authorities. Such individuals would then enter the prison system being perceived as serious criminals only. Any associations with other serious criminals that then occurred in the prison system would only be seen in this context and possible relationships would be thought of as criminal in nature. They may well appear as such even to the OCG with whom the relationship has been formed, as discussed above.

The views of participant QI discussed in Chapter 3 seem to be very logical, in that it is likely it will be OCG 'foot soldiers' who have been seduced by the lure of IS. This is supported by the study conducted by Neve et al. (2020). However, this in no way mitigates the potential risk these individuals may pose in future. If one accepts that it is the young OCG members travelling (and returning) these individuals will likely have long criminal careers ahead, careers very different in terms of reach and capability from those of the fellow OCG members they left behind. These individuals will be returning with enhanced reputations in criminal circles, knowledge of international illicit distribution networks and tradecraft tested in the crucible of intense conflict. It may well be the case as participant QG points out that other indigenous OCGs may be wary of these returnees. From the research presented they likely would have good cause to be so, but this may well not be enough to avoid 'doing business'.

As discussed above Naim's (2013) 'more and mobility' revolution has already shown us how an increasing number of malevolent actors are interfacing and interacting. The (albeit perverse) 'stability' of relationship types A and B, may be giving way to a future where relationships C and D become increasingly common place. The dangers of this appear considerable, and further indication of the changes wrought as we move beyond Rapoport's (2003) religious wave in terms of terrorist behaviour.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has drawn together the case studies in chapters 2, 3 and 4 to consider the main research question, are there commonalities between 'Lone Wolf Terrorists' with participants in crime/ terror nexus relationships, and, if so, what impact do these commonalities have on any classification of contemporary terrorism?

The five-part expanding model illustrated throughout this chapter in Figures 4.1 to 4.5 draws together the factors found through consideration of the available literature in the field and the evidence obtained in chapters 2, 3 and 4.

Terrorism does not take place in a vacuum, socially or politically, and current research acknowledges this, but through the lens of the actions and activities of groups rather than the individuals who compose these groups. The modelling within this chapter takes significant steps to rectify this, by taking Makarenko's (2004) considerations and applying them in a wider and more nuanced fashion to *individuals* as opposed to previous academic consideration of groups.

The central argument advanced in this thesis is that terrorism cannot be understood without first appreciating the place of a terrorist within society as a whole and their particular 'sub societies'. This chapter goes beyond previous works, such Kaplan and Costa (2015) who saw an undertow emerging, by adding a new layer of analysis casting a wider scope for evidence from the 'periphery 'of terrorism research, combining consideration of lone wolf terrorists with other contemporary terrorist actors in tandem rather than in contrast. It does so by arguing that the actions of lone wolf terrorists, which have been extensive and after Kaplan and Costa's work (2015), are meaningful in a wider context in a manner similar to those engaged in terrorist groups. Through recognising the failure to acknowledge this possibility we may have identified at least one reason in the field to accept the changes in Rapoport's (2003) religious wave, and that may be indicative of wider change. Exclude a significant group of actors from consideration and the ability to perceive the change afoot is likely hampered.

This chapter has clearly demonstrated the role of criminality in contemporary terrorism, and consequently the need for its influence to be considered in terms of change to Rapoport's (2003) religious wave. The scale of the global degradation of cause in the interests of self-enrichment amongst contemporary terrorists, and their similarities to members of the fourth religious sub wave, is striking and appears indicative that some form of alteration is at play. Individual interests appear key, and the identified core factors influencing the individual actors in the terrorism milieu provide a means to understand motivations. The increasingly persuasive potential role of 'identity terrorism' appears one worthy of consideration in terms of these seismic changes. It is suggested by this thesis that these factors help uncover what is 'Identity Terrorism' is, and this in turn needs to be taken into account by law enforcement officers countering terrorism in the field as well as those in Parliaments enacting laws aimed at countering terrorism.

