

1 **Comparative Infectivity and Transmissibility Studies of Wild-**
2 **bird and Chicken-Origin Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza**
3 **Viruses H5N8 in Chickens**

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28 **Abstract**

29 Despite the recent advances in avian influenza virus surveillance and genomic data,
30 fundamental questions concerning the ecology and evolution of these viruses remain elusive.
31 In Egypt, the H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) are co-circulating
32 simultaneously with HPAIVs of subtypes H5N1 and low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses
33 (LPAIVs) of subtype H9N2 in both commercial and backyard poultry. In order to isolate AIV
34 from wild birds and to assess their potential in causing infection in commercial poultry, a total
35 of thirty-four cloacal swab samples were collected from apparently healthy migratory wild
36 birds (*Anas acuta*, *Anas crecca*, *Rallus aquaticus*, and *Bubulcus ibis*) from four Egyptian
37 Governorates (Giza, Menoufia, Gharbia, and Dakahlia). Based on matrix (M) gene-targeting
38 real-time reverse transcriptase PCR and subsequent genetic characterization, our results
39 revealed two positive isolates (2/34) for H5N8 whereas no H5N1 and H9N2 subtypes were
40 detected. Genetic characterization of the full-length haemagglutinin (HA) genes revealed the
41 clustering of two reported isolates within group B of clade 2.3.4.4. The potential of a wild bird-
42 origin H5N8 virus isolated from a cattle egret for its transmission capability within and between
43 chickens was investigated in compare to chicken origin H5N8 AIV. Chickens inoculated with
44 cattle egret isolate showed varying clinical signs and detection of virus shedding. In contrast,
45 the contact chickens showed less levels of virus secretion indicating efficient virus inter/intra-
46 species transmission. These results demonstrated the possibility of spread of wild bird origin
47 H5N8 viruses between chicken. In conclusion, our study highlights the need for continuous
48 and frequent monitoring of the genetic diversity of H5N8 AIVs in wild birds as well as
49 commercial poultry sectors for better understanding and determining the genetic nature of these
50 viruses, which is fundamental to predict any future threat through virus reassortment with the
51 potential to threaten human and animal health. Likewise, an assessment of coverage and
52 efficacy of different vaccines and or vaccination regimes in the field conditions should be
53 reconsidered along with strict biosecurity measures.

54

55 **Keywords:** Influenza virus; H5N8; Transmission; Wild birds; Chicken

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58 **1. Introduction**

59 Avian influenza is a highly contagious poultry disease, which continues to spread in bird
60 populations throughout the world. Occasionally, a serious public health problem is caused by
61 the transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) from infected poultry to
62 humans [1]. Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) subtype H5N8 was first detected
63 in live bird markets in China in 2010 [2, 3]. By the end of 2014, it appeared in Central Asia [4]
64 and reached South Africa arguably by wild migratory birds by July 2017 [5]. Since then
65 multiple spillover events have been attributed to localized outbreaks in commercial and
66 backyard poultry, hobby birds and zoological collections resulting in severe economic losses
67 [6].

68 The H5N8 viruses in clade 2.3.4.4 were previously diversified into two main groups;
69 Group A and Group B [7]. During the evolution of H5Nx viruses of clade 2.3.4.4, frequent
70 reassortment events have been occurring with other co-circulating HPAIVs and low
71 pathogenicity AIVs in Russia [8], Germany [9], India [10], Italy [11] and Egypt [12]. In Egypt,
72 H5N8 subtype of clade 2.3.4.4 (Group B) was first detected in migratory wild birds during
73 winter season of 2016-2017 [12, 13]. Thereafter, several H5N8 outbreaks have been
74 documented in domestic poultry and ducks in several Egyptian Governorates [14- 21]. A recent
75 study has shown that clade 2.2 viruses are being steadily replaced by clade 2.3.4.4 viruses
76 (H5N8) and reassorting with H9N2 viruses while zoonotic transmission to human has not been
77 reported [22]. Reassortment is a common signature within clade 2.3.4.4 viruses has been
78 reported in different continents including Asia [23], North America [24, 25] and Europe [7]
79 while wild birds were blamed to be responsible for this reassortment [7]. The key factor for
80 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses dissemination is mainly dependent on the flyways of wild birds [6, 7].

