Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes

Suri, Neeraj and Narahari, Y. (2008) Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 26 (7). pp. 1138-1148. ISSN 0733-8716

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Abstract

Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol. © 2008 IEEE.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2200/2208
Subjects:
ID Code:
137593
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
08 Oct 2019 12:50
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
21 Jul 2020 10:09