Performing Gendered Extremism: 
A gender comparative analysis of women’s roles within violent extremist groups

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University
April 2021
**Thesis Declaration**

I declare that this thesis is my own work and that it has not been submitted in any form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

**Word length:** 86,106

*Rosamund V. J. E. Mutton, 21st April 2021*
Abstract
Performing Gendered Extremism: A gender comparative analysis of women’s roles within violent extremist groups.

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Adopting a gender comparative approach, this thesis examines why roles that appear similar in type are performed differently by women across violent extremist group contexts.

Prevailing narratives which implicitly gender violent extremism as inherently masculine overlook the means by which violent extremist groups use gender dynamics to inform their militancy. An absence of theory within the study of women and violent extremism has produced role typologies which descriptively categorise female participation. These produce analyses of female participation that are oversimplified.

In contrast, this thesis develops a theoretically informed framework of analysis derived from a synthesis of gender performativity theory, role theory and a Communities of Practice approach. The application of this framework to female performances of four roles (motherhood; recruitment; combatant; suicide bombing) across seven case studies demonstrates how women occupy and perform their roles from a space that is distinct from male participants and civilian women. These spaces are shaped by contextual factors, organisational needs and the way roles are learned, and thus inform differences in role performances.

This comparative analysis disrupts stereotypes associating masculinity with specific conceptualisations of violence. Instead, a recognition of a spectrum of gendered identities and behaviours which encapsulates femininity, furthers understandings of female participation in violent extremism as diverse and dynamic. It demonstrates that alternative performances to the masculine ‘norm’ exist and achieve a variety of specific outcomes for groups.
Acknowledgements

This research emerged from a studentship funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), an interdisciplinary research centre focused on combining academic research with practitioner needs in a security context. The project is part of the ‘Actors and Ideologies in Social Context’ research programme. My thesis would very literally not exist had it not been for CREST. It has been a privilege to have been a part of CREST, and I am grateful for all of the opportunities that this has afforded me, both to share my research and to learn from others.

I am also grateful to the admin and academic staff in the PPR Department. The nurturing and friendly environment the department created has enabled me to flourish both academically and personally over the last eight years.

There are many individuals whose constant love and support has been a vital accompaniment through this process. I am not sure I can express how much you have each contributed, but here goes.

I never imagined that I would complete writing my thesis during a global pandemic. Unsurprisingly, this has added a certain amount of extra stress and anxiety. However, the continued, if virtual, Zumba classes provided by Paula Santini and the regular ‘tea-breaks’ and encouragement from Claire Selby has helped to maintain some semblance of normality.

Special, big thank you hugs to Rhiannon Main and Ana Maria Kumarasamy for being the best long-distance and round-the-corner besties respectively. Ana, I honestly do not think I could have survived the combined impacts of lockdown and the final stages of a PhD without you. Rhiannon, your perfectly timed care packages have always put a smile on my face and made my day just that little bit sparklier.

I know that I do not say it enough, but my uncle, Dr Michael Seymour, deserves a huge thank you. Your continued advice and support regarding my higher education has been invaluable since I was 16 and I certainly would not be where I am today without your guidance. Thank you for taking the time to proofread many drafts and for always giving your honest feedback, even though I realise I made that quite difficult when I had ‘The Face’ on. As the penguins of Madagascar say, ‘you are a meaningful and valued member of the team’!

A massive amount of love and gratitude goes to my sister and my parents, who have always been the best and most loving supporters ever (in addition to Davy, who deserves a big biff and paw squeeze). Thank you for always being there, encouraging me and putting me back together when I break. You all know how important you are to me and the impact you have had on helping me achieve this. Phili, thank you for being not only my sister but my first and life-long best friend. Your ability to always make me smile has been essential in keeping me going these last few months. Mama, thank you so much for not only being my emotional support blanket and supplying me with motivational treats but also for proofreading the entire thesis, multiple times. Without your attention to detail, there would still definitely be some made up words that I was convinced were entirely real, floating around in here. Last but not least, Daddy, my PhD buddy. You were right when you told me during my very first term of my undergraduate degree that if I dropped out and came home, I would regret it. That message has stayed with me for 8 years and has motivated me not only through my undergraduate degree, but also my MA, and now a PhD. Had I dropped out in 2012, I never would have achieved all these amazing things. You have been one of my biggest inspirations throughout this process. We are all so proud that you have nearly
finished your own thesis after a hiatus of over 40 years. Keep going! If I can do it, you certainly can.

And finally, my supervisors Dr Sarah Marsden and Professor Kim Knott were instrumental to this thesis. Thank you for helping me ‘see the wood for the trees’, for sharing your impressive combined knowledge, caring about me as a whole person and for continually believing in me when I frequently didn't believe in myself. I could not have done this without you.
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**Acronyms**

**Groups**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AQC</td>
<td>al-Qaeda Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Basque Homeland and Liberty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Provisional faction of Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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**Theories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CoP</td>
<td>Communities of Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPT</td>
<td>Gender performativity theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMILs</td>
<td>Gendered mechanisms of interactional learning</td>
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**Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRR</td>
<td>Shared repertoire of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSBs</td>
<td>Female suicide bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSBs</td>
<td>Male suicide bombers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘...when most of us think “terrorist” we do not see “woman”...’

([emphasis original] Elshtain, 1995:178-179)

‘You want a revolution? I wanna [sic] a revelation’

Chapter One: Introduction

Interacting with other women through social media platforms. Passing on religious or cultural practices. Sharing historical grievances with younger generations. Leading a prayer group. Shaming a man for failing to act. Visiting a school. Distributing leaflets. Coercion. Under existing role typologies, these acts are all categorised as violent extremist (VE) recruitment roles. And yet, despite sharing a common role type, female enactments of recruitment activities are performed so differently across VE groups. How can these performative differences be explained?

The thesis explores this question through a comparative analysis of female involvement in a range of VE groups. Through the development and application of a theoretically informed framework, it demonstrates how women occupy and perform their roles from a space that is distinct from male participants and civilian women. Shaped by contextual factors, organisational needs and the way roles are learned, the thesis examines why roles that appear similar are performed quite differently across group contexts, and how this produces varying outcomes for VE organisations.

This chapter introduces the research problem my thesis seeks to respond to by offering three contributions. An overview of how I conducted the research precedes justifications for the choice of the four roles analysed and the definition of key terms. A thesis outline completes the chapter.

Statement of the research problem

The research problem at the core of this thesis is the lack of an analytical gender perspective in literature exploring female participation in VE activities. This absence is a result of, and further shapes, stereotypes about violent extremists. By implicitly gendering VE actors as male, the different ways in which women engage in extremism are oversimplified. Moreover, the means by which organisations use these dynamics to inform their militancy are overlooked.

Despite its age, Galvin’s statement that ‘[f]emale terrorism has, as yet, no autonomy. It is part of a male engineered, male dominated activity...’ (1983:30) has not yet been sufficiently addressed. There is scope for the utilisation of theory to inform analytical methods within the women and terrorism literature. Female participation continues to be assessed
through masculine informed lenses that fail to include feminine differences as part of the analytical process.

The persistent framing of VE through a violent male/non-violent female binary stereotypes female actors as deviant exceptions and has pervaded socio-cultural representations and conceptualisations of terrorist actors (Sjoberg, 2009:69; Phelan, 2020:1). This has historically been manipulated by some VE groups, utilising feminine gender norms for their strategic advantage, impacting the types of roles assigned to women and their subsequent performances. If women are the exception, there is no reason to reframe how VE is studied.

Yet female VE actors are not an exception. They may be a minority, but that does not equate to their participation being exceptional. I argue that analysing female participation through an analytical gender approach emphasises that women are different, rather than deviant, from male VE participants. Owing to this difference, female actors need to be analysed on their own terms.

Other scholars similarly identify a persistent ‘under-utilization of gender analysis’ to understanding participation in terrorism (Phelan, 2020:1; Brown, 2017:430). This thesis contributes to these debates by extending our understanding of the gendered dynamics of women’s involvement in violent extremism.

This approach presents an alternative understanding of the effects gender constructions have on informing a group’s operations, the types of roles allocated to women, how roles are performed and how perceptions of femininity can adapt to meet group needs. The distinction between difference and deviance may be slight, but in the study of women and violent extremism, it has crucial implications. Constructing women as different suggests that assessing female actions through the dominant ‘violent male’ narrative does not fully account for the diversity of female experiences and means by which they participate in violent extremism, requiring an alternative approach. To address these issues, my research seeks to answer the following research questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ1</th>
<th>Why are roles that are categorised as ‘similar’ in type, performed differently by women across VE groups?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RQ2</td>
<td>What effect do variations in gender construction within groups have on the role of women?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ3</td>
<td>If women and men perform the same type of role, how is this gendered and performed differently in terms of femininity and masculinity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ4</td>
<td>In what ways do the roles of women adapt to meet the organisational needs of the group?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ5</td>
<td>How can we understand differences in role performance across extremist groups?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The five research questions that informed my thesis.
I extend recent developments within the study of women and terrorism (see Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007; Narozhna, 2012) towards an analytical gender approach by offering three contributions. First, I present a theoretically informed framework through which to analyse female role performances from a gender reflective perspective. This framework informs the development of five gendered mechanisms of interactional learning (GMILs), which offer a novel means of interpreting how women learn how to perform roles within violent extremist groups. Second, I apply these analytical tools to facilitate a relatively large-scale comparative study that examines seven militant groups active over the last seventy years. This analysis informs my third contribution, which is the substantive argument that women in VE perform their roles from a distinct space that situates women as different both from men in violent extremist groups and civilian women. These spaces are informed by contextual factors and gendered learning processes, thus explaining why roles that were categorised as ‘similar’ in type were performed differently across group contexts.

**Contribution 1: Development of analytical tools**

One of the challenges embedded in the research problem outlined above is the lack of theoretically informed analyses of women’s roles in violent extremism. This absence meant that the majority of existing typologies offered a largely descriptive, rather than analytical, categorisation of roles.

My contribution towards filling this gap was the creation of two analytical tools, derived from synthesising aspects of gender performativity theory (Butler, 1988; 1999), role theory (for example, Biddle & Thomas, 1979; Linton, 1945), and a Communities of Practice approach (Lave & Wenger, 1991).

The first tool was the framework of analysis [see Figure 1, Chapter Three] which I applied to female performances of roles categorised by existing role typologies as Mother, Recruiter, Combatant, and Suicide Bomber to assess the impact gender had on learning processes and role performances. Five gendered mechanisms of interactional learning (GMILs) [Figure 3, Chapter Three] were constructed in relation to the framework, forming a second analytical tool focused on learning processes.

The use of a combined theoretical approach differs from previous research. Both tools contribute systematic methods of analysis from a theoretically informed gender perspective, moving beyond description to analyse the different ways that roles were performed and explain why differences occurred.
Chapter One: Introduction

Contribution 2: Application in a large-scale comparative study

My second contribution stems from the wide-ranging comparative nature of the analysis I undertook. I analysed seven case studies of VE groups [Table 2] which goes further than most other comparative studies which restrict their analysis to fewer groups. Use of a larger number of groups was appropriate for my research because it enabled me to assess the applicability of the framework to ideologically and geo-temporally diverse groups. It further facilitated comparisons of female and male performances of ‘similar’ roles, such as combat, within one group context. Historical examples provided insight into how to respond to contemporary groups and further enabled the identification of a range of contextual factors which shaped, or were shaped by, gender and influenced role performances.

Owing to differences in the amount of data available across the groups, some case studies are covered in greater depth than others in my analysis. Further information concerning each group is provided in the analysis chapters [Chapters Six to Nine] to contextualise my argument.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name in original language</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-qā’idah</td>
<td>al-Qaeda Central</td>
<td>AQC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Dawla al-Islamiyya</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
<td>IS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama’atul Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad</td>
<td>‘Congregation of the People of the Tradition [of the Prophet] for Proselytism and Jihad’; Boko Haram</td>
<td>BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Óglaigh na hÉireann’</td>
<td>the Provisional faction of Irish Republican Army</td>
<td>IRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamilila viyutalaip pulika</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; Tamil Tigers</td>
<td>LTTE</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Basque Homeland and Liberty</td>
<td>ETA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army</td>
<td>FARC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: An illustration of the seven case studies included in this research. It details the name of the case study in its original language, an English translation of this name, and its acronym. The English translation and acronym are used to refer to each case study throughout the rest of the thesis.

Contribution 3: Space, learning, and context

The final key contribution concerns the identification of space, learning processes and context as themes. These themes are products from my application of the framework to role performances. They support my argument that female participation is different rather than deviant and thus should be analysed in a way that accounts for gendered variations. Liberating

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1 Onuoha’s translation (2010).
2 Durney’s translation (2004:8).
the analysis of female participation from a starting point which assumes deviancy would facilitate a gendered analysis. Such an approach prioritises the assessment of the outcomes of female participation, by revealing both the impact femininity can have on the performances of certain roles, and the circumstances in which it might be beneficial for a group to use femininity as a tool in performing a role.

Assessing female performances as occurring from within a third space, which is different from the spaces occupied by VE men and civilian women, enables an analysis that is not constrained by the violent male/non-violent female binary. It removes the notion of male normalcy and reflects the heterogeneity of women’s VE experiences.

Combining this with an analysis of the gendered learning processes that precede and inform a role’s performance further focuses the analysis on the outcomes of women’s VE engagement rather than explaining the motivations for their participation. Utilising gender analysis as an approach emphasises that performing a role in a gendered way served a particular purpose, and thus to properly understand this, a gendered analysis is necessary.

The final theme explains performative differences through contextual factors. Variations including a group’s ideological commitments, individual membership status and external pressure place upon a group altered the surrounding conditions in which a woman performed a role. Analysing role performances from a gendered perspective reveals the pervasive influence of socially constructed norms in shaping VE behaviour. Where women appeared to be allocated, and performed, ‘similar’ roles across the case studies, contextual factors contributed to the creation of varied female-specific VE spaces and so help to explain why role performances differed.

When considered in relation to agency and empowerment, the interdependency of the above three themes in relation to my interpretation of the three theories I synthesis is reinforced. I focus on group level trends in relation to gendered learning processes in order to contextualise the choices women make whilst they are embedded in a group. In this way, it is possible to interpret how their performance and agency is informed by the group’s structure and context, as well as the opportunities and limits this provides for women to be agentic and to experience empowerment through their involvement.
Chapter One: Introduction

Relational autonomy\(^3\) aids the interpretation of these processes by providing a conceptualisation of agency and empowerment that recognises the socially constructed nature of the three levels of analysis (social, individual, group) used throughout this thesis. Such an interpretation enables a more holistic analytical approach. By reinforcing the interrelation of these analytical levels, as opposed to studies which examine each level as a distinct and isolated entity, relational autonomy enables a wider range of informing factors to be assessed. I understand relational autonomy as informed by wider socio-cultural context, but also by the group-level context including its needs, ideology and organisational structure, the latter of which subsequently determines an individual’s membership status. The group constrains or provides opportunities which influence women’s roles and forms of participation.

Research process

My research was shaped by my development of the two analytical tools and was conducted through a literature-based project. Secondary, qualitative data were the most accessible data types. The framework and GMILs were applied to secondary accounts of individual performances, to reveal how roles were learnt and gendered. When performances of similar role types were compared, I found that the actions and activities that were performed differed. Some behaviours recurred across groups, but not as often as categorising by role type implies that they do, as will be demonstrated through the analysis chapters.

The number of case studies analysed further informed how my research was conducted. The inclusion of seven, diverse case studies has meant that VE groups have been reviewed over a broader base.

Role choice

The roles of motherhood, recruiter, combatant and suicide bomber\(^4\) were found to be performed by women across the case study groups, providing the broadest potential for comparison. Not every role occurs within each case study, just as the above list is not exhaustive of all forms of female engagement in VE.

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\(^3\) See Chapter Three for an account of the relational autonomy literature (Hirschmann, 2003; Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007; 2015) as it relates to Butler’s gender performativity theory (1990) with regards to agency and empowerment.

\(^4\) See Footnotes 87 and 88 in Chapter Nine for an outline of the tensions surrounding the term ‘female suicide bomber’ and a justification of its use throughout this thesis.
Chapter One: Introduction

My thesis chapters are structured through an assessment of role types because I found this to be the most effective way of facilitating a comparative analysis. However, each chapter’s role category is deconstructed through the application of my framework which enables a consideration of other interpretations of how a role might be categorised, by assessing the various outcomes. This demonstrates that descriptively categorising roles presents a simplified understanding of female participation.

The chosen roles provide a mix of non-violent, conventional roles assigned to women that adhere to gendered divisions of labour (Mother; Recruiter) and violent, arguably unconventional roles that transgress usual social norms (Combatant; Suicide Bomber). By including violent and non-violent roles, a more holistic and realistic account of female participation in VE is presented. The inclusion of violent roles in this study further enables a comparison of female and male performances of ‘similar’ types of roles within and across group contexts, further emphasising the influence group and individual conceptualisations of gender have on role performances.

Many other roles could have been included in my study, such as fundraiser (Broadwell, 2006), religious educator (von Knop, 2007), or intelligence gatherer (Ness, 2005:358). The main justifications for excluding these roles was a lack of comparative data, or any apparent gender differences in performance. I had intended to include performances of leadership roles (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011) in my analysis, however an insufficiency of data which inhibited performative comparisons resulted in excluding this category.

**Conceptual definitions**

I refer to four broad concepts that require defining: violent extremism, gender, roles, and performance. As subjective constructs, Chapter Five situates my specific interpretations within the context of my methodological approach, whilst the theoretical aspects of these definitions are explored in Chapter Three.

**Violent extremism and terrorism**

The terms *violent extremism* and *terrorism* are often used interchangeably. Both are definitionally ambiguous, contested concepts that are subject to relativist interpretations (Ganor, 2002).

For the purposes of my research, I utilise a broad definition of *violent extremism* derived from Midlarksy’s description of extremism as ‘...the will to power by a social movement in the service of a political program typically at variance with that supported by
existing state authorities...’ (2011:7), achieved through violent mobilisation and behaviour (Bak et al, 2019:8). Both definitions operationalise violent extremism to act as a framing device, encompassing groups with a range of ideological perspectives, organisational structures and internal cultures that are considered to be ‘extremist’, ‘terrorist’, ‘revolutionary’, ‘paramilitary’ or ‘guerrilla’, where violence is used as a tactic to assist them in achieving their goals. The use of a broad definition facilitates the inclusion of seven diverse case studies.

Although ‘no universal legal definition’ (Schmid, 2012:158) of terrorism exists, most describe it as a physical act predicated on the coercive use of violence, often against civilians, to achieve a political objective (Ramsay, 2015:211). As with definitions of violent extremism, an emphasis on identifying instances of terrorism as based upon the use of violence has shaped most definitions.

However, a broader definition that encapsulates forms of non-violent participation or ideological support, is necessary because as this research demonstrates, engagement in VE activities is a more holistic action that transcends an individual violent actor. Non-violent actions can contribute to others’ use of violence. While I wanted to draw attention to the aspects I believe these terms to be lacking, it is beyond scope of the present research to construct an alternative definition. Despite their focus on violence, I continue to refer to violent extremism and terrorism to maintain continuity and situate my research within the wider area of study.

Gender
The second key concept, gender, is also defined in multitudinous ways. The core premise of much of the now extensive body of literature distinguishes sex from gender. In its most simplistic form, sex is referred to as a biological manifestation of anatomy, while gender is theorised as a socially constructed norm (Gilbert, 2002:1274; de Cataldo Neuburger & Valentini, 1996; West & Zimmerman, 1987). This contradicts the historically popular ideal which presented male and female as natural binary opposites, determined and fixed by physiological and biological differences (Ransome, 2010:269-270). Such binaries imposed ‘value distinctions’ (Vickers, 1993:107) informed by traditional sexual divisions of labour. These distinctions implicitly convey associated characteristics and behavioral expectations that contribute to the formation of organisational and societal attitudes towards women.

5 Replication of the definitional debates surrounding terrorism is beyond the parameters of this research. For more detailed expositions, see Weinberg et al (2004); Ganor (2002).
Chapter One: Introduction

Although I perceive gender to be socially constructed, the terms femininity and masculinity are used to differentiate between gendered behaviours, as understood by the VE group.

I draw on Lips’ definitional approach, where gender comprises ‘the non-physiological aspects of being male or female - the cultural expectations for femininity and masculinity’ (2008:5) such as role behaviours, occupations, traits, and physical appearance (Deaux & Lewis, 1984). As with the production of culture, social actors consciously create gender through human interaction (Lorber, 1994:99). Perceiving gender as dynamic emphasises the changing nature of ‘appropriate gendered behaviour’ (Deutsch, 2002:107), as influenced by context including ideological, temporal, and geo-spatial factors. Centring a definition of gender around a relative approach which emphasises the influence of contextual factors recognises the variations in how all seven case studies conceptualise and enact gendered behaviours.

My choice to operationalise gender performativity theory (GPT) (Butler, 1988; 1999) into a framework facilitates the consideration of how contextual differences of each group informed the types of roles women were assigned and performed within the analytical process.

Roles
Within existing VE literature, the term role is not often explicitly defined. The common approach is to allude to roles as descriptive, based on verbs. The absence of a definition is problematic because it assumes the existence of a universal understanding for a concept that is intrinsically subjective. To address this and make my use of it as a term clear, role theory literature (including Biddle, 1986; Newcomb, 1949; Bates & Harvey, 1975) is used to theorise a role as a broad definitional category.  

For Linton, a role describes ‘the attitudes, values and behavior [sic] ascribed by the society to any and all persons occupying this status’ (1945:77). Rambusch & Ziemke expand upon this, detailing how a role forms ‘a socially meaningful unit of behaviour in which a variety of action sequences is structured around shared goals and conditions’ (2005:1804).

Informed by these definitions, I conceptualise a role as an embodied practice, understood as the physical enactment of a practical activity, action or task by an individual

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The material cited here could be criticised as outdated, however, the core role theory literature has not been meaningfully revised since the academic field’s development during the early-to-mid-twentieth century. As new research concerned with role theory continues to define terms with reference to this foundational literature, it is appropriate for me to do the same.
according to the requirements of the VE group or social setting. The consequences of an action assist a VE group in achieving its aims, thus roles have specific purposes and functions (Bates & Harvey, 1975:106). Within the context of my research, the seven VE groups are interpreted as the ‘societies’ within which a role performance occurs, while ‘status’ refers to an individual’s group membership status.

Performance

Throughout performance is understood from a performativity theory perspective, as derived from Austin’s use of the verb to perform and the noun action (1962:6) and taken to mean the embodied doing of activities. To perform a role, an individual engages in socially recognised, learned behaviours that have become associated with fulfilling that role type (Goffman, 1959). Roles are thus comprised from the performance of a range of activities.

As is explained in Chapter Three, role performances are behaviours that seem ‘situationally appropriate’ with regards to group demands (Sargent, 1951:360) and ideas about what the individual will do (expectation); or what the individual should do (norms) to perform the role (Banton, 1965:28-29).

Such activities are ascribed meaning through socio-culturally constructed interpretations informing perceptions and the recognisability of a role’s performance within a specific context. Thus, the same physical process should be understood differently across contextual settings.

However, within current VE literature concerned with role typologies, this aspect of recognisability has become the key identifier to which role performances are reduced to in order to aid generalisable categorisations. This has resulted in the practice of descriptively categorising role, which I argue obscures performative nuances.

Thesis outline

Following this introduction, Chapters Two to Five expound on the processes through which I conducted this research. Chapters Six to Nine form the bulk of my analysis, detailing the application of the framework to female performances. Concluding remarks outlined in Chapter Ten complete the thesis.

Based upon a review of the literature, Chapter Two argues that much of the existing research reproduces stereotypical constructions of female VE actors. Building upon five
Chapter One: Introduction

existing descriptive role typologies, I situate my research as a continuation of the recent shift towards reflecting on gender through analysis. In response to this gap in existing research, Chapter Three presents the theoretically informed framework as an analytical tool to facilitate a gender reflexive analysis of female role performances. It further outlines each of the three theoretical approaches the framework was derived from. By synthesising role theory with a Communities of Practice approach, gender performativity theory was operationalised into an applicable framework.

Conceptualising each case study as a distinct Community of Practice linked the theoretical and methodological approaches used, outlined in Chapters Four and Five. Chapter Four justifies my choice of case studies, explaining the impact a Communities of Practice approach had on differentiating between individual and group learning processes when the framework was applied to role performances. Chapter Five assesses the impact adopting case studies as a research design had on how I conducted this research. It further sets out my socially constructivist and interpretivist approach.

Chapter Six is the first comparative analysis chapter. My application of the framework to examples of motherhood roles found that a group’s conceptualisation of, and interaction with, a ‘state’ situated mothering roles within domestic spaces. Yet, variations in the proximity of these spaces in relation to group membership boundaries influenced the types of activities mothers could engage with, informing performative differences.

The analysis of recruitment roles in Chapter Seven found that despite involving similar activities, contextually specific idealised notions of femininity determined gender-appropriate behaviours.

Chapter Eight analyses performances of combat and operational participant roles. Through engaging in gendered learning processes, female combatants adopt a synthesised identity, occupying a hybrid space which combined aspects of femininity with ‘masculine’ characteristics of violence. Although gendered as a ‘masculine’ characteristic, female use of violence is disciplined in relation to feminine stereotypes.

The final analysis chapter, Chapter Nine, assesses suicide bombing and bomb-carrying roles. Performances of these roles subverted stereotypical feminine norms in order to maximise the effectiveness of the role’s intended outcome. In this way, female suicide bombers and bomb-carriers were differentiated from both male VE actors and civilian women.
Chapter Ten concludes by reiterating the recurring themes that emerged from the framework’s application. The location of women in specific spaces, the identification of gendered learning processes and the influence of contextual factors account for performative differences in roles descriptively categorised as ‘similar’ in type. Areas for future academic research are suggested, alongside policy implications.
Chapter Two: Gendered Frames and Role Typologies

Female involvement in extremist activities remains an emerging area within the broader sphere of terrorism studies. Literature specifically focusing on gender, and female extremist actors, is limited. Rather than evidencing the claim that fewer women participate in violent extremist (VE) activities, this is indicative of female participation being overlooked. This thesis is a continuation of the gender responsive approach which has recently developed (for example, by Narozhna, 2012; Jacques & Taylor, 2013). This approach argues that the only difference between male terrorists’ violent actions, and female terrorists’ violent actions, is their gender identity and the narratives which frame their violence. I extend this idea further, through assessing how the types of spaces occupied by women within VE contexts influence their role performances.

I begin with a brief overview of the key debates within feminist International Relations (IR) studies and feminist terrorism studies, situating the thesis within these disciplines. The chapter then adopts a thematic approach to explore the broader literature.

My assessment of this literature is divided into two themes, from which I identified four areas that the creation of a theoretically informed analytical framework sought to address. Both themes evidence a largely uncritical engagement with data through gender analysis, framing research through a gendered lens which constructed women as the ‘Other’ (as found by Gilbert, 2002). In contrast, I emphasise that women are not deviant or Other, but are different because they occupy a different space to male VE actors.

The first theme concerned how scholarly literature exploring women and terrorism was reproduced in a feminised way, producing three of the four areas that need addressing. The inherently gendered production of the literature through stereotypical frames (as found by Gilbert, 2002; Talbot, 2001; Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007) was exhibited through the conflation of active participation with violence; the male normalcy/female exceptionality binary of VE actors; and finally, how female terrorists are prefaced by gender.

Present within all three areas is a common focus on constructing narratives to explain why women are violent and constructing violent women as deviating from societal norms and expectations, rather than analysing how they are violent and what this achieves. Socially entrenched female gender stereotypes were drawn upon in the enactment of violence thus

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7 For historical accounts detailing female involvement in terrorism, see Schraut (2014). Third (2014); Sjoberg & Gentry (2011); Schraut & Weinhauer (2014); Jacques & Taylor (2009; 2013) assess the development of women and terrorism as a distinct area of research.
Chapter Two: Gendered Frames & Role Typologies

gender identity was constructed as the primary explanation for female actions within the extremist sphere. Vetter & Perlstein’s assessment of the literature found a ‘remarkable profusion of stereotypes, caricatures, simplifications, distortions, and gender-biases...’ (1991:105). Motivational factors behind VE activity were presented as gender-differentiated (MacDonald, 1991; Georges-Abeyie, 1983:82; Marshall et al, 1984:8; Benson et al, 1982). Although conducted nearly thirty years ago, such biases continue to inform perceptions of women and terrorism.

The second theme relates to the literature concerning role typologies, forming the final area for attention. Existing role typologies which explore how women participate as part of a VE group lack a theoretical underpinning and remained largely descriptive. My framework facilitates the analysis of role performances from within different group contexts, identifying and seeking to explain why roles that are categorised as ‘similar’ in type are performed differently, which current typologies do not consider.

Situating my research within feminist IR and feminist terrorism studies

Prior to the exposition of the four areas within the literature that I have identified as needing to be addressed, it is important to reflect on feminist International Relations (IR) studies and its more specific subset of feminist terrorism studies. Both fields emphasise the necessity of utilising gender as an analytical lens, which this thesis adopts. While feminist IR seeks to challenge the invisibility of women in the international sphere (see key contributions made by Tickner, 1988, 2006; Enloe, 1983, 2000, 2000a [1989]; Elshtain, 1995; Reinharz, 1992; Sylvester, 1994, 2002), feminist terrorism studies more specifically explores the intersection between gender and terrorism, seeking to provide gender-attentive alternatives to the prevailing ‘malestream’ narratives for the discussion of women’s involvement in terrorist violence (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007:174; Parashar, 2010). Other related works examine the development of women and terrorism as a distinct area of research (Third, 2014; Schraut & Weinhauser, 2014; Jacques & Taylor, 2009, 2013).

Feminist terrorism studies encapsulates a very diverse field of perspectives, with these positions often existing in tension with one another. However, of most relevance to this research are the debates regarding how to approach the study of women and terrorism.

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8 While it is important to recognise the presence of such tensions, detailed exposition of these debates is beyond the parameters of this research. Work by Sjoberg (2009) and Banks (2019) more effectively articulate these debates.
Chapter Two: Gendered Frames & Role Typologies

Sjoberg & Gentry’s criticism of previous studies which ‘add women’ to methods of analysis already framed by a masculine discourse (2015:31) most clearly captures this. Analysing women’s participation through a lens defined by men’s participation further reinforces stereotypes that construct female VE actors as exceptional and deviant, a criticism explored in Theme 1: The feminised reproduction of the literature.

Two further debates are similarly explored in subsections within the first theme of the subsequent literature review. The second is concerned with tensions surrounding the portrayal of women’s participation within violent arenas, best examined by Narozhna (2012). Although they utilised different approaches, Narozhna critiques both Bloom’s (2005) and Skaine’s (2006) works concerning suicide bombing as deploying gender as an analytical category that is consistent with broader gender stereotypes (2012:82). I discuss similar concerns in the section Female terrorists prefaced by gender.

The third debate relates to discussions over whether research should focus on individual narratives or generalisable group trends (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2018). Focus on the individual has resulted in tensions surrounding the interpretation of women’s motivations and the implications of this on undermining women’s agency (with Bloom [2005, 2011] presenting the most notable alternative to Sjoberg & Gentry). In order to avoid overgeneralising an individual’s experience as indicative of a heterogeneous collectives’ experiences, I primarily focus on identifying broader group trends. My emphasis on the importance of context leads me to argue that motivations and agency need to be examined in relation to each individual case. While I include the individual as an analytical unit, when combined with group and social levels of analysis, this results in a more holistic approach than arguably is provided by previous research.

My contribution to all three debates takes the form of the analytical framework I develop, heavily informed by Butler’s GPT (1990). My framework provides an alternative approach to analysing female VE actors that moves away from simplistically ‘adding women’. Accounting for flexibility in gender performances and enabling the identification of generalisable trends in relation to female participation, emphasises women’s difference as VE actors over previously perceived deviance.

Sjoberg & Gentry’s seminal works (2007; 2015) offer an exemplar within feminist terrorism studies around which subsequent studies have coalesced and developed further

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9 A similar criticism is made within feminist IR studies (Runyun & Peterson, 1991; Steans, 2006 [1998]; Saloom, 2006).
Chapter Two: Gendered Frames & Role Typologies

(see Gasztold, 2020; Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger 2014, 2018, 2018a). Taking Enloe’s ‘the personal is international’ (2014 [1989]:232) as a foundational premise, Sjoberg & Gentry critique dominant discourses of female political violence for overemphasising motivations, diminishing female agency and excluding marginalised perspectives (2007:29). They argue that the narratives of mother (ibid:30-36), monster (ibid:36-41) and whore (ibid:41-49) confine violent women to ‘vengeance, insanity and sexuality’ (ibid:216) and thus overlook both how these women may be empowered and the factors that inform their decision-making processes (ibid:224). In framing how women’s political violence is perceived, ‘the narratives singularise violent women who do not fit the mould of idealised femininity...’ (ibid:222). The failure to challenge idealised masculinity leaves ‘the image of idealised femininity intact’ (ibid), thus contributing to the persistence of stereotypical, gendered assumptions about politically violent women.

In response, Sjoberg & Gentry argue that the only way to resist these narratives is through a ‘feminist approach to women’s participation, agency and emancipation’ (ibid:225). Their work provides two contributions in relation to encouraging a feminist approach focused on agency. The first relates to reconceiving and re-presenting politically violent women (2015:156-158). Including marginalised individuals, such as women, as actors within the IR sphere (2007:200) broadens the range of actors beyond those which traditional theories recognise (Sjoberg, 2011:234). Through their conceptualisation of ‘relational autonomy’ (2007:189), Sjoberg & Gentry assert that individuals in global politics exist ‘relationally to other individuals, social groups and political entities’ (ibid:217), as opposed to operating completely independently, which they identify as a prominent, and problematic, trend in general IR research (ibid:199-200). Rather, individuals have choices and maintain a level of agency in their decision-making but are simultaneously constrained by various contextual factors (2015:203; 232). This aspect is explored later in the thesis, in relation to the development of my third space argument.

The second contribution pertains to the development of perpetrator narratives as another tool to re-present violent women. In contrast to the stereotypical ‘mother, monster, whore’ narratives, perpetrators are portrayed as ‘intensely political, thinking beings who make (deeply constrained) choices and who have complex relationships with gendered social contexts’ (ibid:157). Such narratives complement the adoption of a relational autonomy perspective, reinforcing the influence social context has on individual actions. This includes

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10 Agency forms a significant concern within feminist terrorism literature and is further analysed by Åhäll & Shepherd (2012) among others, with Auchter (2012) interrogating the concept of agency itself.
decision-making processes in analysing women’s participation in political violence, in a way that had not been considered before. The use of perpetrator narratives subsequently became a popular method within the study of feminist terrorism, utilised by studies included in this thesis such as Alison (2009) and McEvoy (2009).

By offering tools to resist stereotypical, gender assumptions about politically violent women, Sjoberg & Gentry identify numerous criticisms of the existing literature that I similarly recognise and outline in more detail in the subsequent literature review. However, I respond to the issues Sjoberg & Gentry raised in a methodologically and theoretically different way. The articulation and disruption of the ‘mother, monster, whore’ narratives aids researchers in the identification of inherent gender biases in how women’s participation in VE is perceived by others. Yet while these generalised categories challenge gender biases, a gap remains in terms of understanding tangible contributions made by women to VE groups.

My research addresses this gap by examining how and why women’s performances of roles differ and what such performances achieves for the group. My analysis demonstrates how women occupy and perform their roles from a space that is distinct from male participation and civilian women. As part of this, I argue that gender, particularly characteristics and traits associated with stereotypical norms of femininity can provide a strategic advantage to a group. This deepens the literature’s understanding of areas that were not the central focus of Sjoberg & Gentry’s work.

Through my reinterpretation of Butler’s concept of parody, discussed as the subversion of feminine characteristics or the adoption of masculine traits, I focus on the flexibility of contextual gender understandings as informing role performances and fulfilling the needs of a VE group. The bulk of the thesis tests my operationalisation of Butler’s theory into an analytical framework, primarily utilising more empirically focused literature and data, as encouraged by an understanding of perpetrator narratives. Méndez’s articulation of a Butlerian approach into her ‘Militarized Gender Performativity’ framework (2012) similarly relied on empirical data. As her work demonstrated, adopting a more-empirically focused approach provides several benefits, including the ability to ground analysis in a well-established, complex and nuanced theory of gender.

Although recent research has developed vital contributions to both fields, the starting point of my research is comparable to the issues previously recognised by scholars in these areas. Many of the issues they identified, and which are explored in more depth in the following literature review that follows, continue to persist within the broader sphere of
terrorism studies. That there remains a sub-field of both IR and terrorism studies concerned specifically with women and feminism suggests a continued need for research focused on these areas before the conflation between men, masculinity, terrorism and violence is completely disrupted.

**Theme 1: The feminised reproduction of the literature**

Terrorism as an academic field of study implicitly and uncritically genders violent extremism as a masculine act, performed by male actors (Malvern & Koureas, 2014:4). Such a gendered lens is based upon the acceptance of socially constructed, dichotomous gender stereotypes and expectations of behaviour. These stereotypes create the assumption that violence is a pre-eminently masculine behaviour (Möller-Leimkühler, 2018; Ness, 2005), thus the tendency to define terrorism by the use of violence biases men as the default for VE actors. The traditional absence of women from spaces that commonly utilised violence, such as war, gangs and violent crime further compounds this. This perspective developed from interdisciplinary criminological and sociological research into gender and violence from the 1970s, which emphasised the deviance of violent women (Perlstein & Vetter, 1990:98). The cultural equation of violence with masculinity (Grindstaff & McCaughey, 1996:150) indicates that ‘aggression is a primary marker of masculine/feminine difference’ (ibid:150): female aggression is thus ‘an anomaly’ (Jack, 2001:141). Wight & Myers’ assertion that womanhood provides the lens through which a violent woman’s actions ‘are seen and understood’ (1996:xi; see also Talbot, 2001:165). This lens is predominately reproduced within the women and terrorism literature and has implications for female agency.

Until the 1980s, ‘almost all significant terrorist operations were directed, led, and carried out by males’ (Vetter & Perlstein, 1991:107), and although women are present and active within most VE groups today, they remain the minority. This is partially informed by a group’s ideology. Owing to their commitment to social equality, groups underpinned by a Far-Left ideology, such as FARC, tend to have a higher percentage of female members. Yet a relatively high participation rate of women remains the exception. Female participation in most other groups is much lower. Data collected by Reinares suggests that until the 1980s, approximately only 5 percent of ETA’s members were women (2004:467). Arguably, focusing on membership statistics excludes more social forms of participation, performed by non-members and fails to consider non-violent roles as forms of participation. It is likely that the number of women who engage in supportive roles but who remain outside of a group’s boundaries and do not hold membership status is larger, especially within groups such as ETA.
where mothers were generally excluded as members. The wider social participation of members’ kin and peers should be recognised as contributing to a group, albeit to a lesser extent than members. Mahan & Griset make a similar point, discussing how female sympathisers’ participation is ‘less direct’ (2013:242) yet crucial to facilitating group activities.

Literature that does analyse the role of women in VE groups primarily focuses on specific individuals who engaged in the masculine activity of violence. Well-known examples include Mairead Farrell [IRA] (Eager, 2008:164-166; Rolston, 2018:373); Leila Khaled [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] (Irving, 2012; MacDonald, 1991); Ulrike Meinhof [Red Army Faction] (Passmore, 2011); and María Dolores González Katarain (‘Yoyes’) [ETA] (Aretxaga, 1988). Contradictory narratives were constructed around these women. On the one hand, their uniqueness as women navigating a hypermasculine sphere and using violence was emphasised, whilst on the other, their experiences were assumed to reflect the typical experiences of all women in that group. In contrast, engagement in VE through non-violent, supportive roles usually comprised similar activities to those allocated to women within society. Such activities can be performed from within the private sphere, adhering to accepted gender roles and thus are not considered deviant. As Vogel, Porter & Kebbell identify, analysing individual actors has resulted in a prominent trend in terrorism literature to ‘over-inflate the perceived prevalence of certain types of participation’ (2014:93), obscuring the many and varied experiences of most female participants. These experiences are further obscured by the absence of an ‘exploration of generalisable group level trends in female participation’ (ibid:93), a gap which my framework aims to address.

The absence of such generalisable group level trends is not limited to discussions of female participation but is indicative of a broader attitude in the wider field of terrorism literature. Discussions surrounding changes in how terrorist groups are organised and structured are summarised most explicitly in the Hoffman-Sageman debate (2008). Consideration of this debate is of relevance to my research because the types of roles considered necessary to achieving the group’s intended aims and those allocated to women primarily depends upon the decisions taken by the group. However, I assert that there is a need for more nuanced interpretations of group functionality in relation to shaping opportunities and norms for various intra-group processes and dynamics. This includes female participation and the types of roles women engage with.

Hoffman [1998] argued that the structuring of terrorist groups had altered from a ‘hierarchical, pyramidal structure’ to a ‘flatter, looser and more linear’ form of organisation
Chapter Two: Gendered Frames & Role Typologies

(2006:39). Within such structures, Hoffman asserted that there was an absence of a publicly identifiable ‘central command’ (ibid:271), implying greater independence in decision-making compared to traditionally structured groups. In contrast, Sageman’s description of the structural evolution faced by groups placed greater emphasis on a bottom-up homegrown leaderless network (2008). This focuses on a more individualised approach, prioritising webs of relationships.

Sageman’s prioritisation of the individual gained traction within wider terrorism research, with a shift in the field towards paying more attention to the individual level as decision-making actors within the terrorist context. Arguably, Sageman’s work further contributed towards examining how individuals operate outside of the boundaries of a traditional group structure.

However, I take a similar approach to Gill & Young, who argued that the trend towards individualism fails to explore an individual’s ‘specific role within terrorist networks’ (2011:18) and so undermines the significance the group and its organisational structure has on shaping individual participation. Rather, Gill et al cite strong evidence that ‘role and task assignment explains relational structure’ (2014:73). This refers to how individuals within a group interact to perform their roles, shaping the limits of their participation.

In the context of my research, this link between roles and relational structure appears more iterative, with a group’s organisational structure, along with its aims and intended outcomes, informing the types of roles required to be performed. This approach is further supported by Horgan’s statement that the available role opportunity spaces and activities assigned to individuals are informed by ‘a whole host of local internal and external group, organizational, leadership and other “management” or response issues’ (2005:100).

This is accounted for within my research through including the group as a unit of analysis in my theoretically informed framework, in addition an analytical level focused on the individual. The group level enables the conceptualisation of interactional processes through which women learn their roles as situated within specific group and social contexts. This emphasises the adaptability of a group and its structures in response to external threats (Crenshaw, 2003; Neumann, 2009) and contextual factors, thus informing role opportunities and shaping other intra-group dynamics and processes.

Thus, female presence within the extremist sphere remains the exception that needs to be analysed and understood. As the following three arguments (the conflation of active participation with violence; male normalcy/female exceptionality; and female terrorists
prefaced by gender) demonstrate, despite a recognition of it during research from the 1990s, this gender bias continues to frame, and be reproduced in, much of the literature that examines female participation in terrorism.

Conflation of ‘active’ participation with violence
My assessment of the literature finds that socially accepted gender norms inform the types of actions acknowledged as contributing to terrorism, inhibiting the recognition of non-violent roles as valid forms of participation. Such a conflation of active participation with violence reproduces women and terrorism literature in a feminised way.

Historically, most individuals who participated in violent extremism through non-violent activities, such as providing logistical support or gathering intelligence, were predominately female (as noted by Talbot, 2001). Conflating active participation with the use of violence perceives forms of non-violent participation in opposition, as passive. This informs perceptions of VE activities, perpetuating misleading accounts of how women engage as violent extremist actors, eclipsing contributions made by women through non-violent activities.

One of the most common reasons cited by women who wished to return to the West after the collapse of IS’s Caliphate was that their participation was as housewives and mothers. Shamima Begum argued, ‘[m]e just going there, and being a housewife and just sitting at home, and them taking care of me is not really in anyway helping [IS]...’ (Sommerville, 2019, 02:51-02:57). The emphasis that she did not participate in violence is invoked as evidence that her participation should be viewed differently from a man’s, which invariably involved the use of violence. The absence of violence further implies diminished culpability and accountability, seeming to provide a justification for sanctioning female returnees.

However, as my research seeks to demonstrate, assessing VE participation on the basis of the presence or absence of violence has implications for female agency and negates the outcomes non-violent roles achieve in sustaining a group. This influences how non-violent forms of participation, often associated with women, are analysed. To develop a more nuanced and fuller account of VE, policy, practice and academic research need to be better informed of the various forms of participation.

Male normalcy / female exceptionality
Associated with this conflation, terrorism studies is framed as ‘gender blind’ (Goldstein, 2001:35; Malvern & Koureas, 2014:72), despite presenting the masculine as the ungendered
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‘general’ (Wittig, 1983:64; Jackson et al, 2011:77). Perceived in binary opposition, the feminine is thus gendered. The assumption of maleness as the norm for perpetrators of political violence primarily constructs women as passive victims of this violence (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2018a:1).

Male normalcy was perpetuated through the association of hypermasculinity with the use of violence (Scheff, 2006). Hypermasculinity is defined as ‘the inflation of stereotypic masculine attitudes and behaviours…’ (Corprew et al, 2014:105-106) involving the exaggeration of the ‘violence-orientated image of the warrior’ (Möller-Leimkühler, 2018:122). Traditionally, violence has been identified as ‘the only medium available where real masculinity can be acquired and verified,’ (ibid:122). Terrorist acts are ‘...the ultimate manifestation of hypermasculinity’ (Malvern & Koureas, 2014a:4, see also Talbot, 2001:165; Ferber & Kimmel, 2008:877).

This dichotomy posits female violent actors as exceptional because they disrupt the stereotypical association between masculinity and violence (Herman, 2009-2010). The significant deviation that female violence makes from acceptable, feminine behaviours means that it must be explained. This perspective is not unique to terrorism studies but is also exemplified in research concerning spaces where the use of violence is prevalent and acts as a key mechanism for defining participation, including women and violent crime (Peach, 2000), such as gang culture,11 and women in the military.12 Terrorism, the military and violent crime are perceived as ‘gendered institutions’, so defined because internal processes, practices and distributions of power are informed by expectations associated with masculinity and femininity (Acker, 1992:567; Whitworth, 2004:27) constructing them as male-dominated spaces. All three areas of research share similarities in their depiction of women, informed by gender biases towards who can be a legitimate actor within that sphere; the apparent exceptionality of women; and the subsequent discussion of female presence as deviant.

Gilbert analysed discourses surrounding female violence, emphasising the creation of a narrative to distinguish between real women and violent women. This narrative argued that female and male perpetrations of violence were inherently different, owing to gender, constructing female violent perpetrators as ‘Other’ (2002:1293). While Gilbert did not refer to terrorism, her research is applicable to female terrorists. As a category, violent women ‘fail to conform’ (ibid:1274) to traditional, societal stereotypes of femininity, and so are viewed by

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12 For specific analyses of the presence and experiences of women in the military, see Harel-Shalev & Daphna-Tekoah (2020); Rimalt (2007); Egnell & Alam (2019).
society as neither *real* women, nor as men. Despite their use of violence, by virtue of their sex, they cannot be categorised as men. They represent a third, deviant category, in which women are demonised and sexualised (ibid:1290). Malvern (2014) and Schraut (2014) take this further, noting that narratives portray violent women as engaging in an act of double transgression, contradicting both their expected political and gender roles. The female terrorist is situated within a sphere from which she should be excluded. By virtue of her ‘Otherness’, her use of violence is differentiated from male performances of violence (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007:29).

Further, research by Galvin (1983), de Cataldo Neuburger & Valentini (1996), and Talbot (2001:179-180) analyses representations that differentiate female violence through specific reference to the terrorist context. The creation and application of this third category to female terrorists further ensures that dominant socially-constructed gender norms, which characterise women as non-violent, are not disrupted. If female terrorists are understood to be psychologically abnormal and are not *real* women, then their use of violence is a manifestation of their abnormality. Sjoberg & Gentry take a critical view of this dominant discourse arguing that prevalent narratives diminish agency by framing female violence as deviant (2009; 2015). By focusing on female participation, my research similarly seeks to interrupt this interpretation because it implicitly encourages VE to be understood and analysed in a gendered way.

This idea of a third category is key. I argue that VE women occupy a third space, which differentiates them and their role performances from both VE men and civilian women. The contextual factors which influence role performances vary according to the space occupied, resulting in performative differences. However, I do not refer to this space as indicating a female VE actor’s deviancy or exceptionality. Creating scope for female role performances to be analysed through a frame which does not assert maleness as the default norm could help to provide a fuller account of female participation.

**Female terrorists prefaced by gender**

This feeds into the final area for improvement, that female terrorists are always prefaced by their gender. A *terrorist* is universally understood as referring to a male actor, whereas a female actor is qualified by her gender: she is a ‘*female* terrorist’. In his assessment of the presentation of gender within the context of war, Goldstein asserts that ‘all the gender references concern women; men still do not have a gender’ (2001:35), framed through the
Chapter Two: Gendered Frames & Role Typologies

assumption of the masculine norm. I agree and argue that this inherent bias is further identifiable within much of the literature exploring women and terrorism, as has been found by Talbot. She identifies and challenges ‘the more traditional and conventional notions about women who terrorize’ (2001:171). Most of these notions analyse female participation in VE through gendered frames. As a result, terrorism literature cuts a female terrorist’s identity ‘…into two mutually exclusive halves; either the “woman” or the “terrorist” is emphasised ([emphasis original], Talbot, 2001:165), discarding ‘the notion of a woman as a terrorist’ ([emphasis original], ibid:170). Analysis framed through these inherent biases preface female terrorism by gender and are most identifiable in two strands of the literature: the gendering of motivations and the media framing of female terrorists.

**Gendering of motivations**

In contrast to male terrorists, female motivations for engaging in political violence are cited as emotional rather than rational; personal and relational rather than political and individualised (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2012:151; MacDonald, 1991). Female involvement was often explained by ‘causal factors’ (Friedman, 2008:192) such as the masculinization of women (Georges-Abeyie, 1983:82), the absence of traditional feminine traits (Marshall et al, 1984:8), and as influenced by feminism (Friedman, 2008:192; Perlstein & Vetter, 1990; Benson et al, 1982).

The focus on relationships as motivating factors is exemplified by Bloom’s ‘Four Rs Plus One’ framework (2011:231-237). It summarises five of the most recurrent motivating factors that are supposedly most relevant to women. These factors are: ‘Revenge’ for the death of a close family member (235); ‘Redemption’ for past sins (ibid); a ‘Relationship’ with a male partner or family member (ibid); the desire to earn the ‘Respect’ of their community (236) and ‘Rape’ (ibid). Bloom describes ‘Rape’ as the ‘Plus One’ factor, including it to represent increased instances of sexual exploitation by women in conflicts (ibid). All these factors are predicated upon an emotional and relational, rather than political or ideological, reason. Although Bloom acknowledges that these motivations can equally apply to men (2011:236), there are few, if any examples of non-political motivations being considered in either media representations or the wider academic literature with regards to men, emphasising how female terrorists are prefaced by their gender. This is not to deny that some motivations will undeniably recur across group contexts and time periods, and may inevitably be personal in nature, but it is the generalised way in which these motivations have previously been discussed that needs to be challenged. The implication is that women’s motivations are universal by virtue of their shared gender identity, overriding motivations that relate to individual experience or group specifics.
A body of work developed to disrupt these inherently gendered stereotypical assumptions based on the negative implications they have on recognising female agency (Talbot, 2001; Malvern & Koureas, 2014; Brunner, 2007:963; Jacques & Taylor, 2009:506). This is the approach that my thesis seeks to take and to contribute to. Friedman criticises the characterisation of female participation ‘as something other than whole-hearted dedication to the terrorist cause itself’ ([emphasis original], 2008:193) for diminishing both female political commitment (ibid:189) and participation (ibid:193). As a result of this work, the idea that men and women have the same motivations and are subject to the same push/pull factors is gaining traction within IS research (Saltman & Smith, 2015). Such an idea critically analyses the place of gender in motivations for terrorism rather than reinforcing generic stereotypical assumptions. While my research is not concerned with analysing factors which motivate women to engage in VE, the current discourse which genders motivations illustrates how pervasive an uncritical gender approach is within existing literature.

**Media framing**

Despite academia developing a more critical approach towards gender and terrorism, ‘the media fetishizes female terrorists,’ (Bloom, 2011:33) owing to their deviation from accepted feminine norms and behaviours. On average, a female perpetrated attack receives eight times as much press attention as a male perpetrated attack (ibid; Conway & McInerney, 2012). Such coverage often perpetuates stereotypical biases which demonise female terrorists (see, for example Berrington & Honkatukia, 2002), representing them through a feminised lens (as discussed by Brown, 2011a; Gardner, 2007).

Nacos’ analysis identified five feminised framing modes that influenced media reporting on female terrorists (2005). Examples include the ‘physical appearance’ frame (2005:438-439); the ‘terrorist for the sake of love’ frame (2005:440-442) and the ‘tough-as-males/tougher-than-men’ frame (2005:444-445). Subsequent literature has referred to ‘physical appearance’ as one of the media’s most common framing modes (Conway & McInerney, 2012:7). Sternadori’s summary of Handley & Struckman’s (2005) conference paper refers to their finding that ‘female terrorists were more likely to be described in terms of age, appearance, “familial or relational context” and stereotypical traits’ ([emphasis original], 2007:15) than male terrorists were.

13 However, some factors are of more relevance to female experiences based upon certain forms of discrimination, such as restricted access to education based upon gender or the threat of rape, as discussed in Jacques & Taylor’s literature review (2009:506).
Despite academic research identifying and challenging these framing methods, the ‘terrorist for the sake of love’ frame endures, and is particularly prevalent in framing Western women who migrated to join IS. IS’s derogatory and traditionalist attitudes towards women are antithetical to Western conceptualisations of female empowerment, thus a woman’s decision to voluntarily migrate to join is portrayed as incomprehensible. However, media presentation of these women through the ‘terrorist for the sake of love’ frame offers a more socially acceptable, and feminine, motivation than the idea that a woman could support an ideology that seeks to subjugate her. This framing mode produced the phrase jihadi bride, which has been generically applied to all Western women who migrated, especially minors, diminishing their recognition as possessing agency. It posits that a woman’s primary motivation for migrating was for marriage and sexual relations.

The idea of the jihadi bride is presented through two stereotypes. It can be used to emphasise the perceived vulnerability of the women: ‘The London girls lost to Isis: what became of the “jihadi brides”’ (Shackle, 2016). This portrays the female actors as passive and exogenous to the decision-making process. The second stereotype utilises the idea of female deviance, vilifying women who migrated: ‘Brides of evil are teenage jihad baby makers: Extremists across the globe using social media to encourage teen beauties to become wives of Syrian and Iraqi terrorists’ (Meers, 2014). Although very different portrayals, both serve to distance female terrorists from a capacity for rational decision-making and diminishes accountability for their actions. A hesitation to comprehend the potential for women to be VE actors was a social attitude that past VE groups manipulated. When combined with historical entrenchment through male-centric counter-terrorism policies, this unintentionally aided VE groups through enabling them to achieve certain tactical advantages.

Prefacing female terrorists by their gender, as exemplified by the preceding discussions of the gendering of motivations and media framing, has implications for recognising women’s agency as VE actors. Portraying female terrorists as less politically motivated or committed than men, assuming their coercion or vilifying their behaviour as unfeminine (Talbot, 2001:165) has in the past contributed to the view that women do not pose credible security threats. Chapter Nine explores this further, regarding suicide bombing roles.

Nacos challenged these stereotypes through her conclusion that female violence is no different from male ‘in terms of terrorist recruitment, motivation, fervor [sic] and brutality’ (2005:436). Rather, ‘it is the social context and gendered discourses in which they [female
terrorists] operate that differs and affects how we conceive of them’ (Auchter, 2012:132), implying an inevitability of gendered roles structuring how women participate.

The idea that social context produces a gendered discourse through which female participation in VE is analysed is foundational to my research and informs my analytical approach. While my research does not address the gendering of motivations or media framing, these examples illustrate the difference in perception between the academic research and public opinion. This contextualises the debates surrounding women and terrorism to which my thesis contributes, making the gendered way in which female terrorism as a concept is thought about, and the pervasiveness of stereotypes, explicit.

