Three essays on education, epistemic legitimacy, and their relationship with social justice

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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This thesis results entirely from my own work and has not been offered previously for any other degree or diploma. It conforms to the permitted maximum word-length (46,591 words including appendices)

Signature: 

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Abstract

This thesis draws attention to the contemporary (and historic) admiration for conceptions of 'powerful knowledge' (Young, 1995 [1971]) or 'epistemic access' (Morrow, 2009) in response to a public dismissal of intellectualism. This thesis argues that this focus, in educational theory and research, on power through access to, and participation in, a universal idea of knowledge does little to acknowledge that education, and particularly higher education, has not had many of the economic, political or social effects that this premise of 'powerful knowledge' proposes (for example, Hendel *et al.*, 2005 ; Jencks, 2002 ; Roth, 2019 ; Wolf, 2002).

This thesis argues that by expanding on discussions of 'legitimacy' as seen in the historic and contemporary literature on the social, political, and economic power of knowledge, that a distinct conception of 'epistemic legitimacy' can be created and utilised to theorise this gap. In this sense, 'epistemic legitimacy' is characterised as 'the utility' of knowledge for epistemic participation in the public sphere separate from any exercise of power or value.

By using a history of ideas – from the three separate intellectual traditions of social, political and economic legitimacy – this thesis traces the interaction between these concepts, and argues that 'epistemic legitimacy' is a model which expands the 'bureaucratic imaginary' at the heart of Young and Muller's conception of 'powerful knowledge' and contributes models for the development of the use of 'powerful knowledge' for the conception of a new reality, and the 'authority of knowledge' to affect an individual change or development in line with this reality.

This view allows a conception of 'powerful knowledge' as part of the historic (and ongoing) struggle between institutional and structural knowledge ('bureaucracy') and the authority within the public sphere to enable action and change ('entrepreneurship'), and therefore, in turn, informs our understanding of the gaps in social justice theories which presuppose a link between access to, and participation in education; and social, economic, and political effects – theories such as social mobility.

Contents

Acknowledgements

All doctoral theses are a collective project: not only the prior work on which arguments are built but also the thoughtful criticisms of others. For every word that is written, its strengths, future developments and limitations are not always clear until kind and generous critique is applied.

With this in mind, I would like to particularly thank my supervisor, Professor Malcolm Tight, for his time and patience as this project took its course through both silence and intense engagement. I would also like to dedicate much of the argument to the late Professor Sir David Watson – who acted as my first doctoral supervisor – and discussed and commented on so many of the themes in this project at its inception and without the memory of whose initial encouragement this project would never have been completed.

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Finally, I would like to thank my boys and partner. Braidon and Ralph, I hope that one day I will be fortunate enough to be able to do as much to help you achieve some of your dreams: as your love, giggles, and cuddles have helped me to achieve this one of mine. And to my partner, Mark, there is nothing that could ever express how important and kind you are to me – all my achievements are shared with you.

As grateful as I am for all this help and assistance it is necessary to say that responsibility for the shortcomings of this work are entirely mine.

List of abbreviations

HDI	Human Development Index
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America

List of Figures and Tables

Notes on referencing and language

This thesis uses references (citations, footnotes, and bibliographic entries) formatted according to the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 7th Edition (2020)* and due to the importance of the historical context of many of the texts used to the development of the argument all citations include the original date of publication as outlined in the style.

In addition, as this thesis has ideas and arguments that were first published in languages other than English, the main text uses an English translation to ease the flow of the text for the reader. In cases where texts in their original language have gendered pronouns, this thesis uses the collective pronoun in the English translation. However, where the text uses an author translation the gendered pronouns have been kept.

Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational. This consists on the one hand of technical knowledge which, by itself, is sufficient to ensure it a position of extraordinary power. But in addition to this, bureaucratic organisations, or the holders of power who make use of them, have the tendency to increase their power still further by the knowledge growing out of experience in the service. For they acquire through the conduct of office - special knowledge of facts and have available a store of documentary material peculiar to themselves. While not peculiar to bureaucratic organizations, the concept of "official secrets" is certainly typical of them. It stands in relation to technical knowledge in somewhat the same position as commercial secrets do to technological training. It is a product of the striving for power.

Only the capitalist entrepreneur, within their sphere of interest, is superior to bureaucracy in the knowledge of techniques and facts. They are the only type who has been able to maintain at least relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge. In large-scale organizations, all others are inevitably subject to bureaucratic control, just as they have fallen under the dominance of precision machinery in the mass production of goods.

In general, bureaucratic domination has the following social consequences:
(1) The tendency to "levelling" in the interest of the broadest possible basis of recruitment in terms of technical competence.
(2) The tendency to plutocracy growing out of the interest in the greatest possible length of technical training. Today this often lasts up to the age of thirty.
(3) The dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality: "Sine ira et studio," without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm.

The dominant norms are concepts of straightforward duty without regard to personal considerations. Everyone is subject to formal equality of treatment; that is everyone in the same empirical situation. This is the spirit in which the ideal official conducts their office.

Max Weber (1978 [1922]) Economy and Society, p. 225

Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Framing

> The day revealed by Saint-Simon approaches in which each shall have an inheritance, and each will receive from the distributor state the means of production - an education - and will thus function in line with their vocation.
> Anonymous (1831) De la propriété, *Le Globe 7*, p. 11

> Hence the crucial link between the entitlement to 'powerful knowledge', the curriculum and the universal right to schooling. Only if you do not think there is 'better knowledge' that all have a right to, would the principle of social justice reject the entitlement to specialised powerful knowledge through the curriculum.
> Michael F.D. Young and Johan Muller (2013) On the powers of powerful knowledge, p. 231

1.1 Overview

This thesis contributes to discussions of how education can drive social justice through a development and expansion of Michael Young's model of 'powerful knowledge' (Young, 1995 [1971], 2007, 2010b, 2013a, 2013b ; Young *et al.*, 2014 ; Young & Muller, 2011, 2013). The debate about education and social justice has continued since Plato, as education has often been positioned as a – if not *the* – force for social mobility, emancipation, and ultimately justice. Whether individuals can freely access and participate in education; whether education enables individuals to think independently and challenge the status quo; whether education qualifies individuals for participation in the structures of power and authority; are all questions posed to gauge the effectiveness of educational decisions and policies of different societies.

But this thesis is built on the observation that this contention is unusual in discourses of power in that it is politically neutral. While the political right often contends that education underpins the creation and sustainability of a 'great meritocracy' and the

political left advance that education is part of the "awakening of the critical and political consciousness" both argue for education – its institutions and techniques – as the driver for a more equal society. Education is seen as the primary contributor to social, political and economic policies which enable individuals to fully participate in society unbounded by social convention or position (for example, see Apple, 2014 ; Ellsworth, 1989 ; Whitehead, 1959 [1916]; Young, 1994 [1958]).[1] This unanimity in the face of what are otherwise contentious debates about social, economic and political power raises questions about the special position given to education in this discourse.[2]

To analyse this further, this thesis draws attention to the contemporary (and historic) admiration for conceptions of 'powerful knowledge' (Young, 1995 [1971]) or 'epistemic access' (Morrow, 2009). These concepts - coined in relation to curriculum studies by Young (1995 [1971]) based on Durkheim's (1983 [1913]) lectures on the nature of knowledge – are taken to refer to a broad range of epistemic processes linking access to, and participation in, education with social, political and economic status or power. Further, 'powerful knowledge' is not only 'information' but 'ways of thinking'; both related to and unrelated to itself and a form of objective reality: it is "knowledge that […] takes its meanings from us as social beings but in ways that are quite unlike those associated with our everyday experience and opinions" (Young & Muller, 2013, p. 230)

Therefore, 'powerful knowledge' is conceptualised as product, process and

[1] For examples of these positions, see Theresa May's Britain, the great meritocracy: Prime Minister's speech (2016), Theresa May's Britain, the great meritocracy: Prime Minister's speech (2016) and Friedrich Friedmann's Youth and society (1971), particularly p. 43 from which the above quote is taken.

[2] Indeed, some of these are referenced as 'articles of faith' by Jon Nixon's Higher education and the public good (2010) in his discussion of protecting higher education against the capitalist privatisation model and its effects.

relationship: subject, object and action.

However, this thesis argues that this focus does little to acknowledge that education, and particularly higher education, has not had many of the economic, political or social effects that the premises, arguments, and conclusions of 'powerful knowledge' and its inextricable link with curriculum and education propose (for example, Hendel *et al.*, 2005 ; Jencks, 2002 ; Roth, 2019 ; Wolf, 2002). In this way, it does not seem to hold the power to create social change or the power for individuals to overcome social barriers. So how does an object so revered across the political spectrum become 'powerful' while at the same time lack 'power' itself?

This thesis argues that by expanding on discussions of 'legitimacy' as seen in the historic and contemporary literature on the social, political, and economic power of knowledge, and particularly building upon Weber's conception that "[s]uperior to [the power of knowledge … it] is only the capitalist entrepreneur [who …] maintain[s] at least relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge", can a distinct conception of 'epistemic legitimacy' be created.

Further, this thesis proposes that this distinction can utilise social, economic and political literature to further explore why some impacts of 'powerful knowledge' theories may not be seen in the empirical literature to the same extent as theorised. In this sense, 'epistemic legitimacy' seeks to explore 'powerful knowledge' theories and their often implicit building on Weber's (1978 [1922], p. 225) "inevitabl[e] subject[ion] to bureaucratic control" through application of the ideas of 'legitmacy' from social, economic and political perspective to show how educational knowledge is utilised for the epistemic participation in social justice which requires emancipation across all three domains.

This thesis, therefore, traces the interaction between these concepts, and argues that 'epistemic legitimacy' is a public exchange affecting the 'authority of knowledge' that is disconnected from the existence or intrinsic usefulness or value of knowledge outside of these contexts or any attempt to use knowledge as the basis of power. In other words, 'legitimate authority' controls the social acceptance of knowledge in the exercise of social, economic, and political power required to affect the structural changes which underpin socially just outcomes.

This view allows a conception of 'powerful knowledge' as part of the historic (and ongoing) struggle between institutional and structural power ('bureaucracy') and the authority within the public sphere to enable action and change ('entrepreneurship') which, in turn, informs our understanding of the gaps in social justice theories which presuppose a link between access to, and participation in, education and socially just outcomes.

1.2 Context

> At best there is a greater indifference towards those who possess the knowledge and evidence to better inform policymaking on a national and international level. At worst there is actual hostility expressed to "experts" presented as part of a distant and malevolent elite. […]
>
> At a time when many of the values [universities] hold dear are under threat, we need to do a better job of explaining our contribution to society and how essential rigour, clear communication, training in critical thinking and genuine academic debate are to the good that we do.
> Minouche Shafik (2017a) Experts must fight back, para. 7&15

The dismissal of experts and expertise has been a widely noted feature of social and political discourse over the last five to ten years – Brexit; political populism in the US,

France and Sweden (for example, see Durant, 2015 ; Suiter, 2016 ; Tallis, 2016).[3] It is argued that the knowledge and thinking of 'the expertariat' – universities, scholars, and other 'intellectual elites' – should have no more weight in public debate and policy than the views of any other individuals (or citizens).[4] In opposition to this, universities and scholars are often, as outlined in the quote above, encouraged to respond to this (perceived) rejection through means such as better explanations, publicising their core methodologies (their 'epistemic goods') and exalting their ability to contribute to a socially just society (Kotzee, 2018).

Further recent research in disciplines such as the 'public understanding of science' (for example, Cofnas *et al.*, 2018 ; Gauchat, 2011, 2012, 2015) suggests that social attitudes against intellectualism (and universities-as-institutions and scholars-as-actors) have become more wide-spread and have hardened from holding simple anti-intellectual views (for example, the unwillingness to debate; or a disregard for universities as useful institutions) to a more active de-legitimisation or post-truth culture (for example, see Koehn, 1995 ; Sismondo, 2017 ; Tallis, 2016 ; Tileagă, 2007) and almost total rejection of the proposed power of collective intellectualism in the public sphere (for example, see Barnett, 1998, 2003 ; Jasanoff, 2004 ; Jasanoff, 2012).[5]

Within this, esoteric or specialised knowledge and intellectualism are considered an over-complication in all areas of social, political, and economic life and 'common sense' or obvious reality reified. Knowledge (and often education or its institutions

[3] For further exploration of the impact on higher education, see Michael Peters, Sharon Rider, *et al.* (Eds.). Post-truth, fake news: Viral modernity & higher education (2018).

[4] 'Expertariat' is a term coined in 2017 by an advisor to US President Donald Trump, Myron Ebell, in a speech on climate change policy (Ebell in Damian Carrington's Green movement 'greatest threat to freedom', says Trump adviser (2017)).

[5] For further exploration of post-truth cultures see, Jane Suiter's Post-truth politics, *Political Insight* (2016), Benjamin Tallis's Living in Post-truth: Power/Knowledge/Responsibility, *New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* (2016). For the impact of post-truth on universities, which will be explored in more depth in Chapter 2, see Michael Peters, Sharon Rider, *et al.* (Eds.). Post-truth, fake news: Viral modernity & higher education (2018).

such as universities) is viewed as inherently dangerous – powerful – which can destabilise the social, political, and economic structures. However, alongside these capitalist models and entrepreneurs take on positions of reverence in the social, political and economic imaginaries of the same cultures. The capitalist celebrity – Trump, Branson, Musk – is encouraged to create the destabilisation so feared of knowledge institutions while building on myths of their limited education but celebrated natural intelligence (for example, see Marvel *et al.*, 2016 ; McCaffrey, 2009b ; O'Donnell, 1973). Thus, it is important to note that anti-intellectualism references a very strong tradition which is at odds with the theories, cultures, and principles of many of the theories of how education creates social justice and particularly the model of 'powerful knowledge' as discussed by Young in his 2014 book on the topic (for further exploration, see Neimark *et al.*, 2019 ; Waldorf, 2012).

While sociologies, philosophies and economies of knowledge differ considerably in their consideration of how these epistemic goods contribute to social effect, there is considerable synergy around the belief that 'epistemic goods' themselves (as an object such as knowledge, epistemic relationships or as action such as participation in education) are sufficient to achieve the desired effects for individuals. However, these discussions of the influence of knowledge – including those within the discipline of the sociology of knowledge such as Nico Stehr (2015) or Karl Mannheim (1997 [1936]) – either closely relate or completely collapse education into its representative social institutions, individuals, and actions - at a minimum treating them all as mutually dependent, inseparable, or essential to the effects of any one component. For example, Michael F.D. Young and Johan Muller (2013, p. 231) state:

> [N]ew specialised knowledge requires specialist institutions like universities and research institutes. To transmit such knowledge to the next generation also requires specialist institutions. These may be universities, colleges or schools. Specialised knowledge is not acquired or produced informally as part of

people's every day lives.

A consequence of this collapse is that public policy often follows on and judges access to institutions or simple participation in the action of education as sufficient to create a desired social impact with 'social justice' often being foremost among these (Stoddart, 2007). [6]

Within such educational discourse, there are no repercussions on a theory of powerful knowledge that is accessed and actioned by educative means. The assumption, rarely argued is, if an individual accesses, accepts, utilises the outcomes of education (in other words "full participation" (Amor *et al.*, 2019)) then the outcomes will result – in Young's terms 'the "objective character" of knowledge' (Young & Muller, 2013, p. 230). Thus, often in educational literature, knowledge and education's potential for creating either the conditions for or the action of social justice itself is simply taken as an article of faith. An article that asks not 'if' knowledge has the power – through its social, political, and economic institutions, people, and actions to contribute to social, political or economic change – but 'how' (for example, see Marginson, 2006 ; Simons *et al.*, 2007 ; Williams, 2008).

An good example of this argument is the United Nation's (2019) Human Development Index (HDI) (Figure 1.1) where 'participation' in education (in the two forms of governmental expectation and actual duration) is identified as one of only three metrics for assessing the development of countries.

[6] This thesis focusses on formal education for a good discussion of informal education, see Jack Mezirow and Edward Taylor's Transformative learning in practice (2009).



Figure 1.1 Human Development Index
Source: http://hdr.undp.org (Accessed on 03/12/2017)

However, this thesis considers that, as Young endorses, this is a fundamental category error related to the conception of power, and it is too heavy a burden for 'powerful knowledge' and thus education to bear, and it is fundamental as to why empirical evidence is at best equivocal on the effects of education on social justice (for examples, that question the evidence for social, political, or economic effects of education, see Apple, 2015 ; Brennan & Naidoo, 2008 ; Milburn, 2014 ; Payne, 2017 ; Peters, 2015 ; Roth, 2019 ; Wolf, 2002).

Further, this thesis considers that this error is compounded in the literature on education or knowledge where many argue that education and knowledge are powerful but there are other barriers that must simply be lifted and educational power will reign supreme. Again these impute errors of assumption and modal scope in the 'power of knowledge', where education and knowledge is powerful but needs:

(a) broadening access or "making the hoard of knowledge produced or preserved by universities available more broadly to society" (Calhoun, 2006, p. 9; see also Marginson, 2011 ; Nixon, 2010 ; Pusser, 2006);

(b) the removal of obstacles to its effectiveness particularly current theory identifies neo-liberal forces or inadequate funding (for example, Caffentzis, 2005 ; Giroux, 2010 ; Lynch, 2006 ; Olssen & Peters, 2005 ; Saunders, 2010); or

(c) increasing motivation to participate and remove the self imposed blocks to participation (for example, see Fine, 1991 ; Lareau, 2011 ; MacLeod, 2018 ; Weis, 2013 ; Willis, 2017 [1978]).

Therefore, the persistence of these views has obscured the discussion of newer phenomena such as the active delegitimization of expertise (Goodwin, 1998 ; Merkley, 2019 ; Motta, 2018 ; Nowotny, 2000) or the inadequacy of 'epistemic access and participation' models in achieving their purported economic, political or social effects (Payne, 2017 ; Roth, 2019 ; Wolf, 2002).[7] Instead, it perpetuates a traditional view (and one with which Weber, Durkheim, Thorstein Veblen, Jürgen Habermas, and Joseph Schumpeter can all be said to agree) that the more educated the population, the more inclusive the public sphere will become. Within this argument, knowledge develops as a coherent social force which – in the public sphere – is "real, alive and powerful, which dominates the person and to which they owe the best part of himself" (Durkheim, 1972 [1893/1912], p. 206). Thereby, public domination by knowledge (bureaucracy) – as explored by Durkheim (1972 [1893/1912], p. 203) – is structurally important (powerful) as: "society can survive only if […] education perpetuates and reinforces […] homogeneity by fixing through knowledge […], from the beginning, the essential similarities that social life demands".

Likewise, 'knowledge is power' is also a pervasive concept and article of faith across much of the discourse in political and economic sciences. In politics, this is discussed as the failings of liberal democracy caused by lack of access to knowledge (often called political ignorance or the 'know-nothings') to which there are rational (König, 2020 ; Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2007 ; Williams, 2020) and particularly "educative solutions" (Weitz, 1993, p. 428). A tradition refers back to John Dewey's *Democracy and education* (1999 [1916]) and *Education and the social order* (2011 [1934]) where knowledge – often simplified again to formal education – is the enabler of active and

[7] Fredric Jameson's Postmodernism, or, the cultural logic of late capitalism (1991) links the development of contemporary reverence for knowledge to the post-modern division between authentic knowledge (experience) and imitation knowledge (vicarious experience), a concept which he links to mass media building from Wolfgang Haug's Critique of commodity aesthetics (1987).

equal political participation and the creator of social equality without which there is an almost inevitable rise of totalitarian and autocratic regimes.[8] In economics, the consideration of knowledge and educations effects on social justice are again of paramount importance. This is a concept discussed and worthy of comment by many of the twentieth-centuries most famous economists such as Friedrich Hayek in "Economics and knowledge" (1937) or "The use of knowledge in society"(Hayek (1945), and picked up again and again in social economic literature (for example, see Nelson, 2020 ; Vrousalis, 2020), or by Nobel Prize winning economists in discussions of causes of economic inequality which are often placed firmly at the door of inadequate access to or participation in education (for example, see Arrow, 1993 ; Arrow *et al.*, 2018 ; Stiglitz, 1999, 2012).

But again the premise of 'how' opportunities for public participation and equality are provided by education often rests upon ideas of the transmission, acquisition of forms of 'powerful knowledge' and the access this provides through its relationships to experience and 'objective reality' to power. Further, political and economic discussions have argued that this includes not only the traditional power of 'knowing' information or 'knowing' forms of rationalisation (bureaucratic justice), but how knowledge's relational nature enables their interpretation of 'objective' social experiences to be of equal social and political importance (hermeneutical justice) – a position endorsed by Young - and therefore empowers an individual's voice to be equally considered in the public sphere (testimonial justice) (Fricker, 2008, 2013, 2017) – an argument specifically excluded by Young.[9]

[8] For other examples, see Nico Stehr's Knowledge politics (2015), Roberto Unger's Knowledge and politics (1976), Georg Lukacs's Destruction of reason (2016 [1957]), Hannah Arendt's The origins of totalitarianism (2017 [1951]), Max Horkheimer's Eclipse of reason (2013 [1947]).

[9] This thesis uses the term 'public sphere' to relate to Jürgen Habermas's The structural transformation of the public sphere (1989 [1962]).

Thus – and often given as an inescapable consequence – limiting access or any other "distributive unfairness in respect to epistemic goods such as information or education" is its own 'injustice' (Fricker, 2011, p. 1; see also Hookway, 2010 ; Kidd *et al.*, 2017 ; McKinnon, 2016 ; Pohlhaus, 2017). Limits to access and participation in knowledge and education, it is argued, are the active diminution of an individual's power over themselves and the wider social, economic, and political citizenry.

Therefore, although throughout these political positions and debates it is argued that by allowing access to a specific type of knowledge; and participation in the social structures of its acquisition (often simplified as formal education) are the *sine qua non* of an individual's full, unconstrained participation in the public sphere, these are arguments with which Young's conception of 'powerful knowledge' has at best a complicated relationship or, at worst, ignores.[10]

However, this complicated relationship only raises further issues of the connection between knowledge and social justice. If the power of knowledge in enabling public participation is not found only in its capacity for individual 'intellectual development' but also as a part of Émile Durkheim's (1968 [1922]) 'common social knowledge' or Max Weber's "coercive social and political consensus" (Pettit & Hamlin, 1991, p. 33) of then what forms can knowledge have the capacity to change this 'essentially human' nature of a collective public? Here, as both Weber and Durkheim argue knowledge and rationality are powerful both as representation of individual acquiescence to the publicly acceptable consensus but also are powerful if they can change the relationship between individuals and society. For them, education is a

[10] In this form, the argument is often one of 'epistemic access': a term coined in Wally Morrow's Bounds of democracy (2009) which developed from Chrissie Boughey's 'Epistemological' access to the university, *South African Journal of Higher Education* (2005); and is explored extensively in a wide variety of contemporary education literature such as Johan Muller's Every picture tells a story, *Education as Change* (2014) and Michael Cross and Vivian Atinde's The pedagogy of the marginalized, *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies* (2015).

process for ensuring individuals will behave in the 'right way' to support the social contract but knowledge gain can allow a change in the individual's conception of a future experience enough to perpetuate change (for examples of this argument, see Alejandro, 1993 ; Bakiner, 2015 ; Beetham, 2013 ; Davies, 2017 ; Young, 1989).

As an alternative, this thesis proposes that the power of knowledge is not necessarily a socially, politically or economically safe assumption whereby knowledge bestows some power through its accumulation, relationship or utilisation (c.f. Bourdieu, 1986 ; Helliwell & Putnam, 1999 ; Huang *et al.*, 2009) but rather that the power of knowledge can be explored as one part of Weber's (1978 [1922], p. 1038) continuing "struggle for legitimate authority" and in this way can be viewed as a fetishized 'commodity' built upon Young's 'powerful knowledge' which allows individuals and societies to "imagine the previously unimaginable, and to think the previously un-thought" (Young & Muller, 2013, p. 239). In this way, this thesis contributes by extending Young's conception outside of the sociology of education and embracing its political possibilities as a foundation concept of social justice, and in doing so takes up Young's (2013b, p. 197) challenge that:

> In unequal societies such as ours, even with a subject-based curriculum derived from the disciplines, teachers, however theoretically informed their pedagogy may be, are unlikely to be successful with more than a proportion of any cohort. A deeper change in the distribution of educational opportunities would involve political as well as educational issues.

1.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framing

One of the primary goals of any sociological study is to seek to understand specific phenomenon that appear in specific national or cultural contexts. Phenomena such as the interaction between education and broader political, social, and economic justice spheres while appearing to have universal meaning, value and application

instead have specific combinations of social phenomena which organise their impact in specific social contexts.

While noteworthy in the modern environment, anti-expert and anti-intellectual argument has had a long sociological and political history; where "anti-intellectualism, may be considered a part of [an] English cultural inheritance" (Hofstadter, 1996 [1963], p. 20) formed in the Celtic philosophical tradition but adopted almost universally throughout the Anglo-cultural tradition (for further exploration, see Allen, 1986 ; Collini, 1993, 2006 ; Sternhell, 2010).

In this context, for over 300 years, from John Cotton's "[t]he more learned and witty you be, the more fit to act for Satan you will be" (Cotton, 2011 [1642], p. 171) discussions of the negative impact of 'learning' have been strong elements of both conservative and liberal social, political and economic ideologies.[11] Classic examples are exemplified by Edmund Burke (1982 [1790]) and the English Counter-Enlightenment interactions with Jeremy Bentham's (2011 [1787]) advocacy of social emancipation through universal education; Emmanuel Sieyès (2003) treatise and letters on education famously expressed by Durkheim's 'L'Individualisme et les Intellectuels' (1898) alongside the fervent anti-intellectualism within the Dreyfus Affair[12]; and Dwight Eisenhower's 1959 State of the Union address (Eisenhower, 1959) on standards in education within the socio-economic environments of McCarthyism. With this latter example giving rise to one of the modern seminal studies of opposition to intellectual contribution in the public sphere, Hofstadter's *Anti-Intellectualism in*

[11] The broader debate can be traced in Western thought from Plato's philosopher kings in The Republic (2007 [c. 380 BC]).

[12] First published in Revue Bleue (1898), 4e série, 10, pp.7-13, it is referenced in this thesis as Steven Lukes's Durkheim's 'Individualism and the Intellectuals', *Political Studies* (1969).

American Life (1996 [1963]).[13]

Furthermore, and importantly for the arguments regarding the power of knowledge for social justice, the anti-intellectual tradition is one that is founded on the notion of knowledge as having "dangerous levelling tendencies" (Hamerton, 1929 [1873], p. 47) and should be eschewed in favour of a social, philosophical preference for 'common sense'. In this way, anti-intellectualism looks to provide a reassurance that citizens are protected from "the patriotic crimes of an enlightened age" (Burke, 1982 [1790], p. 41), as a protection against thinking rather than knowledge itself, as explored in Karl Popper's *The poverty of historicism* (2013 [1936/1956]).

In particular – and of most importance to the arguments regarding the connection between education and social justice – Burke (1998 [1757]) articulates that a development of equality of knowledge, thought or rationality is a clear threat to any individual's own 'sense of limitation' which is a bedrock of social cohesion.[14] Knowledge and thought – if too widely distributed – are a threat to the public collective because they enable individuals to become unlimited in the thoughts about their place within society, politics, and the economy. This is almost the exact opposite of the current public discourse on education and social justice and is exactly the power of knowledge proposed by Young – the power to overcome 'self-limitation'.

To explore this, the three essays contained in this thesis consider the interrelationship between three conceptual areas in which knowledge affects the contribution to just

[13] David Simpson's Romanticism, nationalism, and the revolt against theory (1993) lays a comprehensive timeline of the relationship between the British public sphere and anti-intellectualism beginning with the 17th century response to issues of land reform.

[14] For an in-depth discussion of the political Leveller movement during the English Civil War, see Frederick Donnelly's Levellerism in Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth-Century Britain, *Albion* (1988).

outcomes: social relationship, representative governance, and economic distribution. However, prior to this, the next sections look to outline some initial definitions of terms used and the theoretical traditions to which they belong.

1.3.1 Definitions

Education is confined to a discussion of specialised knowledge that is traditionally accessed through formal higher education. It does not address the informal education or schooling structures. However, to address the concerns of the 'mutual dependency' and 'conceptual collapse' that are often inherent in discussions using this concept (as outlined above) three terms are used: institutions, actors, and actions. This is to separate the social institutions, actors, and actions of education while keeping their connection to the overall conceptual construct of education. However, while in places universities and scholars are chosen to provide instances within the arguments of the thesis, these are not the only institutions or actors of education that are affected. Additionally, the focus on higher education is chosen due to the prevalence of 'social justice' assumptions within the policy literature.

