A Cultural Political Economy of South Korea’s Development Model in Variegated Capitalism

Jihoon Park

BA, Economics, Sogang University
MA, Political Science, Sogang University

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.
Abstract

This thesis investigates the Park Chung Hee model (PCHM). This term refers to a South Korean variant of the East Asian model of capitalism—particularly, the historical model that guided the rapid and sustained growth of the economy since the mid-1960s. This historical investigation is theoretically informed by a cultural political economy of variegated capitalism (VarCap-CPE) that enables a differential and integral exploration of both historical and contemporary capitalism. In this context, my contribution is twofold. The first is theoretical. While a theoretically informed historical investigation into East Asian capitalism requires an approach to (post-)colonialism, imperialism and hegemony as a prerequisite, VarCap-CPE has still not fully integrated such an approach into its analytical framework. So, my first aim is to improve this paradigm by drawing on Marx’s insights into colonialism, the world market, and international hegemony and propose how they might be put in their place, provisionally, in a VarCap-CPE analysis. My second goal is empirical. Based on the enhanced version of the VarCap-CPE, I aim to give a better account of the PCHM than previous literature in political economy. Specifically, I show how the model was informed by two contradictory state strategies: (1) the fascist and autarkic state strategies of Imperial Japan; and (2) the liberal and free trade-oriented developmentalism, based on W.W. Rostow’s modernization theory. I thereby demonstrate that the PCHM was self-contradictory and, in this context, present it as a “chimerical” model that combines in a contradictory manner the DNA of two rival species. On this basis, I provide an integral account of its seemingly miraculous performance as well as the dilemmas, contradictions and crisis-proneness that beset it. In addition, unlike much of the extant literature on the Park model, my analysis permits theoretically consistent further research into its crisis and subsequent neoliberalisation.
Acknowledgements

This thesis has taken much longer to complete than I had initially hoped. Along the way I have incurred an extensive array of debts, both intellectual and personal. First, I want to thank Professor Bob Jessop in the Department of Sociology and Dr Ngai-Ling Sum in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion for all the comments, advice and support with which they provided me as my PhD supervisors. Once I came to England for my studies, and in particular, before I started my studies at Lancaster University, I was told a couple of times that the most important part in doing a PhD would be your supervisor. And, indeed, then I did not understand what it implied. Yet, having been trained by Professor Jessop and Dr Sum for several years, I have naturally come to realise the reason why English people have said so. Thanks to their helps, I could author this thesis and, in doing so, do far more than my ability. I also want to thank Professor Andrew Sayer and Professor Michael Krätke. My understandings of not only critical realism, but also what critical social scientists should do began with Professor Sayer’s articles, books and lectures. Professor Krätke provided helpful comments on the earlier version of this thesis. I am also deeply indebted to Dr David Tyfield at Lancaster Environment Centre and Dr Jamie Doucette in the Department of Geography at the University of Manchester. In my viva voce, they identified many interesting and important areas for discussion and further elaboration in future publications. I also want to thank Dr Stephen Jackson, Dr Peter Fuzesi, Dr Satya Savitzky, Dr Nader Talebi, Dr João Almeida, Dr Öznur Yardimci for their friendships and advice on living in Lancaster and, more broadly, England.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Critical Institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CMP</td>
<td>Capitalist Model of Production</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Critical Semiotic Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWPS</td>
<td>Chimerical Warfare Pre-National State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Deoxyribonucleic Acid</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>EAEC</td>
<td>East Asian Economic Crisis</td>
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<td>EAMC</td>
<td>East Asian Model of Capitalism</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWNS</td>
<td>Keynesian Welfare National State</td>
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<td>LTV</td>
<td>Labour Theory of Value</td>
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<td>M/M</td>
<td>Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach</td>
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<td>PCHM</td>
<td>Park Chung Hee Model</td>
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<td>RA</td>
<td>Regulation Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCNR</td>
<td>Supreme Council for National Reconstruction</td>
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<td>SRA</td>
<td>Strategic-Relational Approach</td>
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<td>SWPR</td>
<td>Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMSA</td>
<td>Transformational Model of Social Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>VarCap-CPE</td>
<td>Cultural Political Economy of Variegated Capitalism</td>
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<td>VTL</td>
<td>Value Theory of Labour</td>
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1. Introduction: Putting the Park Chung Hee Model in Its Place in a Cultural Political Economy of Variegated Capitalism

This thesis investigates the Park Chung Hee model (hereafter PCHM). PARK Chung Hee was the military strongman who ruled South Korea from his military coup in 1961 until his assassination in 1979. He has been a symbolic figure regarding not only the Miracle on the Han River but also South Korea’s political economy more generally. In this respect, the PCHM refers to a South Korean variant of the East Asian model of capitalism (hereafter EAMC)—particularly, the historical model that paved the way for the astonishing and prolonged growth of the economy since the mid-1960s until the mid-1990s, i.e., beyond his period in power up to neoliberalisation (on growth rates, see figure 6.1). Therefore, this thesis is primarily concerned with this model and its predecessors.

Yet, unlike much of the literature on the EAMC or the PCHM (for more details, see the excursus below on previous work in the field), I do not suppose that it has permanent and stable features. For the PCHM was never repetitively self-identical even during the Park Chung Hee era. Specifically, since its birth in 1961-2, the model has mutated at least, twice (in 1964 and 1972-3) enabling its continuing evolution until the late 1970s (for basic information on the different phases in the Park Chung Hee era, see table 1.1), with further changes occurring thereafter. Nor do I attempt to discover the “miracle ingredient” that facilitated its phenomenal performance since the 1960s. For, notwithstanding its marvellous and sustained achievement, the model suffered from insoluble dilemmas and incurable crisis-tendencies that were manifested in different forms but did not fundamentally change. Thus, I examine the PCHM warts all. Above all, I explore its origin, mutation and evolution genealogically and then provide a form-analysis of its mature, consolidated configuration in a world market context, noting its contradictions, dilemmas and crisis-tendencies. This
investigation is theoretically informed by a cultural political economy of variegated capitalism (hereafter VarCap-CPE; see Sum and Jessop 2013). This emerging paradigm has the distinctive merit of enabling a “differential and integral” exploration of a real-concrete objects with regard to capitalism(s). It thereby helps us represent the real-concrete as the concrete-in-thought (for a brief account of what is at stake in this method, see Marx 1857/1986, 37 ff.; and, in more detail, Chapter 2 of this thesis).

Yet, my theoretical application of this emerging approach is not uncritical. For, while it is wide-ranging, it is not all-inclusive. To give an example directly relevant to this thesis, a theoretically-informed historical investigation into the EAMC calls for a theoretical approach to (post-)colonialism, imperialism, and international hegemony because of the intertwined effects on the EAMC of Imperial Japan’s role as a historically distinctive imperialist power, post-war Japan’s role as one of the region’s core states, and the influence of the post-war USA as a global hegemon. But the VarCap-CPE as developed until now lacks the substantive conceptual tools to develop or integrate these issues. Thus, I seek to upgrade it, albeit in a preliminary and provisional manner, by putting supranational relations in their place within the VarCap-CPE paradigm and applying this enhanced version in my investigation into the PCHM. Based on this theoretical work, then, I focus on the relations of social forces, not only within, but also beyond, the state in its narrow sense of the governmental apparatus. In other words, I explore how the supranational relations of social forces have been inscribed, refracted and reflected in the PCHM. Based on my empirical work, I illustrate how the model had been created, mutated and evolved as the rather unintended result of the cumulative inscription and condensation of two contradictory state strategies: first, the fascist and autarkic state strategies, and; second, liberal and free trade-oriented developmentalism. The first strategy originated from two far-right forces in the Army of Imperial Japan and was then adopted by Park Chung Hee and his associates. It can be thus viewed as one of the
Table 1.1 The Four Phases of the Park Chung Hee Era

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<td><strong>Political Regime</strong></td>
<td>Military junta</td>
<td>Authoritarian democracy</td>
<td>Totalitarian dictatorship after the “October Yushin” (Restoration)</td>
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<td><strong>President</strong></td>
<td>Park Chung Hee as Deputy Chairman of the military junta</td>
<td>Park Chung Hee as the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th President of South Korea</td>
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<td><strong>Hegemonic political fraction</strong></td>
<td>“Old” military fraction, led by Park (after his assassination, “new” military fraction emerged and then implemented neoliberal measures in the early 1980s)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hegemonic economic fraction</strong></td>
<td>Park’s “back-room boys”</td>
<td>Neoclassical economists, called the “Sogang School” &amp; American advisors</td>
<td>Park’s back-room boys in conflictual cooperation with the “takeoff” boys</td>
<td>The rise of neoliberal bureaucrats</td>
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<td><strong>Economic strategy</strong></td>
<td>Fascist-autarkic strategy, the final aim of which was a state with nuclear weapons</td>
<td>The integration of Rostow’s theory in the Autarkic strategy</td>
<td>Return to fascist-autarkic strategy, combined with export-oriented policies</td>
<td>Measures for market-friendly economic restructuring (April 1979), which lead to Park’s assassination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The start of export-oriented “light” industrialisation; the start of the rapid growth of the economy</td>
<td>The start of “heavy-chemical” industrialisation</td>
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<td><strong>Domestic Events</strong></td>
<td>Park’s military coup (1961), overthrowing Democratic revolution (1960)</td>
<td>Transfer to democracy under the US’s pressure</td>
<td>Transfer to a totalitarian regime (1972)</td>
<td>Park’s assassination (October 1979)</td>
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<td><strong>Overseas Events and Foreign Relations</strong></td>
<td>Outbreak of the Vietnam War (1964)</td>
<td>Join in the Vietnam War (1964-1966); Re-establish diplomatic relations with Japan (1965)</td>
<td>Nixon doctrine (1971); the first South and North Korea Joint Statement (1972); the oil shock (the mid-1970s) and the crisis of Western Fordism (late 1970s)</td>
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Source: My own
Note: For details, see Chapter 5 and particularly chapter 6; however, note that this thesis deals only with the first three phases.
postcolonial legacies of Imperial Japan. The second strategy was anchored on Walt Whitman Rostow’s theory of economic development and modernisation in the third world. It was what the US (particularly, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations) sought to implant in South Korea. In brief, the PCHM was self-contradictory. In this context, I represent it as a chimerical model. In Ancient Greek mythology, the chimera was a beast with a lion’s head, a goat’s body, and he a serpent as its tail. In this spirit, I use ‘chimerical’ to describe the hybrid or mongrel character of the PHCM as the product of the interbreeding of two contradictory gene pools.

However, why focus on South Korea alone? More precisely, why do we need to study and read the previous model of South Korea’s capitalism today when there are other, more recent success stories in the region? Is such an inquiry into the historical model of South Korea’s capitalism no more than a belated intervention in an outdated topic? In what follows, I respond to these questions by locating my concern with the PCHM in a wider context, thereby clarifying its relevance. Then I give a more detailed introduction of the VarCap-CPE, and of situated universalism as a critical realist tenet for a theoretical application to a historical case, thereby clarifying more on my contribution to critical and cultural political economy. The last section introduces the overall structure of this thesis. Then, I offer an excursus on previous literature on the East Asian economic miracle.

1.1 The EMAC and a Need for a New Theoretical Paradigm

The inspiration for this thesis did not start with an interest in the PCHM itself. Rather it began with my observation and personal experience of lay people’s suffering in the South Korean economy since the comprehensive implementation of neoliberal measures in response to the East Asian economic crisis of 1997-8. This prompted a political interest in alternatives to the
neo-liberalised economy. The practical concern was in turn followed by an academic interest in different models of capitalism, particularly in its East Asian variants in an increasingly integrated world market organized in the shadow of neo-liberalism. The link between these two concerns is that a political strategy requires a conjunctural analysis and this, in turn, requires a theoretical paradigm. In this respect, academically, my thesis started with an interest in a currently fashionable issue in political economy, namely, capitalist variety, diversity and variegation. Hence the need to place my investigation into the PCHM in a broader political economy context. To elaborate on the context, let me also briefly sketch some debates over the EAMC.

The EAMC has hitherto received substantial attention in academic and policy circles in, at least, three distinguishable, albeit entangled, contexts. The first is a debate over the East Asian miracle. As soon as it occurred in the 1960s, the phenomenon started being deemed a counterexample or, at least, anomaly, to the trade-pessimism that pervaded much post-war theorising of economic development and modernisation in the third world (for trade-pessimism, see Box 1.1). In this context, the need arose for a new account for the marvellous and sustained performance of the EAMC and this prompted the introduction and circulation in academic networks of some now widely used concepts and metaphors, such as the developmental state, the export-led economy, Confucian capitalism, the Asian flying geese (for more details, see excursus).

The second context is a debate over the East Asian economic crisis (hereafter EAEC) in 1997/1998 and, equally importantly, over the neoliberal crisis-management approach that was adopted in some affected by the EAEC. Admittedly, immediately after the crisis broke out, liberal economists in international economic organisations, the media in the Western world, and East Asian liberals started identifying the EAMC as the culprit behind the
Box 1. Trade-pessimism in the mid-20th century

The mid-twentieth century witnessed the build-up of many forms of trade-pessimism. To be more specific, economic literature (e.g., Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Rostow 1960) promoted the international division of labour from a Ricardian perspective on trade—particularly studies that asserted that foreign trade functions as an engine or one of vital preconditions to enable less-industrialised and/or newly decolonised states to catch up or leapfrog more advanced economies—had been subject to several kinds of trade-pessimistic criticism, both theoretically and empirically. For example, dissenting scholars sought to dismiss such a predilection for free foreign trade by: (1) problematising the availability to poor countries of an outward-oriented economic strategy in the mid-twentieth century on the grounds of trade opportunity less than in the late nineteenth century (Nurkse 1957/2009; 1959/2009); (2) illustrating that the impacts of trade expansion on economic growth varied from country to country even in the late nineteenth century (Kravis 1970); (3) pointing out that foreign trade between leading and lagging economies tends to bring about in the latter perpetual and/or cumulative harms, such as a ‘secular deterioration in the terms of trade’ (Prebish 1950) or the cumulative operation of ‘backwash effects’ that surpasses ‘spread effects’ (Myrdal 1956), and; (4) disclosing the modalities of a structurally unfair relation between core and (semi-)peripheral countries or, more broadly, of capital accumulation in an exploitative hierarchy on a world-scale (e.g., Amin 1974; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1974/2011).

Not long afterwards, however, the rapid and prolonged ascent of East Asian economies was evident and this prompted a critical turning point in scholarly treatments of this issue. Yet, notwithstanding the Asian miracle, not all trade-pessimistic approaches were dismissed as meaningless. For some trade-pessimistic scholars took it not as a counterexample in a Popperian sense, but an anomaly in a Kuhnian sense. Thus, they dealt with the phenomenon as a deviant case awaiting a supplementary account within the trade-pessimistic framework. In my view, a geopolitical account, based implicitly on the modern world-system approach, of the Asian miracle belongs here (see Cumings 1998; see also the excursus).

Source: My own
economic turbulence. In particular, this supranational alliance of liberal elites construed it as politically authoritarian, economically oligopolistic (or monopolistic) and socially managed by a clique. In sum, they claimed that East Asian capitalism was not only ineffective, but even corrupt (see, Fisher 1998a; 1998b; IMF 1998; IMF Staff 1998; Kang 2002). Crony capitalism, a term coined at this time, encapsulated all these negative features and, in this context, was used to justify calls for market-oriented economic restructuring—that is, the neoliberal transformation of the model—as the best response to the crisis. What is more, these liberal elites used international agencies to compel the affected states to engage in neoliberal restructuring. Also, in a few cases, especially those where this alliance came to be hegemonic at the strategic moment (with South Korea as a representative case), abrupt and radical measures for economic liberalisation were implemented with bailouts from, and under the surveillance of, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Needless to say, such a neoliberal interpretation of, and reply to, the crisis spawned fiery debates, turning scholarly attention not only to the legitimacy of neoliberal crisis-management but also to the distinctive features of the EAMC (see, e.g., Chang 1998; Chang, Park and Yoo 1998; Weiss 1999; Wade and Veneroso 1998).

The third context is far wider than the previous two. For it relates not to a single debate over a specific aspect of the EAMC but to a series of controversies over: (1) the hyper-globalisation thesis, which appeared as a conservative cry of triumph since the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the intensification of neoliberal globalisation (Fukuyama 1989, 1992; Ohmae 1995); (2) the capitalism-versus-capitalism thesis (Albert 1993) and varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) approach as a response to the ideologically narcissistic hyper-globalisation capitalism thesis; (3) the diversity of capitalism as a regulationist complement to the parsimonious account of the varieties and to the neo-institutionalist silence over capitalism itself (Amable 2003; Lane and Wood 2009), and; (4) Variegated capitalism as a
critique of all the spatially one-dimensional approaches to contemporary capitalism, and of their neglect of the generic features of capitalism, including contradictions, dilemmas and crisis-tendencies (Jessop 2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b; cf. Peck and Theodore 2007). That is, the third context is broadly concerned with the convergence and divergence of national models of capitalism and, in this context, the EAMC, including post-socialist cases, also won more attention in the burgeoning field of comparative and/or geographically sensitive political economy literature.

In reviewing past and present debates regarding the EAMC, there emerges an intriguing point, which has been, rather surprisingly, ignored in academic circles. This is the dissociation between actual history and major theories in political economy. As noted, the EAMC was constructed to describe an alleged East Asian miracle. Yet the East Asian economies evolved through different phases in different ways in different East Asian economies. After enjoying an unexpectedly surprising performance in the capitalist world market, these economies then fell into crisis. At this point, academic theorists questioned the validity of the model. In the real world, however, as a response to the crisis and/or for the other reasons, different East Asian economies were transformed, abruptly or gradually, transformed in line with the prevailing hegemonic or, at least, dominant neoliberal protocols in a world market that was being reorganized in the shadow of neo-liberalism. In academic circles this transformation was deemed to effect convergence among the national variants of capitalism, although, as with other models of capitalism, as with other models of capitalism, the EAMC was held to have retained some distinctive features too. In brief, while the history and present of East Asian capitalism is complex, this is not always fully reflected in the major bodies of political economy literature, which have failed to give a concrete, and theoretically consistent, account of the complex history. In my view, this failure has occurred because, fundamentally, their theoretical foundations tend to focus one-sidedly on just one facet of
the complex and concrete history. In this situation, those who aspire to understand the EMAC have often proved opportunistically reductionist, selectively silent, and/or eclectically incoherent.

In a nutshell, we need a new approach to the EAMC or broadly capitalism(s) itself. Yet the new paradigm must not be (yet another) simple and abstract theory that aspires to subsume all of the historical complexity and concreteness under some generic principles. Instead it must be a concrete and complex paradigm. In other words, it must be able to grasp the general, particular and singular features of the historical and contemporary capitalism(s). In addition, it must be able to deal, in a theoretically consistent manner, not only with the relatively stable accumulation and intermittent or recurrent crises, but also with the spatiotemporally multi-dimensional transformations, in the capitalism(s). Furthermore, equipped with these tools, we must investigate the past of capitalism(s) again, and then link such investigations into historical capitalisms to our concerns with the present of capitalism(s). My interest in the VarCap-CPE originated from this context and this, in turn, has informed my investigation into the PCHM. Therefore, I do not want this thesis to be judged as nothing but a belated intervention into an outdated debate. Rather, I hope it will be read as a preliminary to future enquiries into the neoliberalisation of South Korea’s capitalism and its present in a world market. In addition, I want my analysis to be interpreted as a “beta test” for alternative inquiries into other variants of the EAMC. I also hope that these can be incorporated into inquiries into another models of capitalism. In this rather broader context, my investigation into the PCHM, based on the VarCap-CPE, aims to put the model on its place in the VarCap-CPE. But what does this entail?

1.2 A Cultural Political Economy of Variegated Capitalism
It is impossible to give a full explanation of this paradigm in a short chapter. Here I simply identify its basic features and will use Part I to explicate it more fully. A brief summary is difficult because the paradigm is itself the synthesis of the diverse. Specifically, it consists of critical realism (which resonates with Marx’s method and the meta-theories on which the method relies), the strategic-relational approach, Marx’s account of the historical specificity of the capitalist mode of production (and, more broadly, his critique of political economy), historical and evolutionary institutional economics (particularly, different schools within the regulation approach), (post-)Marxist state theory, critical semiotic analysis, and the variegated-capitalism approach. That is, it is provides a complex conceptual schema that its authors describe as a heuristic rather than a general theory. Yet, thanks to this complexity and its ability to address a wide range of interconnected issues, it enables a concrete inquiry into a concrete object. Here are some basic features.

1. The VarCap-CPE is doubly relevant to Marx’s critique of political economy or his anatomy of civil society. First, it draws on his intellectual project. But, second, it seeks to contribute to the completion of the unfinished project. To do so, the VarCap-CPE has integrated many theoretical achievements after Marx’s death. In this context, Sum and Jessop (2013, ix) described their approach ‘as pre-disciplinary in inspiration, trans-disciplinary in practice, and post-disciplinary in its aspiration’. More specifically, while the VarCap-CPE is inspired by Marx’s pre-disciplinary critique of political economy, it has also drawn, with a post-disciplinary aspiration, on a wide range of scholarship and research by social scientists. As a result, it enables a trans-disciplinary inquiry of historical and contemporary capitalism (see Jessop 2002, 1; see also Chapter 3).

2. As regards the philosophy of social studies, the VarCap-CPE is anchored on Marx’s method and underlying meta-theory. It also recognises that these resonate with critical
realism. In this dual context, its ultimate research object is the real-concrete and its ambition is to represent this as the concrete-in-thought. This is the justification for the concreteness and complexity of the paradigm (see Chapter 2). But complexity is also deemed to require the choice of specific entry-points based on theoretical work to identify a specific explanandum or explananda rather than begin with what Marx described as a ‘chaotic conception’ of the whole.

3. As regards social theory, VarCap-CPE depends on the strategic-relational approach. As one of the three main forms of critical realist social theory, the strategic-relational approach provides comprehensive insights regarding: (1) structure and agency; (2) form and content; (3) form and formation; (4) system and sub-system; (5) the objective realities and actualities of a world, and subjective construals of the objective features of the world, and; (6) spatiotemporally multi-dimensional fixes and transformation (see Chapter 3).

4. As regards capital and the capitalist mode of production, VarCap-CPE takes Marx’s value theory as a foundational reference point. In particular, following Diane Elson (1980), the VarCap-CPE interprets Marx’s value theory not as a labour theory of value but as a value-form theory of labour power (see Jessop 2004). On this basis, the VarCap-CPE regards the theory as a foundation for an inclusive inquiry into: (1) the historical preconditions for the development of the wage relation as a general feature of the social relations of production; (2) the conditions for the relatively stable operation of capitalist social formations, despite the inherent crisis-tendencies of the CMP; and (3) the societal effects of the historically specific phenomenon, that is, the generalization of the commodity form to labour power and its treatment as if it were a real commodity.
5. As regards institutions, the VarCap-CPE adopts critical institutionalism as an alternative to all the old and new variants of institutionalism. This said, while critical institutionalism is just one part of the VarCap-CPE, its scope is wide-ranging. For it contains the regulation approach, post-Marxist state theory, critical semiotic analysis and the variegated-capitalism approach in its inside. Based on critical institutionalism, the VarCap-CPE explores the social and cultural embeddedness and institutedness of economic mechanisms and conduct integrally. Above all, it seeks to illuminate ‘how institutions aid the provisional stabilization (institutionalization) of specific systems of exploitation and domination’ Sum and Jessop 2013, 35).

Of course, each of these five points require detailed explication. They are given in the substantive chapters of this thesis—particularly, in Part I, which addresses (meta-) theoretical issues regarding the VarCap-CPE. Meanwhile, I want to emphasize only the following points. Thanks to its own substantive concreteness and complexity, and for its own methodological consistence, the VarCap-CPE enables a differential and integral exploration of historical and contemporary capitalism(s)—specifically, differential analyses of the object, based on rational abstraction, and then an integral synthesis of the analyses. My investigation into the PCHM is theoretically inspired by this paradigm. Yet, as noted, it is not applied uncritically. To elaborate this, let introduce a critical realist tenet for a theoretical application for a historical case—namely, situated universalism.

1.3 Situated Universalism and Upgrading the VarCap-CPE

Situated universalism emerged as a critical realist response to a postmodernist, relativist dismissal of aspiration and practice for accumulating a body of nomothetic knowledge. The
oxymoronic tenet posits that, while we must recognise the situatedness of knowledge; this sensitivity to context does warrant ‘a plea for particularism or relativism’ (Sayer 2002, 182). For ‘[t]he issue is not simply one of situatedness versus universalization; there is also the question of legitimate versus illegitimate universalization’ (175). Hence, ‘it is possible to conceive situated universalism’ (182). In this context, the notion rejects reductionist universalism or simply general theory that aims to subsume even the particularities and singularities of a concrete research object under its general principles. Simultaneously, it acknowledges a possibility that we can examine a universal or general aspect of the concrete research object (for more details on the distinction among the universal, the particular, and the individual, see Chapter 2). Needless to say, this epistemological tenet relies on the critical realist ontology that acknowledges the differentiation and stratification of the real and the contingent actualisation of the real mechanisms. More fundamentally, it resonates with Marx’s method and meta-theory.¹

Also, when we rely on this tenet, we can recognise clearly that a relation between theory and history can be doubly heuristic. This is because, on the one hand, because observation is unavoidably theory-laden. Indeed, based on the VarCap-CPE, I focused on not the endogenous attributes or exogenous conditions of the PCHM, but the wider ensemble of social relations in which the model is embedded. On the other hand, recognizing situated universalism helped me re-discover historical facts. Specifically, I recognised, in examining

¹ Admittedly, Marx (1857/1986) called for a concrete inquiry into the concrete. Simultaneously, in a preface for German readers to his book on capitalist mode of production in which England appears as the typical example, Marx (1867/1996, 8) proclaimed: ‘De te fabula narratur!’ (i.e., this story applies to you). In a same context, we can distinguish grand theory from general theory (see Sum and Jessop 2013, 98 ff.)
its history, that the PCHM was informed by supranational social relations far more than by the balance of domestic social relations.

This is because South Korea is not one of the Western, let alone North Atlantic states. Nor is it a first-order state even in a regional hierarchy, let alone on a global scale. Furthermore, from a US strategic perspective, South Korea has been one of the states in its Asian frontline, first in the Cold War and, presently, in its hegemonic competition with China. Thus, since 1945, the US has intervened actively in South Korea’s political, economic, and military affairs. Consequently, many South Korean leftist scholars or intellectuals have deemed their country as no more than a (neo-)colony of the US. Also, although the Cold War has ended, South Korea remains part of a partitioned peninsula. Hence, North Korea, too, should be considered as another external influenced on domestic affairs in South Korea. Moreover, before being split by the US and the USSR, the Korean peninsula had been a Japanese colony for 36 years (1910-1945). Thus, (post)colonial legacies, too, should be considered. In addition, its colonising power was not a Western imperialist state, but its neighbour—that is, Japan. The latter was initially just another victim of Western imperialism the late 19th century. In this context, we must recall that Japan’s colonies, culturally (and racially) similar and geographically adjacent to their metropolitan state, had been managed differently in the late 19th and early 20th centuries from the Western pattern of imperialism and this meant that the colonial influences of Imperial Japan and its postcolonial legacies in South Korea were also distinctive.

These factors are all intertwined and have contributed in their interconnection to the creation, mutation, evolution, and operation of the PCHM. In this context, my analytical strategy, based on situated universalism, is to insert historical and, partly, genealogical analyses of the situated factors between VarCap-CPE and the PCHM. In contrast, the VarCap-CPE does not have an approach to such a (post-)colonialism, imperialism and
international hegemony. For this reason, drawing on Marx’s insight into colonialism and hegemony on a world market, I integrate relevant conceptual tools into the VarCap-CPE approach. Thus equipped, I then investigate the PCHM.

1.4 The Overall Structure of this Thesis

The substantive chapters can be grouped into two parts: theory and history. Part I deals with theoretical issues regarding VarCap-CPE. Chapter 2 presents a philosophical foundation for this approach. Specifically, I present Marx’s method as involving two procedures for presentation and inquiry, which, taken together, constitute an artistic whole; clarify Marx’s method for inquiry; uncover the meta-theoretical foundations on which the method relies; and link them to critical realism. In Chapter 3, I introduce the VarCap-CPE approach itself. This chapter gives a more detailed explanation not only of its overall features but also of its theoretical components, such as the strategic-relational approach, Marx’s value theory, critical institutionalism, (post-)Marxist state theory, critical semiotic analysis and the variegated-capitalism approach. In Chapter 4, I put (post-)colonialism, imperialism and international hegemony on their places in the VarCap-CPE. This work is based on Marx’s analysis of domination and hegemony in a world market. By doing so, I give an entirely new interpretation on Marx’s authentic approach of the birth of a capitalist society, of a first place where the society was born, and of the role of Protestantism and Puritanism on the birth and operation of the capitalist society. In this context, I contribute not only to improving the VarCap-CPE but also to Marxist studies more generally.

In Part II, I investigate the history of the PCHM. Chapter 5 examines the origin and features of the autarkic state strategies of the fascist military cliques in Imperial Japan since the 1930, and then indicates its relevance to post-war South Korean and North Korean elites.
This work is needed to understand not only the postcolonial legacy of Imperial Japan, which was reflected in the PCHM, but also the rather complex relations—that is, commonalities as well as dissimilarities—between South Korean capitalism and North Korean socialism during the Cold War era. In Chapter 6, I illustrate how the PCHM was created, mutated and evolved by the fascist autarkic state strategy and Rostowian developmentalism. I also give a form-analysis of its functional operation. Chapter 7 analyses two cooperative, and simultaneously contradictory, semiotic strategies that contributed to (in)stabilising the PCHM. Needless to say, one of them is Park Chung Hee’s “developmentalist” discourse. The other is the US’s “developmentalist” and “modernisation” discourse.
Excursus: Twelve Bodies of Literature on the Asian Miracle

This excursus provides a comprehensive review of extant literature on the Asian miracle. On my reading, this literature can be divided into twelve approaches, which can be put into two larger groups, albeit of unequal size. For, while ten approaches seek to identify the decisive factor that enabled the Asian miracle, the other two, following Parisian regulationist tenets, focus more on the structural features and the overall configuration of the EAMC than on any given individual factor. Remember here that regulationism is part of the VarCap-CPE approach. Accordingly, these two bodies of literature have a special relation to my investigation into the PCHM. But let me first review the other approaches.

1. Weberian statisticians have studied the rapid and prolonged growth of the East Asian economies in terms of the intention, autonomy and capacity of state managers or apparatus. On this basis, they argue that the rationally calculated strategy and prudent policy decision of a development-oriented and competent pilot agencies in East Asian countries caused the splendid performance of their economies. Indeed, the concept “developmental state” emerged from this approach. By referring to the East Asian states as a development state, the concept has not only highlighted their distinctive features, but also distinguished this particular group of capitalist states from regulatory and predatory states in capitalist societies as well as the socialist type of state (see Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1995).

2. Market-fundamentalists, too, have highlighted the exceptional features of East Asian economies. In particular, they have identified their distinctive features vis-à-vis Latin American economies, whose relatively sluggish development has been explained in terms of their international dependency or the interregional exploitation of surplus
value. In this context, the market-fundamentalists focused on the “freer” trade policy (i.e., export promotion and free import) of the East Asian states and the articulation of their respective economies with others in a world market. On this basis, they argued that export expansion brought about positive externalities (particularly, an increment in productivity and efficiency), thereby contributing to the East Asian economies far more than export growth itself (see, e.g., Balassa 1978; 1988).

3. Neoclassical, particularly Keynesian, macroeconomists agree with the claim that export promotion generated positive externalities. Yet they reject the market-fundamentalist assertion that export expansion augmented efficiency or productivity in the East Asian economies. Instead, they viewed an increase in investment as the external benefit, which was caused by export promotion (see, e.g., Young 1994; Krugman 1994). Also, in this context, they recognise the efficacious role of the East Asian governments in boosting their economies.

Before proceeding further, we can address an intriguing debate over the denotation of the Asian “miracle”. Admittedly, the Solow Economic Growth Model, which had been very influential in neoclassical economics until the emergence of new growth theory in the early 1980s, views the level of productivity in a production function as an exogenous factor. Thus it could not (and cannot) explain changes in productivity. For this reason, although market-fundamentalists asserted that the productivity of the East Asian economies rose as the result of their market-friendly trade politics, this claim could not be explained in the major growth model in neoclassical economics of the time. This may be why the rapid and sustained growth of the East Asian economies was depicted as “miraculous”. For, although the phenomenon was fabulous, it was “scientifically” unexplainable. A few macroeconomists criticised this point, because, as noted, they believed that the externalities, led by export promotion, were
due to the mass of investment rather than productivity gains. In their view, then, the growth can be explained even in the traditional growth model and, hence, the growth was not a miracle (see Krugman 1994). This debate is nonetheless relevant to the fourth approach, which is located between the market-fundamental and Keynesian positions.

4. In the early 1980s, as mentioned, new growth theory emerged in neoclassical economics. The theory, called endogenous growth theory, highlights learning in the course of market exchange. It proposes that we learn technologies and managerial skills in trading commodities and services, thereby gaining the ability to improve productivity. On this basis, advocates of the theory focused on the productivity of the East Asian economies again. Yet, unlike market-fundamentalists, they argued that the productivity was increased by learning abroad in trading with advanced countries (see, e.g., Lucas 1993).

5. Another approach involves economic eclecticism resulting from a political compromise in an international organisation, namely, The World Bank’s 1993 report. Market fundamentalists have argued that the Asian miracle occurred by “getting prices right”. On the contrary, statists indicated “getting prices wrong” as its cause. Between these two, the World Bank suggested “getting fundamentals right” as an alternative interpretation on the Asian miracle. Yet fundamentals are nothing but a term that is used in policy circles to refer roughly to macroeconomic factors. Also, in this context, the report is market-friendly; yet, it simultaneously affirms the previous role of East Asian governments as appropriate. Yet, given earlier reports from the World Bank, this interpretation was rather deviant, because the international organisation had previously offered a more market-friendly account of the Asian miracle. In this context, the well-known 1993 report of the World Bank must be read in terms of its internal
politics. For the report arose because Japanese technocrats and economists in the World Bank lodged a protest about the libertarian bias of the organisation, leading to neglect of Japan’s actual economic history (for the internal politics in the World Bank, see Rodrik 1994; Terry 2000; Wade 1996).

6. Weberian culturalists, as opposed to statists, were dissatisfied with political-economic approaches to the miracle. Thus, they focused on “Asian values”. They argued that, just as the Protestant ethic contributed to the emergence, operation and development of modern Western capitalism, Confucianism played an identical role in East Asian capitalism. This led to the concept of “Confucian capitalism”, which, for Weberian culturalists, complements the developmental state (Lew 2013; Tu 1996)

7. As I noted above, the development of the East Asian economies has frequently been regarded as a “Popperian” counterexample to the trade-pessimistic literature. Yet some have regarded it instead as a “Kuhnian” anomaly in this context. Specifically, they provide a geopolitical account that focuses on the exceptional status of East Asian states in the exploitative world system of capitalism. For, because East Asian capitalist states, unlike their Latin American and African counterparts, were located in one of the fronts of the Cold War, the US and other core capitalist states felt obliged, exceptionally, to boost their economies to advertise the superiority of capitalist over socialist development and also protect them from communist threats (Cumings 1998).

8. Some scholars focused on the historical preconditions of the Asian miracle. Accordingly, they highlighted the colonial managements of Imperial Japan. Although not all historians who investigated the relation between the colonial history and the Asian miracle are sympathetic to fascism, this is, certainly, one of the approaches that Japanese fascists have most liked. For it implies that, unlike Western metropolitan states, Imperial Japan contributed to the economic development and, broadly,
modernisation of their colonies. For this reason, its ideological background is crypto-fascism (see, e.g., Eckert 1999; Kohli 1994)

9. There is also another version of crypto-fascism. Since the early 1960s, a few Japanese economists have accentuated Japan’s leadership in the Asian economy. They argued that as a leader in East Asia, Japan not only enabled the mutually reciprocal division of labour in the region, but also led the East Asian group to the ranks of the advanced economies in the Western world. This view generated the metaphor “flying geese”. Yet, its political implication is at least crypto-imperialist if not crypto-fascist. For it implies that, while, as trade-pessimistic studies illustrate, Western core states have exploited Latin America and Africa by means of international trade, Japan has actually proved beneficial to (semi-)peripheral states in East Asia (Akamatsu 1962).

10. Lastly, let me introduce a class-deterministic account. Some Marxists draw on the asymmetric nature of the capital-wage labour relation to argue that the rapid accumulation of capital in East Asian states was anchored in over-exploitation of their labour force by means of the low wages and long working hours in the East Asian economies (Chang 2009). However, given the resulting economic growth, this did not mean that East Asian workers did not, in certain conditions, experience rising wages. It meant simply that wages did not rise in line with productivity as that capital retained a growing proportion of surplus-value.

None of the ten approaches to the Asian miracle is, on its face, entirely absurd. Even the market-fundamentalist claim has its own rational kernel. Yet, they also have some common flaws that underpin their respective shortcomings as well. In reading the ten bodies of literature, it emerges that they rely, explicitly or implicitly, on an empiricist-comparativist logic – although some of the political economy theories on which they draw have few affinities
to, or even contradict methodologically, empiricist comparativism. Thus, all ten sought to discover some single decisive factor that enabled the miracle. In doing so, some argued that the miracle can be reenacted in spatiotemporally different situations by transplanting the decisive factor there (e.g., their industrial and trade policies). Others claimed that it is impossible, because the decisive factor cannot be transplanted (e.g., the East Asian geopolitical location during the Cold War era, the Asian value, Japan’s leadership, etc.).

Yet, empiricist comparativism, which draw on David Hume’s philosophy and John Stuart Mill’s logical methods, is problematic in its own terms. Nonetheless, for the moment, let me assume for the sake of argument that it is best suited to scientific inquiry, especially where there are only a few cases, ruling out reliance on statistical analysis as well as real-world experiments. Even so, the ten approaches have seriously flawed research designs. For there are too many variables in a small number of cases for valid conclusions to be drawn. Empiricist-comparativist methodologists have thus developed their own solutions to avoid this problem: (1) increase the number of cases; (2) reduce the potential property space by using parsimonious dichotomies; (3) combine a most-similar-cases design, based on John Stuart Mill’s method of difference, and a most-different-cases design, based on Mill’s method of agreement, in order to eliminate as many non-decisive factors as possible in comparing/contrasting cases (see, e.g., Przeworski and Teune 1970); (4) when exploring only one case, choose either a most-likely case study for a hypothesis that the researcher seeks to refute or a least-likely case study for a hypothesis that the researcher seeks to uphold (Eckstein 1975). While these different protocols can prove productive, they are not followed by any of the ten approaches considered above. Worse, as mentioned, in some of them, we find a contradiction between politico-economic theories on which they rely and their methodological position. On the basis of the poor research designs, what they did was to
accentuate again what the theories or political ideologies on which they draw have accentuated.

One might claim that this is unavoidable. For observation is theory-laden, and theory is value-laden. And yet, the theoretical foundations of these ten approaches have a one-sided focus on one or another facet of the East Asian capitalism. Taken together with the flaws in their research designs, this led to factual inaccuracies in their arguments. For example, it is right that state managers played an important role in boosting the South Korean economy. Yet, a unified pilot agency, whose economic strategy stemmed from Friedrich List’s thoughts, never existed in South Korea. It is partly correct that South Korea had implemented a policy measure to free imports during the Cold War era. It eliminated a barrier to import for only capital goods and raw materials that are necessarily required to manufacture their own goods. The “Asian value” discourse has little to say about Koreans’ resistance to their authoritarian and, sometimes, totalitarian regimes. It also neglects the history that Western-centric value, traditionalism, nationalism and Japanese fascism had ideologically struggled with one another in South Korea. I provide more examples of factual errors in the substantive chapters of this thesis. Yet it has to be here reassured that the factual errors in the ten analyses considered here are not just accidental but are grounded in their theoretical flaws.

Lastly, let me briefly comment on two regulationist analyses of the EAMC. First, one early Parisian regulationist, Alan Lipietz, conceptualised the models of capitalism in the third world as “peripheral Fordism” (1987). In my view, his analysis has two strong analytical purchases. First, following regulationist protocols, it focused on the structural features and their configurations of the East Asian model of capitalism. Second, it opened space to explore the uneven relations in the international hierarchy of capitalism. Yet, it grasped the capitalist models of the third world in terms of their dissimilarities from Western Fordism. This led to neglect of many of their immanent features. For this reason, the earlier work of regulationism
on the third world has been criticised even by regulationists themselves on the grounds that it depends implicitly on a Eurocentric perspective. Second, in response, later analyses of East Asian capitalism(s) have sought to overcome this bias. For instance, Boyer and Yamada (2002) gave an alternative account of Japanese capitalism by conceptualising it as “companyism” (for more advanced analyses of Japan, see Boyer, Uemura and Isogai 2013). Jessop and Sum (2006) also gave a non-Eurocentric account of the East Asian “Gang of Four” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) by conceptualising them as “exportism”.