While early research merely acknowledged the above debates comprising the first theme identified within the literature (Perlstein & Vetter, 1990; Benson et al, 1982; MacDonald, 1991; Georges-Abeyie, 1983), I contribute to the growing shift towards analysing female participation in terrorism through a gender reflexive lens. In response to the male normalcy/female exceptionality binary, I conceptualise female actors as different rather than deviant. This informed the overarching thesis of my research, arguing that women occupy, and thus perform their roles from within a different space to male participants. Framing my analysis through this gendered reflexive lens sought to disrupt prefacing female terrorists by their gender. Gender differences shape female and male participation yet utilising a gender reflexive lens prevents the perpetuation of gendered stereotypes as explanations for these differences.

The inclusion of non-violent roles within my analysis (Chapters Six and Seven) further undermines the conflation between ‘active’ participation and violence by demonstrating that a group’s existence is sustained by non-violent activities. Failing to consider non-violent roles as forms of active participation negates analysing a VE group as a holistic entity. The analysis of such roles is facilitated by the introduction of the ‘peripheral associate’ as a third strand of membership status, outlined in Chapter Three.

**Theme 2: Role typologies**
The second theme within terrorism literature that this research seeks to develop relates to role typologies. I found five typologies that aim to make the categorisation of women’s roles within violent extremist activities clearer (Hearne, 2009; Carter, 2013; Mahan & Griset, 2013; Cragin & Daly, 2009; Alexander, 2016). These typologies have been key in framing academic perspectives towards female extremists, forming crucial contributions to the women and
terrorism literature. They informed how other researchers conceptualise and debate female participation. The demonstration that women are present within extremist spheres and engage in myriad activities, both violent and non-violent, challenges the implicit gendering of violent extremist actors as male. Role typologies act as bridges between literature framed by gendered stereotypes, as discussed in Theme 1, and the move towards adopting analytical approaches towards gender.

The categorisation of the types of roles women engage with is by no means a redundant exercise. These categories continue to be important but need to be re-worked to more accurately understand the diverse ways in which women participate in VE and the outcomes their role performances achieve for specific groups. Existing typologies are too broad and descriptive, and do not clearly capture simultaneous performances of multiple roles. The current method of constructing a category as based upon the identification of generalised characteristics is problematic because it arguably perpetuates an inaccurate representation of female engagement. Grouping qualitatively and performatively distinct roles together falsely indicates homogeneity between roles perceived to be of the same ‘type’. This obscures the nuances of role performance and purpose which contribute to qualitatively different roles being fulfilled in different ways. My research finds that, although roles are often categorised as similar in type, the ways in which women perform these roles varies greatly.

The remainder of this section assesses each of the five typologies, concluding with a discussion of Vogel et al’s thematic model (2014). This model is not included as one of the five typologies but is assessed separately because it was created in response to Vogel et al’s critiques of Cragin & Daly’s (2009) and Mahan & Griset’s (2013) typologies. Furthermore, the model emphasises group level trends over classifying the actions of individual women (Vogel et al, 2014:102), drawing on quantitative rather than qualitative methods and data.

Of the five, Alexander’s work forms the most recent, and narrowest, typology. Only applicable to female participation in Islamist jihadi groups, it captured the growth of American women engaging in IS-affiliated activities, considering how female participation varied domestically within the US and in IS-controlled territory.14 Alexander divided female participation into three categories related to geographic location: ‘plotters’ (2016:7-8), who ‘design, attempt or carry out domestic attacks’ (ibid:vii); ‘supporters’, who disseminated

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14 Although Davis’ research discussed women in radical Islamist extremism as ‘planners’; ‘perpetrators’; and ‘patrons’ (2006) her analysis does not present, and did not intend to construct, a role typology. Davis does not define how she conceptualised the three role types, thus impacting the applicability of her role categories by other researchers. The closest typology to Davis’ analysed here is Carter (2013).
material support domestically (ibid:9-14); and ‘travelers’ [sic], who migrated to physically join IS (ibid:15-20). Once arrived in the Caliphate, female ‘travelers’ [sic] further contributed to IS through various auxiliary roles (ibid:20).

To illustrate its analytical value, Alexander applied her typology to a range of individual case studies. While the use of an individualistic approach to role categorisation has been criticised in previous research for resulting in over-generalisations regarding female experiences (see the discussion of Cragin & Daly (2009) and Mahan & Griset’s (2013) typologies which follows), in Alexander’s research this approach served to draw attention to variations in how the three types of roles could be performed and the different activities that contributed to role performances.

Although the typology focused on America, it could be applied to other Western contexts from which women migrated, as it captured both domestic and migratory participation. This is crucial as most research concerning Western women and IS concentrated on understanding female participation within IS territory (see, for example Perešin & Cervone, 2015; Cook & Vale, 2018; Loken & Zelenz, 2017). Female migrants were the primary concern for Western security services. The collapse of the Caliphate only increased this, as it prompted several women to make public appeals to return to live in the West. Yet this focus often neglected how women who remained in the West may have participated in IS, albeit through different means to female migrants. Alexander’s statement that ‘women can contribute to jihadi efforts without ever perpetrating violence’ (2016:21) captures how female participation in non-violent activities such as fundraising or ideological dissemination contributed to the presence of IS affiliates within the US. While useful for assessing female participation in jihadist contexts, it does not help to facilitate a comparison outside of the Islamist ideological milieu.

Hearne’s (2009) and Carter’s (2013) contributions discuss female engagement in broader terms. Hearne describes women as ‘participants’; ‘enablers’; or ‘preventers’, with Carter slightly rephrasing this, substituting the category of ‘enablers’ for ‘promoting’ extremism. In my judgement, both typologies are so broad and generalised that they have blunted analytical value and are no longer so useful in understanding how women engage with extremism. A key example of this is Hearne’s and Carter’s use of the category ‘participant’, which I find problematic. As I have found, women participate on many different levels, fulfilling many diverse roles. Yet as a category, ‘participant’ does not provide information about the

15 Exemplified by Shamima Begum, the UK (Snowden, 2019); Lisa Smith, Ireland (Tuite, 2019); and Hoda Muthana, USA (Psilakis, 2019).
kinds of activities women engaged with practically, which influence how an individual participates. For both, participation involves ‘direct engagement in violent acts’ (Hearne, 2009:1; Carter, 2013:2) citing an increase in female suicide bombers (FSBs) as evidence of female participation (Carter, 2013:6; Hearne, 2009:3). This association between participation and violence initially seems logical given the inherently violent nature of terrorism, however, it exemplifies the conflation of active participation with the use of violence. Hearne’s reference to the evolution of women’s roles from auxiliary support to violence (2009:1) suggests a linear progression from non-participation to participation as VE actors. By continuing the analysis of female participation through gendered stereotypes, she reproduces the literature in a feminised way.

In contrast, Cragin & Daly (2009) and Mahan & Griset (2013) identify a limited number of roles that they believe represent common forms of female participation. Both utilise examples of individual women to illustrate the applicability of their categorisations. Cragin & Daly developed a more focused approach, defining female engagement as: Logistician; Recruiter; Suicide Bomber; Operational Leader and Fighter; or Political Vanguard roles. Similarly, based upon their research into ‘guerrilla’ groups, Mahan & Griset present female participation as limited to: ‘sympathisers’; ‘spies’; ‘warriors’; and ‘dominant forces’ (2013:242-243). By including categories dedicated to non-violent roles, neither typology conflates violence with active participation, as Hearne’s and Carter’s typologies arguably do. Cragin & Daly further emphasise the importance of non-violent roles as ‘essential for the terrorist group in order to sustain its violent activities’ (2009:xi), a perspective that had largely been ‘discounted’ (ibid:xi) within the literature and which I also take.

The most comprehensive assessment of Cragin & Daly and Mahan & Griset’s typologies is provided by Vogel et al, who argue that both suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity as ‘similar activities represent different roles...’ (2014:95). Evidence of this is found within my case studies, where the categorisation of roles can be debated, affected by theoretical positioning and the case study in question. It is difficult to objectively assign a role to just one category-type when such assignment is based upon subjective interpretation. Certain roles can be categorised as fitting multiple, different categories depending on interpretation. The performance of motherhood by a female IS member could be categorised as either a sympathiser or spy role by Mahan & Griset, whereas under Cragin & Daly’s typology, it could be perceived as either a recruiter or logistician role. However, none of these categories consider the importance IS places on this role, and the various outcomes motherhood can achieve.
Chapter Two: Gendered Frames & Role Typologies

My analytical framework does not solve the difficulty in categorising roles but forms an alternative contribution to addressing this challenge. By grounding my analytical perspective in gender and learning theories, the social construction of the roles and their meaning for the groups is emphasised. It further recognises that women simultaneously engage in multiple different roles and hold intersecting identities. This is a significantly different approach to other efforts which identify a largely objective set of descriptive roles.

Although not one of the five typologies, Vogel et al developed a thematic model informed by quantitative data in response to their assessment of the existing typologies (2014). 482 cases of female involvement in political and revolutionary violence were analysed through Smallest Space Analysis (SSA), run with 41 variables (2014:99). The model comprises a graph divided into four sections, each corresponding to a thematic role representing specific patterns of activity: ‘active’, defined as fighting and leadership activities (2014:102-103); ‘caring’, comprising traditional feminine tasks (2014:104). ‘Support’ is differentiated as logistically based tasks (2014:104), while ‘ideological’, involving the propagation of a group’s explanatory and justificatory frameworks (2014:103-104), forms the final category. The positioning of role actions on the graph relates to the thematic role to which it contributes, demonstrating how actions can overlap several themes.

Vogel et al found that while there were similarities with the activities represented by Cragin & Daly and Mahan & Griset, ‘the plot could not be entirely partitioned in a manner consistent with these typologies’ (2014:99). Through this model, Vogel et al sought to distinguish between everyday tasks and the conceptual roles women fulfilled within the group (2014:94). Unlike Alexander, Cragin & Daly or Mahan & Griset, Vogel et al stated that their model ‘established the full range of specific ways in which a broadly representative sample of women participated across a variety of different types of conflict’ (2014:104), thus ameliorating claims of over-generalisations based upon the extrapolation of individual data. Basing the four categories on themes rather than role-types facilitates a flexible interpretation in analysing the outcomes of role performances, thus allowing for roles to be categorised in multiple ways according to contextual as well as operational factors.

Although the thematic model facilitates more analysis than the other five typologies, it does not consider the variety of ways in which a role action can be performed and further lacks a theoretical underpinning. Vogel et al justify this absence by citing the lack of a

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16 SSA is a multidimensional scaling technique. Vogel et al describe it as ‘based on the assumption that the underlying structure or behavioural system is more readily understood if the relationships between all the variables are examined simultaneously’ (2014:99).
Chapter Two: Gendered Frames & Role Typologies

Theoretical base from which theory development and refinement was possible. I agree with this statement but confronted this challenge within my own research by synthesising various theoretical perspectives in order to create my own base. Deriving my framework from three theoretical perspectives facilitated an analysis of how role performances were learnt, thus informing explanations of why role performances differed.

**Chapter Conclusion**

I have shown how my research is situated within terrorism studies but engages with broader gender debates, specifically with feminist IR and feminist terrorism studies. My thesis aligns with both sub-disciplines in approaching the study of women and terrorism through utilising gender as an analytical lens. I develop a reflexive approach towards understanding female participation in VE which disrupts gendered stereotypes framed though the dichotomous binary of male normalcy/female exceptionality. Instead, my research advances understandings of how and why femininity can be used strategically to fulfil specific roles or achieve certain group aims, informed by differences in the spaces VE women inhabit.

The first theme within the women and terrorism literature comprises three areas requiring more attention. The conflation of active participation with the use of violence, the dichotomous binary of male normalcy/female exceptionality, and the prefacing of female terrorists by their gender (as exemplified by the feminisation of motivations and the media framing of female terrorists) all contribute to the reproduction of the literature in a feminised way. This is problematic because women are continually situated as the exception within the VE sphere, suggesting that their use of violence deviates from male-perpetrated violence. When discussed, female terrorist violence is considered as something that needs to be explained, rather than assessing the impact of their violence. This biased perspective further excludes non-violent roles from being considered as forms of VE participation. Yet I take the perspective that because non-violent roles fulfil alternative functions which complement a group’s use of violence, such roles are important for sustaining, maintaining and facilitating the group (Brown, 2019:1).

My research is aligned with the movement towards critical approaches regarding gender and violent extremism. Grossman et al identify that binary approaches which define women as either victims or perpetrators of violence fail to account for the interaction between these identities and instead advocate for a 'both/and' approach (2018:13). Moreover, La & Pickett’s research into FSBs argues that women should be represented as ‘agents, victims, and
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witnesses simultaneously’ (2019:13). In a similar way to Sjoberg & Gentry’s criticism of the mother, monster, whore narratives (2007; 2015), both arguments seek to challenge accepted narratives which posit that female participation in VE is linear and static, instead presenting female participation as complex and heterogeneous. Application of my analytical framework and consideration of the space VE women occupy, emphasises that women can perform multiple roles, and assume several identities, simultaneously. Participation is unlikely to follow a specified trajectory, but is dependent upon the group needs, organisational attitudes towards women and individual skills.

Gilmartin further challenges implicit assumptions that continue to frame perceptions of VE women, by calling for a broadening of perceptions of violent actors beyond the ‘person holding the weapon’ (2017:463). My research similarly problematises gender bias, through the identification of five gendered mechanisms of interactional learning (GMILs) (see Chapter Three). These mechanisms seek to mitigate the conflation between active participation and violence, emphasising that non-violent roles achieve different, although important, outcomes for a group. The GMILs further facilitate the analysis of how roles performed by women are learnt and gendered, and the impact this has on role performance. It answers my research question ‘Why are roles that are categorised as ‘similar’ in type, performed differently by women across violent extremist groups?’

The claim that female and male violent actions are solely differentiated by gender identity is contested through answering: ‘If men and women perform the same role, how is this gendered and performed differently in terms of masculinity and femininity?’ The comparison of female and male performances of combat and suicide bombing roles finds that where performative differences are manifested in gendered ways, this occurs for operational reasons rather than owing to essentialised or inherent gender characteristics. Where female actors are perceived to provide certain operational advantages owing to their gender, such advantages primarily exist because of the pervasive male normalcy/female exceptionality binary within society, which is manipulated by VE groups for strategic gains.

This thesis further responds to the second theme identified within the literature, concerned with existing typologies categorising female participation in VE. Primarily descriptive, this literature is deficient in both theory and analysis. As I will demonstrate, while certain role categories recur across many groups, the understandings and specific conceptualisations of what such a role entails are relative and subject to various factors, including individual performances and the group’s realisation of its aims. Despite any apparent
similarity in appearance, roles are actually performed in qualitatively diverse ways, resulting in a range of functions and outcomes. To group together roles according to an assumption of shared characteristics and categorise by ‘type’, as current typologies do, is misleading. The theoretically informed analytical framework builds upon these typologies, explaining rather than describing female participation. The combination of gender and learning theories, as introduced in the next chapter, aids my analysis by capturing the learning processes women undertake, which contribute to performative differences.
Chapter Three: Performativity: Roles, Gender & Practice

In response to the absence of theory from existing role typologies identified in Chapter Two, I developed a theoretically informed analytical framework. This chapter begins with an articulation of the framework (Figure 1). A second diagram (Figure 2) links the framework to recurring concepts of the overall thesis, demonstrating its contribution to answering my research questions. My interpretation of the three gender and learning theoretical perspectives from which the framework was derived follows, highlighting the sections of the framework each theory informed.

Framework of Analysis

The framework provides a tool to assess violent and non-violent roles through the same criteria, such as what each role achieves for a group, as opposed to on the presence or absence of violence. Shifting the focus away from the use of violence intends to avoid the conflation of active participation with the use of violence, resulting in a more nuanced understanding of other forms of participation. Despite an assumption of shared characteristics and any similarity in functional appearance, I argue that the examination of the practical performance of a role and the outcome it achieves for a group reveals performative variations.

I apply the framework to analyse the case studies (see Chapters Six to Nine) by interrogating the data (accounts of female performances of various role types across a range of VE groups) through questions, organised by three units of analysis: social, individual, and group (Figure 1 below). The structuring of the analytical units in this order corresponds to the overall flow of my argument, reiterated in each analysis chapter which follows the same structure. These distinct levels enable the consideration of various factors that inform a role’s performance which go beyond the categorisation of practical actions, such as socio-cultural context; external pressures on the group; and the function of the role.

The framework synthesises aspects of gender performativity theory (GPT) (Butler, 1988, 1999), role theory (see, for example Linton, 1936; Biddle, 1986), and a Communities of Practice (CofP) learning approach (Lave & Wenger, 1991). All three theories relate to a social

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17 Owing to the extensive bodies of literature which surround these theories, it is beyond this thesis’s scope to provide an exhaustive account of each. Rather, this chapter outlines core concepts and significant critiques of each theory that are of relevance to this thesis.
constructivist position and allow for the researcher’s own interpretation to be visible in the analysis, as informed by my ontological and epistemological methodological positioning.18

Two further concepts were implicit in the framework’s development. *Performativity* (Austin, 1962; Loxley, 2007) forms the unifying concept through which I understand and analyse the three theories. As is discussed later in the chapter, I utilise *performativity* to conceptualise the enactment of roles, gender and practice. It does not appear as a distinct or articulated section of the framework because its all-encompassing influence made it relevant as a lens to use when applying the whole framework.

As this thesis is concerned with female performances of roles within VE groups, the second implicit concept was *gender*. The framework was informed by an acceptance that *gender* is a social construction, where *performativity* is the method by which gender discourse is produced through citational practice. This conceptualisation was derived from my interpretation of GPT, which fulfils three functions. Comparable to the use of *performativity*, the first function of GPT was to provide a theoretical conceptualisation of gender as a social construction which informed the overall framework.

The second was the identification of what I term *gendered mechanisms of interactional learning* (GMLs) (see *Figure 3*). Distinct from, yet related to, the framework of analysis, these causal mechanisms simultaneously form an outcome of my engagement with Butler’s GPT and part of my analytical toolkit. Application of the GMLs to the case studies, in conjunction with the framework’s group level of analysis, provide the level of detail necessary to answer my research questions, that I found to be absent from existing typologies. This is discussed further in the *Butler & Gender Performativity Theory* section of this chapter.

The final function of GPT was to form a distinct aspect of the framework which influenced data analysis processes. As GPT is such an abstract and complex theory that is interpreted in a myriad of ways (Tyler & Cohen, 2010; Nelson, 2010; Hollywood, 2002), it was difficult to convert it into a framework that produces replicable application. Supplementing GPT with role theory and a CofP perspective provided tangible concepts that enabled me to operationalise GPT. As *Figure 2* illustrates, each of these theories serves a specific purpose within the framework. Role theory conceptualises actions undertaken by VE actors as *roles*, while CofP situates these activities within a learning space and informs how gender identity and role performances are learnt.

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18 See Chapter Five.
Through situating these activities within a learning space, the CoP approach set boundaries around each case study, determining the data to be included or excluded from analysis. Figure 2 portrays this as the red dashed line which surrounds the rest of the diagram. Contextual factors are further considered through the largest concentric circle, surrounded by demonstrable influential factors. Both aspects relate to the social level of analysis, framing what is possible for the individual and group levels. This informs the types of roles women have the potential to engage in as shaped by contextual factors.

Roles and performances operate within the boundaries of each CoP case study, forming the individual and group levels of analysis. The individual level is the second level of the framework, providing a description of the role’s performance which considers a group’s operational needs. Role theory and the conceptualisation of performativity are of most relevance to this level. It is depicted in Figure 2 as a rectangular red box. The box is situated outside of the three concentric circles to emphasise how the individual level is informed by the social and group levels. It is the clearest level at which gendered learning can be analysed.

The final unit of analysis is the group level. It combines findings from the social and individual levels. Although the GMILs remain separate to the framework, they are applied in conjunction with the group level of analysis. Based upon the data gathered at the individual level, identification of the appropriate GMIL processes analyses role performance in relation to context, the group’s needs and aims, and how an individual’s performance contributes to fulfilling these.

Gendered learning is at the centre of the diagram to emphasise how all of the above factors influence learning processes and role performances, thus explaining how and why roles that are categorised as ‘similar’ in type are performed in different ways by women in different VE groups.

The use of a theoretical perspective produces an analysis that moves beyond descriptive accounts of mechanistic actions. This results from the two analytical approaches enabled by the framework. The first assesses each distinct level of analysis separately, while the second approach offers a holistic examination of all three levels combined. For one framework to encompass both approaches enables a more informed understanding of how specific factors within each level operate, in addition to how the broader levels interact with each other to inform a role’s performance.

Further, the framework has implications for analysing male and female performances of comparable roles within one VE group. Where practical actions and physical role
performances appear to be similar regardless of the gender of the actor, (for example, the act of detonation by a suicide bomber), performative differences occur when gendered ideas are conferred onto the extremist actor and action. If the actor is aware of these social ideas of gender, and acts in accordance with them, the practical actions to fulfil their role become gendered through social observation and interpretation. This links to Butler’s theory that gender is a social construction and performativity is the method by which gender discourse is produced, through citational practice. Thus, role performances are differentiated by gender.

Finally, the framework and the GMILs offer analytical tools which future researchers can apply to role performances and VE groups not examined within this research. It must be borne in mind that analysis conducted by other researchers may yield variant results, owing to the qualitative nature of the data and the interpretivist standpoint taken by myself and other researchers. However, the process by which the framework can be applied is replicable, and it is this application process that has future utility.
Making the performance intelligible and effective (social level):

a. What are the cultural, contextual factors that frame or influence attitudes towards women within the group?
b. What does this tell us about why these roles are performed differently in different contexts?

Performance of a role (individual level):

c. What do they do?
d. How are role performances bounded by an individual’s membership status?
e. How was the role practised?
f. How are these practices informed by gender?
   (1). What is gendered about this performance?

Interactional processes of learning role performance (group level):

g. What mechanisms for learning appropriate gendered behaviours and characteristics were used?
h. Did the group’s shared repertoire of resources limit or provide new opportunity spaces for the types of
   behaviours considered appropriate in the performance of a role? If so, how did this happen?
i. What does the role, performed in that specific way, enable for the group?

Figure 1: The framework of analysis, which is used throughout this research to identify and assess variations in role performances by women across my seven case studies.
Chapter Three: Performativity – Roles, Gender & Practice

Figure 2: This diagram depicts the relationships between the three theoretical perspectives, the framework and its levels of analysis, and the GMILs.

**Gendered Mechanisms of Interactional Learning (GMILs):**

- i. Parody as subversion
- ii. Parody as adoption
- iii. Imitation
- iv. Discipline
- v. Repetition

**Making the performance intelligible and effective (social level):**

a. What are the cultural, contextual factors that frame or influence attitudes towards women within the group?

b. What does this tell us about why these roles are performed differently in different contexts?

**Performance of a role (individual level):**

c. What do they do?

d. How are role performances bounded by an individual’s membership status?

e. How was the role practised?

f. How are these practices informed by gender?

(1). What is gendered about this performance?

g. What mechanisms for learning appropriate gendered behaviours and characteristics were used?

h. Did the group’s shared repertoire of resources limit or provide new opportunity spaces for the types of behaviours considered appropriate in the performance of a role? If so, how did this happen?

i. What does the role, performed in that specific way, enable for the group?
Performativity

Performativity is the lens through which I interpret the three theories that inform the framework. According to Loxley’s summation of the complex and contested narrative that surrounds performativity (2007:3), it developed as a concept in the philosophy of language from J. L. Austin’s speech act theory (1962; 1975). Most relevant to my thesis is Austin’s claim that certain types of speech, such as requests or declarations, are performative because they perform an action (1975:6). In asserting that ‘to utter the sentence...is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it [sic]’ ([italics original], Austin, 1975:6), Austin conceived of speech as forming linguistic actions (Loxley, 2007:3). Although drawing on Austin’s initial definition, I use the term without philosophical implications. Instead, I take a generalised understanding of performativity, as ‘...the rather general quality something might have by virtue of being a performance’ (Loxley, 2007:140). This relates to Austin’s initial definition of the term performative as derived from the verb to perform and the noun action (1975:6).

Since Austin’s initial work, many have reinterpreted or challenged his idea of performativity (such Searle, 1969; Felman, 2002). Arguably one of the most influential reinterpretations is Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble (1999), discussed later in this chapter. Butler’s understanding of the performative was influenced by Derrida’s reinterpretation of Austin. Butler’s theorisation of GPT applied Derrida’s ‘retooled concept of performativity to dominant claims about identity categories’ (Loxley, 2007:3) such as sex and gender.

Derrida responded to Austin’s claims that a performative utterance is only successful if it remains culturally contextualised (Salih, 2002:90) by introducing the concept of citationality (Loxley, 2007:74). For performance utterances to succeed, Derrida argued they must conform to an established and recognisable ‘iterable model’ (1988:17-18) that transcends context and convention (1972:93). Although not central to the formation of my framework, Derrida’s model has implications for assessing existing approaches that descriptively categorise role performances within VE groups by type.

Performances are defined by the identification of established, recognisable behaviours: roles which involve an individual’s detonation of explosives are categorised as suicide bombing. These categorisations are applied to all extremist groups, regardless of context, and are considered to meaningfully convey a universal understanding of how a role

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19 This very brief outline of Austin’s theory does not account for the nuances of his theory but is instrumentalised for the purposes of this research.
was performed. In contrast, I argue that it is inaccurate to base assessments of role performances on such broad categorisations because they fail to explain how a role is actually performed within a specific context.

Performativity & Roles
Throughout, I conceptualise a role as an embodied practice, understood as the physical enactment of practical action or task that has a specific purpose and function. Role theory significantly shaped the creation of the framework’s individual level of analysis, concerned with assessing individual role performances.

Role theory was chosen as a theoretical tool because it enabled the clarification of what comprises a role, detailing the factors that inform a role’s development. As a theory, it consists of various strands, but overall it seeks to explain patterns of human conduct (Biddle, 2013:xii) as informed by social context. The repetition of these patterns results in the formation of social roles that are accompanied by associated prescriptions on individual behaviour (Van der Horst, 2016) that should be adhered to.

Three foundational aspects of role theory are operationalised within my research: identities and social positions; expectations; and social systems (Biddle & Thomas, 1979). To make a complex literature more accessible, similarities between the themes are emphasised. The three themes locate the formation of social roles from within a specific context. Individual role performances, as understood through role theory, occur within the social level of analysis derived from a CoP model, explicitly linking the two theories.

The first theme, identities and social positions, asserts that specific roles are related to social positions and social structures (ibid:4). As humans organise collectively, social position informs an individual’s identity. Linton perceived social position as indicative of an individual’s status, determining both the type of role assigned and how it was performed (1936; 1945). Merton’s took a similar position but augmented this with the assertion that each social position was accompanied by ‘designated rights and obligations’ (1957:110) which aided the individual in performing their role. Biddle & Thomas built upon Merton’s argument, classifying individual behaviour as serving a purpose relating to social division of labour (1979:4). Each social position has an intended function that can be fulfilled through adherence to Merton’s idea of rights and obligations.
Chapter Three: Performativity – Roles, Gender & Practice

Within a VE group, I relate social position to an individual’s membership status and positionality. As Linton referred to social status as determining the type of role assigned and how it was performed (1945), I argue that membership status becomes reflective of an individual’s social position within the group. Membership status (explored later in my exposition of the Communities of Practice theoretical approach) informs the opportunity spaces an individual can access, accordingly facilitating or limiting the allocation of certain roles. Arguably, an individual’s membership status is indicative of their perceived value to the group. Linked to the types of roles assigned are the kinds of behaviours that inform how these roles are performed. This informs the construction of an individual’s identity within a VE group.

Moreover, expectations refers to ideas held by individuals and wider society about appropriate behaviours within a certain setting that contribute to a role’s performance (Biddle, 2013). Variations in the type of language used to describe expectations occur. Reference is made to ‘norms’ (Bates & Harvey, 1975:106; Biddle, 1986:71), understood as ‘a standard shared by members of a social group’ (Kolb, 1964:472), whereas Banton terms these as ‘expected behaviours’ (1965:19). Sargent emphasises that a role is a form of behaviour that ‘seems situationally appropriate’ (1951:360) given the group context while Goffman (1959) states the importance of an individual engaging in socially recognisable behaviour that aids the identification of a role’s type. Although described slightly differently, all the above emphasise the centrality of context and commonly held expectations in producing a role concept that is understood by many.

For the purposes of my research, expectations are conceptualised as determining how the role is identified by others within a specific social setting. As forms of pre-existing constructed knowledge that are socially understood, expectations can be theorised through Derrida’s concept of citationality (1972). While there may be cultural and contextual variations, owing to the formation of expectations within a specific CofP setting, the ability to categorise role performances suggests conformity to a recognisable ‘iterable model’ (1988:17-18). By conforming to certain expected behaviours, others recognise and categorise those actions as forming part of a defined and understood role. In contrast, transgressing expectations produces confusion and alters how the role is perceived and categorised.

Social systems form the final theme identified by Biddle (1986:67). Turner’s work dealt with social systems, perceiving culture as a series of active processes that are constantly ongoing (1974). Such processes, termed as ‘rituals’ (Turner, 1969), alter the culture they occur within. Roles are thus performed and situated within social systems which contribute to the
socio-contextual meaning ascribed to a role performance. As is discussed later, utilising a CofP approach situates extremist group individuals as inhabiting a collective domain with its own shared repertoire of resources (SRR) (Wenger, 2011:2). Most social norms created within each VE group’s social system are shared and determine the types of roles available inside that context. Although internal organisational aspects may have been informed by the wider social system from which the group emerged, a group’s boundaries and hierarchies usually differ from broader society.

Role theory primarily contributed to developing the framework’s individual level of analysis. This considered the influence the space inhabited by women and female membership statuses had on role performances. The exploration of identities and social positions; expectations; and social systems framed these performances as social products, linking the individual level of analysis to the group and social levels. Group attitudes towards women combined with social norms concerning appropriate female behaviours shaped opportunities for participation by determining the types of roles assigned to women.

**Butler & Gender performativity theory (GPT)**
The second *performativity* strand relates to gender, commonly defined as a socially constructed norm (Gilbert, 1983:1274). As humans produce culture, gender is similarly produced through social interactions (Lorber, 1994:99). Gender characteristics and stereotypes are relative, according to socio-cultural context, thus ‘there is no single stereotype of masculinity or femininity’ ([emphasis original], Lips, 2008:5). However, the terms *male* and *female* implicitly convey associated characteristics and ‘imposed value distinctions’ (Vickers, 1993:107). Such distinctions are comparable to role theory’s reference to *expectations*. As Lindsey argues, each society produces gender roles by associating expected attitudes and behaviours with each sex (2016:5) demarcating appropriate characteristics which convey a gendered identity. Through applying *performativity* to gender, gender performativity theory (GPT) seeks to problematise and critique entrenched, binary categories of gender identity (Butler, 1999:163; Loxley, 2007:117). An outline of the main conceptual points, situating GPT within the context of my research and illustrating how my analytical framework was derived, follows.

*Gender Performativity Theory*
I focus on Judith Butler rather than on an array of other gender theorists or theories because her work is the most critically-informed development and application of *performativity* to gender. GPT is a complex composition of multiple intersecting facets, situated within ‘post-
Chapter Three: Performativity – Roles, Gender & Practice

Foucauldian theories of discursive construction’ (McNay, 1999:175). Butler is concerned with subject formation through the assumption of identities as constructed within existing power structures (Salih, 2002:2). In elucidating her ideas, she synthesises aspects of theories developed by Austin (1975), Derrida (1972), Hegel (1807), Foucault (1976), and de Beauvoir (1949), among others, to compose a theoretical standpoint grounded in feminist phenomenology, post-structuralism, psychoanalytic theory and constructivism.

I use gender theory instrumentally, to contextualise role performances and explore how gender identity can navigate participation in roles which may be counter to those usually designated as feminine. I do not analyse the effectiveness of it as a theory or seek to disrupt binary categorisations of gender identities. Instead I operationalise it for the purposes of explaining why roles that are categorised as ‘similar’ in type are performed differently. While GPT informed the development of the framework’s three levels of analysis, it specifically contributed to the group level and the assessment of learning as a gendered interactional process. Butler’s iterative development of her arguments evidences her adoption of Hegel’s dialectic model (1807) to structure her presentational approach. Her own positioning with regards to the theories to which she has contributed needs interpreting in and of itself. Butler’s work enters ‘...into dialectical engagement with the categories by which the subject is described and constituted...’ (Salih, 2002:4), where the ‘subject’ is referred to as a linguistic structure that is constantly involved in an endless process of ‘becoming’ (ibid:2), as opposed to as an individual. Given this presentational approach, Butler often revises and develops her positions, contributing towards a theory that adapts to new findings and arguments. The resulting iterative and dialectic style of Butler’s written work makes it difficult to accurately provide a meaningful summary of her arguments or to absolutely ascertain Butler’s position regarding a particular topic. Indeed, Salih asserts that to attempt to clarify Butler’s exact positioning goes ‘against the Butlerian [sic] grain’ (2002:2), hence the need to combine GPT with other theories in order to operationalise it into an analytical framework.

Consequently, my account and operationalisation of Butler’s theory is specific to my own interpretivist and constructivist approaches, facilitating the examination of social and individual-level processes which would otherwise remain invisible. Applying my own

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20 A sub-field of research has coalesced around Butler’s GPT, with some seeking to demonstrate its real-world application (Powell & Cook, 2006; Tyler & Cohen, 2010; Entwistle & Mears, 2012; Dyvik, 2017). Others criticise the theory for a plethora of reasons. Butler’s most ardent critics (Nussbaum, 1999; Digeser, 1994; Hood-Williams & Cealey-Harrison, 1998) argue that GPT is too abstract and theoretical, in part owing to Butler’s philosophical emphasis on language (Digeser, 1994). While I do not respond to, or seek to address these criticisms, it is useful to be aware of them because they have implications for the operationalisation of GPT into a framework of analysis and its subsequent application.
interpretation of Butler is warranted because while some researchers such as Aretxaga (1997) and Dyvik (2017) tentatively cited Butler’s theory in their work, their attempts were not developed to present rigorous theoretical application for analysing gender and violent extremism. I judged it necessary to develop my own method of applying Butler’s theory. In line with the abstract nature of GPT, my interpretation is relatively broad, supplemented by role theory and a CofP approach. This facilitates the broad, comparative nature of my research project. Other scholars with similar perspectives may find comparable themes, but owing to the dynamism of Butler’s approach, there is likely to be some flexibility and interpretive difference.

I do not take as philosophically-informed a view as Butler, and neither do I conceive of the ‘subject’ as a linguistic process, because I am more concerned with operationalising the theory to analyse how gendered conceptions influence practical role performances. While I do not deny the foundational importance that linguistic theory has in contributing to Butler’s theoretical perspective and its presence in GPT, this is not an aspect that my research focuses on. My interpretation highlights understanding Butler’s theory through viewing performativity as a process which produces a series of effects, that are gender. This enables a consideration of how gender is flexible and can alter according to context. Therefore, while it might seem at odds with Butler’s theory, it does not undermine my position or my use of GPT to use the terms ‘female’ and ‘women’ interchangeably. My use of Butler is not indicative of my ontological or epistemological positions outlined in Chapter Five.

Butler emphasises social temporality, informed by Foucault’s historical analysis of the variety of ways sex and sexuality are constructed within different contexts (1976). Gender is thus an identity ‘tenuously constituted in time’ (Butler, 1988:519) and is not a fixed concept. Although ‘unfixed’ (Salih, 2002:5), a ‘heterosexual matrix’ (Butler, 1999:194) provides a ‘grid of cultural intelligibility’ (ibid:208) which regulates accepted gender practices. Such frameworks limit and delineate the identity that a subject can assume whilst simultaneously recognising the dynamism of gender identity. As bodies are culturally and historically shaped, identity adapts to its situated context and change over time. I concur with Butler about the importance of temporal and geo-spatial context, however I deploy it in a way that has relevance to my research. I refer to context to develop my argument that contextual differences contribute to why apparently ‘similar’ roles are performed differently. Group conceptualisations of gender vary, according to the context from which the group emerged. Examining a group from within its context helps to account for changes in gender conceptualisation and role performances when compared across groups.
For Butler, the matrix pre-exists ideas surrounding gender, whereas the gendered subject itself does not, because it is created alongside the construction of gender. A body becomes gendered through the consolidation of a ‘stylized repetition of acts’ ([italics original], 1988:519) which can consist of particular behaviours, gestures and movements (ibid:519). These acts ‘constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self’ (ibid:519), reproducing gender identities in relation to ‘sedimented [sic] expectations of gendered existence’ (ibid:524). Acts are ‘stylized’ in the sense that they conform to the normative behaviours that occur within, and are bound by, the rigid matrix. Butler describes this process as a ‘...persistent impersonation that passes as the real’ (1999:xxviii). That the illusion passes as the real results in the belief that gender is a continual identity, producing bodies that conform to these perceived pre-existing understandings of gender.

Butler’s emphasis on context further relates to the notions of agency, empowerment and relational autonomy (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007; 2015) in my conceptualisation of the third space as one which differentiates women who participate in or are associated with VE activities from male actors and civilian women.

Sjoberg & Gentry (2007) applied Hirschmann’s work concerning feminism and freedom (2003) to researching women’s political violence. Hirschmann analysed freedom through women’s material experiences (ibid:32), as informed by ‘the social and personal construction of gender’ (ibid:34). She stated that women traditionally perceived by society as lacking in agency, such as those experiencing domestic violence, ‘actually express agency and choice everyday, but do so within severely restrained contexts’ (ibid:32). Broader context in addition to specific events determined an individual’s ‘differing levels of power, control, and coercion’ (ibid:34). Although engaging with different life experiences, comparisons can be made with how VE women’s agency is often perceived as absent (as outlined in McKay, 2005; Auchter, 2012; Gentry, 2020). With regards to women’s political violence, Sjoberg & Gentry defined relational autonomy as the existence of choice dependent upon social context (2007:203). Individuals have an ‘independent identity’ (Sjoberg, 2011:232) but the choices they make are ‘constrained by their relationships with others’ (ibid:232) including other VE group members and leaders.

My interpretation of Butler’s GPT provided a frame that recognised the constructed nature of all three levels of analysis. Both Butler’s and Hirschmann’s approaches reinforce a need to apply theoretical conceptions to the broader contexts that construct specific ‘events and the individuals who participate in them’ (Hirschmann, 2003:34) in order to make visible
those behaviours and attitudes that appear natural but which are socially constructed, thus making them more easily analyisable. In addition to understanding the social and individual levels as socially constructed, the group can also be seen in that way. Even while acting as a constructing force for individual members and associates, the group itself is informed by the context it exists within.

Application of GPT to my research enabled an assessment of women’s performances which made visible how gender is a flexible construct that is adaptive and responsive to group needs. Similar to Sjoberg & Gentry’s conceptualisation of relational autonomy as informed by context (2007:32; 34), analysis through my framework finds that once involved with a group, regardless of gender, individual choices and agency become informed by group structures and needs. However, in contrast to relational autonomy, I find that for women, this manifested in a gendered way through inhabiting the third space, where a range of contextual, group-specific factors differentiate VE women from male actors and civilian women. The specific role types assigned to women by a group are related to its intended aims as well as its broader perceptions of women’s functions and purposes. Such considerations inform the types of roles that are either assigned to or made available as an option for women.

**Gendered Mechanisms of Interactional Learning (GMILs)**

As with the development of the framework of analysis, GPT, role theory and CoP all informed my identification of the five gendered mechanisms of interactional learning (GMILs) (**Figure 3**). However, the terminology to describe the mechanisms is derived from my interpretation of parody, repetition, imitation and discipline as four key aspects of GPT. The GMILs are a conclusion reached from my engagement with Butler, which are operationalised as an analytical tool, distinct from, but applied in conjunction with, the framework.

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<th>Gendered Mechanisms of Interactional Learning (GMILs):</th>
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<tr>
<td>i. Parody as subversion</td>
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<td>iv. Discipline</td>
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<td>v. Repetition</td>
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**Figure 3:** The five gendered mechanisms of interactional learning (GMILs). Applied alongside the framework, the GMILs aid the analysis of how women’s roles are learnt and performed in relation to gender.

Emphasising the influence of contextual factors, as illustrated in **Figure 2**, these mechanisms explore how women learn and consolidate appropriate gendered behaviours and characteristics within a group’s boundaries. Where an individual’s pre-existing notions of gender align with those held by the group, a process of consolidation is likely to occur. Individuals learn their role within a group through a combination of the GMILs which serve to
reinforce and emphasise the shared notion of gender. Where there is a dissonance between an individual’s pre-existing notions of gender and the group’s gender discourse, the GMILs aid the individual in learning and constructing alternative gender understandings which relate to those of the group. This may result in the individual unlearning previously held ideas. These processes are not mutually exclusive but are likely to adhere to these patterns.

While the GMILs act as forms of learning, they are further examples of how roles are performed, broadly illustrated by the following examples. Engaging in roles that are similar to those performed prior to group involvement, such as the performance of motherhood in association with ETA, are informed by repetition. Boko Haram’s female suicide bombers (FSBs) imitate socially accepted behaviours in an attempt to avoid detection prior to detonation, while many women of the IRA subverted feminine norms through smuggling weapons hidden in synthetic pregnancy bumps. Female combatants of the LTTE and FARC parodied the association between masculinity and violence by adopting masculine behaviours. IS’s female morality enforcers meted out disciplinary actions to those women found to have transgressed the group’s expected social norms.

Analysing role performances through the GMILs aids the identification of gendered learning processes, accounting for performative differences where comparable role types are performed by female and male actors. An explanation of my interpretation of parody, imitation, repetition, and discipline into the five gendered mechanisms of interactional learning follows.

Parody and imitation form two intrinsically linked ways that describe how gender can be performed. For Butler, a parodic performance ‘is of the very notion of an original’ ([italics original], 1999:175), illustrated through the example of drag. Men in drag are in a sense parodying femininity because their performance ‘…plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and the gender that is being performed’ (ibid:175). Moreover, parody can be a behaviour that ‘effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender’ (ibid:174). Butler further argues that imitation is a fundamental aspect of parody, whereby the ‘parodic repetition of “the original”… reveals the original to be nothing other than a parody of the idea of the natural and original’ ([emphasis original], ibid:41), questioning whether “the original” exists at all. Consequently, a parodic performance which involves the imitation of gender ‘implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency’ (ibid:175). Parodying or imitating an idea of a gendered identity are ways of performing gender, but also contribute to creating this identity.
For the purposes of my research, I split parody into two related aspects. One refers to the distinction between a performer’s anatomy and the gender performed to understand female engagement in roles that are perceived to be stereotypically masculine. In contrast, the other draws upon Butler’s idea of parody as mocking the notion of a true gender, to understand female participation in roles which subvert feminine norms and ideals. Butler states that ‘parody by itself is not subversive...there must be a way to understand what makes certain kinds of parodic repetitions effectively disruptive’ (1999:176). For certain roles within extremist groups, I argue that the role’s performative effects and instrumental purpose result in the subversion of feminine norms and ideals. For both conceptualisations, parody reveals something about how gender is performed differently. The first demonstrates that to fulfil certain roles, women must suppress any characteristics associated with femininity and instead adopt masculine traits, thus emphasising the distinction between anatomy and performed gender. The second reveals the benefits of utilising femininity as a tool to achieve strategic advantage. While other research discusses occurrences of women manipulating feminine norms for strategic organisational benefits, specifically as suicide bombers (O’Rourke, 2009), the interdisciplinary nature of such research renders a theorisation of this as absent.

I distinguish imitation from parody, to develop imitation as a concept in its own right, to explain female engagement in roles that are usually gendered as ‘feminine’, such as those often referred to as supportive or involving caregiving. This interpretation focuses on the imitative structure of gender, referring to the roles that female participants within the group engage with regardless of time period. In contrast to Butler, who questions whether repeated acts are more than just simple imitation (1999:41), I argue that when considered in the context of gender creation within extremist groups, there is an instrumental purpose to repeated actions. These acts do not solely reproduce existing gender norms but imitate behaviours because they are considered to fulfil some operational purpose for the group, such as aiding a group in achieving its aims. That such behaviours also reproduce gender norms is a side effect rather than the main cause.

Butler further states that imitation gives the illusion of continuity to produce identities (1993a). This can be explored in relation to VE groups, where I believe there is an appearance of continuity in role performances. It is beneficial for the group to continue to ensure the performance of roles that have been identified as furthering the group’s aims. Where there is an instrumental purpose to explain the performance of particular roles, this continuity is not an illusion, but is of itself performing a purpose which then produces identities that are perceived as having been present among previous generations within the group. This takes a
broad conceptualisation of imitation, understood in conjunction with an embodied repetition of actions.

The final two GMILs are discipline and repetition. My understanding of both concepts is close to Butler’s definitions. She describes how gender is a ‘disciplinary production’ (1999:172), owing to the social pressure to perform gender in a way that conforms to accepted norms. Any transgressions are punished (ibid:178). As a GMIL, I interpret discipline as occurring on two levels: imposed on the individual by the group; or internally imposed by the individual on the self. Both are concerned with regulating gender boundaries, in part through the performance of acceptable roles and behaviours, informing how identities are created within a group. Discipline is applied to instances where women may be perceived as engaging in stereotypically ‘masculine’ roles, such as those involving the use of violence. For these roles, femininity is often suppressed in exchange for more ‘masculine’ behaviours.

Repetition is implicit within most of the other GMIL processes which involve repeating certain embodied patterns. Distinguishing repetition as a GMIL relates to role theory’s assertion that roles have associated expected behaviours, which thus enable them to be socially recognised. As socially constructed concepts, both the constitution of gender and role performances are relative to the socio-cultural context they are situated within. Yet despite variations, both retain an element of conformity to a recognisable ‘iterable’ model (Derrida, 1988:17-18) that transcends context and aids the categorisation of behaviours. Socio-cultural context further ascribes meaning and ideas regarding appropriate gender and role behaviours, prescribing these behaviours and further contributing to the development of social norms. Although Butler discusses the repetition of acts as constituting gender (1999:179), I argue that within VE groups the repetition of acts constitutes gendered role performances.

The influence of both concepts, particularly when conceiving of a role as indicative of social position, informs identity and the types of roles possible for an individual to perform. While some literature discusses the performance of gender as a role (see Eagly & Wood, 2011), my research focuses on how gender can influence role performances within a VE group, interpreting roles as consisting of enacted tasks and activities which have an intended purpose and function. Repetition is further considered in relation to the CoP approach where learning is a situated process of ‘doing’ in a similar way to gender, explored further in the following section.
Chapter Three: Performativity – Roles, Gender & Practice

Communities of Practice (CoP)
The final theory that informed my analytical framework is the Communities of Practice (CoP) approach. It conceives of learning as a situated, relational social process. Learning is of relevance to my thesis because it describes the process individuals underwent to become participants of a VE group. A learning process was apparent in relation to female performances of newly assigned roles, such as combat, and roles that were similar to roles performed in wider society, such as motherhood. Even where certain attitudes or practices were assimilated by a VE group from wider society, there would be areas of divergence, suggesting the need for a learning process to facilitate performances of these activities.

Through their study of apprenticeship learning models, Lave & Wenger challenged dyadic teacher-student transmissions common to traditional educational institutions. Rather, they presented a social theory of situated learning (Eckert, 2006). This asserts that learning is ‘always situated in and articulated by, members of a community who reproduce their knowledgability through participation in common practices’ (Contu & Willmott, 2000:272). It forms an alternative to learning through internalisation because it ‘concerns the whole person acting in the world’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991:49) emphasising how learning occurs beyond institutional boundaries. The individual is an agent of learning who acts as both a receiver and transmitter of knowledge, regardless of their status as a new or existing member of the community. This contrasts with dyadic, hierarchical processes which place a teacher in a relative position of power over a student. The CoP typology has more recently been applied to research into Management and Organizational Systems Theory, however I take CoP as originally theorised: concerned with social interactions (Cox, 2005). This provides a more holistic sphere from which to examine the three units of analysis of my framework (social, individual, group levels). The CoP model is based upon a number of key premises, outlined below.

Lave & Wenger’s study resulted in two conceptual shifts. The first was from apprenticeship to an idea of ‘situated learning’ (1991:32-34). The second reconsidered ‘situated learning’ as ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ (ibid:34-37), the ‘process by which newcomers become part of a community of practice’ (ibid:29) through engaging with existing members, referred to a ‘old-timers’ (ibid:56). Such interactions aid a newcomer’s transition from the periphery of the group into the core. Situated learning was thus conceived of as a conceptual bridge to develop a theory of learning based upon a generative social practice (ibid:35). In a similar way to performativity, this posits that the experienced world is socially and culturally constituted through an interdependency between an agent and the world (ibid,
This perspective emphasises the inherently social negotiation of contextually specific meaning (ibid:66).

A Community of Practice is differentiated from a generic community through three aspects: domain; community; and practice. CofPs are formed by ‘people who engage in a process of collective learning in a shared domain of human endeavour’ (Wenger, 2011:1). This domain defines the group’s identity. Membership of a CofP is indicative of commitment to this domain. Members pursue shared interests and learn from each other by building relationships, disseminating information, and participating in joint activities (ibid:2; Wenger-Trayner & Wenger-Trayner, 2015:2) as a community. Such sustained interaction results in the development of a collection of shared practices, through which CofP members become practitioners. Learning occurs through the creation of a shared repertoire of resources (SRR) (Wenger, 2011:2), such as experiences, stories, symbols, vocabulary, and routines imbued with that CofP’s accumulated knowledge (Smith, 2003).

For my research, CofP provides a method for bounding my case studies. The theory further offers a more holistic sphere from which to examine the three units of analysis. Each extremist group is conceptualised as a distinct Community of Practice, emerging from and existing within a specific context. Role performances are learnt and gendered in accordance with that context, influenced by socio-cultural, historical, temporal and geo-spatial factors (see Figure 2). This is appropriate because all the chosen case studies developed from a common grievance or ideology, subsequently generating a SRR that ensured group maintenance and continuity. The applicability of a CofP lens to analysing VE groups is reinforced through Huysman’s assertion that organisations construct new or reconstruct existing knowledge (2002:4) that influence actions taken by group members (ibid:5). If Hastrup’s perspective that cultural knowledge is primarily stored in actions as opposed to words (1995) is taken, then an interactionally developed SRR becomes a crucial mechanism for transmitting embodied knowledge to newcomers, widening group membership.

The inclusion of a learning perspective offers insight into the processes that inform the ways that women acquire and perform their roles. This is informed by Hundeide’s application of the CofP model to VE groups. I similarly prioritise ‘the psychological process of becoming an insider’ (2003:122) over the development of skills through knowledge, in contrast to Lave & Wenger’s original research (1991). This position was reinforced through CofP applications to analyse behavioural changes within Al-Muhajiroun (Taylor, 2010:125; Kenney, 2017). Indeed, Kenney argues that members of a VE group
‘undergo a process of development in which they acquire beliefs, norms, and values that legitimize violence – and skills, practices, and procedures that help them transform their convictions into action’ (2017:1).

It is these kinds of processes that the application of my analytical framework and GMILs intends to capture. However, no reference is made to how the CoP model can elucidate gendered concerns, the impact gender might have on role performance, or how these processes may influence female participation in a VE group. A synthesis of gender performativity and social learning as understood from a CoP perspective is not present within existing research on women and extremism, despite demonstrations of the applicability of CoP to violent extremist contexts (Hundeide, 2003; Taylor, 2010; Kenney, 2017). The application of CoP theory through a gendered frame is absent from VE literature, providing an area of original contribution for this research.

Much like role theory and GPT, all three of the framework’s levels of analysis contained aspects of CoP. For the group level, CoP informed the analysis of opportunity spaces for appropriate behaviours as based upon a group’s SRR. The impact of membership status as assessed through the individual level was derived from the CoP model. Yet as CoP is interpreted as constituting the social world, its most explicit contribution to the framework was to the social level of analysis. This emphasised the importance of context to analysing role performances, establishing the contextual parameters from which the roles were analysed.

The CoP model further understands learning as constituting identity. As Lave argues, ‘developing an identity as a member of a community and becoming knowledgeably skilful are part of the same process’ (1991:65). In developing a skill, an actor simultaneously undergoes an identity change. This process is especially clear for groups attracting members who were not conventionally part of their target audience. The recruitment of Western women is a relatively new ambition for jihadist groups, yet they were deliberately recruited by IS, forming part of IS’s target audience. Thus, when Western women have migrated, in order to fit in with the group it has been necessary for them to adopt new cultural understandings, particularly concerning gender roles and expectations (see Chapter Six). The formation of an identity and skill-set specific to a CoP implies that roles categorised as ‘similar’ in type are performed differently as a consequence of variations in contextual factors.

Changes in identity further signal changes in an individual’s membership status, influencing the assignment and performance of roles. Applying a CoP lens facilitates the examination of the impact an individual’s membership status has on role performances. Lave & Wenger discuss how individuals transition from peripheral status to a core membership
status through learning and developing a group identity (1991:56), although not a necessarily linear process. Through a distinction between ‘direct involvement’ and the ‘enabling of others’ to commit terrorist acts, Hearne’s role typology implies a similar consideration of membership status (2009:1). However, applying CofP theory to the framework entrenches an individual’s membership status as integral to my analysis of role performances. Links between CofP and role theory are further visible through an analysis of membership status. Skinner argues that the things an individual does and the way these things are performed ‘depend in part upon the practices of the group of which he is a member’ (1979:326). This situates context as an important factor in shaping how individuals engage in role performances. Skinner’s statement that ‘the community as a whole often establishes conforming behaviour through what are essentially educational techniques’ (ibid:326) further strengthens this by suggesting an element of discipline enacted by the group, to reinforce certain behaviours that fit with the group, punishing those which do not.

While distinguishing between core and periphery members of a group is useful, I argue that it assumes that all individuals associated with a group can be clearly defined into these categories. However, I have found that such distinctions are blurred, particularly in VE groups which claim to represent and interact with wider civil society, such as the IRA’s relationship to some local communities in Northern Ireland. Indeed, ‘Karen’ asserted the importance of ‘women in the support network who may not have been active volunteers’ (Gilmartin, 2017:466) as having been vital to the IRA’s survival. In these situations, it is often difficult to define what constitutes ‘membership’ in the group, as families and friends may help an individual who is part of the group, despite not being members themselves. This raises the question of the extent to which families and friends can or should be held accountable for tacitly aiding the group. They may only be helping because of a relationship with an individual, but that indirectly helps the group. To consider this question and attempt to fill this gap, I introduced the idea of a third strand of membership: peripheral associate. A peripheral associate was located outside of a group’s boundary but was connected to the group through a relationship with a specific individual(s). Their interaction in relation to the group was limited to helping or supporting this individual. The performance of activities distinguishes peripheral associates from family members whose support for an individual does not manifest as tangible actions that contribute towards the group’s aims. While both peripheral associates and supportive family members are located outside group membership boundaries, peripheral
associates are located closer to the boundary line, and may overlap it in some instances where knowledge is held.\(^{21}\)

This third strand seeks to recognise the participation of those who tacitly aid a group but does not view this form of participation as equivalent to those possessing core or periphery membership. A peripheral associate is likely to possess limited knowledge of the group’s SRR, but this is not guaranteed. There are also varying levels of peripheral associate activity, from little engagement to high engagement, stopping short of transitioning into a periphery member owing to group restrictions. This is seen in relation to women and AQC, where some women wish to become members, but are prevented due to a prohibition on female membership, limited to peripheral associate status.

**Chapter Conclusion**

To conclude, *performativity* provides the frame through which this research understands role theory, gender performativity theory and the Communities of Practice approach. Such theoretical positions are largely absent from existing research on women and extremism. Synthesising aspects of these theories facilitated their operationalisation into an analytical framework that moves beyond descriptive accounts of role performances. CofP brought a social learning perspective, useful in understanding how women within VE groups learnt their roles, while GPT framed this with regards to gender. Role theory provided a clearer definition of a ‘role’.

Construction of the framework from these theories captures the complexities of women’s roles and experiences in VE through a gender reflexive analysis. By identifying and analysing performative differences in ostensibly ‘similar’ role types, the framework helps to account for why such roles were performed differently. Previous research has examined the compatibility of various combinations of the theoretical perspectives. Yet I have not found this to extend to synthesising all three theories and *performativity* together within one research project.