In terms of the role of criminality and its ongoing impact, it is of particular note that the experts contacted for opinion on the issue of IS returnees discussed in chapter 3 were unanimous in respect of the danger of these individuals in terms of participation in organised crime. The potential impact on conventional organised crime in democracies of IS returnees should not be underestimated, and any impact they might have on this sub culture surely merits close monitoring.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

6.1 Answering the Research Question

The primary research question this thesis set out to addresses was:

- *Are there commonalities between 'Lone Wolf Terrorists' with participants in Crime/ Terror Nexus relationships, and, if so, what impact do these commonalities have on any classification of contemporary terrorism?*

To answer the research question we need to consider each of the research sub questions in turn, as outlined below.

6.1.1 Answering the Research Sub Questions

This research question was broken down into the following sub-questions:

- *What factors and/or motivations influence individual participation in a 'lone wolf' terrorist attack, and are their actions meaningful in a wider context than that of their own activity?*
- *What factors and/ or motivations influence individual participation in a Crime/ Terror nexus relationship, and are the actions of participants meaningful in a wider context than their own activity?*
- *When the factors/motivations are examined together, are recent changes in 'lone wolf terrorist' attacks and Crime/ Terror Nexus relationships, sufficient to support the argument that there has been a shift beyond Rapoport's religious wave?*

To address this first sub-question "what factors and/or motivations influence individual participation in a 'lone wolf' terrorist attack, and are their actions meaningful in a wider context than that of their own activity?" one must examine both parts of the sub-question in turn.

The thesis has identified significant factors that may influence a lone wolf terrorist and discerned a number of motivational contributions that appear to have previously either been overlooked or their significance may be undervalued. Apparent social exclusion of the lone wolf terrorist actors within their immediate societies and sub societies is a cross cutting factor. This thesis has demonstrated these actors overcome this exclusion and undertake action against their societies through intellectual alignment to a counter philosophy, however nonsensical this alignment may seem to a rational individual.

Mental health materialises as a clear factor in driving contemporary lone wolf terrorism, and that the actions of those who are ill need to be seen as those of a terrorist when appropriate utilising the definitions outlined. In chapter 2 it was illustrated that dismissal of lone wolf terrorists as outliners, one offs, or exceptions to the established understanding of terrorism as being religiously motivated tended to rely significantly on mental health as a factor to explain the occurrence of the acts perpetrated by lone wolf terrorists. Whilst mental health has a relevance, to rely on it exclusively as the means to explain or rationalise the actions of lone wolf terrorists adopts a shallow understanding of terrorist motivations. This follows the same 'shallow' pattern evident in the existing literature which fails to appreciate the changing nature of terrorist motivations which is only exposed or best exposed by the intersection between

organised crime and the terror nexus this thesis utilises. The examples provided in the thesis, and particularly that studied in depth of Ali Sonboly (who had mental health difficulties but interacted with criminal actors to obtain a firearm prior to his attack), demonstrate that many interested parties, academic and in law enforcement, are quick to dismiss lone actor's actions as having no meaning, particularly when mental health factors are sighted as contributory.

Sonboly's actions in conjunction with the 17 year old Welsh non-Muslim IS adherent are archetypal of the lone wolf terrorists attaching themselves to causes, however bizarre the attachment may seem to a rational actor. In the studies conducted on lone wolf terrorists, it was revealed that there was an overwhelming indicator of a motivational desire amongst terrorists to matter, to achieve notoriety and a connection to events bigger than themselves. The chilling statistic that deaths to lone wolf terrorist actions were greater in 2016 than in the preceding thirty four years is a stark indicator of the significance of this problem.

There will always be difficulties in describing or putting a label to draw significance to those suffering mental health difficulties. In addition there will equally be difficulties in understanding the significance of mental health problems in motivating terrorist actors. This thesis contends that by using the crime/ terror nexus as a prism to understand terrorist motivations in a holistic manner one can begin to unravel these dual difficulties by considering the impact of mental health on the individual and their motivations across all aspects of their particular drivers rather than calling out mental health as a 'catch all' pseudo explanation. Through examining terrorist actors antecedents and the manner in which they align themselves with a cause, however well understood by them that cause might actually be, we gain a far better understanding of terrorism's 'pull' factors on potential participants. To simply dismiss these actors with varying degrees of mental health difficulties, as has occurred in the past, is extremely dangerous. Without understanding the actors to the best degree we can (accepting their mental health condition will limit our full understanding) means that mitigation measures cannot be enacted and we are in danger of these actors numbers continuing to grow.

