Incumbency and Distributive Politics:Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico

Abbott, Andrew James and Cabral, René and Jones, Philip (2017) Incumbency and Distributive Politics:Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico. Southern Economic Journal, 84 (2). pp. 484-503. ISSN 0038-4038

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Abstract

In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Southern Economic Journal
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
Departments:
ID Code:
140445
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
17 Jan 2020 09:10
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
19 Aug 2020 05:59