Remember here that the VarCap-CPE was launched in academic circles by Jessop and Sum. In this regard, my investigation into the PCHM, based theoretically on the VarCap-CPE, has affinities to their regulationist analysis of exportism. More specifically, my research seeks to upgrade their empirical analyses of the PCHM and partly the EAMC in relevance to the following points. First, they relatively neglected the internationally uneven relations and their effects on exportism. Second, in this context, they rather uncritically interpreted the macroeconomic policies of the exportist models of capitalism during the Cold War era as Ricardian or Listian. That is, they gave a similar interpretation with that of Weberian statists. Third, they did not integrate discursive struggles, developed on a supranational scale, for a particular type of societalisation in South Korea. By focusing on the supranational relations in which the PCHM was embedded from a variegated-imperialism perspective, I improve the regulationist approach to exportism (for variegated imperialism, see Chapter 4).
Part I. Theoretical Considerations
2. Laying a Philosophical Foundation for a VarCap-CPE Approach

Here I lay a philosophical foundation for both the VarCap-CPE approach and my investigation into the PCHM. Generally speaking, empirical inquiries in social studies seek one or more of the following four objectives: first, discovering constancy or regularity; second, explaining causality; third, describing a process, and/or, fourth, interpreting a meaning. To do so, they tend to draw theoretically on just one single paradigm or one aspect of a broader paradigm. In contrast, my eventual goal in this thesis is to re-define in a relatively detailed fashion the previous development model of South Korea’s capitalism—particularly one that is still often claimed to have produced an economic miracle. In addition, I utilise an integral paradigm, dubbed the VarCap-CPE approach, along the way. In these two respects, my thesis differs fundamentally from usual empirical inquiries in social studies, and for this reason, I justify it in the light of the philosophy of social sciences. To do so, above all, I clarify what is at stake in Marx’s method and then unveil its philosophical foundations. For, on the one hand, the VarCap-CPE approach is fundamentally anchored in Marx’s method and his distinctive scientific philosophy; on the other, however, notwithstanding their importance, these premises remain unclear. Accordingly, subsequent sections deal with the following topics: first, Marx’s method; second, his metaphysics; third, his epistemology; fourth, his methodology; fifth, analysis, synthesis and pragmatist elements in Marx’s method; sixth, rational kernels and a mystified shell in Hegel’s philosophy; seventh, existing interpretations on Marx’s method. Then, I shall connect the aforementioned issues to my investigation, based upon the VarCap-CPE.

2.1 Marx’s Method as a Procedure
Contemporary social scientists tend to refer to their research techniques in terms of their methods. In contrast, Marx (1857/1996, 37-8) referred to his method of research (Forschungsweise) and distinguished it from the method of presenting his research results (Darstellungsweise) (1873/1996: 18-19). I suggest that the two procedures can be diagrammed as follows.

Figure 2.1: Marx’s Procedure for Inquiry and Presentation

A World

![Diagram showing Marx's Procedure for Inquiry and Presentation]

Source: My own interpretation
Note: A scientific inquiry starts with “motion 1”, whereas a logical presentation about the inquiry begins from “point 2”.

Simply speaking, a Marxian method of research proceeds as follows: first, observing or experiencing a factual phenomenon; second, perceiving and then conceiving a research object, which Marx referred to as the real, the concrete, a living whole, an organic whole, and the like; third, analysing the initial conception of the research object (i.e., a conceptual descent from a chaotic conception to the simplest determination); fourth, synthesising the analyses
(i.e., a conceptual ascent from the simplest determination to the concrete-in-thought), and; fifth, testing the concrete-in-thought practically in an outer world (see Marx 1845/1975, 3-4; 1857/1996, 37-8). Note, however, that this procedure is an idealized representation of his research practice. In reality, this procedure can never be completed. It thus results only in an incomplete body of knowledge of the research object that we can obtain and then test again and again. In this case, the practical test can itself function as a new observation or experience—that is, as a new starting point for a more developed inquiry of the object. In this context, I regard Marx’s procedure for an inquiry as a spiral process that allows us to obtain an increasingly detailed body of knowledge. For this reason, I name the test as a “pragma-dialectic test”, which involves trial-and-error (re-)search practices. In contrast, the Marxian method of presentation starts with the conclusion of the aforementioned descent—that is, with the simplest determination. Although this has encouraged some to simplify Marx’s method with the slogan, “from abstract to concrete”, this catchphrase does not concern Marx’s method itself but his method of presentation.

On the other hand, from this interpretation on Marx’s method and in the light of his plans for the critique of political economy, we can infer that Marx’s inquiry started with his observation of a periodically recurrent crisis in the contemporary world market. We know that it was the ‘first world economic crisis’ of 1857 that led him to renew his intensive studies of political economy. In this context, it seems that beginning from such crises (i.e., which would have been part of the topic of the last book in his initial six-book plan for Capital, namely, the world market and crises), Marx asked what the capitalist world must be like for such global crises to occur. He then analytically moved down, through foreign relations among states, to the state itself. It also seems that, at this point, he analytically decomposed the state into three social classes and/or the three factors of production (i.e., capital, landed property and wage-labour). Furthermore, in my view, considering that both the world
market and the state are anchored on the capitalist mode of production (hereafter CMP), he would choose capital as the first topic. Here, to deal with capital, he would move downward again until arriving at the cell form of a bourgeois society—that is, a commodity. It seems in this context that *Capital* vol. 1 came to be presented from a commodity (for his six-book plan, see Marx 1857/1986, 45; 1857-8/1986, 195; 1859/1987, 261; for his four-book plan, including three theoretical books and a historical-literary one, see Marx 1865/1987, 173; for his discussion on the commodity as the economic cell form of capitalist society, see Marx 1867/1996, 19). The project, of course, remains incomplete. However, in the light of his methods for both an inquiry and a presentation, his project has an intriguing totality. Also, it seems in this context that Marx (1865/1987, 173) wrote: ‘Whatever shortcomings they may have, the advantage of my writings is that they are an artistic whole’ (for more details on the debates over his plan, see Chapter 3).

2.2 Marx’s Metaphysical Stance

Metaphysics (or ontology) deals with the ultimate nature of being. For his inquiry to be scientific, Marx’s method must rely on a specific, particularly acceptable, set of metaphysical doctrines. Marx, of course, did not give us an inclusive and systemic explanation of his position in metaphysics. Yet, we can infer it, albeit imperfectly, from his method and other pieces of writing. In my reckoning, his metaphysical stance depends on the following points.

1. An object in an outer world exists independently of our mind (see, e.g., Marx 1857/1986, 38). In this context, the object can be referred to as the real. Here, the real denotes the mind-independent. Yet, as I shall add, that something is real may also mean that it has an ontic depth.
2. The mind-independent object is neither universal nor general. According to Marx (1857/1986, 23), a general thing can exist only in a form of pure abstraction. On the contrary, the mind-independent has its own historical trajectory that is geographically specific. Furthermore, its emergence, too, relies on its historical presuppositions that are also geographically specific (see, e.g., Marx and Engels 1846/1975, 38 ff.).

3. Not only the mind-independent and historico-geographically specific object, but a world itself is also “overlaid” or “laminated”. In other words, a world has an ontic depth; as mentioned, in this context, both the object and the world can be also described as real. Specifically, Marx decomposed the world into actual and real layers, though critical realist Marxists, following Roy Bhaskar (1975/1997, 1979/1998, 1987, 1989), tend to trifurcate it into empirical, actual and real realms. An actual world, which Marx and Engels (1846/1975, passim) also referred to as a ‘sensuous world’, is a presently apparent and thus immediately observable part of the world. Thus, it corresponds to a surface or an outer layer in the laminated world. In contrast, a real world is an inner layer in the overlaid world. It is thus the layer at which our senses do not reach directly. In this context, the real world is also a place where what Marx referred to as inner connections, relations or necessities are operated (see Marx 1867/1987, 390; 1869/1988, 232; 1873/1996, 17-20). On the other hand, for this reason,

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2 Thus far, Marx’s anatomy of a capitalist society has been in large part regarded as historically materialistic. Yet it was also geographically sensitive from the outset, and this feature in his critique of political economy is found par excellence in his discussions on the historical emergence of a capital relation, the CMP, and a capitalist system in the context of a world market—particularly his discussions on capitalist hegemony on a world market (for more details on Marx’s world market and hegemony, see Chapter 4).
the real in Marx’s method refers to a mind-independent and, simultaneously, ontologically deep object.

4. Such a real and historico-geographically specific object is also regarded as concrete. This means that the object is the synthesis of the diverse. Therefore, it is a rich totality. In this context, to borrow Hegel’s terminology, it may be regarded as having its own individuality too. On the other hand, the concrete is opposite to the abstract. Here, the abstract is only one-sided and thus simple. In this context, the concrete is coupled with the complex (see Marx 1857/1986, 38).

5. The real-concrete that has its own historico-geographical specificity is synthetically determined by not only its innate attributes, but also its relations or mediations. For this reason, Marx synthetically defined an object as not only an attribute, but also a

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3 Here we need to distinguish the individual in Hegel’s philosophy from an individual in methodological individualism. In Hegel’s philosophy, the individual (or, in some cases, what is translated into the singular) refers to an abundant and concrete whole. Thus, it corresponds to the concrete. In particular, the individual is regarded not only to include mediations among its parts, but to be also mediated with others (Hegel 1807/1977; 1816/2010; 1817/2010). On the contrary, an individual in methodological individualism is close to a windowless monad. Individuals are, therefore, simple units that are mutually insulated. Considering these, it is correct to argue that Marx’s inquiry does not start with an individual. Yet, it may be wrong to argue that his inquiry does not start with the individual. For, as noted, Marx’s inquiry for the critique of political economy started with his observation of a world market—particularly the 19th-century world market, and the market had its own totality and thus individuality (cf. Ehrgar 2007).

4 On the one hand, as is well recognised, the dichotomy between the simple and the complex can be also found in Locke’s and Hume’s methods. For instance, in Hume’s method, the complex image (or idea as a faint image) in our mind is a result that simple images (or ideas), obtained through our senses from an outer world, are habitually associated with each other in mind. On the other, the dichotomy between the abstract and the concrete originated from Hegel (for Hegel’s distinction between the two, and further for his advocate of a concrete thought about a concrete object, see Hegel 1808/1966, 461-5; 1807/1977, passim; see Section 6).
(social) relation. Recall that Marx (1845/1975, 3-4; 1849/1977, 211; 1867/1996, 753; 1894/1998, 801) grasped a human being, a commodity, money, capital, and so forth as ensembles of social relations. Also, for the same reason, a Marxian definition of a thing differs from the Aristotelian genus-differentia definition that is usually employed in scientific research (for details, see Section 6). On the other hand, this implies that Marx adopted the realist approach to a relation too. That is, in Marx’s reckoning, relations too exist mind-independently or, as Marx (1859/1987, 263) sometimes highlighted, will-independently. They are also ontologically deep in that relations are not observed directly. In addition, they have effects on a thing, and thus come to be inscribed in the thing. Here, we need to recognise that the realist approach to a relation is a highly distinguishable position in modern metaphysics.⁵ Therefore, the distinctive position in

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⁵ According to Bertrand Russell (1912/1998, 94 ff.), there are two ways of thinking about a metaphysical topic. The first is to do so by way of a proposition that comprises a substantive and an adjective. The second is to do so by way of a proposition, including a verb and/or a preposition. Generally speaking, the first way focuses on only a property or an attribute in an object that the substantive indicates. Thus, it hinders us from thinking about its relation. On the contrary, the second way allows us to deal with a relation, because both a verb and a preposition tend to imply relations. Here, Russell argued that since Spinoza, most of modern philosophers had followed only the first way, and thereby they had treated a relation as merely nominal. In contrast, irrelevantly of whether or not Russell was aware of it, it seems that Hegel acknowledged a mediation as effective being. Moreover, Hegel recognised the becoming of a relatively concrete thing that emerged, in part, out of the interplays, through the meditations, among relatively abstract things. Yet, Hegel’s philosophy was not realistic in that he went further to acknowledge the all-pervasive, all-embracing whole that is immaterial. In Hegel’s philosophy, therefore, mediations even in an objective world are not independent from the immaterial whole. It is basically in this context that Marx’s realist approach to a relation is eminently distinguishable in modern metaphysics. Unlike those who Russell categorised as most of modern philosophers, and like Hegel, Marx acknowledged mediations as effective being. He also acknowledged the emergence of a relatively concrete thing. Simultaneously, he discarded the all-pervasive whole as the mystified shell of Hegel’s philosophy (for more details on Hegel, see Section 6).
metaphysics seems to be one of the decisive factors that fundamentally distinguishes Marx’s *critique* of political economy from earlier and current contributions to classical or vulgar political economy. His realist approach to social relations helps us avoid fetishising a thing or its innate substance.

6. As regards Marx’s realist approach to a relation, let me return to the dichotomy between the simple-abstract and the complex-concrete. As mentioned, the dichotomy between the simple and the complex can be found in Hume’s method too. Yet, the complex in Hume’s method is no more than the habitual association of the simple things, regardless of whether it properly reflects an object in an outer world. In contrast, for Marx and Hegel, the complex is far much more than the simple sum of the simple things. This is because both of them recognised not only mediations as effective being, but also becoming into, or the emergence of, a relatively concrete thing. The becoming arises, in part, out of the interplays (i.e., a dialectical synthesis), through relations, among relatively abstract things. In this context, for both Marx and Hegel, relations are not only inscribed in the object; they also concretise it.

7. Insofar as different kinds of relations are densely embedded and even mutually entangled in a world and, further, insofar as they concretise, and thus change, an object, the real-concrete and historico-geographically specific object, and further the world itself can be conceived as a living organism. In this context, they can be referred to a living or organic whole. Also, in the same context, we can state, as Lukács argued, that Marx highlighted the category of totality. Note, however, that Marx did not acknowledge ‘the all-pervasive supremacy of a whole over its parts’ (Lukács 1923/1972, 27). It seems to me that the supremacy of a whole seems nothing but the ‘mystified shell’ of Hegel’s philosophy. Indeed, nothing in Marx’s inquiry corresponds to the pantheistic existence in Hegel’s philosophy. Thus, the supremacy of a whole over its
parts is not the method that Marx took from Hegel, but the method that Marx discarded in taking ‘rational kernels’ from Hegel⁶ (See also Louis Althusser’s comments on the specificity of the Marxian dialectic vis-à-vis Hegel).

All in all, as Marx (1873/1996, 19) himself admitted, Marx’s metaphysical stance is ‘severely realistic’. Specifically, as critical realists have correctly argued, the stance can be referred to as ‘depth realism’ that acknowledges not only the mind independence of a world, but also its ontic depth (see, e.g., Collier 1994). In particular, as noted, Marx adopted the realist approach to a relation, which is highly distinguishable position in modern metaphysics.

### 2.3 Marx’s Epistemological Stance

Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge and how to obtain it. Marx’s method of inquiry also requires an acceptable set of epistemological principles that must also be compatible with his position in metaphysics. In my reckoning, Marx’s epistemological stance comprises the following points.

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⁶ I agree with Lukács’s (1923/1971, 1) argument that Marxist ‘orthodox refers exclusively to method’. In addition, as mentioned, I agree with his argument that Marx attached great importance to the category of totality. Yet, the supremacy of an all-embracing whole over its parts is relevant to God, Notion, Concept, and/or Absolute Spirit in Hegel’s philosophy. In my reckoning, it corresponds to the shell of Hegel’s philosophy that makes the philosophy mystified, and thus it seems to be stripped off by Marx that attempted to take rational kernels in it (for more details on Hegel, see Section 6).
1. Scientific knowledge is, basically, produced through subjective, mental, labour concerning a mind-independent object in an outer world. The knowledge is thus the particular product of a particular human practice. For the same reason, it can be regarded as a mental tool that is manufactured by, and thereby has a use-value for, a human. In this respect, as with the utility of a physical tool, mental tools must also be tested in the light of their practical use in an outer world (Marx 1845/1975, 3-4; see also Section 5). In this context, while Marx’s method depends on ontological depth-realism and epistemological pragmatism.

2. Given that the mind-independent object has ontic depth, the process of fashioning the mental tool must include a process of probing, with reason, the real determinants of the object. Otherwise, ‘we should surely have no need of science at all’ (Marx 1867/1987, 390, italic in original; see also Marx 1869/1988, 232; 1873/1996, 19). Given also that the real object is concrete, knowledge production must involve a process of identifying the contingent co-working of necessary mechanisms. Added here that the real-concrete object is also historico-geographically specific, the production has to include a process of exploring the historical presuppositions of the object and its historical development that are geographically specific.

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7 This is drawn from Marx’s (1845/1975, 3) synthesis between what he called ‘all the hitherto materialism, including that of Feuerbach’ and idealism. According to Marx, all the materialism before him has a rational kernel in that it basically acknowledges the mind-independence of an object. Yet, simultaneously, it has a chief defect in that it takes the object only in the form of contemplation. In contrast, idealism, particularly a Hegelian one has a rational kernel in that it seeks to grasp (greifen) an object through subjective labour and produce concepts (Begriffe). That is, it accentuates the active side of mental labour. Yet, it relies on an illusion that an outer world is the representation of an all-pervasive immaterial whole. To me, it seems that Marx articulated the rational kernels of the two, producing thereby a distinctive, realist-pragmatic view of knowledge production.
3. Yet, even the integrated exploration of the research object is only one part of the knowledge production. Recall here that, at the ending point of the integral synthesis, knowledge refers to the concrete-in-thought that reflects the real-concrete. This implies that, at the final stage, knowledge appears in the form of a concept in which the diverse determinations of the research object have already been taken into account synthetically. It further implies that, at the latest stage in the process of manufacturing the mental tool, we aim to re-define the research object synthetically. For this reason, on the one hand, knowledge production is involved with the integrated exploration of the contingent co-operations of the diverse mechanisms; on the other, it is accompanied by the elaboration of concrete concepts. In other words, the synthetic course in producing scientific knowledge is also involved with concrete conceptualisation—more specifically, the synthetical derivation of increasingly concrete concepts from relatively abstract concepts. This also implies that knowledge production involves a process of rendering an extant conceptual system itself more abundant by adding concrete concepts to it.

Marx argued that, to produce knowledge—that is, to create a mental tool— we have to engage in a real labour process. In my reckoning, the process is Marx’s method as a procedure for an inquiry that I outlined in Section 1. The more detailed introduction of the procedure is as follows.

1. We start the inquiry with a sensuous observation. In political economy, thus: ‘We proceed from an actual economic fact’. In other words, we do not start our inquiry with ‘a fictitious primordial condition’ (Marx 1844/1975, 271; italic in original). For instance, we may start with an observation of the ‘periodic recurrence’ or ‘periodic
average incidence’ of a factual phenomenon (Marx 1869/1988, 232). Then, we perceive, and further conceive, a research object that has a rich totality. However, the concept, obtained through the initial conception, is superficial. For it is nothing but one that refers to the living, organic and concrete whole as a whole. In other words, the superficial concept says little things about the historico-geographical and real determinations of the object. That is, the history, the geography, and the real determinants, of the object still remain indefinitely in the whole concept, and the initial conception is thus ‘chaotic’ (Marx 1857/1986, 37).

2. Faced with a chaotic conception, therefore, we must disaggregate it in a descending analysis to produce a conceptual system that we can then utilise. In other words, in view of an outer world and history, we must analyse the superficial concept by using the power of reason. Here, an analysis can refer to two distinguishable activities. One is to decompose the initial concept into simpler categories. This must be continued until the discovery of the simplest category that generally (or universally in Hegel’s terminology) defines the research object. This analysis involves the decomposition of the initial concept in line with a descent in an existing conceptual system. In addition, by this means, we can dig out not only the contemporarily real determinants of a

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8 In 1857 Introduction, of course, Marx (1857/1986, 36) argued: ‘It would seem right to start with the real and concrete … Closer consideration shows, however, that this is wrong’. To me, it seems in this context that many Marxists have simplified his method as a catchy phrase of “from abstract to concrete”. Yet, Marx also wrote that the concrete in an outer world is ‘the real starting point, and thus also the starting point of perception and conception’—though: ‘In thinking, it … appears as a process of summing-up, as a result, not as the starting point’. In addition, as noted, Marx argued elsewhere, the inquiry proceeds from a fact. In this context, I suggest that whilst a Marxian presentation proceeds from abstract to concrete, the inquiry starts with an observation which is followed by perception and conception (see Section 6).
research object, but also the historically preceding determinants that the initial concept presupposes. Ideally speaking, therefore, this type of analysis involves an infinitesimal unit of differential abstractions from the rich totality of a research object (see Section 5; for a realist method for rational abstraction, see Sayer 1992). The other is to identify a form (i.e., a specific mode of organisation of content) at only an abstract level (for a critical realist view of a social form, see Jessop 2007a, 421-2). To distinguish the two analyses, I refer to a former sense of analysis as a differential analysis or a conceptual differential—and the latter as a form-analysis. On the other hand, although the destination of the differential analysis is the simplest determination, we must not end with the discovery of a few general relations at the simplest level. For it is close to the Hobbesian, Newtonian or Wolffian approach in pursuit of a deductive and parsimonious explanation of a world—that is, according to Marx, the approach on which the 17th-century political economists drew (Marx 1857/1986, 37; Engels 1859/1980, 473).

3. From the end-point of the conceptual descent, therefore, we need take one more step, and this is a synthesis that I call a conceptual integral or an integral synthesis. Ideally speaking, the synthetical course seems to comprise the repetition of the following steps: first, discovering the mode of a relation (or mediation) between two abstract things;

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* Incidentally, this view of a form differs greatly from that in the Aristotelian hylomorphism. For Aristotle, the form of an object is close to its essence, and the essence refers to the differentia specifica in a genus-differentia definition of the object. For instance, Aristotle regarded a rational soul as the form and essence of a human. It takes up the differentia specifica in the Aristotelian definition. That is, in a genus-differentia definition of a human, such as “A human is a rational animal”, the differentia specifica is the rationality of a human. On the other hand, needless to say, whilst the genus-differentia definition has been usually used, Hegel’s and Marx’s definitions of a thing is highly different from it (for the Aristotelian hylomorphism, see Ainsworth 2016; for more details on Aristotle’s, Hegel’s and Marx’s definitions of a thing, see Section 6).
second, specifying the modalities of the relation; third, identifying the mutual inscribing of the two abstract things through the relation; fourth, moving toward a relatively concrete thing that emerges in part out of the dialectical working, through the relation, between the relatively abstract things, and; fifth, if necessary, deriving relatively concrete concepts from relatively abstract concepts (i.e., re-defining the relatively concrete thing concretely enough to contain real and historical determinants until the level). In this context, whilst a conceptual differential is to descend the ladder of abstraction in a conceptual system that we can use presently, a conceptual integral is to ascend it. Yet, the latter course is not to ascend the ladder merely again. In other words, it is not a return journey to the chaotic conception. For the ascent requires improving the ladder itself by developing concrete concepts and adding them to the existing conceptual system. Thereby we can arrive at the concrete-in-thought. Also, in this context, scientific progress involves a process that renders a conceptual system itself more abundant than ever before. On the other hand, according to Marx, Hegelians particularly highlighted this synthetic course. Yet, as repeatedly highlighted, they acknowledged an immaterial whole as being. For this reason, Hegelians were mistaken to assimilate a human conceptual fabrication, which is nothing but the result of mental labour for reflecting the real-concrete, to a human interpretation on, and further a human approach to, God, Notion or Concept which is claimed to march self-referentially (for more details, see Section 6).

As mentioned above, the basic principle of Marx’s epistemological stance is pragmatist. As also stated, it originated from Marx’s synthesis of materialism, which acknowledges a mind-independent and/or ontologically deep material world, and idealism, which attaches great importance to mental labour regarding an object. Likewise, Marx’s mode of research
also seems to stem from his articulation between the research procedure of 17th century political economists and that of the Hegelians. Simply put, the early classical political economists, who acknowledged the mind independence of a research object, analysed only their research objects. For this reason, their researches ended up with ‘the discovery of a few deterministic abstract, general relations’ (Marx 1857/1986, 37). In contrast, Hegelians started their scientific inquiry with sensuous certainty. Then, they rightly proceeded from the sensuously certain body of knowledge, through the universal and particular, toward the singularity of the individual, that is, the concrete (see Section 6). However, as noted above, Hegelians acknowledged the mystified entity too, and thereby ‘arrived at the illusion that the real was the result of thinking synthesising itself within itself’ (Marx 1857/1986, 38). Marx articulated these two methods from his distinctive realist and materialist perspective. On the other hand, in my reckoning, this same context has led to contradictory readings of Marx’s method for the critique of political economy. As Marx (1973/1996, 17-9) put it, after Volume I of *Capital* was published, while some commentators assimilated Marx’s method to that of the British theoretical economists, others dismissed the method as ‘Hegelian sophistry’, and yet others correctly appreciated it as ‘severely realistic’. This kind of confusion seems to arise from some commentators’s partial grasp of the total procedure.

**2.4 Marx’s Methodological Stance**

Methodology for science is understood as a theory of scientific method. Conventionally, its subject matter covers: first, whether science should focus on prediction or explanation, and; second, what is the best reasoning for scientific argumentation (more specifically, whether induction, which has a few notorious flaws, is sufficient for science or it has to be complemented, or even alternated, by other types of reasoning). In this context, mainstream
social scientists, particularly naturalists who have stubbornly advocated the possibility of, and a need for, hard science even in social studies, base their researches either on inductively valid reasoning, starting with a finite set of observations (e.g., statistics or a comparative research method), or on deductively valid reasoning, starting from a few axioms (e.g., mathematical modelling or a theoretical explanation for identifying a nomological link or a causal mechanism). By doing so, they have sought either to discover constant (or regular) conjunctions between two events, which are simplified as dependent and independent variables, or to identify causality or a natural law that makes an event, which is simplified as an *explanandum*, occur.

In contrast, Marx’s methodological stance belongs to neither of the two approaches. Rather, it subsumes and goes beyond them both. This is basically because, as I illustrated, the procedure for a Marxian inquiry comprises multiple stages, each of which requires mutually complementary types of reasoning. Recall, first, the inquiry starts with a finite set of observations. Thus, it may start with a contemplation of a periodically recurrent or average incident. In this context, the inquiry does not exclude induction. An important point here is that the inquiry does not end, but earnestly starts, with the inductively valid contemplation. Likewise, after contemplation, the inquiry proceeds through the perception and conception of a research object to an analysis. This in turn can be divided into two activities. At the stage of conceptual differentiation, as critical realists argue, we must use transcendental questioning or retroductive reasoning to reveal simpler categories. Conversely, at the stage of a form-analysis at an abstract level, we must use deductively valid reasoning in order to construct a necessary sequence where causal powers are at work. Here, the inquiry also involves deduction. This said, Marx regarded a relation as bidirectionally effective. Therefore, to explore causal necessity in a Marxian way, the deductively valid inference must be applied bidirectionally even at an abstract level. Moreover, Marx thought that the mutual effects of
the abstract things generate emergent properties. So, at this stage, Marxian inquiry requires another reasoning. Specifically, it must use dialectical reasoning that allows us to derive synthetically a relatively concrete thing from the interplay of relatively abstract things.

In addition, we must recall here that a Marxian inquiry does not limit itself to abstract levels alone. It involves the gradual synthesis of abstract mechanisms, thereby moving towards the reproduction of the real-concrete as a concrete-in-thought. At this stage, Marx attached great importance to the interaction and co-evolution of diverse mechanisms, some of which may counteract each other. In this context, Marx regarded those mechanisms as only tendentially instantiated. Moreover, the contingent instantiation of the diverse mechanisms may also lead to the emergence of a more concrete thing or the occurrence of a more concrete phenomenon. Thus, the synthetic stage too requires dialectical reasoning.

Overall, then, I regard Marx’s reasoning for scientific argument as dialectical. Yet this can only be true in an overarching sense. For, it seems to me, Marx’s dialectical reasoning is not something mysterious that is completely distinct from induction, deduction and retroduction. For, as I explained, the dialectically valid derivation of a concrete thing from relatively abstract things presupposes inductively, deductively, and retroductively valid inferences.

Based on this, we can now turn to the objective of a Marxian inquiry. As mentioned, naturalistic social scientists in mainstream academic circles have sought for expectation or explanation. In contrast, Marx did not only aim for the two, but also went beyond. First, a Marxian inquiry too aims for expectation. Yet a noteworthy point here is that the form of the expectation differs from that of a Humean one. To give an example, Marx’s critique of political economy implies an expectation that if a causal mechanism necessarily relevant to an economic crisis remains operative, or at least unless it is counteracted, the crisis is likely to occur in some form or other. This further implies that it is unlikely that a prolonged period
of stable capital accumulation will not be interrupted by an economic crisis. In this way, a Marxian inquiry too can produce a prediction regarding a probable event. Yet, this does not rely on a constant or regular conjunction between two empirical events but, rather, on a contingent link between a real causal power and an actual event. Second, needless to say, a Marxian inquiry seeks for explanation as well. Yet, its form too differs from that of mainstream social scientists. For, whilst those scientists aim for a simple explanation at a universal or general level, Marx sought for a synthetic one. Therefore, whilst the mainstream explanation is a parsimonious one, a Marxian explanation seems close to an explication—that is, to unfold a detailed explanation gradually that can increasingly contain the rich totality of a research object. Third, in producing the particular type of expectation and explanation, a Marxian inquiry seeks to invent concrete concepts, thereby aiming to improve a conceptual system itself. It is in this context that the inquiry manufactures a mental tool. Fourth, admittedly, the inquiry finally aims to help change a world.

2.5 More on Analysis, Synthesis and Pragmatistic Elements in a Marxian Inquiry

As noted, a Marxian inquiry has pragmatist elements. In particular, the elements are linked to not only the objective of Marx’s inquiry, but also his epistemological position. To deal with this issue in a broad context, let me return to analysis and synthesis. Analysis and synthesis were first introduced in the ancient Greek for obtaining geometrical knowledge. In this context, then analysis meant a method for discover foundational things in a geometrical
figure in order to develop a proof on the assumption that the figure itself is already admitted. In contrast, synthesis meant a method for developing the proof by arranging and interlinking analyses on the assumption that the analyses are already completed (see Beaney 2014). That is, the two methods were dialectically utilised at the inception. Also, then they were not merely philosophical, but particular mathematical methods. In modern times, however, the methods encountered new thoughts and reflections. Particularly by Leibniz, they started being linked to differentiation and integration, both of which are centred on a concept of infinity. As a result, they also started being held for new fields. For instance, it is already well known that Leibniz applied them for calculus and thereby invented a mathematical symbol system for a differential-and-integral calculus. In addition, he applied the two methods for making propositions of infinitely possible worlds, or of the contingent instantiation of a fundamentally necessary and further harmonious order (for Leibniz’s infinite analysis, see Look 2017). Also, in my reckoning, the idea that we can differentiate and integrate a world can be found in Hegel’s philosophy and Marx’s critique of political economy.

In this context, not only the ancient, but also modern thinking on analysis and synthesis have a few important implications, some of which I have only mentioned, for a Marxian inquiry. First, it implies that an outer object is so concrete that it can be differentiated into an infinitesimal unit of parts. It is basically for this reason that as noted, a Marxian inquiry cannot be perfectly completed. Also, this further implies that the concrete-in-thought, indeed, cannot be the exact mirror of the real-concrete, though we may pursue it ideally. The knowledge that we can obtain is, thus, always partial. Second, whilst analysis and synthesis used in geometry or calculus have a mathematical object. In contrast, Marx’s analysis and

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10 Recall that extracting a concept of value form exchange-value, Marx gave us a geometrical illustration to make it clear. That is, he compared value to a triangle in different rectilinear figures (see Marx 1867/1996b, 47).
synthesis are concerned with an outer world that is not only historico-geographically specific but also mind-independent. Therefore, Marx’s analysis and synthesis necessarily pose a question of whether the concrete-in-thought reflects the real-concrete correctly, albeit even partially. In Marx’s epistemology, however, there is no criterion that allows us to make an eventual judgement of the correspondence between the concrete-in-thought and the real-concrete. Yet, simultaneously, Marx already provided us with his own solution to the problem. In a nutshell, he did not consider the issue itself as merely epistemic. Conversely, he was critical of the merely epistemological stance. Instead, according to Marx (1845/1975, 3):

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

It is basically in this respect that his inquiry includes a pragmatistic element. Also, the element is linked to other parts in his philosophical positions. Recall, for instance, that Marx regarded the knowledge itself as a mental tool. In this context, Marx’s pragmatistic view of a scientific test corresponds to his view of the nature of knowledge. In addition, this view is accordant with his view of the purpose of science. As mentioned, for Marx, ‘the point is to chance a world’. In this context, the test of the produced knowledge is, indeed, an attempt to change a world. Also, insofar as a Marxian inquiry is a trial-and-error (re-)search, such an attempt has to be continued. In this respect, I named the test as a pragmatic-dialectical test.

2.6 A Mystified Shell and Rational Kernels in Hegel’s Philosophy
Thus far, I have attempted to clarify Marx’s method and to unveil the philosophical foundations on the method relies. Yet, indeed, my explication of them is still much insufficient. For, to explain them in full details, I should have dealt with more on the relationship between Hegel and Marx. That is, to grasp Marx’s method concretely, we cannot turn away from Hegel. Yet, because of the lack of space, I could not include my discussion on the relation between Hegel and Marx in my previous explication of Marx’s method. As regards the relation, of course, Marx (1873/1996, 19; see also Marx 1859/1987, 261-5) once wrote simply that: ‘My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite … With him it is standing on its head’. Yet their relation is not that simple, and I believe that for this reason Marx intended to author a piece of writing about his own dialectics and, further, its difference from the Hegelian one. Moreover, even Hegel’s philosophy itself is not so simple that it can be summarised in a nutshell. For these reasons, I prefer to distinguish the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy clearly from its mystified shell rather than to dumb down their intricate relations in a few sentences. In this context, I give my own brief note on them. In my reckoning, the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy include, but are not limited to, the following points.

1. Hegel regarded an object as the concrete—and, further, the individual in that the concrete has its own individuality, based on its own rich totality. For Hegel, an object is thus the synthesis of the diverse.

2. Hegel acknowledged a mediation as effective being, whilst most modern philosophers had since Spinoza treated a relation as nominal. On this basis, Hegel recognised the becoming of the relatively high or concrete properties that arise out of the interplay
(i.e., dialectical synthesis), through the mediations, among relatively low or abstract parts.

3. In this context, Hegel regarded the concrete as an organism—and, further, as far much more than the simple association of its parts. In the same context, Hegel asked us to market into a concrete thought on the concrete object. Hegel viewed a merely abstract (i.e., only one-sided and simple) thought on the concrete as typical of “the uneducated”. For Hegel (1807/1977, 317), such a thought is nothing but an ‘uneducated thoughtlessness’ about a dialectically effective mediation—and, thus, no more than an obstacle to a concrete thought (for Hegel’s theoretical distinction between the concrete and the abstract, see Hegel 1807/1977, passim; for the everyday examples of abstract and concrete thoughts, see Hegel 1808/1966; for Hegel’s mediations, see also Hegel 1816/2010; 1817/2010).

4. In this context, Hegel’s definition is highly different from the Aristotelian definition—that is, a genus-differentia definition that we have usually used. In my view, the difference can be specified, at least, in three respects.

(a) Whilst the Aristotelian definition takes a species, which is located at the lowest position in a taxonomical rank, as its object, the Hegelian definition grasps the individual, which has the rich totality and concrete abundance, as its object.

(b) In this context, the Aristotelian definitions has only two moments of a concept: first, the proximate genus of the defined species, and; (b) a differentia that the defined species in the genus exclusively shares. In contrast, Hegel’s definition ‘contains three moments of the concept: the universal as the proximate genus (genus proximum), the particular as the determinacy of the genus (qualitas specifica), and the individual as the defined object [Gegenstand] itself’ (Hegel 1817/2010, 294). Note here that, in the Hegelian definition, whilst the first move
from the universal to the particular can be achieved at one go, the second move from the particular to the individual is not the case. For the second move is to follow a long path in order to include all the remaining details of the individual. Also, because of this second move, the Hegelian definition seems as an infinitude of conceptual synthesis.

(c) Whilst the Aristotelian definition takes the endogenous property of the defined species as the differentia specifica, the Hegelian definition accentuates not only properties, but further medications as determinants, because as noted, Hegel acknowledged a mediation as effective being (Hegel 1817/2010, 294-5; see also Hegel 1816/2010, 707 ff.).

5. This distinctive view of definition is also relevant to Hegel’s view of science (for the Hegelian scientific cognition, see Hegel 1807/1977, 1-45). Simply speaking, for Hegel

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Let me here discuss on Marx’s definition of a thing. For instance, basically, Marx regarded a human as Homo Faber (see Marx and Engels 1847/1975). Note here that there is a great difference between “Homo Faber” and a “rational animal”, though both definitions of a human commonly contain only two moments of a concept. Simply speaking, when we define a human as a rational animal, we focus on only its endogenous property. This holds for other definitions of a human, such as Homo Sapiens or Homo Economicus. In these cases, we come to take wisdom or economic rationality as our distinctive essence. Those definitions are explicit. Yet, they come to end there. On the contrary, when we define a human as Homo Faber, it is to highlight our specific action. Needless to say, in many cases, an action presupposes its object. Thus, in those cases, it implies the mediations of a human. For instance, when we treat a human as Homo Faber, we can go to think about mediations among a human, its products and, further, materials that we use for the production, and for this reason, the definition can be additionally unfolded. Recall here that Marx’s definition of a human does not end with Homo Faber. According to Marx (1845/1975, 4): ‘In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations’. In my reckoning, this succinct statement about a human implicitly expresses the long path in order to contain all the remaining details of a human. In addition, the same holds for Marx’s approach to a commodity, money, capital and the like. Basically, Marx regarded them as a social relation. In addition, his discussions on them are gradually developed. In particular, in doing so, Marx (1996) moved upwards the relatively concrete, that is, from a commodity, through money, to capital.
(1807/1977, 58), a scientific cognition starts with sensuous certainty. Based on it, we can obtain a body of knowledge. In particular, according to Hegel, the sensuously certain kind of knowledge ‘appears as the richest kind of knowledge’. It also ‘appears to be the truest knowledge; for it has not as yet omitted anything from the object, but has the object before it in its perfect entirety’. Yet, simultaneously, ‘this very certainty proves itself to be most abstract and poorest truth. All that it says about what it knows is just that it is; and its truth contains nothing but the sheer being of the thing’ (cf. Marx’s perception and chaotic conception of a research object). Therefore, the object has to start being definitely identified, and a definition of it is thus needed. In other words, the abstract parts of the rich and concrete abundance need to be differentially classified. Needless to say, the starting point of the definition is to find out the universal (cf., the simplest determination in a Marxian inquiry). In this context, Hegel’s cognition for science proceeds from a sensuously certain body of knowledge to the universal that defines the concrete universally (cf., Marx’s conceptual decent from a chaotic conception to the simplest determination). From then onward, it proceeds, through the particular, toward the individual, that is, the concrete (cf., Marx’s conceptual ascent toward the concrete-in-thought).

6. In this context, for Hegel too, the starting point of an inquiry (or, a scientific cognition in Hegel’s terminology) differs from that of a presentation (Darstellung) (or, a logical beginning in philosophy in Hegel’s terminology). That is, discussing the scientific cognition of human consciousness in The Phenomenology of Spirit, as noted, Hegel (1807/1977, 58) indicated sense certainty concerning the concrete as the start of our coming to know. In contrast, in The Science of Logic, ‘[t]he essential point’ of which is ‘an altogether new concept of scientific procedure’, Hegel (1816/2010, 9, 45, 48) presented ‘pure being … this simplest of all simples’ as ‘a beginning in philosophy’, that
is, ‘the logical beginning’. It was the *Science of Logic* that Marx chanced to read while preparing *Capital* and, in a letter to Engels, described as a major source of inspiration regarding his own method in that work. In a nutshell, not only for Marx, but also for Hegel, a method as a procedure is twofold: one for a scientific cognition (*Forschungsweise*), and one for a logical presentation (*Darstellungsweise*).

7. The Hegelian definition and/or scientific cognition include the derivation of increasingly concrete concepts from abstract ones by sublating and synthesising the abstract concepts.

8. This view of a scientific cognition is also linked to Hegel’s distinctive view of a human. To begin with, it seems well recognised that Hegel regarded a human as a (self-)consciousness that can appear in different forms in accordant with the phases of its evolution. Here, in particular, Hegel argued that a human (self-)consciousness can be *witty*, particularly when it encounters contradictions, and thereby, when it becomes *inwardly disrupted* and thus *unhappy* (see Hegel 1807/1977, *passim*). That is, Hegel thought that a human is capable of dealing with a language in an inventive way. By doing so, when it is disrupted by contradictions, a human is assumed to be capable of manufacturing something linguistically synthetic, though not all humans can do so in that the uneducated remains to be mired in merely abstract thoughts. Also, by doing so, a human can manufacture something relatively concrete in thought and, thereby, it can go beyond the contractions that have made it unhappy.

9. In this context, it can be stated that Hegel basically saw a human as Homo Faber. To me, it seems in this context that Marx (1844/1975, 333, italic in original) wrote: ‘Hegel grasps *labour* as the *essence* of man’.
In the same context, Hegel seems to highlight the active side of mind, that is, mental labour regarding knowledge production, whilst all the materialism before that of Marx had taken an object only in a form of contemplation.

