MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Ingham, Hilary and Thompson, Steve (1995) MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57 (3). pp. 295-308. ISSN 0305-9049

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Abstract

ABSTRACTS The determinants of CEO compensation within the UK Building Society sector are investigated. Using an unbalanced panel data set for the period 1986–90, we find only weak support for the existence of a positive link between performance and CEO remuneration. In contrast we find age to be an important determinant of CEO pay increases. This finding reinforces the oft noted potential for inefficiencies in mutuals. Given that alternative market based control systems are absent, our results suggests that there is a lack of any mechanism to align owner and manager interests in the UK building societies.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1800/1804
Subjects:
ID Code:
161166
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
19 Oct 2021 09:35
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
19 Nov 2021 12:04