Impoliteness and hate speech: Compare and contrast

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Abstract
Both impoliteness and hate speech deal with offensive behaviour, yet it is also obvious that they are not exactly the same. This paper aims to tease out the similarities and differences. The first part concentrates on theorising by impoliteness and hate speech scholars, and thus takes a second-order perspective. It discusses the notions of face (largely overlooked in studies of hate speech), incitement (largely overlooked in studies of impoliteness) and intentionality (and related concepts) (examined in both studies of impoliteness and hate speech, though often without explicit connections to the other field). The second part of the paper concentrates on the metapragmatics of the labels impoliteness and hate speech, which are approached through the terms impolite and hateful. Hateful, in comparison with impolite is characterised by more extreme behaviours, the emotion of hurt, and associations of prejudice. This part of the paper also provides a demonstration of what one can do with corpus-methods. Overall, it is hoped that this paper will promote theoretical synergies, and also greater awareness of the labels that are used.

Keywords
Impoliteness, hate speech, face, incitement, intentionality, metapragmatics

1. Introduction
The 2020 special issue, “Hate speech: Definitions, Interpretations and Practices” (Pragmatics and Society 11 (2)) clearly establishes hate speech as the business of pragmatics. However, in all seven papers there is but one reference clearly connected with work on impoliteness, a field with roots in linguistic pragmatics. This gives the impression that hate speech and impoliteness deal with different things. The aim of this paper is to probe the truth of the matter. That aim is made somewhat more difficult by the fact that there is not just one definition of what either encompasses. Hate speech, Baider et al. (2020: 171) write, “defies standardized definition”, and, regarding impoliteness, Locher and Bousfield (2008: 3) write that “there is no solid agreement […] as to what ‘impoliteness’ actually is” (a situation that is arguably worse now than it was then). Consequently, what follows in this paper does not suggest what is similar or different about hate speech and impoliteness as wholes (even if that were possible). Instead, it highlights some areas of similarity/difference and offers a “take” on the issues.

Broadly, this paper is organised into two parts. The first, taking more of a second-order approach (orientating to the perspective of the scientific analyst), considers notions that have been discussed by scholars with either or both hate speech and impoliteness as a focus. It will present snapshots of issues relating to face (strong in impoliteness studies, but not hate speech), incitement (strong in hate speech studies, but not impoliteness) and intentionality and broadly related concepts (strong in both).¹ The second, taking more of a first-order

¹ This sentence makes claims about "impoliteness studies" and "hate speech studies". As already stated, these are rather amorphous areas of study, a situation probably made worse by their multidisciplinarity. However, they are characterised by particular traditions and tendencies. Impoliteness studies very much has its roots in sociopragmatics, developing, at least initially, as a kind of contrastive model to Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory. Hate speech, despite its relevance to linguistics and pragmatics, does not have such roots. Its centre of gravity is in legal studies, though often interfacing with linguistics. This is seen in the fact that
approach (orientating to understandings articulated by the layperson), focuses on the terms
*hate speech*, *impoliteness*, and more particularly *impolite* and *hateful*, as metalinguistic items. This section demonstrates an approach that has been applied to impoliteness-related terms, but not, as far as I am aware, hate speech-related terms.

2. Impoliteness and hate speech: Second-order aspects

2.1 Face

Jeremy Waldron, a notable legal philosopher, writes in his book, *The Harm in Hate Speech* (2012), that hate speech aims:

> to compromise the dignity of those at whom it is targeted, both in their own eyes and in the eyes of other members of society. […] It aims to besmirch the basics of their reputation, by associating ascriptive characteristics like ethnicity, or race, or religion with conduct or tribute should disqualify someone from being treated as a member of society in good standing. (2012: 5).

No theoretical underpinnings are mentioned, and no mention is made of the notion of face, a notion which is also absent from the special issue on hate speech mentioned at the beginning of this paper. In contrast, face has populated many impoliteness studies, especially in the early days (e.g. (e.g. Lachenicht 1980; Austin 1990; Author 1; Bousfield 2008). Interestingly, the words “both in their own eyes and in the eyes of other members of society” echo an important aspect of Goffman’s (1967) definition of face, namely, that it is not just the positive values that you yourself want, but what you can claim about yourself from what *others* assume about you. As Goffman (1967: 5) puts it, face concerns “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact”.

