Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue:Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

Barbosa, Klenio and De Silva, Dakshina and Yang, Liyu and Yoshimoto, Hisayuki (2019) Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue:Evidence from the Chinese Experiment. Working Paper. Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

[img]
Text (LancasterWP2019_012)
LancasterWP2019_012.pdf

Download (521kB)

Abstract

This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior.

Item Type:
Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects:
ID Code:
134420
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
22 Jun 2019 01:24
Refereed?:
No
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
09 Aug 2020 00:00