A core argument advanced in this thesis has been that the motivations of terrorist actors has tended to be overshadowed by a fixation on religion as a primary motivation to explain the occurrence of modern terrorism. It is contended that this fixation on religion as a motivating factor may be contributing towards scholars and counter terrorism professionals not acknowledging the significance of changes in relevant actor's characteristics. This fixation on religion, coupled with a long-time dismissal of lone wolf terrorist activity as meaningful in terrorism's wider context, has resulted in a failure to appreciate that when lone wolf terrorists antecedents and actions are reconsidered it appears that the validity of their part in Rapoport's religious wave is in significant doubt. The sheer volume and lethality of lone wolf terrorist attacks, coupled with the links to terrorist group activities, be that shared espoused motivations (however apparently odd and misplaced), or the strikingly similar antecedents of actors be they lone wolf terrorists or terrorist group members challenges the previous notion that these activities are not meaningful in a wider context. This thesis contends, from the evidence obtained and analysis conducted, that current lone wolf terrorist activity, when looked at in its totality, provides powerful indicators of the factors driving contemporary terrorism; and that commonalities across terrorist actors, if acknowledged, would assist in moving forward understanding of how terrorism is changing, assisting in re-framing considerations of how to mitigate against the phenomena's impact.

In chapter 2 the nuance of the causes driving the contemporary lone wolves is made clear, as is the general lack of religious 'credentials' amongst these actors, which is counter intuitive to

their actions fitting a religious wave. It has been argued in the past that lone wolf terrorists are exception to social movement theory, which would perhaps explain this anomaly. However the actors and their actions as considered in this thesis are clearly linked to national and international conflicts, with actors often demonstrating their connection to 'struggles' through forms of signalling, such as altered social media profiles, manifestos and even commentary on international conflicts during live streaming of attacks. It is accepted that the focus of this study is on one calendar year (2016) and based on information available through 'open source' techniques. That said, given the examples provided in the thesis post the 2016 study, attackers continue to demonstrate factors common to those of actors from the case study. There is no known evidence that undermines the assertion of the relevance and meaning of contemporary lone wolf terrorists activities. However, this thesis acknowledges, as Rapoport (2003) asserted, that terrorism changes and although the activities of lone wolf terrorists may be of striking relevance to the period studied this will likely alter over time. In respect of the use of 'open source' research this is a limitation all scholars of terrorism face, acknowledged at the commencement of this thesis. Given the breadth of the examples provided in the case study there is no likely predictable motivational factor that would be common to the actors identified that would undermine their actions perceived relevance and consequently the use of this technique to gather information appears wholly valid.

Returning to the second part of the sub-question, whether lone wolf terrorist actions are meaningful in a wider context than that of their own activity, on the conceptual scale the actors identified in the 2016 data set of lone wolf terrorists have much in common with those of Rapoport's (2003) first wave, the anarchists. Although this is acknowledged by other authors its significance has arguably been missed or its importance underestimated. This contention rests on the basis of an anomaly between contemporary terrorist actors and those actors in Rapoport's first wave, the anarchists. It can be recalled from chapter 2 where it was explained that the actions and motivations of independently acting (lone wolf terrorist) anarchists constituted Rapoport's 'first wave'. It is contended that there is no logical explanation as to why the actions and motivations of contemporary independent actors cannot be viewed in similar terms to Rapoport's anarchists, or at least viewed as being indicative of significant change being afoot.

Actors with extreme social agendas are emerging for whom it has not, as yet, been possible to properly frame or fully appreciate the geo political context of their actions and motivations. This is in fact what Rapoport (2003) himself envisaged would occur at the conclusion of the religious wave, but remains largely unacknowledged in current academic discourse. The lone wolves, through their rhetoric and actions, clearly perceive themselves as influencing world events and the examples of their post action embrace as fellow travellers by terrorist groups such as IS and National Action clearly shows their actions are indeed meaningful in a wider context than that of their own activity

From here we have the second sub question to consider, "what factors and/ or motivations influence individual participation in a crime/ terror nexus relationship, and are the actions of participants meaningful in a wider context than their own activity?"