81 Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are major respiratory pathogens in Egypt's poultry industry
82 and their continuous circulation is related to tremendous socio-economic losses [26].
83 Continued adaptation and enhanced replication through point mutations for avian influenza
84 viruses are reported. However, no re-assortment in mammalian hosts have been recorded in
85 Egypt [18]. Clades 2.3.4.4b H5N8 viruses have been diversified into at least 5 genotype (Gt1-
86 Gt5) as a result of continuous evolution and reassortment; Gt-1 and -2 were detected in 2016
87 (all in wild birds), Gt-3 and -4 in 2017 (poultry only), and Gt-5 since 2017 (poultry only) [20].
88 Likewise, the possibility of emergence of novel reassortant H5N8 HPAIVs with unstable gene
89 constellations and zoonotic significance is a public concern [21]. Continuous evolution of avian

90 influenza viruses has notoriously been linked to Egypt mainly due to two main hot spots; North
91 Mediterranean Coast that is considered a vital stopover for migratory birds during the annual
92 migration and the Nile Delta region, which is a habitat of an impressive number of bird species
93 [27]. Moreover, introduction of HPAIV subtype H5N8 to the Egyptian poultry populations
94 complicated the disease prevention and control, especially due to endemicity of HPAIV
95 (H5N1) of clade 2.2.1.2 and low pathogenicity AIV (H9N2) strains of G1 lineage [28].

96 While multiple attempts have been made to report the prevalence of H5N8 AIVs in
97 Egyptian wild birds, information related to clinico-pathological assessment and pathogenicity
98 remained elusive in chickens. This study was carried out to characterize two H5N8 viruses
99 isolated from wild birds during 2019 and their relationships with other contemporary H5N8
100 viruses to better understand the role of wild birds in avian influenza epidemiology. Studying
101 the clinical pathogenesis of wild bird-origin H5N8 AIVs could also improve the diagnostic
102 aspects of disease and implementation of the control measures. Therefore, the aim of the
103 current study is to investigate the infectious potential and transmission patterns of wild bird-
104 origin H5N8 AIV in commercial poultry to underpin the potential virus spillover from wild
105 birds to poultry.

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107 **2. Materials and Methods**

108 *2.1. Ethics statement, Samples collection, Virus isolation and Genetic Characterization*

109 All animal studies and procedures were carried out under strict accordance with the
110 guidance and regulations of animal welfare and health. As part of this process, the work
111 approved by the Ethics Committee at Veterinary Serum and Vaccine Research Institute
112 (VSVRI), Agricultural Research Center (ARC), Abbassia, Cairo, Egypt.

113 During 2019, molecular screening for avian influenza viruses (AIVs) was conducted in
114 migratory birds in Egypt. During this screening, a total of thirty-four cloacal swab samples
115 were collected from apparently healthy migratory birds (*Anas acuta*, *Anas crecca*, *Rallus*
116 *aquaticus*, and *Bubulcus ibis*) (Table 1) from four Egyptian Governorates (Giza, Menoufia,
117 Gharbia, and Dakahlia). Capturing by nets and sampling from live wild birds were carried out
118 in accordance with all relevant guidelines, regulations and animal ethics permits issued by
119 Veterinary Serum and Vaccine Research Institute (VSVRI), Agriculture Research Centre
120 (ARC), Egypt. No clinical signs for AIV infection were observed in birds during sampling.
121 Virus isolation for two passages was performed by inoculation into the allantoic cavity of 10-

122 day old specific pathogen free (SPF) embryonated chicken eggs (ECs) according to the OIE
123 diagnostic procedures [29]. The allantoic fluids from inoculated eggs were assessed for
124 agglutination activity via hemagglutination assay (HA) using 0.5% chicken erythrocytes
125 according to OIE recommendation [29]. The positive HA samples were subjected to viral RNA
126 extraction using a QIAamp viral RNA mini kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) according to the
127 manufacturer's protocol, then typed by M gene using RT-PCR [30]. The M gene positive
128 samples were further subtyped for HA and NA genes as previously described [31, 32].
129 Meanwhile, all collected samples were screened for avian avulavirus and gammacoronavirus
130 and were found negative.