In my reckoning, all of these points belong to the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy. However, Hegel also brought an elusive being, that is, an immaterially mystified substance to the fore in the whole system of his philosophy. Needless to say, it is what he called God, Concept, Spirit, and so forth. Appeared to be fundamentally conceptual, discoursal or linguistic,¹² it is presented as an all-pervading and all-embracing entity in Hegel’s philosophy. Also, in the philosophy, it is regarded to march self-referentially toward a concrete one, and also to functions as a kind of motive power as well that did not only bring about a world into being, but further has made it possible for the world to evolve into an increasingly concrete one. This is, needless to say, the mystified shell of the philosophy. Also, because of it, even the rational kernels in Hegel’s philosophy came to remain in a mystified form. For instance, Hegel (1807/1977 ,17) rightly argued, like Marx, that: ‘Science set forth this formative process in all its detail and necessity, exposing the mature configuration of everything’. Yet, simultaneously, Hegel thought that the everything regarding the concrete ‘has already been reduced to’ only a part of the concrete in the entire world scale, that is, ‘a moment and property of Spirit’. For this reason, for Hegel, a human scientific cognition is no more than an interpretation on, and further an approach to, the Spirit, God or Concept.

¹² My view of taking Hegel’s God as conceptual, linguistic and/or disposal depends on analytical Hegelians’ interpretation on his philosophy. From the last decade, some analytical philosophers have argued, pace Russell’s reading of Hegel, that the Hegelian philosophy is, indeed, a conceptual holism, and thus, that it implies the ubiquitousness of something linguistic (see, e.g., Redding 2007).
Here recall my previous argument that Hegel saw a human as Homo Faber. In what sense was it regarded by Hegel as Homo Faber, however? As noted, the Hegelian God, Spirit and Concept marches self-referentially toward a more concrete one. In line with the movement, the Hegelian human fabricates a concrete concept or discourse, thereby chasing the concretisation of the Concept. In this context, indeed, Marx argued: ‘Hegel’s standpoint is that of modern political economy. He grasps labour as the essence of man’. However: ‘The only labour which Hegel knows and recognises is abstractly mental labour. Therefore, that which constitutes the essence of philosophy’. In contrast, Marx knew not only mental labour regarding philosophy, but further physical labour regarding material interests. He knew not only ‘the doings of philosophy’, but also doings for the material condition of human life (1844/1975, 333). Here, if we fix our focus only to this point, Marx’s method would seem a direct opposite to the Hegelian one. It would seem, then, that Hegel’s method ‘is standing on its head.’ In contrast, as I have attempted to illustrate it, if we broaden our focus onto the overall relation between Hegel and Marx, we will be able to be far more aware of the marks of Hegel’s rational kernels in Marx’s method and the philosophical foundations that the method relies.

2.7 Existing Interpretations on Marx’s method

Based on previous work, here I briefly review existing interpretations on Marx’s method. First, although dialectical materialists and Lukács focused on mutually different sides with regard to the history of human life, they committed a common mistake. That is, in interpreting Marx’s method in terms of its relation to Hegel’s philosophy, they accepted not only the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy, but also its mystified shell. For this reason, dialectical materialists contended that the history evolved self-referentially (see, e.g., Adratsky
1934; Kuusinen 1960/1961), and Lukács (1923/1971) claimed that there was a whole, the supremacy of which guided its parts, even in Marx’s theory. Second, the opposite holds for both structural Marxism and analytical Marxism. Admittedly, the two strands in a Marxist tradition focused on different sides with regard to the structure-agency issue. Yet they commonly dismissed not only the mystified shell of Hegel’s philosophy, but also its rational kernels. For this reason, Althusser and his associates overemphasized the alleged theoretical rupture between young Marx and old Marx, and on the dissimilarities between Hegel and Marx (see Althusser 1965/2005; Althusser et al. 1968/1979). For the same reason, analytical Marxists came to succumb to methodological individualism (see, for instance, Elster 1985; 1986; Przeworski 1985). Third, systemic-dialectical Marxists have accentuated a need for a re-reading of Hegel’s philosophy. Yet, along the way, they tend to privilege his Science of Logic, which is directly relevant to a logical presentation (Arthur 2004; Moseley and Smith 2014). By doing so, they tend to ignore the other side of Marx’s method—that is, a method for an inquiry that presupposes a logical presentation.

Lastly, critical realists have discussed a relation between critical realism and Marxism. In my view, it is not easy to answer to this question. For, first, the philosophical stance to which critical realism refers is somewhat unclear. For instance, even Roy Bhaskar’s work on critical realism can be divided into three different phases, each of which is respectively relevant to the basic tenet of critical realism, dialectics and meta-reality (see Gorski 2013). Second, the theoretical stance to which Marxism refers is also unclear. For instance, Marxism can be viewed in term of a family resemblance. In this case, modern world-system theory or analytical Marxism can be regarded as Marxist analysis. However, Marxism can be seen in terms of a theoretical focus on a capital relation. In this case, modern world-system theory can be regarded as Braudelian or Smithian approach—I return to these in my concluding chapter. In addition, as Lukács argued, we can understand Marxism in terms of totality. In
this case, analytical Marxism is not Marxist approach. Also, we must recognise that, generally speaking, whilst Marxism is categorised as scientific theory of a bourgeois society, critical realism is close to meta-theory for scientific theory.

In this context, here I focused on not Marxism, but Marx himself. Furthermore, I gave the focus to, specifically, not his critique of political economy, but his method of political economy. On top of that, I went further to uncover his meta-theory on which the method is anchored. And, in the light of my previous discussion, we draw a few provisional conclusions regarding the relation between critical realism and Marx’s meta-theory. First, ontologically, Marx’s inquiry relies on depth realism, and epistemologically, it is pragmatistic. In these regards, Marx’s meta-theory resonates with the basic or original tenets of critical realist ontology and epistemology. For, Bhaskar’s transcendental realism for natural science and its naturalist, albeit qualified, application for social studies is the depth realism. It is also because a few critical realists have regarded practical adequacy as a criterion for judgemental rationality, which is distinguished from epistemological relativism (see Sayer 1984/1992). For this reason, on the one hand, I believe that Marx’s ontology and epistemology can be recast in critical realist terms.

However, the relation between the dialectical aspect in Marx’s meta-theory is critical realism is still ambiguous. I argued that Marx’s reasoning can be seen as dialectics. Yet, in my reckoning, the speculative derivation, based on the dialectics, of something relatively concrete from relatively abstract things presupposes inductively, deductively and retroductively valid inferences. Based on them, a concrete concept can be manufactured by mental labour and, by doing so, we can re-define the real-concrete in an increasingly concrete manner. Also, in my reckoning, this view depends substantially on the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy. That is, it seems a result that Marx sublated respectively, and then synthesised, both Hegel’s philosophy and what he referred to ‘all the hitherto materialism, including that of Feuerbach’.
In contrast, such a speculative, synthetical derivation of a concept seems to have been less focused by critical realists. For a critical realist re-definition means a transformation from a nominal definition, which grasps ‘actualistically understood characteristics or manifest appearance’, to a real definition, which captures ‘the essential structure or ALETHIC truth of the thing’ (see Faulkner 2015, 112-113). Also, while Marx, certainly, took the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy, Bhaskar (1993, xiii) offered his own dialectics that has a ‘non-preservation sublation of Hegel’s dialectic’ as one of its features (for a brief overview of dialectical critical realism, see Norrie 130-8). For these reasons, Marx’s meta-theory and critical realism can be seen as having important dissimilarities as well. Let me recall, however, that Bhaskar is not the only critical realist. Nor do all critical realists endorse his later work on dialectics and meta-reality. Also, in this context, provisionally, I conclude that Marx’s meta-theory and critical realism can be mutually complementary. That is, as noted, Marx’s ontology and epistemology resonate with the earlier tenet of critical realism. They can be thus recasted in critical realist terms. Simultaneously, I believe that Marx’s meta-theory has something that can be added to critical realism for its enrichment.

2.8 Concluding Remark

Let me here return to the start of this chapter. Unlike usual empirical inquiries in social studies, my investigation finally aims to re-define the previous model of South Korea’s capitalism. This means that I bring not a why-question, nor a how-question, but a what-question to the fore. Yet posing such a question does not suggest that my inquiry is non-academic or non-scientific. Nor does it imply that the investigation is entirely distinct from an explanatory, or expectative, inquiry. For, according to Marx’s method and meta-theories, an answer to a what-question presupposes to why- and how-questions. Indeed, I shall
identify how the PCHM was created, mutated and then evolved. I shall also reveal what factors influenced the fabulous performance of the South Korean economy since the mid-1960s. In addition, I shall explain that, even so, why it had been that unstable. To do so, following Marx, I will focus not merely on the attributes of the PCHM but also on the social relations in which the model was concretised. In particular, I will consider not only domestic social relation but also the supranational scale of social relations. By doing so, I shall represent the development model of South Korea as a chimerical one that embodies mutually contradictory genes. This inquiry is theoretically informed by the VarCap-CPE. Also, the paradigm itself relies on Marx’s method and meta-theories. In this context, I introduce the approach in Chapter 3.
3. Introducing the VarCap-CPE

In previous chapter, I tried to lay a philosophical foundation for the VarCap-CPE. On this basis, I now introduce the VarCap-CPE itself. The overarching merit of the emerging paradigm is that it enables a concrete inquiry into a real-concrete object in relevance to capitalism. This implies that the VarCap-CPE is in itself integral, because no single theory can exhaust the concrete object. Indeed, it consists of several theories and approaches in the traditions of Marx’s critique of political economy, critical political economy and critical discourse studies. Also, for this reason, it is far way more complex and concrete than any other in both political economy and cultural studies. To be specific, it contains critical realism, the strategic-relational approach, Marx’s value theory, critical institutionalism, (post-)Marxist state theory, critical semiotic analysis and the variegated-capitalism approach. For this reason, it is by no means easy to outline its genealogy, features and even competitors. Considering this difficulty, subsequent sections address: the basic and overall features of the VarCap-CPE; second, its philosophical and, particularly, social-theoretical foundation; third, its approach to capital and capitalism; fourth, its approach to institutions; fifth, its approach to the state; sixth, its approach to the discursive, the linguistic and/or the cultural, and; seventh, its approach to capitalist spatiotemporality. In concluding remarks, I relate it to my investigation, and indicate its deficiency that I shall supplement in the following chapter.

3.1 The Basic and Overall Features of the VarCap-CPE

The VarCap-CPE emerged as a result of some 20 years of work by Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum, sometimes individually and at other times together, in the aforementioned traditions. Thus, basically, it aspires to be an emancipatory, and theoretically grounded and reasoned,
critique both of an extant social system of exploitation and dominance, and of mainstream discourses that serve for the system (Sum and Jessop 2013, 35, 164, 501; for more details on not merely critical, but particularly “emancipatory” social science, see Sayer 2001; 2009; for the (meta-)theoretical foundation of, and methodical steps for, such a critique, see Jessop and Sum 2016). In particular, as I shall show, it has a double relation to Marx’s lifelong project—that is, the critique of political economy or, more broadly, the anatomy of a bourgeois civil society. On the other hand, it has been also engaged with many theoretical developments in humanities and social studies after Marx’s death. And these features, taken together, have brought about its incremental complexification and concreteness.

_The VarCap-CPE and Marx’s Anatomy of a Bourgeois Society_

In chapter 2 I argued that the VarCap-CPE relies on Marx’s method and philosophy. In addition, it takes Marx’s value theory as a foundational reference point for its integral inquiry into bourgeois society. However, as is the case with Marx’s method, Marx’s value theory has been arguably interpreted. In terms of this issue, following Diane Elson (1979), the VarCap-CPE distinguishes the labour theory of value (LTV) from the value-form theory of labour (VTL), and adopts the latter as Marx’s theory of value. By doing so, Marx’s value theory is now understood as extensively concerned with a society in which the historically specific phenomenon, that is, the ‘buying and selling of labour power’ (Marx 1867/1996, 177) becomes a generic feature of capitalism. In other words, the CMP generalizes the commodity form to labour-labour. In this way, the VarCap-CPE interprets Marx’s value theory as a foundational theory of a bourgeois society (or, more broadly, world) where labour power is generally treated as value or, more specifically, _as if_ it were a commodity. By doing so, the VarCap-CPE regards Marx’s VTL to pave the way for an integral inquiry into: (a) historical
preconditions for the emergence of such a society; (b) historical conditions for the relatively stable operation and evolution of the society, and; (c) social effects that the treatment of labour power as a fictitious commodity has reversely on the society (see Jessop 2004; see Section 4).

Yet, as mentioned, the relation between the VarCap-CPE and Marx’s critique of political economy is not one-directional. For the VarCap-CPE has also sought to contribute to the completion of the “incomplete” project. To elaborate on this, let me recall the debate over Marx’s plan for his anatomy of civil society. Admittedly, Marx could not finish even three volumes of Capital in his life-time. In addition, since the late 1850s, broadly speaking, he suggested two different plans for the anatomy. The first is the “six-book” plan that we have discovered in his notes, letters (to Lassale, Engels and Weydemeyer) and publication in the late 1850s (Marx 1857/1986, 45; 1857-8/1986, 194-5; 1858/1983a, 269; 1858/1983b, 298; 1859/1983, 376-7; 1859/1987, 261). According to the plan, his anatomy of a bourgeois world comprises six books on, respectively, capital, landed property, wage labour, the state, foreign trade, and world market and crisis. The second is the “four-book” plan that has been found out in his letters (to Engels and Kugelmann) in the 1860s (Marx 1862/1985b, 435; 1866/1987, 328-9; 1867/1987, 357). According to this plan, it seems that, in the 1860s, Marx intended to publish only four books, that is, three theoretical books on capital and a historical-literary book on the theories of political economy.

In this context, Marxists have debated over the status of the three volumes of Capital and Theories of Surplus Value in the light of his plans. Noteworthy are three interpretations, none of which, indeed, bases its argument on bibliographically sufficient evidence (see Oakley 1983, 114). First, citing Marx’s correspondence to Kugelmann, Henryk Grossman (1929/2013, 140; italic in original) claims that: ‘Capital, as it is presently available to us in four volumes, is essentially complete’. Second, based on his earlier reading of Marx’s economic
manuscripts in 1857-8, Roman Rozdolsky (1968/1977, 11) argues that Marx’s original plan was abandoned. More specifically, according to him: (a) the first book on capital was expanded; (b) in the course, the second and third books on landed property and wage labour were incorporated into the three volumes of Capital, and; (c) the last three books—‘or at least one of them, on the world market’—were allotted to an ‘eventual continuation’. Third, Maximilien Rubel asserts that, although the first book on capital came to be unexpectedly extended, Marx himself never revealed any intent to abandon his six-book plan. For Rubel, therefore, the three volumes of Capital and Theories of Surplus Value are no more than small fragments in Marx’s original plan. In this context, he also contends that even the three or four volumes of Capital cannot be ever a ‘Marxist bible of eternally codified canons’ (O’Malley and Algozin 1981, 181). That is, according to Rubel, at least, five books still remain unwritten (see also Lebowitz 1992/2003, 27-30).

Among those three, the VarCap-CPE implicitly prefers Rubel’s interpretation to the other two. Also, in this context, the paradigm, which takes Marx’s VTL as an interpretive foundation for the three volumes of Capital, has been keenly engaged with not only critical geographer’s works, such as David Harvey’s (1982; 1989) ones, on land use, uneven development and spatiotemporal fixes in capitalism, but also Michael A. Lebowitz’s (1992/2003) work on wage labour, for it regards them as partial complements to the deficiencies in the fragmentarily fulfilled plan (for Jessop’s critical endorsement of those works, see Jessop 2004; 2006). Furthermore, Jessop and Sum themselves have, individually or jointly, contributed to Marx’s intellectual project. For instance, Jessop’s (1982; 1990; 2002b) works on the capitalist type of state, his collaboration with critical human geographers for a spatially sensitive form-analysis of the state (Jones, Brenner and Jessop 2003; Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008) and his works on régulation and (meta-)governance in relevance to the state are not simply complementary to the missing book on state, but have also developed
Marx’s theory of the state that Althusser (1968/1971, 138) once evaluated as ‘still partly descriptive’ (for the regulation approach and (meta-)governance, for instance, see Jessop 1995a; 1995b; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2002a; 2015c; see also Sum and Jessop 2006). Also, more recently, Jessop and Sum have, theoretically or empirically, enquired into a world market and a crisis (Jessop 2012; 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b; Sum 2013). Needless to say, those attempts are particularly germane to the sixth book in Marx’s original plan. In this way, the VarCap-CPE has sought to contribute to the completion of Marx’s critique of political economy and I, too, shall attempt to make such a contribution in this thesis by unfolding Marx’s view of hegemony on a world market (see Chapter 4).

The VarCap-CPE and Paradigmatic "(Re-)Turns" in Humanities and Social Studies

I have thus far associated the VarCap-CPE with Marx’s critique of political economy. Yet, indeed, the approach has also set out to go beyond the completion of Marx’s original plan. For it does not only acknowledge Marx’s genius, but also recognises that he was no more than an intellectual in Europe in the 19th century. On this basis, the VarCap-CPE has been vigilant against a risk of falling into a theoretically, empirically and linguistically Eurocentric bias, on the one hand (for its self-critique of such a bias with regard to East Asian studies in critical institutionalist political economy, see Jessop and Sum 2006, 152-86; for a similar reflection in a regulationist tradition, see Boyer 1990, Boyer and Yamada 2002; Boyer, Uemura and Isogai 2013); on the other, it has been engaged with several paradigmatic shifts and theoretical accomplishments in humanities and social studies after Marx’s death. In this context, we might describe it as post-Marxist. Yet, in this case, the term of post-Marxism does not imply any “retreat from class” or from Marx (for a Marxist criticism on such a retreat, see Wood 1986/1998). In other words, it does not mean to succumb to, for instance, post-structuralism
(e.g., Laclau and Mouffe 1994), even though not all the post-structuralist theorists are dismissed by the VarCap-CPE theorists as absurd (for Jessop’s critical realist adoption of Michel Foucault with regard to the state, see Jessop 2007b; 2010; for a triad relationship among Marx, Gramsci and Foucault in the VarCap-CPE, see Sum and Jessop 2013, 203-214; for a critical realist critique of Foucault, see Sayer 2012). For, as repeatedly accentuated, the VarCap-CPE still starts with Marx’s value theory in the field of political economy. It is also because it has sought to contribute to the completion of Marx’s unfinished anatomy of a bourgeois world. Thus, this version of post-Marxist paradigm implies not any retreat, but a sanguine advance, from Marx. Such an advance is, of course, to develop the integral paradigm, which resonates with Marx’s method, meta-theory and anatomy of civil society, on the one hand; on the other, it is also to occupy, with a flag of Marx, new “commanding heights” in theoretical battle fields.¹³

In this context, to give a few examples, the realist, linguistic, discursive, reflexive, spatial, cultural and institutional (re-)turns have been respectively marked somewhere in the VarCap-CPE. Due to spaces limit and my incapacity, not all the details can be outlined in this section. Instead, I shall mention some of them in subsequent sections. Here, therefore, let me

¹³ It seems, however, that Jessop himself prefers the term “plain Marxism” to post-Marxism. The term originates from C. W. Mills’s (1962) book. According to Mills, Marxists can be divided into vulgar, sophisticated and plain ones. Vulgar Marxists are dogmatic. They give a monocular focus to only a part of Marxist political ideologies, and identify the arbitrarily construed part with Marxism itself. By contrast, sophisticated Marxists accept Marx theoretically. Yet, they reduce Marx’s complex theory to a simple model of society. In addition, when they face a deviant case to the model, they try to eschew the fact itself or escape the crisis of the theoretical model by adding supplementary hypotheses to the model. Plain Marxists different from both tendencies. First, while they also work in Marx’s tradition, they treat him as one of the great scholars in the 19th century. They recognise that Marx’s work remains relevant to their own attempts to grasp current issues. Yet, simultaneously, they also recognise that Marx’s work, too, is historically specific, and thus, tied with the context of the 19th century.
reassure the following two points. First, the integral absorption of insights and concepts from such paradigmatic (re-)turns into the VarCap-CPE has by no means conducted in an eclectic way. For, as I shall illustrate, the work has been always done in line with, generally, Marx’s philosophical, and critical realist, rubrics and, particularly, with a Marxist and critical realist social theory—namely, the strategic-relational approach. Second, much of the work has been also done in relation to Marx’s critique of political economy or, at least, Marx’s other and some Marxists’ classical texts.

On this basis, we can now understand the way that the VarCap-CPE has, justifiably, come to be so complex and concrete. In brief, its engagements with Marx’s unfinished anatomy of a bourgeois world and, also, with paradigmatic (re-)turns have rendered it increasingly integral. In doing so, theoretical “repair” works have been also continually conducted. For instance, encountering state theory, economic theory, discourse theory, systems theory, geographic theory, and so forth, the strategic-relational approach (hereafter SRA) has continually evolved (for an overview of the development of the SRA, see Jessop 2007c, 21-53; for its current form, see Section 2). On the other hand, it is also noteworthy that in the course, a few traditional Marxist frameworks or concepts come to be replaced with others. For instance, although the VarCap-CPE has been inarguably inspired by Marx and Gramsci, it does no longer endorse a dichotomy between an economic base and a political-ideological superstructure, because it recognises that the intersubjective production of sense and meaning (i.e., semiosis) occurs in all the “empirical” (i.e., perceived and conceived) realms in a world. By doing so, it has sought to go beyond a dichotomy between the material and the ideological. In addition, although the VarCap-CPE has been influenced by Althusser and, far more importantly, Poulantzas, it no longer utilises the concept of relative autonomy. For it argues that some concepts appropriated from the autopoietic systems theory are better in understanding a society in that they help us distinguish between operationally autonomous
and substantively (or materially) interdependent relations among the subsystems, and thereby also pave the way for grasping the ecological dominance of a particular subsystem and the structured coherence (or, at least, patterned incoherence) of the overall social system (see Jessop 2001a; 2001b; 2008; Jessop, Ji and Kytir, 2006).

All in all, the VarCap-CPE is an integral approach. As such, it enables social scientists to analyse a capitalist society differentially and, then reversely, of integrally synthesising the analyses of the differentiated parts. In this context, the VarCap-CPE is, in essence, oriented toward an anti-reductionist inquiry. Let me recall here again Marx’s polemic against the universalist perspective of the 17th-century economists (Marx 1857/1987, 37-8). Nonetheless, as repeatedly accentuated, it is also vigilant of a risk of falling into eclecticism that: ‘merely goes snuffling round amidst the wealth of set answers’ (Marx 1862/1985a, 379).

Also, in this context, Sum and Jessop (2013, ix) describe their integral ‘approach as pre-disciplinary in inspiration, trans-disciplinary in practice, and post-disciplinary in its aspiration’ (for their distinction among pre-disciplinary, disciplinary, multi- or pluri-disciplinary, inter- or trans-disciplinary, post-disciplinary and anti-disciplinary studies, see Sum and Jessop 2013, 13-4). In the following sections, I shall introduce the theoretical components of the VarCap-CPE approach respectively.

3.2 Its Philosophical and Social-Theoretical Foundations: The SRA as a Marxist and Critical Realist Social Theory

Social studies must rely on one of the acceptable methodological positions that not only informs a specific method but also presupposes a specific set of metaphysical (or ontological) and epistemological doctrines. For this is, of course, a key criterion that distinguishes scholarship from journalism. Thus, the VarCap-CPE, too, needs its own philosophical foundation, which I explicated in Chapter 2. Here, then, I focus on the distinctive social
theory on which it depends within the general framework of philosophy. This social theory is, as repeatedly noted, the SRA. Broadly speaking, it is widely concerned with structure and agency, form and content, form and formation, subsystem and system, and multi-scalar spatiotemporal fixes and transformation. I shall start the introduction of it with revealing a place where the SRA is located in the fields of social theory. To do so, let me first deal with the way that structure has been understood in social theory.

**Putting the SRA on Its Place in Social Theory**

Broadly speaking, social theorists have grasped social structure as one of the following five things: first, aggregate behaviour that we can observe more or less stably in a society (e.g., methodological individualism); second, nomothetic regularities among social facts (e.g., Durkheimian sociology); third, an internally differential system that was arbitrarily pre-given as a whole at a point in time (e.g., Saussure’s linguistics and French structuralism); fourth, collective rules and resources (e.g., Giddens’s structuration theory), and; fifth, the ensemble of social relations. As Douglas Porpora (1998) indicates, both Marx and critical realism belong to the last position, though not all Marxists have followed Marx with regard to this issue. Based on Marx’s philosophy and critical realism, the SRA, too, is the case. It is also in this respect that the SRA can be primarily distinguished from other positions in social theory. Yet we need to recognise here that the SRA is not the only social theory in Marx’s, and the critical realist, meta-theoretical framework. To elaborate on this, we also need to categorise Bhaskar’s work on critical realism into three phases and, further, to divide his critical realism

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14 I added French structuralism to Porpora’s (1998) four conceptions of social structure.
in the first phase into a general rubric (i.e., critical realism as philosophy) and a particular approach (i.e., critical realism as social theory)

To begin with, as most critical realists concede, Bhaskar’s critical realism can be broken down into three kinds according to the three phases of his philosophical work: first, “basic” or “original” critical realism on which he had worked from the late 1970s to the early 1990s; second, “dialectical” critical realism after his dialectical turn in the early 1990s, and; third, “transcendental dialectical” critical realism since his theological or spiritual turn in the 2000s (Gorski 2013; see also Bhaskar and Lawson 1998). Among the three, the critical realism that has attracted a scholarly attention as philosophical or, more specifically, methodologically metaphysical realism for science (i.e., transcendental realism) belongs to basic or original critical realism (see Bhaskar 1975/1997). The critical realism that is recognised as a set of ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality also belongs to original critical realism. In addition, the critical realism as critical and “qualified” naturalism—that is锚ed on the aforementioned transcendental realism as a “midwife” or an “under-labourer” for natural science and, simultaneously, that allows both naturalist and hermeneutic studies for an explanatory critique of a society—is also the case (see Bhaskar 1979/1998). For this reason, although many have proclaimed themselves as critical realists, it does not mean that all of them acknowledge Bhaskar’s later works as well. For some have endorsed merely his basic critical realism or only his works until dialectical critical realism. The VarCap-CPE acknowledges only his original critical realism.

On the other hand, as a few critical realists (Archer 1998; Jessop 2005; Outhwaite 1990) have perceptively indicated, even Bhaskar’s work on the original critical realism can be divided into a philosophical or meta-theoretical rubric (critical realism in general) and social theory (critical realism in particular). That is, according to this distinction, a set of ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality belongs to a philosophical
rubric. In contrast, Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity (hereafter TMSA) is a specific social theory within the general rubric (for more details on the TMSA, Bhaskar 1987; 1989). Furthermore, his TMSA is not the only social theory in critical realism, because we also have two other specific social theories within the general critical realist framework: first, Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic approach (hereafter M/M approach; see Archer 1998), and; second, Jessop’s SRA. Here is thus the exact place where the SRA is located. That is, the SRA is one of the Marxist and critical realist social theories. Also, as I shall illustrate, it is the most advanced one of the three.

**The Features and Merits of the SRA**

Now let me introduce its features and merits. Admittedly, it was invented, discovered, or creatively reformulated, by Bob Jessop.\(^\text{15}\) Also, whilst one might be still confused about it, the SRA emerged as a specific social theory for underpinning a specific state theory that synthesises the German state-derivation theory, Gramsci and Poulantzas (see Jessop 1982; 1990). Then, as mentioned, encountering economic theory, discourse theory, autopoietic theory, geography, and so forth, it has continually evolved. Here, I briefly introduce the latest version of the SRA (for more details, see Jessop 2005; 2007c)

1. On the dualism between structure and agency. Unlike both the agency-fetishised and structure-fetishised social theories, and like structuration theory, the TMSA and the M/M approach, the SRA recognises that structure and agency are inseparable with one another, and also mutually influential. In particular, as I shall show, it examines one in

\(^{15}\) As regards the invention of the SRA, Jessop himself says: ‘[I]t’s more a question of discovery than invention because it was already there’ (see Jessop, Ji and Kytir, 2006).
relation to the other, thereby seeking to go beyond a dualism between structure and agency.

2. On the social relations of collective social agents. Structuration theory, the TMSA and the M/M approach treat social actors as nearly homogeneous. For this reason, they tend to stop at the point of concentrating on the relatively abstract interplay between structure and agency. By doing so, in particular, the TMSA and the M/M approach fail to fulfil their meta-theoretical accentuation of complex social relations at a social-theoretical level. In contrast, the SRA brings the co-existence of collective social agents to the fore. That is, the SRA supposes that individuals, albeit not all, can be grouped into distinguishable social classes or, more broadly, social forces that have different (or, in some cases, even mutually contradictory) strategies and tactics. By doing so, it gives way more concrete insights in relation to the complex and dynamic interplays between structure and agency.

3. On the structural selectivities. On this basis, the SRA does not regard structure as simply constraining. It goes further to recognise that the structural constraints are strategically selective. This means that structure does not accord equal opportunities or constraints to all the social forces. That is, the SRA argues that structure privileges some collective agents and their strategies over others, thereby paving the way for disclosing inequality, exploitation and dominance. Furthermore, in this context, it regards social actions are constrained by structurally inscribed strategic selectivities. Also, it is in this regard that it examines structure in relation to agency.

4. On structure and context. Let me recall here again that the SRA is one of the Marxist and critical realist social theories. In this context, it argues that the structure is only “tendentially” selective. This is the reason why it argues that structure contains not selections, but selectivities (see Jessop, Ji and Kytir 2006). This means, on the one hand,
that the structural selectivities are causal properties in a *real* realm; it implies, on the other, that the contingent actualisation of the necessarily selective properties can bring about mutually distinguishable conjunctures, which belong to an *actual* realm, within even the same structural configuration. In this way, the SRA perceptively distinguishes between *real-structural* and *actual-conjunctural* realms, thereby giving not only *structurally, but further contextually sensitive* insights in terms of the structure-agency issue.

5. On the performance of social agents. On this basis, it is argued that social agents perform on a specifically pre-given structural-contextual matrix. On top of this, the SRA argues that the performances of the social forces are also based on their respective observations of, and reflections on themselves and, the given matrix. This occurs in an empirical realm. Thus, according to the SRA, social actions are based not only on objectively pre-given (i.e., strategically selective structural-conjunctural) matrix, but further on a subjectively obtained (i.e., ideologically and discursively construed) observations and reflections.

6. On the permeation of the semiotic through the empirical world. In this context, the SRA does not conceive an empirical realm in a world as merely objective. Instead, the SRA regards it as, in essence, semiotic. That is, according to the SRA, the semiotic, the ideological, the discursive and/or the cultural permeate the empirical world. In this way, the SRA highlights the role of the semiotic and the discursive. Also, in such a way, it seeks to go beyond the old-fashioned dualisms between the material and the discursive, and between an economic base and its superstructure.

7. On the strategic calculation and structural orientedness of social actions. As noted, different social forces may have mutually different aims, strategies and tactics. For instance, their strategic and tactical actions may aim either to reproduce or to transform
the pre-given matrix. Yet, in any case, the actions are *structurally oriented*. In addition, as also noted, their actions are based on their interpreted observations and reflections. In this context, their actions are also *strategically calculated*. Taken together, the SRA regards social actions as structurally oriented and strategically calculated. Also, in this context, as regards the structure-agency issue, the SRA basically examines an interplay between *structurally inscribed strategic selectivities* and *strategically calculated and structurally oriented actions*.

8. On the structured coherence or patterned incoherence of a society. Yet the SRA does not stop here. For it goes further to examine the possible outcomes of the recurrent interplays. That is, the SRA argues, on the one hand, that the path-dependency of structure and the condensation of different social forces’ strategic actions combine to bring about *reflexively reorganisation of structural configuration*; on the other, this structure too contains its own selectivities, and thereby strategies and tactics come to be *recursively selected*. In addition, based on all of these, the SRA seeks to explain an autopoietic (self-producing) social configuration which is structurally coherent.

9. On social forms, contents and a social formation. Its approach to form, content and formation can be understood in terms of its approach to the structure-agency issue. When the SRA is applied to a real-concrete object, following Marx himself, German “state-derivation” theorists and Poulantzas, it basically seeks to analyse its forms. In particular, the SRA regards a form as inscribed by a social relation and thereby synthetically determined. Thus, a social form is nested in a wider ensemble of social relations, and determined by the condensation of the strategic actions of the social forces. A social formation refers to an ensemble of the social forms. It is examined by synthesising the priorly analysed social forms integrally.
10. On the multi-scalar spatiotemporalities. Lastly, the SRA is also sensitive to spatiotemporal fixes. The SRA argues that neither structural selectivities, nor strategic actions are transhistorical or trans-geographical. In this context, it also argues that the structural selectivities privileges a specifically spatiotemporal fixes over others. Therefore, it also argues, reversely, that the strategic actions can be also oriented toward either the reproduction or transformation of spatiotemporal selectivities.

All in all, the SRA is one of the three social theories within the Marxist and critical realist framework. Furthermore, among the three, it provides the most concrete insight regarding many social theoretical issues. The VarCap-CPE is anchored on this specific social theory. Thus, at a social theoretical level, an analysis based on the VarCap-CPE, indeed, means a Marxist, critical-real and, further, strategic-relational form-analysis. Below, we shall see that the SRA is, indeed, associated with theories of value, the state, institution, discourse and capitalist spatiotemporalities.

3.3 Capital and Capitalism: Marx’s “Value Theory of Labour”

Now I enter the field of political economy. As noted, the entry point of the VarCap-CPE in the field is Marx’s VTL. Also, as I shall illustrate, the reference point is linked to a specific way that Marx conceived capital and capitalism. To elaborate on it, let me recall that a word of capital has been diversely understood by political economists. To begin with, presumably on the ground that, in an economic context, the word originally referred to the principal of a money loan as opposed to the interest, some political economists (e.g., Turgot, Sombart, Schumpeter, Polanyi, etc.) have conceived it with regard to its monetary value (for the etymology of the word and its development as an academic concept, see Braudel 1979, 231-
248; Böhm-Bawerk, 1891/1930, 24-35; see also Schumpeter 1954/2006, 307; Polanyi 1944; for Sombart on capital and capitalism, see Parsons 1928). In contrast, the other political economists (e.g., British classical political economists after Adam Smith, neoclassical economists, Böhm-Bawerk, Weber and even many Marxian economists) have conceived capital as the means of, or an aggregate of goods for, production (for Weber on capital, see Parsons 1929; see also Böhm-Bawerk 1891/1930, 36 ff.). Yet, particularly since the early 20th century, another political economists, historians and sociologists have attempted to include intangible assets into capital. In doing so, they have defined capital as an (in)tangible asset, particularly one that returns illegitimately excessive or differential profits to its owners for any reasons. Broadly speaking, American old institutionalist Thorstein Veblen (1908), the French Annales School of historiography Fernand Braudel (1979), and their respective associates, such as Immanuel Wallerstein (1974/2011), Giovanni Arrighi (1994), Simshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan (2009), belong to this position. Furthermore, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1979/1984) cultural capital, Catherine Hakim’s (2010) erotic capital and Thomas Piketty’s (2013/2014) Capital in the Twentieth-First Century are all, indeed, capital as an asset that accords its owners differential profits.

While these three conceptions of capital are all to refer to a particular thing as the term of capital, Marx conceived it with regard to a definite social relation or, rarely, a definite social process. This idea is not easy to grasp at first glance. My synthetic interpretation of it can be summarised as follows.

1. For something to be designated as capital, it has to be a commodity. That is, at least, it must have both exchange and use values. In other words, on the one hand, it must be tradeable in a market and thereby monopolistically possessed or owned; on the other,
it must be capable of being exploited in market-mediated, profit-oriented accumulation.

2. However, the first condition is no more than one of the necessary conditions for anything to be capitalised. That is, for any commodities monopolistically exploited for the production to be referred to as capital, it must also be associated with labour power that is purchased in a market and exploited in the whole process of production. In other words, unless free proletarians are subsumed under capitalist control, other kinds of means of production cannot be designated as capital. This is the point that Marx made in discussing Mr Peel in Australia. It is why Marx repeatedly stated capital is a social relation in the first and third volumes of Capital and other work (see Marx 1849/1977, 211-215; 1867/1996, 753; 1894/1998, 801-802). Also, this is the very definition of capital that the VarCap-CPE follows.

3. Yet, we also need to recognise here that, indeed, labour power is not a genuine commodity. For, whilst a commodity is (re)produced for sale, labour power is not so produced. To borrow a term from Karl Polanyi, labour power is a fictitious commodity. For, as the generic human capacity to appropriate and transform labour-power that is typically reproduced in extended or nuclear families, its treatment as if it were a commodity becomes universal only with the development of the capitalist mode of production. In this context, Marx developed a value theory of labour rather than, as often but falsely posited, a labour theory of value. It is a foundational theory for enquiring into the historical preconditions for such a capitalist society and the effects that the historically specific phenomenon has reversely on the society.

4. Finally, the primary objective of making such a capital relation, of investing money in production, and of exploiting other kinds of the means of production is the self-expansion of value in the process of production and then to realise profits through
exchange on the market. Yet, if the things and their interrelations are at rest, valorisation does not occur. For this reason, unless they are in motion, they are not capital. In this context, Marx (1885/1997, 110) only once defined capital as a definite social process in the second volume of *Capital*. Also, this is the definition of capital that David Harvey (over-)stresses.

All in all, Marx did not regard capital as a thing, because he adopted the same relational approach to capital as he did to other reified social relations, such as the commodity, money as money, law, the state, or social categories such as women or slaves. Thus, according to the view, a question such as whether money as such is capital has no significance. Money is a social relation or, more precisely, an ensemble of social relations. That is, from Marx’s perspective, not all money is capital. Yet, money which is put into the total process of production, anchored on a capital relation, is money as capital, namely money-capital. Likewise, not all labour power is capital. Yet, labour power as a fictitious commodity subsumed under the process is labour power as capital. In this way, Marx divided capital into money-capital, merchant capital, interest-bearing capital, constant capital, variable capital, commodity-capital, fictive capital, and the like. Also, he tried to analyse their metamorphoses. In enquiring into capitalism, the VarCap-CPE approach follows this conception of capital. Along with the conception, it also uses a term, the “capitalist mode of production” (hereafter CMP). In addition, although it seems that Marx himself did not use the term, following a conventional usage in academic circles, the VarCap-CPE approach refers to an overall social system, based on the CMP as capitalism. Likewise, based on the SRA as the Marxist and critical realist social theory, this approach tries to analyse the differential forms of the social system, and then to synthesise the form-analyses integrally into a social formation. In what follows, we shall see how the VarCap-CPE analyses institutional, state and
semiotic forms regarding a capitalist social formation, and the spatiotemporal fixes of the social formation.

3.4 Institutions and Capitalism: Critical Institutionalism and the Regulation Approach

A notion that economic conduct and mechanisms can and should be studied in terms of institutions has incrementally diffused in social sciences. VarCap-CPE, too, affirms the importance of institutionalist analysis, the methodological feasibility of such an analysis and, more importantly, the inevitability of the social institutedness and embeddedness of economic conduct and mechanisms (for more details on the SRA to diverse institutional turns, Jessop 2001; 2008, and Sum and Jessop, 2013, chapter 1). Furthermore, as an integral paradigm, the VarCap-CPE contains a specific version of institutionalism as one of its components. The institutionalism is self-described as critical institutionalism (hereafter CI), and CI is highly distinguishable from a few variants of “new institutionalism” or “neo-institutionalism” (i.e., game-theoretical, sociological, historical and constructivist ones) for many reasons. To give a few examples, first, CI seeks to place institutions in the ensemble of social relations. Thus, at a fundamental level, it regards institutions in a bourgeois society as inscribed by a capital relation. This implies, unremarkably, that CI is anchored on Marx’s method, critical realism and the SRA. Also, in this way, CI is nested in the VarCap-CPE.

Second, CI is Marx-inspired and this implies that it is an emancipatory project. Yet, CI does not reduce the extant forms of institutions to the instantiation of a capital relation. For CI resonates not only with Marx’s VTL, but also with Marxist institutionalism and, partly, post-structuralist concerns with institutions. Therefore, CI conceives not only accumulation regimes or ideological apparatuses, but also what Foucault termed dispositives. In this context, CI regards the extant institutions as instantiated by the condensation of complex
power relations. Also, in the same context, it strives to disclose the contribution of such institutions to various forms of dominance and hegemony. Third, CI does not have a single-minded focus on one set of institutions. On the contrary, it explores not only economic mechanisms and institutions but also extra-economic ones – and their articulation. In addition, in the course, CI examines the role of semiosis (i.e., the intersubjective making of sense and meaning) in normalising or stabilising extant institutions, and/or in justifying specific institutional changes. Fourth, CI gives spatiotemporally sensitive analyses of institutions, whilst new institutionalist variants are in large part confined to methodological nationalism.

Yet, because of those complex features of CI, a fuller explanation of it goes beyond the range of this section. In other words, as mentioned, CI is based on Marx’s method, critical realism, the SRA and Marx’s VTL that I have thus far explicated. Also, for this reason, CI can be nested in the VarCap-CPE. However, CI is in itself a rather integral approach to institutions. In particular, it includes the regulation approach, the SRA to the capitalist type of state, critical semiotic analysis and the variegated-capitalism approach that I shall introduce below. For this reason, here I deal with only the regulation approach (hereafter RA), thereby building a bridge between what I have explicated above and what I need to explicate in the following sections.

1. The VarCap-CPE prefers terms of the RA or regulationism to régulation theory. For it conceives this as an ongoing research programme rather than a single or unified theory. In this context, the VarCap-CPE does not identify the RA with a few early French regulationist works (e.g., Aglietta 1976/1979; Boyer 1990; Lipietz 1987) but, instead, incisively periodises the history of the RA into a few generations. Also, it distinguishes seven schools in even its first generation, though it simultaneously acknowledges the
dominant status of the Parisian variant among the schools (see Jessop 1990; Jessop and Sum 2006, 13-57).

