LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT TO INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of Lancaster University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, June 2005

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Abstract

Lack of commitment on the part of local leaders to peace processes has been seen as one reason for the failure of such processes. However, there is a paucity of research into the development and sustainability of leaders’ commitment to dialogue. These issues are explored in this thesis.

Drawing upon theories and empirical findings on commitment from various fields of study, a framework is developed to analyse how previously confrontational leaders may become committed to dialogue as a means of resolving conflicts. This framework also provides for the analysis of the dimensions of commitment to dialogue.

Applying this framework to case-studies highlights the salience of the interplay between variables, in committing leaders to dialogue. The importance of preserving the volition of leaders for their actions during a peace process also emerges
as crucial in the development of their commitment to the process. This finding adds weight to the conflict resolution theory which argues against excessive use of pressure on local leaders during a peace process. The case-studies also reveal conditions that influence the deepening of leaders’ commitment to dialogue. Evidence is presented, indicating that leaders are more likely to develop deeper commitment to dialogue when they are not dogmatic about the means of resolving conflicts, as might be expected. Interestingly, it is found that leaders can develop deeper commitment to dialogue even when highest in their hierarchy of commitments is the welfare of their groups. This affirms the thinking in conflict resolution that dialogue is the most likely means to promote the longer-term welfare of groups in conflict. Finally, the thesis examines barriers to the development of leadership commitment to dialogue and causes of retreat from such commitment. It is envisaged that the framework developed in this thesis will be useful for predicting and helping to induce leaders’ commitment to dialogue.
Declaration

This thesis is my own work and has not been previously submitted for a degree in this or any other form.
Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Dr Hugh Miall for his kind support and advice throughout my Ph.D. research at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University.

Equally, I thank Ian Overton for reminding me to enjoy the process.

Thanks also to family and friends, including Carole Overton, Kaska Hempel, Dave Brugh, Michael Overton and Heather Overton for their encouragement and insightful comments on aspects of the thesis.

Last but not least, I am grateful for the financial support provided by Lancaster University, under its studentship award. Additional financial assistance was provided by the Department of Politics and International Relations (Lancaster University), Cartmel College (Lancaster University), The Sir Richard Stapley Trust and The Sidney Bailey Trust (Conflict Research Society). I thank them for the support.
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PART I

FOUNDATIONAL ASPECTS
Chapter 1

An introduction to leadership commitment and peace processes

Commitment of local leaders to peace processes is generally recognised as important for the sustainability of such processes (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2000, 7-8; Miall et al., 1999, 164). Despite this recognition, the field of conflict resolution lacks any systematic research into the nature and dynamics of leaders’ commitment at various stages of a peace process.

It is conceivable that some leaders, who had previously advocated and engaged in confrontational modes of conflict resolution, subsequently enter into a peace process with the intention of being committed to the path of dialogue. For various reasons, they come to reject violence and the ‘win-lose’ mentality underlying confrontational modes of resolving conflicts. One example is David Ervine, the leader of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) in Northern Ireland, who attributes his conversion from paramilitarism to democratic politics to self-analysis during the time he spent in prison. He says: “In all truths, you know, I have never experienced childbirth, for obvious reasons; but, my sense is that the next most painful thing must be self-analysis... We hated people we don’t know; something quite inhuman about hating people you don’t know. We did, because that was what we were taught since we were born, the way we were nurtured, and our Catholic neighbours were taught the same thing. So it is that—it is that knowledge that we can’t go on as we are. It’s a dawning. I can remember, it sounds silly at times – really silly – I can remember thinking I was taller and that my lungs were filled with more air when I made the break from being told what to do and thinking for myself. That was in jail, that was at Long Kesh”
(interview, 2002). Since his release, this leader of the loyalist community has been a firm advocate for political solutions to the conflict in Northern Ireland through dialogue.

This thesis, however, focuses on leaders who have no deliberate intention of committing themselves to a peace process, at its onset, and examines two questions: (I) how such leaders may become committed to dialogue as a means of resolving conflicts, and (II) what conditions deepen their commitment to dialogue.

Below, I examine the shift from confrontation to dialogue, on the assumption that the shift is due to situational exigencies. Then, I explore the concept of ‘leader’ and some of the issues that impinge upon the leader at the beginning of a peace process. This is followed by a consideration of leadership commitment to dialogue from a more global perspective, which provides a context within the wider field of conflict resolution. Finally, I present an outline of the thesis.

**From confrontation to inclusive dialogue**

When parties engaged in armed-conflict explore an alternative method to violence, it is often done while keeping the military option open. Such a posture is quite appreciable as the level of hostility is likely to be high and the trust low. In his key address at the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, Yasser Arafat said: "Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.” A similar stance is apparent in Danny Morrison’s speech, to republican members, as
Sinn Fein decided to enter electoral politics: "Who here really believes that we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?"

One reason for maintaining the military option is that it provides leverage during negotiation. There is, however, another reason why leaders may not intentionally embrace the path of peaceful dialogue, exclusive, at the initial stages of a peace process. The experiences of lives lost and the hardship of fighting (in harsh conditions), which result from the employment of violence, affect the motives in a conflict. The armed-strategy is no longer based on purely instrumental calculations of the costs and benefits of the use of violence but becomes enmeshed with emotive and normative justifications. Zartman observes the tendency of parties in internal armed-conflicts to develop a 'total and exclusive commitment' to armed-struggle (1995, 9). Therefore it is likely to be psychologically difficult for leaders who once advocated armed-confrontation to embrace the exclusive path of dialogue, even in situations where protracted military stalemate becomes a catalyst to precipitate this shift.

The term 'confrontational' clearly applies to leaders directly responsible for violence perpetrated by their followers. However, it can also describe less extreme leaders who are averse to physical violence, and yet whose approach to resolving conflicts is to alienate and deny the grievances of others. For a stable peace process, it is equally important that the openly violent leaders and the leaders that marginalize other groups become committed to a politically inclusive process of dialogue. For the latter this may entail engaging with those who have employed violence.
When a confrontational leader decides to engage in inclusive dialogue, it is assumed that this is due to a realisation that their previous strategy has failed to produce the desired results. In the context of military confrontation, Mitchell (1981) proposes that a decision to shift from confrontation into dialogue may arise from either when one party is winning or losing in the militarily confrontation. He argues that the leader of the winning party is motivated to terminate the use of force and negotiate, since he would be negotiating from a position of advantage (power), produced at the battlefield (Mitchell, 1981). Additionally, the leader may be concerned that the military situation will change against him, and thus prefers to negotiate sooner than later. In contrast, the leader of the losing party decides that it is time to cut losses and negotiate an agreement. As opposed to the previous scenario, here the leader perceives the military outcome to be unlikely to change before the exhaustion of his side’s resources. These views reflect an assumption that the shift from confrontation into dialogue is primarily due to situational considerations.

**Leaders: the ‘bearers of demand’**

Every group produces leaders to articulate, mobilise and steer the group towards achieving the goals of the group. Zartman describes leaders as the ‘bearers of demand’, the ‘spokesperson’ for the ‘demand-group’ (1980, 87; 1995, 18). However, as Edinger points out, social scientists have ‘found it difficult to agree on what leadership is and does’ when they probe beneath its manifest aspects (1967, 5). In his study of how rebel leaders build upon the commitment of followers to the leaders, Downton Jr. defines leadership broadly as the ‘coordinating structure of social systems’ (1973, 12). My particular focus is on the individual at the apex of the
organisational hierarchy of groups in conflict, organised either as political parties or more loosely as a movement. Unless otherwise stated, the term ‘leader’ is used in this thesis to refer to this topmost level of leadership.

From armed-struggle to negotiating a settlement, the ‘effective’ leader is capable of mobilising his followers in their directive actions. Effectiveness, therefore, denotes the ability of the leader to move the group in one direction rather than another (Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987, 9). The influence of the leader over his group makes the leader’s commitments an important consideration. Nonetheless, the direction of the influence is rarely one-way. The group is the leader’s power-base. The more democratic the group, the more accountable is the leader to his followers. If followers come to doubt the decisions of their leader, it will undermine his credibility, which in turn will affect the ability of the leader to mobilise followers in a particular direction. Losing credibility could produce more severe consequences for the leader, such as being voted out of power. In militaristic groups, the leader may even face a threat to his life.

Leaders are entrusted with the primary and constant responsibility for evaluating the progress of groups towards their group-goals. They are, therefore, in the foremost position to realise if a particular strategy is failing. Assuming that a leader realises that confrontation with other groups is not advancing his group towards its goals, how will the leader convey this information to the group? A change of strategy may be perceived as a sign of weakness, especially when the leader has espoused confrontational methods. As Sherif points out ‘in matters concerned with existence, self-identity, well-being, and safety, expectations for its leaders are more exacting
than for other lesser positions. He cannot afford to have an image of being "soft" in his dealings with the adversary" (1966, 16). From the leader’s perspective, a change in strategy may be purely tactical, but followers may not see it that way and react adversely. What can the leader say to assure his followers that their sacrifices have not been in vain? How will the leader convince his group that the decision to negotiate is not a sign of weakness in the leader’s commitment to the group-goals? How will the leader overcome factionalism in his organisation, to win the support of the secondary leadership and to rein in the more militaristically inclined members of the group? These are just some of the problems leaders face when they attempt to make the shift from confrontation to dialogue (Mitchell, 1981, chapter 8).

The possibility of being accused of incompetence, being deposed, and threat to his life, may cause the leader to continue with a failing strategy of confrontation. Sometimes a leadership change may be necessary for a deviation from confrontational actions. Nonetheless, whether it is the old or new leader who decides to initiate changes, the leader will usually employ a strategy of gradual transition, to avoid moving too far ahead of the group (as noted in the previous section). During such period, the leader requires support and inducement to build upon his commitment to the new strategy of dialogue. This highlights the potential for the ‘commitment-builder’ function, which could be performed by external and internal peacemakers throughout the different stages of conflict resolution, starting from the initial intervention. This function is an addition to the list of tasks and functions that interveners can undertake in a conflict, as identified by Mitchell (1993, 147).
Conflict resolution and leaders’ commitment to dialogue

Conflict resolution is defined as ‘a gradual process conducive to structural and attitude change, to reconciliation, to development of a new relationship mindful of interdependence’ (Kelman as quoted in Hauss, 2001, 41). One way of understanding conflict resolution is in terms of the nature of change envisaged. Watzlawick et al., in ‘Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution’ (1974), present two types of change: (I) first-order and (II) second-order. The distinction between the second-order and the first-order type of change is best illustrated by the experience of a nightmare. The individual can do many things in the dream – ‘run, hide, fight, scream, jump off a cliff etc. – but no change from any one of these behaviours to another would ever terminate the nightmare. The only way out of a dream involves a change from dreaming to waking. Waking, obviously, is no longer a part of the dream, but a change to an altogether different state’ (Watzlawick et al., 1974, 10). The changing actions within a dream illustrate first-order type of change. Conflict settlement approach seeks changes of the first-order type as it is primarily concerned with changes on a behavioural level, without affecting the underlying attitudes and system of relationships (Northrup, 1989, 77). On the other hand, conflict resolution is aimed at changes or transformations of the second-order type. For instance, the empowerment of the underdog is seen as necessary in asymmetric conflicts in order to create a more balanced relationship between the warring parties, which in turn creates the opportunity for addressing the conflict in a more creative manner (Miall et. al, 1999, 12; see also figure 1, below). The ‘Seville Statement on Violence’ (1986), produced by a group of eminent academics, reflects the importance of personal transformation in the resolution conflicts: ‘just as wars begin in the minds of men,
peace also begin in our minds.’ Miall et al. remark that for some conflict resolution theorists ‘personal and group transformation… is at the heart of change’ (1999, 157). The development of a commitment to dialogue, on the part of previously confrontational leaders, could be seen as transformation on the personal level.

There are only a few works on peace processes which note the need for commitment at the level of local leaders to such processes and which offer an indication of the prevailing assumptions. According to Darby and Mac Ginty, one of the essential features of a peace process is that ‘negotiators are committed to a sustained process’ (2000, 8). The authors argue that such commitment is dependent on the extent to which the negotiators (i.e. leaders) consider the peace process as a feasible road to resolving the conflict (2000, 8). This suggests that they assume that commitment is a deliberate decision based on instrumental calculation. Another group of academics propose that for a peace process ‘to go forward,’ among others, parties must ‘commit themselves politically to a process of peaceful settlement’ (Miall et. al., 1999, 164). Miall et al. propose that ‘one way of making the commitment is for leaders on both sides to lock their personal political fortunes so strongly to one option [i.e. to move together to a peaceful settlement] that they could not go down the other path [to renege from the process] without resigning’ (1999, 165-66). Again, the assumptions are that commitment is a discrete decision and that it is instrumental in nature.

If previously violent leaders, upon deliberation, decide to commit themselves in a highly irreversible manner to a peace process, the number of problems and challenges in resolving the conflict is significantly reduced. The situation is more
complex when leaders enter into a peace process without a deliberate commitment to remain in the process. What are the insider and outsider peacemakers to do in this case? Should they seek an explicit commitment? Given the psychological barriers and misperceptions that make it difficult for parties to even consider dialogue (Mitchell, 1981, 71-119), the requirement for local leaders to tie their political fortunes to the success of the peace process at its beginning is likely to be a non-starter issue. On the other hand, if we assume that it is possible for leaders to become committed to the peace process gradually, even without a discrete decision to commit themselves at its commencement, it is important to consider the ways to encourage the development of this commitment, including the nature of such commitment process and the intervention strategies. In the absence of research on commitment in the field of conflict resolution, it is informative to consider the wealth of material regarding commitment offered by the literature regarding interpersonal relationships. The research into the development of interpersonal commitment does indeed indicate that ‘a commitment may develop quite unconsciously’ (Leik et al., 1999, 243), but that at some point the individual becomes aware of his commitment to the relationship. In contrast to the view of commitment as a discrete decision, suggested in the conflict resolution literature, this later approach considers commitment as a subtle process of personal change. Also, if leadership commitment is to amount to personal transformation of a second-order type, this suggests the need for deeper motivations, beyond instrumental calculations. Thus, in this thesis, one of issues considered is the development of deeper (attitudinal) commitment to dialogue in the case of previously confrontational leaders.
Thesis outline

In the second chapter (in the first part of this thesis), I examine the different conceptualisations of 'commitment' and construct a general framework of a process by which leaders may become committed to inclusive dialogue. This framework is derived mainly from theories and empirical studies on interpersonal, organisational and personal commitment. Within the framework developed, I explore the relationship between the process of leaders becoming committed to dialogue and the formation of attitudinal bases underlying a commitment to dialogue. The thesis is then divided into three further parts. In Part II, I examine the process that commits a leader to dialogue, and in Part III, I focus on the dynamics of the leader's attitude towards dialogue and the determinants of the different motivational bases for the commitment to dialogue. In Part IV, I discuss potential barriers to leaders becoming committed to dialogue and causes for retreat from commitment. Finally, in Part V, I summarise the main findings in the study and highlight directions for future research.
An example of a situation that requires second order change thinking is the now familiar puzzle of ‘connecting nine dots as in the figure below by four straight lines without lifting the pen.’

Attempting to join the dots by lines originating from within the square formed by the dots will inevitably result in failure of solving the puzzle (from a first-order change perspective). The solution comes from a change in perspective (second-order type change), i.e. the presuppositions restricting the way the problem is ‘seen’ is altered.

The Solution:
Chapter 2

Leadership commitment to dialogue: a general conceptual framework

The intensification of commitment on the part of elite decision-makers has been researched primarily in the context of conflict escalation (Halberstam, 1972; Lauren, 1979, 192-193; Teger, 1980), while the analysis of commitment in the de-escalation of conflicts is lacking. In my opinion, the latter process requires a development of new commitment, directionally and qualitatively antipodal to the old one. In this Chapter, I construct a general framework conceptualising the development and sustainability of leadership commitment to a process of dialogue. This is based on the analysis of conceptualisations of commitment shaping research in other fields of study.

Conceptualisations of commitment

There appear to be two distinct approaches to conceptualising personal, interpersonal and organisational commitment. The first approach focuses on the attitudinal manifestation of commitment. Under this approach, the research interest is on the conditions that cause the individual to feel and think in a particular way about the object of commitment (Mowday and McDade, 1979). The second approach conceptualises commitment as 'the pledging or binding of the individual to behavioural acts' (Kiesler, 1971, 30). Under this strand of research, the interest is on factors that bind the individual to act consistently with what he had done before (Salancik, 1977a, 64; Cialdini, 1984, 67). These two approaches are considered in turn.
The attitudinal approach to commitment:

To be attitudinally committed, be it to a personal goal, task or relationship, has been conceptualised in three different ways. One, commitment as a conscious decision prior to action; two, commitment resulting from a realisation following action; and three, as a combination of the two, posits the individual as having a favourable initial attitude towards the object of commitment, which then deepens as further acts consistent with the initial attitude are performed.

A number of researchers conceptualise commitment as a conscious decision prior to action. In their study, ‘The Structure of Personal Commitments,’ Novacek and Lazarus define commitment as ‘goals for which people would indeed strive with high energy and persistence’ (1990, 695). In this context, commitment is a conscious attitude manifesting as decisions regarding selection and order of personal goals. The authors distinguish between goals and goals which are commitments: ‘goals imply energy and direction of action, [whereas] commitment connotes…the willingness to persevere and sacrifice to realize a goal and prevent its thwarting’ (1990, 695). Vaughan and Higgs, in their analysis of the tension between work and private life for medical doctors in the U.K., similarly describe commitment as a ‘conscious choice’ (1995, 1655). The authors argue that setting deliberate goal commitments may help to create healthy boundaries between doctors’ professional and personal lives. Another author, Farley, conceptualises commitment as a will-ingness to do something for or about the object of commitment (1986, 14). The foregoing conceptualisation of commitment as a conscious decision prior to action, however, is of little use in the analysis of leaders who enter a peace process without any obvious commitment to
remain within the process. A more suitable conceptualisation is provided by Kanter, in her study of commitment to utopian communities (1968).

Kanter considers that for a utopian community (as an organisation), the issues of recruitment and retention are distinct problems. She argues that ‘recruitment does not require commitment but may be accomplished in many other ways, with non-committed actors’ (1968, 500). Nevertheless, how the individual is recruited will have implications for the continuance of participation, i.e. retention. It is the retention that Kanter regards as a commitment problem: ‘once a person has performed any single act within a system, the problem arises of committing him to further and future participation’ (1968, 500). Kanter goes on to identify the mechanisms employed by utopian communities to commit the individual to the organisation.

Just as in the case of an individual joining a utopian group in Kanter’s analysis, the leader’s decision to become involved in a peace process does not have to be equated with a conscious commitment to remain in the process. At the same time, the possibility of the leader harbouring devious intentions, such as buying time to build up military operation, are excluded for the purpose of this study. As outlined in the first chapter, it is proposed that the initial decision to engage in dialogue is precipitated by the failure of previous confrontational methods.

While an initial deliberate decision to commit may not be required, Becker argues that ‘awareness’ is necessary before a commitment motivates and sustains an individual within a consistent line of action (1964, 281). In ‘Notes on the Concept of Commitment’ Becker gives examples of commitment situations, among which the
most often quoted is that of a buyer who wants to persuade a seller that he will not pay more that a certain price for a house. In fact, the example originates from Shelling (1969, 15). The buyer consciously commits himself to a particular position before engaging in the negotiation, which, as noted above, is a conceptualisation of attitudinal commitment of little relevance to this thesis. More pertinent here is another of Becker’s examples, less explored by academics.

He discusses schoolteachers in lower-class schools who had an opportunity to improve their situation in the short-term by moving to another, slightly better lower-class school. Instead of moving they ‘chose to remain in a lower-class school for a lengthy period necessary to reach the top of the list for a desirable middle-class school. When the opportunity to make a move came, they found that they no longer desired to move because they had so adjusted their style of teaching to the problems of dealing with lower-class children…’ (1964, 282). When the teachers initially choose to stay with a lower-class school, this is not based on any strong commitment to remain there. The awareness that they have become committed arises at a later point, when the status quo is challenged (when they are offered a transfer). Similarly, a leader involved in a peace process may only become aware that he has become committed to remaining in the process at its critical junctures, for example, when the survival of the process is at stake or the leader’s decision to remain within the process is challenged.

As an attitude, commitment is far from a one-dimensional construct (Adams and Jones, 1999, 10). Kanter, based on Parson and Shils (1962) and Kelman (1958), distinguishes the types and intensity of commitment according to the three axes of the individual’s personality system (1968). In other words, commitment as an attitude
motivates because it forms in conjunction with the three general functions of attitude (Sarnoff and Katz 1954, 117). Apart from the cognitive or ‘rational’ function, Sherif and Nebergall propose that ‘attitude-related judgement or perception [underlying decisions and actions] is inextricably an affective-motivational…affair’ (1965, 6). The third function of attitude is the normative or evaluative function, emerging as the individual’s personal value system. Based on the three functions of attitude (or axes of personality system), commitment theorists conceptualise three inter-relating dimensions of attitudinal commitment. The first is the instrumental dimension, the second being the affective dimension, and the third, the normative dimension (Kelman, 1958; Kanter, 1968; Buchanan, 1974; Rusbult, 1980; Meyer and Allen, 1990, 1991; Johnson 1999. These dimensions of commitment are explored in greater detail in Part III of the thesis).

Confusion and problems arise when attitudinal commitment is conceptualised as one-dimensional. For example, Farley appears to suggest that signing a contract, posting bail and exchanging wedding rings all constitute ‘tangible’ evidence of obligatory (i.e. normative) commitment (1986, 6-17). She states, that, commitment ‘entails a new relation in the present—a relation of binding and being-bound, giving and being claimed. But commitment points to the future. The whole reason for the present relation as “obligating” is to try to influence the future, to try to determine ourselves to do the actions we intend and promise’ (1986, 18). But, do her examples involve only one axis of motivation, to the exclusion of others? Let us consider the example of the exchange of wedding rings. Indisputably, some couples may indeed feel a sense of obligation on their wedding day. However, it can be argued that it is erroneous to infer such depth of motivation merely from the public ceremony itself.
Farley does not sufficiently justify conceptualising the marital ceremony solely as a manifestation of obligatory commitment. Exchanging wedding rings or uttering ‘till death do us part’ may not necessarily reflect a sense of obligation, since people do marry with lesser intentions.

It is notable that in the study of peace processes, the motivation of leaders to remain within the process has mainly been conceptualised in a one-dimensional manner, as being instrumentally motivated (Mac Ginty and Darby, 2002, 79; Cochrane, 2001; Pierre du Toit, 2001; Mitchell, 1981). Given that commitment is a multidimensional concept, such perspective may provide for an incomplete understanding of the leaders’ sustained involvement in and perseverance with a peace process. Thus, the need for developing a framework that enables the analysis of leadership commitment in all its possible attitudinal dimensions.

*The behavioural approach to commitment:*

Lay understanding of commitment may not necessary include the notion of behavioural commitment. Yet, social psychologists have conceptualised commitment in a behavioural manner (Mowday and McDade, 1979). A well-known social psychologist, Cialdini, sets the context and conceptualises behavioural commitment as follows: ‘once we realize that the power of consistency is formidable in directing human action, an important practical question immediately arises: How is that force engaged? What produces the click that activates the whirr of the powerful consistency tape? Social psychologists think they know the answer: commitment. If I can get you to make a commitment (that is, to take a stand, to go on record), I will have set the stage for your... consistency with that earlier commitment’ (1984, 75). Another
prominent experimental psychologist, Kiesler, gives this description of behavioural commitment: ‘behaviour, if explicit enough, freezes one, in Lewin’s terms. Explicit behaviour, like an irrevocable decision, provides the pillar around which the cognitive apparatus must be draped. Through behaviour, one is committed’ (1971, 17). In this research tradition, behavioural action is central to the concept of commitment. Commitment here signifies the individual becoming ‘bound’ to act in a manner consistent with what he has done before (Salancik, 1977a, 64; Cialdini, 1984, 67).

Nonetheless, not all forms of behavioural action are considered committing. Experimental studies have demonstrated that when a decision is made public, it is more committing than a private decision (Salancik, 1977a, 64). Behavioural commitment increases when a public action is also irreversible. Salancik illustrates this point with an example of the difference between one who announces his intention to keep the population growth rate down and another who actually sterilises himself (1977b, 4). These two factors, publicity and irreversibility, are identified as characteristics of behavioural actions that ‘make them binding and hence determine the extent of commitment’ (Salancik, 1977b, 4; see further discussion in chapter 3). Additionally, the extent of behavioural commitment is influenced by certain context variables, such as the presence of an audience valued by the actor (Morris and Steers, 1980).

In practical terms, under both, attitudinal and behavioural conceptualisations of commitment, the result is considered to be a consistent line of action. Nevertheless, the two concepts differ in terms of what motivates the consistency. As noted above, attitudinal commitment is motivating as a result of the activation of distinct axes of the
personality. Behavioural commitment, on the other hand, produces future consistency due to certain *social-psychological implications*, including internal and external forms of justification, norms of consistency and retrospective rationality (Staw, 1981). I consider these factors in detail in Part II.

Both concepts of commitment are implicitly included in some conflict analyses but they lack clarity. Shelling relies on commitment as a tactical measure to bolster one’s threat or promise (1966, 1969). On one level, for Schelling, commitment is a conscious decision with the purpose of influencing the enemy’s action (1969). While he proposes commitment as communication, the communication appears to be restricted to “I will execute the threat (or fulfil a promise) if you act (or refrain from acting) in a particular manner.” This communication, however, does not inform about the nature of the intention that forms the commitment to the threat or promise. Under the assumption that it is the intention underlying the commitment that influences the enemy, this intention must be clearly picked up by the other side before it could be said to have the desired effect. An enemy is likely to respond differently to a threat that appears to be instrumentally motivated compared to that which indicates a normative resolve. On another level however, Schelling employs commitment in a behavioural sense, as a public conduct, which is voluntary, costly and irretrievable (1969, 22). Here, the intention is irrelevant. What is more important is the strength of behavioural commitment evident in the conduct, which would communicate that the issuer of the threat is bound to act consistently with his previously committing action. Hence, it could be argued that Shelling gives behavioural commitment a central role in his deterrence theory. Nevertheless, he does not distinguish between the behavioural
and attitudinal conceptualisations of commitment, which are implicit in his argument, nor does he tell us how these conceptualisations relate to each other.

**The relation between attitudinal and behavioural commitment**

Empirical studies in the fields of organisational management and social-psychology have produced evidence of a linkage between the behavioural and attitudinal approaches to commitment. It has been found that in the longer-term behavioural commitment influences the formation of, or changes in, the underlying attitudes (Brehm and Cohen, 1962; Mowday and McDade, 1979; Salancik; 1977a). While the traditional view has been that attitude influences behaviour, it has been discovered that behaviour is not necessarily an indicator of attitude. Instead, behaviour can be influenced by situational factors (Fisbein, 1966; Raab and Lipset, 1970). Thus, according to Fisbein, when the individual is situationally influenced to behave in a manner discrepant with his existing belief or attitude, this gives rise to ‘a new set of relationships between the individual and the attitude object. This may then lead to …attitude change… however… the change in attitude may lag well behind the change in behaviour’ (1966, 210).

Behavioural commitment, therefore, could be seen as an *antecedent condition* in the development of certain axes of attitudinal commitment. As an illustration of the link between behavioural commitment and attitudinal commitment, let us take up the earlier example of a couple exchanging wedding rings, given by Farley. It is conceivable that the marriage could be one of convenience or based on attraction, without any sense of a normative obligation to remain in the union. If the marriage
were based on physical attraction, this reflects the *basal* commitment to the relationship, which could equally deepen or dissipate. On the other hand, from a behavioural perspective, the act of exchanging rings, especially in the presence of a valued audience, is considered to be a behaviourally committing gesture. If the marriage is also legally recognised, this increases the difficulty of leaving the relationship, since substantive grounds are required for annulment. The relative irreversibility of the action therefore contributes to binding the individuals to the relationship, at least in the short-term.

After the wedding, the couple are likely to invest effort and energy in the relationship. They are also likely to attend family and social events together as a couple. Again, effort, public acts and valued audiences are factors identified as increasing the individual’s behavioural commitment to a specific line of action (Kiesler, 1971; Mowday and McDade, 1979). In other words, the development of behavioural commitment results in consistency of action. Researchers on intimate relationship have found that behavioural consistency, in the longer-term, contributes to a *belief* about the importance of the relationship. The relationship becomes an important facet of the couple’s self-definition (Leik et al., 1999, 240; Lund, 1991, 220). Thus, in this example the escalation of behavioural commitment may lead to deeper motivation, from a superficial attraction to each other to the relationship becoming an aspect of the couple’s belief system.

The linkage between behavioural commitment and the formation of different motivational axes of attitudinal commitment is evident in Kanter’s study of utopian communities (1968). Kanter proposes that the instrumental axis of commitment is
formed by inducing new members to act in irreversible ways, for instance, by assigning their personal property to the community without keeping records of each individual’s contribution (1968, 506). Deeper commitment is also induced by requiring members to perform acts that are behaviourally committing. According to Kanter, the affective dimension of commitment is targeted by the act of giving up relationships outside the group (1968, 508). Kanter makes a direct connection between behavioural acts and the formation of the affective dimension of commitment. However, I would argue that it takes time for the affective dimension to concretise. Rather, it is the social-psychological implications of having acted in a behaviourally committing manner that may be the reason for the individual to remain within the organisation in the short-term. The individual rejects family and friends in order to join the ‘utopian’ group. From the behavioural perspective, this act of renunciation is effortful, which causes the individual to seek internal justification. It would be difficult for him to return to the outside world, as this would imply that he had been wrong in his judgement. His self-esteem is at stake. This psychological force creates a pressure for the individual to remain, which provides further opportunity for the organisation to build upon the individual’s commitment. Nevertheless, Kanter’s study is important as it indicates that behavioural commitment is a factor in the development of attitudinal commitment. Kanter also identifies other antecedent factors of attitudinal commitment, apart from behavioural commitment, such as gratification and the perceived lack of alternatives (1968). These are considered further in Part III.

Overall, the two conceptualisations of commitment provide a useful basis for us to proceed with developing a general framework for analysing the development and sustainability of leadership commitment to inclusive dialogue.
A conceptualisation of the development and sustainability of leadership commitment to inclusive dialogue

Figure 2, below, represents the proposed framework for the development and sustainability of leadership commitment to inclusive dialogue as means of resolving conflicts. A situational factor, such as a hurting stalemate, is proposed as the catalyst event, which causes the initial shift from confrontation into inclusive dialogue. The initial shift is considered, at most, as indicative of the waning of the commitment to confrontation. It is not assumed to reflect any underlying attitudinal commitment towards dialogue. Kanter’s study informs us that explicit commitment is not necessary at the point of entry into the peace process. To reiterate, commitment is a retention problem. The decline of the commitment to confrontation, however, can be seen as creating an opportunity for peacemakers to induce a new commitment to dialogue.

Since the shift from confrontation is assumed not to be based on an attitudinal commitment to peaceful and inclusive means of conflict resolution, then actions become necessary for such commitment to evolve. As discussed above, it is only actions with specific characteristics, influenced by specific context variables that result in such actions being committing on the individual. Thus, in Figure 2, the evolution of commitment to inclusive dialogue is conceptualised according to the behavioural approach to commitment.

The shift into dialogue is often preceded or accompanied by other de-escalatory gestures. It is proposed that the extent to which a de-escalatory gesture is behaviourally committing depends upon the presence of the conditions of behavioural
commitment (Fig. 2). Some of these conditions have been noted in the above sections. *Ceteris paribus*, behavioural commitment increases the likelihood of future consistency, namely, the continuation of the leader’s participation in the peace process. This proposition has wide support in research of Kiesler (1971), Cialdini (1984) and Salancik (1977). Also noted above, the tendency to act consistently is a result of social-psychological implications that follow from having acted in a behaviourally committing manner. Leaders may attempt to rationalise to themselves and others their continuing actions in line with their earlier decision. The underlying reasons, however, could be both to maintain internal self-esteem and to preserve external image as competent leaders (Ross and Staw, 1986).

It is assumed here that the effect of behavioural commitment is not diminished so long as the individual perceives the response to, or outcome of, his action, as not patently negative. However, arguably it would be difficult for a leader to act consistently if surrounding circumstances make it impossible for the leader to justify, internally and externally, remaining in the peace process. At such point, the leader is presumed to be in a difficult position; he knows that his credibility among his followers is likely to be affected if he retreats, but he also knows that he may not be able to continue to justify maintaining his line of action.

In my view, behavioural commitment is useful to retain leaders within a peace process in the short-term. In the longer-term, I propose and conceptualise sustainability as a function of the commitment to dialogue manifesting as an attitude (Fig. 2). More precisely, the long-term sustainability of a commitment to remain within a process of dialogue depends upon which of the three dimensions of
motivation are in operation. In addition to behavioural commitment, in Part III, I identify other antecedent conditions that could influence the formation of the different attitudinal axes of commitment on the part of leaders, in the context of peace processes. I propose that the development of leadership commitment to inclusive dialogue can be seen as a progression from behavioural commitment to attitudinal commitment (Fig. 3).

Since the aforementioned framework focuses on the development and sustainability of commitment, I have not included the possibility of decline of or retreat from commitment. Admittedly, commitment may decline, for example, when guarantors of a peace process leave prematurely, before leaders develop deeper (attitudinal) commitment to the peace process. Thus, a leader may continue to maintain participation, but his actions could reflect a diminution of behavioural commitment. He might reduce the amount of effort expended into the peace process and begin to introduce ambiguity into his words and actions. When his previous actions, associating him with the peace process, become a distant memory in his people’s minds, the leader is able to retreat from the peace process. Indeed, the issue of barriers to the development and sustainability of leadership commitment to dialogue is an important one. In practical terms, identifying the barriers to, and causes of retreat from, a commitment to remain in dialogue, allows peacemakers to take pre-empt measures. Although the issue of barriers and retreat from commitment is not included in the above framework, it is examined in the Part IV of this thesis.

From the perspective of conflict resolution, a peace process is complex and prolonged, with a multiplicity of interdependent factors contributing to its
sustainability. Acknowledging this, Mitchell argues that 'any systematic attempt, however preliminary, to understand any part of such complex process will be none the worse for starting modestly and concentrating upon basic issues before moving on to more complex problems' (2000, 58-59). It could be further argued that 'any part of such complex process' may itself be a complex process that can be investigated from various angles. Such is my view of the subject of leaders and their commitment to a process of dialogue. The issues explored herein are a fraction of many possible questions that may be asked on the subject, yet the exploration constitutes a beginning in an otherwise uncharted area of research in the field of conflict resolution.
Figure 2: Development and sustainability of leadership commitment to inclusive dialogue as means of resolving conflicts
Figure 3: *Progression of leadership commitment to inclusive dialogue*

**Note:** The arrow in the diagram indicates the direction of progression. Attitudinal commitment is presented at the core, for two reasons. Firstly, this is due to the assumption that when shifting from confrontation into dialogue, the leader does not make a conscious commitment to remain within dialogue as means of resolving the conflict. In the early stages of dialogue, the leader’s consistency of involvement is conceptualised as a function of his actions satisfying the conditions of behavioural commitment. Secondly, it emphasises that escalation of behavioural commitment has the tendency to develop into deeper motivational bases for the commitment to dialogue. This is considered important for the longer-term sustainability of the leader within the peace process.
PART II

BECOMING COMMITTED TO INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE
Chapter 3

When Actions Commit Leaders to Dialogue

In the last chapter, the behavioural commitment model was employed to conceptualise the process by which leaders may become committed to dialogue. To recapitulate, under this approach, commitment connotes the binding of the individual to a line of action. This happens when (a) certain characteristics are present in the nature of an action, and such action is performed in the presence of (b) certain contextual determinants. In this chapter, I develop this conceptual framework, focusing on the characteristics of an action which promote behavioural consistency. This is followed by the exploration of contextual determinants, in the next chapter.

As noted in the previous chapter, it is mainly in the fields of social-psychology and organisational management that the characteristics of an action that influence behavioural consistency have been researched and identified. Researchers in other areas of study have made use of this knowledge. For instance, Schelling refers to some of these characteristics in his discussion of commitment in the context of deterrence theory (1969). Additionally, Mitchell discusses these characteristics in the context of increasing the credibility of conciliatory gestures (2000, 146). It is thus likely that the presence of the characteristics of behavioural commitment in the actions of the leader who shifts from confrontation into dialogue may bind him to future consistency. Such actions could be performed either directly in engaging in dialogue or indirectly as confidence-building measures.

Since in the general conceptual framework outlined earlier, it is proposed that through his actions the leader becomes committed to the peace process, the first thing
to do is to examine the typical actions that mark the progression of peace processes and to consider whether they have the characteristics of behavioural commitment. Apart from this general analysis, it is also useful to identify actions that are more effective in producing behavioural commitment. This can be achieved by examining the types of actions undertaken in sustained peace processes and to investigate whether such actions are absent or avoided in collapsed peace processes. However, more than an action *per se*, it is the characteristics of the action which are considered to contribute to the committing effect of such action. Therefore, it is relevant to determine which characteristics (or combination thereof) appear more crucial in binding leaders to the peace process.

In considering these issues, first, I examine the characteristics that have been identified to bind the individual to his behavioural action. Second, I discuss the presence of these characteristics in actions considered typical in a peace process. Third, I bring in examples of actions taken in real-life peace processes to distinguish among the actions on the basis of how effective they are in committing leaders to behavioural consistency. Fourth, I identify the characteristics which are more significant in committing leaders to remain within a process of dialogue.

*The characteristics that commit the individual to his act*

When an action is *public, distinctive, free* and *relatively irrevocable* — such action is considered as behaviourally committing, and to that extent as influencing future consistency (Salancik, 1977b; Kiesler, S., 1978, 169; Kiesler, C., 1971, 33). Charles Kiesler also found the performance of an increasing *number of consonant acts* strengthens the behavioural commitment to the line of action (1971, 33). Other
characteristics that have been discovered to influence behavioural commitment are effort and responsibility (Aronson et al., 1994; Staw and Fox, 1977). Some of these characteristics are not absolute in nature, but rather are a matter of degree. For instance, one could invest much or little effort into a course of action and such action could be physically easily reversed or more difficult to undo. Each of these characteristics is examined in turn.

Publicity

In the field of social-psychology, publicity has long been established as a characteristic that commits the individual to his action (McGuire, 1969, 261; Cialdini, 1984, 82; Salancik, 1977a, 5). One of the earliest cited experiments on the effect of publicity was a study of group dynamics by Kurt Lewin (1964). In this experiment, some women were exposed to a lecture on the economic and health benefits of certain meats (e.g. beef heart and kidneys) which people are generally averse to eating or preparing for their family. Another group of women were involved in a group discussion on the same matter, and at the end of the session those willing to introduce these foods were asked to raise their hands. It was found that only 3% of those attending the lecture acted upon the information provided, whereas 32% of those involved in the group discussion did introduce at least one of the meats. Latter-day researchers regard Lewin’s experiment as indicative of the correlation between publicly identifying oneself with a position and subsequent behavioural consistency. This correlation has been tested, for instance by Pallak and Cummings (1976). In a field experiment, these researchers found that subjects who were informed that their names would be published in the local newspaper with the amount of energy consumed, used a significantly lower amount of natural gas compared to those who
privately agreed to reduce their consumption. In a less topical experiment, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) found that amongst the subjects asked to estimate the length of lines, those who had written down their decisions and openly identified themselves with their decisions were more resistant to changing their opinion when subsequently provided with additional information showing their original estimates to be wrong. These studies demonstrate the committing effect of publicity.