Knowledge is in this thesis a socially and politically valued cognitive relationship to a reality. On one side of the relational process is an individual, and on the other side is an experience to which the knower directly or indirectly seeks relationship. While there is a gradation of directness, in this thesis knowledge of things is used as the instantiation of a direct form of knowledge and thinking about things. The former has often been called knowledge by acquaintance since the subject is in experiential contact, whereas the latter is propositional knowledge since what the subject knows is a true proposition in relationship to the proposed reality.

Powerful Knowledge is used in this thesis to refer to the model of knowledge developed by Young and others related to curriculum theory and sociology of education. It has several defining characteristics in its use and theory of both the terms - knowledge and power. Firstly, knowledge is only that which has a relationship to it social construction. Secondly, knowledge is conceptualised as objectively

possible and exists outside of human experience alone, it disavows any conceptualisation of knowledge which may be considered relativist in nature. Finally, powerful knowledge refers both to knowledge that is specialised in nature, and only that specialised knowledge which can support a claim of 'truth'. Power in this context expresses not the ability to coercer or impose action but rather any that allows the freedom to identity (and to some extent utilise) unforeseen expanded possibilities.

Legitimate Authority is taken as a broad concept of the "capacity […] to engender and maintain the belief that the existing institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society" (Schaar, 1981, p. 8). While the differences between belief and appropriateness are obvious, they are also fundamental to the development of a value contribution through "epistemic legitimacy". For the purposes of this thesis, Weber's distinction of two fundamental components to the development of both normative orders and authority (Weber, 2012 [1920], pp. 124-125) is utilised. The essence of authority is "a relationship between two or more actors in which the commands of certain actors are treated as binding by the others" (Weber, 1954, p. 328). Authority is thus connected to its legitimacy and where authority exists ordered interaction is also possible. Thus, authority and norms are sometimes seen as contradicting principles both are compliance with commands but in the first this is external to the individual and in the second it is internal principles. The significance of legitimate authority is, as Weber makes clear, that the most stable power is achieved when the ordering principles are held to be binding by the actors due to both, when they value the rule or principle and when they are able to compel others to also value the same principle.

Social justice is acknowledged as a widely developed concept across many theories. However, it is rarely defined (e.g., Elster, 1992 ; Liebig & Sauer, 2016 ; Moore, 2001 ; Walzer, 2010 [1983]). For the purposes of the essays in this thesis, the definition of social justice is where:

(a) social benefits – and obligations – within a society are dispersed fairly in accordance with a system of allocation principle – distributive social justice (for example, see Lerner, 1975 ; Walster *et al.*, 1978);

(b) customs, and directions that guide social decisions maintain the fundamental rights, freedoms, and entitlements of individuals and groups – procedural social justice (for example, see Leventhal, 1980 ; Lind & Tyler, 1988);

(c) humans (and perhaps other species) have respect and are dealt with regard to their self-worth from all relevant social actors and authorities, including fellow citizens - interactional social justice (for example, see Bies, 1986, 2001 ; De Cremer *et al.*, 2004); or

(d) that societies view historical as well as current distribution, procedure or interaction as the basis for social system-level change to rebalance historical concerns – restorative social justice (for example, see Anfara Jr *et al.*, 2013 ; Braithwaite, 1989 ; Schweigert, 1999).

1.3.2 Powerful knowledge

Powerful knowledge is a social, economic, and political conception that knowledge-as-an-object, and knowledge-as-a-process form part of an individual's power within society, as it forms the relationship between the reality of society and the individual experience. In this framework, exploring types of knowledge – object / subject, process / product, official / unsanctioned, public / private, formal / informal – is

integral to developing this understanding.[15] For as Basil Bernstein (2018 [1973], p. 328), famously states: "[h]ow a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits, and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control within that society".[16]

However, the question of what constitutes both 'knowledge' and 'power' has always been regarded as highly contestable and influenced by the historical and cultural contexts of individual societies. Within the current conception of 'powerful knowledge', Young argues that, in the contemporary cultural context of relativizing knowledge, it is denied any "intrinsic autonomy" (Young, 2007, p. 27). Rob Moore and Young (2001, p. 22) continue to argue that contextual uses of knowledge:

> become forms of attack and offence between oppressors and oppressed (or rather those claiming to defend their interests). At the same time by privileging the exclusiveness of particular experiences, they deny to oppressed communities the possibility of knowledge that goes beyond their experience and might play a part in enabling them to overcome their oppression.

Thus, as contended by Moore and Young (2011, p. 22), any sociological concept of knowledge ought to permit the "incorporation of objective knowledge that transcends the historical context of its production". In line with this, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Marx all consider knowledge interwoven with its history since it is, at least in part, the creation of human thought both within its contemporary but also historical model (Burr, 2003, p. 12). Durkheim took this position further in his ideas about the division concerning 'sacred' and 'profane' knowledge and the

[15] While it has grown in importance in education in the last 50 years, the importance of knowledge typology and selection has been developed across most Western philosophical, psychological and sociological traditions, for a good exploration of these, see Mark Burgin's Theory of knowledge: Structures and processes (2016).

[16] For a comprehensive overview of Bernstein's complex thought, see Rob Moore's Knowledge structures and intellectual fields: Basil Bernstein and the sociology of knowledge (2006); and Alan Sadovnik's Knowledge and pedagogy: The sociology of Basil Bernstein (1995).

belief that the sacred signified the exemplary social form of knowledge: a distinction between the 'social foundations of knowledge' and 'practical knowledge' (Young, 2007, p. 164).[17]

For Durkheim, abstract and theoretical knowledge provided the basis for the elaboration of shared social understandings, and also a means for that collective to understand themselves (Young & Muller, 2011, p. 19), and – importantly for later discussions of why 'epistemic legitimacy' is an important addition to the model of 'powerful knowledge' – "maintain social exclusion" (Levitas, 1996, p. 18). The everyday and more mundane knowledge became known as "profane knowledge" (Durkheim, 1995 [1912], p. 476) which enabled the 'division of labour' within a capitalist economic model and effective possession and dispossession.[18]

Here power relations are key, for as Leesa Wheelahan (2005, p. 2) states "[t]he way in which knowledge is classified expresses power because it defines 'what matters' and the way in which ['what matters'] is defined, and, who has access to it."[19] Young *et al.* (2014, p. 73) extend this not only to what matters or "the particular knowledge itself that is included in the curriculum [but also] what it can do for those who have access to it". As Young observes this exposure opens the question of "what is worthwhile knowledge?" to have access to, and to use (Young, 2007, p. 80).

[17] Basil Bernstein asserts that he took his notion of the pedagogic classification of knowledge from Durkheim and that this classification is central to his 'pedagogic device' (Singh, 2002). For a good introduction, see Gabrielle Ivinson's Bernstein: Codes and social class (2011).

[18] This argument is made throughout Émile Durkheim's The division of labour in society (2013 [1893]), and as Durkheim acknowledges this was heavily influenced by the principles of social exclusions that were outlined in Auguste Comte's Cours de philosophie positive (2009 [1830 - 1842]) which in turn owes much to the philosophy of Henri Saint-Simon and his views on education as the means of production of social advancement.

[19] For Bernstein, knowledge can be strongly or weakly classified as influential where the 'Official Re-contextualising Field' (ORF) is state constructed and the 'Pedagogic Re-contextualising Field' (PRF) is practitioner-based and manifested in the pedagogies of schools, colleges and universities. See also Martin Jephcote and Brian Davies's Recontextualizing discourse: an exploration of the workings of the meso level, *Journal of Education Policy* (2004)

Bernstein's (2000, p. 12) 'framing' of regionalised discourse describes the public power relations or more simply "who controls what". Bernstein identifies five variables regarding the 'knowers' power and their options regarding the knowledge: they can select; sequence; pace; determine criteria; and – importantly for the essays that follow – control the social order in which the discourse is possible (Bernstein, 2000, p. 13). Moreover, Bernstein suggests that above the individuals there are rules of social order (regulative discourse) separate from the structures of education (instructional discourse) and implicit to the regulative discourse are the hierarchical practices and expectations of education (institutions and individuals). Substantially, he highlights that "the instructional discourse is always embedded in the regulative discourse, and the regulative discourse is the dominant discourse" (Bernstein, 2000, p. 13).

More specifically regarding those who enter education, Bernstein (2000), it is the principles of allocation inherent in the regulative discourse that mediate the inclusion of knowledge within instructional discourse. Thus, how society chooses to determine worthiness and unworthiness regarding access serves as the mechanism for the creation and ongoing development of 'powerful knowledge' (Young, 2010b). Discourse in the public sphere (regulative discourse) mediates access to the specialist (vertical) knowledge on which social, political, and economic power is based. Therefore, instructional, or educative discourse, does not allow direct access to 'powerful knowledge' but rather access provided by instructional discourse is mediated by the power of regulative discourses to express the normative order (as outlined in Figure 1.2 below). In this framework - which underpins much of the contemporary theory of 'powerful knowledge' - knowledge is powerful because it holds specific relationship to the social collective.

For Muller (2009, p. 208) this is articulated as:

> Scientific knowledge grows by the evolution of evermore abstract and general propositions; this is its epistemic destiny, so to speak. Applied knowledge grows through an accretion of practical solutions to particular problems. Of course, it can be, and is, retrospectively rationalised in terms of its scientific generalisability. But its raison d'etre is procedures that work: science's is principles that are true.

To take this further, the purposes of 'powerful knowledge' and the importance of its relationship to some 'objective truth' cannot be overstated. Where for, both Weber (2014 [1915]) and Young (2013a) suggest a reciprocal pairing of 'powerful knowledge' and 'knowledge of the powerful' where individuals separated by knowledge acquisition processes - such as education - are in danger of the normative order dictating the receipt of "powerless knowledge" (Young, 2013b, p. 196). Where the argument differentiates between the intrinsic qualities of knowledge (powerful) to explore the socially possible and its 'powerlessness' for utility regulated through its ability to conform to the social rules: or 'regulative discourse'. Therefore, an interesting dyad of the power of knowledge is created:

(a) the 'regulative discourse' sets the rules of distributive access of individuals (as explored by Boughey, 2005, and; Morrow, 2009); and

(b) the 'regulative discourse' sets the rules for recognition of individuals to effect social action (as explored by Deranty & Renault, 2007 ; Fraser & Honneth, 2003 ; Van den Brink & Owen, 2007).[20]

[20] For for a good overview of key points regarding regulative discourse see Sharon Gewirtz and Alan Cribb's Plural conceptions of social justice: Implications for policy sociology, *Journal of Education Policy* (2002).

The foundations of this approach are clear within contemporary curriculum theory and continue to exist within much of the policy discussion surrounding education in the UK. For example, if the regulative discourse recognises education for the purposes of economic prosperity within the normative order, there is considerable access given to individuals. However, there is recognition that where it is restricted to collective prosperity, it may limit personal prosperity and sustainability (Arrow, 1974, 1993 ; Arrow *et al.*, 2018).

This is seen in much of the current discourse surrounding higher education where the primary concern is with the needs of the economy: as Simon Marginson (1997, p. 152) says: "[t]he educated? citizen imagined in government was an economic citizen" (See also, Nokkala, 2016 ; Olssen & Peters, 2005 ; Suspitsyna, 2012).

Here the clarification within Young's notion that powerful knowledge is: "acquired in specialist institutions staffed by specialists" and that it "be often, but not always discipline based" (Young, 2013b, p. 195) becomes necessary. Within this current conception 'powerful knowledge' – defined as differentiated and specialised knowledge within a specific social context – assumes dominance in the context of other social, political and economic knowledge and hence is "never distributed to all in an egalitarian manner" (Young & Muller, 2013, p. 231) as it is connected to pre-existing social constructs which have inherent access and power constraints. In this way, Young's conception of 'powerful knowledge' is necessarily narrow and constrained to that knowledge which allows consideration of alternative social realities.

1.3.3 Legitimate Power

As Dianne Penney (1997) proposes, knowledge's power depends not only on inherent power or access to this power but also the 'permission' to use that power and "for others to submit to it" or its legitimacy (Weber, 1978 [1922]). Thus, the Oxford English Dictionary (2019) defines legitimacy as:

> 1. Conformity to the law, to rules, or to some recognized principle; lawfulness. Also: conformity to sound reasoning; logicality; justifiability.

Indeed, the foundational sociology of legitimacy, from Weber, sites legitimacy particularly within the boundaries of the legal state:

> A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. […] The state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence.
> (Weber, 2004 [1917/1919], p. 78).

While Schaar (1970, p. 19) identified the "old definitions all revolve around the element of law or right" and site legitimacy in the political terms as "external to and independent of the mere assertion or opinion of the claimant"; contemporary definitions and those that explore pluralist political systems with, as Robert Dahl puts it, "uneven political influences […] and conflicting aims all dissolve legitimacy into beliefs and opinions" (Dahl, 1984, p. 108).

This develops the idea that legitimacy exists not only on the rational perspective but within the public social structures of collective belief. This, in turn, builds on Weber's construction of legitimacy as: "[t]he degree to which institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper." (Connolly, 1987, p. 128). Other writers define legitimacy "as the quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to

inhere in a [particular] regime. That […] is legitimate which is viewed as morally proper for society" (Merelman, 1966, p. 548).

In this way, legitimacy in the Weberian system is a compelling belief in the social rules and therefore something that has authority (Spencer, 1970a). Weber states that this provides the actor with a system of social legitimacy that is outside of itself (external to the citizen) and unlike charismatic or traditional authority rests on a belief in the 'right' of individuals within the social system to exert authority. The rightness of legitimacy exists in the 'force' exerted by social norms and discourse and those norms claim to be the 'right' thing to do (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975 ; Reus-Smit, 2007).[21]

Legitimacy, in this sense, becomes a public meta-objectivity of a collective which accepts that legitimacy is not influenced by personal experiences of social or individual outcomes: discourse is regarded as maintaining legitimacy not because of any specific outcome (good or otherwise) but because of a social collective belief in its intrinsic 'rightness' or truth (Beattie, 2000 [1770]; Suiter, 2016).

These arguments site legitimacy outside of the 'rightness' of the decision or its consequences and rather within social experience itself - not only expressed and contained with discourse but guided by it. Here, legitimacy is a matter of "credibility and acceptability on the part of the modern State in its relationship to its society and its citizens" (Weiler, 1985, p. 185).

Although Weber insisted that rational legitimacy characterised the public sphere of the western capitalist state, he was clear that as a sociological principle of organisation no type of legitimacy was complete in its control of political institutions or

[21] Christopher Ham and Michael Hill's The policy process in the modern capitalist state (1984) states that this takes Weber's definition further in its ability to be free from class control.

practices. As Wolfgang Mommsen (1974, pp. 85-86) asserts, Weber "pointed out again and again that the legitimacy of all empirically known systems of domination rests on mixed foundations." Mixed foundations raise the possibility of conflict among opposed legitimacy principles which, in turn, might weaken legitimacy itself and damage political institutions.

Weber clearly recognised that rational legitimacy involved constant struggle and was always precarious. As Lawrence Scaff (1989, p. 226) writes: Weber believes that "[i]n fact, whoever exists in the 'world' […] can experience […] nothing other than the struggle among a plurality of value series, each of which appears binding when viewed for itself. In such circumstances, 'many old gods, disenchanted and hence in the form of impersonal powers, ascend from their graves, strive for control over our lives and resume their eternal struggle with each other.'"

In fact, Weber found several enduring forces that blunt the power of rational legitimacy in practice. Wolfgang Schluchter (1985, p. 88) states that for Weber rationality is "controlled by the intellect" and that "[i]ntellectual self-consciousness may devise persuasive doctrines that stabilize adherence to law or the state. However, conscious meditation may have precisely the opposite effect, giving reason to doubt what had formerly been accepted as self-evident."

Weber also stipulated that self-interest and coercion always play a role in submission to authority. Every social institution had at least to maintain the threat of coercion to enforce its orders. It is worth noting here that Weber showed the modern political context with the monopoly on legitimate force, not with the exclusive control of legitimacy itself. It is certainly arguable here that Weber would not have done so had he not envisaged continuing challenges to the overall construction of legitimate authority from period to period. Weber (1978 [1922], p. 37) also identified

"expediency" as a common motive for submission to authority; and where economic and material interests hold sway this would be particularly acute. It follows that where any social element is a source of individual or collective economic benefit, then material expediency may well supersede any source of authority; indeed, Weber (2012 [1920], pp. 319-320) says: "[w]hat is important is that, even then, the individual will ask first of all how far the real income allotted to them and the labour service required of them […] appear to conform with their interests. This would be the basis of their behaviour and submission to authority."

Nor did Weber envision the institutions of legitimacy in total control of the social or normative order. Bureaucracy is a good example, where he writes:

> Our officialdom has been brilliant wherever it had to prove its sense of duty, its impartiality and mastery of organizational problems in the face of official, clearly formulated tasks of a specialized nature. […] But here we are concerned with political, not bureaucratic achievements, and the facts themselves provide the recognition which nobody can truthfully deny: That bureaucracy failed completely whenever it was expected to deal with political problems.
> (Weber, 1978 [1922], p. 1417)

For Weber, with a lack of normative foundations rationality might cause disunity within the public. For legitimacy that is lacking consensual normative ends, nothing keeps instrumentally rational order (bureaucracies) from pursuing incompatible, self-interested goals ever more relentlessly and efficiently. Adherence to common normative ends would commit the public to mutually coordinated, politically compatible actions. However, in the absence of such ends, instrumentally rational agencies may go their separate ways ruthlessly. In fact, Weber's (1978 [1922], p. 1399) assertion that "politics means conflict" virtually dooms bureaucracies to struggles of

legitimacy against a political regime which seeks its legitimacy outside of rationality.[22]

Weber also envisaged continuing conflict (struggles) between bureaucracies and other public institutions. In practice, bureaucracy can co-opt parliamentary democracy, to supply legitimacy for the extension of bureaucratic power. Nevertheless, in principle, the legitimacy of bureaucratic and democratic structures remain fundamentally opposed to each other. After all, the former lodges power with experts and the latter with "the people" (Sadri, 1992, p. 92) or as Weber (1978 [1922], p. 991) puts it: "We must remember the fact […] that 'democracy' as such is opposed to the 'rule' of bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization."

Likewise Weber (1978 [1922], p. 991) was cautious about the effectiveness of bureaucratic control writing, "[i]t must also remain an open question whether the power of bureaucracy is increasing in the modern states in which it is spreading." Weber therefore warns us not to confuse the increased visibility of bureaucratic structures with effective domination.

Nor did Weber discount the continuing appeal of ethical, religious, and emotional challenges to rational legitimacy (Weber, 2014 [1915], pp. 333-340). Indeed, he mentions recurrent efforts to escape "the iron cage" of capitalism and rational legitimacy (Scaff, 1989). For Weber, individuals always pursued non-instrumental "meaning" in their lives, and therefore rational legitimacy might organize public life, but they would always face challenges from cultural and social movements offering transcendental, subjectively fulfilling personal visions. As Scaff (1989, p. 170) puts it, Weber expected "a struggle between the 'rational autonomy' of the modern political

[22] This is one of the criticisms levelled at Jürgen Habermas's The theory of communicative action (2007 [1981]); and is particularly prominent in Agnes Heller's Habermas and Marxism (1982).

order and an increased tendency toward flight into the irrationalities of apolitical emotionalism or feeling". According to Jose Merquior (1980, p. 185) , it is unsurprising that "two generations after [Weber's] death, what some rather hastily call the 'technological society' is literally swarming with ecstatic creeds, irrationalist trends, and a mounting clamor of technique-bashing."

1.3.4 Social Justice

Social justice need not address all aspects defined above but, conceived of in any of these ways, social justice is – understandably - intrinsically linked with its social systems – or a "predicate of societies" (Frankena, 1962, p. 4). This concept is also developed in the social justice theories of Amartya Sen (2009), John Rawls (2005 [1971]), Martha Nussbaum (1992, 2003) and Daisaku Ikeda (1976). However, there is significant divergence between them – even after years of discussion – regarding each part of the definition (see Boucher & Kelly, 1998 ; Campbell, 2001 ; Miller, 2003).

Therefore, for brevity without expansion on these arguments, this section continues primarily as a historical overview. In Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (2002 [384 - 322 BCE], p. 159) begins his discussion of justice with the conception that "we call just the things that create and preserve happiness and its parts for the citizen community". According to Sarah Broadie (2002, p. 36), for Aristotle:

> The hallmark of a just apportionment is equality. In distribution, this consists in maintaining the same ratio of quantified goods or burdens to quantified merit for all recipients. In rectification, it consists in restoring the parties to the relative position (schematized as "equality") they were in before one harmed the other.

Here, for Aristotle, neutrality is the basis of a just distribution: it is "treating equals as equals" for the purpose social harmony and individual happiness (for example, see

Frankena, 1962 ; Mansbridge, 2005, p. 22), and his model of distributive justice thus highlights the principles of equity, proportionality, and merit (for example, see Deutsch, 1975 ; Walster *et al.*, 1978).

However, Aristotle (2002 [384 - 322 BCE], p. 162) appreciated the primary difficulties of justice theories based on proportionality in that there is wide disagreement about which "inputs" (or merits) are used to determine outcomes (or rewards):

> [E]verybody agrees that what is just in distributions must accord with some kind of merit, but everybody is not talking about the same kind of merit: for democrats merit lies in being born a free person, for oligarchs in wealth or, for some of them, in noble descent, for aristocrats in excellence.

Thus, while egalitarian (non-selfish) and law-abiding social action is the basis of the Aristotelian social justice, there is also a recognition that required impartiality can lead to results that are contrary to a conception of social justice, particularly if impartiality is regarded as a need to ignore context or the facts of the specified circumstances.[23] Thus, and importantly, social justice and the normative practice of law are not synonymous for Aristotle. Indeed, the rational person may diverge from the legal to arrive at a preferable outcome: that which is reasonable:

> It is clear, then, what the reasonable is; and that it is just, and better than just in one sense. From this it is also evident who the reasonable person is: the sort who decides on and does things of this kind, and who is not a stickler for justice in the bad sense but rather tends to take a less strict view of things, even though he has the law to back him up – this is the reasonable person. (Aristotle, 2002 [384 - 322 BCE], p. 175).

Building from this position, there are two major Western philosophical traditions of

[23] John-Stuart Mill's On Liberty (2006 [1859]) also differentiates between justice and social conceptions such as generosity, or moral action.

social justice. Michael Sandel (2010 [1982], p. 184) sums up these traditions succinctly as the utilitarian and deontological perspectives: "Should justice be founded on utility, as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill argue, or does respect for individual rights require a basis for justice independent of utilitarian considerations, as Kant and Rawls maintain?".

Utilitarianism is an 'ends' theory of social justice, that justice results from that which creates "greatest happiness of the greatest number" (Bentham, 1988 [1776], p. 5) .There is considerable difference within utilitarianism about how to assess and measure 'happiness' and other connected ideas, such as 'well-being', 'public interest, and 'general good' (Bowie & Simon, 2007). However, redistribution of wealth and other valued resources which underpins the 'socialist' conception of social justice is justified or – as described by William Frankena (1962, p. 44) "justicized" – on largely utilitarian grounds (for examples, of these arguments, see Arrow, 1950 ; Konow, 2003 ; Sen, 1979) and is widely used in liberal democratic political and economic traditions.[24]

Deontologists conception of justice relies instead on conceptions that there are principles which 'transcend' humanity and are self-evidently either divine principles or necessary to the co-existance of a concept of the social – for example, 'thou shalt not kill'. Most famously, perhaps, Immanuel Kant (1993 [1785], p. 30), suggested that within society it is a "categorical imperative" to "[a]ct only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" or put simply, justice is the action that can be rationalised as part of the normative order within any particular social collective.

[24] For further exploration of these ideas, see Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham's Planet of the Durkheimians, where community, authority, and sacredness are foundations of morality (2009).

Thus, John Rawls (2005 [1971], p. 28) proposes that the connection between rational decision makers and just outcomes is decision-making in the absence of any knowledge of their effects on the decision maker – or under a "veil of ignorance". Here, it suggests that inequality is acceptable within a society and that people will tolerate it, but only to a level where it is not solely for individual benefit.

Thus most philosophical notions of social justice, specifically those that highlight needs-based laws, are founded upon a criticism of the acceptance of traditional or normative social, economic, or political arrangements (for example, see Barry, 2004 ; Hayek, 2012 [1976]; Reisch, 2002). David Miller (2003, p. x) states that "social justice has always been, and must always be, a critical idea, one that challenges us to reform our institutions and practices in the name of greater fairness".

On the political right, which tends to find a discourse of social justice less appealing, there is a strong inclination to make need and equality secondary considerations to other principles, such as worth, merit, or self-determination (for example, Nozick, 2017 [1974]; Smith, 2000 [1776]; Solomon & Murphy, 2000). In particular, the tendency in these conservative or traditionalist discourses is on loyalty to the social contract, compliance with tradition, and particularly achieving purity regarding social normative orders (Haidt & Graham, 2009).

In more contemporary literature, social justice has pursued a sense in which justice and rationality (or reasonableness) are inextricably linked, and thus continued with the principles of the link between content and structure of education and socially just outcomes (for examples, see Fraser & Honneth, 2003 ; Nussbaum, 2003 ; Sen, 2011 ; Young, 2011 ; Young, 2010a). In particular, it is clear that the social justice literature has moved from a 'contractarian-based' justice to that which is focused both at a social and collective level (for examples, see Phillips, 2004 ; Roemer, 2004 ; Young,

2001) and to where justice outcomes are those that are related to the structural elements either of removal of oppressive forces or the enabling of substantial (or functional?) freedoms for individuals (for examples, see Nussbaum, 1992 ; Nussbaum, 2003 ; Sen, 2005, 2009).

1.4 Structure

This introduction has sought to lay out the tensions between the conception of powerful knowledge and the value given to it in education policy. Further, it has laid out a context for this argument and presented initial definitions and a context for the three key concepts of 'powerful knowledge'; 'legitimacy'; and 'social justice'.

As outlined previously, in seeking to extend Young's conception further, the thesis presents three separate essays on different dynamics of the development of knowledge within the political system (social relationship, economic distribution and representative governance). Each essay is free standing in content, argument, and discipline, and should be read as such. Due to this approach, the concepts are not statically or systematically developed from the beginning to the end of the thesis but are connected argumentatively in the concluding chapter.

The first essay (Chapter 2: Legitimate Power of 'Powerful Knowledge') will (a) explore the social context and creation of epistemic legitimacy building on the social nature of 'powerful knowledge' and (b) investigate the changes in the basis for the claims of legitimacy, authority of knowledge and intellectualism as a foundation of 'epistemic legitimacy'. The essay will also build on the theory of Weber's predicted struggles in legitimacy and particularly the application of capitalist entrepreneurship and Weber's exploration of how entrepreneurial action cannot be supplicant to knowledge-primacy required by a bureaucracy. On a theoretical level, this struggle between

legitimacy, knowledge and capitalist action outlined in Weber's writings on commercial transactions – and developed in strands across both *Three types of legitimate rule* (1958 [1922]), and his work on types of authority outlined in *Economy and Society* (1978 [1922]) – is used to problematise legitimacy as a competitive concept.

The second essay (Chapter 3 – Ignorant Public and Epistemic Democracy) begins by developing the importance of 'knowing' in representative governance by investigating education's asserted role as a response to public ignorance and irrationality. To explore this, the essay offers an exploration of political responses to ignorance in particular the special place reserved in many of these theories for public reason. In the second section of this essay, these notions are then explored through the lens of 'epistemic legitimacy' in order to explore the political tensions developed between exclusion of ignorant individuals as a way of achieving social levelling and equality. 'Epistemic legitimacy' is then proposed as a model of access to knowledge-based power that meets the needs of representative government and is fundamental to address the struggles outlined in the first essay.

The third and final essay (Chapter 4 – Cognitive Capitalism and Epistemic Power) builds on the first two essays to further explore the effects of economic distribution and competition on both the entrepreneurial (market-based public knowledge) and esoteric knowledge (institution-based private knowledge). Through the lens of the 'Power Theory of Value' (for examples, see Nitzan & Bichler, 2006b ; 2009, 2014, 2019), the essay continues by exploring how knowledge is conceived as a legitimising concept of distribution. Further, it begins to build the conceptual mode of epistemic legitimacy through a discussion of the recent conceptual movement from 'Differential Advantage' to 'Differential Accumulation'. This further problematises the importance of the concept of 'knowing' within any 'powerful knowledge' framework.

The final concluding section (Chapters 5 – Discussion and Conclusions) provides an analytical reflection on the positioning of education and its influences on conceptions of social justice by seeking to bring the three areas of the essays – social, political and economic – together to extend Young's approach to 'powerful knowledge' in order to extend it as part of the historic (and ongoing) struggle between institutional and structural power ('bureaucracy') and the authority within the public sphere to enable action and change ('entrepreneurship') thus expanding its usefulness into the political sphere. Chapter 5 finishes with an outline of the proposed responses of scholars and universities as two components of the education system to the dynamics outlined and discusses the implications of the study and some further areas for development.

