

# **The Future of Community and Values**

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## **Executive summary**

This paper examines the future of community and values for 2050 in three areas: likely trends, probable trends, and possible outcomes. It evaluates current and emergent patterns, in particular the overarching shifts toward a more individualised society; the use of digital technology as both enabler and inhibitor of participation in wider society; and the rise in socio-spatial inequalities and the empowering responses to those inequalities.

In order to generate new insights and establish a wider understanding of the implications of and for communities and values out to 2050, our paper sets out a novel way of examining key trends and patterns through five stages. First, we introduce a matrix that enables us to identify examples of communities across their different states (i.e. formation, movement, preservation, dissolution) in relation to core characteristics of communities (i.e. access, place, power, security). Secondly, we use a wide range of different examples of communities to populate this matrix to illustrate the complex interrelationships of the different types, their values, and scale of influence. Thirdly, having examined these examples through business as usual scenarios, we then use a speculative mode to explore radical alternatives based on the evidence collected to understand the challenges, barriers, risks and threats that may face the future of communities and values out to 2050. These scenarios are described in order to explain the way events might unfold and in doing so, enable us to understand what guidance and actions may need to be followed to direct us toward a desirable future. Fourthly, we then use an analytical mode to examine evidence that enables assessment of the underlying changes informing risks and threats (i.e. who we are, what we will do, why we will do it). Finally, we compare these two modes to understand how the future of community and values might change over the next 30 years.

## **Futures research**

As Ki-Moon (2014) has observed, one of the key issues facing governance and security of post-2015 development agenda is that “people across the world are looking ... (for) a truly transformative agenda that is both universal and adaptable.... Their voices have underscored the need for democracy, rule of law, civic space and more effective governance and capable institutions...” Prior to examining the core subjects under investigation in this report, this section provides a short critical review of future studies, foresight and scenario methods, and their relevance in understanding and discussing the future of community and values. The uneven set of environmental, economic and political conditions across different territories also means that the methods and implications for foresight and understanding trends varies (UNDP, 2014). However, we present here a fresh perspective for understanding futures and enabling scenario formulation to examine possible alternatives.

In particular, the main purpose of this section is to provide a rationale for the approach that we adopted for compiling this report. In this approach, trends and forecasts are not accepted as blueprints of what lies ahead (Dator, 2007), but as starting point for exploratory discussions aimed at highlighting possible and unlikely alternatives, how these might come to be, and what implications and frictions might they involve for the future of communities and values.

### **1. Futures**

Firstly, it is important to understand how “futures” are conceptualised in the field of future studies. The way in which futures are looked at has in fact a defining influence on how futures are researched (and therefore on approaches and methods of future studies). The most radical shift in the way futures are understood took place when historical circumstances largely influenced by human agency (rather than divine plans) came to be acknowledged as the main factor shaping the way in which both individual and social futures may unfold (Robinson, 2003; Adam, 2010; Urry, 2016). At the same time, complexity theories developed from the 1970s demonstrated that that when dealing with social adaptive systems such as cities, communities, ecosystems, and so on, it is difficult, and often impossible, to predict the future outcomes of actions and decisions that are taken in the present (Lewin, 1999; Gell-Mann, 1995). From such theories, social sciences adopted the idea of futures as sets of emerging alternatives, rather than unfolding along linear pathways (Urry, 2016).

Within this context, several authors have attempted to define futures and their characteristics. Many scholars have provided definitions and laws of the future informed by its uncertain and complex nature (see for example Amara 1981; Bell 2002; Rescher 1998). The main characteristics of these definitions are summarised in Glenn's list of commonly accepted philosophical assumptions about the future (2003):

1. You cannot know the future, but a range of possible futures can be known;
2. The likelihood of a future event or condition can be changed by policy, and policy consequences can be forecasted;
3. Gradations of foreknowledge and probabilities can be made; we can be more certain about the sunrise than about the rise of the stock market;

4. No single method should be trusted; hence, cross referencing methods improves foresight;
5. Humans will have more influence on the future than they did in the past.

Unpredictability is the common feature of all definitions of the future. For this reason, most anticipatory approaches currently focus on the idea of “alternative futures”.

Henchley (1978) identified four classes of futures:

- Possible Futures: all the futures that we can imagine might happen, no matter how unlikely;
- Plausible Futures: all the futures that could happen according to today's current knowledge;
- Probable Futures: the futures that we think are more likely to happen, based on our understanding of how current trends could continue;
- Preferable Futures: the futures that one would like to happen.

To this list, Voros (2003) adds:

- Potential Futures: all of the alternative futures, including those that are beyond the power of imagination.

As a way of visualising the complexity of understanding the future, this way of classifying the future shows that outcomes that appear to be unfathomable are worth of being discussed, if there is an even remote possibility of them becoming reality.

While being problematic in their deterministic assumptions (as it will be discussed in the following section), these categories are indicative of the probabilistic (Robinson, 2003) approach that guided the development of a dedicated field of research: the transdisciplinary field of future studies.

### **3. Futures studies**

Futures Studies can be defined as the discourse concerned with the systematic and semi-structured examination of future potentials and possibilities (Spies, 1982; Schwartz, 1996; Sardar, 2010) through the use of scientific methods and processes (Son 2015).

The field of future studies emerged with the intention of developing tools and techniques for supporting the setting of long-term strategies, and guide decision-making by creating probabilistic models of possible futures. Crucially, many scholars have argued that future studies is not concerned with predicting “the future” as a single entity (Sardar, 2010), but with challenging plans and expectations through “what if” questions that are formulated in the form of scenarios (Slaughter, 2002; Schwartz, 1996). Both foresight and scenario methodologies have been widely adopted for grounding discussions on future strategies and decision-making, both in corporate and institutional settings. But while scenario-based discussions can result in the development of strategies that are flexible enough to respond to unexpected future developments (Schwartz, 1996), some authors warn us against the shortcomings of foresight methods.

Foresight is the strategic forward-looking analysis of socio-technical systems conducted for the purpose of identifying promising areas of research and development to plan investments (Son, 2015). It is a much used technique by companies and institutions, but criticised in the field of futures studies because it fails to make the standpoint of the research explicit and therefore is limited in capturing diversity and alternatives. It also

typically identifies futures that are preferable to the institution that commissioned the study. Sardar detects a tension between the way in which futures studies have been formulated (see the laws cited earlier for example) and the “intrinsically singular” nature of foresight methods that are employed for decision-making. Foresight is, for Sardar (2010), business-like and product-oriented. For this reason, and because of the wide range of possible futures that they can represent, scenarios are considered a more suitable method for considering a wider range of futures. Scenarios are plausible, challenging and relevant stories about how the future might unfold (Hunt et al., 2012), developed to inform strategies or to guide interventions (Börjeson et al., 2006). As a tool, they have been adopted by government think-tanks, business strategists, and by research institutes investigating global challenges. Unlike the futures emerging from foresight techniques, scenarios usually describe ranges of distinct futures, presented as easy-to-understand narratives leading to further discussions.

Adopting scenarios as a starting, rather than end point for strategic discussions, is a way of dealing with the uncertain and subjective nature of futures. Dator (2007) points out that while “the future” cannot be predicted (due to its uncertainty), “alternative futures” can and should be forecasted, analysed and discussed. These discussions should include “ridiculous” and unexpected ideas: “Because new technologies permit new behaviours and values, challenging old beliefs and values which are based on prior technologies, much that will be characteristic of the futures is initially novel and challenging. It typically seems at first obscene, impossible, stupid, “science fiction”, ridiculous. And then it becomes familiar and eventually “normal”” (Dator, 2007). Furthermore, as experiences and images of the past and the present shape the way in which futures are conceptualised (Sardar, 2010; Gonzatto, 2013), introducing scenarios as sites of discussions can also help with clarifying agendas, expectations, underlying values, and assumptions. Such assumptions refer both to what is considered preferable, but also what is probable, possible, or plausible since probabilistic models of futures are largely influenced by the tools and practices that generated them (Dator, 2007).

Finally, just like presents and pasts, futures will be evenly distributed. Probable, possible, plausible, and potential futures will coexist and will look very different to different communities and individuals (List, 2005; van der Heijden, 2005; Savransky and Rosengarten, 2017). This multiplicity of futures can be captured in scenarios that are structured in ways that makes it possible to open discussions that both include and consider heterogeneous groups of actors and contexts.

## **5. Understanding the future of communities and values**

This section has so far described futures as complex, heterogeneous, and unfolding through non-linear trajectories. It has suggested the existence of the paradox of needing to understand the possible consequence of decisions and actions while not being entirely able to predict what the future might look like. As a method, scenarios can assist us in capturing the complexity of the future, while enabling us to explore and understand a variety of possibilities. One of the roles that scenario-making activities can play is to enhance structured discussions. In such discussions values and expectations are made explicit and can be questioned, and the impacts and implications of each scenarios on different community can be explored. This report will reflect on the future of communities and values in the context of nine global challenges to society. Rather than relying on

trend analysis and foresight techniques for providing a forecast of the way in which different communities around the world might react to such challenges, we will suggest a framework for storytelling and world building.

The framework considers four states of communities ('formation', 'movement', 'preservation', 'dissolution/change') with four core characteristics of them ('access', 'place', 'power', 'security'). These states and characteristics will be used as narrative guidance for describing the future scenarios related to each societal challenge. The framework will be fully described in the next section. For each challenge we will initially present one possible "business as usual" (GSG, 1995) scenario. As part of this study, we intend to conduct a workshop in which participants will be asked to explore alternative scenarios, by building variations of the story presented in this report, and/or considering different communities. In this sense, this report is to be intended primarily as a tool for discussion, rather than an answer to the question of the future of communities and value.