Researchers have argued that the committing effect of a public action is more significant in the case of an individual in a leadership role (Brockner et al., 1981). To illustrate this point, let us consider a case where a local newspaper publishes an article on the country's on-going war with another. Included are the views and photos of Mr Hardman, the local butcher and Mr Domino, the local M.P. The article sparks a debate in the community and following this, the M.P. is invited to many public occasions to speak on his position. A behavioural approach to commitment would predict the publicity surrounding the view of the M.P. to be more committing on the local leader compared to the publicity of the butcher's opinion. This difference can be explained by looking at the social context (Cialdini, 1994, 68). In the instance of the local butcher, the decision of customers to buy meat from him is unlikely to be significantly affected, whether he continues to sustain his publicised position or not. On the other hand, inconsistency on the part of the local M.P. creates the impression of irresoluteness, untrustworthiness or the inability to make accurate judgements, which is likely to undermine the credibility of the leader in the eyes of present and potential supporters. To avoid this, the leader would be more reluctant to change his public position (Cialdini, 1994, 68; Staw, 1981). Thus, it is the interplay between the public nature of an act and the social context which determine the extent to which the act is
committing on the individual. The influence of the social context is examined in the next chapter.

*Distinctiveness*

While a public act may induce behavioural commitment, when such act is also distinctive, this is considered to increase the degree of commitment. Brehm and Cohen submit that the committing effect of a distinctive gesture is associated with the ‘difficulty of changing whatever reality it represents’ (Brehm and Cohen, 1962, 65). Visibility and distinctiveness of an action means that the physical source is undeniable. According to Kiesler, this operates as an internal constraint, for it ‘solidifies’ the cognition relating to the behaviour (1971, 142). In my view, this ‘internal’ explanation for the committing effect of a distinctive action is unlikely to be a strong motivating factor especially in the case of political leaders. There is another and more important reason for the committing effect of distinctive actions taken by such leaders.

In his analysis of conflict de-escalation, Mitchell submits that a distinctive conciliatory gesture is more likely to result in the other side having ‘little choice but to pick up’ the signal (2000, 130). Equally, one’s own followers are also unlikely to fail to ‘pick up’ or to evaluate the action and its consequences. As Staw and Ross point out, summing-up the finding of other researchers: ‘when faced with external… evaluation, an individual may be motivated to prove to others (rather than, or in addition to, oneself) that he or she was not wrong in an earlier decision’ (1980, 250; Fox and Staw, 1979; Tedeschi et al., 1971). This, again, highlights that the extent to which a distinctive act commits the individual leader to future consistency is closely
relates to the social context in which the action is performed, such as the cues and attributions of his followers and external peacemakers.

**Irrevocability**

To give an everyday example illustrating irrevocability, imagine a commuter who is waiting for his bus to arrive. The bus journey would normally take ten minutes, whereas it would take half an hour on foot. The bus does not arrive on time and the commuter continues to wait. Brockner et al., propose that the commuter may begin ‘to feel increasingly compelled to justify continuing waiting on the basis of the time that has already been invested’ (1978). The prolonged wait is an irrevocable action with costs incurred in terms of time already spent waiting.

Whilst distinctiveness means that the individual cannot deny his act, according to Salancik, ‘irrevocability means the behaviour cannot be changed’ (1977a, 65).

Nevertheless, irrevocability is a matter of degree. For example, a marriage can be dissolved, albeit with more difficulty than returning a purchase later deemed to be unsuitable. One way that irrevocability can be engendered is through a legally binding contract. This happened in the case of Britain becoming locked into producing the Concorde with France. The agreement stipulated that the party to withdraw prematurely from the contract must bear the entire cost of the development of the project up to the point of withdrawal (Salancik, 1977a, 66). Some acts, like the example of waiting for the bus, cannot be undone physically. Another example, given by Mitchell, is President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem on November 19th 1977. As Mitchell says, ‘the Egyptian President could not deny that such a visit had occurred, nor could he undo the effects of having been seen to make the visit’ (my emphasis.}


2000, 155). The first part of the statement denotes that the gesture was distinctive, while the second part implies that the action was irrevocable.

Salancik proposes that the relative irreversibility or irrevocability of an action ‘is committing because in taking a step that cannot be retrieved one is left to accept the salient implications that support it’ (1977a, 66). The implications could be, as Gerard suggests, ‘that there are costs involved in reversing the decision’ (1968, 467).

In the case of the joint venture between France and Britain in producing the Concorde, withdrawal was associated with an economic loss. For leaders, the costs of retreat may include the loss of their leadership status.

Acting in a highly irrevocable manner results in behavioural consistency in the short-term and in the longer-term, it could lead to attitudinal changes. The latter effect was observed by Staw in a field study of cadets at a Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) during the Vietnam War (1974). Staw compared between cadets who had signed a two-year contract of training and those who had not, and the effect of subsequently finding out that their chances of being drafted was low. For those who had not signed a contract, the ROTC became less attractive. The cadets with a two-year contract, however, were in a situation of knowing that they were unlikely to see the battlefields, yet having to face up to the salience of their previous irrevocable act of having voluntarily signed up to the training programme. These cadets were found to enhance the value of the ROTC programme.
Effort

Social psychologists also propose that the amount of expended effort commits the individual to his action or decision (Brehm and Cohen, 1962; Cialdini, 1994; 1984). Cialdini provides as example the initiation rites to join college fraternities in the U.S. During those events individuals are often required to perform acts causing severe physical and psychological strain (Cialdini, 1984, 90-96). Researchers found that the effort expended in the course of performing such acts enhanced the value of the group for the individuals. More evidence for the effect of effort invested into a line of action comes from Yaryan and Festinger’s (1961) experimental study of two groups of individuals taking actions in preparation for a future event. The researchers discovered that individuals in a high effort condition, meaning those who had expended substantial effort into the preparatory actions became more convinced of the future event happening, compared to those in the low effort condition. In another study based on a covert observation of a doomsday cult, Festinger and colleagues discovered that when the prophesy of a great flood and the rescue of its faithful members by a flying saucer did not materialise on the predicted night, those members who had invested a substantial amount of effort preparing for their rescue began to speak and act in ways that boosted their effort, whereas others soon left the cult. A key leader of the cult described his effort as follows: “I've had to go a long way. I've given up just about everything. I've cut every tie. I've burned every bridge. I've turned my back on the world. I can't afford to doubt. I have to believe” (Festinger et al., 1956).
Volition

The extent an action is committing has been found to be strongly associated with the degree of volition or ‘freedom of action’ experienced by the actor in the choice and performance of the action (Brehm and Cohen, 1962, 201; Aronson et al., 1994, 88; Salancik, 1977b, 4). For Kiesler, this variable is at the ‘core of commitment’ (1971, 160). A notable difference between this characteristic and those considered above is that volition may not be directly observable. Instead, volition is inferred when the person chooses a given alternative, without the presence of any obvious pressure for making that particular choice. The presence of volition in an action, however, must not be mistaken for an explicit intention to commit oneself to a particular course of action. Recall Becker’s example of the schoolteachers, who chose to teach at a low ranking school instead of a transfer to a slightly better ranking school. As we saw, this action was not based on any sense of commitment to the school or students, but rather on a perception of improving their chances for a later shift to a higher-ranking school. The initial choice was made voluntarily even though there was no intentional commitment to the particular choice.

The effect of freely choosing to act in a particular manner, as Cialdini observes, is that ‘we accept inner responsibility’ for the act, and thus feel bound by it (1984, 97). The result is the same, even when the individual acts under an ‘illusion’ of freedom of action. Research shows that volition is affected by rewards and punishments. Psychologists, Aronson and Carlsmith are of the view that whether it is a father intervening between two fighting sons or an outsider between warring-parties, the more severe the threat, the more immediate the behavioural compliance. But in such situations, compliance lasts only for so long as the actor feels the effectiveness of
surveillance from the issuer of the threat (Aronson, 1966, 111). A large reward or punishment could be wholly sufficient to support the cognition that one has performed an action contrary to one’s personal attitude. The external justification frees the individual from personal responsibility. Even in our ordinary dealings, responsibility is attributed only when volition is present. For example, laws governing contractual relationship, be it a marriage or a sale of goods, stipulate duress and undue influence as sufficient reasons to avoid or annul the contractual obligations. But, when a threat is strong enough to induce compliance, yet not severe enough to become the operative justification, researchers have found that the compliant behaviour does result in behavioural commitment (Aronson, 1966). The volition attached to the performance of an action, importantly, has been shown to lead to the \textit{internalisation} of the action (Cialdini, 1984, 96; Aronson, 1966, 115-116). The individual comes to consider the behaviour to be actually what he had wanted to do in the first place, or that it was the most righteous course of action (thus attributing the quality to the Self) (Aronson, 1966, 112; Katzev and Wang, 1994; Cialdini, 1984, 96-100).

Contrary to the above line of research, incentive theory seems to have gathered evidence showing that higher incentives can precipitate greater attitude change. However, Aronson points out that high incentives may cause an individual to expend much effort on a task, and that it may be the amount of effort expended which actually causes the attitude change and not the reward \textit{per se}. He further notes that experiments on incentive theory have generally failed to isolate the effect of effort expended from the effect of rewards (1966, 127 and 131).
While it has been observed that volition links the actor to his actions by invoking responsibility for the action, Staw and Fox also found evidence of a positive correlation between a condition of high personal responsibility and behavioural commitment when volition is held constant (1977). In their experimental study, individuals who were assigned high responsibility as the original formulators of a course of action, continued to invest further resources, despite feedback of negative consequences from their previous decision. The academics observe that ‘it is tempting to draw analogies from the present line of research to cases of escalation in everyday life. For example, U.S. participation in the Indochina War followed a period of escalation, withdrawal, and attempt to re-escalate (blocked by Congress).’ While cautioning against neat parallels between experimental data and the real world, Staw and Fox proposed that experimental studies may capture some of the more important elements of commitment, and that ‘responsibility or original participation in the formulation of a course of action clearly seems to be an important variable’ (1977, 448). In a subsequent article, they suggest that ‘internal justification’ may explain the behavioural commitment of the participants in the above experiment (1979, 466). Internal justification arises from the individual becoming ego-involved, that is to say, when the individual identifies the Self with the action (Sherif and Nebergall, 1965, 64-66). In another set of experiments Fox and Staw (1979) found that while the condition of high responsibility did lead to persistence with a line of action, when additional factors such as resistance and criticism from others, and vulnerability of position were introduced, the degree of commitment increased (466). They propose ‘that both internal and external justification may influence commitment and their effects may be additive’ (466). They argue that when status is tied to performance, there is a tendency
to exhibit stronger behavioural commitment. From the individual's 'point of view, it is necessary to defend the usefulness of past projects so as to justify or demonstrate the rationality of previous allocation of resources', since failure would often mean a loss of power and position (1979, 465 and 467). This phenomenon known as 'retrospective rationality' means that the individual in the leadership position is 'interested in turning a situation around so as to recoup certain sunk costs or to redeem an earlier error' (1979, 467). Fox and Staw appear to believe that behavioural commitment is likely to be even more salient in the real world than in a laboratory simulation (469), because in the former case leaders are kept in power by followers based on the success or benefits attained for the group (see also, Downton, 1973).

**Consonant acts**

Sherif and Nebergall (1965) in their formulation of the theory of social judgement and attitude change propose two interesting concepts: 'latitude of acceptance' and 'latitude of rejection.' The latitude of acceptance denotes the range of tolerance towards a position or an incoming communication. The latitude of rejection is the range of objectionable positions (Sherif and Nebergall, 1965, 24 and 226). These concepts are pertinent when considering precedent-breaking gestures, which are more difficult to revoke and thus more likely to lead to stronger behavioural commitment. Sherif and Nebergall explain that the latitude of acceptance and latitude of rejection are closely linked to existing attitudes and beliefs (1965, 14-15), and thus precedent-breaking conciliatory gestures are more likely to be rejected particularly in the initial stages of a peace process since they are likely to run counter to core beliefs of leaders and groups that have been confrontational towards each other.
It is arguable that peacemakers may be more successful in inducing a series of conciliatory and de-escalatory gestures that singularly do not challenge the existing beliefs or attitudes of the leader or his group. Nevertheless, in the long run, the series of acts have a similar effect to a precedent-breaking action. When considered cumulatively, the magnitude of the series of actions becomes a decision influencer, a psychological turning point (Kiesler, 1971). Kiesler argues that the individual (the leader) must live with his past decisions and actions, and therefore the more times he performs consonant acts, the more difficult it becomes for the individual (the leader) to deny, reinterpret or distort his behavioural actions (1971). This is because ‘the increased number of times chosen implies greater responsibility for the behaviour, greater volition in accepting that strategy’ (Kiesler, 1971, 72). Besides the short-term effect of binding the individual to consistency, in ‘Perceiving the Causes of One’s Own Behaviour’ Nisbett and Valins (1971) point out that in the longer-term several consonant acts could lead to attitude change. They submit that the process involves the individual seeking validating information from various sources, including the previous occasions when the individual had acted in a similar way as well as the attributions made by others (Nisbett and Valins, 1971).

In summary, researchers have generally found that an individual behaves consistently with his past act, when the initial action is experimentally manipulated to include the characteristics of distinctiveness, irrevocability and others as discussed above (Cialdini, 1994; Salancik, 1977a; 1977b; Kiesler, 1971). Experimental studies, however, are conducted under limited conditions, where only one or more factors are manipulated while all others are held constant. Hence, in the open environment of peace processes, it should be considered that the presence of the above-considered
characteristics in the actions of leaders increases the likelihood of future behavioural consistency and not its absolute certainty. We have also seen that behavioural commitment can influence changes of belief and attitude (Brehm and Cohen, 1962; Cialdini; 1994; Katzev and Wang, 1994). However, I propose that in the case of a leader shifting from confrontation, any changes to his attitudes and beliefs resulting from having acted in a committing manner in the course of dialogue, is likely to be a gradual, longer-term process. Next, I consider the presence of these characteristics in actions that are considered typical in a peace process.

**Typical actions in a peace process and the presence of the characteristics of behavioural commitment**

Kriesberg observes that ‘if a conflict does end, the genesis is likely to be in the de-escalation process of the conflict’ (1999, 181). The initiation of de-escalatory actions by leaders of groups in conflict is a significant event. Properly nurtured, de-escalatory actions could evolve into a sustained peace process, creating space for the issues in the conflict to be addressed. It is well-known that the progression of a peace process is unlikely to be linear. Kriesberg observes that it is more likely to involve either small incremental steps forward or a wave-like progression (1999). A wave-like progression is characterised by some advancement in the de-escalation of a conflict followed by a few steps backwards (1999, 111). While each peace process is likely to have some idiosyncratic facets, academics propose that there are certain common features that mark the progression of peace processes.
In the conceptual framework presented in chapter 2, the decision to shift from confrontation into dialogue arises from an appraisal of a stalemate experienced as a result of the confrontational strategy. An initial question to consider is how committing is the shift itself, for the leader? What characteristics of behavioural commitment are present in this change of strategy? The decision to engage in dialogue would often require much effort, as the leader needs to build sufficient consensus within the group, especially in terms of support from the secondary leadership.

Through persuasive arguments, promises and threats, the leader has to convince those opposed to the change in strategy (Mitchell, 1981, chapter 8). The decision to engage in dialogue is also likely to be highly distinctive, since the same leader had previously advocated a confrontational strategy. Another important aspect of such decision is the responsibility it entails. Studies on attributional process suggest that as observers, individuals generally tend to causally attribute an event or an act to controllable (or stable) factors, such as the individual, rather than to inconstant factors (Hewstone, 1988). In the context of leaders, Pfeffer uses the theory of attribution to explain the tendency of followers to identify the individual leader as responsible for an act or decision, rather than to recognise that the decision or action could be ‘a function of a complex set of interactions among all group members’ (1977, 109). For the current purpose, it could be argued that followers are likely to hold the leader primarily responsible for directing the group’s strategic actions, even if the decision to shift into dialogue is a result of consultation with the secondary leadership. Furthermore, followers may not readily attribute the decision to shift into dialogue to the stalemate in the confrontational dimension, but rather they may lodge causality in one or a few individual leaders in the group (Pfeffer, 1977). Leaders are acutely aware of this responsibility usually resting on them. Additionally, the degree of behavioural
commitment is affected by the amount of volition present in the decision to shift into dialogue.

Once a party decides to shift into dialogue, it may publicly signal this willingness to the other side. It is also possible that a party may resort to privately communicating its position and ascertaining the opposing party’s willingness to engage in dialogue. Each side may set pre-conditions to formal negotiations, such as, to demand a cease-fire, the release of prisoners or to set up demilitarised zones. Again, the issue is how committing are these actions for the leaders of the respective groups? To discuss the committing nature of actions taken at this stage of the peace process, I will make use of the general categorisation of de-escalatory actions into symbolic gestures, concessions, tension-reducing initiatives (TRIs) and confidence-building measures (CBMs) (Mitchell, 2000, 96).

Mitchell points out that a symbolic gesture is important not so much because of the act itself, but rather because of the deeper meaning behind the action (2000, 98). Mitchell submits that for a symbolic gesture to be successful, that is, to become a signal picked-up correctly by the other side, it must be ‘unexpected, distinctive or innovative’ (2000, 99). Mitchell also proposes that the element of irreversibility must be inherent in the gesture in order to increase the credibility of the intention behind the gesture (2000, 161). The distinctiveness and irreversibility of an action, as discussed above, are characteristics that bind the actor to his action.

A concession, as defined by Mitchell, is ‘any retreat from previously clearly laid out bargaining position. This may involve dropping a demand or prior condition,
lessening the magnitude of some recompense demanded or decreasing some level of activity wanted from the adversary' (2000, 97). He submits that 'the larger and more obvious the retreat, the more likely the move is to be recognised and then responded to' (2000, 98). Elsewhere, Mitchell also states that a concession requires a 'major, rather than a minor policy revision and a qualitative rather than quantitative' alteration of behaviour (Mitchell, 1999, 44). Prior to and during negotiations it is also typical for leaders to undertake TRIs and CBMs. The aim of the former is to reduce the level of tension in the relationship, whereas the latter is intended to increase the confidence level in the relationship. Mitchell distinguishes CBMs from TRIs, by considering CBMs as strictly militarily oriented, and TRIs as relating to more general activities, for instance, exchange visits at the level of the civil society and sporting events (2000, 100). CBMs are either informational or constraining (Klepak, 1998, 51). Informational CBMs include such activities as publishing information on defence budgets, prior notification of military exercises and establishing hot lines. Constraining CBMs include cease-fires, arms reductions and restricting the deployment of forces to “sensitive” areas (Klepak, 1998, 51-52). In practice, TRIs and CBMs could be employed concurrently to de-escalate the conflict.

Concessions can be seen as more irrevocable and effortful than symbolic gestures, and the same could be said of CBMs when compared to TRIs. Beyond this general distinction, I would argue that regardless of whether an act is categorised as a symbolic gesture, concession, CBM or TRI, the likelihood of a follow-through depends on the number and strength of the characteristics of behavioural commitment present in the specific act.
Next, I consider how committing the gesture of being in negotiation can be on leaders. The length of time spent in dialogue is a factor likely to influence the level of behavioural commitment, for it further strengthens the public and distinctive association of the leader with the new strategy. Whilst negotiating with the enemy, the leader has to also maintain unity within his own group. This may entail fighting-off internal leadership challenges and convincing the group to support his decisions and actions. Overall, this amounts to a high degree of effort expended into the peace process, which should lead to behavioural consistency. On the other hand, the physical act of being in negotiations *per se* is not a difficult act to undo.

Negotiations may result in a peace agreement. To what extent is a peace agreement binding on leaders? It is generally known that a peace agreement does not necessarily signify any underlying intention on the part of the leaders to commit to what they agree on paper. But, from a behavioural perspective, what aspects could contribute to a peace agreement being committing on the leaders who consent to it? Cialdini analyses the case of U.S. prisoners of wars (POWs) during the Vietnam War as a real-life example of written statements having a binding effect on individuals. Many of the returning POWs believed that while Communism may not be suitable for America, that it was good for Asia. Some even praised Communist governance in China (Cialdini, 1984, 82). It was found that prisoners were induced to write pro-Communist essays, which were then publicised in the camps. Cialdini points out that these acts had a number of characteristics of behaviourally committing actions. Firstly, the written statements were produced for prizes, which were small but sufficient to generate the interest of the prisoners (1994, 66). This preserved at least an illusion of freedom of action. Secondly, the act was publicised (Cialdini, 1994, 65).
We can also add a third element, namely, distinctiveness, since to make pro-
Communist statements must have been highly contrary to the POWs’ previous
position as American soldiers fighting the spread of Communism. Cialdini submits
that the publicity, and we can include the aspect of distinctiveness, created a drive to
appear consistent, in the case of the POWs (1994, 65). Cialdini further argues, based
on Jones and Harris (1967), that generally people tend to perceive a written statement
to reflect the true sentiment of the writer, even when they have been informed that the
writer was instructed to make the statement (1994, 65). Moreover, experimental
studies show that the perception of others does influence people to ‘make their actions
consistent with that view’ (Cialdini, 1993, 66; Kraut, 1973). The phenomenon finds a
good illustration in the children’s story, ‘Little Lord Fauntleroy’ by Hodgson Burnett
(1885, 1974). In the story, a seven-year old boy’s view of his grandfather as a
charitable Earl appears to compel the otherwise violent and miserly old man to
perform acts of charity. A salient point in Burnett’s story is the fact that the Earl
feared that the grandson would dislike him, were the boy to discover the truth about
him. In short, the Earl acted in accordance with the child’s view of him only because
the boy was a valued ‘audience.’

The signing of, or consent to, a peace agreement is usually marked by a formal
ceremony to celebrate the success of reaching the agreement. Leaders are often
present at the ceremony in addition to others involved in the process, including
mediators, guarantors and international observers. Based on the above-mentioned
research, I preliminarily propose that the extent a peace agreement is committing on
the leaders is determined by the interplay of factors (characteristics and context
variables) as exemplified in the case of the POWs. Bennet’s story and, more
importantly, experimental studies highlight that audience influence on the individual will depend on how much the person values the opinion of his audience (Bateman, 1986). Thus, the amount of effort personally invested in getting to a peace agreement, the distinctive and public nature of the leader’s involvement in the peace process and the presence of important audiences, such as guarantors of the agreement, are factors that influence the extent to which the peace agreement is binding on the leader.

In the period immediately following a peace agreement, the focus often shifts to holding elections or developing power-sharing arrangements, as well as disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. Is the implementation of these actions behaviourally committing? If an election is held on a ‘winner-takes-all’ basis and the rebel leader-turned-politician loses, what is there to prevent him from rejecting the result of the election and reneging from the peace process? Because of such possibility, some academics suggest that the shadow of a severe threat of punishment from a powerful guarantor of the peace process is what is needed to prevent parties from reneging (Dixon, 1996; Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Carment and Rowlands, 1998). If external interveners make severe threats to local leaders to procure an agreement between them and then again for them to participate in elections or power-sharing arrangement, as observed previously, the excessive use of threats is likely to negate the local leaders’ volition for their compliance. Thus, the compliant actions (of participating in elections and in power-sharing government) are unlikely to internally bind the leaders to the peace process. These considerations become especially relevant in the light of the general lack of political will amongst the global military powers to engage in any prolonged peace enforcement effort (Lake and Rothchild, 1996).
In order to participate in elections, a rebel organisation must transform itself from an underground operation to an open political party. Provided that the shift into politics results in far-reaching changes to the organisational structure, the act becomes highly irreversible, in terms of the ability of the leader to retreat back to guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, if combatants are demobilised prior to elections and such action is effectively pursued, this increases the degree of irreversibility from the peace process. What if demobilisation was precipitated by a severe threat of punishment for non-compliance? In the previous paragraph, it was proposed that a lack of volition weakens the behavioural commitment to a line of action. However, effective demobilisation may produce a degree of irrevocability high enough to behaviourally commit the leader to the peace process, despite a lack of volition.

In sum, I propose preliminarily that volition is a necessary element in committing a leader to the post-settlement political structure, unless the leader is compelled to undertake actions that are highly irrevocable, which could bind the leader to future consistency in the peace process. Next, I consider the propositions and assumptions raised in this section, in the context of actual peace processes.

**The operation of behavioural commitment in peace processes**

Case studies indicate that prior to any public engagement in dialogue, parties do engage in private ascertainment of the other side’s response. Informal or secret contacts may take place over a long period of time, as it happened in South Africa between Mandela and the National Party (NP) government. Mandela, and then his party, the African National Congress (ANC) were involved in secret ‘talks about
talks’ with the government from 1986 until 1990 (Mandela, 1995). Mitchell notes a similar but shorter period of ‘behind the scenes’ contact in the case of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, prior to President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 (2000, 25-27). Such private and informal contact is not committing for parties since they can conveniently deny that it ever took place, or change its purpose (Mandela, 1995, 659). Nevertheless, the indirect contact can have important consequences. In the case of Sadat, indirect contact resulted in the leader becoming ‘reasonably sure of a positive response to any initiative he might care to undertake’ (Mitchell, 2000, 27). This private assessment led to the formal visit to Jerusalem, which, according to Mitchell’s analyses, was clearly a behaviourally committing gesture (2000, 154-157).

In the private talks in South Africa, the government insisted that ANC must renounce violence before negotiations, whereas ANC demanded that the government withdraw the ban on ANC and all other political organisations, lift the State of Emergency, release political prisoners and allow exiles to return (Mandela, 1995, 641, 665). On 2 February 1990, the President of South Africa F.W. de Klerk announced before the Parliament that “the time for negotiation has arrived”, and then proceeded to meet the pre-negotiation demands of ANC (Mandela, 1995, 666).

However, unilateral or bilateral acts of symbolic significance, concessions or TRIs/CBMs do not necessarily precede a direct and open dialogue. In the Angolan conflict, informal contacts in 1989 between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government led by dos Santos and the rebel group, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, resulted in the latter offering a cease-fire prior to direct dialogue. The cease-fire did not materialise. Instead, it appears that U.S. pressure on Savimbi and dos Santos’s desire for
international recognition brought the parties to the negotiation table in April 1990 (Rupesinghe, 1997). In another case, open contact between the Guatemalan government and rebel organisations, organised under the umbrella of ‘Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca’ (URNG), was initiated in February 1991 and continued for a couple of years without a de facto cessation of the armed struggle.

In order to assess the degree of behavioural commitment arising from the shift into dialogue, we need to consider the influence of any public action undertaken as a precursor to dialogue, be it in fulfilment of pre-conditions to negotiation, or as an unsolicited unilateral conciliatory action. While Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the Knesset was proposed as a successful conciliatory gesture, in that, of it being perceived accurately by the Israeli government, the initiative did not mature into a process of sustained negotiation. After several meetings, the bilateral process came to a halt and was replaced by formal U.S. mediation. But as mentioned above, Mitchell considers Sadat’s visit as a behaviourally committing gesture, mainly due to the irrevocable nature of the gesture. Mitchell submits, ‘Sadat could hardly go back to the position of not recognising the existence of Israel or the need to negotiate a settlement with Israeli leaders’ (2000, 156). He contrasts this with acts such as truces and ceasefires, which he argues to be less physically irrevocable as they could be ended with little difficulty (Mitchell, 2000, 156). However, the physical acts of the plane journey to Israel and making the speech in the Knesset could hardly be considered as highly effortful actions. Sadat’s speech itself was only ‘a little more than a restatement of the existing Arab conditions for negotiation’ (Mitchell, 2000, 292). Therefore, while the visit could not be undone in a physical sense, it was not very costly, as
would have been the case if Sadat had made concessions indicating a retreat from his bargaining position.

In my view, the public nature of and the concomitant social context for Sadat’s action may have been more important in binding the leader to his action. Again, as Mitchell’s study indicates, two extreme reactions were evoked when Sadat first made public his proposed visit and later, following the actual event. Sadat’s secondary leadership was opposed to the visit, as exemplified by the protest resignation of his foreign minister. Egypt’s allies and clients also denounced the initiative as a ‘set-back to Arab and Palestinian causes’ (Mitchell, 2000, i). On the other hand, there was encouragement from Western leaders. Mitchell also describes the visit as ‘wildly successful’ at the grassroots level, in both Egypt and Israel (2000, 29). Having raised both, hopes and outrages, a failure to fulfil the hopes and prove his critics wrong would have had serious consequences for Sadat’s leadership position. The high degree of personal responsibility and volition evident in the action may also have increased the degree of behavioural commitment of Sadat’s gesture. Mitchell observes that Sadat had ‘played a curious double game, even with his own advisers, right up to the last minute giving the impression that he was firmly committed to the Geneva process [a U.S. initiative to produce a general settlement for the Middle East] while privately planning his gesture’ and at the same time keeping the plan secret from the U.S. (2000, 28).

Although the bilateral dialogue between Egypt and Israel came to an end after several months, it could be argued that one reason why the process had been sustained for so long was that Sadat had acted in a committing manner and therefore had to
persist with it, in hope of achieving a success to justify his original initiative. This argument is supported by the fact that Sadat continued with the bilateral dialogue even when he was outraged with Israel’s action of building new settlements in captured territories (Mitchell, 2000). Even so, the continuing lack of positive response from Israel made it impossible for Sadat to justify further persistence with the dialogue. Mitchell details a resurgence of intra-party opposition to the dialogue with Israel — ‘in decision-making circles, members of the military were becoming wary of a process that seemed not unlikely to lead to the retention of some Israeli military presence in Sinai,’ ‘a powerful group in the national security council...were concerned about Egypt’s loss of influence in the Arab world,’ and finally, many of Sadat’s advisors raised ‘serious objections’ to continuing the bilateral process (2000, 296).

In the previous section, it was proposed that the decision to engage in dialogue could be behaviourally committing per se. Publicised dialogue with the enemy may be a highly committing gesture, especially when, as it is common in conflict situations, each side has vilified the other to the extent that it becomes impossible to talk to one another without losing credibility with one’s own followers. Such was the dilemma for the NP government, as Mandela narrates: ‘Minister Coetsee and Dr Barnard pointed out, the National party had repeatedly stated that it would not negotiate with any organization that advocated violence; therefore, how could it suddenly announce talks with the ANC without losing its credibility?’ (1995, 641) Nevertheless, de Klerk did proceed to negotiate with ANC without a renouncement of violence from the latter. After several rounds of negotiations, he merely achieved an agreement from Mandela and his negotiators to suspend armed activities (Pretoria Minute, 6 August 1990). For Mandela, engaging the white government in dialogue was an equally
distinctive gesture, since black grassroots were previously mobilised by the ideology of a continuing armed-struggle until the ‘whites handed over power for good’ (Ottoway, 1993, 87; Adam and Moodley, 1993).

There are several aspects of participation in negotiations that could have a committing effect on the leaders. Similar to symbolic gestures, CBMs/TRIs and concessions performed prior to negotiations, such actions performed during negotiations are likely to increase irrevocability from the course of dialogue. For example, in addition to the implementation of some concessions and CBMs by de Klerk prior to the start of formal dialogue with ANC, other highly irreversible acts were performed after the commencement of negotiations. These included the release of political prisoners and the lifting of the State of Emergency in most regions of South Africa. Also, even at the early stage of the bilateral talks, de Klerk undertook the implementation of some highly irrevocable and effortful changes within his Party, aimed at widening its support base. In 1990, the National Party conducted a nationwide recruitment drive for new members of all races. Other intra-party changes included the appointment of a new management council and new regional secretaries to oversee the Party’s reforms, as well as, the establishment of a new training program for party leaders emphasising racial tolerance. Such actions not only connote effort and high irrevocability, but also signify a high level of personal responsibility on the part of de Klerk as the leader presiding over the dramatic changes within his Party and country. Regardless of de Klerk’s initial motives, once he took these actions their characteristics of high degree of personal responsibility and irreversibility increased the likelihood of future consistency. Indeed, this tendency for behavioural commitment to gather its own ‘rhythm’ has been noted before (Halberstam, 1972,
539), as “once on the tiger’s back we cannot be sure of picking the place to dismount” (George Ball, quoted in Halberstam, 1972, 498).

It has been suggested above that a peace accord representing ‘commitments on paper’ by itself is of low irrevocability. This weakness of peace agreements *per se* in binding leaders to follow through with their promises is illustrated by the ease with which Savimbi reneged on both, the Bicesse Accord and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol in the case of the Angolan conflict mentioned above. Although the case bears certain similarities with the peace process in Mozambique, in contrast to Savimbi, the rebel leader in the Mozambican conflict, Afonso Dhlakama, did not return to violence when his party, ‘Resistência Nacional de Moçambique’ (RENAMO), failed to secure political power in the 1994 UN-monitored elections. Instead, Dhlakama remained as the leader of the main opposition party in the National Assembly. Examining the differences between the actions taken by Savimbi and Dhlakama may provide insight into aspects of a peace process that are behaviourally committing on leaders who are shifting from confrontation into dialogue.

Given the proposition that peace accords *per se* are not behaviourally committing, I shall assume that the 1992 General Peace Agreement (GPA) between the Mozambican government and Renamo was not by itself committing for Dhlakama. I shall also assume no deep attitudinal commitment to the peace process. Like MPLA and UNITA, RENAMO and the Mozambican government entered into dialogue without any pre-negotiation gestures that may be considered committing. Additionally, the CBM of partial ceasefire along the Limpopo and Beira transport corridors, agreed to early on during negotiations, was consistently violated by RENAMO and, to a lesser extent, by the government. Hence, Dhlakama, like Savimbi
in Angola, had not undertaken actions that may be characterised as behaviourally committing until the signing of the GPA. The apparent success in reaching a peace settlement in the Angolan conflict in form of Bicesse Accord provided impetus for parties in the Mozambican conflict to arrive at an agreement. However, the subsequent collapse of the peace process in Angola, and Savimbi’s return to arms, caused the international community to fear that Dhlakama would also act in a similar manner.

The main difference between the collapsed peace process in Angola and the successful one in Mozambique relates to the implementation of the UN missions in the two countries. In Angola, the demobilisation of combatants was not a priority following the Bicesse Accords. Instead, the emphasis was on holding elections (Hare, 1999, 648). As noted above, this situation meant that it was not difficult for Savimbi to return to armed conflict after losing in an election declared free-and-fair by the UN. Prendergast observes that in the subsequent attempt at producing peace in Angola, UNITA was able to rearm and re-supply throughout the period when the UN forces were supposedly implementing the Lusaka Protocol, which required the dismantling of UNITA’s military machine (1999). By contrast, Ajello observes that ‘it is generally recognized that demobilization was the most spectacular achievement of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique. A total of 80,000 combatants have been demobilised and reintegrated smoothly into civilian life’ (1999, 632). This was the case despite that it was not Dhlakama’s intention to demobilise his troops in accordance with the GPA, but rather the rebel leader’s objective ‘was to keep his troops in the bush as long as possible to preserve his bargaining power with the government’ (Ajello, 1999, 632). Nevertheless, the monetary incentive offered to the combatants in the conflict by the UN lured even those held in reserve to come forward
to the demobilisation centres (Ajello, 1999, 631). The demobilisation of troops is no
doubt a highly irrevocable action, and as such, it is likely to account for the greater
success of the peace process in Mozambique compared with the obvious
ineffectiveness of a similar procedure in Angola.

Peace accords often involve rebel organisations agreeing to revert back to
normal politics, in exchange for the government agreeing either to power-sharing
arrangements or to free elections. Organisational restructuring to enable conflict-
parties to operate as normal political parties in the post-agreement period may be
another highly irreversible change. Intra-party changes may also occur during
negotiations, as in the examples of NP and ANC. Above I have already noted the
actions taken by de Klerk to transform his party. In order to participate in the
constitutional negotiations, ANC also had to restructure itself from a liberation
movement into a political party, ‘from the smallest branch to the National Executive’
(Mandela, 1995, 710). As a movement, ANC was an umbrella organisation for groups
with divergent policies and interests, and these groups had to be united in order to
form a party with agreed principles and objectives (Ottoway, 1993). And, as Mandela
points out, the restructuring of ANC ‘had to [be done] in a matter of months during a
period of extraordinary change’ (1995, 710). By Mandela’s own account, the changes
to the nature and identity of ANC involved in the transformation from a mass
movement to a political party were a far-reaching and colossal task. Mandela remarks:
‘it is relatively simple proposition to keep a movement together when you are fighting
a common enemy. But creating a policy when the enemy is across the negotiating
table is another matter altogether’ (Mandela, 1995, 710). Furthermore, the ‘new
status’ disqualified ANC from accessing financial support from several international
donors since they did not fund political parties (Adams and Moodley, 1993). Adams and Moodley also observe the lack of appetite amongst former exiles to return to the ‘bush,’ which meant that the ANC leadership ‘would rather bend over backwards to reach a compromise’ (1993). Thus, changes to the organisational structure may be both effortful and difficult to revoke.

Summary and Conclusion

The characteristics that commit the individual to his action have been researched mainly in the field of social-psychology. In this field, future behavioural consistency is predicted when an action is public, distinctive, free, relatively irrevocable, repeated, effortful and under condition of high personal responsibility. From the above consideration of the actions taken by leaders in real-life peace process, I shall attempt to identify the characteristics that appear to have a greater influence in behaviourally committing leaders to remain within a process of dialogue:

(I) The mere public nature of an act, such as a unilateral gesture of conciliation, initiating formal dialogue or signing a peace agreement, is not necessarily committing on leaders in peace processes. This seems contrary to the suggestion by Salancik, a commitment theorist, that the public aspect of behaviour is committing since the individual cannot deny or forget his action (1977a, 64). However, it is important to consider the audience for the individual’s denial of his action.

Even when an act is private, the individual knows that he has acted in a particular manner, and to that extent cannot deny the action to
himself. On the other hand, when the act is public, beside the Self, there are others to whom it may be more difficult to deny that the action took place. Let us assume for the moment that the person knows that the external audience does not necessarily expect him to act consistently, or even if they do, their opinion is of no importance to him. In such situation, it would not really matter to the person that he is unable to deny or distort his action. In essence, the social constraint is insufficient to commit the person, despite the publicity of his action. This highlights the importance of the interplay between conditions of behavioural commitment, such as the public nature of an action and the social context in which the action occurs.

(II) The extent to which the initial shift into dialogue commits a leader to behavioural consistency depends not only on the act per se, but also on any pre-negotiation actions taken whether as a unilateral gesture or in fulfilment of preconditions. Similarly, the level of behavioural commitment to being in negotiation is influenced by acts performed outside the negotiation room, including TRIs/CBMs, concessions and symbolic gestures. This was illustrated above in the South African case, where de Klerk performed several highly irrevocable concessions and CBMs prior to and in the early stages of negotiations with ANC.
The relative irrevocability of an action appears to be a more crucial characteristic in committing leaders to future consistency, when volition is lacking. The Angolan case study supports this conclusion. Reflecting on the failed UN peacekeeping mission following the Bicesse Accords, Margaret Anstee, the head of the mission, argues that a ‘strong referee’ and stricter sanctions when Savimbi began to flout the terms of the agreement could have prevented the rebel leader from returning to armed conflict (1999). As noted above, Savimbi was induced to engage in dialogue mainly as a result of the U.S. assurance that he would win any constitutional elections following the talks. In line with social-psychological research, this assurance can be interpreted as providing an external justification for his actions, which militated against personal volition. However, it can be argued that despite this weakness, if demobilisation had been effectively carried out, the highly irrevocable nature of such action could have had a stronger influence on the rebel leader, in terms of binding him to the peace process.