1.5 Conclusion and Contribution

> Here, indeed, lies the peculiar responsibility of the intellectual: to apply rational judgement to a problem of 'practical morality', in the face of 'the enthusiasm of the crowd' and 'the prestige of authority'.
> Émile Durkheim (1969) Individualism and the Intellectuals, p.14

> The extent to which a curriculum is underpinned by 'powerful knowledge' is both an epistemological and a social justice issue.
> Michael F.D. Young (2013b) Powerful knowledge, p. 196

In short, this thesis utilises Weber's (1978 [1922], p. 225) superiority of the 'capitalist entrepreneur' and their "relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge" to problematise the superiority of knowledge to affect social transformation which is at the heart of the 'powerful knowledge' model assumption connecting education and social justice. This thesis extends the powerful knowledge model with the alternative (Weberian) tradition of authority founded in the struggle between the structural power of knowledge ('bureaucracy') and the authority of knowledge within the public sphere to enact change

('entrepreneurship'). It is argued that Weber's insights developed through social, economic and political theory demonstrate that a legitimacy-based model that underpins the authorisation of epistemic modes of participation in the public sphere can mediate the power of knowledge to create social change.

Therefore, by replicating the method of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot's (2006) *On Justification*, this thesis seeks to place conflicting theoretical traditions alongside one another to identify rival ways in which the value structures which affect knowledge can be explored as social, political or economic phenomena. For as Wendy Brown (2015, p. 78) states "[s]uch heterodox practices of engagement are what I understand critical theory to be and to be for" and by doing this the thesis will look to draw attention to the contradictions in contemporary public policy discourse about the legitimate use of 'knowing something'.

By focusing on these theories, this thesis explores the risks that embracing 'powerful knowledge' as a model for education will enable exclusion and simplification which, in turn, pose a heavy and – it is argued - currently observable risk to the very institutions, actors and actions that it is proposed to strengthen (for example, universities, schools, teachers, formal education) and thereby risking any connection between education and socially just outcomes. It will be argued that this represents the rarely acknowledged reality where education has "effectively maintained inequality" within society (Lucas, 2001).

Finally, in the conclusion to this thesis, I will propose that the dominant answer in educational research to this contradiction has traditionally been "to protect the university against the market" as outlined by Kenneth Arrow (1993, p. 11) in *Excellence and Equity in Higher Education*. I argue that if we understand the struggle as a legitimacy based argument, that this dominant answer does not deal

with the "threats from public authorities to conform to the then current standards of political and ethical belief".

Put simply, for knowledge in current societies to be the basis for effective social justice, this thesis argues it must hold a position outside the consensus-based knowledge of bureaucratic power because liberal democratic and capitalist structures guide the specialised knowledge of education to a position of struggle for legitimacy. Therefore, the struggle to use knowledge for social, political and economic emancipation is defined not by its ability to imagine possibility but by the ability to implement that possibility.

Therefore, this thesis contributes to the debate by extending the theoretical tradition of 'powerful knowledge' from the education sphere into the political. By doing this, it seeks to focus on the gap between the empirical outcomes related to social advantage bestowed by education and the theory of knowledge-based power in a liberal, capitalist democratic model, and where possible propose a model which can be used to theorise how this gap maybe addressed.

Chapter 2: Legitimate Power of 'Powerful Knowledge'

> As the areas of human activity became more clearly differentiated, an intellectual order in the true sense, dominated by a particular type of legitimacy, began to define itself in opposition to the economic, political and religious powers, that is all the authorities who could claim the right to legislate on cultural matters in the name of a power or authority which was not properly speaking intellectual.
> Pierre Bourdieu (1969) Intellectual field and creative project, p. 90

> [The belief is that] though error is something that needs to be explained (by lack of good will or by bias or prejudice), truth will always make itself known, as long as it is not suppressed. Thus arises the belief that liberty, by sweeping away oppression and other obstacles, must of necessity lead to a Reign of Truth and Goodness … [An] important myth which also may be formulated: 'Nobody, if presented with the truth, can fail to recognise it'.
> Karl Popper (2014 [1963]) Conjectures and refutations, p. 468

2.1 Introduction

Following, Francis Bacon's famous adage "knowledge is power" ("scientia potentia est"), public policy often bestows intellectualism, knowledge and thought with an assumption of political (and social) status and power.[25] As outlined by Bourdieu and Popper above, this is often described as a distinct and different type of power - separate from the political, economic and cultural institutions and systems – rather it is power which is inherent within knowledge and its relationship with the experience of reality, as a universal truth and separate from any particular knower.

[25] Commonly attributed to Sir Francis Bacon, this phrase does not exist in his own work: "ipsa scientia potestas est" ('knowledge itself is power') in Meditationes Sacrae (2016 [1597]) is the closest construction in Bacon's own work, and the exact phrase is first contained in the 1668 version of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (2016 [1651]). While power is the common translation for this saying, importantly "potentia" is alternatively translated as might; force; strength; efficacy; efficiency; authority; control; and political power.

Building on this, sociologists, political theorists, journalists, and philosophers often consider how the engagement with 'knowledge' and its institutions such as universities, schools or colleges, or actors such as scholars or public intellectuals changes the power dynamics of political systems and thus the empowerment of its members: citizens (for example, see Johnson, 2001 ; Nowotny, 2000 ; Pellizzoni, 2003 ; Rata, 2012).

From education (Goodson, 1999), the arts (Becker, 1995) and social work (Karger & Hernández, 2004), the literature on knowledge in public debate acknowledges and reinforces this role where knowledge (often also used as a proxy for 'rationality') is a sphere where power and authority are played out (for examples, see Chong, 2000 ; Coleman, 1993 ; Cook, 2004 ; Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018). In this way, knowledge becomes not only the "condition for the acquisition of agency, but also the sphere for imagining oppositional social change" (Giroux, 2004, p. 60).[26] The power of knowledge is its ability to create 'the alternative'; to envisage a new world. It is this power that Young describes as the type of power inherent in the term "powerful knowledge.

However, the alternative social imaginary is a small component of the discussions of power by Weber (1978 [1922], p. 1115) who suggests it to also be the main anti-structural, anti-institutional force, that "in a revolutionary and sovereign manner […] transforms all values and breaks all traditional and rational norms." In this context, it is unsurprising that sociological literature has generally considered knowledge and power to be – at minimum – inextricably linked (for examples, see Barber, 1955 ; Brameld, 1955 ; Hodges, 1966 ; Triki *et al.*, 2017). Indeed, often in sociology, power

[26] For further background, Ivor Goodson's essay The educational researcher as a public intellectual, *British Educational Research Journal* (1999, p. 289) which explores how debates about education over the last 30 years have "equated intellectuals with academics [… as] more and more intellectual life has been colonised by the massive expansion of universities".

and knowledge cannot exist independently. A good example of this appears in *Discipline and Punishment,* where Michael Foucault (1980, p. 27) states "[t]here is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations". Further, this conception of knowledge as an almost omnipotent force for social change is subsumed – sometimes without question – into education and particularly curriculum theory (for examples, see Beck, 2013 ; Catling & Martin, 2011 ; Kinchin, 2016 ; McPhail & Rata, 2016 ; Roberts, 2014 ; Wheelahan, 2007).

However, in current discourse, discussions of intellectual contribution in the political or social sphere are routinely characterised by the language of 'decline' and 'weakening' with the conclusion to be drawn that this is a concomitant decline in the power of knowledge and its institutions and actors. This decline is positioned as a threat to social cohesion and 'just social development' often at the hands of shadowy external forces, for example, the 'deep state' (Michaels, 2017), unelected bureaucracy (Goldring & Thynne, 1987) or 'political elites' (Parry, 2005 [1969]).[27] But it is little acknowledged that these threats are also characterised by a discourse of the power of knowledge: a particular knowledge that Weber argued is specialised to the bureaucracy: secrecy (Rourke, 1957 ; Weber, 1978 [1922]).

Therefore, how can knowledge be both an acknowledged political power and declining in its power concurrently? Are there diverse types of power? Is the knowledge different?

[27] For examples of the decline narrative, see Richard Posner's Public intellectuals (2009), Donald Wood's Post-intellectualism and the decline of democracy: the failure of reason and responsibility in the twentieth century (1996), David Marquand's Decline of the public: The hollowing-out of citizenship (2005), Frank Furedi's Where have all the intellectuals gone?: Confronting 21st century philistines (2004).

Karl Maton (2000, p. 147) in looking at this issue states "the sociology of educational knowledge remains a sociology without a theory of knowledge". While throughout these discourses, knowledge and, often by imputation, 'thinking' or 'rationality' have an intrinsic power, the discussion of how this power is linked or related to a form of reality, its objectivity or relativity is limited or, worse, assumed. Equally, as outlined in Chapter 1, the discourse as to why knowledge acquisition and usage by individuals within a social context are often not effective in the ways these discourses outline is left as an assumed failing either on the individual or the systems behalf.

Further, intellectual discourse plays each against the other with educational literature blaming economic or political forces for the inability of knowledge to affect political or social change and advancement (for example, see Apple, 2000 ; Davies & Bansel, 2007 ; Giroux, 2010). These divisions spelled out in educational literature mean the limits of 'the power of knowledge' are often simply passed over as something for some other type of discourse to examine or overcome preferring as with Young to stick to the cognitive power of knowledge to create but not realise – in this way Young is specific that knowledge is 'legitimately powerful' in the first domain but not the second.

Therefore, the questions with which this essay begins are:

- What is being discussed when we discuss knowledge is power which is separate from the current conception of 'powerful knowledge'?
- How can knowledge use power for social and political change?
- Is there any specific element or elements which might enable an exploration of the extent of the conceptual limits of 'powerful knowledge' as used in the educational literature?

In answering these questions, this essay seeks to reappraise the form of knowledge within the concept of the 'structural struggle' – central to Weber's (1958 [1922]) model of legitimacy and as expanded upon by Jurgen Habermas (2007 [1981])in *The theory of communicative action* and Lyotard (1984) *Postmodern Condition* – and build upon this to further illuminate the power of knowledge and thought in the public sphere.

By beginning with this definition, this essay is able to explore how the tension (and potential contradiction) between the type of legitimacy given to intellectual contribution in the contemporary discourse – delegitimised for the development or enactment of public policy (or "normative ordering") but legitimised for individuals seeking social advancement and social justice ("binding quality of rightness") – is in line with the struggle between institutional and structural power ("bureaucracy") and the struggle for legitimacy authority for action and change ("entrepreneurship").

Therefore, the first section of this essay seeks to frame the types of 'legitimate authority' within this struggle beginning with the model proposed by Weber and illustrates how this applies to intellectual contributions to public debate. The second section expands on this framing through the critical framework of 'normative ordering' of knowledge structures and explores the dynamics of legitimacy as it may affect the power of knowledge. The final section will conclude with the argument that, through this critical framing, an expansion of legitimacy, as not only the legitimation of knowledge but also the legitimation of individual social action through knowledge, is required for knowledge not only to sustain power but to assume and utilise social authority.

2.2 Legitimacy expanded

At the beginning of this discussion, it is important to note that conceptualisations of legitimacy across the literature are ill-defined. As Richard Merelman (1966, p. 548) asserts:

> The diffuse, largely irrational nature of […] legitimacy has made it difficult for political scientists to handle the concept systematically. That systems are or are not "legitimate" has been asserted numerous times, though often **the precise definition of legitimacy employed has been at best vague** and the indices of legitimacy unclearly stated.

Therefore, for the purpose of an exploration of 'powerful knowledge' and in order to begin the discussion with a specific definition, Spencer (1970a, p. 123) usefully ascribes a simple definition following Weber's conception of legitimacy as "a normative system which is upheld by the belief in the actors of its binding quality or rightness" and required to uphold authority or power (herrschaft) within a "normative order (brauch)" (Weber, 1978 [1922], p. 58).[28]

Following on from the discussion of legitimacy in Chapter 1, it is important now to expand the definition of legitimacy. As explored previously, in *Three types of legitimate rule*, Weber (1958 [1922]) outlines his tripartite classification of authority or rule [Herrschaft] underpinned by his theory of legitimacy. Along with the developments in his *Vocation Lectures* (Weber, 2004 [1917/1919]) and in *Economy and Society* (Weber, 1978 [1922]), this is classed as the seminal theory of legitimacy in Western intellectual history.

[28] In his works, Weber predominately used the term "Legitimen Herrschaft" The word herrschaft is alternatively translated as power, authority, rule, control, domination and dominion. For a useful exploration of the difficulty of translation in Weber's works, see Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters's Weber's rationalism and modern society: New translations on politics, bureaucracy, and social stratification (2015), p.11-12.

The model was originally published by Weber in German as Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft . However, in the English translation, the title omits the word 'reinen' [translated as pure or uncorrupted] which often leads to the interpretation that Weber was offering a simple tripartite classification of authority. But, as Weber makes clear in Politics as a Vocation (2004 [1917/1919]) the strength of the model [or system] is in the exploration of the transitions and tensions between the categories and particularly the limits and ongoing struggle between all the elements of the model. In particular, Weber (1978 [1922], p. 58) goes on to define "power"(macht) in relation to the struggle, and particularly as "the probability that one actor […] will be in a position to carry out their own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests."

Within this context, Weber puts forward his three basic mechanisms for the individuals to overcome the struggle through the exercising of authority: tradition, charisma and legal or rational. However, the definitional structure and often simplification of the system is expressed by the fact that Christopher Ham and Michael Hill (1984, p. 47), refer to this as the three basic types of **'authority'** and in contrast Dahl (1984, pp. 64-65) refers to these as the three grounds on which to claim '**legitimacy**'. Authority in this context being simply defined by Dahl as a claim of legitimacy without the social implication of the coalescence or acquiescence of others and their views.

The relational nature of legitimacy and authority, within a system of coalescence and acquiescence, is clear for Weber (1978 [1922], p. 31) when he writes:

> Only then will the content of a social relationship be called an order if the conduct is, approximately or on the average, oriented toward determinable "maxims." Only then will an order be called, "valid" if the orientation toward these maxims occurs, among other reasons, also because it is in some appreciable way regarded by the actor as in some way obligatory or exemplary for him. […] But the circumstance that, along with the other sources

> of conformity, the order is also held by at least part of the actors to define a model or to be binding, naturally increases the probability that action will in fact conform to it, often to a very considerable degree. […] But even this type of order is in turn much less stable than an order which enjoys the prestige of being considered binding, or, as it may be expressed, of "legitimacy."

To explore this further, knowledge is imbued with power because the knowledge itself is deemed by social institutions and structures ("normative order") to be considered binding on others. To know something only assumes power because it is legitimate and therefore it can be claimed as 'truth' and used within an order to display authority. The models of 'powerful knowledge' expounded by Young and others accept this and describe a socially acceptable type of knowledge as that acquired through education and which therefore naturally or consequently has authority. It is also inherently legitimate or binding because it is 'true' and 'objective' but also because it is rare and therefore limited to those who understand it and can agree to its binding quality.

However, this model of powerful knowledge, does not address the disruption of the truth model of legitimate authority outlined in the 1960s and 1970s, when in *The Civic Culture*, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (2016 [1963]) maintained legitimacy was not about a power framework based in inherent truths but rather a shared belief based on 'value consensus': an argument that order is not binding based on truths but trusted agreement. With this conceptual shift, the theoretical development of legitimacy was reinvigorated and debate flourished with Michael Mann (1970), Spencer (1970a), Habermas (1975), and Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) developing it through theories of 'pragmatic role acceptance', 'legitimation crisis', and 'language games'.

Indeed, Mann (1970, p. 473) reasoned that Almond and Verba's construction of legitimacy "does not exist" empirically and instead contended that legitimacy was

an individual accepting their social role and thus the power required to support the social contract would lead to 'false consciousness' of perceived external authority.

However, Habermas (1975, 2015 [1979]) and Lyotard (1984) started their discussions by building on the truth versus trust debate and that because of this legitimacy was significantly challenged. To deal with this challenge, Habermas (2015 [1979]) echoed a connection with consensus formation and argued that this would be based on the ability of individuals to engage in the public sphere and communicate their needs underpinned by a form of generally accepted reason. Lyotard (1984) alternatively, explored the idea that legitimacy had become individualised and so offered only the opportunity for parallel rationalisation that was sustained by the agreed exclusion of logical consensus. However, for our purposes, the question remains as to what happens when powerful knowledge becomes non-legitimate when it is distrusted irrespective of its truth or objectivity, and how does this affect knowledge's connection with social justice and emancipatory effect?

To begin to explore this problem, Habermas suggests that any theorist looking into questions of 'power and authority' should primarily be concerned not with a notion of inherent exercisable legitimacy but, taking from Marx, the mechanisms by which legitimacy is gained, altered, or destroyed - processes which he terms 'legitimation'. For Habermas (1975), the mechanisms and processes of legitimation are a vital extension to the notion of legitimacy (1975)because it allows an ongoing connection between the social, economic - in the context of 'late-capitalism'- and the political - in the context of the "private appropriation of public wealth" (p.7). Therefore, as Thomas McCarthy's (1978) outlines, legitimation is the problem of how to distribute socially produced wealth inequitably and yet legitimately, and is intimately connected with distributive social justice empowered by knowledge (Morris, 2009 ; Voigt, 2019).

To extend this, knowledge and its comparative-historical connection with power can be effectively developed by exploring the Habermasian formulation of the process of 'legitimation' of this knowledge within any normative order (for examples of where legitimation has been added to traditional assumptions of legitimacy in order to expand a discourse, see Bexell, 2014 ; Symons, 2011 ; Tyler, 2006). This extension allows for a further combination of considerations between the social, economic and political legitimacy of 'knowledge as power' which, in turn, may be helpful to the exploration of its connection or lack of connection with social justice.

In addressing these issues of legitimation, Habermas, names four crisis tendencies which affected the ability of normative order, or the individuals within it, to function: economic, rationality, legitimation, and motivation. This is again a development from viewing legitimacy in economic, political, and social systems and is therefore helpful and parallel to the method employed in this thesis. As Habermas outlines in this context, a legitimation crisis occurs in late-capitalism as administrative manipulations by political systems – particularly as knowledge-based manipulations as in the "Weberian Bureaucracy" – grow throughout society but that this political system "does not succeed in maintaining the requisite level of mass loyalty while the steering imperatives […] from the economic system are carried through" (Habermas, 1975, p. 46).

Point of Origin	System Crisis	Identity Crisis
Economic System	Economic Crisis	
Political System	Rationality Crisis	Legitimation Crisis
Socio-cultural System		Motivation Crisis

Table 2.1 Habermas' Crises

Source: Legitimation crisis, p. 45

Here, Habermas moves away from the traditional Weber perspective that "decisions that reflect the existing organizational principle of society *ipso facto* do not admit rational consensus" (McCarthy, 1987, p. 156). Therefore, inside the Weberian rational legitimacy seen as a dynamic (but somewhat neutral) force, Habermas creates the possibility of "conflict and contradictions" where the public sphere experiences a "legitimation deficit" (Habermas, 1975, p. 47) or the inability to maintain legitimacy. It is clear that this could also be the case for 'powerful knowledge' where, due to conflict, or struggle, the knowledge acquired within an educational framework may be unable to maintain the legitimacy for the purposes for which it is given.

To explore this further in *Contradictions of the Welfare State,* Claus Offe (1984) builds on Habermas and takes forward 'contradiction' as the predominate notion instead of the Habermasian 'crisis'. Offe argues that contradictions in legitimacy are found as actors discover that economic essentialism has created social situations "where the necessary becomes impossible and the impossible becomes necessary" (Offe, 1984, p. 132). Here, the fundamental contradiction of legitimacy within a capitalist model is efficiency versus legitimacy. Building on this, Offe (1984, p. 268) distinguishes two kinds of legitimacy problems that arise:

(a) Sociological where "legitimacy means the prevalence of attitudes of trust in the given system".

(b) Philosophical where "the legitimacy […] depends on the justifiability of its institutional arrangements and outcomes".

Therefore, as a progression for Offe, Habermas' "mass loyalty" becomes again trust plus justifiability. Thus Offe, while obviously heavily influenced by the Habermasian structures, allows for a broader view. This broader view, when argued through for the concept of powerful knowledge, proposes that the social, political or economic legitimacy of the knowledge requires not only specialisation and acquisition but a

sense of loyalty, trust, and justifiability both in the knowledge itself, but also in the institutions from which society seeks its acquisition, and also the people involved in the process. As a consequence, there are three stages of progression within the processes of legitimation:

First, if the political system is "providing, restoring and maintaining commodity relationships for all citizens and [these meet] the totality of their needs" (Offe, 1984, p. 268), then there will be no contradictions within the systems legitimacy. However, as Offe notes "this happy condition of normality can hardly be assumed to be the normal case" (ibid, p. 145). This normal would be where knowledge acquired and used meets the totality of the needs that people have for knowledge within the system.

Where the commodity relationships are not able to be maintained in an appropriate manner, the distribution mechanisms of the society fail to function and the citizen's trust and satisfaction in the 'social contract' are fundamentally affected, leading "[t]o […] a sense that society does not work according to its own established standards" (ibid, p. 268) and thereby creating a sociological contradiction in legitimacy. In knowledge terms, this has been expressly dealt with by the discussions of issues which relate to the marketisation of education and the belief education is not fulfilling its social purpose and thus its place in society is not working.

Finally, where this type of access, and distributive failure is widely prevalent, citizen's questions become more basic and fundamental in nature. This, in turn, raises issues regarding the "validity of the normative foundations" of the political arrangements (ibid, pp. 268-269) creating philosophical contradictions in legitimacy. The question becomes not only one of knowledge but also of the factual basis on which knowledge exists. The power of knowledge is affected by questions concerning the

fundamental norms of its existence, or a version of the contradictions in the power of knowledge in a 'post-truth' context (for example, see discussion within Neimark *et al.*, 2019 ; Sismondo, 2017 ; Tallis, 2016)

To explore this further, the next section expands on the framing of knowledge developed within a framework of 'normative orders' and explores how dynamics of legitimacy may further affect the power ascribed to knowledge. In addition, it further explores legitimation as founded in a commodity-based relationship in order to lay the groundwork for a specific concept of and action supported 'epistemic legitimacy' connected to powerful knowledge.

2.3 Dynamics of legitimacy and power

For Weber, central to the theory of legitimacy is the principle of instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalitat) or legitimacy gained from the disciplined application of efficient means to widely accepted and democratically-approved public or social ends (Scaff, 1989, p. 32; Weber, 1978 [1922], pp. 24-26).

Weber's work on instrumental rationality explores where:

- Structurally, instrumental rationality is based in a democratic rational political system operating primarily through bureaucracy (Kronman, 1983 ; Weber, 1978 [1922], pp. 176-177).
- Intellectually, instrumental rationality is exemplified by the hegemony of fact over faith as a social value (Brint, 1996, 2015 ; Motta, 2018 ; Reed, 1996).
- Politically, instrumental rationality is supported by the consent to be governed by popularly elected parliaments (Weber, 1978 [1922], pp. 1407-1408).

In this way, through bureaucracy, parliaments, and factual knowledge, the liberal democratic system exerts legitimate rational domination and expands the range of

effective governance (for critiques, see Abercrombie *et al.*, 2015 ; Turner *et al.*, 2016 [1980]). However, often omitted from these discussions is one key exception that Weber outlined in *Economy and Society* to the operation of instrumental rationality and its support for legitimacy – the dominance of capitalist entrepreneurs and their ability to resist the bureaucratic formulations of knowledge – the ability to know better or more than the knowledge which is already within the normative order.

2.3.1 Educational policy and legitimacy

In many periods in time, universities' and academics have been characterised as so powerful that they are a threat to the orderly administration or security of the state and consequently in much discourse are imbued with 'the authority' of social change (Clark, 2008).

However, as Wolfgang Mommsen (1974, pp. 85-86) asserts, Weber "pointed out again and again that the legitimacy of all empirically known systems of domination rests on mixed foundations […] although, as a rule, one of them plays a dominant role" and therefore while policy rests on notions of powerful universities, there are limited discussions of the 'structural struggle' that this legitimate authority would have should it be connected to broader systems of change in the Weberian model of social power (Varnham & Jackson, 2015). This is a point Bourdieu (1969, p. 105) briefly raises in his essay *Intellectual field and creative project*:

> These may be isolated agents like the intellectual creator, or system of agents like the educational systems, the academies or circles, defined, basically at any rate, both in the existence and their function, by the position they occupy in the intellectual field, and by the authority, more or less recognized, that is more or less forceful and more or less far-reaching and in all cases mediated by their interaction, which they exercise or claim to exercise over the public both the prize and at the same time to some extent the empire of the competition for intellectual consecration and legitimacy.

As Bourdieu notes, for although Weber insisted that rational legitimacy characterised the public sphere of the western capitalist state, he was clear that as a sociological principle no type of legitimacy was complete in its control of political institutions or practices. Indeed there are multiple avenues for structural or institutional struggle, one of these being the perceived power of knowledge through 'intellectual legitimacy'.

To explore this further, Hans Weiler (1982, 1983a, 1983b) applied Weber's structures of values-based legitimacy to educational policy-making. Writing that education's position was one of assuring the acceptance of social norms, his perspective still relates to the domination of instructional discourse by the regulative discourse as outlined in the section on legitimacy in Chapter 1. Weiler thus focuses on the need for education to be legitimated for the social purposes to which the 'powerful' put it. Therefore, for Weiler (1983b, p. 261) education is not a means of creating power through knowledge but of socialising through knowledge to support existing structures within society. As he states:

> [e]ducation has a key role in allocating statuses and in socializing different groups in society into accepting and sustaining existing structures of wealth, status, and power. In this role, education is particularly exposed to conflicting norms and thus in need of especially high level of legitimation.

Further, Weiler recognises three tactics used within existing structures as methods of alleviating a legitimation deficit that may be caused by such a usage of education to support the political system: legalisation, expertise, and participation. While legalisation stands within the bureaucratic structures of knowledge and purports to strengthen the authority of knowledge by increasing its binding nature, and 'expertise' concerns compulsory use of expertise for the development of policy. Importantly, for the idea of 'powerful knowledge' participation refers to the

"development and stipulation of client participation in the policy process".[29] This participation principle can be seen in the UK and US stipulation of student's involvement in the policy and regulation of education. Participation, unlike legalisation and expertise, Weiler (2005, 2011) (Weiler, 2005, 2011)argues is an indicator of a legitimacy deficit that has grown up surrounding how knowledge and particularly education are used for both social and political change. Thus participatory justification within educational policy is built on trust, or as Weiler (1984, p. 476) states:

> The notion of 'legitimation by procedure' thus opens up the possibility of authorizing the continued exercise of political authority without examining its normative 'worthiness' - so long as it proves to adhere to procedures that can claim to be 'rational', intelligible and transparent.

But what happens to education and models of the power of knowledge when this trust is eroded? For Richard Merelman (1998, p. 356) in *On Legitimalaise in the United States* this erosion becomes a matter of justification which he develops as the concept of legitimalaise:

> Legitimalaise exists when the public becomes sharply divided over whether supposedly rational/legal institutions respect rational/legal principles in practice. More concretely, legitimalaise exists when a substantial number of people do not believe that courts, government bureaucracies, scientific institutions, or legislatures behave according to rational/legal principles of knowledge, impartiality, efficiency, obedience to formal rules or to the popular will. When this condition exists, political dominants are not able – in Weberian terms – to "justify" their power. Therefore, their hold on power weakens.
>
> Legitimalaise is neither a legitimacy crisis nor rational/legal legitimacy itself. Rational/legal legitimacy requires that political institutions be able to appeal

[29] For further exploration, see Trevor Gale and Deborah Tranter's Social justice in Australian higher education policy: An historical and conceptual account of student participation, *Critical Studies in Education* (2011).

> successfully to widely held rational/legal principles. By contrast, legitimalaise is distinguished by the inability of institutions to succeed in such appeals. For its part, a legitimacy crisis exists when the public rejects not only the institutions but also the very principles of rational/legal legitimacy.

For educational policy, the crisis in legitimacy then is not only the erosion of trust in any particular institution but the erosion of the belief in rationality as a useful mechanism in itself. All information becomes subject to legitimate use only through justification – essentially no institution or actor is sufficiently trusted to mandate the binding quality, and rather legitimacy is built in a continual process of justification and evidence seeking. As we see in post-truth context, knowledge is nothing without the justification for its existence.

It is important to note that social action as the basis for the acquisition of legitimacy can be imbued with the Marxist viewpoint that the procedures for legitimacy must be in the interests of the winners "for avoiding substantive changes in the objective of those who exercise power over a society" (Weiler, 1984, p. 477). The notion that there may become not only a struggle for legitimacy within the normative order but that some vestige of legitimacy can be left within the social discourse is important to explore in relation to how knowledge is legitimised within society (Merquior, 1980).