Interpreting these theories through a social constructivist perspective enabled the examination of contextual factors to be placed at the centre of my research. Hirtle’s assertion that ‘knowledge is never neutral...the ways in which knowledge is mediated and created are as dynamic and important as the knowledge itself’ (1996:1) is central to how I combined the

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\(^{21}\) See *Chapter Six.*
three theories into the analytical framework. Synthesising CofP with Butler’s GPT demonstrates how culture is negotiable (Spreckels & Kotthoff, 2007:457), positioning society members as ‘agents of culture’ (Ochs, 1996:416). The placing of individuals in positions of constructive power is further emphasised by a comparison of CofP and performativity. An individual’s social position is impacted by created ‘cultural facts’, such as the types of activities that form part of their SRR (Spreckels & Kotthoff, 2007:455). I hold a similar position, emphasising the influence of contextual factors on producing performative differences of roles categorised as ‘similar’ in type.

The interpretation of role theory content as a precursor to a CofP lens relates ideas of membership to context. Conquergood discusses a form of knowledge about roles that is ‘grounded in active...hands-on participation and personal connection...anchored in practice and circulated within a performance community...’ (2002:146). The practical production and learning of this type of knowledge implies that such a community could be perceived as a CofP. The importance of context is further supported by West & Zimmerman’s discussion of role performances ‘as situated’ (1987:128), linking role theory and GPT.

My theoretical approach could be criticised as Western-centric. Applications of these theories to non-Western contexts may suggest assumed universality. However, concerns of Western centricity have been mediated through synthesising theories associated with a social constructivist perspective. Central to the theories I use are understandings of temporality and geo-spatial context as informing the construction of identities in distinct, contextually relative ways. The case studies investigated spanned a variety of geographic regions and cultures from across the world, as demonstrated in the next chapter. It was more appropriate to synthesise several theories to construct my own approach that was tailored to the needs of the research, enabling the framework’s application to assess groups from within their context.

CofP theory provides a bridge into the next chapter, which explores the operationalisation of the CofP model in relation to the case studies analysed. The boundaries of analysis were established by conceptualising each case study as a distinct Community of Practice. A more holistic approach is facilitated by reviewing the knowledge of each group, including ideology, cultural norms, and roles under the CofP term ‘shared repertoire of resources’.
Chapter Four: Case Studies as Communities of Practice

The conceptualisation of each case study as a distinct Community of Practice (CoP) in this chapter determined the boundaries of the VE groups analysed. A case study research design methodologically operationalised CoP theory, bridging chapters Three and Five.

Application of a CoP approach in conjunction with the framework’s three levels (social, individual, group) enabled an analysis of the case studies which incorporated the influence of socio-cultural factors on role performances and accounted for individual female experiences. This captured and differentiated between individual and group learning, further emphasised through the development of the third membership strand, peripheral associate, from CoP theory. An analytical process not informed by CoP theory would have likely omitted such differentiation. Combined, these elements offer a holistic analysis of relevant interacting factors beyond those internal to the group whilst simultaneously setting the data parameters of this research.

Following a CoP approach, this chapter is organised into sections dedicated to each case study:

i. al-Qaeda Central
ii. Islamic State
iii. Boko Haram
iv. Irish Republican Army (Provisional faction)
v. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
vi. Basque Homeland and Liberty
vii. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army

Each section is divided into five sub-sections. A brief introduction outlines the years the group was active, motivation for the group’s formation, ideological aims, size, and geographic location. The second sub-section overviews women’s roles within the case study. This is followed by an explanation of the focus of analysis within this research. The fourth sub-section justifies the inclusion of the group as a case study, assessing available data sources. The challenges posed by including the group forms the final sub-section.

Following the end of the seventh case study section, two tables provide a visual summarisation of data sources. The first demonstrates the relationship between the research questions and available data types, while the second depicts the data types available in English.
for each case study. The conclusion leads into *Chapter Five*, which justifies the choice of a case study methodological approach.

As a broad, comparative study, my approach aimed to analyse different sorts of roles enacted by women within a range of groups. The most fundamental criterion for including a group in my study was the presence of female participants (see *Figure 4*).

The justification for these specific case studies was driven by the distinctiveness of women’s roles, with each group having diverse roles, spaces and opportunities for women. In contrast to most comparative studies, which compare two or three VE groups, my study analyses a larger sample of case studies. This approach could be criticised as lacking depth. However, the use of a relativist approach mitigates this criticism to some extent. Analytical depth is provided in this research through situating role performances within the context from which they emerged. The comparison of groups that are not often analysed together has the potential to reveal similarities that might otherwise go unnoticed.

In addition to female presence, access to sufficient data regarding female participation was a further criterion. This was necessary to enable the comparative analysis of role performances. A mix of contemporary and historical groups further increased the amount of data available, combining recently released academic studies with news reports detailing and responding to recent events, with more reflective research concerning past events.

Secondary factors that informed the decision to include a case study related to ideology and geographical location, taking contextual factors, such as socio-cultural traditions, into account. The case studies broadly represented three ideological types: Communism, ethno-nationalist separatism, and jihadism. The inclusion of three groups defined as separatist, and three defined as jihadist, allowed for a comparison within an ideological type.

The criteria for excluding a group as a case study were based upon my research’s purpose, propositions and theoretical context (Rowley, 2002:19). Insufficient data to facilitate the analysis of a role’s performance was the primary reason for excluding a group. Skinhead groups (Borgeson, 2003; Anahita, 2006) and Valkyria, a Norwegian all-female group (Fangen, 1997; 2000) were considered but excluded on these grounds, as were Loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) (McEvoy, 2009). Further exclusion criterion related to whether women’s assigned roles changed over time and whether women performed a diverse range of roles. From conducting preliminary research, women’s

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22 See *Chapter Five*. 
roles in Chyornyye Vdovy (the Chechen Black Widows) appeared restricted to suicide bombing (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006a), thus was excluded. Other groups were excluded on the basis that the study already contained an ideologically or geographically comparable case. While performative differences likely occurred, as the aim was to conduct as broad a comparative analysis as possible, preference was given to groups that would enhance the number of differential factors analysed. Where similar groups were found, the amount of data available determined which was included in my study. M-19 was excluded because its aims, geographical context, and women’s roles were very similar to FARC (Vásquez Perdomo, 2005).

*Figure 4* illustrates the process used to determine whether a VE group was included as a case study in my research. The questions in the black boxes acted as a ‘defined set of operational criteria’ (Yin, 2003:78) that were applied to each group in turn. To qualify for inclusion, I had to be able to answer ‘yes’ to all of the questions and reach the yellow ‘include’ box. At the first answer ‘no’, a group was excluded from my study.

A qualitative case study selection process was most appropriate because the ‘phenomenon under study’ (a VE group) ‘is not readily distinguishable from its context’ (Yin, 2003a:4). This was further compounded by conceiving of the VE groups as Communities of Practice. Discussion of a group’s practices and knowledge as a shared repertoire of resources (SRR) further illustrated the interdependency between a group and its context. Taking a qualitative approach enables a greater level of nuance to be captured in my analysis. *Chapter Five* explores the adoption of case studies in greater methodological detail.
Does the group include women as ‘members’ and/or ‘supporters’?

No

Exclude

Yes

Do women perform diverse roles?*

No

Exclude

Yes

Are women’s roles within the group distinctive?²

No

Exclude

Yes

Have the types of roles assigned to women changed over the lifespan of the group?

No

Exclude

Yes

Is there sufficient data available (in English) to facilitate the group’s inclusion in the study?

No

Exclude

Yes

Include

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*’Diverse’ refers to three or more role types, spanning the public/private divide spectrum.

*²‘Distinctive’ was interpreted in relation to whether roles and performances were differentiated in some way to men’s roles and performances.
There is much debate surrounding AQC’s origins (Hellmich 2012; Gerges, 2011; Burke, 2004) however for the purposes of this research, Gunaratna’s (2008) distinction of the al-Qaeda movement as consisting of three parts is adopted. According to Gunaratna, reference to ‘al-Qaeda’ can refer to one of the following: the group founded by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam in the late 1980s; the al-Qaeda (AQ) network which was comprised of this original groups and affiliate groups predominately located in Middle Eastern and Asian regions; or the broader, ideologically affiliated cells which acted for global jihad, either in the name of or inspired by the AQ network (ibid:48).

AQC is understood as the original group founded by bin Laden and Azzam. It is this group that continued to provide and disseminate the Salafi-Jihadist ideology (Turner, 2010) to the wider al-Qaeda network of affiliate groups, where bin Laden’s articulation of transnational jihad ‘catalysed the proliferation of jihad groups’ globally (Gunaratna, 2008:47). Although post-2001 AQC’s operational capacities became weakened, it transitioned into an ‘ideological vanguard’ (ibid:47) termed ‘Al-Qaedaism’ (Burke, 2004:18).

As Chapter Three states, the sharing of accumulated knowledge communicated through a shared repertoire of resources (SRR), is key and provides a central analytical tool of my thesis. Owing to AQC’s transnational nature, multiple localised branches developed, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). These groups were affiliated to AQC through the AQ network and likely received funding, weapons and training from the central leadership (Gunaratna, 2008:48). Yet while they broadly shared AQC’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology, these ideas were interpreted in response to local needs and circumstances, offering these groups a certain amount of operational agency. Narrowly focusing on AQC as the ideological centre to identify interpretations of the AQ ideology suggests that differences in the types of roles assigned to women are informed by contextual factors.  

Women are excluded from possessing AQC membership status (INSITE Blog, 2009: paras. 21 & 23), and so participate as peripheral associates, outside of group boundaries. Women are restricted to gender-appropriate activities within the private sphere (Lahoud, 2014), such as raising children in accordance with AQC ideology and goading men into participating in jihad (trans. Lahoud, 2010). While women associated with AQC performed roles which Ayman al-Zawahiri recognised as essential to AQC’s continuation, group policy was

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23 See Chapter Nine.
not revised to include female members. A distinction should be made here between women associated with AQC, and female participation in local branches, where women have engaged as members and in a much wider range of roles.

My analysis focuses on AQC’s ambiguous position towards the female perpetration of violence, assessing the impact this had on the types of roles assigned to women and how these roles were performed. Historically, AQC prohibited female use of violence, unless extenuating circumstances such as legitimation by a fatwa or for defensive purposes, were met (trans. Lahoud, 2010: para. 10). Yet this position became increasingly vague as the use of internet messaging grew. Dedicated online message boards enabled supporters to directly contact group leaders. There were instances of women asking for clarification regarding AQC’s stance on female participation, with some directly imploring that women be admitted to AQC as members, with female perpetration of violence sanctioned (The Telegraph, 01/06/2008). Al-Zawahiri’s responses did not outright deny that women could engage in violence, but nor did he state that such actions were permissible (Bloom, 2013:172-173), contributing to an unclear position. This ambiguity was further compounded by an open letter addressed to female AQC supporters, written in 2009 by Umayma al-Zawahiri, al-Zawahiri’s wife. In this, she appeared to support calls by women for opportunities to engage as martyrs, while simultaneously emphasising the appropriate position of women as within the private sphere (Anzalone, 2017).

AQC’s ambiguous position towards female participation in violence is interesting because regional branches such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and AQAP adapted their position to enable women to participate as suicide bombers (Gentry, 2011:187; Eggert, 2015:365). In contrast, AQC appeared to remain consistent in its definition of appropriate roles for women, despite lacking clarity with regards to female perpetration of violence. The use of FSBs has caused tensions between AQC and its localised branches but was often indicative of a response to local group needs or conflict settings (Stone & Patillo, 2011:161-162). Often, female participation in regional branches is generalised as indicative of female participation in AQC within academic literature (ibid; von Knop, 2007; Saikal, 2016). By distinguishing AQC’s female peripheral associates from women who participate in regional branches, my research challenges over-generalised, misleading accounts of the types of roles women perform.

24 At the time of writing (May 2020), Ayman al-Zawahiri was the leader of AQ (Gunaratna, 2011).
25 In addition to Footnotes 87 and 88 in Chapter Nine’s reference to the contested nature of the term suicide bomber, groups with an explicit religious ideology where suicide is forbidden (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003) tend to refer to instances of self-sacrifice as martyrdom (Narozhna, 2012:81) as opposed to the Western imposed frame of suicide.
There are two main justifications for including AQC as a case study in my research. First, alongside IS and BH it demonstrates the evolution of women’s roles in global jihadist groups. Despite sharing ideological roots, and initially assigning women gender-appropriate roles within the private sphere, a divergence in terms of group attitude towards women, women’s membership status, and the types of roles assigned to women occurred across these jihadist groups. This implies that an emphasis on contextual factors as informing performative differences is justified.

Despite the ambiguity of AQC’s position towards women and the many online statements from women desiring a violent role, as far as I have found, there is no evidence of women affiliated with AQC engaging in violence. This contrasts with IS, where women in regions outside of the proclaimed Caliphate have disregarded IS’s prohibition on female combatants and conducted violent attacks anyway. There are many reasons for this disparity, including the needs of each group in addition to differences in levels of agency between the central leadership and dissolved power to regional commanders.

The second relates to data availability. A limited body of primary and secondary sources relevant to women were accessed. While a significant amount of secondary literature has developed about AQC, that focusing on women and their participation remains limited. Data concerning women’s embodied contribution to AQC is sparse, owing to the dispersed structure of the group. I have based my analysis on the types of role performances AQC outlines in its propaganda, which, judging by the few accounts there are, women appear to adhere to. Broader discussions surrounding the role of women in jihad, and whether women can legitimately, according to religious interpretations, participate in violence are of further relevance in analysing female participation in relation to AQC.

Primary data accessed was in the form of propaganda, specifically magazine articles. Female contributions and participation to AQC form the topic of *Al-Shāmikha* and *Beitukia* magazines. Published by AQC, both have been directed towards women and are written in Arabic (Fenton, 2019) thus the majority of content is inaccessible to me. However, I accessed an English translation of an *Al-Shāmikha* article entitled ‘A heart Moving Interview With a Mojaheed Widow’ [sic] (Umm Muhaned, 2011). Detailing her response to receiving news of her husband’s martyrdom (ibid:11) and her acceptance that female participation in jihad is

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26 See Cook (2005); Lahoud (2014); Ghanem-Yazbeck (2016); Anzalone (2017).
restricted to ‘incitement’ (ibid:9), the interview depicts Umm Muhaned as a role model for other AQC wives to emulate, communicating AQC’s gender ideals to women.

In terms of data in English, women are mentioned in a few *Inspire* articles. Although produced by AQAP (Landau, 2012), it formed the AQ network’s English-language magazine and so disseminated the overarching ideology as conceptualised by AQC.27 *Inspire* was targeted towards men, containing guidance on how to conduct effect attacks (*Inspire*, Issue 1, 2010:33-40; Issue 10, 2013:52-55). Similar to IS and the *Al-Shāmkha* article, the little content directed towards women in *Inspire* contains advice on how to be a good wife and reminds women of their obligations. This is exemplified by a poem, supposedly written by a woman who laments her desire to be a ‘mujahid’ [sic] (Haya, 2013:30). However, she ends by stating she knows she cannot be a mujahid because she is a woman (ibid:30), emphasising to readers that personal desires are irrelevant because AQC prohibits women from engaging in violence. Gender ideals were further communicated by other propaganda content, including ‘The Role of the Women in Fighting the Enemies’ (*Al-‘Uyayri*, n.d.). The similarities of content between the Arabic and English propaganda implies commitment to a coherent narrative.

The primary challenge posed from including AQC as a case study was the difficulty in differentiating between women associated with AQC and female participants of its affiliated groups, such as AQAP or AQI. Often in academic research and primary data reporting attacks, various AQC branches are taken to be indicative of general AQC policy. As an example, in describing the number of female suicide bombing attacks claimed by al-Qaeda since 2011, Rinehart Sixta asserts that multiple attacks ‘were committed by terrorist organisations who have declared their loyalty to al-Qaeda and others were committed by al-Qaeda members’ (2019:135), yet does not differentiate between the two. Al-Qaeda has often been used as a broad term to refer to attacks associated with jihadist ideology, and this conflation, along with that made between AQC and affiliated groups, produced a generalised literature. In response to this challenge, I focused on analysing primary data such as magazine articles and statements made by individuals known to be part of AQC, such as Ayman and Umayma al-Zawahiri. The use of secondary data, where distinctions between AQC and affiliate groups were blurred, provided contextual information which aided my overall understanding of AQ as a network, but did not form a direct part of the analysis.

27 AQC’s specific media branch, As-Sahab Media, limits magazine content to Arabic (Fenton, 2019a). However, important statements, such as those claiming attacks, or the advice issued concerning the ‘Coronavirus Pandemic’ (*Al-Qaeda Central*, 2020) are also released in English. I have not found any content produced by As-Sahab specifically targeting women.
Chapter Four: Case Studies as Communities of Practice

Conceptualising AQC as an ideology rather than as an organisation posed a further challenge as it contrasted with the approach taken towards the other case studies and could have required an alternative method of analysis. Yet focusing on AQC as an ideology facilitated its inclusion within this research. The diversity of the AQ network’s distinct organisational attitudes towards women and the types of roles assigned was beyond the parameters of this research. Thus, it was necessary to narrow AQ’s boundaries. Application of the CoP model to all case studies mitigated the need for an alternative method for analysing AQC. The emphasis of communicating knowledge through SRR was similar to the function AQC provided in relation to its affiliated groups. This conceptualised all case studies through the same analytical lens, enabling comparison.

**ii. Islamic State (IS), 2014-2019**

Similarly described as identifying with the Salafi-Jihadism movement derived from a Sunni interpretation of Islam (Bunzel, 2015:7), IS’s existence can be traced back to at least 1999 (Lister, 2014:1). However, my analysis spans from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a ‘pan-Islamic Caliphate’ in 2014 (Jones et al, 2017:iii) to the re-capture of Baghouz, Syria, by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on March 23, 2019 (Glenn et al, 2019). This signified the loss of IS’s final territorial enclave (ibid). This period is of most relevance to research focusing on Western female migrants’ participation in IS, with most available data drawing on similar temporal boundaries.

At its height in late 2014, IS was believed to have controlled ‘over 100,000 km² of land and the 11 million residents therein’ (Cook & Vale, 2018:7; Jones et al, 2017) across areas of Iraq and Syria. Estimating IS’s membership numbers was difficult owing to the dynamic nature of the conflict, inflated claims disseminated by the group, the difficulty in distinguishing between residents living under IS control and IS members, and the number of individuals who self-affiliated with IS but who may not have declared bay’a or migrated. Cook & Vale asserted that between April 2013 and June 2018, ‘41,490 international citizens from 80 countries became affiliated with IS in Iraq and Syria’, with ‘up to 4,761 (13%)’ of this figure recorded to be women (2018:3).

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28 Following Bunzel’s outline (2015) I understand Islamic State as the iteration of a group that evolved from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) [October 2006 – April 2013], into Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham / and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) [April 2013-June 2014] (ibid: 3; Wang & Fan, 2015:51). June 2014 marked the transition to the Islamic State, accompanying the declaration of the Caliphate which group members perceived as the creation of an Islamic state. This accords with how the group referred to itself.  
29 Bay’a refers to the ‘pledging of allegiance to a person of authority’ (Wagemakers, 2015:99).
In keeping with the gendered sexual division of labour which characterised many Salafi-Jihadi organisations, women in IS were originally allocated private sphere roles, such as wife, mother or online recruiter. Such roles contributed to IS’s state-building project, with a small number of qualified women additionally working as doctors or teachers, owing to gender segregation laws (Saltman & Smith, 2015:14). The al-Khansaa Brigade (aKB) was one of only two formally organised female wing of IS (Jacoby, 2015:536). Created in late 2014, it offered women a public sphere role. Initially established with the purpose of performing stop and search activities, after men dressed as women assassinated checkpoint staff, aKB’s remit extended to policing public morality (Spencer, 2016:83). Its members patrolled the streets of IS’s territory, handing out punishments to women found to be transgressing IS’s laws. However, early propaganda emphasised the primacy of motherhood over any other role.

My analysis of female role performances within IS focuses on demonstrating the long-term consequences of non-violent roles. The conflation of active participation with the use of violence prevalent within policy, practice and academic understandings of VE often overlooks contributions delivered through non-violent role performances. The analysis of activities associated with motherhood, such as child-rearing and ideological transmission, reveals that non-violent roles were integral to sustaining a group into the future.

IS’s territorial losses should not be mistaken as evidence of its complete ideological defeat. Instead, it has rendered non-violent roles as particularly important. As IS sought to reassert itself on the online sphere, the responsibility of women to safeguard, and subsequently transmit, IS’s ideology likely intensified. Statements from individuals living in the temporary Kurdish-administer refugee camps, such as al-Hawl, detail the continued commitment of many women to IS’s ideology (Vale, 2019:6; Zelin, 2019).

Analysing IS in relation to gender provides an example where the relationship between external pressures placed on IS and a change in women’s roles remains unclear. Based upon other case studies analysed here, such as the LTTE, it would be expected that such external pressure would have resulted in a change in the types of roles allocated to women. However, this was not clear within IS, where changes in the types of roles assigned to women, to include violent combat or suicide bombing, was contested. IS thus provided an interesting

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30 ‘Umm Al-Rayan’ (Jacoby, 2015:536; Eggert, 2015:367) was the second all-female wing. I excluded it from my study because no accessible data concerning the group’s structure or activities could be found.

31 Punishable offences included the failure to wear gloves in public; wearing an improper hijab; and visiting public spaces without a mahram [male guardian] (Khelghat-Doost, 2017a:22; Saripi, 2015; Zakaria, 2015:112).
example where tension between ideological commitment and group responses to external pressures arguably further constrained the types of roles assigned to women.

The voluntary decision made by some women to migrate from the West to IS-controlled territories was considered paradoxical. Many in the West perceived IS’s female migrants to be exchanging freedom for oppression. Yet IS argued that they offered women an alternative form of empowerment (Zakaria, 2015; Musial, 2016:72; Colliver et al, 2019). The focus on a biologically informed gendered division of labour enabled women to return to their ‘inborn human nature’ \[fitrah\] (Dabiq, Issue 15, 2016:20) and so embody wife and mother roles as God intended. IS’s ability to attract 4,761 migrant women from across the globe (Cook & Vale, 2018:3) is used by the group as evidence of the viability and popularity of its alternative form of governance and way of life. Arguably, no other VE group has been as successful in attracting such large migratory numbers from across the globe (Roy, 2017). Analysing the types of roles women performed in IS territory enables an assessment of the extent to which women’s participation is framed around these principles.

One of the main reasons IS was included as a case study was its contemporary nature. During the lifespan of this PhD, IS underwent both its rise and subsequent fall. At the start of my research, governments’ concern was on preventing individuals from migrating whereas latterly the focus shifted to address those individuals who wish to return from IS. As a consequence of this, the need to understand exactly how women participated in and contributed to IS intensified. Tensions have arisen regarding the duty of care by states towards citizens who migrated, exacerbated by misinformation and sensationalist media reporting, which impeded access to accurate accounts of female role performances. This situation was very different from security concerns regarding AQI, where the comparison between IS and AQI further enabled the analysis of how and why women’s roles have changed or been performed differently across global jihad movements.

The contemporary nature of IS informed the amount of primary and secondary data available, which increasingly examined the experiences and roles of women. Initially, factors that motivated women (and men) to migrate were of primary concern, resulting in much research explaining why women joined (Schneider & Weingarten, 2015; Saltman, 2016). This was complemented by analyses of IS’s propaganda and the feminised targeting of content (Biswas & Deylami, 2019; Bradford, 2016). Both areas of research responded to specific

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32 The Quran defines \[fitrah\] as ‘the original state in which humans are created by God’ (Esposito, 2003b).
security needs and illustrated the dominant narrative of perceived incomprehensibility of IS’s appeal to women held by many in the West. Academic research was accompanied by frequent news coverage of IS and its activities, which further validated research into IS.

IS produced multiple primary sources. These ranged from material produced by IS’s official media branch, the al-Hayat Media Centre, disseminated through social media platforms such as Telegram, IS’s various magazines and YouTube (Liang, 2015:6), to social media posts ostensibly produced by female members.33

_Dabiq_ was the first of IS’s English-language magazines, rebranded as _Rumiyah_ in 2016. Articles focusing on women and group-defined women’s issues appeared sporadically in issues following _Dabiq_, Issue 7 (January-February 2015). _Rumiyah_, Issue 5 (December 2016 - January 2017) established a permanent ‘Sisters’ section which featured in every subsequent issue until Issue 13 (August – September 2017).34 Presented as written by a woman for a female audience, a range of female-specific subjects were covered including outlining preferred behavioural traits such as not ‘backbiting’ (i.e. gossiping) (_Rumiyah_, Issue 7, 2017:30) and being ‘steadfast’ (_Rumiyah_, Issue 2, 2016:28-30). _Dabiq_’s early material further reinforced the duty of women to migrate and participate in ‘A Jihād without fighting’ (Issue 11, 2016:40-45), establishing and limiting women’s role as non-combative. However, this theme altered, arguably as territory was lost and the organisational needs of IS changed.

In searching both magazines, the term _sister_ frequently brought up more generic results in reference to the broader oppression of the global Ummah. Women (as _sisters_) were referred to as an especially vulnerable demographic. This demonstrated IS’s construction of gender as premised on female innocence and male protectors, further informing my understanding of IS’s organisational attitude towards women.

The inclusion of IS as a case study posed three methodological challenges, relating to linguistic considerations and how I accessed and collected primary data. A final challenge relates to the generalisability of my conclusions.

I was limited by my need to work with sources in English and reliance on third party translations. I focus exclusively on English language research and propaganda, including translations of key texts such as the aKB manifesto translated by Winter (2015). IS itself translated significant bodies of primary literature from Arabic, in order to reach a more diverse

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33 For a detailed collection and analysis of female produced social media posts, see Saltman & Smith (2015); Hoyle et al (2015); Huey (2015); Pearson (2018a); Martini (2018).

34 The last issue of _Rumiyah_ I was able to access.
target audience. This enabled me to analyse the material that female Western migrants and non-Arabic speakers from other places in Europe would likely have been exposed to and informed their understandings of their roles in IS.

Owing to the extremist content of the propaganda articles that provided access to primary data, ethical approval had to be sought prior to the collection process. The data collection process was further hampered by the removal of previously easily accessible extremist content from social media platforms.\(^{35}\) My initial approach to data collection, viewing data online and without downloading or printing it had to be revised so that I could repeatedly access the data.

The final challenge posed by including IS related to the generalisability of my conclusions. Evidence suggests that the narratives of the English, Arabic and French propaganda initially differed to appeal to their target audience.\(^{36}\) An analysis of *Rumiyah* and Arabic language *al-Naba* found that latterly there was an element of translating material across the publications. This targeted propaganda tactic (Mahlouly & Winter, 2018:33) demonstrated IS’s overarching narrative. As I drew on English-language data, my analysis was specific to and offered conclusions regarding English speaking women who migrated from Western Europe, America or Australia and should be read as such. The findings of my research therefore cannot be generalised and applied to IS women who migrated from other areas. Similarly, my findings do not necessarily capture the participatory experiences of Western women who did not migrate, although attention is given to this demographic in *Chapter Seven*.

**iii. Boko Haram (BH), 2009-2020**


Based upon Salafi-Jihadist principles (Cook, 2018:1; Thurston, 2018:20), Yusuf sought to fuse religious ideology with the alleviation of socio-economic grievances (Matfess, 2017). Latterly referred to as ‘Yusufiyah’ (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012:26), this was a ‘largely peaceful

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\(^{35}\) See *Ethics, Chapter Five*.

\(^{36}\) See *Chapters Six and Seven*. 

In response to perceived harassment from the Nigerian state during the final months of Yusuf’s leadership, BH shifted towards the use of indiscriminate violence. Following the extra-judicial death of Yusuf in 2009 (Oriola, 2016:3), Abubaker Shekau assumed leadership of BH. Indiscriminate violence continued under Shekau, intensified by an added desire to avenge Yusuf’s death. It is from this point that BH became considered a terrorist group (Onuoha, 2010), marking my analytical starting point.

2009 further saw the cementation of BH’s relationship with other global Salafi-Jihadist groups, exemplified by the participation in joint training camps with fighters from Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) (Matfess, 2017:10). Shekau’s declaration of a Nigerian Caliphate in Gwoza in 2014 (Pham, 2016) was followed by a pledge of bay’ā to IS in 2015 (Kassim & Nwankpa, 2018:407-409). Subsequently, BH became known as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (Cook, 2018:1). Yet within a year, ISWAP had split into factions (Bryson & Bukarti, 2018). At the time of writing (March 2020), ISWAP remains affiliated with IS while the other faction returned to the name Boko Haram, continuing under Shekau’s leadership. It is this latter group my research is concerned with.

As with all presently active militant groups, the exact size of BH is impossible to ascertain. Previous estimates range from 280,000 members ‘spread across Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Sudan’ (Onuoha, 2010:58) to a ‘fighting force’ of 15,000 (Amnesty International, 2015: para. 6), although both sources recognised that numbers are likely to be ‘much higher’ (ibid: para. 6). It is unclear whether either figure referred solely to men or included women and children. Ascertaining statistics concerning female membership is equally as challenging.

As a currently active group, I have tried to incorporate the most recent research and information about BH, taking March 2020 as the end of my data collection period. This time frame includes BH’s move to deploying women as suicide bombers, initiated in 2014 (Warner & Matfess, 2017:4), in addition to the abduction of 276 female students from a Christian, secular school in Chibok (Oriola, 2016:14), an event which has arguably dominated how the existing literature discusses women and BH.

Female participation in BH appeared restricted to the domestic roles of wife and mother (Matfess, 2017), or suicide bombing (Anyadike, 2016; Galehan, 2019a). However, there is limited detail regarding how female members participated as wives and mothers, beyond that provided by Matfess (2017:125).
Consequently, I focused on analysing suicide bombing performances. Female performances of suicide bombing operations fulfilled BH’s desire to demonstrate an ability to conduct attacks without depleting their number of male fighters. These roles were primarily allocated to the non-Muslim women BH frequently abducted, although it could be assigned to female members whose utility for the group was considered exhausted. This included women who had been widowed for a third time, thus were considered unlucky and unmarriageable (Englehart, 2019). Abducted women were told they could convert to Islam and become the wife of a fighter, or perform a suicide operation (Worley, 2016; Searcey, 2017).

This research concentrated on BH’s organisational attitude towards women and the impact this had on women’s membership status and the assignment of suicide bombing roles. A scholarly assessment of BH’s attitude towards women was gained through the group’s frequent perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence against women (Oriola, 2016). This, combined with an absence of a narrative that lauded the contributions women make (Ladbury et al, 2016:9), suggested that in contrast to other case studies examined, such as IS, contributions made by women were seemingly not valued.

The involvement of women in BH is likely to remain a prominent research area. Interviews conducted by Moaveni with female former members of BH found that an increasing number of women who had escaped BH were voluntarily returning, motivated by despair (2019a). Although supposed to offer inhabitants a modicum of safety and necessary resources, internally displaced persons (IDP) camps were frequently spaces which subjected women to sexual abuse from security forces. Ironically, BH was perceived as the more stable of the two options. Marriage to a BH fighter provided access to food, further limiting what was often multiple abusers in an IDP camp to just one: her husband.

BH provides a further ideological comparator to AQC and IS, but from a West African perspective. However, the primary motivation for including BH was its contemporary activity. Similar to IS, BH developed alongside the lifespan of this PhD. Most previous research into African groups focused on liberation groups that assigned women combatant status. BH represented a change from this and it offered an interesting comparator with AQC and IS, where contextual factors produced differences despite stemming from similar ideological roots.

BH’s deployment of the largest number of FSBs of any VE group (Warner & Matfess, 2017:4) motivated the question of the extent to which conceptualisations of gender influenced either BH’s reason for assigning women this role or how suicide bombing roles were
performed. Several online news features detailed interviews with former female members and women abducted by BH (see, Ansbro, 2017; Soy, 2016). As the available data focuses on the role of women as suicide bombers, analysis of BH only features in Chapter Nine. However, it acts as the main case study for this chapter, exploring questions relating to female participation and agency.

The inclusion of BH as a case study posed two data-related challenges. The first related to the availability of general literature and data concerning BH, while the second was specific to data regarding women.

The amount of data on BH was small. Existing analyses largely concentrated on explaining how BH emerged from specific socio-economic and political conditions in North-Eastern Nigeria (El-Affendi & Gumel, 2015). Owing to its ‘opposition to the totality of Western culture’ (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012:27) and consideration of social media as a Western export, no primary data was published by BH via online platforms. Instead, information was released through video or audio-recorded speeches made by the group’s leaders. Kassim & Nwankpa translated and collated some of Yusuf’s, and subsequently, Shekau’s speeches into a book (2018). This has proved to be a key academic resource concerning BH’s internal attitude and organisation, however references to women are negligible.

Secondly, the amount of data concerning women in BH remains an even smaller subset which predominately discussed BH’s abduction and coercion of women (see Anyadike, 2016; Matfess, 2016), the role of women as suicide bombers (see Pearson, 2018; Onuoha & George, 2015; Markovic, 2019) or BH’s frequent perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence (Oriola, 2016). These areas of research intersect to present a narrative of diminished female agency, thus making the differentiation between women who voluntarily joined as members and abducted women difficult. There is evidence that women did voluntarily join as members, but there is little available information regarding how they performed their roles, and their position within the group. While most women deployed as suicide bombers were likely to have been coerced, perceiving this as a standard form of female participation is an overgeneralisation which inhibits analyses of other forms of female membership status and participation.

Although such a distinction would have been valuable, owing to an insufficiency of data, this research focuses on female performances of suicide bombing by coerced or peripheral associate women. This was enabled through triangulating secondary literature with
primary material produced by the group and media reports. As far as possible, the resulting analysis differentiates between various levels of agency held by different women.

iv. Irish Republican Army (IRA), 1965-1999
The IRA opposed ‘Britain’s denial of the fundamental right of the Irish people to national self-determination and sovereignty’ (The Guardian, 26/07/2012). It believes itself to be ‘the direct representative of the 1918 Dail Eireann Parliament’ (Melaugh, 2019: para. 1), and as such is the ‘legal and lawful government of the Irish Republic’ (ibid). While there have been several Republican splinter groups, including the Official IRA (OIRA) and Real IRA (rIRA [sic]), the bulk of research into the role of women concerns the Provisional IRA (PIRA). For the purposes of this research, ‘the IRA’ refers to the Provisional faction which has arguably been referred to as the ‘IRA’ since the OIRA’s ceasefire in 1972 (Stanford, 2012).

Women have been involved with the IRA through two strands: community activism or membership, although the two were not mutually exclusive. These strands produced very varied forms of participation.

Community activism provided informal, communal level support (Shannon, 1989:236), likely derived from direct experiences of injustice and can be understood through the concepts of ‘accidental activism’ (McWilliams, 1995) and ‘prison culture’ (Shannon, 1989). Both relate to the cultivation of sympathy and grassroots support for the IRA’s aims, albeit not necessarily its methods, within the wider Catholic nationalist communities. McWilliams described ‘accidental activism’ as ‘born of immediate experience of social injustice, rather than as a consequence of a pre-existing ideological belief’ (1995:13-15). The British policy of internment was one such unjust experience that Shannon argues created a ‘prison culture’, which ‘drove wives, sisters and mothers into sympathy with republican Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA’ (1989:238).

Such community level support manifested in accordance with women’s ‘traditional gendered roles’ (Ashe, 2006:154) as characterised by prevalent wider socio-cultural norms the Roman Catholic church perpetuated, which situated women within the domestic sphere (Sales, 1997:185). Roles ranged from ‘alerting the community to the presence of the British army by banging bin lids’ (Ashe, 2006:154) and providing IRA members with food (Shannon, 1989:237), to enabling the disposal of arms (Radden Keefe, 2018:34). As a result, many women ‘served the [Republican] movement, but were not strictly part of it’ (Taylor, 2000:302).
When combined with the pervasive nature of the conflict, which often blurred the boundaries between the public and private spheres, it was difficult to distinguish community activism from membership. As Horgan & Taylor noted, the IRA’s active membership did ‘not exceed a few hundred at any one time, but this merely obscure[d] a much larger support network consisting of thousands’ (1997:3), which would have included women engaging in community level support roles.

Community activism often prompted the development of a political consciousness more generally, which for some women did manifest as involvement with the IRA as peripheral associates, or as formalised members. Female members’ participation was dynamic and varied, often switching between several different role types at any one time. Roles further altered according to time period and changes to an individual woman’s membership status. This contrasts with existing role typologies which present female participation as a static and linear progression which does not account for holding multiple roles simultaneously. The most common form of roles women engaged with were arms, explosives and ammunition transportation or disposal (Dowler, 1998:167), sexual bait (Toolis, 2000:399), intelligence gathering (Eager, 2008), or combative violence (McDowell, 2008:339).

Female participation in the IRA is analysed from the re-emergence of violence between the British Army and Irish Republicans during the mid-1960s, until the Good Friday Agreement came into effect in 1999. This period is commonly referred to as ‘the Troubles’ and marked the peak of the current incarnation of the IRA’s activities.

It encapsulates the lead up to the inclusion of women as full members of the IRA, which began with the formal alignment of Cumann na mBan (CnamB), the ‘women’s division of the Irish Republican Movement’ (Ashe, 2006:154), with the Provisional IRA in 1970 (Reinisch, 2019:421). This culminated in a merger between the two groups in 1972 (Ashe, 2006:154; Radden Keefe, 2018:43-47). Prior to this, all female involvement with the nationalist movement was through secondment from CnamB which had formed in 1913 ‘to act as auxiliaries’ (Fairweather et al, 1984:240) for the exclusively male Republican movement.

The IRA was included as a case study for three reasons. First, it offered a historical perspective that provided meaningful contrast with contemporary groups. Secondly, as more time has elapsed since the end of ‘the Troubles’, the volume of research into that period has increased. Through making information accessible to the public, several projects contributed to Northern Ireland’s reconciliatory justice process. The Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)
website, administered by Ulster University, exemplified this. It details multiple facets of Northern Ireland’s conflict, including a list of databases containing more information.

CAIN was a valuable research tool for my project, particularly because it provided access to the IRA’s handbook, the *Green Book I* (1956) and its updated version, the *Green Book II* (1977) (Melaugh, 2019; Coogan, 2000). The Book forms one of the few primary sources produced by the IRA which was supposedly given to its members during their training (Coogan, 2000:544). The only reference made to women are as the ‘girlfriends’ (Melaugh, 2019: para. 4) of members. The absence of women continues in *Book II*, despite being released after the CnamB merger which supposedly resulted in great equality of opportunities for women.

Unlike the other case studies, I had greater opportunity to access primary data which provided contextual information about Northern Ireland and the IRA. I viewed copies of newsletters and pamphlets produced during ‘the Troubles’ in support of the Republican cause. The *Women Protest for Political Status in Armagh Goal* newsletter gave insight into the experiences of female IRA prisoners and the community campaigns that were created to demand better conditions (Women Against Imperialism, 1980; Loughran, 1986). While not produced by the IRA, such sources helped to contextualise wider social attitudes and responses towards female IRA members.

Academic research has produced several ethnographic (Aretxaga, 1995; Aretxaga, 1997) and interview-based studies (Dowler, 1998; Ryan & Ward, 2004; Fairweather et al, 1984), as well as the Dúchas Oral History Archive (1999) to analyse female experiences. Combined, these works offer insight into the experiences of civilian women and conditions for female IRA members inside Armagh prison. As found in relation to the other case studies, details regarding female IRA participation through performances of various role types is limited but enough to facilitate my analysis.

The final justification for including the IRA relates to my use of theory. As exemplified above, the IRA demonstrates the difficulty in distinguishing between the actions of members and the contributions of non-members to group activities. Conceptualising the IRA as a CofP allows the actions of non-members to be captured and recognised as part of the analysis, informing the development of the peripheral associate membership category. Although this category applies to other case studies, assessment of the IRA was instrumental in my formulating it in relation to membership status. As a CofP, the IRA facilitates the analysis of how the types of roles assigned to peripheral associate women remained gendered and located within the private sphere. In contrast, the types of roles core and periphery women
were able to participate in evolved from reinforcing traditional gender stereotypes to manipulating these stereotypes in an unconventional way as a tool to offer the IRA operational advantages.

While measures in Northern Ireland encouraged a commitment to the accessibility of information relating to ‘the Troubles’, data limitations compromised access to certain histories located in the Dúchas archive (1999). Even excluding these testimonies, the data I had collected was sufficient for the broad level comparative analysis of my study. However, should this research progress further, these oral histories may be useful to access.

v. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 1980-2009
The LTTE formed as a ‘youth guerrilla movement’ during the 1970s (Samaranayake, 2007:174), integrating battlefield insurgency strategies and protracted rural guerrilla warfare tactics with terrorism (ibid). Their main objective was to secede from the Sri Lankan state (Alison, 2011) and create an autonomous Tamil state (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 2008; Manoharan, 2003).

The types of roles considered appropriate for women changed significantly as the conflict persisted. Unlike my other case studies, these changes were accompanied by a concerted revision and reinterpretation of ideology and practices that sought to retain the support of wider Tamil society whilst simultaneously responding to the needs of the group and pressure exerted by women to participate in violence. Arguably, other groups’ attempts to do the same have had varied results.

Initially, ‘care was taken to not upset the cultural values of wider society so... roles of women were overtly gendered’ (Alison, 2009a:127), restricting women to first aid and cooking (ibid:127). Latterly, roles expanded to include administrative work, medical care and intelligence gathering (Eager, 2008; Stack-O’Connor, 2007). In 1983, the Women’s Front of the Liberation Tigers (‘Vituthalai Pulikal Munani’) was formed (Alison, 2003), however it did not engage in combat until 1986 (ibid).

The proportion of the LTTE’s female members is unknown and disputed by scholars. Estimates range from women comprising 15-20% of the guerrilla fighters (Alison, 2003:39; Stack-O’Connor, 2007:53) to one third of the movement (Jordan & Denov, 2007:43; Wang, 2011: 102) to an ‘unrealistic’ 50% (Alison, 2003:39). The gender ratio differed within specific

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37 In 1972, Velupillai Prabhakaran founded ‘Tamil New Tigers’ militant group, which became known as the LTTE from 1976 onwards (Hopgood, 2006:47).
38 Chapter Nine examines how attitudes changed.
units, but it is believed that around 33% of the LTTE’s elite suicide unit, the Black Tigers, were women (Stack-O’Connor, 2007:53).

Analysis of the LTTE examines the changing nature of women’s roles, and the circumstances that precipitated the shift from culturally traditional, gender appropriate roles to the inclusion of women as combatants and suicide bombers. While many women continued to perform non-violent roles or returned to non-violent activities following their retirement from combat (Wall & Choksi, 2018), the opportunity for women to engage in violence was significant. Prior to the LTTE’s creation of a violent female actor, the association between femininity and violence was absent from Tamil culture (Schalk, 1994). The LTTE reinterpreted aspects of Tamil culture, such as motherhood, to legitimate female use of violence. Yet even after the inclusion of women in violent roles, traditional conceptualisations of gender continued to inform female role performances, exemplified by gender segregated combat units (Davis, 2008:1).

Female participation in the LTTE is examined from 1980 until the 2009 ceasefire. The period prior to the formation of the women’s unit is included to assess the decision-making processes and other factors that contributed to the change in women’s roles.

As a group that has become synonymous with female engagement in violent activities, the LTTE acts as an interesting comparator for roles that utilise violence, hence its inclusion as a case study. The comparison of combatant roles with those deployed by the FARC emphasises the influence ideology can have on role performance, while the analysis of suicide bombing roles as performed by women in BH illuminates how organisational attitudes towards women can influence the types of roles women are assigned, their role performances and the level of agency women possess.

In terms of source material, there is a large amount of overall data available, concerning various facets of the conflict as well as female participation. Like the IRA, several ethnographic studies have been conducted.39 These primarily took the form of qualitative interviews with current (at the time of the research) and former female LTTE members, although some studies included male participants. Such data provides insight into the types of roles performed by women and female experiences of the LTTE that I would otherwise be unable to access.

39 See Trawick (1997); Alison (2003; 2009a; 2011); Jordan & Denov (2007); Herath (2012).
Chapter Four: Case Studies as Communities of Practice

The main themes present in the data concerning women relate to organisational reasons to include women in violent roles (Wang, 2011; Stack-O’Connor, 2007) and the motivations for women joining the LTTE, including reference to gender-specific factors such as female emancipation (Alison, 2011) or an experience, fear or threat of sexual violence by Sinhalese military and police (Eager, 2009:10:283; Herath, 2012:154). Most research concludes with an assessment of the extent to which involvement in more actively violent combatant roles resulted in female empowerment (Alison, 2003; Jordan & Denov, 2007). The types of social, private sphere roles women had to return to after the 2009 ceasefire are compared with roles performed in the LTTE. As LTTE members, women were more likely to have engaged in roles that provided a relative amount of power and agency. The trajectory of increased female emancipation arguably observable within the LTTE was not paralleled by significant changes within wider Tamil society (Friedman, 2018:636).

Two valuable sources of primary data also enabled my analysis of the LTTE. Niromi de Soyza’s autobiography Tamil Tigress (2011) narrates her trajectory from her decision to join her school’s Students Organisation of Liberation Tigers (SOLT) (2011:62), to receiving combat training and participating in an ambush attack. Although her account focuses on recounting her life-story, references to her female LTTE colleagues depicts a variety of other experiences. Secondly, the website ‘Tamilnation’ stored English translations of information, speeches and propaganda that was initially written in Tamil. Although not curated by the LTTE, Tamilnation’s affiliation and support of the struggle for Tamil independence was clear. As the target audience of this website was the Tamil diaspora, many of whom may not have learnt the Tamil language, the translations available are likely to be accurate. However, given the intended audience, such translations and the original content could be biased and act as a form of informal propaganda to remind those in the diaspora of the continuing Tamil struggle. Yet, as with the above discussion of interview data, these sources illustrate the LTTE’s organisational position and are interpreted as forms of the LTTE’s shared repertoire of resources.

Two factors must be borne in mind when analysing this data. First, Alison acknowledged that the female LTTE members she interviewed in 2009 had been chosen by the LTTE leadership (2009a:124). These interviewees may have been coached to answer questions in a specific way, to reinforce a perspective the leadership wanted disseminated, precluding other information the leadership did not want known. While I was aware of this, it did not prevent me from using the data. Indeed, owing to my social constructivist and
interpretivist approaches, I analysed this data as illustrating the LTTE’s constructed reality and perception of their situation.

Secondly, an awareness of the original researcher’s own perspectives and the frames they have imposed upon their data is required. Unless the raw data is also included, most references and quotations of interview responses are deployed in support of a specific argument. As such, when drawing on these types of sources, particularly where I am relying on the researcher’s own translation of an interview response, the original researchers’ agendas should be kept in mind.

vi. Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA), 1960-2018
ETA has been described as a ‘radical nationalist’ (Hamilton, 2007:1) group, committed to attaining Basque independence from Spain through armed struggle (ibid:1). It sought to unite regions in the north of Spain and south-western France into an independent Basque Country. Formed in 1959, ETA ‘began as a political and cultural movement’ (Hamilton, 2007a:134), not introducing violent tactics until 1968, when ETA leader Txabi Exterbarrieta shot a Civil Guard at a roadblock (Hamilton, 2007:72). This resulted in a series of violent reprisals. The Civil Guard found Exterbarrieta and shot him in return (ibid:72), prompting ETA to assassinate police inspector Melitón Manzanas (Rodríguez Lara & Villanueva Baselga, 2015:59). Of the sixteen members accused of Manzanas death, three were women (Hamilton, 2007:105).

The first written record of female involvement in ETA was 1963, and between the mid-1960s and early 1970s, small numbers of women joined (ibid:105). These numbers grew during the 1970s and 1980s. Reinares states that female membership peaked at 11.2% during 1983-1995 (2004:467), while Hamilton cites a slightly higher figure of 12-13% (2007:105). As such, my research focuses on 1960 to May 2018, when ETA declared it had completely dissolved all its structures (Ormazabal & Aizpeolea, 2018: para.1) becoming defunct as an organisation.

Whereas the progression of the IRA and LTTE’s conflicts had widened role opportunities for women, this was a much more incremental development within ETA. Women’s participation was informed by changes occurring in the socio-cultural context. Militarism was defined as a masculine activity, yet the modernisation of gender roles within wider society was challenging rigid gender norms (Hamilton, 2007a:136). This produced ETA’s seemingly contradictory organisational position towards women. A key ETA document, ‘Letter to Basque intellectuals’ (1964-65) asserted that women ‘should enjoy identical rights and possibilities to men’ (trans. Hamilton, 2007:56). Yet the following sentence stated that
‘conscious of the special function incumbent upon her in the home as wife and mother, society should pay due attention and facilitate the fulfilment of this function’ (ibid:56). This limited female ETA participation to cultural activities located within the domestic sphere, such as teaching the Basque language (Hamilton, 2007a:136), or support roles (Hamilton, 2007:105).

However, by the late 1960s, a small number of women were participating as ‘armed activists’ (ibid:105), with others accepted into leadership roles (Hamilton, 2007a:136). By September 2000, Maria Soledad Iparraguirre Guenechea was the overall leader of ETA (Cragin & Daly, 2009:3).

My analysis focuses on demonstrating how performative differences were informed by an individual’s membership status. ETA’s location of mothers outside of group boundaries limited their ability to participate in a way that comparable groups, such as the IRA, did not. The development of peripheral association as a third category of membership enabled the inclusion of mothers associated with ETA in my analysis. By assuming a greater share of the burden of caregiving, women facilitated their husbands’ participation as ETA members, thus tacitly contributing to the group’s continuation. Hamilton’s extensive research into women and ETA (2007; 2007a; 2007b; 2000) took a similar approach, involving the contributions of mothers to ETA, confirming to me that this approach was possible and relevant.

In my analysis ETA is used primarily as a comparator to the IRA. Both groups were concerned with separating a distinct minority identity group from a perceived oppressive central state. They operated in similar time periods and socio-cultural contexts infused with Roman Catholicism. Despite such similarities, there were significant differences between female performances of comparable role types. Comparing female participation in ETA and the IRA demonstrated the influence of the space women occupied on membership status, role opportunities and role performances.

Primary data sources existed in the form of ETA’s El Libro Blanco [The White Book], and several regular newsletters, such as Zutik. ETA’s various propaganda outputs were compiled chronologically into eighteen volumes, published as Documentos Y [Documents And] (ETA, 1979-1981). Madrid’s National Library of Spain provided physical access to these volumes on request. Analysis of this material centred on identifying key, gender-specific words such as la mujer (woman) and las mujeres (women). Thus, assessing ETA as a CofP was appropriate because the group had created a body of accumulated knowledge, intrinsically

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40 Thank-you to Richard and Philippa Mutton for their cursory translation of documents to check for relevance, followed by their more detailed translation of documents on my behalf.
linked to wider Basque culture, which I interpreted as part of ETA’s shared repertoire of resources.

Access to English-language data concerning ETA posed the main challenge. As Basque separatism was predominately, and possibly exclusively, supported by people who self-identified as Basque, there was no need for ETA to translate its propaganda into English. Sources produced by ETA exist in Spanish and French, not solely in Basque, because the Basque language was banned during Franco’s dictatorship (Hamilton, 2007:22). The use of Spanish encouraged inclusivity of those who considered themselves Basque yet did not speak the language, while the use of French was directed towards the French areas of the identified Basque region. Any analysis of ETA propaganda materials was reliant on third-party translations.

Research sources on ETA are predominately in Spanish, receiving little attention in English. Even fewer English-language sources are concerned with women in ETA. Ethnographic studies by Hamilton (2007) and Aretxaga (1995; 1997; 2005) are the exceptions. Although numerically few, these sources are high in quality and offer insight into broader socio-cultural factors as well as female participation.

Much like BH and AQC, ETA features less prominently in my analysis, but appears in three out of the four chapters.

vii. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 1964-2017
The final case study is FARC, a left-wing armed insurgency group (Herrera & Porch, 2008:610) which operated in southern Colombia from its declaration as ‘un ejército guerrillero’ ['a guerrilla army'] (FARC-EP, 1964:3) on 20th July 1964\(^{41}\) until the weapons amnesty of 2017 (BBC News, 16/08/2017). Membership of FARC peaked at ‘around 20,000 in the late 1990s’ (Ince, 2013:20). However, the dedication of state resources to weaken FARC reduced this number to about 9,000 by the late 2000s (ibid:21). FARC claimed that as much as 40 percent of their overall membership were female (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017:770), although academic research estimates figures closer to 20-30 percent (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008:10).

I concentrate on female performances of combatant roles in FARC after its restructuring as a militaristic organisation during the late 1970s (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza

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\(^{41}\) It was not until 1966 that the disparate Communist Party sponsored peasant self-defence groups were formally structured into the FARC (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2018:636).
Franco, 2017). While there is evidence that women had been ‘present and active’ members of the rural force since its formal creation in 1964 (Balasubramaniyan & Raghavan, 2014:198), they ‘did not participate in combat or in organizational decision-making’ (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017:772). Women’s primary responsibilities were familial and supportive (ibid:773) and arguably conformed to traditional gendered divisions of labour, in part influenced by Roman Catholicism (Nader, 2013:78). The adoption of militaristic structures marks the point where women became involved in combat roles.

Female participation in FARC is examined through a close analysis of combatant role performances. This is reflective of the types of roles I chose to analyse for this study rather than because women in FARC were limited to this role. Under the broad category of ‘combatant’, women engaged in a range of activities such as disassembling camps or undertaking guard duty (Herrera & Porch, 2008:617). Analysing combat enables a comparison between female and male performances. As discussed in Chapter Eight, while female and male embodiment of combat may appear comparable, closer examination demonstrates that female combatants continued to be differentiated by their gender.

FARC offers an example of where ideology had a clear influence on female participation. Its commitment to socialism resulted in apparent gender equality between members. This facilitated greater equality in terms of the types of roles women could access and perform, in comparison to other case studies I research. Where other groups, such as the LTTE, altered the role of women in response to organisational needs and subsequently justified this through a reference to ideology, ideology took precedence for FARC.

FARC’s military efficiency was attributed to women, with some researchers portraying female participation as integral to the group’s longevity (Herrera & Porch, 2008:611). The primacy of female contributions is not explicitly discussed to the same extent in the other case studies analysed. This could further be attributed to FARC’s ideological position, enabling women access to opportunity spaces that were likely to be restricted in more ideologically conservative groups.

This is further supported by the range of data sources available which detail female participation in FARC. Around 40 of the existing 1595 statements released by FARC related to women (Centro de Documentación de los Movimientos Armados, 2005). Content varied from multiple International Women’s Day statements (FARC-EP, 2006; 2007a; 2013), to emphasising the crucial role women performed as FARC members (FARC-EP, 2005). These statements represented FARC’s portrayal of their organisational attitude to women, which
constructed gender through emphasising equal opportunities. A dedicated website, ‘Farianas’, (mujerfariana.org, 2017), celebrated FARC’s women. It acted as a repository for a collection of statements and gender-related discussions, in addition to individual profiles and memorials of female combatants.

Academic researchers conducted interviews with former and contemporary female FARC members (Herrera & Porch, 2008; Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017; Stanski, 2006) offering valuable insight into female experiences. These have been complemented by videos of media reports which similarly interviewed female members, discussing their roles and FARC’s attitude towards women (Russia Today en Español, 2016; 2016a; Suarez, 2014).42

FARC’s more general policies were outlined in three key primary sources. *Progama Agrario de los Guerrilleros de las FARC-EP* [Agrarian Programme of the FARC-EP Guerrillas]43 (FARC-EP, 1964) outlined FARC’s first political agenda through an eight-point policy. This was broadened at the Eighth Guerrillas Conference of 1993 (Phelan, 2019:839). *Cartilla Ideológica* [Ideological Handbook]44 (FARC-EP, 1980) was the second source. Following the Sixth Guerrilla Conference of 1978, this document was distributed to all members, to educate them on FARC’s political ideology (Phelan, 2019:840). It distinguished between FARC’s overall strategy for the revolution, ‘la estrategia’, and the everyday politics enacted by FARC, ‘la política diaria que realizamos los comunistas’ (FARC-EP. 1980:2).45 *Marulanda and the FARC: For Beginners* (Salgari, n.d.) is the third key primary source. Unlike the previous two sources, this was available in English as well as Spanish. Using cartoons and short sections of text, it presented FARC as a continuation of Simón Bolívar’s liberation of Latin America (ibid:18) and refuted media portrayals of the group as a ‘narco-guerrilla terrorist’ group (ibid:10).

As with several other groups included in this analysis, language skills posed the main barrier. In a similar way to ETA, there was no need for FARC to translate its key documents into English. Yet, as the analysis of women’s roles in FARC only contributed to one chapter, less data was required compared to groups which recurred throughout the thesis. When the limited amount of English-language data available was combined with the translation of key primary sources provided by Kristine Endsjø and Richard and Philippa Mutton, there was sufficient data to facilitate the analysis of female performances of combat roles.

