Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings : Evidence from horse racing

Butler, D. and Butler, R. and Simmons, R. (2022) Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings : Evidence from horse racing. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 60 (1). pp. 152-175. ISSN 0007-1080

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Abstract

A considerable body of evidence shows that performance-related pay schemes can raise worker productivity with much of this increase due to worker sorting. However, variations in the power of performance-related pay contracts are rarely observed. The thoroughbred horse racing industry offers such an opportunity. Contrary to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker shirking when the power of incentive contracts is reduced through jockeys switching from complete performance-related pay schemes into a salaried (retainer) contract. Moreover, salary contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance continuing for elite jockeys even after their salary agreements have expired. We argue this is due to a reduction in monitoring costs. © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Item Type:

Journal Article

Journal or Publication Title:

British Journal of Industrial Relations

Uncontrolled Keywords:

/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1400/1400

Subjects:

?? general business,management and accountingorganizational behavior and human resource managementmanagement of technology and innovationbusiness, management and accounting(all) ??

Departments:

Lancaster University Management School > Economics

ID Code:

154705

Deposited By:

ep_importer_pure

Deposited On:

10 May 2021 16:00

Refereed?:

Yes

Published?:

Published

Last Modified:

19 Aug 2024 23:51

URI:

https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/154705