## Structure and themes

This report examines the key 'states' of community i.e.: their formation, movement, preservation, and dissolution. For the context of this work, values are understood to be intrinsic to any community so this enables the states to also be explored through how and why values contribute to the building of a community, how and why a community and/or its values may travel, how and why values of a community are preserved, and, where applicable, how and why values and/or a community perishes.

To aid the understanding of these states, we then explore them in relation to four core characteristics: access, place, power, and security. For the purposes of this report, a definition for each of these themes follows.

- Access in this context is understood as the ways in which a community admits its constituents and their interactions within it.
- Place here is defined as the contextual boundaries of the community's operation, geographic or otherwise.
- Power refers to the organisation of the community, whether explicit or implicit, and any attendant notions of structure, hierarchy, management, and protocol.
- Security is understood here as the ways in which a community controls itself and protects its values from others where risk or threats are perceived or identified.

In order to illustrate emergent and established trends and patterns across different states of community and these core characteristics, we use nine issues to enable the breadth and depth of the future of community and values out to 2050 to be assiduously connected to the evidence gathered for this report. These nine issues have been initially identified using meta-analysis of global trends and futures thinking and are as follows:

1. Climate change
2. Food and water security
3. Health and wellbeing
4. Urbanisation
5. Work
6. Housing
7. Identity
8. Diversity
9. Migration

We acknowledge the matrix generated for this work is our design and is deliberately flexible and not absolute. This directly correlates to the considerable difficulty of defining both 'community' and 'value' in an increasingly complex, fluid, interconnected, and rapidly changing world. As such, we use the nine different themes as a vehicle to unpack different types, scales and values of communities. This provides a dual function. Firstly, it enables us to inhabit the matrix so that we are able to communicate the ways in which communities are created, evolve, transfer and sometimes perish. Secondly, it also affords us the opportunity to construct plausible scenarios based on probable developments whereby the world largely continues 'business as usual'. The advantage of these functions is that it supports critical evaluation and speculation of radical alternatives in relation to what we might understand as being a conventional future i.e. a comparatively steady continuation of the various communities and values we currently

identify around the globe. Through this synthesis, the construction of three potential future worlds: conventional, barbarous, and great transition, provides a platform across which we are able to identify signifiers as to how and why events may unfold in the future and therefore have a greater understanding of what actions may be necessary to promote or prohibit their development as appropriate.

## **The four states**

In this section we introduce the four states of community across which different groups that share or have certain attitudes and values in common may experience depending on the nature, context and conditions affecting them. Communities exist for different lifespans and various scales. We therefore examine how they are formed, move, preserved or dissolve depending on their features and contexts.

### **1. Community Formation**

The first state of a community is its creation. How and why a specific community comes into being can be for a number of different, sometimes intersecting, purposes.

Communities may be typically focused around a particular interest, practice or socio-spatial context. Clearly different communities form for different reasons but there has to be a shared value or set of values by its members for it to be defined as such.

### **2. Community Movement**

Communities are not necessarily static or fixed geographically. Importantly, they may be poly-nucleic or have a number of constituent groups that are connected. In this manner, the values of a community may be dispersed across a network that connects multiple locations. A community may move physically, i.e. the geographic mobilisation of its members to another location, or its values may be transferred to a separate context. The latter situation may result in stability, increase or decrease of the community's size and influence.

### **3. Community Preservation**

One of the most important ways in which a community defines itself is through the shared values of its members. Of course, such values are not necessarily supported or shared by others outside of a specific community. This renders many communities with the need to protect or sustain certain values intrinsic to their group indeed it may lead to their initial formation. Preservation of values through a community raises important issues since the promotion or maintenance of particular attitudes and values usually correlated with the implicit or explicit occlusion or disavowal of others.

### **4. Community Dissolution**

Communities may exist for different lifespans or across various timeframes. A community's purpose may be around a specific issue that once addressed leads to the dispersal of that group. Other communities may be broken up through violence and or opposition, degenerate through fragmentation, or lose momentum through inertia. The strength or fragility of a community relates to its members' ability to sustain its values against competing interests or serious threats to it.

### **Core Characteristics**

To provide a better understanding of these states, they are illustrated in relation to four core characteristics: access, place, power, and security. Access in this context is understood as the ways in which a community admits its constituents and their interactions within it. Place here is defined as the contextual boundaries of the community's operation, geographic or otherwise. Power refers to the organisation of the community, whether explicit or implicit, and any attendant notions of structure, hierarchy,

management, and protocol. Security is understood here as the ways in which a community controls itself and protects its values from others where risk or threats are perceived or identified. Through illustrating how these core characteristics of communities relate to the different potential states using specific examples, we aim to demonstrate the connections in future-oriented thinking about communities and values and provide a synthesis of the detected key trends and patterns. These are then brought together through three future world scenarios to afford more nuanced understanding of how events might unfold and in doing so, allow us to speculate what guidance and actions may need to be followed to direct us toward outcomes that are desirable.

## **Challenges to society**

This section provides the context for community and values in relation to wider issues facing society within a multi-disciplinary discourse, along with any relevant definitions used. Drawing from a wide array of futures-orientated literature, we have selected nine pertinent themes across which we will describe a range of futures that may shape and affect communities and values out to 2050. Each of these nine themes will subsequently be unpacked in relation to the different states of community (i.e. formation, movement, preservation, dissolution) and explore how these relate, in multi-various ways, to four core characteristics of communities (i.e. access, place, power, security). In doing so, we aim to be able to illustrate the complexity and diversity of interrelationships between communities and values. Through the synthesis of these themes we then examine the three future worlds to identify potential trajectories concerning the challenges, barriers, risks and threats that may face the future of communities and values out to 2050.

### **1. Climate Change**

Perhaps the single most significant challenge to humanity is climate change. The effects of climate change are predicted to have long-term implications for the global population, with a wide range of consequences differing from location to location but are likely to include: drought, flooding, higher temperatures, more frequent and extreme weather events, and shifting seasons.

### **2. Food and water security**

By 2050, the world's population is projected to have grown to around 9 billion. The majority of these people are expected to live in developing countries and have higher incomes than is currently the case which directly correlates with an increased demand for food and potable water. The IFRI's policy report, *Climate Change: Impact on Agriculture and Costs of Adaptation*, used climate modelling expertise to analyse crop growth under two simulated future climate scenarios. Gappolin (2012) illustrates the key drivers and causal links affecting water stress and sustainability and human wellbeing through five scenarios to draw out various future trajectories.

### **3. Health and wellbeing**

The environment is critical in forming and understanding communities and their values. For example, places may provide safety and secure access to a range of resources essential to human life and thus important for health and wellbeing. The implications of changing communities and values for the

### **4. Urbanisation**

Increased urbanisation around the world and general trends of migration toward cities indicate they will have an important role in the future. In terms of challenges to society, cities provide the primary context within which many different agglomerations of issues come together. Cities are often the underlying nexus across which various communities establish, assert, contest and reconfigure their values. They are necessarily places of complexity, with multiple interactions and significant diversity of communities typically being key features of them. Although a global phenomenon, the process of urbanisation performs differently in terms of the scale, speed and resulting built environment depending on the geographic context. Urbanisation has a symbiotic relationship with

those areas that are rural or not urban since its processes require material resources, labour, energy and food production that are typically drawn from this wider context, if not across various national and international borders.

## **5. Work**

Fundamental tenets that may inform communities and their values are related to how they live, their work and its patterns, and housing conditions. How people live, where they work and which type of accommodation they inhabit, if any, are important drivers to the relationships they form as part of *communities of proximity* i.e. those communities that are primarily a result of physical locations and the routines and behaviours that occur within them. In terms of work, the future of the nature of work appears to be precarious for a growing number of people. The rise of zero-hour contracts, the gig economy, and other temporary or even precarious forms of work means that the previously held routines related to places of work, regular shift patterns, and comparatively stable workforces are being eroded.

## **6. Housing**

With regard housing, in the UK the pressure to provide affordable housing continues as market forces and investment shape patterns of tenure, purchase and dispossession. The widespread growth of 'individual collectivism' (Bernheimer, 2014), wherein young people are either deferring or declining family formation is leading to significant changes in the demands of housing and living patterns more broadly. There are several key shifts: mega/micro commuting patterns, the decrease in dormitory suburbs, and reformulation of housing ladders. Commuting patterns have evolved to relative extremes with either extensive or minimal travel to places of work. This has led to people commuting longer distances but also working from home or other proximate places more frequently. In correlation with the latter, the blurring of living and working spaces has meant the decline in dormitory suburbs. The shrinking of dedicated space per person in offices has been parallel to a growth in space per person in the dwelling, reflecting to some extent the shift of work activity into the home. What is less clear at present is how these two dominant patterns will influence and reshape housing ladders. Housing need is typically discussed at the national level, yet housing markets are more deeply defined by the local context of supply and demand.

## **7. Identity**

Identity in the UK and elsewhere is changing. Out to 2050, the transformations to people's identities are likely to be significant, affected by key drivers of change especially the rapid pace of technological developments. The emergence of hyper-connectivity, widespread growth of social media, and the increase in online personal information are key factors which will influence identities which in turn shapes the type of communities that will form and how and why they will develop. In 2013, Foresight Future Identities identified three significant findings for the future of identity: hyper-connectivity; increasing social plurality; and the blurring of public and private identities. The first of these indicates that developments in social and technological environments will combine to exert significant influence on people's identity. Greater social plurality or heterogeneity in UK society is reducing the norms to which people conform in their behaviour or views whilst their world-views typically become more diverse. Attitudes toward privacy are also shifting, with people increasingly willing to place personal information into public

domains, for example via social media, which is creating a convergence between formerly private and public identities.