2.3.2 Claims of legitimacy

Following the Weiler perspective, the institutions and structures of knowledge – such as universities - may seek self-legitimacy within their own controlled spheres such as instructional discourse without necessarily resolving struggles for legitimacy which are external to this. Put simply, universities make the claim for the authority of knowledge because knowledge was previously authoritative based on its connection with the institution or the actor rather than having any connection to continuing processes of legitimation required by a justificatory model.

In relation to this, Weber expounded in a passage immediately following his discussion of the place of knowledge in social structures that : "[i]n a very large proportion of cases, the actors […] are of course not even aware how far it is a matter of custom, of convention, or of law" (Weber (1978 [1922], pp. 37-38). Being unaware thus means that many people may have no conscious reason for submitting to it, or even more that the actor may have no conscious reason to justify it. However, in Weber's terms 'unconscious submission' is the basis of power along with self-interest and physical coercion.

It is significant that Weber identified this as the reason that the political system usually has a monopoly on power not legitimacy, and it is therefore arguable that he would not have made this connection had he not envisaged continuing challenges to legitimate authority within any normative order endorsed by the political system. (Matheson, 1987 ; Stryker, 1994).[30] Further, it is clear that within this notion powerful knowledge is controlled by the normative order and, by imputation, the normative order that it creates and sustains in the interest of unconscious submission to it. However, for powerful knowledge what is its connection to the unconscious submission to it, and how are institutions and actors of knowledge set up to produce this?

Taking this idea, Lyotard (1984) rejects any notion of unitary, binary and pluralist conceptions of knowledge as equally legitimate. Instead he argues that for knowledge to be powerful there is an essential Durkheimian 'common social bond' but more importantly this bond is advocated for by the institutions of knowledge (for examples of how this is used in particular arguments, see Lingis, 1994 ; Raffel, 1992). In

[30] For further exploration of this idea, see Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch Jr's Status, power, and legitimacy (1998) and Norman Uphoff's Distinguishing power, authority & legitimacy, *Polity* (1989).

this way, such institutions seek to control knowledge through narratives of legitimation which only apply situationally and without broad application, as Lyotard (1984, p. 60) outlines in *The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge*:

> Postmodern science – by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by in complete information, "*fracta*," catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes – is theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the word *knowledge*, while expressing how such a change can take place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing to do with maximized performance, but has as its basis difference understood as paralogy.

In this way, the argument for powerful knowledge becomes one that proposes that knowledge and its institutions and actors has no option but to participate through their social actions in legitimation processes. In this way, the process of legitimation is the social construction through the narratives that it produces and reinforces or the 'unconscious acceptance of custom' (Johnson *et al.*, 2006 ; Rorty, 1984).[31] Accordingly, only knowledge which is legitimated by acceptance is legitimate and within the public discourse legitimate knowledge is only that which follows the narrative of science, for example its repeatability; its acceptability by peers; transparency; and competition with other knowledge (for an example of this as proposed by University's themselves, see Shafik, 2017b, p. 9).

Importantly, for discussions of 'powerful knowledge', in contrast with the statements by Young and Muller (2013, p. 231, see page 4 for quotation), Lyotard's technological argument states that when knowledge is performatively legitimised that education nor its specialised institutions is not the primary mechanism for access, participation or

[31] For further exploration, see Richard Rorty's Habermas and Lyotard on post-modernity, *Praxis International* (1984).

utilisation of knowledge. Education is not the 'common' social basis as a preparation for experiencing a common reality but an 'ongoing' flexible entity.

Similarly, Weber envisioned that knowledge-based legitimacy could not be totally fixed within the normative order. Knowledge could exist as a means of legitimate power or control over the common regulative discourse, but this would not be total in its social effect. Here Weber's (1978 [1922], p. 1417)discussion of bureaucracy is a good example:

> Our officialdom has been brilliant wherever it had to prove its sense of duty, its impartiality and mastery of organizational problems in the face of official, clearly formulated tasks of a specialized nature. […] But here we are concerned with political, not bureaucratic achievements, and the facts themselves provide the recognition which nobody can truthfully deny: That bureaucracy failed completely whenever it was expected to deal with political problems.

In fact, Weber named several enduring forces such as bureaucracy that blunt the power of knowledge legitimacy in practice. Paradoxically, most of these forces spring from rationality itself. Schluchter (1985, p. 88) identifies the paradox that, unlike other forms of order, knowledge is "controlled by the intellect" and thus while intellectual self-consciousness may devise persuasive doctrines that stabilize adherence to the normative order, it may also have precisely the opposite effect (for examples of arguments based on this type of oppositional action, see Cefaï, 2007 ; Kinzig *et al.*, 2013 ; McFarlane, 2009 ; Merkley, 2019).

For Lyotard, however, this can be seen where narrative knowledge can exclude the factual and the creation of the alternate scientific view which is supported by social custom (narrative knowledge) alone. This development that Schluchter (1985, p. 45) calls "representation into reflexivity" can create scepticism rather than automatic adherence to fixed principles through denial of factual knowledge in the face of

social custom and requirement.[32] Knowledge is power within its reasoning which exposes the reasoner to various alternatives, to criticism, and to the possibility of changing his or her mind on defensible grounds (Gouldner, 2018 [1979]). To legitimate knowledge, the regulative discourse (and its dominant normative order) must concede a basic premise: that in the possession of powerful knowledge the knower may legitimately defect from any social or political order including factual knowledge.

In Table 2.2, as an extension of the earlier Habermasian crisis models (Table 2.1), this thesis argues that this denial of knowledge is a crisis in the legitimacy of the socio-cultural system – creating a truth crisis.

Point of Origin	System Crisis	Identity Crisis
Economic System	Economic Crisis	Exchange Crisis
Political System	Rationality Crisis	Legitimation Crisis
Socio-cultural System	Truth Crisis	Motivation Crisis

Table 2.2 Habermas' Crises expanded

This system crisis in the lack of trust and justification underpinning the system of co-ordinating knowledge produces a questioning of the legitimation of knowledge to support custom as outlined by Lyotard, i.e. a lack of support for the Durkheim / Weberian common social knowledge. This points to the notion that legitimacy of knowledge is fundamental to its power but it is not a crisis in knowledge itself but rather knowledge systems. Further, this 'truth crisis' is explored by Jonathan Haidt (2016a) in his work on what he states are the two contemporary competing 'teloses'

[32] For further exploration, see Gordon Gauchat's The political context of science in the United States: Public acceptance of evidence-based policy and science funding, *Social Forces* (2015) or Jason Mast's Legitimacy Troubles and the Performance of Power in the 2016 US Presidential Election, *American Journal of Cultural Sociology* (2017)

of universities as social institutions of knowledge – social justice or truth. In line with Lyotard, Haidt and others argue that the structure of legitimacy within contemporary 'education' and instructional discourse will necessarily have a detrimental effect on knowledge (Heterodox Academy, 2015).

This is the foundation for exploring **'epistemic legitimacy'**. Epistemic legitimacy recognises that, for the institution and actors of social knowledge in the absence of utility, personal beliefs or tastes may be substituted for normatively legitimated knowledge. Authority for any set of public goals then derived from this knowledge is unstable and transient, and all goals to which the knowledge is applied or would be applied to impose authority either of the normative order or of individuals is deemed equally unstable. Whereas Weber's knowledge-based normative order depends upon the presence of normative substantive which aims for knowledge to serve, or as Kathi Friedman's (1981, p. 55) *Legitimation of social rights and the western welfare state* states, for Weber:

> [L]egitimacy ultimately derives from its substance. Weber treats the continuing quest for the law's "spirit," "kernel," "real intent," or ultimate "meaning" in the notion of the law's "logical sublimation." Logical sublimation, as Weber term, is essentially equivalent to the law's substantive rationalization. Both refer elaboration of the law's ultimate objectives.

But in socio-cultural crisis, the episteme – or substance as Friedman titles it – is decoupled from its intrinsic meaning – its truth. But, in this sense, epistemic legitimacy raises the further question of the content of truth-based legitimacy. Is it rationality or common goals? Lyotard argues that this is legitimation by paralogy – legitimation

beyond or beside rationality.[33] In relation to universities-as-institution and scholar-as-individuals, this means the production of legitimacy outside the rational through trust or justification rather than truth (for an interesting crossover with social justice theory, see Opotow, 1990, 1995). Moreover, the legitimacy of knowledge does not "rest the force of a claim (whether it be a claim to political power or to the validity of a conclusion in an argument) upon foundations external to and independent of the mere assertion or opinion of the claimant" (Schaar, 1981, p. 20).

This structure of legitimacy may be driven, as Weber (1978 [1922], p. 37) identified, by 'expediency' as the common motive for submission to authority – or in Lyotard the legitimacy of mercantile use or the function or the identity of the knowledge within the social system or what value is placed in the exchange of knowledge (Buck-Morss, 1995). Therefore, this thesis extends the Habermasian model further (Table 2.3) to explore the 'Exchange Crisis' which refers to the notion that one of the intrinsic complexities in the legitimisation of knowledge within the economic system is its usefulness in assisting transaction. Here, as Lyotard continues to explore the legitimacy of knowledge, is where material interests hold sway and knowledge is primarily a commodity. The impetus for its creation within the economic system is the desire for it to be commoditised, sold and consumed as part of the accumulation processes of capital.[34] In this sense, the value of knowledge is not its truth but its price, or put simply, the idea driving the social creation of knowledge is not truth but

[33] Paralogy is para as 'beside, past, beyond' and logos as 'reason': or the movement beyond or past reason. For Lyotard, reason is not a universal but a consequence of normative ordering thus paralogy is usefully seen as the development counter to the reasoning of the normative order. For further discussion, see Nigel Blake's Paralogy, validity claims, and the politics of knowledge: Habermas, Lyotard, and higher education (2006).

[34] In this sense, most arguments here are framed from the Marxist dialectic. For further discussions of the sale and commodification of knowledge see works such as Bob Jessop's Varieties of academic capitalism and entrepreneurial universities, *Higher Education* (2017), Alan Kahan's Mind vs. money: The war between intellectuals and capitalism (2010), Mark Olssen and Michael Peters's Neoliberalism, higher education and the knowledge economy: From the free market to knowledge capitalism, *Journal of Education Policy* (2005).

utility – Lyotard's 'legitimation of performativity' (for examples of this in relation to educational policy, see Blake, 2006 ; Gietzen, 2010 ; Paden, 1987).

Consequently, to extend the argument related to the truth of knowledge, it is important to also discuss utility as a factor in the 'epistemic legitimacy' of powerful knowledge. Therefore, the next section expands on this framing and explores the dynamics of legitimacy valued for its use as it may affect the intrinsic power of knowledge.

2.3.3 Legitimacy as use

As knowledge becomes a source of economic benefits, then material expediency of the individual rather than the system supersedes knowledge-based authority with Weber (2012 [1920], pp. 319-320) saying as much:

> What is important is that, even then, the individual will ask first of all how far the real income allotted to them and the labour service required of them […] appear to conform with their interests. This would be the basis of their behaviour.

But how is knowledge legitimacy existing outside of rationality? Here, as Schluchter (1985, p. 45) puts it, "For Weber not only Christian ethics but ethical principles as such have become problematic. In Western modernity the morally evaluating and acting individual is forced to choose his own moral fate."

This is something that Lyotard and Habermas both discussed as the ability of rationality to work on an ongoing diffusion of consensus regarding what is the socially moral action to take.

> Wherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently brought about the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism, a definitive pressure arises against the claims of the ethical postulate that the world is a divinely ordered, ... somehow ethically meaningful cosmos. (Habermas, 2007 [1981], p. 160)

But might not the burden of moral choice spill over into the realm of politics, weakening adherence to knowledge legitimacy through utility? On the one hand, choice allows individuals to compare potential courses of action in terms of efficiency, costs, and benefits and to make the most instrumentally rational decision. Choice also frees people to accept fully and conscientiously the principles of rational knowledge legitimacy. On the other hand, nothing ensures that people's choices will yield consistent collective action (Riker, 1988, 1995). Only if people choose to pursue common purposes will rationality necessarily sustain the normative order but, if people choose conflicting goals, the very efficiency of their actions will increase disorder.

Moreover, some people may choose to reject the principle of knowledge use as it implies an objective rather than fluid conception. In each case, the reach of legitimate authority gained by the utility of knowledge within its institutions, actors and actions shrinks. While Weber specifically denied that contemporary Western societies held any ultimate values regarding rationality [Wertrationalitat] - that is, consciously held, substantive goals of the normative order – he did outline how through the loss of rationality, utility would take precedence and people would continue to gain efficient knowledge, but without passion, unconvinced that their efforts are necessary. Under these conditions, should we not expect that knowledge begins to lack the level and commonality of public submission that allows it to be powerful?

However, Lyotard (2011 [1971]) argues, that utility as the basis for legitimacy is so radical that it can change the normative order in ways which are not self-evident within the public legitimating discourse or meta-narrative (dominant due to its basis in

consensus). Therefore, knowledge does not have public rational utility and its consideration by the individual waits until after the social action alters the normative discourse and, as a result, they seem to be of little personal value according to the utility criterion ('limited performative legitimation'). Consequently, knowledge legitimation by utility tends to follow the consensus opinion and limits the use of knowledge for social change or individual emancipation – in fact in this sense because utility is consensus following it does not enable it to force change against resistance. Thus it is not powerful if conceptualised and formed within policy as a commodity for as Friedman (1981) argues, this weakens the power of rational institutions and discourses themselves.

However, while intellectual debate could not claim the legitimacy of utility, Weber did not discount the continuing appeal of ethical, religious, and emotional claims of knowledge legitimacy utility not rationalised but irrational in nature only (Weber, 2014 [1915], pp. 333-340). Weber knew that individuals always pursue non-instrumental "meaning" in their lives. Instrumental rationality and rational/legal legitimacy might organize public life, but they would always face challenges from cultural and social movements offering transcendental, subjectively fulfilling personal visions.

Indeed, Weber left open the possibility that, without strong substantive foundations, rationality might cause disunity even within the state. Lacking consensual normative ends, nothing keeps instrumentally rational government bureaucracies from pursuing incompatible, self-interested political goals ever more relentlessly and efficiently. Adherence to common normative ends would commit specialised government agencies to mutually coordinated, politically compatible actions.

As Scaff puts it, Weber expected a struggle "between the 'rational autonomy' of the modern political order and 'an increased tendency toward flight into the irrationalities

of apolitical emotionalism or feeling'" (Scaff, 1989, p. 170, quoting Weber). Weber also envisaged that this emotionalism would drive conflict between knowledge and the political system. For in practice, knowledge in the form of bureaucracy usually co-opts parliamentary democracy, with the aim to provide legislative cover for the extension of bureaucratic power (Hudson, 2016). Nevertheless, in principle, bureaucratic and democratic structures stay fundamentally opposed to each other. After all, the former lodges power with experts and the latter with "the people" (Sadri, 1992, p. 92) as Weber (1978 [1922], p. 991) puts it:

> We must remember the fact [...] that "democracy" as such is opposed to the "rule" of bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization. Under certain conditions, democracy creates palpable breaks in the bureaucratic pattern and impediments to bureaucratic organization.

Weber saw democratic forces placing successful demands on government bureaucracies for the expansion of public benefits. However, the hierarchical organisation of bureaucracy that is necessary to provide such benefits leads to alienation of the democratic public such that bureaucratic hierarchy may prove incompatible with democratic equality.

Consequently, it can be argued that Ernest Gellner (1998 [1974], p. 191) reads Weber superficially when he remarks that Weber "would seem to have overdone it a bit" in his depiction of rational/legal legitimacy. Weber would not be at all surprised that, as Merquior (1980, p. 185) puts it, "two generations after his [Weber's] death, what some rather hastily call the 'technological society' is literally swarming with ecstatic creeds, irrationalist trends, and a mounting clamour of technique-bashing." This was for Weber, a symptom of rationalism being co-opted by utility.

Therefore, as universities have moved through various 'struggles for legitimacy', they have both gained and lost power and authority in the public sphere. Their legitimacy, which at some point seemed unassailable, has now been called into question. By moving from their presenting 'knowledge as power' to seeing 'knowledge as a commodity', universities have made themselves vulnerable to hostile outside forces.

It may well be that the re-legitimation of knowledge, as well as the resumption of social authority, may require universities to accept the legitimation of individual social action through knowledge – or legitimation as a 'currency' or means of exchange (Blau, 2017). However, this appears to be the opposite of approaches taken by universities in many current high-profile cases of academic protest against knowledge utility and commodification (for example, see Apple, 2006 ; Davies & Bansel, 2007 ; Lorenz, 2012 ; Montoya & Valdes, 2008 ; Petrick, 2015 ; Shafik, 2017a).[35]

2.4 Exploration of the impact on social justice

> So far I have not directly addressed the most significant aspects of any environment of learning, namely power and authority. Until quite recently, questions of the kind: whose power? whose authority? in what domains? how exercised? had a clear answer. The school provided the environment for engagement with a curriculum which had general assent and legitimacy socially […]. The school, as the agent of state power had responsibility for […] what role power played in relation to knowledge; what value was given to correctness (a social issue, linked to convention) as against accuracy (an ethical issue, linked to truth); what modes for representation were admitted and which were marginalized or banished; and so on.
> Gunther Kress (2008) Meaning and learning in a world of instability and multiplicity, p. 261

[35] While this is more contemporary, the notion of the resumption of social authority in this way has a longer history, particular in the works on academic activism of the 1970's such as John Searle's The Campus war : A sympathetic look at the university in agony (1971) and Sidney Hook's Academic freedom and academic anarchy (1970).

One implication is that for Lyotard, basing legitimation in utility only ensures exclusion of individuals from the discourse (Lyotard uses the term 'terror' for this social action) (Malpas, 2005 ; Sidorkin, 2002).[36] Similarly, Wheelahan (2010, p. 17) contends that as society does not allow for hermeneutic equality in knowledge this is a fundamental barrier to 'society's conversation' for those with little or no access:

> Theorising the nature of knowledge is thus a key task of the sociology of education, because this provides an understanding of the way it should be constructed in curriculum so that there is equitable access to it.

But Lyotard's reply, in *The Differend* (2007 [1983]) and *Au Juste* (2008 [1985]), is to reiterate that there has never been a timeless idea of justice and that any social or political appeal to some traditional sense of justice is only occurring in order for the normative order to obscure a demand for change. As Lyotard (2008 [1985], p. 23) writes:

> This means that all [justice] implies the prescription of doing something else than what is. But this prescription of doing something else than what is, is prescription itself: it is the essence of a prescription to be a statement such that it induces in its recipient an activity that will transform reality […].

Consequently, the normative order makes prescriptions which seek its own self-preservation and proliferation. Those prescriptive statements parallel Bernstein's regulative discourse in which competing orders are selected founded on their power as the lone owners of 'oughtness' (Bernstein, 2003).

[36] While this is currently focussed on the nature of epistemic legitimacy it is also important to note that this exclusion is central to Lyotard's conception of justice which will be explored later in the essay. For full discussion of the 'terror' of exclusions in relation to education, see Pradeep Dhillon and Paul Standish (Eds.). Lyotard: Just education (2000).

However, knowledge in making prescriptions ensures that the 'possibility space' for social thought cannot be avoided while maintaining loyalty to the normative order. Through this argument, the idea is raised that there is not a single prescription or truth, but rather a variety which are all true within a single discourse: "we are always in judgments of opinion and not in judgments of truth" (Lyotard & Thébaud, 2008 [1985], p. 28). Within this, a normative order has a logic of exclusion of all others. Lyotard wants us to embrace conflict by arguing that one model cannot hold all variables and thus it is not a set of norms that controls a discourse but that atomisation within society allows for multiple world views.

In this way, 'epistemic legitimacy' would be a confined 'oughtness' with legitimacy being the product of the social environment. However, for Lyotard, the conception of justice is such that it necessarily involves the exclusion of the possible and, in this sense, is restrictive and always relative. Likewise, exclusion in many other contexts has been widely valorised as the basis for legitimacy. In this case, 'epistemic legitimacy' and its authority is based not on the bestowal of social relevance but on the exclusion of social relevance and an absence of context – it is that which exists outside the relative. Within the idea of an 'epistemic legitimacy' argumentation and debate are sites of the struggle for trust and justification which underpin the legitimate authority knowledge, and thus the authority for the use of powerful knowledge lies within the debate not the truth. Indeed, as explored by Lyotard and Habermas, the power of knowledge in the development of individual and collective justice is often argued to lie not in its existence but in its absence. This is an absence particular of individual truth in order to grow trust and allow 'impartial justification'. As Charles Collier (1992, p. 160) explains:

> The archetypal image of intellectual authority is that of the blindfolded woman holding scales and sword and administering justice 'without fear or favor.' **Self-imposed blindness is indeed a valued procedure for ensuring fairness and**

> **impartiality as well as a splendid metaphor for abstracting from irrelevant or biasing "institutional" factors.** Well-known examples include Rawls's "veil of ignorance," the standard "double blind" experimental procedure, the secret ballot, the use of anonymous examination numbers, the numbered protocols used in professional wine tasting and judging, and "blind reviewing" of manuscripts by scholarly journals.

Likewise, rather than Young's assertion of the power of knowledge being within its acquisition, albeit with the mitigation that this acquisition needs to be "meaningful" (Muller, 2014, p. 255) when legitimacy of this knowledge is explored, exclusory principles can be argued as a significant component of 'powerful knowledge'. However, as many discussions of 'powerful knowledge' explore, there is a tendency to accentuate meaningful access and acquisition as founded in social relationships internal to the institutions to the disadvantage of deliberations of how meaningful are the public systems which underpin the authority of knowledge. This issue is seen, for example, as Young (2013a, p. 196) asserts:

> The tension I am concerned with arises from the problem of 'massifying' an elite system and from unresolved questions as to whether this involves (a) extending elite knowledge to the mass, (b) replacing the concept of knowledge associated with elite forms of education, or (c) developing a diversified system of education suited to the needs and interests of different groups in society.

Normally there is an inherent hierarchical relationship set up in an understanding of authority so that, in looking to legislate for individual freedoms, the 'power' is placed within the institution. Thus, there is an in-built hierarchy of power at the very foundation of the expression of authority. Consequently, a right is something that is inherent in an institution and is delegated to the individual. A right is often seen in opposition to a responsibility. Something that is formed within an individual or position, and, then exercised for a purpose without the necessity of intervention from someone representing an institution, such as the university itself (Jakubowski & Lange, 1978).

While knowledge may be powerful as a fuel for participation within the social sphere, it is not powerful within the notion of the creation of just system outside of itself. The danger is that acceptance and operation within this regulative discourse makes knowledge mere opinion. In accepting that there is no single truth, only opinion, or multiple co-existing truths it becomes remarkably simple to work toward such a position dialectically through social and political discourse. Within this discourse there is no truth, there is only agreement as to the 'right' opinion; there is no knowledge which specifies social authority or 'oughtness'; legitimacy exists within the level of agreement regarding an opinion or as Lyotard and Thébaud (2008 [1985], p. 81) claim "there is no possible politics. There is only consensus." And in consensus: "the manufacture of a subject that is authorized to say 'we'".

Here, Lyotard's search for separation involves a logical mistake which has key implications for its social application. Within this, Lyotard does not seem to acknowledge that an underlying requirement for consensus is the same requirement for consensus' own appeal to truth (Frank, 1988). In this way, it is inconsistent to appeal to reason on behalf of a pluralism of thought that is supposed to elude the same reason. Thus, in putting forward this argument against a rational consensus, Lyotard seems to give rise to a framework of injustice and differing ends or as Weber (1954, p. 155) argues when considering similar moral arguments that "domination-free argumentation [is] only […] a precondition of the good life – it is not the good life itself".

Thereby, legitimacy exists not in the permission to undertake a regulative discourse to a certain type of knowledge capable of creating action through its authority but rather in the decision as to what is to be done. The power of knowledge to enact social change sits not within a single 'truth' but within the 'conflict between multiple truths'.

So 'powerful knowledge' exists not within the object that is knowledge but within the ability to expand within the 'conflict' of multiple truths. Powerful knowledge is the power to decide. Powerful knowledge is a capability for self-determination of action and for inclusion within the 'we' structures through consensus of action:

> This is where the whole matter lies: one must not merely take into consideration all of society as a sensible nature, as an ensemble that already has its laws, its customs, and its regularities; but the capability to decide by means of what is adjudged as to be done […]
> (Lyotard & Thébaud, 2008 [1985], p. 83)

Since this ability to break down the traditions and rational norms is discussed extensively in the literature regarding 'social justice', it is important to consider how this type of authority can assist with the development of social justice through access, participation or use of a particular set of knowledges (Chapman, 1990, p. 56). For as Weber (2012 [1920], p. 276) says, one of the key characteristics of bureaucratic power is not change but "continuous rule-bound conduct" i.e. the continuity of the same rules over an extended period. In this sense, power is gained through knowledge because rules tend to change slowly and with a great deal of difficulty. This level of continuity of rules leads to "bounded application" (Weber, 2012 [1920], p. 302) or the institution seeking to limit the scope of the application to within the regulative discourse. Rather than Lyotard's regulative discourse setting the range of possibilities, Weber argues that knowledge itself has its own application to mitigate against social change. The power of knowledge exists not through change but through continuity – or more strongly, it is not powerful to know something that tomorrow will be redundant due to social change. As Weber (1978 [1922], p. 62) termed it "[t]he fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world."

2.5 Conclusion

For Ellen Cushman (1999), Richard Reeves (2003) and Frank Furedi (2004), intellectualism in the public sphere neither creates principles, nor commands compliance. It is, according to Stanley Fish (1984, p. 1325), in this way distinct from 'institutional authority'. Instead, it displays an 'intellectual authority' or "the authority exerted by arguments that make their way simply by virtue of a superior rationality, and do not depend for their impact, on the lines of power and influence operating in an institution".

Rationality, as Danielle Fuller (2006, p. 149) explores, is a "disturbingly passive characterization not uncommon when defining public intellectuals. It basically absolves intellectuals of any responsibility for their ideas, since the fate of those ideas is taken out of their hands and placed in some reception community". It is up to that community to impute from an inherent truth the authority that intellectualism contains.

The codification of public intellectualism over the last 40 years in the UK has privileged the rational voice. This bureaucratisation presents a challenge to the ability of universities, and their academic staff, to disrupt and present alternatives visions in service of 'just social development' and thus exerts a separation between access to a 'constant' of knowledge in order to exert the power of existing rules and the ability of knowledge to be the 'power of decision'.

This inherent contradiction between rationality, social justice, and public intellectualism is discussed in depth by Agnes Heller when she questions Habermas's communicative rationality:

> If we accept the plurality of ways of life, we have to accept the plurality of theories as well. Consensus regarding one theory would mean consensus in one single way of life. To exchange pluralism for consensus would be a bad.

Therefore, this essay has argued that, on the contrary, the legitimacy of intellectualism or knowledge in the public sphere in the development of social justice is not only a function of presenting and rationalising new norms through the effects of social action but also of presenting a 'command to be followed' through the realisation of new 'possibilities' not just their creation as outlined in Young's model of 'powerful knowledge' and is therefore not then grounded in a truth but in action. This is what is being termed 'epistemic legitimacy'.

Epistemic legitimacy recognises that, for the institution and actors of social knowledge in the absence of utility, personal beliefs or tastes may be substituted for normatively legitimated knowledge. The legitimate authority of both direct and indirect knowledge for the achievement any set of public goals then derived from this is unstable and transient, and all goals to which the knowledge is applied or would be applied to impose authority either of the normative order or of individuals is deemed equally unstable. As Fuller (2006, p. 152) expounds:

> The premier virtue of public intellectual life is autonomy, speaking for oneself in, as the Greek root suggests, a "self-legislated" fashion. But it is impossible to display this virtue with the presence of external interference, in terms of which autonomy is the defined in terms of one's active resistance, or what used to be called, after György Lukacs, "oppositional consciousness".

The autonomy is an important feature of the legitimacy discussion but underpinning this is a notion - adopted by Young - that imagined possible alternative futures will linked with the desire to create these futures and that it is 'external interference' that prevents this link. In the absence of this, individuals will actively seek to create the

reality to link with the knowledge that they possess. Further that this will be possible because of the connection between the direct knowledge of things and the rationality through which is has been created within the knowledge framework of the individual. In this way, knowledge becomes not only the "condition for the acquisition of agency, but also the sphere for imagining oppositional social change" (Giroux, 2004, p. 60). Further Giroux (2002, p. 432) states:

> Struggling for democracy is both a political and an educational task. Fundamental to the rise of a vibrant democratic culture is the recognition that education must be treated as a public good - as a crucial site where students gain a public voice and come to grips with their own power as individual and social agents. […] Reducing higher education to the handmaiden of corporate culture works against the critical social imperative of educating citizens who can sustain and develop inclusive democratic public spheres. A long tradition extending from Thomas Jefferson to John Dewey and C. Wright Mills extols the importance of education as essential for a democratic public life.