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42 Thank-you to Kristine Endsjø for her translation of several videos.
43 Translation as stated in Phelan (2019:839).
44 Translation as stated in Phelan (2019:840).
45 Translation provided by Richard Mutton by email, 16th May 2020.
Chapter Four: Case Studies as Communities of Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Types</th>
<th>Autobiographies</th>
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<th>Oral Histories</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Personal social media posts</th>
<th>Poems</th>
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<th>Magazines</th>
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<th>Official social media posts</th>
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*Table 3: A cross-reference between my research questions and data types available to answer each question. As demonstrated, certain data were more appropriate for specific questions.*
Table 4: a table summarising the different data types available for each case study analysed in this research. It refers solely to sources available in English. As demonstrated, a differing amount of data and sources are available for each group, thus comparisons drawn between groups cannot be as holistic as desired. For some groups, certain information was inaccessible to me. Yet each group does have at least one detailed study into female participation that I draw upon, circumventing this challenge to a certain extent.

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**Chapter Conclusion**

This chapter justified the inclusion of AQC, IS, BH, the IRA, the LTTE, ETA and FARC as case studies. The ideological, geo-spatial, and temporal diversity gained from the selection of these particular groups was demonstrated through each introductory sub-section. These factors contributed to a group’s attitude towards women, the types of roles assigned to women, and female membership status. An outline of the various roles women frequently performed illustrated the distinctiveness and visibility of women’s roles within each group. Despite contextual variations, existing research categorised women’s roles according to descriptive typologies. This concealed performative differences, implying that roles categorised as similar in type were performed in comparable ways. Thus, the focus of analysis on female role performances differed between case studies. An assessment of the available data concerning women’s role performances further justified the inclusion of a group as a case study, with data-based challenges considered in the final sub-section, alongside ethical and practical challenges posed to the inclusion of these groups as case studies.

Conceptualising each VE group as a CofP case study defined the analytical parameters by framing contextual factors as contributing to a case study’s shared repertoire of resources. This extended beyond simply defining a group’s boundaries as distinguished by membership status, as exemplified by the construction of a third strand of membership, peripheral associate. It further recognised the continued interactions between the group and the wider external factors that influenced its internal attitudes and practices, in addition to locating female experiences from within the broader understanding of the group as a CofP.

As the following chapter demonstrates, case studies were the most appropriate methodological approach to facilitate a comparative analysis of real-life phenomena from within their natural context (Yin, 2003:13). The purpose of this was to explain the influence contextual factors, such as an individual woman’s membership status and the space women occupied when performing their roles, had on a role’s performance.
Chapter Five: Methodology

From Chapter Four’s summary of the case studies, this chapter examines case studies as a methodological tool. Employing gender as a theoretical and analytical tool connected my theoretical and methodological approaches. Gender informed the development of the framework, shaped the type of data collected and influenced its assessment through documentary (Olson, 2010; Bowen, 2009) and thematic (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Clarke & Braun, 2017) analytical approaches.

As a socially constructed concept, variations between VE groups’ understandings of gender occurred, shaped by contextual differences according to historical, cultural, temporal and geo-spatial factors. Much like gender, participation in extremism was neither static nor linear. Roles categorised as ‘similar’ in type could hold different gendered meanings, with performances further influenced by a role’s purpose and function; practical actions; group needs; and the presence of a catalyst which caused change. The examination of female role performances from a gender reflexive perspective emphasised such nuances and demonstrated how roles categorised as similar in type could differ in performance.

Two pieces of research into methodology shape this chapter. The first is Bryman’s distinction between method and methodology. Method is understood throughout as the techniques researchers employ to conduct research (2008:160), whereas methodology refers to the study of these methods, concerned with emphasising the ‘practices and assumptions’ of the researcher (ibid:160).

Ritchie & Lewis’ idea of ‘emphatic neutrality’ (2003:13) forms the second. Recognising that research is never value free (ibid:13) is key to producing a reflexively conscious thesis, exposing inherent assumptions and biases of the researcher. These assumptions influenced how the research was conducted, including data collection and analysis, and shaped the project’s research questions.

Such a crucial part of the research process is often unclear, hence this chapter clarifies and justifies my methodological approach. It begins with a statement of this study’s aims, followed by an explanation of my ontological and epistemological standpoints, which both relate to interpretivism. The third section utilises Yin’s research (2003; 2003a) to support my case study research design. This research design encouraged the use of qualitative data, collected from literature-based sources, as discussed in the fourth section, and the two approaches used to analyse the data, forming the fifth section of the chapter. A final
substantive section outlining ethical considerations pertaining to data collection precedes the chapter’s conclusion.

**Study aims**
The primary aim of this study was to conduct a broad comparative analysis of female participation to explain how and why female performances of ‘similar’ types of roles varied. In response to existing, overly simplistic typologies, I derived an analytical framework from combining three social constructivist theories, all informed by the overall concept of *performativity*. As the first framework to introduce the theoretical perspective of gendered learning to the analysis of role performances, it offers an original methodological contribution to the field.

The interpretation of aspects of Butler’s theory into gendered learning mechanisms (GMILs) further evidenced the conceptualisation of gender as a combined theoretical and analytical tool. Applied alongside the framework, the GMILs aided the analysis of how women’s roles were learnt and performed in relation to gender. Research questions which investigated the effect gender construction had on role assignment, compared female and male performances of similar role types, and assessed adaptations to women’s roles facilitated the application of the framework and the GMILs to the data.

I deductively developed (Braun & Clarke, 2006:84) a combined methodological approach where the processes of data collection and analysis occurred independently. Research into women and violent extremism spans multiple disciplines, each associated with various methodological traditions. As I combined several of these fields, no singular methodological approach could be generally applied to the numerous types of data utilised.

Most existing research fell into three categories of study. The first offered an in-depth examination of various aspects for one specific case study, such as Alison’s numerous studies into female participation in the LTTE (2003; 2011); Speckhard & Akhmedova’s Chechen Black Widows research (2006; 2006a); or Blee’s study of the Women’s Ku Klux Klan (WKKK) (1996; 2005). The second compared two groups which shared a similarity (either ideological or in method of operation) but were operationally distinct in terms of geographical and cultural settings. Examples of this included Alison’s comparison of women’s roles in the IRA and LTTE (2004) and comparative studies of guerrillera [female guerrilla] participation in various left-

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46 Exemplified by terrorism studies, peace and conflict studies, psychology, and sociology.
wing Latin American groups (Reif, 1986; Gonzalez-Perez, 2008). The final type of study took a much broader comparative approach, examining multiple groups (Alison, 2009a; Eager, 2008; Henshaw, 2017) regarding aspects including structure; membership demographics; and effectiveness of attacks.

An assessment of all three approaches led to the combination of what I perceived as the strengths of the second and third categories. The broad comparative approach of the third category is emphasised through the analysis of seven ideologically, operationally and culturally diverse case studies that were historically or contemporarily active in a range of geo-political environments. Taking the GMILs as the comparative factors offered more generalisable conclusions, as provided by the second type of study described above.

**Ontological & Epistemological positions**
My ontological standpoint was located within social constructivism (Gordon, 2009; Wisker, 2008), informed by a commitment to relativism (Blaikie, 2007). I judged that reality and the social world were constructed and produced by human social interactions. Such interactions were themselves informed by the historical genealogy of culture and marked by perceptions of prevalent cultural trends, which demarcated what was appropriate for each context. Recognition that the social world is heterogeneous enabled a more holistic and meaningful analysis of complex factors that contribute to the creation of the social world. My interpretation and synthesis of GPT, CoF and role theory for the purposes of developing my analytical framework, further reinforced my social constructivist position. In operationalising the theories into a framework, I prioritised each theory’s conceptualisation of the influence of social contextual factors in shaping lived experiences.

In my judgement, there is a reality that exists independently of the social world, however, an objective understanding of this reality is difficult for humans to meaningfully comprehend. We are cultural, geo-spatial, and temporal products shaped by our environments and biographies, thus can only perceive reality as framed through the lens of our specific beliefs, practices and experiences. Truths are subjective and relative, shaped

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47 Constructivism as a cognitive theory is the idea that humans make meaning in relation to the interaction between their experiences and their ideas (Piaget, 1952). This contrasts with the constructionist approach. A learning theory, this involved individuals constructing mental models to understand the world around them (Papert, 1980).
according to these contexts, which helps to explain the diversity of lived experiences and interactions within the social world.

Understanding the meanings that underlie, and are attributed to, social interactions is important because these meanings provide insight into explaining why the social world exists as it does. It makes visible the specific, complex socio-cultural, historical, politico-economic, temporal, geo-spatial, and legal factors that interact to produce the social world (Mansfeld & Pizam, 2006). Reality and the social world become intrinsically linked, with the social world becoming the mechanism through which humans perceive reality.

My epistemological standpoint was that knowledge is produced through two interrelated, but distinct, processes. In the first process, knowledge is produced through the assessment and engagement in critical debate with pre-existing knowledge. New knowledge is created by building upon what is already known. The second process produces knowledge through the interpretation of the social world, including lived experiences and interpersonal relationships, in accordance with a specific frame. While the individual is the primary unit of production, both processes can also occur on a collective level, accounting for shared cultural beliefs and knowledge.

In a research project, both processes are at play. As the researcher, I produced knowledge through analysing that which already exists, but also by interpreting the social world through my specific standpoint. Recognition of the presence of my standpoint, and an awareness of how it influenced the production of knowledge is key. The way I interpreted the data, and the meanings I derived from it, are shaped by my own lived experiences and produce knowledge (as my research) through a specific frame.

My position was shaped by interpretivism (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003:17) and goes some way to explaining why people hold subjective understandings, even when presented with the ‘same’ information. They interpret such information according to their specific lenses, as influenced, or ‘prejudiced’ (Carr, 2006:429) by their beliefs, time period, location, culture, and personal biography and experiences. Taking an interpretivist position can account for these differences, whilst also recognising that each is valid without privileging one position over another or by claiming any objectivity. Interpretivism allows and accounts for diversity and relativity. As Schwandt argues, social constructivism and interpretivism are complementary processes, as related by a shared goal of ‘understanding the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it’ (1998:221), providing support for my combined ontological and epistemological positionings.
Case Studies as a research design

My ontological and epistemological interpretivist perspectives contributed to utilising case studies as a research design. Described as ‘a comprehensive research strategy’ (Yin, 2003:14), case studies are the most appropriate methodological tool for projects which seek to investigate and explain ‘complex social phenomena’ (ibid:2). Where these phenomena cannot easily be distinguished from their contexts (ibid:13; Yin, 2003a:4), context is analysed as an influential factor forming part of the case study.

Violent extremism (VE) is one such phenomena that is made accessible through a case study research design. Role performances and activities contributing to VE are contextual products. They cannot be distinguished or meaningfully examined outside of the specific beliefs and experiences of each individual actor, termed as intangible data (Wisker, 2008). Neither can role performances be analysed as distinct from the temporal, geo-political, and cultural context of the group, itself informed by wider societal factors. Conceptualising each VE group as a case study framed as a Community of Practice (CofP) delineated the analytical boundaries of the case studies, interpreting a group’s shared repertoire of resources (Wenger, 2011:2) as a form of intangible data. This facilitated a holistic assessment of the multiple, dynamic factors which interacted with, influenced, and produced performative differences.

Situating role performances as contextual products complemented the analytical tools I developed. As Chapter Three outlines, the framework was structured according to three levels of analysis: social, individual, and group. Case studies offered a methodological approach which encapsulated the data necessary to facilitate analysis across all three levels. The in-depth analysis of a single case study (micro-level analysis) compared performances of similar role types according to gender and membership status. These findings were extrapolated for a collective comparison of female performances made between multiple case studies (macro-level analysis).

One weakness of a case study methodology is the difficulty in drawing conclusions that are applicable to all the phenomena under examination, without producing inaccurate generalisations. This was mitigated through centring the role as the organising principle of the research and as informing the selection criteria for the case studies. Groups were included if women performed distinctive and visible roles which would contribute to the research.

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48 Gonzales Vaillant et al (2012) offer a clear example of the benefits of utilising a case study approach when analysing gender relations within violent resistance movements.
objective (George, 2004:69). Broader comparisons at the macro-level were facilitated through applying the gendered learning mechanisms (GMILs) as analytical units. This derived more generalisable conclusions whilst continuing to recognise the influence of contextual differences. From the broader conclusions, performances of similar types of roles differed according to the space women inhabited, shaping the scope of women’s involvement in VE.

The adoption of a focused selective approach to data collection (George, 1979) enabled the comparison of multiple case studies. Only certain aspects of the cases were examined (George, 2004:69). Minimal historical detail for each case, beyond what was necessary to conduct the analysis and produce valid conclusions (ibid:69), was included. In conjunction with the research questions, theoretical propositions were developed prior to data collection and analysis, to guide both processes (Yin, 2003:14). Combining a case studies research design with the conceptualisation of each VE group as a CofP utilised theory for explanatory purposes (George, 2004:69).

**Data types**

The types of data analysed were informed by three methodological factors discussed in preceding sections of this chapter: my relativist, interpretivist and socially constructivist ontological and epistemological positions, a research design based upon case studies, and research questions which explored female extremists’ behaviours and experiences. Combined, these aspects recommended qualitative data collected from literature-based sources.

Qualitative research centres on how the researched individuals understand and interpret their constructed social reality (Bryman, 1988:8). It is understood as based upon intangibles (Wisker, 2008) such as experiences, ideas, beliefs, values, or interpretations which locate the observer in a world that is itself made visible by these interpretive, material practices (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000:3). Data that referred to female behaviours and experiences of performing VE activities were prioritised as essential to understanding how and why similar types of roles were performed differently.

The use of qualitative, literature-based data is common across the disciplines contributing to the study of women and violent extremism. Any conclusions and claims made by this research continue to be located within the wider traditions of the field (Clough &

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49 Chapter Five explores other contributing factors, such as the availability and accessibility of data.
Nutbrown, 2012:38-39). Despite developing a specific methodology, this was not completely divorced from those used by previous studies.

A prevalent criticism often applied to terrorism research is a lack of empirical evidence, where generalised conclusions are extrapolated from small datasets. Practical and ethical considerations inherent with accessing relevant VE group member populations limit data collection opportunities. Comparative studies within the field that did collect empirical evidence utilised interview or ethnographic study methods. While appropriate for research which compared two or three case studies through ideological or geo-spatial lenses (exemplified by Eggert, 2017; Thapar-Björkert & Ryan, 2002; Graham, 2008), neither method was suitable for conducting a larger-scale comparative analysis. Drawn from a variety of geographic locations, ideological backgrounds, languages and time periods, my comparison of seven case studies required a greater volume of data. To adequately utilise interview or ethnographic methods to collect a substantial amount of primary data lay beyond the time scale and resource limitations on a doctoral research project. Moreover, such methods would have compromised the production of the intended broad, comparative study.

Multiple source of evidence were triangulated (Yin, 2003:14), including both primary and secondary documents. Primary documents, defined as ‘those created by people closest to the phenomenon under study’ (Olson, 2010:3; Merriam, 1998), included texts produced by the groups themselves. Handbooks, forms of propaganda, leader speeches, press releases, and first-hand accounts from members, such as autobiographies and social media posts, were used as primary document sources. As each case study was conceptualised as a CofP, material produced by the group was further considered as carrying the accumulated knowledge of the group, contributing to their SRR. Such material was analysed from within the boundaries of the CofP from which it emerged, exemplifying how theory informed data analysis.

The omission of primary and secondary sources in original languages could be criticised for excluding key data that may not appear in English-language sources. Yet this approach was justified because it balanced the breadth necessary for facilitating a larger-scale comparative analysis with including an in-depth level of detail where appropriate, for example, in the analysis of the role performances. Considerations regarding the language of available resources influenced the level of detail used to contextualise each case study. The exclusive

50 Tables 3 and 4 in Chapter Four offer a summary of the data types this research utilised.
use of English-language sources provided enough data to situate a role from within the context it was performed.

A specific challenge posed by analysing social media data produced by IS and AQC as primary documents was ascertaining the veracity of these posts and accounts. It was not possible to verify whether individuals authoring posts claiming to be from female group members were official members or were even women. Moreover, the factual accuracy of a post’s content could not always be reliably confirmed. To circumvent this challenge, social media data were assessed as forms of propaganda. As with material produced by the group, regardless of the veracity of any claims made, social media revealed information about what the group wanted to portray about themselves. From my relativist ontological and interpretivist epistemological perspectives, these posts were read as revealing how the group constructed gender, influencing how women’s roles were learned and enacted.

Secondary documents, ‘created by those not directly involved and perhaps at a later date’ (Olson, 2010:3; Merriam, 1998), consisted of ethnographic or interview-based studies conducted by other researchers in the field (such as Trawick, 1997; Aretxaga, 1997; Matfess, 2017). As I could not practically conduct my own interviews, these studies were crucial for gaining an insight into the experiences of female participants. As this data was imbued with the original researcher’s interpretation, my use of a relativist ontological approach took into account that the data had previously been assessed through another lens and was not in its raw form.

**Analytic methods**
This range of data was examined through documentary analysis (Olson, 2010; Bowen, 2009) or thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Clarke & Braun, 2017), according to which method was most appropriate. The choice of analytical methods was informed by the data types and research questions under consideration. These methods accompanied an overall gendered analytical approach. As Chapter Three discusses, gender analysis informed the development of the framework, a further tool which facilitated data analysis.

**Documentary analysis**
As a literature-based study, documentary analysis formed the primary analytical method. Defined as ‘a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents’ (Bowen, 2009:27), this method of analysis was the most suitable for the data types and sources I accessed. Supplemented by Merriam’s outline of the kinds of materials that comprise ‘documents’ to
include visual and physical material (1998), this method can further be applied to data accessed from radio interviews and televisual documentaries.

Three of Bowen’s five function of documentary analysis (2009:29-30) are relevant to this study. The first refers to the provision of context, including background information and historical insight (ibid:29-30). This is central to my use of case studies as a research strategy, in addition to complementing my ontological and epistemological standpoints. Of most significance is how the holistic understanding of each group when taken as a case study, is complemented by the provision of data from documents conceived of as ‘by-products of human activity’ (Olson, 2010:2). Documents and documentary analysis provide the in-depth data that are fundamental to creating as detailed and accurate a case study as possible. Selecting documentary analysis in combination with a case study strategy conforms to the wider traditions of this field of study.

The second, related function is the ability to gain supplementary research data from other researchers’ interview and ethnographic data (Bowen, 2009:30). This aids projects, such as mine, that did not or were unable to collect original primary data. Using others’ data is a valid alternative that documentary analysis makes possible.

The third and final function of relevance is the ability of documentary analysis to track changes and development (ibid:30). This approach contributed to answering the research question concerned with identifying changes in women’s roles over time. Combining documentary analysis with the temporal boundaries applied to each case study as a CofP, changes in female participation across and between the case studies could be tracked.

As referred to in the previous Data Types section, this study drew on both primary and secondary documents. For both categories, documents which were produced by various authors and differed in form were utilised to present a range of viewpoints. This not only corroborated the evidence presented within these documents (Bowen, 2009), but also reduced the risk of bias within the research (Olson, 2010). Corroboration of facts is essential when studying VE groups because their internal dynamics and relationships are often inaccessible to external, non-participants. Owing to my social constructivist ontological position, I focused on analysing a group’s perception of their reality, as presented through their propaganda. The emphasis of documentary analysis on considering the audience and purpose of a source enabled me to be mindful of the spectrum of distinction between public and private documents (ibid:2). As many of the internal documents produced by the extremist groups themselves would have been created with an audience of group members in mind, the
content of these documents differed from those created for public output, such as recruitment propaganda. The examination of internal documents such as the IRA’s *Green Book* (Coogan, 2000:544-571) provided a representation of perspectives that were unlikely to be present in documents produced for an external audience (Olson, 2010:2), or in previous research into these groups, unless the researcher had unprecedented access to the group and its participants.

**Thematic analysis**

Thematic analysis further complemented a comparative analysis based on a case study research design. A ‘method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data’ (Clarke & Braun, 2006:79), thematic analysis describes a data set in rich detail (ibid:79). The identification of comparative themes correlated to the three units of analysis that organise the framework I developed. On the social level, themes coalesced around contextual factors. Themes pertaining to the nuances of role performance existed on the individual level, while on the group level, characteristics including group size; organisational structure; ideology; and role types were compared.

While there are various conceptualisations of thematic analysis as a qualitative research method, for the purposes of this research, Clarke & Braun’s perspective (2006) was applied. My research questions informed the processes of data collection and analysis, described by Clarke & Braun as a ‘theoretical’ or ‘deductive’ approach (2006:84). This was applicable to the varying data types I utilised.

Thematic analysis was most applicable to answering the questions, ‘What effect do variations in gender construction within groups have on the role of women?’ and ‘If men and women perform the same role, how is this gendered and performed differently in terms of masculinity and femininity?’ Both questions explored the underlying socio-cultural, political and organisational factors that informed a VE group’s conceptualisation of gender, and their attitude towards women. Through identifying assumptions made at the group and individual levels, a thematic approach to analysis contributed to explaining performative differences as influenced by gendered learning processes. This informed the type of data gathered and facilitated its analysis. Referred to as the ‘latent’ or ‘interpretive’ level of data analysis (Clarke & Braun, 2006:84), this examined the ideas, assumptions, conceptualisation and ideologies that underlay and thus informed data content (ibid:84). Although concerned with comparing individual female performances of specific roles, the importance of wider contextual factors in interacting with and influencing these performances must be recognised. Thematic analysis
facilitated this through theorising the contextual factors and structural conditions that shaped individual accounts (ibid:85).

Structural conditions and sociocultural contexts influenced how women engaged in VE groups. A key example of this was the creation of opportunity spaces for female participants, shaping the types of roles women could engage with. Depending upon factors such as the group’s attitude towards women and external pressures placed on the group, role types are inaccessible to or made available to women. Viewing the case studies as social products reinforced that the groups were reproducing the society from which they emerged, creating a new form of society, or as in most cases, combining aspects of these two approaches. The causes which these groups seek to propagate were also social and were endemic of contending ideas about how different groups of people should co-exist. The social level of the framework focused on such aspects, seeking to explain why groups hold certain assumptions, and the manifestation of these assumptions through female role performances which are gendered and learnt in various ways.

**Ethics**

The final section of this chapter considers the ethical considerations regarding data collection methods; data accessibility; data storage; researcher safety; and data analysis, further shaping decision-making process of the research.\(^{51}\)

As noted earlier, owing to the broad comparative nature of this research and my need to utilise English-language sources, I excluded interviews as a method of data collection. This mitigated the ethical considerations associated with interviewing, such as a duty of care to interviewees, issues surrounding consent and anonymity, and accessing former or current extremist group members.

However, my analysis of literature-based primary sources created by the VE groups, such as propaganda materials, resulted in other ethical challenges. As all case studies (except FARC) were listed as proscribed groups by the Home Office (2020), accessing source material produced by these groups raised legal questions. It is illegal to disseminate such material to other people (Terrorism Act, 2006). While it is not technically illegal to view such material,\(^{51}\)
caution should be taken to demonstrate that I accessed these sources solely for research purposes and committed not to pass this material on to others, or to allow them to read it. To mitigate this risk, I implemented a rigorous method to logging my data collection process. This involved keeping a log of the websites visited, along with the dates and times I accessed them.

Risks surrounding data accessibility were further mitigated through ensuring that propaganda material was only accessed from third-party repository websites for militant output, such as Clarion Project and Jihadology. The Clarion Project was a non-profit organisation engaged in grassroots activism to educate the public about the dangers of radical Islamism. Jihadology was run by Aaron Zelin, a researcher of Islamist jihad who published jihadi primary source material for other researchers to access. I applied to my university library to request an institutional subscription to the Terrorism Analysis and Research Consortium (TRAC) database. It encapsulated groups along the ideological spectrum active across the globe. Contributions were made by experts in the field, who logged instances of attacks and updated social media chatter.

Limiting my exposure to this data to through third-party websites and a strict data collection process reduced the risk to me as the researcher. Should any external actors have become concerned at my accessing this information, the maintenance of detailed records stating when and where this material was viewed established a full paper trail to support that access was solely for research purposes.

Ethical considerations further influenced my data collection and analysis processes. Part of the stipulations for my ethical approval was based around as minimal exposure to extremist material as possible, ensuring that I only viewed the material that was essential to my research. When viewing online sources sister; woman; women; female; wife were adopted as ‘Ctrl F’ search terms. This search function reduced exposure to extremist material by locating sections of the text that contained these words on my behalf. Except for sister, which owing to the practice of referring to Muslim women as ‘sisters’ was searched specifically for Islamist groups, the five terms were applied when collecting data for all case studies.

Ethical approval was initially granted on the basis that propaganda materials were not downloaded, saved to my personal computer or printed. Subsequent efforts by social media platforms to limit access to extremist content available on the Internet restricted my ability to
view certain types of data, exemplified by Tumblr’s removal of IS recruiter Umm Layth’s blog *Diary of a Muhajirah*, which had been easy to access prior to the introduction of restrictions.\(^2\)

Potentially losing access to my main sources of primary data resulted in a revised decision. I was permitted to print sections of propaganda and handbook material relating to female participation, as long as I adhered to revised guidance. This included storing the material securely, within a locked drawer inside my university campus office which was similarly lockable. Certain posts from Umm Layth’s and other female IS recruiters’ blogs were retrieved through the WayBack Machine, a tool that enables users to view archived Internet content. Content must have been captured by another user prior to its removal, but once saved, it can be viewed by anyone. While the blog posts captured by this tool were intermittent and limited in number, it provided the sole method of accessing this material.

Further ethical considerations related to researcher safety. I needed to protect myself from various risks, including:

1. Harm to the researcher;
2. An extremist group finding out who I was; where I lived; or trying to contact me;
3. Accessing unsafe websites resulting in accidentally downloading a computer virus, malware or software which tracked my location; or my personal data being hacked;
4. The Police becoming concerned that I was becoming radicalised or a potential person who needed to be put under surveillance.

Issues surrounding harm to the researcher needed to be considered as some of the material I read was very upsetting and disturbing. I received advice from my supervisors concerning how to mitigate this, which included not reading any distressing material at night-time, stopping if I became upset and talking to a university counsellor if necessary. Throughout the project I continued to maintain an ongoing liaison with my supervisors, keeping them informed.

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\(^2\) Section 3 of the UK’s Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act (CTBSA) (2019) amends Section 58 of the Terrorism Act (2000), concerned with the collection of information, to include viewing or accessing material that contains extremist information. Changes in the law were precipitated by perceived failings of social media companies’ self-governed approaches to removing extremist content from their platforms (Home Affairs Committee, 2017: paras. 20-22). Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Microsoft responded by forming the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism in 2016 (Crosset, 2019:81-82), to identify and remove such content (ibid:82). Although academic research was cited as a ‘reasonable excuse’ for accessing extremist content (CTBSA, 2019, 3a:bii), platforms’ increased self-regulation has impacted the accessibility of this material for researchers.
informed of how the research was progressing, and making them aware if I felt upset or affected by any of the material I read.

With regards to the second and third risks, these were mitigated by ensuring that material produced by extremist groups was only accessed through a university networked computer. As far as possible the use of and searches for material that was not already available through the safe sources identified above, was limited.

The final risk was mitigated by ensuring that the university Prevent officer was aware of my area of research, and my proposed timelines regarding when I planned to search for sources that may have contained extremist content. This was supported by my implementation of the rigorous data collection process described earlier. This demonstrated to anyone concerned that I adhered to the conditions that accompanied being granted ethical approval and made it possible for my data collection process to be tracked and checked.

**Chapter Conclusion**

This research facilitated a comparative analysis of female performances of similar types of roles through adopting a case study research design. Conceptualising each case study as a Community of Practice linked the theoretical and methodological approaches used. The application of documentary and thematic methods of analysis from a gendered perspective further linked theory and methodology, influencing the framework’s development and data collection methods. Analysis of the data was similarly shaped by the data types available and the study’s research questions.

A social constructivist ontological standpoint was complemented by an interpretivist epistemological position. Both positions were suitable perspectives through which to analyse qualitative data, where an awareness of the researcher’s assumptions and the former extremist participant’s assumptions should be acknowledged within the analysis. The three theories from which the framework was derived could all be interpreted from a constructivist tradition.

Various factors, such as the number of case studies assessed, resource and time limitations, variable access to former female participations of inactive groups, and a need for sources to be in English, rendered a literature-based approach more appropriate than an interview-based or ethnographic study. Qualitative, English-language, written secondary documents were the most accessible data types. However, where available this was
supplemented by first-hand accounts from female participants. Most of this type of data was found in autobiographies, oral history testimonies or other researchers’ studies which conducted interviews.

Any primary data used was based upon material produced by the VE groups, including propaganda and handbooks for members. Such data had attached ethical considerations, relating to researcher safety and the accessing of proscribed material. These concerns were met by adhering to my institution’s ethical guidance regarding data collection and storage.

Focus now turns to a multi-layered analysis of each role type, applying the factors that have been detailed in the previous four chapters. This begins with Motherhood.
Chapter Six: Motherhood and Conceptualisations of the State

IS, AQC, ETA, the IRA, and the LTTE were all concerned, to varying degrees, with establishing an independent state. Through a comparative analysis of material and symbolic feminised spaces, this chapter argues that a VE group’s conceptualisation of, and interaction with a ‘state’, influenced female performances of motherhood roles. Indeed, this is similar to Brown’s assertion that ‘...in maternal logics of statehood, it is through their private relations as mother, sister, wife, and daughter that women interact with the state’ (2020:116). Inhabiting, and enacting motherhood roles from within contextually relative spaces highlighted divergence across the case studies. Activities ranged from childbearing and rearing; ideological transmission; and caregiving and facilitating others’ direct involvement. Hence, it is inaccurate to generalise or merely describe these roles as motherhood without exploring exactly how performances occurred.

Ideology, context, and a group’s needs framed the relationship between the ‘state’ and a group’s aims. ETA, the IRA and the LTTE were motivated by ethno-nationalist separatist aims (Eager, 2008), while IS and AQC intended to establish states governed by fundamentalist Islamist principles (Hashim, 2018; Lawrence, 2005:121). This relationship determined whether motherhood was performed from within or outside group boundaries. Combined with the amount of agency women were allowed to exert, this informed the membership status assigned to women-as-mothers. Membership status influenced the spaces an individual inhabited within or in relation to the group. Depending upon the group, this made certain role opportunities accessible to women, whilst restricting their access to other forms of participation.

Each group’s conceptualisation of a state was interpreted as falling into the categories of ‘actual’; ‘desired’; or ‘ideal’. ‘Actual’ referred to a part instantiated or already existing state, while ‘desired’ defined a type of state that a group wanted to create. Finally, ‘ideal’ referred to an idealised or perfected notion of a state, where the ultimate goal would not be compromised. Despite some overlap, these categories provided useful distinctions between group aims. The following categorisation is based upon my interpretation of each case study’s

53 Although BH’s interpretation of Islamism was ostensibly concerned with state-building it is excluded from this chapter’s analysis. While women engaged in motherhood roles (Matfess, 2017), Ladbury et al argues that BH was more concerned with ‘contributing to global jihad’ (2016:12), lacking any conceptualisation of a state as ideal, desired, or actual.
54 See also Sylvester (2002:182-206) and Chatterjee (1994) for more discussion concerning gender and statehood.
views on statehood, developed by engaging with group propaganda materials and academic research that contextualised a group’s formation and ideology.

The main case study of this chapter, IS’s state conceptualisation was classed as ‘ideal’ because their main objective was to utilise their fundamentalist ideological principles to establish a pure Caliphal state. AQC’s notion of the state can similarly be defined as ‘ideal’. IS and AQC held different criteria for establishing a state, relating to the timing of the Caliphate’s implementation (Hashim, 2014:79) and the legitimacy of al-Baghdadi as a Caliph (Hashim, 2018:133). In contrast, the IRA, ETA and the LTTE were interpreted as combining ‘actual’ and ‘desired’ concepts of a state. ‘Actual’ because an identity group aligned to the aims of independence pre-existed each group’s formation, but ‘desired’ ideologically and legally, whilst working to secure their secession.

Discussed throughout from a CoF perspective, mothers participated through a range of membership statuses. Where motherhood was perceived as integral to the achievement of the group’s overall aims, it was performed by core or periphery group members. For IS, the central aim of building an idealised Caliphate was partially fulfilled through population creation. Operationalising this as a form of state-building created a gender-specific way for women to participate built around reproductive activities.

In contrast, motherhood performed as reproductive capacity was absent from the other four case studies and was more likely to be performed by women associated with the group. Not themselves members, these women can be described in two ways. Peripheral associates were women who straddled the boundaries between the group and wider society. Such women likely intended to join the VE group, but their participation was prevented by group structures or cultural barriers, exemplified by women associated with AQC. Family members primarily inhabited a civilian space but interacted with kin or peer relatives who were group members, forming a distanced link between themselves and the group. Such actions may simultaneously have tacitly aided the groups by contributing to maintaining and sustaining the group’s existence and operational capacity. Performances of motherhood in the IRA and ETA which assumed a greater burden of caregiving to facilitate the direct participation of others, and AQC women who raised children in accordance with group ideology in preparation to populate their future state, exemplified this.

For the LTTE, a symbolic rather than embodied performance of motherhood was achieved through constructing narratives which delineated the bounds of female participation and spaces women could occupy. Such narratives justified female engagement in suicide
bombing, conceived as an extension of a motherhood role. This created a feminised space framed by familiar cultural representations of motherhood which female suicide bombers (FSBs) inhabited, explored in Chapter Nine. Understanding the various ways motherhood is performed in relation to a state demonstrates that mothering roles fulfil a specific group need.

Synthesising aspects of the theoretical positions outlined in Chapter Three contributes to this chapter answering three of the five research questions: ‘Why are roles that are categorised as ‘similar’ in type, performed differently by women across violent extremist groups?’; ‘What effect do variations in gender construction within groups have on the role of women?’; and ‘How can we understand the differences in role performance across extremist groups?’ Role expectations and social status were derived from role theory. However, social status is interpreted as referring to an individual’s membership status in relation to the group. This is informed by a CofP lens, which further contributed to the assessment of group narratives as shared repertoires of resources (SRR). These positions are combined with the instrumentalisation of Butler’s GPT through the framework.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first analyses motherhood as performed by IS’s female core and periphery members, while the second compares IS with mothering activities from AQC, ETA, the IRA and the LTTE, finding significant performative differences. Both sections follow a similar structure. A brief introduction outlines each group’s conceptualisations of a state. The social and group levels of the framework are analysed first, using a CofP perspective to identify each group’s SRR. This frames the subsequent analysis of individual performances of motherhood. The final sub-section concerns the gendered mechanisms. Repetition and imitation are identified as occurring within each case study, yet variations in how these mechanisms facilitate learning processes produces performative differences of motherhood roles.

**Islamic State, motherhood and the production of the state**

IS sought to establish an ideal Caliphal state, governed by a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia law (Atwan, 2015:138-139). This involved a complex process of state-building that required the construction of governing structures, administrative systems and territorial control (for more detail, see al-Tamimi, 2015) in addition to population expansion. IS ‘need[ed] women to assume the traditional roles as wives and mothers’ (Perešin & Cervone, 2015:499) as ‘the progress of the state…is best served through marriage and motherhood, supporting fighters and providing “cubs”’ (Rafiq & Malik, 2015:28).
IS’s approach to assigning state-building roles was framed through their understanding of sex and gender as natural, mutually reinforcing attributes ordained by God (trans. Winter, 2015:18). Masculinity and femininity were positioned as dichotomous binaries, defined in opposition to each other: ‘women have this Heavenly secret in sedentariness, stillness and stability, and men its opposite, movement and flux...’ (ibid:19). In differentiating between male and female characteristics and applying a sexual division of labour, this located each in a gender segregated space. This equates to a Western essentialist understanding of gender and is further reminiscent of maternalism. A conventional approach taken to analysing women’s participation in the political arena, maternalism infers ‘women’s perceived natural relational qualities, innate emotional decision-making and instinctive dedication to preservation’ ([italics original] Gentry, 2009:237). Thus, female involvement is usually equated with peace and nonviolence (ibid:235), as was also initially seen within IS.

Women were designated a variety of explicitly feminised roles that ‘contribute[d] to the cause of the ISIS community’ (Tarras-Walberg, 2016:9). This included professional roles such as medicine and teaching, administering to and educating IS’s female population (Bradford, 2016; Perešin, 2015). Yet the primary and most important role assigned to women was motherhood. Maternal identity was operationalised as a feminised form of state-building, embodied through childbearing and rearing.

As the ‘twin halves of men’ (Dabiq, Issue 8, 2015:33), women were provided with the physical reproductive functions and psychological capabilities necessary for fulfilling what was perceived by IS to be their natural childbearing role (trans. Winter, 2015:18). These biological differences gendered the private sphere as female, situating women in a different operational space to men.

Women residing in IS-controlled territory were further divided into three categories: migrant women; local women; and enslaved women [sabaya]. These correlated to variations in membership status assigned to or adopted by women, distinguishing between voluntary and enforced participation. Women of all three categories were expected to perform essentially the same childbearing role, yet significant differences regarding the spaces they inhabited and the amount of agency they possessed shaped IS’s attitude towards, and treatment of, each group. For example, whereas the rape and abduction of local and sabaya women (Watts, 2015:26) was justified through religious references (Rafiq & Malik, 2015:30),

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55 These are translations of the all-female al-Khansaa Brigade’s (aKB) manifesto, published alongside Winter’s extensive analysis of its contents by the Quilliam Foundation in 2015.
the same actions committed against core or periphery women were condemned because female members were revered as mothers of the next generation (Bloom & Winter, 2015).

Migrant women travelled to live under IS rule. While much Western produced research focuses on migrants from Western Europe, America and Australia, evidence collected from a female migrant guesthouse register demonstrates that, for that specific residence at least, the three most popular areas of origin were Dagestan, Turkey and Xinjiang (Milton & Dodwell, 2018:20). Other research has also emphasised the number of women who migrated from Indonesia (Nuraniyah, 2018) and Kosovo (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2017).

Unlike men, women were not required to pledge allegiance [bay’a] (de Bont et al, 2017). Their migration to IS territory was taken as indicative of their intention to join, implying that such women held either core or periphery membership status. However, some women who migrated, such as Tania Joya and Samantha Sally, claimed they were coerced by their husbands into travelling (Wood, 2017a; Paton Walsh & Abdelaziz, 2018). It may be more accurate to describe these women as peripheral members. While they may have lacked a personal desire to join IS, that they migrated and lived under IS control served IS’s aims. Activities they are likely to have engaged in, including domestic tasks and childbearing contributed to their husbands’ participation.

‘Local’ referred to Syrian or Iraqi women who resided in areas subsequently occupied by IS. The membership status of these women was more contested, as local populations often had no choice but to remain once IS gained control of an area, although equally some may have volunteered to join. Sabaya women were non-Muslim women, most notably Yazidi, captured by IS fighters (Abu Rumman & Abu Hanieh, 2017:133-134). Their status as ‘slaves’ was permitted by an IS-issued fatwa (ibid:133) and other propaganda.

The diversity of female experiences in relation to IS should be emphasised. Owing to a scarcity of English-language data regarding the experiences and contributions of local and sabaya women, this research focuses primarily on Western female migrants. Performances of motherhood roles by migrant women occurred within feminised core and periphery membership spaces, learnt and gendered through the mechanisms of repetition and imitation.

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56 IS’s treatment of enslaved Yazidi women is beyond the parameters of this research. However, Otten (2017); Amnesty International (2014); Khalaf (2016) are concerned with experiences of Yazidi women.
Female jihad as a shared repertoire of resources

IS cultivated a broader appeal which transcended nationality (Roy, 2017; Rafiq & Malik, 2015:23) populating its ideal state through amalgamating individuals from varied cultural backgrounds. Their literalist strict interpretation of Sunni Islam (Wood, 2018) is understood through a CoP approach, as forming the ‘shared domain of interest’ (Wenger, 2011:1) around which individuals coalesced. Before joining an extremist group, an individual had pre-conceived understandings of gender norms and roles, shaped by the society they grew up in.

To ensure that group ideology, norms, and values were adhered to and privileged within its ideal state above pre-existing norms, it was imperative that IS communicated its gender narrative effectively. This required the establishment of an overarching organisational IS culture, created through combining ideology, socio-cultural context, operational aims and group needs into a SRR. As an IS culture was different from the norms and experiences held by migrant women, communicating how motherhood roles should be performed and making this intelligible to female members was essential to sustaining group continuity.

The dissemination of a female jihad narrative encapsulated IS’s organisation attitudes towards women and communicated appropriate behaviours and expectations for female role performances.57 State-building through motherhood was identified as a female-specific form of jihad. This contributed to constructing a space inhabited by women that was separate from male performances of jihad, where core and periphery women performed childbearing and rearing roles. At that point in the Caliphate’s existence, state-building through motherhood was prioritised as women’s primary role, with female participation in combat prohibited.58

The frequent association of ‘jihad’ with the use of violence necessitated that IS marketed the ‘act of mothering the child of an Islamic State soldier... as an active contribution to the group’s jihad’ (Rafiq & Malik, 2015:25). Jihad required reframing from a female perspective to convince women that adherence to their designated maternal roles contributed to jihad in a uniquely feminine way. IS propaganda emphasised the spiritual and material rewards [ajr] associated with motherhood as a form of state-building over that obtained through martyrdom operations [see, for example, (‘Umm Layth’, 09/04/14; cited in Saltman &

57 The role of women in jihad is a complex area that predates IS’s formation. Female participation in jihad continues to be theoretically and practically contested and cannot be summarised as one coherent position. There is a tension between the desire to include women so as to mobilise the maximum number of participants, and adherence to conservative social codes which restrict female activities (Anzalone, 2017:2). For more detail, see von Knop (2007); Bonner (2006); Ispahani (2016); Cook (2005).

58 For detail about changes to including female participation in violence, see Chapters Eight and Nine.
Chapter Six: Motherhood and Conceptualisations of the State

Smith, 2015:32). Issue 11 of Dabiq detailed a feminised version of jihad informed by sexual divisions of labour:

‘the absence of an obligation of jihād [sic] and war upon the Muslim woman – except in defense [sic] against someone attacking her – does not overturn her role in building the Ummah, producing men, and sending them out to the fierceness of battle’ (2015:41).

The al-Khansaa Brigade manifesto further encouraged women to adhere to such roles, stating: ‘Know that you are the hope of the ummah. The guardians of the faith and protectors of the land will emerge from you...you are of us and we of you’ (trans. Winter, 2015:41). This asserted that participation of women in state-building roles was intrinsic to IS positioning itself as protecting the Ummah, as without women, neither the Ummah nor its guardians would exist.

Childbearing & rearing
Combining childbearing and rearing as embodied performances of motherhood simultaneously synthesised the fulfilment of women’s religious obligations with a practical contribution to building IS’s ideal state (as discussed in Khelghat-Doost, 2019:866; Perešin & Cervone, 2015; Loken & Zelenz, 2017; Cook & Vale, 2018).

Childbearing was encouraged through selective reference to sections of the Qur’ān and Hadiths:

‘The Prophet ordered to increase the Muslims’ numbers,’ stating “Marry the affectionate woman who is fertile, for I will outnumber the [other] [sic] nations through you” (Rumiyah, Issue 5, 2016a:35).

Although directed towards men, referring to women as passive subjects of male behaviour, the implication was that women should be willing to engage in reproductive activities and presented procreation as a religious duty.

Not including the number of children taken by parents to live in IS controlled territory, statistics regarding the number of infants born inside the Caliphate vary. Reports identifying infants born to foreign parents range from a baseline of ‘at least 730’ (Cook & Vale, 2018:30) to unverified reports of 5,000 infants (Chulov, 2017). Despite statistical inaccuracy, these numbers demonstrate that owing to the need to create a population, a key focus for IS was increasing birth rates.
Mothers were responsible for child-rearing: bringing up, educating, protecting and caring for future generations (trans. Winter, 2015:18). Referring to children as ‘lion cubs’ (*Dabiq*, Issue 11, 2015b:45), IS advised a mother to perform her role through:

‘devot[ing] herself to increasing the Ummah in lions and preparing them, making a den for them out of her house, wherein she nourishes them with tawhid and wala and bara until she opens the den’s door for them...’ (*Rumiyah*, Issue 5, 2016a:35).

Mothers transmitted ideological and cultural traditions on to their children. Raising children in accordance with IS’s ideology strengthened its collective identity because it created ‘a new generation of believers’ (Khelghat-Doost, 2019:865).

**Gendered Learning Processes**

As referred to earlier, owing to the disparity between Western values and those espoused by IS, it was necessary to alter Western female migrants’ perceptions and understandings of female roles within IS society. Repetition and imitation were the mechanisms (GMILs) through which core and periphery women’s performances of motherhood were learnt and gendered. Both mechanisms transmitted IS’s narrative of female jihad, interpreted here as a form of SRR, which provided guidance regarding appropriate and expected female role performances.

*Repetition of gender norms through magazines*

The repetition of gender norms through magazines and social media sources arguably occurred throughout all IS propaganda, regardless of its language or target-audience. IS’s narrow understanding of masculinity and femininity was further supported throughout these articles, which communicated both the ideological and the practical need for mothers to act as state-builders.

For Arabic-speaking women, IS communicated its gender norms through the al-Khansaa Brigade’s (aKB) manifesto. Described as an exclusively female social and moral policing force, its methods of discipline were notoriously brutal. The manifesto stated that: ‘the greatness of her [a woman’s] position, purpose of her existence is the Divine duty of motherhood’ (trans. Winter, 2015:18). This communicated an idealised expectation of

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59 Wood (2018) translates *tawhid* as equivalent to monotheism; *wala* as ‘loyalty to Muslims’; and *bara* as ‘disavowal of infidels’ (2018:170).

60 The manifesto was only released in Arabic, targeting Middle Eastern women as opposed to Western European women. Beside issues of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*, the aKB manifesto is the only other official document released by the IS leadership which refers to, and outlines, the role of women.
women, bounding the types of roles considered appropriate and implying the kinds of behaviours that IS expected women to conform to.

Such an idea was further perpetuated by English-language propaganda articles in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. Dedicated women’s sections created feminised propaganda spaces as they explicitly targeted Western women, seeking to appeal to both Muslim women and new converts.\(^6^1\) Undoubtedly the most consistent and recurring theme throughout both these magazine sections was the conceptualisation of motherhood as a form of state-building. Various iterations of motherhood were referred to in 13 issues of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*.\(^6^2\) The holistic nature of these articles, including justifications of practices deemed unacceptable outside of IS, provided a rich source of information for women whose pre-existing concept of femininity differed to IS.

**Imitation & role models**

Moreover, women learnt motherhood roles through imitating female role models taken from the Qur’an. Such role models legitimised certain behaviours by providing religious precedence and references to the past (Rafiq & Malik, 2015:30; Atwan, 2015:137).

Imitation involved an individual basing their role performance on copying an ‘original’. Mothers in IS were encouraged to follow the 7th century example of Al-Khansa Bint ‘Amr, whose story was shared in an article entitled ‘Stories of Steadfastness: From the Lives of the Sahabiyyat’ (*Rumiyah*, Issue 2, 2016:28-30). Four of her sons took part in a battle, and all were killed on the first day. When informed of this, IS claimed she responded: “All praise belongs to Allah, who honoured me through their being killed…” (ibid:30). She is portrayed as sacrificing her children for the cause of jihad and celebrating once they have been martyred. IS encouraged mothers to imitate this example framing and justifying gender appropriate forms of participation through the group’s interpretation of religion.

Furthermore, as a recruiter, ‘Umm Layth’s’ blog presented ‘…The 4 greatest women in Islam = [sic] Khadeejah, Asia, Fatimah and Maryam...’ (09/04/2014; cited in Hoyle et al, 2015:46) as role models for women to emulate. She argues, ‘…What made them so unique was that they raised the best of men. They raised true slaves of Allah. Their role as mothers were so important since their upbringing resulted in the future of their child…’ (ibid). Western

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\(^6^1\) *Chapter Seven* expands upon how propaganda was complemented by social media interactions between female recruiters residing in IS-territory and potential Western female recruits.

\(^6^2\) Issues 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 15 of *Dabiq*; and Issues 2, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 13 of *Rumiyah*. 

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women learnt to perform the roles IS expected of women by imitating the examples, guidance, advice and role models centred around motherhood as the ideal embodiment of femininity.

Utilising a CofP lens to interpret female jihad as a shared repertoire of resources demonstrated that an IS organisational culture, which located female participation in mothering activities within a feminised space, was communicated through magazine and social media forms of propaganda (Aasgaard, 2017). Western women learnt to perform overtly gendered motherhood roles through engaging with repeated communications of IS’s gender norms and imitating acceptable female role models. Repetition and imitation transmitted accepted gender norms to women from various cultural backgrounds, with the intention of providing a clear narrative through which female participation should be framed.

**Motherhood and state-building in other threat groups**

In comparison, the analysis of motherhood roles as performed in relation to AQC, ETA, the IRA and the LTTE revealed performative differences based upon group conceptualisations of the ‘state’, individual membership status, and outcomes achieved for each group. Except for AQC, all case studies examined conformed to the argument that a group’s conceptualisation of the state informs performances of mothering roles.

As ethno-nationalist groups, ETA, the IRA and the LTTE adopted existing cultural symbols surrounding the reification of women as the mothers of their respective nations. Similar to IS, AQC took symbols from their specific interpretation of Islam. Such symbolism was incorporated into each group’s SRR, conferring certain behavioural ideals and performative expectations onto motherhood roles. Used to frame group attitudes towards women, in combination with ideology and socio-cultural norms, this determined the types of roles women were assigned and the activities undertaken to perform these roles. Despite differences in ideology and state conceptualisation, this resulted in an initial preclusion of female participation in combat for all five case studies. Female participation was limited to mothering roles, citing a need for women to avoid combat so that they could continue to reproduce the nation, both physically and ideologically.63

By claiming ‘women’s gendered role as mother...to symbolise the collectivity’ (Gentry, 2009:238), groups politicised motherhood for their cause. Whether or not individual women

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63 While this emphasised the expected gendered roles initially envisioned by all five case studies, as will be discussed in later chapters, a combination of external pressures and needs of the group resulted in a revision of the types of roles women could perform in the IRA, the LTTE and IS.
were ‘mothers or claimed their motherhood, a motherhood ideal [wa]s... applied to them anyway’ (ibid:236). Comparisons can be made to processes of state formation outside of VE contexts. Peterson identified ideological constructs such as ‘the cult of motherhood’ as tools used by a state to socially control women (1992:46). Summarised as passive maternalism, such an attitude is identifiable within all the case studies to varying degrees. My focus on analysing role performances and their outcomes enables the identification of agency as a relational concept, which varied and was specific to the context female actors operated within thus contributing to the construction of a fundamentally different space for female contributions compared to the space inhabited by male participants.

Unlike IS, none of the four comparative case studies regarded motherhood as integral to achieving either their group aims or conceptualisations of a state. As such, it was not a role that was assigned to female core or periphery members, but rather was informally assumed and performed from within a social space outside group boundaries. ETA’s exclusion of mothers, and the broader exclusion of women from possessing AQC membership, shaped motherhood as a form of peripheral associate participation. While the IRA accepted female members, the all-encompassing nature of the conflict encouraged participation through community-level participation. This form of participation occurred from a social space external to the group, thus is interpreted here as a form of peripheral association. In contrast, instead of an embodied performance, the LTTE utilised social understandings of motherhood to justify a change in women’s roles.

Furthermore, performances of motherhood within the comparative case studies did not manifest as physical state-building, rendering this an IS-specific performance. Motherhood roles for AQC’s peripheral associate women centred on ideological transmission activities, in preparation for the future creation of an ideal Caliphate. Meanwhile, ETA, the IRA and the LTTE were ethno-nationalist groups which sought to mobilise the populations of actual states to produce a desired separatist state. The perception of women as mothers of the nation served to ensure a level of socio-cultural consistency in attitudes towards women between the actual state’s minority population and the group which purported to operate on their behalf. In the IRA and ETA, this manifested as mothers facilitating others’ direct participation through assuming a greater burden of caregiving.

In terms of theoretical application, that all the activities analysed in this chapter were identified as fulfilling a motherhood role, despite performative differences, suggests an element of conformity to a recognisable ‘iterable model’ (Derrida, 1988:17-18) through which
role expectations were formed. This model transcended socio-cultural boundaries, defining these activities as motherhood because they all interacted with children, forming a maternal identity. By conforming to certain expected behaviours, others recognised and categorised those actions as forming part of a defined and understood role. The categorisation of these role activities as generic forms of motherhood conveys similarities across VE groups regarding the types of roles women were likely to participate in. However, unless analysed in depth, this can result in a misinterpretation of how women performed roles within VE groups, implying similarities in role performance that are tenuous.

The analysis of motherhood performances through the mechanisms (GMILs), alongside application of the framework, disputed implied similarities. In IS and AQC, it was necessary for each to communicate role expectations and gender narratives that were distinct from those held by their target audiences. For both, this was achieved through the deployment of repetition and imitation as gendered mechanisms of learning. Although the same mechanisms can be identified, these were expressed in culturally distinct ways, as informed by each group’s conceptualisation of a state. In contrast, owing to an alignment between the three ethno-nationalist case studies’ and target audiences’ notions of gender, GMILs were less identifiable. This reinforces the importance of GMILs in communicating group norms and creating a coherent group identity. As with the preceding section analysing IS: ‘what effect do variations in gender construction within groups have on the role of women?’ and ‘how can we understand differences in role performance across extremist groups?’ are answered through the application of the framework.

This comparative section begins on the social and groups levels of analysis, with an overview of each group’s SRR, interpreted as informing cultural symbolisation narratives of women as a nation’s mothers. Based upon ideological similarities, AQC is compared with IS, and ETA with the IRA, detailing examples of cultural symbols adopted by the groups. This is followed by a brief discussion of the group level as applicable to the LTTE, where motherhood was not an embodied role but was used to justify female suicide bombing roles. Interpretations of the various SRR frame the subsequent analysis of individual performances of motherhood as ideological transmission and caregiving activities. Performative differences resulted from varying conceptualisations of the state, individual membership status and space women inhabited, group aims, and the external pressures placed upon a group.
Shared repertoires of resources and the cultural symbolisation of women as a nation’s mothers in AQC, ETA and the IRA

While all four comparative case studies considered motherhood to be an appropriate role for women, norm variation produced differences in performance. Interpreting the cultural symbolisation of women as a nation’s mothers from a CofP perspective, analysis of a group’s shared repertoire of resources explains these differences through the relationship between a group’s conceptualisation of the state and appropriate female behaviours and roles. This symbolism did not produce embodied performances of motherhood as part of group activities, contributing instead to communicating group norms which shaped acceptable female behaviours and roles as performed by peripheral associates in wider society. Positioned in a space that was external to, yet associated with, the group, peripheral associate performances of motherhood roles manifested as ideological transmission in relation to AQC and caregiving to facilitate others’ direct participation in the IRA and ETA. In answering ‘what effect do variations in gender construction within groups have on the role of women?’ analysis of the influence of cultural symbolisation on motherhood performances was limited to the social and group levels of the framework.

Arguably, the most influential factors on group attitudes towards women were ideology and conceptualisation of the state. IS and AQC’s conceptualisation of their ideal states relied to a certain extent on women engaging in mothering roles, although performative differences occurred. Their SRR, exemplified by pan-Islamic ideology (Gunaratna, 2002:87) and narratives of non-mandatory (Aasgaard, 2017:110) female-specific jihad (von Knop, 2007), based their understandings of sex and gender on conservative, essentialist principles. Acceptable role types and behaviours for women were derived from sexual divisions of labour. In a similar way, the narratives ETA, the IRA and the LTTE used to encourage support for their desired separatist states drew upon a conceptualisation of women as mothers reproducing the nation, delineating cultural and ethnic membership boundaries (Yuval-Davies & Anthias, 1989). Yet this symbolism was operationalised in varying ways and achieved different outcomes and embodied performances of motherhood for each group.

Created in response to perceived needs held by specific groups in their societies, both the IRA and ETA were engaged in localised conflicts that did not try to appeal to individuals outside of their community or culture, unlike IS or AQC. As CofPs, the IRA assumed many symbols of the Northern Irish Catholic Republican community into their SRR, while ETA’s developed from Basque cultural practices. This produced an integration between internal group organisation and their wider societies that IS lacked. In contrast to IS, where the
communication and intelligibility of IS’s gender norms was necessary to sustaining group continuity, GMILs were largely absent for the IRA’s and ETA’s mothers. These women were operating within the same cultural space and replicating wider social norms that they had inhabited and engaged with prior to their association with either group.