## **8. Diversity**

Closely related to and, to some extent, bound up in various notions of identity in the wider context is the theme of diversity. The increasing diversity of the UK's population means that dual ethnic and national identities will continue to become more common, while the gradual trends toward a more secular society seem very likely to continue over the next few decades. Of course, this outlook belies the various challenges that may arise as a result of radically different viewpoints and beliefs, which with increasing diversity of population may result in competing issues within communities and witness the emergence of radically alternative values outside of mainstream society.

## **9. Migration**

The movement of people for various reasons including climate change, conflict, political unrest, and disasters is expected to continue. Climate change is expected to prompt growing population movements within and across borders, as a result of extreme weather events, sea-level rise and acceleration of environmental degradation. Furthermore, climate change will have adverse consequences for livelihoods, public health, food security, and water availability. This in turn will impact on human mobility, likely leading to a substantial rise in the scale of migration and displacement. These key drivers for movement of people will also be supplemented by those looking for better prospects across a spectrum of issues including but not limited to: employment opportunities, cohesive social structures and housing conditions.

## **Example 1: Food and water security in relation to community formation**

Meeting the demands for safe food and water necessary to sustain 9 billion people (the size of global population expected by the middle of the century) is one of the most pressing challenges of our time. If business stays as usual, the increase in population and the expected increase in overall wealth will bring about a significant increase in the overall demand of processed food, meat, fish, and dairy that will add an enormous pressure on the food production system. The situation will be exacerbated by the threats of climate change and the growing competition for resources (Godfray et al., 2010). It follows that a major shift in food production and consumption paradigms is needed if the goal is to ensure food and water security at a global scale (Davis et al., 2016). To address this challenge, the “Western diet” will be forced to radically change. But, as food is related to many more factors than the simple consumption of calories for producing energy, a significant change in eating habits can only emerge from a change in value systems.

The scenario described in this section presents a situation in which National Governments react to the looming scarcity of resources by changing food cultures through exerting direct control on what children in the education system eat. This constitutes not only a short-term systemic response to an immediate crisis, but also, and most significantly, a long-term strategy of reshaping values and redirecting practices. It is in fact proven that children eating habits are directly related to eating habits in adulthood (Mikkila et al., 2004), and that familiarising children with new foods and flavours through sensory education can increase the variety in their diet later on (Mustonen and Tuorila, 2010; Sandell et al., 2016).

In relation to access, children in school systems will be the first to experience new, enhanced, resource-efficient foodstuff. Innovation will interest the producers of both crops and processed food. The latter will be increasingly entirely man-made, and will make wide use of lab-grown proteins, flavoured fungi, and synthetic supplements. Once these new flavours and shapes are accepted as the norm by school-kids, they will start to get adopted in family meals. The relationship to place will be defined as new practices of eating will be diffused initially in school canteens, which will become sites of food and sensorial education. Once the acceptability of new foodstuff is assessed, and new eating practices are established in school, new products and packaging will be distributed more widely, starting with targeting the ready-meal sector, traditionally more prone to innovate. Vending machines, take-away shops, and corner stores will be at the forefront of innovation. The power of multinational corporations such as McCain and Monsanto will extend the control that they have come to exercise on the current agricultural system to new seeds and crops. Large consumer good corporations that include food divisions (e.g. Unilever, Procter and Gamble etc.) will extend their control to new synthetic substances and foodstuff. The private sector will then work in partnership with national governmental organisation and international bodies to develop educational and food-adaptation programmes developed for schools. Issues concerning security will, in this example, be focused upon a sensory education programme (Mustonen and Tuorila, 2010) will be implemented as a soft form of indirect control. These programmes will be closely monitored, so that global diet and new foodstuff will co-evolve in time.

## **Example 2: Migration in relation to community movement**

In this second example, we examine the challenge of migration in relation to community movement and the four core characteristics. In terms of access, as countries around the world lurch politically to the right in the midst of rising nationalist sentiments, policies are being drafted that more vehemently restrict who can migrate to their lands. Migrant communities with capital, promise and the 'right' nationality will be allowed to enter; those without money, the relevant skills or who come from countries on watch lists will receive travel bans, regardless of their situation. With regard place and boundaries, migrants from Africa and the Middle East, wishing to enter Western European countries, continue to be placed in migrant centres or camps, like in Calais, which are poorly planned and prone to hazards. The camps often do not have proper sanitation and waste facilities, creating environmental waste and opportunities for airborne pathogens to spread among the migrant communities forced to live there until they are moved on.

Power and organisation in relation to migration is a complex interrelationship between basic human needs and the various competing forces seeking to provide them across a public-private axis. The power within companies that typically profit from natural or human-made disasters, such as during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, are turning to 'migrant capitalism' to make a quick buck. Through the increasing privatisation of 'migrant care' as a way of easing the burden faced by aid organisations, multinational companies are creating agile teams to visit immigrants all over the world to ply their brand of help, which usually involves paying lots of money for little, effective assistance. The security and control issues coalescing around migration issues are increasingly prominent as their impact upon other global challenges becomes further apparent. With border security between countries becoming tighter, more and more specific migrant communities (e.g., Mexican men and women in the US) have to maintain a precarious, bi-national lifestyle: migrants must go back to their home countries throughout the year and hope that policies, legislation and the moods of border control guards do not change in ways that will negatively affect their potential to earn money, have a better quality of life and move relatively freely.

## **Example 3: Identity in relation to community preservation**

An important aspect of identity within a community is the sense of belonging. In order for a community to flourish, there is typically a set of shared values through which agreement is founded and bonding is developed. For the continuation of a community and its interests and/or practices, there is nearly always an element of preservation. This characteristic ensures that the community and its constituents' original purpose within it both endure. However, whilst there are benefits to the preservation of values and their respective communities there can also be significant disadvantages. Preservation may result in certain communities being viewed as outmoded and questioned or challenged through competing communities with alternative values. The promotion and sustaining of a value set also means that other values are deliberately excluded or hidden which may directly shape the size and accessibility into a particular community. The preservation of identity in an increasingly fluid and rapidly changing world can be challenging. Although the blurring of private and public identities on the one hand encourages convergence,

the prevalence of digital technologies may also result in membership of many different communities, unbounded by geography, and as such there may be numerous identities of an individual. The EU Referendum result of 24 June 2016 reflected the conflicting opinions and attitudes toward identity in the UK. Although the campaigns for either leaving or remaining in the European Union were based on a series of issues, a core argument to both sides was related to identity and notions of 'Britishness'. Central to either side's position on this was the respective pros and cons of immigration, closely bound up in the diversity of the nation.

In relation to access and interactions within a community, identities influence people's behaviour, though they are not necessarily predictable, especially at the level of the individual (Foresight Future Identities, 2013). The role of online communities and identity within them has enabled like-minded individuals and groups to form collectives in order to sustain preserve their values. However, not everyone has access to digital technologies to facilitate these interactions resulting in disparity between those communities who are enabled to flourish and maintain their values on the one hand, and those who are unable to preserve their identities on the other. Significant socio-economic deprivation may lead to exclusion and isolation, meaning that certain values are not promoted and ultimately unpreserved. People have strong attachments to places, which become integral to their identity and, importantly in this context, are strongly connected to their sense of belonging and security (Fresque-Baxter and Armitage, 2012). Despite the increase of globalisation and typically mobilised and urbanised societies, this relationship with place is no less significant (Adger, 2011). The connection between identities and place is potentially important for the preservation of community values and citizenship. Changes to the built environment can therefore be anticipated to have direct impacts, both positive and negative, on place identities. Therefore, the problems within deprived areas can also be understood to impact upon identity. Communities seek to preserve their values amidst the broader environment and circumstances in which they live. This may lead to segregation either undertaken to preserve 'safe' areas or, indeed, to exclude those deemed undesirable. Gated communities are perhaps the most obvious physical manifestation of this preservation within the built environment. Although not a new phenomenon, they are strong indicators of increased and growing social inequality. Whilst they may preserve the values of a particular community, this is potentially at the expense of wider social exclusion.

The relationship between the power and organisation of a community and identity is typically understood through how we share, cooperate and form connections in the first instance. One of the key issues here, and indeed of political drivers more widely connected to identity, concerns trust. In the UK and elsewhere there has been a long-term trend of declining trust in figures of authority (Duffy et al., 2005). This situation has received considerable attention recently due to the burgeoning of communities via social media and the rise of 'fake news'. The ability on online communities to organise and influence others based on shared values and interests coupled with a growing mistrust in mainstream media is enabling certain communities to preserve their identities through strong and active presence through various social media channels and blogs. Whilst this is facilitating an apparent shift of power from traditional bodies, it is less clear to what degree this move is actually occurring or is illusory due to the way echo chambers of opinion function (Lotan, 2016). The security and control surrounding the preservation of

identity online is primarily based on the original ethos behind the internet and the widely held view that users typically do not read website terms and conditions or privacy statements before accepting them (Harper, 2014). The prevalence of personal and collective data has led to the internet becoming a valuable resource for crime including: identity theft, fraud, and facilitating terrorism (Cabinet Office, 2011). At a community and individual level, identity theft may enable a range of criminal purposes by exploiting existing trust in their identity and social capital to deceive others or, conversely, to bring them into disrepute. Security of access and the interactions within a community, especially when conducted using technologies that may bypass face-to-face verification, is paramount. As the distinction between online and offline identities decreases, criminals are likely to seek new ways of exploiting interlinked data and thereby use reputations for blackmail extortion or simply destroy them. The importance of various detection and prevention strategies to address the evolution of identity-related security risks will be increasing critical (Anderson et al., 2012).