However, the next chapter will explore the assumptions at the base of these types of discussions of legitimacy and the power of knowledge and education. The next essay continues the development of the conceptual basis for epistemic legitimacy through the engagement with the underpinning assumption that education will not only empower individuals it will ensure that they support and act to support the 'critical social imperative' is a strong and often unsupported claim which is not only empirically shaky it ignores the deliberative democrat tradition of the 'moral good' of ignorance.

Chapter 3: Ignorance and the Power of Knowledge

> There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there always has been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge".
> Issac Asimov (1980) A Cult of Ignorance, Newsweek, p.19.

> The intellectuals' revolt against scholastic monopolies of knowledge produced a great democratization of the intellect. Today, we need to keep faith with this ideal. The information revolution has made the intellectual's translation function more important than ever. We need to rescue knowledge from the closed language games of specialists. In the Middle Ages, our credulity was based on factual scarcity; today, it is rooted in factual overload. We know too much, understand too little, and when we turn to the humanities and social sciences for help, what do we get?
> Michael Ignatieff (1997) Decline and fall of the public intellectual, p. 398.

3.1 Introduction

On all sides of political discourse, individual citizens' opinions are often considered to be ill-informed, uneducated, or irrational. While this notion of 'political ignorance' is often discussed at a group level ('the citizenry'), the individuals are also often categorised – sometimes in rather pejorative (and paternalistic) language – as 'know-nothings'..[1] The answers given as to how to address this phenomena are exceptionally varied but, at their centre, are invariably concerned with the power of increasing knowledge within society (often short-handed to increasing education). This reification of government by the knowledgeable citizen – or 'the epistocracy' –is

[1] In political science, this terminology originated in reference to the populist American Party in the 1865 Presidential Election as outlined in Humphrey Desmond's The Know-Nothing Party (2010 [1905]). However, it was given theoretical prominence in Herbert Hyman and Paul Sheatsley's Some reasons why information campaigns fail, *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1947)

often espoused based on the principle that not only will knowledge support appropriate choices of representative government but lead to a 'good' use of power in the broader interests of those in the public sphere.[2] In political science, this 'good use of knowledge' is due to the sanctity of the principle that active participation of individuals in the public sphere is significant to the health and effectiveness of any democracy. Indeed, while most individuals understand that an individual's vote is generally insignificant, the vast majority of citizens of countries with democratic systems continue to participate and advocate for democratic decision-making (Downs, 1957a, 1957b).

The consequence that high participation in democratic decision-making equals high legitimacy of outcome is easily seen in many of the political discourses surrounding the UK and indeed globally. Thus, it is argued that while politically education may enable citizens to engage with the 'truth' of a given political circumstance, it does not alter the legitimacy of the decision even if this is against a clear outcome. Instead, citizens vote according to an easily understandable solution and, in the best political situation, would vote unanimously – with unanimity as the mark of legitimacy.

The link with the power of knowledge is clear in this context. Knowledge is considered to enable not only the choice of representatives but also more moral government – embedding the structural power of knowledge and building on its binding qualities. However, if knowledge is the instigator of individual resistance founded in a public rationality, and further is the basis of moral governance, what is the effect on the power of knowledge if people choose not to be involved in it.

[2] As coined in David Estlund's Why Not Epistocracy? (2003) however the concept has a long history with the modern term noocracy or "aristocracy of the wise", as originally defined by Plato with his idea of Philosopher kings. Vladimir Vernadsky, Édouard Le Roy and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin also significantly expand this concept which has been recently returned to with works such as Jason Brennan's Against democracy (2017).

Russell Hardin (2009, p. 202) states, this is largely because: "[voters] expect democracy to work poorly and to be a poor tool for generating just laws and social policies…[but believe] all feasible alternatives to democracy would expectably perform even worse". Indeed, Hardin (2006) continues by arguing that that in choosing to remain ignorant citizens are making a moral and rational choice. For Hardin, this is a simple matter of opportunity cost - by not engaging in education and knowledge acquisition for the purpose of improving their vote - they are relying on the broader community and strengthening and improving this community in ways which are more morally significant, and potentially influential on the positions that representatives are required to take to be elected. Indeed, he goes further to say that this is in the interests of the majority of electors to act in this fashion.

Therefore, while in most democratic societies there is strong belief in a political system underpinned by rational decision-making, it is argued that there is often no rational reason or incentive for individuals to educate themselves in the interest of enhancing their political position or power. Ignorance is a valid position for any individual as increasing knowledge will not change the justness or appropriateness of the outcomes and in this way, knowledge does not meet the social criteria of 'oughtness' or legitimate authority.

Therefore, as Friedman (2007, p. 11) maintains, for many citizens the rational choice is one of "radical ignorance". So that it is not just a passive lack of knowledge but an active choice not to participate in any educative solution because it is a danger to the alternative knowledge of reality: the often admired 'common sense' solution. In this way, the objective reality at the base of Young's conception of 'powerful knowledge' continues the track where reality is not arguable. If knowledge is conceived as a relationship with reality so that reality is that which is the most connected with people's own and their communities experience of that reality.

Young's rebuttal is that this does not affect the overall nature of reality, which this thesis accepts, and so 'powerful knowledge' is possible through the connection with specialised knowledge of objective fact. However, it is not - as discussed in the previous essay - authoritative if it is not a trusted representation of an individual's reality. Common sense in this way is both trustable and justifiable separate from truth.

Therefore, for knowledge to be legitimate it needs to be seen as most likely to achieve a just or 'good' outcome due to the inadequacies of the political system.[3]

Consequently, the belief evolves that political and their concomitant social questions – while being made to appear complicated – are reducible to very simple principles which do not require any specific or specialised knowledge to solve. This argument is perhaps most famously made in Thomas Paine's *Common sense* (1997 [1775/1776]) but is a fundamental one for much of western society political thought stemming from the Scottish School of Common Sense and works such as Thomas Reid's *An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense* (2001 [1764]) and James Beattie's *An essay on the nature and immutability of truth* (2000 [1770]). This preference for simplicity has a long history in English and Scottish philosophy from John Duns Scotus and Ockham's razor, through to Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (2014 [1922]).

Indeed, outside of education there is extensive literature on the issue of individual ignorance, the preference for common sense and its consequences for public discourse.[4] With Hardin (2009, p. 231) observing that "since polling began in the 1930s, about a fifth of U.S. individuals call themselves conservatives and vote in view

[3] Most sociological discussions of 'radical ignorance' have a basis in the arguments by Richard Hofstadter's Anti-intellectualism in American life (1996 [1963]) and Philip Converse's Ideology and its discontents (1964).

[4] For further exploration of the nature of singular and domain ignorance, see Bobby Duffy's The perils of perception: Why we're wrong about nearly everything (2018).

of that but take liberal stands on key issues".[5] In this way, the individual version of a desired future reality created through 'powerful knowledge' can never be realised and indeed people act in a way through voting which promotes the creation of a reality in opposition to their desired reality.

The idea is that 'common sense' is the basis for democratic unanimity with limited or no space for reasonable pluralism and that, within this unanimity, no level of 'conflict' will occur around the 'right' outcome (c.f. the works on political polarisation, such as Elena Baldassarri and Bearman (2007)). These arguments are often deployed as commendations of the strengths of contemporary liberal democracy. For example, Michael Sandel in Justice: What's the right thing to do? (2009) argues for a concept of "politics of the common good" operating on the belief that there are more or less just outcomes from particular political situations. This is built upon the belief that for policy making to be just it requires moral obligations outside simple impartiality. Therefore, Sandel suggest that political discourse should be built on fundamental moral stances which in his belief are self-evidently more desirable than others. Within this, powerful knowledge is illegitimate as within Young's definition it is neither 'common' nor makes easily understandable 'sense' nor does it act in a relativist way connected to moral objectives.

Importantly, in this way, voter ignorance does not challenge the 'common sense' view of participatory democracy. Instead, as Sophia Rosenfeld (2011) in *Common Sense: A Political History*, argues 'common sense' is established as a political construct whereby obscure debates are seen as obvious realities when they may actually be radical claims in themselves. The fundamental issue, however becomes

[5] The Ipsos MORI's Perceptions are not reality (2013) survey of British political attitudes showed, for example, that voters believe 24% of benefits payments are claimed fraudulently while the reality is that less than 1% are.

that, without arguing that common sense of the democratic participants and chosen representatives meets the requirements of any political decision-making, democracy lacks justification and would always decide against the need for radical social or political change. Thus, through common sense a democratic public sphere can argue that mass participation will ensure good decision-making and overcome any wide-spread ignorance.[6]

This discourse within the public sphere has significant implications for Young's model of 'powerful knowledge' and its legitimacy uses. This is particularly so as a consensus has emerged around increasing evidence that the average voter participation is grounded in a belief in the 'oughtness' of an outcome from participating within a political group that is unconnected to their own underpinning knowledge or beliefs regarding the 'rightness' of those outcomes.

This should not be taken as an argument for wholly self-interested participation in the public sphere. On the contrary, evidence suggests that individuals formulate their participation to achieve outcomes targeted to the wider public good (termed 'sociotropical' preferences) (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981 ; Lau & Heldman, 2009). However, it is the belief that this wider public good can be achieved just as well without knowledge as with it.

Therefore, in the discussion and development of epistemic legitimacy, it is clear that the dual doctrinal perspective, where (a) democratic legitimacy is formed based on the size of individual or group participation and (b) that the common-sense answer is a just outcome and equivalent to one based in knowledge, has considerable

[6] Ilya Somin's Deliberative democracy and political ignorance, *Critical Review* (2010) and Richard Posner's Pragmatism, law and democracy (2003) have used some of these empirical findings showing the extent of public ignorance as an argument against the possibility of a deliberative democracy. In other words, people tend not to be able to meet the knowledge requirements imposed by deliberation theorists.

consequences for the concept of 'power of knowledge' and the development of 'epistemic legitimacy'. Therefore this essay continues to develop the arguments from Chapter 2 as to the discourse which defines the legitimate uses of knowledge.

In summary, the power of knowledge (in this case promoted as access to education) is actively delegitimized as education is only allowing further access to 'uncommon' knowledge which, while 'powerful' to solve certain either mechanical or technical issues, is not 'legitimate' because that requires 'commonality'. Here mere participation allows for a 'political consensus' – the only representation of the 'common' – and is therefore an accurate representation of the 'sensible' position in opposition to the 'knowledgeable position'.

This essay explores how different understandings of 'political ignorance' and their associated 'educative solutions' inform how knowledge's power or authority is legitimised or delegitimised in contemporary political cultures. Beginning with a brief overview of public political ignorance, the essay considers how such debates interact with an understanding of 'powerful knowledge', and how common understandings of democracy support the demands for – and reverence of – education and knowledge without necessarily collate power. The idea of epistemic legitimacy - as developed in Chapter 2 - will be further developed by exploring how the criteria for the 'good' usage of 'powerful knowledge' or 'properly exercised powerful knowledge' is characterised in contemporary political discourse.

3.2 Epistemic legitimacy in democratic theory

Although some research (for examples, see Bauer, 2008 ; Nisbet & Goidel, 2007 ; Young & Matthews, 2007) suggests that most citizens can assemble enough expertise to understand their own interests in a situation of controversy, democratic theories

generally discuss three types of responses aimed at addressing the issue of widespread public ignorance. They are:

(a) systematically improving the level of information and rationality of all current and future participants in democratic decision-making ('educative response');

(b) limiting democratic decision-making and policy to only those matters that the public can 'reasonably' be expected to understand ('minimalist response'); or

(c) reducing or amending the franchise to include only participants with particular and often proven sets of information or rational skill ('exclusivist response').

Each of these are addressed in turn and the implications for 'epistemic legitimacy' explored.

3.2.1 The educative response

The most famous development of the educative argument can be found in John Dewey's (2012 [1927], p. 325) *The Public and its Problems: An Essay in Political Inquiry*. In this, Dewey identifies that democratic participants often seemed "lost [… or] certainly bewildered" and argues that participants can become more skilled and knowledgeable participation through the introduction of "a more radical and committed democracy based in education".[7]

For Dewey, and many who follow the educative response, education is a demonstration of the individual's political commitment to representative government as the chosen means of developing and enforcing social order. For Durkheim (1972

[7] Deweyan democratic theory following on from the preoccupation for democratic education found in Thomas Jefferson and John-Stuart Mill's Considerations on Representative Government (2019 [1861]). In Thomas Jefferson's From Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe, 13 August 1786 (1954 [1786]) he remarked that "the most important bill in our whole code, is that for the diffusion of knowledge among the people [as] no other sure foundation can be devised for the preservation of freedom and happiness [for … failing to provide public education would] leave the people in ignorance."

[1893/1912], p. 203): "society can survive only if […] education perpetuates and reinforces […] homogeneity by fixing through knowledge […], from the beginning, the essential similarities that social life demands". For Dewey (1922, p. 277), a public democracy was the foundation of good education "as far as it could develop a predisposition to think rationally about pushing back the boundaries of ignorance".

Therefore, for the educative response to succeed, democracy must be founded in basing participation in the public sphere on the condition that public policy ensures participants are provided with the opportunity to learn moral responsibility (Bernstein, 2010, pp. 292-293). This raises the question as to what personal responsibility is for and Dewey responds to this only briefly by stating that it is the personal responsibility to act in a way to achieve the best social construction for all (Honneth, 1998).

However, the limitation of the educative response is not in the provision of education which is taken as a fundamental responsibility of well-function democratic states through good and evidenced based education policy, it is the development of the citizens desire information and the transfer of it decision-making. For as Somin (2016, p. 15) suggests, "the major constraint on political knowledge is not the supply of information but the demand for it" – an argument evidenced by the evidence that while most western democracies are seeing a steady growth in education of their citizens and information relevant to most political decisions is available to most people within seconds, the understanding of arguments for and against on political issues has declined over the last 20 years (for examples, see Galston, 2001 ; Somin, 2016).

Another issue for the educative response is the potential for any participation in an educative solution to form part of indoctrination by the normative order (Mill, 2006 [1859]; Somin, 2016). Even if this concern is not considered serious enough, it does

remind one that an educative response to public ignorance will only generally be available within the pre-existing knowledge structures available in the public sphere – which in the Durkheimian sense is necessary for social order. Therefore, education can only act in a way where 'powerful knowledge' allows conceptions of future realities that are agreed and supported by the existing structures of knowledge - a conception which is clear in Young's discussions of the nature of specialised knowledge (Moore & Young, 2001 ; Young, 1995 [1971], 2013a ; Young *et al.*, 2014 ; Young & Muller, 2011). In Young's terms "better knowledge" is only powerful knowledge if it is already acceptable and not necessarily that which provides either testimonial or hermeneutic authenticity leading to greater vulnerability to domination or "powerlessness" since it is not part of a collective domain of power. Knowledge in this sense is only power if it is present in its authoritative sphere or as Bernstein (2018 [1973]) puts it 'knowledge regions'.[8]

Indeed, in this sense, knowledge might possibly make democratic political systems more vulnerable to manipulative or coercive influences more generally. Specifically, even the development of expert participants, if dependent on the choice of the representative government or the same decision-making process, will usually import the same knowledge as the basis for the educative process due to the *a priori* ignorance of the participants who are selecting the education. This would thereby create "an obstacle to its own alleviation" (Somin, 2016, p. 193) or, as Ian Shapiro (1996, p. 128) argues, the problem becomes "expertise itself is the best means of measuring the expertise of decisions of potential officials".

Therefore, an educative solution is unlikely to affect the legitimacy of the knowledge gained through this mechanism. For powerful knowledge in this sense is powerful only

[8] For further exploration, of 'knowledge regions' see, Jim Hordern's Regions and their relations: Sustaining authoritative professional knowledge, *Journal of Education and Work* (2016).

when and if it 'ought' to be part of the political system, and this 'oughtness' is only appreciable to those who already have the knowledge. Thus, while certain knowledge in this sense is powerful, it is also in one part restricted to the areas that are, as discussed in the earlier chapters, already legitimised from a social and economic perspective. In addition, certain knowledge is required in order that other knowledge becomes powerful within a democratic regime.

3.2.2 Minimalist response

Others are less guarded in their response to this problem. James Bovard (2006a, p. 244) writes that there are only two options available to the issue of knowledge within the political public sphere:

> We can either embrace paternalism and openly admit that the government must protect people from themselves (and from their foolish political opinions), or we can reduce the size and scope of government to something that the average citizen can better understand.

For Bovard, if the knowledge required for political engagement is too immense or complex for the average citizen to rationally participate, then "a minimal government with representatives having clear responsibilities and mandates reduces the potential for public ignorance to be harmful" (Kaye, 2015a, p. 112). In Somin's *Foot voting, federalism, and political freedom* (2014), the minimalist response is extrapolated as "foot-participation in the public sphere". Where, following Caplan (2011), the areas of concern for the government are argued to be solely the areas with a direct and immediate impact on individuals lives because, in these areas, participants recognise the need to be more informed in these areas, and thus have or seek the information for decision-making. Thereby, as Caplan (2011) continues, if individuals only participate in the public sphere when they are rationally self-interested then ignorance would not have democratic impact as citizen's would only engage when

they were knowledgeable. However, this argument falls short in both logic and reality because it obscures the power given to certain individuals or purveyors of information and the legitimacy that they have to determine the 'oughtness' or 'rightness' of the information received: it is a fallacy of construction to suggest that individuals have the knowledge to know whether they are knowledgeable. In addition, Caplan's argument misses the construction of whether the knowledge contained in the individual understanding is a representation of reality.

It is also arguable that the problem for democratic decision-making of individual ignorance and irrationality is not because of people's self-interest but because people also take part in what they consider to be the public interest. Thereby, democratic representatives are supposed to consider majority – or, in first past the post, simple maximal – public preference as an expression of will that they need to submit to as it expresses the plurality of knowledgeable individual interest. Therefore, as Caplan (2011, p. 214) notes, democracy is inherently problematic for a model of powerful knowledge because the "threefold combination – irrational cognition, selfless motivation, and modest slack – is as bad as it gets".

Against this Jason Brennan (2012, 2017) argues – following Frederic Bastiat (1995 [1848]) – that, because a democracy is a collective endeavour and all participants must to some extent live with the decisions of others then personal preference is a poor and in places immoral basis for decision-making.[9] Instead, the individual should develop a "moral outlook" to inform a "justified perception" of what is congruence with the interests of the majority of other participants, and proceed on the basis of that understanding – voters should be simply proxies for the collective opinion

[9] "[W]hy is incapacity a cause for exclusion? Because it is not the voter alone who must bear the consequences of his vote" Frédéric Bastiat's Selected essays on political economy (1995 [1848]) pp. 57-58.

(Brennan, 2012, p. 4). While Brennan accepts that individual understanding of the public interest is based upon perceptions, he argues there is a distinct difference between "justified perception" and mere beliefs.[10]

This is clearly linked to the discussion of social legitimacy of knowledge developed through trust and justification as set out in Chapter 2. However, this discussion is extended by the arguments of the minimalists. In particular, having set out both the ethical significance and justificatory principles of participation, Brennan does not argue for an educative response, an increase in or exclusions from the franchise or the shrinking of government's areas of concern (as, for example, Lecky (2008 [1896]) would or Bovard (2006a, 2006b, 2015) might). Instead, those who are not capable of justified participation in the public sphere are encouraged to knowingly abstain, and thereby render redundant discussions of individual knowledge limits by adopting the principle of absence in preference to ignorance (Brennan, 2012, p. 45).

For Brennan, knowledge is powerful if it allows for self-limitation of participation. Self-limitation becomes an important principle for an 'epistemically legitimate' political sphere: citizens though never excluded from democratic participation are instead mandated to be internally restrictive using the principle of non-participation in the interest of not placing a burden on others. Brennan argues that the level of knowledge required to be informed as to whether you will place a burden on other through ignorance is the lowest sustainable obligation of democratic participation. To extend this into the discussions of 'powerful knowledge', this knowledge only underpins legitimate action within representative government if the imagined future reality does not impose a burden on others but, to again return to Giroux's 'legitimate

[10] For further exploration of the difficult logic of knowledge within Brennan's argument, see the excellent discussion in Simon Kaye's The mythology of democracy: Justification, deliberation and participation (2015b).

resistance', does not all resistance and change place a burden on others. Likewise, those who are already likely to accept that ignorance is the basis for absence from the democratic process are likely to be those for whom education is most prominently advocated (Dalton, 2017 ; Parvin, 2018). Therefore, this is not taken forward in the context of this thesis as it is clearly an inadequate consideration of the empirical reality of social justice outcomes from representative government.

These are the two types of minimalist responses to public ignorance:

(a) Limit democratic decision-making to small areas where participation can on average be knowledgable and therefore not impose a broad burden of required knowledge; or

(b) Self-limitation of participation only to those areas where the participant is able to contribute knowledgably and not impose a burden on others.

The failure of these arguments stems from the fact that the reality of democracy is that individuals do not vote on single issues but rather for a platform where citizens are likely to have a range of epistemic preparedness. However, as discussed above, for knowledge to be powerful it needs to be able to resist alternatives to ensure that its position is taken forward. As discussed in previous chapters, this is through the authority that knowledge can be said to legitimately hold for participants within the context in which the knowledge is to be used. The minimalist position limits this power by placing structural impediments to its usage and by seeking from all participants a similar knowledgeable position. This lack of a place for specialised or specific knowledge would mean that the 'epistemic legitimacy' would create authority but this is mitigated by the unanimity required to enact as power.

3.2.3 Epistocratic solution

As Estlund (2003, 2009) suggests, the extreme version of the minimalist position is limiting the effect of the franchise through vote-weighting.[11] This includes solutions such as: testing political or economic understanding; or restraining the franchise to, or increasing the weight of votes of the more educated. For example, J. S. Mill (2019 [1861]) proposed to give more votes to every person at each level of education.

Within these solutions, democratic development through expert representatives or officials are again dependent on some form of choice and will import the same epistemically questionable judgements as previous educative or minimalist solutions, as they all require clear decisions both on what the minimum expertise is required of someone to qualify as an expert and how to measure that expertise has been gained. And as Shapiro (1996, p. 128) has asserted, that more importantly while neither of these positions present simple tasks, in completing these tasks any democracy is only reinforcing a prior understanding of what they believe to be the 'right' outcome of the decision-making process - as any judgment will solely be based on current acceptable positions of knowledge.

However, it is important for the argument about epistemic legitimacy to recognise that some form of 'epistocratic' limitation already exists across the democratic world. In modern societies, universal franchise while originally limited by being based on economic participation is now limited by being based instead on a *de facto* criterion of epistemic participation – "age" (Tremmel & Wilhelm, 2015). So, while Shapiro may be correct in his assertion about the difficulty of choice of experts, the epistemic threshold required of a political system is already managed by governments through

[11] It is worth noting that Estlund builds considerably on Bryan Caplan's Rational irrationality and the microfoundations of political failure, *Public Choice* (2001).

educational policy. Thus, increasing the age of school leaving and government-led curriculum rebalancing as has occurred in the UK or US in recent years has been proposed based on its supposed effects on the 'epistemic preparedness' for participation in democracy - under the discussions of 'citizenship education' (Pontes *et al.*, 2019 ; Weinberg & Flinders, 2018). These policies have also legitimised some knowledge within that landscape in order that it 'positions' the correct outcome (for example, see discussions about British Values within the curriculum). Indeed, each of these positions enforces the normative orders obligation to control the citizenry's information in a manner over which the individual has little or no control - reinforcing the control of structural and institutional-based knowledge through the bureaucracy.

Here the normative order's mediation of knowledge is threefold: – it mediates:

(a) first, the inclusion of certain types of knowledge within the curriculum thus legitimising specific knowledge; then

(b) second, the access of individuals to the instructional discourse by which they access this knowledge; and then

(c) third, they mediate the use of that knowledge to affect change by limiting the spaces in which that knowledge may or may not be used.

In this sense, individuals may therefore consider their understanding of the issues to be complete depending on the 'powerful' and 'legitimised' positions to which they have access. The requirement of knowledgeable participants and the exclusive franchise only reinforces the "demographic objective" against epistocracy (or government by 'knowers') (Estlund, 2003, p. 62). For this process will only ever result in importing whatever demographic 'sample bias' is at the start of the process. Therefore, it is plausible that should demographics change it will serve to undermine the legitimacy of democratic politics and the basis for the desirability of the universal franchise. In this case, knowing participants do not respond to knowledge of alternative realities

that may expand or change with time. For Young's model of 'powerful knowledge' specialised knowledge is concretised according to that which occurs at a time unless there is a mechanism for which the knowers can become unknowers - a process which is both unlikely and at odds with all major theories of political power and legitimacy authority discussed in Chapter 2.

However, there is a solution which is offered to this limitation. It is to move the position of the instructional discourse from that which is delivered in private for the individual's benefit to that which is done in public for the citizenry's benefit. The mode that is often expressed in these terms – and is argued by Habermas and his followers – is the necessity of 'public reason' the development of reasonableness as the criteria for acceptance - again a return to a mechanism and process that views not the legitimate authority of individuals but the legitimation of them.

3.3 Public Reason and Social Justice

> Democratic theorists now take deliberation to be the exemplary practice or activity for democrats, and they gear their arguments toward its realization. Hence deliberation has become a standard for the accomplishment of democracy: it is what democratic theorists aim for, our ideal and our aspiration. […] What, then, could be wrong with deliberation? To begin, one might simply be suspicious of the near consensus among democratic theorists on its behalf.
> Lynn Sanders (1997) Against Deliberation, p. 347.

Deliberative political arrangements such as democracy accept as a starting point the epistemic diversity and rational pluralism of contemporary society but are seeking to "enable limited conflict to continue while supressing the violence of greater conflict" (Przeworski, 1986, p. 32). Thereby, having rejected the pursuit of consensus or unanimity as overly-exclusionary, the epistemic standard targeted by deliberative processes and public reason is that political decisions should only be finally taken

following the triumph over others of a reasoned and justifiable position that other citizens find acceptable: at least to the extent they agree to submit to it.[12] Again, this is a repeated argument of the legitimate authority of justification as outlined in Chapter 2, and the objections to it raised above still stand. However, can public reason provide for the development of 'epistemic legitimacy'?

The general approach of public reason is one which rather than seek information or decision-consensus – and thus ignore the political conception of majoritarian rule – looks to engage in the relationship between the "act of reason-giving" and the state of "being reasonable" - both of which require of individuals a 'knowledgeable position' (Jasanoff & Simmet, 2017 ; Mast, 2017). The legitimate authority of knowledge is the enablement of the limitation of conflict and not simply its ability to engage others to submit to it - so in this way it is not only justification but also conciliation/appeasement. Thus knowledge is legitimate because it aids the recognition that the proponents are 'being reasonable' (for an example of this argument in justice studies, see Smits, 2008).

In exploring this argument, this section will now consider a range of approaches to the development of public reason – including Habermas and Rawls – and then turn to a criticism of this approach in achieving 'socially just' outcomes.

In traditional theory, representative government requires all citizens to value reasonableness since this develops a system for accepting decisions because they are procedurally fair or 'reasonable' regardless of the individual impact. However, in

[12] For examples, see James Bohman and William Rehg (Eds.). Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (2015), John Dryzek's Deliberative democracy and beyond: Liberals, critics, contestations (2002), James Fishkin's When the people speak: Deliberative democracy and public consultation (2011), Russell Hardin's Deliberative Democracy (2009), Ilya Somin's Deliberative democracy and political ignorance, *Critical Review* (2010), Robert Talisse's Does public ignorance defeat deliberative democracy?, *Critical Review* (2004).

addition, power structures based on public reason work to incorporate rationality as an end in itself and not just the means of debate (for examples, see Gaus, 1997, 2010, 2011 ; Rawls, 1997 ; Rawls, 2015 [1993]). Indeed, Amy Gutmann and Thompson (2006, p. 3) go so far as to write that "deliberative democracy's basic requirement is for 'reason-giving'".

Further, the theories of public reason extend this to champion not only reason-given but acceptable and even 'good' reason-giving (Chambers, 1996 ; Habermas, 2007 [1981], pp. 90-91). This distinction is particularly important in Habermas' of the difference between strategic and communicative action. Strategic action, in this sense, encompasses 'manipulative and coercive' power whereas "communicative actors are interested in sharing, and finding grounds for genuine agreement on the reasons that they give for submitting to any particular course of action" (Habermas, 2007 [1981], pp. 38-39).

In this sense, communicative reasoning can derive its authority from any position: objective facts, individual opinion, or - and importantly for the effects on 'epistemic legitimacy' and 'powerful knowledge' - references to social norms or structures. These lines of argument are developed in *Between Facts and Norms*, as Habermas argues for the development of an understanding of legitimation as developing on the foundations of the "location and environment of communicatively rational discourse" (Habermas, 2015 [1992], pp. 82-85). As is discussed in John Finnis' *On 'Public Reason'* (2006, p. 11), this proposes that knowledge in this sense does not need to be factual, objective or truth-based. Indeed it means "[i]ndividuals coming to agreement without mutual engagement in frank, good-willed discourse will not necessarily approximate truth".