**Cultural symbolisation as patriotic motherhood and the Cult of the Virgin Mary**

Symbols that were derived from wider society provided moral guidance that reinforced dichotomous gender binaries in the IRA and ETA. Rather than directly influencing embodied performances of motherhood roles, this symbolisation informed initial role allocation and socio-organisational attitudes towards women within both groups. To a certain extent, group perceptions of motherhood reproduced wider social norms that were shaped by a combination of their specific nationalist politics, socially relative strands of Roman Catholicism and localised factors. The cultural symbolisation of women as passive mothers aided the construction of a narrative which situated men as the defenders of the nation, asserting masculinity through the use of violence in opposition to appropriate forms of femininity, such as caregiving. This sexual division of labour simultaneously located peripheral associate women in a different space to both male participants, owing to variations in the types of roles assigned, and civilian women, by virtue of their association with a VE group.

Neither ETA nor the IRA assigned motherhood as a role to women, restricting performances of motherhood to the private sphere outside of, yet associated with, group boundaries. ETA’s attitude towards women was arguably influenced by Franco’s dictatorship: ‘Women were the “heart” of the family in National-Catholic Spain’ ([emphasis original], Morcillo, 2000:162). Hamilton further observes that ‘under Franco the ideal Spanish woman was to be first and foremost a wife and mother, whose primary sphere of activity was the family home’ (2007:48). This prevalent socio-cultural attitude permeated ETA, contributing to the narrative that a maternal identity and group membership were considered in dualistic exclusion (ibid:103). Women ‘either had to sacrifice motherhood in order to become ETA activists, or to sacrifice activism once they became mothers’ (ibid:103). Perceived as a non-negotiable binary, the location of mothers in the domestic sphere distinguished their contributions from the activist space inhabited by ETA members.

While mothers could hold IRA membership, they were encouraged to conform to wider social norms bounding femininity. Although not applicable to the North of Ireland, the 1937 Irish Constitution arguably informed this attitude through connections between Ireland and IRA members. Based upon the mutual dependency of sexual and national identities, depicted as ‘suffering Mother Ireland and the self-sacrificing Irish mother’ (Meaney, 1991:3),
the Constitution restricted women’s social role to the domestic sphere (ibid; Aretxaga, 1997:63).

This restriction led many women to construct a role for themselves through community activism. They created their own feminised space through which they could contribute to the IRA in socially accepted ways. A significant proportion of the women Aretxaga interviewed specifically identified the July 1970 British-imposed curfew on the Lower Falls and the introduction of internment policy as a catalyst for their politicisation and subsequent engagement with the Republican movement on a more formal level (1997:54-71; Alison, 2004:451). British military house raids served to blur the public and private spaces, forcibly bringing the conflict into the private sphere (Eager, 2008; Gilmartin, 2017), and brought everyday life into the VE sphere as tools to enable female participation. McWilliams adopts Hyatt’s terminology of ‘accidental activism’ (1995:21; Hyatt, 1991) to describe such socially acceptable female participation. This terminology is interpreted here as a form of peripheral association.

Comparisons with IS can be drawn regarding the use of symbolic role models to communicate appropriate roles performances to women in ETA and the IRA. Whereas IS utilised religious doctrine to include women as core and periphery group members, ETA and the IRA used religiously informed wider social norms to situate women beyond the group boundary. A predominant theme of the symbolism found in ETA and the IRA that stemmed from wider society emphasised a ‘very specific maternal relationship to the activist son’ (Hamilton, 2007:102). This relationship was comparable to that between the Virgin Mary and Jesus during the Passion of Christ and was to be viewed in the public domain. A narrative depicting and symbolising a mother’s relationship to an activist daughter (ibid:165) did not exist. Unlike the relationship between mother and son, who both conform to their idealised social roles, the daughter has transgressed her expected role to become an activist and such transgressions should not be tolerated. This suggests a tension between superficially accepting female members and accepting women as equal to men.

For ETA, this relationship was associated with ‘patriotic motherhood’ (Hamilton, 2007:101). It was perceived that ‘a man’s sacrifice involved giving up his own life, but a woman’s sacrifice was typically seen in relationship to her children’ (Hamilton, 2007:103). The surrender of sons to significant deaths became a ‘higher mode of giving birth’ (Lloyd, 1987:76). ETA’s portrayal of Angel Otaegi’s mother exemplified this. Through her son’s death, she was
framed as ‘a symbol of the radical nationalist cause...as the essence of goodness and resistance...’ (Hamilton, 2007:100), having suffered the most intense form of sacrifice.64

Conversely, the IRA has been more explicitly linked to Roman Catholicism and the influence of the ‘Cult of the Virgin Mary’ (Butler Cullingford, 2002). This reified the Virgin Mother as the ideal role model for women (ibid, 2002; Fairweather et al, 1984:109). The personification of Ireland as a mother constructed the Irish nation as Ireland’s children (Morgan & Fraser, 1995:82; Forker, 2007:77), providing an allegorical representation of the relationship between a mother and her suffering activist son. These ideas developed as emblematic of how women associated with the IRA should behave, resulting in many women performing motherhood roles consistent with the IRA’s gender narratives.

Such symbolism was used to dictate how this maternal relationship was to be viewed in the public domain, exemplified by Bobby Sands’ mother. Like the Virgin Mary, mothers were encouraged by the IRA to publicly grieve for their sons’ sacrifices but were expected not to intervene to prevent this suffering from occurring. This linked to a belief that a woman’s sacrifice for the nationalist cause was through and of her male children, rather than of herself.

Yet not all performances of motherhood associated with ETA or the IRA adhered to each group’s cultural symbolisation narrative. There were multiple examples of mothers who challenged the nationalist discourse portraying women as the nation’s mothers. Despite ETA’s representation of Angel Otaegi’s mothers as the ideal role model for mothers, she resisted her son joining ETA (Clark, 1984:156). Despite the Cult of the Virgin Mary emphasising the maternal sacrifice of sons, the mothers of thirteen of the IRA’s hunger strikers intervened to prevent their sons’ deaths. The IRA responded to this by claiming the Catholic Church had manipulated the hunger strikers’ families. By insinuating that mothers who had refused medical intervention did not love their sons (Flynn, 2011; An Phoblacht, 2016), the Church had challenged the sacrificial relationship between a mother and son. The IRA thus placed the blame on the Catholic Church for exerting pressure and undermining the Cult. These examples are key in demonstrating heterogeneity in women’s responses to group discourses regarding motherhood roles. However, owing to an insufficiency of data, it is beyond the parameters of this research to analyse such performances further. The focus of analysis remains on performances of motherhood that complied with group expectations.

64 Ortaegi was convicted of killing a Guardia Civil officer and was one of the last men to have been executed under the Francoist death penalty in 1975 (Giniger, 1975; Way, 2019).
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ETA’s desired form of state and the IRA’s relationship with a part instantiated, actual state combined with the lack of written evidence of any formal, ideological articulation of the types of roles intended for women, support the conclusion that neither group contained a mechanism for women to learn how to perform their roles. Conceptualisations of patriotic motherhood and the *Cult of the Virgin Mary* presented women with role models for mothers, but these stemmed from wider socio-cultural practices and reinforced ideas of motherhood that were consistent with women’s accepted social roles. IS emphasised the communication of its ideals to female members, whereas in ETA and the IRA, there was much more continuity between the roles women performed as part of wider society and the roles performed in association with a group.

*Cultural symbolisation to justify role changes within the LTTE*

Further comparisons exist between IS and the LTTE’s use of symbolism as a mechanism to communicate group ideas. Symbolism as used by the LTTE communicated and justified changes in the types of roles assigned to women. By 2019, such a process of change had not occurred within IS. Role models portraying women as mothers offered continuity to female members rather than facilitating change.

Similar to ETA, the LTTE sought to instigate a desired state. Yet while ETA’s narrative prefaced mothers’ sacrificing their sons, the LTTE shifted this narrative to encourage women to sacrifice themselves. Existing symbolism was ideologically manipulated to encourage broader organisational support for this change, legitimated through synthesising a traditional Tamil idealisation of motherhood (Alison, 2011) with a more literal manifestation of self-sacrificing mothers (Herath, 2012). When the conflict began, motherhood had been purely a symbolic role. The physical reproduction of a population was not required, instead invoking nationalist sentiments portraying women as emblematic mothers of the nation. As the conflict endured the needs of the group altered, partially owing to an insufficiency of men. To fulfil organisational needs, motherhood increasingly became fused with violence, resulting in the construction of a *mother-warrior* identity (Maunaguru, 1995). This expected the ideal Tamil woman to be both warrior and mother, consequently providing space for women to engage in a wider range of roles, including suicide bombing.

This is the extent to which the LTTE’s motherhood roles are discussed as part of this chapter. Arguably, ideas surrounding motherhood manifested performatively as suicide bombing roles. The relationship between the cultural symbolisation of women as the nation’s mothers and performances of suicide bombing is analysed in greater detail in *Chapter Nine*. 
Motherhood as ideological transmission

The previous section analysed the social and group levels of the framework, interpreting each case study’s SRR as producing their envisioned forms of motherhood. Informed by these narratives, this section utilises the framework’s individual level to analyse motherhood role performances.

The transmission of a group’s ideology and SRR to children intended to secure the group’s future existence by raising children in a context that would prepare them to be the next generation of members. The childrearing aspect of IS mothers’ responsibilities exemplified this. Yet this role was not restricted to children raised within an extremist group atmosphere. In societies where women are assigned responsibility for transmitting cultural expectations to their children, ‘when these norms include the use of violence for political ends, women encourage the radicalism and militaristic self-sacrifice that lead to terrorist acts’ (Caiazza, 2001:3).

Such a role is exhibited in the majority of VE groups that seek to extend their membership pool, including all the cases examined in this study. Child-rearing through ideological transmission by mothers in the IRA, ETA, and the LTTE was not a role assigned to female members by group leaders. Owing to these groups basing much of their internal culture on wider social norms, motherhood roles were assumed socially and organically by peripheral associate women, in accordance with group expectations of civilian women. Peripheral associate mothers contributed to maintaining the broader culture but enacted their roles from a space which related them to the group via a shared domain of interest. Civilian women were not related to the group.

Chapter Seven explores different manifestations of ideological transmission and historical conscience as forms of recruitment when performed in relation to the IRA and ETA. As informal roles in the IRA and ETA, many mothers likely did not intend to transmit group ideology to their children, but to raise them in accordance with their socio-cultural traditions. However, the appropriation of these norms by the VE group claiming to represent the minority community made it difficult to distinguish the culture from the VE group and may have tacitly contributed to children latterly joining the group. This exemplifies the difficulty in clearly assigning roles to one specific category. The purpose of ideological transmission, whether perceived as a mothering or recruitment activity, was to educate younger generations and encourage their participation in the group. Yet performative differences occurred according to who performed the role and their relationship to receiving individual.
Discussed as a motherhood role, this section compares performances of childrearing through ideological transmission activities by AQC’s and IS’s mothers, complemented by a brief reference to ETA. Given IS’s concern with population creation for its ideal state, it could be assumed that AQC would similarly conceive of motherhood as a form of state-building premised on childbearing. However, AQC excluded women from group membership and differed in the timing of its state-building project. This resulted in peripheral associate women engaging in a role that combined AQC’s social expectations of women, as defined by its interpretation of religion, with this future state-building commitment. Thus, motherhood was performed as the ideological transmission of AQC’s norms from a mother to her child. Peripheral associate mothers inhabited a different space from civilian women and AQC’s exclusively male membership, linked to AQC through a shared domain of interest and adherence to its SRR.

The membership status of women was a key principle of divergence. Unlike IS, AQC excluded women entirely from its organizational and membership structure (Davis, 2006:1). A 2008 radiobroadcast by Ayman al-Zawahiri, AQC’s then leader, restricted women’s role in jihad to non-military support (Aasgaard, 2017:104). The extent to which women could participate in AQC activities was limited to utilising their positions as wives and mothers to ‘encourag[e] family members to participate in battles’ (ibid:104). Female interactions with AQC were restricted to a male relation’s, usually a husband’s, membership. Locating women outside of group boundaries signified AQC’s perception that women were unable to directly contribute to fulfilling violent group aims. Constructing female involvement through peripheral association contrasted with IS’s emphasis on female core and periphery members performing motherhood through childbearing as a feminised form of state-building. Although women associated with AQC similarly conformed to gendered expectations and engaged in motherhood roles, this was performed through raising children in accordance with a globalised interpretation of Salafi jihadism (Hellmich, 2008:115).

AQC’s exclusion of women from group membership is comparable to ETA. Owing to a belief that motherhood and armed militancy were incompatible roles (Hamilton, 2007), ETA situated mothers as peripheral associates, outside group boundaries. Likewise, mothers associated with ETA acted as a historical conscience within some families, perpetuating Basque grievances and ideology. In an interview with Hamilton, #3 stated that ‘...the nationalist spirit in the homes has been transmitted by our mothers...’ (2007:63), suggesting that the passing on of grievances and culture did, for some children, motivate their participation in ETA as adults.
Yet despite preventing mothers from becoming members, ETA’s relationship with their desired state resulted in its recognition that motherhood was integral to group functionality, as occurred within IS.

The organisational space of ETA and the domestic sphere of the home were ‘separate, but highly dependent, spheres of activity...’ (ibid:99) that were both key to ensuring the survival of the Basque nation. ETA remained the arena and mechanism for conducting radical nationalist action. Similar distinguishing spheres were present within IS and AQC, with female members predominately restricted to transmitting ideology whilst remaining in domestic spaces. However, unlike IS and AQC, ETA did not specifically assign this as a role. Owing to a cultural consistency between ETA and wider Basque society, women were likely to be performing this role anyway.

The second factor differentiating performances of motherhood in AQC from IS related to the timing of the creation of the ideal state (Hashim, 2014:79). For AQC, a ‘long and drawn-out process of jihad’ (O’Shea, 2016:55) had to occur before a Caliphate could be declared. A temporal disagreement as informed by differing worldviews and interpretations of religious doctrine, altered the types of activities mothers were required to perform. AQC’s and IS’s group needs and strategies differed. Whereas IS believed that global events of 2014 signified the fulfilment of the prophesies required prior to forming their ideal state which culminated in their declaration of a Caliphate, AQC disagreed. Partially as a result of this declaration, al-Zawahiri explicitly positioned AQC in opposition to IS (Turner, 2015). AQC argued that current conditions were not conducive to the creation of a lasting Islamic State, and instead focused on creating the optimum conditions for this through enacting global jihad and persuading Muslim populations of such a state’s legitimacy (ibid:209). For AQC, the concept of the Caliphate is symbolically operationalised as a tool to unite the ummah (Pankhurst, 2010:530) and justify globalised jihad (ibid:550) rather than as a true political aim (ibid:532).

AQC’s ideal state as a future project prioritised ideological transmission. This encouraged children to ‘learn to love their deen and get ready to fight for its sake’ ([italics original], Inspire, Issue 12, 2014:49). By acting as an instrument to prepare younger generations for their responsibilities in creating and maintaining the future ideal state, mothers were key to sustaining AQC, yet remained outside membership boundaries.

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65 Din, anglicised as deen, refers to a way of life lived in obedience to God (Esposito, 2003a).
Despite such differences, IS and AQC communicated their versions of appropriate femininity through magazine articles and wider propaganda directly targeting women. As both needed to secure future group members, this can be explained through ideological similarities and the shared aim of forming an ideal state. From these sources, women learnt how to perform their assigned roles through the gendered mechanisms (GMILs) of repetition and imitation. Umayma al-Zawahiri’s open letter (2009) invoked the examples of Khadija and Safiyya bint Huyayy (two of Prophet Muhammad’s wives) as role models for patience and steadfastness, feminine qualities AQC wanted to cultivate in women (Anzalone, 2017:2).

Magazine articles further repeated key messages to construct a very specific notion of femininity and a related feminised space, which women were expected to conform to and inhabit. However, the messages communicated differed. AQC’s propaganda prioritised childrearing and a mother’s transmission of AQC’s brand of ideology and religion to her children: ‘O mother of the upcoming generation, it is your obligation and responsibility to teach and enlighten your children...’ (Inspire, Issue 10, 2013:33). Failure to do so was inferred as equivalent to failing to fulfil their incumbent religious duty.

While AQC focused on the potential of future generations’ contributions, rendering a childbearing embodiment of motherhood as extraneous, IS framed mothers as directly participating in the state-building project.

**Caregiving and facilitating others’ direct involvement**
Performances of motherhood which occurred in contestation with an actual state or which sought to create a desired state were embodied as forms of caregiving. This was exemplified by groups defined as ethno-national separatists, on the basis of self-defined minority populations according to religious, ethnic or linguistic differences, such as the IRA and ETA (Eager, 2008:133). Whereas the construction of IS’s ideal state required population expansion, a numerically significant and culturally coherent population existed prior to the IRA’s and ETA’s formations. Both groups operated within existing states and held secessionist aims focused on political and cultural sovereignty for their respective minority populations who perceived the state as repressive.

Consequently, motherhood as a role was not assigned to female members, but was informally performed by many women located inside and outside of membership boundaries. A peripheral associate’s actions may have simultaneously tacitly or indirectly aided the group and should not be taken as an explicit demonstration of alliance with group ideology, aims or methods. Their actions were motivated as aiding members with whom they had a close
relationship. The combination of their positioning outside of the group with a familial connection to a group member enabled them to assist in ways that were likely not possible for core or periphery members. Women assumed a greater burden of familial roles and caregiving responsibilities (Gilmartin, 2017; Dowler, 1998; Hamilton, 2000) tacitly enabling husbands, sons, and latterly, daughters, to conduct group activities.

Identification of GMILs was more difficult to distinguish in analyses of motherhood roles performed by the IRA’s and ETA’s peripheral associates. IS and AQC relied on repetition and imitation. While both mechanisms contributed to the IRA’s and ETA’s learning processes, the role behaviours, sources of knowledge and the emphasis placed on repetition and imitation differed. Peripheral associate mothers operated within the same cultural space they had inhabited prior to their group association. Owing to cultural consistency between the IRA, ETA, and their respective societal contexts and gender expectations, peripheral associate performances replicated the role as it was performed in a civilian space. However, while the type of motherhood role performed did not change, the burden of responsibility increased, accompanied by the politicisation of intended outcomes associated with these roles.

Such performances demonstrate that an individual’s membership status was not a definitive indicator of involvement with a VE group and emphasise that female contributions could occur from informal, social spaces. One of Gilmartin’s interviewee summaries how there were ‘...all these women who never joined the IRA as such but who without [them] the war could never have happened... there are lots of women who played those vital roles’ (‘Gemma’, 2017:466). While not solely referring to women-as-mothers, this grouping forms a key example of the ‘vital roles’ women performed. A more holistic assessment of how VE groups function could be enabled by recognising these more informal, peripheral-based contributions and including them within analyses of VE activity. This would disrupt the prevalent theme within existing literature which conflates active participation with the use of violence. The IRA and ETA both situated mothers as peripheral associates, yet two performative differences occurred. The first was the importance the separate domestic space had on ETA’s continuation, while the second was a change in the IRA’s policy towards including women who were mothers as group members.

Wider social norms and the gender narratives as conceptualised by the IRA and ETA constructed the domestic sphere as a specifically feminine space. It was expected that women would assume a greater burden of domestic responsibilities in order to enable husbands to
participate in group activities. The domestic sphere became a space where women dealt with the consequences of male involvement in frontline political contestations against the state.

In an interview about ETA, interviewee #6 stated: ‘He depended on me. He led his whole [activist] life but of course he depended, at the family level, on it working without him...’ (Hamilton, 2007:98). From this, and other similar statements, it can be argued that mothers, and wives, abilities to sustain a family without physical support or contributions from their husbands, facilitated the maintenance of ETA. Therefore, it served ETA’s purpose to continue to situate mothers outside of group membership boundaries this determined many men’s ability to conduct clandestine activities. There was a perception that including mothers as members would have disrupted the balance between the mutually dependent domestic and VE spaces. While mothers’ scope for agency in relation to the group was very limited, they possessed significant agentic capabilities within the domestic space.

Changes in organisational policies towards including mothers as IRA members comprises the second factor that informed differences in peripheral associate performances of motherhood. It is unclear whether ETA’s policy towards including mothers ever altered, and a comparable change was not seen in IS. Alterations to women’s roles over time were not formally ideologically articulated by the IRA but were instantiated in actual organisational changes. The shift to include women as members of the IRA during the late 1970s (MacStiofain, 1975:218) suggests that there was an organisational need for such a policy change. Younger women were able to participate on a more direct level than the previous generations were allowed.

Following this, often the same generation of female peripheral associates who had facilitated their husbands’ participation through assuming more of the caregiving burden found themselves performing a motherhood role again. This time, it was as grandmothers (Dowler, 1998:173). Such an experience was likely similar to many women during that time who perhaps may have wanted to join the IRA and shared its ideological commitments but were unable to owing to the need for women to keep a family together. This in itself aided the group because it facilitated the direct participation of others.

Mothers were situated as peripheral associates, who tacitly, as well as overtly in some cases, contributed to their respective group. Husbands, sons or daughters acted as the conduits through which the maintenance of the domestic space offered by women as wives

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66 Changes in IS could potentially manifest in the future, following their loss of territory which altered interactions between individuals and the group.
and mothers impacted the group. The various aims and intended outcomes the groups hoped to achieve from motherhood roles informed differences in performances.

**Chapter Conclusion**

To conclude, with the exception of AQI, differences in performances of motherhood roles can be understood through variations in a group’s conceptualisation, and interaction with, a state. As conceptualisations of a state differed, so too did the extent to which a group’s aims could be fulfilled by mothering roles. In all five cases, motherhood activities were performed from within feminised spaces which invoked the cultural symbolisation of women as the nation’s mothers. The communication of group norms through the mechanisms of repetition and imitation differed according to the level of cultural consistency between a group and its target audience. Performances of motherhood from within these feminised spaces differentiated these role performances from male forms of participation and civilian women’s embodiments of motherhood.

The interpretation of each case study as a CofP with a distinct shared repertoire of resources helped to answer the research question concerned with the effect variations in gender construction had on women’s roles and framed how differences in a role’s performance could be understood across VE groups. Each group’s SRR was imbued with its accumulated knowledge (Smith, 2003) concerning group norms, such as gender construction and attitudes towards women.

IS constructed motherhood as a feminised form of state-building. Assigned to migrant, local and sabaya women, this role emphasised childbearing as a population expansion method, with women literally producing future state members. Female migrants as core and periphery IS members inhabited a different space, possessed a greater level of agency and could access different opportunities. Unlike local or sabaya women who were not IS members and whose childbearing was enforced, migrant women’s participation was predominately voluntary and framed as contributing to a female version of jihad.

Variations in attitudes towards women within IS were exemplified by the re-education of migrant women. The removal of inconsistencies between IS’s group norms and the pre-existing beliefs and social values held by female migrants was necessary to ensure the primacy of the overarching IS narrative. This process involved the communication of IS’s shared repertoire of resources through propaganda. I interpret the repetition of key messages and the provision of ideal role models for mothers to imitate as gendered learning mechanisms,
through which migrant women learnt to perform their motherhood roles as well as their identity within IS.

AQC similarly utilised repetition and imitation conveyed via propaganda as mechanisms for women to learn their role performances. Yet although AQC also conceptualised an ideal Caliphate, variations with IS regarding the timing of the state-building project and the exclusion of all women from possessing membership status demonstrated key differences in motherhood performances. For AQC, motherhood took the form of ideological transmission. Female peripheral associates prepared children for their future role in passing on AQC ideology, until the optimal conditions for declaring a Caliphate have been established. This negated a need for childbearing as a form of state-building instead prioritising mothers’ responsibilities as ideological guardians.

As ethno-nationalist separatist groups, ETA, the IRA and the LTTE conceptualised desired, independently sovereign states but interacted with actual states, perceived as oppressive. Similar to AQC, the assignment of a childbearing role to female members was unnecessary, although this was partially because culturally coherent minority populations pre-existed group formations. Motherhood activities were not perceived as directly contributing to achieving group aims, as they were in IS.

Rather, performances of motherhood in ETA and the IRA occurred outside of group boundaries, informally assumed by peripheral associates. As they operated in spaces where there was greater consistency between group norms and societal values, repetition and imitation learning mechanisms were less visible. Peripheral associate mothers engaged in and repeated familiar behaviours, tacitly, sometimes even overtly, contributing towards maintaining and sustaining group existence by facilitating others’ direct participation. This aligned with group aims to continue to exert pressure upon the oppressive existing state. ETA was dependent upon the existence of this separate, domestic space and on mothers conforming to role expectations, while in the IRA mothers inhabited a space that blurred the boundaries between group membership and the local community. Frequently, these boundaries overlapped, exemplified by the ability of women to simultaneously possess both IRA membership status and a social identity as mothers. Motherhood in ETA and the IRA was thus performed as a social role, but due to an individual association and shared domain of interest with a VE group, such performances were located in a different space compared to performances by civilian women.
In contrast to the other case studies, motherhood was not an embodied practice within the LTTE. As a socially familiar ideal role for women, the cultural symbolisation of women as the nation’s mothers was exploited to justify changes in the types of roles assigned to women. This altered the space women occupied, from a non-violent domestic space, to the use of violence as LTTE members. As the embodiment of motherhood arguably occurred as a suicide bombing role, these performances are analysed in Chapter Nine.

All the above factors contributed to differences in how motherhood roles were performed across the five case studies. While some activities, such as caregiving and childrearing are arguably comparable, crucially it is the framing of these activities and what they contributed towards the group that differed. The combination of a group’s needs and aims, gender construction, and socio-cultural attitudes adopted from wider society with their SRR produce a group-specific context that influenced motherhood performances.

While each group located women-as-mothers in private, domestic spaces, variations occurred in the proximity of this space in relation to group membership boundaries. These spaces informed the membership status and opportunities for involvement that were accessible to women, thus shaping the types of activities performed as motherhood roles. Decisions taken regarding how to achieve their aims and fulfil the needs of a group necessarily informs the types of roles that need to be performed and the intended outcomes expected to result from this performance. Conceptualisations and performances of motherhood were thus extended into a VE sphere of activity and continued to be based around caregiving, rather than changes to the type of activities the motherhood role consisted of.

This analysis demonstrates that despite being referred to as ‘motherhood’ roles, individual performances differed across the case studies. However, to refer to all as embodying motherhood obscures such performative nuances and can lead to the assumption that women across extremist groups fulfil these roles in the same ways. While descriptive frameworks are useful tools for categorising on a broad scale the types of roles women engage with, an awareness of the exact activities women in VE groups performed is equally important because this reveals more about group attitudes towards women and how women are perceived to contribute to fulfilling group aims.
### Chapter Six: Motherhood and Conceptualisations of the State

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motherhood</th>
<th>IS</th>
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<td><strong>Childbearing &amp; rearing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AQC</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideological Transmission</strong></td>
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<td><strong>IRA &amp; ETA</strong></td>
<td><strong>Caregiving &amp; facilitating others’ direct involvement</strong></td>
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<td><strong>LTTE</strong></td>
<td><strong>Symbolic</strong></td>
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#### Purpose
- **IS**: To populate the Caliphate and provide future members.
- **AQC**: To raise children in accordance with group norms, intentionally transmitting ideology.
- **IRA & ETA**: Neither concerned with population expansion as a significant population existed prior to group formation.
- **LTTE**: Communicated changes in women’s roles; justified female participation in suicide bombing.

#### Membership status
- **IS**: Core and periphery members, who migrated to IS-controlled territory.
- **AQC**: Peripherally associated (women excluded from membership).
- **IRA & ETA**: Gendered as a mother’s responsibility.
- **LTTE**: Symbolic of the primary role performed by women in wider Tamil society.

#### Gendered Mechanism of Interactional Learning
- **IS**: Repetition of gender norms through propaganda material, such as the aKB.
- **AQC**: Repetition of gender norms through propaganda material.
- **IRA & ETA**: Similar to IS.
- **LTTE**: Repetition of familiar social roles and an invocation of nationalist sentiment.

#### Performance
- **IS**: Performed by adhering to narratives of female jihad communicated through IS’s shared repertoire of resources. Initially prioritised motherhood over participating in combat.
- **AQC**: Emphasised preparing children for future AQC participation. Childbearing did not fulfil AQC’s needs.
- **IRA & ETA**: While not a means of directly achieving a group’s aims, by assuming a greater burden of familial roles and caregiving responsibilities, this tacitly enabled others to participate.
- **LTTE**: Physical embodiment not as expected. Used by the group to invoke nationalist sentiments of women as emblematic mothers of the nation. Manifested as suicide bombing.

*Table 5: A table summarising the key findings regarding performances of motherhood roles in IS, AQC, the IRA, ETA and the LTTE, as analysed through the framework.*
Chapter Seven: Recruitment and Idealised Notions of Femininity

In fulfilling the group goal of growing each movement, female performances of recruitment in IS, AQC, the LTTE, the IRA and ETA were informed by constructions of idealised femininity. From a Butlerian perspective, social actions are regulated and made intelligible within a culture by a heterosexual matrix (1999:24-26). This matrix is interpreted as formed from wider social ideas that manifested within VE groups as attitudes towards, and expectations of, women. Owing to disparities between group conceptualisations and individual embodiments, these notions of femininity were *idealised*. Use of femininity as an instrumental means of attracting new recruits varied across the case studies, as influenced by ideological, technological and socio-cultural contextual differences and the potential for individual women to act with agency. This chapter explores how women navigated and performed recruitment activities in accordance with group expectations and organisational demands.

The analysis of recruitment performances by women which targeted female and male audiences argues that recruiters enabled and contributed to ideological transmission and recruit norm development. The tactics and methods recruiters used varied according to the target audience’s gender and the spaces recruiters inhabited. Spaces ranged from exclusively women-only, exemplified by IS’s recruiting practices, through to less gendered spaces with fewer apparent differences between women and men’s performances, identifiable in the IRA’s and ETA’s Familial relationships.

Recruitment refers to embodied activities which intended to facilitate other individuals’ inclusion in extremist group membership (della Porta, 1988; Gerwehr & Daly, 2006; Hegghammer, 2012). Taking many forms, including facilitator, propagandist, and historical conscience (Cragin & Daly, 2009:41), recruitment was not necessarily formally assigned by the group to its members. Recruitment could be an informal, social role, as demonstrated in the IRA and ETA. Often interrelated with radicalisation processes, distinguishing recruitment from radicalisation is difficult. To retain conceptual clarity, recruitment is interpreted as a process whereby recruiters provide ‘emotional, informational, and logistical support’ to potential recruits (Huay, Inch & Peladeau, 2017:15). This support would contribute to facilitating an individual’s joining of a group, occurring after the individual’s initial alignment with group beliefs. Other related aspects, such as radicalisation outcomes or propaganda narratives are excluded, except where they constitute part of recruitment role performances.
Chapter Seven: Recruitment and Idealised Notions of Femininity

Application of the gendered mechanism (GMILs) found that recruitment activities were performed through repetition. This contrasts with other analytical chapters where the GMILs analyse the learning processes which precede and inform role performances. Yet based upon the available data, the recruiter’s learning process was difficult to capture. However, inferences regarding the learning processes of potential recruits can be made through analysing recruitment performances. This suggests that the individual benefitting from the learning process may not necessarily be the individual performing the role. The content of messages communicated by recruiters extended the boundaries of the group as a CofP to include the recruit and facilitated their norm development. As these norms were indicative of group expectations, the recruit was informed of their potential position and roles as a group member.

For each of the following recruitment activities analysed it is not possible to conclusively assert whether an intention to recruit was present or absent from performances. Such assertions require an in-depth analysis of a specific individual performance, which were difficult to achieve owing to the available data. Moreover, the agency of the individual targeted by the recruiter shaped responses to recruitment information disseminated and informed decisions to join a group.

Two more of the research questions are answered. Where applicable, a comparison of female and male recruitment performances answers ‘If women and men perform the same role, how is this gendered and performed differently in terms of femininity and masculinity?’ Gender-informed performative differences are explicitly identified through three factors: the gender of the target audience, the messages communicated, and the tools recruiters used to reach this audience. All three related to the space recruitment activities were performed from. From a CofP perspective, these factors contributed to recruit norm development by introducing them to the group’s shared repertoire of resources (SRR). The communication of group expectations and gender-appropriate behaviours emphasised the interactional nature of the learning relationship between the recruiter and recruit.

Analysis of the above three factors further answers ‘In what ways do the roles of women adapt to meet the organisational needs of the group?’ This question assesses changes to female role performances over time, particularly where membership is expanded to include women after a significant event.

This chapter begins by analysing IS’s female performances of online and offline recruitment roles. Comparisons with AQC’s female peripheral associates’ goading of men, the
Chapter Seven: Recruitment and Idealised Notions of Femininity

LTTE’s propaganda as recruitment, and familial relationships which facilitated the transmission of ideology and historical conscience for the IRA and ETA find that idealised notions of femininity were instrumental in attracting recruits for IS and AQC, but not for the LTTE, ETA or the IRA. For these latter three groups, performances of recruitment occurred from within gender-integrated spaces, influenced by different kinds of membership status, which were not as rigidly gendered as performances in IS and AQC. Informal performances, such as in the IRA and ETA, are more difficult to analyse compared to formally assigned roles because they took place within the private sphere and were not often recorded in detail. However, as this chapter demonstrates, these performances did contribute to recruitment processes.

Gendered recruitment and Islamic State

IS’s recruiting practices were a diverse composition of actors, audiences and messages. Each individual’s recruitment process likely involved three complementary devices: an echo chamber; propaganda; and an enlister [referred to throughout this research as a recruiter] (Winter, 2016:6). This perspective, which I adopt, distinguishes recruitment from the initial radicalisation process. It implies a recruit was usually ideologically committed to IS prior to their interactions with a recruiter. Thus, recruiters predominately acted as a ‘humaniser of risk’ (ibid:6), simultaneously deepening ideological commitment by contributing to the recruit’s development of IS norms and formation as a gendered IS subject.

Existing literature concerned with gender and IS recruitment differentiates between male and female recruitment narratives and discusses processes for recruiting women (for example, Daglish, 2015; Erelle, 2016). However, such research does not examine female recruiter performances.

The analysis of Western women’s performances of recruitment roles from online and offline spaces contributes towards filling this gap. These performances exemplified the instrumental use of IS’s idealised notion of femininity as a means of attracting female recruits. Both spaces enabled the targeting of other women residing in the West as potential recruits but differed in terms of the recruiter’s location and intended outcomes. Online recruitment tended to be performed by Western female migrants, who aimed to assist a recruit’s development of IS norms and ultimately facilitate their migration to IS-territory. Physical

67 Reflecting the heterogenous nature of recruitment processes, the timing of, and who initiates, this contact is widely debated (see Grossman et al, 2018; Berger, 2015; Cottee, 2016). Although I am aware of these debates, engagement with them is beyond the scope of this research.
interactions occurring within offline study and prayer group spaces were organised by women who remained in the West and sought to consolidate an individual’s commitment to IS.

In contrast with other research (see Berger, 2015; Berger & Perez, 2016), I maintain that online and offline spaces did not occur in isolation but interacted in complex social and individual processes. Both spaces were informed by other factors, such as relationships to family members (Hafez, 2016) and temporal context (Gill et al, 2014). Combined with individual membership status and geographical location, these factors influenced the different types of knowledge IS’s participants held.

IS’s idealised notion of femininity are interpreted as derived from the al-Khansaa Brigade’s (aKB) manifesto, based around qualities of ‘sedentariness, stillness and stability’ (trans. Winter, 2015:19). The manifesto provided a key source of IS’s SRR, articulating its conceptualisation of gender and expectations of female members. Ideal feminine qualities such as chastity and obedience (ibid:26) were framed through religious obligation.

As explained in Chapter Six, gender was considered part of an individual’s natural state (Esposito, 2003b). Yet a Butlerian perspective of gender as culturally intelligible (1999:208) emphasises that IS’s conceptualisations were similarly socially constructed. For Butler, a gendered subject is formed through the bodily assumption of an identity created within a power structure (Salih, 2002:2). IS presented itself as an alternative power structure to Western cultural norms, with a clearer ideological and embodied delineation between femininity and masculinity. Individuals became IS members through assuming these gendered identities that were formulated within the context IS constructed.

In online spaces, the communication of gender norms formulated a subject through language (Hollywood, 2002:95). Engagement with gender-targeted message content and discussions familiarised potential recruits with IS’s attitude towards women and gendered role expectations. Recruiters introduced recruits to IS’s SRR. This contributed to the formation of the recruit as a gendered IS subject by facilitating their development of IS’s norms. Thus, the recruitment process was instrumental in recruits gaining an understanding of their position and role expectations within IS.

**Online recruitment via social media platforms**

While recruitment for most VE groups occurred via face-to-face interactions, recruitment in IS became synonymous with the use of social media platforms. Telegram (Clifford & Powell, 2019); Tumblr (Pues, 2016); Twitter (Farwell, 2014; Klausen, 2015) and Ask.FM (Perešin,
Chapter Seven: Recruitment and Idealised Notions of Femininity

2015:26) were frequently used. Besides enabling global communication with potential recruits, broadening the pool of accessible targets, internet technology became the key ‘vehicle for female recruitment’ (Daglish, 2015:2). While men similarly fulfilled online recruitment roles, use of social media within the Caliphate provided the opportunity for women not only to be recruited, but also to act as recruiters. This diversified opportunities for female participation beyond motherhood.

Advances in internet technology created a gender-specific online space that enabled women to act as recruiters from within the confines of their home (Conway, 2017:89-91). Online spaces mitigated restrictions which prohibited the public presence of women, unless accompanied by a mahram. Combined with the geographical displacement between the Caliphate and intended recruits residing in the West, female Caliphate residents were limited in their ability to participate in face-to-face recruitment practices (Pearson, 2018a:853). As a recruitment tool, social media shaped recruitment performances through physical immobility. This conformed to the principles of sedentariness and stillness (trans. Winter, 2015:19) that underpinned IS’s idealised notion of femininity, yet fulfilled IS’s need to recruit more women.

To increase effectiveness, female recruiters targeted those of a similar cultural background and identity to themselves. Western women recruited other Westerners, while Arab women recruited other Arab women (Winter, 2015). Implied shared experiences of life prior to migration aided the formation of a meaningful relationship and more practically, increased the probability of a shared language. Contradictory information exists regarding whether online recruitment interaction was gender segregated. Statements made by IS recruiters implied that the prohibition on unmarried men and women mixing without a guardian applied to the online sphere. One recruiter’s blog post advised women ‘to try to limit their communication with the brothers here’ (‘Umm Layth’, 09/04/2014). Although I have yet to find evidence of male recruits targeted by female IS recruiters, examples of female recruits targeted by male recruiters exist. Whilst undercover, a male recruiter proposed

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68 Mahram translates as a woman’s male blood relation (Esposito, 2003c), often understood as a male guardian. As ‘a woman’s hijrah [migration] from dārul-kufr [the land of disbelief] is obligatory whether or not she has a mahram...’ (Dabiq, Issue 8, 2015:35), an exception was made to facilitate female migration. The duty of migration was considered a higher priority than travelling with a mahram. Yet, once residing in the Caliphate, strict norms were enforced which limited female movement to the home.

69 Aqsa Mahmood adopted after the name ‘Umm Layth’ after migrating from Scotland to IS (Pues, 2016:8). Her blog, comprised of multiple posts, was cited as one of the most influential social media accounts in motivating young European women to migrate (ibid; Abu Ramman & Abu Hanieh, 2017:142). Owing to difficulties in accessing IS’s online content, I rely disproportionately on material produced by a few, well-known female recruiters. This does not generalise these women’s experiences as representative of all female recruiters, but were analysed as suggestive of how women were likely to perform online recruitment roles.
marriage to Erelle as an incentive to encourage her to join (2016). Arguably, fewer Western women were physically present in IS-territory immediately after the Caliphate’s declaration, hence the reliance on men targeting female recruits. The following analysis focuses on female-to-female interactions.

The assignment of recruitment duties to women adapted female roles to meet IS’s organisational needs. As control over territory expanded and consolidated, more female migrants were needed to fulfil state-building roles. By leaving materially stable lives in favour of IS, Western women provided ‘high public relations value’ (Bradford, 2015:5) and were regarded as more supportive of IS’s aims than local women (Perešin, 2015:27). Consequently, more women were deployed in online recruitment roles. In targeting female recruits, female recruiters shared female-specific logistical information, such as journey planning and essential items to pack.70 From a CofP perspective, this information-sharing formed the circulation of knowledgeable skills and IS’s shared repertoire of resources to near-peers (Lave & Wenger, 1991:57). It extended IS’s boundaries to the recruit, including them in knowledge reserved for group members.

Recruiters shared information with recruits via three types of learning relationship. Recruitment on a one-to-one level occurred through encrypted platforms or direct messaging between a single recruiter and recruit. Secondly, chatrooms and blogs’ comments sections enabled recruitment on a one-to-many level, between a single recruiter and many potential recruits. The final learning relationship was more collective, between many recruiters and many recruits. By sharing information on more publicly accessible platforms such as Twitter, some recruits may have engaged in a way that facilitated another recruit joining. The accessibility of public forms through social media helped women to connect with other women ‘contemporaneously undertaking the same process’ (Windsor, 2018:3). This suggests that an element of collective recruitment occurred parallel to the more dyadic recruiter-recruit relationship. While CofP theory promotes a range of learning relationships beyond the traditional teacher-learner dyad (Lave & Wenger, 1991), performances of recruitment roles examined as part of this research demonstrate dyadic learning relationships. This is due to the singular direction of information transmission, from the recruiter to the recruit. However, the inclusion of the recruit in the group’s SRR renders a CofP approach appropriate.

70 See blogs written by ‘Shams’ and ‘Umm Ubaydah’ in 2014-2015. Footnote 63 contains more information about ‘Shams’, while Footnote 65 has information regarding ‘Umm Ubaydah’.
Based upon the number of nodal connections and linkages with others many female actors on social media were observed to possess, Bohannon et al found that in IS, women ‘play a key role, possibly more important than men, in the group’s recruitment and propaganda machine’ (2016:1380). This concurs with Strømmen’s argument that women were ‘key recruiters’ who amassed large networks (2017:3). Nodal connections were used to transmit information and share contacts, facilitating interactions and arguably forming a virtual process of CoP-based situated learning. Both forms of connections involved direct, interpersonal and peer-to-peer contact and interaction. While men could perform recruitment activities from both online and offline spaces, women were significant gateways for reaching female audiences.

The high number of connections IS women were found to possess online was indicative of ‘recruitment-by-friendship’ (Rafiq & Malik, 2015:38-39) methods. Online interactions created close communities that replaced quotidian networks formerly created and sustained in person (Loken & Zelenz, 2017:63), reliant on the establishment of a bond of trust between recruiter and recruit (Hegghammer, 2012). Female recruiters referred to the strong friendships immediate formed between women who had arrived in the Caliphate:

‘the family you get in exchange for leaving the ones behind are like the pearl in comparison to the Shell [sic] you threw away into the foam of the sea which is the Ummah...’ (‘Umm Layth’ 11/09/2014 as cited in Hoyle et al, 2015:24; Perešin, 2015:28).

Some women were likely to have genuinely formed strong friendships through online interactions. However, this narrative also had appeal as an organisational strategy which likely resulted in the instrumental use of some friendships as a motivation and tool for recruitment (Colliver et al, 2019:9).

When analysed through the GMILs, female recruiters’ communication with recruits imitated the formation of friendships usually established face-to-face, situated instead in an online space. This builds upon Loken & Zelenz’s suggestion that trust formed online simulated the bond formed through face-to-face interactions (2017). Referring to this process as imitation does not diminish the authenticity or meaningfulness of the friendships formed. Rather, it emphasises that these relationships were formed in a space different from offline physical interactions. Social media was vital in cultivating a ‘deep, emotional bond [between] “sisters”’ ([emphasis original], Colliver et al, 2019:9), replacing the physical interactions that historically enabled recruitment. New female recruits who felt socially isolated whilst living in the West (ibid:10) may have been attracted by the sense of belonging (Tarras-Wahlberg,
Recruitment processes did not occur linearly and were not always successful. Yet an established, reciprocal bond of trust between the recruiter and recruit was crucial in the final stages. Frequently the recruiter acted as a ‘familiar voice...[to] guarantee the group’s promise of deliverance’ (Rafiq & Malik, 2015:39). When given by a member of the same sex, ‘who claim to have once suffered from the same set of grievances and identity crises’ (ibid:38), this guarantee is ‘far more powerful’ (ibid:38). Recruiters would only reply, and share key information to enable migration, with recruits they trusted (‘Shams’, 27/11/14). This reciprocity served to imitate the trust held between friends. Thus, IS’s idealised notion of femininity was used instrumentally by women as a means of attracting new recruits through appealing to other women based on mutual, female experiences.

Recruitment roles performed by Western female migrants residing in the Caliphate aimed to facilitate the migration of other women located in the West. A second, related aim was to aid a recruit’s development of IS norms. For both aims, the gender of the recruiter and the content of the messages communicated was significant and differentiated female recruitment performances from male.

*Facilitating migration through discipline*

To facilitate recruit migration, female recruiters drew on three frequently recurring strategies: the invocation of religious duty; sharing their personal migration experiences; and offering generic and female-specific logistical advice. The content of advice shared, the gender of the target audience and the space from which the role was performed combined to form a gendered process of migration facilitation. Relating to Butler’s conceptualisation of gender as a ‘disciplinary production’ (1999:172) outlined in *Chapter Three*, all three are analysed as forms of discipline.

Migration was conflated with IS’s idealised notions of femininity, presenting IS membership as an intrinsically religious obligation (Tarras-Wahlberg, 2016:7-9). It was the sole way to live ‘...a true and pure Islamic life’ (Colliver et al, 2019:9) which exerted ‘...peer pressure to push others to make *hijra* [migrate]...’ (Rafiq & Malik, 2015:9). Unless physically incapable, those who failed to migrate were positioned as transgressing a necessary religious obligation.

Saltman & Smith described ‘Shams’ as ‘one of the most noteworthy voices to emerge from the English-speaking female migrant cohort’ (2015:36). She was active online on several social media platforms, predominately Tumblr.
This transgression was compounded for women, as it further symbolised a failure to conform to idealised notions of femininity based on piety and virtue.

Female peer recruitment relied on the ‘twin ideals of redemption and deliverance … being specifically directed at females by females’ ([italics original], Rafiq & Malik, 2015:38). Piety (ibid:30-37) was emphasised as one of the main facets of IS’s idealised notion of femininity. It set the boundaries of expected and accepted female behaviours that new recruits from the West were likely unfamiliar with, such as not leaving the house without a mahram or the importance of correct veiling practices in public (Saripi, 2015:27). Conformity to pious and virtuous behaviour set a clear boundary which could be adhered to through self-discipline as well as discipline enacted by others, such as women of the al-Khansaa Brigade (aKB) (ibid, 2015; Zakaria, 2015). This presented subjective notions of an ideal Muslim as objective standards on which to judge potential recruits. By communicating IS’s accepted gender norms and behavioural expectations, female recruiters sought to regulate recruit behaviour by encouraging conformity to the ideal Muslim trope.

The second method involved sharing personal experiences. Experiences relating to the recruiter’s migration process and everyday life within the Caliphate were the most commonly shared (Milton & Dodwell, 2018:16). Concentrating on sharing personal migration stories, this likely contributed to a recruit’s decision to migrate because the journey became perceived as possible (Winter, 2016). In sharing her migration story, ‘Umm Khattab’ prepared female recruits for the reality of making hijra.72 As a woman migrating, the difficulties appeared more pronounced, but ‘Umm Khattab’ depicted herself as evidence that such challenges were surmountable. She simultaneously reassured other women that IS (at that time) had the resources to help those who encountered such difficulties. Alongside the narrative of migration as a religious duty, the recruiter sharing personal migration experiences acted as a further disciplinary mechanism. Arguably, this exerted further peer-pressure on those who had not yet travelled by implying that there were no justifiable excuses that could be cited as having prevented travel.

The final strategy shared generic and female-specific logistical advice with recruits. The aforementioned reciprocal relationship of trust was essential in limiting access to ‘strict and detailed travel support information’ (Perešin, 2015:27) solely to individuals who intended to migrate. This was augmented by transferring interactions between a recruiter and recruit

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72 ‘Umm Khattab al-Britaniyyaa’ claimed to be a British 18-year old who migrated to join the Islamic State. In 2014, she was described as ‘one of the most visible female ISIS [sic] members on Twitter’ (Hall, 2014b: para. 1).
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from publicly accessible forums to encrypted channels such as WhatsApp (Bradford, 2016: paras. 14-15; Hoyle et al, 2015: 33-34). Altering the space in which these interactions occurred added a further layer of security to prevent the interception of information or apprehension of the recruit by security services.

Logistical advice to facilitate a recruit’s travel covered generic topics such as sharing the location of where to attempt a border crossing into IS territory (Hoyle et al, 2015: 33-34) and to advice to delete all social media accounts prior to travel in an attempt to evade detection of intention to migrate (Saltman & Smith, 2015:26). More gender-specific advice detailed items women should pack, covering packing for children (‘Umm Layth’, 22/07/15) and ‘...ladies [sic] personal items...’ (ibid; see also ‘Umm Ubaydah’).73 This advice drew upon personal experiences and included message content that did not appear in interactions between male recruiters and recruits, demonstrating a difference in female and male recruitment performances. Similar to the strategy of religious obligation, sharing logistical advice acted as a disciplinary mechanism. By communicating IS’s gendered expectations of female behaviour and roles, recruiters arguably attempted to encourage recruit behaviour that conformed to IS’s norms.

All three strategies communicated aspects of, and introduced recruits to, IS’s SRR. These performances associated migration facilitation with norm development.

*Developing IS norms through repetition*

The second aim of female Caliphate-resident recruiters was to aid a recruit’s development of IS norms. Intended to ease the recruit’s transition into an IS member, this process extended the boundaries of IS’s SRR to include the recruit. Strategies to communicate IS’s norms included the recruiter answering questions posed by the recruit (Pues, 2016:13) and sharing their personal experiences of life within Caliphate. As Butler argues, gender is ‘tenuously constituted in time’ (1988:519), regulated by a ‘heterosexual matrix’ (Butler, 1999:194) that provides a ‘grid of cultural intelligibility’ (ibid:208). Thus, IS’s gender norms were different from those developed by women whilst inhabiting a Western cultural context. The repetition of key messages delivered through propaganda exposed women to IS norms. However, individual responses to this exposure and the extent to which women came to internalise these norms varied owing to individual agency, and so cannot be measured except case by case.

73 ‘Umm Ubaydah’ was a recognised IS online recruiter who migrated from Europe to Syria in 2014 (Sciarone, 2017:18). She is referred to in several articles researching the role of IS’s female recruiters (Hoyle et al, 2015; Perešin, 2015).
Questions were answered through a combination of publicly and privately accessible platforms, personalising the recruitment process to meet the individual’s needs. Repetition framed both recruiter performances and recruit learning processes. By answering questions, the information shared was shaped by IS’s idealised notions of femininity. In turn, the recruits used the communicated information to embody IS’s accepted norms and behaviours. My analysis of female recruiters’ performances finds that learning processes and recruitment interactions occurred simultaneously, contributing to Western female migrants’ development of IS’s norms.

Blogs written by ‘Umm Layth’ and ‘Shams’ both had an ‘Ask me anything’ function where recruits could submit questions, which the respective blogger would answer (‘Shams’, 2014; 2015; ‘Umm Layth’, 2014). While all of the questions recruits asked were not available to be read, those that were provide an insight into the types of concerns some women held over migrating and everyday life in the Caliphate:

‘...what would you say is the dress code for women in the islamic state? [sic]’
(‘Shams’, 05/04/2015b)

‘...would I be able to teach in Dawlah [sic], I'm 18 and a sister’
(‘Shams’, 03/04/2015)

‘...is it possible for woman in d4wl4h [sic] to drive a car?’
(‘Shams’, 04/04/2015a)

‘...whats [sic] the ruling on doing hijrah without a mahram?’
(‘Shams’, 17/04/2015c)

All four examples reveal that many were concerned about the ability to engage in activities or behaviours permissible in the West. In answering these concerns recruiters were responsible for communicating IS’s idealised notions of femininity, arguably attempting to provide a realistic expectation of women’s lives in the Caliphate.

The ability of women to participate in ‘Qitaal’ [fighting] (Pues, 2016:14) was another common topic. Propaganda targeting female Western audiences initially emphasised the potential for migrant women to experience ‘adventure’ (Tarras-Wahlberg, 2016:14-15). Adventure had been used to imply an acceptance of female participation in violence and multiple Western women expressed an appetite for this. A dissonance between Western

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74 The definition and translation of qitaal was taken from Kilani (1996:41-42).
75 Havlicek refers to examples of this kind of social media content (2015:12).
women’s expectations and the reality of assigned female roles emerged, requiring clarification.

Recruiter’s sharing their personal experiences likewise contributed to norm development. To reassure the recruit that life with IS contains familiar aspects, positive experiences of everyday life within the Caliphate were commonly shared (Perešin, 2015:33). A tweet from one woman described an Oreo cheesecake she made with a friend (cited in Hoyle et al, 2015:22). Yet the accompanying picture shows ‘a grenade positioned next to the cake’ (ibid:23), juxtaposing Western culture with the reality of living with IS. Although seemingly unrelated to IS and its ideology, sharing the making of this cheesecake demonstrates to women that life in the Caliphate is not completely dissimilar to the life they have been used to. The portrayal of relatable activities suggests that developing IS’s norms is an easier process than it may appear because some norms and acceptable behaviours are already recognisable to the recruit. From a CofP perspective, IS’s shared repertoire of resources thus developed as multiculturally informed and thus accessible to all.

Daily activities for women are described as ‘the same duties as a normal housewife’ (‘Umm Layth’, 09/04/14, as cited in Hoyle et al, 2015:22), reinforcing familiar routines between life with IS and life within the West. This image of daily-life subtly reinforced IS’s idealised notion of femininity, simultaneously promoting an awareness of how IS organises internally and its attitudes towards women. This promoted a female recruit’s awareness of IS’s insider knowledge, cultivating the recruit’s sense of belonging within IS.

Learning process of recruit through repetition
Within my other analytical chapters, gendered learning processes are assessed through the role’s performance. As a result of data access limitations, it is not possible to conclusively assess the recruiter’s learning process. However, by applying the GMIL of repetition, inferences relating to norm development can be made concerning how a recruit learnt IS’s idealised notions of femininity and how this impacted their role within the group.

Repetition as a mechanism of learning was used to communicate and reinforce key messages to new recruits, further informing recruits about how women were treated by the group. While the new recruit also learnt about group norms and other significant information through exposure to propaganda and an echo chamber (Winter, 2016), this peer-to-peer contact disseminated insider knowledge. Such knowledge was unlikely to be available without being in contact with an existing group member.
Although not the focus of this analysis, women who remained in the West had opportunities to perform online recruitment roles as well as emotional encouragement. IS’s online recruitment activities exemplified that even within the context of one VE group, performances of a similar role type could differ. Performative variations were influenced by the physical and virtual spaces the recruiters inhabited, the different types of knowledge possessed and the intended purpose of the role. As a result of their online activities, British women Mary Kaya, Fatima Peer-Mohamed, Zafreen Khadam, and Alaa Abdullah Esayed were separately convicted of offences relating to terrorist propaganda dissemination (BBC News, 12/10/2017a). By contributing to others’ radicalisation processes, I interpret their activities as recruitment practices. Regardless of their geographic location, online recruitment roles were performed from exclusively feminine virtual spaces and contributed to the recruit’s norm development.

Despite this, two significant performative differences occurred. Migration facilitation through providing practical and logistical advice was a less prevalent purpose for online recruiters situated in the West. As discussed, sharing personal experiences and knowledge facilitated others’ migration. Women, such as the four mentioned above, who had either not migrated or attempted to and failed, lacked this knowledge and so were unable to fulfil this function.

Online recruitment within the West could be performed alongside offline recruitment roles. The contributions female recruiters remaining in the West make to others’ radicalisation processes cannot be underestimated. This is explored further in the following section, concerned with offline recruitment as performed by women residing in the West.