Nevertheless, adopting a conflict resolution approach to the issue of commitment in particular, and to conflicts in general, would emphasise the need to preserve the volition of leaders when inducing them to perform behaviourally committing actions. Indeed, as noted above, for some psychologists, volition is considered a core condition of behavioural commitment. This is
because behaviour perceived as volitional creates a sense of personal responsibility, and consequently influences the formation or change of personal attitude in congruence with the behaviour. The Mozambican peace process is one example where the mediators and guarantors successfully maintained the fine balance between preserving the leader’s perception of volition and the use of rewards and threats. Andrea Bartoli observes that ‘significantly, Mozambicans did not perceive the agreement in Rome as an imposed document’ (1999, 266). At the same time, incentives could be useful at critical points to induce compliance. For example, the international trust fund to assist RENAMO to transform into a political party secured Dhlakama’s cooperation on the demobilisation issue. Monetary incentives were also provided to the individual soldiers that handed-in weapons to the UN. The effectiveness of the demobilisation programme, in turn, arguably contributed to the retention of the rebel leader in the peace process.
Chapter 4
Contextual Influence on Leaders
Becoming Committed to Dialogue

The influence of the social context is often the only contextual variable considered by researchers (Janis and Mann, 1977; Cialdini, 1984). However, other context variables may have equally strong influence on the extent of the leaders’ behavioural commitment to dialogue. To illustrate this, let me refer to Howard Becker (1964) and recall one of his examples of a committing situation: ‘suppose that you are bargaining to buy a house; you offer sixteen thousand dollars, but the seller insists on twenty thousand. Now suppose that you offer your antagonist in the bargaining certified proof that you have bet a third-party five thousand dollars that you will not pay more than sixteen thousand dollars for the house. Your opponent must admit defeat’ (1964, 280). According to Becker, the buyer by his own action has staked ‘some originally extraneous interest on [himself] following a consistent line of activity’ (Becker, 1964, 280). In this example, the predictability of the buyer’s future consistency is determined by the ‘bet’ with the third-party, as the bet’s apparent irreversibility, commits the buyer to his action. Becker’s argument can be extended to include the consideration of two other factors affecting the buyer’s commitment: the capability of the third-party to enforce the side-bet and the value of future relationship with the third-party for the buyer. If the cost of legally enforcing the bet is too high for the third-party, the buyer could renege from the bet with impunity. Moreover, if the third-party is a stranger to the buyer and there is no need for future dealings, the relationship is not important to the buyer. Both of these conditions would result in a negative influence on the buyer’s overall behavioural commitment to the bet.
In this chapter, to illustrate the influence of context variables on the formation of a leader’s behavioural commitment to dialogue, I examine three variables:

(I) presence of valued audience or relationship (social context)
(II) norms and rules
(III) future interaction

Valued Audience or relationship

Sherif and Nebergall aver that ‘the mere presence of another person watching, performing the same task, commenting on performance, praising or criticising is sufficient to affect us, as an accumulated body of experimental literature shows. This is an important fact’ (1965, 204-205). In the words of Bauer ‘the audience, in a fashion coerces the individual into playing a role’ (1958, 70). However, the degree of influence an audience has over the individual is determined by the value the individual places on the relationship with the audience. The audience may be valued for its capability to provide or withhold resources perceived as essential by the individual. In a conflict situation, among the people watching and evaluating the leader, those that the leader may consider more important to him are the members of his group, potential supporters and external allies. For a democratically elected leader, the constituency that voted him into position is a valued audience, since the same group is also likely to be vested with the power to remove the leader from his position. A rebel leader may consider the masses to be a valued audience if this group is a source of recruits and resistance against the government. While the rebel leader does not necessarily worry about being voted out of power, he still needs to maintain the loyalty of his troops. During armed conflict, external parties able to supply material
and psychological resources are another group of valued audience for leaders. Similarly, when leaders enter into negotiations they seek external allies with the capacity to provide leverage or other resources, in order to bolster their bargaining position.

An important or valued audience influences behavioural commitment in two ways, namely, by the cues it provides and the attributions it makes (Bauer, 1958; Brockner et al., 1981; Ross and Staw, 1986). When leaders face a military stalemate, a positive cue in favour of dialogue from valued audiences may help to tip the balance away from violence. The initiation of the Mozambican peace process no doubt required a willingness from both, the government and the rebel leader, to consider dialogue as an alternative to the protracted civil war. Equally discernable are strong cues from external parties that they favoured a negotiated end to the Mozambican conflict. It is particularly interesting to observe the strategy adopted by certain external parties in order to become a valued audience of the rebel leader. Robert Mugabe, the President of Zimbabwe and ‘Tiny’ Rowland, the President of a British mining company in southern Africa, Lonrho, started channelling significant funds to the rebel group in an attempt to induce the shift into dialogue. These relationships were valuable for the rebel leader as previous sources of financial support declined with the end of the cold war. At the same time, RENAMO’s previous regional ally, the apartheid regime in South Africa, was seeking negotiations with ANC, and it also urged Dhlakama to shift into dialogue and mainstream politics (Gonclaves, 1998). According to Gonclaves, ‘high-level [South African] officials undertook several secret visits to Renamo-held areas in the late 1980s to discuss with the rebels how best to shape and articulate their political demands’ (1998). While in the previous chapter I
noted that Dhlakama had not performed actions of behaviourally binding nature before the General Peace Agreement (GPA), it could be argued that during the negotiation period, the presence of valued audiences provided the binding influence that committed the rebel leader to remain in dialogue with the government. Indeed, Gonclaves concludes: ‘with degrees of support from ‘Tiny’ Rowland, the South Africans and other regional and international leaders, Mugabe would play an important role at every step in convincing Dhlakama to remain engaged’ during the two years of negotiations (1998).

In the last chapter, I pointed out a major difference between the failed attempts at securing lasting peace in Angola and the successful peace process in Mozambique, namely, the lack of demobilisation of combatants in Angola compared to an effective UN demobilisation programme in Mozambique. This difference resulted in increasing the degree of irrevocability from the peace process on the part on Dhlakama, whereas such an effect was lacking on the part of Savimbi. Here it can be added that another significant contrast between these two rebel leaders is the value they placed on the support of external parties. Aldo Ajello, the special representative in charge of the UN peacekeeping mission to Mozambique following the GPA, notes that international recognition was important to Dhlakama (1999, 627). Thus, as the representative of the international community, Ajello was able to influence Dhlakama to take highly committing actions towards implementing the peace agreement (e.g. demobilisation). In contrast, although Savimbi may have publicly signed a peace agreement, but as Margaret Anstee argues, neither the U.S. nor anyone else had any influence over Savimbi (1999). Although U.S. assurances led Savimbi to engage in dialogue, continuing U.S. support did not matter to Savimbi as he found another source to
finance his ambition. Savimbi established control of the diamond-rich areas of northern Angola and ‘proceeded to wage the war almost entirely through the trade of diamonds for arms’ (Wills, 2002).

In addition to providing cues, important audiences may bind a leader to his actions through attributional process. In the previous chapter, I proposed that publicity associated with an action taken by a leader to initiate dialogue does not necessarily increase the likelihood of his future consistency, i.e. does not produce commitment. I also proposed that the presence of a valued audience and its attributions to the leader are crucial for the publicised act to commit the leader. According to Janis and Mann, ‘the stigma of being known as erratic and unstable is in itself a powerful negative incentive that inhibits even discussing with others the possibility of reversing a decision’ (1977, 280). To recall the instance of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, I argued that the gesture by itself was not a highly irrevocable action. Rather it was the public nature of the gesture, accompanied by the grassroots euphoria in Egypt and Israel and the attribution of a peacemaker quality to Sadat by western leaders which collectively increased the committing nature of the gesture. I suggested that the failure to live up to the attributions by valued audiences might result in adverse consequences for the leader, such as a withdrawal of support by the followers. Janis and Mann describe such consequences as ‘new entries in the decisional balance sheet [of the leader that] increase the net incentive value of sticking with the chosen alternative even when new information makes the decision maker reluctant to implement his original decision’ (1977, 280). As previously observed, Sadat did not promptly withdraw from the bilateral dialogue despite the lack of reciprocation from Israeli leaders and their violation of a previous promise to not build new settlements.
While a public statement appears more easily reversed than an action, social attribution may help to bind the speaker to his words. Seen in this light, the overwhelming positive reaction from the international community to de Klerk’s February 1990 speech, in which he proposed actions to dismantle the apartheid system, may have bound the leader to act consistently with his words. Messages of congratulation and encouragement from eminent world leaders followed de Klerk’s speech, as he notes in his autobiography (1998, 59). The international public opinion was also quick to draw a comparison between de Klerk and Gorbachev, the reformist Soviet leader (Ottoway, 1993, 59). It is also evident from de Klerk’s writing that ‘after forty years of confrontation and growing isolation’ the leader placed considerable importance on ‘rejoining the international community’ (1998, 183-185). Thus, the importance de Klerk attached to international recognition and support could have contributed to his continuing concern over the international community’s opinion of him and his actions. The international community, therefore, was able to bind the leader to his words, which otherwise were not difficult to reverse.

The reality of peace processes, however, makes the influence of the social context a much more complicated issue. Since leaders may be influenced by cues from different groups or individuals, a situation could arise when cues are contradictory. Let us say, that the followers of a particular rebel leader become dissatisfied with dialogue and want their leader to return to armed struggle. On the other hand, external allies, whom the rebel leader relies upon for financial support and prestige, lobby for continuation of dialogue. In this circumstance, the rebel leader faces making an uncomfortable decision and here the degree of freedom of action that the leader enjoys becomes an important factor.
Hollander proposes that a leader may increase his freedom of action by earning ‘credit’ or building up ‘acceptance capital’ (1985, 502). The leader earns ‘credit’ or political capital, when he is perceived by his followers to have: (a) advanced the group towards the group’s goals, and (b) upheld the group’s norms (Hollander, 1985, 502). The leader with sufficient credit within his group is able to make an unpopular decision without fearing that followers would withdraw their support. In the preceding example, it is likely that the cues from external parties for continuation of dialogue would be rejected or ignored if the rebel leader has insufficient credit within his group. It is safe to assume that the leader’s overriding concern would be to maintain his position. In this situation, external parties would be ill advised to increase pressure on the rebel leader, because it would have negative effect on the leader’s volition. As already emphasised, the leaders’ perception of volition while they take actions in pursuit of dialogue is generally necessary to commit them to behavioural consistency, in the short-term. And, if we take a longer-term view of the process of resolving conflicts, that is, if behavioural commitment is to lead to personal transformation, then volition must be preserved. Furthermore, compelling the leader to continue acting in favour of dialogue whilst intra-party political capital is low may cause him to become alienated from his supporters and weaken his authority. Thus, it is advisable for an external party in the position of a valued audience to make use of positive incentives to enhance the political capital of the leader. Arguably, such strategy would not only increase the said leader’s manoeuvrability within his group, but it would also increase the value of the external party to the leader. Consequently, the cues of the third-party may have a greater influence on the leader. This argument is consistent with the general consensus among conflict resolution scholars, who argue that the use of
positive incentives is more effective than threats or punishments in encouraging sustainable peace (Miall et al. 1999).

**Norms and Rules**

Norms are present at every level of society, from the interpersonal to the international. One definition of a norm is that it is ‘a rule or a standard that governs our conduct in the social situation in which we participate. It is a standard to which we are expected to conform whether we actually do so or not’ (Bierstedt, 1963). More recently, Finnemore conceptualises norms as the ‘shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors’ (1996, 22). Both definitions clearly consider collective expectation as a distinct attribute of norms. Hence, in an interaction between two parties, both must agree on the standard of behaviour that each can expect from the other (Shaw, 1976). When the community of actors comprises of three parties, at least two of the parties would need to recognise and accept the norm before it can be considered to govern the conduct of all parties. In larger groups, Shaw proposes that theoretically it is difficult to say how many members of the group must accept a particular way of behaving before that behaviour becomes established as a norm, yet the operation of the norm does not depend upon the acceptance of all members of the group (1976, 251). Accordingly, the presence of the apartheid regime in South Africa did not constitute a negation of the international norm for racial equality (Klotz, 2002). Individual cases of deviation do not nullify a norm, but if a majority of actors stop adhering to a particular way of behaving, then the normative behavioural rule is effectively replaced by another or is simply abandoned. One example is the present-day *jus cogens* against the practice of slavery,
which as a fundamental international norm may not be violated by any country or set aside by treaty. This is in contrast to the 19th century, when slavery was an acceptable social practice. Norms are, therefore, distinguished by the consensus of opinion held by the ‘community of actors’ and its reaction to violation of expected conduct. The fact that deviant conduct produces a reaction against the deviation is another distinct attribute of a norm. The content of the reaction itself is not significant, but that a reaction is observable is important. Thus, reaction may range from sanctions to a mere voicing of disapproval.

What does then motivate the individual to act in accordance with a norm? Shaw argues that the person who has yet to internalise the norm may be motivated in his initial compliance by the material rewards arising from conforming to the norm, or the tangible costs of non-conformity (1976, 252; this is also a realist view). Others propose social and psychological reasons for compliance with norms. Shannon, citing Ron (1997, 277) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 902), observes that ‘complying with norms brings “social worth” and psychological benefits of self- and national esteem that accrue, while violations is met with disapproval, social isolation, and its impact on “esteem” (2000, 297).

Conduct-guiding norms could impact upon the behavioural commitment of leaders in three distinct ways. Staw provides us with an example of the first way in which norms may influence the individual’s behavioural commitment (1981). Based on experimental studies and anecdotal observations, Staw concludes that there is a shared expectation among the masses (at least in the U.S.) for their leaders to behave in a consistent manner. When the leader remains consistent with a course of action
despite setbacks and when he is ultimately successful, he is hailed as a hero (Staw, 1981). The presence of the norm of consistency in a society explains the contention of the commitment theorist, Cialdini, when he says: 'whenever one takes a stand that is visible to others, there arises a drive to maintain that stand in order to look like a consistent person' (original emphasis. Cialdini, 1984, 87). While visibility of an action contributes to committing the person to his act, this is subject to the condition that the 'others' who observe the action (context variable) are important to the actor. I submitted that the concern for the attributions from 'significant' others compels the person to behave consistently. It can now be added that the presence of an established norm of consistency within a society could be sufficient to bind the person and thus remove the requirement for the significant others to exercise personalised power to ensure the individual's consistency. Again, I would like to emphasise the interplay between the different variables in producing behavioural commitment and in determining its extent.

The second way in which norms may influence behavioural commitment is by preserving the volition of the actor in his behavioural compliance. Instead of directly trying to induce the leader to engage in dialogue or to perform CBMs, a third-party may evoke the existence of a norm that prescribes such course of action. While a norm creates pressure to conform, Thibaut and Kelly propose that the person, which in our case is the leader of a group in conflict, is likely to perceive the locus of causality 'not as internal to a whimsical or self-aggrandising' third-party, but as 'existing in the depersonalised norm' on behalf of which the third-party is acting (1959, 133). The appeal for adherence is not based on a power of one over the other, but on a non-personal value. Thibaut and Kelly claim that this has an effect of reducing
dissatisfaction or hostility on the part of the person complying (1959,131). Thus, it is possible that norm-based compliance preserves the volition of the actor to some degree. The action of the apartheid government in South Africa to begin negotiations with ANC and to dismantle racially discriminatory governance demonstrates the foregoing point. Adams and Moodley observe that ‘there was no perception of defeat or outside coercion’ among the Afrikaner elites, rather the shift into dialogue with ANC was explained as arising from Afrikaner’s own historic ‘desire for freedom’ (1993). However, de Klerk admits to a “realisation that it is necessary for South Africa to come into line with the international community” (speech at Parliament, 24 January 1992). International ostracism, according to Patti Waldmeir, made Afrikaners into ‘objects of universal moral disgust’ (1994, 119), while economic sanctions, Merle Lipton points out, sent a clear message that helped to ‘concentrate minds on the country’s long term problems’ (1990). Nonetheless, even under severe international pressure, there appears to be an illusion of volition in the ‘reform’ actions taken by de Klerk, which he himself describes as ‘irreversible’ (24 April 1991, The Guardian).

de Klerk’s perception of his actions as irreversible can be attributed to the third manner in which norms influence behavioural commitment. Specifically norms can precipitate gestures embodying the characteristics that bind the leader to future consistency. In the previous chapter, I examined in detail the attributes of de Klerk’s actions which may be considered as behaviourally committing. As suggested above, one factor that appears to have influenced de Klerk to perform those highly distinctive and irrevocable concessions was the realisation that if South Africa wanted to be part of the international community, the nation’s leaders had to behave according to the shared expectation of the community.
Future Interaction

In an experimental study, Kiesler and Corbin induced individuals who had initially agreed to engage in a trivial task, to consent to further participation by using subtle social pressure. They were told of the consensus among other participants to continue, which pressured them into being a good sport and acquiescing to the request. Once this was accomplished, some of the individuals in the experiment were told that they were very likely to remain throughout the series of experiments with the same group, whereas others were informed that they could change groups if they were dissatisfied. Following a ‘rigged’ disagreement between an individual and the group, the results of the experiment showed that those who envisaged continued interaction with the group but found the group unattractive, were the most affected by the disagreement (Kiesler, 1971, 129). These individuals, not only adjusted their opinion to be in line with the group, but they also re-evaluated the group to be more attractive (Kiesler, 1971, 130).

What would happen if an individual were unable to change his preference for the group and yet has to continue with the group? A public expression of dislike for the group may put an individual in such a position. Sara Kiesler argues that in such case the individual is precluded from rationalising his behavioural compliance as due to attraction to the group (Kiesler, 1978, 206). In sum, those who are able to increase their liking of the group may be able to attribute their compliance to their attraction to the group. In contrast, those individuals who dislike the group and are unable to re-evaluate their attraction must justify their compliant action without resorting to the attraction argument and are likely to take personal responsibility for their actions.
Theoretically, it is the latter case that is more likely to produce a stronger behavioural commitment to actions performed within the context of a group.

In order to consider the application of the above arguments to leaders and their commitment to dialogue, I shall focus on power-sharing arrangements. The consent to power-sharing among former adversaries is tantamount to agreeing to future cooperative interaction along several dimensions of state power, i.e. political, military and economic. Hartzell and Hoddie observe that power-sharing arrangements are a relatively common feature of negotiated settlements to civil wars (2003, 329). In a study of 38 civil wars that ended through a negotiated settlement between 1945 and 1998, Hartzell and Hoddie found that an agreement that envisages the creation of ‘an array of power-sharing institutions is positively associated with a durable peace’ (2003, 319). One reason for this durability, based on the preceding consideration, could be the influence of future interaction on behavioural commitment, which is predicted to be stronger when the interaction takes place with a disliked party. The leaders of warring parties often publicly vilify the enemy during confrontation, and therefore when they engage in power-sharing (with the same enemy) they are compelled to become proselytiser of the process itself, in other words, to justify their actions as being the right thing to do, despite the enemy being not so righteous.

**Summary**

This chapter considered some examples of context factors which can impact favourably upon the leader’s behavioural commitment to dialogue as means of
resolving conflicts. I looked at the influence of three variables: valued audience or relationship, norms and rules, and future interaction. Important audiences can help to produce or strengthen the leader's behavioural commitment to dialogue by the cues and attributions they make. In cases when the cues from the valued audiences contradict, the political capital of the leader becomes an important factor. When a leader lacks political capital, peacemakers should generally refrain from applying excessive pressure for behavioural compliance on the leader since this would only alienate the leader from his followers and further weaken his position. A weakened leader may not be able to prevent splits in the organisation, and become unable to prevent the more militant members from leaving the organisation. I also submitted that from a conflict resolution perspective, if behavioural commitment to dialogue at the leadership level is to lead to personal transformation, a peacemaker in the position of valued audience should make use of rewards rather than threats to enhance the political capital of the leader. The supply of rewards would also increase the value of the peacemaker to the leader. This in turn would increase the power of the cues from the peacemaker for the leader to behave in furtherance of dialogue. Nevertheless, the incentives must not be as high as to negate the leader's perception of volition for his actions.

Conduct-guiding norms can impact upon the behavioural commitment of leaders to dialogue in three distinct ways. First, the content of certain norms, such as a norm of consistency, may contribute to binding the individual leader to his action. Second, depersonalised power over the individual leader, embodied in the norm, may help to preserve his volition for the shift into dialogue itself and other actions required upon the shift into dialogue. Third, calling upon a known norm which the leader
violates with his confrontational behaviour, may precipitate actions that signify a deviation from that behaviour. The new line of action is likely to be distinctive (and may include other 'committing' characteristics, discussed in the last chapter), which in turn helps to bind the leader to his actions. It is important to note that apart from a few universal norms such as the *jus cogens* against apartheid, norms tend to be inherently culture-specific. For example, the norm of consistency has been mainly identified by experimenters in the U.S, and thus its application to conflict resolution outside the U.S. context should be carefully considered. In addition to norms, the prospect of future interaction can also have an important positive influence on behavioural commitment. The impact of future interaction appears to be further enhanced when leaders are unable to adjust the dislike for the opposing party in the interaction.
Chapter 5

Explaining the commitment of leaders to dialogue

The basic premise of the behavioural approach to commitment is that under certain conditions, the individual becomes bound to act consistently with his previous action. In the previous two chapters, I presented a general outline of these conditions and considered their presence in the specific situation of confrontational leaders that enter into dialogue. It needs to be clarified that the future behavioural consistency is mediated by certain psychological and social implications, produced as a result of the presence of the conditions of behavioural commitment. Below, I examine these motivational factors under two categories: (I) ego-defensiveness or justification to Self, and (II) social implications or justification to others. These two motives are suggestive of a departure from rational economic decision-making, since the decision-maker appears more influenced by his past actions rather than future consideration of the benefits and costs of acting consistently with his past actions. According to Dawes, this departure (from rational economic decision-making) is a systematic and predictable anomaly (1998). He observes that for although people may believe that they should act based on prospective rationality, their actual behaviour often violates this principle (1998, 497). But, as I will also consider, there may be times when it is difficult to ignore or distort prospective rationality in the decision whether to persist or not with dialogue. This leads to a conclusion that underlying the behavioural commitment of leaders to dialogue are multiple and interactive motives.
The origin of this motive can be traced to the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Although there is much contention about the situations when dissonance is present, one of the more settled instances is when the individual has acted in a committing manner (Aronson, 1968). Much of the credit for explicating the role of commitment in dissonance theory goes to Brehm and Cohen (1962). According to these authors, dissonance theory in its original formulation ‘concerns itself with the conditions that arouse dissonance in an individual and with the ways in which dissonance can be reduced’ (1962, 3). Dissonance is a state of tension which people normally attempt to avoid or resolve. From this general proposition, Brehm and Cohen argue that in a situation when an individual is induced to act in a behaviourally committing manner and when such act is contrary to the person’s existing belief or attitude, it is possible not only to predict the likelihood of dissonance arising in the person, but also the way in which the person will try to reduce or resolve the dissonance (1962; see also Petty and Wegener, 1998, 336).

Brehm and Cohen review a series of experimental studies which showed that when a person engages in a public and irrevocable action which is contrary to his existing attitude or belief under conditions of high responsibility and choice, the person subsequently appears to shift his attitude in order to justify his action (Brehm and Cohen, 1962). They propose that due to the presence of characteristics of behavioural commitment in these experiments, the action and its implications for the future become salient and difficult to distort cognitively (1962). As opposed to a behavioural action, attitude is seen as much easier to shift as it is more ‘fluid and not
terribly explicit' (Kiesler, 1972, 17; Brehm and Cohen, 1962). Thus, dissonance theorists submit that the individual will subtly modify his perception to justify his committing behaviour (Aronson, 1968; 1994; Brehm and Cohen, 1962). For instance, the individual may come to view his action as what he really had wanted to do (Aronson, 1994). This may appear as 'self-deception,' and outsiders to the field of social-psychology may doubt whether such a trait is really a part of human motivation. Nevertheless, Baumeister argues that 'social-psychologists have in fact devoted considerable time and effort to study such [process, and]...the evidence is clear...that self-deception (in a very loose sense of the term) in fact occurs right at the interface between motivation and cognition' (1998, 690).

In the case of a leader shifting from confrontation into dialogue, his past conduct is in stark contrast to the act of entering into dialogue with the enemy. It is also highly likely that the leader, at least dislikes the enemy. Under these conditions, the leader would experience some measure of dissonance. Recall Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, discussed in Chapter 3. Mitchell proposes that it was a precedent-breaking gesture, and thus ‘dissonance creating in the extreme...among the target’s decision-makers’ (2000, 130). I submit that the action was likely to have been even more dissonant for the initiator of the gesture. Tabory notes that Sadat’s action was ‘not in keeping with what might have been considered a normative action by an Arab leader’ (1978, 194), as the Arab world in general refused to recognise the state of Israel. Sadat’s action, to borrow Mitchell’s words, displayed ‘maximum non-consistency with previous behavioural pattern’ (2000, 131), that is, the visit to Jerusalem was inconsistent with the previous state of war and hostility between the two countries. In theory, these inconsistencies would cause some measure of dissonance for Sadat. To
resolve this dissonance, Sadat could change his attitude towards the Israeli and towards his own action to become more positive. But, what if Sadat were unable to change his dislike for the Israeli government? In chapter 4, it was proposed that in an interaction between parties, the individual is likely to value his action more when it is difficult for him to change his dislike for the other party, compared to when the individual can justify his action by the other party being a worthy beneficiary. The knowledge that one has acted in a manner that confers benefit to another and that other is disliked is dissonant. And, according to dissonant theorists, when the liking for the other cannot be changed and the action itself is behaviourally committing, the individual is left with no other mode of resolving the dissonance but to boost the value of his own action (Brehm and Cohen, 1962; Aronson, 1994; Kiesler, 1978). Once the individual comes to view his action as worthy in itself, surely he would find it difficult to justify not persisting with the line of action, unless extenuating reasons could be found.

Indeed, Mitchell recognises the operation of this motive in his discussion of conciliatory gestures. He says: 'the justification hypothesis implies that decision-makers in an initiating party who begin a new conciliatory policy, even if they do this tentatively...will become both politically and, equally important, psychologically committed to the beliefs and attitudes implied by the policy the more publicly they act, the more frequently they act, and the more they act through their own choice’ (original emphasis. 2000, 151). To become psychologically committed signifies the operation of the self-justification motive.
Further support for the importance of self-justification motive for the escalation of commitment to a course of action comes from Brockner’s review of several decades of empirical studies (Brockner, 1992). In this work, Brockner identifies the condition of high responsibility for an action, e.g. when the individual is the original formulator of the course of action, as crucial for producing behavioural persistence with a strong need-to-justify motive (1992). Irrevocability is another key factor that produces behavioural persistence as demonstrated by Brockner et al. (1979). Their experiment, like most experiments on escalating commitment, involves participants making decisions on resource allocation into a course of action. But in contrast to some other studies, it clearly demonstrates that self-justification is an important motivation underlying the behavioural commitment to a course of action (1979). In a questionnaire following the experiment, a significant number of participants who escalated their effort vis-à-vis their original decision considered the following item as an important reason for their action: “I had already invested so much, it seemed foolish not to continue” (Brockner et al., 1979, 500). Brockner (1992) claims this data reveals the operation of a self-justification motive.

How likely is this motive to underlie the behavioural commitment of leaders to dialogue? The presence of dissonance in the case of Sadat remains a hypothesis. However, dissonance theorists appear confident that most people will experience dissonance given the proper conditions (Aronson, 1968). As noted above, Mitchell also accepts the self-justification motive in the context of leaders engaged in conciliatory gestures. Thus, though tentative, self-justification should be considered as a possible explanation for the behavioural commitment of leaders to dialogue.
Motive II: Social Implications

It may be difficult to consider the self-justification motive as a sufficient explanation for the behavioural commitment of an astute rebel leader or a consummate politician to remaining in dialogue. It is easier to envisage that such leaders may act consistently in order to justify their previous actions to others. Fox and Staw propose that: 'when justification is considered primarily as an intra-individual process, individuals are posited...to act in ways to protect their own self-images. But within organizational settings, justification may also be directed externally. When faced with an external threat or evaluation, individuals may be motivated to prove to others that they were not wrong in an earlier decision and the force for such external justification could well be stronger than the protection of individual self-esteem' (original emphasis. 1979, 453). Similarly, Janis and Mann observe that social ties are 'among the most pervasive constraints on reversing decision' (1977, 280).

In a study of 'a visible and prototypical example of escalation of commitment,' Ross and Staw examine the behaviour of the premier of British Columbia following his proposal in 1978 to host a world fair (1986). The world exposition was held in 1986. In examining the possible motives underlying the persistence of the provincial leader in holding the Expo in spite of ballooning costs and several crises, Ross and Staw submit: 'for several years, the premier had been arguing for the value of the exposition, not merely to the people of British Columbia [public opinion poll indicated that the plan remained politically popular] but to representatives of dozens of major corporations and countries in a variety of private and public forums. To reverse this long-held, repeatedly stated and emphatically articulated position would
reveal a level of inconsistency that would undoubtedly damage the perception of the premier’s leadership qualities’ (Ross and Staw, 1986, 290). The premier’s decision to persist with the project was motivated by a concern over how his valued audiences would judge him and the consequences of a negative evaluation. Conger and Kanungo propose that a leader maintains the loyalty of his followers by ‘projecting an image of being likable, trustworthy and knowledgeable’ (1987). Being judged as inconsistent may result in the leader appearing untrustworthy or lacking in knowledge, which as McElroy argues, contributes to weakening the leader’s position (1982, 414).

The volatility of the followers’ loyalty depends on the nature of their relationship with the leader. Arguably, a charismatic leader, who is able to inspire ‘an unquestioning acceptance [and] trust in the leader’s beliefs, willing obedience, emulation and identification with the leader’ in his followers, has a more robust image compared to a leader whose relationship with his followers is transactional (Kuhnert and Lewis, 1987, 639). A transactional leader is usually subjected to regular performance assessments, as to whether the leader is providing sufficient benefits to the group in return for their loyalty. Regular evaluation implies vulnerability of the leader’s position and this could create a greater pressure on the leader to justify his decisions to followers. This argument finds support in an experiment carried out by Fox and Staw (1979). They found that conditions that evoke the external justification motive, such as (I) overcoming resistance (from others in the group) to the implementation of one’s decision and (II) politically vulnerability, produced the greatest effect on the individuals in the experiment. These individuals increased their effort into their prior course of action following a setback (Fox and Staw, 1979).
Fox and Staw's study is relevant to the issue of how committing the shift into dialogue itself is for the leader. In chapter 3, reference was made to Mitchell's (1981) observation that when leaders shift into dialogue from a strategy of confrontation, they are likely to face considerable intra-group resistance. The extent of effort and skill expended by the leader in overcoming this resistance was proposed as a factor that is likely to influence the leader's degree of behavioural commitment to the course of action. In such situations, the operation of justification motives based on Self and others may to some extent explain the leader's behavioural commitment. Firstly, having expended considerable effort into convincing his followers to support the shift into dialogue, for the leader not to continue with that course of action would imply that the leader's previous effort had been a waste, and this may be difficult to justify to Self (Fox and Staw, 1979, 465). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, after fighting-off criticisms and convinced his party to support his decision to engage in dialogue, to then renege from the process is likely to create an impression that the leader has acted in a misguided fashion. Thus, the internal and external needs to justify may act in combination to motivate future consistency.

*Retrospective rationalisation and prospective rationality*

Staw observes that 'it should be apparent [that the justification motives] lead to departures from rational decision making' (1981, 581). There is substantial evidence corroborating this statement, including studies by Brockner and Rubin (1985), Ross and Staw (1986), Staw and Ross (1987) and Staw and Hoang (1995). The last-mentioned study is one of the few field researches in the area of escalating commitment. The researchers found that, contrary to rational calculations, coaches of
NBA teams (National Basketball Association, U.S.) allow more playing time for players they paid most for and keep these players for a longer period, regardless of such players’ productivity (Staw and Hoang, 1995). Thus the coaches analysed in the study appeared more influenced by their past irrevocable decision of paying a high price for a player, rather than a calculation of future advantages from using such players.

The justification motives involve retrospective rationalisation, which causes the individual not to choose his future action based solely on objective cost-benefit calculation. Staw and Ross argue that escalation of commitment would be a ‘quickly disappearing event’ if decision-makers employed only a simple cost-benefit calculations in deciding their future action (1987, 44). Street goes further to assert that ‘often, if not usually, non-rational factors play a dominant role in decision-making’ (1998, 19). Why do decision-makers behave in such manner? Much of the research demonstrating that real-life decision-making may often be contrary to economic model of the ‘rational man’ originates from the work of Herbert Simon and his idea of bounded rationality (1985; 1987). Apart from the decision-maker’s inherent weaknesses, such as limited computational capacity, the bounded rationality theory proposes that the decision-maker faces an environment which is ‘fundamentally more uncertain than is understood in prevailing choice models’ (Jones, 1999, 308). Simon claims that ‘lack of reliable knowledge and information is a major factor in almost all real-life decision-making’ (1985, 302). These two conditions lead the decision-maker to arrive at a decision which Simon terms ‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1985, 1987). This implies that the decisions made under the abovementioned external and internal limitations are “good enough”, but that such decisions are not optimal in the economic
sense (Bazerman, 1998). Simon also says that information accessed by the decision-maker is usually filtered by his frame of reference, which is selectively evoked by his roles and status and socially-related others (1985, 302; see also, Jones, 1999, 298). In other words, theorists on bounded rationality propose that the individual accesses information that preserves his Self-image in a particular role or as having certain status and as brought to his attention by others in significant relationship with the decision-maker.

The self-justification motive, as I have considered above, relates to the preservation of Self-image or Self-concept (Aronson, 1968). I have also discussed the drive to justify to others, especially when the decision-maker is in a politically vulnerable position. Hence, theoretically, acting in a committing manner should amplify the selective accessing of information. Based on experimental evidences in support of this view, Caldwell and O’Reilly (1982), Lord et al. (1979) and Staw (1981) argue that the justification motives may be so strong in some cases so as to lead to selective accessing and processing of information and thus result in a deviation from objective calculations of costs-benefits.

Further confirmation of retrospective rationalisation in decision-making is provided by the field-study of the Shoreham Nuclear Energy Plant project (U.S) conducted by Ross and Staw. For nearly two decades the top decision-makers of the project persisted with building and operating the nuclear energy plant (but which was finally closed), despite the costs of construction increasing beyond the point where electricity generated from the plant was no longer a cheaper alternative to oil (Ross and Staw, 1993). The academics suggest that the chairman of the project had a strong
need to justify the project to others, since his position was at stake. The chairman finally resigned when he was unable to turn the situation around, that is, when he was unable to justify his persistence with the project (Ross and Staw, 1993, 712).

Additionally, the academics observed that the uncertainties associated with exogenous influences on the project made it difficult for the decision-makers to conduct cost-benefits analysis on the project’s continuation (Ross and Staw, 1993, 715).

Nonetheless, the circumstances under which justification motives overwhelm rational calculations in decision-making require closer examination. Usually, experimental studies of persistence or escalation of effort in the face of negative challenges manipulate the conditions of behavioural commitment, such as the irrevocability of and responsibility for the initial action, without providing the individuals with information which may influence cost-benefit calculation. When such information is provided, results of experimental studies indicate that the information does have an effect on the individual’s decision-making. For instance, Staw and Ross’s experimental study (1978) discovered a greater tendency for decision-makers to persist when a temporary exogenous cause was given as reason for a current setback. The persistence was more pronounced in those who had previously experienced a setback. In contrast, the decision-makers reduced their effort into the course of action when the current setback was presented as due to long-term endogenous factors (Staw and Ross, 1978). These findings may help to explain the observable decline in Sadat’s behavioural commitment to his initiative of engaging in bilateral dialogue with the Israeli government in the face of continuing setbacks to the process. In chapter 3, we saw that the lack of reciprocity and bad-faith on the part of the Israeli government were among the reasons given by Mitchell for the failure of
Sadat’s initiative to lead to a sustained process of bilateral dialogue. What is evident about these setbacks is their endogenous nature, which may have counteracted any justifying motives arising from Sadat’s previous committing gesture.

The experience of repeated setbacks or negative consequences is difficult to ignore or distort (Staw and Fox, 1977). Its effects on prospective rationality can be illustrated with the Shoreham nuclear power plant case study (Ross and Staw, 1993). As mentioned above, evidence suggests that justification motives were likely to have been present in the decision-makers of the project. These motives appear to undermine objective calculations for a considerable period of time, due to the exogenous nature of setbacks and uncertainty of information relevant to objective calculations. Only when the expected production of electricity from the plant became three times more expensive than electricity generated from oil, it became difficult to ignore or set-aside rational calculations (Ross and Staw, 1993, 711).

In sum, researchers in the field of escalating commitment generally submit that unless cost-benefit calculations unambiguously indicate that persistence with a course of action is unlikely to achieve the goal, justification motives, when present, are sufficiently strong to influence the individual to maintain the course of action. If cost-benefit calculations are ambiguous, it is easier to justify to Self and others the persistence with the course of action. When cost-benefit calculations support persistence, they presumably reinforce the effects of the justification motives.
**Summary and Conclusion**

In this chapter, I looked at the two motives commonly considered as underlying behavioural commitment: justification to Self and justification to others. I explored the possibility that those in a leadership position experience dissonance and are motivated to preserve their internal image by seeking to justify their actions to the Self. In the context of the confrontational leader who shifts into dialogue, I proposed that the self-justification motive might not provide a sufficient explanation for behavioural commitment to dialogue. The 'need-to-justify to others' motive was speculated as likely to be a greater force of influence on an astute rebel leader or a consummate politician. I also considered the potential tension between the justification motives as retrospective rationalisation, and prospective rationality or objective cost-benefit analysis. There is substantial empirical evidence that leaders, either in a political or economic arena, are susceptible to escalate their efforts due to a need to justify their past actions (Staw, 1981; Snyder, 1978; Teger, 1980). But there is also evidence that leaders may be influenced by the costs and benefits of continuing with a particular course of action (Staw, 1981; Staw and Ross, 1978; Staw and Fox, 1977).

In conclusion, I propose the following, regarding the dynamics of the motivations underlying the behavioural commitment of leaders to dialogue:

(I) When the cost-benefit calculation is consonant with the justification motives, all three motives may act to reinforce the leader’s behavioural commitment to dialogue.

(II) When there are uncertainties in terms of information for conducting cost-benefit calculations and if setbacks are attributable to exogenous reasons,
the justification motives arising from having acted in a committing manner may be sufficiently strong to support the leader’s persistence with dialogue.

(III) When cost-benefit calculations are unambiguous and strongly contradict the justification motives, the behavioural commitment of the leader to his previous line of action may be weakened.
Chapter 6
Strategies for inducing behavioural commitment

While a single, behaviourally committing action, can produce consistent future behaviour, Kiesler and Mathog found that inducing a person to perform a series of related committing gestures further strengthens the behavioural commitment of the person to the particular line of action (Kiesler, 1971, chapter 4). In their experiments, the academics also noted what they term a ‘boomerang effect’ in a person following the performance of a series of committing actions. That is, compared with the individual who performed a single committing act, the person who performed a series of committing acts became more entrenched in his position when that position was subsequently subjected to attack or criticism (Kiesler, 1971, 73).

In chapter 3, I suggested that it should be easier for a peacemaker to persuade a leader to perform a series of committing gestures, which individually fall within the leader’s latitude of acceptance, rather than to force the leader to perform a precedent-breaking action that falls within his latitude of rejection. When the series of gestures are considered cumulatively, they may have a similar effect to that of a precedent-breaking action, or as Kiesler argues, ‘the collection of behaviour may have an intense freezing action’ (1971, 73).

One way the peacemaker may attempt to induce the leader to perform a series of actions in the process of dialogue is by directly manipulating the rewards or punishments for compliance. However, as already emphasised, such inducements, when excessive, negate the volition of the actor, thus weakening the behavioural
Commitment produced by the compliant behaviour. Commitment theorists have identified subtler strategies for building up the behavioural commitment of an individual. The purpose of this chapter is to explore these strategies and their utility for the peacemaker in building upon the commitment of local leaders to dialogue.

