The acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems:a choice-based approach

Bouacida, Elias and Foucart, Renaud (2020) The acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems:a choice-based approach. Working Paper. Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

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Abstract

We report the results of two experiments on the social acceptability of random devices in allocation mechanisms. A majority of subjects do not opt for a lottery if they can rationalize an alternative mechanism as non-random. It is, however, possible to design a payoff-equivalent mechanism to the lottery that is more acceptable. Our results shed light on the real-world reliance on obscure criteria in allocation problems where lotteries seem to be simpler and more efficient.

Item Type:
Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects:
ID Code:
145978
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2020 14:30
Refereed?:
No
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
17 Sep 2020 23:53