In the quotation from Waldron (2012: 5), it is important to note the centrality of specific identity aspects: “ethnicity, or race, or religion”. It seems to be a commonality of hate speech definitions that they “must target an individual or group on the basis of so-called ‘protected characteristics’, such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, and so on” (Baider et al. 2020: 172). A key difference between studies of hate speech and studies of impoliteness is that impoliteness is not thus restricted. Perhaps this is why the notion of face is not much in evidence in hate speech literature, as discussions of face in traditional (im)politeness studies have typically revolved around the personal qualities of an individual, such as goals, achievements or possessions (all mentioned in Brown and Levinson 1987: 63). However, this limited conception of face experienced a backlash from scholars studying non-Western cultures, who pointed out the importance of “group face” (e.g. He and Zhang 2011; Nwoye 1992). More recent research has explicitly accommodated group membership in the notion of face. Spencer-Oatey (e.g. 2000), for example, proposed different types of face, one of which is “social identity face”. This involves any group that a person is a member of and is concerned about. This can include small groups like one’s family, and larger groups like one’s ethnic group, religious group or nationality group. (Spencer-Oatey 2005: 106)

linguistic approaches to hate speech often quote and/or critique legal texts. It is also why hate speech is often considered part of forensic linguistics.
Clearly, then, the specific group membership characteristic of hate speech can be accommodated. It is also worth briefly noting that some theorists (e.g. Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2009, 2013), have proposed that identity and face co-constitute each other, and together are involved in (im)politeness assessments.

2.2 Incitement
As far as scholarly discussions of impoliteness are concerned, the notion of incitement seems completely absent, though it fits their purview, involving as it does face-attack, norm violation, inappropriacy, social harm, and so on (all possible features of impoliteness; see the definitions in Author 5: 19-20). Perhaps the reason for this is that incitement occurs rather rarely in the data selected for analysis of impoliteness, unlike that selected for analysis of hate speech. It is an empirical question as to whether this is true (I am not aware of any studies that have systematically addressed it), but I believe it to be so. Note that scholars’ selections of their data may well be coloured by what they believed to be the remit of the terms impoliteness and hate speech. This will be relevant to the examination of those terms in section 3. Certainly, we can say that, in contrast with impoliteness studies, incitement is central in hate speech studies. In fact, possibly uniquely, the notion of incitement is part of the Italian label for hate speech, incitamento all’odio. Assimakopoulos (2020: 178) notes that many legal definitions of hate speech are framed in terms of “incitement to discriminatory hatred”. Incitement is often approached with speech act theory (see, notably, Kurzon 1998 and Assimakopoulos 2020).

I will briefly air some issues by starting out from two examples of incitement reported in Author et al 3.²

1. [shouted] let’s kill him

2. GET THEM OUT OF OUR COUNTRY

Both, as far as could be ascertained from the data, were uttered to the victims by one member of a group of transgressors. In my view, incitement has considerable similarity with threats, another speech act frequent in hate speech (see Author et al 3). Fraser (1998:171) proposes that for the speech act of threatening

the speaker must intend to express by way of what is said

(1) the intention to personally commit an act (or to see that someone else commits the act);

(2) the belief that the results of that act will affect the addressee in an unfavourable way;

(3) the intention to intimidate the addressee through the awareness of the intention in 1.

If we change the first condition to just the part in brackets, the intention “to see that someone else commits an act”, we come much closer to incitement. Unlike threats, note that incitement, as O’Driscoll (2020: 91) points out, has a minimum of three participants, and that the inciter is issuing a kind of directive to the incitee, which simultaneously intimidates the target. In some way, incitement is a complex illocutionary act, a multivalent act with different