**Offline performances of recruitment: study and prayer groups**

As noted in this chapter’s introduction, existing research analyses online forms of IS recruitment. Compared to historically active VE groups, IS’s unprecedented use of the internet and social media as recruiting tools enabled greater access to geographically dispersed target audiences. Prior to the introduction of more coherent measures by several social media platforms in 2016 to remove content identified as extremist (Crosset, 2019), this form of data was easier to access and analyse. Obtaining data concerning offline performances of recruitment roles was relatively difficult in comparison. Where mentioned, offline recruitment offered a complementary process to online manifestations, becoming ‘...more significant the

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76 See Footnote 45 in Chapter Five.
closer one gets to an Islamic State-contested territory’ (Berger, 2015:22). The level of trust required to gain an invitation to physically attend a group meeting necessitated a greater concentration of human resources for the researcher.77

Offline performances of recruitment by IS women took two forms. The first resulted from the consequences of interactions between women and their kin and peer networks. Discussed as an embodied form of motherhood, Chapter Six analyses these performances. In brief, mothers residing in the Caliphate informally recruited their children by raising them in accordance with IS’s ideology. Conversely, ideological transmission to kin and peer networks is further analysed as a form of recruitment. The comparative section of this current chapter analyses ideological transmission and historical conscience interactions as performed by a range of actors within the IRA and ETA.

Secondly, female adherents who remained located in the West performed offline recruitment roles by leading and participating in study or prayer groups. Much like recruitment roles performed from virtual spaces inhabited by female recruiters located within the Caliphate or the West, these groups contributed to other women’s radicalisation processes. Yet the space in which a recruit’s adherence to IS norms developed was physical rather than virtual.

The remainder of this section analyses offline recruitment as performed in UK-based IS-affiliate study or prayer groups. Owing to the closed nature of these groups, and the dearth of literature regarding the use of prayer and study groups by female recruiters, the following analysis was heavily informed by a Channel 4 documentary, ISIS: The British Women Supporters Unveiled (Begum, 2015). It followed an undercover woman who gained access to two IS-affiliated study groups and demonstrates the types of activities that occurred within these meetings. Although the information taken from this documentary is specific to the two groups infiltrated and cannot be generalised, it is likely that other similar groups met and used comparable tactics to recruit women.

I interpret the documentary through my framework as offering a visual simulation of the gendered process by which newcomers were included in IS’s SRR. The documentary enables a comparison of online and offline recruitment activities performed by women located in the West. From this, I argue that the type of space the recruiter inhabited, the knowledge

77 Inge’s research (2016) successfully accessed an otherwise closed, non-violent Salafist female study group. While her work does not refer to IS, it is nonetheless helpful for thinking about the dynamics and experiences of a Salafist women’s study group.
they passed on, and the intended purpose of the role influenced performative differences. This argument is supplemented by court records, to compare female performances of offline recruitment with male performances. It finds that women and men held specific, and different, roles in relation to female recruits.

As previously discussed, both online and offline performances occurred exclusively within feminised spaces using similar narrative to communicate IS’s SRR. While the transmission of information from a recruiter appears as a dyadic relationship of learning, a CofP approach remains relevant because norm development was a process which legitimated new recruits’ participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991:34) in IS.

Using a GPT frame suggests that the gendered narratives and behaviours communicated within offline and online spaces intended to teach adherence to IS’s idealised notions of femininity to women from culturally diverse backgrounds. Norms were learnt through the repetition of key messages, including religious rhetoric and female-specific advice (Begum, 2015). Butler states that a body becomes gendered through the consolidation of a ‘stylized repetition of acts’ ([italics original], 1988:519). Similarly, the repetition of these narratives constructed a gender identity specific to IS’s ideology and organisational needs. Regardless of the intentions underpinning this process, the extent to which all recruited women accepted and adhered to these norms is impossible to measure owing to differential influences in individual women’s agency.

Despite communicating similar narratives, the process of communication varied, as informed by the space female recruiters inhabited. While this manifested virtually for online recruiters, study and prayer groups provided spaces for physical encounters. Arguably, online interactions preceded offline forms of recruitment as study and prayer groups usually recruited individuals who had already expressed support for IS and its worldview online. The recruit would only be issued with a private invitation to ‘meet other sisters’ in person (Begum, 2015) at a weekly study or prayer group once a tentative reciprocal bond of trust had developed with an online recruiter. This transitioned the recruitment process offline. Physical interactions with other like-minded women deepened an individual’s existing commitment and encouraged them to become an IS member.

The differences in the spaces female recruiters inhabited further influenced the type of learning relationship used to facilitate recruitment. In both spaces, individuals likely engaged with multiple actors, such as contemporaneously recruited peers within the closed community who influenced and contributed to each other’s recruitment (Windsor, 2018). Yet
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whereas online recruitment was primarily performed by one recruiter who engaged with multiple recruits, offline performances appeared to manifest as a many-to-many relationship. Each of the two study groups investigated in the documentary appeared to be led by one woman, who preached to the other women in the group (Begum, 2015, 26:55-28:25) via monologue and organised the group’s activities. Neither of the two group leaders portrayed in the documentary were Zahera Tariq, yet court proceedings from Tariq’s trial noted that she was ‘a regular speaker at the group featured in the documentary’ (A Local Authority v M, F, C, D, E, F (by their children’s Guardian) [2016] EWHC 1599 (Fam) [18]). It further cited evidence that she had acted as ‘one of the co-ordinators of the women’s supporters who organise[d] pro-ISIL demonstrations and [sought] to recruit others to their cause’ (ibid:19). This suggests that women who engaged in offline recruitment roles shared leadership responsibilities amongst themselves, suggesting a many-to-many learning relationship.

Furthermore, female offline recruitment roles performed at study or prayer group meetings in the UK were comparable with male offline performances, as detailed by BBC News’ public record database of UK individuals who were convicted of terrorism-related offences (12/10/2017a). The activities of Yousaf Bashir, Rajib Khan, and Mohammed Alamgir involved speaking at meetings, holding Islamic classes for members, as well as promoting ‘their view of Islam at a dawah stall after mosque on Fridays’ (Regina v Alamgir and others [2018] EWCA Crim 21 (CA) [2]). ISIS: The British Women Supporters Unveiled similarly showed women running a public information stall (Begum, 2015, 21:11-23:50). The narratives used to introduce recruits to IS’s SRR shared further similarities. Both female and male meetings discussed the obligation of Muslims to make hijra (migrate) and condemned actions taken by Western governments (Regina v Alamgir and others [2018] EWCA Crim 21 (CA) [3]; Begum, 2015).

Yet gender informed three significant differences between female and male offline recruitment performances. The primary difference was the gendering of space. Despite meeting in private, offline study and prayer groups were gender segregated. Only certain types of public spaces, such as information stalls, were constructed as acceptable for female recruiters to inhabit. Other spaces, such as public demonstrations, were perceived as exclusively male (Begum, 2015, 16:33-16:46). This suggests that female presence is only acceptable in certain types of public spaces, limiting opportunities for women to engage in offline recruitment roles outside of prayer or study circles. Secondly, female recruiters were arguably visibly gendered when inhabiting public spaces. Women running the public
information still remained fully veiled in their niqabs, whereas in the private space of the study meeting, these were removed (ibid, 26:26-26:35). While the motivation for this could have been related to personal views of modesty and piety, it also conformed to IS’s idealised notions of femininity and exemplified behaviours appropriate to the spaces occupied. The addition of explicitly gendered content to the messages shared within women’s study and prayer groups forms the final performative difference. Female-specific messages reiterated IS’s gendered division of labour, prohibiting female use of violence and reinforcing appropriate roles for women as wives and mothers. Motherhood was even invoked when discussing the impact of allied methods of warfare by emphasising the suffering of children (ibid, 33:05-33:17). For offline performances of recruitment, it was the spaces in which these meetings occurred and the additional feminised messages communicated that were gendered, rather than the activities performed.

In summary, although occurring within different spheres, locations and utilised varying methods to interact, performances of online and offline recruitment roles by Western female IS members were similar. Both types of performances consisted of a combination of dyadic and reciprocal relationships to develop trust through interactions between a recruiter and recruit, with both methods instrumentally using IS’s idealised notion of femininity to attract female recruits by disseminating gender-specific content and segregated spaces, emphasising a perception of shared, female experiences.

With regards to online performances, female and male use of social media as a medium through which to recruit implies performative similarities. However, the performance of these roles in gender-segregated spaces and the gender-specific content of the messages disseminated illustrate that recruitment roles in IS were gendered and performed differently in terms of femininity and masculinity. Female recruiters in online spheres sought to facilitate a recruit’s migration by providing enough information to the recruit through three tactics. The provision of logistical advice, answering questions posed by recruits, and sharing personal experiences disseminated female-specific messages and included the recruit in IS’s SRR which subsequently aided the recruit’s development of IS norms. Female and male role performances of ostensibly similar and comparable role types are viewed as performed in a gendered way because of IS’s strict boundaries that distinguish between the genders. Unlike other groups examined in this study, IS has to do more work to reinforce gender boundaries because they are more reliant on members fulfilling their assigned roles in an appropriate, gendered way. Thus, the learning process used by recruits to develop group norms is vital as
the achievement of IS’s aims is built upon the synthesis of complementary roles assigned to men and women.

The inclusion of Western women living in the Caliphate as recruiters demonstrates how female roles adapted to meet IS’s organisational needs. This is exemplified using online social media platforms as tools to facilitate communication. These tools enabled women to physically remain in the private sphere, whilst engaging with other women in the online domain. Women performed recruitment roles online through imitation and discipline as GMILs.

Similarly, offline performances through study and prayer group meetings further included a recruit in IS’s SRR and contributed to their norm development process, providing information about appropriate roles and behaviours for women. Offline performances emphasised the repetition of key messages as a GMIL, as the aim of these performances was to consolidate an individual’s existing commitment to IS. These performances demonstrated IS’s need to cultivate dedicated members outside of the Caliphate’s territory, particularly after many states restricted the ability of citizens to migrate to join IS.

**Further examples of recruitment devices in other threat groups**
Comparisons of IS women’s performances of online and offline recruitment roles with AQC’s, the LTTE’s, the IRA’s and ETA’s recruiting practices demonstrates that female performances did not necessarily occur in overtly gendered spaces. Recruitment activities in all five case studies analysed involved the transmission of ideology and the development of group norms by recruits. However, similar to IS, the goading tactics used by AQC’s peripheral associate women were performed from gender-segregated spaces constructed by technological advances. In contrast, the LTTE’s form of propaganda as recruitment and performances of ideological transmission and historical consciousness by women in the IRA and ETA occurred in less rigidly gendered, physical spaces. Performances in these latter three groups answer the research question ‘If men and women perform the same role, how is this gendered and performed differently in terms of masculinity and femininity?’ Despite engaging in similar actions to men, performances of recruitment activities by women in these contexts were perceived as different, owing to their gender.
Goading
Performances of online recruitment by women affiliated with AQC are referred to as forms of goading. Lahoud cites a statement by AQC leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s wife, Umayma al-Zawahiri, who encouraged women ‘to goad their brothers, husbands and sons to defend Muslims’ territories and properties’ (trans. Lahoud, 2010: para. 5). This supported Osama bin Laden’s earlier position that ‘our women...motivate...their sons, brothers and husbands to fight for the cause of Allah.’ (bin Laden, 1996, cited by von Knop, 2007:405-406). From these statements, women’s recruitment roles on behalf of AQC are understood as concerned with inciting men to participate in AQC’s operational activities.

Goading is interpreted as an extension of the wife and mother roles AQC expected of its peripheral associate women. Arguably, the relative agency and influence women held in the domestic sphere in relation to their male kin and peers was extended into an online space. This enabled women to navigate online spaces as they would their domestic spaces, yet increased accessibility to men who were beyond a woman’s direct kin or peer networks.

Comparisons exist between the goading tactics used by AQC’s peripheral associate women and IS’s core and periphery female recruiters located in the Caliphate. A shared sense of propriety limited female performances to online spaces. For both, use of the internet enabled women to physically remain in private spaces during their engagements with potential recruits via public social media platforms.

However, unlike IS, AQC’s female recruiters specifically targeted men rather than other women. To fulfil their state-building aims, IS extended membership status to women. Yet AQC was solely concerned with recruiting men who could fulfil operational roles, excluding women from possessing membership (Bloom, 2013:172). Female recruiters used goading tactics to recruit men through questioning a man’s honour, shaming him for failing to join AQC and ultimately emasculating him (Von Knop, 2007:401; Bloom, 2013; Lahoud, 2014). This aimed to instigate a man’s involvement by offering AQC participation as a method of reasserting his questioned masculinity. Such a tactic emphasises the association of masculinity with the use of violence whilst simultaneously portraying the female recruiters as requiring a man’s protection.

As within IS, female recruiters learnt goading tactics through adherence to key messages repeatedly communicated by AQC. Al-Zawahiri explicitly responded to questions from women concerning their role in AQC (Bloom, 2013:173; The Telegraph, 01/06/2008). He situated women outside AQC’s boundaries and allocated recruitment, incitement and support
roles. Much AQC propaganda cited a belief that women were ‘an obstacle in the men’s way to *Jihād*’ ([italics original], Al-ʻUyayrī, n.d.:30) and had the potential to ‘hinder (men) [sic] from the Path of *Allāh*...’ ([italics original], ibid:32). AQC’s allocation of recruitment to women used feminine influence to promote male participation in jihad, rather than preventing it. Issue 10 of AQC’s *Inspire* magazine stated: ‘O sister, you have to wake up the hearts of the men and arouse the determination of the heroes...You have to push your loved ones to the battlefield’ (2013:32). This conferred onto women the responsibility of encouraging men to join. Women who performed goading roles imitated ideas and values espoused by AQC’s leadership yet remained located in female-appropriate spaces.

The online utilisation of goading tactics by women to recruit men served to fulfil a similar function as for female IS recruits, yet reinforced masculinity rather than femininity through norm development and discipline. Narratives and imagery which reinforced gender binaries surrounding heroic men protecting vulnerable women (Bloom, 2013) served to remind men of their inherent responsibilities to the rest of the Ummah. Through these narratives, female recruiters seemingly embodied a position representative of any man’s own female kin. Goading tactics could fulfil a disciplinary mechanism by a woman assuming a position as a generic female conscience and communicating AQC’s SRR to men. The website of female recruiter Malika el-Aroud (Speckhard, 2015:6) was described as illustrating ‘how women capitaliz[ed] [sic] on the gender norms of Muslim society to successfully goad men into participating in *jihād*’ ([italics original], Bloom, 2013:163). This exemplified conformity to AQC’s idealised notion of femininity, yet innovatively utilised gender norms to fulfil a recruitment role.

Another common goading tactic was to cite examples of female suicide bombers (FSBs) deployed by local branches of AQC (Bloom, 2013), such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Davis, 2013:282-283). The narrative surrounding female perpetrators of violence inverted the accepted idea that men were protectors of women and the imagined nation (Bloom, 2013:181), constructing FSBs as fulfilling men’s roles in their stead. For a group that emphasised dichotomous binary gender roles, this was significant. References to the inappropriate conduct of FSBs, who engaged in a role incompatible with their gender, sought to evoke feelings of emasculation by implying that men were not fulfilling their required roles. The solution to reclaiming masculinity was presented as joining AQC. Male participation in violence would remove the need for women to assume these roles and thus redress previous failures.
Conversely, female goading practices simultaneously subverted values AQC associated with femininity. The use of feminine characteristics by women to incite men to violence, exemplified by narratives which emphasised the relative weakness of women compared to men, is interpreted through the framework as a subversive performance. The gender mechanism of parody as subversion defines a disruption between the anatomy of the performer and the gender being performed (Butler, 1999:175). Female recruiters’ incitement to violence appeared subversive because it was contrary to AQC’s disassociation between women and violence. Yet an examination of these behaviours from AQC’s idealised notion of femininity, demonstrates that female incitement to violence was justified and formed an integral part of female engagement with AQC. As long as women themselves did not engage in violence, their incitement of it served an operational recruitment purpose and conformed to AQC’s gendered expectations (Lahoud, 2010; Bloom, 2013).\footnote{Lahoud refers to Dr Fadl, who stated that female use of violence is prohibited, unless it is legitimised by a fatwa or for defensive purposes (2010: para. 10).} Owing to the otherwise strict attitude AQC leadership had towards women, such female influence might be considered unexpected.

To summarise, similar concepts of female appropriate roles and behaviours informed performances of recruitment in AQC and IS. Yet female performances of goading tactics targeted male recruits and the norms AQC’s idealised notions of femininity were used to develop were masculine, rather than feminine as found in IS. Narratives emphasising binary gender boundaries and roles sought to motivate men to join AQC by evoking feelings of shame and humiliation. Goading tactics as a form of recruitment further illustrated the adaptation of women’s roles to AQC’s organisational needs. Assigning female peripheral associates’ recruitment roles arguably placated calls by some women for the inclusion of women as AQC members. Utilising an existing, often vocal, support base for recruitment purposes implied to women that they formed a vital part of AQC’s operational mechanism whilst simultaneously securing more male recruits.

**Propaganda as recruitment**

Propaganda distribution formed the focus of LTTE recruiting practices.\footnote{Much of the literature states that LTTE women enacted recruitment roles (Jordan & Denov, 2007; Wang, 2011; Stack-O’Connor, 2007), but offers no discussion of how these duties were performed.} As existing research discusses the recruitment function the LTTE’s propaganda facilitated as part of a propagandist role (Cragin & Daly, 2009:46), my inclusion of it within the analysis may seem redundant.
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However, I argue that interpreting it as a form of recruitment is justified and provides a further example of the difficulty of definitively categorising roles. Huey, Inch & Peladeau distinguished between recruitment and propaganda roles within IS (2017:15), yet contextual factors explain why these roles were integrated within the LTTE.

Tamil concepts such as karpu (Schalk, 1994), ‘addaccam (modesty and silence) and odduccam (poise and restraint)’ ([italics original], Sangarasivam, 2003:65) influenced the LTTE’s early idealised notions of femininity and gendering of roles. Prior to the 1983 formation of the ‘Women’s Front of the Liberation Tigers’ ['Vituthalai Pulikal Munani'] (Richards, 2014:26; Gonzalez-Perez, 2008; Eager, 2009-10) female combat unit, non-violent roles were equated with femininity. Support services, including the creation and distribution of propaganda (Cragin & Daly, 2009:46) were designated to the women’s political wing ['Suthanthirapparavaigal'] (Richards, 2014:26). Despite gender norms shaping appropriate roles for women during the early years of the LTTE’s existence, such notions did not appear to influence female embodied performances of propaganda as recruitment. Where male recruiters were deployed, there were few apparent differences between female and male performances. This can be viewed through Lorber’s arguments that within wider society, despite women and men performing the same actions, ‘the social institution of gender insists only that what they do is perceived as different’ ([emphasis original], 1994:26). Whereas in IS women and men performed recruitment duties in gender-inflected ways, there is no evidence that a similar process occurred within the LTTE. Femininity was not instrumentally used to attract new recruits, supporting the argument that within some VE contexts, recruitment occurred in less gendered spaces.

As the conflict developed and other factors such as pressure exerted by women to engage in operational roles widened opportunity spaces for female participation, the LTTE’s idealised notions of femininity adjusted to ideologically and culturally legitimate female participation in violence.80 Following this, the LTTE sought to convey the message that women could engage in all the activities men did, and the labelling of certain roles as feminine or masculine was largely abandoned. The LTTE’s idealised notion of femininity thus became focused on equality with men, rather than emphasising gender differences. Although gender boundaries continued to be distinct, for example the gender segregation of combat units (Davis, 2008:1), it did not emphasise that women and men had fundamentally different roles, so clearly seen within IS.

80 Discussed at greater length in Chapter Eight.
Unlike IS’s structured and formalised recruitment sector, the LTTE initially did not recruit as intensely or as explicitly, preferring new recruits to volunteer (Jordan & Denov, 2007:52). Propaganda was key in facilitating this. Leaflets and advertisements (Stack-O’Connor, 2007) targeted Tamil communities, to inform people of the perceived and real injustices perpetrated against them by the Sri Lankan government (Jordan & Denov, 2007:52; Cragin & Daly, 2009:46), to publicise grievances and reinforce animosity (Alison, 2009a:46). This form of recruitment did not necessarily involve personal interactions between recruiters and recruits but could develop through an individual’s self-engagement with propaganda materials. Prolonged exposure to such materials reinforced the values and ideas held by the LTTE, normalising these to such an extent that individuals would often ‘just disappear’ from home to go and join the LTTE (Jordan & Denov, 2007:52; Arnestad, 2004). The LTTE further capitalised on publicising violence perpetrated by Sri Lankan forces against Tamil communities. Arguably this formed their most effective recruitment tactic as the number of volunteers who joined often spiked after a state attack (Jordan & Denov, 2007:52; Trawick, 1997).

LTTE preference for voluntary recruitment was undermined by claims of abduction and forced recruitment (Human Rights Watch, 2004:2). Changes in recruitment methods were a response to external pressures placed on the LTTE as the conflict progressed. Performances of forced recruitment roles were not facilitated by propaganda distribution, thus are beyond the focus of this section.

The LTTE primarily distributed propaganda to communal and educational spaces. Former combatant ‘Velu’ worked on community recruitment drives after she was injured (Wall & Choksi, 2018: paras. 73-74). The activities she engaged with to perform her recruitment role were generalised. In addition to producing radio broadcasts, ‘Velu’ travelled ‘with theatre and dance troupes...’ (ibid: para.73). Moreover, her delivery of motivational speeches which ‘extoll[ed] the sacrifice of the Tigers’ (ibid: para.73) did not communicate overtly gendered messages. Whereas for IS, the gender of the target audience tailored the content of the message, the tactics used and determined the gender of the recruiter and the space the role was performed from, this was irrelevant for the LTTE. That ‘women and men [we]re subject to the same recruiting practices...’ (Davis, 2008:11) implied that recruiters performing these practices did not instrumentally use gender.

Propaganda distribution to facilitate recruitment was similarly prevalent in schools (Alison, 2009a). The presence of an externally administrated Student Organization of
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Liberation Tigers (SOLT) at former combatant Niromi de Soyza’s school impacted her decision to volunteer (de Soyza, 2011). The SOLT’s regional unit leader would visit the school to educate the pupils about the conflict with the Sinhalese and share Tamil grievances to encourage them to join (ibid:62-64). Videos depicting karate classes (Grinker, 2004:22) were complemented by screenings of successful LTTE missions and atrocities perpetrated against Tamils (Child Soldiers International, 2001: para. 14). Such propaganda appealed to desires of adventure and excitement held by many young people, inciting them to ‘become “heroes”’ ([emphasis original], ibid: para. 14) by joining the LTTE.

The distribution of propaganda in schools is comparable to female engagement in IS’s study or prayer groups in the UK. Both fulfilled the ‘emotional’ and ‘informational’ aspects (Huey, Inch & Peladeau, 2017:15) of the definition of recruitment used throughout this chapter. However, this was also a point of difference. By sharing IS’s SRR, interactions within the study and prayer groups aided a recruit’s development of IS norms and communicated appropriate gender roles and behaviours. In contrast, the LTTE’s propaganda as recruitment strategy was less individual-centric, focusing instead on using education and grievances to motivate Tamil individuals to volunteer. Whereas pre-existing identities and social norms needed to be reshaped to prioritise values held by IS, a shared cultural identity that bound the Tamil population together existed.

For the LTTE, a combination of ideology, external pressures and organisational needs regarded recruitment roles as feminine. Despite this view, as far as I could find, female recruiters did not engage in explicitly feminised actions. In contrast to IS, their focus was on disseminating information about Sri Lankan injustices against Tamil people, motivating individuals to volunteer to join.

**Ideological transmission & historical conscience**

The transmission of ideology and historical conscience served recruitment purposes for the IRA and ETA and are the final performances of recruitment analysed.\(^8^1\) The IRA and ETA formed in response to perceived threats to Northern Irish Republican and Basque minority cultures respectively. Their ideologies emerged from these cultures but were further developed in dialogue with and to defend their threatened cultures. As transmission activities were not officially assigned by either group, they remained separate from the IRA’s and ETA’s

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\(^8^1\) For greater detail concerning the role of women as historical consciences, see Cragin & Daly, 2009:49-52.
operations. Utilising pre-existing kin and peer networks, these performances constituted socio-cultural methods of passing cultural practices and grievances from one generation to another (see, for example Cragin & Daly, 2009:49-51). However, the IRA’s and ETA’s assimilation of these wider social norms into their respective shared repertoires of resources suggests that instances of transmission which occurred after either group’s formation, whether performed by a group member or not, had the potential to fulfil a recruitment function. While the community and group remained separate, some viewed group membership as formalising their participation in sustaining that culture.

Given the importance of cultural transmission for continuing an identity group, it is not unreasonable to interpret cultural transmissions and transmissions of culture, ideology and historical conscience specifically as fulfilling recruitment functions. As discussed in the analysis of recruitment roles in IS, AQC and the LTTE, such transmissions contributed to the development of social norms within Northern Irish and Basques contexts, regardless of an intention to recruit the receiver to the IRA or ETA. Where there may have been no recruitment intention, cultural knowledge may have combined with the personal experiences of the individual receiving the information, to motivate them to join the group. Equally, where a recruitment intention was present, individual agency may have been exerted to prevent joining the group. Individuals recruited by the other forms of recruitment in IS, AQC and the LTTE also possessed agency, but the transmission of ideology and historical conscience is more complicated to analyse owing to a difficulty in identifying whether a recruitment conscience was present or absent as these roles occurred informally within domestic spaces.

Such performances contrast with the other three recruitment performances analysed in this chapter, and with Chapter Six’s interpretation of ideological transmission as a childrearing activity performed by mothers in IS and AQC. Comparisons are drawn regarding the spaces in which the roles were performed, and the gender and membership statuses of the actors performing the roles.

The transmission of ideology and historical conscience primarily took place from within private, domestic spaces. While public symbols and narratives would have contributed to the formation of an individual’s understanding of their culture, close kin and peer networks fulfilled transmission roles. As with IS, AQC and the LTTE, the IRA and ETA gendered the private sphere as a feminine space. For ETA especially, the home and Church were symbolic spaces that were distinctly feminine (Hamilton, 2007:53, 58-60). Cultural activities performed in these spaces, such as learning the Basque language or singing (Hamilton, 2007:57) facilitated female
engagement with ETA. This contrasted with the almost exclusively male cuadrillas (friendship group) (ibid:46-48) through which men joined ETA, recruiting women and men from different, gendered spaces. In Northern Ireland, women held particularly powerful positions within the family as ‘transmitters of culture’ (Morgan, 1996: para. 23). Yet despite feminised domestic spaces, many men in Basque or Northern Irish Republican homes, particularly fathers, transmitted ideologies and historical consciences to younger generations (Hamilton, 2007:31-33; Radden Keefe, 2018:10-11).

Female and male transmission performances in both contexts can be compared with online recruitment roles enacted by female and male IS members. In all cases, recruitment responsibilities by both genders utilised similar, ungendered tactics. For IS, this related to forming friendships, answering questions and providing logistical advice (Weimann, 2016). For transmission performances, this involved storytelling and memory-sharing (Cragin & Daly, 2009:50; Hamilton, 2007), communicating norms through repetition. Despite identifying repetition as a performative mechanism, from my analysis, transmission activities did not appear to be gendered in performance. Although the content of the messages shared by female and male IS recruiters were gendered (Van Leuven et al, 2016:107-110), the transmission of culture in Northern Ireland and Basque communities involved more generic knowledge. This would have included, but not been limited to, gender norms. Messages were likely to have been gendered only to the extent that experiences shared by female and male actors differed, as influenced by restrictions placed on the types of roles with which women could engage.

A further contrast relates to the membership status of the actors who performed recruitment activities. Within IS, the LTTE and AQC, recruitment was a clearly definable role that was assigned to group members or peripheral associates. Although not officially assigned to IRA or ETA members as roles, transmissions of ideology and historical conscience that occurred within the wider societies surrounding both groups served to function as informal recruitment roles. Transmission activities were likely self-instigated by individuals within the Northern Irish Republican and Basque communities, who may or may not have held IRA or ETA membership.

Bosi argues that for many who joined the Republican movement before 1969, ‘a trajectory of mobilization began out of a longstanding counterhegemonic consciousness in their homes. Family ties were key vehicles for armed activism recruitment’ (2012:349; see also Gill & Horgan, 2013:441). Entry into the IRA was most easily facilitated through contact with
existing members (White, 2007:288), although mass mobilisation following state violence, such as the aftermath of Bloody Sunday in 1972, attracted many recruits (ibid:296). This implies that a more formalised recruitment method which targeted the wider community in general, as demonstrated by the LTTE’s propaganda as recruitment strategy, was deemed unnecessary. In Dolours Price’s family, involvement with Republican paramilitary activities by both female and male relatives dated back several generations (Radden Keefe, 2018:9-13; Cunningham & Moloney, 2018). A commitment to Republicanism was passed on to her, informed by the bedtime stories based upon her father’s experiences as an IRA member (ibid:10). Hamilton’s research suggests a similar path into ETA. Multiple interviewees described the influence of parents and other family members as contributing to their support for Basque separatism (2007:27-34). Interviewee #4 stated ‘my mother has never directed me at all…But of course, I absorbed her experiences’ (ibid:28) which consequently informed #4’s own politics and decision to join ETA. Through these devices, female and male IRA and ETA members and peripheral associates communicated cultural norms and grievances that had been adopted as part of each group’s SRR. Whereas IS’s and AQC’s global reaches could only be facilitated through social media platforms, the localised nature of IRA and ETA concerns rendered family ties satisfactory in fulfilling recruitment needs.

However, similar cultural transmission processes occurred in families that did not contain associates or members of either group. For many adults, a desire to protect children from violence and ‘a commitment to preserve and transmit their own culture which may lead them consciously or unconsciously to pass on stereotyped and potentially divisive attitudes’ co-existed (Morgan, 1995: para. 23). While Morgan specifically referred to Northern Ireland, such a co-existence is arguably identifiable in the Basque context. Where historical grievances become part of the cultural collective memory, it can be difficult to separate practices and symbols from attitudes which continue to fuel a conflict. A recruitment intention was likely absent from cultural transmissions by families within the wider Northern Irish Republican and Basque communities that did not contain members of the IRA or ETA. Many such transmissions likely focused on passing cultural traditions to younger generations. Yet despite individual intentions, some younger family members may still have joined either the IRA or ETA. Both groups portrayed themselves as representing a minority culture’s interests and offered independence as a tangible solution to redressing historical grievances. Thus, performances of cultural transmission as occurred within the wider Northern Irish Republican and Basque communities, had the potential to be perceived as transmitting the IRA’s and ETA’s ideologies.
When combined with individual experiences and traumas, such transmissions may have encouraged individuals to join either group.

I interpret the IRA and ETA’s female and male performances of ideological transmission and historical conscience as informal recruitment practices. Through passing formalised culture on to younger generations, women engaged with those whom they already shared a cultural identity group. Specifically, female performances may have conformed to expectations of femininity held by their respective group, however this did not include the instrumental use of idealised notions of femininity as a means of attracting new recruits. Performances of recruitment roles were not explicitly gendered, as other role types were.

**Chapter Conclusion**
To conclude, the analysis of female performances of recruitment roles within IS, AQC, the LTTE, the IRA and ETA reveal variations in embodied performances. All five involved ideological transmission and contributed to recruit norm development yet were performed from various spaces. Space was shaped by group idealised notions of femininity, which determined what was acceptable for women, and so informed role opportunities.

Analysis of these role types answers why roles that are categorised as similar in type were performed differently by women across VE groups, according to group needs and the intended function of the role. For IS, female recruiters sought to facilitate migration and norm development by female recruits. Conversely, women associated with AQC targeted men, utilising gender norms to shame men into participating in jihad. For the LTTE, the IRA and ETA, recruitment activities were not performed in overtly gendered ways. The function of recruitment in the LTTE was to raise awareness of perceived and real injustices against the Tamil community, intended to motivate individuals to volunteer. This targeted women and men alike. For the IRA and ETA, the sharing of culture could be perceived as informal methods of recruitment, performed from outside group membership boundaries. These instances may have intended to motivate younger kin and peer relations to join the group.

Performative differences further occurred owing to the extent of the recruit’s learning process. This was not as necessary where shared similarities between the culture a recruit was raised in and the values held by the group existed. IRA and ETA ideologies and values were consistent with identities that pre-existed group membership. However, individuals who joined IS adopted a new identity that adhered to group ideology. This cultural identity could not be separated from IS membership. Performances were more structured because most
individuals were required to learn a new identity informed by the overarching IS culture. In contrast, owing to the links between wider social norms as assimilated into group culture, the LTTE, the IRA and ETA possessed a cohesion between members that IS lacked, and thus had to construct through enforcing key messages through repetition, imitation and discipline.

Context and time period further explained why roles that were categorised as similar in type were performed differently. Technological advances enabled the creation of female-specific spaces in the online sphere. Thus, women in IS and AQC occupied a specifically constructed space that enabled their contributions to group aims whilst adhering to wider social norms. In contrast, for the LTTE, the IRA and ETA, recruitment was not gendered in terms of performance or target audience. Differences in performance occurred between female and male recruiters, prompted by membership status and the location of female recruiters as inside or outside of group boundaries.

The analysis of recruitment roles further illustrates how female and male performances of similar role types are gendered. The overall thesis argument of space is key in answering this. Online and offline performances in IS and goading as performed in relation to AQC were performed from within exclusively female spaces. Yet a difference occurred in the audiences female recruiters targeted. While IS’s online and offline female recruiters targeted women, women associated with AQC targeted men. All three performances instrumentally utilised idealised notions of femininity and so differed from male performances of recruitment. Male recruiters inhabited a different space, and the content shared was similarly gender specific. The tools used were gendered according to the gender of the target audience, the messages communicated and the tools the recruiters used to reach that audience, as well as the function and purpose of the role.

In contrast, there is insufficient data for the LTTE, the IRA and ETA to distinguish between female and male performances in as much detail. Women and men in these groups appeared to perform recruitment activities in similar ways, suggesting that performances were framed in accordance with interpretations of social norms and appropriate gendered behaviours.

Finally, the analysis of recruitment roles reveals the ways in which the roles of women adapt to meet organisational group needs. IS’s needs related to population expansion. It was necessary to attract a greater number of women to fulfil these roles, yet gender segregation policies were compromised by male recruiters contacting female recruits. Hence, female recruiters were required, and social media platforms presented a way in which women could
perform recruitment roles in socially acceptable ways as well as accessing Western women as a new target audience. The creation of a space inhabited exclusively by women met this need and facilitated acceptable role performances. AQC’s use of goading is interpreted as a way of mobilising women who wanted to participate in AQC activities, which continued to situate women as outside group boundaries. Latterly in the LTTE’s conflict, recruitment enabled the retention of ideologically committed members who could no longer participate in combat (Wall & Choksi, 2018). For the IRA and ETA, the relationship between female performances of recruitment roles adapting to meet organisational needs is less clear. Similar to motherhood roles, women were performing a role that they would have likely performed in wider society.

Having discussed how female participation in non-violent roles sourced new group members, the subsequent chapters now address changes to women’s roles which legitimated their participation in violence, and how these performances interacted with conceptualisations of gender.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th>IS</th>
<th>IS</th>
<th>AQC &amp; IS</th>
<th>AQC</th>
<th>LTTE</th>
<th>IRA &amp; ETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Online via social media</strong></td>
<td><strong>Offline via kin &amp; peer networks</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideological Transmission</strong></td>
<td><strong>Goading</strong></td>
<td><strong>Propaganda</strong></td>
<td><strong>Historical Conscience</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
<td>To facilitate the migration of ideologically committed women; norm development.</td>
<td>To spread ideology; encourage others to migrate.</td>
<td>To pass ideology and grievances on to children, with intention to recruit them.</td>
<td>To recruit men to fulfil operational roles.</td>
<td>To inspire individuals to join voluntarily; to publicise grievances.</td>
<td>To pass history, culture and/or grievances on to kin &amp; peer networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership status</strong></td>
<td>Migrant core and periphery members.</td>
<td>Core and periphery members, who have not migrated to IS-controlled territory.</td>
<td>Peripheral associates for AQC; core and periphery members for IS.</td>
<td>Peripheral associates.</td>
<td>Likely core and peripheral members.</td>
<td>Diverse range of individuals, although primarily a parental or kin responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gendered Mechanism of Interactional Learning</strong></td>
<td>Repetition of key ideological messages, which communicate group norms.</td>
<td>Repetition, to disseminate key messages, such as appropriate behaviours for women; advice about how to best support their husbands.</td>
<td>Require performative guidance, so that fulfil the role according to expectations.</td>
<td>Repetition of key, gendered messages.</td>
<td>Repetition of key ideological messages and narratives regarding grievances.</td>
<td>Group ideology and values consistent with a pre-existing identity, therefore the element of learning less pronounced within the group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance</strong></td>
<td>Physically restricted to the home, facilitated by technology. ‘Recruitment-by-friendship’: sharing personal experiences; answering questions posed by recruits; providing logistical advice.</td>
<td>Physically, interact with women in their close kin and peer network, but also form invitation-only, exclusively female prayer and study groups.</td>
<td>Religion used to communicate ideology.</td>
<td>Online engagement. Used feminine to motivate men to join: questioned a man’s honour; shamed him for failing to join AQC; emasculate him; inverted idealised narrative that men are the protectors of women, citing instances of FSBS from local AQ branches such as AQAP or AQI.</td>
<td>Although initially assigned as a feminine role, did not involve instrumental use of femininity.</td>
<td>Initiated out of a desire to pass cultural norms and practices on to children. Participation consistent with everyday activities: sharing memories; personal experiences of oppression; telling stories.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6: A table summarising the key findings regarding performances of recruitment roles in IS, AQC, the LTTE, ETA and the IRA.*
Chapter Eight: Combat and Female Occupation of a Hybrid Space

This chapter argues that female combatants perform their roles through synthesising aspects of femininity and masculinity and that this contributes to the formation of a hybrid space. According to Harel-Shalev & Daphna-Tekoah ‘claims of gender equality or gender neutrality usually hinge on the unacknowledged basis of masculinity’ (2016:313). My findings agree with this statement and suggest that assessing female combatant performances through a hybrid space lens recognises the variety of contributions women make to combat roles. Parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics inform both the creation of a hybridised space and gendered learning of conventional combatant roles as performed by women in groups whose internal organisational structures were comparable to state-level military institutions, such as the LTTE or FARC. In contrast, as I will show, in conflicts where the boundaries between civilians and group members were blurred, such as in the IRA, female performances of combat-related activities were learnt and gendered through parody as the subversion of feminine stereotypes.

My argument that female combatants adopt a synthesised identity and occupy a hybrid space further develops discussions which construct violent women as the ‘Other’ (Gilbert, 2002; Morgan, 2001). As the ‘Other’, violent women deviate from gender norms dichotomizing violent men against non-violent women. A hybrid space similarly situates female combatants as different from male combatants and non-violent civilian women, however an inherent value judgement of women who engage in violence as deviant is absent. I disagree with the categorisation of violent women as deviant and instead argue that gendered performative differences occur in roles such as combat because women are participating from within a different space to men. My discussion of the hybrid space aims to demonstrate how women’s roles adapted to meet a group’s organisational needs and how in turn, groups adapted, either ideologically or structurally, to justify the inclusion of women in previously restricted roles. The most explicit group alteration is exemplified by the LTTE’s creation of the armed-virgin identity which itself served the group’s need to retain its traditional support base in addition to legitimising female participation in combat.

Much of the existing literature concerning female combatants, in both state-militaries and violent extremist groups, revolves around the idea that women are inhabiting

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82 For example, Egnell & Alam (2019); Woodward & Duncanson (2017).
spaces that are predominately defined as masculine. As Digby asserts, ‘war is gendered...To engage in combat has been deemed masculine and thus not feminine’ (2014:152). This stems from the dominance of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (Connell, 2005), describing ‘practices that promote the dominant social position and aggressiveness of men and the subordinate social position and passivity of women’ (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2018:19). Masculinity as the dominant gender norm within VE groups provides the foundation for group expectations towards both genders. The binary social construction that conflates masculinity with violence and martial values has contributed to the assumption that male combatants are the norm, while female combatants are shaped by their absence of maleness.

Female combatants thus form the exception, yet their perpetration of violence is assessed through a masculine lens. Owing to their dissonance with the accepted male gender identity, ‘women’s incorporation into the military body is achieved via a cancellation of the feminine’ (Harel-Shalev & Daphna-Tekoah, 2016:314). It is perceived that female combatants must conform to, and adopt, masculine characteristics. Despite often conforming to a militarised form of masculinity during role performances, I argue that female combatants continued to be viewed by the group in a feminised way. This locates female combatants in a hybridised space, constructing them as different both to male combatants and to civilian women located outside of the group.

I utilise Alison’s broad definition of combat, where a combatant refers to any individual who is trained in the use of ‘non-conventional guerrilla forms of warfare and “terrorist” tactics’ (Alison, 2009a:3), including, but not limited to, bomb-making and planting, assassinations, and participation in battle (ibid:3). Such a broad definition that encompasses a wide range of activities helps to facilitate a comparative analysis that will capture and exemplify performative differences.

Application of the framework is further informed by the concept of militarization. Central to Enloe’s ‘militarized masculinities’ argument (1993), it refers to a socio-political process whereby ‘any part of a society becomes controlled by or dependent on the military or military values’ (Enloe, 1993:100). Hence, it is applicable to VE groups that have adopted military-style tactics as their primary method of action, such as the LTTE (Richards, 2014) and FARC (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017). Militarization is based upon specific ideals about masculinity (Enloe, 1993) which becomes understood as the dominant norm, through a process of legitimation (Méndez, 2012:29), linking back to Harel-Shalev & Daphna-Tekoah’s referral to masculinity as ‘unacknowledged’ (2016:313).
I further employ Méndez’s research into gender and FARC (2012). Combining Enloe’s work (1993) with Butler’s gender performativity theory, Méndez produced an analytical framework of ‘Militarized Gender Performativity’. Her framework is only applied to this chapter because of the four roles I analyse, combat alone involves overtly masculinised role performances. Moreover, Méndez’s discussion of militarised femininities supports my argument that female combatants occupy a hybrid space. While she does not use the term herself, her referral to the concept of militarised femininities implies the existence of a hybrid space because within the context of militarisation, a form of femininity is produced that has been affected by military values. As femininity and military values are often considered incompatible, I interpret Méndez’s conceptualisation as indicative of a hybridised space.

The LTTE, FARC and the IRA are prioritised as case studies. Female performances of combat in the LTTE form the chapter’s main case study. The creation of the armed-virgin identity is compared with forms of guerrillera\(^\text{83}\) combat in FARC, and baiting and distracting tactics deployed by the IRA’s female operational participants in turn. The inclusion of ETA and IS in the introduction to the comparative section, Manifestations of hybrid space for female combatants in other threat groups, serves to demonstrate other variations in female performances of combat whilst not contributing to the chapter’s overall analysis.

Comparing female and male performances of combat in the LTTE and FARC answers ‘If men and women perform the same role, how is this gendered and performed differently in terms of masculinity and femininity?’ The mechanistic actions of a combat role, such as shooting, are similar regardless of gender. However, the implicit internal bias of many groups that promote idealised notions of masculinity as indicative of gender neutrality, and the enforcement of policies that make visible female combatants’ embodiment of femininity, create the perception of gendered performances and situate female combatants in a hybridised space.

Both ‘In what ways do the roles of women adapt to meet the organisational needs of the group?’ and ‘Why are roles that are categorised as similar in type performed differently by women across VE groups?’ are answered through the analysis of the three main case studies. The answer to the former considers how groups adapted ideologically or structurally to justify the inclusion of women in previously restricted roles, while the latter concentrates on the influence contextual factors had on shaping female participation.

\(^{83}\) As defined by Breslin & Newstead, ‘guerrillera’ is a recognised Spanish term denoting a female guerrilla fighter (2016:464).
The LTTE and the dichotomy of the Armed-Virgin

In response to organisational needs, the LTTE constructed an *armed-virgin* identity (see, for example Coomaraswamy, 1996; Wang, 2011:105). As a ‘hybrid creation’ (Schalk, 1994:178) which introduced ‘a new social role to an old culture’ (ibid:178), I argue that this identity constructed a hybrid space that enabled female participation in combat through socially acceptable means.

Initially derived from wider Tamil socio-cultural norms, the LTTE’s shared repertoire of resources (SRR) required reinterpretation. The fusion of feminine ideals with the use of violence produced a role that remained masculine in definition but adhered to Tamil conceptualisations of femininity when performed by women. Analysing female performances through the GMILs of parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics and discipline demonstrates this. As *Chapter Three* explains, parody emphasises the distinction between anatomy and the performed gender (Butler, 1999:175). The LTTE’s female combatants were anatomically female, yet performed activities socially defined as male. The equation of violence with masculinities produced a perception that masculine traits were necessary to fulfilling violent roles. Discipline is the second GMIL applied. Discipline acts as a form of social pressure exerted on individuals to ensure performances of gender that conform to accepted norms. Those which transgress these norms are punished (ibid:178).

Discussion of the LTTE’s use of gender stereotypes is polarised. One side asserts that an adherence to traditional Tamil gender norms presented idealised notions of masculinity as synonymous with aggression (Gronfors, 2002:21; Alexander, 2014) rendered the LTTE ‘male in constitution and gendered in ideology’ (Ismail, 1992:1677). Related to this was the LTTE’s belief that secession could only be achieved through revolutionary violence (ibid:1677). This created ‘a nationalist subject/agent that [was] singularly male’ (ibid:1677) who embodied their masculinity by participating in secessionist violence. At the time of the LTTE’s formation in 1972 (Hopgood, 2006:47), women were excluded from combat, limited to logistical or communication roles (Alison, 2009a:124) because these were perceived to be more compatible with feminine Tamil gender norms. Yet once women were assigned combat roles, Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger argue that the association between masculinity and martial values produced training practices which ‘aimed at stripping recruits of their feminine traits to imbue them with male attributes’ (2018:22), thus supporting the argument that female combatants imitated masculine characteristics.

However, others maintain that the LTTE rejected this essentialist gender positioning and did not regard armed struggle as an exclusively male activity (Schalk, 1994:170), citing the
change in institutional policy to permit women in combat as evidence of this (Balasingham, 1993: para. 14). The inclusion of female combatants exemplified the adaptation of women’s roles to meet the LTTE’s organisational needs, in response to three challenges faced (Alison, 2009a:125).

Following a particularly devastating period of ‘anti-Tamil riots’ in 1983 (Samaranayake, 2007:173; Stack-O’Connor, 2007:47), the first challenge required the replacement of a significant number of male combatants who had been killed, imprisoned or migrated to avoid capture by Sri Lankan forces (Alison, 2011). To sustain group existence, the LTTE was forced to revise its policies. The inclusion of women in operational roles, such as combat, provided access to a numerically significant demographic of the population that had previously been excluded from these activities.

The second stemmed from the LTTE’s ‘ideological need’ (Alison, 2009a:125) to demonstrate that it was representative of the Tamil population (Davis, 2008:14), seeking to be the sole Tamil separatist group (Herath, 2012:42). The incorporation of gender equality policies and the development of a commitment to women’s liberation as an integral aspect of Tamil independence helped to strengthen the group’s claim to represent women.

The final factor was informed by internal pressures. For several years, young Tamil women had exerted pressure to be involved in ‘active combat roles’ (Swamy, 1994:96-97; Alison, 2009a:124). By responding to, and widening opportunity spaces for women, the LTTE was able to resolve both practical and ideological strategic needs whilst appearing to be socially progressive and supportive of women’s liberation.

By 1985, the number of women receiving military combat training had increased (Jordan & Denov, 2007:46), culminating in their first battle deployment in July 1986 (Alison, 2009a:127). The inclusion of women in combat activities that involved similar behaviours to male combatants, such as ambushing Sri Lankan forces (Balasingham, 1993: Chapter 4, para. 10) and targeted assassinations (ibid: Chapter 3, paras. 27-29), is often considered to represent gender equality within the LTTE (Prabhakaran, 1996; Alison, 2011:141). This equality was perceived by female former combatant ‘Geetha’. She stated: ‘we were treated as equals and we did not have any difference between us...’ (ibid:138), which included receiving the same training (Davis, 2008:11).

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84 For example, see Prabhakaran’s ‘International Women’s Day Message’ (1993; 1996).
For the purposes of this research I present an alternative view, combining aspects of both contrasting perspectives. I argue that while the LTTE depicted itself as gender-neutral, as an organisation it perpetuated the narrative of unacknowledged masculinity (Harel-Shalev & Daphna-Tekoah, 2016:313) referred to in this chapter’s introduction. This situated femininity as the sole gendered subject (Wittig, 1983). Much of the existing literature (Jordan & Denov, 2007; Alison, 2011; Stack-O’Connor, 2007) asserts that female combatants externally imitated masculine characteristics. This conformed to the LTTE’s ‘image of a masculine warrior in a feminine guise’ (Herath, 2012:57), where the inclusion of individual female combatants was dependent upon ‘not disrupt[ing] the masculine image of warfare’ (Jordan & Denov, 2007:58).

In contrast, taking Méndez’s notion of militarised femininities (2012) in conjunction with my framework, I found that female combatants engaged in a complex process of identity formation which synthesised idealised Tamil notions of masculinity and femininity. Rather than manifesting in individual performances, gender differences arguably occurred through the learning processes female combatants underwent. This contributed to the construction of the ideal Tamil Tigress as an ‘armed-virgin’ (see, for example Schalk, 1994) who occupied a distinct hybrid space. The armed-virgin identity provided continuity with traditional Tamil expectations of femininity, whilst facilitating and legitimating female participation in a role and space formerly restricted to men: combat.

**Karpu as Shared Repertoire of Resources**

I interpret the Tamil concept of ‘karpu’ (Schalk, 1994:178) as contributing to the LTTE’s SRR. I refer to Schalk’s exposition of karpu as ‘learning a behaviour of restraint’ (ibid:178). Often conceptualised as chastity or a form of sexual self-control (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 2007:13), karpu communicated gendered ideals to LTTE members. According to Schalk, karpu was instrumental in rationalising the inclusion of women in combat roles (1994:177). The analysis of female combat performances through the mechanisms of parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics and discipline are informed by karpu.

In response to organisational needs, the LTTE reinterpreted karpu through the social process of militarization. This infused karpu with martial values. Traditionally, these values had been gendered as masculine, and so were inappropriate values for women to embody. However, the creation of the armed-virgin identity as informed by militarization simultaneously entrenched gender norms whilst enabling women to transgress them (Tambiah, 2005:243). Yet gender norms were only transgressed insofar as doing so proved...
beneficial for the LTTE, specifically to legitimise the assignment of combat roles to women, thus fulfilling the LTTE’s need for a greater number of combatants. The armed-virgin ideal justified female transgressions into a performatively masculine space. This enabled female participation in a role socially defined as masculine, but which was performed in adherence to feminine expected behaviours, providing behavioural restrictions which shaped the boundaries of female combatants’ role activities. I contend that this fusion of femininity and masculinity challenges the idea that female combatants externally imitated masculine characteristics and instead illustrates a more complicated process that resulted in the occupation of a hybridised space by the LTTE’s female combatants.

The narrative behind the concept of the armed-virgin served two purposes. First, the creation of a new identity was integral to legitimising female participation in LTTE violence, minimising socio-cultural disruption. Within Tamil culture female participation in active combat was ‘not sanctioned by tradition’ (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 2008:14), as there was no historical precedence for female involvement in violence that could have been cited to justify the change in women’s roles to include combat activities (Schalk, 1994). Instead, such justification was derived from synthesising elements of the group’s idealised notion of a militarised masculinity with appropriate feminine behaviours. The inclusion of traditional feminine characteristics provided enough continuity with traditional concepts of gender identities to situate the armed-virgin as still connected to Tamil culture, rather than an anomaly borne from the LTTE’s organisational needs. While the construction of this role was based upon the LTTE’s needs, it was in the group’s interest to present this new identity as culturally consistent, rather than appearing to use culture instrumentally for the group’s gain. In creating this identity, the LTTE’s initially rigid conceptualisation of appropriate gender boundaries was redefined and became more fluid as a response to external pressures placed on, and the resulting needs of, the group. In this way, the LTTE prioritised the maintenance of the group over sustaining cultural continuity of gender norms.

The second purpose was to present combat as a compatible role with women’s social positions. Davis described this combination of traditional and non-traditional gender roles as a ‘transitional mechanism’ (2008:9). This sought to create an identity that was partially intelligible to women, despite an unfamiliarity with perpetrating violence. Instigating gender-segregated combat units and policies reassured wider society of the LTTE’s internal conformity to social values, including sexual chastity (Eager, 2008:139; Alison, 2011:138). It further avoided offending the cultural values (Ness, 2005:363) held by the LTTE’s primarily male, traditionalist support base (Davis, 2008:10). This faction was initially resistant to change,
Chapter Eight: Combat and Female Occupation of a Hybrid Space

particularly regarding the status of women, because they had offered their support to LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on the condition that, in seeking Tamil independence, the existing social structure would remain unchanged (Alison, 2009a). Thus, female combatants were required to assimilate to masculinised ideals, whilst simultaneously ‘contend[ing] with the gendered ethical ideal of moral purity, virtue, and obedience expected of Tamil women’ (Tambiah, 2005:251).

**Parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics**

The development of the *armed-virgin* identity exemplified a process specific to the militarised context which affected female LTTE combatants’ identities. Female members became ‘a different person with respect to the possibilities’ that were open to them (Lave & Wenger, 1991:53). Alterations to feminine behavioural ideals that sanctioned participation in previously restricted activities, such as violence, required women to learn and embody new feminine ideals. Male performances were arguably absent from the need to learn comparable behavioural changes. Female combatants embodied an identity that was different from both male combatants and civilian Tamil women.

From my application of the GMILs, the *armed-virgin* identity was learnt through parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics. This suggests a more complex process than implied by prevalent assertions that female combatants imitated ‘customary masculine and militarized attitudes and values’ (Jordan & Denov, 2007:47; 57-58). Imitation was applicable, however I found this occurred as part of the training programme, contributing to the facilitation of parody as adoption rather than as a separate mechanism.

Applying the concept of parody reconciles the gendered differences between the female body and the masculinised role performance. Gendered characteristics were innovatively utilised, expanding identity beyond the binary opposition of masculine/feminine to create new, hybrid opportunity spaces of masculine-feminine combined. As opposed to abandoning their femininity, female LTTE combatants suspended it on a situational basis, maintaining ‘the innate qualities of femininity as recognized by the culture that surrounds them even as they kill’ (Ness, 2005:364). This recognises that women adopted masculine characteristics on the individual level, whilst the LTTE were reliant on its female combatants adhering to the value of *kaṟpu* in order to remain visible to the wider community as women.

The application of Méndez’s ‘Militarised Gender Performativity’ framework (2012) reiterates this. Developed to analyse the FARC’s female performances of combat, Méndez’s
discussion of identity formation processes is of relevance to combat performances by LTTE women. She asserts:

‘women who join illegal armed groups as combatants do not simply become like men; they go through different and contradictory processes which affect their feminine identities in a context of militarization.’ (2012:32)

I agree with Méndez but further argue that certain masculine elements are included in a militarised feminine identity, to facilitate the acceptance of women in a ‘masculinised’ space and role type. This legitimised female performances of violence by conferring an accepted status on female presence in violent roles. Indeed, the LTTE ‘appear[ed] to reinforce existing patterns of gender constructions’ (Jordan & Denov, 2007:42) through ‘the reproduction of conventional cultural standards’ (ibid:44). These gendered ideals arguably defined the boundaries of combat performance. Women remained bound by a required adherence to socio-cultural norms disciplining female bodies, despite participating in activities defined as masculine. This gendered their performance of combat as feminine, differentiating it from male performances.

The LTTE’s training programme offers the most accessible evidence that learning processes between female and male combatants were gendered. During the 1980s, the LTTE’s main combat strategy ‘was based upon a campaign of armed resistance, to harass and strike at enemy forces’ (Balasingham, 1993: Chapter 3, para. 16). Basic training was delivered through attendance at a ‘boot camp’ (Hopgood, 2006:62), where individuals learnt basic infantry skills and developed their fitness (TamilNet.com, 1997: para 7). Once completed, more advanced training could be accessed, with the intention of enhancing specialist skills, such as ‘mining, explosives, weapons technology, electronics, intelligence work, and combat’ (Balasingham, 1993; Jordan & Denov, 2007:46). Despite the implementation of gender segregation policies, for the first cohort of women trained within Sri Lanka during the summer of 1987, ‘lessons on politics, explosives and combat tactics were provided by visiting male instructors’ (de Soyza, 2011:119). It was not until October 1987 that the first all-women training camp was set up in Jaffna ‘completely organised and implemented by the existing women cadres’ (Alison, 2009a:127).