The pervasive commonality found in participants in the crime/ terror nexus was evidence of the influence of the impact the relationship had on an individual actors pursuit of *profit*, be that financial, or as is often the case through enhancement of their 'reputation and/or notoriety'. In addition the research has shown further impactive factors that affect the relationship between nexus actors. These are: the individual's characteristics; the influence of culture and sub-

cultures; the distance from operations of activity; whether participants have employed deception; the degree to which the withdrawal of co-operation will impact ongoing activities; and whether actors have experienced incarceration. This factor identification is not presented as exhaustive, however it may be considered at minimum as being a significant achievement by increasing the understanding of the influences on nexus actors.

When set within Rapoport's framework these behaviours are very useful in framing the influences that exist around the wider unacknowledged shift in terrorist behaviour this thesis contends have occurred. The identification of these behaviours makes the modelling of chapter 5 possible, allowing an illustrative approach that increases understanding of nexus interactions. The thesis makes these assertions from its case studies and examples from scholarly work on other contemporary conflicts. These 'commonalities across conflicts' the modelling draws together appear unacknowledged, perhaps due to actors never previously being compared in this manner, but are indicative of the potential wider changes in terrorist behaviour similar to the lone wolf terrorists considered above.

This leads directly into the third sub question, "when the factors/motivations are examined together, are recent changes in 'lone wolf terrorist' attacks and crime/ terror nexus relationships, sufficient to support the argument that there has been a shift beyond Rapoport's religious wave?"

The thesis shows there are indeed commonalities between 'Lone Wolf Terrorists' and participants in crime/ terror nexus relationships, such as a desire for reputational enhancement (be that in specific sub societies or in wider society); a lack of antecedent history indicative of long term attachment to/ understanding of their cause or adherence to previously acknowledged principles; but, set against this a continuing need for actions to be tied to matters of very significant national and international import (such as Northern Irish related terrorists retaining 'legitimacy' by carrying out conflict related actions while there main focus is on organised criminal activity, or lone wolf terrorists who are isolated refugees and adopt IS related rhetoric when undertaking their terrorist actions). There is no previous scholarly endeavour where the two phenomena have been considered *together* in this manner. It is contended that when these two phenomena are considered together they combine to form an analytical lens which can be used to identify changes in terrorist motivations. This change in terrorist motivation may be considered as being symptomatic of a more significant change within terrorism and supports the need to re-evaluate Rapoport's religious wave.

The discussion in chapters 2, 3 and 5 demonstrates that previous work on exploring the motivations of terrorist actors remains fixated on 'religion' as being a primary motivation.

This continued fixation has occurred despite the general literature on terrorism advocating the phenomena's ever changing nature, with Rapoport's (2003) whole thesis being that terrorism is changing over time yet this change in terrorist motivations clearly identified in this thesis appears to have been missed. By considering the individual and their motivational drivers in more detail, a clear picture of the potential new wave of terrorism, 'identity terrorism' emerges.

The thesis does not in any way contend that all terrorism should be understood solely through the prism of individual motivation and influencing factors. Instead, it argues that these should be taken into account in the same manner as macro considerations on group action and drivers. Only through giving due account to the *individuals* who participate in any wave of terrorism can we truly understand its true origin, meaning and objectives.

The thesis is not suggesting that we have moved into some *new* form of terrorism but rather that the current change may have occurred unnoticed by the majority despite a considerable round of literature accepting terrorism changes all the time. The explanation for this oversight may lie in the sheer magnitude of the 9/11 attacks and the religious motivations of their perpetrators. Through the 2 decades of subsequent terrorist attacks that have occurred this may have resulted in a continuing and ongoing focus on 'religiosity' as a motivational explanation, and a widespread belief that we remain within the confines of Rapoport's (2003) fourth wave of Religious Terrorism, with a label of 'exceptionalism' applied to attackers who do not fit the mould of the accepted paradigm This belief appears to run contrary to the evidence presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4, which is indicative of potentially widespread changes to terrorist actor motivations. In addition, while the academic community remain persuaded we are in an ongoing phase of religiously motivated terrorism it also largely considers terrorism in terms of groups, rather than the individuals who constitute these group's memberships, or not as the case may be, yet nonetheless commit acts that fit widely accepted definitions of terrorism.[22]

6.2 Summary of Contribution to Knowledge

Although both the concepts of lone wolf terrorism and the nexus between terrorism and organised crime have been studied at length, the originality of this thesis is the lack of comparative studies of the phenomena and the modelling it provides to assist in understanding the factors driving contemporary terrorist motivation. Doing so provides a unique perspective on modern terrorism. This in turn provides a way to analyse the occurrence of terrorism that can be utilised not only in analysing counterterrorism law and policy but also can help inform its development.