131 The cDNA was synthesised by superscript III reverse transcriptase as per manufacturer
132 protocol using the Uni-12 primer (5'-AGCRAAAGCAGG-3'). Genome was amplified as
133 previously described [33] using the Q5[®] high-fidelity DNA polymerase package (NEB, UK).

134 *2.2. Sequencing and Sequence Analysis*

135 The PCR products were size separated by agarose gel electrophoresis, excised and purified
136 from gels using the QIAquick Gel Extraction Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany). The purified
137 PCR products were used directly for sequencing using BigDye Terminator v3.1 Cycle
138 Sequencing Kit (Applied Biosystems, California, USA) and ABI 3500 Genetic Analyzer (Life
139 Technologies, California, USA) by Source Biosciences Sequencing Facility (Source
140 Bioscience, UK).

141 Sequences generated in this study were submitted to the GenBank under accession
142 numbers MT256069 and MT256070. The obtained sequences were subjected to NCBI
143 BLASTN analysis (<https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi>). BioEdit 7.0 software was used for
144 multiple sequences and genomic signature analysis [34]. The MEGA 7.0 was used for
145 phylogenetic tree construction using the maximum likelihood method based on the General
146 Time Reversible model, and Gamma distributed with invariable sites (G+I). The codon
147 positions 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and non-coding sequences were included and the positions containing
148 gaps and missing data were eliminated [35]. Analysis for the presence of glycosylation sites
149 N-XT/S motif (X can be any amino acid except proline) within the HA protein using NetNGlyc
150 1.0 server (<http://www.cbs.dtu.dk/services/NetNGlyc/>).

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153 2.3. *Comparative Infectivity and Horizontal Transmission*

154 In the animal experiment, pathobiological assessments of cattle egret H5N8 strain (Cattle
155 egret/Egypt/VRLCU/2019) using mock-infected, inoculated, and contact birds were performed
156 individually (Fig 1) to study the pathobiology and possibility of horizontal transmission of
157 wild-bird-origin H5N8 AIV to SPF chickens compared to chicken origin H5N8 AIV
158 (MT256068 A/chicken/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 (H5N8) that was isolated from commercial layer
159 flock vaccinated with inactivated commercial H5N1 vaccine.

160 The animal experiments were conducted in BSL3-compatible isolators in accordance with
161 all relevant guidelines and animal ethics permits issued by Veterinary Serum and Vaccine
162 Research Institute, Abbassia, Egypt. Chickens were kept on deep litter and water was provided
163 through nipple drinkers/drinking towers and appropriate food was provided *ad libitum*.

164 Fifty SPF chickens (kindly provided by the Egyptian SPF Production Farm, Egypt) were
165 housed separately in two groups; inoculated (n=20) and non-inoculated (n=30). Chickens in
166 the non-inoculated group were divided into three further subgroups; two contact groups (n=20,
167 10 serve as contact group for group inoculated with cattle egret isolate while the other group
168 serve as contact group for inoculated group with chicken isolate) and mock infected as negative
169 control group (n=10) (Fig 1). Chickens in the inoculated groups were divided into two groups;
170 inoculated group with cattle egret H5N8 AIV and inoculated group with chicken origin H5N8
171 AIV. Inoculated chickens were inoculated with a dose of 100 µl of 10^{6.5} EID₅₀/ml from both
172 inoculated viruses through the intranasal route on day 21 old according to the standard
173 procedures at VSVRI, Egypt. After 48 h post-challenge, the contact birds were introduced to
174 both inoculated birds to assess for comparative infectivity and horizontal transmission of both
175 viruses. The mock-infected group served as a negative control and was inoculated with 100 µl
176 of sterile normal saline.

177 For the next 14 days, all chickens were kept and monitored twice daily for clinical signs,
178 including depression, anorexia, sneezing/coughing, respiratory disorders, ocular/ nasal
179 discharge, conjunctivitis, ruffled feathers, reluctance to move and dyspnea along with
180 collection of oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs to monitor shedding of the challenge viruses.