2. The VarCap-CPE approach does not regard the history of the RA as a linear development. Rather it perceptively differentiates the merits and limits of each generation. For instance, the earlier regulationists started their institutional analyses with a capital relation, and for this reason, their analyses resonated, both substantively and methodologically, with Marx’s critique of political economy. Also, they tended to highlight not only (extra-)economic institutions, but further economic mechanisms themselves. For this reason, some of them have examined the possibility of Kaleckian macroeconomics, supplemented by post-Keynesian economics, and the need for the mathematical modelling of advanced economies (see Boyer 1990). In contrast, many later regulationists have forgotten, or even ignored, the Marxian roots of the RA. Also, they tended to put a one-sided focus on (extra-)economic institutions, thereby ignoring economic mechanisms. On the other hand, the early regulationist work had remained underdeveloped regarding the state, governance and the like. Furthermore, their case studies had been by and large limited to North Atlantic states. Also, even though a few early regulationists attempted to examine the third world, their work was based on Eurocentric bias. In contrast, later regulationists started articulating state theory to the RA, dealing with governance theory, and correcting the Eurocentric bias latent in the early RA.

VarCap-CPE theorists have sought to synthesise the merits of different regulationist schools and generations (see Jessop and Sum 2006). In the course, they have also contributed to the regeneration of the RA and, further, the re-articulation of the later versions of the RA
with a Marxian root. Yet, as mentioned, the RA is a component of CI and, further, of the VarCap-CPE. Thus, for a fuller understanding of it, we need to go further.

3.5 The State and Capitalism: The Strategic-Relational Approach to the State

The VarCap-CPE contains a distinctive state theory too. The theory basically relies on a strategic-relational form-analysis of the state (for more details, see Jessop 1982; 1990; 2002b).\(^{16}\) In this context, as regards the issue, this approach has the following features. First, it focuses on states in particular rather than the state in general. Needless to mention, insofar as it is basically concerned with capitalism, with particular states referring to the capitalist type of state – and this in turn being explored in increasingly concrete-complex terms. Specifically, the VarCap-CPE explores its forms, functions and their tendential transformation. By doing so, it identifies not only the substantial features of the capitalist state, but also its accidental changes. Second, basically, it regards the state as a relatively unified ensemble of state apparatus (i.e., institutions and organisations). Yet, this does not entail that it this ensemble is an independent entity. Rather the VarCap-CPE argues that the ensemble is intertwined with other institutional and/or organisational orders. Furthermore, it posits that their respective logics are mutually influential. In this context, it also examines the modes and modalities of their articulation. Third, it places the institutional and/or organisational ensembles, including that of state apparatus, as embedded in a wider ensemble of social relations. On this basis, it treats the forms and functions of the state as inscribed within social relations. It is in this context that, following Poulantzas, the VarCap-

\(^{16}\) Bob Jessop identifies six potentially complementary approaches to the state. Form-analysis is but one. He also argues that the integral use of all six enables a concrete understanding of state.
CPE defines the state as a social relation. This, of course, resonates with Marx’s approach to capital as well.

Fourth, because it treats the state as a social relation, the VarCap-CPE does not regard the state as ‘a fully constituted, internally coherent, organizationally pure and operationally closed system’. In contrast, the state is ‘an emergent, contradictory, hybrid and relatively open system’ (Sum and Jessop 2006, 97). Fifth, it provides a spatiotemporally sensitive form-analysis of the state. For instance, the spatiality of the state is not innately fixed. Based on this, the approach enables multi-scalar examinations of the state. Seventh, the it acknowledges the role of discourses or, more broadly, semiosis in the exertion of state power. For instance, some discursive or semiotic formations may contribute to the normalisation, stabilisation and/or naturalisation of the specific functions or projects of the state. In other words, the VarCap-CPE recognises that the exertion of state power requires discursive legitimisation. Eighth, according to the approach, the state is not only the subject of regulation and governance, but simultaneously their object. This implies that the state can be both explanans and explanandum. Needless to say, insofar as it is based on the SRA, a strategic-relational form-analysis of the state is based methodologically on Marx’s philosophy and critical realism. Also, insofar as it regards the state as a social relation, it follows Marx's VTL. Furthermore, it regards the state as a rather unified ensemble of institutions and organisations, resonating thereby with the RA too, because the state can be regarded as a part of extra-economic institutions that regulationists highlight. In addition, insofar as it also analyses the mode of societalisation and multi-scalar spatiotemporalities, it is naturally linked to critical semiotic analysis and the variegated-capitalism approach. I now discuss these two in more detail.

3.6 Culture and Capitalism: Critical Semiotic Analysis
Here I show how the VarCap-CPE deals with discourse, culture, performativity, identity formation, and the like. For this set of issues, as mentioned, it depends on critical semiotic analysis (hereafter CSA). As a rather belated response from critical realists to diverse cultural turns (see Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer 2002; 2004), CSA has a distinctive and significant status in the VarCap-CPE. For it is the very component that transforms no more than a critical political economy, into a cultural political economy, of variegated capitalism. Its basic features are as follows. First, CSA prefers the term “semiosis” over others, such as argumentation, narrative, rhetoric, hermeneutics, reflexivity, discourse, reflexivity, and the like, that have been accentuated in diverse cultural turns. For semiosis includes all of them. That is, semiosis is used as an ‘umbrella concept’ (Jessop 2004, 161; Sum and Jessop 2013, 24). Second, CSA posits that semiosis is not only meaningful, but also causally efficacious. For this reason, semiotic analysis can and should operate in the generic framework of critical realism (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer 2001). Third, when dealing with the casual effects of the semiotic, CSA highlights its evolutionary mechanism—that is, variation, selection, and retention. Furthermore, when analysing the mechanism and the semiotic formation, CSA depends on the SRA. On the other hand, because it is based on critical realism and the SRA, critical semiotic analysis can be nested in CI and, more broadly, the VarCap-CPE.

Fourth, according to CSA, semiosis does not occur in just one or two fields (e.g., political and ideological superstructure or economic base). Rather CSA posits that it happens everywhere in the social world. For social action takes the complexity reduction of the world as a precondition and the complexity reduction requires semiosis. In this context, semiosis is regarded as ubiquitous in the empirical world. However, in the same context, it is argued that semiosis does not exhaust the world itself. Fifth, for this reason, CSA does not argue for a monocular focus on semiosis. In other words, it simultaneously highlights the
indispensability of extra-semiotic analysis and, further, of a synthetic understanding of
semiotic and extra-semiotic analyses. In this context, the VarCap-CPE depends on not only
CSA, but also other theoretical components that belong to critical political economy, thereby
presenting the third route between hard political economy and soft economic sociology, or
between structuralism and constructivism. In other words, although CSA and, more broadly,
the VarCap-CPE acknowledges the effects of semiosis on normalising, stabilising or
regularising structuration, it does not reduce the structural to the semiotic. Sixth, CSA itself
has its own theoretical sources. They can be divided into grand theory and grounded
analytics. At the level of grand theory, it relies on Marx, Gramsci’s vernacular materialism,
historical semantics, and Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy. At the level of analytics
grounded in the grand theory, it resonates with critical discourse analysis, particularly its two
variants: Norman Fairclough’s dialectical-relational approach and Ruth Wodak’s discourse-
historical approach. It is in this context that CSA enables not only a description of, and
interpretation on, a specific text, but also an explanation at the levels of inter-texts, contexts
and supra-texts. Lastly, CSA too gives us a spatiotemporally sensitive analysis of semiosis.
Yet, such sensitivity applies for not only CSA, but further other components in the VarCap-
CPE. In the following section, I shall deal with this feature.

3.7 Time, Space and Capitalism: Periodisation and Variegated Capitalism

There are two final issues to address: how to deal with temporality and spatiality with regard
to capitalism. To begin with let me recall that there are several methods to study historical
time (e.g., chronicle, narrative, genealogy, chronology and periodisation; see Jessop 2012).
The VarCap-CPE frequently relies on periodisation, though it does not dismiss others as
useless. Periodisation refers to a classification of the flow of historical time and, as such, this
relies on a construal of internal affinities and external breaks between historical events and/or processes. Also, because it depends on construal, periodisations can be partial or mistaken. Construal is theory-laden, and theories are value-laden. This also holds for t VarCap-CPE approach to periodisation. Specifically, it relies on critical realism and the SRA. Thus, the periodisation has the following features.

1. Critical realism acknowledges the differentiation and stratification of the real world. It also acknowledges the contingent actualisation of necessary mechanisms. These imply that, even in the same structural configuration, mutually distinguishable conjunctures exist. In this context, the periodisation of the VarCap-CPE acknowledges ‘the paradoxical simultaneity of continuity/discontinuity in the flow of historical time’. In the same context, the periodisation accentuates relative continuity and relative discontinuity. An elaboration on those requires a discussion on the SRA.

2. The SRA acknowledges the structural coherence (or patterned incoherence) of a specific regime or system. In periodising the regime or system, relative continuity and relative discontinuity are both relevant to the structural coherence. Specifically, relative continuity is used to describe a period in which, although there are relevant changes, they do not disorganise the structural coherence itself. Similarly, relative discontinuity is to point to a time when relevant changes disrupt the structural coherence itself. Yet, simultaneously, the collapse of the structural coherence, that is, the end of a specific regime or system does not suggest a sheer rupture with all features relevant to the previous regime or system. For some of them are likely to be extant even in the new regime or system that demarcates a new period, and must also operate newly in accordance to the new context.
In brief, the periodisation, based on critical realism and the SRA, enables us to grasp both “variation in invariance” and “invariance in variation” in the flow of historical time. More broadly, it allows us to examine multi-scalar temporalities with capitalism in history and the history of capitalism. This means, of course, that the VarCap-CPE does not take history as a linear and teleological process that is governed by a single law. It implies that the VarCap-CPE takes into consideration diverse time scales that penetrate the real-concrete, that is, a research object as the synthesis of the diverse.

As regards capitalist spatiality, the VarCap-CPE adopts the variegated-capitalism approach. This approach, which emerged out of a series of debates over the history since the end of the Cold War and the effects of globalisation on national states, provides a third route between the hyper-globalisation thesis (e.g., Fukuyama 1989; 1992; Ohmae 1995; Negri and Hardt 2000) and comparative-institutionalist studies on the rivalry, or varieties (or the diversity), of capitalism (e.g., Albert 1993; Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001). For variegated capitalism not only acknowledges the possibility of the co-existence and co-evolution of national capitalisms, but also sets out to examine the articulation of the multi-scalar regimes of capitalism in a world market. In particular, Jessop’s elaboration of the concept is also to contribute to the completion of Marx’s critique of political economy. For his work on variegated capitalism is directly relevant to Marx’s world market (for more details, Jessop 2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b; cf. Peck and Theodore 2007). Thus, in line with Marx’s realist approach to relations, the variegated capitalism approach not only examines the multi-scalar relations among different places and locations in an increasingly integrated world market, but also the effects of the relations on the places, locations.

**3.8 Concluding Remarks**
To recap, the VarCap-CPE is, fundamentally, associated with Marx’s critique of political economy and, more broadly, his anatomy of civil society. In other words, it depends upon the incomplete project and, simultaneously, seeks to contribute to the completion of the project. To do so, rather than holding a hermeneutic attitude toward Marx’s “divine” texts, VarCap-CPE theorists (effectively in this context, if must be admitted Jessop and Sum and a few dedicated followers) have not hesitated to adopt theoretical accomplishments in critical scholarship that have occurred after Marx’s death. Also, as a result, the approach emerged as an articulation of Marx’s VLT, the RA, the strategic-relational and regulationist theory of the capitalist type of state, CSA and the variegated-capitalism approach. Also, such integration has occurred in line with the same philosophical and social-theoretical rubrics, which enables the overall approach to escape the pitfalls of both reductionism and eclecticism. My investigation into the PCHM is guided by this integral paradigm. Yet, simultaneously, as argued in the opening chapter, its current form is not (yet) sufficient for a historical investigation of East Asian models of capitalist development. This is because it lacks, on my reading, an adequate theory of imperialism and/or hegemony on a world market. Yet, as also noted in my introduction, in many cases, the capitalist development in East Asia since the Second World War cannot be understood without reference to Japanese colonialism, its post-colonial effects, US hegemony in the Cold War, and the like. Thus, a concrete inquiry into East Asian capitalism requires consideration of the supranational relations of social forces. As the tools for such an historical analysis are missing, the VarCap-CPE needs to be updated. This is the task of the following chapter.
4. Putting (Post-)Colonialism, Imperialism and International Hegemony in Their Places in a Cultural Political Economy of Variegated Capitalism

In this chapter, I place (post-)colonialism, imperialism and international hegemony in a VarCap-CPE. This work is needed on two grounds. First, while longstanding scholarly interest in those issues has been burgeoning explosively for several reasons since the end of the Cold War, the VarCap-CPE approach has not yet addressed them. Second, my historical investigation requires the insights from such work because it highlights the effects of such supranational relations on the PCHM. In particular, such work must meet three requirements and their corollaries. First, it must be commensurable with critical realist and strategic-relational tenets, thereby allowing its integrated into the VarCap-CPE approach. Second, if possible, it should draw on Marx’s critique of political economy. Third, also if possible, Marx’s insights regarding the issue must be articulated with theoretical achievements after his death.

Keeping those points in mind, here I pursue three sets of tasks. First, I offer a conceptual map regarding imperialism and its cognate terms. Second, anchored upon a “strategic-relational”, particularly geo-historical, reading of Marx, I clarify Marx’s analysis of hegemony on a world market to fill contents in the conceptual map. In doing so, I also give an entirely new interpretation on the birth of capital, the CMP and capitalist society. Third, based on Marx’s analysis of the supranational relation on the market, I offer my periodisation of an imperialist system in variegated capitalism at the level of the world market. Specifically, subsequent sections deal with: (1) terms concerning imperialism and its cognate words; (2) Marx on a world market; (3) Marx on hegemony on a world market; (4) Marx on geo-historically specific hegemonies on geo-historically world markets; (5) Marx on the commonalities of the geo-historical hegemonies; (6) the periodisation of an imperialist
system in variegated capitalism. My conclusions are followed by an excursus on extant literature on (post)colonialism, imperialism and international hegemony.

4.1 Defining Terms: Imperialism, Imperialist Practice, Imperialist Relation, and Imperialist System

Notwithstanding a difference in etymology, I regard imperialism and colonialism as interchangeable. Also, as imperialism or colonialism, I refer to an ideology in pursuit of inter-state, inter-population and inter-territorial dominance. Based on this, I distinguish imperialist practice, relation and system from the imperialism as an ideology.

1. By imperialist practice, I mean strategically calculated (in)actions to fulfil imperialist aspiration (i.e., imperialism). Furthermore, I divide it into three kinds of practices: first, militaristic-geopolitical; second, geo-economic, and; third, cultural-semiotic ones. The first two roughly correspond to the territorial (or geopolitical) and capitalist (or geo-economic) logics of capitalist imperialism discussed by Arrighi (1994), Callinicos (2009), Harvey (2003), and others. In contrast, cultural-semiotic practice is involved in what post-colonialists problematise, and/or what Nye (2003) call ‘soft power’. In my view, all three are important in establishing and, further, maintaining supranational dominance. Also, in a specific phase, each seems to have specific forms. Imperialist dominance in a specific phase, therefore, relies on the specific compound of specific forms of the three kinds of imperialist practice. Also, from this perspective, all the extant discourses on the American empire or neo-imperialism since the end of the Cold War, rightist or leftist, only deal with parts of changing forms of US’s practice (see excursus 2).
2. Imperialist relations result from the direct effects or by-products of imperialist practices. Three points are important. First, as with imperialist practice, this relation can be considered along three dimensions, that is, geopolitical, geo-economic, and cultural. Second, as with all kinds of relations, these are dialectical. Recall here, for example, that, as Said illustrated, the cultural-semiotic practice of Western imperialism has shaped not only an Oriental identity but also an Occidental one. The same holds for the other two dimensions. Third, imperialist relations are not linear. Rather, they involve networks or “assemblages” of entangled relations, which are fluid and changeable. Thus, from this perspective, a banal question of ‘horizontal or inter-metropolitan rivalry versus vertical dominance’ is by no means important; for, imperialist relation here includes the two relations and even other types of relations.

3. Imperialist system denotes a supranational system, based on the entangled imperialist relations. Specifically, I regard the system as a supranational—and, currently, patently global—formation. Formation here means a relatively unitary mode of the
supranational articulation of, in some cases, *multiply unequal* and, in others, *multiply rivalrous* social formations. Thus, it is impossible to define the system fully from the outset; for, it is irreducible to an individual and linear relation, although extant literature tends to do so (see excursus). Here, conversely, a specific imperialist system is regarded as one of the determinants that effects a specific mode of imperialism (i.e., ideology). In this regard, a specific ideological aspiration for supranational dominance, too, is not reduced to innate malignancy. It is determined by outer structures as well. Figure 2 briefly shows the hitherto definitions.

Note here that my discussion is not meant to suggest that states should be regarded as independent actors in the manner of classical realism; for, my strategic-relational approach to the state is carried over into my analysis of imperialism. Both are interpreted as material condensations of shifting balances of force mediated through specific social forms and, in this context, inter-state relations often reflect and refract on a supranational scale the relations among domestic social forces with different scalar horizons of action.

### 4.2 Marx on the World Market

To fill contents in the conceptual map, here and in the following three sections, I elucidate Marx’s insights into hegemony on a world market. Let me start with the world market. Political economists in the 18th and 19th centuries focused only on the universal aspect of the world market. Quesnay (1766/1846, 76), for instance, viewed the world market as ‘the universal commercial republic extending over different countries’, and Sismondi (1819/1991, 205, 276, 304, 562) saw it as ‘the market of the universe’. Ricardo (1821/2004, 134) also defined it as ‘the universal society throughout the civilized world’ (cited in Gimm 2016, 218-
Let me recall Marx’s polemic against the universalist disposition of political economists (see Chapter 2). That is, from his perspective, the political economists’ view is nothing but a pure abstraction. Marx’s world market is not a universal one. It is the real-concrete, and for this reason, it can be regarded as the singular or the individual that contains within itself both the universal and the particular. Furthermore, it should be viewed as a far larger totality. For it is a nexus or ensemble that comprises many “internal” and “local” markets in both “home” and “foreign” markets that are mutually interwoven, at least, on an intercontinental scale (for the scale of a world market, see below). In this context, although Marx referred to it as a world market, he also thought that a global scale of a world market emerged in the 19th century. In addition, even in a world market, territorial barriers still survive, albeit they will tend to disappear as the market reaches completion – to the extent that this is possible.

Moreover, Marx thought that the world market has a dialectical relationship with capital, the CMP or, more specifically, ‘the historically specific division of labour’. In other words, the emergence and development of a capital relation and the CMP requires a world market as a prerequisite. ‘The proletariat can thus only exist world-historically’ (Marx and Engels 1846/1975, 49; italic in original). Simultaneously, after their emergences, the development of a capital relation and the CMP has a tendency of (re-)creating a world market, because: ‘The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, established connexions everywhere’ (Marx and Engels 1848/1976, 487). In this context, Marx (1857-8/1986, 335; italic in original) also wrote: ‘The tendency to create the world market is inherent directly in the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome’. Yet, this does not imply, of course, that a world market expands linearly in a capitalist era. As regards this, Marx (1857-8/1986, 337; italic in original) wrote:
‘[F]rom the fact that capital posits every such limit as a barrier which it has *ideally* already overcome, it does not at all follow that capital has *really* overcome it; and since every such limit contradicts the determinations of capital, its production is subject to contradictions which are constantly overcome but just as constantly posited. Moreover, the universality for which capital ceaselessly strives, comes up against barriers in capital’s own nature, barriers which at a certain stage of its development will allow it to be recognised as being itself the greatest barrier in the way of this tendency, and will therefore drive towards its transcendence through itself.

For these reasons, Marx (1857-8/1993, 227-8; cf. Marx 1857-8/1986, 160) conceived the world market as a field ‘in which production is posited as a totality together with all its moments, but within which, at the same time, all contradictions come into play.’ According to him, afterwards, ‘[t]he world market …, again, forms the presupposition of the whole as well as its substratum’. It is in this context that Marx regarded the market as dynamically reshaped and even reemerged. Indeed, as I shall elaborate below, Marx mutually distinguished, at least, three world markets, which were *geo*-historically specific. According to Marx, they arose since, respectively, (a) Crusades in the 13th century (thus, the emergence of the 14th-century world market), (b) the discovery of America in the late-15th century (thus, the rise of the 16th-century world market), (c) the absorption, in the 19th century, of California, Australia, China, Japan and the like into the 16th-century world market (thus, the emergence of the 19th-century world market).

4.3 Marx on Hegemony on a World Market
Here I should address Marx’s approach to hegemony on a world market. To be sure, Marx never used the term, hegemony, in the three volumes of Das Kapital or their drafts. However, he certainly left his distinctive explication of what we usually refer to hegemony or a “hegemonic state”. In doing so, yet, he used a term “supremacy” instead of hegemony. Therefore, to Marx, what we can refer to as “hegemony on a world market” was, indeed, “supremacy on a world market”. Also, as I shall illustrate, if we focus on his explication of this supremacy, Marx will be read in an entirely novel manner, particularly regarding the early history of capitalism and supranational relations on a world market. First, however, we should recall that his method is both differentially analytical and integrally synthetical and he applies this approach to supremacy as well.

To begin with, Marx divided supremacy into two subcategories: commercial (or trading) and industrial supremacy. Then, he related this division to his distinction between the epoch of machinofacture and its precedent epochs—particularly phases between the first emergence of a world market and the emergence of machinofacture. Here, according to Marx, in the epochs before the emergence of machinofacture, it is ‘the commercial supremacy … gives industrial predominance’. That is, in these epochs, a state that seized commercial supremacy, went further to accede to industrial supremacy, thereby ascending to whole supremacy (see Marx 1867/1996, 742). To give an example relevant to the manufacturing period, this is because: ‘Manufacture arises where there is mass production for export, i.e., on the basis of large-scale maritime and overland trade, in its emporia’ (Marx 1857-8/1986, 434; italic in original). In this context, in the period, supremacy in large-scale trade precedes

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17 He used the term “supremacy” not only in the context of an international relation, but also other political and/or economic contexts. To give an example, he wrote: ‘The labour of superintendence and management, arising as it does out of an antithesis, out of the supremacy of capital over labour’ (Marx 1894/1998, 384; italic added; for other examples, see ibid, 383, 595).
supremacy in manufacture. Also, in the same context, Marx (1867/1996, 742) argued that, in the manufacturing period, ‘the colonial system plays’ a ‘preponderant rôle’. In contrast, in the machinofacturing period, this occurs in the reverse direction. In this epoch, ‘industrial supremacy implies commercial supremacy’ (Marx 1867/1996, 742). Therefore, total supremacy in the machinofacturing period is anchored fundamentally upon industrial supremacy. In other words, in this epoch, a state that seeks to gain supremacy should first seize industrial supremacy. In this way, supremacy in the manufacturing and machinofacturing periods are subtly different. This is evident from Marx’s account of three successive examples of supremacy.

4.4 Marx on Northern Italian, Dutch and British Supremacy on Three Historical World Markets

Marx (1847/1976a, 574) confirmed that a ‘world market appeared before the discovery of America’. That is, it emerged after the Crusades that did not only make ‘the product of the Orient’ known, but further ‘greatly increased the demand for such products’, in Western Europe. In the world market in the 14th and 15th centuries—‘when there were as yet no colonies, when America did not yet exist for Europe, when Asia existed only through the intermediary of Constantinople’—‘the Mediterranean was the centre of commercial activity’ (Marx 1847/1976b, 179). Specifically, the republican city-states in Northern Italy seized the commercial supremacy. This led to their industrial supremacy and, thereby, overall supremacy. In particular, as regards their supremacy in industry, Marx (1867/1996, 707) argued that Italy was a place ‘where capitalist production developed earliest, the dissolution of serfdom also took place earlier than elsewhere’. That is, in Marx’s reckoning, a capital relation and capitalist manufacture arose in the 14th or 15th century. Furthermore, Marx (1857-8/1986, 434) argued that the manufacture later extended to ‘Constantinople, the
Flemish and Dutch cities, a few Spanish ones like Barcelona’ (see also Marx 1861-3/1986, 465; 1861-3/1994, 328; 1894/1998, 334; Marx and Engels 1846/1975, 67). By any means, however, Marx did not regard those towns as a bourgeois society. Thus, in the 14th and 15th centuries, whilst both a capital relation and capitalist production already appeared, a capitalist society did not exist. For, in those centuries, manufacture, based on a capital relation, did not develop on a large scale. According to Marx (1857-8/1986, 429, 434; italic in original), even ‘in the Italian cities’, ‘it developed side by side with guilds’, whilst ‘if capital is to generally dominant for an epoch, its condition must be developed not merely locally, but on a large scale’. In other words, capitalist manufacture at that time appeared only ‘sporadically or locally, alongside the old modes of production’.

In this situation, the world market was radically expanded after the discovery of the Americas in the late 15th century. This revolution on a world market led to the rise of the 16th-century world market, thereby replacing the old emporia with new ones. Accordingly, the Mediterranean could no longer function as the centre of a commercial activity (see Marx 1853/1979, 628). As a result, it also ‘annihilated Northern Italy’s commercial supremacy’. Consequently, in Italy’s industry as well, ‘a movement in the reverse direction set it. The labourers of the towns were driven en masse into country, and gave an impulse, never before seen to the petite culture, carried on in the form of gardening’ (Marx 1867/1996, 707; italic in original). In brief, Northern Italy, by seizing the commercial supremacy on the 14th-century world market, could accede to the industrial and total supremacy. Conversely, Northern Italy, by losing the commercial supremacy on the 16th-century world market, came to lose even the industrial and total supremacy. For Marx, during the course, a capital relation and thus capitalist production emerged for the first time in history. A capitalist society, however, did not emerge.
On the 16th-century world market, the Dutch gained commercial, and thereby industrial, supremacy.\textsuperscript{18} As regards this supremacy, Marx identified a few distinguishing features. First, regarding the commercial aspect of the supremacy, Marx argued that whilst ‘[u]ntil then there were only first trading towns’, the Dutch was the ‘first dominant trading nation’. Marx did not claim that only the Dutch succeeded in such a transition. For: ‘Spaniards and Portuguese [also] form[ed] a transition from dominant trading towns to dominant trading nations’. Marx added, however: ‘Carrying trading and fisheries nevertheless still form[ed] a decisive constituent of Dutch supremacy’ (Marx 1847/1976a, 575; italic in original). That is, in Marx’s reckoning, whilst the 14th-century world market had existed in the form that a town-scale of local markets had been rather sparsely entangled on an Eurasian scale, the 16th-century world market existed in a form that a nation-scale of home markets, albeit still not all on the whole world market, were interlinked on not only an Eurasian, but also Atlantic scales. From this phase, therefore, the commercial supremacy also began to be seized on a nation-scale, and the first nation that achieved it was the Dutch.

Second, as regards the industrial aspect of the supremacy, Marx argued that the Dutch established a capitalist social formation. It is also in this context that Marx (1867/1996, 706-707) wrote: ‘Although we come across the first beginning of capitalist production as early as the 14th or 15th century, sporadically, in certain towns of the Mediterranean, the capitalist

\textsuperscript{18} In discussing about Dutch hegemony, Marx rather confusingly used terms such as “the Dutch”, “Holland”, “Netherlands”, “the United Provinces”, though he usually used the first two terms. Yet, when he discussed Dutch hegemony, it seems to refer to the state that was \textit{since 1579 separated from Spain as the United Provinces}’ (Marx 1861-3/1991, 401; italic added). This is, above all, because Marx regarded the late 16th century as the starting point of Dutch supremacy. Also, he argued that the Dutch seized supremacy on a \textit{nation}-scale for the first time in history. Therefore, regardless of nomenclature, his referent seems to be the Dutch Republic. The same issue occurs for English hegemony. For, when he referred to the hegemony in the 18th and 19th centuries, Marx usually writes “England” instead of “Great Britain” or “the United Kingdom”.

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era dates from the 16th century’. Third, as the colonialist aspect of the supremacy, whilst ‘there were as yet no colonies’ in the world market in 14th and 15th centuries, the Dutch ‘in the 16th and 17th centuries was the dominant … colonial nation’ (Marx 1861-3/1991, 397).

My interpretation that Marx regarded the Dutch republic as a capitalist social formation, of course, may make many readers surprising. Some of them may view the interpretation as absurd. They might argue that the Dutch republic at that time was no more than a mercantile society. Yet such an argument is, certainly, different from Marx’s view of it (see Marx 1867/1996, 740; 1894/1998, 331; 1961-3/1989b, 531). In Marx’s reckoning, basically, the rise of the 16th-century world market, followed by the discovery of America, transplanted the commercial centre from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic coast of Western Europe. In the 16th-century world market, the Dutch—after its revolt with, and separation from, Spain—seized the trading supremacy on a nation-scale for the first time in history. This contributed to the flourishing of the Dutch manufacture, based on capitalist relation, that had emerged, albeit sporadically, in the 14th and 15th centuries. Remember here that, in the 15th century, the capital relation in Northern Italy’s manufacture was extended to ‘Constantinople, the Flemish and Dutch cities, a few Spanish ones like Barcelona’ (Marx 1975, 67). Remember also that Marx (1886, 434; italic in original argued) argued: ‘Manufacture arises where there is mass production for export, i.e., on the basis of large-scale maritime and overland trade, in its emporia’. That is, capitalist manufacture existed, albeit sporadically, in Dutch cities even before the emergence of the 16th-century world market. On the new world market, the Dutch seized trading supremacy. In turn, this led to the flourishing of the Dutch manufacture.

In this context, Marx indicated Holland as a place ‘where capitalist production in the form of manufacture and the large-scale of trade first blossomed’. More specifically, according to Marx, ‘in its early phase capitalist production, having gained strength, seeks to
subordinate interest-bearing capital to industrial capital by force’ and ‘this was in fact done first of all in Holland’. In contrast, ‘in England in the 17th century it was, partly in very naïve terms, declared to be the primary requisite of capitalist production’ (Marx 1861-3/1989b, 531). In the same context, in Das Kapital, vol. I, Marx (1867/1996, 740) pointed out Holland as the ‘head capitalist nation of the 17th century’. Overall, Marx did not regard Holland as either precapitalist or merely commercial. Indeed, he criticized this view. For instance, recall Marx’s remarks on Gülich who argued: ‘Holland … in 1648 in the acme of its commercial greatness’. As regards this, Marx commented: ‘Gülich forgets to add that by 1648, the people of Holland were more overworked, poorer and more brutally oppressed than those of all the rest of Europe put together’ (Marx 1867/1996, 740). Nevertheless, we can still argue that commerce had a preponderant role in the Dutch society. Yet, it does not imply that the Dutch in the 17th century was not a capitalist social formation. It suggests that Dutch supremacy was anchored on not industrial, but commercial supremacy. It means that the era belongs to the age of manufacturing in the history of capitalism.

In identifying the Dutch as the first capitalist society, Marx (1847/1976a, 575; 1861-3/1991, 397, 401) specifically discussed its several features. For example, he argued that Dutch Protestantism contributed to the emergence of the capitalist social formation.19 Also, in

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19 In discussing Protestantism, unlike Weber, Marx did not distinguish Lutheranism and Calvinism. Instead, he employed terms such as ‘Protestantism’, ‘Dutch Protestantism’, ‘English Puritanism’, and ‘American Puritans’. For him, Dutch Protestantism contributed to the emergence and operation of a capitalist society on three grounds. First, it justified usury, thereby enabling interest-bearing capital to be invested in capitalist production. In this context, he described Holland as ‘the first apologia for usury’. Second, ‘by changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays’, it played ‘an important part in the genesis of capital’ (Marx 1867/1996, 218). Third, Marx (1857-8/1986, 164) connected ‘English Puritanism and Dutch Protestantism’ with ‘the cult of money, … its asceticism, its renunciation, its self-sacrifice—thrift and frugality, contempt for the worldly, temporary and
mentioning Dutch “wool” manufacturing, Marx also noted that the Dutch preferred ‘cattle breeding within the country rather than tillage’. On this basis, he offered an intriguing comment of the relation between Holland and England. According to Marx, Dutch supremacy in commerce and industry brought about an economic upheaval in England in the 16th and early 17th centuries.

For instance, in England in the 16th century, the development of Dutch industry made English wool production of great commercial importance, and, on the other hand, especially increased the need for Dutch and Italian commodities, arable land was converted into sheep-walks and the small-tenant system was broken up, producing that rather violent economic upheaval which Thomas More deplored (Marx 1857-8/1987, 481).

In other words, ‘the importation of commodities from the Netherlands gave a decisive significance to the surplus of wool that England had to offer in exchange’, thereby producing the ‘rather violent economic upheaval’ in England in the 16th and early 17th centuries. Thus, the surplus of wool in England at that time was to supply materials, that is, wool to Dutch wool manufacturing. In return, this corresponded to increasing English demands for Dutch transient pleasures; the pursuit of eternal treasure’ (see also Marx 1857-8/1987, 364). In this context, Marx (1861-3/1991, 403) regarded Protestantism as one of ‘the intellectual prerequisites’ of a capitalist society.

In this context, Marx argued: ‘Holland as the first trading and industrial nation, from the end of the 16th to the middle of the 17th century, is also the first nation for whom its domestic agriculture is insufficient and where the population is growing in far too great a proportion to domestic agriculture. Therefore carries on the first large-scale trade in grain. Amsterdam becomes the chief granary of Western Europe’ (Marx 1976a, 575; italic in original).
products. In the course, the enclosure occurred, producing landless workers in England. Marx called this as 'the civilising effect of foreign trade' (1857-8/1986, 187; italic in original). Of course, Marx did not regard Dutch capitalism as matured. Instead, he described the phase of Dutch supremacy in the history of capitalism as 'infancy' (Marx 1861-3/1994, 327). In the infant phase of capitalism, the Dutch lost its total supremacy by losing its commercial supremacy following the wars with Britain. Thus, Britain came to seize total supremacy by taking commercial supremacy from the Dutch. Then, the Industrial Revolution occurred there. Thereby, Britain acquired a new kind of supremacy on a world market. That is, British supremacy since the 18th century was fundamentally anchored not on its commercial, but on its industrial, supremacy. This led to the creation of the 19th-century world market in which, Marx (1858/1983, 346) wrote: 'bourgeois society has for the second time experienced its 16th century'.

4.5 The Commonalities of the Geo-Historical Supremacy on the Geo-Historical World Markets

Marx (sometimes, together with, Engels) also dealt with their commonalities. The first emerges from their discussion about the system of public credit. That is, according to Marx and Engels, an ‘idea that only the state becomes richer when individuals become richer on the basis of bourgeois property, or that up to now all private property has been state property, is an idea that again puts historical relations upside-down’. This is because: ‘with the development and accumulation of bourgeois property, i.e., with the development of commerce and industry, individuals grew richer and richer while the state fell even more deeply into debt’. Then, they added: 'This phenomenon was evident already in the first Italian commercial republics; later … in Holland, and now it is again occurring in England'. In this regard, they concluded:
It is therefore obvious that as soon as the bourgeoisie has accumulated money, the state has to beg from the bourgeoisie and in the end it is actually bought up by the latter. This takes place in a period in which the bourgeoisie is still confronted by another class, and consequently the state can retain some appearance of independence in relation to both of them (Marx and Engels 1847/1975, 361).

Second, according to Marx, as all three states were losing their supremacy, they began to invest their money, particularly in their rivals. For instance:

Thus the villainies of the Venetian thieving system formed one of the secret bases of the capital wealth of Holland to whom Venice in her decadence lent large sums of money. So also was it with Holland and England … Holland had ceased to be the nation preponderant in commerce and industry. One of its main lines of business, therefore, from 1701-1776, is the lending out of enormous amounts of capital, especially to its great rival England. The same thing is going on today between England and the United States. A great deal of capital which appears today in the United States without any certificate of birth, was yesterday, in England, the capitalised blood of children (Marx 1867/1996, 743-4).

Even in the early 1850s, Marx gave an identical argument.

In the competitive struggle between America and England we see the latter pushed increasingly into the position of Venice, Genoa and Holland, which were all forced to lend their capital on interest after the monopoly of their trading power had been
## Table 4.1 A Comparison among Italian, Dutch and English Supremacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Italian supremacy</th>
<th>Dutch supremacy</th>
<th>English supremacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• From the 14th to 15th centuries</td>
<td>• From the end of the 16th, to the middle of the 17th, centuries</td>
<td>• Its first phase from the middle of the 17th century; also, its second phase from the last third of the 18th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Based on the 14th-century world market as the sparse interlinkage, on a Eurasian scale, of a town-scale of local markets</td>
<td>• Based on the 16th-century world market as the interlinkage, on not only a Eurasian, but also Atlantic scale, of a nation-scale of home markets</td>
<td>• Initially arose from, basically, the 16th-century world market as the interlinkage, on a global scale, of home markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Mediterranean as the centre of a commercial activity</td>
<td>• The Atlantic coast of Europe as the centre of a commercial activity</td>
<td>• The Atlantic coast of Europe as the centre of a commercial activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capital and the CMP in a form of manufacture emerged; thus, the embryonal phase of capitalism</td>
<td>• Capitalism in a form of manufacture emerged; thus, the infant phase of capitalism</td>
<td>• In its second phase, capitalism in a form of machinofacture; thus, the mature phase of capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The total supremacy, anchored on commercial supremacy; thus, relatively easy to break</td>
<td>• The total supremacy, anchored on commercial supremacy; thus, relatively easy to break</td>
<td>• In its second phase, the first total supremacy, anchored on industrial supremacy; thus, relatively tricky to break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The first supremacy on a world market, albeit on a town-scale</td>
<td>• The first supremacy on a nation-scale</td>
<td>• The epoch of “colonialism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No colonies</td>
<td>• The epoch in which a credit system first took root; invested, particularly, in its rival, England, with the decline of the supremacy</td>
<td>• The epoch of “colonialism” which was later called as “imperialism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The origin of a credit system; invested in, particularly, its rival, Holland, with the decline of the supremacy</td>
<td>• The first nation that experienced a far greater rise in population than that in agricultural products</td>
<td>• In its second phase, a large-scale of financial investment in industry in not merely America, but also other continents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The first apologia for usury</td>
<td>• Achieved a historically incomparable scale of trade in the first phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Protestantism</td>
<td>• Even unlimited usury recognised as a condition for capitalist development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commonalities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Puritanism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• As bourgeois were richer, the states were poorer because of a rise in national debts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• As the supremacy declined, they invested in their rivals, especially the rising power.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: My own
broken. Genoa and Venice helped Holland to emerge, Holland provided England with capital, and now England is obliged to do the same for the United States of America. Only today all the conditions in this process are of a much larger scale than they were at that time (Marx 1853/1979, 628).

Marx added, however, that: ‘England’s position differs from that of those countries in that the main factor for them was a monopoly of trade, which is easy to break, whilst she possesses a monopoly of industry as well, which by its very nature is tougher’ (for more details on a comparison among the three hegemonies, see table 4.1)

4.6 Periodising the imperialist system in variegated capitalism

Thus far, I have offered a new interpretation on Marx’s approach to supremacy on a world market, which has many implications for Weberian and Braudelian criticisms of Marx. For, without ignoring the capital relation and the division of labour, Marx also considered points that only Weber and Braudel of the three are supposed to have highlighted and that provided the grounds for their polemics against Marx. Examples are the contribution of a specific religion to the genesis of capital, a hegemonic transition from a long-run perspective and the emergence of finance-led accumulation following the decline of hegemony. To elaborate these points would take me far beyond this thesis.