**Self and Group-imposed Discipline**

I interpret discipline as a mechanism that ensured female combatants adhered to the karpu boundaries of the armed-virgin identity.

As a military organisation, group-imposed discipline was the most explicit. Unit commanders’ emphasis on discipline reflected Tamil values (Jordan & Denov, 2007:50),
exemplified by enforced gender segregation (Davis, 2008:1). As one interviewee from Jordan & Denov’s study noted, ‘[w]hether you are male or female, you obey your commander’ (2007:50), suggesting no significant gendered difference with regards to obedience.

In contrast, in terms of gender, the armed-virgin identity required women to adhere to the appropriate balance of masculine and feminine attributes. Such adherence was essential to maintaining wider societal acceptance of female engagement in violence. According to Sajjad:

‘while the LTTE woman’s internal make up is expected to be ‘pure’, ‘chaste’, and ‘virginal’, her outer body is marked as masculine; her hair is cut short and she wears a beret, combat fatigues, boots, and a cyanide capsule around her neck…’ (2004:9; De Alwis, 2002).

This description alludes to a gendered tension female combatants’ faced. Internally, this was reinforced through self-discipline, whereas the external embodiment was subject to discipline by others, such as unit commanders.

Subsequently, women had their ‘own organizational structure and plan[ned] their own projects’ (Ness, 2005:363) independently from the male units. This is indicative of female combatants’ occupation of a hybrid space, developing innovative forms of gender performance. Integration was only allowed during battle (Alison, 2009a:50). Both forms of discipline regulated how women performed combat roles, as well as their identity as women within the LTTE. Male combatants did not encounter this type of discipline because they engaged in a role which conformed to gendered expectations and did not have to navigate an identity which synthesised both genders.

Both levels of discipline reinforced parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics, by ensuring female performances adhered to traditional norms of karpu. While combat roles were not performed differently in terms of gender, learning processes were gendered. Rather than suppressing femininity, male behaviours synthesised with aspects of femininity were used as a gendered form of disciplining female combatants.

In summary, the LTTE responded to a reduction in the availability of men who could perform combat roles by constructing the armed-virgin identity. This created a hybridised space that revised previous restrictions to include women in combat roles. Allowing women to participate in combat in a way that adhered to moral virtues defined by karpu met the need for more combatants whilst retaining more traditional support. Within the LTTE, the presence of female combatants demonstrated that women’s roles adapted to meet a group’s organisational
needs, prioritising the need for more combat roles to be fulfilled over a traditional ideological prohibition on female violence.

The analysis of female performances through the GMILs of parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics, as informed by imitation and discipline, found that gender differences were not overt at the performative level. The learning process, rather than the performance of the roles, is gendered. Women learnt to perform masculinised combat activities in a way that is prefaced by their gender.

**Manifestations of hybrid space for female combatants in other threat groups**

Having looked the construction of the LTTE’s armed-virgin identity as a hybrid space from which women performed combatant roles, attention will turn to guerrillera combat in FARC and the IRA’s baiting and distraction tactics by way of comparison.

In doing so, the extent to which combat performances were informed by a woman’s occupation of a hybrid masculine/feminine space is assessed. Female participation in masculinised roles required either an innovative use of gender or a reconciliation of the feminised body in a masculine arena through parody as adoption or subversion.

The hybrid space occupied by FARC’s female combatants was shaped by group’s assumption of a formalised militaristic structure that perpetuated values of machismo. Application of the framework finds that once integrated into FARC’s structure, women learnt to perform combat roles through parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics. In contrast, the IRA’s female operational participants’ baiting and distraction tactics occurred from a hybrid space constructed by parody as the subversion of feminine stereotypes and were explicitly feminised performances.

Before analysing FARC and the IRA, several important observations regarding the occupation of hybrid spaces by female combatants in ETA and IS should be noted as demonstrating further performative differences across the case studies of a similar role type. As these spaces were less visible in ETA and IS, they are not included as part of this chapter’s in-depth analysis.

In her ethnographic research, Hamilton noted the rejection of assumptions by two female former ETA members that military activity was masculine (2007:121-122) and that women using violence imitated men (ibid:122). Rather, both women maintained that violence was an ungendered, politicised activity (ibid:121-122), interpreted by Hamilton as ‘strategies’
through which women created new ‘female activist identities’ (ibid:122). Although she did not refer to it in these terms, through my framework, Hamilton can be understood as discussing the creation of a hybrid space inhabited by ETA’s female combatants. This space enabled female performances of combat by undermining gender boundaries demarcated by the masculinised symbolism of a gun (ibid:118).

In discussing role performances, Hamilton implicitly referred to parody as subversion, although again she did not use these terms. She argued that the female activist’s “mask” is actually the activist herself (2007:109). She continued:

‘...her female body and specifically “feminine” markers – clothes, accessories, hair, make-up, and so on – are represented as a kind of drag covering the presumed masculine activist underneath, making her doubly dangerous for her duplicity’ (2007:109).

Hamilton’s reference to drag was reminiscent of Butler’s definition of parody and drag within gender performativity theory (1999:175). Inherent within Hamilton’s research, although not expressed through theoretical terms, was the implication that ETA’s women enacted combat roles from within a hybrid space. The feminised body was reconciled in a masculine arena through parody as the subversion of feminine norms.

It is unclear whether women have been deliberately deployed as combatants by IS. For many Islamist groups, female inclusion in violence is only sanctioned by a fatwa during extenuating circumstances, such as the need for defence, following the doctrine outline by AQC founder Abdullah Azzam (Aboul-Enein, 2008:4). Yet as with most jihadi groups, a means to justify female perpetration of violence has always been present within IS’s ideological position. Members of the all-female al-Khansaa Brigade received a fifteen-day weapons course, which included learning how to fire pistols (Spencer, 2016:83-84). This suggests an acknowledgement that IS might be required to deploy women in violent roles if the occasion arose in the future.

Whether IS’s position has shifted to allow female combatants is a subject of intense academic debate. It should be borne in mind that as IS was operational at the time these debates were published, the circumstances in which IS operated changed quickly, particularly impacted by their significant territorial losses and movement back into the online sphere and are likely to continue to shift. Cottee & Bloom (2017) cited the following passage as evidence that IS’s policy restricting the deployment of women as combatants, or suicide bombers, remains unchanged: ‘if the weapon of the men is the assault rifle and the explosive belt, then know that the weapon of the women is good behavior [sic] and knowledge’ (Dabiq, Issue 11,
2015:44). This clearly delineates roles according to the gendering of violence as masculine. ‘Umm Layth’s’ statement that ‘...there is absolutely nothing for sisters to participate in Qitaal [fighting] ...No amalia istishhadiya (martyrdom operations) [sic] or a secret sisters [sic] katiba [battalion]’ (09/04/14) further supported this.85

In direct response to Cottee & Bloom, al-Tamimi asserts that IS has ‘always considered a combat role for women to be undesirable but permissible when necessary’ (2017: para. 3). Indeed, he further notes, ‘there is no evidence of ISIS [sic] ever issuing an explicit and outright prohibition on women’s participation in combat’ (ibid: para. 13). This debate was further complicated by the release of an apparent ‘call to arms’ for women, in the form of a propaganda video (Dearden, 2017; 2018; Mironova, 2019). Winter & Margolin’s analysis of two statements taken from Rumiyah and al-Naba found an explicit change in IS policy towards permitting female participation in violence (2017). These statements coincided with a significant territorial loss for IS, which could have been interpreted as the extenuating circumstances necessary to sanction female use of violence (Winter, 2018:5). This implies that the adaptation to include women in combat roles was in response to organisational needs. Despite these debates, there is insufficient, corroborated evidence describing female performances of combat to include as part of this research’s analysis.

**Guerrillera Combat**

FARC is described as a ‘guerrilla’ group, owing to the preferred tactics used throughout its campaign of rural insurgency. Several scholars refer to female FARC combatants as ‘guerrilleras’ (Welsh, 2015; Gonzalez-Perez, 2016; Herrera & Porch, 2008), utilising the Spanish terminology (Breslin & Newstead, 2016:464), hence my use of the term to encapsulate female performances of combat.

Female guerrilleras were performatively the closest comparison to the LTTE’s *armed-virgins*. In both, women participated in frontline guerrilla warfare on a relatively equal level to their male counterparts, utilising weapons to fight (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017:775; Graham 2008; McDermott, 2002) and preparing ambushes against state forces (Herrera & Porch, 2008:618). Former member Mariana Paez asserted that female and male combatants performed the same roles: ‘women are not treated differently... They march with the men, they carry their equipment and they fight just the same’ (McDermott, 2002 paras. 12-13). Her statement supported FARC’s 1985 declaration of equality among members (Welsh,

85 The definition and translation of *katiba* was taken from Chelin (2018:19).
2015:4) and implied that combat roles were neither gendered nor performed differently in terms of femininity and masculinity. However, the following analysis demonstrates that FARC’s organisational attitudes prefaced guerrilleras by their gender.

FARC’s guerrilleras underwent a similar process to the LTTE’s female combatants, learning to perform their roles through adopting a synthesised identity. Whereas Méndez asserted that femininity within FARC was militarised (2012), I argue that guerrilleras’ identity combined FARC’s notions of femininity and masculinity, thus adding parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics by women to the identity formation process. Dietrich Ortega conceptualised these identities as ‘temporary guerrilla femininities’ (2012:503). Owing to this identity construction, FARC’s female combatants were ‘considered a different type of woman’ (ibid:503-504) to civilian women located outside the militarised space. It further differentiated female combatants from their male counterparts. This suggests that guerrilleras created, occupied and performed their roles from a hybrid space.

In contrast to the LTTE, FARC achieved this through a change in organisational structure. Its adoption of a militaristic structure integrated female combatants with men and produced an internal feminisation process (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017). While FARC’s Marxist commitments meant there was ideological space for women to engage in combat, it was not until external pressure necessitated an explicit need for their involvement that female combatants were deployed (ibid:775).

Changes to women’s embodied roles in response to organisational needs widened female opportunity spaces. FARC’s structural alteration contributed to the perception that women were the ‘lynchpin’ of the organisation (Herrera & Porch, 2008:612). Women occupied ‘critical operational, tactical and social roles’ (ibid:612), suggesting a value conferred upon them by FARC and a form of engagement that differed to male participants.

I begin by examining the influence of Marxism and machismo on the FARC’s SRR. This is followed by an assessment of female combatants’ performance and learning processes through repetition, imitation and discipline. Parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics recurs as a theme framing all subsequent sections.

**Machismo as a Shared Repertoire of Resources**

Ideologically, a commitment to Marxism was used to justify FARC’s rejection of the traditional, binary gendered divisions of labour found in wider society, informed by Roman Catholicism. As discussed in the chapter on motherhood and state-building, culturally prevalent ideas
influence an individual before they join a group. Unlike the LTTE, which relied on the support of the wider community to legitimise its claims to be representative of the Tamil population (Davis, 2008:14), FARC sought to construct a parallel society separated from the rural communities from which many of its members originated. Whereas this group-community relationship informed the LTTE’s justification of decisions that were contrary to accepted cultural norms, such as the inclusion of women in combatant roles, FARC was not constrained in this way.

Owing to this difference, members underwent a learning process to acquire FARC’s ideology and alter socio-cultural norms. One aspect of FARC’s training involved ‘imparting authority, prestige, and identity upon new recruits’ (Stanski, 2006:143), inducting new members and exposing them to FARC’s beliefs (ibid:143-144). When conceptualised through a CofP approach, this training communicated FARC’s SRR and implied a knowledge-sharing process that aided a periphery member’s progression to core membership status. Marulanda and the FARCs: For Beginners (Salgari, n.d) was published as a political course which presented the FARC’s ideology and origins in an easily accessible format. The provision of a militarised group identity through adherence to a unifying set of principles and commitments reiterated internal dynamics and structures. This created a FARC identity isolated from, and seeking to transcend, a ruralised Colombian identity.

FARC’s adherence to Marxist principles occurred most obviously in the extension of combat roles to women. Whereas many VE groups restricted female participation in violence, FARC’s inclusion of female combatants was perceived as indicative of an internal organisational gender equality (Herrera & Porch, 2008:618). The change in organisational structure resulted in a reconfiguration of gender arrangements that disrupted the portrayal of FARC as a ‘univocally masculine’ organisation (Dietrich Ortega, 2012:496).

However, as in the LTTE, militarization contributed to the reproduction and implicit privileging of ‘unacknowledged’ masculinity (Harel-Shalev & Daphna-Tekoah, 2016:313) as the dominant, ungendered norm within FARC (Méndez, 2012). In relation to FARC, the concepts informing militarization arguably derived from the prevalence of the dualistic machismo/marianismo culture across Latin America (Carranza, 2018). This gendered binary informed FARC’s SRR, perpetuating and communicating gender norms its Marxist principles sought to disrupt.

*Machismo* refers to a set of male cultural expectations based upon the ‘belief that men are physically and morally superior to women’ (Hernandez, 2003:862). It manifests as
‘exaggerated aggressiveness...arrogance and sexual aggression in male-to-female relationships’ (Stevens, 1973:90). In contrast, marianismo is the ‘cult of feminine spiritual superiority’ (ibid:89). Méndez asserts that certain aspects of femininity were ‘acceptable and desirable within militarised organisations’ (2012:33), manipulated to generate dominant ideals of militarism (ibid:32-33). The manipulation of marianismo-based feminine ideals contributed to a form of militarism within FARC based upon machismo principles. This implies the existence of a hybrid space occupied by the FARC’s female combatants, resulting from the synthesis of FARC’s idealised notions of femininity with masculinity.

FARC itself denied machismo influences. An official statement emphasised that the ‘...machismo of traditional Colombian society and their elites in power is uncomfortable with the egalitarian way of life in the insurgency...’ (Salgari, n.d:175). Mariana Paez’s assertion that FARC did not instigate or endorse machismo as an organisational policy (McDermott, 2002: para. 9) further supported this. However, Stanski upheld that many women were exploited by these apparently egalitarian power structures (2006:146-147). Interviews from former combatants of both genders depict FARC as a very masculinised organisational space which required the suppression of femininity (Herrera & Porch, 2008:627). This suggests a disconnect between individual experiences and FARC’s organisational and ideological ideals. Although it seems contradictory, this suppression served to emphasis female combatants’ femininity because as women, they were undergoing a different identity formation process to male combatants. This concurs with Méndez’s argument that guerrilleras’ feminine identities were affected in the context of militarization (2012:32). Female identity formation involved creating and occupying a hybrid space which emphasised their femininity, shaped by FARC’s feminised organisational attitude towards women.

Repetition, imitation and training
A comparative analysis of training processes reveals that female combatants in both the LTTE and FARC learnt their roles through repetition and imitation. In contrast to the LTTE, FARC’s training was not gender-segregated, but arguably organisational attitudes produced gender differences between female and male combatants. These differences did not necessarily manifest through individual performances, but as wider behavioural expectations of female combatants that varied to those held for men.

The formalised use of drills and routines as training practices became permanent after the adoption of the militaristic model (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017:773). During the completion of a two-month basic training course (Herrera & Porch, 2008:617), women ‘performed basically the same duties, routines, and drills as men in the camps’ (Gutiérrez Sanín
& Carranza Franco, 2017:775). FARC did not cut women ‘any slack during training or operations...’ (McDermott, 2002 para. 12). On the expectation that women were able to perform roles to the same physical capacity as men, both accounts appear to exemplify FARC’s Marxist commitments in practice.

Yet Stanski’s assertion that while training was often cited as exemplifying FARC’s gender equality, women did not have equal opportunities to access advanced training (2006:143) challenges this. Interviews with former female combatants referred to women receiving only the basic level of training. While up to 40% of the mid-level positions in FARC were filled by women (Welsh, 2015:4), a denial of advanced training excluded women from the possibility of attaining leadership positions (Stanski, 2006:143; Herrera & Porch, 2008:614). FARC’s highest-level of command, the secretariat, was always exclusively male (Leech, 2011:52).

**Contraception as a feminised form of discipline**

Female performances of combatant roles were further learnt through discipline. Contraception (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017; Leech, 2011) was a form of feminised discipline, as it was only compulsory for women (Stanski, 2006:148). As a practice, it sought to regulate potential reproductive capacity to maximise the ability of women to physically engage in combat. It stemmed from the attitude that a pregnant combatant could not perform her role properly: ‘Can you imagine a pregnant woman in combat?... For their own sake and for our army’s, women must not have children...’ [interview active guerrilla no. 2] (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017:773). This specifically feminised anxiety was based upon biological differences between female and male combatants.

On the one hand, it presented women as equal to men because it was their skill and not their gender that was considered important to performing a combat role. Yet on the other, women’s potential reproductive capacity was conceived as a threat to both the ability of women to effectively perform combat roles, and group stability. There was a group-held perception that women’s loyalties would be divided between the cause and her child, producing a concern that women who had children were more likely to desert (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017:775). Contraception exemplified a manipulation of femininity in the generation of dominant ideas of militarism (Méndez, 2012:32-33) and the attempt to advocate these ideas through the regulation of women’s bodies (Stanski, 2006:148).

This mechanism had a dual purpose. In addition to teaching women about the types of roles they were expected to perform, it also communicated FARC’s gender norms and
formed part of the group’s SRR. In order to retain fighters and maintain social isolation from civilian communities (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco, 2017:773), sexual relationships between male and female members were encouraged (Herrera & Porch, 2008). Such interactions were acceptable, as long as they did not result in pregnancy, regulated by compulsory female contraception (Stanski, 2006:147; Leech, 2011:53). In contrast, contraception as a feminised form of discipline was not seen in the LTTE. The wider community’s acceptance of female combatants resulted from the LTTE’s reassurances that female combatants continued to adhere to prevalent gender norms related to virtue whilst within the organisation.

To summarise, the question of whether female and male combatants performed their roles differently, in accordance with notions of femininity and masculinity is complex to answer. As demonstrated by an assessment of training through repetition and imitation, accounts from both female and male former combatants emphasise that role assignment and performances were similar, regardless of gender. Whilst performing combat roles, women and men engaged in comparable activities, suggesting no gender-informed differences.

While the mechanistic performances of combat imply gender equality, FARC’s institutions, policies and attitudes towards female members were largely discriminatory on gendered grounds and were indicative of masculinity as the unacknowledged norm. Arguably, when assessed through a CoP perspective, cultural attributes from machismo/marianismo influenced FARC’s SRR and pervaded organisational attitudes. This produced discriminatory attitudes towards women, exemplified by contraception as a form of feminised discipline. Thus, female combatants occupied a hybrid space within FARC. Although combat performances did not differ significantly from male performances, group attitudes towards women marked them as different from both male combatants and non-member women.

‘Operational Participants’: Baiting and Distraction
The definition of the Troubles as a war remains contested (Radden Keefe, 2018). As there were no distinct ‘battlefield’ sites or conventional military-style fighting as is traditional in warfare, the boundaries between the private sphere and spaces of conflict were often distorted. The conduct of destructive searches for weapons by the British Army and archaic forms of social justice administered by the IRA meant the conflict intruded into the wider community’s homes.
In contrast to the LTTE and FARC, the extent to which female IRA members performed combat activities can be questioned. There is evidence that a small number of women performed paramilitary violence through ‘carrying out killings’ (McDowell, 2008:339) and ‘engaging the enemy in the street’ (Gilmartin, 2017:463). While these activities are comparable to performances by female combatants of the LTTE and FARC, within the IRA these women were in the minority (Alison, 2004). It would not be unreasonable to suggest that IRA women’s engagement in combatant roles similarly involved the adoption of a gender-synthesised identity which led to women occupying a hybrid space. However, this conclusion cannot be supported as there is insufficient data regarding the IRA’s female combatant performances to facilitate such an analysis.

Owing to the type of conflict between the IRA, the British state and the environment this occurred within, an alternative conceptualisation of combat informed female role performances. As such, this section analyses female performances in specifically feminised ‘operational participant’ roles, defined by decoy (Cragin & Daly, 2009:24) and sexual baiting (Eager, 2009-10:280) activities. Most female IRA members engaged in these types of roles rather than direct combat. The perpetration of violence differentiates operational participant roles from combat. An operational participant may not necessarily perpetrate violence themselves, but their actions may be designed to facilitate others’ use of violence. Analysis of these activities further supports this chapter’s overall argument, that female combatants occupied a hybrid space which differentiated their participation from male combatants and civilian women.

However, in this case, women learnt and performed their role with reference to a different form of parody: parody as the subversion of socially accepted feminine characteristics. Subversion is the process whereby the anatomy of the performer and the gender being performed are congruous, but where stereotypes related to this idea of gender are manipulated to undermine the principles of femininity that prevail in wider society. Use of this tactic implies conformity to wider social norms but manipulates this to conceal the achievement of specific ends for a group that are contrary. The application of subversion as a learning mechanism identified instances where the blurring of boundaries between civilians and female members provided the IRA with a tactical advantage. Female operational participants provided a certain level of strategic value and were useful to the IRA ‘as women’ (Taylor, 2000:279) when outwardly appearing to conform to social norms.
In contrast to the adoption of a synthesised identity conforming to, and informed by, aspects of masculinity and femininity (as in the LTTE), or an organisational restructuring to facilitate female participation as combatants (as in FARC), the IRA’s female operational participants manipulated accepted feminine norms for operational benefits. An identity for female operational participants was constructed around the disruption of accepted gender norms. They fulfilled their role by deploying behaviours learnt within wider society, but in settings and to achieve purposes that contradicted their normal usage. Both baiting and decoy roles manipulated femininity to facilitate the performance of violence, either by the women themselves or by other actors. In certain settings, such as a security checkpoint, women could provide operational advantages that men could not, owing to their femininity (Radden Keefe, 2018:49).

Such activities developed in response to the IRA’s changing needs. Adapting women’s roles to include operational participation met a growing shortage of male participants whilst deploying actors who did not conform to stereotypical British constructions of IRA members as young, white, Catholic men. The utilisation of femininity in a way that externally conformed to wider social norms strengthened the ability of female IRA operational participants to blend in with the community and enhanced the likelihood of being mistaken as a civilian whilst simultaneously reducing the chances of their operation being interrupted.

As argued in earlier chapters, that the conflation of ‘violence’ with ‘active’ engagement in VE has frequently rendered female violent extremists invisible. A study conducted by Gilmartin found that female ‘combatants’ conceptualised their involvement in armed struggle differently to men (2017). Women challenged the dominant male narrative that differentiated between supporter and fighter binary identities and roles. Instead, they sought a more fluid narrative that reflected the realities of female participation (ibid:463-464), where the self-perpetration of violence was likely limited. This resulted in Gilmartin’s rejection of conventional definitions of a ‘combatant’, as he argued these diminish the ‘multiple and vital’ contributions of women during conflict (ibid:467). This contrasted with the LTTE and FARC’s female combatants, who emphasised their performative similarities and equality to male colleagues.

Following Gilmartin’s approach it is appropriate to introduce a broader definition of a ‘combatant’ which looks beyond the typical “person holding a weapon” ([emphasis original], Gilmartin, 2017:463) perspective. Rather, the term ‘operational participants’ challenges the hegemonic binary narrative of male fighter/female support that results in stereotypically
gendered understandings of VE participation. This provides further support for the need to create a separate hybrid space through which to understand and interpret women’s involvement in militancy as differentiated from male involvement. Including female operational participant roles in this analysis emphasises other ways of performing militant roles which this thesis may otherwise overlook. In addition to self-perpetration of violence, this expanded definition incorporates roles that facilitated others’ perpetration of violence, such as through acting as decoys or sexual bait.

*Catholicism as a Shared Repertoire of Resources*

As mentioned in previous chapters, Northern Irish Roman Catholicism and the permeation of wider socio-cultural norms contributed to the IRA’s attitude towards women and SRR. Prior to the extension of membership status to women during the 1970s (Radden Keefe, 2018:43-47), Irish Republican Catholic nationalism was perceived to be founded upon ‘the complementarity of hegemonic (dominant) masculinities and compliant (subordinate) femininities’ (Jackson, 1990:202). This produced a strongly gendered attitude towards the division of labour, shaping the types of roles considered appropriate for women and men to engage with. In an interview with Dowler, ‘Maureen’ asserted ‘women aren’t supposed to be doing the same thing that the men are in this war’ (1998:169). Combat activities were associated with men and masculinity. For women to publicly engage in violent combat would have been viewed as their ‘rejecting a dominant masculinity inherent in Irish nationalism’ (ibid:169), threatening prevailing social norms external and internal to the IRA.

It can be hypothesised that it was more beneficial for the IRA to deploy women in roles that emphasised their femininity owing to the positioning of the IRA as blended with, and reliant on support from, local communities. Whereas the LTTE and FARC imposed strict policies of self-containment and isolation from civilian populations, such policies were absent from the IRA. Former IRA member Eamon Collins stated ‘without the community we [the IRA] were irrelevant’ (1997:225). In addition to more tangible support such as the provision of safe houses (Ryan, 1999:262) and weapons and ammunition storage (Gilmartin, 2017:462-463), the local Catholic Republican community ‘turned a blind eye’ to IRA operations (Collins, 1997:225).

From a CofP perspective, the above examples demonstrate that individuals exist as ‘part of a broader system of relations’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991:53) which ‘arise out of and are reproduced and developed within social communities’ (ibid:53). Much of the IRA’s ideology
and internal organisational structures were derived from, and reproduced, prevalent socio-cultural norms of twentieth century Northern Ireland. The majority of IRA members likely grew up within this context, with symbolic knowledge and learning straddling the often-imperceptible divide between the IRA’s group boundaries and wider Catholic Republican society. Towards the end of the 1970s, this was more compounded by materials disseminated by the IRA, such as the Green Book I and II (for excerpts see Coogan, 2000:544-571). Female IRA operational participants likely subverted this shared knowledge of wider gender norms to create opportunity spaces which facilitated their engagement in violence whilst appearing to maintain a perception of conformity to those same norms. While there is no explicit evidence to confirm or deny this assertion, arguably it was in the IRA’s interest for female operational participants to emphasise their femininity and avoid transgressing socio-cultural gender expectations.

The subversion of physical appearance
Performances of decoy roles involved women taking advantage of ‘their seemingly innocent status in society to distract security officials from their duties or even lure them to harm’ (Cragin & Daly, 2009:34). As Alison notes, because women are often not perceived to pose a threat, as extremist actors they ‘frequently utilized existing conservative gender constructions and stereotypes to pursue their objectives’ (2004:448). This is discussed in more detail in the chapter analysing Suicide Bombing roles, however it is a tactic significant to this chapter.

One popular decoy tactic was for women to accompany men when transporting and planting a bomb. Horgan & Taylor referred to this as posing as a ‘courting couple’ (1997:12), as the outward appearance as ‘just another working class couple’ (Toolis 2000:259) was perceived to attract less attention from security services than a young man out alone.

In contrast, performances as sexual bait or ‘honey traps’ (ibid:399; Bloom, Gill & Horgan, 2012:64) involved behaviour which contradicted traditional concepts of accepted female behaviours. Through the manipulation of feminine sexual attractiveness, women acted ‘to entice their targets to capture or a violent death’ (Taylor, 2000:300), specifically attracting ‘British soldiers with sexual advances only to lure them to a secluded spot where they could be killed by IRA gunmen’ (Cragin & Daly, 2009:34; see also Eager, 2009-10:280; Bloom, Gill & Horgan, 2012). Although women acting as sexual bait may not be an obvious form of ‘combat’, as it did not lead to the women physically engaging in violence themselves, these women were integral in facilitating others’ perpetration of violence.86

86 Women also acted as sexual bait to gather intelligence (McAleese, 2009 para. 9; Bloom et al, 2012:64).
In addition to exploiting gendered social norms, the IRA’s deployment of women as *honey traps* recognised a facet of British military culture that needed ‘women as the gender ‘women’ to provide men with masculinity-enforcing incentives to endure all the hardships of soldiering’ ([emphasis original], Enloe, 1983:214). As discussed in relation to FARC, a connection can be made with Méndez’s framework, as she argued that militarism involved the manipulation of certain aspects of femininity (2012). In the IRA, the role of sexual bait required women to manipulate their femininity and sexuality for operational success. Luring soldiers through physical attractiveness was subverted by possessing an intention to facilitate the soldiers’ deaths, where violence is considered a masculine trait. Thus, performances of sexual bait roles were explicitly feminised, portraying women as adhering to gender norms, whilst disguising their intentions.

Performances of decoy and sexual bait roles similarly occurred from within a hybrid space, albeit one that was constructed in a different way to those of the LTTE and FARC. Interpreted as learnt and gendered through parody as the subversion of stereotypical feminine norms, baiting and distraction techniques were explicitly feminised. This differentiated the IRA’s female operational participants from their male colleagues as men could not engage in comparable activities. By utilising their femininity in an unconventional way, yet which externally appeared to conform to social norms, the IRA’s female operational participants constructed a hybrid space. This further distinguished them from civilian women, whose performances of femininity similarly adhered to wider social norms yet were absent of subversive or violent intentions.

**Chapter Conclusion**

I have argued that female combatants underwent a complicated process that was not confined by socially constructed dichotomous gender binaries. Women’s involvement in militancy differed from men’s because women inhabited different spaces. Due to the association between militarism and masculine ideals relating to the use of violence, combat is socially gendered as masculine. In occupying a different space to men, female combatants adopted an identity which synthesised aspects of femininity with male characteristics of violence. In addition to the application of my analytical framework, Harel-Shalev & Daphna-Tekoah’s assertion of unacknowledged masculinity (2016:313) and the concept of *militarization* (Enloe, 1993; Méndez, 2012) proved foundational to my argument.
Hybrid spaces differentiated female combatants from both male combatants and civilian women. These spaces and synthesised feminine/masculine identities were articulated differently within each group, according to their ideology, structure, needs, and attitudes towards women. These contextual variations partly explain why roles categorised as forms of combat were performed differently by women in the LTTE, FARC and the IRA.

The creation of the armed-virgin identity served as a hybrid space for female LTTE members, augmented by gender-segregated combat units. FARC achieved this through adopting a formalised militaristic structure which integrated female and male combatants. The IRA’s female operational participants similarly occupied a hybrid space, but one which manipulated the dissonance between femininity and the use of violence. Although externally appearing similar to civilian women, operational participants’ subversion of feminine stereotypes and sexuality to facilitate violence differentiated them. These processes served to reconcile the presence of feminine bodies in a culturally defined masculine space and role, legitimising female participation in violence.

Of the three case studies analysed, only performances of baiting and distraction techniques within the IRA were explicitly gendered forms of combat activities. As the boundaries between the private sphere and spaces of conflict were blurred, deploying unconventional participants who were less likely to be suspected of IRA involvement, such as women, offered strategic advantages. The social preservation of assumptions linking femininity and nonviolence could then be subverted by female operational participants. The reliance on subverting femininity meant that men could not perform these roles in a comparable way to women.

Female combat performances in the LTTE and FARC did not differ from male performances in terms of the activities undertaken. However, the processes by which women learnt to perform their roles were gendered. In terms of gendered mechanisms of learning, female combatants in both groups engaged in parody as the adoption of masculine characteristics. Yet despite this, their participation continued to be perceived and disciplined by the feminine aspects that were considered to contribute to each group’s aims. The concept feminine morality as defined by karpu (Schalk, 1994) pervaded the LTTE, requiring female combatants to adhere to its values. Although female combatants received the same training as their male counterparts, they were continually defined and disciplined by their femininity. Conversely, although it was in FARC’s interests to encourage sexual relations among its members, compulsory contraception served as a form of feminised discipline. The militaristic
structure kept female combatants separate from civilian women, while social and personal attitudes towards women within FARC differentiated them from male combatants.

All three case studies exemplify instances of ideological revision, structural alterations and adaptations of women’s roles in response to external pressures placed on a group. The LTTE’s inclusion of women as combatants stemmed from an insufficiency of men, thus framing a need to present female combatants as socially acceptable. In FARC it related to a need to convey a practical adherence to its Marxist ideology. The element of separation between the LTTE and FARC and their respective wider communities enabled both groups to construct new roles for women that met group needs. For the IRA, the engagement of women in traditional combat roles, performed in accordance with idealised notions of masculinity would have impeded its capacity to operate. Subverting femininity to facilitate violence was a more effective tactic.

The subversion of stereotypical feminine norms continues as a theme throughout the final analytical chapter, concerned with performances of suicide bombing.
Chapter Eight: Combat and Female Occupation of a Hybrid Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant</th>
<th>LTTE</th>
<th>FARC</th>
<th>IRA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
<td>To sustain armed campaign of resistance against Sri Lankan state forces. Reduction in the number of male combatants led to female inclusion in combat.</td>
<td>frontline combat, to perpetuate rural insurgency against the Colombian state. Aimed to create a socialist state.</td>
<td>To intentionally facilitate others’ perpetration of violence. Not conventional, military style combat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership status</strong></td>
<td>Core and periphery members. Enabled through the creation of the <em>armed-virgin</em> identity. This hybridised space combined traditional feminine characteristics with the use of violence, distinguishing female combatants from male combatants and non-violence, civilian women.</td>
<td>Core and periphery members. Deployed in response to external pressures and need for a greater number of combatants. Adoption of a militaristic organisational structure contributed to the militarisation of femininity which resulted in a hybridised space for female combatants.</td>
<td>Core and periphery members. A different kind of hybrid space was constructed. The subversion of femininity distinguished female operational participants from civilian women. Reliance on gender-specific performative tactics further differentiated female operational participants from their male colleagues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gendered Mechanism of Interactional Learning</strong></td>
<td>Process of learning gendered. Parody as the adoption of the <em>armed-virgin</em> identity, introducing women to male-defined behaviours and characteristics. Further informed by imitation, as learnt through the training regime. Self-enforced and group-imposed forms of discipline ensured that female combatants adhered to expectations of moral chastity. Further reinforced by gender-segregated units and a parallel female structure.</td>
<td>Role learnt through imitation and repetition of training practices and drills. Extent to which learning mechanisms were gendered can be questioned, as women and men engaged in the same activities. However, contraception as a form of feminised discipline was gendered, as it was only compulsory for women.</td>
<td>Parody as the subversion of femininity, using behaviours learnt from within wider society, but in settings and to achieve purposes that contradicted their usual usage. Parody as subversion also used as a performative tactic as well as learning process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance</strong></td>
<td>Gender differences not overt at the individual performative level. Participated in the same activities as men, including ambushing Sri Lankan forces and targeted assassinations.</td>
<td>Gender differences not overt at the individual performative level. Participated in the same activities as men, including utilising weapons to fight and preparing ambushes against state forces.</td>
<td>Performance gendered, with women utilising their femininity in an unconventional way. This included sexually baiting British soldiers into ‘honey traps’; accompanying men to transport and plant bombs; distracting security officials.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: A table summarising the key findings from the main three case studies (excluding ETA and IS), regarding performances of combatant roles in the LTTE and FARC, in addition to operational participant roles performed by female members of the IRA, as analysed through the framework.
Chapter Nine: Suicide Bombing and the Subversion of Feminine Stereotypes

In a similar way to tensions surrounding the extension of combat roles to women, the deployment of women as suicide bombers\(^\text{87}\) has proven a divisive issue across VE groups. Various factors, such as ideological considerations, the age of the group and whether it is in a position of weakness or strength (Israelsen, 2018), contribute to the inclusion or exclusion of women as suicide bombers.

As found in the conclusions drawn in Chapter Eight in relation to the IRA’s female operational participants, this chapter argues that female performances of suicide bombing roles subverted stereotypical feminine norms in order to maximise the effectiveness of the role’s intended outcomes. Conceptualised as a form of parody, the subversion of feminine characteristics and behaviours superficially appeared to conform to culturally accepted gendered stereotypes. However, this conformity obscured how these behaviours were strategically used to facilitate violence through the manipulation of prevalent social assumptions about women for operational gain. In doing so, female suicide bombers (FSBs) performed their roles from within a feminised space, thus were gender-differentiated from male suicide bombers (MSBs).\(^\text{88}\) Owing to the prevalent association of VE and violence with masculinity, this interpretation of parody reveals the benefits gained by FSBs utilising femininity as a tool to achieve strategic advantages.

There are many varied definitions of ‘suicide bombing’ within the existing literature (Zedalis, 2004; O’Rourke, 2009; Rajan, 2016; Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2018), but most refer to a suicide bomber killing oneself in the process of killing others, often motivated by an ideological cause (Warner & Matfess, 2017:2). For the purposes of this research, Warner &

\(^{87}\) Suicide bomber is a contested term. Research by Narozhna & Knight captures the debate surrounding suicide bomber in greater detail (2016:30-47), however a significant criticism relevant to this thesis relates to the inability of the term to recognise or contextualise culturally specific instances of suicide terrorism (Euben, 2007; Brown, 2011). As Brunner elucidates, use of the singular fails to address the ‘plurality and complexity of women in different regional and national conflicts’ (2007:966), perpetuating harmful Occidentalist representations (ibid:969). Indeed, McCall argues that use of the category suicide bombing ‘inevitably leads to demarcation, and demarcation to exclusion, and exclusion to inequality’ (2005:1777). These criticisms are recognised and considered, however for the purposes of this research, the term ‘female suicide bomber’ (FSB) is used to ensure continuity and coherence with the majority of the literature consulted during the development of, and cited throughout, this chapter. As Narozhna & Knight acknowledge, it is the term most often employed in mainstream representations and terrorism studies (2016:33, 36).

\(^{88}\) The word bomber rather than attacker was chosen because most cases discussed in this thesis involved the detonation of explosives attached to the self.
Matfess’s definition of suicide bombing as ‘a process in which a human kills him or herself in the course of killing others for a politically or religiously motivated end’ (2017:2), is used.

Despite diverse definitions, it is assumed that suicide bombers, including women, perform their role in a comparable way, regardless of context. This assumption focuses on the completion of the role, failing to consider how the perpetration of suicide bombing draws on a range of strategies and practical actions which produced performative differences. Previous research focused on the ‘unexpected’ operational and demographic nature of various groups’ deployment of FSBs. While useful in conceptualising performative differences between female and male bombers within a group, little research has been conducted into how individual performances of suicide bombing differ between groups, or how this role is gendered.

As a result of combining explicitly gendered performative tactics and significant increases in deployments of FSBs during the late 2010s, Boko Haram (BH) is the main case study under analysis. Performances by peripheral associate women in BH are compared with two specific attacks attributed to IS, female core members of the LTTE’s elite suicide unit, the Black Tigers, and women who performed bomb-carrying roles within the IRA. Whilst not forms of suicide bombing, the inclusion of bomb-carrying roles demonstrates that similar performative tactics can be used across varying role types. All four examples support my argument that women inhabited a different space to men and utilised gender-subversive tactics to perform their roles. When assessed in relation to space, the importance of several factors that previous research has overlooked, such as group attitudes towards women, female opportunities for membership status and their level of agency, are emphasised.

Analysing performances of suicide bombing roles revealed two differences when compared with the other role categories examined here. First, learning processes were predominately identifiable at the group rather than individual level, although some evidence of individual learning processes was found when analysing the comparative cases. By definition, if a suicide bombing role is successful, performance by a specific individual will

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89 The majority of research concerning FSBs focused on various Palestinian groups (Naaman, 2007); Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Mostarom, 2009; Nolen, 2016); and the Chechen ‘Black Widows’ (Nivat, 2005; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006a). Although not included in my analysis, it has been useful to consider the narratives which framed these studies.

90 Several localised branches of Al-Qaeda, including AQI and AQAP, deployed FSBs (Gentry, 2011:187; Eggert, 2015) but as I focus solely on AQC, I exclude these examples from my analysis (see Chapter Four).
occur only once. Hence, it is the group who learns from these role performances, altering tactics to meet group needs or to enhance the success of future operations.

Secondly, suicide bombing provides an example of a role category that was performed in similar ways across groups. The concealment of explosives through external appearance and the assumption of maternal identity were tactics used in all four cases. The enactment or physical portrayal of these tactics was realised through culturally and contextually specific norms and behaviours, which nonetheless facilitated comparable performative tactics. These alterations ensured conformity to wider social norms, reinforcing the ability of female bombers and bomb-carriers to blend into their surroundings.

One of the purposes of this chapter is to explain why groups deployed FSBs when they have men available. Existing research suggests that the inclusion of women in previously prohibited violent roles likely signifies a group’s ‘desperation’ (Dalton & Asal, 2011). However, I take a similar approach to Balasubramaniyan & Raghavan (2014), who emphasise the importance of multicausal factors influencing female motivations to enact suicide bombing missions. While Balasubramaniyan & Raghavan focus on motivational factors, I find that female performances enabled a range of tactical, operational, and ideological outcomes and opportunities for groups.

Conformity to female gender stereotypes encouraged social audiences to make certain assumptions about a woman, which often included the failure to consider the possibility of violent female perpetrators. Yet it was precisely such ‘expectations governed by norms that regulate[d] women’s behaviour in the societies where the attacks [took] place’ (O’Rourke, 2009:686) that female bombers manipulated when appearing to conform to these norms. This enabled FSBs to aid a group in ways MSBs could not, suggesting the inclusion of women in bombing roles was tactical and strategic. Onuoha & George term this the ‘feminisation of terror’ (2015:2; see also Olaniyan, 2017), recognising that specifically feminised behaviours were manipulated to aid a violent extremist (VE) group. I refer to this feminisation as the process by which violent female actors utilised stereotypically feminine social norms as tools in their perpetration of violence. FSBs violence became integrally linked to perceptions of the female gender and were ‘feminised’ whilst simultaneously subverting these norms.

This analysis has agentic implications. Current literature unsatisfactorily separates women into distinct categories of those who were coerced and those who volunteered (as outlined by Brown, 2011; Brunner, 2007). My chapter frames agency through La & Pickett’s
argument that media framing of VE women in a dichotomous binary of either perpetrators or victims further hinders the ability to assess their agency. They argue that women should be represented as ‘agents, victims, and witnesses of violence simultaneously’ (2019:13). Similarly, Brown’s emphasis on resistance seeks to further mitigate dichotomous approaches towards FSB agency through enabling analyses which ‘focus on relationships and interfaces between different agents, events and contexts’ (2011:198). I agree with La & Pickett’s and Brown’s assessments, as the binary approach over-simplifies a complex amalgamation of lived experiences, grievances, ideological commitments, political and personal motivations (see also Marway, 2011; Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, 2020; Brunner, 2007). However, a conclusive assessment of each individual FSB’s level of agency is not the focus of this research.

Membership status is referred to as an approximate indicator of the variations in agency held by women, indicative of ideological commitment or coercion. Status differences inform role performances as they determine the level of training a woman received and whether she self-detoned. This influences the narrative surrounding a woman’s actions and her perceived value to the group, including the importance placed on a suicide bombing role, as well as how a FSB was remembered by the group: whether she is revered as a martyr or forgotten.

Through the application of the theoretical framework, three research questions are addressed: ‘What effect do variations in gender construction within groups have on the role of women?’; ‘If women and men perform the same role, how is this gendered and performed differently in terms of femininity and masculinity?’; and ‘In what ways do the roles of women adapt to meet the organisational needs of the group?’.

The first found that each group’s SRR, specifically attitudes towards women, informed the likelihood of the group assigning suicide bombing roles to women. Membership status and the ensuing level of agency held by women also contributed to changes in women’s roles. By analysing gendered influences on female and male performances of what ostensibly appear the same type of role, the answer to the second question found that FSBs engaged in explicitly

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91 A further distinction should be made between suicide and proxy bombers. Proxy bombers lack control over the method and timing of detonation, suggesting diminished agency and statuses as peripheral associates. Although subtle agentic, performative and learning differences likely occur between suicide and proxy bombers, unfortunately, owing to data constraints, this research is unable to accurately distinguish performances of proxy bombings from suicide bombings. Some instances of suicide bombings performed by women analysed in this thesis may have occurred as proxy bombings and have been included in error.
feminised performances. Both the tactics used, and the spaces FSBs occupied, differentiated their performances from MSBs according to gender. While performative difference between female and male actors operating within the same VE group were found, when examined between VE groups, FSBs utilised similar tactics, deployed in different ways according to the group’s internal structure, culture and wider context. My response to the final question centred around the changing circumstances of a conflict and the impact this had on altering women’s roles. For both IS and the LTTE, changes to organisational needs widened opportunity spaces for women, reconceptualising suicide bombing as an appropriate role for women.

In addition to deriving this chapter’s organising principle from Butler’s gender performativity theory (GPT) (1999), several other theoretical points offer contributions. Use of a Communities of Practice approach (CoP) (Lave & Wenger, 1991) facilitated the analysis of an individual’s membership status and a group’s SRR. Throughout, role theory was referred to through an awareness of expectations surrounding suicide bombing role performances held and communicated by each group.

**Boko Haram’s female suicide bombers**

Between June 2014 and February 2018, Boko Haram deployed 469 FSBs in 240 incidents (Pearson, 2018:33). Warner & Matfess concluded that Boko Haram has ‘deployed not only more total female bombers than any other terrorist group in history, but more female suicide bombers as a percentage of its overall suicide bombing workforce’ (2017:4). Such a prolific use is significant because it suggests gender was integral from a performative perspective. In certain circumstances, femininity was perceived to offer potential operational advantages that may not be enabled through male performances.

Although Oriola argues that women were rendered ‘genderless’ (2016:16-17) when deployed by BH as suicide bombers, I disagree. Application of the framework to female performances of suicide bombing roles identified parody as the subversion of femininity as a significant performative factor. This manifested as the concealment of explosives through external appearance, the assumption of maternal identity, and the deployment of multiple bombers in a group. My findings concur with Markovic’s assertion that the ‘targeting, delivery method, and other tactics’ (2019:284) of BH’s suicide bombing were differentiated by gender. Perceptions of femininity were key to female performances of suicide bombing roles. The
practical actions through which the role was embodied and performed were gendered and differed to male performances.

Analysing female performances of suicide bombing raises several conceptual and methodological tensions, requiring the setting out of this section’s parameters.

The membership status of individual women in BH was difficult to verify. Three main trajectories were identified from the available evidence, suggesting that the most dominant was coercion. Most first-hand accounts from women who escaped detonation described their abduction by BH and subsequent coercion into performing suicide bombing operations (Searcey, 2016a, 2017; Moaveni, 2019a). To assess the benefits BH gained from coerced FSBs, I term these women peripheral associates. This is not to suggest that they were group members, or to detract from the trauma they endured. Rather, it is to understand their actions and the completion of bombing roles as aiding BH. Consequently, female performances of suicide bombing shock on two levels: the exceptionality of female participation in violence; and the status of many female participants as themselves victims of Boko Haram, coerced into these roles.

Equally, it is inaccurate to assume that all women in BH were coerced. There is significant evidence that some joined voluntarily (Davis, 2017:4; Matfess, 2017; Warner & Matfess, 2017; Ansbro, 2017; International Crisis Group, 2016:10; Moaveni, 2019). Motivated by various reasons, including ideological commitment and socio-economic incentives (International Crisis Group, 2016), these women participated as core or periphery members. It can be intimated that it was in BH’s interest to retain female volunteers as their engagement in other group activities, such as domestic service, foot-soldiering or recruitment roles (Botha & Abdile, 2017:6), better served to perpetuate BH’s existence. Previous core or periphery female members likely followed one of two trajectories into a suicide bombing role: widowhood or ideological commitment. For women who had been widowed multiple times, suicide bombing presented the final contribution they could make (Englehart, 2019). Conversely, women who were ideological zealous may have volunteered for a suicide bombing role (Okoli & Azom, 2019:1223; Oduah, 2016: para. 57).

Unlike other roles types included in this thesis, learning processes were identifiable at the group level, occurring in relation to achieving organisational goals, rather than at the individual level. Access to data which would enable the analysis of individual level learning processes was limited, so it was not possible to establish whether performative differences occurred between women who were coerced into the role, and those who volunteered. Unless
otherwise stated, this analysis refers to women who were abducted or coerced, where ideological commitment was likely absent.

Shared repertoire of resources stemming from wider social context
Much contradictory information about the origins and presence of BH exists.\(^{92}\) Many scholars agree that it was a product of the Nigerian North-East’s ‘social, religious, economic, and political milieu’ (Pham, 2016:17-18), influencing BH’s internal dynamics, tactics, and aims (Loimeier, 2012; Onuoha, 2010; Salaam, 2012). Although informed by a complex interaction of factors, analysis here is limited to assessing the impact of religion and socio-economic grievances on BH’s shared repertoire of resources (SRR).\(^{93}\)

Religion is overwhelmingly cited as the most influential explanatory factor (Azumah, 2014:33; Campbell, 2014).\(^{94}\) Emphasising religion as a catch-all explanation for BH’s emergence and SRR is understandable, yet risks eclipsing other contextual factors, particularly those that influenced female participation.

The combination of North-Eastern social conservatism which positioned men as superior to women (Maiangwa & Agbiboa, 2015) with BH’s apparent adherence to ‘fundamentalist Wahhabi theology’ (Campbell, 2014:1) might be expected to produce an organisational attitude towards gender similar to that of IS. Yet within BH, gender construction and ideology appeared to not have restricted the types of roles assigned to women. Although women existed for ‘purposes of procreation within the domestic sphere’ (Oriola & Akinola, 2018:606), BH were simultaneously reliant on deploying women in operational roles, such as suicide bombing. Thus, religious ideology does not satisfactorily explain why BH deployed women in operational roles which were discontinuous with accepted female social and religious roles. BH’s organisational needs and the operational advantages achieved by deploying FSBs were prioritised over a commitment to ideological purity.

This attitude differed from other Islamist groups with which BH ostensibly shared ideological grievances, exemplified by the factional split between BH and what became Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) in 2016 (Bryson & Bukarti, 2018:4). The split was partly motivated by ISWAP’s condemnation of BH’s prolific use of female suicide bombers (ibid:2018). Under Shekau’s command, BH’s commitment to a Salafi-Jihadist ideology and aims

\(^{92}\) See Walker (2016); Iyekekpolo (2016); Oriola & Akinola (2017).

\(^{93}\) For other factors, see Alao (2013); Adenrele (2012); and Botha & Abdile (2017:8).

\(^{94}\) Nwankpa (2018:8-10) offers a concise overview of the effect the politicisation of religion had on BH.
to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Northern Nigeria were questioned. An audio recording from 2014 appears to be a declaration by Shekau of a Caliphate in Gwoza and was cited by Pham as evidence of BH’s commitment to forming a state (2016). However, this was refuted by Ladbury et al.’s assertion that the lack of state-building structures, specifically the absence of a positive narrative for women as state-builders, was evidence that BH’s focus had shifted to prioritising local, socio-economic inequalities as motivating factors over religion (2016).

Boko Haram lacked a formal articulation of their gendered ideology (Pearson, 2018:50), but inferences can be drawn from observing group attitudes towards, and the types of roles assigned to, female members and peripheral associates. On the rare occasions that Shekau explicitly articulated Boko Haram’s gender position, the tactical use of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women was legitimised (Oriola, 2016; Pearson, 2018:51; Zenn & Pearson, 2014) and constructed as integral to the group’s existence. BH’s patriarchal internal structure considered women only to the extent that they offered instrumental value to achieving group aims. Such a conceptualisation of women enabled BH to sculpt their ideology in accordance with their tactical needs (Pearson, 2018:50).

To understand BH’s attitude towards women, wider perceptions of the group must alter. Rather than perceiving it as a fundamentalist religious group intent on establishing a Caliphate, it might be more accurate to frame BH as challenging socio-economic structural inequalities perpetuated by the Nigerian state, specific to the North-East (Ladbury et al, 2016). Its aims and capabilities were far more localised, thus other context-specific factors besides religion must be considered as impacting the types of roles BH allocates to women.

BH’s violence against women can be considered ‘an extension of the patterns of neglect and abuse’ suffered by women in wider society (Matfess, 2017:45) demonstrating how socio-cultural attitudes were assumed by BH as part of their SRR. Research specifically focusing on female participation emphasised that socio-economic structural inequalities in peripheral regions created a context that offered a more holistic explanation for BH’s use of FSBs than religion alone (Matfess, 2017; Galehan, 2019a). This contributed to the manifestation of structural violence against women in these areas, including the North-East.

The assignment of suicide bombing roles to women was an extreme interpretation of this attitude, instrumentalising women as weapons (Ladbury et al, 2016:10). Potential female suicide bombers were regularly sourced through abductions (Olaniyan, 2017; Okolie-Osemene & Okolie-Osemene, 2019) of non-Muslim women and girls who were regarded as a form of ‘expendable material’ (Oriola, 2016:7). This justified the assignment of a role to women that
was contrary to accepted socio-religious norms as based upon the role’s fulfilment of an organisational need. The imbalanced ratio of the high number of FSBs deployed to the low-level success rate and haphazard means of conducting individual operations (Warner & Matfess, 2017:25-28) implied that BH’s strategy prioritised demonstrating capacity to sustain suicide bombing attacks over ability to be effective.

BH used the cultural norms which influenced its SRR as a form of discipline to determine how women performed suicide bombing roles.

The subversion of femininity through performative tactics
BH’s shared repertoire of resources positioned FSBs within a feminised space, differentiating them from MSBs. FSBs performed their roles through engaging in stereotypically feminised behaviours. Of the women Searcey interviewed, prior to being sent on her suicide operation ‘Maimuma’ was told to ‘act like a woman…look attractive…’ (2017: para. 66). This concurs with findings that the manipulation of femininity was a common tactic used by FSBs in other VE groups (for example, Bloom, 2011). An integral aspect of the performance of suicide bombing was engaging in activities that formed part of a woman’s expected social role. In unknowingly observing FSBs’ performances, wider society was encouraged to make certain gendered assumptions about the individual women, prefaced on failing to consider the possibility of female engagement in violence. Yet, it was precisely this assumption that BH’s disciplining of FSBs sought to manipulate through their outward appearance of conformity to social norms.

Although the organising principle of this chapter is the subversion of feminine stereotypes, the extent to which BH’s predominately abducted, non-Muslim, ‘expendable’ FSBs participated in a learning process informed by parody as the subversion of femininity is debatable. The coercive interactions between BH and their FSBs suggest it may be more appropriate to consider the manipulation of femininity and cultural norms as disciplinary tools used by BH. Three performative strategies manipulated femininity: the concealment of explosives through external appearance; the assumption of maternal identity; and the deployment of ‘multiple bombers’ (Warner & Matfess, 2017:4). The success of an operation was contingent upon utilising one or more of these strategies to sustain the appearance of external conformity to socio-cultural gendered stereotypes whilst simultaneously manipulating assumptions surrounding appropriate feminine behaviour. In encouraging the use of these strategies, BH imposed subversion on women as a form of discipline to direct how suicide bombing was performed.
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Concealment of explosives through external appearance
One of the most oft-used performative strategies of BH’s FSBs was the wearing of female-specific clothing and accessories to conceal explosives. In facilitating the concealment of explosives, this conformity was superficial and subverted femininity.

In the predominately Islamic North-East, women commonly wore the veil in public to protect and display their modesty. A tactic utilised by FSBs in several Islamist VE groups (Miller, 2007; Rajan, 2011:67), the ‘billowy folds’ (Warner & Matfess, 2017:29) of a hijab’s excess material became a method to hide and convey explosives (Onuoha & George, 2015:6). In distorting a woman’s body shape, any explosives secured by belt or vest (Markovic, 2019:283) were conveniently concealed. Cultural citations gender an item of clothing as masculine or feminine. The use of clothing to conceal explosives weaponised the chosen piece of female attire.

Public adherence to the social concepts differentiates performances of suicide bombing roles by gender. For BH’s FSBs, performance of a feminine identity appears to be as integral to the role performance as the practical actions of transportation and detonation.

Assumption of maternal identity
The second performative strategy was the assumption of maternal identity. This was consistent with North-Eastern Nigerian women’s primary social roles (Matfess, 2017:125; Asiyanbola, 2005:2), exemplifying a further cultural norm used by BH as a form of discipline which subverted femininity.

One of the women who targeted a Maiduguri market in 2014 carried wrapped up explosives ‘on her back, just like a baby’ (ABC News, 25/11/2014). Emerging during the late 2010s, a more concerning strategy saw FSBs carry an actual infant (Odunsi, 2017; Cornish, 2016). Strapped underneath a baby carried on a woman’s back, this aimed to obscure the visibility of the explosives (Markovic, 2017: para. 1; Warner & Matfess, 2017:29). This mocked normative ideals surrounding motherhood, using society’s gendered division of labour and conceptualisation of gender norms against society itself, to cause harm.

