Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points – an experimental investigation

Sitzia, Stefania and Zheng, Jiwei (2019) Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points – an experimental investigation. Games and Economic Behavior, 117. pp. 461-478. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

This paper reports an experimental investigation of Schelling's theory of focal points that compares group and individual behaviour. We find that, when players' interests are perfectly aligned, groups more often choose the salient option and achieve higher coordination success than individuals. However, in games with conflicts of interest, groups do not always perform better than individuals, especially when the degree of conflict is substantial. We also find that groups outperform individuals when identifying the solution to the coordination problem requires some level of cognitive sophistication. Finally, players that successfully identify the solution to this game also achieve greater coordination rates than other players in games with a low degree of conflict. This result raises the question of whether finding the focal point is more a matter of logic rather than imagination as Schelling argued.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Games and Economic Behavior
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
ID Code:
148024
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
08 Oct 2020 12:00
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
20 Oct 2020 08:47