#### **Example 4: Health and wellbeing in relation to community dissolution**

How and why a community dissipates may be for a number of reasons connected to its original purpose, lack of motivation between its constituents, being supplanted by a more dominant community or, at the extreme, being violently dispersed or rendered redundant. In terms of access and interactions and in an effort to save public funding, access to the NHS in the UK has been changing over the past 10 years to include more virtual opportunities to see GPs and doctors, such as through Skype consultations. While promoting these options, NHS funding to some rural hospitals has declined to the point where they have to consider closing, thus removing a vital lifeline to communities living in rural areas who do not have good WiFi connections. Relationship to place and boundaries of health and wellbeing are increasingly blurred due to contemporary lifestyles, processes of globalisation and aspirations for those in poverty to be able to access better living standards. In both developing and developed countries, the shift in prevalence from communicable to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) over the last 70 years has meant that communities of medical practice have had to change, often breaking up and reforming in new ways to combat NCDs, such as cardiovascular disease, cancer and diabetes. Focus also has shifted to the prevention of NCD risk factors, including tobacco and alcohol use, which may involve new forms of campaigning that are found in both physical (e.g., billboards about eating fresh fruit and veg in neighbourhoods considered to be 'food deserts') and virtual (e.g., viral social media campaign about checking lumps on bodies) places.

The power and organisation behind many of the issues pertaining to health and wellbeing lie within the private sector. Large pharmaceutical companies have been partnering with – or buying up – companies in the agricultural industry, often restructuring these once specialist markets and undercutting how they do business. As a result, many people in traditional farming communities are being put out of business, as they are getting less money for their yields, and efficiency and profit is being championed above healthy, organically-grown, quality crops. In terms of the security and control of provision and distribution, as a result of taking greater control over the agricultural industry, large pharmaceutical companies are beginning to influence what

citizens eat. Through large kickbacks to physicians and educational facilities, the tight-knit community of school nutritionists are being called into question, as their advice is not needed, especially when they disagree with big pharma. Instead, companies are thinking of installing their own 'lifestyle nutritionists' in schools who can toe the party line and effectively sell their products to children.

### **Example 5: Work in relation to access and interactions of a community**

This example is informed by the recent proliferation of new market-mediated alternative modes of use, acquisition, and access to services and work force. Bardhi and Eckhart define *access-based consumption* as “transactions that may be market mediated in which no transfer of ownership takes place. The consumer is acquiring consumption time with the item, and, in market-mediated cases of access, is willing to pay a price premium for use of that object” (2012, 881). Botsman and Rogers (2011) have noted in recent years a renaissance of models of collaborative consumption, similar to access-based consumption, but with an emphasis on the relation between users, related in particular to three main areas of sharing: *product-service systems; redistribution markets; collaborative lifestyles*. In particular, academic, popular, and trade-specific literatures have focussed on the *sharing economy*: a particular type of collaborative consumption in which dedicated platforms enable users to share idle assets (Woskow, 2014; Botsman, 2013). These platforms play an essential role in new models of sharing economy, by creating “markets in sharing” that facilitate the exchange of goods, services and “productive assets” (i.e. assets that enable production, such as tools, information, spaces) (Schor, 2014). The high rates of adoption of the most popular examples of sharing economy (e.g. AirBnB, Lyft, TaskRabbit), and the positive connotations attributed in popular media to the phenomenon, had a spill over effect promoting other models of access-based use and consumption, beyond the sharing economy (Meelen and Frenken, 2015; Yaranghi and Ravi, 2017). In Europe PwC showed how sharing economy models are influencing wider consumer behaviour, in particular with on-demand ride-sharing changing the way in which we travel (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2016).

As models of access-based and collaborative consumption growth from niche to mainstream, access-based forms of work part of the so-called the “gig economy” have become more prominent. The UK Chartered Institute for Personnel Development (CIPD) defines the gig economy as “a way of working that is based on people having temporary jobs or doing separate pieces of work, each paid separately, rather than working for an employer” (CIPD, 2017). While according to a recent CIPD survey (2017) “gigging” is not yet the main source of income for most UK workers (but is usually complementing a main job), evidence suggest that the situation might be changing in the future. PwC, who has been studying the phenomenon for the last few years, argues that the fastest growing sector of the sharing economy (+50%) will be the gig economy, and particularly Peer-to-peer on-demand household services, “freelance marketplaces enabling households to access on-demand support with household tasks such as food delivery or DIY”. In 2025 this will be the second biggest sector overall, behind peer-to-peer transport (1<sup>st</sup> overall) and above Peer-to-peer accommodation (3<sup>rd</sup> overall).

In this paper we chose to look at access-based work at a national scale. However, while Europe and North America have so far been leaders in the collaborative economy, the phenomenon has a worldwide significance (Yaranghi and Ravi, 2017; McLaren and Agyeman, 2015).

Considering the formation of communities for work in this example, throughout the last century, big manufacturers have displaced their production and distribution systems and shifted from a national to a multinational scale. In the future, this displacement will interest the global and national scale alike. As companies turn to digital platforms to optimise their operations, online environments will replace traditional offices. Furthermore, IoT and 3D printing will promote networked systems of production and use of hybrid digital and physical goods and services. It therefore seems possible, in this highly networked infrastructure both for specialised and non-specialised workers to collaborate with different employers, a large portion of the workforce will consist of freelance “gig economy” workers. The movement of such communities will necessarily become further mobile. With the gig economy entering traditional sectors (services and manufacturing), the workforce will be displaced: from traditional offices to co-working spaces. Some of these spaces will be equipped with manufacturing pods sponsored by different companies. In this highly networked hybrid system, vicinity to a corporate office will no longer be essential for most people. However, the quality of co-working spaces, and the type of “gigs” that are accessible in different cities or neighbourhood will vary, with better opportunities for career growth located in particular areas of few cities.

With regard the preservation of working communities, technology is likely to be the primary driver of change. Algorithms will be the main form of control of the efficiency, conduct, and performance of each worker. The algorithm measures and rewards positive behaviours, thus eliminating discriminatory practices that might hinder career progression. At the same time, however, the algorithm leaves no room for empathy between employee and employer, as it eliminates personal relationships within the company chain of management entirely. This means that while workers are in principle free to manage their commitments and portfolio, failures to meet the expectations as calculated by the system, may result in poor feedback results and penalties. These might accumulate over time with a ‘snowballing’ effect. A key concern that may influence the dissolution or reformulation of communities of work is the different forms of discrimination embedded in many sharing economy services. This is both about personal bias, but also (although there is scant evidence to prove it), embedded in the algorithm. This will continue in a system in which the gig economy is the main mode of employment, with dramatic consequences for vulnerable groups. In addition, the over-reliance on personal means and resources will dramatically increase discrimination based on wealth.

### **Example 6: Climate change in relation to place and boundaries of a community**

Among all the challenges considered in this report, climate change is arguably the most critical one. The effects of climate change are in fact bound to directly or indirectly influence the development of every other issue that is taken into consideration. The most

recent report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded that based on direct observation and longitudinal monitoring, “[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia” (IPCC, 2014). While long-term predictions based on experiments and studies carry with them a significant degree of uncertainty, experts agree that if greenhouse emissions are not radically reduced in a sustained way, further warming and changes in all components of the climate system are virtually certain to occur (Collins et al., 2013). However, it is now clear that even if CO<sub>2</sub> were to be stopped, the effects of climate change will persist for a long time. The consequences of a rise in temperature will not be the same in different regions. For example, while some areas will experience drought, others will be affected by more copious rainfall. The 2013 IPCC report includes detailed information on the expected patterns in different regions and ecosystems (IPCC, 2013). But unlike in the past few years, when anthropogenic extreme phenomena and natural disasters were mostly concentrated in particular areas and happened as individual episodes, in the future the effects of climate change will be felt at a global scale. Episodes of droughts, flooding, will be common and expected also in areas that would have been traditionally considered safer. In this sense, climate change has therefore been recognised to be also a social and political issue as well as a scientific and economic one (Urry, 2011). As such, it will impact the life, organisation, and values of communities.

This example illustrates how the place of a community affected by frequent flooding might move through the four states. In terms of formation, the last century has seen an increase in individualistic and consumerist values and behaviours, in which private property and self-reliance are prioritised (Ivanova, 2011). However, after a number of flooding episodes causing increasingly disruptive of built environment and infrastructures, people leaving in affected areas start to come together as communities with the practical purpose of dealing with damage and disruptions. As flooding becomes a more frequent occurrence, such communities organise themselves and put pressure on local councils and governments to implement better preventive and response measures. In terms of community movement, some individuals might be forced or enticed to be relocate, to less affected areas. The choice of where to move is often informed by research and media reports on the causes and localised effects of climate change. People might also value community cohesion and engagement in the new place where they move. The preservation of the community in this instance may be difficult. NGOs and special interest groups become increasingly crucial, for their efforts to monitor and support change and implementing preservation measures. They will be more visible in the community and become the fulcrum of networks of citizens and local authorities. However, some individuals with resources might decide to isolate themselves, and advocate against policies and interventions that are intended to benefit the community as a whole, but might be perceived as disadvantageous for the individual. This example illustrates how the dissolution process of a community may begin, as wealthier people decide to sell their property and move to places that are not yet dramatically affected by flooding, some communities will suffer from the consequences of having fewer services, lower resources, and empty properties. Such communities will be fragmented, impoverished, and will show lower levels of wellbeing.

