The concept of disorder revisited : Robustly value-laden despite change

Cooper, Rachel (2020) The concept of disorder revisited : Robustly value-laden despite change. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 94 (1). pp. 141-161. ISSN 0309-7013

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Our concept of disorder is changing. This causes problems for projects of descriptive conceptual analysis. Conceptual change means that a criterion that was necessary for a condition to be a disorder at one time may cease to be necessary a relatively short time later. Nevertheless, some conceptually-based claims will be fairly robust. In particular, the claim that no adequate account of disorder can appeal only to biological facts can be maintained for the foreseeable future. This is because our current concept of disorder continues to be laden with ethical and political values in multiple different ways.

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Journal Article
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Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
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This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Rachel Cooper, The Concept of Disorder Revisited: Robustly Value-Laden Despite Change, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 94, Issue 1, July 2020, Pages 141–161 is available online at:
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05 May 2020 09:35
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20 Feb 2024 00:53