Strategies for inducing compliance without application of excessive pressure have been studied within various settings, such as sales, pro-social activities and negotiations. Commitment theorists argue that these strategies may also be applied to induce behavioural commitment (Cialdini, 1984). The strategies are grouped into three general types (I) foot-in-the-door, (II) door-in-the-face and (III) low-balling. Peacemakers attempting to induce leaders to act in committing ways to the path of dialogue could use rewards and punishments in combination with these three strategies. Importantly, the use of the strategies would preserve the leader’s perception of free will regarding his compliance. These strategies can also be identified in the practise of peacemaking (Janis and Mann, 1977, 289). However, they tend not to be included as an explicit part of the design to induce commitment to dialogue on the part of local leaders. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the ways in which the strategies may be combined more formally in order to effectively induce confrontational leaders to perform series of behaviourally committing actions, beginning with inducing them to enter into dialogue. This issue is considered in the concluding section of this chapter, once I have explored the individual strategies.
Foot-in-the-door strategy

The foot-in-the-door strategy is probably the oldest and most widely researched among the compliance strategies. Freedman and Fraser are recognised as the first to provide research evidence for the effectiveness of this technique (1966). In brief, their study revealed that subjects who complied with a small request (putting up a small sign in their window urging people to be safe drivers) appeared more willing to comply with a larger request at a later date (to place a large and unattractive sign on their lawn on the same issue). A further impressive evidence for the effectiveness of this method is analysed by Cialdini (1984) and Janis and Mann (1977, 291-298), relating to how Chinese communists turned American prisoners-of-war into collaborators during the Korean War, which was also referred in chapter 3. Cialdini explains: ‘only a few men were able to avoid collaboration altogether…the majority collaborated at one time or another by doing things which seemed to them trivial’ (1984, 77). He notes that an initially mild compliance was followed by further substantive demands and compliances, so much so that in the end the returning prisoners showed a remarkable change in their beliefs in favour of Chinese communism (Cialdini, 1984, 76-82). However, Burger and Guadagno observe that over the last three decades the many variations of this technique investigated in experimental conditions have produced mixed evidence in terms of its effectiveness in inducing compliance (2003, 79).

In my opinion, one reason for the failure of the foot-in-the-door technique to induce compliance may be the insufficient committing effect of the initial request. This view is shared by Goldman et al. (1981). In the original experiment by Freedman
and Fraser, the highest rate of compliance with the second request was found in those who actually performed the first request, and both requests were related to the same issue. Although the first act was considered innocuous enough to ensure that refusal was unlikely, it was not without consequences. The sign in the window would have acted as a visual reminder of the first compliance and its relation to the second request. This may have increased the salience of the initial compliance in the mind of the individuals when they were considering the second request.

Crucially, what sets the experiment by Freedman and Fraser apart from others that failed to replicate the effect of the foot-in-the-door strategy is the extent to which the initial action was behaviourally committing on the individual. In the experiment, the first act had several important characteristics – it was public, freely agreed to and irrevocable in terms of the time the sign had been displayed in the window. As discussed in chapter 3 these characteristics commit the individual to his action. In the previous chapter, I explained that it is the social and psychological implications that arise from a committing action which make it cognitively salient, which in turn increase the tendency to follow-through. This was observed in the experiment by the compliance with the second, larger request. Indeed, Freedman and Fraser do propose that the initial action may have affected the self-image of the individual complying with the request, such that ‘he may [have] become, in his own eyes, the kind of person… who takes action on things he believes in, who cooperates with good causes’ (1966, 201). Other researchers have found that social labelling, such as praise for the initial action, also increased compliance with the second and more difficult request (Goldman et al., 1982; Goldman, et al. 1985).
As mentioned above, Kiesler demonstrated the positive effect of repeated and related actions on the degree of the individual’s behavioural commitment to a particular line of action. Additional evidence for this effect comes from the study by Goldman et al. (1981). These researchers observed when the foot-in-the-door strategy is used the initial request needs to be sufficiently effortful to produce continuing compliance. Moreover, they found that inducing a series of increasingly effortful actions increased the compliance rate for the final and most effortful request in comparison with situations when an easy task was followed by a request to perform the most effortful task, or when only the most effortful task was requested. The experiment also showed that the degree of compliance was increased when the person derived direct benefit from acting in a compliant manner.

**Door-in-the-face strategy**

Door-in-the-face strategy involves making the first request so large or effortful that it ensures its rejection, and then following it by a smaller request (which in fact is the target action). Scaling down the request gives the impression that it is a concession. According to Cialdini and Goldstein, the effectiveness of the door-in-the-face strategy in producing compliance depends on the concession being perceived as genuine (2004, 600). This aspect of the technique makes it ineffective in settings where the motive of the requester is likely to be viewed suspiciously, for example in a business context (Mowen and Cialdini, 1980, 253-254). Similarly to the foot-in-the-door technique, the effectiveness of the door-in-the-face technique was found to improve when the beneficiary of the second request was the person complying with the request rather than someone else (Millar 2001).
Cialdini argues that compliance to the second request is produced because the concession activates the norm of reciprocity (2004). The person rejecting the first request complies with the second request as reciprocation to what seems to be a concession on the part of the requester. Other explanations for the effectiveness of the strategy include guilt arising from rejecting the first request (O'Keefe and Figge, 1997; 1999) and the perceptual contrast between the two requests (Cialdini, 2004, 601-602). A time delay between the requests in the door-in-the-face strategy was found to lower the likelihood of compliance, which is in contrast to the foot-in-the-door strategy where such time lapse was shown to have no effect (Cialdini, 2004, 601).

In my opinion, this strategy alone is unlikely to induce local leaders to perform a series of behaviourally committing gestures in the context of a peace process. Firstly, the peacemaker's demand for a costly de-escalatory gesture in the early stages of a peace process could backfire, as the leader may think he is being pushed into a corner. Secondly, assuming the initial demand is rejected, the peacemaker's willingness to reduce the demand may be interpreted as a sign of weakness, which could lead the local leader to refuse compliance with the subsequent watered-down demand. Thirdly, is it likely that the norm of reciprocity would be activated just because the peacemaker agrees to reduce his demand? Arguably, this depends on whether such a norm exists within the leader's culture or within the particular relationship. Additionally, the effectiveness of the strategy would depend on whether the smaller request is perceived as sincere. Finally, the strategy's effectiveness will diminish if it is used repeatedly with the same leader. For these reasons, the door-in-
the-face technique may not in itself be sufficient to induce a series of committing gestures in the context of a peace process. However, it may be possible to use it as part of a sequenced approach to inducing committing actions from leaders.

**The low-balling strategy**

In the earliest experiments on the low-balling strategy, Cialdini et al. attempt to distinguish this strategy from the foot-in-the-door strategy (1978). They submit: ‘it might be argued that the low-ball sequence in which a requester secures an active decision to perform a target behaviour and then raises the cost of performing the behaviour is just a version of the foot-in-the-door procedure…While both techniques seek to gain performance of a costly action by obtaining accession to a less costly request, there is at least one important difference. With the low-ball tactic, the behaviour requested initially (e.g. buying a certain car, participating in a certain experiment) is in fact the target behaviour; only the costs of carrying out the behaviour changes. With the foot-in-the-door procedure, the behaviour requested initially, may be related to the larger favour desired by the requester, but is not the target behaviour itself” (1978, 466).

These researchers proceeded to test the difference in the effectiveness of the two strategies experimentally. One experiment contrasted the effects of the low-ball and the foot-in-the-door strategies in a situation where the experimenter knocked on the door of subjects and made a request for the individuals to display a pair of posters. For the low-ball strategy, subjects were informed upon agreement that unfortunately the experimenter did not have the posters with him, but that the posters could be
picked up from a certain location within the next hour. In order to represent the foot-in-the-door condition, the experimenter introduced the requests more gradually. He asked if the subjects were willing to display one poster in the window. If the subjects agreed, they were thanked and then a further request to display another poster on the door was made. If the subjects agreed again, then similarly to the low-ball condition, the experimenter apologised for not having a door poster with him and instructed the subjects where it may be obtained.

The results showed that the low-ball strategy caused more of the subjects to comply with the final request compared with the foot-in-the-door strategy. Thus, the researchers argued the superiority of the low-ball technique in producing behavioural compliance. Moreover, they suggested that the subjects in the foot-in-the-door condition never intended to perform the target behaviour (i.e. go to the specified location where the other poster could be collected) despite their verbal agreement. They argued that ‘since the full cost of the target action was known to these subjects before they were asked to agree to do it, many may have privately decided not to perform the costly action but rather to provide only the impression that they would’ (Cialdini et al., 1978, 468). However, the design of the experimental procedure creates doubts about the validity of this suggestion.

In the foot-in-the-door condition, as described above, once the first request was agreed to, the experimenter made the second request, but at this point, the subject is unaware of the extra effort required to obtain the second poster. This is similar to the low-ball condition. So, it is inaccurate to hold that the subjects in the foot-in-the-door condition knew the full cost of the target action before they agreed to it. It is also
not clear whether compliance was measured as success when both posters were
displayed or whether one was sufficient. Arguably, unlike the subjects in the low-ball
condition, the foot-in-the-door subjects who were given one of the posters may have
felt that it would not really matter that they did not collect the other poster, even if
they had verbally agreed to it. Since they could put up the window poster, their sense
of social responsibility may have been satisfied or the dissonance between the
cognition that they agreed to do something and the awareness of not acting
accordingly may have been resolved. These means of weakening the motives for the
follow-through were denied to the subjects in the low-ball condition. Furthermore, the
effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique depends on the extent to which the
initial act is behaviourally committing. In my view, the agreement to the first request
in the foot-in-the-door experiment was hardly committing. The interaction took place
between the subject and a stranger in private, and no effort was involved in agreeing
to the first request (as the poster was handed to the subject).

Interestingly, in his more recent work on low-balling Cialdini suggests that a
series of actions prior to and related to the target behaviour may be important for
increasing compliance using this technique (1984). In the 1978 experiment, Cialdini
and his fellow researchers did not require the individual in the low-ball situation to
engage in any intermediary action between agreeing to display the posters and actually
doing it. In his later work, based on covert observation of automobile dealers, Cialdini
claims that the dealers understand that getting the individual to perform a series of
small committing acts based on a promise of a bargain or a very good deal, makes it
difficult for the individual to withdraw from the transaction even after the bargain is
taken away (1984, 103). He says: 'once the decision is made [i.e. to buy a particular
car], a number of activities develop... a raft of purchase forms are filled out, extensive financing terms are arranged, sometimes the customer is encouraged to drive the car for a day before signing the contract, “so [he] can get the feel for it and show it around in the neighbourhood and at work” (1984, 102). Notably, these intermediary actions are behaviourally committing, and Cialdini suggests that the committing nature of these actions makes it difficult for the individual not to follow-through with his decision.

Joule found similar effects of intermediary actions on the compliance of smokers to a target behaviour of refraining from smoking for 18 hours (1987). In his experiment, compliance was increased in the subjects who had performed several actions between the initial agreement to participate in the study and the final revelation of the request for the target behaviour. According to Joule, these participants were asked to perform ‘various more or less costly behaviour... [such as to] first fill out and sign a questionnaire, then to set an appointment by phone, and finally to go to the laboratory [to participate in the experiment]’ (1987, 364). In other words, these participants have already invested a certain amount of effort, freely and publicly, which was likely to bind them to the line of action even after being informed that further substantial effort would be required to complete the line of action. Joule argues that his experiment demonstrates that inducing a sequence of intermediate actions increases the effectiveness of the low-ball strategy compared to the traditional experiment by Cialdini et al (1978), where requirement for the further effort is presented soon after the verbal agreement to the request.
In Joule’s experiment, the low-ball conditions are rather different to the original formulation of the low-balling technique by Cialdini et al (1978). The experimenter initially solicits a mere agreement from subjects to participate in his experiment without informing them what the experiment entailed (Joule, 1987). However, as quoted above, Cialdini et al (1978) argue that an important difference between low-balling and foot-in-the-door is that with the former strategy the individual agrees to the actual target action from the very beginning. This, in Joule’s experiment, would have required the subjects being informed that they would have to refrain from smoking for 18 hours. Since the act would be effortful to the regular smoker, low-balling may involve offering an attractive reward to induce consent but which is later reduced or withdrawn. Often some excuse or apology is given for the later retraction of benefit (or increase in cost). At this point, the individual would have to decide whether to continue with or change his course of action. Given the influence of excessive inducement, arguably the subject may feel justified to walk away from the experiment upon the withdrawal or reduction of the reward if his sole motivation up to the point of arriving at the appointed time for the experiment had been the large reward. This situation bears a resemblance to the promise made by the U.S. to Savimbi aimed at inducing the rebel leader to shift from armed struggle into dialogue (chapter 3). Savimbi was assured that he would win in any democratically held election in Angola. It is not possible to determine whether the U.S. government used the strategy of low-balling deliberately. This would have been the case, had the U.S. government known that the promised advantage was unlikely to materialise.

Overall, the evidence for the superiority of the low-balling over the foot-in-the-door strategy is still inconclusive. In my view, similarly to the door-in-the-face
method, the former strategy is not likely to be effective if used frequently. In a business setting, a company only needs to use the low-balling strategy once to induce a potential buyer to purchase its product or to enter into a contract. In the context of a peace process, the peacemaker may implement low-balling by making certain promises that hide the cost of engagement in dialogue or make attractive the performance of other committing gestures, for a particular leader. However, I discern two problems with the use of this strategy in peace processes. Firstly, the peacemaker may lose credibility in the eyes of the leader who was induced to act based on inflated promises. Non-fulfilment of promises may cause the leader to become wary of future promises from the same peacemaker. Secondly, the strategy relies on making inflated promises of benefits or hiding the true extent of the cost of an action. If the promises are wholly sufficient to justify compliance, then past acts may not be committing enough to hold the leader to the course of dialogue. Nonetheless, the different strategies may be more effective when used in combination. Let us consider how such an approach might be applied to induce leaders to become behaviourally committed to dialogue.

Combining the strategies to induce behavioural commitment to dialogue

Rather than testing the relative superiority of the above strategies, some academics have attempted to find out which combination of the different strategies may further increase behavioural compliance. Most notable research in this area is by Goldman and associates (1986). Goldman presents three arguments: (1) Inducing the individual to perform a relatively effortful action at the beginning would increase the strength of behavioural commitment present in the past action and make it more likely
for the individual to comply with a subsequent request. (2) However, if the individual refuses to comply with the first request, then he is also less likely to comply with a subsequent request. (3) On the other hand, it may be possible to use the door-in-the-face strategy by making the initial request large, resulting in certain refusal, and then following it with a moderate request. In this situation, the second or the target request could be more effortful or costly for the individual compared to an initial request in a foot-in-the-door situation. Goldman presumes that 'the face procedure would help insure that a larger proportion of individuals would agree to carry out the moderate task' which would serve as 'foot-in-the-door' for the final target behaviour (1986, 112-113). Obviously, as Goldman points out, there may be many other possible ways of combining the different strategies.

In the context of a peace processes, I pointed out that to use the door-in-the-face strategy in the beginning could lead to the impression that the peacemakers are weak in resolve when they subsequently reduce their demands. Also, I argued above that to start with a request that is most likely to be rejected could backfire and push leaders further into a confrontation mode of resolving conflicts. There is an important difference between the experiments on influence strategies and a peace process. In the former, the aim is only one final target behaviour but in the latter instance, each action performed by the local leader is in itself a target action. Every conciliatory and de-escalatory action is valuable and can potentially be built upon. In my view, the foot-in-the-door strategy is more appropriate in the early stages of a peace process. The peacemaker could attempt to induce the leader to perform a series of actions increasing in effort and irrevocability. The low-balling and the door-in-the-face strategies may be used infrequently when the peacemaker recognises their
appropriateness, under given circumstances. It may not be wise for the peacemakers to employ the low-balling or the face-in-the-door too often, as this would only undermine their credibility.
Chapter 7

Application of the analytical framework to case studies from the Northern Ireland peace process

Thus far, I have been using the behavioural commitment model to explore how confrontational leaders may become committed to inclusive dialogue. This analytical framework was drawn from the fields of social-psychology and organisational management, and relied on findings, ideas and theories generated in both experimental and field settings. Several peace processes and some of the leaders involved in these processes have been examined to adapt the framework to the context of the present study. In this chapter, the theoretical framework is applied to the case studies of two leaders involved the Northern Ireland peace process. Conducting crucial case-studies at this point is important for the refinement of the analytical framework and the identification of further questions for investigation.¹

Although there is a vast amount of literature – academic and journalistic, on the peace process in Northern Ireland, proposing varied hypotheses for the sustainability of the peace process; none of it investigates the commitment of the local leaders to the peace process. Thus, the analysis into the micro-level process of leaders becoming committed to remaining within a peace process arguably offers a new

¹ Jabri uses the crucial case-study method for a similar purpose, in investigating the decision-making processes of third-party interveners in conflict situations (1990). The author argues that such method is appropriate since understanding social phenomena is a gradual but progressive process (Jabri, 1990). Another source of support for the research approach taken in this thesis is Eckstein (1975). The academic voices his discontent with the trend in the field of political studies where finished theories emerge from minimal data and not much attention is given to robust theory-building, which he, similar to Jabri, argues is a gradual process involving several phases and different methods (1975). The lack of any previous systematic study of the subject of leadership commitment in the context of peace process means that the current research does not offer a theory from propositions and case-studies but rather an analytical framework that is sufficiently cogent to increase our understanding of the phenomenon.
dimension to our understanding of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The two leaders examined in this chapter are David Trimble, the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) from 1996, and Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein from 1983. In April 2005, a month before the U.K. general election, both leaders still remain in position.

The analysis begins at Sinn Fein’s imminent entry into formal negotiations, in September 1997. Formal negotiations commenced in June 1996, but until May the following year, when the Labour party won the British elections and its government endeavoured to bring Sinn Fein into the negotiation, little progress was made. As one participant observes, during this period ‘the talks appeared to be going nowhere’ (Durkan, Accord, 1999). There were several different strands in the negotiations, reflecting the endogenous and exogenous dimensions of the conflict: strand one dealt with the internal relations within Northern Ireland, including the equality agenda, policing and the political aspirations of the majority within the province; strand two, the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, including the historic ties and political aspirations of Irish nationalists; and strand three, the relationship between the governments of Irish Republic and Britain in the light of the historic link between the two neighbouring states and current domestic and regional political realities.²

The negotiations led to an agreement on 10 April 1998, which was publicly supported and consented to by all parties who participated in the substantive phase of the negotiation. The Good Friday Agreement (referred to hereafter as “the GFA” or

² The ‘three strands’ approach to resolving the conflict originates from John Hume’s proposals. See Drower (1995).
"the Agreement"), as it came to be known³, is better seen as an opportunity for the people of Northern Ireland to actually begin addressing the root causes of the conflict. Nationalists (including republicans) still maintain their aspiration for a united Ireland, whilst unionists want Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom. The GFA recognised the desires of both identity groups as legitimate goals. The difference post-Agreement is that the leaders of republicans, loyalists and unionists have committed themselves to far-reaching changes, albeit the seemingly unchanging effect to their group-goals. The UUP, at the time of the Agreement the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland⁴, and the loyalist parties, Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), agreed to an institution for specific co-operation with the Irish Republic on a whole island basis. They also accepted the possibility of a united Ireland, subject to republican leaders accepting that violence is no longer acceptable and that any change in the status quo would require the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

The above account is but a brief summary of a long process of negotiation, which took 22 months to complete. Next, I consider the leaders who participated in the negotiation process and those who were its spoilers. This will clarify my selection of the leaders for the critical case-studies. John Hume, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), was undoubtedly committed to the Northern Ireland peace process.⁵ For decades, this leader had consistently advocated dialogue and invested his effort into constructing an inclusive peace process. He clearly is not an example of a leader shifting from confrontation into dialogue, on which this thesis focuses. The

³ Officially known as The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiation, 10th April 1998. Also referred to as the 'Belfast Agreement.'
⁴ In the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections, DUP overtook UUP, gaining the majority of unionist votes.
⁵ Hume retired from leadership position in 2001.
polar opposite of John Hume is Rev. Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), who had always cried “No Surrender” and had rejected dialogue with republican leaders. A close ally of Rev. Ian Paisley at the time of the negotiations was Robert McCartney of United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP). When Sinn Fein, the main republican party in Northern Ireland with paramilitary connection, was admitted formally into the negotiations in September 1997, Rev. Paisley and McCartney withdrew from the on-going dialogue. Hence, at the starting point of my investigation both of these unionist leaders could not be considered as shifting from confrontation into inclusive dialogue. In fact, they were spoilers of the negotiations.

In the past, leaders from the loyalist community espoused the use of violence against the nationalist community. However, a new generation of leaders like David Ervine of PUP and Gary McMichael of UDP, who were involved in the negotiations from June 1996, demonstrated willingness to engage in dialogue with all groups in the conflict. As described in chapter 1, David Ervine’s personal transformation from paramilitarism to the acceptance of non-violent struggle on behalf of his community, occurred whilst the leader was in prison. Gary McMichael, on the other hand, was never a member of any of the loyalist paramilitary groups, but during the negotiations, his party was linked with and represented the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). McMichael was also ready to engage in dialogue with Sinn Fein despite its links with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), which murdered McMichael’s father, a loyalist paramilitary leader. With regards to dialogue with his enemies, McMichael’s view was: “we have spent—generally, in Northern Ireland—we have spent a long, long time being self-obsessed, and fearful of interaction with each other and between the communities. A lot of that still exists, but
it's only by removing the perceptions, and challenging the perceptions that you have of each other, that you learn to communicate at a human level... My view has changed dramatically over the years, because of what’s happened to me, because of, I suppose, a conscious decision to try and effect change.” (1999, O’Connel Street).

Other prominent leaders in the negotiations, such as Lord Alderdice (Alliance Party) and Monica McWilliams (Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, NIWC), were non-sectarian politicians that supported inclusive dialogue. Lord Alderdice led his party in February 1995 to engage in formal talks with Sinn Fein following an IRA cease-fire in 1994. And, the NIWC had been formed prior to the elections to the Forum in 1996 ‘to put forward an agenda of ‘reconciliation through dialogue, accommodation and inclusion’ (http://www.niwc.org/). Again, these two leaders were already committed to dialogue at the time of Sinn Fein’s entry into the multi-party talks.

In contrast, David Trimble as leader of UUP, declared himself as opposed to substantive negotiations with political parties linked with paramilitary organisations, unless those organisations decommissioned their weapons. David Trimble’s ascent to the helm of UUP has been attributed to his seemingly hard-line attitude displayed months before the UUP leadership elections. During the annual Orange Order march at Drumcree in July 1995, television cameras captured images of David Trimble walking hand-in-hand with Rev. Ian Paisley. This was seen as a triumphalist march through the nationalist, Garvaghy Road. Upon election, Trimble continued to appear as the bulwark of traditional unionism, by refusing to negotiate with the Irish government any matter considered as the internal affairs of Northern Ireland (9
February 1996, Guardian). Unlike the leaders of DUP and UKUP, Trimble did not withdraw when Gerry Adams led Sinn Fein into Castle Buildings for negotiations; to the contrary, bellicose Trimble announced that he was staying in the process to expose Sinn Fein’s “con-job” of being in the talks (4 September 1997, Belfast Telegraph).

While Trimble’s actions set him apart from the extreme stance of Rev. Paisley or McCartney, he was also unlike the other leaders considered above, who were willing to engage in inclusive dialogue with all parties, some despite their personal dislike of Sinn Fein or their opposition to paramilitary violence. At the starting point of my analysis, Trimble clearly appeared confrontational in his approach to the republican leadership, yet decided to participate in the multi-party negotiations. Trimble was not a leader who had previously advocated violence against nationalists or republicans (although he had been a member of a quasi-paramilitary organisation, the Ulster Vanguard, in the 1970s), but as Cochrane sums up, he was certainly viewed as ‘a man who would do little to help the peace process’ (2001, 341).

In chapter 1, I proposed that the shift from confrontation into dialogue is likely to be a gradual transition, especially for leaders who have advocated violence. This appears to be confirmed in the case of Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein’s president, who is also reputed to have been a high-ranking member of the IRA. The political objective of the IRA’s armed-struggle was to secure a British declaration of intent to withdraw from Northern Ireland. The demoralisation of IRA members during the 1975 cease-fire led Adams to consider a strong political side to the republican struggle for the reason that in the event of a cease-fire in the future, members’ morale could be maintained by channelling their attention and energy into lawful activities, like street agitation (Loughlin, 1998, 83). The 1981 hunger strikes provided the opportunity for
Adams to build upon the political side of the republican movement. As Sharrock and Devenport submit: ‘the election and death of [Bobby] Sands represented a high-water mark for republicanism, which had achieved favourable public comment throughout the world and a flood of fresh recruits to the IRA and Sinn Fein’ (1997, 180). This led to the formulation of the ‘Armalite and ballot-box’ strategy, which involved continuing with armed-operation and competing in electoral politics at the same time. Hence, between fighting elections, Adams would declare that the armed-struggle is ‘a necessary and morally correct form of resistance in the six counties’ and vowed to resign from Sinn Fein if it disowned the military struggle (Ware, 30 January 1995, Independent; Bew, Forthnight, September 1998, No. 373, 13-14).

Several reasons have been given for the republican leadership’s shift into dialogue, which started from the late 80s. Martin Mansergh was an insider to the peace process with a long-standing contact with Adams, from his years as special advisor to Albert Reynolds, and Bertie Ahern, as Taoiseach. He is of the view that the reasons that encouraged the republican leadership to consider dialogue and which brought about the IRA cease-fire in 1994 included ‘military stalemate and political stalemate, the courage displayed by governments and constitutional parties in dealing with the politicians close to paramilitary forces [specifically, Albert Reynolds and John Hume], the examples of breakthroughs and peace processes elsewhere in the world, the unprecedented high priority commitment given by a US President to peace in Ireland…’ (Accord, 1999).

Much of the blame for the collapse of this cease-fire in 1996 is attributed to the lack of will on the part of the British (Tory) government to engage Sinn Fein in formal
dialogue and the demand that the IRA decommission some of its weapons prior to the inclusion of Sinn Fein in political negotiations. However, a change of government in Britain in May 1997 led to the modification of the decommissioning pre-condition, the setting of a fixed period for the verification of IRA cease-fire and the admittance of Sinn Fein into formal negotiation. These changes were sufficient for Adams to convince the IRA to reinstate its cease-fire in June 1997.

Responding to this cease-fire, Ken Magginis from UUP argued that “there is nothing as far as the attitude of Sinn Fein or the IRA is concerned which suggests any commitment to the democratic process” (3 June 1997, Irish Times), but others such as Joe Hendron from SDLP were more prepared to accept that Adams was genuinely committed to seeking a settlement (2 April 1997, Belfast Telegraph). This juxtaposition of contradictory views about Adams’ true attitude leads Sharrock and Devenport to describe the leader as ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’ (1997, 450). They interviewed various actors involved in the conflict and it is revealing that as at the IRA cease-fire in 1997, there were as many who felt that Adams was serious about the peace process as those who thought otherwise (Sharrock and Devenport, 1997, chapter 32). Regardless of the ambiguity surrounding Adams’ attitude at the entry of Sinn Fein into formal negotiations, the leader can be described as one shifting from confrontation into dialogue. My interest is to consider if any of the leader’s actions from this point onwards were behaviourally committing.

An understanding of behavioural commitment, that is, being able to identify its presence and strength, facilitates the prediction of future consistency. It is this predictive power of the behavioural commitment theory which has generated interest
in its application in various other contexts, such as employer-employee relationship and other forms of interpersonal relationships. More recently, McCourt has extended the application of the model to the context of donor-recipient of international developmental aid (2004). McCourt argues that the behavioural model of commitment allows donors to assess whether the leaders of the recipient countries are likely to follow-through with the developmental programmes, and to generate behavioural commitment where it is lacking, such that donors can be assured that their funds are not wasted (2004). McCourt’s arguments are relevant to the present study; we could easily substitute the peacemaker for the donor and the context of international peacemaking efforts for the context of international aid. The ability to identify that a certain leader has become behaviourally committed to the path of dialogue is a form of assurance when attitude is not transparent. A failure to recognise this may lead to inappropriate responses that either weakens the leader’s emerging behavioural commitment or make it difficult for the leader to justify continuing with his line of action (as previously noted in the case of Sadat).

Besides Trimble and Adams as party leader and president, there are other individuals holding influential positions within their respective parties. This is especially true about their deputies. The support of John Taylor for Trimble and Martin McGuiness for Adams was crucial before they could convince others. For Adams, it was equally important to have the support of secondary-level leaders who were ex-(‘political’) prisoners, because they had the ‘street-cred to help bring along the most sceptical and violent members of their community’ (Fortnight, February 1999, 14). For his actions and decisions, Adams has managed to build an impression of solid support from the other position-holders, while the converse has been the case
for Trimble. From defections to stalking horses, every important decision Trimble has taken to include UUP in the peace process has led to highly publicised internal challenges. Recognising this complexity of roles and positions within these organisations, I nevertheless focus on Adams and Trimble. Such focus is justified as observers of and actors in the Northern Ireland’s politics agree on the centrality of these two leaders to the peace process. For instance, Brian Feeney comments: ‘in the last analysis, however, since the peace process meant bringing the republican movement intact into the political mainstream, the central figure responsible for achieving that goal was Gerry Adams’ (2002, 383). Trimble’s importance to the peace process was emphasised by Joe Hendron of the SDLP on the day of GFA: “If he says no [to the Agreement], the thing fails” (10 April, 1998, Irish News), and by Senator George Mitchell’s resounding remark: “even the dogs in the street know there will be no decommissioning, no possibility of decommissioning, if Mr Trimble is rejected....” (19 November 1999, Irish Times).

In the next section, I examine the actions of Adams and Trimble for the presence of the characteristics of behavioural commitment, in the period starting with the imminent entry of Sinn Fein into formal negotiations and ending with the historic bilateral meeting between the leaders in an effort to prevent the collapse of the implementation of the Agreement. Subsequently, I discuss the contextual influences. I then explore the possible motivational explanations for their behavioural commitment. Following this, I consider if any of the strategies considered in the previous chapter is evident in the various approaches of the peacemakers and guarantors within the peace process.
The Committing Actions of Adams and Trimble

Marjorie 'Mo' Mowlam, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from May 1997 to October 1999, claims that one of the first and most important aspects of making any peace process work is 'including people' (2002, 304). In a field experiment, Coch and French found that participation in decision-making made people more willing to invest their effort in the implementation of the decision compared to those on whom a decision was imposed upon (1948). Salancik also argues that inclusion facilitates the development of commitment, since it produces a sense of responsibility through participation (1977b, 35). For the republican leadership, being included in the formal negotiation meant that they had to perform certain actions, such as maintaining the IRA cease-fire and affirming to the Mitchell Principles. As we shall see, these actions were behaviourally committing. More generally, by being inside the negotiation process, republican leaders were investing their effort, talents and credibility into the project; thus, they acquired equal ownership of the process, and held equal responsibility for the success of the process. In contrast — exclusion, as practised by the previous Tory government and unionist leaders, arguably made it easier for the IRA to end its 18-months cease-fire in February 1996.

Like all the other parties in the talks, Sinn Fein had to commit to the principles of democracy and non-violence as an entry requirement (i.e. the Mitchell Principles referred above). Sinn Fein also committed itself to support the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. Regardless of the intention associated with the verbal commitment to the Mitchell Principles, let us consider the action per se, and the extent to which it was behaviourally committing for Adams. Besides the public and

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6 Trimble's predecessor, James Molyneaux suggested that Sinn Fein underwent a five-year period of quarantine before it could join any political talks.
unambiguous nature of the pledge, the content of the Mitchell Principles was in contradiction to what Adams had advocated previously. Adams had on many occasions argued that it was Sinn Fein's duty to "defend the IRA's right to wage armed struggle" (Sharrock and Devenport, 1997, 196, 213). The significance of the same leader leading his party into affirming the Mitchell Principles was noted astutely by Deaglán de Bréadún: 'no comets were seen in the sky, but maybe –just maybe – things would never be quite the same again' (2001, 62).

Despite its verbal nature, the magnitude of the act of pledging to the Mitchell Principles by Sinn Fein resounded deeply within the republican movement. Within the movement, it was reported that "the Mitchell Principles, and the Report, more than any other single event or feature of the peace process, have always had the potential to split both the IRA and Sinn Fein" (Moloney, 9 November 1997, Sunday Tribune). This is because the Mitchell Principles were antithetical to the republican belief that 'republicans without armed struggle are like birds without wings - unable to go anywhere' (McIntyre, 1998). On this basis, convincing the republican followers to support the leadership’s decision to pledge to the Mitchell Principles and to participate in dialogue could not have been an easy feat and it signifies a high level of responsibility.

The resignations that followed from both the IRA and Sinn Fein provide evidence that some members were unable to assimilate the action of their leaders, either cognitively or emotively. This increased the leader’s responsibility for having led the party into formal dialogue. Another costly implication was the emergence of the 32 County Sovereignty Committee as a pressure group to oppose the actions of
Sinn Fein’s leadership. The emergence of this group was obviously a threat to Adams’ credibility within the republican movement. The consequence of losing his credibility is pointed out by Professor Monica McWilliams (NIWC): “I found that there was a great deal of humanity amongst those people from paramilitary backgrounds, and they actually understood at times how others were trying to not reach an agreement, whereas they were pretty desperate to reach one because they could see themselves being the first to be killed if we didn’t” (interview, 2002). Deaglán de Bréadún also notes that ‘words can be a matter of life and death’ within the republican movement (2001, 274).

In chapter 2, I noted that in the literature on behavioural commitment, verbally agreeing to perform an act is considered less committing that actually performing it. Nevertheless, the above consideration of Sinn Fein pledging to the Mitchell Principles, indicates that verbal statements can be strongly committing for a leader who is himself shifting and attempting to shift his followers into dialogue. A strong behavioural commitment emerges when the verbal gesture is not only public and unambiguous, but also highly distinctive. Also, although the gesture may be merely verbal, as observed above, it may result in costly implications (i.e. members leaving the organisation). This heightens the responsibility of the leader and to that extent commits the leader to future consistency. Personal responsibility gives rise to the need to justify the action (chapter 5).

As late as July 1997, Trimble voted together with the DUP and UKUP against proceeding into the substantive phase of negotiations without prior decommissioning
of paramilitary weapons.\(^7\) Attention turned towards Trimble when the leaders of DUP and UKUP declared that they would leave the negotiations if Sinn Fein were included. Trimble’s decision was important, since without UUP the unionist representation would be insufficient for the talks to proceed. Appeals for Trimble to remain in the talks were along the following lines: “he [Trimble] can stand aside and risk being cast an enemy of the peace” or “swallow hard” and enter the talks “because the history books are waiting” (22 July 1997, Irish News). Conversely, there was also a formidable opposition, such as that from Rev. Ian Paisley who warned Trimble that he would find himself ‘a chief without Indians’ if he remained in the talks without the prior IRA weapons decommissioning (Dixon, 2001, 268). Trimble also faced an intra-party challenge, as UUP Parliamentarians, Martin Smyth and Roy Beggs publicly indicated that they were against remaining in the talks, and pointed out that the UUP’s advocated position had been “no weapons, no talk” (25 September 1997, Irish News). Under these circumstances, Trimble decided to recommend to the UUP Council to remain within the talks.

Even symbolically, the behavioural act of UUP remaining in the talks after Sinn Fein’s entry was likely to be committing on its leader, given the magnitude of the gesture. Regardless of the fact that Trimble refused to have direct talks with Gerry Adams, it was the first time since the “Troubles” that a UUP leader involved his party in negotiations that included republican leadership. The decision entailed considerable risks for Trimble, as there were no guarantees that the IRA would decommission during the talks. Publicity, the unequivocal nature and magnitude of Trimble’s decision, as already noted, are characteristics that have been found to bind the actor to

\(^7\) At this time, political parties associated with loyalist paramilitaries were involved in the procedural stage of the negotiations.
his action (Brockner et. al., 1979; Kielser, 1971; Salancik, 1977b; Mitchell, 2000). Another crucial factor is that Trimble did not appear to be browbeaten into the dialogue and thus it is likely that he had acted out of his own volition, which increases his personal responsibility for the action.

Events following Trimble’s unequivocal public stand in support of UUP remaining in negotiations could have also contributed to committing the leader to his decision. Political opponents within the unionist community took advantage of the situation to condemn Trimble. In a debate arranged between the leaders of the DUP, UKUP and Trimble, Rev. Ian Paisley warned a capacity crowd: “the union is in the hands of a negotiating body with Sinn Fein at the steering wheel” (26 September 1997, Irish News). Trimble did not attend the meeting. One analyst pointed out that the DUP and UKUP ‘could well go for the kill. The worst scenario for Trimble would be if elements of his own party joined them’ (Breen, Fortnight, October, 1997). Given the high decibel of criticisms not just from outside the party, but also from within the UUP, arguably it became essential for Trimble to demonstrate that his decision to remain in the talks was right. The criticisms aimed at Trimble could be seen as contributing to the degree of irrevocability of his line of action. However, it can be argued that at the point of entry into dialogue, the degree of behavioural commitment to the action may not be high since it could be seen as the first positive gesture in that direction.

Another factor that may have contributed to the UUP leader becoming committed to the peace process is his negative attribution of Sinn Fein. Though Trimble decided to remain in the negotiations, he would refer to Sinn Fein contemptuously as “a bunch of unreformed terrorist” and “fascists” (4 and 18
September, 1997, Belfast Telegraph). While some may argue that these words constitute ‘theatrical performance,’ to impress a certain audience (mainly his constituency) (Dixon, 2004), the literature on behavioural commitment, examined in chapter 3, indicates that words can bind the individual to a certain course of action. Of importance here is the way Trimble justifies his involvement in the project with the ‘fascists’. The project was dramatised and sold to the unionist audience as the right thing to do, as an undertaking in defence of unionist interests. Reneging from this course of action after arguing and convincing his group that it was right would have projected an impression of a misguided leader. As discussed in chapter 5, commitment researchers have argued that for those in leadership position external justification is a strong motive to sustain or escalate their efforts into continuing with a previously chosen line of action.

Although it is usual practice for peace negotiations to be conducted in private, when an agreement is achieved, it is commonly marked by a public ceremony. In Northern Ireland, a worldwide audience watched the live broadcast of Trimble saying “Yes” to the final package deal. The publicity of such gesture, as previously discussed, is a characteristic that may help to bind the individual leader to his action. Yet, as we have seen in chapter 3, there are instances when leaders renege upon public and formal peace agreements. It was argued that the degree of volition involved in the consent to a peace agreement is important in binding the leader to its implementation. I suggested that the amount of personal effort invested by the leader in getting to a peace agreement is another influence on the leader’s degree of behavioural commitment to the agreement. Let us proceed from these general propositions to take a closer look at Trimble and what had transpired within UUP negotiating team in the
last hours of the negotiations leading to the GFA, in order to identify factors committing the leader to the peace agreement.8

It was unfortunate for the UUP leader that just a day before the deal was made, his deputy, John Taylor, commented on the draft agreement as "untouchable and incapable of amendment, in whole or in part." The 'buck' was thus publicly passed to Trimble. The leader's responsibility became more apparent on the day of the Agreement, for not only was UUP negotiation team divided on the decision, but it was also the case for the UUP Party Officers.9 In those last few hours of uncertainty, Trimble took control. Steven King provides an insider account of the occasion: "he came and reported to the negotiating team, he said 'Look the Party Officers are divided, and the Party Officers have instructed me that I am not allowed to persuade you one way or other, but I'm saying to you that I'm going to go and agree to this. And if you're with me then we're going upstairs in 5 minutes time.' And people just had five minutes to decide whether they were for it or against it. I think it was very brave of David because he couldn't be sure how many people [would agree] and his leadership was very much on the line" (interview, 2002). Significantly, when Trimble came out to announce UUP's support of the Agreement to the waiting audience, his deputy did not accompany him. The media also focused upon the fact that another prominent figure in the UUP's secondary leadership, Jeffery Donaldson, had left the

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8 I am not able to examine Sinn Fein and Adams in this regard for the lack of information. A more accurate analysis of the events that transpired within the UUP is possible here as I was able to interview three insiders to the UUP negotiation team.