## **Example 7: Housing in relation to power and organisation of a community**

In order to provide focus to the challenge of housing, in this example we examine the nature of co-housing. Co-housing is defined as housing with common spaces and shared facilities (Vestbro, 2010). For the purposes of this report, the different models of housing, including collaborative housing, communal housing, collective housing and commune, may be considered here (Vestbro and Horelli, 2012). Concerning the formation of the community, an increasing number of people appear to be wanting to escape solo home ownership and individual responsibility in bland suburbs (e.g., having to pay an expensive mortgage because of a bad credit score); instead, they wish to try living in a higher density, more eco-friendly environment where social interaction with neighbours is better and where more collective or collaborative decision-making processes occur. The community movement of co-housing values, particularly those around building together, sharing everyday life and serving a common ideal, began in other countries (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Russia, America, Australia) from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards. These values have spread to the UK, as more people wish to live in different types of mixed-tenure and mixed-ownership developments and are shunning traditional, neo-liberal economic models of homemaking.

The preservation of co-housing communities is on the increase, in tandem with their growth in formation. Co-housing developments are gaining favour across the UK, with over 60 communities established or developing, and countless more being formed. Creating and maintaining social bonds and living less expensive lifestyles act as strong reasons to stay within this community, especially compared with increased loneliness and isolation and higher costs of living experienced in cities. The rise in 'co-housing consultants', found mostly in America, help to educate people on the benefits of co-housing lifestyles. However, the dissolution of this type of community is also evident. Maintaining group solidarity, creating a shared vision, developing group decision-making processes etc., may be difficult for some individuals and groups to enact on a daily basis, with between 70-90% of co-housing developments not achieving their goals. People may retreat to their nuclear families and more traditional ways of living when things do not work out as planned.

## **Example 8: Diversity in relation to security and control of a community**

The challenges and risks for security relating to diversity are principally connected to major differences between communities and values. The increased threat of acts of terrorism and the networks behind them raises serious issues for ensuring and maintaining security. This has seen a series of events whereby the diversity of nations, including the UK, has been depicted as problematic despite the lack of strong evidence to support some of the claims made. Within this threat are different communities of belief whose values seek to severely disrupt the operations and values of the communities of others. The situation is further complicated by the transfer of individuals or groups from

one community to another through conversion of their beliefs, via a process of radicalisation. The tensions caused by such actions raises key concerns regarding the diversity of populations since it is perceived, if not fully understood how, they foster radical values and their respective communities. The 2017 report by the National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends: Paradox of Progress*, states that the "threat from terrorism is likely to expand as the ability of states, groups and individuals to impose harm diversifies. The net effect of rising tensions within and between countries—and the growing threat from terrorism—will be greater global disorder and considerable questions about the rules, institutions, and distribution of power in the international system" (p.32).

In terms of the formation of communities in relation to diversity, it is likely that the increased awareness and expectations of the public in a highly interconnected world will challenge prevailing assumptions about governance and security. The diminishing capacity of national governments to provide and sustain effective governance has led to the transfer of governance to local bodies, businesses, advocacy groups and the third sector, especially where they are more agile in delivering services and thus garner support from populations for their agendas. What is less clear at this point is whether the redistribution of services will lead to a fragmentation of resources and greater inequality. The formation of new communities concerned with security will present a new challenge to governments and societies as to how to effectively combine them whilst ensuring overall safety and security of the nation is not compromised. The movement of power from established nations to rising and developing countries but also towards non-state actors. These non-state actors may be agents or spoilers of cooperation. A wide range of transnational communities have been equally, if not more, effective than states at reframing issues and mobilising public opinion for the better including: NGOs, civil-society groups, faith-based organisations, corporations, and other interest groups. However, hostile non-state actors for example terrorist networks and criminal organisations, all empowered by existing and new technologies (e.g. the Dark Web), present serious security threats and may further compound systemic risks.

Concerning the preservation of community values, the shift to a 'multipolar' world (EUISS, 2010), is adding complexity to the process of effective global governance. The growing economic influence of emerging powers increases their ability to exert political effects far beyond their geographic boundaries. Increasing diverse perspectives on, and suspicions about, global governance processes of internationalisation which are typically seen as Western concepts, will further contribute to the difficulties of effectively preserving the security of current values and responding to the increasing number of challenges to them. Rising tensions within and between countries coupled with the slowing down of the global economy will contribute to the increasingly complex challenges facing the world and its communities, leading to significant disruption, reformulation or, indeed, dissolution of them. The potential dissolution of existing orders due to the growing range of states, organisations, and empowered individuals who shape geopolitics will cause considerable uncertainty. The emerging global landscape is evidently entering a new era beyond the Cold War that dominated the communities and values concerning security for the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

## **Example 9: Urbanisation in relation to different states and core characteristics of a community**

The role of the built environment as the primary habitat for humankind in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is crucial to understanding the various issues around the future of communities and values. Cities and other urbanised areas play a fundamental part in how people meet and share their interests and values. They also engender competitiveness for resources and for different values to be recognised. This leads to the formation, movement, preservation and dissolution of a wide range of communities with specific interests. The processes of urbanisation bring with them a complex confluence of issues that underpin many of the other themes examined in this report. Despite various attempts to imagine different ways of designing and living in our cities (Dunn et al., 2014) we have yet to conceive of any practical and sustainable method to construct large scale environments for ourselves. Cities often harbour many communities since they are typically places of contestation, tension, difference, and resistance. As such, individuals may form or join a community to preserve or relocate their shared values with like-minded others. In this example, the theme of urbanisation will be used to demonstrate the interconnections between various states of communities and the different characteristics of them.

In relation to community formation and access, by 2050, the proportion of people living in urban areas is likely to have increased from slightly more than 50% to approximately 70% of the world's population (OECD, 2012). Of the 23 cities expected to have populations of ten million or more inhabitants by 2015, 19 are likely to be in developing countries. The exposure to new ideas and accessibility of goods and services that urban inhabitants may experience will have a range of effects. It may provide a catalyst for formation and movement of some communities via civil activism, particularly where inequality is evident, and it may lead to a better quality of life for a large number of people. This latter aspect of urbanisation directly correlates to the values people hold and share and how they may evolve. Through their access to a higher standard of living, individuals and groups may build communities to maintain their values and interests, and to protect certain lifestyles or the choices of them. Clearly, such lifestyles vary considerably across different urban areas around the globe, from basic human rights of potable drinking water and sanitation to the accessibility and provision of more extensive resources that enable human life to flourish.

Concerning the relationship between community movement and place, the greatest increases in urbanisation are likely to be in Asia, with between 250 and 300 million people likely to move from rural to urban areas over the next 15 years in China alone. Cities are typically a nexus of competing communities and values so this overall movement toward urban areas will see the movement of existing communities but with, or in relation to, newly formed aspirations, alongside the reconfiguration or emergence of communities whose values are directly influenced by their new habitat.

With regard community preservation and power, governments will increasingly need policies and processes for enabling public-private partnerships with a wide variety of urban actors including: city leaders, NGOs, and civil societies, to address emerging challenges. The role of multinational corporations and charitable foundations in supporting the work of governments is likely to increase particularly in the provision of

education, healthcare, information service, and research to societies. Although states will continue to be the primary providers of national security and other elements of 'hard power', their capacity to leverage communities of local, private, and transnational members would augment their 'soft power'. Decentralised governance combined with liberal forms of democracy will best support these partnerships between public-private and local-national-transnational. New forms of governance, with varying degrees of self-organisation and collective decision making will be fostered by technologies in some societies. However, other governments may not be able to or have the desire to provide the infrastructure and access to such technologies, leading to a range of outcomes such as increased authoritarianism or state failure.

Community dissolution and security when examined through the challenge of urbanisation indicate a number of risks. Processes of rapid urbanisation, often uneven across different territories, couple with substantial inequality amongst populations are likely to increase the probability of social unrest as a direct consequence of the conditions of their built environment, such as densely inhabited slum areas. The concentration of populations afforded by urbanisation makes them efficient in many ways. However, it also makes them susceptible to the effects of natural disasters, disease and deliberate acts of violence. Due to the large number of urban areas in coastal regions, cities are also likely to be especially vulnerable to the effects of rising sea levels. The issues surrounding cities that fail or are failing, in both developed and developing countries, could pose major security challenges (for example: social unrest and even insurgencies) with the potential for nation-wide repercussions that may breach national borders. If, as projected, an increased number of people live in urban areas, security and armed forces will almost certainly need to operate in this environment to a greater extent. Adversaries could range from government-controlled militaries to armed non-state groups with criminal or malign ideological intent.