Instead, based on my previous analysis of the commonalities and dissimilarities of the three bodies of supremacy, I offer a periodisation of an imperialist system in variegated capitalism. As shown in Table 4.2, I divide it into four phases. That is, based on a broad consensus about 20th century history, I added the fourth phase, when the US has seized the supremacy, to the three phases of Italian, Dutch and English supremacy. Recall, however,
### Table 4.2 The Four Phases of Variegated Capitalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>First phase (Embryonic phase)</th>
<th>Second phase (Infant phase)</th>
<th>Third phase (Adolescent phase)</th>
<th>Fourth phase (Adult phase)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period (century)</td>
<td>13th c.</td>
<td>14-5th</td>
<td>From mid-16th</td>
<td>From early 17th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>Northern Italy’s city-states</td>
<td>The Dutch Republic</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>The US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony content</td>
<td>Total hegemony, anchored on commercial supremacy; thus relatively easy to break</td>
<td>Total hegemony, based on industrial supremacy; harder to break</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony content (Continued)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of rivalry</td>
<td>Competition for commercial advantages</td>
<td></td>
<td>Competition for industrial catch-up or leapfrogging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle</td>
<td>1. As bourgeois were richer, the states were poorer because of a rise in national debts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle content (Continued)</td>
<td>2. As the supremacy declined, they invested in their rivals, particularly, the following supremacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour process</td>
<td>Handicraft with the sporadic emergence of manufacture in the 14th and 15th centuries</td>
<td>The flourishing of capitalist manufacture</td>
<td>Machinofacture with an emergence of systemofacture in the late 20th century</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-form</td>
<td>The emergence of commune (comune)</td>
<td>The emergence and expansion of national-territorial states and nation-states</td>
<td>The emergence of post-national regime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of world market</td>
<td>the 14th-century world market as the sparse interlinkage, on a Eurasian scale, of a town-scale of local markets</td>
<td>the 16th-century world market as the interlinkage, on not only a Eurasian, but also Atlantic scale, of a nation-scale of home markets</td>
<td>Initially, the 16th-century world market; the 19th-century world market as the interlinkage, on a global scale, of home markets</td>
<td>The partition and recovery of the world market due to the emergence and collapse of the socialist bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic heartland</td>
<td>The Mediterranean</td>
<td>The North Atlantic coast of Western Europe</td>
<td>The Atlantic coasts; the increasing importance of the coast in North America</td>
<td>The Atlantic coast; the increasing importance of North East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>Scholastic “liberalism”</td>
<td>Dutch liberalism</td>
<td>British classical (moral) liberalism</td>
<td>Embedded liberalism and, then, neo-liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Ideology</td>
<td>Thomas Aquinas’s Scholasticism</td>
<td>Dutch Protestantism (Calvinism)</td>
<td></td>
<td>English and American Puritanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The emergence and rise of different forms of “republicanism” in the heartlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: My own
that the first phase does not belong to a capitalist era, though capitalist production had already appeared alongside commerce. I thus designate it as an “embryonic” phase. Note also that the fourth phase does not imply the mortality of capitalism in a foreseeable future. On the other hand, Table 4.2 rather concretely illustrates the features of each phase. Note, however, that they are basically relevant to the geo-historical heartlands where supremacy and metropoles were located on the geo-historical world markets. Remember also that an imperialist system can be simply reduced to neither a hegemonic state, a horizontal rivalry between metropoles, nor a vertical dominance in the hierarchical system. Thus, the features, outlined in Table 4.1, should be further complemented. Considering, this and, that many of the features in the table have been already discussed, I add a few remarks on the contents of the table, particularly on some of the issues about which I have not mentioned above.

First, Table 4.2 indicates that geo-historical heartlands on the geo-historical world markets commonly experienced the rise of “liberal” economic thoughts. As regards this interpretation, three points needs to be clarified, because it may have readers confused.

1. As regards the expression of scholastic liberalism, one might ask: In what respect can scholastic economic thoughts be regarded as liberal? They were certainly not liberal in a contemporary sense. Yet, in using this expression, I want to highlight that, since the 13th century, scholastic scholars started conceding possible exceptions to the longstanding Aristotelian, and earlier Medieval Church’s, tenets regarding the sterility of money. For instance, Thomas Aquinas denied the possibility of usury theoretically; yet, practically, he conceded it with a few exceptions (Le Goff 1988/1990, 65 ff). This is, needless to say, an important question for the genesis of capital. For, as Marx (1861-3/1989b, 531) noted, ‘during the transition to capitalist production, the first step is the recognition that “usury”, the old-fashioned form of interest-bearing capital, is a
condition of production, a necessary production relation’. Also, according to Braudel (1979/1983, 232): ‘Italy, the forerunner of modernity in this respect, was at the centre of such discussions’. On the other hand, this period corresponds to the time when the term “capital” started being used in an economic sense—particularly, to refer to the principal of a business loan. According to Braudel, it was also Italy ‘that the word was first coined, made familiar and to some extent matured’.  

2. The other might wonder at the expression of Dutch liberalism. For many have still regarded Adam Smith as the founder of economic liberalism. Yet, in analysing reasons for the economic success of the Dutch Republic, Dutch economists published books that advocated free trade, free competition and a republican regime even in the 17th century, which were highly popular in the Netherlands at the time (for more details, see Weststeijn 2012). That is, Dutch people witnessed the rise of economic liberalism before English people. Recall also that Marx argued: ‘[Holland] was the first apologia for usury’. Yet, the expression “the first” does not mean that there had been no interest-bearing capital in Northern Italy. Instead, his stress on the Dutch republic as providing  

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21 In this context, Braudelians have argued that Marx was mistaken to limit capital to production (see Braudel (1979/1983). In my view, however, their argument highlights not Marx’s mistake, but their misreading of Marx. For Marx (1867/1996, 157), too, recognised that: ‘As a matter of history, capital … invariable takes the form at first money; it appears as moneyed wealth, as the capital of the merchant and of the usurer’. Yet, here Marx added: ‘[W]e have no need to refer to the origin of capital in order to discover that the first form of appearance of capital is money. We can see it daily under our very eyes.’ Recall here that a capitalist circulation (i.e., M—C—M’) starts with money-capital. Remember also that Marx pointed out Northern Italy as the first place where capitalist production, based on a capital relation, appeared. Thus, it is not difficult to infer that, in Marx’s view, the origin was money-capital in Italy. Yet, as repeatedly accentuated, Marx did not regard Northern Italy’s city-states as a capitalist society.
the first apologia for usury is relevant to Calvinism that Marx himself referred to as Dutch Protestantism. On top of this, Marx (1861-3/1989b, 169) argued: ‘[Holland] compels most capitalists, except the largest ones, to employ their capital in industry, instead of living on interest and is thus a spur to production’. In this context, Marx also argued: ‘it was the first nation that subordinated interest-bearing capital to commercial and industrial capital’.  

3. Therefore, we need to reinterpret Adam Smith too. To my mind, what he advocated was neither liberalism in general nor general liberalism. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, for instance, his polemics targeted not only Hobbesian philosophy, but also the Anglo-Dutch political economist Bernard Mandeville’s argument that private vices result in a public benefit. According to Smith (1759/1984, 308), such an argument ‘seems to take away altogether the distinction between vice and virtue’ and thus to be ‘wholly pernicious’. He therefore regarded Mandeville’s liberalism as nothing but a ‘licentious system’. He argued not for general, but particular liberalism. He did not advocate all kinds of self-interests but prudent pursuit of self-interests. To me, therefore, what he really sought to achieve in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations was to embed liberalism in certain moral principles. He wanted to embed economic conduct in a moral liberal society.

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22 On the other hand, as regards usury in England in the 17th century, Marx (1861-3/1989b, 537) wrote: ‘The polemics are no longer directed against usury as such, but against the amount of interest, and the fact that it dominates credit. The desire to establish the form of credit. Regulations are imposed’. Then, he added that, in the eighteenth century, even ‘[u]nrestricted usury’ was ‘recognised as an element of capitalist production’.
Second, Table 4.2 contains an argument about the changing forms of rivalry in a world market, which I have never explained. It implies a new interpretation on the ages of “colonialism” on the 16th-century world market and “imperialism” in the 19th-century world market. That is, I view the two as different forms of hegemonic or inter-metropolitan rivalry in a variegated capitalism that unfolds with the world market as its ultimate horizon of development. Thus, following Marx, I do not divide the world market into precapitalist and capitalist eras and regard colonialism and imperialism as interchangeable terms. There are, of course, differences between the two ages. Whilst the colonialist rivalry in the 16th-century world market sought for commercial advantages, the imperialist rivalry in the 19th-century world market aimed for industrial catch-up or leapfrogging. This also suggests a reinterpretation of mercantilism. Whilst mercantilism in the 16th-century world market was oriented toward commercial protection, that of the 19th-century world market sought industrial protection. As repeatedly accentuated, this orientation toward commercial protection in the 16th-century world market does not mean that the era was precapitalist. For, in the market, commercial supremacy implies industrial supremacy in capitalist manufacturing.

In addition, we can understand “absolutist states” in a new manner. The usual view that are exceptional states in a transition to a capitalist era may seem reasonable – but only when we adopt, consciously or unconsciously, a comparativist perspective, based on methodological nationalism (or regionalism) and exclude the contemporary Dutch Republic from relevant cases (see, e.g., Anderson 1974). In other words, this interpretation only seems appropriate when we analyse England and France in this period in methodologically nationalist terms. In contrast, as illustrated above, Marx’s view of the birth of capital, the CMP and a bourgeois society was spatially multi-dimensional. Above all, Marx explored the world market not as universal market but as the concrete and complex network of home and
foreign markets. In particular, he thought that the network of the 14th-century world market was formed on a Eurasian scale. He also argued that its nodal points in Western Europe existed on a town-scale. In contrast, the 16th-century world market expanded abruptly when the Americas were discovered. Also, the European nodal points in the market began to acquire a national scale. In the course, the central place of an economic activity, too, was transplanted from the Mediterranean to the Western Europe. Along the way, important territorial changes occurred, particularly the separation of the Dutch Republic from Spain, which had an important effect on variegated capitalism in the 16th-century world market. In brief, Marx’s account of the birth of the CMP is not just historical, but geo-historical. Specifically, as I illustrated, his account of historical world markets contains historical changes in territory, place, scale and network. In addition, he thought that, in the course, exchange on a world market and the division of labour have been dialectically efficacious. In contrast, even Marxist historians have been trapped in methodological nationalism (or regionalism) and comparativism. For this reason, they have debated only over whether the motive power for a transition to capitalism lay in economic base or political superstructure (or class struggle) in England or Europe, or over whether the power lay in exchange or production (see, e.g., Anderson 1974; Brenner 1976, 1977, 1982; Dodd 1946; Sweezy and Dodd 1950; Wood 1999/2002). By doing so, indeed, they have provided clues for Weberian and Braudelian polemics against Marx.

In brief, many absolutist states in Europe were already absorbed into the variegated capitalist order in the 16th-century world market, where people in its heartland witnessed the rise of republicanism earlier than elsewhere. Thus, the age of the absolutist states should belong to a capitalist era. This co-evolution of different political regimes within a variegated

23 Needless to say, my geo-historical reading of Marx’s historical account is based on the SRA (for the SRA to spatial multi-dimensionalism, Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008).
capitalist order is not unusual. For, even in the 20th century, it is never difficult to find out examples that capitalist development or neoliberalisation was accomplished under an authoritarian or even totalitarian regime. The PCHM is one of the examples in a variegated capitalist order on the 20th-century world market where its heartland already witnessed liberal-bourgeois democracy. Needless to say, it holds for the 21st century. China can be viewed as its typical example. Note here that Marx (1857-8/1986, 436) argued: ‘the plantation owners in America … are capitalists’. Specifically, Marx regarded ‘their existence as anomalies within a world market based on free labour’ (see also Marx 1861-3/1989a, 516; 1894/1998, 790). That is, the co-evolution of heterogeneous regimes or relations holds for not only political, but also economic fields. And this tells us that capitalism has been variegated from the outset. This further means that the history of variegated capitalism, including colonialist and imperialist wars that occurred in each phase, should be re-discovered and re-interpreted from a geo-historical perspective, and in line with Marx’s insights into the supremacy on a world market.

4.7 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I tried to achieve two aims. The first is to draw a conceptual map that presents an imperialist system as a formation (i.e., an ensemble of forms) that is inscribed by imperialist practices and relations. In particular, I argued that the supranational scale of a social formation can be understood neither in terms of horizontal (i.e., hegemonic or inter-metropolitan) rivalry nor as vertical dominance/resistance. Needless to say, this approach corresponds to the critical realist and strategic-relational rubrics. The second objective is to draw Marx’s insights into such a supranational relation from his critique of political economy. If an observation is theory-laden, a reading would be the case. Indeed, my re-
reading of Marx is inspired by Marx’s “differentially analytical and integrally synthetic” method for inquiry and the strategic-relational approach, particularly its advocate for spatial multi-dimensionalism. Based on this reading, I clarified Marx’s approach to supremacy on a market and the history of the CMP. It shows that Marx adopted a geo-historically concrete and relationalist approach to those issues. This implies that his approach and account can be nested in a VarCap-CPE. To develop a theory of an imperialist system in variegated capitalism, much more work is required.

Yet, this thesis is concerned with the PCHM. Thus, I return to the PCHM. To investigate it historically, at first, I focus on East Asia in the 19th-century world market. This is because the effects of East Asian particularities in the variegated imperialist order of the world market on South Korea in the Cold War era. Here I highlight the peculiarities of Imperial Japan. In the 19th-century world market, Japan became the first Asian metropolitan state in a capitalist world market. Furthermore, because Japan is located in the third world, unlike the relations of Western metropolitan states to this region, it colonised its neighbours.24 For this reason, (post-)colonial and imperialist relations in East Asia cannot not be captured by the dichotomies such as ‘Global South versus Global North’ or ‘East versus West’. For several East Asian countries were colonised by an “East” Asian state in the Global “North”. In this context, I shall deal with Imperial Japan—particularly, the emergence of fascist strategies in the 1920s and of fascist coups in the 1930s that led to the Asian-Pacific War (1931-45). For they are the post-colonial legacy in South Korea.

24 But note that Eastern Europe was colonized by West European powers (e.g., Napoleonic France, Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire); the USA invaded Mexico and incorporated half of it into the Continental USA, later invading other Latin American neighbours with a view to securing their subordination to its imperial reach.
Excursus: Extant Discourses on Imperialism and Its Cognate Terms

It is challenging to outline discourses on imperialism systematically because of the entanglement of the concept of imperialism with other concepts such as imperium, colonialism, empire, world-systems, international dependency, post-colonialism, international hegemony, and so forth. Likewise, not all the theories and discourses on imperialism have emerged out of the same conjuncture. In addition, their theoretical and ideological foundations greatly vary. Accordingly, my review starts by categorising extant discourses rather complicatedly, as seen in the table 4.3.

In the first place, five groups of classical discourses on colonialism and imperialism emerged. The first is racist colonialism. Upheld by conservatives and liberals alike, this position starts with the civilised-barbaric-savage trichotomy and, on this basis, justifies internationally disparate treatment among the trifurcated regions. We can distinguish two sub-positions here: (1) reckless racist colonialism (RRC), and; (2) paternal racist colonialism (PRC). The RRC overtly expresses a relentless greed for the territorial expansion and economic prosperity of the privileged nations (e.g., Cecil Rhodes). The PRC advocates only a particular type of colonialism by decorating it with a humanitarian vocation or a paternal discipline for the enlightenment of non-civilised nations. Specifically, according to this logic, even colonialism can be a humanitarian intervention in, or a moral commitment to, non-civilised peoples, if it gives them liberty or guides them to civilisation (Mill 1859/1984). In this way, the PRC romanticises colonialism as the ‘white man’s burden’ (Kipling 1899) or the ‘strenuous life’ (Roosevelt 1899/1999) for not themselves, but others. The other four groups are anti-imperialist discourses, all of which rely on distinctive political-economic theories of capitalism, though not all the discourses acknowledge a special nexus between capitalism and imperialism (e.g., Schumpeter denies such a relation; see table 4.4). Also, they often highlight...
Table 4.3 Conservative, Liberal, Radical, and Marxist Discourses on Imperialism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Non-Marxist Radicalism</th>
<th>Marxism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First phase</td>
<td>Conservative and liberal racist (pro)colonialism</td>
<td>British-liberal (or reformist) anti-imperialism</td>
<td>American-radical anti-imperialism</td>
<td>Marxist anti-imperialism (e.g., Lenin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(form the late 19th to early 20th centuries)</td>
<td>(e.g., Rhodes, Mill, Kipling, Roosevelt)</td>
<td>(e.g., Hobson)</td>
<td>(e.g., Veblen)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second phase</td>
<td>(Neo)Realist critique of classical theories</td>
<td>Liberal analyses of Empires</td>
<td>Third worldist, post-colonialist, and neo-</td>
<td>The retreat from imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the Cold War era)</td>
<td>(e.g., Morgenthau, Waltz)</td>
<td>(e.g., Lundestad, Brzezinski, Doyle)</td>
<td>Gramscian approaches</td>
<td>(Poulantzas as an exception)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neocon imperialism or offensive realism</td>
<td>Liberal imperialism or the “imperialism of human rights” (e.g., Ignatieff)</td>
<td>Partly conservative and largely liberal criticism on the American empire and offensive realism (e.g., Nye, Bacevich, Mann, Johnson)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third phase</td>
<td>Neocon imperialism or offensive realism</td>
<td>Liberal imperialism or the “imperialism of human rights” (e.g., Ignatieff)</td>
<td>Varieties of radical and Marxist discourses (e.g., Arrighi, Wallerstein, Wood, Gindin &amp; Panitch, Hardt &amp; Negri, Bello, Harvey, Callinicos, Gowen, Brenner, Duménil &amp; Lévy, Nitzan &amp; Bichler)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(neoliberal globalisation since the end of the Cold War)</td>
<td>(e.g., Ferguson, Boot, Mearsheimer)</td>
<td>Partly conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: My own

the relations between imperialism and a particular social class in a metropolitan society rather than inter-civilisational relations. Table 4.4 summarizes and compares their distinctive features.

In the second phase, as conjunctures became more complex, the discoursal topography of this phase became more differentiated. Nonetheless, we can discern a distinctive tendency here, namely, the withering or disappearance of classical imperialist discourses and emergence of new discourses. First, as the colonialist era ended, racist colonialism largely
### Table 4.4 Hobson, Schumpeter, Veblen, and Lenin on Imperialism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political-economic theory</th>
<th>Hobson</th>
<th>Schumpeter</th>
<th>Veblen</th>
<th>Lenin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theories of underconsumption and over-saving (arising from income inequality) in the tradition of British political economy</td>
<td>Schumpeterianism in the tradition of German historical school of economics</td>
<td>Socio-psychological institutionalism, influenced by German historical school of economics</td>
<td>Leninism as the oversimplified and one-sided interpretation of Karl Marx’s critique of political economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism as (imperfect) Market-economy</td>
<td>Capitalism as a socio-economic system, the essence of which is a creative destruction</td>
<td>Modern capitalism as a price-system in which a predatory mode of rent-seeking pervades</td>
<td>Capitalism as a system based on the capitalist mode of production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialism as a foreign policy</td>
<td>Imperialism as a simple disposition to expansion</td>
<td>Imperialism as the new name of dynastic politics</td>
<td>Imperialism as the last phase of monopoly capitalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial capital</td>
<td>Martial class</td>
<td>Absentee owners</td>
<td>Monopoly capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The promotion of foreign investment as a solution to over-saving</td>
<td>The objectless disposition of a reigning martialist class</td>
<td>Absentee owners’ political and socio-economic interests</td>
<td>A lawlike historical tendency following capitalist development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialism as a policy choice to solve economic problems in a capitalist society</td>
<td>No essential relation to capitalism and imperialism</td>
<td>Imperialism as the strategic choice of absentee owners, surged as modern capitalism develops</td>
<td>Imperialism as the necessary and last phase of capitalist development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Primary sources: Hobson (1902), Schumpeter (1919/1955), Veblen (1908, 1923), Lenin (1917/1948)
Secondary sources: Cramer and Leathers (1977); Edgell and Townshend (1992); Hunt and Lautzenheiser (2011); Kruger (1955); Sullivan (1983)
disappeared from official discourse. Yet, strictly speaking, the RRC disappeared and the PRC remained in disguise and has been re-articulated with other justification for imperialist interventions. Recall, for example, that the civilised-barbarism-savagery trichotomy of the colonialist era was almost entirely translated into a new trichotomy in the developmentalist era, that is, the division of the world into developed, developing, and underdeveloped nations. Recall also that developed political-economic systems and life styles were depicted as goals that newly decolonised (i.e., developing or underdeveloped) nations should catch up with as fast as possible. Indeed, in this situation, developed nations, particularly the US, intervened in the development of the “third world”. Eurocentric and liberalist literature on development also argued by implication that colonial rule helped to prepare the preconditions for the modernisation of the third world—‘modernisation’ as a substituting term for civilisation. Thus, the PRC did not become extinct but was concealed. Although, because developmentalism is not a theory of imperialism, I omit it from figure 4.1, the PRC permeated developmentalist literature. The emergence of “third worldism” in this phase is relevant to this version of the PRC that lurked in the liberal developmentalism.

Second, the upheaval of mainstream international relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE) due to the behavioural revolution and scientific realism in political science also influenced the collapse of classical discourses. For example, (1) Morgenthau’s (1948) state-centred realist theory of imperialism, (2) Waltz’s (1959, 1979) neorealist or structural-realist theory of war, and (3) (neo)realist and/or (neo-)liberalist advocacy of, and criticism of, the beneficial role of a hegemon in stabilising international commercial and financial arrangements (Gilpin 1975, Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; Keohane 1984) were, overall, attempts to substitute mainstream IR and IPE theories for classical discourses. Thus, in this phase, not only Marxist theories, but other classical discourses too, became less and less influential (cf. Callinicos 2009; for an exception to the retreat from a Marx-Leninist
theory of imperialism, see Poulantzas 1975). Third, it is also noteworthy that many ideological (as opposed to scientific) attempts to define bipolar superpowers (i.e., the US and the USSR) as contrasting empires emerged (e.g., ‘empire by invitation’ versus ‘empire by force’ and ‘benign imperium’ versus ‘malign imperium’; see Lundestad 1986; Brzezinski 1986). Doyle’s (1986) liberal and transhistorical theorisation of an empire, which criticises not only classical discourses, but also Waltzian neorealism, too, is not irrelevant to this trend. Lastly, varieties of radical or critical discourse are one of the distinguishing features of this phase. The examples of this group include: (1) dependency theory and the modern world-system theory in comparative and regional studies; (2) the neo-Gramscian approach in IR and IPE, and; (3) post-colonialism and cultural imperialism in literary studies (e.g., Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Prebisch 1950; Wallerstein 1974; Cox 1981, 1987; Said 1978).

Lastly, in the third phase, the discoursal topography has become even more uneven. On the one hand, all groups of discourse in the second phase, except for dependency theory and the demonisation of the Soviet Union, have remained and even been further elaborated in the third phase. On the other, classical discourses have been revitalised. Needless to say, this discoursal complexity reflects the conjunctural complexity of this phase. Firstly, this phase started with declarations of the end of the Cold War and the opening of a new world order in which the US remained as the unipolar superpower. Subsequently, on the one hand, US-led neoliberal globalisation was accelerated; on the other, the end of history and the end of nation-states were in turn declared in some academic circles (Fukuyama 1989, 1992; Ohmae 1995). In opposition to such optimistic hyper-globalisation theses, some expected the emergence of new kinds of inter-metropolitan and inter-civilisational cleavages (e.g., ‘capitalism against capitalism’ and the ‘clash of civilisation’; see Albert 1992; Huntington 1996). Then, 9.11 irrupted unexpectedly from clear blue skies and the global war on terrorism followed. During this period and afterwards, China surged economically, politically, and, to
some extent, militarily to become the second superpower and, in addition, the economic crises, which proceeded from, particularly, neoliberalism and financialization, affected Latin America, East Asia, Russia, the North Atlantic regions, and so forth. In their different ways all of these have cumulatively shaped a new discoursal topography of imperialism and its associated topics. This has led to an explosive resurgence of interest in these topics.

In this situation, much attention, rightist and leftist alike, is paid to the American empire or its neo-imperialism. Also, in addressing it, the PRC has patently reappeared through neocons’ outspoken eulogy for the British empire and/or hymn to the American empire (Boot 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Ferguson 2002, 2004). Political realism, which had rather defensively spoken for the US hegemony in the second phase, evolved into a more offensive form—in a nutshell, even a preventive war can be one of the rational choices of the great power, and a hegemonic war is one of the unavoidable destinies of a hegemon (Mearsheimer 2001). Some liberals take an ambivalent position, which Hobsbawm (2003) called ‘an imperialism of human rights’ in order to identify ‘those who hate the ideology behind the Pentagon, but support the US project on the grounds that it will eliminate some local and regional injustices’ (e.g., Mallaby 2002; Ignatieff 2003a, 2003b; see also Ferguson 2004, 5). On the other hand, not only liberal IR theorists and sociologists (Johnson 2000, 2004, Nye 1990, 2003, 2004, Mann 2003), but even a few conservative IR theorists (e.g., Bacevich 2002) deplore the American militarism, unilateralism, and moral exceptionalism of the reigning militarist neocons, and further foresee the downfall of the hubristic and imperious empire.

In this phase, critical, radical, and Marxist discourses are becoming complicated. Representative examples include: (1) basically Braudelian, world-systemic analyses of hegemonies, economic crises, hegemonic transitions, the decline of the American power, and the upsurge of China (Arrighi 1994, 2009; Wallerstein 2006); (2) a radical hyper-globalisation
thesis, or an autonomist, optimistic and prophetic diagnosis of a borderless and centre-less empire (Hardt and Negri 2000); (3) Marxian economic analyses of the relation between a tendential fall in a profit rate in metropolitan states and the advent of this new phase of capitalism (Brenner 2006; Duménil and Lévy 2004); (4) Marxist analyses of the American empire, and/or neo-imperialism (Bello 2005; Callinicos 2009; Gowan 1999; Harvey 2003, 2009; Panitch and Gindin 2012; Wood 2003), and (5) a Veblenian critique of classical Marxism on financialization and imperialism (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). Of course, although this trend shows the revival of Marxist theory, it involves more than mere recitation of classical theories. For example, Arrighi attempted to synthesise Braudel, Marx, and even Adam Smith. Harvey is trying to articulate his historical-geographical materialism with Arrighi’s distinctive take on world systems theory. Callinicos, surprisingly, seeks to reconcile classical Marxist theories and Waltzian neorealism. My efforts to put (post-)colonialism and imperialism in their place in a VarCap-CPE seek to develop theories in this complex terrain.
Part II. Historical Investigations
5. East Asia in the Variegated Imperialist Order of the 19th-Century World Market: Imperial Japan, Korea and Manchukuo

Based on the theoretical considerations in Part I, here I start my investigation of the PCHM. First, however, I outline its historical background. Let me recall that my investigation highlights social relations on a supranational scale. Here my work gives key clues to understanding the social relations relevant to the PCHM. Specifically, it addresses five issues. First, I explain East Asian particularities in an imperialist system within the variegated capitalist order of the 19th-century world market, focusing on the distinguishing features of Imperial Japan. Second, in the light of the latter’s exceptional features, I also elucidate early industrialisation in the Korean peninsular under Japanese rule. Notably, I refer to Korea’s social formation in the period as colonial capitalism, and then reveal its distinctive features. Third, I refute claims that the experience of colonial capitalism directly contributed to South Korea’s re-industrialisation since the 1960s without, however, denying that the legacy of Imperial Japan had an important role in this process. Instead, I argue that the legacy should be found in the post-colonial, that is, cultural aspects of Imperial Japan. Fourth, to identify these aspects, I examine Meiji Ishin (1868-1912), Taishō democracy (1912-26) and the rise of fascist militarism in the earlier phases of the Shōwa era (1926-45). 25 In doing so, I highlight the two strategic coups of two fascist fractions in the Army of Imperial Japan—that is, the building of Manchukuo in 1932, and Shōwa Ishin in 1936. Lastly, I illustrate how the fascist

25 The Shōwa period ended in 1989. We can divide it into two phases: first, one before the end of the Second World War, and; second, the other after the end of the war. Also, we can divide phase one into two sub-phases: first, one before the rise of fascist militarism in the 1930s, and; second, another from 1931 when the Manchu Incident occurred until 1945 when Imperial Japan itself collapsed. Here I deal with the first phase of the Shōwa period.
militarism of Imperial Japan influenced Park Chung Hee’s fraction in South Korea and Kim Il-Sung’s fraction in North Korea. In this context, I also show that their regimes had intriguing commonalities. A final point is that my investigation is not only historical, but further geographically sensitive. Accordingly, my narrative of the history here does not follow ‘the normal flow of the linear text’ (Soja 1989, 1). Instead, in order to ‘spatialize the historical narrative’, I several times inserts “lateral” connections’ into the flow of historical time (ibid). That is, my narrative of the history contains spatial shifts from one place, territory or scale to another.

5.1 The Particularities of Imperialist Relations in East Asia

Nowadays, imperialist relations or their legacies are usually discussed in terms of two dichotomies: “The Global South versus The Global North” and “The East versus The West”. Yet, imperialist relations in East Asia cannot be grasped through such dualisms. This is because, on the one hand, although East Asia belongs to the Third World, it is located in the northern hemisphere; and, on the other, and more importantly, it is because several countries in East Asia were Japan’s colonies. In East Asia, therefore, the legacies of Western imperialist forces and Imperial Japan have beencomplicatedly entangled. These complexities originated, of course, from East Asian regional particularities in an imperialist system within the variegated capitalism of the 19th-century world market. As Marx (1858/1983, 347) observed, the 19th-century world market absorbed not only California and Australia, but also China and Japan into its inside. By doing so, ‘bourgeois society … for the second time experienced its 16th century’ (ibid). On the other hand, although Marx did not observe it, the world market also witnessed the belated emergence of a non-Western metropole in East Asia for the first time in the history of capitalism. Specifically, in 1895, Japan transformed itself into
an imperialist force by colonising Taiwan as the result of its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5). Since then, Japan continuously expanded its territories by way of colonisation and the building of puppet states in East Asia until 1945 (see Map 1). Thus the contemporary history of China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore and so forth is entangled in complicated ways, varying by case, with Imperial Japan. This is why we need to take into consideration Imperial Japan and its effects on other countries in East Asia. In short, when exploring East Asian capitalism and even socialism historically, the complex relations among the Western imperialist forces, Imperial Japan and their victims should be considered. This is also why modern world-system theory, dependency theory and post-colonial studies cannot be applied without further reflection to East Asia (for more details on these theories, see the excursus in Chapter 4).

Map 5.1. The Japanese Empire’s Evolution (1914, 1936, 1942)

Therefore, let me identify the basic features of Imperial Japan that distinguished it from Western imperialist powers. To begin with, Japan was, initially, nothing but one of the Asian victims of Western imperialist forces in the 19th-century world market (for an overview about Japan’s strife with the ‘black ships’ of Commodore Matthew Perry from the US, the reluctant opening of its harbours and the unfair treaties that it was forced to sign by Western
The primary concern of state managers in Japan in the late 19th century was thus to restore Japan’s national sovereignty which was seriously impaired because of its military inferiority to Western imperialist powers (Barnhart 1987, 17). This led Japan to rush eagerly toward embracing Western civilisation and sciences. Thereby Japan was able to become the first Asian country that achieved a Western type of modernisation. For example, regarding the military aspects of Western imperialist powers, Japan learnt from the British Royal Navy and the French Army in the 1860s. Following the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1, however, when Prussia defeated France, Japan started taking models for its constitutions, political regime and Army from Germany. Based on this innovation, Japan opened the harbours of Chosen (i.e., the feudal kingdom in the Korean peninsula from 1392 to 1897) militarily in the same way that the US squadron had employed to open Japan’s harbours. This led to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) in the Korea peninsula. By winning the war, Japan took not only reparations and compensations for war losses, but also Taiwan from China. This enabled the expansion of Imperial Japan’s armed forces. Based on the military expansion, Japan went on to win the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) too. Consequently, in 1905, Japan obtained an opportunity to build a railway in Manchuria. It also colonised Korea in 1910 (on Japan’s military history, see Edgerton 1997).

Basically, in this context, Imperial Japan was distinctive compared to Western imperialist states. In the 19th-century world market, the latter sought to find their colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which were later categorised as the third world. Yet, Japan geographically belongs to the Third World. For this reason, as an East Asian metropole, which emerged rather belatedly in comparison with Western metropoles, it colonised its neighbouring countries (Cumings 1998, 218). In particular, Japan is an island country located at the eastern end of Far East Asia. Accordingly, it sought to advance into the East Asian continent, particularly the Chinese mainland, and, in this context, regarded the Korean
peninsular, which is located between China and Japan, as a strategic bridge for its continental expansion. This is why the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War occurred in, or in the seas around, the Korean peninsular. For the same reason, Japan did not merely take Korea as an agricultural supplier, it also used it rule to rapidly industrialise Korea. In particular, it linked Korea’s agriculture, industry and infrastructure to both the Japanese archipelago and Manchuria. Further, as noted, Japan viewed itself as one of the victims of the Western imperialist forces and declared that its empire would protect its East Asian neighbours from the threats of Western imperialist forces. All these features were peculiar to Imperial Japan. Below, I shall elaborate not only on the creation and mutation of the empire, but also on its puppet state (i.e., Manchukuo). Before that, however, let me discuss more on the early industrialisation in the Korean peninsular and its effects on the South Korea’s industrialisation since the 1960s.

5.2 The Specificities of the Early Industrialisation in the Korean Peninsular

As mentioned, Japan was opened to foreign influence by the squadron from the US in 1853-4. After the incident, the island country learnt from the UK how to build a modern navy. In this context, by using the same military offensive that it had suffered at US hands and, specifically, employing a warship manufactured in the UK, Japan opened Korea’s harbours in 1875-6. Korea was then forced to sign several treaties, which were unfair, not only with Japan, but also with the US, France, Germany, and other powers. Thereby Korea, too, came to be forcibly woven into the 19th-century world market even before its annexation into Imperial Japan. Moreover, after the opening of its harbours and its annexation, Korea was rapidly industrialised. That is, whilst states in the economic heartland of a world market were transformed into a capitalist society by obtaining colonies, Korea achieved this by becoming
a colony. To fill in deficiencies in agricultural products, followed by the rapid industrialisation in the Japanese archipelago, the Japanese General Government of Korea and Japanese landlords were, of course, zealous in raising agricultural productivity in the Korean peninsular and importing agricultural products into Japan. In turn, Korea should import crops from Manchuria to fill gaps in its agricultural output. In addition, for Japanese capitalists, Korea was a new investment destination. Thus, they built industrial facilities (see pictures 1 and 2) in their adjacent country to gain a comparative advantage in a competition with, or to supply components to, companies in the Japanese archipelago. In this context, the Japanese General Government of Korea started infrastructure construction for all of them. Of course, it was also to make links from the island country, through the peninsular, toward the continent. The capital relation in the Korean peninsular thus largely consisted of Japanese capitalists and Korean workers (for the exceptional emergence of Korean capitalists, see Eckert 1991). This not only introduced the inherent contradictions and antagonisms of capitalism that Marx identified but also generated latent national hostilities. This geo-historical specificity was the seedbed from which nationalist and, further, even jingoist socialism emerged in the Korean peninsular.

The social formation of Korea in the early 20th century can be thus viewed as colonial capitalism. Marx (1857-8/1986, 436) argued that even plantation owners in a colony can be regarded as capitalists, insofar as their products were circulated in a capitalist world market that, in its economic heartland(s) is based on free labour. If so, Japanese landlords in the Korean peninsular, too, functioned as capitalists, because they circulated Korean crops into Japan. Yet, these Japanese capitalists were neither landlords, nor plantation owners. They were industrial capitalists, and accordingly, Korean workers employed by them were industrial workers. They were, of course, overworked and exploited even more than Japanese workers. Yet, they were, certainly, formally free labourers, because the feudal social system of
Picture 5.1 Chosen Spinning and Weaving Company

Source: The Bukyung Modern Historical Materials Research Institute

Picture 5.2 A Panorama of the Chosen Spinning and Weaving Company

Source: The Busan Museum
Korea was already dismantled in a process that Chosen (i.e., the feudal kingdom in the Korean peninsular) collapsed since the opening of its harbours. That is, many Koreans during the colonial era could manage their lives, only when they sold their labour power to capitalists, regardless of whether the capitalists were Japanese or Korean. Also, while Koreans could run businesses in the peninsular, provided that they cooperated with Japanese rule, and some Korean capitalists even invested in industrial facilities in Manchuria, the dominant capitalists during the era were Japanese.

Picture 5.3 A Panorama of Heungnam Industrial Area

Source: Chugan’gyŏnghyang (11 July 2017)

Picture 5.1 and Picture 5.2 show a facet of the early industrialisation in the Korean peninsular. Chosen Spinning and Weaving Company, which was established by Japanese capital in 1917, built a spinning and weaving factory in Pusan (i.e., currently, the second biggest city in South Korea). It was the first and biggest textile factory in the history of Korea. The female workers were Koreans. The factory includes 54 buildings, including a hospital and a dormitory for workers. Picture 5.3, which shows the landscape of an industrial region in
Hungnam (a city in the northeastern coast of the peninsular) in 1930s, also indicates the strategic industrialisation in the Korean peninsular. Japan created several sizeable industrial estates in the eastern coastal cities of what is currently North Korea. This occurred first because those coastal cities were easily linked to the Japanese archipelago; and, second, because Japan wanted to produce items there necessary for its advance into the Chinese mainland from the Korean peninsular. This also enabled even Korean capitalists to invest in Manchuria in the 1930s. For, as indicated, Imperial Japan’s territorial expansion was accompanied by its industrial expansion and Korea also became an industrialised capitalist society even in the early 20th century. Yet, in the light of Weber’s (1920/1978, 164-6; 1981, 207-9) typology of capitalism, it was not purely rational capitalism, because it was for the interests of Imperial Japan. Nor was it entirely political capitalism, however. In the Korean peninsular during the era, the capitalist businesses into which largely Japanese merchant capital and interest-bearing capital were investing employed formally free labourers.\(^{26}\) This suggests that Imperial Japan’s colony differed from Western Europe’s colonies that Marx or Weber were able to examine.

**5.3 The Contribution of Imperial Japan to South Korea’s industrialisation since the 1960s**

\(^{26}\) Let me recall here that I periodised the era of Imperial Japan into “Meiji”, “Taishō” and “Shōwa” periods. Likewise, the era in which Korea was under Japanese rule can be also divided into three periods. In its third phase, particularly from the occurrence of the Second Sino-Chinese War (1937) to the end of the Asian-Pacific War (1945), not only was forced labour prevalent, but young women were also mobilised as “comfort women” (i.e., sex slaves). Thus the link between formally free Korean labourers and Japanese capitalists, which I discuss here, occurred in the first two phases of Imperial Japan’s colonial management.
All the claims about the contribution of Imperial Japan to South Korea’s industrialisation since the 1960s have focused on the exceptionalism of Imperial Japan and Korea. Many have thus claimed that industrial facilities and infrastructure built in the colonial era functioned as a foundation for South Korea’s re-industrialisation since the 1960s. It has even been argued that the Korean economy during the imperial period benefitted from export expansion and the lessons of the colonial experience (Kohli 1994). However, the industrial facilities and infrastructure could only play their roles in spatiotemporally specific contexts. That is, they could function properly (1) before Korea was partitioned into northern and southern parts and (2) when it was articulated economically with the Japanese archipelago and Manchuria. For their normal operations presupposed the geo-historically specific articulation within Imperial Japan—including the Japanese archipelago and its colonies—and further Manchuria. In contrast, in 1945, the colonial relation between Imperial Japan and Korea was dismantled. The Japanese economy was disarticulated from Korea. Also, from the same year onwards, the Korean peninsular was partitioned by the USSR and US. The Cold War dismantled the relation between China and South Korea. For this reason, immediately after its liberation, South Korea came to be, practically, an isolated island in Far East Asia until 1965 when Japan and South Korea re-established their diplomatic relation under the intervention of the US.

More importantly, we need to recognise that the facilities and the infrastructure were substantially destroyed during the Korean War (1950-3)—which also gave a great opportunity to Japan because, for the duration of the war, it provided items needed for the war. In particular, the US ‘spent nearly three billion dollars in Japan for war-related goods and service’. The amount ‘was comparable to those of Marshall Plan on Western Europe’ (Dingmans 1993, 41). Thus, whilst the Korean war revitalised the Japanese economy, it seriously damaged both North and South Korea. In particular, because of North Korea’s
sudden offensive, industrial facilities and the built environment throughout South Korea, except for a small part of its southeastern area, were destroyed or occupied by North Korea in the first 3 months after the invasion. In addition, to drive back North Korean and, later, Chinese troops, the US Air Forces carried out an extensive bombing in not only North Korea, but also South Korea. The bombing of the Korean peninsular was done under the control of Curtis LeMay who was later appointed in United States Air Force Chief of Staff (1961-5). He was also the commander who took the lead in the firebombing of Tokyo in 1945. Notorious for his own saying: ‘There are no innocent civilians. … So it doesn’t bother me so much to be killing the so-called innocent bystanders’, he ordered the bombing of even South Korea’s infrastructure and South Korean “people in white” in case the enemy might use the infrastructure and because it was difficult to distinguish South from North Koreans (Kim 2008, 2012a, 2012b; Pape 1996). As a result, the war brought about total ruin in the Korean peninsular. Hence, after it ended, both North and South Korea had to be re-industrialised, albeit in their own ways. Lastly, a claim that South Korea learnt the importance of export from Korea’s colonial experience is nothing but a factual fallacy. Park Chung Hee and colleagues did not stem from the industrial capitalist class. Indeed, Park did not even know the importance of export. Export-led industrialisation was nearly forced by the US in the mid-1960s (see Chapter 6). Nonetheless, I still believe that the historical legacy of Imperial Japan was highly influential in South Korea’s re-industrialisation, although the legacy was neither colonial nor tangible. Instead, it was post-colonial (i.e., cultural) and intangible. Moreover, the cultural legacy was to an autarkical strategy rather than an export-oriented strategy and, indeed, went well beyond issues of economic strategy. To understand the cultural aspects of Imperial Japan’s legacy, we need to move our focus from the Korean peninsular to the inside of the Japanese archipelago. Then, we also need to broaden the focus to not only Imperial Japan, including Korea, but also Manchuria.
5.4 Meiji Ishin (1868-1912)

Meiji Ishin stemmed from the backlash of “samurai” in a few rural areas in Japan against not only Western imperialist forces, but also the Shogunate regime that had failed to guarantee Japan’s territorial and economic security. Its initial motivation was thus nativist, though it led to a comprehensive embrace of, and inclusive learning from, Western forces for practical reasons. Also, as seen in the first of its three slogans (i.e., “Enrich the state; strengthen the military”), Meiji Ishin was inextricably tied to military purposes. Japan’s military inferiority to Western imperialist states implied its industrial inferiority too. For this reason, the industrialization that the imperial government initiated was aimed at manufacturing new weaponry such as warships and rifles. This implies that Japan sought import-substituting heavy-chemical industrialisation from the outset. Based on it, and copying the British Naval and German Army organisations and tactics, Japan could win the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), thereby weakening China’s political influences on Korea and, further, colonising Taiwan in 1895. The substantial indemnity acquired from China was also used to strengthen the Japanese military and this contributed in turn to Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). As a result, Japan could advance on Southern Manchuria by obtaining a right to build a railway in the region and, conversely, it could weaken Russia’s political influences on Korea, which it went on to annex in 1910. In these regards, Meiji Ishin was militaristic and colonialist from the outset (for Japan’s early industrialisation, see Barnhart 1987, 17, 22; cf. Sassada 2013, 23-5).

