Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

Barbosa, Klenio and De Silva, Dakshina and Yang, Liyu and Yoshimoto, Hisayuki (2021) Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. ISSN 1945-7669 (In Press)

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Abstract

This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers-the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank-to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these estimates indicate that there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond-yield rate measurements and participation behavior.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
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Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000
Subjects:
ID Code:
153756
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
13 Apr 2021 10:35
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
In Press
Last Modified:
24 Jun 2021 04:02