This thesis does so through a focus on the individual motivations towards terrorist activity, while acknowledging the role groups play but seeing them as a collection of the individuals that constitute the cadre rather than a homogeneous body. Much of the current literature focusses on groups, not their participants. Much of the literature on organised crime considers 'profit' purely in monetary terms, not in a wider sense. It is the individualised approach this thesis adopts and illustrates in chapter 5 that unlocks the ability to understand the immersion or alliance with organised criminality that occurs for so many terrorist actors. In turn this new conceptualisation provides a new perspective on the widespread degradation of cause amongst terrorist actors; a worldwide phenomenon that receives scant acknowledgement at the macro level.

Ironically, by focussing on individual actors we are able to see these widespread changes, and understand their significance within Rapoport's (2003) framework. Through this the modelling in the thesis is possible, and provides the reader with a unique means by which to understand contemporary terrorism developments, and its influencing factors.

6.3 Key Conclusions

The key conclusions of this thesis are:

- The antecedents, actions and attributes of contemporary lone wolf terrorists and participants in crime/ terror nexus relationships have significant similarities. This thesis

[22] As discussed in detail at Section 1.4, Chapter 1.

uniquely examined edge phenomena of the crime/terror nexus and lone wolves set within Rapoport's wave theory. In doing so it draws out previously unacknowledged common factors across what, until now, appear wholly disparate terrorist campaigns. From IS, the Real IRA, the far right and FARC common factors amongst the individual participants become clear, particularly when considered set within the modelling this thesis presents in chapter 5. These commonalities present new opportunities for counter terrorism professionals to reconsider the partitioned approach to dealing with adherents to what appear radically different ideologies and instead focus on the individuals espousing their allegiance; perhaps looking for more macro counter measures targeted on the prevalent characteristics amongst participants rather than tackling the apparently all important group narrative of each contemporary terrorist campaign. Tackling individual common circumstances rather than splitting resource and effort across disparate ideologies may prove fruitful.

- Far greater attention to the individualised drivers of terrorist behaviours is required. Only through accepting a wider understanding of 'profit', beyond simply financial gain but also in terms on individualised benefits to those engaged in the activities studied can we gain a true understanding of motivations. Throughout the research contributing to this thesis time and again the issue of 'reputation' and its value in the criminal and terrorist realm were clear. To function in either milieu an appropriate reputation is a necessity as with no formal governance structures all ongoing actions and activity are dictated by culture. The enhancement of 'reputation' in a manner the actor seeks, be that as a lone wolf terrorist seeking some form of media based notoriety and influence, or a arms dealer from within the Irish Republican sub society, is a form of profit. This concept that applies across the two phenomena studies is one that appears to have escaped previous academic consideration to any significant degree. It contains obvious weaknesses within it too, where an actor's reputational degradation by law enforcement through targeted tactics may be a future avenue for research and operational exploitation, accepting the accompanying likely ethical dilemmas that may result.
- The significant changes that appear to have been identified through this research warrant appropriate consideration as to whether Rapoport's (2003) religious wave is indeed still the existent driver for terrorist behaviour, or if instead we have moved beyond this into the age of 'identity terrorism'. While the nomenclature of terrorist organisations such as Islamic State may imply the groups 'raison d'etre' closer analysis of individual members, their actions, apparent motivations and behaviour post conflict necessitate a far more nuanced understanding of their drivers. This reappraisal undertaken in this thesis, placing a variety of actors under scrutiny from a new perspective, clearly shows that the crest of Rapoport's (2003) religious wave has passed and terrorism appears to have moved into new uncharted waters. Counterterrorism law and policy need to adapt to combat the occurrence of contemporary terrorism. If those framing law and policy remain fixated on a religious understanding of terrorism, as this thesis contends is the case for the reasons described above, it is likely that the development of counterterrorism law and policy will not be truly effective in managing the threat contemporary terrorism represents. To analyse contemporary terrorism scholars similarly need to take into account the changes this thesis highlights. The academic study of terrorism can only be accurate if it has a full appreciation of its current manifestation, and retains the ability to refocus as actors motivations change over time.