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27 The other two slogans were, respectively, “encourage production; flourish industry” and “effloresce civilisation”.
Meiji Ishin was also a political project for building a modern nation- and national state. It was thus inseparable from the emergence of Japanese nationalism as well. For instance, as soon as the imperial government was established, state managers sought to forge the Japanese population into a nation and to form Japan as a national polity. This had two preconditions. On the one hand, they needed to incorporate not only the lowest class of people in a feudal order, but also natives in islands, who were previously uncontrolled by the shogunate authorities, into a Japanese nation; and, on the other, they were needed to get the newly created nation to pledge allegiance to the emperor-centred national polity. The geographical range of the national polity abruptly went far beyond the local boundaries that feudal lords had de facto governed. The symbolic centre, that is, the emperor, was hardly recognised by laypeople. For these reasons, the imperial government created a distinctive politico-religious system. For instance, based on Shinto (the indigenous religion of Japan), the government manufactured a nominally unreligious ritual system of “State Shinto”—which was abolished by the US immediately after the end of the Second World War. Based on the State Shinto, it fabricated the image of “Tennō” (literally, emperor from/in heaven, i.e., emperor of Japan) as the highest priest and a demigod who takes charge of ancestral rites and other national rituals in line with State Shinto. For this reason, soon after the end of the Second World War, emperor Shōwa was forced by the US to declare publicly that, indeed, he was not a god. In doing so, the imperial government used a few Confucian concepts such as ‘kingly way’ (i.e., rule based on monarch’s generosity as opposed to a ‘hegemonic way’ based on military apparatus), ‘loyalty’ and ‘filial piety’. Thus the emperor now became a traditionally ideal monarch, which fitted laypeople’s normative sense and thereby guaranteed fealty. In addition, it drew the enthusiastic commitment of the Buddhist circles to the creation and spread of the new politico-religious system (for the making of the emperor, see Fujitani 1996;
for the relation between the Buddhist circles and Japan’s military expansion, see Doak 1995, 177-82; Sharf 1993; Victoria 1996).

The emergence of Japanese nationalism was also associated with Japan’s international relations. First, Japan had to re-define its national status in the modern world, which was construed through the framework of ‘civilisation vs. barbarism’. Japanese intellectuals suggested a distinctive self-construal by introducing a third category between ‘civilised’ Europe and ‘less-civilised’ Asia and, then, inserting Japan into it. The discourse of ‘escape Asia; enter Europe’ that obtained in Japan at the time shows this. In the framework, Japan was close to, or, at least, oriented toward, Europe regarding civilisation, whereas it was geographically located in Asia. Second, the emergent nationalism of Japan also explains why the Meiji government gave attention to, particularly, Prussia among Western states. Simply speaking, the large number of emissaries that the imperial government dispatched to the US and Europe from 1871 was inspired by Prussia’s victory in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, its subsequent unification of the German nation, and the establishment of the German Empire in 1871. For this reason, the Meiji government renovated the Japanese Army based on the German Army and, further, came to enact the Meiji Constitution of 1889 based on the German Constitution with the help of German scholars.

5.5 Taishō Democracy (1912-26) and the Decline of the Military

After the death of emperor Meiji in 1912, this militaristic, colonialist and nationalist modernisation of Japan encountered a crisis. It was because of the effects of world-historical events, which broke out in Europe in the 1910s, such as the First World War, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the German Revolution of 1918, on the Japanese Empire. Their influences on Japan in the 1920s can be summarised as follows:
1. State managers, *inter alios*, military officers in Japan came to be deeply shocked by the First World War for the four reasons. First, the First World War took a completely new form—that is, a total war. Second, compared to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) that Japan had won swiftly, the new form of war was protracted. Third, Japan belonged to the winner group in the First World War even though Japan had no direct interest in it. It was obliged to join in according to the terms of the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty that both sides signed in 1920 to foil Russia’s southward move into East Asia. This meant that it was hard for neutrals, such as Japan, to exist in the new form of war that was likely to develop on a world scale. On the other hand, given that Japan shifted its attention from the French to the Prussian Army after the Franco-Prussia War, the Japanese Army was agitated by observing that Germany lost the war. This prompted the Japanese military to entirely rethink future state strategies and programmes. Among other actions, it dispatched many military officers to Germany even after the end of the war to learn new military operations and explore how Germany prepared for, and why it defeated in, the war.

2. The start and end of the First World War brought about, respectively, the rapid growth and then sudden sluggishness of the Japanese economy. In the process, some Japanese capitals, which colluded with corrupt bureaucrats and politicians, grew into monopoly capitals. In addition, the economic stagnation in the 1920s was combined with the intellectual repercussion of the Russian Revolution (1917) and the German Revolution (1918-9). This caused the rapid surge and spread not simply of liberal-democratic aspiration but also socialism, communism, anarchism, anti-war movements, labour militancy and the solidarity between labours and peasants. It is in this context that,
whereas the Meiji era has been summarised as Meiji Ishin, the Taishō (1912-26) period has been expressed as Taishō Democracy.

3. The global order established after the First World War ended obliged Japan to downscale its military. In addition, the aforementioned social atmosphere of Taishō democracy also contributed to the weakening of the social influences of the Japanese military. Finally, these circumstances also influenced colonies in the Japanese Empire. For instance, stimulated by Woodrow Wilson’s principles for national self-determination in 1918, Koreans launched a nation-wide non-violent independence movement on the first day in March 1919. Yet, after this was repressed by Japan, and as it was increasingly recognised that Woodrow Wilson’s principles did not apply to Korea because it was a colony under the rule of Japan, which belonged to the winner group in the Great War, two political trends emerged in Korea from the 1920s: first, the influx of Soviet-friendly communism into, and the spread of labour movements in, Korea, and; second, the reinforcement of armed struggles, based in Manchuria.

In brief, from a Japanese military perspective, the 1920s meant that Imperial Japan was getting out of shape. Amongst other points, although every country in the variegated imperialist order of the 19th-century world market was liable to be involved in a total war on a world scale, Japan was unprepared for the war technologically, militarily and economically. In particular, such a war would require the mobilization of an immense amount of war materials for a protracted period and this would require an astronomical amount of military expenditure. To prepare for such a war, Japan needed economic, industrial and technological advance. Domestically, however, the Japanese Diet and government were corrupt. Furthermore, internationally, they were incompetent, acquiescing in US and UK calls to downscale the Japanese military. The free market seemed anarchic. The Japanese bourgeoisie
was greedy. Workers and farmers suffered from economic difficulties. The making of a civil society and, further, the surge of leftist ideologies in the society resulted in social disorder. Resistance from colonies, which the Japanese military strived to retain, was growing. Lastly, the social power of the military was getting eroded. In this situation, from the early 1920s, young military elites in the Japanese Army became fascinated by far-right ideologues and their state reformation programmes.

5.6 Young Elites in the Japanese Army of the 1920s

They particularly adored Tanaka Chigaku (1961-1939) and/or Kita Ikki (1883-1937). Their thoughts were based on the syncretism of Nichirenism (i.e., a lay-oriented and nationalistic sect of Japanese Buddhism), ultranationalism, militarism, state socialism and pan-Asianism. Their thoughts were thus basically religious, and the religion was linked to State Shinto. In this context, an ultranationalist devotion to Tennō as the incarnation of a national polity, a non-Marxist, militaristic and socialist revolution from above, and the building of a Buddhist paradise were highlighted in their thoughts. On this basis, in the 1930s, sometimes accidental and other times pre-mediated military coups were committed one after another by the Japanese Navy and Army. Among them, we should focus on two factions in the Japanese Army: that is, first, the Kōdōha (i.e., Imperial Way) faction, and; second, the Tōseihā (i.e., Control). The Imperial Way faction denied even the necessity of the Japanese Diet. It thus called for the direct ruling of Japanese emperor to care about poor laypeople, such as farmers and workers. In February 1936, young military officers in the faction occupied the Diet with their troops and assassinated occupants of some of the highest posts in the Diet and government. This military coup, which occurred in the Shōwa period, has been referred to as “Shōwa Ishin”. Yet the coup proved a failure in just four days. After the occupation of the
Diet, the troops waited for approval from Shōwa. Yet, Shōwa made an order to quell the rebel. The suppression of the rebel was done by the Control faction. It led to the extinction of the Imperial War faction itself in the Japanese Army. In addition, the fascist ideologue, Kita Ikki, too, was convicted and executed for inciting the troops to wage the coup. Yet, an intriguing point here is that, ideologically, the Control faction had much in common with the Imperial Way faction. As regards domestic politics, however, a major difference between the two factions was their attitude toward the Diet. The Control faction accepted a need for the formal control by the Diet over the military. In this context, their political strategy was also different from that of the Imperial Way faction. That is, while the Imperial Way faction coup can be interpreted as a failed “war of maneuver”, the Control faction waged a multi-staged and territorially complex coup. The Manchurian Incident (1931), the building of Manchukuo (1932), the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and the Pacific War (1941-5) should be all understood in terms of its political strategy. That is, while the Imperial Way faction failed to transform the Japanese Empire into a fascist one, the Control faction really succeeded in doing so. The Control faction sought to change the internal order in Imperial Japan. It also aimed to change the regional order in Asia. On this basis it also wanted to change the world order. To understand its strategies, it is required to discuss on a person called as the “mastermind of Manchukuo” and the “maverick of the Japanese Army”, that is, Ishiwara Kanji. For, although he retired from the Army immediately before the Pacific War because of his conflict with Tojo Hideki (a former four-star General in the Army, former Prime Minister of Japan during the Pacific War), he was the key strategist of the Control faction.

Ishiwara was baptised in the early 1920s into Nichiren Buddhism by participating in a religious organisation, Kokuchūkai (i.e., a society that wants to be the pillar of a state), which was founded and led by the far-right ideologue, Tanaka Chigaku. After that, then-lieutenant Ishiwara was sent to Germany to study total war and new military operations. On his return,
he taught military science at the Military Academy of Japan. He thereby gained a growing reputation for his view of war and Japan’s future strategies, becoming a key figure in the Control faction. As seen in his book, *On the Final World War* (1940), his thought was not very complicated. In his view, first, the world after the end of the First World War was divided into four regions, i.e., Western Europe, a Soviet bloc, the US and Japan. Second, Western Europe and a Soviet bloc would be eliminated from the competition for global hegemony. Third, a final war between the US and Japan leading Asia would occur in the mid-1960s.\(^{28}\) Influenced by Nichirenism, Ishiwara aimed to build the Buddhist paradise in the world. Yet, from his perspective, Japan was entirely unprepared for the total war. To prepare for this, Japan had to achieve the highest level of industrialisation. In particular, neutrals could hardly exist in the total war. Thus, Japan should not depend on importing natural resources and other materials from countries that might participate in the war as Japan’s enemy. For this reason, Ishiwara thought that Japan required to build an autarkical economy. This was impossible solely within the Japanese archipelago and the Korean peninsular. In addition, the Japanese Diet and civil society in the 1920s were eroding the military’s social power. Moreover, to win the imperialist competition, Japan needed to draw enthusiastic supports from Asian people. Yet, in the 1920s, resistance against Japan in its colonies was strengthened. To solve these problems simultaneously, Ishiwara planned to build a puppet state, that is, Manchukuo. The multi-staged coup of the Control faction thus started by expanding Japan’s territory itself.

### 5.7 The Building of Manchukuo (1931-1945)

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\(^{28}\) Ishiwara was thus critical of the Pacific War on the ground that Japan was still unprepared for it. This created conflict with his higher officer Tojo Hideki, leading to his retirement immediately before the war. Then Tojo became Prime Minister of Japan and waged the war.
The Manchurian Incident broke out in this context. Dispatched into the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria, Ishiwara and his colleagues blew up the Manchurian railway that they should protect. Then, blaming Chinese warlords for the explosion, they attacked them without permission from the Japanese Diet, the Japanese government, the headquarters of the Japanese Army and, indeed, even commanding officers in the Kwangtung Army. Their troops continuously won the battles with Chinese warlords, thereby occupying Manchuria, the size of which was far greater than the Japanese Archipelago. Then, on 1 March 1932, the Kwangtung Army established the puppet state of Manchukuo. This had such profound consequences that this state has been represented as the ‘black box’ of the modern history of East Asia. The Kwangtung Army used Manchukuo as follows.

1. Manchukuo was a key factor in the political-military strategy of the far-right factions in the Japanese Army. First, as regards Japan’s politics, Manchukuo was a key element in the territorially complicated, multi-stage fascist coup. That is, the strategy of the Control faction can be divided into the following stages: (1) expanding Japanese territory into Manchuria, thereby stimulating external enemies at the same time as oppressing internal conflict in Japan; (2) building a fascist fortress in the region, thereby obtaining a laboratory for economic, industrial, political and military experiments, and (3) re-articulating that fortress with Japan and its colonies. In this way, the Kwantung Army transformed Imperial Japan itself into a fascist empire. In this respect, while Shōwa Ishin was a fascist coup from above, Manchukuo was a fascist coup that occurred from the outside inwards. It was the outward expansion of a fascist force and, simultaneously, its ‘countercurrent’ into Japan (Yim S.-M 2000). Second, as regards macroregional international politics, Manchukuo served both as a bulwark
against the Soviet Union and as a battlefield for the Kwangtung Army to directly purge anti-Japanese Chinese and Korean guerrillas. Third, globally, it was an indispensable foundation in preparation for the final world war.

2. As mentioned, the Kwangtung Army conducted many political, economic, military and social experiments in the puppet state. In other words, Manchukuo was the Army’s laboratory. First, it experimented with building a state (or empire) that was managed in conformity with its ‘internal guidance’. In particular, it had complete authority to appoint bureaucrats, including those dispatched from Japan, and to attend any and all governmental meetings without prior notice. Second, it experimented with nation building as it attempted to forcibly merge Manchurians, Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians and Japanese into a nation under the guise of the harmony of five ethnic groups. Third, it undertook military experiments. Notably, it massacred many people to test biochemical weapons. Fourth, it tried to achieve rapid heavy and chemical industrialisation. In the process, Ishiwara appointed Miyazaki Masayoshi, who after studying political economy in Russia, worked as an expert in the Russian (or Soviet) planned economy. Thus Manchukuo’s “Five Years Plan of Industrial Development” (1937) was inspired by the first “Five-year plans for the national economy of the Soviet Union” (1928-32).

In brief, although a few developmental statists have glamorised Manchukuo as the prototype of an East Asian development state, that is, the state of plan-rational, development-oriented economic bureaucrats (Johnson 1982; 1999; Sasada 2014), it was, instead, the fascist puppet state of the Kwangtung Army, based on the articulation of (1) European fascism, (2) the planned industrialisation of the Soviet Union and (3) the Japanese far-right, militaristic interpretation of Buddhism, Confucianism and, further, its indigenous religion. Also, the
construction of Manchukuo was prepared in anticipation of the second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War. In the process, Imperial Japan eventually mutated into a ‘national defence state’, based on Nazi’s war state. Overall, then, Japanese fascism since the 1930s can be regarded as the Japanese far-right syncretism of national socialism and state socialism.

5.8 Imperial Japan, Manchukuo and South Korea

To explain the effects of Imperial Japan and Manchukuo on South Korea, let us revisit the Korean peninsular in the early 20th century. As mentioned, Japanese rule in the Korean peninsular can be divided into three phases. In the 1910s, Korea was ruled by Japan’s military police. In the 1920s, Japan abolished this apparatus and allowed formal press freedom and expanded educational opportunities in Korea. This occurred in part because of the non-violent liberation movement in 1919, which was inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s principles for national self-determination in 1918. It was also a reflection of the rise of Taishō democracy in Japan. The “civilised” or “cultural” ruling of Japan caused a conflict among Koreans. On the one hand, even many leading figures in the liberation movement started to succumb to Japanese rule. On the other, the failure of the non-violent movement, the inflow of socialism via Japan to Korea, and discontent with the US led to the building of a Korean government in exile, the rise of a socialist labour movement in Korea, and Anti-Japanese armed struggle in Manchuria. Since the 1930s, Japan tried to annihilate Korean culture and mould Koreans into Japanese people. In particular, from the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan operated a ruling regime for the total war.

In this context, Manchuria had diverse implications for Koreans. For instance, to some Koreans, the region provided a base for developing their armed struggle against Japan. For others, it meant a land of opportunity in which they could climb higher on a social ladder as
“Japanese” people. In this context, Korean capitalists invested, and built logistics companies, in Manchuria to make profits from the war. Likewise, many Korean youths applied for military school to become military officers in the Japanese Army or the Manchukuo Imperial Army. Park Chung Hee, too, moved from the southeastern part of South Korea to Manchuria in the late 1930s in order to enter one of military schools in Manchuria. In the school, he changed his name from Park Chung Hee to Takagi Masao and swore an oath of loyalty to emperor Shōwa. As the highest ranked graduate of the school, he gained an opportunity to be trained at the Imperial Japanese Army Academy. Then, he returned to Manchukuo in 1944 and served in the Manchukuo Imperial Army. Yet, as mentioned, he was not the only Korean who graduated from the military school of Imperial Japan or Manchukuo. Many Koreans served in the Kwantung Army or the Manchukuo Imperial Army. After Korea’s liberation and its partition into North and South Korea, those people formed a “Manchurian network” in South Korea. In the 1950s, the network was no more than a faction in the South Korean Army. Yet, after the military coup, led by Park Chung Hee, on 16 May 1961, the Manchurian network became a dominant political faction in South Korea until the late 1970s. In this context, the fascist strategies were present in South Korea since the 1960s. What Park Chung Hee and his “backroom boys” added to the fascist strategies was a strategy for becoming a state with nuclear weapons. As the Japanese military learnt the importance of a total war by observing the First World War, the Second World War taught them the importance of nuclear weapons. I explore this in more detail in the next chapter. Before that, we need to address one more historical issue, that is, the relation between Japanese fascism and North Korea. For it gives a key clue to understating a relation between North Korea and South Korea.

5.9 Imperial Japan, Manchukuo and North Korea
Manchuria has a distinctive meaning in North Korea too, related to its political and economic system. Economically, North Korea pursued an immediate transition from a situation in which colonial capitalism had collapsed to socialism. This prompted some North Korean ideologues, following Kim Il-Sung, to develop their own view of historical development. At first, they tended to follow Marxism-Leninism or Stalinism. Yet, not long afterwards, Kim Il-Sung and his faction advanced a new ideology. According to it, a transition to a higher stage in history is not determined by a material or economic law. Instead, it is achieved by human will and capability. In other words, history is not made by an objective law but a subjective mind. In this context, the ideology was, indeed, to replace economic determinism with mind-determinism. This was because North Korea should nearly skip over the stage of capitalist development in the five stages of historical development that dialectical materialists identified. Therefore, North Korean ideologues should claim that, if human will and capability are sufficient, a transition to socialism will be made even without an experience of a capitalist development. This is North Korea’s official position on historical development, referred to as the juche idea, where juche means a subject. In brief, North Korea presented a subject as the prime mover of history. To appropriate Marx’s metaphor for Hegel’s philosophy, in North Korea’s ideology, Stalin is standing on his head.

For this reason, as a next step, North Korean ideologues should impose a unifying principle on all personal subjects in North Korea. That is, they should present an exemplary subject for all North Koreans to take as their role model. In this context, they suggested the nationalist, anti-imperialist, socialist and revolutionary armed forces in Manchuria as the historically existent model. That is, they identified North Korea’s political leaders as role models. In consequence, Kim Il-Sung was represented as the commanding general of the national and socialist warriors that led to Korea’s liberation and even the end of the Second
World War. By doing so, he was mythologised not only as the supreme hero and father of a Korean nation, but also as a politico-religious figure whom all people in the world should admire. The takeoff message of the ideology is thus simple: to succeed in building a socialist paradise, all people should study General Kim’s life and then live like him. In this way, North Korean state managers, centred on Kim Il-Sung, built a distinctive type of political-religious regime. They constructed a peculiar type of warfare state that forges its population into socialist, nationalist and anti-imperialist guerrilla. In doing so, the state managers emphasised feudal allegiance and a filial duty to their devotional leader not just as a comrade but also as a benevolent father. Thus, although North Korea has taken an anti-imperialist position, their politico-religious system and, further, their totalitarian techniques, which have been used in controlling and mobilising people, resemble what had been already witnessed in Imperial Japan and Manchukuo. The same holds for their economy. For North Korea has been obsessed with autarky.

It must also be noted that North Korea itself was, indeed, constructed with help from pro-Japanese elites in Imperial Japan. That is, not all pro-Japanese rulers who had been loyal to Imperial Japan were eradicated in North Korea after its liberation. Socialist state managers in North Korea purged landlords to obtain peasants’ allegiance toward the North Korean regime. In contrast, bureaucrats, intellectuals and military officers survived and even remained in governmental organisations, insofar as they cooperated with socialist state managers. In addition, the state managers were enthusiastic for a collaboration with their former rulers in constructing a new state, because they lacked experience. Even Kim Il-Sung once expressed his negative comment about a claim, based on a robust anti-Japanese sentiment, that pro-Japanese elites should be expelled from, or punished within, North Korea. In brief, unlike its propaganda, North Korea was not free from the legacies of Japanese fascism from the outset (for more details on pro-Japanese elites in North Korea and South
Korea, see Ryu Seokchun and Kim Gwangdong 2013; for the influences of Japanese fascism on North Korea in the post-war era, Armstrong 2003; Cumings 2003; Myers 2010). What the state managers added to the fascist strategies is the goal of becoming a nuclear state. These factors explain many of the distinctive features of North Korea. That is, because Japanese fascism has been post-colonially inscribed in it, North Korea has been different from socialist states in Eastern Europe. For the same reason, Park Chung Hee’s regime and Kim Il-Sung’s regime resembled each other in key respects.

5.10 Concluding Remarks

Let me recall here that my investigation into the PCHM highlights social relations relevant to the model. To give some key clues to understanding the social relations, I explored some aspects of their complex historical background. Before proceeding, it is worth highlighting a few points are highlighted. First, Korea in the early 20th century was characterized by colonial capitalism. Yet, the social formation was entirely dismantled by its liberation, partition and, particularly, the Korean War. South Korea in the 1950s was, actually, an isolated island that could only survive based on US’s aid. In this context, in South Korea in the early 1960s, key social classes, such as capitalists, labourers and even landowners, were highly underdeveloped. In this light, South Korea’s state apparatus was over-developed. In particular, it retained gigantic military forces relative to its economic size. In addition, a faction in the military (i.e., the Manchurian network, centred on Park Chung Hee) held political power in South Korea since 1961. For this reason, the PCHM lacked social embeddedness in the social relations among capitalists, labourers and landowners. Conversely, the making of the PCHM was itself a process of building capital relations and promoting capital accumulation. In this context, as regards the creation and mutation of the
PCHM, a supranational scale of social relations was particularly important. These relations included the Park Chung Hee faction’s links to Japanese, North Korean and American state managers. Although many people tend to think that in the Cold War era, South Korea, Japan and the US formed an alliance to counter that among China, North Korea and the Soviet Union, matters were not that simple. For instance, Park Chung Hee had different relationships with, respectively, the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Carter Administrations. Also, reflecting changes in his relations to the US administrations, the relation between Park Chung Hee and South Korean technocrats also altered. Likewise, the relation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Il-Sung was not simple. They were extremely antagonistic throughout the 1960s but, since the early 1970s, they entered a period of Détente. Park Chung Hee’s Yuhsin regime and Kim Il-Sung’s consolidation of absolute political power were both based on this compromise. On this basis, Park attempted to achieve not only South Korea’s heavy-chemical industrialization also to possess nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Needless to say, these state projects led to deteriorating relations to the Nixon and Carter administrations. In brief, the social relations relevant to the PCHM were entangled in complex ways. Also, in my view, to explore those relations concretely, we need to understand Imperial Japan and its puppet state. For Park Chung Hee and Kim Il-Sung were the offspring of the empire. In this context, I addressed the creation, mutation and evolution of Imperial Japan, and further the making of Manchukuo. The following chapter explores how the fascist strategies were represented by Park Chung Hee, and refracted by the contemporary history of China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore and so forth is entangled in complicated ways, varying by case, with Imperial Japan. This is why we need to take into consideration Imperial Japan and its effects on other countries in East Asia. In short, when exploring East Asian capitalism and even socialism historically, the complex relations among the Western imperialist forces, Imperial Japan and their victims should be considered. This is also why modern world-system theory,
dependency theory and post-colonial studies cannot be applied without further reflection to East Asia (for more details on these theories, see the excursus in Chapter 4).
6. The Emergence of a Chimerical Model in South Korea Since the Mid-1960s

In this chapter, I offer a state-theoretical and, partly, regulationist analysis of the PCHM. This involves a genealogical analysis, and a periodisation, of the PCHM. Also, the partial regulationist analysis shall be supplemented in the following chapter. Before proceeding, two elaborations on the model are needed. First, as shown in the Introduction, the Park Chung Hee era had four phases. The first was the period from his military coup (May 1961) to the transition to a democratic regime (October 1963). The second covers the period from 1964 to October 1972 in which South Korea’s political regime was transformed into a totalitarian regime. Phase three designates the period from 1972 to April 1979 when a policy paradigm for neoliberalising South Korea’s economy was launched for the first time. The fourth phase is the period for six months from April to October 1979, when Park was assassinated by the Director of South Korea’s CIA. Here I explore the first three phases, deferring the fourth phase, which is more related to the dismantlement of the PCHM than its development to chapter 8 (which continues the regulation-theoretical analysis). Regarding the second elaboration, I analyse the PCHM in terms of social relations, distinguishing between structural and agential relations (for the critical-realist and strategic-relational approach to structure, see Chapter 3). For example, the relation between the US and South Korea is a structural relation. Its structuration started in 1945 and the structural relation was, therefore, established before Park Chung Hee’s coup. In contrast, the relation between Park Chung Hee and the Kennedy Administration is agential insofar as Park Chung Hee sought to revise the US-South Korea relation, pursuing two different strategic relationships across different US Administrations. Given these two points, I explore how the PCHM was created and then mutated, evolving into a chimerical model. I then consider the state form of the PCHM.
6.1 Social Relations Relevant to the PHCM’s Development

Here I describe the structural relations inherited by Park Chung Hee, beginning with the Korean War. As noted in chapter 5, the war ruined the South Korean economy. Throughout the 1950s, therefore, South Korea survived only with US economic aid so that, by the early 1960s, the capitalist and working classes still remained much underdeveloped. Conversely, the traditional landowning class was eliminated in the late 1940s under the land reform implemented by the first South Korean government. Thus, even in the early 1960s, the three typical social classes in a bourgeois society, namely, capitalists, wage labourers and land owners, were all underdeveloped. In contrast, because of the war, and for South Korea’s national security, coercive state apparatuses were overdeveloped (for overdeveloped states in postcolonial societies, see Alavi 1972). Park Chung Hee seized the oversized state apparatuses through his military coup. Therefore, compared to state managers in the liberal-bourgeois democracies in the same period, Park Chung Hee could enjoy greater autonomy from “particular” social classes. For the emergence and development of the PCHM itself was a process of making and nurturing social classes more typical of bourgeois civil society. Nevertheless, South Korean social forces did influence Park’s policies – but as a “nation” that had previously been colonised by Japan and was then partitioned. In other words, South Koreans tended to act as an ethically homogenous, anti-Japanese and reunification-aspired state population (for more details, see chapter 7).29

29 In South Korea, monopoly capitals started resisting governmental policies in an organised way from the early 1980s. They objected to the neoliberalisation of the economy. Likewise, as an organised social force, starting from 1987, workers strongly influenced government policies by waging a national general strike (see Chapter 8). Of course, this does not imply that labour had not resisted during the Park Chung Hee era – but this was quite occasional and relatively unorganised (for the history of labour moment in South Korea, see Chang 2009; Sonn 1997).
Second, a lay understanding of international relations in Far East Asia during the Cold War era seems that Japan, South Korea and the US formed a triangular and capitalist alliance against the other triangular and socialist alliance among China, North Korea and the USSR. Yet, their relations were not that simple.

1. **On the structural relation between the US and South Korea.** The relation between the two has often been described as a “bloody alliance” but it was far from an even one. Nor have their respective Administrations and Governments always reached a happy agreement on political, economic and military issues. In 1945, the southern half of the Korean peninsula was occupied by the US military and, for 3 years thereafter, the armed forces ruled South Korea. In 1948, the US transplanted liberal democracy in South Korea. As a result, the first general and presidential elections were held, respectively, in May and July in the same year, which established South Korea’s Government officially for the first time.\(^{30}\) In the presidential election, Lhee Syngman was elected. Although he was one of the liberation activists, his career was rather different from those of usual leaders of liberation movements. For, he had previously studied at George Washington (BA), Harvard (MA) and then Princeton (PhD). Furthermore, exceptionally, he was a pro-American protestant. In 1949, as mentioned, the government implemented a capitalist type of land reform, eliminating thereby the traditional landowners too. Then, the Korean War occurred. During the war, the wartime and peacetime operational control of South Korea’s military was handed to the United Nations Command. In 1979, the authority was turned to the ROK-US

\(^{30}\) The Korean Provisional Government was launched in Shanghai, China in 1919.
Combined Forces Command.31 Yet, in both cases, the commander was the commander of United States Forces Korea, implying that operational control of South Korea’s military has been fundamentally subordinate to or, at least, strongly influenced by the US. Moreover, as noted, the South Korean economy could even be managed without US economic aid. South Korea’s military itself, which was gigantic in comparison to its economy and civil society, operated thanks to this aid. In sum, as regards its economy and military, South Korea was deeply reliant on the US. For this reason, many South Korea leftists have deemed South Korea as one of the (neo-)colonies of the US.32 This is what I refer to as a structural relation between South Korea and the US. It was inherited by Park Chung Hee in the early 1960s. He sought to (re-)build a nation- and national state and to development the economy. Yet, his strategic actions for the projects should be considered in this structural context, together with other structural relations. Based on those, Park had strategically different relations with US administrations. For instance, he maintained good highly cooperation only with the Johnson administration, conflicting with the Kennedy, Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations.

2. **On the structural relation between Japan and South Korea.** The collapse of Imperial Japan and South Korea’s decolonisation after the end of the Second World War disarticulated South Korea from Japan. Their diplomatic relation was re-established only in 1965. Thus, starting with the Park Chung Hee era, their relation started being

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31 The ROK is an acronym for Republic of Korea, that is, the official appellation of South Korea. On the contrary, North Korea is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

32 In the debate over South Korea’s social formation which was fashionable in the mid- and late 1980s, pro-North Korean and nationalist lefts argued that South Korea was nothing but one of the colonies of the US. On the country, Marxists regarded the country as a neo-colony.
re-structured. First, from that time, Japanese funds started flowing into South Korea in the form of loans, grants and compensation. The export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) of South Korea from the mid-1960s was based largely on these funds. In consequence, not only financially, but also industrially, South Korea’s economy was re-articulated with the Japanese economy in a rather subordinate way. EOI was based on processing trade. Hence, South Korea should import raw and auxiliary materials, parts and components, and so forth. Among them, high value and technologically advanced products were imported from Japan. The rise of the South Korean economy thereby contributed to that of the Japanese economy too. In this context, South Korea’s economy has been referred to as the “cormorant” economy (Komura 1988/1989). Let me explain this metaphor. In Japan or China, trained cormorants on leashes dive into rivers and then catch fishes by swallowing them intact. Yet, because of the leashes, these fish remain in the cormorants’ gullet and fishers recover them from the birds. In this context, the cormorant economy refers to a phenomenon that, when South Korean cormorants catch profits in foreign rivers, Japanese fishers will finally gain the large proportion of the profits.33 This shows a structured relation between the Japanese economy and the South Korean economy since the mid-1960s. This structural relation was inherited by Park Chung Hee but emerged in his era. On the other hand, Park

33 Akamatsu highlighted this aspect of the regional division of labour through the “flying geese” metaphor. Yet, intriguingly, he did so even before the Japanese economy was re-articulated with the South Korean economy. In this context, whilst his claim has its own relevance from a current point of view, it seems to be anchored on the ideological aspiration for the prewar Japanese right-wing’s pan-Asianism. His claim also exaggerated Japan’s role. For, although the metaphor describes Japan as an independent leader in the region, the relation between Japan and South Korea has been subordinately articulated with the US.
Chung Hee was highly pro-Japanese. Therefore, he kept an extraordinarily close relation to behind-the-scene elder statesmen in Japanese politics.

3. *On the structural relation between North Korea and South Korea.* In South Korea, it is often said that we have not yet achieved independence. South Korea was liberated from Imperial Japan and then immediately partitioned, with the two parts remaining under the influence of the US and Japan and the USSR and/or China respectively. That is, the two Koreas have both failed to build an independent nation- and national state after the peninsular was liberated although both have continued to plan and execute their respective projects and operations for (re-)building a unified state. In this context, North Korea has basically regarded South Korea as a colony or puppet regime of the US. In contrast with South Korea, in which pro-American and/or pro-Japanese leaders ruled, North Korea describes itself as a “nationally” legitimate state because it was built by the anti-Japanese armed guerrilla. Furthermore, it claims officially that North Korea is still waging a war against the US to liberate South Korea from control of this new imperialist force. South Korea makes the opposite argument. Dominant factions in South Korea’s politics and their ideologues have refuted the politico-religious myth of North Korea. For them, North Korea is lying when it claims to have eliminated formerly pro-Japanese elites from its government (see chapter 5). They also argue that Kim Il-sung was not a liberation activist, but a military official in the Soviet Army and, therefore, nothing but a puppet of the USSR. So South Korea has regarded North Korea as a puppet regime or anti-Korea organisation. Yet the relation between Park Chung Hee and Kim Il-Sung was more complex than the structural relation between North and South. For, as we will see, the two sometimes cooperated with each other for their own political purposes.
It follows that the legacy of these structural and agential relations was inscribed in complex ways into the emergence and development of the PCHM and, indeed, as I will show, different aspects were condensed in specific ways in different phases of the Park Chung Hee era.

6.2 Toward Autarkic State Capitalism

The first President of South Korea, Lhee Syngman, was corrupt and incompetent. He also conflicted with the Eisenhower Administration (1953-61) over his military and economic policies. For this reason, as time went on, the US no longer provided unconditional support to his Government (Park Taegyun 2009). Notably, Lhee continuously tried to prolong his presidency by electoral frauds, constitutional amendments, and the like. In taking this course, he employed not only the police force but also gangs of political thugs. In April 1960, a democratic revolution occurred. Some have argued that US Ambassador in Seoul asked Lhee to resign. Others have claimed that Lhee decided to resign on his own terms. In any case, he stepped down from the Presidency and became an exile in Hawaii. After the First Republic of South Korea collapsed in this way after 18 years, the Second Republic was established but it collapsed within just one year. After the democratic revolution, every kind of social demand erupted at the same time. Even elementary school students demonstrated on the street regarding their school problems. For this reason, the Second Republic has been referred to as the “Demo” Republic. Yet, the government did not respond to the explosion of social issues. Instead, inside what was a semi-presidential system, an extreme power struggle occurred.
between President Yun Posun\textsuperscript{34} and Prime Minister Chang Myon\textsuperscript{35} (for details on South Korea’s Republics, see Table 6.1). In this situation, the May 16 military coup took place in 1961. Then, the Manchurian network emerged as a politically dominant force in South Korea until Park’s assassination in 1979.

The armed forces called their coup a military revolution for building a “genuinely democratic” political order. They overthrew the Second Republic in just 60 hours after initiating their military operation and transferred all the authorities of the government, the national assembly and the judiciary alike to the Military Revolutionary Committee. Three months later, the Committee changed its name to the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR). Its chairman was Major General Park Chung Hee. Park needed to explain the legitimacy of his coup. He therefore first promised to rebuild a democratic regime by 1963. He also promised to clean up “old evil” and normalise a social order for the intervening two years. In this context, the SCNR liquidated the political gangs and punished corrupt politicians. It also nationalised private banks on the grounds that the bourgeoisie had accumulated their wealth illegitimately. Simultaneously, the military coup needed US acceptance. So, in November 1961, Park Chung Hee visited the US to meet John F. Kennedy.

\footnote{During the colonial era, Yun Posun studied medical sciences in Japan. Then, to join in the liberation movement, he moved to Shanghai, China. After living in China for 3 years, he moved to the UK and studied Archaeology at the University of Edinburgh. After six years in the UK, he returned to Korea in the 1930s. Even then, he tended to stay at home, because there was little for him to do Japan’s imperial rule. In the 1940s, he participated in only Christian activities, re-starting his political activities only in 1945.

\footnote{Whilst Lhee Syngman and Yun Posun were both protestants, Chang Myon was a catholic. During the colonial era, he participated in educational activities as a missionary. In 1921, he moved to the US, and studied English Literature and Education at Manhattan College, a Catholic Colleges in New York. He decided to continue to undertake Catholic Mission in South Korea. After visiting the Vatican City and an audience with Pope Pio XI (1922-39), he returned to South Korea, where he participated in English education and missionary activities.}
Table 6.1 The Periodisation of Political Regimes in South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Japan’s rule</th>
<th>The rule of the US Military</th>
<th>First Republic</th>
<th>Second Republic</th>
<th>The Park Chung Hee era</th>
<th>Fifth Republic</th>
<th>Sixth Republic</th>
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<td>Military junta</td>
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<td>US Army Military Government (during the same period, North Korea was governed by the Soviet Union)</td>
<td>Liberal democracy</td>
<td>Liberal democracy</td>
<td>Military junta</td>
<td>Liberal democracy</td>
<td>Dictatorship</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Presidential system</td>
<td>Semi-presidential system</td>
<td>Presidential system</td>
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<td>Presidential system</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Governor-General of Korea</td>
<td>Lhee Syngman</td>
<td>Yun Bosun (President); Chang Myon (Prime Minister)</td>
<td>Park Chung Hee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>The end of the Second World War in 1945</td>
<td>US’s transplanting liberal democracy in South Korea in 1948</td>
<td>April 19 Democratic Revolution in 1960</td>
<td>May 16 Military Coup in 1961</td>
<td>Transition to a democratic regime, based on Park’s manifesto after the coup</td>
<td>Self-coup in 1972</td>
<td>Park’s assassination (1979) and the other military coup in 1980-1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note
1. The rise of the South Korean economy, based on export-oriented industrialisation, began from the start of the Third Republic.
2. The leapfrogging of the economy into heavy-chemical industrialisation began from the start of the Fourth Republic.
3. The South Korean economy fell into a serious crisis in 1979-80, and the IMF intervened in the crisis recovery for the first time;
4. Although this is not the subject of this thesis, the first attempt to neoliberalise the economy was made in 1979.
5. In particular, in the early 1980s, neoliberal technocrats acquired power in the government of the Fifth Republic.
6. Yet, the comprehensive neoliberalisation was delayed until the Asian economic crisis in 1997-8 in which the IMF intervened for the second time.
7. This was, mainly, because of chaebols and organised labour.
8. That is, Park Chung Hee was relatively autonomous from particular social forces for the 1960-70s, because the social forces remained much underdeveloped; yet, since the 1980s, even politically dominant factions have become less and less autonomous from the social forces that started being developed in the Park Chung Hee era.

Source: My own
and re-assure him of his willingness to rebuild a democratic regime in 1963. In return, Park gained military and economic supports for his military junta from the Kennedy Administration. A further promise was to begin economic development immediately after his coup, even though, indeed, he had no plan at that time. Thus, the SCNR had to examine swiftly the accumulation strategies of previous administrations in South Korea, particularly the five-year plan of the short-lived Second Republic, which was never announced because of Park’s coup. It must therefore promulgate its own strategy urgently (for the five-year plan of the Second Republic, Satterwhite 1994).

The first five-year economic plan of the SCNR was officially released in January 1962 after several draft plans had been announced, discussed and revised for approximately eight months. The SCNR announced that the plan aimed for a ‘guided capitalist system’ (Taehanmin’gukch’ŏngbu [The Government of South Korea] 1962; see also Kim 2004, 78-82). Specifically, the plan emphasized the following points: first, it aimed at state-guided industrialisation; second, this was basically orientated to import-substitution; third, the state-supervised, import-substituting industrialisation aimed to develop heavy-chemical industrialisation; fourth, as regards investment funds for this project, domestic funds were preferred to foreign loans, although the latter were also regarded as important, and, fifth, the following sequence of intermediate goals towards the main objective of industrialization was highlighted: (i) securing energy resources, such as electricity and coal, (ii) agricultural development, (iii) the expansion of basic industries and social overhead capital, (iv) a rise in employment and land development, and (v) export promotion (see Cho Gapche 2005; Lee byŏngch’ŏn 1999; Park T’aekyun 2000b; Taehanmin’gukch’ŏngbu 1962). Overall, then, the plan was oriented toward a self-sufficient or self-reliant economy. In particular, from the outset, the SCNR aimed to build fertilizer plants, a petroleum refinery, boost cement production, construct integrated steelwork, produce general-purpose machinery and
equipment, and engage in shipbuilding and automobile production. In addition, the industrialisation should be based primarily on domestic funds. In this regard, the accumulation strategy differed markedly from the trade-oriented or export-led one that has been recognised as an economic strategy for South Korea’s industrialisation. According to Park Huibeom who was an economic advisor to Park Chung Hee, the plan consulted Egyptian and Indian models under, respectively, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Jawaharlal Nehru (Lee byŏngch’ŏn 1999, 145). To borrow Callinicos’s (2009, 183) analyses of the Egyptian and Indian models, this means that Park Chung Hee’s first accumulation strategy referred to ‘the most ambitious’ models of import-substituting industrialisation—that is, ‘autarkic state capitalism’ which ‘copy the bureaucratic command methods of Stalinist Russia in order to build up their own heavy industrial base.’ Why and how did this happen, however?