9 According to Peter Weir, the Party Officers are an annually elected group, of about 14. In an interview with the author, Weir explained that this group is a part of the principal body of the Party. He said that while the Party Officers were a separate group, a few of them were members of the negotiation team. Weir reveals that on the day of the Agreement it was not intended for the negotiation team to seek the Party Officers' view on the agreement However due to the degree of division within the negotiation team, it was decided that the final decision about the Party's consent to the Agreement should be taken by the Party Officers since they were considered the closes to the representatives of the Party (interview, 2002).
venue of the Agreement before Trimble’s announcement. This reduced any impression of collectivity behind UUP’s decision to support the GFA. Indeed, in front of the world audience and more importantly in front of his primary audience, the unionist constituency, Trimble appeared to bear most of the responsibility for the decision.

After pledging support for the GFA inside Castle Buildings, Trimble and Adams had to actively ‘sell’ the Agreement to their constituency in face-to-face encounters. Despite that during the referendum campaign Trimble and Adams provided contradicting interpretation of the Agreement\textsuperscript{10} — more significantly, they both became \textit{proselytisers} of the Agreement. Proselytising, according to Aronson et al., increases the degree of commitment to a course of action or to a decision (1994, 78-80). Having expended effort into convincing others, the individual is more likely to sustain his position —otherwise he would have to admit that all of the invested effort was a waste. Gerard argues that effort expended becomes a \textit{psychological cost}, which influences the decision to continue with the line of action (1968). Aronson et al. further point out that effort enhances the value of the project itself (1994, 81). Recall the reaction of the leader of the doomsday cult when the prophesy of a great flood and a rescue flying saucer failed to happen, as noted in chapter 3.

In Trimble’s case, Henry McDonald notes the leader’s ‘herculean task involved in fighting on two fronts —against Paisley and McCartney, and against his own dissidents’ (2000, 223). The month-long campaign saw Trimble canvassing support

\textsuperscript{10} Notably, at the launch of the UUP’s ‘Yes’ campaign Trimble claimed that “\textit{with the Union safe in our hands, we must look forward with confidence to the future}” (8 May 1998, Irish News) and that the GFA was an acknowledgement of the partition “\textit{by our enemies}.” On the other hand, Adams was saying that the Agreement is a part of “\textit{a process which is evolutionary and transitional... until Irish independence is achieved}” (4 May 1998, The Militant, http://www.themilitant.com).
through face-to-face meetings with the unionist constituency, as well as engaging in a televised battle with the UKUP leader. Peter Weir points out the consequence of the Agreement collapsing for Trimble, given his actions as a proselytiser of the Agreement: “it wouldn’t take long for people to say ‘well, hold on a moment, you recommended this, you’re submitting you’ve made a tremendous mistake, why should we ever trust you again’....So, their political fate is very much tied in with the long term success of the Agreement” (interview, 2002).

Adams’s task was probably equally difficult, for he had to convince his constituency to accept the Agreement which did not set a date for British withdrawal, but instead envisaged Sinn Fein’s leaders participating in the ‘partitionist’ Northern Ireland Assembly. On the morning of the GFA, Adams remarked: “That’s the way nationalists and republicans will come to this—come to it sceptically but I think hopefully they will asks themselves could it be a new beginning? And what we in political leadership have to do is to manage all of that. To be measured and try to move forward” (RTE, 10 April 1997).

A useful lesson can be derived from the foregoing discussion — to increase the likelihood of leaders sustaining their pledge to any peace agreement made on paper, the guarantors of the peace process ought to design a behavioural commitment procedure in the post-agreement period. Such a procedure should induce leaders to expend considerable effort in affirmative actions consistent with their pledge.

Deaglán de Bréadún remarks that the GFA ‘was certainly a point of no return’ (2001, 141). What would indicate an undoing of the Agreement? In a physical sense, a
failure to implement the Agreement would suggest a retreat or withdrawal. Was Trimble’s refusal to set up the power-sharing assembly envisaged under the GFA before the IRA decommissioned some weapons, an attempt to revoke the Agreement? Also, how difficult was it for Trimble to revoke the Agreement? One crucial factor was that the governments were able to proceed with the implementation of certain parts of the Agreement, especially those that did not require the co-operation of the UUP leader. For instance, though Trimble could prevent the setting up of the Northern Ireland Assembly, he would not have been able to stop changes to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), nor to prevent prisoners from being released. In this sense, there were aspects of the Agreement which Trimble could not undo.

The essence of Trimble’s dilemma was that he had become behaviourally committed to two competing positions! On the one hand, he had committed himself, in the eyes of his party members, to the stance of requiring decommissioning to occur prior to him entering into government with Sinn Fein. On the other hand, his previous actions during negotiations and in the following period, committed him to the implementation of the peace process. Having taken the decision to pledge his support for the GFA, in the following days Trimble faced considerable opposition not only from rival unionist leaders, but also from senior figures within the UUP. The day before UUP Council (UUC) voted on the Agreement, six of his negotiating team members (Peter King, David Brewster, Peter Weir, David Campbell, John Hunter and Arlene Foster) were firmly against the Agreement. There were also calls for Trimble’s resignation (Daily Telegraph, 18 April 1998). At UUC meeting, after what was described as an impassioned plea from Trimble, the Agreement was endorsed by a majority of 72% (Sunday Life, 19 April 1998). Notably, Trimble was only able to
secure a favourable vote by claiming that the British Prime Minister had provided assurance that decommissioning of paramilitary weapons would happen soon after the Agreement and that he would not proceed with the implementation of the Agreement without IRA decommissioning its weapons.

However, the presence of the characteristics of behavioural commitment in the series of actions he took during negotiations and thereafter suggests that Trimble had become committed to the Agreement and its implementation. For instance, we have examined the effort Trimble invested into the process of arriving at the Agreement, having to sell it to his constituency and confront his dissenters. As argued by commitment researchers, effort expended in a course of action commits the individual to a follow-through (Aronson and Mills, 1959; Aronson et al., 1994, 85-87; Brehm and Cohen, 1962, 29; Cialdini, 1984). His responsibility for the making of the Agreement was not only undeniable, but opposition leaders within the community did their best to remind the unionist grassroots of this. Furthermore, there were real and psychological costs involved with Trimble’s choice to support the Agreement. The immediate cost of the GFA was the emerging split within the UUP. John Hunter, a member of the negotiation team who opposed the Agreement, decried: “The party is tearing itself apart...It’s dividing constituencies and even families” (18 April 1998, Daily Telegraph). On the psychological level, ever since the GFA, Trimble suffered torrents of verbal abuse and daily pickets in front of his house by anti-Agreement unionists (McDonald, 2000). The risks and difficulties endured as a result of his previous actions would surely become meaningless if the Agreement collapsed. Also, a withdrawal at this stage, even if it were due to the failure of the IRA to
decommission, would only lead to “I told you so” from those unionists that had opposed the Agreement (Cochrane, 2001, 383).

Evidence seems to suggest that Adams also acted in committing ways. The failure of the Agreement in fact would have serious consequences for Adams. For Trimble, the cost may be the loss of his position as leader of the UUP, but for Adams it was a matter of life and death. For Adams, the decision to enter into dialogue carried a risk of assassination by dissident republican groups and by militant members within his own movement if he failed in his project. Adams’ involvement in the peace process had been much longer than Trimble’s. The origins of the peace process that culminated in the GFA can be traced to the talks between John Hume and Adams. As a Sinn Fein insider reveals, “the energy and effort that were put into those talks on our side were quite considerable” (Jim Gibney, as quoted in Feeney, 2002). Joseph Todd considers the Agreement was made possible by ‘more changes’ to republicans’ traditional commitments and to a ‘lesser extent’ by unionist concessions (1999). The Agreement, which envisaged a devolved assembly, signified a break from the long-standing republicans’ rejection of anything less than the end of partition (Todd, 1999, 56-57). Adams’ leadership had also conceded that decommissioning of paramilitary weapons has to form part of the peace process. This was an issue anathemic to traditional republicanism. Publicly, Adams’ responsibility for these changes within republicanism can be traced back to his speech in 1994, at the 89th Sinn Fein Ard Fheis. In this speech, he outlined his strategic vision towards a united Ireland. In the short term, it meant strengthening the nationalist agenda in ‘bread and butter issues’ such as ending job discrimination and securing the release of long-term republican prisoners. The GFA, strong on the ‘equality agenda’ could be interpreted as a
‘success’ of Adams’ project. To allow the collapse of the implementation of the Agreement would, however, reverse this success, yet leave the republican movement with substantial costs to bear. These factors suggest that a high degree of behavioural commitment had accrued on the part of Adams to the success of the peace process.

Trimble, influenced situationally by the high level of opposition within his party, may have felt that the only way to obtain the Party’s approval of the Agreement was to offer IRA weapons decommissioning as a precondition to the setting up of the executive. This placed Trimble in a position that conflicted with his behavioural commitment to the success of the GFA. Adams argued that the precondition made it difficult for him to secure the IRA’s consent to decommission its weapons, since it would create an impression that the IRA yielded to unionist’s pressure. One need not be an expert on Northern Ireland’s politics to conclude that Trimble’s demand fell outside republicans’ ‘latitude of tolerance’, in other words, it was repugnant to core republican sentiment. In the period following the GFA, both leaders appeared to lack political manoeuvrability, with Trimble being more restricted.

Under these circumstances, the Real IRA detonated the devastating bomb in Omagh on 15 August 1998. The indiscriminate violence towards both Catholics and Protestants resulted in the overwhelming public sentiment in favour of the peace process. The event produced a supervening favourable condition, which enabled Adams to make a statement on 1 September 1998, widely regarded as highly significant. Adams saying that ‘violence must be a thing of the past’ paved the way for the first face-to-face meeting between Adams and Trimble (Holland, 1999, 296). This meeting was the first time in 66 years that a UUP leader met with a Sinn Fein leader.
The meeting reversed Trimble’s policy from his stance earlier in the negotiations, forbidding his team from speaking to Sinn Fein negotiators. Such a public meeting between leaders of opposing sides in a conflict is a highly committing event. This is because it implies legitimacy of the opposing side, which is difficult to undo. The distinctive nature of the direct bilateral meeting between Trimble and Adams was enhanced, since it constituted the first visible concerted effort by these leaders to progress the political process.

It appears that the governments (especially the British one) played a major role in engineering the meeting, particularly in securing Trimble’s attendance. Mo Mowlam reveals that the meeting was part of a series of steps carefully planned by the governments (2002, 259). The British government was able to influence Trimble’s behaviour because it was an important audience for the leader. The role of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and his Irish counterpart, Bertie Ahern, as well as the U.S. Presidency under Bill Clinton, as important audiences, provided the social context which helped commit Adams and Trimble to the process of dialogue. I shall take a closer look at the role of these peacemakers and guarantors in the next section. Here, I consider the way they used rewards and punishments to induce Adams and Trimble to perform behaviourally committing gestures without negating the two leaders’ sense of free will.

To recall, behavioural commitment theorists posit volition as crucial for binding an individual to his actions. I argued in chapter 3, that the preservation of a high degree of volition is essential if short-term behavioural commitment is to lead to the
personal transformation involved in the formation of deeper attitudinal dimension of commitment to dialogue.

An important factor in the preservation of Adams’ volition to his actions in the peace process was the cordial character of his relationship with Bill Clinton. George Mitchell observes that ‘a transforming step in Adam’s journey [into constitutional politics] was the decision by Clinton to grant him a visa in 1994 to enter the United States. That validated Adams...’ (1999, 113). For Adams, the connection with the U.S. President was important as it provided international prestige and access to resources for the republican organisation. Although Clinton argued that his role was “to try to give aid, comfort and support to those who take risks for peace without trying to tell people what specific decision they ought to make...” (9 December 1995, The Times), McKittrick observes, “in Washington there is no such thing as a free lunch” (27 May 1995, Independent). Clinton’s strategy comprised mainly of providing rewards and promises to Adams, but there was a clear expectation of reciprocation. As Ambassador Holbrooke declared before the American Congress: “the President has clearly taken a risk on behalf of peace...The ball is in their [Sinn Fein’s] court to show that they are serious about removing the gun from the political arena in Northern Ireland” (16 March, 1996, USIS). According to Mo Mowlam, Clinton’s intervention was important ‘to get Sinn Fein back’ during the final negotiations of the terms of the Agreement (2002). Clinton himself admits to presidential pressure on Adams: “Adams said he still had people in the IRA that really didn’t believe in the principle of consent: they wanted to get outta Great Britain. And I told him that he was gonna have to wait for the Catholic birth rate to change the electorate for that to happen” (19 June, 2001, Irish Times). The message from Clinton
was that violence was not acceptable as means to achieve the republican aim. Nevertheless, Adams has never alluded to being pressured into the Agreement.

A good example of how volition was manipulated to create ‘an illusion of freedom’ is the case of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. As previously noted (113-114), in May 1997 a Labour-led government removed the precondition imposed by its predecessor, and Sinn Fein’s inclusion into the formal negotiation process was no longer dependent upon the IRA decommissioning some of its arsenal. Decommissioning was re-packaged and sold as a ‘voluntary’ gesture on the part of the paramilitaries in order to advance the peace process. As General De Chastelain argues: "Well, it is the IRA that decides when they would decommission...There is no means that we have of coercing them into doing this. Nor is there means of the governments" (interview, 2002). This does not imply that there was no pressure applied to procure IRA decommissioning. For one thing, through the establishment of the International Body on Decommissioning, the pressure to decommission became internationalised. Arguably, the implementation of other aspects of the Agreement, including the release of prisoners associated with the IRA and the initiative to reform policing in Northern Ireland, by the governments was also likely to put pressure on Sinn Fein and the IRA to deliver on their side of the bargain. Nevertheless, the impression created was that decommissioning is a voluntary act. This was a necessary face-saving gesture which enabled republican leaders to convince the paramilitary to put their ‘arms beyond use’ (IRA statement, 6 May 2000). By October 2003, the IRA had engaged in three acts of decommissioning of weapons.
The series of decommissioning actions by IRA, which were presented as ‘voluntary’ by the Decommissioning Body, guarantors and republican leaders, arguably militated external justification for the actions. Thus, arguably republican leaders (and their followers) had to find internal justification for their actions. To seek internal justifications, as Aronson et al. argue, is likely to lead to self-persuasion, in which case ‘we would expect the attitude change to be far more deep-seated and permanent’ (1994, 95). Having acted in ways contrary to past behaviour and belief without sufficient external reasons, dissonance is experienced. One way of resolving this dissonance, especially when the latest gesture is irrevocable (such as when weapons are decommissioned), is by rationalising and Self-convincing that the action truly reflects one’s intention. In other words, they ‘chose to do it for its own sake’ (Aronson, 1968, 19).

Let us now look at how the British government influenced Trimble. As formal negotiations were underway, Mo Mowlam would tell the parties that “the ball was firmly in [their] court and they need to discuss these issues frankly...if we are to bring lasting political stability an agreement that emerges must have the ownership of the parties” (28 January, Irish News). However, when it came to the final draft agreement, Mo Mowlam reveals that Tony Blair told Trimble that at this stage it was ‘too late now to make any changes’ to the document (2002, 221). Instead, the leader was offered a side-letter of assurance from the Prime Minister on the issue of IRA weapons decommissioning. Despite the pressure to support the Agreement, I propose that Trimble’s volition for his decision was preserved, since he assumes personal responsibility in a later statement: “The only thing I was ever locked into was the Agreement I entered into. Of course, when we entered into the agreement, we did so
with the absolute intention of carrying it through. Which is of course what we are doing” (my emphasis. Hearts and Minds, BBC, 10 December 1998). Trimble, at first, attributes responsibility for the decision to support the GFA to himself — which is reflected in the words “the Agreement I entered into”. Probably realising the implication of his utterance, he then changes tack to use the term “we” to impress that the decision was collective.

The presence of the characteristics of behavioural commitment in the actions of both, Trimble and Adams, indicates the emergence of behavioural commitment in both cases. I submit that the commitment was likely to be strong as a result of the high degree of responsibility and volition associated with some of the leaders’ actions.

**Contextual influences on the leaders’ commitment to dialogue**

In chapter 4, I discussed three contextual variables that influence the behavioural commitment of leaders to dialogue: (I) important audiences, (II) norms and rules and (III) future interaction. In this section, I examine the influence of these context determinants on Adams and Trimble.

(I)  
**The influence of important audiences**

The influences of three important groups of audiences are explored herein: (a) the peacemakers and guarantors, (b) the wider unionist and nationalist electorate and (c) the core constituency.
(a) Influence of peacemakers and guarantors:

In his presidential address at the 89th Ard Fheis (1994), Adams stated that: "the political reality of all this is that there can only be advance, continued advance, if we grasp the opportunities of the times. This means working together, even though we are rivals with other parties. It means winning and maintaining the backing of the Dublin government...and to obtain the powerful international allies the Irish nationalist cause needs" (my emphasis). This statement indicates that Adams viewed the support of the Irish government and international allies, such as the U.S. Presidency, as important to the furtherance of Sinn Fein's objectives. A pan-nationalist front was Adams' coveted spoils. If the Fianna Fail government, viewed as being sympathetic to the republicans' struggle in Northern Ireland, became a friend-at-court, republicans would not only have greater leverage when dealing with the British government, but also could have the Irish government as a 'spokesperson' for them.

An ally in the form of the President of the U.S. was also considered important for access to international prestige and material benefits. This reliance meant that these outsiders could influence Adams—directly through rewards for individual actions and indirectly through Adams’ concern about their opinion of him.

There are many instances during the peace process when the Irish government and President Clinton provided guarantees and 'credit' to Adams. Here I discuss a few significant examples to highlight the influence of valued audiences. Some of these examples predate Sinn Fein's entry into formal negotiations. The year after the first entry visa was granted to Adams, the U.S. President permitted Sinn Fein to fundraise in the U.S. and invited Adams to the White House. The *quid pro quo*, in the words of...
the Office of the Press Secretary of the White House was ‘the statement put forward by Mr Adams in which they agree to put decommissioning on the table at the talks with the British. We view that as an important step.’ It was disclosed that Adams’ statement was the result of Clinton seeking ‘a public commitment from Sinn Fein to include decommissioning... in the talks’ (News Alert, 13 March 1995). However, the Tory government’s pre-condition that the IRA must decommission some weapons before Sinn Fein could participate in formal talks created much fury among republican grassroots. Clinton’s December 1995 visit temporarily increased the public support for the peace process, but republicans’ expectations were dashed when the visit failed to shift the British government’s position on decommissioning. As a republican source revealed: “the ace had been played and nothing happened. Adams lost sway in the movement. A decision was taken to break the cease-fire” (15 February, 1996, Irish Times).

The formation of the government in the Irish Republic by Fianna Fail under the leadership of Bertie Ahern following the June 1997 elections helped to restore the IRA cease-fire. Ahern’s government was generally considered to be pro-nationalist, thus reviving the notion of a pan-nationalist front in the talk process. In December of 1997, the Irish government released six prisoners. The release came at a time when the more militant elements within the IRA wanted to end the cease-fire, as they disagreed with the affirmation of the Mitchell Principles by Sinn Fein (8 November 1997, Daily Telegraph). Adams also needed the political capital to counter public

11 At the time, other issues added to the republican rank and file’s growing dissatisfaction with the peace process. These were the statement by Sir Hugh Annesley, Head of the RUC that it was inconceivable for some prisoners to be released and the RUC treatment of republican protesters during the Ormeau Road Orange march in August 1995 (11 February 1995 Irish Post; 31 August 1995, Irish News).

12 The British government also helped to provide credits for Adams— for example, Tony Blair spoke in the House of Commons soon after election saying that he wanted Sinn Fein in the talks process and he re-opened enquiries into the ‘Bloody Sunday’ tragedy (26 June 1997, Irish News).
condemnation of his actions by senior figures such as Francie Mackey, a Sinn Fein Councillor for Omagh who had served the party for 13 years. Mackey resigned, saying that Sinn Fein's signing-up to Mitchell Principles was "against the republican position" (12 December 1997, Irish News). Referring to the Irish influence, Mo Mowlam notes that since Bertie Ahern's government was considered as "greener", this apparently allowed them to take a tougher approach to Sinn Fein without being accused of 'selling out' on republicans (2002, 73). The tougher stance was laced with rewards, such as Ahern's statement soon after the Agreement that he hoped to see a united Ireland in his lifetime and that the "North-South arrangement as something that will work over time and convince people that this is a better way of running affairs on this small island" (19 April 1998, Sunday Times). Again, the temporary release of the Balcombe Street Gang to enable them to attend the Sinn Fein's Ard Fheis at which a decision was to be made on the support for the GFA was an attempt by the Irish government to increase Adams' political capital and help him to gain his constituency's support.

These examples demonstrate how guarantors and peacemakers may provide rewards or promises to induce leaders to perform individual, behaviourally committing actions. Also, when a leader relies on the peacemakers or guarantors for tangible and non-tangible support, the latter's opinion becomes important. This enables peacemakers and guarantors to influence the leader's behaviour. The leader is aware that adverse assessment could result in withdrawal of valuable support. In the case of Adams, it was made clear to the leader that the support of the pan-nationalist

13 Interestingly, in interviews with the author, both Mitchell McLaughlin (Sinn Fein) and Steven King (UUP) said that the threats of 'walk-outs' from the talks did not mean that they intended to walk-out on the peace process, whereas another participant of the talks, Monica McWilliams that she "never took the threat of leaving seriously" (interviews conducted in 2002).
front and U.S. President would survive only if Adams persisted on the path of dialogue.

— The influence of peacemakers and guarantors on Trimble

In a televised interview on the day of the Agreement, Trimble said that he had been provided with a letter from Blair, which Trimble interpreted as assurance that Sinn Fein would not be allowed into Ministerial office without prior IRA decommissioning. A year after the GFA, Trimble admitted that “without those assurances there wouldn’t have been an agreement” (10 April 1998, BBC News; 10 April 1999, Channel 4, ‘One Year After Good Friday Agreement’). However, in another television news bulletin on the evening of the GFA, the Irish Taoiseach declared Trimble’s interpretation of Blair’s letter “incorrect” and asserted that the exclusion of Sinn Fein and others from government could happen only if they were involved in a parallel armed strategy. But, he argued: “that is not Sinn Fein’s position. As I understand them, they want to participate fully in the political process” (10 April 1998, RTE, Prime Time).

Why did Trimble choose to believe Blair, despite his fellow UUP negotiators, such as Jeffery Donaldson, doubted the credibility of the Prime Minister’s assurance? I suggest that one reason for the divergence in perspective between the leader and those within the UUP secondary leadership who opposed certain terms of the GFA is the difference in their previous actions. Jeffery Donaldson, Peter Weir and others within the UUP who opposed the Agreement were not seen as responsible for leading the Party into negotiations. Conversely, as argued in the previous section, Trimble’s responsibility for the shift in the Party’s position was highly publicised.
According to Peter Weir, when all other political parties in the negotiations except for the UUP responded positively to the draft agreement, Lord Alderdice argued “along the lines of... ‘You [UUP] blow this chance and you would not be forgiven’ ” (interview, 2002). The alleged threat reflected a real concern of the UUP leader. This is discernable from the following disclosure by Steven King: “I think as long as the IRA are not being half unreasonable than it is difficult for us to leave because the effect that would have on our relationship with the British government.... And David is pretty determined not to do that” (my emphasis, interview, 2002). On Trimble’s decisional balance sheet, the goal of maintaining a positive relationship with the British government may have outweighed the cost, namely the risk of acting upon Blair’s ambiguous guarantee. Peter Weir suggest “actually the main participants in their own mind had already mentally signed up to it anyway...There was a high degree of significance, in the two or three days in the run up to the Agreement with the involvement of Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern personally in it, which I think did help seal the agreement particularly with David Trimble” (interview, 2002).

(b) Influence of the wider unionist and nationalist electorate

As leaders of political parties competing actively not only in local elections, but also in elections to Westminster and the European Parliament, Adams and Trimble are ultimately responsible for the electoral performance of their parties. So, outside the core party followers, the larger pool of potential voters and supporters provide another important influence on these leaders’ decisions and actions. Leaders may experience
tension (a ‘push-and-pull’ effect) between the responsibility to ‘popularise’ their parties within the larger electoral audience and maintaining the loyalty of core followers. To win electorally may require actions that are not acceptable to core supporters, but which are favoured by the electoral audience. Yet, ‘pleasing’ core supporters could lead to poor electoral performance, for which the leader is the scapegoat.

In the case of Adams, the opinion of Irish voters south of the border became important, when in 1986 Sinn Fein ended abstentionism to the Dail. At the time, Ruari O’Braidaigh warned Adams that he was entering ‘the world of compromises’ by engaging in electoral politics (O’Braidaigh was the former president of Sinn Fein who opposed ending abstentionism. Mallie and McKittrick, 1996, 38-39). An IRA spokesman once observed: “our central base can take a hell of a lot of jolting and crises (25 October, 1993, Independent); but the wider nationalist electorate had reacted adversely to IRA violence. This meant that until the Northern Ireland Forum’s election in 1996, Sinn Fein failed to achieve advances in its trumped-up ‘ballot-box’ politics. However, when in the Forum’s election Sinn Fein made the unexpected, and the highest at the time, gain of 15.5%, this was considered a signal from the nationalist electorate for a continued cessation of IRA violence and the pursuit of nationalist goals through dialogue.

Assuming that the GFA collapses due to Sinn Fein or the IRA actions, and IRA returns to violence, this would frustrate the wider nationalist population’s expectations for peace and prosperity. The leadership is most likely to be aware of the

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14 There was widespread nationalist revulsion against IRA violence. Additionally, the majority of the nationalist electorate in Northern Ireland were more concerned with immediate issues such as gaining political, economic and cultural equalities (Ruane and Todd, 1998, p 180).
consequences of such a scenario to Sinn Fein, a prime beneficiary of growing electoral support. If a large proportion of nationalists withdrew their electoral support for Sinn Fein, this would also expose the hollowed nature of the IRA’s renewed violence. Thus, once Adams had entered into the formal process of negotiations, the concern about the opinion of the wider nationalist electorate made it more difficult for Adams to renege by increasing the cost of withdrawal.

In May 1997, an article titled “Shut up and talk” appeared in the magazine *Fortnight* (No. 361, 19-21). The article contained the results of a survey conducted by Queen’s University and *Belfast Telegraph*, which indicated that inclusion of all parties, including those with paramilitary association, into the talks process following a ceasefire and the affirmation of the Mitchell Principles, was within the latitude of acceptance of a majority of electorate interviewed (71% of both Catholics and Protestants). Trimble’s consultation with the wider unionist community prior to publicly agreeing to remain in the talks also indicated support for the peace process. In the period leading up to the GFA, according to Alban McGuiness (SDLP), the “public out there were generally supportive in both sides of the community; without that, I doubt the process would have been successful” (interview, 2002).

Sentiments of the electorate can, however, be like shifting sand, easily swayed by the most current issue. This is evident in the fact that while 71% of the Northern Ireland’s population voted in favour of the GFA, including a majority of unionists, shortly afterwards, a decline in the popularity of the Agreement became apparent when the anti-agreement unionists leaders only narrowly lost to UUP in the June

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15 The survey was conducted between March 12 and 26, 1997. A total of 932 face-to-face interviews were completed from 32 points across Northern Ireland to provide a representative sample of the population.
Assembly elections (Anti-Agreement unionists took 25 seats compared to UUP’s 28 seats). This decline was likely to have been due to, among others, the unionist electorate witnessing paramilitary prisoners being released without any visible gains for themselves.

A condition of being a faceless or nameless person in a crowd of people, or deindividuation, has been found to reduce the sense of responsibility for an action performed as a member of a group (Aronson et al., 1994, 335-340). This may explain the ease with which the unionist electorate who had encouraged Trimble to engage in the negotiations and had voted in favour of the GFA in the referendum subsequently withdrew its support for the implementation of the GFA. However, it was not so easy for Trimble to deny either his responsibility for negotiating the GFA or his support for it. For him to retreat from the Agreement would give an impression that his previous actions had been wrong. Thus, while the unionist electorate had induced Trimble to behave in ways which committed him to the peace process, after the electorate withdrew its support for the Agreement, Trimble could not do the same. The continuing decline of the popularity of the Agreement resulted in weakening Trimble’s position within the unionist community.

(c) Influence of the core constituency

The most immediate audience for a leader are the electing members of his organisation. As noted in chapter 5, transactional analysis of leadership assumes that members remain loyal or accept the leader and the leader’s actions only as long as members continue to experience benefits from their relationship with the leader
The relationship is one of 'mutual dependence' (Kuhnert and Lewin, 1987, 649); an exchange involving tangible payoffs and non-tangibles such as trust, respect and loyalty. The ability of the leader to retain his position depends on how effective he is in fulfilling the expectations of followers, and this forms yet another influence on the leader's choice of action. Trimble appears to fit the transactional analysis of leadership. Trimble's election as leader was based upon the exchange of a non-tangible pay-off, that is, party members' confidence that he would preserve traditional unionism.

At the same time as being in a transactional relationship with his followers, Trimble could also be described as an instrumental type of leader, based on Etzioni's classification. Etzioni classifies leaders either as instrumental or expressive. Instrumental leaders are concerned with setting and achieving group's goals, whereas the expressive types are skilled at maintaining the cohesiveness of the group (Etzioni, 1965). Some leaders may be capable of performing both roles. It is evident that Trimble is an instrumental type of leader, for instance, from a televised interview which he gave during the referendum campaign. During the interview, it was suggested to Trimble, that he could have better prepared his followers for the emotive issues such as the early release of paramilitary prisoners and the reforming of RUC. Trimble interrupted the interviewer to claim — "actually the strands 1, 2 and 3 are the really important thing. The really important thing is getting the constitutional position secured...Now the other things that you have mentioned are the consequences of an end to violence....The fact that people are focusing on those rather than the

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16 A list of academic writings on 'transactional leadership' is available in Kuhnert and Lewis, 1987
17 Trimble's action during Drumcree 1995 contributed to the image of a traditionalist.
structures shows that we’ve got the structures right. At the end of the day, it is the structures that really matter” (UTV Live, 14 May 1998).

Etzioni argues that task-oriented or instrumental leaders, like Trimble, seek ‘leaders of the complementary kind’, or the expressive type, to maintain solidarity within the group (1965). John Taylor, as his deputy, exercised the ‘expressive’ function and hence his support had been vital for Trimble to ensure that a majority of his followers continue to approve of his decisions.\(^\text{18}\) Although John Taylor may have appeared supportive of Trimble, he also has openly criticised Trimble, and is described by a colleague as having "more positions than the Kama Sutra.” (3 July, 1999, Guardian; Mowlam, 2002, 151). The opposition to the Agreement and its implementation from the upper echelons of the Party was often played-out in public, which further highlighted Trimble’s heavy personal responsibility.

Having examined the nature of the UUP leader, let us now consider the nature of his constituency. Unionists have been described as “almost legalistic”, “wanting certainty”, seeking “absolutes”, which is an “indication of [their] insecurity” (David Ervine, interview, 2002). “David Trimble has a constituency, and the constituency is driven by a set of morals that they weren’t complicit, they weren’t to be blamed. It is always, in a divided society, someone else’s fault, someone else’s responsibility...and Trimble had to grapple with that” (David Ervine, interview, 2002). This “substantial body” of constituents according to Steven King “just cannot morally assent to it [GFA]. And even if it protects their interest, in terms of constitutional position, they just regard it as immoral. And there is nothing you can do

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\(^{18}\) For instance, Taylor’s support was critical for Trimble to obtain the approval of the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) on the GFA, and on the decision to enter into the executive prior to IRA decommissioning.
about that” (interview, 2002). From a transactional perspective, Trimble’s constituency wanted him to provide them with certainty about being part of Britain and certainty about decommissioning. The certainty about remaining within Britain also related to physical symbolisms, such as the preservation of the RUC. The moralistic members also desired a leader who is like them, and as such found it difficult to assimilate their leader’s apparent position as an abettor to the release of paramilitary prisoners, as the consequence of the Agreement.

Having to deal with a moralistic constituency, could partly explain Trimble’s confrontational behaviour towards Sinn Fein during the negotiations. As Weir reveals: “whenever they [UUP’s leadership] do take some sort of leap of faith or make a compromise, then that tends to be fairly hurriedly followed up by on other perhaps more minor things, for want of better words, trying to play the hard man or trying to appear in a much tougher position” (Interview, 2002). Trimble had to appear uncompromising to prevent followers from switching leadership, especially to Rev. Ian Paisley. Although some may argue that Trimble ill-prepared his constituency for the Agreement, his elite supporters, such as Steven King would say that Trimble in fact managed, in difficult circumstances, to create changes within the Party: “Frankly, if you’d put the Agreement to the Unionist Party five years before hand, they would have laughed at you. If he’d said what he was going to agree to, he wouldn’t have stayed as leader for five minutes” (interview, 2002). Nevertheless, the lack of support for the GFA from his core constituency has had a negative influence on Trimble’s commitment to the peace process. This issue is considered further in chapter 10, where the barriers and obstacles to leadership commitment are examined.
Turning the focus to Sinn Fein, an important feature of the party was that it constantly appeared as a united front. As one member remarked: "Unity is our strength, and strength is our unity" (17 April 1998, Guardian). Adams has displayed the characteristics of a charismatic leader, performing both the instrumental and expressive functions of leadership.\(^\text{19}\) Any challenges to Adams’ decisions and actions in the peace process have remained largely unknown to the public at large. Politically astute, Adams ensured that those who commanded the loyalty of the more militant followers (and therefore the most difficult to convince) were delegated roles of expressive nature. His deputy, Martin McGuiness, and others such as Gerry Kelly, having been in prison under charges of republican militancy, played an important role in maintaining the solidarity of the republican movement. Brian Feeney declares that ‘careful preparation of grass-root’ members were a feature of Gerry Adams’ political leadership (18 April 2002, Irish News). Another writer observes that ‘having marched the IRA to the top of the hill in the mid-1980s, the real story of Gerry Adams is that he had been marching it down again ever since –so skilfully that some of them don’t even know it’ (Ware, 30 January 1995, Independent).

I asked Mitchell McLaughlin how the leadership avoided a major split in the organisation when it affirmed to the Mitchell Principles and then to the GFA. He replied: \textit{"We studied other international experience of peace processes and conflict resolution processes, and then particularly studied the South African experience... The most important lesson we got from the ANC was never to become separate from the base, to negotiate every step of the peace process with your support base. And we took that very much to heart. Now, Ireland is a much smaller country than South}\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\) Adams is recognised as an asset within the republican movement, because of his international stature and experience. Even Adams’ opponents acknowledge his abilities, albeit rather curtly: \textit{"that bastard has charisma"} (14 February 1996, Independent).
Africa, so it is possible for us, physically to talk to republicans, to bring republicans into central positions, to bring them into regional centres, and then to send our leadership to explain what is happening within the peace process, and what the next step would entail, and to negotiate with our base, in relation to their concerns...we kept them involved, we kept them informed, they owned the peace process because they participated in it, as a result we have had very very few dissidents” (interview, 2002).

Soon after the Agreement, speaking to an audience of about 4,000 republican followers in Carrickmore, Adams made sure that his followers felt a sense of ownership of the peace process: “This cannot be a leadership led struggle...Accept your responsibility to access this document – each and everyone of you.” Although Sinn Fein’s final position on the Agreement was subject to members’ approval, when Adams was asked if leadership also meant shaping the party’s opinion, he responded saying: “I think I am doing that” (18 April 1998, Guardian). Prisoners, as noted above, were also an important group for Sinn Fein, and in many of their rallies, ex-prisoners spoke of their support for Adams’ leadership. In his final analysis of Sinn Fein and the wider republican movement, Feeney concludes that ‘only Gerry Adams could deliver the republican movement in one piece’ and the reason for this was the ‘trust’ republican followers had in their leader (Feeney, 2002, 383; 9 November 1997, Sunday Tribune).

The potential for contradictory cues from different audiences is a significant issue in the consideration of leaders becoming committed to dialogue. I suggested in chapter 4 that leaders could be ‘pushed-and-pulled’ between the demands of external
allies and the need to maintain internal cohesion in the groups of followers. Such
tension was present in the case of Adams, for example, when demands were made for
Adams to denounce IRA violence: “I have a position of political leadership. I have a
very firm role and commitment to building a peace process; how I perceive it can be
developed and how I respond publicly to tragedies...not how that will go down in
Dublin 4 or wider” (my emphasis. Adams, 25-26 October 1993, The Irish Times). In
this instance, the leader was more concerned about his core supporters rather than his
external allies. I suggested in previous discussion that lack of political capital is one
reason for the inability of the leader to respond positively to the cues from
peacemakers or external allies when those contradict cues from the core constituency.
Also, in the early 1990s, when the above demand was made, it clearly fell outside the
latitude of tolerance of republicans. If the leader responded positively to the demand,
this would have lead to his rejection by the group.

Nonetheless, peacemakers and external allies were able to induce Adams to act in
committing ways, but only when they employed a gradual approach. Such an
approach appears effective when dealing with a leader who is shifting from violence
to dialogue since the leader has to maintain the loyalty of supporters who have lived a
life of war. As an ex-paramilitary member, David Ervine explains the problem for the
group that is shifting from violence — “those who lived a life of war, very often want
the war to go on. So as people try to grapple with the ending of a conflict, they are
filled with huge degrees of emotion. If I end the conflict does that mean I cease to
venerate our cause? Does that mean I cease to venerate our sacrifices?” (interview,
2002). This complex situation requires a charismatic leader, and Adams clearly
fulfilled this requirement. A charismatic leader is skilled in transforming his
followers, physically and psychologically, to accept his vision. Adams has been successful in directing the course of republicans’ actions according to his vision (as outlined in his speech at the 89th Ard Fheis. See above). But as Conger and Kanungo argue, even a charismatic leader is unlikely to be able to take any single drastic measure that is beyond the group’s latitude of tolerance (Conger and Kanungo, 1987). Since the leader himself is only able to transform his group gradually, the peacemaker attempting to induce such leader to perform committing actions is unlikely to succeed by demanding grand gestures in the early stages of a peace process, like the above demand for Adams to condemn IRA violence.

When the leader’s relationship with his constituency is of a transactional nature, as was the case with Trimble, we know that followers endorse their leader’s action only to the extent he is able to provide immediate rewards to his followers. Guarantors and peacemakers in the Northern Ireland peace process were able to ensure that their cues were acted upon by providing the leader with rewards to ‘buy’ the support of his followers. But when guarantors stopped providing rewards, Trimble found himself in a difficult position. Because he had acted in committing ways there was a pressure to continue to justify his previous decisions and actions, but he was faced with the lack of acceptance of the peace process from his constituency. As argued above, deindividuation allowed for easy shifts in position and support among Trimble’s constituency. This suggests that when peacemakers are dealing with leaders of a transactional type and their constituencies are not favourable towards dialogue with the enemy, it is insufficient to provide immediate rewards that temporarily produce acquiescence from these constituencies for their leaders’ committing actions. Peacemakers need to invest their efforts in transforming perceptions within the
constituencies. The peacemakers and guarantors in Northern Ireland failed to do so, particularly with the unionist community.

(II) The importance of norms and rules

As previously mentioned, the norms of democracy and non-violence underpinned the formal multi-party talks in Northern Ireland. The Mitchell Principles were accepted by a majority of those in the multi-party negotiations. To gain entry into negotiations, Sinn Fein had to agree to abide by these norms. The principles were presented as an expression of the expectations of the people of Northern Ireland. One of the formulators of the principles, George Mitchell, writes: ‘we met with dozens of government officials, political leaders, and business and religious leaders…We worked long hours every day, listening, asking questions, taking notes. Then we retreated to the Churchill Hotel in London for several days to make our decisions and write our report’ (1999, 29).