To begin with, a foundation such as rationality and reasonableness would seem to be difficult for anyone to disagree with. If individuals feel there is a good reason for their beliefs, then this ought to be expressed in public debate. However, there are two key difficulties with a model of public reason. Firstly, the level of knowledge that public rationality demands, and secondly, in the political exclusivity that such epistemic demands could lead to, and finally in the fact that rationality or reasonableness is not necessarily a motivational factor in human interaction. In this way, Heller (1982, p. 43) argues against Habermas's contentions that development within the public sphere "can be nothing but the realization of rationality - with priority given to communicative rationality - by suggesting that in doing this Habermas disregards the "whole motivational structure of human beings".

Therefore, as Kaye (2015b, p. 128) the net effect is "the establishment of reason-giving as a necessary condition for political engagement within a democracy sets up mechanisms for exclusion and self-exclusion that may be both procedural and unintentional". For any individual to take a strong public stance is to take on the role of a persuader and, in this educative solution model, it is to construct the 'instructional discourse' as discussed in Chapter 1. However, to hold views and reasons at odds with what is 'allowable' in the 'instructional discourse' is to take part at a relative disadvantage within any deliberative activity. Thus specialised knowledge which is individualised - a contention in Young's model of 'powerful knowledge' - could be powerful for creating conceptions of change (in an entrepreneurial sense) but place the knower at a significant disadvantage given acceptable reasons require some plurality. As John Dryzek puts it, this fosters within representative democracy a movement away for majority or maximal positions in "a turn […] that seeks reasoned agreement rather [than] the mere aggregation of preferences" (Dryzek, 2002, p. 36). It reinforces the 'power of mediation of representation' which can affect the inclusion, access and permission for change that works within the public sphere.

Publicity of voting likewise places the individual in a transparent space of transgression should they not accept what, to the knowledge structures, is 'plainly rational'.

Instructional discourse here has heightened control as it mediates not only what is allowable within the preparation for participation in the public sphere but also what must be the 'end' outcome – it must be 'rational' or it must be 'reasonable'. Therefore, how can knowledge (or 'truth') have any power against the structured regimes of mass-membership political parties who stand as totems of representation and of particular forms of 'powerful knowledge', particular knowledge that "transforms all values and breaks all traditional and rational norms" Weber (1978 [1922], p. 1115), or the institutional inertia of bureaucracies and their codification of acceptable knowledge?

For a response, we turn to an interpretation of John Rawls' argument that this limitation is only overcome by the absence of the individual's adherence to their own structural interest. Gerald Gaus (2010, 2011, 2015) states that Rawls is best summed up as moving the role of public reason to a position of moral objectivity which an overcome the "problem of conflicting private judgement" by ensuring that everyone works in the interest of morally acceptable principles rather than self-interest (c.f. Sandel above).[13]

Public reason in this sense is the requirement for individuals to not only hold a position but to make clear the reasons and rationality behind the choice of this position. However, it is important to note that in most of the theories of 'public reason' or rationality in the public sphere that the argument and reasons given should also

[13] For an in depth discussion and critique of Gaus's approach to public reason, see Enzo Rossi's Legitimacy, democracy and public justification, *Res Publica* (2014).

display overall an inherent 'logic'. But as Simone Chambers (2009, p. 335) argues that the at the beginning of the debate about public rationality, Aristotle's believed that it wasn't only the argument but also the way it was expressed in public. In this way, rhetoric was "a proper use of emotion and an appeal to character" which while substantially retaining its need for a claim to normative moral order did not need to move away from the logic being expressed. But the connection, here is that the knowledge which underpinned the argument is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 'reasonableness'. In this sense, knowledge is necessary but not sufficient to create 'reasonableness'. This can also be applied to knowledge itself – the power of knowledge, in particular - as a hybridised concept of knowing. There is something to know, there is a way of knowing, and there is emotion of knowing - all of which give power to its effect within the 'oppositional consciousness' of social justice. In this sense, there is a limit on what reasons are useful, powerful, or legitimate within public discourse. Again, we see that it is the hallmark of 'morality' as the legitimate force behind the power of the reasons given (Chambers, 2009, p. 334).

Therefore, like reason, a hybrid-form of the legitimate authority of knowledge may intuitively encompass several over lapping communicative activities. Indeed, rationality (or reason giving, in this context) becomes a combination of descriptions of causality of preference, or justificatory from a range of thesis points - moral, norms, utility - but most importantly it is also with the participatory democracy an emotional connection connected to a 'known' reality of the citizenry. However, the most important standard and component is also the most overlooked, the reasoning in the public sphere is communicative in nature, and is able to be known by others outside of the reason-giver. In this context, as Habermas explores, this means that communicative rationality is necessarily and extension of that which is already in existence within the public sphere. It must in this way, ensure that it is not a creator of by a limiter of the 'imaginative capacity of the power of knowledge'. It must only

seek those actions within existing knowledge structures. But this also means that a reason, or knowledge within the public reason space may be factually untrue since existing knowledge structures do not necessarily need to be truth-tracking (where this is objectively determinable) - the true representation of Isaac Asimov's "my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge".

Therefore, a reason in the public sense – and in the sense in which theorists of deliberative democracy use the word – needs the added part of 'other-regardingness'. This is particularly true, for as Fricker (2011, 2013) develops this is the basis of both testimonial and hermeneutic injustice, as it is unlikely for any minority viewpoint to be recognisable as a reason for change to the majority outside of that viewpoint. Indeed, this can be extended further if we consider that hybridity is a necessary component of rationality that an unpersuasive and unrecognisable viewpoint may not actually be regarded as reasonable at all. As Robert Talisse (2004, p. 456) argues: "there is general agreement that […] expressions of private interest do not count as reasons" within an deliberative democratic forum.

Rawls explores this further by connecting reason-giving and public rationality generally to the values of the normative order. In this sense he is clear that while reason-giving is an essentially logical exercise it must also incorporate and not contradict the values of the normative order (Rawls, 2005 [1971], pp. 416-417). For Rawls, this is "the familiar notion of rationality" that is employed throughout his work (ibid., pp. 418-419).

Thus in this way, the Rawlsian connection between the set of reasons and the identification or attribution to them of intrinsic goodness is the basis of 'public reason. In this way, as public is because the reason is one that the individuals or citizenry "may reasonably be expected to endorse" (Finnis, 2006, p. 3). The hurdle however of public

reasoning in this model is however significantly increased for any one participant in the public sphere. Communication is not reason unless it is also either automatically or argumentatively in line with acceptable public understanding of 'goodness' and therefore the access of the knowledge becomes both a duality of knowledge and an increased burden on the knower. It is knowledge of the categories of acceptance as well as the justifications themselves that combine to supply the 'power of knowledge'..[14]

Thus for Rawls (2015 [1993], p. 99) while "there are many non-public reasons", there can only be "but one public reason". Unanimity, again, becomes the bearing standard for public reason, as it only exists in the singular. If agents try to reason publicly but fall outside normative space, they transgress the regulative discourse and therefore, for Rawls, are either excluded from membership of the public domain, or have not succeeded in supplying a reason.

This is a paradoxical notion of public reason where it simultaneously is potentially unbounded – all viewpoints are arguable and publically reasonable for Rawls or Habermas' public – and can at the same time only be expounded by those who exist within – and understand – the boundaries of existing agreement.

In this model, public reason would both actively and passively exclude individual knowledge used for public reason, if they do not form part of the consensus. It is important to outline here that the overlapping consensus of the Rawlsian perspective also requires individuals in the public sphere who are able to respond to the requirements which are set out by the public as a collective. In this way, the barrier of

[14] It is worth noting that while Rawls explicitly rules out the existence of fully private reasons, he sets up that a variety of non-public reasons must exist. This is a comment which points to Rawls' dependence on the work of Wittgenstein and in particular the notion of no fully developed non-linguistic private sphere that is explored in the Philosophical investigations (2009 [1983]).

acceptability to themselves and others is addition to the requirement of knowledge itself in the specialised fashion outlined by Young. It is a convergence or toleration across the public sphere (Rawls, 2005 [1971], p. 517) or, as he expresses it, a citizen would need to understand:

> [W]hat each regards as a political conception of justice based on values that […] others can reasonably be expected to endorse [… and be] in good faith prepared to defend that conception so understood. This means that each of us must have, and be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines we think other citizens (who are also free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us.
> (Rawls, 2015 [1993], p. 104)

Indeed, Habermas agrees with this position and states more clearly that it is a matter of excluding those who do not have the competence or the ability to meet the requirements of the epistemic burdens laid out within the public sphere, as they are not able to meet the requirements (Habermas, 1984, p. 21).

Habermas, however, defines the overlap differently as a tension between compromise and consensus: "whereas parties can agree to a negotiated compromise for different reasons, the consensus brought about through argument must rest on identical reasons that are able to convince parties in the same way" for "only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the acceptance of all citizens" (Habermas, 1996, p. 339). In this way, Habermasian public reason is built on consensus and not compromise, only those reasons with meet with unanimity are acceptable.

The contradiction in this Habermas idealised normative version of public reason is that: "everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs", and that this cannot be prevented by either "internal or external coercion" but that only unaminity

is allowed (Habermas, 1990, p. 87). In order to support social justice, any process which is built on a process of idealisation and exclusion is necessarily inadequate to the task.

Therefore, Rawls and Habermas' determination of public reason still leaves knowledge as an *a priori* concept. But instead of specific concepts to understand, it is knowledge of the social perspective of others that enables knowledge to be powerful. What then are the effects of these political ideas on how knowledge supports 'political power' within modern democracies?

Different individuals, however, will accept the legitimacy of these reasons to differing extents. There can be no single universally acceptable reason, even if there can (and this is questionable) be a universally recognised form by which to show what a legitimate reason is – a category rather than an object. In this way, the legitimate authority of knowledge where it is used for political, social, or economic (public) purposes may also be conceptualised as being a category rather than an object. It is not necessarily 'knowing' something - as this may or may not be legitimised within the discourse - it is instead knowing that there is a category 'knowledge' to which discourse chooses to submit or not submit and is therefore more or less powerful depending on whether it does or not.

In this way, if the public or a section chooses not to submit to the category of knowledge - or its social institutional (universities), actor (experts) or action (peer review) - there is an alternative form of truth to which it can turn. In this way, while knowledge may be objective and we accept Young's plea to avoid relativism, we can accept that knowledge is a category which is utilised or not.

3.4 Conclusions

In Jonathan Quong's (2014, p. 267) *On the Idea of Public Reason*, he articulates this kind of hybrid duality of public reason, as ensuring that there is reason and there is justice and they do not represent the same but differing elements of: "the virtues of reasonableness and civility" built on the acceptance of the normative order.

In this sense, there is an argued position for public reason separate from that normative action which results in just outcomes. If not, then they are excluded – in line with Young's formulation 'ignorance is unpowerful' since it diminishes the ability for imaginative participation in the public sphere. As deliberative democrats such as James Fishkin (1992, 2011) expound, when considering how there is a reflexive benefit to public reason and pubic argument, where any normative consideration and acceptance of a justificatory standard necessarily includes the acceptance of a possibility of exclusory knowledge.

However, the conceptual boundaries of legitimate pluralism that is at the foundation of most of Rawls work does highlight the tension between the exclusory and inclusory principles of his idea of public reason and its connection with political justice. In this sense, as Rawls is clear about, justice both conceptually and normatively play a key role in the realisation of the outcomes of public reason. In this way for Rawls, it becomes again a notion of 'goodness' but importantly for the development of epistemic legitimacy it is knowledge of what is just and that this is connected to the "values which are robust across different conceptions of the good" (Quong, 2011, p. 17). In this case, the existence and consistency of such values, and their ability to be formulated from specific knowledges that are widely available within instructional discourse – or within the education provided by public reason – are a decisive factor in whether democratic politics is inherently exclusionary.

In this sense, the role of knowledge structure is to ensure that public reason sufficiently mitigates and balances the development of public reason as a support of an individual's power position - 'I accept disadvantage because that disadvantage is equal to another's disadvantage'. Thus, public reason, again becomes the demand for rational, substantive consensus but the consensus that we all submit to involves an equal sense of disadvantage.

Thus, while much of the literature on public reasoning would argue that public rationality is an enormously effective way of moving debate from the personal to the collective understanding that is required by the democratic conventions, they are poor mechanisms for balancing - in Weber this balancing function lies with the ever present bureaucracy.

This section has looked to challenge the argument that, within this 'public discourse,' public reason propels 'social justice'. It has argued that, on the contrary, as explored the power of knowledge as a means is no better than the reification of knowledge as an end in the educational debate. It has argued that the development of social justice is not only a function of supplying new reasons for change to be affected through the social actions of an individual formed into a collective but also of transgressing the normative orders control of access and the boundaries of acceptable reason within these. In this way, as Popper (1995) argues, democracy is valuable precisely because it does not require citizens to have direct access to the truth but rather to a truth-disclosing structure. This gives way to an understanding that the legitimate authority of knowledge is the recognition that normative order judgement exists without a truth value necessarily being associated with it and therefore is an inherent 'unknowledgeable' position. It expands the scope and understanding of the regulatory discourse as social and political communication but in this way does not represent truth but an acceptability of disadvantage.

In opposition to this, social justice requires that citizens draw on all the knowledge they possess – not just the knowledge they are consciously aware of or can put into words - and communicate it to others not through a rational communicative means but through the means of action. In this way, they supply something that can be recognised by others even if in opposition to knowledge structures not as rational, trust-worthy, justified or acceptable but as functionally superior and resistant to knowledge structure in their moral necessity. A form of legitimate authority that Weber classes as 'charismatic'..[15]

This grants knowledge a decisive advantage over democracy since, in deliberative forms of democracy, privileged information can be put into linguistic form and offered discursively in public debate. The individual and the social justice process of social knowledge aggregation through action of multiple actors thereby undoes a linguistic bias in democratic deliberation that leads to the delegitimization of knowledge within the political discourse. In this way, 'epistemic legitimacy' can be seen to be able to capture and make use of information that would be lost to a deliberative democracy. Thus, it is that the need for the normative order to dispense authority through comprehension is displaced by one where knowledge is powerful because it is recognisable in its form as necessary action.

Knowledge in this sense is powerful because it is the recognition of Rawls 'other-regardingness' – the power of knowledge is to recognise through action the other in ourselves and have regard for the need to support the otherness.

[15] This is an argument that will also be picked up in the next essay, as many theorists advocate this argumentative path to support 'market-led' decision-making as the most informed method of social and political decision making – economic supremacy. For examples, see Mark Pennington's Hayekian political economy and the limits of deliberative democracy, *Political Studies* (2003)For examples, see or Samuel DeCanio's Democracy, the market, and the logic of social choice, *American Journal of Political Science* (2014).

As Iris Marion Young (2002) espouses in *Inclusion and Democracy* (following Lévinas, 1981):

> To recognize another person is to find oneself already claimed upon by the other person's neediness. [… as it] is through the condition of being a hostage that there can be in the world pity, compassion, parody, and proximity – even the little that there is, even the simple, 'After you, sir.' The unconditionality of being hostage is not the limit case of solidarity, but the condition for all solidarity.

It is important to note that this resistance builds on early works by Weber – particularly *Stock and Commodity Exchanges* (Weber, 2000 [1894]) - on bureaucratic limits in the face of commodification at the heart of which is the charismatic nature of the entrepreneur. This has been responded to by those writing about educations subjugation to capitalism as a form of seeking alternative or as Sheila Slaughter (2001, p. 24) has argued that "professors made it clear that they did not want to be part of a cutthroat capitalism. Instead, they tried to create a space between capital and labor where [they] could support a common intellectual project directed toward the public good."

Therefore, building on this and the previous chapter, the next essay explored the expansion of Young's conception of 'powerful knowledge' and its' developing correlate of 'epistemic legitimacy' by further using the struggle between legitimacy, knowledge and capitalist action outlined in Weber's writings on commercial transactions – and developed in strands across both *Three types of legitimate rule* (1958 [1922]), and his work on types of authority outlined in *Economy and Society* (1978 [1922]). This is used to problematise the space between labour and capital and open up a discussion of the charismatic nature of 'epistemic legitimacy' as a way of dealing with the differential advantage which is at the heart of public reason-giving and deliberative models of governance.

Chapter 4: Cognitive Labour and Epistemic Power

> [I]n a capitalist society 'knowledge of nature for its own sake' is an insufficient legitimation to support an enterprise requiring large-scale funds such as the scientific enterprise.
> Henry Etzkowitz, et. al., (2000) The evolution of the entrepreneurial university, p. 41

> These are the disadvantages of a commercial spirit: The minds of men are contracted and rendered incapable of elevation. Education is despised, or at least neglected, and the heroic spirit is almost utterly extinguished. To remedy these defects would be an object of worthy attention.
> Adam Smith (2017 [1762]) Lectures on justice, police, revenue and arms, p. 259

4.1 Introduction

As outlined in the previous essays, in educational literature, capitalism as a structure is seen as a barrier to the effectiveness of knowledge as power, and generally as an enemy of knowledge, its institutions, actors and actions (for a small sample of this tradition in educational literature, see Apple, 2006 ; Brown, 2015 ; Caffentzis, 2005 ; Davies & Bansel, 2007 ; Davies, 2016 ; Giroux, 2002, 2010 ; Lorenz, 2012 ; McLaren, 2007 ; Olssen & Peters, 2005 ; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2009).

This literature refers to two key preoccupations of the effect of capitalism on the legitimate authority of knowledge specifically and educational structures and actions more generally - the first concern is the effect of the ability of knowledge to act as both labour and capital, and the second is the tendency of the capital accumulation to be supportive of existing knowledge structure and so be utilised to defy disruption.

In seeking to further clarify the concept of 'epistemic legitimacy', this essay seeks to

address both of these points and, in so doing, utilises Weber's (1978 [1922], p. 225) superiority of the 'capitalist entrepreneur' and its "relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge" which, in turn, problematises the superiority of knowledge to affect social transformation within capitalist structures instead of in defiance of it. This thesis extends the powerful knowledge model with the alternative (Weberian) tradition of authority founded in the struggle between the structural power of knowledge ('bureaucracy') and the authority of knowledge within the public sphere to enact change ('entrepreneurship') through the utilisation of charismatic authority.

Further, this essay argues that as societies develop more indicators of 'cognitive capitalism' and elements of the economic model become more akin to the 'post-worker' capitalism, 'knowledge' developed, exercised, and exchanged as labour can be ultimately capitalised and accumulated. Thus, the capitalist entrepreneur who has accumulated capitalised knowledge can ensure 'through their relative immunity' that this knowledge overcomes or resists bureaucratic control to affect social, political and economic change. Therefore, the basis of this immunity is both in the access to the highest level of 'specialised knowledge' (see Weber's quote on page 1and akin to Young's model of 'powerful knowledge') but also in their call to legitimacy through charismatic authority. In particular, the capitalised versions of 'imagined alternative of the future' which underpin Young's conception of 'powerful knowledge' are, in themselves, able to be exchanged, monetised, and capitalised as the results of cognitive labour. In this way, they are able to be used in the capital accumulation and creative destruction function of entrepreneurship particularly if they are publicly endowed through education (Mazzucato, 2018). This is the way that 'epistemically legitimate knowledge' engages productively not only in the struggle between knowledge structures and the power of knowledge but also as an agent of public good or as Saint-Simons puts it, "mode of production – an education".

Therefore, this essay expands on the discussions of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 and seeks to refine the power of knowledge to affect social change. To do this, the first section of this essay will look at the impact of cognitive capitalism and its impact on models of authority and legitimacy of knowledge (for example, see Geroski & Mazzucato, 2002 ; Mazzucato, 2016 ; Schwartzberg, 2015). The second section builds on this to explore the nature of capitalisation processes with the 'power theory of value' or 'capital as power' in the context of the Weberian bureaucracy vs entrepreneurship organisation of legitimacy. Finally, the essay will explore how entrepreneurial models may be developed to underpin models of 'epistemic legitimacy' in the interests of social justice (for example, see David & Foray, 2002 ; Fine *et al.*, 2010 ; Frunzaru *et al.*, 2018 ; Sum, 2009 ; Sum & Jessop, 2013).

4.2 Labour and Capital in Cognitive Capitalism

There is a clear conception in much economic literature that capitalist economies are entering a new phase of development - alternatively called Industry 4.0 or the 4th Industrial Revolution. Within this phase, it is argued that the automation of jobs and decisions means that immaterial accumulation – which includes Young's conception of knowledge development or the 'accumulation of specialised knowledge – is developing as the foundation of economic power relationships (for example, see David & Foray, 2002 ; Fine *et al.*, 2010 ; Kenway *et al.*, 2004 ; Stiglitz, 1999).

Within this discussion, economic literature is replete with arguments as to who will control how knowledge will be contained within automation processes and what knowledge will remain outside of these processes. As Yann Moulier-Boutang (2011, p. 6) outlines in *Cognitive Capitalism*:

> The role of knowledge becomes fundamental. To the creation of value through material production is added the creation of value through the

> production of knowledge. Cognitive capitalism means that the production of wealth takes place increasingly through knowledge, through the use of those faculties of labour that are defined by cognitive activity (cognitive labour).

In this way, the discussions of economic development have led to theory and practice where in Industry 4.0 the creation, availability and ownership of knowledge becomes integral to economic value creation both in terms of capital but also through classification of 'cognitive labour'.

To extend this further, cognitive capitalism also shares Braudel's (1992a, 1992b, 1992c) view that as capitalism existed well before the industrial revolution so did the process of subsumption and therefore cognitive capitalism is simply part of this ongoing process (Moulier-Boutang, 2011) and the culmination of "the history of [ongoing] subsumption of labour under capital" (Bowring, 2004, p. 105). For cognitive capitalists, as outlined by Carlo Vercellone (2007, p. 19) knowledge would be the final subsumption of labour to capital united through an arc from formal subsumption to real subsumption and finally to the general intellect.[1]

Thereby, during the stage of formal subsumption (mercantilist capitalism) the workers produce, own and control knowledge but only within the means of production of other exchangeable products. This is followed during the stage of real subsumption (industrial capitalism) by specialised scientific or technological knowledge becoming centralised to a small group through the accumulation of fixed assets such as factories or machinery which are then only fully exploitable through the ongoing innovation (future imagined alternative) that this knowledge can provide. And finally,

[1] For the sake of brevity, an understanding of the concept of Marx's "General Intellect" is assumed. However, a further short essay on the General Intellect is contained in Appendix A in order to further expand the gap on economic power of knowledge should that be useful to the reader. For further information, also see Tony Smith's The 'general intellect' in the Grundrisse and beyond, *Historical Materialism* (2013).

during the stage of general intellect, knowledge begins to be and is finally totally re-appropriated by all workers as the productive capacity itself. As can be seen, the model of knowledge adopted by Young is one which best fits with the stage of real subsumption. However, economists are generally clear that we are entering at least the first stages of a version of Marx's general intellect (Coccia, 2018 ; Davis, 2017 ; Mosse, 2018).

This stage of "biocapitalism" is "a process of accumulation that not only is founded on the exploitation of knowledge but on the entirety of human faculties, from relational-linguistic to affective-sensorial", when the difference between labour and non-labour develops a growing loose relationship (Morini & Fumagalli, 2010, pp. 234-235). In this way, both labour and capital become infinitely expandable in amount and in the time available to exchange it - and this is the fundamental shift in the conception of knowledge in post-industrial economies. Indeed, this is the argument in much of post-capitalist and post-worker literature where current theories of 'fully automated luxury communism' have seen cognitive labour being toppled from its privileged place within the left's political imaginary and then begin explore how capitalism can conceive cognitive labour as the precarious 24/7 worker (Beech, 2019 ; Mason, 2016).

In this, workers and their knowledge – empowered by education (Vercellone, 2007) – are no longer the connection between labour and capital accumulation but rather cognitive labour is capital and therefore able to be commoditised and exchanged. Further, as Heesang Jeon (2010) explores, placing cognition within the mechanism of capital exchange removes its legitimacy for social action as it is valued for its economic (monetary) benefit to the individual rather than for political resistance. In this way, the value of knowledge becomes its ability to create economic empowerment as is argued across much educational literature (Cantwell *et al.*, 2018 ; Marginson, 1997, 2018).

Further, the theorists of cognitive capitalism suggest that if (or when) cognitive labour is totally subsumed by capital and becomes the dominant economic force then this would be an impetus for a crisis in 'law of value' as value would no longer be contained by individual labour or time. Interestingly, in economic terms, a law of the value of knowledge is not provided or discussed in detail within the works of cognitive capitalism theorists. Moreover as Caffentzis (2005, p. 89) points out, "the 'Law of value' is not explicitly defined in Marx's work", and therefore, as many of the works of cognitive capitalism belong to the Marxist tradition, a definition should probably not be expected. However, Vercellone (2007, pp. 33-34) proposes – in line with Marx – that value, for the proponents of cognitive capitalism, refers to the assignment value through its connection with labour time and the consequential assignment of price by value.[2]

In this sense, for cognitive capitalism, knowledge is at essence a labour activity such that:

(a) Labour remains the fundamental source of value in, and capitalism continues to be based on, an unaltering / unchangin mode of production (Hardt & Negri, 2014 [2004], p. 145); and

(b) Labour, when connected implicitly to cognitive process are incapable of being managed through a concept of labour time (Vercellone, 2007, p. 30).

It should be noted that in the economic markets the value of knowledge in cognitive capitalism is not – as described by the post-capitalist – in it becoming a commodity where its' value is close to zero as it is related to negligible socially necessary labour

[2] Carlo Vercellone's From formal subsumption to general intellect: Elements for a Marxist reading of the thesis of cognitive capitalism, *Historical Materialism* (2007, p. 16) uses "the law of value-labour" to propose a difference between commodity-value and knowledge-value. While for reasons of conceptual clarity these terms are not used within in this essay it is important to note that this discourse is the same while not using the terminology.

time in its production but instead, the labour time for knowledge which creates value is not in its production but in its accumulation (Harvey, 2010, 2018). Value is created through the process of capital accumulation. Likewise, Schumpeter (2010a [1942]), Veblen (1990 [1919], 2015 [1918]) and Robert Hutchins (2008 [1936]) all state that 'crisis in the legitimacy' of the intellectual contribution to the economic order was inherent in all stages of capitalist economies, and enquiry into the role of the 'power of knowledge' in economic systems is nothing new. For Schumpeter (1991 [1934]) these processes of power (including legitimacy) should be investigated as part of the ongoing understanding of capital flows outside of labour processes.[3]

Thus, in the third stage of capitalism (or the fourth stage, if automated economies are classed as a separate cycle, see Kagermann, 2015 ; Lasi *et al.*, 2014 ; Toffler, 1981 ; Toffler, 1990 for further discussion)) knowledge is not viewed as a stage of development but as part of the ongoing mechanisms of capital flows of accumulation and ownership. Consequently, in this context, consideration of both accumulation and ownership models are important to enable the investigation of how knowledge is legitimated as power within and through the processes and networks of capitalism in which cognitive labour is simply a subset of capital (for examples, see Fine, 2003 ; Lebert, 2011 ; Rudy & Gareau, 2005 ; Santos & Rodrigues, 2009).

Similarly, it can be argued that cognitive capitalism drives the same Marxian perspective to connect the class struggle between labour and capital within knowledge production and ownership (and in some cases access) and therefore is

[3] This is obviously intimately connected with the expression of capital of knowledge developed by Bourdieu and his followers. For examples, see Pierre Bourdieu's The forms of capital (1986) and Parlo Singh's The knowledge paradox: Bernstein, Bourdieu, and beyond, *British Journal of Sociology of Education* (2015). However, it is worth in this regard referring also to Tak-Wing Chan and John Goldthorpe's Class and status: The conceptual distinction and its empirical relevance, *American Sociological Review* (2007) in particular for the expression of knowledge based occupations and their connection with cultural consumption.

connected likewise with debates and discourse regarding the emancipatory power of knowledge that is also used in these arguments.