### 6.3 The “Last Soldier of Imperial Japan”

To answer the question, we need to examine who formulated the plan. The leading figures in making the plan were Park Chung Hee himself (Chair of the SCNR), Yu Wonsik (Chair of the Financial and Economic Committee of the SCNR) and Park Huibeom (an economic consultant to Park Chung Hee). As noted, Park Chung Hee was very pro-Japanese. In the 1940s, he was trained in Manchuria and then Japan as a military officer. Then he returned to, and worked for, Manchukuo until the end of the Second World War. In November 1961, he re-visited Japan on his way to meet the Kennedy Administration after his coup. This was an opportunity to meet Japanese political leaders as a new political leader in South Korea—though the diplomatic relation between the two countries had not yet been re-established. In the meeting, Park amused elder statesmen in Japanese politics, such as Kishi Nobuske (Prime Minister of Japan from 1957 to 1960), by politely calling them senpai (a Japanese appellation...
that refers to a person who took a higher rank in schools and other organisations). This was because many elder statesmen in Japanese politics had been previously high-ranking bureaucrats in Manchukuo. For instance, Kishi was one of the key figures who made the “Five Years Plan of Industrial Development” in Manchukuo.\footnote{Let me recall that the key planner of Manchukuo’s industrial policy, Miyazaki Masayoshi, studied political economy at the Saint Petersbourg State University and then worked in the South Manchuria Railway Company as an analyst in the field of the Soviet economy.} Since the 1920s, Kishi was an admirer of the rapid industrialisation of the Soviet Union and, since the early 1930s, he was notorious for his celebration of Nazi Germany as a model for Japan (Driscoll 2010, 267 ff.). After the end of the Second World War, he was convicted as a Class A war criminal and imprisoned. Yet, the US finally judged him as the best politician in terms of its interests and allowed Kishi to become Prime Minister in the late 1950s.\footnote{He is still a symbolic figure in Japanese politics. For instance, Prime Minister of Japan Eisaku Satō (1964-7 and 1970-2) is, indeed, Kishi’s younger brother. Incumbent Prime Minister of Japan Abe Shinzō is his grandchildren. He had been an influential person behind the scenes of postwar Japanese politics until his death in 1987.} Park Chung Hee showed his respect for such a figure as a former senpai.

In the official banquet, Park expressed his thanks to the schoolmaster (i.e., former major-general Shinichirō Nagumo) at the Manchurian military academy, who was among the guests. Specifically, Park was given a standing ovation from Japanese politicians, including the Prime Minister, Hayato Ikeda (1960-4), when he said: “Because of your recommendation, I could attend the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, and because of that, eventually, I can be here at the moment”. In addition, he surprised Japanese politicians by declaring that, “I am just a military officer who has no knowledge of the economy and the politics; yet, I most respect the father of Japan’s modernisation, Yoshida Shōin”. For Yoshida Shōin, whom Japanese conservative politicians, including the incumbent Prime Minister Abe
Shinzō, continued to follow ideologically, was the samurai who not only rebelled against the Shogunate regime but also campaigned enthusiastically to occupy Korea. In this way, Park Chung Hee made the Japanese statesmen nostalgic for their days in Imperial Japan and Manchukuo (for more details on Kishi Nobuske and Park Chung Hee, Kang Sangjung and Hyŏn Muam 2012). After the end of the Second World War, Japanese “samurais” who were responsible for the Second World War committed suicide or were liquidated by the US—though economic bureaucrats, who served them, could survive selectively in line with the interests and foreign policies of the US. In this situation, a Japanese samurai seemed to have risen again in South Korea and, following his coup, had returned to Japan as his country’s new political leader and talked about his own ishin (restoration) in front of Japanese politicians. In this context, Okazaki Hisahiko (former Japanese Ambassador and former diplomatic and security advisor to several Prime Ministers of Japan, including Abe Shinzō) extolled Park Chung Hee as ‘the last soldier of Imperial Japan’ (Okazaki 1980, 116; quoted in Moore 2007, 91). In the same context, Ōno Banboku (one of the elder statesmen who controlled Japanese politics behind the scenes) called Park Chung Hee “my son”. Specifically, participating in the presidential inauguration of Park Chung Hee as Japan’s special envoy, he told the local press that he visited South Korea to celebrate a ceremony for his son (Han Honggu 2012a).

6.4 Park Chung Hee’s “Backroom Boys”

Yu Wonsik was also an important figure, because he led the making of the first five-year plan. Yet, he was not an economic expert. Before the end of the Second World War, he had also served for the Manchukuo Imperial Army. According to him, he met Park Chung Hee in Manchuria for the first time and was deeply impressed by Park’s spirit as a soldier. He recalled
that the first meeting convinced him of Park as a comrade and a friend (Yu 1987, 104). Returning to South Korea, he also worked in the South Korean Army. Also, even before the May 16 military coup, he argued that South Korea, too, should obtain its own nuclear weapons and that the economy should be autarkic. According to him, he discussed with Park Chung Hee before the military coup on the economic issues of South Korea, and they reached at a sheer agreement. Also, he requested Park Chung Hee to help him take charge of the economic affairs after the coup. In this context, he could become Chair of the Financial and Economic Committee of the SCNR (Ibid, 255). Immediately after the coup, he declared that the military junta aimed to implement ‘a planned economy within the boundaries of a liberal economic system’ (Ibid, 291). He knew that the expression was an oxymoron. Yet, according to him, it referred to a third way between both totalitarian-planned and liberal-bourgeois economies. It certainly was not a “mixed economy”, which he regarded with sarcasm. He certainly believed that the rebuilding of South Korea should begin from the building of an autarkic economy. In his view, this should be centred on heavy-chemical industrialisation, linked in turn to military development. The final aim of the latter was obviously nuclear weapons. For him it was the only way that South Korea as a newly decolonised country could survive and rise in the international order. This view seemed to combine (1) Japan’s import-substituting and heavy industrialisation before the First World War, (2) the autarkic economy, linked to the heavy-chemical industrialisation of the Soviet Union, that Japanese fascists had pursued since the end of the First World War, and (3) his own contemplation of the strategic importance of nuclear weapons in the Second World War.

However, Park Chung Hee and Yu Wonsik had no experience in formulating an economic plan and therefore needed economic experts. Professor in the Department of Economics at the Seoul National University Park Huibeom was chosen in this context. He had been advocating state-led economic development, together with his intellectual
colleagues as a group, since the 1950s. So, it seems that Park Huibeom was the best man to translate the demands of Park Chung Hee and Yu Wonsik for a particular form of industrialisation into an actual plan. Indeed, his intellectual group was chosen by the SCNR’s military leaders and, among them, Park Huibeom won the biggest credence from Park Chung Hee and Yu Wonsik (see Park 2005; Park T’aekyun 2002). Also, according to Yu Wonsik, there was no discord between Park Huibeom’s opinions and theirs. This was because Park Huibeom was a figure who asserted even in his academic article that, as regard efficiency, the Nazi economy was certainly superior to modified capitalism in the Western liberal states in the mid-twentieth century (Park Huibeom 1968, 263).

In brief, the previous political leaders in the First and Second Republics of South Korea, such as Lhee Syngman, Yun Posun and Chang Myon, studied International Politics, Archaeology, English Literature and Education in the US or the UK. They were also protestant or catholic by faith. In contrast, Park Chung Hee was educated in the military academies of Manchukuo and Imperial Japan and was strongly pro-Buddhist (see Chapter 7). He was also friendly to Confucian traditionalists in South Korea. More exactly, even in South Korea in the 1930s before moving to Manchukuo, he had been affected by the State Shintoism of Imperial Japan, which contained far-right interpretations on Confucianism and Buddhism. Let me recall that both religions are polytheistic. For this reason, far-right wings in Imperial Japan had regarded Tennō as a demigod. In the same context, even in postwar Japan, the soldiers who died in the Second World War and Generals who were executed as war criminals after the war have been served as demigods in the Imperial Shrine of Yasukuni (Tokyo, Japan). Also, some of South Korea far-right wings have done the same things for Park Chung Hee.

Given all this, it is not surprising that the SCNR’s first accumulation strategy aspired to state-capitalist autarky. Indeed, in July 1961, when different governmental organisations
under the control of the SCNR were still suggesting alternative provisional plans, Park Chung Hee gave a guideline for the associated bureaucrats working for the plan. It was that the objective of the plan should be ‘to lay a foundation for an autarkic economy urgently’ (Kukkagirogwŏn [The National Archives of Korea] 2014, 51). And, in concretising the plan, Park Huibem consulted both Nasser’s and Nehru’s models that referred, in turn, to the method of the Soviet Union. Genealogically, it resonated with Manchukuo’s model as well (see chapter 5). After the official announcement of the plan, Park Huibem rather ambiguously referred to it as naebojeog (inward-containing) industrialisation. For him, it meant ‘Koreanism’, which was equivalent to ‘Nasserism in the Arab world’ (Park Huibem 1968, 64-65; see also Lee byŏngch’ŏn 1999; Park T’aekyun 2000b). The starting point for realizing such a strategy was, of course, to raise funds. That is, the junta needed money-capital. At first, it tried to obtain the funds by raising interest rates and boosting a securities market. Yet, the measures failed. Then, the junta enforced a sneak account squeeze and then imposed currency reform. These financial measures, in which Yu Wonsik took the lead, were so covert that only five persons had prior knowledge. including Yu Wonsik himself, Park Chung Hee and Park Huibem, in the SCNR. Indeed, not even the Governor of the Bank of Korea knew beforehand. The US was advised just 48 hours before its announcement (Yun Kwangwŏn 2008). Needless to say, this prompted the ire of the Kennedy Administration.

6.5 A Reaction from the Kennedy Administration

According to a report that US presidential task force formulated to help the highest posts in the Administration, including John F. Kennedy himself, to discuss South Korean issues, whilst ‘US policies in Korea have succeeded in keeping the Republic solidly on the side of the Free World and in maintaining a minimal standard of living’, ‘they have not succeeded in
remedy the lack of national direction or sense of responsibility of the Korean people or their leaders’ (Presidential Task Force on Korea 1961, 12). This report was submitted in early June 1961, that is, a few weeks after the May 16 military coup. On this basis, the Kennedy Administration encouraged the junta to design its own economic plan. Yet, whilst one of the key US foreign policy post-war objectives was to prevent economic nationalism, Park Chung Hee’s plan and its subsequent measures seemed to go even beyond economic nationalism toward socialist development. A series of reports and memorandums, which were sent from Seoul to Washington in the period, show that the US was aware of the reason why things were going in such a way. American bureaucrats in South Korea reported that Park Chung Hee had been deeply influenced by his education at the Japanese-run Daegu Normal School—which was well known for its heavy emphasis on State Shintoism—and military academies. Furthermore, they indicated that there was a group of “backroom boys” behind Park Chung Hee. In these reports, the latter were described as ‘nationalist’ and ‘socialist’. The reports argued that, for the reason, they tended to select ‘radical, totalitarian solutions to economic and political problems’ (see Park 2005, 678).

The Kennedy Administration intimidated Park Chung Hee into revoking the account freeze with a threat that it would otherwise retract the military and economic aids, except for minimum assistance. It also sought to purge Park Chung Hee’s backroom boys. In addition, it wanted to alter the first five-year plan into one based on Rostow’s developmentalism. Park Chung Hee had no option but to accepting all these demands because of the aforementioned structural dependency of South Korea on the US. For example, approximately 72 per cent of South Korea’s national defence expenditure in 1962 came from US aid (Han’gukkaebaryŏn’guwŏn [Korea Development Institute] 1991, 119; Park T’aekyun 1999, 152). Without such economic aid, Park could not manage even the South Korean military, which was a key supporter for his rule. As a result, the account freeze was lifted. Park
Huibeom, Yu Wonsik and others were all expelled from the corridors of power (Kimiya 1991; 2008; Park T’aekyun 1997; 2000a; 2000b; Chang, Jun’gap 2011; Haggard, Kim and Moon 1991). Also, the direction of the first five-year economic plan was converted. Park Huibeom (1963, 167-8; quoted in Lee byŏngch’ŏn 1999, 151-2) argued that there were no economic reasons for the account squeeze to be revoked. In this regard, he described his experiences as a ‘harrowing failure’. Immediately after the failure, Yu Wonsik (1987, 340) lamented: ‘The South Korean economy came to turn its orientation from an autarkic economy to a colonial, dependent economy. Now, the revolution is over. From now, a reactionary age is coming’.

6.6 The Reactionary Age?

This period commenced with a transition to a liberal-democratic regime and with the introduction of trade-oriented developmentalism to South Korea. This period corresponds to the second phase of the Park Chung Hee era. The transition to liberal democracy followed the agreement between the Kennedy Administration and Park Chung Hee; a trade-oriented developmentalism was implemented after the strife between the two on the first five-year plan and the junta’s planned financial measures (for a further discussion on the influences of Rostow on South Korea’s economy, see Park T’aekyun 2002). In this context, in October 1963, there was a presidential election, which Park Chung Hee won by 1.5 per cent, and in December of the same year, the supplementary plan of the first five-year plan was made public. The revised plan, which was released in February 1964, was influenced by Walter Whitman Rostow’s theory of modernisation. Hence, first, the plan came to pursue export-oriented industrialisation. Second, it highlighted importing raw materials and capital goods
freely from other countries. Third, it argued that the industrialisation should be based on foreign funds. Fourth, it sought to nurture light industry instead of heavy-chemical industry. In brief, the plan was oriented toward inserting the South Korean economy into the world market rather than pursue autarky. The economy showed a rapid growth from this time. Yet, not all the details in the first five-year plan were entirely revoked. That is, although Rostowian developmentalism reoriented the plan in a liberal direction, several measures for an import-substituting and heavy-chemical industrialisation remained, albeit partly. For this reason, whilst it was from the early 1970s that heavy-chemical industrialisation was driven again in South Korea, it was in 1962 that the first industrial complex for heavy-chemical industrialisation was built. Also, from this phase, South Korea imported raw materials and capital goods that were necessary for manufacturing exports. In particular, low customs duties were levied on imports for manufacturing exports to lower the prices of exports. On the contrary, a home market for durable consumer goods was strictly protected. In many fields, importing foreign consumer goods were hindered. Thus, the supplementation of Rostowian developmentalism to the autarkic strategy incubated a dualistic structure of the PCHM from this period (cf. Lee byŏngch’ŏn 1999).

A starting point to fulfil the new strategy was, of course, investing money-capital in the newly planned capitalist circulation. In this context, Park Chung Hee visited West Germany in the winter of 1964 to get commercial credit from the government. In the same context, the rapprochement between Japan and South Korea in 1965 was particularly important. For, by normalising diplomatic relations with US backing, Park Chung Hee obtained compensation for Japan’s colonial rule, aids, grants and loans, which were utilised for the industrialisation, 38

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38 As regards the rise of the South Korean economy, what market-fundamentalists stressed on is this aspect of the economy. According to their claim, whilst the economy was export-oriented, it was, simultaneously, based on free importation (see Chapter 1).
though this measure angered South Korean nationalists, particularly university students and, in turn, led to Park’s political crisis in the mid-1960s. Furthermore, re-establishing diplomatic relations enabled Japanese capital goods and technologies to flow into South Korea. Thus, from this period, the “fisher-cormorant” relation between the Japanese and South Korean economies started being structured.

A further important factor was the Vietnam War. As indicated, the South Korean Military was so big that it could not be maintained without the US’s financial assistance. Hence, since the end of the Korea War, the US had been continuously asking the South Korean administrations to downsize the military to facilitate economic development. Yet, Park Chung Hee decided to dispatch a huge contingent of South Korean troops to the Vietnam War, amounting to a total of 300,000 Korean soldiers from 1964 to 1973. On the one hand, this was a strategic choice to maximize economic aid from the US. In this regard, Park Chung Hee tried to develop institutions and laws related to conscription. At the same time this was also Park Chung Hee’s reply to the public backlash against his relation to Japan. For conscription would bring young students under military control.

On this basis, Park Chung Hee enjoyed a honeymoon period with the Johnson Administration (1963-9). In the second phase of his era, Park maintained a liberal-democratic regime. He also followed the trade-oriented economic strategy. And he sent many South Korean troops to Vietnam. Thereby the South Korea’s economy was subordinately re-articulated with the Japanese economy. The cheap consumer goods started being manufactured in South Korea, and then sold in Western markets and Vietnam during the war. This enabled the economy to begin its take-off (for the links among the US, South Korea and Vietnam, see Woo 1991, 93-6).

6.7 American Advisors and Neoclassical Economists
In this phase, the key figures in economic affairs were also changed. As noted, in the first phase, Park Chung Hee himself and his backroom boys, who aspired to build autarkic state capitalism, played a leading role in making the economic strategy. Yet, in the second phase, whilst Park Chung Hee survived, his backroom boys were expelled from the government and Rostowian developmentalism were introduced. Yet, it is unclear who took charge of implementing this strategy within the Korean government just as it is obvious that American advisors were deeply involved in South Korea’s economic affairs in this phase. This is evident from a letter sent by the US Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown in South Korea to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs on 26 August 1966.

> We have a very special relationship with Koreans. The Republic would not exist had it not been for us. We make possible its military establishment. We participate in all major economic decisions of its Government. In the central sanctum of the Economic Planning Board there are always Americans. Each provincial Governor has an American advisor. We have unusual intelligence liaison arrangements. The American military review and pass on virtually every aspect of the Korean defense budget … Everywhere one goes in Korea there are Americans in key places (Brown 1966).

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39 For this reason, Yu Wonsik criticised Park Chung Hee from the second phase until his death. He argued that Park Chung Hee betrayed their “revolution” to sustain his own political power. Conversely, Park Huibeom returned to the government in 1968 – but as Minister of the Ministry of Culture and Education rather than someone in charge of economic affairs.

40 This is not private correspondence. It was shared with Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Nicholas Katzenbach (Attorney General), Walt Whitman Rostow (Counsellor of the Department of State) and other key figures in the Department of State in the Johnson Administration (Ibid).
In brief, the “takeoff” of the South Korean economy was not accomplished by South Korean economic technocrats. For, in the second phase of the Park Chung Hee era from which the South Korean economy started showing its rapid rise, Americans occupied the space from which Park Chung Hee’s backroom boys were expelled. Also, from this phase, a group of neoclassical economists, which was later called the Sogang School, started working in high office in the government. For instance, Nam Duck-woo, the School’s leader, participated in policy-decisions as a counsellor from the mid-1960s. In 1969, he was appointed as Minister in Department of the Treasury. Then, many economists from the school participated in the government until Park’s assassination. Yet, the heavy-chemical industrialisation in the 1970s was not designed by them, because it was secretly prepared by a second generation of Park Chung Hee’s backroom boys. That is, the evolution of the PCHM to a mature chimera was the other group of economic technocrats that was organised in the early 1970s.

6.8 The Evolution of the PCHM into a Mature Chimera

The third phase of the Park Chung Hee era began in 1972. The transition was triggered by the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. As noted, Park Chung Hee somewhat conflicted with the Kennedy Administration because of his accumulation strategy and then enjoyed a honeymoon period with the Johnson Administration for reasons and benefits noted above. In this context, the Nixon Doctrine signified that the new US Administration violated the prior agreement between the Johnson Administration and Park Chung Hee. In particular,

41 The Nixon Doctrine was nonetheless a proximate cause for a transition into a totalitarian regime. For Park Chung Hee had laid a foundation for such a totalitarian regime in the 1960s.
the Nixon Administration decided to downscale the United State Forces Korea. This prompted Park Chung Hee to secretly organise a task force team in the Blue House (the executive office and official residence of the President of South Korea), and then order it to prepare a plan for a nuclear weapon in 1971 or, at latest, early 1972 (Jungangilbo Teukbyeolchwijjaetim 1998, 260-1; see also Eom Jeongsik 2013; Jo Cheolho 2000). This military project was linked to his new accumulation strategy. For the task force team planned the project for heavy-chemical industrialisation as a preparatory stage for the military strategy. It was linked to a plan for the development of a surface-to-air missile system and, of course, this was expected to be linked to a nuclear weapon. The leader of the task force team was O Won Chol and, although he was not an economic expert, he continued working as a senior presidential secretary for economic affairs until Park Chung Hee’s assassination. After reading chemical engineering science at university, he served as a technical officer in South Korea’s Air Force until he was promoted to major. After that, he worked as a plant manager at an automobile company until Park’s military junta summoned him to work for it. In particular, in the first phase of the Park Chung Hee’s era, he took responsibility for formulating the chemical side of the heavy-chemical industrialisation strategy. He then drew Park’s attention again in 1970 when the latter was searching for a method to development a munitions industry. O Won Chol, who was as a secretary to Vice Minister in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, proposed a plan to build parts factories for the development of such an industry, and it was accepted by Park Chung Hee. In this context, he was appointed in the next year as the leader of the task force team for a heavy-chemical industrialisation strategy associated with the munitions industry. It therefore happened that Park Chung Hee’s economic strategy in phase three was led by a second generation of his backroom boys. Yet, before announcing the new economic plan, Park Chung Hee waged a self-coup.
In July 1972, North Korea and South Korea abruptly announced that Kim Il-Sung and Park Chung Hee agreed on three principles for the reunification of two Koreas: first, independence; second, peace, and; third, national coherence. It was the first joint communiqué of the two Koreas since their division in 1945. Three months later, Park Chung Hee dissolved South Korea’s national assembly and promulgated martial law. Simultaneously, he announced the revision of the Constitution on the pretext of preparing for reunification and defending national security. Park Chung Hee declared this political measure as Yushin. It was a Korean pronunciation of Ishin (restoration). The new Constitution authorised him to invalidate even the new Constitution itself. It gave him absolute power and, in this regard, it has been argued that it resembled the failed military coup of the Imperial Way faction in the Army of Imperial Japan, that is, the Showa Ishin. For the latter was a project to provide Tennō (Emperor of Japan) absolute political power (Han Honggu 2012a; Kim Dŏngnyŏn 2015). Before the official announcement of Yushin, Park Chung Hee twice informed North Korea of his plan. In contrast, the US was notified of his decision 24 hours before the announcement (Park Myŏngnim 2011). For the 24 hours, the US remonstrated with Park Chung Hee, especially as it learnt that his manifesto for the October Yushin contained strong criticism of the foreign policies of Japan and, particularly, of the Nixon Administration. The Administration accepted it as ‘offensive’ and asked Park to meet the US Ambassador before the announcement. Park declined even the visit of the US Ambassador to the Blue House. Although, because of the remonstration of the US, Park removed criticisms on the US’s foreign policies, he still announced the October Yushin. Immediately after Park’s proclamation, the Nixon Administration declared it was irrelevant to the US (for on the 24 hours before Park’s announcement of Yushin, see Hong Seokryul 2013, 38-47). Thereby, Park transformed South Korea’s political regime into a totalitarian
one. Three months later, Park proclaimed his projects for “heavy-chemical industrialisation” and “the scientification of all nationals”.

Before its official announcement, the project was unknown to any of the Minsters in the Park Administration. The project was not contained in the third five-year plan (1972-6). It was a secret project inside the Blue House. Approximately 20 days after the announcement, Park summoned the Ministries to the Blue House. In front of them, O Won Chol gave a four-hour briefing about the details of plan. In response, Nam Duck-woo pointed out the difficulties of financing. Yet, according to O Won Chol (2006, 149, 215-27), Park Chung Hee interrupted Nam by saying that, “I am not telling you that I am going to declare war; nevertheless, are you saying that you can’t help me?” Nobody felt able to disagree with Park Chung Hee. Park ordered Nam Duck-woo and others to find methods to obtain money-capital and the meeting ended. From then, more loans were introduced, and simultaneously, forced savings implemented. Hence, the heavy-chemical industrialisation as the key accumulation strategy in the third phase of the Park Chung Hee era was, indeed, propelled by a consideration for not ‘comparative advantages’ nor ‘economic validity’, but ‘technological necessity’ and ‘technical possibility’ (Kim Hŭnggi 1999, 217, 267).

Based on the heavy-chemical industrialisation, the South Korean economy continued to grow rapidly during the 1970s as well (see figure 6.1). But this came at a cost. It generated a serious inflation, which the government tried to moderate, even as the oil crises in 1973 and 1979 aggravated the high inflation. For instance, the wholesale price index in 1974 rose by 42.2% (Song Hŭiyŏn 2003, 66). In 1979, the PCHM itself fell into a crisis and the IMF intervened in the South Korean economy for the first time (see figure 6.1). Also, Park Chung Hee’s political, economic and military strategies increasingly exacerbated his relation to the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations. For example, Donald Gregg, who served as an CIA agent in Japan (1964-73) and South Korea (1973-5), and was later appointed as US
Ambassador to South Korea (1989-93), said in October 1976, that: ‘[I]f President Park runs for another six year term, as he is expected to do, he will probably not live to serve out his term’. That is, in the late phase of his era, Park Chung Hee was regarded as one of the targets of CIA’s ‘murder policy’ in the 1970s (McGuire 1976, 34).

Figure 6.1: Growth Rate (Korea, 1961-2013)

Source: Economic statistics system, the Bank of Korea

Here we can discuss briefly on South Korea’s chaebols (the large industrial conglomerates of South Korea, such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG and the like). The making of chaebols commenced with heavy-chemical industrialisation, though some already existed from the 1950s. That is, the businesses, which survived into the industrialisation, were later transformed into chaebols. An intriguing point here is that, just as Yushin is a Korean pronunciation of Ishin, chaebol is a Korean pronunciation of a Japanese term zaibatsu. That is, Yushin and Ishin are different pronunciations of the same Chinese characters, which mean “restoration”; and, similarly, chaebol and zaibatsu are different pronunciations of the same
characters, which literally mean “financially powerful family or faction”. In Japan, the term originated from the Meiji period. Then, the first generation of zaibatsu grew up with the first Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. Its later generation emerged with Manchukuo’s industrialisation. In this context, zaibatsu were closely linked to the Military of Imperial Japan, and for this reason, immediately after the end of the Second World War, The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), which occupied Japan, attempted to dismantle the zaibatsu system by confiscating its assets. In brief, then, Park Chung Hee attempted to create in South Korea in the 1970s what the US had disorganised in Japan in the late 1940s. For this reason, chaebols had had a similar system for corporate governance and, likewise, although Samsung, Hyundai and LG are known as companies that manufacture mobile phones, cars, home appliances and the like, they have been simultaneously logistics companies.

6.9 The State Form of the PCHM: Chimerical Warfare Pre-National State

Based on previous work, here I offer a state-theoretical and regulationist form-analysis of the PCHM. Similar analyses of North Atlantic Fordism define the state form as Keynesian welfare national state (KWNS). Also, according to them, such a state has been tendentially transformed into a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime in a post-Fordist era (see, e.g., Jessop 2002). From the same perspective, the East Asian newly industrialised economies of the Cold War era, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are viewed as East Asian Exportism. In the same context, the state form of the Exportist model is defined

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42 In this context, chaebol’s corporate governance was one of the key issues in the policy programme that IMF suggested as a reply to the East Asian economic crisis in 1997-8. That is, what was dismantled in Japan in the late 1940s was reformed in South Korea in the late 1990s.
as a Ricardian or Listian workfare regime. Specifically, the state form of South Korea and Taiwan is regarded as a Listian workfare national regime (Jessop and Sum 2006, 152-85). My work, too, is based on the SRA-based state theory and the RA and, insofar as it concerns the South Korean economy, that is, a variant of the East Asian newly industrialised economies, it basically resonates with the non-Eurocentric regulationist analysis of Exportism. Yet, in this thesis, I have attempted to concretise the analysis of the South Korean model by taking a supranational scale of social relations into account. In other words, I have attempted to put the model in its place in an imperialist system within variegated capitalism in a world market and, thereby, to offer a relatively concrete and complex understanding of the model.

Table 6.2 The Chimerical Warfare Pre-National State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinctive set of economic policies</th>
<th>Distinctive set of social policies</th>
<th>Primary scale</th>
<th>The relation between state and market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Inscribed by a libertarian and trade-oriented strategy for an economic takeoff</td>
<td>- Familial, work-oriented and asset-based</td>
<td>- Relative primacy given to national scale</td>
<td>- Not a mixed economy between state and market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Anchored on autarky-aspired and fascist-militaristic developmentalism</td>
<td>- The subordination of social policy to economic policy, subordinated by military policy</td>
<td>- Not national-territorial state in a strict sense, because of North Korea and USA</td>
<td>- The state-led nurturing of controlled markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The subordination of economic policies to the strategies for military aggrandizing</td>
<td>- A “mobilisation” regime in a “garrison” society</td>
<td>- Continuously aiming to complete the building of a nation- and national state</td>
<td>- Impaired sovereignty of the state, because of militarily, economically and intellectually special liaison with the US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chimerical (Autarkic/Rostowian) Warfare Pre-National State

Source: My own

In this context, I re-define the state form of the PCHM as an Autarkic/Rostowian warfare pre-national state. On this basis, I simplify it as a chimerical warfare pre-national
state (CWPS). Thus far, I have sufficiently illustrated why the macroeconomic policy of the PCHM can be referred to as chimerical. In the first phase of his era, Park Chung Hee was quite unaware of the economic effects of export expansion. In its second phase, his autarky-aspired strategy was supplemented by the libertarian and trade-oriented economic strategy. In this third phase, Park Chung Hee himself tried to combine autarky-inspired heavy-chemical industrialisation with the export-oriented strategy. This seems to reflect his direct experience of the beneficial influence of export growth on the South Korean economy.\(^{43}\) For this reason, it seems evident that the PCHM was evolving into a chimerical model. Yet, why should its social policy be viewed in terms of warfare?

6.10 The CWPS as a “Warfare” or “Garrison” State

My suggestion reflects a basic belief that the social policy regime of South Korea during the Park Chung Hee era is better understood in term of a ‘warfare state’ (Edgerton 2006) or ‘garrison state’ (Lasswell 1941) than as a welfare or workfare state. Those concepts emerged to highlight the unwarranted effects of a ‘military-industrial complex’ on the postwar liberal-bourgeois states. Also, in this light, the relation between the military establishment and zaibatsu in Imperial Japan, and the relation between the Park Chung Hee faction and chaebol can be seen as a particular type of a military-industrial complex. In this context, although

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\(^{43}\) Whilst he discovered the effect of export promotion on the economy after his experiences in the 1960s, it seems that he was not aware of the effect of high inflation on the economy. For, notwithstanding a serious level of inflation in the 1970s, he had a deep attachment to investment and export growth during the period. In the late 1970s, even nearly all economic experts in the Bank of Korea, his Cabinet and the government-run research institute simultaneously warned that the massive amount of investment, the oil shock and the high inflation were seriously harmful to the economy, Park Chung Hee himself continuously argued for investment and export growth.
Eisenhower’s farewell speech (1961) warned that the ‘conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience’, such a nexus was not that new in East Asia. Let me also recall that Eisenhower (Ibid) warned: ‘In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist’. On the contrary, in Imperial Japan, particularly since the 1930s, and in South Korea during the Park Chung Hee era, the fascist and militaristic factions themselves directly seized political power and, then, strategically nurtured big businesses, which, inter alia, served the purposes of military aggrandisement. In this context, South Korea during the Park Chung Hee era was more genuinely warfarist than the Western states. Indeed, Park Chung Hee mobilised the whole society for military aggrandisement and, in this context, social policy was also subordinated to military policy. More precisely, social policy was subordinated to economic policy and this, in turn, was subordinated to its military policy. Let me recall that Park Chung Hee’s heavy-chemical industrialisation was based on a calculation of not economic validity, but technical necessity and technological possibility for military aggrandisement. For this reason, it was announced without taking account of financial issues. As noted, approximately 20 days after Park Chung Hee’s official declaration of heavy-chemical industrialisation, its economic and financial impact started being discussed for the first time.

In this context, I refer to the social policy regime of the PCHM as a warfarist regime. Yet, it also had its own detailed characteristics. First, as Jessop and Sum (2006; see also Jessop 2002, 145) argue, the ‘familial’ unit had an important role in the social policy regime. In other words, in the regime, the role of families and, particularly, of a breadwinner in a patriarchal and extended family were essential. Yet, a proviso is required here. In the warfarist regime of the PCHM, not only male, but female workers also functioned as breadwinners. As noted,
Park Chung Hee launched heavy-chemical industrialisation from the early 1970s, with adult males preferred to female workers. Yet, in light industries, which were launched from the mid-1960s, most workers were young women. Accordingly, the female workers who moved from rural agriculture to industrialising cities also served as breadwinners for their extended families in their birthplaces, at least until they married. Yet this served patriarchal ends. For it was common for the wages of only primarily educated young female workers to be used for the high(er) education of their brothers because of the cultural preference for boys over girls. In other words, it was because the extended families in rural areas wanted their sons, who were expected to succeed to the familial patrimony, to become white-collar workers in cities after being more educated than their female siblings.

The social policy of the PCHM can be also regarded as work-oriented. For this reason, it might be viewed as workfarist. This is in contrast with neoliberal usage of the term, where it implies a 'mandatory work programme for welfare recipients or, more generically, to the process of work-oriented welfare reform' (Peck 2003, 85). This was not the case in the PHCM social policy regime. Rather, the social policy in the Park Chung Hee era was linked not to welfare policy but to tax and financial policies. In this sense, it can also be regarded as asset-based. Here the asset on which the regime relied was, indeed, savings. Admittedly, in the South Korean economy during its rapid industrialisation, household savings had been high. Yet, let me recall that the wages of South Korean workers were relatively low. The gap between high savings and low wages were bridged by tax policy (see figure 6.2 on the next page).

Simply speaking, as regards earned income, the Park Administration permitted a wide range of tax deductions. In particular, in the early 1970s when it launched heavy-chemical

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44 So South Korea had to discipline not only modern housewives, but also the young female labour power from the 1960s. To do so, the military junta created a distinctive narrative for the happiness of the young female workers who moved from the countryside to cities to find jobs.
industrialisation, the Administration gradually increased the standard deduction amounts. Because of the path-dependent effects of this tax policy, even now, approximately a half of wage earners in South Korea is exempted from income taxes. By doing so, notwithstanding low wages, the Administration could raise the disposable incomes of wage labourers relatively. In this situation, on the one hand, private consumption was restrained; on the other, savings were half-forcedly mobilised. The money was flowed into the nationalised banks⁴⁶ that guaranteed relatively high interest rates. It was, of course, used for re-investment (for more details, see Kim Dokyun 2013; 2018). I note above that the wages of South Korea’s

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⁴⁵ On the other hand, here we must recall that savings were a key element for operating the PCHM. Further, Park Chung Hee had to discipline young female workers. His message was simple: “Save for the future happiness”. In this context, Park’s discourse, too, conflicted with US discourse insofar as the US continuously stimulated South Korea’s females to aspire for the abundant consumption of the American ladies (see Chapter 7).

⁴⁶ As noted, South Korea’s banks were nationalised immediately after Park’s military coup in 1961. They were privatised again from 1980, that is, after Park’s death.
workers had been viewed as production costs rather than demands for the Park Chung Hee era, because mass production in South Korea was oriented toward mass consumption abroad. Here I can add one more thing to the statement. At a national level, wages were also a source for savings and reinvestment (see figure 6.1). In this context, the social policy of the PCHM was subordinated by its economic policy in a different manner from that of the neoliberal era. The economic policy was, as noted, subordinated by its military policy. In the same context, the social policy was a part of a “mobilisation” regime, and for this reason, I argue that the social policy regime can be characterised as warfarist.

6.11 The CWPS as a Client State

Lastly, the state form of the PCHM can be also viewed as a pre-national state. If we focus only on the scale at which the primacy of economic and social policy is located, the state form might be seen as national. Yet South Korea and, indeed, Korea itself have never been national states in a strict sense. In its medieval period, Korea (i.e., Chosun, 1932-1897) was a tributary state of Chinese dynasties. Immediately after the emergence of the 19th-century world market in which the hegemony of the Chinese dynasty in East Asia collapsed, South Korea came to be inserted into a subordinate position in the prevailing imperialist system within a variegated capitalist world market by being forced to accept a series of commercial treaties (see Chapter 5). In 1897—that is, two years after the last Chinese dynasty was defeated by even Imperial Japan and, as a result, Taiwan was annexed into Japan—Korea, too, proclaimed that it was transformed into the Great Korean Empire (1897—1910). Yet, since then, the Empire had been gradually annexed into Imperial Japan. In 1910, the self-described Empire became a colony of Imperial Japan.
In brief, as an East Asian country belatedly articulated into an imperialist order within the variegated capitalism of the 19th-century world market, Korea had to achieve capitalist industrialisation as well as to build a nation- and national state. Yet it failed to accomplish those state projects that had been gradually for a few centuries achieved in Western Europe. Admittedly, Korea was decolonised in 1945. Yet, the decolonisation was not made by Korean people. In addition, immediately after the liberation, the Cold War began, and Korea were divided into two parts. In this context, South Korea had to re-launched state projects for the industrialisation of the South Korean economy and the building of a nation- and national state in an imperialist order within the variegated capitalism of the 20th-century world market. The PCHM should be viewed in terms of those state projects. Park Chung Hee accomplished industrialisation. Yet, South Korea has not yet pursued the projects for the building a nation- and national state.

This is partly because of North Korea. Of course, North Korea and South Korea joined the United Nations at the same time in 1991. Accordingly, since then, at the level of international politics, they have implicitly recognised each other as nation- and national states. Yet, South Korea’s Constitution has still specified the territory of South Korea as “the Korean peninsular and its adjacent islands”. This obviously implies that North Korea is not a legitimate state. Indeed, by law, South Korea regards North Korea as an illegal organisation that illegitimately occupied the partial territory and state population of South Korea. On the other hand, the structural relation between the US and South Korea explains why South Korea is not a national-territorial state in a strict sense. Let me note again that South Korea’s prerogative of Supreme Command still exercises operational control over South Korea’s military after it was handed to the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC)—although South Korea’s Constitution specifies the President of South Korea is Commander-in-Chief. Also, since 1979, when Park Chung Hee was assassinated, the Commander of CFC is the
Commander, United States Forces Korea (a four-star general officer in the US Army) with the Deputy Commander being Chairman of Republic of Korea Joint Chief of Staff. In brief, South Korea’s wartime operational control is still under the strong US influence. Also, until December 1994, South Korea did not have even peacetime operational control over South Korea’s Armed Forces. These imply that the SWPS was more dependent on the US. It seems, then, that there is, currently, no concept to grasp the relation between South Korea and the US. For instance, although Central and Eastern European states under the hegemony of the USSR had been referred to as satellite states, the concept does not apply to South Korea, because it reflects a geographical characteristic of the relation between those states and the USSR. Also, while some African states, which had been colonised by European states, were defined as neo-colonies in the postwar era, this concept is also inapplicable to South Korea, because it highlights the post-colonial dependence of the colonies on their previous metropolitan states, and the continuous exploitation of the metropoles. Yet, notwithstanding its formal independence, South Korea has been substantively “cliental”. In this context, it has been a distinguishable type of client state. Also, to highlight these points related to North Korea and the US, I define South Korea as a pre-national state.

6.12 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate how and why the PCHM evolved into a chimerical model. On this basis, I define its state form as CWPS. In doing so, I have focused on a supranational scale of social relations. In my view, those relations have been rather paradoxical. For instance, many South Korean people still have anti-Japanese sentiments. They have aspired to overcome and overtake Japan by developing the economy. Yet, without the financial and industrial subordination of the South Korean economy to the Japanese
economy, South Korea’s industrialisation itself was infeasible. Also, South Korea needed the US to protect it from the threats from North Korea. Yet, the sovereignty of South Korea was impaired by the US as well. In this situation, Park Chung Hee chose not a status quo but a revision. Yet, in doing so, he tried to utilise the fascist state strategies by which he had been affected in his colonial experience. Thus, at first, he cooperated with the US to overcome North Korea. Later, he tried to raise his voice against the US by retaining nuclear weapons, based on the relative relaxation of tension with North Korea. These relations were all inscribed into the PCHM and, as a result, the model has its own distinguishable features.