Dissonance theorists submit that when an action is inconsistent with past actions or beliefs, the individual is, cognitively, in a ‘noxious state,’ especially when the action is important (Markus and Zajonc, 1985). In such situation, empirical evidence shows that the individual’s perception of his past actions and beliefs undergoes a subtle adjustment to become more in line with the new behaviour (Cialdini et al., 1981; McGuire, 1966). For Trimble, agreeing to the Mitchell Principles probably did not have much of an effect since the leader saw himself and the UUP as advocates of the norm of non-violence. This was in contrast to the
Republican leadership for whom agreeing to the norm of non-violence was contrary to IRA tradition and rules, and specifically against the IRA’s General Order No. 5, Part 1(3), which stated that ‘an IRA volunteer shall not swear or pledge …in any way to refrain from using arms or other methods of struggle to overthrow British rule in Ireland’. Thus, as observed above, Sinn Fein affirming the Mitchell Principles was likely to have produced dissonance within the republican organisation. This dissonance could not be reduced by disowning responsibility for the action due to the depersonalised nature of the norm.

Another commiting aspect of Sinn Fein affirming the Mitchell Principles is the isolation of IRA from public and political discourse (McIntyre, 1998). After the Agreement, everyday life in Northern Ireland has witnessed some low intensity paramilitary activities, mainly on an intra-community level and in the form of punishment beatings and internal feuds (notably within loyalist paramilitary groups). However, the public affirmation of the norms of non-violence by Sinn Fein and loyalist leaders, denies those continuing to be involved in paramilitary activities the moral justification for their actions, which had been used by IRA and loyalist paramilitaries in the past. Those who continue with violence can no longer call themselves ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘defenders of community’, but they are likely to be classed as racketeers and Mafioso.

(III) **The inevitability of future interaction**

Future interaction between UUP (or the majority unionist party) and Sinn Fein was ensured by the GFA, due to the interdependence envisaged in the political
arrangements following the Agreement, coupled with the recent voting trend in Northern Ireland. In contrast to the period prior to the Agreement, when UUP leaders attempted to cut a deal with SDLP to the exclusion of Sinn Fein, it is observed that 'the Agreement is based on an informal coalition though without a coalition contract, primarily among the UUP, SDLP and Sinn Fein, the successful operation of its institutions, and hence the devolution of power...hinges on their co-operation' (Mitchell, 2001, 29). The 108-member Assembly is designed based on cross-community power-sharing. Ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive are not collectively responsible, but some decisions require unanimity, including those on government budget and the 'broad programme' for the government (Wilford, 2001).

With Sinn Fein’s growing electoral gains becoming a fait accompli, culminating in its largest ever election win of 17.65% in the Assembly elections of 1998, UUP leaders have no choice but to walk the same corridors, sit together in meetings and take decisions on key issues which require voting based on cross-community support. Sean Neeson of Alliance Party provides his opinion of the relationship between the different political parties working within the institutions of Northern Ireland: “I think that once devolution was established, the Anti-Agreement Unionist in particular have worked the system. They’ve tried to create an image outside that they are totally opposed but they’re working in the system......and I think that within the committees there are good relationships and good friendships...I am the vice-chair of the Committee on Enterprise Trade and Investment and I have very good relationship with Pat Doherty from Sinn Fein who is the Chair, as well as the other committee members...there is rapport developing” (interview, 2002).

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20 This trend continued in the 2003 Assembly elections, when Sinn Fein overtook SDLP as the party representing the majority of nationalist in Northern Ireland.
Alban McGuiness (MLA) a senior member of SDLP has a similar view: “I think there is an increasing trust. Over the years Unionists [UUP] are prepared to trust Sinn Fein more, I think we are prepared to trust Sinn Fein more. I think we are prepared to trust the Unionist a lot more. And I think the Unionists are prepared to trust us a lot more. But that is not to say that everybody trusts, no they don’t— but there is a great deal more trust and understanding amongst and between the political parties. Working together has helped to build trust. There is certain element of bonding that arises, but there is fierce resistance here to bonding on a personal level. But despite everything, I think bonding has taken place” (interview, 2002).

‘Trust’, however, is a rather imprecise term, with different import depending on the type of the relationship. More realistically, rather than achieving a true trusting relationship, an important consequence of the political structures in place in Northern Ireland since the GFA is the abandonment of UUP’s façade from the time of negotiations when they refused to deal with Sinn Fein directly. Sinn Fein under Adams’ leadership has taken up their seats in the Assembly and worked within the system, despite their objection to an internal solution during the negotiation process. The post-Agreement political dynamics has meant that both sides had to accept the inevitability of working together and co-operation to ensure smooth running the regional institutions. The consequence of this, as Alban McGuinness suggests, is that “... at the end of the day whether they wanted to or not, they became committed to the process and worked the process and maybe were forced into and absorbed into the process...when a system is established, people tend to be absorbed by the system” (interview, 2002).
From the consideration of the influence of context variables on behavioural commitment in the case of Adams and Trimble, I turn to examine possible motivations underlying the behavioural commitment of these leaders.

*Motives underlying the behavioural commitment of Trimble and Adams to inclusive dialogue*

In chapter 5, several propositions were made on the dynamics of the motivation underlying the behavioural commitment of leaders to dialogue. It was proposed that having acted in a behaviourally committing manner gives rise to a need to justify the action, to Self and others. Let us consider these motives in the context of Adams and Trimble.

*Motive I: Justification to Self*

Most experimental and field studies *infer* the operation of a self-justification motive when the conditions of behavioural commitment, such as high responsibility for a line of action, are present. Nevertheless, as previously observed in chapter 5, some researchers (Brockner et al., 1979) have obtained direct evidence that the self-justification motive underlies the behavioural escalation of a course of action. In considering this motive as a possible explanation for the behavioural commitment of Adams and Trimble, the arguments below are based on inferential evidence as direct evidence is lacking.
Looking first at Adams, he had a choice as to whether to lead his party into the formal negotiation. Admission into negotiations was, however, based on a pledge to the norms of non-violence and democracy. When Sinn Fein affirmed to these norms, the gesture was precedent-breaking. Precedent-breaking gestures are considered as ‘dissonance creating in the extreme’ (Mitchell, 2000, 130). Since this gesture was in great contrast to Adams’ past actions and stated belief, it can be inferred that Adams experienced some dissonance. It is evident that some IRA and Sinn Fein members did experience a sense of dissonance when their leaders, contrary to republican belief and tradition, pledged to the Mitchell Principles. The dissonance was resolved by them leaving Sinn Fein and the IRA. However, this mode of reducing dissonance was not an option for the president of Sinn Fein as the initiator of the gesture. Nor could the leader justify the gesture based on external pressure. Dissonance theory holds that the mode of reducing dissonance available to Adams is limited to subtly changing other inconsistent cognitions, such as to justify his decision by increasing the attractiveness of the decision or by appropriating the values reflected in the decision as one’s own standards, which in turn promotes behavioural consistency (Aronson, 1968, Janis and Mann, 1977, 283, Sherif and Sherif, 1967).

As considered in chapter 5, dissonance theorists argue that when an individual does not like others with whom future interaction is inevitable, and the individual has acted in a committing fashion in the course of the interaction, such that the implications of that action are salient and difficult to change, the individual is left with no other mode of resolving the dissonance predicted to arise given the situation, but to boost the value of his own action. As indicated by Steven King (interview, 2002), Trimble recognised that “he got a good deal on Good Friday” and that “what he did
was the right thing”. Could this suggest he felt a need to enhance the value of the Agreement as means of reducing the dissonance that would have been produced by the presence of conflicting cognitions in his situation? Trimble must have realised the inevitability of future interaction with Sinn Fein as well as being aware that he had acted in ways benefiting Sinn Fein. As these perceptions contradict his visible dislike for Sinn Fein, this situation would have induced dissonance. Since Trimble could not easily renege on his actions, this suggests that he would have had to convince himself that his actions were of value. Once the leader perceived his course of action in this manner, it becomes difficult to justify not persisting with it.

**Motive II: Social Implication**

When a person in a leadership position performs a highly committing action and also faces external evaluation and insecurity of position, commitment researchers posit that the person is likely to sustain the line of action as he is motivated by a need to prove to others that he was not wrong in an earlier decision (Fox and Staw, 1979, 453; see also chapter 5). The transactional nature of Trimble’s leadership implies greater vulnerability of position as such leader is subject to regular performance assessments. We have seen that Trimble had to fight back fierce resistance from within and outside the party, to nearly every decision he took, beginning with his decision in 1997 to remain in the negotiation process at Sinn Fein’s entry. He also had to overcome challenges to his leadership. These circumstances suggest that social implications could have been a factor underlying Trimble’s behavioural commitment to the peace process. The need to prove to others that his judgments were right (i.e. that the process would produce benefits to unionists) may partly explain Trimble’s
willingness to forsake his previous policy of avoiding any direct contact with Sinn
Fein and to engage Adams in face-to-face dialogue.

The political and personal implications for Adams, if he were to admit that
entering into dialogue, supporting the Agreement and the decommissioning of IRA
weapons had been a mistake, are self-evident. Of greater concern to Adams was the
threat to his life, if his project failed. The leader was also undoubtedly aware of the
consequence of frustrating the expectations of the majority of the nationalist electorate
for their own and future generations to be able to live in a peaceful environment, after
decades of violence. The consequence was described dramatically by David Ervine:
"it is inconceivable that we have given the people of Northern Ireland, almost a form
of Japanese water torture—you know, a drip feed that there can be an agreement,
there will be an agreement. To walk away from here will be the destruction of a lot of
political careers." (UTV at Six, 10 April 1998).

Retrospective rationalisation and prospective rationality

The need to justify to Self and to justify to others are usually considered as
underlying the dynamics of behavioural commitment. Individuals are also
prospectively rational, meaning that they take into account the objective costs and
benefits of continuing with a course of action. Informational uncertainties can
however adversely affect the ability to calculate the costs and benefits of a given
choice. Moreover, justification motives may lead to selective information processing,
which causes decision-makers to deviate from rational calculations. Let us examine
the force of the justification motives and prospective rationality at a key juncture in
the peace process, when the leaders had to decide whether to support the draft peace agreement or not. Teger defines such junctures as points of recommitment (Teger, 1980, 89).

The negotiators failed to arrive at an agreement by the deadline imposed by the chairmen of the negotiation process. We know that during the final hours of the extended deadline, Trimble encountered objections to the draft agreement from several of his negotiating team members, though at the same time, he was encouraged to compromise by the British government. The pressure on Trimble increased when all other parties indicated a favourable response to a formalised agreement. The conditions, in which Trimble had to make a decision is known in decision-making literature as one of 'hot cognitions,' similar to the 'public officials who make major decisions affecting the fate of their country' (Janis and Mann, 1977, 45). The decision of the UUP leader was a consequential one. The fate of the negotiations, and thus the prospect of long-term peace in Northern Ireland depended on Trimble’s support for the agreement. Under such circumstances, according to Janis and Mann, the leader typically experiences ‘a high degree of ego involvement in prior commitments, persistent longing for the gains they expect, and acute worry about high costs…’ (Janis and Mann, 1977, 49). The leader is in a state of intense stress, which affects his decision-making abilities in ways that further aggravate the conditions of bounded rationality.

The time constraint faced by the UUP leader also reduced the possibility for a comprehensive search for and processing of information. The UUP leader most likely considered the possibility of a challenge from within the unionist community if he
decided to support the Agreement, but the extent of the potential challenge was uncertain. On the other hand, the consequences of his original committing gesture to remain in the talks, and subsequent incremental investments made during the nearly two years of negotiations, would have been salient and arguably more tangible in his mind. Furthermore, the vociferous criticism of Trimble by other unionist leaders most likely evoked a need in Trimble to prove his detractors wrong.

It appears that the leader and some others within the UUP negotiating team did make an objective calculation of sorts. There was a sense of a lack of better alternatives, which Sir Reg Empey, a senior officer in UUP emphasized following the Agreement: "As members of the UUP and the pro-Union electorate begin to digest last week's events at Stormont, they should ponder....Historically, every time unionists leave the negotiating table without agreement, we come back the next time to a worse set of circumstances. There is no possibility that simple bilateral talks with government will provide a solution. Whitehall has long since abandoned this mechanism as a way forwards....The younger generation deserves a better chance than some of us have enjoyed to live their lives in a more stable society. I neither hear or see any credible alternative to the present process. Indeed had there been one we should have followed it" (my emphasis. 16 April, 1998. Newsletter).

The issue of whether Sinn Fein members would be excluded from holding office in the Northern Ireland Executive if the IRA delayed on decommissioning was surrounded by uncertainty. This uncertainty caused adverse reactions to the draft agreement from most of Trimble’s negotiation team, including his deputy. The uncertainty appeared to be addressed, at least in Trimble’s mind, by a side-letter of
assurance from the British Prime Minister. The assurance was that ‘if they [Sinn Fein] were part of the Assembly and people went back to violence’ then the British government would seek to ‘review the rules.’ The letter of assurance, on the face of it, was no better than the Agreement in clarifying the requirement for decommissioning prior to the setting up of the Executive, but Trimble appeared convinced and sought to convince others that there was a sure guarantee. Above, I raised the question about Trimble’s choice to believe the assurance while others in the negotiation team chose not to. I suggested Trimble’s behaviour could have been influenced by the high level of responsibility for keeping UUP in the peace process. To reiterate, high level of responsibility for an action is associated with strong ego-involvement in the action, which in turn has been found to result in greater resistance to depart from the chosen course of action (Sherif and Sherif, 1967; Staw and Ross, 1980). As a result, the individual would seek out information justifying the persistence with the ego-involved line of action.

To sum up, on the one hand, evidence suggests that justification motives were likely to have been present at this particular juncture in the peace process when Trimble had to decide whether to support the draft agreement. Sinn Fein members holding office without IRA decommissioning its weapons could have been considered as a cost in Trimble’s calculation. As we saw, this issue was shrouded in uncertainties which would have reduces the leader’s ability to conduct objective and prospective calculations. Nonetheless, it is apparent that Trimble considered the prospective options and saw no better alternative to the peace process. Thus, for Trimble at this juncture in the peace process, prospective rationality did not contradict retrospective
rationalisation, but in fact combined to motivate the leader to persist in the peace process.

Equally, Adams may have thought that republicans lacked a better alternative to the current peace process, as the only apparent alternative of the return to armed struggle was unattractive by comparison. Albert Reynolds, as Taoiseach, had warned Sinn Fein’s leadership of the inferiority of the armed-option: ‘they can detour away for another twenty-five years of killing and being killed – for what? Because, at the end of that twenty-five years, they’ll be back where they are right now, with damn all to show for it, except thousands more dead and all for nothing’ (Sharrock and Devenport, 1997, 345). As observed by Ervine, above, the political cost would have been high for Adams if he were seen by the people to reject the chance of an agreement. On the other hand, the benefits of being in the peace process for republicans are illustrated by Mo Mowlam: ‘it was easier to move on some of the nationalists issues – because they were often about making N. Ireland a fairer and more equal place to live for everyone’ (2002, 67). There have also been personal gains for Adams, such as his current international respectability. Sharrock and Devenport observe: ‘Adams is in some senses bigger than the movement from which he emerged… This, politically, is an incredible achievement… to be seen by ordinary nationalists not as a man responsible for contributing to the situation but as an honest broker with a difficult job’ (1997, 452). The justification hypothesis is also likely to apply in Adam’s case, for like Trimble, the republican leader shouldered the responsibility for many costly actions of Sinn Fein and IRA. The influence of psychological motives on republican leaders (and others) is revealed by Mitchell McLaughlin of Sinn Fein: “Some of these emotions were close to the surface. Very
powerful... They were very intense, emotional highs and lows and when it looked as it
did, from time to time that the process would grid to a halt, there was huge, huge
psychological pressure on all of us, to go back and have one more attempt. Nobody
at the end of the day wanted to walk away from the process, even David Trimble” (my
emphasis. interview 2002).

Summary and Conclusion

In this section, I consider how the above analysis furthers our understanding of
behavioural commitment and of how leaders may become committed to dialogue as
means of resolving conflicts.

The analysis above provided an excellent illustration of how local leaders’
volution for their compliant actions in a peace process can be preserved. This is
demonstrated particularly well by the issue of weapons decommissioning. We saw the
failure of the strategy based on requesting a major gesture (such as decommissioning
of weapons) as a demonstration of the leader’s attitudinal commitment to dialogue
prior to its commencement. The Labour government under Tony Blair took a different
approach: ‘if you have a big obstacle in your path, you have two choices: to butt up
against it again and again in the hope, however vain, that it will move, or to look on
one side and then on the other to see if you can find a way to go around it…’
(Mowlam, 2002, 155). Instead of testing the republican leader’s commitment, they set
out to induce committing actions from the leader. Publicly announcing that
decommissioning was voluntary and more in the nature of a good-will peace
promoting gesture was better received by the paramilitaries. The locus of the pressure
for decommissioning was also transformed from being a demand of the enemies to that of a compliance with a depersonalised norm, overseen by an impartial international body.

Quite unlike in any other peace process, after concluding the peace agreement the leaders in Northern Ireland had to take on the roles of proselytisers of the peace process. Not only were they publicly identifying themselves with the Agreement, but they also had to expend considerable personal effort in selling the Agreement to their respective communities during the referendum process. As we already know, publicity, effort and responsibility are characteristics that bind the individual to his action.

One significant problem apparent from the above analysis and not evident in earlier discussion is the possibility of the leader becoming behaviourally committed to competing positions. This happened to Trimble. Social-psychologist, Muzafer Sherif suggests one reason for such situations: ‘in times of change, individuals often are caught between the role expectations of the traditional community and the demands of developing trends...As the older framework is criss-crossed by developing trends that require giving up old prejudices and narrow alignments, individuals caught between them are bound to exhibit inconsistencies as one or the other loyalty becomes salient from one situation to the next’ (1966, 69). Opposing attributions may be situationally evoked, and when this happens, the result is conflicting behaviours. The negotiations leading up to the GFA and thereafter represent a period of accelerated change in the politics of Northern Ireland, as well as for the UUP leader on a personal level. Trimble’s decision to remain in the negotiations despite the entry of republican
politicians and the leaving of DUP and UKUP distinguished him as a progressive unionist leader. The loyalist leaders who were equally progressive in their approach to the conflict became Trimble’s measure within the negotiations. He was also urged by the guarantors and international leaders to be a peacemaker rather than a peace-breaker. However, his own side is often described as traditionalists, fearful and defensive (Cochrane, 2001, 372, 376, 379), and Trimble’s selection (and sustainability) for the leader’s position depended on his ability to appear similar to his electing followers, acting as a ‘symbol’ of the group’s attitude, values and goals. Trimble, therefore, was caught between opposing attributions, which led to him becoming committed to competing positions, in the period following the referendum.

I also looked at the influence of three context variables on the development of behavioural commitment to dialogue, on the part Adams and Trimble. Crucially, I identified the tension between contradictory cues from different valued audiences. Research on behavioural commitment and leaders in other settings has not delved into the problem of contradictory cues. The above analysis confirms the previous proposition (chapter 4) that if a leader lacks political capital, he is likely to reject the cue from a peacemaker to perform a committing action when this contradicts the cue from his core constituency. And, while peacemakers and guarantors may be able, at times, to indirectly influence the group’s cue by supplying rewards that momentarily ‘buy’ the acquiescence of the group, there are two factors supporting alternative and parallel strategies in building upon the commitment of leaders to dialogue. Firstly, a leader in a transactional relationship with his followers is subjected to regular assessments and must consistently supply benefits to the group for their loyalty. This implies that when the reward from the intervener stops, the leader may find that his
followers no longer acquiesce his actions. Secondly, acting as a group provides anonymity to the individuals within the constituency, and this enables the individuals in the group to easily shift their views. This leads to the problem of the leader nailing his colours to the mast, i.e. becoming identified with a particular position, while the peacemaker or guarantor readily provides benefits, only to find that his supporters have shifted their views, when benefits stop flowing in. It is suggested that if peacemakers find that the local leader’s constituency do not favour an inclusive peace process, in addition to supplying rewards to buy the acquiesce of the constituency, the peacemakers need to invest their efforts in transforming perceptions within that particular constituency.

I considered the motivating dynamics underlying behavioural commitment. In the case of the two leaders considered above, objective cost-benefit calculation did not appear to contradict the forces of justification motives, which meant that the influence of the justification motives could not be easily distinguished from that of prospective rationality.

Finally, in terms of strategies for building behavioural commitment, the approach of the Tory government could be seen as a variation of the door-in-the-face strategy. However, this strategy of demanding decommissioning of paramilitary weapons and then attempting to dilute the demand by focusing on an election mechanism to precede formal negotiations backfired and led to the collapse of the IRA cease-fire in 1996. The foot-in-the-door strategy appeared a better alternative, at least when it came to dealing with Adams. The grant of visa to Adams to enter U.S. and the promise of an ally in Dublin were crucial to procure the 1994 IRA cease-fire.
This was followed by another reward, offered by the U.S. administration in return for a more substantial request, for Adams’ agreement to discuss the issue of arms decommissioning with the British government. Later, by removing decommissioning of weapons as a precondition for Sinn Fein’s inclusion into formal talks, its leaders had perform the precedent-breaking gesture of pledging to the principles of non-violence and democracy. Nonetheless, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was seen as a necessary component of the peace process. At the final stages of negotiations, there was pressure from Clinton on Adams to accept the principle of ‘consent’ as the determining event for any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. This indicates that when a leader is shifting from confrontation into dialogue, a gradual approach is probably a better strategy for inducing behaviourally committing actions from the leader.
PART III

THE SUSTAINABILITY OF COMMITMENT TO INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE
Chapter 8

Commitment to dialogue: the development of attitudinal axes

One important effect of inducing individuals to perform behavioural committing acts that are contrary to their pre-existing attitude is that this results in attitude change consonant with the committing behaviour (Tiller and Fazio, 1982; Kanter, 1968). Researchers therefore propose behavioural commitment as an antecedent condition of attitudinal commitment (Meyer and Allen, 1991). This linkage is useful for conceptually progressing from Part II, which employed the behavioural commitment model to explore how confrontational leaders may become committed to dialogue, and this, Part III of the thesis, which will examine the development of attitudinal axes underlying the commitment to dialogue. The formation of deeper attitudinal dimensions of the commitment to dialogue is important for the longer-term persistence of the leader within an inclusive peace process.

Behavioural commitment has been found to influence the development of the affective axis of the individual’s personality system. In earlier discussion (chapter 2), I identified two other axes of commitment – the instrumental and the normative. When academics discuss attitudinal commitment, they use the terms ‘instrumental commitment’, ‘affective commitment’ and ‘normative commitment’ for convenience, although instrumental, affective and normative are in fact axes of the personality system underlying a particular attitude towards an object of commitment.

In this chapter, I discuss these different dimensions of attitudinal commitment and how these dimensions can be identified. Kelman (1958) found that the
manipulation of certain conditions results in distinct and corresponding attitudinal orientations. Commitment theorists have used this knowledge to identify the antecedent conditions which determine the presence of the three distinct types of attitudinal commitment. Some of these antecedent conditions are considered below.

In empirical research, by far the most favoured method for determining the attitudinal axes of commitment has been the ‘paper-and-pencil’ test, where subjects are ‘asked to make an active effort to be honest in completing the questionnaire items’ (Rusbult, 1980, 181; Allen and Meyer, 1991; Buchanan, 1974). This method has been criticised by Sherif and Nebergall, who argue that the subjects’ self-analysis is often more favourable then their later words and deeds. These academics suggest that a more accurate method to infer attitude is from actions and verbal utterances of a subject not ‘aware that his attitude is being studied’ (1965, 6). This method was employed by Surra et al. (1999), who use the language employed by the subjects in the study to decode the underlying attitude of the subjects towards their commitment.

I will use a similar approach in the next chapter to analyse the language and deeds of leaders from the Northern Ireland and South African peace processes at critical junctures of re-commitment in order to discern the underlying axes of their attitudinal commitment. I shall also attempt to elucidate the antecedent conditions that appear present in the case-studies. This exercise will provide additional evidence for inferring the underlying axes of commitment. The final section brings together the main arguments and propositions from the discussion in this part of the study, to help in the understanding of leaders and their attitudinal commitment to dialogue.
The Three Attitudinal Axes of Commitment

Although inconsistent terminology is evident in the literature on attitudinal commitment, I use the terms (I) instrumental commitment, (II) affective commitment, and (III) normative commitment to discuss the nature of each of these dimensions of commitment (Kelman, 1958; Kanter, 1968; Buchanan, 1974; Rusbult 1980; Meyer and Allen, 1990, 1991; Johnson 1999).

Instrumental commitment induces one to maintain a consistent line of action ‘not because [the individual] believes in its content but because he expects to gain specific rewards or approval and avoid specific punishment or disapproval’ (Kelman, 1958, 53). Based on this original formulation by Kelman, two issues need to be addressed to clarify the nature of instrumental commitment. First, is instrumental commitment based on a ‘positive’ cognition? That is the continuation of a course of action due to the benefits of continuing outweighing the costs of reneging. Some theorists conceptualise commitment more narrowly, as ‘the continuation of an action…resulting from a recognition of the costs associated with its termination’ (my emphasis. Meyer and Allen, 1991, 64; Stebbins, 1971). The seminal work of Howard Becker (1964) is often invoked in support of this restraining view of instrumental commitment. The second issue relates to locating the locus of control for instrumental commitment. According to some, it is always externally sourced (Johnson, 1999; Meyer and Allen, 1984). Can it equally originate as an internal personal state? Both issues have important implications for the sense of choice experienced by the individual for the decision to maintain a particular course of action.
Let us consider the first issue. Kanter conceptualises instrumental commitment as arising from positive cognition: 'when profits and costs are considered...profits compel continued participation' (1968, 500). On the other hand, Stebbins (1971), and Meyer and Allen (1984) posit instrumental commitment as a negative cognition. In the context of organisational commitment, Meyer and Allen claim that 'it is the threat of loss that commits the person to the organisation' (1984, 373). Stebbins as well as Meyer and Allen found weight to their argument in Becker’s conceptualisation of commitment (Stebbins, 1971, 36; Meyer and Allen, 1984, 372-373). Becker employed the notion of ‘side-bet’ to distinguish commitment from the observable tendency for behavioural consistency arising from commitment. ‘Side-bet’ has been described as ‘anything of value the individual has invested (e.g. time, effort, money) that would be lost or deemed worthless at some perceived costs to the individual if he or she were to leave the organization’ (Meyer and Allen, 1984, 373; 1991). Meyer and Allen refer to Becker’s example of the individual who wishes to leave his employment, but finds that if he does he is liable to lose his substantial pension fund (1984, 373). Meyer and Allen were right in interpreting the connotations of Becker’s example. Becker does give the impression of the individual experiencing a negative sense of being unable to leave the particular line of activity (1964). Becker, however, does not explain the reason for the individual to perceive his situation solely in negative terms of the costs restraining him from leaving the organisation.

Could not the same example be turned on its head, to argue that the individual at the point of deciding whether to leave or not, positively cognises the profit of remaining in terms of the accrued pension funds? In my opinion, the individual’s other experiences within the organisation are crucial influence on the individual’s
perception of his investment. For instance, a positive perception would be promoted by the experience of receiving information from the employer which suggests the fund is a benefit accrued in the course of employment. Conversely, an experience that involved the employer holding out the pension fund as ransom for continuing loyalty to the employer would produce a negative perception of the option to leave the employment.

Becker gives another example which similarly fails to clearly negate the possibility of the individual’s decision being influenced by the profit associated with remaining in a course of action. This example, first referred to in chapter 2, involves schoolteachers assigned to a ‘lower-class’ school choosing to remain at the school instead of opting for a quicker move to another ‘lower-class’ school that is better than their present situation. The reason Becker gives for the decision of the teachers to remain in their current position is that it betters their chance for future transfer to a ‘middle-class’ school. But when the opportunity arises for the teachers to move to a ‘middle-class’ school, according to Becker, change is no longer desirable because the teachers have adjusted their teaching style to suit the environment (1964, 282). This example seems to indicate a positive cognition— that there is a profit associated with staying, which will obviously be lost if the teacher decides to leave.

It is important to distinguish between the cases when the individual is feeling that he has to remain because there is a loss associated with leaving, and when he wants to remain due to the profits of staying on. The two contrasting perceptions will have divergent implications for the actor’s future behaviour. If the individual maintains a course of action because of a sense of restraint, the negative cognition
would result in an unwillingness to increase the effort, development of hostility to others (re-directing of frustration) and a lack of motivation to engage in creative problem-solving. This is equally likely to be true for the teachers in Becker’s example and for leaders engaged in a peace process.

I am not suggesting that all costs associated with discontinuing an action can be turned around and perceived as profits for maintaining the action. However, what I would like to emphasise is that in reality some aspects of the cost-benefit calculation can be influenced by how they are \textit{presented} to the decision-maker. The cliché of ‘perceiving the glass as half-full or half-empty’ comes to mind. In the context of a peace process, this suggests room for \textit{persuasion} in terms of how leaders perceive the value associated with remaining with the peace process. For the longer-term sustainability of instrumental commitment, outsiders with capabilities to provide rewards or punishment should attempt to create a \textit{positive cognition} as the basis for primary leaders’ decision to remain within the peace process.

The presence of alternatives is another important consideration in the instrumental model of commitment, according to Rusbult (1980), based on Thibaut and Kelley (1959). \textit{Rationally}, the individual is predicted to change his course of action if there is a ‘better alternative’ to the present course of action and the costs of withdrawal are outweighed by the ‘profits’ of the alternative. Conversely, when the individual perceives a lack of a better alternative, the individual will maintain his current course of action but feel dissatisfied (Kelly and Thibaut, 1959, 23). Thus, perceiving a lack of better alternative may produce superficial consistency, without any deeper qualities.
On a micro-level, in situations involving marital problems, Stanley et al. (1999) describe a successful application of the cognitive therapeutic strategy to help couples overcome their dissatisfaction associated with maintaining a relationship because of a perceived lack of alternative. This strategy helps people reframe their constraints into the “best choice in a given the situation. The strategy has been noted to produce constructive or improved behaviour in relationships, which previously were ‘empty shells’ (Stanley et. al., 1999, 383). Similarly, if the peace process is to develop into a genuine process of conflict resolution, it is not sufficient for leaders merely to maintain their involvement in the process. As leaders attempt to address the thornier issues in the conflict, they are more likely to face opposition from those who prefer the status quo to a compromise. Under these circumstances, leaders need to be willing to re-double their effort and to respond creatively in resolving the issues in the conflict. This suggests that even if commitment to the peace process is instrumental, it needs to be based primarily on a positive cognition.

The sense of choice over one’s course of action affects the cognitive state of the individual. Choice invokes a positive cognition, partly because of a sense of control over situations and one’s own fate. With this in mind, I address the second issue as raised above. Johnson says that commitment could arise from: (I) a ‘sense of wanting to’ remain with a course of action or association, also described as ‘personal commitment’; (II) ‘feeling morally obligated,’ or known as ‘moral commitment’; and (III) ‘feeling constrained,’ otherwise described as ‘structural commitment’ (1999, 74-75). Johnson’s notion of personal commitment is what other academics refer to as ‘affective commitment’ (Buchanan, 1974; Meyer and Allen, 1991). Here the focus is on his conceptualisation of structural commitment, which is akin to instrumental
commitment. Johnson takes a constraining approach to this type of commitment. Structural commitment, he submits, arises as a result of the ‘prohibitive costs if one decided to withdraw’ (Johnson, 1999, 75). For Johnson, structural commitment ‘is experienced as external to the individual’ (1999, 74). He distinguishes this type of commitment from commitment as an internalised condition, represented by the affective and moral types of commitment. Johnson argues that structural commitment induces consistency due to the actor recognising structurally imposed costs. The locus of control is external to the actor.

Among the four components of structural commitment identified by Johnson, of immediate relevance is Johnson’s inclusion of investments made into the current association. Another equally well-known authority on commitment and relationship, Mary Lund (1991), also distinguishes between internal locus of control and externally based forces when comparing the axes of attitudinal commitment in romantic relationships. But unlike Johnson, Lund proposes that the concept of investments takes the theory of commitment ‘from a quasi-economic evaluation of relation to a new level’ (1991, 218). Both Johnson and Lund agree that outsider pressure is an external locus of control on the individual, like ‘old commitment’ in marital relationship, which relies on friends, relatives and others, for its stability (Lund, 1991). Whereas, the ‘new commitment’ in relationships is identified by Lund as being based on personal investment that ‘puts pressure on the individual to choose voluntarily to maintain a relationship. To be committed to stay in a relationship from the perspective of one’s own decision and not from a position of dependence or obligation’ (my emphasis. 1991, 222). The locus of control is internal, with the actor; hence, the commitment to the relationship is stronger (Lund, 1991). Investments could
range from tangibles such as financial funds or concessions provided to the other, to non-tangibles such as effort, time and talent.

My position is that instrumental commitment could have dimensions of both externalised and internalised pressures. I also envisage a continuum, from a surface level to deeper internalised states of commitment — from instrumental commitment to deeper value-based commitment. Furthermore, I propose that within each dimension of commitment, the experience could vary, as exemplified by the above discussion of instrumental commitment and the external versus internal locus of control. Positive cognition may lead to the development of positive ‘affect’ towards one’s commitment. Thoits suggests that the growing research interest in the affective dimension reflects ‘the recognition that humans are not motivated solely by rational-economic concerns’ (1989, 317). More specifically, Leik et al., argue that ‘it is difficult indeed to imagine the existence of a commitment that has no strong emotional basis’ (1999, 240).

Affective commitment is generally viewed as a ‘favourable attitude,’ an internalised state in the form of ‘attachment’ and ‘involvement’ with the object of commitment (and one’s action in relation to that object), ‘apart from its purely instrumental worth’ (Adams and Jones, 1999, 12; Buchanan, 1974, 533). The notion of psychological reinforcement (Gove, 1994) and the concept of identity in symbolic interaction (Leik, et al. 1999), suggest possible manners individuals may develop an affective commitment to a particular project, role or relationship. Gove (1994) proposes that certain activities activate a ubiquitous, reinforcement process by producing internal reward or a sense of gratification. The more difficult, arduous or risky the behaviour (mentally or physically), the stronger is the sense of gratification.
Gove offers this intrinsic motivation as explanation for the willingness of mountaineers like himself to risk their lives and endure stressful circumstances during climbs. Identities and commitment, according to Leik et al., are ‘intrinsically connected concepts’ (1999, 245), since the affective attachment to certain roles means that one is more likely to favour behavioural enactment consistent with the role. Leik et al. claim that ‘the more salient an identity, the more committed one is to those roles…that evoke that identity’ (1999, 245-246).

The affective attachment to a course of action or goal, according to Sherif and Nebergall, leads to consistency in behaviour (1965, 6). Others have noted that affective commitment is characterised by improvements in the quality of one’s involvement, such as increased efforts to ensure the success of the project, to act beyond narrow self-interest, ‘absorption in the activities of one’s…role’ and willingness to engage in constructive problem-solving; the last characteristic has been noted to be prominent in stable marital relationships (Buchanan, 1974; Leik et al., 1999; Andrews, 1991; Meyer and Allen, 1991). Affective commitment may cause the individual to exhibit stronger emotional reactions, such as dismay, annoyance and disappointment when events are out of line with the success of the object of commitment. At the same time, events in line may produce a sense of satisfaction, pleasure or pride (Sherif and Nebergall, 1965, 6).

Normative commitment is characterised by behaviour that reflects personal sacrifices, and pre-occupation or devotion of Self to a course of action or a goal (Weiner, 1982, 421). Normative commitment is defined by Amartya Sen as ‘when one acts on the basis of a concern for duty which, if violated, could cause remorse, but the
action is really chosen out of a sense of duty rather than just to avoid the illfare resulting from the remorse that would occur if one were to act otherwise' (1977, 327).

This conceptualisation of commitment can be traced back to the ancient proposition in the Bhagavad Gita. In this text, Sri Krishna beseeches Arjuna: ‘The world is bound by Actions other than those performed for the sake of Yajna. Do therefore, O son of Kunti, earnestly perform action for Yajna alone, free from attachment.’ Yajna is to offer ‘the best and the most useful in one for the welfare of the others’ without attachment to rewards of the action (Chidbhavananda, 1997, 222-223). This type of commitment, according to Sen, ‘drives a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare, and much of traditional economic theory relies on the identity of the two’ (1977, 329). Under an instrumental view of commitment, the continuation of a chosen line of action is premised upon the action enhancing personal benefit. However, normative commitment may lead one to choose to maintain a course of action, even though it does not maximize personal benefit, but because it is the ‘right thing to do’ (Weiner, 1982, 421). This is not to say that normative commitment always leads to choice that reduces personal benefit. It is equally possible for one to choose an action which maximises personal gain, but where the dominant reason for the choice is a sense of duty. Kelman submits that normatively influenced action is performed, because it is considered ‘intrinsically rewarding’ (1958, 53).

Though normative commitment may differ from instrumental commitment in the manner described above, the issue of ‘choice’, as raised earlier in the consideration of instrumental commitment, is also important here. Some authors create the impression that normative commitment is an internal constraint that removes choice from the actor (Johnson, 1999; Allen and Meyer, 1991). In the context of a marital
relationship, Johnson submits that normative commitment 'is the feeling that one is morally obligated to continue a relationship whether one really wants to or not' (my emphasis. 1999, 74). Meyer and Allen propose that because of this sense of constraint or lack of choice, 'obligation may carry with it an underlying resentment' with adverse behavioural implications, such as a 'cut back on the level of effort' (1991, 78). The sophism of this argument is however revealed when we look at John Hume. I believe that the normative nature of this leader’s commitment is beyond contention. Unlike any other leader in the peace process, Hume had dedicated nearly all of his political life to advocate and orchestrate a process of peaceful dialogue to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland (Drower, 1995). To say that Hume’s commitment is underlined by a sense of constraint, however, would hardly be accurate. It is more plausible to propose that some individuals indeed experience their obligation as a constraint, in which case the degree of commitment is unlikely to be as strong as in the case of others who consider the fulfilment of a specific obligation as a reflection of who they are and the values that they believe in. For the latter, of which Hume is an outstanding example, performing the obligation is a choice-related action.

Importantly, normative commitment is found to be influenced by, among others, the individual’s socialization process (Weiner, 1982). For instance, Drower considers the influence of primary socialization on the attitude and actions of John Hume, later on in his life: ‘Sam’s [Hume’s father] politics were Labourite, decidedly non-sectarian and pre-dominantly motivated by an impulse to help other...Like her husband, Annie Hume was a kindly community-minded soul’ (1995, 21).
This chapter has examined the three distinct dimensions of attitudinal commitment. These dimensions may be present individually or concurrently. The attitudinal axes of commitment can also proceed through stages of development. For example, in Teger’s dollar auction experiments, subjects appeared to progress in the intensity of their commitment, from an instrumental to a more normative basis for their attitude towards their action of continuing with the betting (1980). I would like to emphasise the aspect of the experiment that necessitated the change of the basis for the subjects’ attitude. There was a point in the auction when bidding (investment) exceed the value of the prize, and at that point, rational calculation became untenable as motivation for continuing with the bidding (Teger, 1980, 89).

Figure 6 summarises the above discussion and places it in the context of leaders and their commitment to dialogue. In the figure, it can be seen that different antecedent conditions promote the development of the three distinct dimensions of attitudinal commitment to dialogue. In some cases, empirical studies have shown that certain antecedent conditions can contribute to the development of more than one dimension of attitudinal commitment (Meyer and Allen, 1991). Some of these conditions, such as behavioural commitment, gratification and identification have been noted above. The axes of commitment progress through stages, although it is also possible for the three-attitudinal dimensions to be present simultaneously.