## **Speculative mode: alternative futures**

Future scenarios are valuable in their ability to offer challenging, plausible and relevant depictions that illustrate how the future may unfold (Hunt et al., 2012). For this report, we will employ the structure first proposed by the Global Scenario Group (GSG, 1995) which consists of three world types: Business as Usual; Barbarisation; and Great Transitions. Each of these world types is subsequently examined through two distinct scenarios i.e. Policy Reform and Market Forces; Breakdown and Fortress World; Eco-Communalism and New Sustainability Paradigm. The intention of these scenarios is to facilitate a deeper understanding of the key fundamental drivers that could bring about realistic world changes. By presenting scenario archetypes that are sufficiently distinct, the aim is to examine radical yet plausible alternatives alongside those futures we currently view as probable. In the context of this paper we have provided brief overviews of Business as Usual: Market Forces, and Barbarisation: Fortress World so that their general relevance to security, risks and threats may be garnered. We have then provided a more in depth look at how a further scenario, Great Transitions: New Sustainability Paradigm, can be used as a critical lens to examine specific challenges to society in relation to different states of communities and core characteristics of them i.e. power (organisation) and housing; Dissolution and Health and wellbeing; and Migration and Movement. This has been conducted to illustrate how the framework of states and core characteristics of communities can be used to examine specific relationships whilst providing a systematic way of supporting the speculative mode of inquiry for further comparative analysis across all challenges to society, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

### **Business as Usual - Scenario 1: Market Forces**

In the Market Forces scenario, the developmental patterns are driven by multi-scalar forces of economics that influence the availability of goods and the demand for them. Whilst this is sometimes closely coupled to government agendas in terms of policy based around productivity and economic resilience, it typically operates outside of any control or support by governments. Whilst the trends of market forces have tended to shape the world gradually, the nature of their indexing to potentially volatile shifts rather than normative fluctuations means that going forward their future may be much more reflective of an uncertain world with regard both resources and security in the widest sense.

The potential impact on communities is that they are witness to the various pushes and pulls of uncontrolled urbanisation and increasing ageing populations, within a consumerist world where those with wealth, however this is measured relative to context, gain further wealth. With the focus on economic efficiency, low levels of government intervention may lead to faster environmental degradation as key factors such as: CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, deforestation, pollutants, resource depletion, and water stress all significantly increase. The further influence of such weak policies results in poor social environments and policies, the latter largely being responsive rather than preventative and proactive.

In terms of the context for communities, development and planning policies follow the market, and are therefore reactionary and unable to control patterns of urban growth and the resultant impact on infrastructures and quality of life. There is significant net change in the land occupied by the built environment; where density and/or sprawl are rampant as the logics of the market dictate. Worse, this further increases the number of ghost developments: neighbourhoods, zones, even entire cities where no one actually lives but are simply part of an investment portfolio. Quality of life across communities varies considerably depending on geographic location and its position as beneficiary within the markets and their effects.

## **Barbarisation - Scenario 2: Fortress World**

In the Fortress World scenario, the world is organised by authoritarian rule where elites control an impoverished majority and manage critical natural resources from protected enclaves. In this future, wealth, resources and conventional governance systems are eroding and alliances are made to protect the privileges of the rich and powerful. This leads to the military control, which is also increasingly privatised, of strategic resources including freshwater and minerals alongside other important biological resources. Geographic boundaries are redrawn and skewed due to the preemptive and defensive practices of offshoring to preserve the lifestyle and security of the elites, which directly correlates to exclusion zones and territories for the poor.

These deepening social and environmental tensions are unresolved and become more pronounced, bringing forth many unwelcome social changes and great human misery. Security and defensibility are the primary values driving actions across all communities, though separate spheres of the elites and the masses as codified in legal and institutional frameworks ensures only a global minority have secure lifestyles. The world thus divides into a form of global apartheid between those inside the fortresses and those outside of them. A gradual decline in human health means that overall life expectancies are lower than today.

Planning policies serve to reinforce the power geometry between the rich from the poor. The built environment sprawls to cover twice its current land cover, in part to meet the demands of population growth higher than today; and agricultural land use increases substantially at the expense of natural forest. High urbanisation combined with population growth leads to more people in urban areas, but densities manifest differently for the rich and the poor. Land recycling is probably lower overall, although it may be higher within the enclaves. The impoverished majority live in poor environmental conditions, with low engagement and low satisfaction as their values are principally based around survival; the privileged elite live in considerably more favourable circumstances.

## **Great Transitions - Scenario 2: New Sustainability Paradigm**

In the New Sustainability Paradigm scenario, new socio-economic arrangements and fundamental changes in values result in changes to the character of urban industrial civilisation. The search for a deeper basis for human happiness and fulfilment is a

central theme for human development. Civil society and engaged citizens become critical sources of change for the new values: an ethos of 'one planet living' (including reducing, re-using, and recycling) facilitates a shared vision for more sustainable living and a much improved quality of life.

A new form of globalisation changes the character of industrial society; the role of business is transformed through the integration of sustainable development as a business opportunity and a matter of social responsibility. Labour-intensive craft economy rises alongside the high-tech base. Integrated settlement patterns place home, work, shops, and leisure activity in closer proximity.

Planning policies are highly regulated, emphasising ecological imperatives, regional planning and sustainability. There is no net change in the land occupied by the 'built environment'; sprawl is contained. Dwelling density is roughly what it is today on the city scale, because of higher brownfield regeneration than today and integrated settlement patterns; however lower population growth and less migration to cities allows for town-within-a-city development, leaving more open space within the cities. The shift to values emphasising quality of life, human solidarity and environmental sustainability supports much greater civic participation; local area satisfaction is much higher than today as is quality of housing and local environmental quality. Life expectancy is higher and employment rates are much higher than today. In relation these fundamental tenets of the New Sustainability Paradigm, it is possible to explore their implications across different community states and challenges to society as illustrated in tables 1, 2 and 3.

**Table 1. Power (organisation) and housing: Co-housing**

|                      | Formation   | Movement  | Preservation   | Dissolution  |
|----------------------|---|---|--|--|
| Power (organisation) | As co-housing becomes more widely adopted in planning policy as a way of fostering human solidarity and environmental sustainability, larger numbers of people in new types of formations (e.g., multi-generational families of different ethnic backgrounds) are coming together to live and share domestic duties and responsibilities. | The co-housing idea begins initially in more rural areas and outer urban fringes, and migrates to city centres, as new generations of urban dwellers take advantage of the close proximity to integrated and shared services, infrastructure, decision-making and social connections. As a result, new architectural forms are created that meld old buildings and spaces into collective spaces for everyone to use and enjoy. | Due to high levels of civic participation and the emphasis on sustainability, co-housing boards are formed at the city and regional scales that promote co-housing ideals and try to make it easier for others to start their own co-housing projects. Discussion of spreading these ideals to work and leisure begin to happen. | Although co-housing boards provide guidance on how to create and maintain co-housing, they are also quite open to groups governing co-housing sites in their own way. In this sense, they are dissolving traditional notions of governance and encouraging more grassroots, experimental types of co-housing governance (as long as these co-housing experiments adhere to sustainability principles). |

**Table 2. Dissolution and Health and wellbeing**

|                       | Dissolution  |
|-----------------------|--|
| Access (interactions) | Habits and behaviours that are considered damaging to the health of people and the planet are discouraged through the development of integrated health teams, based within communities and/or co-housing sites. The teams include a 'sustainability facilitator' who works with health and social care professionals, friends and family and relevant others to get rid of bad habits and behaviours, and instil more fulfilling and worthwhile attitudes and ideas. |
| Place (boundaries)    | More 'towns-within-city' developments take shape, freeing up green spaces within cities for people to be active and healthy, and to practice mindfulness. The trend to bring more green (e.g., parks) and blue (e.g., canals) spaces into towns, co-housing developments and cities, generally, continues, helping to blur the boundaries between nature and the built environment. This has a knock-on effect of reducing illness and greenhouse gas emissions.     |
| Power (organisation)  | Co-housing boards, integrated health teams and other decision-making bodies work together to force out organisations and companies in their cities and regions that pedal 'quick-fix' health medicines and remedies to vulnerable groups (e.g., older people). New health and wellbeing manifestos are currently being drawn up that would give such organisations and companies an opportunity to re-structure along more healthy and sustainable lines.            |
| Security (control)    | Due to people adopting more sustainable living patterns, their quality of life and mental health increases, and they feel much safer in their developments, towns, cities and regions. As a result, security firms that once patrolled neighbourhoods to prevent crime are disbanded and employees are re-trained to become part of integrated health teams.   |

**Table 3. Migration and Movement**

|                       | Movement   |
|-----------------------|--|
| Access (interactions) | New migrants to countries are welcomed with open arms by indigenous and existing communities, particularly those who wish to practice craft-based or high-tech work. Most settle in towns, rather than cities, as they prefer a village-type feel where they can learn about and adopt sustainable, local customs and practices while sharing their own culture.   |
| Place (boundaries)    | Once established, most migrants choose to stay where they are so they can become rooted in their communities and highly-integrated settlements. Those who do decide to move around can do so freely and without prejudice, as countries strive to become boundary-less and work together to promote sustainable lifestyles.  |
| Power (organisation)  | Upon entering new countries, migrants are immediately given full rights (e.g., to vote, to hold office, to co-own property) and are treated like indigenous and existing communities. As such, they are expected to uphold 'one planet living' principles and enact them daily. They also have a strong say and choice over the delivery of services that affect them (e.g., health and social care).  |
| Security (control)    | Migration numbers are not capped anywhere, globally, as individual and collective quality of life is supported over and above a country's ability to 'take someone in'. Funding and other resources are available from international organisations, both public and private, to help countries and communities care for those who wish, or have, to immigrate (as well as providing funding for the migrants, themselves). Emphasis is placed on making the migration journey as painless and as socially, economically and environmentally sustainable as possible. |

## **Analytical mode: underlying changes informing risks and threats**

In the process of researching this report and examining the future of community and values out to 2050, we found a number of sources that present potentially significant underlying changes to this future. These may be best understood as directly responding to the questions of who the communities of the future will be and how this will influence their values. We believe the evidence provided in this section signals important shifts that underpin the nature of what communities we will seek to form or join along with how and why they will be reflective of our changing values. Therefore, in this section we will examine the following interrelated aspects: who we will be, what we will do, and why we do it. These subsections enable us to assess patterns and trends in evidence currently available and unpack their specific implications for the future.