Conversely, my analysis not only helps us understand the PCHM more concretely but also offers an opportunity of better understanding the current state of affairs in South Korea. South Korea has already accomplished industrialisation, and it has been thus deemed as one of the (relatively) advanced capitalist economies. In addition, it has consolidated a liberal-bourgeois democracy. For this reason, its state form, too, has been tendentially transformed into a Schumpeterian welfare post-national state. Yet, this course of development has showed its distinctive features, because it began not from a KWNS but from the CWPS. For instance, as regards a social policy regime, it has been transformed from a warfare regime into a welfare regime. Thereby public expenditure related to welfare policy has sharply increased. Also, South Korea has been transformed from a pre-national state into a post-national regime. In this process, attempts to complete the project for the building of a national state have continued. This project is also related to a project for the building of a nation-state. As a relatively advanced economy in East Asia, South Korea, too, has actively accepted migrant workers. Thus, South Korea, too, has been changed into a multicultural society. Yet, the major proportion of the migrant workers are, indeed, Koreans in China who have lived in the adjacent areas to the border between China and North Korea. Thus, the major tensions between Koreans and migrant workers are neither racial nor religious. Their conflicts were
emerged from a difference in their life styles. Also, in this context, a transition into a multicultural society is also related to a nationalist project. Lastly, in the light of my work here, we can elaborate more on the other institutional features of the PCHM. Yet, before doing so, one more work is also required—that is, an analysis of semiotic formations for normalising and stabilising the PCHM. This work shall be done in the following chapter.
7. A Semiotic Analysis of the Emergence of the Chimerical Model

In the previous chapter, I explained why and how the PCHM evolved into a chimerical model. Based on this explanation, I also offered a state-theoretical and, in part, regulationist analysis of the state form corresponding to this PCHM model. On this basis, I now address the dominant semiotic formations that contributed not only to the normalisation and stabilisation of the model, but also its destabilisation. In particular, I shall introduce US’s and Park Chung Hee’s semiotic practices. As might be expected, while these practices do resonate with each other, they also involve contrasting and sometimes antagonistic semiotic themes. Specifically, they agreed that South Korea needs to pursue an anti-communist path of economic development within the capitalist bloc in the Cold War period; yet, concretely, they emphasized strategies and methods. Thus, just as the PCHM was chimerical and prone to instability, the dominant discourses regarding South Korea’s political, economic and social modernisation also combined different tropes in a hybrid manner with potential to open and deepen cleavages. To illustrate this, the following sections deal with: (1) the sedimented discourses before Korea’s decolonisation; (2) US macro-discourses from the late 1940s regarding development, civilisation and liberalism; (3) US micro-discourses since the early 1950s promoting the superiority of an American lifestyle; (4) Park Chung Hee’s discoursal practices, and; (5) the cultural conflicts and unexpected byproducts in the 1970s. This analysis refutes claims that Asian values or Confucianism contributed to East Asian development.

7.1 Modernisation Discourses Before the US Occupation in 1945
This section introduces modernisation discourses that had been sedimented before the US occupied the southern part of the Korean Peninsular. It begins with Korea’s medieval period because this is directly relevant to Korea’s ethnocentric nationalism. At this time, Choseon’s politics, economy and society were rooted in Sinocentric neo-Confucianism. This ideology belongs to a distinctive type of classicalism in terms of how it envisages an ideal society. This is not something to be achieved in the future but something that had already been accomplished in the age of Emperor Yao (i.e., a mythological Chinese emperor). This to calls to revive that social order represented in the present situation. Specifically, such an ideal society referred to a dynasty ruled by a benevolent monarch such as Emperor Yao. For, according to it, this kind of rule can inspire the people to love their ruler, him voluntarily, and accept reforms. In short, the concept “Kingly Way” (i.e., rule by benevolence) was at the centre of the philosophical system. This contrasts with the “Hegemonic Way” (i.e., rule by power), which implies that the ruling system is based on people’s fear of their monarch. Accordingly, neo-Confucian doctrines highlight the monarch’s and, more generally, ruling class’s systematic self-cultivation and self-discipline for rebuilding such an ideal social order here.

In China, neo-Confucianism was prevalent in the Song Dynasty (960–1279) and the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). Thus, to say that medieval Korea (1392-1897) was Sinocentric means that it was initially Ming-centric. This is crucial for understanding not only medieval but also contemporary Korea because it pertains to the origin of Koreans’ ethnocentric view of the world. Nonetheless, the Ming Dynasty was conquered by the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), which was established by Manchu people. The neo-Confucian ruling class in medieval Korea regarded Manchurians as barbarians who did not follow Confucian ethics. It therefore rejected a tributary relation to the Qing Dynasty, which triggered the Qing invasion of Choseon in 1636-7. After the war, medieval Korea had no option but to accept a vassal
relationship with the new Dynasty in China. Yet, ideologically, it still venerated the Ming Dynasty even after it had completely collapsed. Thus Korea’s ruling class medieval Korea believed that, although the Ming Dynasty failed to keep the Kingly Way, they should continue to represent it. Their ethnocentric view of the world emerged from this context. They believed that the medieval Korea was “little China” that had inherited the values of the Ming Dynasty. Thus, for more than 200 years after the Dynasty collapsed, medieval Korea was still dominated by this “little Sinocentrism”, with its paradoxical form of ethnocentrism. This was also a source of their cultural pride and their view of those who lived in the Japanese Archipelago as barbarians. In was in this situation that Korea came to encounter Western imperialist forces from the mid-19th century.

In particular, medieval Korea observed that even the mighty Qing Dynasty was defeated by the British Empire. This promoted its fear of the Western forces. Thus, immediately after the first Opium War (1839-42), a few envoys were dispatched to Beijing to investigate the consequences of the war and the impact of Western forces. After Korea had conflicted militarily with France (1866), the US (1871), Japan (1875), and the like, the size of the missions was increasingly expanded and they also visited Japan and the US in this period. On returning to Korea, the envoys, who experienced a Western type of modernisation, started arguing for gaehwa (i.e., flowering). It was a call for “enlightenment” in Korea too. Some of the envoys suggested the Self-Strengthening Movement in the Qing Dynasty could be copied to promote Korea’s modernisation. Others took the Meiji Ishin as the right model for Korea. Either way, from this time onwards, some of Korea’s elites started to accept the superiority of Western civilisation and modernisation over the traditional and neo-Confucian order. Moreover, explicitly or implicitly, they accepted the civilised-barbaric-savage trichotomy. For their argument implied that Korea was inferior to the Western World and, thus, that it should be modernized. This is how Eurocentric and racial views were introduced to Korea.
However, this prompted the ire of the traditionalist and ethnocentric elites. Furthermore, as repeatedly noted, Korea eventually became a colony of Imperial Japan. As this occurred, the ethnocentric traditionalism evolved into ethnocentric or, at least, ethnic nationalism. Also, in experiencing successively the colonial era, the partition of Korea by external forces and, then, the Korean War, ethnocentric nationalism has been gradually strengthened. For this reason, it has been argued in South Korea that during the course, ethnocentric nationalism has become a “sanctified” ideology in South Korea (for the sanctification of South Korea’s nationalism, Kang Chŏngin and Chŏng Sŭnghyŏn 2013). On the other hand, since the 1920s, socialism was introduced to Korea via Imperial Japan. This contributed to the rise of a non-nationalist and class-centred thinking in Korea. This is significant because Korea was initially industrialised in the colonial era (see Chapter 5), which fact lent itself to nationalist thinking. However, class-centric socialists started viewing the major contradiction of Korea in capitalist rather than nationalist terms. This was an important factor in the partition of Korea and outbreak of the Korean War following decolonisation. In addition, since the 1930s, an ultranationalist, state-socialist, State-Shintoist and militaristic fascism was also propagated among Korean people with ambivalent effects. On the one hand, this enhanced the resistant nationalism among some Koreans; on the other, it is also meant even previously nationalistic people later succumbed to Imperial Japan. For, in the fascist regime for a total war, many Koreans tried to get recognised as Japanese (see Chapter 5; for the influence of fascism on Koreans, see also Kim Yerim 2009; Hŏ Un 2010).

In this context, at the very moment that Korea was liberated from Imperial Japan in August 1945, traditionalist, Eurocentric, nationalist, socialist and fascist ideologies co-existed and were combined in various ways, producing complex ideological cleavages. For instance, some people were still neo-Confucian and, simultaneously, ethnocentric nationalists so that
they were also anti-Japanese. Conversely, others were state-socialist and (ultra-)nationalist and inclined to be pro-Japanese. There were also class-centric socialists, who opposed Japan and America. In brief, the ideological topography in the Korean Peninsular in 1945 was highly complex. In this situation, the US Military occupied a southern part of the Korean Peninsular. This is when US semiotic practices became important, in line with its military, geo-political and geo-economies goals; and, as such, they also constituted the US reply to the inherited sedimented discourses.

7.2 American Semiotic Practices Since 1945: Macro-Discourses

The discourses that the US diffused can be divided into macro- and micro-discourses. The former concern (1) the construal of the world during the Cold War era, (2) the construal of South Korea’s status in this a world, and (3) a method for raising South Korea’s position in the new world, that is, a politico-economic regime that South Korea should follow. These discourses contributed to defining South Korea’s national identity and its state projects. The macro-discourses emphasized three themes:

- Developmentalism. The imperialist order that had prevailed within the variegated capitalism of the 19th-century world market in the shadow of classical liberalism under the British hegemony was mainly viewed in terms of the Eurocentric civilised-barbaric-savage trichotomy. In contrast, since the Truman Doctrine in 1947, a new imperialist order emerged within the variegated capitalist world market that operated in the shadow of an embedded liberalism organized under US hegemony. And, again in contrast to the previous pattern, it was now viewed in terms of the Western-centric developed-developing-underdeveloped trichotomy. For this reason, since the late
1940s, South Korea was defined as an underdeveloped country in the age of development (for more details on the invention of development, see Esteva 2010).

- **Civilisation versus Savagery.** The US nonetheless continued to use the discourse of civilization but it acquired a new referent and new meaning in the Cold War era. Thus countries in the capitalist bloc of the new world order were categorised as civilised and the newly decolonized colonies of the old empires were undergoing modernization; in contrast the Soviet Bloc was categorized as savage and intent on waging war even in the newly emancipated world order. In this regard, then, South Korea started being viewed as belonging to a civilised bloc (see below). Needless to say, this discourse was sometimes reinterpreted in a manner that was favourable to the USA. For instance, liberal analyses of the bipolar superpowers during the Cold War era contrasted the US as an ‘empire by invitation’ or a ‘benign imperium’ with the USSR as a ‘empire by force’ or a ‘malign imperium’ (Lundestad 1986; Brzezinski 1986; see also Chapter 4).

- **Liberal Democracy and Liberal Economy.** Together, these two macro-discourses suggested “development in civilisation” was a desirable and achievable objective for the newly decolonised countries during the Cold War era. Hence the US championed the superiority of a liberal-democratic regime and a liberal-economic system over others. In this context, the US transplanted liberal democracy to South Korea in 1948 and thereby gifted workers’ and women’s suffrage rather than this being achieved through their own struggles (see Chŏng Yŏngjin 2015; Moon Jiyeong 2011). In the same context, it was also argued from the 1950s that economic development, nation-building and state-building should be led by the private sector (Park T’aekyun 2000a).

Combined with the Korean War, these macro-discourses made the discoursal topography in the country in the 1950s rather distinctive. First, as frequently noted, since the
Korean War, class-centred, Marx-Leninist or Stalinist socialists moved to North Korea or were entirely purged in South Korea. However, state-socialistic or national-socialistic figures still survived in the South. Second, in this context, nationalists conflicted with nationalists (see Hong Sŏngnyul 2002). For example, traditional nationalists and fascist ultranationalists were both nationalistic in their own way. In particular, whilst the former was ethnocentric, the latter were pro-Japanese. Third, democrats conflicted with democrats. This is basically because many people in post-War South Korea identified democracy with anti-communism. Hence it was common for even ethnocentric traditionalists or genuine liberals to be purged in the name of democracy, that is, anti-communism. Fourth, there were several different imaginaries for modernisation. While some called for the reinvention of Korea’s traditional culture, others wanted an American style of modernization, and yet others preferred a fascist way.

The discoursal strategies of Lhee Syngman—that is, the first President of South Korea, who ruled South Korea for 12 years (1948-60)—can be briefly discussed here in this light. Lhee Syngman actively utilised the discourse of civilisation to legitimate South Korea. That is, according to him, while South Korea was a civilised country, the North was a savage puppet regime of the USSR. Yet, let me recall that in South Korea, a conception of a nation has been basically ethno-centred. Thus, his application of the civilised-savage dichotomy for the Korean nation conflicted with the usual conception of a nation. On the one hand, in this context, even traditional nationalists were sometimes purged by anti-communist extremists; on the other, in the same context, Lhee Syngman created a distinctive type of nationalism—that is, Ilminjuui. Lhee suggested the political ideology, which may be translated as “one-nationism”, as the national principle that would provide the foundation for other policies.

47 The ideology has been elsewhere translated as “One People Principle”.

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Notably, Lhee defined nation in terms of loyalty to South Korea’s political regime. That is, he tried to change how South Koreans conceived a nation from an ethnic to a patriotic basis. This can also be read as an attempt to change the conception of nation from a German-style *Volksnation* to an American *Staatsnation* (for the different conceptions of a nation, see Jessop 2002, 173).

This might have occurred because Lhee Syngman was a pro-American politician. Against this interpretation, however, we should note that Korea was, unlike the USA, neither a multicultural nor multiethnic society. It was highly homogeneous culturally and ethnically. Thus, an alternative interpretation is that this one-nationism was Nazi-inspired. Support for this interpretation can be found in the fact that this ideology was developed by An Ho-Sang, who had studied in Imperial Japan, Germany and the UK. He argued publicly that not only bourgeois and socialist ideologies and state strategies were worth taking seriously in the Cold War era but also those of the Nazi regime (An Ho-Sang 1947/1994). In particular, he believed that one state population should have only one ideology, and, in this context, he also argued for equality in the state population. This was the ideological source of “one-nationism”. Based on this, Lhee Syngman declared that North Korean people in pursuit of communism do not belong to our nation. This shows that, as noted, even national socialists remained in South Korea. Unsurprisingly, Lhee Syngman’s flirtation with the Nazi ideology led to a conflict with the Eisenhower Administration (Lee Sŏnmi 2009, 251; Hŏ Ŭn 2004, 33-4).

**7.3 American Semiotic Practices Since 1945: Micro-Discourses**

To explain US’s micro-discourses, let me first introduce the Kitchen Debate between Richard Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev. In the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, the US chose to display the inside of an American middle-class house to Soviet politicians,
journalists and civilians. Given that, a month earlier, the Soviet Union had used its National Exhibition to boast of their Sputnik and heavy-chemical industries, this seemed peculiar. In the kitchen where the Kitchen Debate occurred, Nixon told Khrushchev that it was the typical kitchen of an American middle-class house in California. In the conversation, Nixon highlighted the life of American women, particularly of housewives. Nixon said, ‘In America, we like to make life easier for women …’. Then, Khrushchev interrupted, ‘Your capitalistic attitude toward women does not occur under Communism’. Nixon continued, ‘I think that this attitude towards women is universal. What we want to do is to make life more easy for our housewives’.\(^{48}\) As I shall detail later, Nixon’s utterance seems an elaborately calculated semiotic move to promote the American capitalism of the Cold War era by strategically highlighting show the life style of American Fordism and not just its production practices. In Nixon’s discourse, then, American capitalism was shown not through capitalist production but through capitalist consumption. Also, the major merit of the American capitalism was, spatially, presented through not production sites but the inside of a middle-class house, particularly kitchens. Further, it was not male blue-collar workers but middle-class housewives who were suggested as the representative figures of the American capitalism.

For this reason, in my view, the Kitchen Debate was connected to the emancipation of women or promotion of women’s rights during the Cold War era. This era saw the emancipation, if only in part and in different ways, of women in the Soviet Union and the European social democracies from housekeeping or parenting duties. In these regions, this partial emancipation was based on the relative socialisation of housekeeping or parenting, which enabled women to enter into production more fully and become key agents in this regard. In contrast, American women experienced emancipated through the

\(^{48}\) For the kitchen debate transcript, see the following site at the homepage of the CIA: http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/16/1959-07-24.pdf
commodification and marketisation of housekeeping and parenting tasks. Thus, their emancipation was achieved by buying durable goods or labour power (i.e., nannies or caregivers) for housekeeping and/or caring. I am not suggesting, of course, that Western Women achieved full emancipation from patriarchy during the Cold War era but, between American and socialist systems, there was a clear difference in the way that women’s rights improved. What Nixon advertised in the Kitchen Debate was, indeed, the American style of the emancipation of women. He thought that an aspiration for such a life was universal, though Khrushchev objected it. Or rather, such a semiotic practice had been championed by American sociologists from the early 1950s. For instance, Riesman (1951) called for all-out bombing of women in the Soviet Union with consumer’s goods, and for this reason he called it the ‘Nylon War’ and ‘Operation Abundance’. Hence, one of the key factors in an American style of life in relevance to American Fordism was portrayed as an improvement in the life of housewives. For, in the American style of capitalism, the main subjects (or decision-makers) of consumption regarding durable goods for their houses and kitchens were housewives. For this reason, they were the influential subject in production but consumption. On the other hand, in the Kitchen Debate, Nixon told Khrushchev about American male workers as well. ‘Our steel workers, as you know, are now on strike. But any steel worker could buy this house’ (ibid).

My discussion on US micro-discourses starts with the Kitchen Debate because the substance of Nixon’s takeaway message in this debate was already spreading to South Korea by the early 1950s. In Soviet Union, this debate was an event. In contrast, in South Korea, the American style of life had been elaborately promoted in interlinked for many years through magazines, movies, radio, books, and the like. It was suggested that the core value of this lifestyle was “equality at home”. Also, in the US Army Military Government that ruled South Korea, there were local officials who had studied in the US and many published their
memoirs. Inter alia, they argued that the US became the centre of civilisation because of equality at home (Hŏ ŭn 2014, 296-7). Unsurprisingly, living as they did in a patriarchal society, South Korean women, particularly housewives and young women, were captivated by such a life style.

In brief, the promotion for the American style of life was targeted at women. To do so, the ‘genre chains’ were elaborately interlinked between various mediums (on genre chains, see Fairclough 2003, 31-2). The US disseminated magazines that introduced the American way of life to intellectuals, university students, and farmers. They also distributed movies that portrayed the life style. In addition, the US offered many Koreans visiting programmes to the US. Intriguingly, the main part of those programmes was visits to American homes to meet middle-class families rather than to visit factories or meet workers there. Fascinated by the materially abundant life and the relatively equal relationship among family members, the Korean visitors returned to the relatively underdeveloped society and circulated their experiences abroad in essay form. The essays show that even ethnocentric traditionalists were completely shocked and even overwhelmed by the abundant life, thereby leading them to reconsider the Western type of modernisation. American stories were continuously reproduced through general-interest family magazines or female magazines (for such a semiotic advertisement for the American life, see Hŏ ŭn 2014, 301-6). In brief, the US micro-semiotic practices entirely occupied the field of an “idle talk”, related to everydayness.

Picture 7 including two satirical cartoons shows how much influential US’s semiotic practices regarding the American style of life was in South Korea in the 1950s. In the first cartoon, a poor housewife is mending a blanket. As seen in the cartoon, the pattern of the blanket is the flat of the United States. In the second cartoon, a housewife is making a curtsey

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49 The same magazines were diffused in Germany and Japan after the Second World War ended.
to her husband. In the cartoon, she is saying, ‘Honey, happy new year, and please buy me an electronic washer’, thereby surprising her husband (Hŏ Ŭn 2014, 301-6). Not only did young housewives yearn for the American style of life. One of the most prominent literary scholars in South Korea, Yang Judong (1959, 10) lamented in the late 1950s. American culture ‘is extravagantly and elaborately intruding into our everyday lives, irrespective of whether this concerns men or women, youths or olds, and urban or rural areas’. According to him, the American culture was ‘shaking both the material and spiritual sides of South Korean culture’ (ibid). This trend continued in the 1960s. For instance, in the early 1960s, an American style of house drawings were introduced through female magazines and, thereby such a life style started being more concretely imagined. In the mid-1960s, behaviour patterns to become modern and middle-class housewives were also specified. For instance, women’s magazines in the period argued that modernised housewives should have a wastepaper basket indoors and that they housewives should prepare coffee and cracker for guests (for more details on women’s magazines in the 1960s, see Hŏ Ŭn 2014).
7.4 Park Chung Hee’s Macro-Discourses

Based on earlier parts of this thesis, I now address Park Chung Hee’s macro-discourses. First, as one might surmise, because there were three phases in his period of rule, he did not offer a systemic overall discourse regarding the PCHM but changed it for each phase. In addition, as I shall note, sometimes, his discourses were mutually contradictory. Nevertheless, a few major features of his semiotic practices can be summarised as follows. First, whilst Lhee Syngman utilised discourses of anti-communism and civilisation, Park Chung Hee brought anti-communism and development to the fore. In a nutshell, therefore, the key theme in his macro-discourses was anti-communist modernisation or development. For this reason, his macro-discourses resonated with the US’s macro-discourses; yet, whilst the latter suggested liberalism as a method to achieve this objective, Park Chung Hee based his approach on fascist militarism. Yet, because he could not reveal that his strategies originated from Imperial Japan, he employed the discourses of democracy and nationalism. However, when he mentioned democracy, he used the term pejoratively to contrast a Western type of liberal-bourgeois democracy (Kim Ji hyong 2013, 174) with the Korean variant that he favoured. Thus Park employed qualified terms such as ‘administrative democracy’, ‘nationalistic democracy’ and ‘Korean-style democracy’.

Administrative democracy was used in the first phase of his era. He employed the term to refer to his military junta. Its meaning was that in the inside of the military junta, decision-makings were made democratically. Nationalistic democracy was proclaimed in the second phase of his era without further explanation. It was used in contrast with politicians in pursuit of liberal democracy. That is, identifying himself as a nationalistic democrat, Park Chung Hee criticised liberal democrats as sadaejuija (i.e., Korean people who act like servants of superpowers in an international hierarchy, or uncritically accept their institutions or
cultures). In Park Chung Hee’s terminology, Korean democracy referred to the Yushin regime (Kang Chŏngin 2011). For this reason, although he continuously argued for qualified democracies, his democracy was also continuously criticised by liberals.

On the other hand, Park used the term nationalism in a confusing way. In his first phase, he combined the discourse of nationalism with anti-communism and administrative democracy. That is, he was highly antagonistic towards North Korea and, in this regard, his discourse of nationalism resembled Lhee Syngman’s one-nationism. In this second phase, as noted, he used the discourse of nationalistic democracy. In doing so, he criticised liberal democrats as sadaejuŭija and thereby tried to gain political support from South Korean ethnocentric nationalists. Yet, in this phase, Park Chung Hee was re-articulating the South Korean economy with the Japanese economy and also managed to obtain compensation for Japan’s colonial rule as well as other aid, grants and loans. In return, he accepted many terms and conditions that were obviously beneficial to Japan. This led to national resistance to the resumption of a diplomatic relation with Japan. For this reason, although Park Chung Hee trend to use the discourse of nationalism as a dominant ideology in opposition to the American style of development, it was also, paradoxically, used as a dissenting ideology in opposition to his pro-Japanese disposition (Chŏn Jaeho 2000).

Park Chung Hee continued to employ the discourse of nationalism even in his third phase. In particular, he foregrounded the national interest. Yet, when using the term ‘nation’, he included North as well as South Koreans. He promised to re-unite South Korea with North Korea. To do so, he argued, South Korea should launch not a Western style of, and liberal, democracy, but ‘efficient’ and ‘productive’ democracy. It was Korean-style democracy (Kim Jihyŏng 2013, 178-84). In brief, Park Chung Hee’s nationalism in his first phase was anti-communistic and was targeted only at South Koreans. The nationalism in his second phase was anti-American. Yet it was resisted by anti-Japanese nationalists. In his third phase,
nationalism acquired an ethnic grounding. Yet, based on the ethnic or ethnocentric nationalism, he tried to complete the building of a totalitarian political regime.

### 7.5 Park Chung Hee’s Micro-Discourses

These covered many issues such as happiness, labour, livelihood, savings, consumption and the like. First, from the early 1960s, a new definition of happiness was diffused by South Korea’s Government. In the 1950s, South Korea’s Government preached the value of a mental happiness through radio programmes. Yet, from the early 1960s, happiness started being linked to material abundance (Kim Yerim 2007, 353-6). In other words, it implied that to be happy, South Korea had to develop, and this resonated with US’s micro-discourses.

Second, Park Chung Hee’s Administration created its own narrative of young women from the 1960s. This seems because the export-oriented industrialisation, centred on light industries, needed to employ young female workers. Let me recall that Park Chung Hee tried to launch heavy-chemical industrialisation from the early 1960s. In this context, the Park Administration produced thousands of cars on a pilot basis. The cars were called “new country”. On this basis, a young female and imaginary character was created by KBS (South Korean public service broadcaster). Her name was Tosun. Born in a rural area, young Tosun came to a city on her own. She worked diligently and lived frugally in the city, thereby purchasing the “new country” car. The story ends with her visit to her parents in her birthplace with the car. This narrative was, at first, diffused by a rapid drama and, then, reproduced as a movie. It had many significant meanings. For instance, in South Korea’s traditional society, women lived in an extended family. Yet the narrative suggested women’s independent life in a city. Also, it promised that diligent work and frugal life would lead to happiness. The happiness was specifically expressed as a car. Lives in a city was expressed as fatiguing; yet it was also described as sufficiently rewarding.
This shows that South Korea’s micro-discourses in the Park Chung Hee era differed from those promulgated in the USA. For example, Park Chung Hee faced many difficulties with obtaining money-capital in his state-led industrialisation. Accordingly, savings were one of the key factors for operating the PCHM. Abundant private consumption was thus suggested as accomplishable happiness in the future. Indeed, Park Chung Hee linked to the consumption and, further, the American mass culture in the 1960-70s to images of extravagance, self-indulgence and immorality. For this reason, the Park Administration also diffused different discourses about housewives. That is, whilst South Korea’s women’s magazines boosted South Korean women’s American dream as one for their country, the Park Administration continued to diffuse women’s “rational” economic lives, “unpretentious” consumption and fondness for home products. It also created many government-led NGOs to diffuse his discourses. Furthermore, from the late 1960s, every kind of militaristic term started being used in ways that the fascist apparatuses of Imperial Japan and Manchukuo had utilised since the 1930s. Picture 7.2 illustrated an aspect of such a society. Even adult civilians were regulated by police on the streets on the pretext of having long hair—if it was judged as too long, police could cut it shorter.
7.6. Concluding Remarks

Based on previous work, we draw a few provisional conclusions. First, the semiotic practice is needed to stabilise and normalise a politico-economic model. Reversely, a politico-economic success legitimates a specific semiotic formation. Second, as noted in Chapter 4, imperialist practices involve not only geo-political and geo-economic, but also semiotic, practices. Third, any specific semiotic formations can be considered in terms of macro- and micro-discourses. To borrow Heidegger’s terminology, they may be categorised as “discourses” (Rede) and everydayness-related “idle talk” (Gerede) (see Escudero 2013). In this context, the US diffused different practices in both fields. In official discourse, it highlighted development in civilisation. Specifically, it suggested political and economic liberalism as the right method to achieve it. In the field of “idle talk”, the US promoted a standard life style of a middle-class home in American Fordism. In line with the hegemonic discourses, Park Chung Hee, too, sought anti-communist modernisation or development. Yet, he declined to accept liberal democracy and economy. For this reason, he championed qualified democracies, such as administrative, nationalistic and Korean-style democracies, as well as autarkic economy. The three democracies were respectively with different senses of nationalism as well. On the other hand, the gossips and rumours that the US produced and diffused regained the American style of life could not resonate with the PCHM. For the model should be based on savings. For this reason, Park suppressed the diffusion of American culture. In this way, the semiotic practices of the US and Park Chung Hee only partly resonated with each other. On the one hand, taken together, they contributed to the operation of the PCHM; on the other, the semiotic practices contributed to the destabilisation of the PCHM.
8. Conclusion: Putting the PCHM Again in Its Place in a Cultural Political Economy of Variegated Capitalism

Originally, this thesis began as an attempt to understand South Korean or, more broadly, East Asian capitalism comprehensively. It required an inclusive analysis of its emergence, development, crisis, transformation and current status. Yet, it is impossible for any single thesis to address all these topics. For this reason, I chose to focused only on the development of South Korean capitalism. But it was also my ambition, in this context, that the theoretical paradigm that informed my investigation into South Korea’s economic development should have the potential to be applied to further inquiries too. This was (and is) related to my discontent with the various theories on which the extant literature on the Asian miracle depends. For, generally speaking, they were devised to give a monocular focus to an aspect of the economic growth. Most of them were already ready to extol the growth phenomenon and its emergence in East Asian capitalism. Of course, each of the theories has its own rational kernel. Yet, simultaneously, they paid too much attention to one or another facet of East Asian capitalism and, in this context, in some cases, even distorted historical facts to fit their respective theories. Furthermore, their biased monocular focus rendered them incapable of explaining the crises and resultant transformation of East Asian capitalism. Let me give a few examples. First, market-friendly scholars have for long argued that the South Korean economy rapidly grew because of its market-friendly policies. Yet, when the economy fell into a crisis in the late 1990s, they claimed that it was, indeed, state-friendly. Second, the opposite case holds for statists. Third, cultural analyses of the miracle claimed that Asian values contributed to the East Asian miracle. However, when the economic crisis erupted, they remained silent about it. In addition, all three theoretical approaches are rather dissociated from (neo-)institutional literature on capitalist variety, diversity and variegation. Overall, then, my investigation into South Korea’s development should be substantively inclusive and
theoretically coherent paradigm. This paradigm should also have the potential for further research on other issues regarding the South Korean economy as well as on other variants of East Asian capitalism.

In my view, a VarCap-CPE is the only theoretical paradigm suitable for such a purpose. In this context, I regarded South Korea’s model of development as a variant of East Asian exportism. Specifically, I named it as the PCHM. Yet, to apply the VarCap-CPE in my historical investigation into the PCHM, at least, three prior and continuing theoretical tasks were required. First, I needed to clarify Marx’s method and meta-theories on which the VarCap-CPE method depends. The latter is self-avowedly based on critical realism in general but its ‘critical realism in particular’ is anchored in Marx’s method. Yet, in the VarCap-CPE literature to date, discussion of Marx’s method has been confined to the method of presentation (Darstellungsweise) of particular historical cases, notably the critique of the capitalist mode of production. For this reason, I tried to elucidate his method of investigation (Forschungsweise). In my view, this is based on what I have termed differential-and-integral thinking. Furthermore, the integral synthesis requires the derivation of relatively concrete-complex concepts, through dialectical consideration rather than a linear logical unfolding of concepts, from relatively abstract-simple concepts. This the method of inquiry seems to resonate with critical realism.

It is on this basis that I introduced the VarCap-CPE. Yet, the VarCap-CPE is not so easy to grasp precisely because of its complexity and concreteness. In writing this thesis, indeed, I have been quite frequently asked about it what is at stake in this approach and have also made several attempts to introduce it even to people who do not read political economy. The most effective answer that I was able to provide was that it involves decomposing and, then, recomposing the integral paradigm, because the VarCap-CPE itself can be differentially analysed in terms of the philosophy of social science, social theory, value theory, capital
theory, institutional theory, state theory, cultural theory, spatial theory, the theory of history and even historiography, and then integrally synthesised again into its original formation. In this thesis, therefore, I attempted to introduce it, albeit insufficiently, as a (a) critical-realist and (b) strategic-relational articulation of: (c) Marx’s critique of political economy; (d) Marx-inspired evolutionary institutionalism (i.e., the RA); (e) (post-)Marxist state theory; (f) critical semiotic analysis, and; (g) the variegated-capitalism approach. On top of that, I also tried to insert (post-)colonialism, imperialism and international hegemony into the VarCap-CPE. To do so, I return to Marx and, particularly, analysed his geographically sensitive insights into historical hegemonies on historical world markets. This required me to propose a periodisation of an imperialist order within variegated capitalism in a world market.

Based on these theoretical considerations, I investigated the PCHM historically, highlighting three key points. First, an inquiry into East Asian capitalism should consider not only Western imperialist forces but also Imperial Japan. In this context, I regarded the PCHM as inscribed within the post-colonialist legacy of Imperial Japan. Second, East Asian capitalism during the Cold War era also be viewed in terms of the American hegemony. Combining these perspectives led me to analyse how the PCHM evolved into a chimerical model, i.e., one containing the DNA of different species just as the chimera in Greek and Etruscan mythology had a goat’s body, a lion’s head, and a snake for a tail. Third, the discourses and semiotic practices of both the US hegemon and Park Chung Hee’s government (notably Park himself) contributed to the stabilisation and normalisation of the PCHM. This was not without conflicting discursive goals and imaginaries, however; and this was one contributory factor to the model’s destabilisation.

My analysis helps us better comprehend the PCHM than before. Indeed, based on my investigation, I can specify its institutional features systemically. First, let me point out that
Figure 8.1 The Integration of the PCHM into International Circuits

Source: My own elaboration

Intriguingly, South Korea never enjoyed any surplus in the balance of trade during the Park Chung Hee era, i.e., the PCHM was based on chronic trade deficits. Nevertheless, the South Korean economy experienced rapid and sustained growth. This was because international trade expanded the size of the economy, making deficits more manageable, especially as South Korea had US backing in the Cold War. Second, the PCHM dualised the South Korean economy. On the one hand, Park Chung Hee allowed nearly free importation of raw materials and capital goods that were needed for producing export goods. On the other, he strictly controlled the importation of durable consumer goods in order to protect domestic production in line with an import-substitution strategy. For this reason, the economic border of South Korea, too, was dualised. More details on its institutional features can be summarised as Table 8.1 on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 8.1 The Institutional Features of the PCHM (below)</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industrial paradigm</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Taylorist process (relatively unskilled female labour in light industries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fordist process (more skilled male labour in heavy-chemical industries)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Militaristic organisation of production sites</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regime of accumulation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Complex multiscalar articulation of the circuits of capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Basically extraverted</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Government-driven mass production at home, targeted at mass consumption abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Protected small batch production and private consumption at home</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Interlinking of the two circuits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dualisation of the economic border (free import and controlled import)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode of regulation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wage</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Relative low wages considered as production costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relatively high disposable income as source of savings and reinvestment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Tax and financial policies supporting the wage relation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Competition</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monopoly capitals nurtured at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supportive of the monopoly capital for international competition in foreign markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relative underdevelopment of small businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Money &amp; Finance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Central role of nationalised (state-owned) banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (Re-)investment based on foreign loans and national savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chimerical warfare pre-national state (CWPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International relation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The “cormorant” economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cliental relation to the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode of societalisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Based on imaginary of a developed-developing-underdeveloped world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Self-description as an underdeveloped country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Development-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aspiration for catch-up (to Japan and the West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Militaristically disciplined (school, the Army, the Vietnam War, Reserve Forces); militaristic culture penetrates into nearly all organisations and communities – hence a warfare society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: My own
The PCHM as a model of development can be regarded as the emerging complex that results from the differential articulation of the industrial paradigm, the regime of accumulation, the mode of regulation, and the mode of societalisation. Yet, although the South Korean economy grew rapidly based on its chimerical model, it was also highly unstable. This was partly because Park Chung Hee himself could not coordinate his relations to ethnocentric, anti-Japanese, reunification-aspired and nationalistic South Koreans, to Japanese politicians, to the US Administrations, and to North Korea. For instance, the operation of the PCHM required the subordination of the South Korean economy to the Japanese economy. Also, the PCHM needed the support of the South Koreans people. Yet the two factors mutually conflicted. His relation to Japan promoted South Koreans’ anti-Japanese sentiment, and this undermined Park Chung Hee’s political legitimacy in his second phase. Likewise, the PCHM depended on US aid in return for which Park was expected to comply with the demands and interests of US Administrations. Yet, if Park Chung Hee had obeyed US Administrations, South Korea’s heavy-chemical industrialisation, that is, the evolution of the PCHM, would have been impossible. For this reason, Park Chung Hee continuously conflicted with the American state, except during the Johnson Administration. Likewise, US Administrations sought to transform the PCHM, even after Park was assassinated. Needless to say, this was related to the neoliberalisation of the South Korean economy, although this set of issues goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. Park’s relation to North Korea also involved dilemmas. The PCHM was based on the anti-communist alliance in East Asia. On this basis, it was articulated to Japan, the US and even the Vietnam War. However, as the model entered its mature phase, it came to depend on ethnocentric (ultra-)nationalism. In short, the coordination of these contrasting sets of relations was impossible. For this reason, Park Chung Hee’s discourses were even self-contradictory and
the PCHM also had to change as different aspects of this contradictory model became dominant.

The PCHM had a macroeconomic dilemma as well. Park Chung Hee sought to maintain massive investment, which led to chronic inflation when the industrialization drive began. Conversely, the PCHM was based on the relatively low price of export goods, which required efforts to keep wages low considered as a cost of (international) production. To deal with this, Park should have suppressed inflation but this would in turn require steps to stabilise the economy rather than maintain its destabilizing mode of growth. Park Chung Hee could not solve this macroeconomic dilemma. Eventually, it exploded into a crisis, when the second oil shocks occurred in the late 1970s. Particularly in 1979, nearly all economic advisers in the Bank of Korea, the Government and the Government-run research institution began to argue for macroeconomic stabilisation and even the marketisation of the economy. Park Chung Hee had no choice but to accept their suggestions. By doing so, a comprehensive package of policies for marketising the South Korean economy was announced in April 1979. In other words, the first attempt to neoliberalise the South Koran economy occurred in the late 1970s. Yet, in its mature phase, the PCHM rested on a combination of a suppressive political regime and rapid economic growth that denied the rewards of growth to the Korean population. This led to a wide range of political resistance in industrial cities that were located in the southeast of South Korea. Park Chung Hee wanted to quell it militaristically, and during these efforts, he was assassinated in October 1979 by the Chief of South Korea’s CIA. In brief, as the PCHM entered its mature phase in the 1970s, South Korea succeeded in the heavy-chemical industrialisation project—yet even at this moment, it could not be sustained.

For this reason, an inquiry into the neoliberalisation of the South Korean economy should begin from the dilemmas and contradictions that were implicit in the PCHM. Such an inquiry should also be linked to the economic crisis in the late 1990s. The neoliberalisation
of the South Korean economy was not, of course, a linear process – especially because it involved a shifting balance of forces in the struggles between capital and labour as organised social forces. Let me recall here that, during the Park Chung Hee era, both classes were relatively underdeveloped as social forces. Thus, Park Chung Hee could be more autonomous vis-à-vis these and other social forces than is possible for political leaders in liberal-bourgeois democracies. Yet, South Korea in the 1980s had moved on from the Park era. Specifically, this decade came to witness resistance both from organised monopoly capitalist groups and the trade union movement and these and other emerging social forces in the economy and civil society have become highly influential in the dynamics of South Korean society. Such an inquiry should contribute to comparative or geographically sensitive literature on varieties of, or variegated, neoliberalisation (see, e.g., Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010; Harvey 2005; Macartney 2011; Olesen 2014; Purcell 2009). It should also contribute to extant literature on actually existing neoliberalism (see, e.g., Brenner and Theodore 2002). In addition, insofar as it addresses the supranational relations of social forces, it is likely to contribute to extant literature on (neo)Gramscian international political economy. The peculiarities of the variegated process of neoliberalisation (or process of variegated neoliberalisation) in the political economy of South Korea is hard to understand in terms of the extant theoretical and empirical literature on the Asian miracle for reasons explored above. Accordingly, this thesis will be followed by my future research into the neoliberalisation and neoliberal regime of the South Korean economy. It will be also be theoretically informed by a VarCap-CPE approach.

On the other hand, this thesis calls for further theoretical researches as well. Let me give just one example. My thesis offered an alternative analysis of the PCHM. Simultaneously, it gave an alternative interpretation on Marx. Although I did not develop my analysis of Marx sufficiently because my principal concern in this thesis is the PCHM, the resulting analysis
implicitly suggested a novel view not only of the origins of variegated capitalism but also of potential connections of Marx’s critique of political economy with the work of Fernand Braudel, Max Weber, and even later Marxists. First, Weber has long been regarded as a scholar who provided original insights into the role of religion in the emergence of modern-Occidental capitalism—a theme that some ill-informed commentators allege that Marx entirely ignored, just as some Weberian scholars have overlooked the extent to which Weber’s work integrated key Marxian insights in his broader analysis of capitalism and its development. Second, Braudel has been viewed as an intriguing historian who exclusively highlighted both a regular change in the core sites of commercial activities, that is, a hegemonic transition, and the recurrence of the financial accumulation followed by a hegemonic decline (see also the work of Giovani Arrighi). In this context, Braudel also argued that capitalism should be viewed in terms of the rise and fall of commercial monopolies—a topic that Braudelians have argued was also completely neglected by Marx. Objecting to Weberians’ idealist approach to capitalism, orthodox Marxists have continued to champion a materialist view of history. Likewise, dismissing Braudelians’ neo-Smithian approach to capitalism, Marxists have emphasized the importance of the labour process, production, and class struggle in explaining capitalist dynamics in Western Europe. In this way, Braudelians have implicitly adopted methodological regionalist, if not nationalist, approach—reflecting Braudel’s original concern with the Mediterranean economy. In contrast, my analysis of Marx suggests that his approach cannot be compared with the Weberian or Braudelian paradigms. Let me reassert that Marx’s inquiry into the CMP was both differential and integral. Marx dealt, albeit partly or even rudimentarily, with all the topics that Weber and Braudel studied without neglecting his primary interest in the capital relation. Therefore, regardless of a specific investigation into the PCHM, further elaboration of the general point is required.
Furthermore, the research is expected to develop into theoretically and methodologically new insights into variegated imperialism and geo-historiography.
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