All three dimensions of attitudinal commitment, at the minimum, influence the decision to continue participation in the process of dialogue. Merely observing a continued participation by leaders in a peace process is unlikely to convey much about their underlying attitude. Instead, we need to look at the quality of participation. When
a leader appears to be a passive participant in the peace process, he may be persisting due to a sense of constraint. This attitude may be characterised by an apparent lack of initiative in progressing the peace process, and only reacting to others' initiatives. Hence, in Figure 6, negative cognition is proposed to result solely in continued participation. It is uncertain whether the continued participation based on such a sense of constraint would lead to the longer-term consequences of commitment, particularly, to encapsulate the means of resolving the conflict.

On the other hand, instrumental commitment based on positive cognition results in actions similar to those based on affective and normative commitment (Rusbult et. al., 1999, 438). These axes of commitment are proposed as precipitating active participation and other actions that promote the peace process (Fig.6). Admittedly, some leaders may be primarily motivated by instrumental considerations, while they could be dealing with leaders who are normatively committed to the peace process. However, it is hypothesised that a shared interest emerges between the leaders at the point when they recognise each other's commitment to the peace process. Often leaders assume during negotiations that there is no sphere of common interest, but Deutsch points out that it is possible for parties to develop a common interest, despite continuing competition in other respects (1949, 132). It is proposed that when each leader to the negotiations realises that he is dependent on the co-operation of the other, at the very least, to avoid his investments into the peace process from becoming 'sunk', this would increase the probability of a co-operative exchange between leaders. Interdependence of commitment causes the particular role and actions of one leader to become indispensable to the quality of outcome for the other (Adams and Jones, 1999, 12; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959, chapter 7). The
interdependence of commitment between leaders ‘A’ and ‘B’ is proposed as reinforcing the behavioural outcomes of commitment, since leaders are reassured of their partners-in-dialogue (Fig. 6). There are two possible longer-term consequences of deeper attitudinal basis for the commitment to peaceful and inclusive dialogue: encapsulation of means of resolving conflicts and stable co-operation between leaders, despite their competing interests (Etzioni, 1966). At this stage, the peace process may be viewed as having reached maturation.
Figure 6: *An attitudinal model of the sustainability of the leader's commitment to peaceful and inclusive dialogue and its outcomes*

- **Encapsulation of Means**
  - Co-operation
  - Long-term consequences
  - Recognition of interdependence of commitment
  - Continuous participation

- **Antecedent conditions**
  - e.g. behavioural commitment, gratification, socialisation

- **Dimensions of Commitment**
  - Leader A's
  - Leader B's

- **Affective**
  - Normative

- **Uncertainty**
  - Positive reinforcing effect
Note: In the figure, the arrow leading from antecedent conditions to the dimensions of commitment indicates the direction of influence. The flow of the arrow, from instrumental to affective and then to the normative axis, indicates the deepening process of commitment. It is however possible for the three dimensions to be present simultaneously. This is represented in the Figure by arrows originating outwards from each axis of commitment. A dotted arrow is used in the figure to link continued participation arising from a negative state of commitment and longer-term consequences of commitment, suggesting a low probability of such progression. On the other hand, the solid arrow, linking commitment based on positive cognition, positive affect and normative reasons with the longer-term consequences, represent a relationship with greater probability. While it is not shown in the Figure, a similar model could be used to analyse leader B’s attitudinal commitment. The recognition of the interdependence of commitment between the leaders is proposed as having a positive reinforcing effect for longer-term behavioural outcomes in the process of resolving the conflict between the groups.
Most authors have attributed strong instrumental motives to both Sinn Fein and UUP leadership for their initial involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process (Mac Ginty and Darby, 2002, 79; Cochrane, 2001; Feeney, 2002; Mallie and McKittrick, 1996). Likewise, Pierre du Toit argues that the ANC and NP initially shifted towards dialogue, as a result of instrumental calculations: ‘the military stalemate resulted from, on the one hand, the ability of the state to contain the armed insurrectionary plan of the ANC and, on the other, its inability to displace the armed presence of ANC inside the country. The ANC could, and did, succeed in executing armed actions...inside the country, but they could not succeed in establishing ‘liberated zones’ (2001, 92). It is necessary to distinguish the instrumental reasons for the shift from confrontation to negotiation and the development of a commitment to remain in dialogue as means of resolving a conflict. This chapter focuses on the four key leaders in the two peace processes, Adams, Trimble, Mandela and de Klerk, in order to further the understanding of the formation and development of attitudinal bases of commitment to dialogue. I examine their actions and statements during critical junctures in the peace processes, since at these junctures the underlying attitudes of the leaders are most revealing.
Critical junctures in peace process as periods of study

The Northern Ireland peace process

Just prior to the May 1998 referendum in Northern Ireland, Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke of the GFA as providing "probably the best and most secure way forward for the people in Northern Ireland." He further argued "in this day and age, in 1998, two years off the millennium, there has got to be better way forward than the way we have had before..." (18 April 1998, Belfast Newsletter). The peace process in Northern Ireland has survived into the millennium, although it still appears fragile.

The two years following the GFA provided critical tests of the commitment of the pro-Agreement leaders to the implementation of the Agreement. The leaders were first tested soon after the referendum, when Trimble refused to enter into the Executive with Sinn Fein unless the IRA decommissioned their weapons. I will use Trimble’s actions and statements during this period to infer the nature of his commitment to the peace process. Another critical juncture in the peace process occurred in February 2000 when the British government suspended the Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA), this time to avoid Trimble’s resignation as First Minister from taking effect. At this critical juncture, I analyse Adams’ behaviour, including his statements, to determine the nature of his commitment to the peace process.

The South African peace process

The successful transition to democracy in South Africa, similarly to the Northern Ireland peace process, involved a series of "stepping stones" rather than a single deterministic event (Mo Mowlam, 1998; Ottoway, 1993, 104). Soon after Nelson Mandela’s historic release from Victor Verster Prison, ANC and de Klerk’s National Party (NP) met in earnest to determine the course of negotiations. The
Groote Schuur Minute (4–6 May 1990) records: ‘the government and the African National Congress agree on a common commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiation.’ One of the journalists present at the meeting’s closing ceremony describes Mandela as ‘beaming’ with confidence that “the state president means what he says”, while de Klerk spoke of Mandela’s lack of bitterness (Ottoway, 1993, 106-107). Despite the promising start to their negotiating relationship, soon the escalating violence at the grassroots level cast doubts on the credibility of both de Klerk and Mandela. They appeared either to lack effective control over their own group, or worse, to be conniving the grassroots level violence. Each leader would gradually come to question the genuineness of the other’s commitment to dialogue. The period following the deadlock at negotiations (CODESA II), when ANC initiated a policy of ‘rolling mass action’, could be said to be a critical juncture in the South African ‘peace process.’ The ensuing violence, such as the Boipatong massacre in June 1992, affected the process of dialogue between the leaders. Although at the time when ANC initiated its mass action, its leaders may not have contemplated a prolonged suspension of negotiations, the escalation of violence did just that. Nine months would pass after the violence at Boipatong before formal negotiations were back on track. I believe that this period of deadlock, street protests and violence, constituted a litmus test of both leaders’ commitment to a peaceful transition to inclusive politics in South Africa.
Case-studies (1): David Trimble and Gerry Adams

Senator George Mitchell returned to Northern Ireland in September 1999 to initiate a review of the GFA, designed to overcome the barriers to the implementation of the Agreement. The period of review, which came to be known as the Mitchell Review, is considered an important juncture in the peace process for two reasons. Firstly, it emphasised the importance of inclusivity for a successful peace process. In Northern Ireland, this meant including not just the republican leaders, but also the ‘minor’ political parties that had previously contributed much effort and energy into negotiating the GFA. McWilliams and Fearon, from the Women’s Coalition, claim that prior to Senator Mitchell’s review process, the two governments often neglected the ‘minor’ parties in their attempts to overcome the obstacles to the setting-up of the political institutions in Northern Ireland. In their opinion, inclusion of the leaders of the minor parties in the post-Agreement talks could have had a positive influence on the three big players (the UUP, SF and SDLP) (McWilliams and Fearon, 1999). In contrast with these talks, the review included all pro-Agreement parties.

The review also led Trimble to recognise that Sinn Fein was not just part of the problem, but were now an important player in the ‘solution’ (Mac Ginty and Darby, 2002, 67). Mac Ginty and Darby, with the authority of their many years of research in Northern Ireland politics, regard this as Trimble’s crossing of the Rubicon of inclusivity (2002, 67). Secondly, the review also resulted in Trimble accepting devolution prior to decommissioning of weapons by the IRA, which was crucial to the
survival of the peace process. Did this gesture prove that those who accused him of “bleeding the process dry” had in fact misjudged the unionist leader? (Mallon, 1999)

Notwithstanding the potential biases in the literature, at the time of the Mitchell Review, the predominant view seems to be that Trimble’s commitment to the process was purely instrumental (McDonald, 2000, Mac Ginty and Darby, 2002, O’Malley, 2001). The view of some observers of Irish politics fits the leader’s commitment specifically into the ‘constraint’ type of instrumental commitment. For instance, O’Connors notes that ‘peace process is a term he [Trimble] resolutely avoids’ and claims it as evidence of the lack of depth in the leader’s commitment to the peace process (2002, 178). It is also observed that ‘the UUP leader was anxious not to be blamed for the collapse of the process’ (Mac Ginty and Darby, 2002, 67). As an insider, Steven King appears to confirm the instrumental-constraint nature of Trimble’s commitment: “I think people are rational calculators and people will stay in this process if they’ve got a reason to stay....Maybe people don’t hang in there positively, maybe more negatively” (interview, 2002).

A group of US congressmen were already lobbying for the forfeiture of Trimble’s Nobel Prize, while loyalist leader, Billy Hutchinson (PUP) publicly said that if the peace process collapsed, Trimble was to be blamed (McDonald, 2000, 284). Under these circumstances, according to McDonald, Trimble ‘realized that if unionist rejected the deal [the review], the alternative would be far more detrimental to the union in the long run….unionism would remain politically impotent, friendless and powerless in the world’ (2000, 320). These views of observers and insiders strongly place Trimble’s experience of attitudinal commitment at this juncture of the peace
process within the Johnsonian ‘constraining’ type of instrumental commitment.

Arguably, the penalties for withdrawal were high enough for Trimble not to renege from the peace process.

However Arthur Aughey submits that, as opposed to fatalistic unionism, Trimble-ism is optimistic in character, but is a rather ‘delicate flower’ (2001, 185). Aughey argues that, like the protagonist in the novel ‘The Leopard’, Trimble realised that ‘if you want things to stay basically the same then certain things have to change.’ In other words, Trimble calculated that a response that differed from traditional unionism would be beneficial to unionism in the long run. Although, the conclusion above was that the constraining-type of instrumental commitment probably best described Trimble’s commitment to the peace process, Aughey’s analysis suggests that a positive cognition of the benefits of the peace process (now and in the future) may have had a greater influence on the leader’s decision to remain in the process. In a similar vein, Peter Weir (ex-UUP) affirms: “pro-Agreement Unionist...want to keep the process going, first of all, because there is a belief that there is a certain amount of gains that had been gained from it” (my emphasis, interview, 2002). One such gain was the changing world opinion towards unionism, reflected in the awarding of the Nobel Prize to the unionist leader. David Kerr, Trimble’s press officer, claimed: “Up until 10th December 1998 the only image the rest of the world had of unionism was Ian Paisley shouting and screaming in Belfast, London and Strasbourg. Now the world had a different image of unionism in the shape of David” (McDonald, 2000, 281). Other crucial gains include the restoration of Stormont and the election of Trimble as the First Minister of Northern Ireland. Thus, Trimble’s instrumental
commitment could be said to be a mix of both positive and negative cognition related to being in the peace process.

During the review period, Trimble also appeared to exhibit some willingness to engage in creative problem-solving. As observed in the previous chapter, researchers on commitment consider such behaviour as reflective of deeper commitment. In order to persuade the Party to support his decision to enter into government with Sinn Fein prior to the IRA decommissioning its weapons, Trimble submitted a post-dated resignation letter (from the post of First Minister) to take effect in case of the IRA failing to decommission its weapons. Although some may argue that this action was not a ‘creative’ option, it was in fact crucial for persuading the majority of doubting party members to support the reversal of the party’s policy. Hence, by taking a risk the leader prevented the collapse of the review and by extension, the peace process. This behaviour is in contrast to his previous demeanour of being an unwilling participant in the peace process.

Another important change in Trimble’s behaviour during the review period was the shift from his previous style of ensuring that he was not seen as negotiating single-handedly. During the review, he did not object either to moving the venue for negotiation outside Northern Ireland, to the US ambassador’s residence, or for negotiations to involve only the party leaders, aided by one other member. This led to the accusation: “whole process has been so shrouded in secrecy that not even the Assembly members, never mind the officers of the Ulster Unionist Party and the MPs, have any idea as to what Sinn Fein/IRA put on the table...” (William Ross, UUP MP. 15 November, 1999, Belfast Newsletter). Again, in stark contrast to his previous
confrontational approach to Sinn Fein, at the new venue Trimble appeared willing to participate in occasions designed to enhance rapport between the two leaders (McDonald, 2000, 315-316).

By the end of the review, Trimble provided a more constructive and conciliatory gesture: “we now have a chance to create a genuine partnership between unionist and nationalists in a novel form of government. The UUP is committed to the principles of inclusivity, equality and mutual respect” (17 November 1999, Belfast Newsletter). In spite of the warning from senior members of the UUP: “if David Trimble puts this forward as our stated position to George Mitchell [i.e. setting up the Executive before IRA decommissioning] then I think we will have to start looking for a new party leader,” Trimble managed to gain a narrow majority of 58% from the UUP ruling body in support of the agreement reached at the Mitchell Review (27 September 1999, Irish Examiner).

As mentioned above, most analysts consider Trimble’s decision to set up the executive prior to decommissioning as instrumentally motivated. Early on in the negotiations leading to the GFA, Trimble does appeared to be a passive participant. His motivation to remain in the process could have been due to penalties associated with withdrawal. As Sean Neeson from the Alliance Party explains: “from the Unionist perspective [the alleged] threat of joint sovereignty, by the two government, hung over our heads, whereby the local parties wouldn’t have a say in the running of Northern Ireland. I think things like that certainly, focused minds” (interview, 2002). This assessment appears to have changed very little since the Agreement, as Steven King puts it: “we are not looking for a way out of this process. Because it is a very
steep cliff that we'd be walking off” (interview, 2002). Nonetheless, it is also evident that there were benefits for Trimble and the unionists for being in the peace process, such as the better relationship with the British government, a more positive image of unionists internationally and Trimble in the position of First Minister. Hence, a positive cognition of the benefits of the peace process could have equally motivated Trimble to remain in the peace process which included Sinn Fein.

The emergence of a deeper dimension to Trimble’s attitudinal commitment cannot be ruled out. This was particularly apparent in his willingness to risk his position and the glint of a personal crusade evident in his perseverance during the review period, in the face of his deputy, John Taylor breaking ranks. I asked General de Chastelain if Trimble was normatively motivated. The General replied: “there was a certain feeling of ‘we have a chance of doing something now that will help the circumstances’ ” (interview, 2002). Indeed, Trimble did engage in behaviour indicative of affective and normative commitment. He appeared willing to risk losing the confidence of the unionist electorate by reneging on his earlier election promise of not entering into government with Sinn Fein prior to IRA weapons decommissioning. Sacrificial behaviour, as noted in the previous chapter, has been found to be a characteristic of deeper commitment.

Also, Trimble’s language at the time does speak of a commitment to the process. For instance, in a condemnation of loyalist attacks on Catholic families during the review period, he said: “I have no doubt that those responsible for those attacks were hoping that they could in some way deflect or destroy the process” (29 October, 1999, The Herald, Glasgow). He would reiterate — “I can repeat the commitment I made
through the talks and after the agreement, that this process will not fail for the effort on our part” (22 September 1999, Belfast Telegraph).

Admittedly, public statements by politicians may not reflect their private attitudes. Heskin, who uses a similar source in his psychological analysis of the conflict in Northern Ireland, acknowledges that the public statement of a politician is a ‘fickle ally,’ but can be used together with other sources of communication and knowledge, for ‘a picture must be pieced together’ (1980, 1). Thus, in drawing a conclusion on the nature of Trimble’s attitudinal commitment, some of Trimble’s gestures and statements are indicative of commitment deeper than a purely instrumental attitude towards his participation in the peace process. Yet, the evidence is not completely satisfactory.

The main reason for this problem is the lack of direct access to the subjects of this study. Even experimenters such as Sherif and Nebergall (1965), who as we know criticise the accuracy of the self-assessment method as means of discerning the nature of people’s attitude, had access to their subjects for indirect questioning and observation. Access to subjects provides researchers a measure of control over data collection. For the purpose of the present study, this was not possible. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, by determining the presence of antecedent conditions of the distinct axes of commitment, this provides another form of evidence for the dimensions of a leader’s commitment, i.e. it allows for validation of the findings through triangulation. The antecedent conditions present in the case of Trimble and the other three leaders will be examined in the next section. Here, I
continue the examination of the actions and statements of these leaders to consider the inferences that can be gathered from this form of evidence.

Turning next to Gerry Adams, many unionists still doubt that he is committed to peaceful means of resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland, to the exclusion of violent methods. However, there are many other leaders and insiders to the peace process who are willing to put their reputation at stake by arguing that Adams is genuinely committed to the peace process. Ironically, just days before the suspension of the NIA in February 2000, the Prime Minister made the following statement: “I believe they [Adams and McGuiness] are committed to the peace process” (7 February 2000, Belfast Telegraph). Another insider to the peace process, Michael Oatley, a former M16 officer, also voiced his belief in the republican leader’s commitment: “The prime minister has said that he accepts the sincerity of the two principal spokesmen [of Sinn Fein]. From longer experience, I have no doubt at all of their commitment to finding a political way forward. I should be surprised if most participants in the Mitchell review did not share this view by now” (31 October 1999, Sunday Times (London)).

Oatley argues that Adams recognised the benefits of changing the means of pursuing the republican goal of a united Ireland. As a “witness to their decision” the former secret agent explains: “They [Adams and McGuiness] saw a new way to attract attention to their cause....they did not abandon their armed campaign because they needed a rest or thought it had become irrelevant. On the contrary, it was clear to them that it [the peace process] had put Irish constitutional issues higher up the political agenda than at any time since 1920” (31 October 1999, Sunday Times
Additionally, the growing electoral support for Sinn Fein, a new ambition at the level of the European Union, the ambiguities inherent in the GFA, and setting-up of cross-border institutions, are factors that suggest a strong positive instrumental motivation for Adams commitment to the peace process. This makes it difficult to distinguish the presence of a deeper commitment for the peace process in the leader.

However, the display of emotions such as frustration, disappointment and annoyance in circumstances when one's position is challenged or when facing an impending set-back is considered as a characteristic of a "deep down", affective, commitment to a position or course of action (Leik et al. 1999; Andrews, 1991, 193-185; Sherif and Nebergall, 1965). As Leik et al. assert: ‘committed persons have strong feelings’ (1999, 240).

Strong emotions have been visible in the leader, especially when the peace process did not appear to progress. The suspension of the Assembly was a critical juncture in the peace process, as it showed that politics was not working. For Adams, the political vacuum created by the suspension of the Assembly may have resembled the circumstances surrounding the collapse of the previous IRA ceasefire in 1996. The sum and substance of republican grassroots sentiment at the time of the suspension was voiced by a former IRA prisoner: "We gave the leadership the ceasefire, we gave them their big jobs at Stormont, we gave them their fancy cars and their international adulation but we are not giving them our guns" (6 February 2000, Observer). During this period, Adams showed signs of frustration. The leader, known for his composure even under considerable pressure (most obvious during the time when he was persistently harassed to denounce IRA violence), appeared visibly enraged when the
NIA was under the threat of suspension. Adams vented his indignation: “At the time when we were actually talking to the IRA, what does Peter Mandelson do? He accuses them of betraying the process. Spin-doctoring for Glengall Street [UUP headquarters] was not in Peter Mandelson’s remit.” The leader angrily accused Trimble of adopting a “kamikaze, lemming-like stance,” with the Secretary of State who seemed to think, “this is all about soundbites” (5 February, 2000, Independent (London)).

In an interview with the author, Monica McWilliams revealed her impression of Adams as being committed to long-term peace (2002). Unlike Steven King, she did not believe that negative reasons kept the leaders in the peace process. McWilliams argued that it was a sense of obligation—the knowledge that if the process failed there would be more killing, which kept the leaders from withdrawing from the negotiations (interview 2002). Some of Adam’s speeches since Sinn Fein’s inclusion into the formal peace process do possess a normative hue.

Speaking to a group of Irish republican supporters a few days before the GFA, Adams said: “The responsibility of responsible politicians, republican politicians, is to ensure no more of our young men and women die.” The leader spoke of the “huge onus on the leadership” to build “an unarmed, peaceful democratic freedom struggle” (Panorama, BBC1, 6 April 1998). ‘Responsibility’ was again invoked in Adams’ speech during the review period when he declares of the ‘enormous responsibility on all of us who have argued that politics can work, that politics can deliver real change, to prove that this is the case’ (Adams, 2001, 180).
A sense of responsibility for a group of people or a cause has been found to reflect a deeper, affective and normative commitment (Andrews, 1991, 165-169). Thus, Molly Andrews concludes: ‘feeling responsible (being mentally and emotionally affected by the social [and political] environment) and responding (taking action) are intricately bound’ (1991, 167). A sense of responsibility rouses the individual into action. That the leader of Sinn Fein could have been motivated by a sense of responsibility is evident in his writings. During the period of the review, Adams remarked that he was reminded of a cynic who once had said to him: “the more things change the more they remain the same.” And the leader’s response had been: “I disagreed with him then and I still disagree with him now. His [the cynic’s]...observation is an excuse for doing nothing” (21 February 2000. In the Irish Journal, 2001, 215). In reference to himself, he said: “This Irish Republican isn’t for giving up. Not when so many people back home are depending on people like us to win a future for them and their children” (18 March 2000. In the Irish Journal, 2001, 222).

Adam’s primary sense of responsibility may have been to his own people. One of the common and striking images of Adams during the IRA’s armed-struggle was that of the leader as a pallbearer in many of IRA members’ funerals. Perhaps the repetition of this morbid role had an effect on the leader, such that he resolved to find an alternative to armed-struggle. The armed conflict also has had many negative consequences apart from the loss of lives within his community. On the other hand, the emerging peace process in Northern Ireland resulted in benefits to the young generation of his community, such as advances in the social-educational sector and growth of economic enterprises. Return to armed-conflict would disrupt or reverse this
trend and another generation would grow up learning, living and dying in violence, as was the case for Adams’ generation.

Deeper commitment, according to Leik et al., ‘generates a determination that is absent from more casual, day-to-day behaviours’ (1999, 240). Thus, the determination of Adams and McGuinness to avoid suspension of the Assembly in February 2000 can be interpreted as a reflection of the deeper commitment of these leaders. In his regular column in the Irish Voice, Adams revealed that he had been involved “in intensive discussions with all sides to avert disaster.” His plea was that “the whole issue of arms can be satisfactorily resolved, and I am committed to resolving it, but proving that politics does not work is not the way to persuade armed groups...this issue can be resolved...only if everyone plays their part in a constructive and positive way” (31 January 2000. In the Irish Journal, 2001, 213). Finally, the IRA provided an ‘unencumbered’ and ‘unconditional’ statement on the issue of arms decommissioning.

However, to maintain Trimble’s credibility, the Secretary of State jumped the gun and announced the suspension of the Assembly. Adams bitterly denounced the action: “in one arrogant, unilateral and illegal move, an international treaty was swept aside, the Good Friday Agreement was torn up and the duly elected institutions were torn down.’ He pointed out the effort he had invested and the progress made: ‘I was in contact on a daily basis and sometimes a few times daily with officials of both governments...He [Peter Mandelson] knows that as part of Sinn Fein’s very intense shuttle diplomacy, an advanced IRA position was secured” (21 February 2000. Reproduced in Irish Journal, 2001, 215-217).
In her study of life-long socialists, Molly Andrews found that hope, patience and conviction were important characteristics of deeply committed individuals. They have a long-term view of history and are not side-tracked from their vision (Andrews, 187 and 196). Adams appears to exhibits similar attributes, during the above-mentioned crisis in the peace process. Soon after his initial frustration with the suspension of the Assembly, Adams showed signs of hope. He wrote that if unionists saw the suspension as victory, it was only a “pyrrhic victory. A successful peace process is about more than that.” His hope was that the suspension brought an end to the tactical employment of the arms issue. In the new phase of the process, he hoped that there would be “acceptance that tactical short-term gesture politics is not the way to deal with this issue, then that can become the one powerful positive in an otherwise bleak situation. Because it is in that context that the issue can be dealt with strategically” (6 March 2000. In the Irish Journal, 2001, 220).

Like the subjects in Molly Andrews’ study, Adams has been described as having “great patience. He encourages debate and slowly builds consensus so he can take the whole movement along” (Bernadette Devlin, 28 March, 1994, Time). Adams is also famous for ‘look[ing] at the Big Picture. Everything he says and does in politics is connected with a grand plan or strategy’ (de Bréadún, 2001, 19). A former Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, having had the opportunity to assess Adams face-to-face, expresses his belief that the leader of Sinn Fein does genuinely want an end to the political violence: “that’s his objective in life” (Sharrock and Devenport, 1997, 454).
The more recent actions of the republican leader corroborate the above observations. Despite grassroots warning: “we’ll turn our back on Sinn Fein if they give even a bullet.” Adams contributed to overcoming the political impasse created by the suspension of the Assembly, by convincing the IRA to allow its arms dumps to be inspected and to pledge to put weapons completely and verifiably beyond use (6 February 2000, Independent (London)). Adams argued that the motive underlying these gestures was “to save the peace process” (22 May 2000. In the Irish Journal, 2001, 234). The need for patience and gradualism in dealing with his own members was due to the fact that “weapons and caches are widely dispersed under the control of local cells” and Oatley observed that “[IRA] volunteers are not sheep” (31 October 1999, Sunday Times (London). Although there was grassroots resistance to IRA decommissioning its weapons, the paramilitary organisation had engaged in two acts of ‘putting weapons beyond use’ by April 2003.

Overall, Adams’ words and actions bear the characteristics of deeper commitment. Nevertheless, below, I will consider whether antecedent conditions that support stronger dimensions of commitment are present in the case of Adams.

Case-studies (2): Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk

Nelson Mandela has been described as ‘the hero of heroes, the man of all seasons…the inspirational icon of several generations’ (Woods, 2000, 3). This opinion of the leader is widely held and liable to produce a biased analysis of him and his motives. For instance, Woods claims that ‘if this long-standing political prisoner had not been sufficiently generous of spirit to signify that he was ready to negotiate with his captors, South Africa’s remarkable transformation could not have occurred as it
Mandela’s was the crucial role without which the entire process could not have proceeded with relatively so little violence or difficulty' (2000, 8). On the other hand, less emotively involved researchers interpret the initiative as less due to Mandela’s generosity of spirit, and more as a pragmatic response to the prevailing circumstances (Gastrow, 1995; Adam and Moodley, 1993). Mandela realised that ANC’s armed struggle and the call for mass action aimed at making South Africa ungovernable were not sufficient to topple the white, NP-led government, within the foreseeable future. Woods’ statement is also misleading as Gastrow points out that political violence escalated rather than abated in the period following Mandela’s release (1995, 10). Between 1990 and the end of September 1993, just a month before the approval of an interim constitution by CODESA, a total of 10,495 people died as a result of political violence in South Africa (Gastrow, 1995, 11).

The above observation by Woods, highlights the difficulty and the need to separate Mandela, the leader, from Mandela, the ‘legend’. Significantly, in the volatile political climate in which negotiations were conducted, Mandela launched a campaign of ‘mass rolling action’ in an attempt to break the deadlock that faced the negotiating parties at CODESA II. Mandela warned de Klerk, “you are going to see a mass action on a scale you have not seen before.” “We know that the masses of our people is one most reliable deadlock-breaking mechanism” (1 June 1992, Daily Mail). The leader decided to revert to confrontational means, outside the negotiation hall, in order to force the NP-government to make unilateral concessions in the negotiations. This tactic, as du Toit notes: ‘generated highly tense confrontations between crowds of civilians and various security forces, and each one generated some measure of violence’ (2001, 64). Did Mandela not foresee that the mass action could deteriorate
into further violence? On 16 June 1992, about 10,000 Sowetans marched with Mandela (a smaller turn-out than expected), to mark the beginning of the mass action. The next day, 42 people, mainly ANC supporters, were massacred in Boipatong by Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) followers.

In response, Mandela suspended direct talks with de Klerk’s government. Speaking at an ANC rally, Mandela accused de Klerk of collusion in the violence perpetrated against his supporters: “as the Nazis killed people simply because they were Jews, de Klerk, the National Party and Inkhata are killing people simply because they are black” (22 June, 1992, Independent). He declared to his followers, who were already roused to anger: “we are not deterred by any consequences... ...we are prepared to pay any price for that decision [mass mobilization]” (24 June 1992, Independent). Equating de Klerk’s government to the Nazi regime and describing security forces and IFP as “animals” in the aftermath of Boipatong was considered tantamount to encouraging ANC grassroots to take the law into their own hands (22 June 1992, Guardian).

Mandela gives the impression that ANC supporters were the sole victims of violence perpetrated by IFP and security forces (Mandela, 1995). Non-partisan research, however, provides evidence to the contrary – of ANC ‘self-defence units’ perpetrated violence against their opponents. It was largely ignored that four-days before the Boipatong incident, ANC members had attacked and ‘necklaced’ Zulus (under the assumption that all Zulus must be IFP members) in the same township (30 June, 1992, Guardian). In the final analysis, Adam and Moodley write: ‘it is difficult to ascertain which side has started the violence and which exercises revenge’ (1993).
Until August 1992, Mandela refused to publicly admit the involvement of ANC supporters in acts of violence.

The fact that Mandela was so easily swayed to switch from negotiations to confrontation could be indicative of a ‘lesser commitment’ to the path of negotiation. Some researchers argue that Mandela himself may have preferred to continue negotiations, but that more militant individuals within the secondary leadership had taken over the initiative (Ottoway, 1993, 217; Adam and Moodley, 1993). However, in his autobiography Mandela acknowledges that he was ‘sympathetic’ to the hardliners’ view to abandon negotiations (1995, 724). This may explain Mandela’s confrontational speeches (as noted above), which at times verged on recklessness.

It is obvious that for Mandela, the struggle against apartheid was a normative commitment and probably highest in his hierarchy of commitments. He sacrificed personal freedom and family life for this cause. Mandela considered himself ‘first and foremost an African nationalist’ fighting for the emancipation of the majority black Africans from the minority rule (Mandela, 1995, 138). He professed to fight ‘against white domination, and...against black domination.’ He claimed: ‘I have cherished the ideals of a democratic and free society.... It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die’ (Mandela, 1995, 438).

Until Umkhoto we Siswe (MK) was formed by Mandela, as a paramilitary organization associated with the ANC, non-violence had been a core principle of the ANC, ‘beyond question or debate’ (Mandela, 1995, 324). Mandela explains (in his
autobiography) that unlike the previous ANC leader, Chief Luthuli’s ‘moral commitment to non-violence...I myself believed precisely the opposite; that non-violence was a tactic that should be abandoned when it no longer worked.’ His plan for limited attacks on inanimate ‘symbols of oppression’ would nevertheless mutate to include opposition party members, security and police forces as legitimate targets (Mandela 1995, 322; Adam and Moodley, 1993).

Although the grassroots violence, such as ‘necklacing’, may appear psychopathic, Mandela himself was not a psychopath. He would assert that he did not embrace the path of armed struggle for ‘any love of violence,’ but rather ‘as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation........after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my people by whites’ (Mandela, 1995, 433). As he had launched the armed insurrection in 1961, Mandela also initiated the later move within ANC towards negotiating with the NP government. This shows that Mandela’s attitude towards the means of ending apartheid could have been primarily instrumental. By 1985, he says he realised that the armed-struggle had not and would not be able to force the NP-government to the negotiation table as a defeated party (Mandela, 1995, 625-6).

However, when NP refused to concede to ANC’s demands, confrontational means once again seemed appropriate to force concessions in the negotiations. Nevertheless, Mandela said he ‘gradually realized that there was no alternative to the [negotiation] process’ (Mandela, 1995, 724). One reason for Mandela’s ‘gradual’ realisation was the lack of popular appetite for marches and strikes. Observers agreed ‘the mass action programme was, from the start, pure fantasy’ (23 July 1993, The
Times). Even after the Boipatong incident, attendance at rallies and marches was described as sparse. The two to three weeks of general strike announced by ANC was viewed as unrealistic given the declining economy (23 July 1993, The Times). Finally, ANC limited the general strike to one day, claiming this as a victory.

In reality, ANC’s confrontational approach was not producing the expected results. With low gold prices, agriculture affected by drought and manufacturing experiencing a decline in output, Mandela must have calculated that ANC stood to inherit a weakened economy. Surely, it was not prudent for ANC to cause further damage to the country’s economy. Such reasoning is reflected in Mandela’s own words when he announced his decision to meet de Klerk, nearly three months after Boipatong: “we want to break the deadlock because if we don’t I fear that the economy is going to be so destroyed that when a democratic government comes into power it will not be able to solve it” (15 September 1992, Evening Standard, London).

In a climb-down from the original intention behind the mass rolling action, which had been to extract concessions at negotiations, Mandela limited his demands to three issues: the release of ANC prisoners, the fencing in migrant hostels and the banning of dangerous weapons at public gatherings. He argued that all that he asks of de Klerk was an undertaking to “address them” [the three issues], then “I will be able to go back to my people and say: ‘Look, he has met us. Let us meet him’” (15 September 1992, Evening Standard, London).
Mandela’s acknowledgement of a lack of alternative has been noted to be ‘the best predictor’ of instrumental commitment (Meyer and Allen, 1991, 80). Also, the costs consideration (some as noted above) from a delay in negotiations influenced Mandela’s decision to reconvene formal dialogue. Besides, in contrast to previous international support, this time Mandela faced pressure to return to negotiations, from both outsiders and the business community in South Africa (27 September 1992, Sunday Times). Mandela must have realised that international opinion had changed when the U.N. Security Council rejected his accusation of collusion on the part of de Klerk’s government in the Boipatong incident.

The prima facie conclusion appears to be that the basis of Mandela’s commitment to the peace process was merely instrumental. Nevertheless, as the stalemate continued after Boipatong, Mandela writes that negotiation ‘was what I had been urging for so many years, and I would not turn my back on negotiations’ (1995, 724). Mandela’s language reveals a sense of identification with the peace process, thus suggesting the possibility of an affective attachment to the process. However, evidence for a normative commitment to non-violence and dialogue is lacking, despite the claim that Mandela emulates: ‘the few great political leaders, such as Gandhi’ (Woods, quoted in Mandela, 1995).

As Mandela announced: “mass mobilization is a feasible alternative to negotiations,” de Klerk declared: “no alternative but through negotiation to find a peaceful solution” (24 June 1992, Independent). The NP leader protested that ANC’s action was contrary to their previous commitment to negotiations under CODESA and ‘at variance with the spirit of the Peace Accord’ (de Klerk, 1998, 240. The National
Peace Accord signed on 14 September 1991 committed political leaders to end political violence. Gastrow, 1995). de Klerk claimed that during the critical period after the Boipatong massacre, he continued to 'pursue the negotiation route' (de Klerk, 1998, 243). Publicly, through the media he averred: 'the government remained ready and willing to resume negotiation.' Privately, he sent a memorandum to Mandela, in which he insisted on resolving the differences through negotiations (de Klerk, 1998, 43).

de Klerk presents himself as being committed to the process of dialogue, but what could be the underlying nature of his commitment? Ottoway argues that the motivation behind pursuing negotiations was based on nothing but 'a utilitarian impetus' – the failure of apartheid (1993, 63). In the view of this author, de Klerk had dragged the negotiations on for far longer than necessary, 'just as reluctant as Smith [Ian Smith, former Rhodesian prime minister] to yield power to the blacks, and just as convinced that time could somehow play in the whites’ favor' (1993, 250). Another aspect of de Klerk’s behaviour, which is important for the assessment of his commitment to the negotiation process, is his effort to control and prevent the escalating political violence.

Until de Klerk and Mandela recommenced talks in September 1992, the progress of the negotiation process had been consistently undermined by the violence at the grassroots level. The issue of violence embittered the relationship between the two leaders. Mandela would come to feel that the man of ‘integrity’ had either lost control of his security forces or was conniving with them (Ottoway, 1993, 126). de Klerk pleaded ignorance: ‘I still do not know the full truth about all these charges, or
who within the security forces authorized these gross violations of human rights...The conclusion that I now, regrettably, have to draw is that somebody must have been lying to us’ (1998, 122-123). Nevertheless, the leader argued that when he came to know about some of these activities, he took sufficient action, i.e., he reshuffled his cabinet (to move ministers responsible for the security forces), ordered the termination of funds to IFP and set up the Kahn committee (Advisory Committee on Special Secret Projects) to advise him on the control and closure mechanisms for secret projects. More notably, de Klerk formed the Commission on the Prevention of Public Violence, headed by Judge Goldstone to investigate the involvement of security forces in the instigation, promotion and commission of violence.

de Klerk admitted that at the same time he did not want to alienate the security forces, since ‘the South African Defence Force [SADF] represented the government’s ultimate power base and was the final guarantor of the constitutional process that we had initiated. We [the government] did not at that time know whether the whole process could be completed peacefully’ (de Klerk, 1998, 265). There was a real danger of a mutiny. As de Klerk sidelined the generals, plots against him were commonplace in the SADF Special Forces, headed by those who disagreed with the leader’s policy changes (Adam and Moodley, 1993). In this light, de Klerk’s prevarication over the responsibility of the security forces for the political violence could have been a deliberate balancing act to prevent a military coup, and thus averting a deathblow to the process of democratic transition in South Africa. Alluding to the ‘limits’ of his authority, de Klerk remarked: ‘Mr Mandela. When you join me, you will realize I don’t have the power you think I have’ (Ottoway, 1993, 230).
ANC’s mass rolling action and Mandela’s refusal to engage in negotiation unless his party’s preconditions were fulfilled, arguably made it difficult for the government to concede without being seen as ‘weak.’ This stalemate prevailed until the atrocity at Bisho on 7 September 1992. The death of twenty-nine ANC members, gunned by Ciskei homeland troops in Bisho brought the ANC back to negotiations. Mandela opined: ‘the tragedy at Bisho led to a new opening in negotiations. I met de Klerk in order to find common ground and avoid a repetition of another tragedy like Bisho’ (1995, 726). The Bisho tragedy reduced the moral high-ground ANC previously enjoyed in the negotiations with the government. Though Ciskei troops were mainly held culpable for the incident, the Goldstone commission also inculpated ANC’s Ronnie Kastril as the campaign organiser for “knowingly or negligently” exposing the demonstrators “to the danger of death and injury” (1 October, 1992, Guardian). Any repetition of Bisho would only weaken ANC’s bargaining position.

On 26 September 1992, the Record of Understanding was signed by Mandela and de Klerk, ‘which set the mould for all negotiations that followed’ (Mandela, 1995, 726). Ottoway observes that it was ‘pure political necessity’ that caused both leaders to reach the agreement to revive the CODESA talks (1993, 246).

