On the feasibility of side-channel attacks in a virtualized environment

Vateva-Gurova, T. and Luna, J. and Pellegrino, G. and Suri, Neeraj (2015) On the feasibility of side-channel attacks in a virtualized environment. In: E-Business and Telecommunications : 11th International Joint Conference, ICETE 2014, Vienna, Austria, August 28-30, 2014, Revised Selected Papers. Springer-Verlag, pp. 319-339. ISBN 9783319259147

Full text not available from this repository.


The isolation among physically co-located virtual machines is an important prerequisite for ensuring the security in a virtualized environment (VE). The VE should prevent from exploitation of sidechannels stemming from the usage of shared resources, being hardware or software. However, despite the presumed secure logical isolation, a possible information leakage beyond the boundaries of a virtual machine due to side-channel exploits is a key concern in the VE. Such exploits have been demonstrated in the academic world during the last years. This paper takes into consideration the side-channel attacks threat, and points out that the feasibility of a SCA strongly depends on the specific context of the execution environment. The paper proposes a framework for feasibility assessment of SCAs using cache-based exploits as an example scenario. Furthermore, we provide a proof of concept to show how the feasibility of cache-based SCAs can be assessed using the proposed approach. © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.

Item Type:
Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings
?? feasibility analysisfeasibility factorssecurity classificationsside-channel attackselectronic commercejava programming languagevirtual realityexecution environmentsfeasibility assessmentinformation leakagesecurity classificationvirtual machinesvirtualized ??
ID Code:
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Oct 2019 14:06
Last Modified:
16 Jul 2024 04:45