Political self-deception and epistemic vice

Manson, N.C. (2020) Political self-deception and epistemic vice. Ethics and Global Politics, 13 (4). pp. 6-15. ISSN 1654-4951

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Galeotti argues that we can gain a better understanding of political decision making by drawing upon the notion of self-deception and offers a rich articulation of what self-deception is, and how and why it exerts influence upon political decision making, especially in high-stakes contexts where the decision seems to be counter to rationality. But such contexts are also explicable from a different perspective, with different theoretical resources. In recent years the field of ‘virtue epistemology’ has discussed a wide range of epistemic vices–traits of character, and cognitive strategies, that stand in the way of gaining knowledge. This raises questions about how an explanation of political decision making in terms of self-deception relates to an explanation in terms of epistemic vice. Because the notion of epistemic vice applies to self-deception and to other cognitive deficiencies, it is argued that the broader notion of epistemic vice might be explanatorily richer, and more useful.

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Journal Article
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Ethics and Global Politics
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Deposited On:
10 Jun 2021 14:50
Last Modified:
22 Nov 2022 10:20