² Author et al 3 presents a study based on data from England and Wales’s Crown Prosecution Service records for all prosecuted cases flagged as ‘religiously aggravated’ in the 2012-13 financial year and tried in the Crown Courts.
pragmatic values for different participants. Fraser (1998: 162) notes that the threat does not depend on whether the intimidation, instilling fear, is successful or not, because that is the perlocutionary effect of the threat. Similarly, some researchers (e.g. Assimakopoulos 2020, Kurzon 1998; MacDonald and Lorenzo-Dus 2020) argue that the crucial thing with the incitement of hate is the illocution, because incitement can happen without the potential victim being aware of it, but not without the illocution. This being so, we need to change the term “addressee” in (2), as that may suggest a simple trajectory of communication, as in face-to-face communication, from the speaker/writer as addressor to the addressee. 3 “Target” would be a possibility. 4

Fraser (1998: 163) proposes three preparatory conditions that would make a threat felicitous, and the first is applicable to incitement: the speaker believes that they can perform the unfavourable act (for incitement, that they can get someone else to perform the act). Interestingly, Tedeschi and Felson (1995: 202-206) note, with regard to threats, that the perception of the willingness and ability to carry them out results in greater compliance. For incitement, I would suggest that the result would be greater intimidation. Fraser (1998: 167) also points out that a “threat is never explicitly stated but must always be inferred”. Similarly, the idea of a direct form of incitement has difficulties (Kurzon 1998: 36; MacDonald and Lorenzo-Dus 2020: 491-93). The fact that illocutions (with their emphasis on intention) are key and that incitement is indirect makes incitement much more difficult to evidence (see also the discussion of intention in Section 2.3) – this is a real challenge for law makers and enforcers. Witness the difficulties in prosecuting ex-President Donald Trump for inciting the Capitol Hill riots.

There is, however, a further difficulty. Assimakopoulos (2020: 189) argues that the intention expressed in incitement is:

\[
\text{to negatively influence an audience’s attitude and/or behaviour towards one or more individuals on the basis of some shared protected characteristic, while offering a perspective in relation to this characteristic that not everyone already agrees with.}
\]

The analysis in the previous paragraphs revolved around acts (see condition (1)), and does not capture the role of hate speech in negatively influencing attitudes. Hate speech can be about engineering a specific behaviour (and one that may be relatively easily captured as an offence in legal frameworks), but it can also be about engineering a particular change in mind. In this light, it is more about persuasion, which opens up a complex area. 5 At its broadest, some scholars have argued the mere performance of hate speech constitutes harm, regardless of intentions, because it can alter what is considered permissible or normal (see, for example, MacGowan’s 2004; Langton 2018). Interestingly, “specific act oriented incitement” seems to draw on Searlean speech act theory, whereas “attitude change oriented incitement” seems to draw on Austinian speech act theory. More recently, however, O’Driscoll (2020: 91; but see also 87-90, 115-120 and 135-140) has put forward useful proposals which take a Searlean approach, yet accommodate vague, unspecified incitement (and related speech acts, notably, what he calls “menacing espousals”).

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3 Goffman (1981: 133), for example, defines the addressee as “the one to whom speaker addresses his visual attention”.

4 The use of the term "target" is consistent with a Searle-type approach and an emphasis on intention. In the final paragraph of this section, I mention approach that in which the mere performance of hate speech constitutes harm, regardless of any kind of illocutionary intent. Here, in this frame “victim” would be the better term.

5 For an excellent speech act theoretic discussion of persuasion, or as they put it “encouragement”, in relation to acts of terrorism, see MacDonald and Lorenzo-Dus (2020).
2.3 Intentionality, foreseeability and accountability

Intentionality has been an important issue in impoliteness studies for decades. A touchstone here is Goffman (1967: 14), who distinguishes offences with the “intention of causing open insult”, offences that are “incidental” by-products, and those that are accidental, “unintended and unwitting”. Impoliteness scholars in the 1990s and early 2000s seized upon intention as a means of identifying “genuine” impoliteness. The role of intentionality is especially clear in Bousfield’s (2008: 72; my emphasis) definition of impoliteness:

Impoliteness constitutes the communication of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive verbal face-threatening acts which are purposefully delivered: (1) unmitigated […], and/or (ii) with deliberate aggression […]