Therefore, using Veblen's (1964 [1919], 1994) terms as developed by Nitzen and Bischler (2000, 2019), it is important to note that any capitalised outcome entrepreneurship can vie with bureaucracy as the basis for the connection between legitimate authority, power and social justice. This struggle between the two is ongoing but this section argues that it is given special significance for education, 'powerful knowledge' and the power of knowledge when the capitalised product is cognitive labour. For while the study of epistemic access has often become separated from discussions of economic development and instead sited within discussions of educational institutions or individual actors, there is an intimate connection of both topics through contemporary versions of social justice literature where that literature comes from economists (Arrow *et al.*, 2018 ; Gotoh & Dumouchel, 2009 ; Sen, 1979, 2005).[4]

4.3 Cognitive capital as power

> But in the case of capitalist society there is a further fact to be noted: unlike any other type of society, capitalism inevitably and by virtue of the very logic of its civilisation creates, educates and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest.
> Joseph Schumpeter (2010a [1942]) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p.131

In recent years, many theorists of both social justice and economics have discussed

[4] While this essay is primarily dealing with knowledge structures and therefore theories of cognitive capitalism, there is associated literature on academic capitalism which looks at the impact on institutions of knowledge. For examples, see Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades's Academic capitalism and the new economy: Markets, State, and higher education (2009), Jennifer Washburn's University, Inc.: The corporate corruption of higher education (2008), or Derek Bok's Universities in the marketplace: The commercialization of higher education (2009)

the economic effects of the distribution of ownership and access to distinct types of knowledge (Chetty *et al.*, 2011 ; Chetty *et al.*, 2014). Most importantly, each type of division of labour is characterised – as stated by Jeon (2010, p. 98) – by its "distinctive configuration of production and appropriation knowledge" for social and economic gain and influence. In this way, the economic power of knowledge within this 'cognitive capitalist model' is formed within and through the logic of capital circulation and accumulation and knowledge is, in turn, shaped by the social and political systems that are formed, or interconnect with, this economic power (Coyle *et al.*, 2016 ; Mirowski, 2009).

To further this discussion, this section considers three viewpoints on power within economic markets and how an extension of labour theory of value can be extended in the discussions of value as a factor of legitimacy. Moreover, by exploring Schumpeter and Veblen's discussions of economic value of knowledge and subsequent extension in the 'power theory of value', it further seeks to understand how the epistemic legitimacy of knowledge is impacted by theories of the power of entrepreneurship against bureaucratic knowledge structures.

4.3.1 Capital as Power

Veblen's theory of value has recently been developed (and amended) by Nitzan and Bichler (2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2009, 2014) to explore how power is framed by capitalist processes. This has developed from their original work on a 'power theory of value' to a deeper exploration of 'capital as power'. Therefore if, as proposed by cognitive capitalism, cognitive labour is subsumed within capital, then cognitive labour is power, and this can be explored using the models proposed by Nitzan and Bichler.

Ownership, forums and control are the basis of Veblen's concept of capital and its connection with power as a theory of value. Veblen (1908, p. 111) approach – along with Nitzan and Bischler - differs with both older and more contemporary versions of capitalism by arguing that community assets (in the case of this essay knowledge imbedded in cognitive labour) are not able to become capital, but rather, are capitalized. Capitalization is a process whereby the asset is given a value within the exchange but, importantly for Veblen, Nitzan, and Bischler, it bears no relationship to the labour itself unlike that required to sustain either neo-classical or Marxist economic theory. However, the capitalization of intangible assets (such as knowledge) rests upon the level of control over the community that the asset can provide be it in the sphere of production or distribution. If this control can be direct through the influence of desires and habits of the public, this control is first and foremost structural and based in the institutions which represents the asset socially, politically and economically (in the case of this essay institutions such as universities and schools).

Veblen's theory of value has recently been developed (and amended) by Nitzan and Bichler (2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2009, 2014) to explore how power is framed by capitalist processes and extended from their original work on a 'power theory of value' to encompass a deeper exploration of 'capital as power'. As stated previously, property, forums and control are the basis of Veblen's concept of capital and its connection with power and, importantly, in his approach, Veblen develops Weber's concept of power and argues that as Georg Hegel outlines in *The Phenomenology of Mind* (2014 [1807]) and as Max Jammer develops in *Concepts of Force* (Jammer, 1999 [1957]), power is not a thing in itself, it is only a relationship between things and consequently cannot be observed. We can only observe power indirectly through its effects. For example, if power is a physical force such as gravity, we understand it not by observing it directly, but by measuring the quantitative relationship between mass and acceleration, and it is only by affecting the

relationship that we can affect the outcome. This Veblen contends is similar with any capital as power: we know the power of owners indirectly, by the relationship between action and the way in which it orders society.

For power to be fully explored within an economic model, Veblen begins by proposing that power is not limited to controlling any specific commodity or its mode of production. Instead, for Veblen – and later Nitzan and Bichler – any particular asset (including knowledge) can be used for productive or controlling purposes. To investigate this, Veblen develops a model in which power is a struggle between the productive potentials of society – the sphere that Veblen calls 'industry' – and the realm of social and political control which Veblen terms 'business'. However, this essay argues that this model of 'capital as power' is similar to the relationship between the productive potential of knowledge – called by Young 'powerful knowledge' and the social and political control of knowledge – argued in this essay to be 'epistemic legitimacy'. Thereby, the essay continues by using Veblen's model of how power is created in the relationship between industry and business to explore the relationship between 'powerful knowledge' and 'epistemic legitimacy'.

As above, Veblen's model begins with conceiving power as a space of criss-crossing dynamic relationships. Indivividual social action – either as an act of 'powerful knowledge' or 'epistemic legitimacy' – is an incident in that space which, in turn, affects the dynamics of each of these relationships. However, there is a fundamental disparity among the effects of 'powerful knowledge' and the effects of 'epistemic legitimacy'. 'Powerful knowledge' understood by Veblen as collective knowledge (Young's specialised knowledge) and creative development (Young's alternative futures) is inherently cooperative, integrated and synchronized and thus affects the dynamics of the relationship to develop convergence and consensus. 'Epistemic legitimacy', in contrast, is not consensual but private and thus exercises of systemic

disruption in the interests of restriction result in a process of effect that Veblen called 'strategic sabotage' (Plotkin, 2007). For 'epistemic legitimacy' to be effective, the key object of sabotage is the consensus building of 'powerful knowledge' which is driven by the built-in dissonance of 'epistemic legitimacy'. This dissonance is the disruption of the objective relationship of 'powerful knowledge' to truth by restricting the space of the relationship and therefore the observable effects of such dynamic relationships. To extend this further, 'epistemic legitimacy' sabotages the space of the relationship and can also affect both the direction and pace of 'powerful knowledge's' dynamic relationships. For Veblen, these effects were prevalent. In the economic model, the most obvious effect was the subjugation of minds and bodies to the single-minded idea of controlling economic outcome through social and political means and the consequent stifling of individual and societal productive capacity.

Consequently, when we transfer Veblen's model to understanding how education may affect social change, the insight provided is that, if there is an economic purpose and outcome of knowledge and is thus able to be capitalised, its potential for social and political control is limited to what elements of social and political life knowledge can hold legitimate authority. This is done not by sabotaging the specialised knowledge itself but rather the dynamics of the relationship between experience and reality which is its observable power. In this way, the power of knowledge becomes unobservable due to this disruption of its observable effect. Therefore, knowledge itself becomes 'powerless' except in the service of economic outcome, and knowledge's innovative capacity for creativity is affected.

For Veblen, these and similar diversions of the dynamics of the relationship permeated the entire structure of capitalism and if all are taken into account then the conclusion would be that a significant proportion of growth is wasteful and destructive, and that

the sabotage that underlies this waste and destruction is exactly what makes it so powerful.

The other form of 'epistemic legitimacy' sabotage is the impact it has on the pace of 'powerful knowledge'. In the conventional political economic models, both neoclassical and Marxist, there is positive relationship between production and power. It is argued that capitalists benefit from the cognitive labour required of 'powerful knowledge' because it ensures that their capital is more fully employed and this, in turn, serves to increase their social and political control. However, if capital as power is the strategic sabotage of the productive capacity of 'powerful knowledge', the relationship should be nonlinear – positive increases in social and political control under certain circumstances and negative under others.

Therefore, for capital (cognitive labour) as power, social and political control is never absolute; it is always relative. Thereby, all aspects of accumulation of this capital must be evaluated differentially in relation to other forms of capital. Differing to the assertions of traditional economic models, Veblen's capitalised processes are driven not to maximize power but only to exceed other power and therefore succeed in demonstrating its binding will. It is the necessity to simply be better; not to accomplish maximal accumulation but differential accumulation that is at the heart of the legitimate authority – 'epistemic legitimacy' of the power of knowledge. This differential drive is crucial: to out-perform others within the system means to accumulate more (more trustworthy, more justifiable, more reasonable, more representative). Since the comparative scale of the relevant capital represents power, those who accumulate legitimately authoritative knowledge in a cognitive capitalist environment differentially increase their power – that is, their broad strategic capacity to inflict sabotage on other knowledges or 'alternative future realities'. This it is argued is the issue at the heart of the gap in education's link with socially just

outcomes – education is controlled or it cannot differentially accumulate knowledge more than other social or political knowledge-based actors.

The centrality of differential accumulation means that in analysing accumulation the focus is not on capital as a broad definitional element or segregated element as in social capital, but on the form of overriding capital (cognitive labour) in particular: that is, on the leading institutions and disciplines of specialised knowledge whose differential accumulation is then progressively located as important in the political economy of knowledge. The reference point for legitimate knowledge is not its truth but its institutional (and disciplinary) origin.

For 'powerful knowledge' therefore, by accepting knowledge as wealth creation and as a 'creorder' – in Nitzan and Bichler's vocabulary – knowledge is seen as part of the differential accumulation. Knowledge for knowledge's sake is diminished in light of some future impact ('capitalisation') and, while the debate is whether this impact should be economic or social, Schumpeter (2010a [1942]) argued that this was not the case with knowledgable actors (scholars and intellectuals). Instead he focuses on knowledge as a feeder of the capitalisation process itself - a focus which he states leads to the "vigorous expansion of the educational apparatus and particularly of the facilities for higher education" (Schumpeter, 2010a [1942], p. 152). Further he states that this expansion leads only to 'disenchantment' and 'disorder' by the knowledgable actors (scholars and intellectuals).

4.3.2 Knowledge vs Intellectualism

> Capitalism inevitably […] educates and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest (Schumpeter, 2010b [1942], p. 146).

> They swell the host of intellectuals […] whose numbers hence increase disproportionately. They enter it in a thoroughly discontented frame of mind. Discontent breeds resentment and […] righteous indignation about the wrongs of capitalism (Schumpeter, 2010b [1942], pp. 152-153).

Schumpeter (2010a [1942]), Veblen (1990 [1919], 2015 [1918]), and Hutchins (2008 [1936]) all hold that late-capitalism (and particularly the subsumption of labour to capital) would give rise to inherent struggles between cognitive labourers (particularly knowledgeable actors such as scholars and intellectuals) and the knowledge structures (such as bureaucratic government). For each of these it is argued, conflicts will lead to the three distinct aspects of social and political development which would affect the relationships between knowledge and its institutions, actors, and actions.

These developments would begin with the expansion of the number of knowledge-based institutions (particularly colleges and universities) out of proportion with the number required for the development of specialised knowledge. For Schumpeter and Veblen, advancements of technology and the specialised knowledge required for their exploitation would precipitate a belief that educational expansion is a requirement for economic growth (Betta, 2016). But further for Veblen, due to the continuing decline of the connection between labour and capital, education would become a 'reputational' and 'positional' good for use not in a productive capacity but for social positioning (Reinert & Viano, 2014).[5]

[5] It is important to note however, that for Veblen this social positioning provided by higher learning only applied to lower or more impoverished classes. For a discussion of this, see Clare Eby's Dreiser and Veblen: Saboteurs of the Status Quo (1999).

Further, both Veblen and Schumpeter comment on the tendency within capitalism to drive its opponents to an 'inherent belief in the intellectual superiority and social necessity of their position' (Foresti, 2014 ; Papageorgiou & Michaelides, 2016). For both writers, as late-capitalist processes take hold, the opponents would mistake their belief in their own intellectual position as an inherent truth which, in turn, would give rise to discontent with the very system that established them.

> The man who has gone through a college or university easily becomes psychically unemployable in manual occupations without necessarily acquiring employability in, say, professional work. […] All those who are unemployed or unsatisfactorily employed or unemployable drift into the vocations in which standards are least definite. […]
> (Schumpeter, 2010b [1942], p. 153)

These arguments are further amplified by others who equally believe this expansion is also related to late-capitalism's interplay between excessive leisure time, the need for status, and also the need of developing highly-skilled bureaucrats (Di Leo, 2017 ; Habermas, 1973 ; Schütz & Rainer, 2016). In this way, this expansion would lead to institutions focusing on social disadvantage and thus become "seats of social unrest" contained by bureaucratic and managerial structures rather than the entrepreneurial and so would grow less important for social, political or economic development (2008 [1936]; 2010a [1942]; 1990 [1919], 2015 [1918]).

As briefly discussed in Chapter 2 in the context of a 'truth crisis', these developments have become increasingly empirically supported in the UK and the US colleges and universities over the last 20 years. Jonathan Haidt (2016a) and the Heterodox Academy (2015) argues that knowledge institutions (particular those of higher learning such as colleges and university) are in the middle of structure between two contemporary competing 'teloses' – social justice or truth. Haidt and others go further and argue that the structure of legitimacy within contemporary 'education' and

instructional discourse will necessarily have a detrimental effect on knowledge.

It is argued that this detrimental effect is that, put simply, institutions of knowledge and their actors and actions are increasingly unable to support the discussion of specialised difficult questions and particularly to share alternative ideas without fear of censorship (participate in open inquiry). Further they are unwilling to approach problems from various social and political perspectives (espouse viewpoint diversity) and finally, they disavow productive debate across their epistemological differences (engage in constructive disagreement). The literature points to how all of the above notions relate to the socio-political reality of the institution, its actors and actions (for examples of these extensive discussions in contemporary educational literature, see Ceci & Williams, 2018 ; Cofnas *et al.*, 2018 ; Ditto *et al.*, 2019 ; Haidt, 2016b, 2020 ; Honeycutt & Freberg, 2017 ; Langbert, 2018 ; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2019 ; Martin, 2016).

Haidt and others, agree further with Veblen and Schumpeter that this is a change driven by late-capitalist knowledge structures, as the public knowledge structures become increasingly the drivers of innovative capacity (rather than individual firms or entrepreneurs) and the requirement for the disruptive capacity of knowledge institutions lessens to such an extent that social and political function of the knowledge institutions and entrepreneurs themselves as creators of 'alternative futures' becomes obsolete (Elliott, 1980, 1994). It is useful to note that one of the features described in this system that is the bureaucratisation of innovation into the social-political system, is a well-researched contemporary phenomena which is extensively discussed in current economic literature (for example, see Block, 2008 ; Mazzucato, 2016, 2018 ; Piketty, 2015 ; Wade, 2014).

This is an important development, as previous descriptions noted that entrepreneurial power may be the basis of the development of an 'epistemic legitimacy'. So if that

avenue becomes obsolete in cognitive capitalism, what other capacities are there? Any mode of power is a normative order driven by the accumulation of power – either maximal or differential. However, it is important to note that, as described above, this accumulation power is always profoundly dialectic and can exist only against opposition and resistance. This resistance, for Schumpeter takes two forms: power-replacing and power-negating (Amadae, 2003).

The original form is interior to the power struggle, and it occurs because, as described by Lukes (2004 [1974]), any attempt by one social or political structure to enforce power is continually resisted by additional structures that attempt to utilise the same basis for power, and this ongoing struggle means that power always faces structural resistance.

However, the second category of opposition is external to the structurally driven power struggle. It derives not from a pursuit for power, but from its negation – namely, the need to undo or outdo the structure altogether in favour of autonomy from or cooperation with the social and political structure. This latter drive is often latent, and often suppressed by political power entities such as knowledge structures, but it is always present within any political system – for if it was absent, there would be nothing to rule over and no need for power (Berger & Zelditch Jr, 1998).

Power is enforced through institutional hierarchies and because the struggle for power is continually apparent so is the effort to build and expand the structures within this normative order. The power of the normative order is continuously internally and externally resisted, Veblen (1964 [1919]) notes that "its imposition requires ongoing strategic sabotage: new contenders to power are always lurking and need be eliminated or at least undermined and contained, while those who are to be dominated have to be persuaded, tempted and forced into submission". These

endeavours – importantly for the ongoing construction of 'epistemic legitimacy' – consume a significant portion of the knowledge structures energy. They imply at minimum the development of corporatized and organised entities to promote, protect and enforce the importance of knowledge institutions, actors and actions.

In this way, Schumpeter explores how institutions of higher learning become not only a place for the intellectual to reside and develop contested knowledge but become places of cognitive labourers that have "no ability in either intellectual endeavour or manual labour" (Schumpeter, 2010b [1942], p. 153). This lack of ability, for Schumpeter and Veblen following Weber's thinking, was a direct relationship of the knowledge structures (bureaucracy) creating the knowledge actors.

Further, it was believed that these struggles created by changes in late-capitalism - as Schumpeter particularly expounded in The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism (Schumpeter, 1991 [1934]) would result in intellectuals winning and would contribute to the end of the capitalist economic system (Betta, 2016 ; Festré *et al.*, 2017 ; McCaffrey, 2009a). While Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, and Hayek's *Road to Serfdom*, both offered an equally negative view of capitalism's future; a view of a system that would be progressively deadened by forms of knowledge and intellectualism in culture, particularly through the development growth of rationalisation and its institutional structure of bureaucracy.

But unlike Hayek, Schumpeter's proposed bureaucratic thinking was pervasive not only within private enterprises but also public ones. He argued further that the entrepreneur was a transient actor not a permanent one and that the innovative and change capacity of entrepreneurs would be subsumed for the purposes of legitimate authority for social and political action (Elliott, 1980, 1994). This is discussed further in the next section.

4.3.3 Entrepreneurs of Knowledge

However, returning to the expanded model of 'powerful knowledge' and with the reminder of the Saint-Simonian quotation "each will receive from the distributor state the means of production - an education" (Anonymous, 1831, p. 11) to use Weber's terms, this approach maintains that the legitimacy of the intellectual is to be found through exercising a *value-rational* authority (Spencer, 1970b, pp. 128-129).

One popular counter argument to this is that where the entrepreneur or charismatic individual - as Clark (2008) explores in his work *Academic charisma and the origins of the research university* - asserting a charismatic (or as Hofstader prefers 'enthusiastic') authority over intellectual life has traditionally been important to its status within social and political systems and is the guard against anti-intellectualism.[6]

In contrast to the 'traditional/ rational forms of authority that bring about stability and order, Weber's charismatic authority is typically critical of extant institutions and strives instead to bring about change, renewal, revolution and even disorder in society, as Weber (2012 [1920], p. 64) states: "It is, by definition, a kind of authority which is specifically in conflict with the bases of legitimacy of an established, fully institutionalised order".

However, for Schumpeter (1947a, 1947b), the competitive systems within society and politics behave as a system that is not focussed solely on capital accumulation or wealth creation but on ensuring maximum efficiency within a market. These systems

[6] These discussions often focus on some key themes such as: the contribution to public discourse of notable public intellectuals (for example, Paul Johnson's Intellectuals (2013)); social perspectives on the manipulation of knowledge for a particular purpose (for example, Lewis Feuer's Ideology and the ideologists (2010 [1975])*)*; the universities or the intellectuals place in societies or politics (for example, Mark Lilla's The reckless mind (2001)); reflections on how scholars or institutions engage with the public (for example, Richard Posner's Public intellectuals (2009)); or how intellectuals influence the broader public with their knowledge or lack thereof (for example, Thomas Sowell's Intellectuals and society (2012)

and competitive practices are focussed not on supporting or creating innovative ideas from outside the system but rather on power-negating external creativity to ensure efficient exploitation of current knowledge, process, and production supporting the current knowledge system. They are protecting historic investment not letting innovative ideas take hold. Thus, in terms of 'epistemic legitimacy', public bureaucratic behaviour would be looking not to the power-replacing behaviour of the development of alternative realities – as would be the easy proposal from Young's model of 'powerful knowledge' - but rather to power-negating behaviour undermining the long-term sustainability of the cognitive entrepreneurship to ensure the supremacy of cognitive labour (Beech, 2019 ; Mason, 2016).

Schumpeter supposed that finally the stifling rationality of this imposition of hierarchy and routinisation would precipitate the end of capitalism as a system of economic and social organisation in private enterprise with the public institutions endorsing and becoming the entrepreneur with its requirement for charismatic authority (Schumpeter, 2010a [1942]). The late-capitalist model would be one of increasing charismatic public and governmental sphere: a development we can again draw back to the current growth of populist government (for examples of this debate, see Algan *et al.*, 2017 ; Brewer, 2016 ; Inglehart & Norris, 2016 ; Noury & Roland, 2020 ; Rodríguez-Pose, 2020 ; Rodríguez-Pose *et al.*, 2020).

However, as an impact on 'epistemic legitimacy' we can see that from Schumpeter 's perspective it is not only the actors within the system that can take on charismatic authority it is also the structures themselves. Therefore, if the struggle is not one about the type of authority but rather one of representation and distribution then a consideration of how cognitive labour affects social justice is important.

4.4 Cognitive labour and social justice

This section - following the lead of Sen (2005, 2009) - evaluates the use of cognitive labour and 'powerful knowledge' models for their impact on the development and operation of 'knowledge' for social justice. This is particularly an investigation – in light of the above arguments – of the usefulness of cognitive facilities in creating social justice which is an argument that is important to contemporary social justice theory and particular the 'capabilities' model of social justice.

As far as contemporary investigations of social justice, many social justice movements seek to use the work of Karl Marx as both a philosophical and theoretical basis for action (Adelson, 1995 ; Solomon & Murphy, 2000). However, it is important to say that Marx was famously apprehensive about the connotations and use of the idea of a single or ideal 'justice'. Marx saw justice as an fundamentally bourgeois anxiety - a form of '*noblesse oblige'* - and he articulated contempt for "vulgar socialists" who campaigned under slogans such as "a fair day's wages for a fair day's work" (Carlyle, 2015 [1840]; Jost & Jost, 2007).[7] Simultaneously, Marx espoused his concern that particular notions of justice with their basis in laws provided ideological cover for the *status quo*.

However, many of Marx's followers have deconstructed his writings in order to establish what they consider to be an influential justice-based criticism of capitalism (Campbell, 2001 ; Husami, 2014 [1972]). These approaches often argue that, when Marx contended that capitalism is contingent on the existence of "surplus value" being created through the labour, this can be interpreted as a fundamental principal that capitalism cannot allow for workers to be paid the value of the work because if

[7] It is important to say that scholar's generally agree that Marx did not consider any 'justice' based arguments would be for example, see Robert Tucker's The Marxian revolutionary idea (1969), Allen Wood's The Marxian critique of justice (2014 [1972]).

this was the case there would be no surplus. Through this argument, capitalism makes the bargaining process of how much surplus both the owner of the means of production and the workers will support within the social contract a core part of its model. Then, as Marx obviously condemns this as a form of "exploitation"; it is argued that Marx objected to this bargaining process due to the stark inequalities between social classes that this creates and thus forms an objection essentially identical to that of social justice theory (Cohen, 2014 [1972]).

So, while cognitive capitalism sees a redistribution of labour relations within the economics of society, it only does this in relation to the purchase and transfer of knowledge within the capitalist system. The effect here is to suggest that the interpersonal knowledge inequality that is created by any educative solution (unless impossibly universal) may tend to be magnified by its coupling with the inability to use that knowledge in effective economic ways.

However, in the literature of social justice and education one of the predominate contemporary discussions is of the importance of the development of individual capabilities (for example, see Nussbaum, 2006 ; Saito, 2003 ; Unterhalter, 2003 ; Walker, 2003, 2005). As discussed above, some aspects of the capability approach are linked to the discussion above by, among others, Aristotle, Adam Smith, and Karl Marx (for examples, see Nussbaum, 1992, 2020 ; Sen, 1993, 1999 ; Walsh, 2000). The capability approach suggests that socially just outcomes are a question of what individuals can do or be and both are key to life they are capable of leading.

The capability approach is founded in several articles in which Sen (1974, 1980, 1981) critiques traditional economic models and analytic accounts (for example, utilitarianism and resourcism) as lacking accounts of what individuals are able to undertake ('doings') and what they are able to be ('beings'). In this way, real

freedom means that one has all the required means necessary to achieve both elements: 'doings' and 'beings': it is not merely the formal freedom to do or be something, but the substantial opportunity to achieve it. This then leads to the notion of a form of economic justice that is essentially individualistic in nature – "from each according to their ability, to each according to their needs" (Miller, 2003).

However, if we connect this approach to discussion of cognitive labour above, we can begin to see the limits of this approach. If social justice rests on the capabilities of individuals within the socio-political system, it somehow relies on cognitive facilities to imagine and desire a type of future – similar in this sense to Young's powerful knowledge. However, within the space of capabilities there are three major issues in its relationship with cognitive capitalism. First, human beings cannot be free from their dependency upon other human beings; second and third, under capitalist social relations of production, individuals can be free neither from hegemonic controls over their participation in the public realm, nor from the direct or indirect consequences of the exploitation of human labour.

In this sense, while the first clearly relates to the issues raised by Veblen of the interaction between industry and business, the third, in particular, is significantly problematised by the notion of non-exploitation because it exists in the cognitive realm. The capability approach emphasises the value of human functionings because they are not part of the economic exchange or accumulation system. In this way, Nussbaum's (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 78-79) list of central human functional capabilities includes, for example, "[b]eing able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason". However, as discussed about, these supposedly free functions in late-capitalism are exactly those elements that the socio-political knowledge structures are seeking to draw into the market.

Therefore, capabilities while a useful approach are not sufficient in a cognitive capitalist landscape to develop fully the nexus between education and social change and development. Further it is argued that, although it has its limitations, the discourse of legitimacy provides a more immediate strategic terrain for a politics of need than a discourse of capabilities, particularly if capabilities are to be construed at one stage removed from the context in which socially just outcomes have been settled or through which they can be disputed and extended. In this way, the capabilities approach is well suited to a consensual approach, but a politics of social justice should be about struggle, not consensus: the struggle for the recognition of unspoken needs; the struggle for more direct forms of political participation; the struggle against exploitation and the systemic injustices of capitalism, and capabilities cannot do this if it is built on the assumption that it is outside of the market when it is actually at the heart of the development of late-capitalist subsumption of labour to capital.

4.5 Conclusions

As, Stiglitz (1999, p. 37) says: "To be sure, we still face the economics of scarcity. But just as the importance of land in production changed dramatically as the economy moved from agriculture to industry, so too does the movement to a knowledge economy necessitate a rethinking of economic fundamentals."

For Veblen, Nitzan, Bichler, Schumpeter and others, the economic vision for knowledge is obscured by power. In a cognitive capitalist environment knowledge would need to be centralized in its creation, in its exchange, in its management, and in who works for it. Thus the power of knowledge – through its ownership - would not be in its production or access to the modes of production but in the ownership of its service for any social or economic purpose. The capitalisation processes inherent in

the capitalist model would ensure that it would also tend away from 'absolute maximisation' as the goal to simply 'greater accumulation' than the competitor. The power of knowledge would not be just in getting to the 'theory of everything' first but in ensuring that in relative terms that knowledge is greater than any other capitalist competitor. Thereby, according to Veblen, the main force that has allowed large companies the increase in credit (and not from government), was "strategic sabotage" (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009).

Therefore, the standard neoclassical response espoused the 'perfect competitive market' which considered that nothing was better than the invisible-hand of free competition (c.f. Chamberlin 1933; Robinson 1933; Means 1935; Hall and Hitch 1939. On the contrary, in the model of strategic sabotage, competition is not the main engine of innovation or change. Instead working to 'sabotage' in order to release the price structure and charge whatever the market can bear. In this context the price for knowledge in the market is not related to its utility but to whatever someone else will pay for its ownership. As Nitzan and Bichler (2019, p. 6) state "[i]n this mutually destructive context, the various forms of profit were not a 'remuneration' for the productive contribution of the owned assets, but rather a 'ransom' claimed by their owners for allowing the industrial system as a whole to operate."

The individual is not passive in the development of knowledge but actively bargains and 'sabotages' wealth producing knowledge within the curriculum, as the agent of its delivery. Put simply, for knowledge in current societies to continue as the basis for social action, it must hold a position outside the consensus-based knowledge of bureaucratic power because liberal democratic and capitalist structures guide the specialised knowledge and its institutions, actors and actions to a position as an object whose ownership needs to be managed and thereby removes its legitimate authority.

Thus the argument becomes that the legitimacy of knowledge for social action is held outside of the 'public sphere' requiring the 'entrepreneurial spirit' to transgress the liminal barrier to investigate the legitimacy of the knowledge for social action while legitimating for accumulation of wealth producing knowledge if that is within the competitive spirit of the capitalist model.[8] However, as Schumpeter argues this is not available in a late-capitalism where cognitive and immaterial action becomes labour and that labour becomes capital. The struggle for this capital makes the individual notion of innovative capacity – which arguably is synonymous with Young's powerful knowledge in many ways – obsolete and instead the previously cumbersome knowledge structures take on this innovation 'alternative futures' and in this way negate the power of knowledge to produce change without having to oppose it.