6.4 The Future and Impact of this Research

The consequence of the research in this thesis has been to develop a framework and agenda for future research analysis in the understanding of contemporary terrorist actor's motivations.

6.4.1 The Crime/Terror Nexus as a Framework for Future Research

The main impact of this research should be to engender a reappraisal of contemporary terrorist motivations. A phenomena can really only be understood when the factors and motivations that drive individual actors within that phenomena are begun to be appreciated. Rapport's (2003) central arguments is that terrorism changes over time, but there has been a reluctance in the literature to acknowledge change and perhaps this reluctance has compromised our understanding of terrorist actor motivations and in turn terrorism.

This thesis has utilised the crime/terror nexus as its foundation to gain a better understanding of contemporary terrorist behaviours. It has proved to be a very useful conceptualisation, and it appears wholly appropriate that the nexus is utilised as a framework for future research in this area. In essence, the crime/terror nexus becomes the starting point for future research on understanding and appreciating the significance of terrorist motivations.

The model that has been provided at Figure 4.4 (Radicalisation to Re-Criminalisation), individualises the path from criminal to terrorist, enhancing the previous work of Makarenko (2004) and is indicative of the potential utilisation of the crime/ terror nexus to drive the understanding of changes in modern terrorism. The model illustrates the key points in this journey and that there is the obvious potential for disengagement. If organised criminals who participate in IS are allowed to return unchecked, and un-shepherded, it is difficult to imagine a situation where they would not slip into their past associations and utilise their new skill sets and contacts for nefarious purposes, as appears to be happening already (Neve et al., 2020).

Through expanding the nexus continuum model from group considerations to focus on individual actors this thesis has demonstrated that terrorists and organised criminals with no cultural affinity to their area of operation have less restraint upon their actions as the direct impact of their activities will not be felt by persons from within their immediate cultures, sub cultures or own circle of interaction, such as friends or family. Co-operation may be largely unrestrained, difficult to detect and lead to increased capability for action resulting from the co-operation by both parties. Appreciation of this risk, not previously highlighted in the literature, may be of significant benefit to law enforcement when considering group targeting with finite resource.

6.4.2 An Agenda of Being Alert to Changes in Motivations to Influence Law and Policy

Given the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks, resulting in the largest loss of life to terrorism so far in a single attack, it is understandable that the focus was on understanding the perpetrators of the atrocity and seeking to counter future attacks by such individuals. However, these attacks were twenty years ago. In the intervening years terrorist behaviours have changed significantly, and as shown in this thesis motivations appear to have clearly moved beyond the religious into a new sphere. The focus on the religiosity may have been appropriate, but there is no denying it has been counterproductive.

The focus on Islam, a religion with 1.9 Billion adherents, as a motivator for terrorist action when it has been a tiny proportion[23] of those claiming membership of the religion has unquestionably been counterproductive. In reframing these oft described 'Radical Islamists' as the Caliphites this thesis contends they are, a significant step away from the previous polarising arguments is possible and may prove of significant benefit to community relations and political debate in addition to academia and law enforcement. This is not a 'rebranding' for any superficial reasons; instead it is a retitling of the threat as it actually stands today. As discussed above, reappraising contemporary motivations of terrorist actors informs law and policy so that counterterrorism becomes better at helping with managing the threat. If we can move thinking beyond the (understandable) fixation on 9/11 and its aftermath it should in future not only be easier to accept the apparent arrival of the phase of 'identity terrorism' we now face but also emphasise the need for watching and preparing for changes in terrorism over time so that we are on the alert for developments and their impacts, both potential (where early mitigation measures can be applied) and actual (where counter measures can be identified and implemented). The modelling illustrated in this thesis should help in this endeavour, but only if it as seen as being a moment in time. The factors it outlines will ultimately change, and with this so to should the model.