181 2.4. *Virus Shedding and Histopathology*

182 Swabs (oropharyngeal and cloacal) were examined for virus shedding 0, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 10th,
183 and 14th days post-inoculation (dpi) by using real-time RT-PCR as previously described [38].
184 The cycle threshold (Ct) values were converted to egg infective dose 50 (EID₅₀) based on the

185 standard curve ($R^2 > 0.98$). Different internal organs were collected from the euthanized/dead
186 chickens in both the control and inoculated groups for detailed necropsy and histopathological
187 examination. Selected tissues, including trachea, lung, liver, spleen and intestine, were
188 collected and fixed by immersion in 10% neutral buffered formalin at room temperature for
189 48 h, followed by processing and embedding in paraffin wax. Tissue sections of 5 μ m were
190 stained with Haematoxylin and Eosin and examined for microscopic lesions under a light
191 microscope.

192 *2.5. Statistical Analysis*

193 Results of comparisons of inoculated groups were analysed using one-way analysis of
194 variance (ANOVA), and significant differences among means were tested using Student's t-
195 test. Kaplan-Meier analysis was performed to calculate the survival rate. All statistical tests
196 were conducted using GraphPad Prism 7 (GraphPad Software, La Jolla, CA, USA). For all
197 assays and comparisons, differences were considered significant at a p-value of < 0.05 .

198 **3. Results**

199 *3.1. Screening of Samples and Virus Detection*

200 In this study, two out of thirty-four (2/34) cloacal swabs were positive for H5N8 subtype
201 which were collected from four Egyptian governorates (Giza, Menoufia, Gharbia, and
202 Dakahlia) during 2019. These two samples were negative for both H5N1 and H9N2 subtypes
203 that are currently co-circulating in Egypt.

204 *3.2. Deduced Amino acids mutations analysis and Phylogeny*

205 The HA protein receptor-binding pocket of both wild bird origin H5N8 AIVs have
206 characteristic features of avian receptor-specific binding affinity Q222 and G224. The multi-
207 basic cleavage site motif (PLREKRRKR#GLF) in the HA proteins, characteristic for highly
208 pathogenic AIVs, were identified in the H5N8 viruses. Analysis of glycosylation sites N-XT/S
209 motif within the HA protein revealed that the two H5N8 isolates in this study carried six
210 potential glycosylation sites at positions 10, 23, 165, 286, 483 and 542 (H5 numbering after
211 removal of the sequence encoding the signal peptide) similar to recently detected H5N8 viruses
212 in poultry [16]. These N-linked glycosylation sites play an important role in the receptor-

213 binding specificity which can affect or alter the antigenic sites on the HA protein leading to
214 evolution of escape mutant strains.

215 Phylogenetic analysis of HA gene sequences revealed that Cattle
216 egret/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 and Teal/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 viruses are clustered within the same
217 genotype (Gt-5) of clade 2.3.4.4b, along with the Egyptian viruses recently detected from
218 commercial chicken (Fig 2). Hassan et al. [20] have reported that Gt-5 have emerged since
219 2017 and circulated only in poultry while our results confirmed the circulation of this genotype
220 within the wild birds.

221 *3.3. Comparative Pathogenicity between Wild bird and Chicken origin H5N8 strains*

222 In order to assess the potential impact of spillover of wild bird H5N8 viruses to poultry, it
223 is imperative to investigate the infectious nature of isolates that were originated from non-
224 chicken hosts and clustered within the H5N8 isolates from commercial chickens. For the
225 inoculation experiment, mortality rate of the inoculated group with chicken H5N8 isolate was
226 100% (10/10) by day 7 dpi while its contact group was 100% (10/10) by day 14 dpi (Figure 3)
227 which is statistically significant. However, the mortality rate of the inoculated group with cattle
228 egret H5N8 isolate was 100% (10/10) by day 10 dpi while its contact group was 90% (9/10)
229 by day 14 dpi (Fig 3); statistically significant. Clinical signs of H5N8 virus started to appear in
230 both inoculated groups on the 3rd day after virus inoculation with chicken origin H5N8 and on
231 day 5 post inoculation with cattle egret-origin H5N8 isolate suggesting that the wild bird origin
232 virus able to infect the chickens successfully. These clinical sings included depression,
233 anorexia, respiratory disorders, oculonasal discharge, swelling of combs and wattles. Although
234 severe clinical signs were more often observed in chickens inoculated with the chicken origin
235 H5N8 isolate, the disease outcome was observed on day 3 dpi in both inoculated groups and
236 was associated with the post-mortem lesions as congestion and inflammation of the trachea
237 and lungs.

