Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection

Tabakis, Chrysostomos and Zanardi, Maurizio (2019) Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection. Journal of International Economics, 121: 103246. ISSN 0022-1996

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Abstract

Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) stumbling blocks or building blocks towards multilateral trade liberalization? We address this question by investigating the effects\ of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on the use of antidumping (AD) (i.e., the most common form of contingent trade protection) by member countries against non-members as there has been a concurrent surge in regionalism and AD\ activity since the 1990s. Theoretically-derived empirical predictions are supported by the empirical analysis based on the 15 most intense users of AD. The results demonstrate that both the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs lead to fewer AD measures against non-member countries, except for members of customs-union agreements in force facing large import surges from non-members. Thus, our results highlight a building-block effect of PTAs on multilateral trade cooperation when it comes to AD protection.

Item Type:

Journal Article

Journal or Publication Title:

Journal of International Economics

Additional Information:

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of International Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of International Economics, 121, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.07.001

Uncontrolled Keywords:

/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2003

Subjects:

?? preferential trade agreementsantidumpingmultilateral cooperationfinanceeconomics and econometricsf13f14f15 ??

Departments:

Lancaster University Management School > Economics

ID Code:

135536

Deposited By:

ep_importer_pure

Deposited On:

19 Jul 2019 09:05

Refereed?:

Yes

Published?:

Published

Last Modified:

21 Sep 2024 00:58

URI:

https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/135536