However, as we move towards 2010, positions are changing. This was partly because of the increasing weight of work on intention and intentionality (e.g. Gibbs 1999; Haugh 2008), pointing out that the Gricean notion that intentions exist a priori in the minds of speakers was untenable (e.g. they may emerge in interaction), but also because of contrary findings within impoliteness studies. Both Author 5 and Gabriel (1998) give evidence that sometimes people both construe an act as both unintentional and offensive; in other words, impoliteness does not have to be fully intentional, whether from a speaker or hearer perspective, in order to achieve offensive effects (and, in fact, as Author 5 evidences, such acts can also be labelled as rude or impolite by the public). Author 5 argues that not all impoliteness is intentional, because sometimes the producer of impoliteness is not aware of the offensive effects they are causing, and being aware is a key part of the notion of intentionality (Malle and Knobe 1997). Moreover, Author 5 argues that foreseeability is key. The producer can be blamed for not predicting possible offensive effects (see Ferguson and Rule 1986, on attributions of blame). In the data reported in Author 5, offence tends to taken more frequently in close relationships where one person is likely to think that the other one should have known better (i.e. should have foreseen the effects).

These issues are mirrored in hate speech scholarship. According to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Section 28.1, quoted in the Law Commission Report, 2014, No.348, Section 2.3), an aggravated offence is deemed to have taken place if:

(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group; or

(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group.

This has raised concerns that (a) might "unfairly capture offenders who unthinkingly 'demonstrate' hostility in the 'heat of the moment'" (Walters 2013: 63), and indeed in some legal cases the defence has argued lack of intention (Walters 2013: 63). In other words, cases might be construed as more a matter of incidental and/or accidental offence. But motivation, as captured in (b), is no less problematic. Motivation is not the same as intention, as it concerns the reasons why someone might intend something, whereas an intention also involves a plan of action to achieve the intention. Reasons for doing something are very difficult to prove. Walters’s (2013: 70, original emphasis) solution is to suggests that what matters is not intention but that "the offender intends to express the insult and is aware that to
do so will likely demean the victim's identity. Awareness of the likelihood of something is of course a matter of foreseeability.

Foreseeability seems to have some traction in British law because of its formulation that hate speech is that which is “likely to stir up hatred” (Waldron 2012: 35). However, the notion of foreseeability is not without its problems. Hate speech usually occurs outside the kinds of close relationships noted by Author 5 with all their relative predictability. As Marchand (2010: 144, quoted in MacDonald and Lorenzo-Dus 2020: 487) notes:

> It is unreasonable to expect an individual to foresee or ascertain how a statement will be perceived due to the diverse potential audience and subjective, personal interpretation of the statement

One further notion deserves mention. Assimakopoulos (2020: 190, my emphasis) writes of incitement that

> what matters is whether the speaker can be held accountable for producing hate speech, the relevant focus is on the intention revealed by the speech act, rather than the speaker’s actual intention.

Accountability frees the establishment of hate speech from the impossible task of proving the speaker’s actual intention. Assimakopoulos (2020) does not expand on the notion of accountability, but it is certainly a useful notion that is gaining increasing attention in pragmatics. As Kadar and Haugh (2013:119) point out for politeness (and the same would presumably apply for impoliteness):

> the real-world consequentiality of understandings of politeness is a function of the way in which participants can be held accountable for social actions and meanings, and thus the evaluations that are reflexively occasioned by them, in interaction.

### 3. Impoliteness and hate speech: First-order aspects

One approach to studying impoliteness and hate speech is to consider their metapragmatics, and, more specifically, their metalanguage. The role of metalanguage has had a presence on the agenda of (im)politeness scholars for some time. Eelen (2001) and Watts (2003) claim that classic politeness theories (e.g. Brown and Levinson 1987) ignore the layperson’s usage of politeness terms and what they might mean, and thus also the opportunity to put (im)politeness studies on a firmer ontological footing. In practice, those scholars did little to study politeness terms themselves. Over the last decade, however, there has been an increase in research attention, and especially on impoliteness. Studies include: Author 4 and Author 5: chapter 3, Waters (2012) Taylor (2015, 2016, 2017), Author et al 2, and Bou-Franch (2020). Corpus methods have dominated these studies, not surprisingly, because corpus methods are the default choice for lexicographers mapping the semantic space of words. Of course, we should bear in mind that concepts do not straightforwardly align with the meanings of words, as Haugh (2016: 45) points out:

> while words are indexical to concepts, concepts do not inhere in words. That is, the ‘meanings’ of named concepts are not limited to the use of a word, nor are concepts limited to that which can be named.
My initial aim was to map the meanings of the terms *impoliteness* and *hate speech*. Unfortunately, there are problems. In the 2,073,319,589 word Oxford English Corpus (OEC), containing multiple genres dating from 2000 to 2006, *impoliteness* occurs a paltry 46 times (0.02 instances per million), and *hate speech* 1,713 times (0.7 instances per million). Author 5: 80 argues that it is the low frequency of *impoliteness* “makes it an ideal candidate for the semantic areas covered by all the other terms”; in other words, an ideal second-order term. The problem with *hate speech* is of a different kind, but related. The following are three examples extracted from the OEC by the GDEX tool within Sketch Engine (https://www.sketchengine.eu/), a browser-based collection of corpora and analytical tools:

That is the reason the committee decided to separate that category out and call an inquiry into *hate speech*.

There was bipartisan agreement on the committee to hold an inquiry into *hate speech*.

Where is the line between humor and *hate speech*?

It is clear from these examples that *hate speech* is typically “mentioned” rather than “used”. In other words, it is a second-order term used by legislators and the like, rather than a first-order term, which is the focus in this section.

To circumvent these problems, this study draws a contrast between *impolite* (1,020 instances; 0.42 per million) and *hateful* (4,197 instances; 1.73 per million). These are still low numbers, but they are at least frequent enough for indicative conclusions. Furthermore, these terms are not restricted to second-order use or to a particular genre (and belong to the same part of speech, which facilitates comparison). Of course, *hateful* is not only focussed on *speech*, but, nevertheless, it may offer preliminary insights into the semantic “flavour” of the expression *hate speech*. The analyses deploy the Word Sketch tool in Sketch Engine. Many corpus studies probe the meanings of a word by examining its co-occurring words, and identify, through statistical measures, those that have a strong association, i.e. its collocates. Word Sketch does this too, but also examines 27 grammatical relations and uses the statistic logDice (Rychlá 2008) to assess the strength of the collocates within a particular relation and rank-order them. Such grammatical relations help tease out regular contextual dimensions of use. More specifically, because the aim is comparison, I have used Word Sketch Difference, which generates two Word Sketches and then compares them. Figures 1 and 2 display visualisations of the Word Sketch Difference results for the two grammatical relations which were most densely populated by collocates. The size of the circles and of the collocate text is proportional to the frequency of the collocate; the colours in the circles containing collocates indicate whether the collocate is more frequent in the *impolite* or *hateful* relationship; the positioning of the circles horizontally indicates the strength of the collocation, i.e. whether it forms a stronger collocate with *impolite* (on the right) or *hateful* (on the left), or whether it is somewhere in between.

Figure 1 displays the collocating conjuncts with which *impolite* and *hateful* cooccur.

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6 GDEX automatically identifies examples, on the basis of “length, advanced vocabulary, sufficient context, pronouns pointing outside of the sentence and other criteria”, that are “easy to understand and illustrative enough to serve as Good Dictionary Examples” (see https://www.sketchengine.eu/guide/gdex/).
In Figure 1, undiplomatic and impolitic, conjuncts that strongly tend to cooccur with impolite, echo their antonyms in the politeness literature. On the first page of their book, Brown and Levinson (1987:1) likens politeness to “formal diplomatic protocol”. Watts (1989) proposed a distinction between politeness and politic behaviour, the latter concerning expected, routine behaviours. But the big one associated with impolite in raw quantitative terms is rude, a term which overlaps considerably with the meanings of impolite, though having a slightly wider application of use (e.g. it is used to describe sex and nudity taboos) (Author 5: 84 – 88). What is striking about hateful here, is that it is characterised by a group of words – intolerant, divisive, vile, bigoted, spiteful and hurtful – that cooccur with it but not impolite. Those words seem more extreme than the kinds of words associated with impolite. When people experience hurtful communication, they feel “a combination of sadness at having been emotionally wounded and fear of being vulnerable to harm” (Vangelisti 2007: 123). Note the specific quality of emotion here. Hurt and fear are “self-conscious” emotions, as opposed to “other-condemning” emotions, such as anger and contempt (Haidt 2003: 855). In British culture, an undiplomatic incident such as jumping the queue is likely to trigger other-condemning emotions such as anger, whereas an attack on face or identity is likely to trigger self-conscious emotions such as hurt. Before leaving Figure 1, we should note that hateful has a close association with words, such as bigoted, intolerant and divisive, that indicate or at least hint at hateful often being used in association with prejudice and/or antagonism towards other people on the basis of their group membership.