### **Who we will be**

#### **1. Decline and delay in family formation**

One of the central tenets of many communities around the globe is the formation of family structures, the nature of which typically instils a set of values. These values are either reinforced, revised or rejected depending on their characteristics and wider societal implications, usually through a process of calibration via contact with those both within and outside of the immediate family group. Yet, there is significant evidence that family formation is either being delayed or declined in many countries (Jacobsen and Mather, 2011; Wang, 2017). Two reports by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Doing Better for Families* (2011a) and *The Future of Families to 2030* (2011b) indicate that one-person households and single-parent families set to increase alongside a continuation and even acceleration of transformations in household and family structures. Bernheimer and ADAM (2014) contrast this view with regard the U.K. context, suggesting that solo living has stagnated and shared housing is on the increase. This is partly due to difficulties in entering the housing market for younger generations but also because of the growth in unrelated adults sharing households due to economic necessity, family fragmentation, or other socioeconomic factors including work.

These changes will directly inform the spatial mobility patterns of households and families since it will play an increasingly pivotal role for family cohesion and thus have implications for transport services and infrastructures. Such shifts are also likely to result on more mobility (OECD, 2011a) as more single-person households, increase in divorce rates and reconfigured families, growing proportion of elderly people including rural and suburban areas, all suggest longer distances amongst family members. High levels of commuting and transportation between different households will be necessary for those providing and receiving care i.e. spouses, partners, children and grandparents. Vulnerabilities in services and infrastructures apparent in rural and some suburban areas are likely to increase considerably without substantial investment, thereby reinforcing private car use, if not ownership, further.

The OECD (2011b) also present some important changes to families notably that most countries have witnessed a decline in fertility rate over the last three decades, with almost no OECD country having a total fertility rate above the population replacement rate (two children per women). The consequence of this is that the average household size has also decreased across the same period. This may correlate to the sharp increase in the proportion of women entering the labour force, however, larger gender gaps in employment and earnings remain, with attendant impacts on child wellbeing such as one in eight children on average across the OECD living in relative poverty. Concerning family formation patterns, there is a continuing increase in both men and women wanting to establish themselves in the labour market prior to forming a family. This is resulting in two distinct trends. Firstly, an increase in the age of mothers at first childbirth, and secondly, there has been and continues to be, a rise in the probability of women having fewer children than previous generations. It should also be noted that many women remain childless. The fall in birth rates and increase in life expectancy, there are now fewer children and more grandparents than before, a trend set to continue.

## **2. Rise in individualism**

The second important factor in determining who will form and sustain the communities of the future is the rise in individualism. Santos, Varnum and Grossmann (2017) have illustrated that individualistic practices and values are increasing around the world. Whilst a considerable amount of the research on the development of rising individualism has focused on the United States, their findings illustrate a pattern that applies to other countries that are not industrialised or Western. This trend seems set to continue with the data indicating that overall, the majority of countries are shifting toward greater individualism. The primary driver appears to be socioeconomic development, with those countries that do not illustrate an increase in individualist values correlating to those where socioeconomic development was the lowest across the period examined. It can be seen that the rise in individualism is rapidly transforming those countries and their cultures with traditionally long-held beliefs and values for example in China (Zou and Cai, 2016) and India (Dasguptal, 2017). However, as Douthat (2014) has observed, it remains to be seen whether this level of individualism regardless of how it may be currently understood or defined e.g. disaffiliated, post-familial, post-patriotic etc., is sustainable across the life cycle and can form a culture's dominant way of life.

## **3. Increase in individual empowerment**

Closely coupled to the rise in individualism is an increase in individual empowerment. Reports by RAND (2015) and ESPAS (2015) demonstrate that. One of the difficulties in this issue lies in comprehending the concept of individual empowerment for which there is no universally accepted definition. For example EUISS (2012) considers individual empowerment to be directly related to social and technological progress, whilst the World Bank (2013) focuses its definition on access to information, inclusion and participation, accountability and local organisational capacity. Technological advancements and, particularly, the rise of social media over the past decade have significantly altered the way in which people report and absorb information (Beckett and Mansell, 2008). People have increasing access to information via the internet and grow in connectivity across the globe. Traditional media outlets remain but social media is enabling people to enter into a direct exchange of information, and that in

place of the previous practice individual consumption is one increasingly based in a collective sharing process (Beckett and Fenyo, 2012). As a result of this trend, information technologies have come to be an indispensable tool for those looking to influence people in innovative ways and to coordinate individuals on a very large scale (Norris, 2006; Williams, 2008). Furthermore, this increase in individual empowerment does not necessarily correlate with a growth in democracy (Carothers, 2015). Jang et al. (2016) make it clear that individual empowerment will disrupt the state of global governance through its interconnections with an increasing awareness of human security, institutional complexity, international power shifts and the liberal world political paradigm

## **What we will do**

### **1. Greater division in how and where we live**

The emergence and rapid spread of gated communities in urban, suburban and rural areas around the world over the past thirty years has been associated with the desire to create a sense of prestige and exclusiveness alongside the search for multiple, often non-essential amenities, like tennis courts and spas (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Csefalvay, 2011; Low, 2001; Manzi and Smith-Bowers, 2005; Woods, 2016). One of the biggest explanations for moving into a gated community from other neighbourhoods, though, relates to a perceived reduction in crime, fear of crime and violence. In their study of gated communities in Orange County in California, Branic and Kubrin (2017) confirm this hypothesis, finding that the presence of gated communities corresponded to a 22% decrease in expected violent crimes and a 17% decrement in expected property crimes. These findings are consistent with other scholars (e.g., Addington and Rennison, 2013), suggesting that the trend of moving into gated communities for safety reasons continues to occur.

Another reason to move into a gated community may relate to age. Rosenberg and Wilson (2018) suggest a trend towards more purpose-built communities for older people, including gated communities and ageing resource communities. These types of communities reflect a wider social movement around the creation of 'age-friendly' communities in which places are designed with, and for, older people and their needs (WHO, 2007). Somewhat paradoxically, however, this trend has generated debate about the value of such communities, as they have the legislative ability to segregate people according to age; thus, children and even some working age adults could be excluded from living there if they are below a certain threshold age (see McHugh et al., 2002).

Much Anglo-American academic scholarship has demonstrated the relative homogeneity of suburbs in terms of social class, with the arrival of gated communities in these areas resulting in further homogeneity. Such sameness is preferred because 'everyone looks and seems the same... [and] there would be no need to accommodate differences (Low et al., 2012, p. 288). In many Latin American countries, including Argentina, however, the presence of gated communities has led to social transformation (Roitman, 2017). Whereas Argentinian suburbs traditionally have been the domain of poorer residents, the emergence of gated communities has led to greater heterogeneity between poor and affluent people. Nonetheless, the increasing trend toward gated communities in

suburban areas also has meant stronger segregation processes and more visible, socio-spatial inequalities (Roitman and Giglio, 2010).

While segregation between gated communities and surrounding areas is not a new trend, new research suggests that internal divisions within gated communities can exist and may cause problems (Charney and Palgi, 2018). Exploring kibbutzim in Israel, the authors found that residents experienced social, economic and power stratifications, which had an impact on decision-making powers and rights. This confirms Grant and Middlesteadt's (2004) statement that, 'mixing rarely occurs in gated projects' (p. 924) and, as such, is a trend worth exploring in more detail.

Recent research from Australia has found that master planned, residential estate developments – in particular, gated communities – have flourished in outer suburbs and in areas of high deprivation, resulting in enclosed enclaves of comparative wealth (Kenna et al., 2017). Due to the restrictive covenants associated with these gated communities, changes to their physical fabric often are limited to a prescribed set of alterations that residents can make (e.g., changing roof tiles from a pre-approved list of roof tile colours and materials). As a result, these covenants can put gated communities beyond the reach of broader planning policies for cities and/or the country, including densification, environmental sustainability and climate change. With the growing trend toward more gated communities, local and national governments will need to think carefully about how to work with the restrictive covenants within these communities in order to achieve broader sustainability and climate change targets.

Not all gated communities refuse to change their practices. In Bangalore, India, residents of some gated communities are taking a community leadership role and are pushing for more efficient waste and water management (Ganguly and Lutringer, 2017). National and local laws on waste segregation, coupled with strong leadership within the communities (mostly from women and from those who have spent time in the US and Europe), has meant that community leaders can mobilise support around water and waste management as well as lobby external actors and organisations to establish more effective systems for the gated communities. This activism also has spilled over into other issues within the gated communities and beyond (e.g., some leaders are now environmental activists for the city-at-large).

## **2. Shifting patterns in our consumption and behaviour**

Traditional business is undergoing huge changes as markets and products become increasingly complex. The influence of an ageing population that may not necessarily be familiar or even find itself challenged by the pace of new products is also informing a new form of consumerism amidst increasing amounts of information and competition (Rosebaum, 2015). However, within these shifts is a core trend of empowering the consumer to articulate preferences explicitly, which is allowing businesses to better understand consumer behaviours and the products and services they require (ICF GHK, 2012). In theory this leads to increased consumer strength as a result of better and cheaper products and services, which are supplied with greater efficiency due to increased competition. However, there are disruptive trends that do not readily conform to this model, most notably that younger generations are prioritising the ownership of material goods such as cars and homes less and less in favour of personal experiences

(Saiidi, 2016). This trend has been instrumental in fuelling the growth of major disruptors to traditional business mechanisms such as Airbnb, Uber and WeWork. Notwithstanding this trend, the increased blurring between consumer and producer is bringing forward innovation and new business models as the barriers between modes of production and consumption are disappearing, allowing consumers to be directly and personally involved in the making of bespoke goods or services due to mass-customisation manufacturing techniques and consumer-driven markets.