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95 Reports describe FSBs in Nigeria as wearing the ‘hijab’ (The Telegraph, 01/01/2015; Warner & Matfess, 2017). However, it would be more accurate to describe BH’s FSBs as wearing a niqāb. Yusuf adopted Yan ‘Izala’s veiling practice of a full-length hijab (Renne, 2018:115) as an identity marker of BH (Matfess, 2017:116). In a 2009 speech, Yusuf stated that women should wear ‘a thick and wide ḥijāb [sic]. You should drag it along the floor…’ (trans. Kassim, 2018:114). Despite Yusuf referring to a ‘hijab’, academic translators Kassim & Nwankpa argue that ‘from the description, Yusuf is talking about a niqāb [sic] which covers the entire body’ (2018:114), including the lower half of the face. However, for consistency with source quotations, I use the word ‘hijab’.
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**Group bombings**
The use of ‘multiple bombers’ (ibid:23), where two or more individuals were deployed at the same time and location, forms the third performative tactic. As with the assumption of maternal identity, this tactic similarly developed alongside BH’s increased reliance on FSBs during the mid-to-late 2010s, demonstrating how women’s roles adapted according to BH’s needs.

By 2017, exactly half of BH’s overall suicide attacks had involved multiple bombers (ibid:23), with the ratio of bombers to bombings rising significantly during 2015 (Markovic, 2019:294). Attacks perpetrated by multiple bombers involved simultaneous detonation of all parties, or ‘staggered’ bombings (Warner & Matfess, 2017:25).

Prior to BH’s adoption of suicide terrorism, violence was likely perceived as a masculine characteristic, thus the deployment of FSBs was initially effective because, as in many conflicts, women did not conform to stereotypical assumptions of violent actors. However, as the number of FSBs increased, social attitudes also shifted. Sightings of a single woman or girl in public evoked fear and suspicion (Markovic, 2019:291-292). This intensified until instances of physical violence against women rose, particularly at security checkpoints. A hesitancy to be body-searched resulted in women being shot, mistaken for suicide bombers who sought to conceal explosives (Kaplan, 2015; Searcey, 2017).

While this method was used by bombers of both genders, BH favoured multiple female bombers because as a strategy it regained the previous efficacy of female attacks that an increase in suspicion surrounding individual women in public had diminished (Markovic, 2019). BH’s use of multiple bombers formed as a response to external pressures which made it more difficult for FSBs to succeed operationally. This was a complex form of disciplined parody as subversion because by altering tactics in response to changes in social attitudes, BH attempted to present groups of women as a safer alternative to singular women, then subverting this idea through deploying bombers in groups.

The ‘feminisation of terror’ as a group learning process
Applying the framework found that learning processes were more explicit at the group level. BH’s continuous tactical evolution towards women responded to changes in the conflict environment (El-Affendi & Gumel, 2015:137) rather than motivated by ideology (Davis, 2017:5). Such changes were achieved through the ‘feminisation of terror’ (Onuoha & George, 2015:2), locating its FSBs in a different space to MSBs.
The three gendered performative strategies outlined above facilitated four operational advantages, that male performances were unlikely to achieve. Specifically enabled by performances which emphasised femininity, comparable tactics were identifiable in other VE groups (Gronnvoll & McCauliff, 2013:345; Narozhna & Knight, 2016).

The first operational advantage related to the perception that female actors were less likely to be body searched than male actors (Nnam et al, 2018:39), broadening BH’s potential and capability to conduct attacks. Initial deployments of FSBs were allowed through security checkpoints without being invasively body-searched. In part, this was enabled through the FSBs’ external conformity to feminine appearances and behaviours, as discussed earlier.

The second concerned the accessibility of target locations (Pearson, 2018; Markovic, 2019). Women could access destinations that were either inaccessible to men, or where attention would be drawn to a male presence. BH’s ‘gender-differentiating targeting’ (Warner & Matfess, 2017:32) was exemplified by the deployment of FSBs to predominately socially appropriate, civilian, non-secular ‘soft’ targets (ibid:41), such as markets, bus depots, and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Such targets were spaces that initially did not require women to be searched prior to entry, demonstrating how operational advantages often converged, and offered the potential for numerous casualties.

The deployment of FSBs provided Boko Haram access to a previously restricted target: IDP camps (Pearson, 2018; Markovic, 2019). By the end of 2017, there were 1,707,000 IDPs in Nigeria (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2017), providing captive civilian targets for BH. Between January 2016 and August 2017, BH targeted IDP camps 18 times, calculated by Warner & Matfess to account for 21.4% of total targets within that time period (2017:42).

Conversely, there were certain targets that were stereotypically perceived as masculine, such as military bases. Women were less likely to be deployed to these locations (Markovic, 2019:295) because a female presence would have been inconsistent with accepted gender norms surrounding those spaces. MSBs were most likely to be deployed instead.

Isolated instances refer to men performing suicide bombing roles dressed in niqabs, pretending to be women (Spencer, 2016; Warner & Matfess, 2017:33) and examples where women dress as men (Searcey, 2016a: para 19). The dissonance between the performer’s anatomy and the gender they performed (Butler, 1999:175) in these examples suggested the permeability of an individual’s display of gender in order to conform and gain access to rigidly gendered social spaces. There is insufficient information to analyse these performances, although the gender implications regarding perceptions of the types of behaviours and activities each gender can successfully navigate would be fascinating to analyse.

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A third, very explicit operational advantage BH gained through deploying women as suicide bombers was increased media coverage, partially due to the dissonance between an act of violence and stereotypical perceptions of femininity. For all extremist groups where men and women participate in violence, it has been found that violent female actors attract a substantially higher amount of media attention as compared to violent male actors (Bloom, 2011:23,128; Speckhard, 2008:995). Prior to its abduction of 276 female students from Chibok (Oriola, 2016:14), BH was relatively unknown internationally. Not only did the act of abduction receive significant media attention, but rumours surrounding the group’s subsequent treatment and use of the girls as wives, suicide bombers, or discipline enforcers (Bloom & Matfess, 2017:112), in addition to claims of forced conversion (Kassim, 2018:311-317) sustained media interest.

Finally, the employment of FSBs enabled BH to continue indiscriminate violent attacks without diminishing the ranks of their male combatants (Meservey & Vadyak, 2018). This maintained male, core group members for tasks deemed to be more important in advancing group goals, such as skirmishes with the Nigerian army; destroying villages through raids; and abduction sorties (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Although this related to the gender of the actor performing the role, as opposed to the performance of the role, it is still significant in terms of gender identity enabling designated outcomes for the group.

From this analysis, Taylor’s argument that women are useful to extremist organisations ‘as women’ (2000:279), is applicable to BH. Performing roles as informed by, and conforming to, feminine stereotypes rendered their participation as different from male performances of comparable role types. FSBs provided BH with a range of operational advantages that male suicide bombers were unable to offer.

Such differences occurred on an individual level through three performative strategies: the concealment of explosives through external appearance, the assumption of a maternal identity, and the deployment of multiple bombers simultaneously. All three subvert feminine behaviours and produce a role performance that is specific to women. Role differentiation between female and male bombers can be interpreted as occurring through a feminisation of the violence performed by female actors. This concept modifies conclusions drawn by Onuoha & George, who described Boko Haram’s deployment of women as the ‘feminisation of terror’ (2015:2).
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**Suicide bombing: Appearance and organisational learning across other threat groups**
Appearance and organisational learning offer two points of comparison between instances of female suicide bombings in IS, the LTTE and the IRA with BH.

The concealment of explosives through external appearance and the assumption of maternal identity are recurring performative strategies. As with BH, feminine characteristics were subverted. Although performances adhered to and exploited culturally contextual norms, the perceived incompatibility of femininity and the use of violence prevalent in the host societies provided groups with a strategic advantage that was manipulated through the subversion of feminine stereotypes. However, unlike BH, the three comparative groups – IS, LTTE and the IRA – did not deploy multiple bombers simultaneously, providing a performative difference. The assessment of both performative tactics as they manifested in IS, the LTTE and the IRA answers the question, ‘If women and men perform the same role, how is this gendered and performed differently in terms of femininity and masculinity?’

The second point of comparison relates to the location of learning within the groups. As in BH, parody as the subversion of femininity was most explicit as a learning mechanism (GMIL) at the group level. Owing to a dearth in the availability of data, the learning aspect of individual performances were more difficult to analyse. Additionally, imitation as a learning process was identifiable at the individual performative level, contrasting with BH. Imitation is discussed alongside descriptions of performative strategies. Women in the comparative cases were more likely to have volunteered and had higher membership statuses compared to BH’s coerced FSBs. Where similar performative strategies were deployed in contextually relative ways, variations in individual women’s agency located FSBs in different spaces in relation to civilian women, MSBs and to FSBs from other threat groups. Through this comparison, ‘In what ways do the roles of women adapt to meet the organisational needs of the group?’ is answered with referral to the group’s evolution of tactics and responses to external pressures.

**Gender construction and the influence of shared repertoires of resources**
As found throughout this research, gender construction had the effect of informing acceptable role types for women. This was most obvious in IS and the LTTE, where women’s roles adapted to include suicide bombing roles. Although initially, such roles were prohibited, in response to external pressures and organisational needs, both groups underwent processes which altered their SRR, justifying female inclusion as suicide bombers. In contrast, the IRA did not alter their approach. All three comparative groups contrast with BH, where its official articulation of a
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gendered ideology remained absent. IS’s SRR is the first of the comparative groups to be examined, followed by the LTTE and the IRA.

Despite ideological similarities between BH and IS, it is difficult to ascertain if IS has used suicide bombers in a similar way to BH. Whereas there is clear evidence that BH utilise women bombers, it is unclear whether attacks attributed to IS arose in response to a directive from IS’s centralised authority, a decision taken by a localised branch or an individual decision taken by the women themselves.

As with their policy towards female combatants, the permissibility of FSBs within IS was subject to intense debate, within the group itself, among its affiliates, as demonstrated by the split between BH and ISWAP, and within the academic literature. IS’s communication of gender as an absolute construction aligned biological functionality with a strict division of labour, situating women in a difference space to men. FSBs were incongruous with traditional understandings of gendered performances of jihad, transgressing appropriate feminine norms and behaviours. A reinterpretation of IS’s discourse on jihad as disseminated by their SRR was required to sanction previously restricted actions that become perceived as necessary to fulfil organisational needs. This appears true of both BH and IS, although BH’s adoption of FSBs was less ambiguous.

The few suicide attacks associated with IS limits data available for this study. To date, it is asserted that IS have claimed only one female-perpetrated attack: Mombasa, 2016 (Opperman, 2016). Yet there is evidence of FSBs who claimed allegiance to IS despite the absence of statements confirming IS’s involvement, exemplified by an attack in Iraq during July 2017 (Ensor, 2017). The analysis of FSBs in IS explicating in subsequent sections focuses on these two examples.

Formerly, the LTTE had been the group to deploy the most FSBs (Bloom & Matfess, 2016:104). Formed in 1987 (Hopgood, 2006:43), the Black Tigers were the LTTE’s dedicated suicide unit, who ‘set out intentionally to sacrifice their lives as an integral part of their mission’ (Gunawardena, 2006:81). Interspersed throughout many of the LTTE’s military units (Hopgood, 2006:64), figures suggest that between 1991 and the 2009 ceasefire, women

97 Cottee & Bloom assert that IS’s FSBs are myths (2017), created by IS’s opponents to present the group as ‘desperate’ (ibid: para. 2), supported by Lahoud’s description of IS’s claiming of the Mombasa attack as displaying ‘ideological confusion’ towards female violence (2017:65). However, al-Tamimi refutes this (2017). Chapter Eight outlines this debate in further detail in relation to female combatants.

98 As has been a recurring challenge throughout this research, female suicide attacks attributed to IS are limited to isolated reports (Dearden, 2018: para. 11; Ensor, 2017; Moore, 2017) which provide no information regarding role performance.
constituted around 33% of Black Tigers (Stack-O’Connor, 2007:53), having engaged in 30-40 suicide bombings (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008:62). As a role, it was reserved for ideologically committed core members. In contrast to BH’s predominately coerced FSBs, selection to join the Black Tigers embedded an individual’s elite status. Black Tigers volunteered and underwent a selection process (Davis, 2008) which considered their discipline, skill, and battle experience (DeVotta, 2004:175).

The LTTE’s reliance on the wider community (see Chapter 8) required the group to frame female inclusion in violent roles as socially acceptable. Much like the armed-virgin identity was created to justify female combatants (Coomaraswamy, 1996), the synthesis of suicide bombing with traditional Tamil idealisations of motherhood (Alison, 2011) legitimised female participation in another previously prohibited role. Perceiving FSBs as more literal manifestations of self-sacrificing mothers (Herath, 2012) constructed suicide bombing as an extension of motherhood (Wang, 2011). The wellbeing of the nation became dependent upon a woman’s sacrifice as a symbolic mother on behalf of her children, the Tamil nation. Regardless of whether the LTTE’s FSBs were mothers themselves, motherhood would be a familiar concept that they could emulate in their role performance. FSBs’ acts were condoned as a necessary sacrifice arising from circumstances (Gunawardena, 2006:88), adapting women’s roles to meet the LTTE’s evolving needs. The implied intractability of the Tamil position and necessity of female participation as suicide bombers in order to achieve Tamil Eelam presented the change in role in the most acceptable way to the Tamil nation.

Conversely, in the final comparative case study, female IRA members engaged in bomb-carrying roles but did not necessarily include the act of detonation. Accidents arising from early detonation or incorrectly made explosives resulted in the deaths of bomb-carriers, such as Patricia Black and Frankie Ryan (Toolis 2000:259). However, these individuals’ deaths were unintentional. Although not a form of suicide bombing, I include it here because bomb-carrying and suicide bombing performances drew on similar tactics.

Unlike the other groups examined in this chapter, the IRA never intentionally deployed suicide bombers. The absence of suicide bombing as a tactic could be the result of several explanations. The IRA may have perceived this role as an inappropriate tactic for the context it was operating in (Gill, 2017) and the goals it was trying to achieve. Moreover, for a group like the IRA, suicide bombing may have been a tactic of last resort (Bloom, 2005). They had

99 See Chapter Eight.
other methods that retained community support and contributed towards achieving their desired goals (ibid).

In a case like the IRA, public support may proscribe a group from engaging in certain activities (Bloom & Horgan, 2008). Despite backing the self-sacrifice produced through hunger striking, it was perceived that the Nationalist community ‘rejected the notion of killing oneself deliberately or being coerced by the organization’ (ibid:581) resulting from the influence Catholicism had on the wider cultural context (ibid:593).

Of further relevance to the impact of Roman Catholicism on the IRA’s SRR was the ‘idealization of motherhood’ (O’Dowd, 1987:13). The construction of the female gender as centred around motherhood affected both the types of roles the IRA assigned as well as individual performances. Assigning women bomb-carrying roles enabled the utilisation of women across the range of IRA membership because despite forming a logistically important role, it did not necessitate the use of violence. Thus, the subversion of societal gender norms by female bomb-carriers proved an effective method of operation.

Concealment of explosives through external appearance

Similar to BH, individual performances within all three comparative case studies utilised the concealment of explosives through external appearance. This tactic took culturally distinct forms, but was identifiable nonetheless.

As the closest ideological and performative comparison to BH, IS women on both occasions cited similarly used veils to conceal explosives. The woman who conducted the 2017 Mosul attack was described as wearing a ‘hijab’ (Ensor, 2017: para. 4). In addition to concealing the explosives she carried, it arguably simultaneously attempted to indicate her conformity to social norms and present an external image as a civilian Iraqi Muslim woman.

For the Mombasa attack, veiling in Kenya symbolises a synthesis of practices from Islam with traditional religions and tribal identities (Amer & Antle, 2020), informing the various types of veils worn. Veiled women are visible within Kenya, particularly along the coast where Mombasa is situated (ibid). Descriptions of the three women who conducted the Mombasa attack vary, but all refer to the women as veiled (Gaffey, 2016: para. 5; Akwiri, 2016; Opperman, 2016). Although the suicide bombing aspect failed, the women were attempting to conceal weapons and an explosive vest ‘under flowing robes’ (Akwiri, 2016: para. 8).

Both examples subverted the very idealised notions of femininity that IS sought to espouse. The manipulation of female dress and principles of modesty to facilitate a suicide bombing role is comparable to FSBs in BH, who used veils for a similar purpose. Likewise, the
Iraq and Mombasa attacks occurred within societies where socio-cultural norms discouraged the searching of female bodies by men, similarly prevalent in Nigeria’s North-East. Like the policies Chad adopted in response to BH’s FSBs, anecdotal evidence claimed soldiers in Iraq responded to increased female suicide bombing attacks by asking women in public spaces to remove their niqabs (Roberts, 2017: para. 9). These responses suggest that state responses to terrorism similarly engaged in learning processes. The concealment of explosives under female external markers subverted both accepted ideas surrounding femininity and how men publicly interacted with women to the female bomber’s advantage.

Whereas FSBs enhanced BH’s and IS’s capabilities to conduct indiscriminate violent attacks, the LTTE deployed them to assassinate specific ‘high value’ targets, including Sinhalese and Indian military leaders and politicians (Davis, 2008:8). The intended function of the suicide bombing role affected how a woman enacted it. Compared to tactics utilised by MSBs, application of the framework found the parodic subversion of feminine behaviours and social attitudes facilitated easier access to the intended target.

The LTTE assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 21st May 1991 by ‘Dhanu’100 (Stack-O’Connor, 2007:53) exemplified how the concealment of explosives through external appearances manifested in culturally relative ways and facilitated different types of attacks. Dhanu gained physical proximity to Gandhi, under the guise of garlanding him. Once close enough, she detonated her bomb. In the context of an election rally, Dhanu’s actions were unexceptional – as soon as Gandhi arrived at the scene he was ‘surround[ed] by people trying to garland him’ (Mitra, 1991: para. 43). Dhanu’s external appearance as a civilian woman and her participation in appropriate behaviours for the social situation demonstrated subverting feminine stereotypes to facilitate violence.

A further difference relates to the provision of training. Unlike the other case studies analysed, the LTTE trained its suicide bombers, offering female and male Black Tigers apparently similar training (Hopgood, 2006). However, application of the framework finds that aspects of this training were gender differentiated. The training process Dhanu undertook in preparation for her operation included rehearsals at two different political rallies (Stack-O’Connor, 2007:53; Mitra, 1991: paras. 36-37), simulating the crowded environment of her own forthcoming mission. At both rehearsals she was tasked with touching an identified target (ibid:53-54). While no information describing Dhanu’s rehearsal performances are available, inferences can be made that her actions likely subverted feminine norms, as subsequently

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100 A ‘nom-de-guerre’. Her birth name was Thenmozhi Rajaratnam.
occurred at the attack she perpetrated. Through using stereotypical behaviours and appearances, the LTTE’s FSBs arguably learnt to perform their roles through the mechanism of parody as the subversion of femininity, gender-differentiating them from MSBs with regards to both training and role performances.

Numerous accounts detail how female IRA bomb-carriers manipulated external, physical appearance to conceal and transport explosives. Women ‘frequently employed their femininity and the associations with it to their advantage by using their bodies to transport or hide weapons...’ (McDowell, 2008:339). Such tactics relied on the ability of the individual bomb-carrier to blend in by presenting an external appearance that conformed to wider social norms. External signifiers that implied a female IRA member was a civilian woman reduced the likelihood of being detained by security services.

This concealment of explosives through an external appearance of social conformity further demonstrates how performances of the same role were gendered. Most suicide bombers engage in tactics that are socially constructed as appropriate for their sex. The gendering of target locations by the IRA and the LTTE, which resonate with previous analyses of BH, exemplify gender-differentiation. The locations targeted by women in all three groups were spaces civilian women ordinarily frequented and were different from male-targeted locations.

Female bomb-carriers broadened the IRA’s range of target locations to include women’s and children’s clothing shops. During the 1970s and 1980s, Northern Ireland’s clothing shops were generally focused towards one demographic, unlike contemporary mixed shops. Thus, a single man entering a female clothes shop would have been conspicuous. In contrast, being situated in the appropriate, defined gender-specific area meant that a woman, at that time, would be less likely to draw attention to herself.

This tactical assignment of targets based upon an individual bomber’s gender was a strategy similarly used by the LTTE. The deployment of a male or female Black Tiger was ‘tactical’ and depended on the intended target (Stack-O’Connor, 2007:54). During the late twentieth century, it was uncommon for women to drive vehicles or bicycles in Sri Lankan cities (ibid:53). The only women who drove were LTTE members. A female driver would have been incongruous with prevailing social practices of the time, in addition to being tantamount to confirming a woman’s LTTE membership. Thus, vehicle-borne explosives and bombing operations were mostly performed by men (ibid:53).
The behaviours and characteristics used by individual suicide-bombing and bomb-carrying women in IS, the LTTE and the IRA gendered performances. Through externally appearing to conform to feminine expectations, both in dress and behaviour, female bombers and bomb-carriers in all three comparative case studies attempted to subvert expectations surrounding common social practices and norms.

**Assumption of maternal identity**
The second performative tactic was the assumption of maternal identity. As in BH, this tactic was used to subvert stereotypical assumptions made about mothers to avoid detection. It was manifested through culturally relative performances. Owing to the clear gendering of motherhood as a female role, this performative tactic explicitly illustrates how female and male performances of the same role were informed by femininity and masculinity.

Again, IS offers the closest comparison to BH. Operations conducted by women associated with IS and BH have both involved children. This was not a tactic used in the Mombasa attack, but the woman who perpetrated the July 2017 Iraq attack carried a child with her, and both died (Ensor, 2017). Owing to the emphasis on women performing mothering roles, apparent conformity to this would be expected. Prior to her detonation, the woman was photographed passing a group of Iraqi government soldiers, none of whom appear to notice her or attempt to apprehend her (ibid). One reading of this photograph suggests that from their perspective, she was one of many civilian women present in that public space who conformed to the appropriate role of mother constructed for her by society. However, it could also be indicative of lax security enforcement. While there is uncertainty about this individual case, analysis of the available information through the framework offers an exemplar of a woman performing a suicide bombing role by imitating and subverting feminine stereotypes.

Likewise, children accompanying women on bomb-carrying operations portrayed a maternal identity. The use of items associated with motherhood achieved a similar effect. Examples include bombs being hidden in prams or buggies, sometimes even containing a baby or child (Toolis, 2000:399; McDowell, 2008:339). The distortion of boundaries between civilians and IRA members made it possible for women to combine their everyday social roles with their IRA participation. Behaving in a similar way to civilian women and engaging in comparable activities, which they had likely engaged in as civilians themselves prior to their IRA participation, suggests an imitative gendered learning process. Yet the added internal militant component situated the IRA’s female bomb-carriers in a separate space, distinguishing them from both civilian women and IRA men. As with the concealment of
explosives through external appearance, such imitation was simultaneously a parodic subversion of femininity because the tasks and behaviours imitated were manipulated to achieve strategic operational advantages for the IRA.

In contrast to BH, IS and the IRA, as far as I can find, there is no evidence of children accompanying female LTTE suicide bombers. Rather, the LTTE’s FSBs preferred the appearance of pregnancy as a tactic. The attempted assassination of Nimal Siripala de Silva, the Sri Lankan Minister of Housing, Construction and Public Utilities, in 1996 involved a seemingly pregnant woman (Athas, 1996: para. 6). She approached de Silva’s motorcade as it prepared to move off yet was blocked by a motorcade driver, prompting her self-detonation before reaching her intended target (ibid:8). While Athas’ account provides little detail describing the woman’s performance, it suggests the appearance of the woman’s pregnancy was tactical. Owing to the LTTE’s SRR which enforced strict gender segregation and emphasised female chastity and virtue, and the Black Tigers’ comprehensive selection and training process, it is unlikely that the woman was pregnant.

This tactic was similarly performed by the IRA’s female bomb-carriers, who could be core or periphery members or peripheral associates. Often the assumption of maternal identity was combined with the concealment of explosives through external appearance, feigning pregnancy through the use of synthetic, hollowed-out pregnancy bumps (Bloom, 2011:68). The parodic subversion of social ideals which disassociated motherhood from the use of violence placed security authorities in ‘awkward positions where they would have to go against culturally acceptable behaviour’ (Cragin & Daly, 2009:30). This took advantage of male checkpoint security officials’ hesitancy to invasively search women’s bodies, especially pregnant bodies, for fear of ‘associated negative publicity’ (Alison, 2009a:224; Balasubramaniyan & Raghavan, 2014:202). By exploiting both this hesitancy and inherently patriarchal gender ideologies, women arguably had greater operational freedom than male operatives.

**Role adaption as sanctioned by group**

The final similarity with BH was that of parody as the subversion of femininity was most explicit as a learning mechanism (GMIL) at the group level, exemplified by the types of roles assigned to women adapting to meet group needs.

Contradictions surrounding claims that IS ideologically sanctioned female participation in suicide bombing roles render definitive conclusions difficult. One justification
IS could have used to sanction changes to women’s roles to include suicide bombing was a significant loss of territory induced by pressure from external forces. By October 2017 ‘the caliphate [sic] had lost 60 per cent of its territory’ including Raqqa (Khail, 2019:13). IS may have perceived this as catalyst, transforming their perception of jihad from offensive to defensive. This could have fulfilled the exceptional circumstances required prior to the declaration of a fatwa necessary to legitimise female use of violence. Extending obligatory participation in violent jihad to women would revise previous prohibitions on FSBs, adapting women’s roles in response to IS’s organisational needs.

Yet both attacks analysed here occurred prior to the territorial losses sustained and the publication of what has been termed IS’s ‘call to arms’ for women (Dearden, 2018). However, the narrative accompanying IS’s claiming of the Mombasa attack was divided. Whilst reinforcing a gendered division of labour IS’s response simultaneously suggested that the restriction on female violence was altering. IS described the female attackers as ‘voluntarily shouldering a duty that Allah had placed on the shoulders of the men of the Ummah, the duty of fighting for the cause of Allah’ (Rumiyah, Issue 2, 2016:3). This statement’s message was two-fold, and gendered. For women, it emphasised the exceptionality of female-perpetrated violence, implying that the women acted independently and without IS’s organisational permission. This likely relates to a principal-agent tension, demonstrating how centralised authority and local forms of legitimacy can conflict. As the attack occurred outside of IS-controlled territory, there may not have been a local IS unit that could have directed the women in adhering to gender-appropriate actions. Conversely, the statement can be interpreted as intending to shame men into fighting.\(^{101}\) Although the Mombasa attack undermined IS’s organisational position on women’s use of violence, the attack was claimed because it implied an IS presence in Kenya which had primarily been al-Shabaab’s domain (Withnall, 2016). The release of various statements, including in Rumiyah, enabled the clarification of gender-appropriate roles. IS was thus able to benefit from the attack whilst simultaneously re-entrenching organisational-level authority.

Arguably, the LTTE’s practices surrounding the claiming of attacks served to sanction the adaptation of women’s roles to include suicide bombing. Various Tamil newspapers and websites published FSBs’ and MSBs’ names and ranks (Eager, 2008:138), creating a narrative of martyrdom to honour the LTTE’s dead. Such a practice eulogised a suicide bomber’s self-sacrifice for the collective goal. The depiction of FSBs as a mother who sacrificed herself for

\(^{102}\) As discussed in Chapter Seven, in relation to AQC.
the nation, her ‘children’, sanctioned suicide bombing as an appropriate role for women whilst meeting the LTTE’s organisational needs. In contrast, BH was not reliant upon maintaining wider community support as the LTTE were, thus gave little or no information about the FSBs under their direction.

For the IRA, female bomb-carriers presented an innovative solution to undermine security policies which targeted male actors. Women did not conform to the stereotypical image of IRA members as young, Catholic men. This responded to the IRA’s need to smuggle weapons and explosives undiscovered through checkpoints. Initially, female bomb-carriers offered strategic advantages to the IRA as performances utilising the parodic subversion of femininity increased the likelihood of a woman passing through a checkpoint unsearched. Their evasion of detection was further aided by the opinion that it was inappropriate for men to invasively search women’s bodies. However, this was somewhat curtailed by the introduction of female operatives to security checkpoints who could invasively search women’s bodies without the concern of accusations of inappropriate conduct. This demonstrates that while the assignment of women to certain roles can provide strategic benefits, such benefits are often finite and rely on counter-terrorism methods that perceive the terrorist actor as male.

Chapter Conclusion
Application of the framework found that female performances of suicide bombing roles in BH, IS and the LTTE, in addition to bomb-carrying roles performed by female associates and members of the IRA, subverted feminine stereotypes to maximise the effectiveness of the role’s intended outcomes. Learning processes primarily occurred at the group level, involving parody as the subversion of femininity. This provides a concept that can be applied to instances of suicide bombing in other case studies as it encapsulates ideological and cultural influences on role performances. Conversely, available evidence suggests that individual women in the comparative cases engaged in processes of imitative learning, influenced by their corresponding group’s SRR. All four cases depended upon women performing their bombing or transporting roles ‘as women’ (Taylor, 2000:279), appearing to conform to behaviours and characteristics defined as feminine. The concealment of explosives through external appearance and the assumption of a maternal identity offered performative tactics through which women ‘utilised existing conservative gender constructions and stereotypes to pursue their objectives’ (Alison, 2004:448). While comparable performative tactics were used, these remained culturally relative and influenced by group SRR.
Suicide bombing and bomb-carrying exemplified female and male engagement in the same type of role where gender influenced performative differences. A combination of group attitudes towards women and the use of feminised tactics situated women in gender-differentiated spaces. Performed through female-specific behaviours and characteristics, apparent conformity to existing gender constructions was strategically used to facilitate violence. This disrupted wider social perceptions that women were non-violent and undermined policies within each society directed towards stereotypical male VE actors. It further enabled female actors to access certain targets and locations that were unavailable to men. Female participation widened operational opportunities and increased a group’s capacity to conduct suicide operations, as well as broadening target locations. Men were unlikely to create similar innovative opportunities or to utilise the above tactics to the same effect as women.

In addition to distinguishing between female and male performances, utilising space as an analytical frame exposed differences between female performances of similar roles across groups. The agency an individual possessed related to opportunities for membership status, as informed by variations in gender construction and group attitudes towards women. As a result of focusing on comparing enactments of suicide bombing and bomb-carrying, existing assessments arguably overlook the implications these factors had on performances of these roles. FSBs in BH and the LTTE exemplified contrasting ends of the spectrum. Whereas FSBs deployed by BH were predominately abducted, ‘expendable’ (Oriola, 2016:7), non-Muslim women who were forced into the role, suicide bombing in the LTTE was reserved for only the most committed and experienced trained core members. When compared, BH’s and the LTTE’s FSBs inhabited different spaces within their respective groups. BH’s attitude that its FSBs were disposable restricted these women’s opportunities, yet arguably the LTTE’s approach widened opportunities to the types of roles women could engage with. Organisational structure, ideology and cultural context shaped a group’s attitudes towards women, as exemplified by their SRR. The types of roles women were assigned adapted in response to changes in a group’s needs.

External pressures, such as a reduction in the number of men available or an increase in counter-operations by state forces, provoked changes in organisational needs. All four cases responded to various pressures by altering women’s roles to include suicide bombing or bomb-carrying activities. For BH, FSBs enabled the reservation of its depleted number of male participants for recurring tasks that were perceived to be of greater value to the group, such as raiding villages (Human Rights Watch, 2013). FSBs mitigated an insufficiency of men in IS
and the LTTE, enhancing the capability for violence of both, and further increasing the LTTE’s membership base. However, the inclusion of women in a previously prohibited role required justification achieved by a reinterpretation of each’s SRR. The IRA’s female bomb-carriers enabled the continuation of smuggling operations when those conducted by men were increasingly interrupted.

The internal accommodation of operational change exemplified by adapting women’s roles further indicated parody as the subversion of femininity was explicit as a learning process at the group, rather than individual, level. BH used this learning mechanism as a disciplinary tool to direct coerced FSBs’ performances. In addition to parody as subversion occurring at the group level, female performances analysed from the three comparative cases exemplified imitative learning at the individual level. Each female actor learnt to perform their roles by imitating the socially accepted behaviours and external characteristics displayed by civilian women. In conjunction with performative strategies which subverted femininity, FSBs and female bomb-carriers were situated in a space that differentiated them from their male colleagues (by virtue of their gender) and civilian women (owing to their subversive violent intent). Their role performances adapted to meet changing organisational needs, which in certain situations required innovative tactics, exemplified by BH’s controversial use of women.
Table 8: A table summarising the key findings regarding performances of suicide bombing roles in BH, IS, and the LTTE, in addition to bomb-carrying roles performed by female members of the IRA, as analysed through the framework.
Chapter Ten: Concluding Remarks

My aim in this thesis was to derive an analytical approach from theory to explain why roles that were descriptively categorised as ‘similar’ in type by existing role typologies were performed differently by women across VE groups. Sitting at a nexus of various disciplines within the social sciences, including International Relations, Sociology, and Social Psychology, through this interdisciplinary study I developed a theoretically informed framework as my main analytical tool and applied it to female performances of four role types across seven VE groups. This analysis revealed a fuller account of the range of female involvement in VE, contributing to the gaps I perceived within gender and terrorism studies, as well as feminist terrorism studies specifically.

My principle contribution is to the subfield of work in terrorism studies concerned with the roles women enact in VE groups. This builds upon research by Cragin & Daly (2009) and Mahan & Griset (2013), among others, who constructed descriptive role typologies. Adopting a comparable approach to Vogel et al (2014), but adding a theoretical dimension that was absent from their work, I argue that descriptive role typologies obscure performative nuances. As a result, generalised assumptions become associated with role types which oversimplify the majority of women’s embodied experiences of VE.

I developed the role typology subfield by devising a novel theoretical approach that describes the distinctive space women inhabit when engaging in VE, which has typically been understood in relation to male forms of involvement. Perhaps the most significant finding of my research was that performative differences of ‘similar’ role types can be explained in relation to the spaces individual actors inhabit, distinguishing female VE actors from male participants and civilian women. Such spaces are influenced by contextual factors, organisational needs and learning processes.

I synthesised role theory (Biddle & Thomas, 1979) and a Communities of Practice (CofP) approach (Lave & Wenger, 1991) to provide new insights into how women might learn about the nature of the roles available to them. Learning processes were also important in shaping role performances, which subsequently resulted in my construction of five gendered mechanisms (GMILs) to explore the relationship between gender and learning further. The construction of an analytical approach centred on theory contributed to the feminist terrorism studies literature that has sought to understand how women are positioned within VE groups but which traditionally lacked a theoretical perspective (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007, 2015; Gasztold, 2020; Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger 2018; Third, 2014).
The thesis also contributes to the debate around women’s agency in VE groups that has been a feature of research where terrorism studies and security studies intersect (Tickner, 1988; Elshtain, 1995; Sylvester, 2002). Similar to Sjoberg & Gentry’s conceptualisation of *relational autonomy* (2007; 2015), I find that the agency of the women involved with VE groups is shaped and constrained by broader socio-cultural and organisational factors. My research demonstrates that such analysis of roles reflects the dynamic and complex nature of how women participate in militancy and accounts for diversity in women’s involvement in violent groups, bridging debates about group organisational goals (see, Gill & Young, 2011; Gill et al, 2014; Horgan, 2005) with women’s involvement in VE (Balasubramaniyan & Raghavan, 2014; Dalton & Asal, 2011).

This chapter restates my main conclusions, encapsulated by the argument that female participation in VE is different to, rather than a deviation from, male participation. An overview of the original contributions made by the theoretical framework of analysis follows. I then answer the five research questions in relation to the three recurring themes of *women inhabiting an exclusive space*, *gendered learning processes* and *contextual factors* as framed through the difference rather than deviance argument. My original questions were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ1</th>
<th>Why are roles that are categorised as ‘similar’ in type, performed differently by women across VE groups?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RQ2</td>
<td>What effect do variations in gender construction within groups have on the role of women?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ3</td>
<td>If women and men perform the same type of role, how is this gendered and performed differently in terms of femininity and masculinity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ4</td>
<td>In what ways do the roles of women adapt to meet the organisational needs of the group?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ5</td>
<td>How can we understand differences in role performance across extremist groups?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A reproduction of Table 1, from Chapter One.*

I end with suggestions for further academic research in the field and potential policy applications for this thesis.

**Difference not deviance**

Female participation is different from male participation, rather than deviant. The absence of a gender reflexive perspective has historically stereotyped violent men as representative of all VE actors. The inclusion of a gender reflexive perspective would alter the way VE is perceived, recognising the dynamism of VE engagement. Emphasising the differences between female actors offers a value-neutral judgement and accepts the presence of women in VE spheres of participation.
This research is thus a response to two critiques identified within the literature. The first relates to the construction of women as exceptional actors within VE groups, as is the broader trend visible within terrorism studies which privileges men’s experiences as the ‘norm’ (as discussed by Gilbert, 2002; Herman, 2009-2010; Möller-Leimkühler, 2018). Rather, my approach aligns with the gender and terrorism sub-field, which recognises the existence, and heterogeneity of, women’s experiences (exemplified by Sjoberg, 2009; Parashar, 2010; Jacoby, 2015). The second concerns the generalised nature of existing typologies which categorise forms of female participation (see, Mahan & Griset, 2013; Cragin & Daly, 2009). These typologies perpetuate inaccurate representations of female participation by indicating performative homogeneity across roles categorised as ‘similar’ in type. My framework of analysis built upon these typologies by including a theoretical perspective.

Differences in performances of ‘similar’ role types can be explained through the three themes of space, learning processes and context, manifesting as VE women inhabiting a third space. Emphasising the dynamism of women’s VE engagement, which was not linear or static, adopted an approach prevalent in feminist terrorism studies. This recognises that female engagement involved participation in multiple, intersecting roles and identities simultaneously. In terms of agency, an iterative relationship between socio-cultural context, individual choices and group structures and needs informed female participation, differentiating VE women from male actors and civilian women.

Constructed specifically for this research, my framework synthesised aspects of Butler’s gender performativity theory (GPT) (1988; 1999), role theory (exemplified by Linton, 1936; Biddle, 1986), and a Communities of Practice (CofP) approach (Lave & Wenger, 1991), with each providing a key component to my analytical approach. GPT framed gender as a flexible social construction, relative to, and regulated by, socio-cultural settings.

A clear definition of a role is absent from much research into female VE participation, thus engagement with role theory specified an appropriate definition which communicated the interpretation of a role as used throughout the thesis. My definition understood individual performances as directed by group expectations of the role, informed by my interpretation of relational autonomy.

Conceptualising each group as a CofP enabled the examination of a group’s accumulated knowledge (Smith, 2003), including ideology and practices, as a shared repertoire of resources (SRR) (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Such an interpretation centred contextual factors
as integral to informing performative differences. This illustrated how roles were understood by, and communicated to, group members.

An exploration of the more complex processes implicated in women’s involvement in militancy was facilitated by the creation of my theoretically informed framework. I applied this framework to descriptions of role performances by interrogating the data. Questions were divided into three levels of analysis. The social level explored how a role was made intelligible and effective. The individual level outlined how the role was performed. The group level assessed the processes which informed how a role was learnt. My framework further considered the effects of interactions between levels, offering a more holistic analysis which defined the parameters of the space in which VE women performed their roles.

Further interpretations of a CofP approach towards learning, combined with GPT, developed five gendered mechanisms of interactional learning (GMILs).

These mechanisms served a dual-purpose. First of all, through the GMILs, this research makes an original theoretical contribution. The GMILs acted as my operationalisation of Butler’s abstract gender performativity theory, further extending the otherwise limited application of Butler’s theory into terrorism studies (see Méndez, 2012).

Additionally, the GMILs formed a second analytical tool used in conjunction with the framework. The GMILs facilitated an assessment of the embodied actions that contributed to the performance of a role, and where data was available, provided insight into the learning processes which contributed to these performances. When conceptualised as learning processes, the GMILs applied a gendered interpretation of the CofP approach, extending these concepts into an area unexplored by previous research analysing VE activity through CofP models (see, for example Hundeide, 2003; Kenney, 2017).

My application of the framework and the GMILs to role performances found that the social construction of gender can be utilised as a tool by violent extremist groups and their participants. To fully assess the impact of gender on VE, a more nuanced interpretation of how women contributed to VE groups and activities is necessary. Constructing VE women as deviant fails to fully comprehend how women contribute to groups and achieve outcomes that male participants may be unable to achieve. The development and use of the framework and
GMILs to analyse role performances offers an original contribution to the field, that moves beyond descriptive accounts found within the current role typology literature by producing a level of analytical detail that distinguishes between female performances of ‘similar’ role types. In addition to offering a different perspective on gender and role performances, taking a theoretically informed starting point provides a fuller account of the range of women’s involvement in VE groups. Such an analytical perspective offers not only an alternative perspective but also greater insight into the variations between the roles enacted, despite using apparently identical descriptions. It enables the researcher to separate the realities of the VE actors from the limitations created by the vocabulary, as encouraged by feminist terrorism studies literature.

**VE women inhabiting an exclusive space**

As the first recurring theme, the articulation of a third space from which women performed VE roles provides a lens through which to analyse female role performances without constructing female engagement as exceptional or deviant. Constructed from an amalgamation of group needs and individual actions, this space overlapped aspects of, yet was distinct from, the spaces inhabited by male VE actors and civilian women. Influenced by Gilbert’s sociological research (2002) and the trajectory of the feminist terrorism studies literature, galvanised by Sjoberg & Gentry (2007; 2015), who challenged the previously accepted construction of terrorism in masculine terms to reveal the impact of excluding women as rational VE actors, my first theme similarly critiques the idea of female deviancy in violent arenas. In recognising that female participation is different, as opposed to deviant, the various effects femininity can have on violent extremism become visible. The extent to which group conceptualisations of gender conform to or subvert prevailing norms within wider society influenced the types of roles assigned to women and how these roles were performed in relation to a group’s needs and aims.

Awareness that VE women inhabit a distinct space can broaden understandings of violent extremism beyond the entrenched agent/victim dichotomy. Advances in research advocating for the analysis of gender in relation to VE has already identified that this dichotomy does not accurately reflect all the ways in which women variously engaged in and experienced VE (Gilmartin, 2017) or how engagement altered during the course of an individual’s involvement (La & Pickett, 2019). It also failed to recognise that some VE participants can be both agents and victims simultaneously. The inclusion of non-violent roles in my analysis (*Chapters Six and Seven*) demonstrated the myriad contributions individuals can
make to VE groups. Outcomes from non-violent roles, such as maintaining and sustaining a group’s existence, were frequently overlooked in existing literature owing to the conflation of ‘active’ participation with the use of violence, further emphasising the need for a gender reflexive analysis.

Application of the framework and gendered learning mechanisms provide tools which not only challenge this dichotomy from an analytical perspective but enable the analysis of female participation from within a third space. The three group membership statuses (core and periphery members, peripheral associates) cannot always be clearly distinguished from each other. Assistance offered to an individual member by their kin or peer relations, and the experiences of women who were coerced or forced into VE involvement further complicate the absolute categorisation of an individual as an agent or a victim. Assessing female role performances in relation to a distinct space does not solve this difficulty but it does facilitate the inclusion of these factors in the analysis, providing a more holistic account of experiences in VE.

Variations in gender constructions across groups effected this creation of the third space and conceptualisations of gender-appropriate behaviours and characteristics. Role opportunities for women were restricted or widened accordingly [RQ2]. When combined with adaptations made to women’s roles in response to organisational needs, this highlighted performative differences in roles categorised as ‘similar’ in type. A group’s reinterpretation of ideology and gender norms legitimised alterations to the types of roles assigned to women. Where necessary, such alterations aided wider social acceptance of role changes. Often motivated by external pressures and group needs, this contributed to widening opportunities for women to engage in previously restricted, violent roles. Conversely, groups that prioritised ideological purity were more likely to restrict women to stereotypically feminine roles, limiting access to other role types [RQ4].

Depending upon their level of agency, individual women could also create new spaces for themselves, either by petitioning the group’s leadership to widen women’s role opportunities, or by utilising femininity to their advantage whilst performing a role [RQ5]. Within a group context, women were differentiated from each other by their membership status which further informed differences between women who performed similar types of roles across groups. Although group and individual contributions towards creating a female-specific space could occur independently of one another, arguably they often converged, as informed by contextual factors [RQ1].
Chapter Ten: Concluding Remarks

Perceiving women as engaging in VE through inhabiting a third space contributes a conceptualisation of women’s participation that moves beyond victim/agent binaries as well as recognising that participation is not limited to the use of violence. I extend discussions surrounding agency and female suicide bombers (FSBs) by La & Pickett (2019), Brown (2011), and Marway (2011) into the performances of other role types. This makes visible more forms of female participation in VE and aids reflecting on performative nuances, following Grossman et al’s approach to reject either/or binaries in favour of a ‘both/and’ approach (2018:13). When combined with my third space argument, such an approach captures how women can perform multiple, possibly contrasting, roles requiring engagement in a range of both violent and non-violent activities, simultaneously.

Gendered learning processes
The second theme that explains performative differences of roles categorised as ‘similar’ in type was the evaluation of the processes through which an individual learnt to perform their role. This theme drew most heavily on the CofP literature, yet reconceptualised it to fit VE learning contexts. Gendered elements were included through synthesising CofP principles with Butler’s theory.

Individualised learning processes contributed to how roles were performed and could result in differences between female and male understandings of how to perform a comparable role, such as combat, within a group. This explains how female and male performances of the same type of role were gendered [RQ3]. My focus on gendered processes signifies a departure from feminist terrorism studies, which critiques literature that draws on ‘expectations and assumptions about their [women’s] gender’ (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2015:31) to discuss the violence of women. In utilising socially constructed understandings of gender as an analytical tool, my approach seeks to gain an awareness of how the groups themselves understood and utilised gender. More conservative groups, such as IS or the LTTE prior to the incorporation of women as combatants, tended to promote naturally inherent, essentialised differences between female and male participation. However, despite gender appearing as a fixed and static identity, analysis through my framework derived from GPT (Butler, 1988; 1991) indicates that gender existed as a flexible and fluid construct. I argue that conceptions of gender, particularly femininity, informed group attitudes towards female participation and suggests VE groups are aware of the salience of gender.
Despite the groups which included women in combat presenting it as a gender-neutral role, assessment through the GMILs demonstrates that group attitudes towards female combatants framed their activities in relation to accepted feminine norms. Women learnt to perform this role through gendered processes which subsequently influenced how the role was performed and differentiated it from male performances, despite utilising similar mechanistic activities, such as shooting a weapon. The use of tactics which emphasised femininity, even while subverting feminine norms, further differentiated performances. In certain situations, the deployment of a feminised actor could gain specific tactical advantages for a group that men could not achieve; thus femininity was used as a tool [RQ3].

I find that certain role performances were gendered as feminine and performed in a way that utilises socio-cultural understandings of femininity in order to achieve certain aims and outcomes for a group. To perform a role in gendered way served a particular purpose. This involved the use of gender-informed tactics which resulted in performative differences [RQ3]. Thus, notions of femininity were integral to certain role performances and tactics. As long as VE remains as framed by ‘malestream’ narratives (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007:174; Parashar, 2010), femininity will continue to offer groups a strategic advantage (O’Rourke, 2009; Taylor, 2000; Onuoha & George, 2015). Instead of perceiving female use of violence as exceptional, it is of analytical use to recognise why and within which contexts women may be deployed in violent roles, and what benefits this is perceived to bring the group. In role types where the activities performed by women and men were comparable and seemingly gender-neutral, such as combat, gender continued to have an influence, but in relation to group attitudes towards women and individual learning processes rather than individual performance.

There were certain examples where it was not possible to access data to facilitate the assessment of individual learning processes, particularly in relation to BH’s coerced female suicide bombers. Nevertheless, in these instances, the group’s participation in learning processes could be seen, in terms of assigning specific roles to women or directing roles to be performed in ways that utilised femininity to provide tactical advantages. Most of the groups analysed adapted the roles of women in some way, suggesting that they had learnt how to respond to organisational needs [RQ4].

Differences in role performances across groups can be understood as informed by gendered learning processes, particularly relating to the amount of consistency between a group’s SRR and wider social norms [RQ5]. Thus, ‘similar’ types of roles were learnt in different
ways which could have manifested as performative differences. The creation of the GMILS as mechanisms to articulate and assess learning processes moves beyond describing role performances, to analysing how and why roles were performed differently [RQ1].

**Contextual factors**

Finally, the presence of contextual factors provides a lens through which to understand differences in role performances and helps to explain why roles that are categorised as ‘similar’ in type are performed differently by women across VE groups. This builds upon the idea of *relationality* as it refers to individual autonomy and agency in addition to group structure as a context shaping opportunities for individual participation. The individual agency aspect stems from the gender and terrorism literature, as explored by Auchter (2012) and Sjoberg & Gentry (2007; 2015) whereas the focus on the group is present within broader debates surrounding terrorism research, exemplified by Hoffman ([1998], 2006) and Gill & Young (2011). My use of three analytical units (social, individual, group) contributes to discourses found within these broader literatures by providing as holistic an analysis as possible whilst recognising generalisable group-level trends. An iterative relationship exists between roles, individual autonomy and group structure, as understood from a relational perspective, where these contextual factors, in addition to wider socio-cultural norms restrict or widen participation opportunities for women.

Differences in role performances can be understood as resulting from variations in contextual factors, ranging from a group’s ideological commitments, group needs and aims, the intended outcome and purpose of a role, conformity or disassociation from wider socio-cultural gender norms, the membership status of an individual, external pressure placed upon a group and expectations regarding appropriate roles for women held by a group [RQ5]. These factors contribute to creating varying conditions which alter how a type of role is performed. They further inform the diverse spaces in which women occupied and performed their roles and shaped the types of gendered learning processes women engaged with, thus resulting in performative differences specific to different VE groups [RQ1].

Contextual variations in group gender constructions and attitudes towards women contributed to the creation of female-specific VE spaces, from which women performed their roles [RQ2]. A group’s construction of gender further influenced the range of opportunities available to female actors, including role types. Where wider society’s sexual division of labour was based upon dichotomous binaries which associated masculinity with violence and
femininity with non-violence, this was largely replicated through role allocation within VE groups.

However, changes to role types assigned to women could develop as a response to organisational needs, facilitating female engagement in violent roles [RQ4]. Yet even where women were included in violent roles that had previously been closed to them, gendered expectations and characteristics continued to exist. This suggests that, rather than becoming irrelevant, conceptualisations of gender adapted and became more fluid in response to organisational needs. Across the case studies examined, group needs varied and changed according to the amalgamation and manifestation of contextual factors. Ideological comparisons could be made, as seen in AQC, IS and BH, which might suggest homogenous performances of similar role types. Yet when combined with other factors, such as local grievances, external pressures, or the socio-cultural milieu in which a group operated, performative differences occurred [RQ2].

As demonstrated throughout this research, several role performances span category boundaries. I argue that roles are social constructions that are contextually informed, thus the value of these broad descriptions as analytical tools is debatable [RQ5]. For example, ideological transmission and historical conscience activities can be categorised as aspects of the mother roles when performed in AQC. However, these activities can be performed by female and male actors of varying relationships and membership statuses within the IRA and ETA, as forms of recruitment.

While the influence of contextual factors is not a new argument, an in-depth analysis of their effects on role performance is not often considered. Many of the sub-disciplines that my research is situated within, such as role theory (Biddle, 2013), role types (Vogel et al, 2014), and debates surrounding agency (Auchter, 2012), are concerned with context. Synthesising these various conceptualisations and deriving the analytical framework from three social constructivist theories enabled me to position contextual factors as key to my overall argument. Expressing certain contextual factors as contributing to a group’s SRR stemmed from my use of the CoP model, without which an assessment of the impact broader socio-cultural and organisational factors had on the types of roles considered appropriate for women would not have been possible. These factors subsequently effected individual role performances. Thus, the further development and analysis of the relationship between these different levels might contribute to the development of a predictive model of likely behaviours.
**Further research**
In addition to contributing to the wider terrorism literature in numerous ways, this thesis identifies several directions for future research. For ease of discussion, these are discussed thematically, in terms of academic and policy implications, although the two are interconnected.

**Academic**
The most apparent extension of this research into future projects would be the application of the framework and GMILs to female performances of other role types and VE case studies. If applied by other researchers, their individual positionality would likely yield differing findings. Nevertheless, use of the framework in other studies would provide data to test whether the analytical process is replicable and contains adequate mechanisms for the framework to be applied to other role performances and case studies.

Other extremist roles, such as leadership (Weinburg & Eubank, 2011; Georges-Abeyie, 1983), intelligence gathering (Ness, 2005:358; Mahan & Griset, 2013:243), fundraising (Broadwell, 2006), or religious educator (Saltman & Smith, 2015; von Knop, 2007) could be analysed through the framework. Variations of these roles and activities were performed by women across several of the case studies examined in this research, thus there is some data already in existence that could be assessed. The framework could further be applied to other VE groups in which women participated, such as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) (Celebi, 2010; Haner et al, 2020). A further focus on European and American far-right groups, including the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) (Blee, 1996; 2005), Norwegian group Valkyria (Fangen, 1997), and National Action in the UK could also be beneficial.\(^\text{102}\)

Moreover, in response to my argument that current role typologies are too broad and descriptive, the findings derived from the framework could in future be used to conceptualise an alternative method of categorising female participatory behaviours that is more specific than role typology categorisations.

A further example of the way in which this research could be developed relates to the role experiences of female former IS associates who resided in Kurdish administered refugee camps, such as Al-Hawl and Al-Roj. A comparison of the types of role women performed whilst residing in the ‘Caliphate’ with the types of roles performed now they are living in these camps would offer implications for understanding how space influences role performance, and how role types and activities adapt according to space and environmental changes. It might be

\(^\text{102}\) No academic research into female participation in National Action exists.
possible to use the analysis of the type of role a woman performs to gain an understanding of her status within the camp’s IS supporters and so gauge the extent to which a woman may still be ideologically committed to IS. Moving beyond the application of the framework, research into memory and cultural reproduction, specifically how grievances are shared and passed to future generations through inter-generational and/or peer-to-peer transmission, could further aid a more nuanced understanding of the types of activities IS women engaged with and the possible long term implications and consequences of these actions in relation to calculating the potential security risk of returning women. This would follow on from the aim of this research to emphasise the importance and long-term consequences of female participation in non-violent VE roles, such as ideological transmission and communicating grievances to future generations who may in turn be so motivated. Such a project would likely also have policy implications, relating to international government responses to the repatriation or otherwise of women who migrated to join IS. Once such an academic study had been conducted, the findings could provide insight into framing appropriate and proportionate policy implications.

Policy
In terms of policy implications, the framework and GMILs formulated by my research could be streamlined into an analytical toolkit to aid the assessment of returning women who migrated to IS, facilitating an assessment on a case-by-case basis. Recently released research (see Brown & Rhydian Morgan, 2019; Brown, 2019; Davis, 2020; Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, 2019:11,16; 2020) has emphasised the importance of individual assessments rather than generic policies, but has not as yet presented a method by which these assessments could be conducted. As the framework is designed to account for a host of contextual factors and reflect individual experiences, it could have international applicability.

Owing to the comparative approach outlined in this thesis and the application of the framework to seven VE groups, my research has the potential to inform policy in relation to a wide range of different groups. It demonstrates the importance of considering the long-term nature of women’s participation and impact in VE groups, including the diverse ways this manifests for a group and how it changes over time. Breaking the analysis of a role performance into social, individual and group levels provides an overview of how the three levels interact to contribute to a role’s performance, but also enables a more in-depth analysis at one specific level.
Moreover, the exploration of the relationship between the type of role assigned and an individual’s membership status suggests that roles can be used as a means of understanding the various positions of women within a group. It can be further indicative of a woman’s ideological commitment, although this is relative to each group. Although a ‘similar’ type of role, the comparison reveals how roles become associated with, and allocated to, specific membership statuses as well as demonstrative of different group attitudes towards women. This may be of use to practitioners because utilising roles as a means of understanding women’s positions within a group provides insight into the importance a group places on particular roles and their intended outcomes. In providing a more detailed view of how a group operates, and the contributions women especially make, counter-terrorism responses could be targeted towards these roles and outcomes.

Finally, my research has implications for detailing the intergenerational processes that might be operating. Expanding the types of activities that are understood to contribute towards VE places greater emphasis on the contributions non-violent roles make. Recognising the potential for the transmission of ideology or grievances to occur in place of traditionally understood forms of direct participation in a group has ramifications for the potential radicalisation of younger generations or kin and peer contacts.
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