238 Our results revealed the direct correlation between high degree of virus shedding and level
239 of transmissibility among chickens, which were 100% for chicken isolate and 90% for cattle
240 egret isolate. Various tissues were collected from dead contact chickens that contained typical
241 necropsy lesions that were absent in the mock-infected negative control group. Our results
242 indicated that the H5N8 viruses are highly virulent, chicken-to-chicken transmissibility is high
243 in case of spillover.

244 3.4. Comparative Virus shedding and Histopathological investigations

245 Cloacal and oropharyngeal swabs were collected on alternate days until the end of the
246 experiment. Viral shedding in cloacal and oropharyngeal swabs was observed for both
247 inoculated groups on day 3 dpi, however, slight (non-significant) increase in virus shedding
248 was noticed in the inoculated group with chicken H5N8 compared to cattle egret H5N8 isolate
249 (Figure 4A and 4B). Meanwhile, virus shedding was detected in contact chickens of both
250 inoculated groups and there was a slight increase in virus shedding in the contact group for
251 chicken H5N8 compared to contact group for cattle egret H5N8 which is non-statistically
252 significant and reached approximately the same titers on day 14 dpi (Fig 4A and 4B).

253 Severe histopathological alterations were observed in all internal organs in contact group
254 of chicken H5N8 isolate in compare to wild bird origin H5N8 that might be the wild bird origin
255 virus need additional time or further passage for adaptation to the poultry (Table 2). Trachea
256 revealed focal necrosis of lamina epithelialis, edema in the lamina propria/ submucoas layer
257 while lungs showed congestion of blood vessels, focal pulmonary hemorrhage, pneumonia
258 characterized by infiltration of the air capillaries with inflammatory exudate (mainly
259 mononuclear inflammatory cells) as well as focal pulmonary emphysema. Likewise, marked
260 fibrinoid necrosis and lymphocytic necrosis and depletion were observed in the spleen. Caecal
261 tonsils exhibited massive infiltration of the lamina propria with heterophils, with lymphocytic
262 necrosis and depletion. In the liver, we observed Kupfer cell activation, dissociation of hepatic
263 plates, cytoplasmic vacuolization of hepatocytes, and focal hepatic necrosis and apoptosis with
264 infiltration by inflammatory cells, hyperplasia of the biliary epithelium, and fibroplasia in the
265 portal triad (Fig 5).

266 4. Discussion

267 Wild birds are considered the natural reservoirs and the mixing vessel for avian influenza
268 viruses, which play an important role in the viral diversity through generating novel
269 reassortants [36- 38]. Previous studies have reported that circulating H5 and H7 LPAI viruses
270 in gallinaceous poultry (chickens, turkeys, quail, etc.) could be able to mutate to produce highly
271 pathogenic avian influenza viruses that can cause severe systemic disease and high mortality
272 in gallinaceous poultry and are typically easily transmissible among [39].

273 Due to the ability of clade 2.3.4.4 viruses to reassort, a variety of different genotypes and
274 subtypes has been emerged during their spread from Asia to Europe and Africa [6, 7]. The key
275 mechanisms for the continuous evolution of new subtypes and genotypes of avian influenza

276 viruses are underlined by the aggregation of random mutations and genes reassortment [28].
277 Recently, HPAI H5N8 viruses have been involved in multiple independent reassortment events
278 with other AIV subtypes, with variable genetic diversity at the subclade level; have been
279 reported from several Middle East, European and Asian countries [6, 7, 9, 11, 12]. Therefore,
280 tracking and characterization of emerging influenza viruses in wild birds and commercial
281 poultry is a plausible approach to track their zoonotic potential. The first HPAI H5N8 outbreak
282 in Egypt was detected in wild birds, which had a closer genetic relatedness to European viruses
283 circulating at that time [11]. Therefore, the influenza epidemiological situation in Egypt
284 became complicated especially with the co-circulation of both HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.2.1.2,
285 clade 2.2.1.1 and LPAIV H9N2 among different poultry species [40, 41].