### **3. Transformations in the nature of our work and workplace**

Changes to the nature and destination of our work will result in significant implications for our daily routine, relationships and movements (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2017). As Bernheimer and ADAM (2014) suggest, there is likely to be a continuing declining in commuting and dormitory suburbs will drastically disappear. Homeworking employees are currently the fastest growing workforce segment and with the shifts in family formation patterns along with precarious forms of work increasing is a trend that will endure. Millennials will spend more time where they live, in theory leading to stronger local communities grouped around local services like cafés, crèches and shared office facilities. However, this will depend on the types of work contract they have and the time frame within which they do it, which is significantly shifting from the traditional 9-5 timespan.

The rise of the 'ageless' workplace (Unum, 2014) is largely being driven by the shift to a top-heavy demographic in the Western world i.e. as discussed above both a reduction in birth rates and an increase in life expectancy. In the U.K. Baby Boomers represent 25% of the population and are living longer, whilst in the wider context of OECD countries life expectancy has risen to 80 years. This trend results in a disruption of age in the workplace that creates challenges, such as younger workers managing older colleagues, which at present is not a typical situation. Furthermore, as the working population's average age increases it is likely to be paralleled by negative consequences borne of juggling career, family, friends, etc. suggesting a lack of appetite to work in later stages of life. The compound effect of this is higher levels of stress, and an increased probability of people leaving their job.

In its 2014 report, *The Future of Work: Jobs and Skills in 2030*, the UK Commission for Employment and Skills outlined four key trends that will impact the nature of our work and workplace. These are: emerging economies acquiring stronger representation in global production chains; demographic change and migration changing the face of the workforce; technological developments slowly dissolving the boundaries between sectors and are changing traditional modes of working; and organisational structures in business are evolving and becoming more flexible and more networked.

## **Why we will do it**

### **1. Trust in authority**

There is a significant and continual decline in trust concerning mainstream institutions of all kinds from business to governments, and the media to NGOs. Bowman (2017) reports that two-thirds of countries have fallen into what the Edelman Trust Barometer

labels “distruster” territory, where trust levels have sunk below 50% (Edelman, 2017). Edelman (2017) also provide evidence of a leadership credibility crisis, with just 37% of people now viewing CEOs as credible and 29% feeling the same about government officials. Perhaps unsurprisingly, of the four institutions measured, it is the media that has seen the biggest decline in trust among the public. It is distrusted in 83% of countries (less than 50% of people trust it); and in only five – Singapore, China India, Indonesia, and the Netherlands – does trust exceed 50%. What perhaps is revealing and less expected is that, for the first time, there has been a decline in public trust of NGOs. In the US, China, Japan, Germany and the UK, trust in NGOs fell below 50%. In the social media era, in which ‘fake news’ has become a buzz term, it is perhaps not surprising that more people have lost faith in the mainstream media. Instead, they increasingly trust their peers, “people like themselves”, as sources of information. This clearly has implications and has been the subject of much debate of how public policy can better serve the general public (OECD, 2017). The echo-chamber phenomenon, in which a belief becomes objective truth because it is repeated within groups of like-minded people, has been widely observed. What is more surprising, however, is the fact that people’s peers are now seen as being as credible as those regarded as experts. In the European Union, recent referendum results and shifts toward populism have caused major disruptions to previous, and relatively stable patterns and trends (Algan et al., 2017). This results in a radical shift of who we trust and why.

## **2. Changes and trends in what people value**

The first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century have been turbulent in terms of culture, political unrest, and economic uncertainty. With the advent of new words, new interests and new references, our daily attitudes and lifestyles have changed significantly, reflecting shifts in what we value. Sportoletti (2017) suggests these changes belie how we view ourselves and how the choices we make reflect our identity. In particular, he identifies ten key influences on our evolving values: wellness, authenticity, digitalisation, customer care responsibility, customisation, living together but not mixing well, privacy and safety, ageing, East more than West, and sustainability. However, the situation is further complicated by patterns of value focus that question previously reliable assumptions based on demographics. As Thompson (2017) has reported, in the U.S. it is not the younger generations at the vanguard of non-monetary values and gig-style jobs but the oldest.

## **3. Control of attitudes and behaviours**

How governments seek to inform the behaviours of their populations is a topic that has been increasingly important on policy agendas due to concerns of security, health and wellbeing, and environmental impact. Ipsos MORI (2012) conducted a major analysis on public opinion on behaviour change policy with several relevant outcomes for the context of this paper. Firstly, there are large national differences, for example a considerably higher acceptability of state intervention on behaviour in countries such as India and China than in wealthy North European nations – from Sweden to the UK – and the U.S.’s wariness in particular of intervening. The high overall level of public support for action – and especially for more transparent information and various ‘nudges’ indicates an increased collective responsibility to oneself and each other. This leads to the second key finding, that in some countries on particular issues, for example unhealthy food and its correlation to NCDs, the public seem to be supportive of harder measures than many

policymakers have previously believed. Globally, there is a significant range of support for legislation which perhaps comes as no surprise given the different values and types of community across the geopolitical spectrum. For example, support for partially-restrictive interventions i.e. those that seek to change a behaviour through making it more expensive or difficult drops from an average across policy areas of 88% in China to 46% in the U.S. Outright prohibitions divide global opinion even more, with 87% average support in Saudi Arabia and India but only 33% in the U.S. Thirdly, the more prosperous a country is (as measured by GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power), the less likely its public are to support behaviour change interventions. Yet within countries themselves, wealthier individuals tend to be more supportive of each level of behavioural intervention than those with lower incomes. Although many people may practice an undesirable behaviour, this does not directly correlate with low support for interventions against this behaviour. The effect of prevalence on support of intervention appears to be both issue- and country-dependent, forming a complex landscape for those seeking to control attitudes and behaviours in the future.

## Conclusions

The final section of this report provides synthesis of our findings and a summary regarding the diversity of possible futures in order to draw suitable conclusions in relation to overarching narratives and thematic patterns for how community and values in 2050 may evolve. From the outset, we identified that the subjects under study i.e. 'community' and 'values' are both highly complex and interrelated but do not readily conform to analyses seeking correlation or causality. Because of this complexity in approaching the subjects, we set out to design and develop a novel way of examining key trends and patterns through three stages. First, we introduced a matrix to enable us to identify examples of communities across their different states (i.e. formation, movement, preservation, dissolution) in relation to core characteristics of communities (i.e. access, place, power, security). Secondly, we drew upon a wide range of different examples of communities to populate this matrix to illustrate the complex interrelationships of the different types, their values, and scale of influence. Thirdly, having considered these examples through business as usual situations, we then looked ahead using a speculative mode to explore alternative futures based on the evidence collected to understand the challenges, barriers, risks and threats that may face the future of communities and values out to 2050. These three scenarios were depicted in order to explain the way events might unfold and in doing so, further our understanding as to what guidance and actions may be needed to direct us toward a future that is desirable. Fourthly, we then used an analytical mode to examine evidence that enables assessment of the underlying changes informing risks and threats (i.e. who we are, what we will do, why we will do it). Finally, we will compare these two modes to understand how the future of community and values might change over the next 30 years.

We fully acknowledge the limitations of the matrix presented since it is deliberately flexible and open to interpretation. However, we believe it makes a valuable contribution and enabled us to circumvent some of the problems and pitfalls that are intrinsic to futures research as identified in an early section of the paper. In terms of the speculative mode, the use of a particular scenario as a critical lens to examine specific challenges to society in relation to different states of communities and core characteristics of them was instrumental in demonstrating how our conceptual framework can be used to examine specific relationships whilst providing a systematic method of exploring alternative futures. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be useful to conduct this for each challenge to society to enable comparative analysis of intersecting themes, and gain deeper insights into potential correlations and causality. With regard the analytical mode, we were able to identify important shifts that underpin the nature of what communities we will seek to form or join along with how and why they will be reflective of our changing values. Again, in a similar manner to the challenges to society, these are interrelated i.e. who we will be, what we will do, and why we will do it. In relation to who we will be in the future, there are three primary factors influencing identity and the communities we will associate with: decline and delay in family formation, a rise in individualism, and an increase in individual empowerment. Concerning what we will do in the future, the evidence surveyed provided three further factors that will determine our behaviours and relationships: greater division in how and where we live, shifting patterns in our consumption and behaviour, and transformations in the nature of our work and workplace. Why we will do certain things appears to cascade from who we will be and what we will do but is not hierarchical since this directly connects to our values which in

the future are also shaped by three factors: trust in authority, changes and trends in what people value, and control of attitudes and behaviours. The analytical mode allowed us to have an overview of the interconnected nature of community and values whilst also draw out key issues that will drive security measures against their associated risks and threats. To conclude, this paper has set out to better understand the future of community and values out to 2050. Whilst we believe we have contributed to this, we recognise that such a vast subject is difficult to examine in the scope of such a report and has necessarily led to the development of different methods of analysis and inquiry, which in turn has raised further questions that warrant exploration if a holistic evidence-based assessment is to fully reflect the diversity and complexity of these subjects.

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