Figure 2 displays the collocating adverbs which pre-modify impolite and hateful.

**Figure 2. Collocating adverbs by which it is pre-modified: Impolite and hateful compared (collocates more to the left occur more with hateful, and the converse for impolite)**
In Figure 2, it may seem that the adverbs *wildly* and *terribly* are suggestive of extremity with regard to *impolite*. In fact, both collocates seem to be used as hyperbolic expressions where only a relatively minor infraction of etiquette has occurred, as illustrated by these examples:

> It was terribly impolite to let somebody know you had not paid attention during her visit.

> But not sending a card at all would be wildly impolite.

On the other hand, *downright, truly, utterly* and *simply* are used to signal an extreme level of negativity. Even *even* is used to signal the extreme end of the scale, as in for example: “There's a lot on the web that it is crude, cruel, coarse, even hateful”. Finally, we should note the appearance of *racially*. This is really just a trace element, as the number of cases are few (a mere four), but it does hint at *hateful* being used in contexts where racial group is key, and this result does tally with what we have already observed with the collocates *bigoted, intolerant* and *divisive*.

### 4. Conclusion

The first part of this paper, concerning second-order matters, focuses on three notions and some of the theorising that has accompanied them. The notion of face, endlessly discussed in (im)politeness studies, seems absent in studies of hate speech. This is despite the fact that studies of hate speech make it clear that issues of identity extend to how others treat and/or perceive your identity. Incitement is the converse: whilst theorising in terms of speech act theory is sophisticated in hate speech studies, incitement is absent from impoliteness studies, though clearly within their remit. Regarding intentionality, and notions such as foreseeability and accountability, both fields have been weaving in and out those concepts in complimentary ways, though without necessarily explicitly making connections with each
other. I hope that this part of the paper will help break down silos of scholarly activity and promote theoretical synergies.

The second part, concerning first-order matters, focuses on metapragmatics, and demonstrates a method for revealing potential understandings of impoliteness-related or hate speech-related phenomena. *Impolite* is associated with mild behaviours, whilst *hateful* is the opposite. There is some evidence that *hateful* and *impolite* vary in terms of the kinds of emotion they are associated with, *hateful* having a particular association with *hurtful*. No specific emotion was identified for *impolite*, though previous second-order work suggests that it involves a range of emotions, notably, sadness emotions (which include hurt) and anger emotions (Author 5: section 2.3). The results also show that *hateful*, unlike *impolite*, has a particular association with prejudice and/or antagonism towards other people on the basis of their group membership. Some of these results might have been guessed, especially that regarding the extremity of behaviours, but now have empirical backing. Generally, it is important for scholars to know how their conceptual labels might be understood, not least when they communicate their findings. First order understandings of *hateful* correlate reasonably well with second-order definitions of hate speech. The same cannot be said of impoliteness, whose second-order definitions are much broader than its first, especially with regard to extremity. Rudanko’s (2006) proposed solution is to adopt the label “aggravated impoliteness” for extreme impoliteness. Hate speech could fit there. But drawing a line between impoliteness and aggravated impoliteness would have its own problems.

References

Author 1
Author et al 2
Author et al 3
Author 4
Author 5


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7 A frequent response to conference presentations on impoliteness is that the label *impoliteness* does not sit comfortably with the more offensively extreme examples. As Ebsen Nedenskov Petersen pointed out to me, if impoliteness and hate speech are arranged on a scale of offensiveness, then talking about impoliteness would potentially generate the scalar implicature, via the Maxim of Quantity, “not hate speech”. Whilst admitting that the situation is not ideal, my defence is usually to point out that I am using the term *impoliteness* as a second-order term to encompass a broader range of phenomena. Moreover, no term – *rudeness*, *aggressiveness*, *abusiveness*, and so on – is free from its own semantic restrictions.