In this way, education as a legitimised institution for knowledge may be regarded as a form or patterning of the economic process of sublimation of labour to capital. Education can therefore be regarded as a tangible, built structure – a structure which is a product of the late-capitalist economic processes. Education is a public investment in an individual which sees a return through the compliance with the knowledge structure and the investment in its innovative capacity. Not only is the individual, but knowledge itself, legitimated for this purpose.

The public visibility of knowledge as a site of contestation creates a public discourse which enables negative and positive arguments about the principled order of economic life from different viewpoints but in the understanding that cognitive capitalism is driving the bureaucracy to a charismatic position requiring constant checking to ensure supremacy of its differential accumulation of knowledge. Hence,

[8] The effects of competition on the outcomes of the power within the capitalist model are explored further in the conclusion. However, this will be brief for a full exploration of the wide ranging effects of competition within the economic structures, see William Davies's The limits of neoliberalism: Authority, sovereignty and the logic of competition (2016).

both the positioning of neoliberalism as an enemy of the academy and the gaps between education and social change. Thus as Cushman (1999, p. 328) states:

> [T]hese statements indicate a growing pressure for intellectuals to make knowledge that speaks directly to political issues outside of academe's safety zones. This urgency comes in part from administrators and legislators who demand accountability, but it also comes from academics who have grown weary of isolation and specialization and who hope their work might have import for audiences beyond the initiated few. They wonder if knowledge-making can take risks while both cultivating aesthetics and leading to political action. Above all, these [….] reveal the nagging suspicion that academics have yet to realize their full potential in contributing to a more just social order.

Therefore, the concluding section of this thesis will respond to this deficit in the model of social justice already proposed . It will begin with the argument for epistemic legitimacy that stems from the provision of a 'resource of hope' (Jarvie, 2007) which works to keep alive different visions for communities through expanding their discourse rather than defining it. These visions supply not just rational ideas and interpretation of the 'status quo' but use their intellectual abilities to supply resistance and alternatives.

Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion

> These very same dynamics are replicated in the field of education, even though they are also skewed because of the role of government in the funding and regulation of that world. An extremely complicated situation awaits college graduates. For several decades, higher wages have been combined with an inability to find educationally appropriate employment, a situation that defies every tenet of the economics profession. What follows in this book is an examination of that edge of reality where education and economy produce results just the opposite of what in theory is claimed that they will do.
> Gary Roth (2019) The Educated Underclass, p. 9

> [T]wo [of the] most salient traits of the [student] radical movement are its anti-intellectualism and its hostility to the university as an institution. [...] Intellectuals, by definition, are people who take ideas seriously for their own sake. Whether or not a theory is true or false is important to them, independently of any practical applications it may have. [Intellectuals] have, as Richard Hofstadter has pointed out, an attitude to ideas that is at once playful and pious. But, in the radical movement, the intellectual ideal of knowledge for its own sake is rejected. Knowledge is seen as valuable only as a basis for action, and it is not even very valuable there. Far more important than what one knows is how one feels.
> John Searle (1971) The Campus War, p.49

5.1 Introduction

For many in education studies, the blame for the rise in anti-intellectualism and its move to more active processes lies squarely at the feet of capitalist (and in particular neo-liberal) economic 'philosophies' or, as more commonly termed, 'ideologies' (for example, Apple, 2004 ; Brown, 2015 ; McLaren, 2007). A long-standing connection, for example, Hofstadter (1996 [1963], p. 4) states:

> After twenty years of Democratic rule, during which the intellectual had been in the main understood and respected, business had come back into power, bringing with it the vulgarization of the intellect which has been the almost invariable consequence of business supremacy.

However, across education studies this connection is seen more than an attribution of causation; it is often a demonisation. Following on from Paulo Freire (1996 [1968]) 'Pedagogy of the Oppressed', educational literature has been regularly occupied by works with titles such as "Neoliberal education? Confronting the slouching beast" (Ball, 2016) or "Imprisoning minds: The violence of neoliberal education or 'I am not for sale!'" (Macrine, 2010).

In many cases, this attribution of causation displays its own "anti-rational" form of anti-intellectualism "inasmuch as it represents an unwillingness to undertake the difficult work of judging and justifying the comparative adequacy of competing claims " (Rigney, 1991, p. 439). For many, the removal of the "threat of the market" and the underpinning hegemonic interests will supply total amelioration for the decline in the position and power of knowledge within political and social contexts. However, this is completely at odds with a contemporary culture where knowledge itself is both labour and capital. The claim itself has become circular – knowledge and its institutions, actors and actions need removal from the system of which it is now an irreducible part.

The solution to this it will be argued is to ensure that for knowledge in current societies to be the basis for effective social justice, it must hold a position outside the knowledge of bureaucratic power because liberal democratic and capitalist structures guide the specialised knowledge of education to a position of struggle for legitimacy. Therefore, the struggle to use knowledge for social, political and economic emancipation is defined not by its ability to imagine possibility – as in the Young's model of 'powerful knowledge' – but by the ability to implement that possibility through the authority of consensus-based resistance or 'epistemic legitimacy'.

This contribution is to expand Young conceptions of 'powerful knowledge' by acknowledging the sphere in which it is developed (educational sociology) and show that, while access to knowledge through curriculum choice is important by supplementing the concept with political and economic legitimation, the concept can effectively be transferred to the political sphere and inform debates about how knowledge and education contribute to social justice.

Further, this thesis assists the debate by extending the theoretical tradition of 'powerful knowledge' from the education sphere into the political. By doing this, it provides some theoretical contributions towards overcoming the gap between the empirical outcomes related to social advantage bestowed by education and the theory of knowledge-based power in a liberal, capitalist democratic model.

5.2 A model of 'epistemic legitimacy'

It is proposed that following the arguments on legitimacy, public reason, and cognitive labour in the preceding essays that 'epistemic legitimacy' is a model which is built on the juxtaposition and relationship of various combinations of resistance and innovation capacity of knowledge structures, and thus offers important insights into how modes of power related to knowledge, its institutions, actors and actions, operate and evolve. Therefore, in its general form, this model can be used to examine knowledge within late-capitalism (particularly cognitive capitalism) as well as other modes of power, and it can account for the full spectrum of knowledge structures versus change capacity trajectories.

In simple terms, an individual may know anything but unless they can use it and it is acknowledged, it is 'powerless' regardless of what the knowledge can enact in terms of social and political change. In short, this thesis has argued that Weber's (1978

[1922], p. 225) superiority of the 'capitalist entrepreneur' and their "relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge" is an effective theoretical framework to problematise the superiority of knowledge to affect social transformation which is at the heart of the assumption connecting education and social justice. This is not because of the placement of the entrepreneur within a sphere of charismatic authority or because the entrepreneur is immune from being an effective mechanism of resistance. It is the entrepreneur's fundamental role in the development of the strategic sabotage of the power as a disruption to the collaborative consensus thus allowing the knowledge structure to work to build upon the consensus or to resist it: both elements of democratization.

Building on the earlier essays, this thesis proposes the following points to summarize the development of the model of 'epistemic legitimacy':

1. Site of development - Based on its particular trajectory, the power of knowledge can be classified as expanding (as in Durkheim and Young's models), in crisis (as in Lyotard and Habermas), declining (as in the deliberative democrats), earning (as in the Cognitive Capitalist), resisting (as in Epistemic Legitimacy) or democratizing (as in Weber's bureaucracy).

2. Dual strengths – The power of knowledge is subject to two conflicting forces: a Machiavellian force that drives towards the accumulation of more structural power, and an opposing force – explored by de La Boétie (2000 [1577]) – that seeks both greater autonomy and cooperation. It is proposed that the balance of these two forces affects how the power of knowledge develops. Thus, the power of 'epistemic legitimacy' is not in one force but in the balance between them. The power for social change is found in the balance between seeking co-operation and seeking accumulation of power as is compellingly outlined in

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) Why civil resistance works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.

3. Nurturing strategic sabotage – However, in a socio-political system of expanding use of knowledge such as cognitive-capitalism, the balance of two forces allows both the recognition by the knowledge structures and the level of recognition of resistance to rise. Here, the absolute flow of future imaginaries (innovation capacity) which is now within the knowledge structures always grows faster than ability for groups to recognise this as reality. This, in turn, means that headline measures of change tend to be overstated, possibly by a very wide margin. In this sense, we can say that the power of knowledge grows, at least in part, not despite or because of sabotage, but through sabotage particularly that which resists consensus-formation.

4. Relationship of resistance – Therefore, when successful, resistance to power tends to reduce capacity of the normative order to legitimise and creates a variety of crises of legitimation. These crises, though, might not last for long: successful resistance augments autonomy, and if we are correct in arguing that greater autonomy tends to boost recognition of alternative futures, then the result is to elevate the capacity for recognition within the normative order and therefore enable the development of the knowledge structure which, in turn, seeks to democratize it. Indeed, this type of continual resistance might explain the growth of immaterial organisation which, being subject to periodic contestations within the cognitive capitalist framework, are within this framework broader and taller as well as more resilient. As McRae (2015) states: "The world's largest taxi firm, Uber, owns no cars. The world's most popular media company, Facebook, creates no content. The world's most valuable retailer, Alibaba, carries no stock. And the world's largest accommodation

provider, Airbnb, owns no property. Something big is going on."

5. Legitimate resistance – However, the knowledge structures (bureaucracy) find that through this resistance, there is also a choice to be made. Particularly, the normative order must decide whether to lessen their pressure and allow recognition of resistance (through 'oppositional consciousness') to expand and grow its own power or to press for inclusion of particular relationships with reality within the knowledge structure at a risk of systemic disintegration and decline. Further, the citizenry then also faces a choice: it can either allow total recognition per capita to continue rising (and in so doing leave the door open for larger more complex knowledge structures for the future but still exclusive in some capacity), or it can intensify the pressure toward the radical dismantling of the 'common social knowledge' as the basis for decisions on social inclusion.

In this way, 'epistemic legitimacy' can be developed to have a distinct explanatory power when it comes to studying how knowledge within a curriculum and thus education is connected to social justice. Consistent with Weber's assertions, the public sphere is beholden to a normative order which generally can choose and flux the social, political and economic power of knowledge through its chosen legitimising processes, while separating the same entities with regards to education.

Thus, education can be legitimised for certain purposes - although these are choices of the normative order that can be rescinded at any point - but the knowledge gained through the instructional discourse is only powerful if it is also legitimised either concurrently by the normative order or separately by the public sphere through the balance of co-operation and resistance.

This thesis has extended the powerful knowledge model with the alternative (Weberian) tradition of authority founded in the struggle between the structural power of knowledge ('bureaucracy') and the authority of knowledge within the public sphere to enact change ('entrepreneurship'). It is argued that Weber's insights developed through social, economic and political theory demonstrate that there exists a legitimacy-based model underpining the authorisation of epistemic modes of participation in the public sphere that can mediate the power of knowledge to create social change.

5.3 Discussion

Education in the modern world is portrayed as the archetypal success story which exalts the power of knowledge – the more you know, the better you are, the more you will accomplish, the more power you will have in society over your own social, political and economic participation. However, as explored by Edwin West (1994 [1965]) over 50 years, increasing access, size, and scope of the education system will continue to increase inequality and lower mobility between social groups. From a conventional viewpoint, this combination of educational expansion and intensified inequality may seem counter intuitive. The common expectation is for inequality and limited social justice correlated with poverty, backwardness, and deprivation to be a feature of the past and not one of the prosperous future.

It is clear from the previous discussions that this expectation is grounded in the customary separation of knowledge production from the *nomos* and intellectuals from power. According to the liberal version of this separation, the accumulation of knowledge (both information and rationality) is bred from education, and education in turn reduces ignorance and calls for less restrictions in the public sphere - social, economic, and political. The radical viewpoint, particularly critical pedagogues, seek

to transcend this simplistic methodological calculation but the divergence nonetheless remains, as it still prioritizes the cycle of education and social action as key to understanding the ups and downs of social exclusion and inclusion.

If we take the understanding developed from the three essays above of what constitutes 'powerful knowledge' and what constitutes the legitimacy to transfer this knowledge to the social and political systems, how it evolves, and the ways in which it relates to education, it is further argued that this can led us to a different understanding of the power of knowledge within the public sphere, and more particularly, how 'epistemic legitimacy' affects the use of knowledge and education for social justice.

Therefore, the current conception of 'knowledge is power' as one based in consensus and passivity which when combined with conceptions of liberal bureaucratic democracy – where knowledge is presented as neutral, technical, and fact-based – undermines the understanding of the possibilities created by Young's model curriculum supported by 'powerful knowledge', a limitation which is overcome by attending to the legitimate authority that empowers that knowledge to have a binding quality required for social and political change.

This type of legitimacy underpins the authorisation of epistemic modes of participation in the public sphere and can be effectively viewed as a normative organizing principle of public discourse having a relational order which is capitalised rather than a specific entity – as capital. Thus, to support social justice, 'powerful knowledge' understood in its procedural form must allow legitimate authority to be of the type that is immune to bureaucratic knowledge structures. To achieve this, it must transgress the liminal barrier of the *nomos* by utilising Weber's (1978 [1922], p. 225) knowledge superiority of the 'capitalist entrepreneur'. Put simply, for the 'power of

knowledge' in current societies to continue, it must hold a position outside the knowledge structures of bureaucratic authority because in a capitalist model specialised knowledge is in a struggle against the subsumption into capital, and differential accumulation favours particular disciplines and institutions which represent knowledge, and not the interest of the individual or their communities.

Therefore, as Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon – referred to as Henri de Saint-Simon – outlined at the beginning of the 1830s, education's ability to provide access knowledge is the means to an end in which "each could work according to their aptitudes and strengths [and] consume according to their needs" (Blanc, 1849, p. 79).[1] Therefore, to support social justice, powerful knowledge must be understood in its procedural form outside of bureaucratic knowledge and thinking (Hudson, 2016).

By focusing on these theories, this thesis has explored the risk that embracing 'powerful knowledge' as a model for education will enable exclusion and simplification which, in turn, pose a heavy and currently observable risk to the very institutions, actors and actions that it is proposed to strengthen (for example, universities, schools, teachers, formal education) and thereby risking any connection between education and socially just outcomes. It has been argued that this model with its inherent claims to rationality represents the rarely acknowledged reality where education has "effectively maintained inequality" within society (Lucas, 2001).

Therefore, within social justice, there are significant factors which enable all motivation of individuals within a society to consider only those factors that are necessary to ensure just outcomes within the included members of the social, political or economic system (Jost *et al.*, 2008 ; Jost *et al.*, 2011a ; Kay & Zanna, 2009). This

[1] For a detailed exploration of the development of this famous socialist epithet, see Luc Bovens and Adrien Lutz's "From Each according to Ability; To Each according to Needs": Origin, Meaning, and Development of Socialist Slogans, *History of Political Economy* (2019).

enables the rationalisation of failures within a social justice system and the acceptance of traditional and normative values of the applicable social, economic, and political institutions (Jost *et al.*, 2011b ; Kay *et al.*, 2009) only upon the realisation of the 'alternative future'. Thus within the proposed idea of epistemic legitimacy, the legitimacy of knowledge is not the power to dominate the system and force the system into the perspective that is desired for the individual outcome but rather the ability of the system to be manipulated by the knowledge because the 'alternative future' represents an objective truth which is observable through 'other-regardingness'

Finally, the argument of this thesis has been that the dominant answer in educational research to this has traditionally been "to protect the university against the market" as outlined by Kenneth Arrow (1993, p. 11) in *Excellence and Equity in Higher Education*. In Chapter 4, it has been argued that as we change the nature of the economic foundations of society towards one inclusive of 'cognitive labour' that this dominant answer does not deal with the "threats from public authorities to conform to the then current standards of political and ethical belief" but also encourages the disruption of knowledge-based emancipation by competing social groups.

Put simply, for knowledge in current societies to be the basis for effective social justice, this thesis has argued it must hold a position outside the knowledge of bureaucratic power because liberal democratic and capitalist structures guide the specialised knowledge of education to a position of struggle for legitimacy, a struggle which is only enhanced in the climate of late-capitalism as knowledge becomes part of labour and is subsumed under capital flows. Therefore, the struggle to use knowledge for social, political and economic emancipation is defined not by its ability to imagine possibility but by the ability to implement that possibility.

In the same way, citizens must accept (either consciously or unconsciously) the epistemic legitimacy for within the social, political and economic mechanisms not as an *a priori* construct of fairness – if you have gained this or that qualification then you are more or less able to determine social, political or economic direction for the system - but because of its legitimacy or its authority for seeking change in the normative order. While this is more difficult than not to recognise in the contemporary sphere, it is captured in the move in popular press from education and public intellectuals as authorities to the view of them as experts.

The response to this must be to not look to impose or dominate through knowledge but to extend its authority. Thus the reminder that in Weberian discourse, the authority is different from power only in its ability to disrupt. It is about discussion at the fringes of knowledge that maintain its power, and the ability of this to communicate not in order for action to be taken but in order for questions to be asked. If knowledge does not create questions, it is not authoritative. A focus on traditional mechanisms of academic discourse, and how universities-as-institutions, and scholars-as-individual contribute is paramount. Authority is socially, politically, and economically given by the normative order and without that it cannot seek the legitimacy on which to act.

For resistance to power, and the hope of creating alternative social, political, and economic relationship to replace it, demands a clear understanding of how normative orders react to knowledge of the citizenry within the various, changeable and dynamic systems that make up the public sphere. Although most radical and dissident thinkers in social justice do not subscribe to a full view of 'knowledge is power' in the service of social justice, they either fail to acknowledge the limits of education as a fundamental component, or they simply assume a theory of 'powerful knowledge' without comment. The latter approach is theoretically short-sighted as many education-for-social-justice concepts – including education driving social

mobility – lose their validity in the absence of a theory of knowledge's place for social action. This solution also strips quantitative analysis of all meaning, thus, sacrificing a valuable tool for empirical research in social justice.

Thus, the lingering influence of the powerful knowledge has blinkered educational sociologists and other theorists to the importance of authority in all its complexity. If we believe that a combination of human and non-human activities combined are responsible for our society and history then, in the words of Castoriadis (1984, p. 125), "the task of theory will not be directed to discovering 'laws', but to the elucidation of the conditions within which activity unfolds." One of the primary tasks of such an elucidation must be articulating 'what we talk about when we talk about the power of knowledge to drive social justice.'

5.4 Final words and responses

The conventional theory of 'powerful knowledge' – expressed by Young et. al. – emphasises that the success of individuals within social, political, and economic activity depends on reaching agreements regarding what knowledge is needed in a general curriculum in order for all "projective capacity that augments the capacity […] to imagine the previously unimaginable, and to think the previously un-thought". (Young & Muller, 2013, p. 239).

To alter this trajectory, this section suggests three avenues for further consideration.

If freedoms are to be codified by governments, they could supply these rights at both an individual and institutional level. Like basic human rights, laws to promote academic freedom could be given as rights to academic staff, rather than responsibilities of their institutions. As has been the case with human rights legislation, it becomes the responsibility of academics to exercise, protect and fight for the

freedoms that the law protects. As Thomas Nagel (2005, pp. 141-142) outlines, individual rights rather than institutional responsibilities, provide greater avenues for the development of 'social justice'.

Given the high status assumed by those with 'charismatic authority'. It is important as Posner (2009, pp. 2-3) articulates that academics must be encouraged to do "intellectual work on public issues" by not only contributing to the overall vision of the future and collaborating to construct long term 'democracy by discussion' but also by contributing to public issues in which they have specialised knowledge.

All these considerations argue that the codification of these freedoms should be directed to place less reliance on the role of the institution and more on the responsibilities of the individual. Such a construction would contribute to developing a culture of plurality of voices. This move alone would have an important impact on the ability of UK universities to promote social change and justice within the wider society. Consequently, the interventions of 'powerful knowledge' could come in many forms paying attention to getting the voice heard and not just in creating the statement.

Each of these areas offers the opportunity to empirically explore the theory laid out above, and also to acknowledge that there is no individual panacea to the creation of such a conceptual utopia as social justice, but there are 'resources of hope' such as epistemic legitimacy whereby academics could use not just their knowledge as a transmission but also to present transgressive paths to be followed in a call to authority.

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Appendix A: Brief Discussion of Marx's 'General Intellect'

This discussion is concerned with the argument that the general intellect which Marx presents (for the first and only time) in the *Grundrisse* anticipates the re-appropriation of the role of knowledge production by workers which is often suggested as convincing evidence that Marx shares the cognitive capitalism view.[1]

While connected to the understanding of value theory in cognitive capitalism, this section briefly examines some paragraphs of the *Grundrisse* associated with the concept of the general intellect. These sections are most commonly known as *The Fragment on Machines* ('the Fragment'). The purpose is to provide a brief synopsis of the common interpretation of these segments as outlined in cognitive capitalism and to offer a summary of Marx's position – although through very filtered lens – on knowledge power.

In the Fragment, Marx contends that with the rapid growth of science and technology, at some point, labour time will stop determining value:

> In the degree in which large-scale industry develops, the creation of real wealth becomes less dependent upon labour time and the quantity of labour employed than upon the power of the agents set in motion during labour time. And their power—their POWERFUL EFFECTIVENESS—in turn bears no relation to the immediate labour time which their production costs, but depends, rather, upon the general level of development of science and the progress of technology, or on the application of science to production. […] Once this

[1] Didier Lebert's Errements du capitalisme cognitif ? Éléments de réponse à la critique de Fine, Jeon et Gimm (2010), *European Journal of Economic and Social Systems* (2011), Didier Lebert's Errements du capitalisme cognitif ? Éléments de réponse à la critique de Fine, Jeon et Gimm (2010), *European Journal of Economic and Social Systems* (2011), p.106 criticises this line of critique of cognitive capitalism in Ben Fine, Heesang Jeon, *et al.*'s Value is as value does: Twixt knowledge and the world economy, *Capital & Class* (2010) as being "Ricardian Marxist (marxo-ricardienne)" in the sense that "it apprehends the law of value primarily as a law of the (universal) measure of the magnitude of value, not as a historical product of the law of surplus value", although he does not define "the law of surplus value. In other words, he argues that like Marx who ignored conception since it was negligible in his time, cognitive capitalism should ignore execution, as it is increasingly becoming marginalised in contemporary capitalism.

> transformation has taken place, it is neither the immediate labour performed by man himself, nor the time for which he works, but the appropriation of his own general productive power, his comprehension of Nature and domination of it by virtue of his being a social entity—in a word, the development of the social individual—that appears as the cornerstone of production and wealth. (Marx & Engels, 1987 [1857-1861], pp. 90-91)

Consequently:

> Production based upon exchange value collapses and the immediate material production process itself is stripped of its form of indigence and antagonism. Free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time in order to posit surplus labour, but in general the reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, to which then corresponds the artistic, scientific, etc., development of individuals, made possible by the time thus set free and the means produced for all of them. (Marx & Engels, 1987 [1857-1861], p. 91)

Put simply, within capitalism, the productive power, will "make the creation of wealth (relatively) independent of the labour time" (Marx & Engels, 1987 [1857-1861], p. 92) and as the interactions of production develop within the means of production, those with an ownership role will try "to confine them within the limits necessary to maintain as value the value already created". Thus, developing the cyclical downfall of knowledge within the capitalist framework, as innovation stutters and value is confined within the accumulation mechanisms. Here, the productive powers and the relations of production, "two different aspects of the development of the social individual", and an advanced arrangement of the dual nature of the commodity, unavoidably conflict for "they are the material conditions for exploding that basis of production".

Following this conclusion, Marx studies the implications of the explosion of productive capacity on fixed capital. Through this, he demonstrates that fixed capital is in direct

relation to the extent to which society's knowledge, has developed as a means of production within society, and therefore, the extent to which the 'conditions of social life' are under the governance of a / the General Intellect and changed because of it. Thus, the general intellect is generally take to describe an idea where social influence is created not only in and through knowledge but also as part of general process of just living: existence (Marx & Engels, 1987 [1857-1861], p. 92).

As Marx makes clear in the quotes above, the equation between the development of fixed capital and the appropriation of knowledge is in his consideration the purposes of commodity production. In this way, knowledge that is part of the general intellect or produced by it will be formed as fixed capital or the "immediate organs of social praxis" and likewise then become its own "immediate productive force" of some form of wider socialised labour. Here, Marx's weight is placed in his arguments on knowledge as associated with commodity production and thus fixed capital resources.

However, Michael Heinrich (2013, p. 203) in *The 'Fragment on Machines': A Marxian misconception in the Grundrisse and its overcoming in Capital* maintains Marx's exploration did not follow the cognitive capitalist model and suggest that while Marx indicated and argued for a declining role for labour as a component in the development of real wealth which would create a cumulative contradiction between real wealth and value and thus a change of capitalist model, he did not continue with this argument in Capital but rather replaced this with the concept of an ever increasing relative surplus value driving further inequality as a social force. And while inequality could be a social force for the collapse of a capitalist model this should not be equated with arguing that Marx suggest that economic forces would drive this collapse or change in the economic model, as suggested by the cognitive capitalists in their linking of the Grundrisse argument with a shift in economic cycle.

> In the treatment of the 'concept of relative surplus value' in Chapter Twelve [of the first volume of Capital], Marx speaks of the 'riddle' with which one of the founders of political economy, Quesnay, had tormented his opponents and for which they owed him an answer: namely, the fact that, on the one hand, capitalists were only interested in exchange value; but that, on the other hand, they constantly sought to lower the exchange value of their products.
>
> Marx also could not supply an answer to this riddle in the Grundrisse. There, he had effectively named the contradiction nominated by Quesnay. But rather than resolving it, he had understood it as a contradiction of capital. In the Grundrisse, Marx had ascribed to this 'contradiction' a potential to overthrow the capitalist mode of production. In Capital, against the background of the analysis of the production of relative surplus value, this contradiction is resolved: the capitalist is not interested in the absolute value of the commodity, but rather, merely in surplus value contained within it and able to be realised by means of sale.
> (Heinrich, 2013, pp. 212-213)

For writers within cognitive capitalism, the general intellect becomes something different again, as it is the 'totality of living knowledge'. Here, Vercellone (2007, p. 33) suggests that within the general intellect not only does the type of labour alter, but the division of labour is restructured, with the "emergence of the figure of the collective worker". Cognitive capitalism also seeks to extend Marx's perspective on the sole connection between the general intellect and fixed capital as it will also "overturn the relation of subordination of the living knowledge incorporated in labour power to the dead knowledge incorporated in fixed capital" (Vercellone, 2007, p. 18). Virno (2007, p. 6) continues this with a suggestion that 'mass intellectuality' is the "the prominent form in which the general intellect is manifest today". Hardt and Negri (2009, p. 267) state:

> In today's economy, in contrast, knowledge that is widespread across society – mass intellectuality – is becoming a central productive force, out of reach of the system of control, and this shift undermines the industrial paradigm.

This exploration of the Fragment where Marx's general intellect is associated with living knowledge versus knowledge realised in fixed capital ('dead knowledge'), is an extreme extension of the ideas that Marx put forward and have specific implication for the consideration of knowledge within the economic power base. As outlined previously, within the general intellect, for Marx the attention is on the increasingly free adoption of knowledge through capital to produce commodities (fixed capital) or, as Virno (2007, p. 5) considers: "According to Marx, the general intellect -that is knowledge as the main productive force - fully coincides with fixed capital, that is the 'scientific power' objectified in the system of machinery."[2]

The difficulty here is that he extends this argument to suggest that "formal and informal knowledge, imagination, ethical inclinations, mentalities and 'language-games'", coming to a final definition that the, "[g]eneral intellect needs to be understood literally as intellect in general: the faculty of thought, rather than the works produced by thought (a book, an algebraic formula, etc.)" (Virno, 2007, p. 6).

Instead, I would propose that in the Fragment, Marx envisions a society where labour is still the basis for the creation of wealth although the type, length, and intensity of labour would considerably alter.[3] This would mean that the production of wealth will be dependent on the volume, specificity, ownership, and dissemination of knowledge instead of a specific relationship with labour time, even where this is priced in a way to ensure surplus capital to feed the system of accumulation. In this positioning, the

[2] Carlo Vercellone's From formal subsumption to general intellect: Elements for a Marxist reading of the thesis of cognitive capitalism, *Historical Materialism* (2007), p. 27 disagrees with Virno: "Our interpretation diverges from that of Paolo Virno, according to which Marx identifies the general intellect with fixed capital in toto, in contrast to the way that the same general intellect presents itself as living labour".

[3] According to Tony Smith's The 'general intellect'in the Grundrisse and beyond, *Historical Materialism* (2013), p. 7: "Marx … expected that the general intellect could develop to this point only within communism. He did not foresee capitalism's transformation into a system in which the 'principal productive force' was the general intellect in the form of mass intellectuality".

Fragment, is Marx's initial attempt to explore the historical contradiction concerning the ownership of the means of production and the relationship both economic and social to collective ownership (or the public sphere) within capitalism. Within this, he contends that capital gives impetus to the ownership of the growth of production only to the extent that the ownership is also using the collective knowledge access to forward their wealth.