286 Previous studies reported that Egyptian H5N8 AIVs of clade 2.3.4.4b can be diversified
287 into at least 5 genotypes (Gt1- Gt5) [20]. Interestingly, Gt-3 and -4 bear gene fragments of their
288 genome that were closely similar to those in LPAIV H7N9 and H7N3 and H3N6 viruses or
289 concurrently in Egyptian wild birds [12, 16, 19, 20]. Moreover, it was thought that reassortant
290 avian influenza viruses have been developed, adapted, and gained dominance over the
291 previously circulating genotypes in the Egyptian poultry flocks as a result of unknown selective
292 gain [21]. The role of the genetic makeup of wild bird origin influenza viruses in pathobiology
293 remains unclear. Here, to assess the potential role of wild birds in disseminating HPAI viruses
294 compare to poultry H5N8 isolate, we compared the pathogenicity, viral shedding patterns, and
295 transmissibility of wild bird-origin H5N8 HPAI virus of clade 2.3.4.4 in chickens. Although
296 data are limited, some H5/H7 HPAI viruses can adapt to Gallinaceous species and less likely
297 cause disease in wild birds [42, 43]. Analysis of the deduced residues at the cleavage site of
298 characterized isolates in the current study and previously reported isolates from Egypt [12- 21].

299 Our previous studies demonstrated the importance of wild birds not only for introducing
300 the influenza viruses but also other avian respiratory viruses [44]. Furthermore, comparative
301 analysis of functional domains of HA proteins of studied isolates highlight evolutionary
302 constrains on the HA protein especially as there are no vaccination programs against H5N8 in
303 the Egyptian poultry industry until now. Only vaccination against H5N1 and H9N2 AIVs are
304 being practiced in the country. Previous findings showed that most of the available commercial
305 poultry H5 vaccines used among the Egyptian poultry industry were ineffective against
306 challenge with H5N8 viruses because of the genetic difference between the seed viruses in
307 those vaccines and the H5N8 viruses currently circulating in Egypt [45]. Likewise, the genetic
308 diversity and low reactions between Egypt's H5 commercial vaccines and current H5N8 viruses

309 show that the vaccines might not be successful in the field, or only implement partial safety,
310 and thus may lead to escape mutant strains induced by vaccines.

311 Taken together, nucleotide and subsequent amino acid substitutions explained the evolving
312 nature of RNA viruses [46], especially influenza viruses that warrant future investigation to
313 delineate the importance of these mutations in the pathobiology of these viruses especially in
314 the wild birds-driven potential spillover events. Phylogenetic analysis of the full-length HA
315 gene of two wild bird-originated H5N8 AIVs (A/Cattle egret/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 and
316 A/Teal/Egypt/VRLCU/2019) revealed close relationships to Gt-5 of clade 2.3.4.4b, which is
317 predominantly circulating among the Egyptian poultry sectors since 2017 [20] and were found
318 to be closely related to isolates recently reported from Egyptian commercial chickens. These
319 results highlight the risk of H5N8 AIVs transmission among different avian hosts especially
320 with the high reporting cases of H5N8 compare to H5N1 and H9N2 AIVs. Meanwhile, these
321 genetic and phylogenetic features of the HA genes propose the intercontinental dissemination
322 of HPAIV (H5N8) through wild birds and its potential introduction in the Egypt [12]. Cattle
323 egret is a native feral bird commonly seen in Egypt; therefore, we propose two possibilities for
324 infection of cattle egret with H5N8. Firstly, due to direct and/or indirect contact with other
325 infected wild bird with H5N8. Secondly, as a result with indirect contact with manure of
326 infected chickens.

327 The current study aims to assess the clinicopathological impact of two selected H5N8
328 isolates (chicken-origin and wild bird-origin) to properly evaluate the infectivity and
329 transmissibility of both isolates, including onset of clinical signs, mortality, virus shedding and
330 transmission to healthy chickens. The oculonasal route was used to induce infection within the
331 inoculated groups as a natural pathway of infection under field conditions [32]. We observed
332 sudden deaths in inoculated chickens, which was expected, with severe respiratory clinical
333 signs and sudden death which is characteristic for highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses
334 infection. Similar observations have been reported [47, 48] in immunologically naive birds
335 inoculated with H5N8 AIVs. Meanwhile, severe form of infection was observed in chickens
336 upon infection with chicken origin H5N8 compared to cattle egret origin H5N8. Although
337 severity of observed respiratory clinical signs was relatively less severe for Cattle
338 egret/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 isolate than chicken/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 isolate, the morbidity,
339 mortality rates and virus shedding were comparable between these groups. Mortality rate for
340 the inoculated group with chicken H5N8 isolate was 100% by day 7 dpi while its contact group
341 was 100% by day 14 dpi. However, complete death (100%) for the inoculated group with cattle

342 egret H5N8 isolate by day 10 dpi was noticed compared to 90% in the contact group by day 14
343 dpi.