A refocussing may well ultimately identify other tangential factors influencing contemporary terrorist actors beyond those posited in this thesis. As this thesis has shown the current weaknesses that exist in understanding of terrorist actor motivation, it surely opens the prospect for new ways of understanding other factors beyond the crime/terror nexus as a basis to begin to really understand motivation over time and its changing nature as well as its impact on terrorism more broadly. This is to the greater good, and far more aligned to Rapoport's (2003) original position on the ever changing nature of terrorism that, as discussed, seems to have been largely neglected over the last 2 decades.

Although it would be nigh on impossible to influence terrorist actors who are returning from conflict zones undetected the same cannot be said of those who are detected and incarcerated. For them there are two areas that must be addressed. Ensuring they do not slip back into their IS ideology and inflict attacks on their country of origin is one, and that which is rightly receiving significant attention. However, of equal import is ensuring that they do not leave prison with their burnished credentials and enhanced skill set to return to the world of crime to cause significantly greater misery and despair than before they left. Impact can be made on this potential outcome, and it would appear incumbent on law enforcement and penal agencies to ensure such concerns are taken into account.

Where safety and ethical concerns could be met further primary research through engagement with organised criminals in respect of their thoughts on co-operation with terrorists and the potential impact of IS veterans would likely prove extremely illuminating in gauging their potential impact in this area; this engagement should of course be accompanied by monitoring of organised crime development in the years ahead to ascertain if IS veterans do indeed become (re)involved in serious criminality. Consideration of other terrorist campaigns would also be very useful in considering the modellings wider relevance. This thesis has demonstrated the utility of using the crime/ terror nexus as a foundation for framing such research that could be undertaken.

[23] The CIA estimated for instance IS, by far the largest ever terrorist group claiming to represent the Muslim faith, at its height had 31,500 members (0.000017%) with 2,000 of these being travellers from out with Syria and Iraq. (Nicks, 2014)

This thesis contends there has to be acceptance that mental health is a factor in influencing contemporary terrorism, and that the actions of those who are deemed 'ill' need to be seen as those of a terrorist when appropriate. Only through this acceptance will a true picture of the terrorist threat that is faced be possible, and will there be the possibility for international progress in identifying treatment and preventative measures for those who are ill. If not, we may well face a descent into the spiral identified by Bhui et al. (2014), which will see the actions of lone wolf terrorists grow exponentially. The author accepts that such a change in tack will require a considerable refocusing of resource in a number of disciplines, including but not limited to, social work, mental health, counterterrorism, and criminal justice. However, the prevalence of mental health issues amongst terrorist participants cannot be ignored, and moving this dialogue into a more mainstream acceptance of the issue is the only way progress can be made.

There has to be some soul searching over the place of the criminal in society where we had the situation that embarking on an apocalyptic mission in Syria was a more attractive option to many than seeking reformation, inclusion and legitimisation is one's home state. The potential ongoing triumvirate of Terror, (Organised) Crime and Mental Health is of particular concern given the potential spiralling dire consequences of such a combination.

As stated above, terrorism functions at the political zeitgeists razor edge. Identity is the topic that undoubtedly currently sits astride this keenest of positions in the democracies. Unless we face this, and look to mitigate against extreme positions across the political spectrum the focus on identity is creating the relatively small number 'Identity Terrorists' may soon pose far more significant issues than the relatively minor threat they pose today.

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8. Abbreviations

AUC - United Self Defence Force of Colombia
CAL - Caliphite
CHIS - Covert Human Intelligence Source
CPS - Crown Prosecution Service (UK)
DEA - Drug Enforcement Agency (USA)
DNA - Deoxyribonucleic Acid
ELN – National Liberation Army (Colombia)
FARC - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigations (USA)
IS – Islamic State
MI5 – Military Intelligence 5, aka Security Service (UK)
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
New IRA – New Irish Republican Army
OCG - Organised Crime Group
PIRA – Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKK - Kurdistan Worker's Party
PSNI - Police Service of Northern Ireland
PSP - Police, Social services and Psychiatric information sharing service (Denmark)
Real IRA – Real Irish Republican Army
RICO - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act
UDA – Ulster Defence Association
UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN – United Nations
USA – United States of America
UVF - Ulster Volunteer Force
XRW - Extreme Right Wing
YPG - Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units