344 Viral titers in oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs elucidated the aforementioned
345 pathogenicity variation of the two isolates and coincided with their replication in the respiratory
346 and intestinal tracts. Viral shedding was detected in both cloacal and oropharyngeal swabs from
347 inoculated and contact groups of cattle egret H5N8 on day 3 post infection, which indicate the
348 ability of wild bird-origin H5N8 virus to replicate efficiently in chickens.

349 **5. Conclusions**

350 The generated data in our study can be informative for AIV control strategies for the
351 Egyptian administrative authorities. Our study demonstrates the genetic characterization of
352 H5N8 viruses in cattle egret and teal birds with high similarity. Both isolate clustered with
353 previously characterized H5N8 viruses from both Egyptian wild birds and commercial poultry.
354 In addition, our findings confirmed the possibility for transmission of cattle egret origin H5N8
355 virus to chicken that might be helpful to improve the prevention strategies. Continuous disease
356 monitoring, surveillance and subsequent genome-based characterization are essential to assess
357 the spillover events. While vaccines are key elements for influenza control, these require
358 frequent evaluation and upgradation. Therefore, an assessment of coverage and efficacy of
359 different vaccines and or vaccination policy in the field conditions should be reconsidered
360 along with strict biosecurity measures.

361 To recapitulate, existing disease surveillance and control strategies could be revised in
362 disease-endemic settings. It is also government and public duty to disseminate information and
363 legislation regarding the safe care of both domestic and natural animals in order to minimize
364 bird-to-human transmission. It is advisable to embrace scenario in case of spillover over of
365 H5N8 AIVs from wild birds to commercial poultry and reverse spillover possibility from
366 commercial poultry to wild birds, which will help in preparing a comprehensive plan focusing
367 on increased surveillance and the actions to be taken to prevent its spread.

368

369 **Declaration of Competing Interest**

370 The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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
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580 **Figure captions:**

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583 **Fig 1.** Experimental plan for the assessment of virus infectivity and transmission in chickens.

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
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592 **Fig 2.** Phylogenetic analysis of studied isolates and their clustering patterns with representative
 593 avian influenza clades. Full length HA gene based phylogenetic analysis of two wild bird origin
 594 H5N8 isolates with representative strains of clade 2.3.4.4b currently circulating in Egypt. The
 595 reported isolates clustered within Gt-5 of clade 2.3.4.4b with close relationship with the recent
 596 characterized strains from Egyptian commercial poultry and wild birds.

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
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
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606 **Fig 3.** Percentage survival rates of negative control group, infected group with cattle egret
607 isolate and its contact group compared to infected group with chicken origin H5N8 and its
608 contact group.

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
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611 **Fig 4.** Infectivity, and Evaluation of viral shedding from A) oropharyngeal and B) cloacal
612 swabs for chickens inoculated with Cattle egret/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 and
613 chicken/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 H5N8 viruses. Each data point represents the virus titers

614 detected in oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs on day 0, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 14 after virus
615 inoculation. Bars represent the standard deviation mean.

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619 **Fig 5.** Microscopic examination of different tissues collected from chicken inoculated with
620 Cattle egret/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 and chicken/Egypt/VRLCU/2019 isolates. Arrows
621 indicate lesions in the affected tissues. (A,B,C,D,E and F) Histology of normal tissues:
622 lung, trachea, spleen, liver and caecal tonsil collected from the mock-infected group.
623 (F,G,H,I and J) Histopathological lesions in chicken tissues inoculated with cattle egret
624 isolate. (K,L,M,N and O) histopathological lesions in different tissues collected from
625 chickens which were inoculated with chicken isolate.

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