Thus far, I have analysed de Klerk based on the observer or external viewpoint. Much insight can be also gained from the examination of the motives that he himself attached to his actions. de Klerk depicted himself as a leader who had always cared for the socio-economic welfare of the black community (de Klerk, 1998, 71-71). He claimed that as the State President he did not initiate the reforms and engage in negotiations ‘under pressure or from a position of weakness’ but acted based on ‘inner conviction’ (Kamsteeg and van Dijk, 1990, 64). A normative attitude
underlying the decision to negotiate an end to formal apartheid is evident in some of de Klerk’s speeches prior to him becoming State President. For instance, in a 1989 Parliament Hansard it is recorded that de Klerk said “I want to state unequivocally that the national party is against domination of any group by others. White domination, insofar as it still exists, must go” (Kamsteeg and van Dijk, 1990, 57). However, he was opposed to a simple majority rule, which he feared would lead to domination of white South Africans by black South Africans. Initially, he favoured power-sharing based on the Swiss model, but he claimed that after a ‘long process of deep introspection’ he allowed himself to let go of this ‘ideal’, which he knew ‘if pursued would bring disaster to all peoples of our country – including my own’ (de Klerk, 1998, xix).

However, Ottoway argues otherwise – that de Klerk’s refusal to admit that apartheid was morally wrong indicates that he did not initiate negotiations with ANC due to a normative sense of commitment to ending the repressive system of governance. The leader is instead accused of delaying the process to weaken his enemy (Ottoway, 1993, 63). Overall, the evidence is unclear as to whether de Klerk was normatively committed to negotiating an end to the apartheid governance.

Could the leader nevertheless have felt a sense of gratification arising from the elevation of his status within international circles and internal relief as he and his constituency sought to disassociate from the apartheid dogma? Adam and Moodley note that ‘the world praised and rewarded a change to what should have been normal policies,’ when de Klerk announced a series of reforms in his famous presidential speech in 1990. The leader himself observed: ‘we could once again look the
international community in the eye’ (de Klerk, 1998, 185). South Africans had deeply resented their status as outcasts (Adam and Moodley, 1993), but as apartheid laws were being repealed, de Klerk gained access to and support from important world leaders, including leaders of other African nations. Later, de Klerk would express of a sense of burden being lifted and the unloading of guilt and fear with the ending of apartheid (de Klerk, 1998, xix). This evidence suggests that it was plausible that de Klerk was experiencing a sense of gratification. Thus, de Klerk’s attitudinal commitment to the process of dialogue in South Africa could have been based on a combination of the instrumental and affective axes.

Key antecedent conditions in the development of attitudinal axes of commitment to dialogue

The magnitude of investments, profits related to sustaining present course of action and perceived lack of alternatives have been found to be reliable predictors of instrumental commitment (Meyer and Allen, 1991; Rusbult et al., 1999). The ‘role of experience’ is crucial in the development of affective commitment (Molly Andrews, 1991, 148). In case of normative commitment, as mentioned earlier, the process of socialisation is of importance (Weiner, 1983). Though other factors, such as personality, have been tested as predictors of the different dimensions of commitment, findings have often been tentative, with contradicting or non-significant results. Here, I will focus on the more reliable predictors.

The individual’s desire for profits and aversion to loss is considered indicative of an instrumental attitude. The analysis in the previous section showed that all four leaders were influenced by the consideration of future profits of remaining in the
peace process and the costs of withdrawal from it. For Sinn Fein’s leadership, Mac Ginty and Darby conclude that there was ‘a voluntary desire to remain in the [peace] process… to maximise the returns for their own communities and defend their position’ (original emphasis. 2002, 90). In the case of Trimble, it seems that in the initial stages of his involvement in the peace process, the leader may have been motivated by potential penalties associated with his withdrawal. However, Trimble’s continued participation in the peace process was not based solely on negative cognition. The improved relationship with the British government, the devolution of government as well as his status as the First Minister were all gains from the peace process. Both positive and negative cognitions underlined the instrumental dimension of the leader’s commitment to the peace process. Interestingly, as the positive cognition became stronger, Trimble also became a more active participant in the peace process. This was especially evident during the Mitchell Review period.

Investments made as a result of a decision to pursue a particular course of action have been found to be predictive of the stability of instrumental commitment (Johnson, 1999). Empirical studies confirm that as the size of investment increases, not only does it influence the individual cognitively during decision-making, but it also ‘shapes feelings of commitment’ (Rusbult et. al., 1999, 434). Gove submits: ‘the more we invest in a relationship, activity or creation, the more meaningful that investment is to us’ (1994, 372). Hence, even though the initial decision to invest may be based on a rational, calculative motive, once the investments become substantial they could be internalised and the value attached to them surpasses rational quantification. Among the leaders considered above, Mandela and Gerry Adams have invested many long years of effort, talent and reputation into the peace processes. It is
only reasonable to presume that they, like any other human beings, would come to view their involvement beyond mere instrumental calculations.

Gove's argument can be extended to a more general statement that people give meaning to their life partly through what they do, as proposed by Lifton (1976). In other words, we derive our identity from the actions we take, including the investments made. The development of identities is considered a *cathartic* function of attitudes. McGuire argues that 'the person creates an identity for himself by taking a stand on issues' (1969, 159). In the present context, this argument suggests that by leaders acting in a behaviourally committing manner (i.e. taking a stand to engage in negotiations with the enemy), in the longer-term, they could internalise their actions as a part of their identity. The attitude change is the result of direct (behavioural) experience (Regan and Fazio, 1977). This view is supported by McGuire: 'the result is that [in the longer-term] the person's attitude is modified to justify the new overt behaviour; the person thus internalizes the new norm' (McGuire, 1969, 159-160).

Similarly, Cialdini et. al. consider behaviourally committing actions a better predictor of future consistency since it is more salient in memory, thus allowing such actions to become assimilated as a part of one's attitude (1981, 371).

Social identity is 'that part of an individual’s self-concept’ derived, among others, from the roles and status held by the individual, in approximation to his social and political ties (Tajfel, 1978, 63; Reich, 2000). Therefore, social identity can evolve from the attributions made by others; they become ‘internalized as fundamental aspects of self through socialization’ (Reich, 2000). Even before Tajfel’s (1972) formulation of the notion of social identity, Becker and Carper (1956) wrote of certain
social-psychological mechanisms that lead to the acquisition and maintenance of identity through *participation* in a social or political group. Participation in a certain group leads to socialization and role identification, which in turn becomes a psychological bond that influences the individual to organise and prioritise his actions accordingly (Becker and Carper 1956; Buchanan, 1974; Leik et. al., 1999).

The four leaders considered in this chapter spent varying length of time in the peace processes; some were responsible for initiating the peace process while others joined later as participants. Adams, for instance, had engaged in talks with Hume to start an inclusive negotiation process since the early 1990s. Even from prison, Mandela began to invest much effort and talent into initiating negotiations with the NP-government. Mandela’s stand in favour of negotiations with the South African government was a particularly committing behaviour, in the light of the ‘widespread popularity of armed struggle among the [ANC] youth’ (Adams and Moodley, 1993). de Klerk took actions which were necessary to create conditions favourable for formal dialogue between the adversaries in the South African conflict. In the case of Trimble, while the leader was not involved in the initiation of dialogue with republican leaders, later during the referendum period he became a proselytiser of the Agreement. This action, his Nobel Prize as well as his willingness to meet with republican leaders to overcome the barrier to the implementation of the Agreement, all contributed to the leader becoming identified with the peace process, to the extent that some within the unionist community felt that their leader had betrayed their interests (McDonald, 2000, 1-7). Trimble’s identification with the peace process is best illustrated by the contrast between him walking hand-in-hand with Mary McAleese, the Irish President, when attending the funeral of victims of the Omagh bombing in 1998 and the past...
image of the leader walking hand-in-hand with Rev. Ian Paisley during the Drumcree Orange Order march in 1995. I believe that all four leaders became strongly identified and were identified with their roles in the respective peace processes. This allows for the inference of an affective basis for their attachment to the peace process.

Based on her interviews with ‘fifteen people who, for at least half a century have dedicated themselves to working for progressive social change,’ Molly Andrews concludes that gratification formed an essential part of the explanation for the ‘lifetimes of commitment’ (1991, 170). Importantly, Gove points out that this affective reinforcement ‘occurs whether or not a desired goal is obtained’ (1994, 375). This is evident in the case of the respondents in Molly Andrews’ study: ‘many of them are in their ninth decade of life and no longer think they will see a socialist Britain within their lifetime. Still, this does not diminish their commitment, believing as they do that others will one day reap benefits of their work’ (1991, 195).

As an illustration of how leaders could experience a sense of gratification as a result of their participation in a peace process, I consider David Trimble. An insider to the Northern Ireland peace process, Senator Mitchell, offers his analysis of Trimble: ‘He, like every other human being, is a complex mixture of hopes and fears, dreams and anxieties, biases and prejudices. He, like every political leader I have ever met, mixes high ideals, wanting “to do good,” with the driving ambition, wanting “to be recognized”‘ (1999, 180). The aspect of “wanting to be recognized” essentially reflects a sense of gratification. According to O’Connor, there was ‘little respect and not much liking for Trimble’ in Northern Ireland’s political circle; yet ‘internationally Trimble is seen as successful, and more than that, as brave, skilful and enterprising’.

(2002, 178). This suggests that it is highly probable that in the post-Agreement period,

Trimble experienced some sense of gratification associated with his ‘new’ identity as a peacemaker.

This inference is further supported by revelations from Eoghan Harris, a close adviser to Trimble during the review period. Harris admits writing to Trimble to urge the leader that even if the IRA failed to decommission, and ‘win or lose in the party,’ Trimble would ‘win with the people, and with the history books.’ Harris wrote:

‘soupse the worst comes to the worst and you lose – what have you really lost? A post that had no power to deliver what you want to do. You still have.... the respect of the whole world’ (my emphasis. Eoghan Harris quoted in MacDonald, 2000, 312).

Within a fortnight of the letter, a change in Trimble’s thinking was obvious when Trimble met UUP Assembly members, in the presence of Harris. The leader raised the possibility of providing a post-dated letter of resignation to break the deadlock within the Party (an action he would later execute) (27 September 1999, Irish Examiner). McDonald suggests that Trimble’s decision was motivated by an ambition to gain respectability and fame (2000, 313). Jeffery Donaldson provides a similar analysis. Having in mind that Jeffery Donaldson (ex-UUP secondary leadership) was against the GFA and the review, he describes Trimble during the review process as “anxious to see the political institutions up and running. And he wanted his Ministers appointed and himself operating fully as the First Minister, and he took the risk of jumping before the IRA jumped” (interview, 2002).
Next, let us look at the aspect of ‘wanting to do good.’ I asked his personal adviser what this might have meant for Trimble. Steven King said: “I think people’s sense of obligation is to their community rather than to the whole community.” However, the role of the First Minister in a divided society such as Northern Ireland brings with it a wider sense of obligation to act in the interest of reconciliation between the communities. Therefore, in response to the narrow sense of obligation suggested by King, I emphasised directly— “Even the First Minister?” To this, King replied: “In a sense, because of the nature of it, he is only held in there by his own community. I think he does have a wider sense of the whole community, but he is not going to crucify himself” (interview, 2002). In my view, King’s assessment of Trimble is equally applicable to the other three leaders considered above. Like for Trimble, the highest priority for Adams, Mandela and de Klerk were their own communities (although at times they appeared to be more inclusive). For instance, de Klerk writes: “I was deeply aware of my responsibility for assuring the best possible future for my own people – as well as for all the other peoples of our incredibly complex society” (1998, xviii).

The sense of obligation to one’s own community is usually internalised during the period of primary socialization. We gain an understanding of de Klerk’s early socialization from his recollections made while looking upon the Voorthrekker monument: ‘My people had erected the monument some fifty years earlier to the [Afrikaan pioneers] ....The people depicted in the murals were the heroes of whose deeds I learned at my mother’s knee. The dream that they had dreamt of being a free and separate people...had motivated the ancestors who stared sternly at me from our old family photographs. It had been the central goal of my own father...It was the
ideal to which I myself had clung to...’ (1998, xviii). Nevertheless, this leader was able to break away from perpetuating the apartheid system. The apartheid system established to protect white supremacy became the very threat to their future survival. It was necessary to re-evaluate this policy and de Klerk was able to do so. de Klerk may have been able to do so, firstly, due to his more liberal religious background. In his autobiography, de Klerk emphasises his ‘commitment to Christian values’ (1998, xviii). Kamsteeg and van Dijk propose that de Klerk’s membership in the more moderate Reformed Church of South Africa may have influenced the leader’s attitude (1990). More importantly, de Klerk’s main priority in his hierarchy of commitments was the preservation of his own people. The leader’s willingness to engage in negotiations and then to cast away his ‘ideal’ image of apartheid could be attributed to this foremost sense of obligation to the white community (de Klerk, 1998, xix).

Mitchell McLaughlin reveals a similar reasoning behind the republican leadership’s shift from violent confrontation: “the alternative is young republicans, men and women would become embroiled in military struggle. Young republicans, men and women would be killed or would kill, or would go to jail for many many years” (interview, 2002). Similarly to de Klerk, it is a sense of obligation to one’s own community that appears to have precipitated the republican leadership’s reconsideration of the group’s strategy. As an ex-IRA volunteer, Anthony McIntyre argues that Adam was not stuck within the traditional republican mind-set of an immediate united Ireland or nothing (2001). This view radically contradicts some of the previous academic writings on the Provisional republican movement (Neuberger, 1990). McIntyre examines the socialization process of the Provisional republican leaders to substantiate his argument. He points out that Adams’ initiation into politics
begun as a demand ‘to be treated the same as citizens in Britain’ (McIntyre, 2001, 210). ‘Provisionalism’ itself arose among the urban working-class nationalists in the late 1960s as a reaction to loyalist attacks and the failure of security forces to provide equal protection for the community (later there were also instances of state violence against the community). McIntyre submits that the urban leaders, such as Adams, were a product of these conditions rather than traditional republicanism (2001, 211). Therefore, there was no ideological attachment to the armed-struggle such as argued by Neuberger (1990, 68). Furthermore, Adams was not personally attracted to violence; Peter Taylor informs us that the leader was ‘appalled’ by the Enniskillen Remembrance Day bombing in 1987, which killed 11 Protestants (Taylor, 1997, 304). Yet, like Mandela who believed that armed-struggle would compel the white government to negotiate, Adams also believed that ‘without violence the British would not listen to them’ (Feeney, 2002, 342).

**Summary and Conclusion**

In an interview with the author, David Ervine pointed out: “*there is no such thing as a road to Damascus conversion between paramilitaries and politics. I think there is a slow recognition that there is a need to do things differently— another generation, and another generation and another generation will come behind*” (interview, 2002). Ervine’s observation is in line with the conflict resolution perspective of personal and group transformation being a gradual process. It is unlikely that the four leaders, Adams, de Klerk, Mandela and Trimble, were normatively committed at the beginning of the peace processes in Northern Ireland and South Africa but over time they all developed identification with the peace processes.
And, while it is easier to identify the objective costs and benefits motivating continued participation in a peace process, there is also a need to understand how deeper motivational states are produced and how they influence leaders. This knowledge would be useful to peacemakers designing their intervention strategies. In order to advance this knowledge, this study focused on the variables that determine the presence of the three distinct axes of commitment.

In the previous chapter, it was proposed that instrumental commitment could be based on a positive cognition or a negative cognition. Positive cognition is associated with perceiving the profits of remaining with a certain course of action and hence the decision to remain is based on choice. Negative cognition is associated with a sense of constraint and a perceived lack of choice in the decision to remain with a particular course of action. In the above analysis of Trimble, it was suggested that the initial stages of the leader’s involvement in the peace process appear influenced by negative cognition, i.e. penalties in case he was seen as causing the collapse of the process. But the emergence of a positive cognition associated with the gains of being in the process was also observed in the case of Trimble. Of particular interest were the behavioural changes in Trimble as the positive cognition became stronger. From being a passive participant, Trimble began to participate actively in the peace process.

Acting in a behaviourally committing manner provides direct experience and, researchers have argued, that in the longer-term this amounts to the individual creating an identity for himself. Acting out a particular role makes it more salient in memory, thus allowing the action to become assimilated as a part of one’s attitude. Also
important is the evolution of socially-based identity from the attributions of others, internalised as an aspect of the Self. Identification with the object of commitment is considered a predictor of the affective basis of commitment. The way a leader’s identity changes as he becomes involved in a peace process was discussed using the example of Trimble. The past image of Trimble as a traditional unionist, when he walked hand-in-hand with Rev Ian Paisley, was contrasted with the more recent image of the same leader as a progressive and inclusive leader, as he walked hand-in-hand with the Irish President when attending the funeral of victims of the Omagh bombing. Similar change in identity was also evident in the other three leaders included in this study.

The potential for a sense of personal gratification from the role leaders play in a peace process was also discussed. The recognition and elevation of status accorded by the international community is a source of personal gratification. Trimble, de Klerk and Mandela are all Nobel Peace laureates, in recognition of their efforts to peacefully resolve conflicts that had persisted for decades. While Adams may not have received the same recognition, he has gained equal international respectability.

No conclusive evidence was found for the leaders’ normative commitment to dialogue. Instead, in the case of all four leaders the commitment to the welfare of their own community appeared highest in their hierarchy of commitments. This commitment was normative in form. Nonetheless, the four leaders were not ideologically committed to armed-struggle or confrontation with their enemies. This enabled the leaders to consider an alternative to confrontation when the strategy failed to advance the welfare of their own community.
The above analysis highlights a significant issue regarding commitments—an leader in the context of a peace process, like any person in any other context, often has more than one object of commitment. In the general literature on commitment, there is a lack of research into how the individual manages different commitments. People may have a hierarchy of commitments, as observed in the case of the four leaders considered in this chapter. But is the individual’s hierarchy stable? A leader’s hierarchy of commitments and its impact on the leader’s participation in a peace process are issues requiring further investigation.

It can be argued that, in general, confrontational strategies are unlikely to truly advance the interest of any groups in a conflict, especially, in the longer-term. The extreme form of confrontation, the use of violence, even if applied to challenge injustice, is always unjust to its victims (Miall, 1992, 27). And, it is impossible to limit who the victims of violence are. This point is insightfully argued by Hume in a letter to Adams: “The basic method used by the Provisional Republican Movement is of course the IRA campaign. The price of that campaign is already clear to everyone, not least to the members of that organisation themselves and to their families. Lives have been lost, people have been maimed, young lives have been wasted in prisons, untold damage has been done to the economy of this island as a whole destroying hopes for the future of our young people... The people who have suffered most and the areas who have suffered most are the very people and areas that are represented by either SDLP or Sinn Fein. The other constant irritation to people are the numerous complaints about harassment of security forces, house searches, heavy military presence on streets, providing constant strain and tensions... The justification given by the security authorities in Northern Ireland is that all these activities by the security
forces are a reaction to the IRA campaign and are consequences of that campaign”
(Hume, 17 March 1988).

Importantly, based on the above analysis, a confrontational leader whose primary commitment is to the welfare of his people, faced with the realisation that his own people suffer as much from the group’s strategy as the enemy is more likely to shift from confrontation to dialogue. Another crucial point arising from the above analysis, is that it is much easier for leaders to shift from confrontation when they are not ideologically committed to a particular confrontational strategy as means of securing or advancing the interests of their groups. Once in dialogue with the enemy, this study has discussed the many actions that could behaviourally commit leaders to consistency, in the short-term (Part II). In this chapter, I have shown that in the longer-term such leaders could become strongly identified with the peace process as well as developing instrumental stakes in the continuance of the process. An interdependence of commitment arises when the other leaders in the conflict undergo a similar transformation, and when all the parties recognise each other’s commitment to the peace process. Arguably, such recognition took place for Adams and Trimble during the Mitchell Review period.

While leaders may come to recognise and consequently become more assured of their counterpart’s commitment to the peace process, there are nevertheless significant constraints to a leader’s commitment to the process of dialogue. Although a leader may perceive his decision to be in dialogue with the enemy as based on the welfare of his own group, the group itself may not perceive the leader’s action as such. During their involvement in the peace processes, none of the four leaders
considered above remained untouched by criticisms of betraying the interests and welfare of their groups for the sake of an agreement or for personal interest. Adams, de Klerk and Mandela were generally successful in maintaining the cohesiveness of their groups. On the other hand, Trimble faced the growing disenchantment of his community with the peace process. The unionist community, essentially, did not have a sense of ownership of the peace process (Steven King, interview 2002). Like the shifting sands at the seashore, the initial majority support among unionists for the pro-Agreement leaders was followed by dwindling support for these leaders, as unionists perceived a tide of benefits flowing in for nationalists and republicans from the implementation of the GFA. The influence of the grassroots on a leader’s commitment to dialogue, as means of resolving conflict is further considered in the next chapter, where barriers to and causes of retreat from commitment are examined.
PART IV

OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMITMENT
In the previous two parts of this thesis, I considered, first, how leaders become committed to dialogue and second, how deeper axes of attitudinal commitment are formed. These issues are the main focus of this thesis. However, in chapter 2, I observed that the issue of barriers to the development and sustainability of leadership commitment to a process of dialogue must not be neglected. I highlighted the practical significance of identifying the barriers to, and causes of retreat from, a commitment to dialogue. Importantly, peacemakers will be able to take preemptory measures when they are aware of the obstacles to leaders becoming committed to dialogue, and factors which may cause leaders to retreat from a commitment to dialogue. In this chapter, I explore some of these obstacles, with examples from collapsed and suspended peace processes. However, I do not attempt to construct a comprehensive catalogue of the potential barriers to and causes of retreat from commitment to dialogue.

The personality variable

In the last chapter, I argued that a crucial common feature of Trimble, Adams, de Klerk and Mandela is that these leaders were not ideologically (i.e. normatively) committed to confrontation or armed-struggle. For these leaders, the welfare of the group they belonged to and led was a higher priority than the means of pursuing that welfare in their hierarchy of commitments. Obviously, these leaders also had personal ambitions— for fame and power, but these were secondary to the interest of their
groups. In essence, even when espousing armed-struggle, Adams and Mandela were politically motivated. The fact that the leaders were primarily motivated by the political and socio-economic welfare of their identity-group enabled the leaders to shift into dialogue. They then became identified with the peace process. I also submitted, in the previous chapter, that a leader's commitment to the welfare of his group is consonant with a commitment to resolving conflicts (that the group is embroiled in) through dialogue.

To highlight the importance of the personality variable, let us compare the four leaders mentioned above with the rebel leaders in the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola. The conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola was settled not through the stability of agreements, but following the capture of Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone and the death of Savimbi (during combat) in Angola. The crucial difference between the previously considered leaders and the rebel leaders of Angola and Sierra Leone is that the latter were war-lords with interest in political power primarily for personal gains (Knudsen et. al., 1997). Unfortunately, these rebel leaders are not mere exceptions. Henry Bienen observes that violence in the African continent is often a function of leaders trying to stay in or gain power for purposes of self-enrichment, with few social motives (1993).

In Sierra Leone, peacemakers created a power-sharing government, in their effort to encourage peace. However, Sankoh exploited the access to governmental power, by continuing to profit from illegal diamond mining (Hirsch, 2001, 89). The rebel leader played a 'double-game' of being in government and at the same time sanctioned his rebel army to loot, rape and massacre civilians. By the first anniversary
of the Lomé Agreement, Sankoh had reneged on the peace agreement, evident from
the attacks on U.N. peacekeepers by his rebel army and the resumption of fighting
with government forces. Reflecting on the collapse of the Lomé Agreement, Dennis
Bright concludes: ‘if the war had really been waged on the grounds of an ideology of
some sort, perhaps the agreement could have addressed substantive issues and then
might have enjoyed a better destiny. It seems that Sankoh’s commitment was not to
peace, but to state power and a share in the country’s wealth, involving the connivance
of some interested neighbours’ (Accord, 2000).

As noted in chapter 3, Savimbi reneged on two successive peace agreements.
Prendergast submits that anything less than the Angolan Presidency seems
unacceptable for Savimbi (1999). Another writer observes: ‘billed as an
anticommmunist during the height of the cold war, Savimbi was actually no more than a
power-hungry opportunist who changed his colors to suit the tastes of his particular
financial backers’ (Wills, 2002). Savimbi’s control of diamond-rich areas to finance
the war against government forces meant that popular support was unnecessary. Thus,
the tactics employed by Savimbi created ‘hell on earth’ in Angola (Prendergast, 1999).
Among his tactics were to push ‘civilian populations into government-held cities in
order to stress the government’s capacity to control these areas and demonstrate that
the government is unable to protect civilians. Then UNITA [Savimbi’s rebel army]
shells them incessantly and indiscriminately. Most of the civilians moved into
government areas are children and the elderly, whereas those of productive ages are
press-ganged into military service or kept to work the fields’ (Prendergast, 1999).
To summarise, leaders that are not moved by humanitarian crises, but see war itself as lucrative, are unlikely to develop deeper attachment to a peace process. From a behavioural commitment perspective, binding this type of leaders to the peace process requires the performance of highly irreversible actions such as disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. In both the peace processes of Angola and Sierra Leone, the rebel leaders resisted and rendered ineffective the implementation of the disarmament and demobilisation programmes. Besides that, these rebel leaders never became identified with the peace process, as their actions and words remained inconsistent. A striking example of inconsistent behaviour is of Sankoh declaring that the U.N. peacekeepers were a threat to the security of Sierra Leoneans and were not wanted in the country, despite the rebel leader having previously agreed to the presence of the international peacekeepers (4 February 2000, BBC News). As the Head of the U.N. mission stated, Sankoh’s remarks “could only have incited his audience [his followers] against the Sierra Leone peace process” (4 February 2000, BBC News).

**Inconsistency and ambiguity of action**

Inconsistent, ambiguous or vacillating actions facilitate the denial or distortion of the implications of those actions, to others and to Self. This condition is the reverse of the condition considered in Part II, where the presence of the characteristics of consistency and unambiguity in an action were identified as increasing the extent to which an action is behaviourally committing for the individual. Ambiguous and inconsistent actions weaken the possibility of internalisation or identification with a particular line of action. Another example of this is President Kumaratunga in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.
President Kumaratunga has been notoriously inconsistent in her approach to the intra-state conflict (7 June 2002, Daily Mirror (Sri Lanka)). Kumaratunga ascended to power in 1994 on a peace ticket. At this point, the LTTE offered a cease-fire and was allegedly willing to abandon its secessionist claim. However, as Dr Sathananthan critically observes, although Kumaratunga agreed to lift the economic embargo imposed on the North-East provinces (NEP), her actions were indecisive (2000). Negotiations collapsed and LTTE accused Kumaratunga of behaving exactly like her predecessors. Kumaratunga then pursued a strategy of 'war-for-peace.' But when a United National Party (UNP) government reinitiated negotiations with LTTE in 2002, Kumaratunga declared that "our vision" envisages a political solution "through power sharing and equal opportunity to all our people." Perhaps doubtful of Kumaratunga's words, the Vice President for the South Asia Region of World Bank, who was present at the occasion when Kumaratunga spoke the foregoing words, reminded that "people need to see a leadership whose consistency of words and actions wins their trust over time" (7 June 2002, Daily Mirror). One cabinet minister, during the 2002-2003 negotiations had also remarked of the inability of the President to keep her promises due to her inconsistent policies (22 December 2002, TamilNet). Unfortunately, by November 2003, the President prorogued the sittings of the Parliament, took direct control of the Ministries of Defence, Interior and Media and

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21 The Bandaranaike government in the mid 50s' had also vacillated on its promise to the Tamils. The prime minister had announced a policy of 'Sinhalese Only,' but then withdrew the policy amidst Tamil protest and minor violence. He reassured the Tamils by signing a formal agreement with the Federal Party, but later abrogated the agreement under pressure from Sinhalese extremists.
declared a state of emergency. This led the UNP government to postpone negotiations with LTTE until the political power-struggle with Kumaratunga was resolved.\footnote{In the April 2004 general elections, UNP was defeated by Kumaratunga's United Peoples' Freedom Alliance. Kumaratunga attempted to form a cabinet more favourable to her wishes, with herself controlling the Defence Ministry.}

In the previous chapters, it was submitted that identification of leaders with peace processes, creates a social pressure to maintain the role, as well as, in the longer term, has the potential for the *internalisation* of the role. Leaders become identified with a particular stand through acting consistently. In Sri Lanka, some observers had expressed an early optimism that the 2002-2003 negotiations was the most promising peace process in the history of the conflict. However, Kumaratunga shrouds her personality with ambiguous and inconsistent words and actions. The consequence — Kumaratunga’s line of action is unpredictable.

**Grassroots influence**

On the one hand, it is arguable that commitment developed at the leadership level could be transferred to the group. On the other, it is also possible to conceive that when a group is strongly wedded to peace, it can influence the actions of its leader, not least by choosing the type of leader that would represent its conviction. Hence, grassroots provide the *social context*, which could commit leaders to a process of dialogue. This issue has been considered in chapter 4.

The influence of the grassroots is weakened when the leader does not rely on the support of the people to make war, exemplified by the previously mentioned cases of Savimbi and Sankoh. Conversely, influential grassroots that oppose dialogue with those considered as enemies, present a considerable obstacle to the development of
commitment at the leadership level. An example is the prevalence of reactionary sentiments to the GFA amongst unionists and loyalists which has made it difficult for the UUP leader to sustain his commitment to the political process. Four years into the GFA, Tony Blair admits that “there are people in North Belfast and East Belfast and elsewhere to whom the whole concept of a peace process must seem very, very far away indeed,” (5 June 2002, Guardian). These comments may partly reflect the persistence of confrontation along sectarian lines at the grassroots level. Some of these confrontations are reported as ‘headline’ news, such as the ‘Holy Cross’ incident and the 2002 Short Strand riots.

The Seventh Report on Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland provides a revealing picture of grassroots’ sentiments. A principal finding in the Report is that since the GFA electoral behaviour is becoming more polarised despite a decisive move towards closer cross-communal association, e.g. more Catholics and Protestants are in favour of integrated education and housing (Hughes and Carmichael, 1998). According to Ruane and Todd, the younger working class loyalist/unionist/protestant is less compromising on constitutional issues than the nationalist of their generation.23 ‘There has been…no direct popular pressure on the unionist parties to compromise; indeed the pressure is in the opposite direction’ (Ruane and Todd, 1998).

In the final analysis, the withdrawal of grassroots support for the pro-Agreement loyalist and unionist leaders can be attributed to how the Agreement has been presented by some of these leaders, especially Trimble. According to David Ervine, Trimble played “ala-carte with the GFA’ and spoke in absolute terms of the

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23 A contrasting view is presented by Mo Mowlam, in her lecture at the Bologna Center of the John Hopkins University. She views that on the whole the younger generation that grew up with the violence do not ‘want it to continue’ (1998, 11).
gains for unionists (interview, 2002). “But the practical reality of managing a political process and peace process doesn’t allow for certainty, in human life there is no certainty...[nevertheless] Trimble sells the GFA on the basis of the absolute security and safety of the Union” (David Ervine, interview 2002). Equally, Adams ‘sold’ the Agreement as a basis for advancement towards a united Ireland. Thus, a win-lose mentality continues to define the relationship between the two communities.

The prevalence of a win-lose mentality is quite obvious in the following remark by Peter Weir (ex-UUP, secondary leadership): “Yes, clearly from what their [Sinn Fein] stated position was, there appears to be a compromise. However, it doesn’t seem to be a level of compromise which has created major problems in their own community” (interview, 2002). If Weir, as a unionist leader, can be taken as representative of the growing unionist defection to the anti-Agreement camp, his statement reveals that unionist acceptance of the Agreement depends to a large extent on the crises it (the GFA) creates for republicans. As Weir comments further: “Sinn Fein supporters are a lot more comfortable and supportive” of the power-sharing arrangements “bizarrely, in some regards than unionists are as a whole....Whatever level of some republican activists who may have been prepared to defect to some of the splinter groups, first of all, it seems that the splinter groups are very very small, overall— they don’t seem to have a major presence. But politically, for example, there is not a single council seat in Northern Ireland which is held by a republican who is taking a harder line than Sinn Fein. Now, if Sinn Fein had taken leaps which actually left large percentage of their electorate discontent because Sinn Fein had compromised too much, as a minimum you would have seen some sort of republican
groups set up which would have got a certain level of electoral support...” (interview, 2002).

Unlike many ‘third-world’ conflicts, Northern Ireland has a strong civil society working to help the communities deal with the sectarian dimension of the conflict. Yet, as observed above, sectarian sentiments are only getting stronger. This leads me to inculpate the local leaders themselves for their failure to build upon grassroots acceptance of the peace process. This failure has come back to haunt Trimble. As unionist grassroots no longer view the Agreement favourably, to salvage his position, the leader has attempted to retreat to a more hardline position towards republicans. Nonetheless, as the leader is identified with the peace process, the consequence has been an increasing decline of unionists support for Trimble’s leadership.

Inappropriate response from other parties to the conflict

Farley, in the context of romantic relationships highlights the importance of communication for the sustainability of commitments: ‘today we readily acknowledge the essential requirement of “communication” for the sharing of lives’ (1986, 63). However, a major set-back in the context of peace processes is the tendency for attribution errors to corrupt the communication process. Groups in conflict often perceive and interpret the actions and words of each other through the lenses of past antagonism, violence and their grievances, which increase the chances of attributional error. Hence, even if a leader performs a de-escalatory gesture that is also

24 By the end of 1998, about 130 peace and reconciliation organisations were active in Northern Ireland.
25 Trimble announced that he would be stepping down from the leadership position following his failure to be re-elected as M.P. for Upper Bann in the 2005 General Elections (7 May 2005, http://www.sferson.jervhost.com/blogs/index.php/2005/05/07/david_trimble_steps_down)
behaviourally committing, the other-side to the conflict may view the gesture suspiciously.

According to Betancourt, there is a tendency for parties, whether in international or intra-group conflicts, to attribute negative behaviour (of the other-side) to dispositional causes, ‘underestimating the situational factors,’ while positive behaviour is explained away as situationally motivated (1990, 207). Empirically, Hermann and Yuchtman-Yarr’s data on the attitudes of Israeli-Jews and Israeli-Arabs towards the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, after the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP), allows us to analyse the high chance of attributional error in the interaction between the two conflicting parties (1998). Hermann and Yuchtman-Yarr conducted their survey in March 1995, about eight months prior to the assassination of Yitzak Rabin, the Israeli prime minister who together with Arafat reached an historic agreement in 1993 (see below). The survey conducted by Hermann and Yuchtman-Yarr showed that Israeli-Arabs were strongly in support of Rabin’s effort to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, whereas Israeli-Jews were ‘noticeably less enthusiastic and optimistic’ (1998, 63). Of importance, is their data indicating a fundamental distrust amongst Israeli-Jews of the intention of Arabs. A majority of Israeli-Jews interviewed26 (67.8%) believed that most Arabs would annihilate Israelis if they could (1998, 68).

Given this background, when Hamas initiated a sustained offensive against Israel (from 25 March 1996), killing 102 people in three weeks, ‘even peace-seeking Israelis began to suspect that Arafat was unwilling rather than unable to pursue

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26 Hermann and Yuchtman-Yar’s survey was conducted by a door-to-door survey of a nationally representative sample of 1,221 Jewish and 483 Arab Israeli respondents.
Hamas, and could, therefore, not be trusted to fulfil the terms of a peace agreement' (Kydd and Walter, 2000). In essence, the Israeli-Jews assessment was coloured by their fundamental distrust of Arabs, and this overwhelmed the evidence indicating that Arafat had actually acted in highly behaviourally committing manner in the peace process. Arafat, by this time, had sacrificed his earlier ‘total’ commitment to armed-struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Gowers and Walker also observe that on several occasions Arafat had moved his Council to conciliatory positions by staking his reputation and position as leader (1990). The 1993 agreement included a letter from Arafat renouncing ‘the use of terrorism and other acts of violence’ and PLO’s commitment to the ‘Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.’ In return for the recognition by Arafat of ‘the right of the State of Israel to exist,’ Rabin recognised PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Ten years prior to the DOP, Kelman remarked: ‘I would merely point out that explicit recognition of Israel is not a step that he [Arafat] can take easily or casually’ (1983, 208). According to the renowned academic, if Arafat publicly recognised Israel, ‘Arafat would in effect be telling the Palestinian masses that this is the end of the struggle. For many in his constituents, especially in refugee camps, such a message would mean that at least part of their dream—the dream of returning to their particular homes…would never be fulfilled. Because of the sharp divisions within the Palestinian movement and the Arab world, Arafat would become vulnerable to the accusation that he has betrayed the national cause’ (Kelman, 1983, 208). This observation suggests that the eventual recognition of Israel by Arafat was a highly committing gesture on the part of the leader.
However, some of Arafat's other actions increased the likelihood for inaccurate attributions. Soon after the Oslo DOP, which stated that the issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem is to be resolved in the final stages of negotiations, Arafat called for jihad to liberate Jerusalem (Millward, 1994). Jihad or ‘holy war’ has unfortunately developed a connotation of legitimising violent attacks for the cause of the religion. Arafat may have felt necessary to appear ‘tough’ for fear of losing supporters to the more militant, Hamas. However, given Israelis-Jews fundamental mistrust of Arabs, it was most certain that the former would causally attribute Arafat’s words to dispositional causes, i.e. as reflecting his true intention, hence confirming their fears. In the circumstances, a majority of the Israeli-Jew electorate favoured a more hard line government. The Netanyahu government (May 1996), could not or was not willing to respond appropriately to built upon Arafat’s previous committing actions, particularly, in signing-up to the Oslo Accord. By 2001, a more hard line leader, Ariel Sharon had won the trust of Israelis. Sharon campaigned that his government will never negotiate with Palestinians while its citizens were under attack, and that he will never give up parts of Jerusalem, which his predecessor was willing to trade for peace.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to outline some factors that impede the development of commitment on the part of local leaders to dialogue as means of resolving conflict. One main barrier is when leaders themselves are motivated by greed for personal power, over and above the welfare of the people in whose name the war is waged. Unless such leaders are induced to perform highly irreversible actions
which bind them to the peace process, they are more likely to renege if the peace
process no longer satisfies their personal ambition. I also considered intra-group and
inter-group obstacles. I discussed how grassroots could be an intra-party barrier to a
leader's commitment to remaining in dialogue with adversaries. On this, it became
evident that leaders may fail to create genuine grassroots acceptance of the peace
process and thus grassroots may continue to view their interests in 'win-lose' terms.
On an inter-party level, problem in communication was considered as a basis for
unconsummated commitments. The issues of barriers to and causes of retreat from a
commitment to dialogue, and overcoming these obstacles certainly require further
investigation.
PART V

CONCLUSION
I set out to consider the questions of how leaders become committed to dialogue and how commitment to dialogue deepens, in the context of peace processes. These questions were posed vis-à-vis leaders previously confrontational in their approach to resolving conflicts and who enter into dialogue without any deliberate intention of committing themselves to a peace process. I submitted that from the wider perspective of conflict resolution, a leader becoming committed to dialogue could be seen as a process of personal transformation. I drew upon ideas and findings from diverse fields of research, to discern the different meanings of commitment (chapter 2) and to formulate and develop a theoretical framework for understanding a process by which leaders could become committed to dialogue, and the deepening of this commitment (chapter 2-9). I also used case studies of leaders in peace processes to assess and adapt the framework to the context of peace processes (chapters 3-9). My intention, as made clear in chapter 2, was not to present this study as an all-encompassing theory on leadership commitment to peace processes, but rather I offer it as a foundation on which to build the understanding of a complex phenomenon. With this in mind, I reflect below on the key findings and then consider some future lines of investigation.

**Key Conclusions**

I used the behavioural model of commitment to conceptualise the process by which leaders may become committed to remain within a peace process. The
behavioural commitment model does not necessarily match the lay notion of commitment. According to this model, commitment is the binding of the individual to a line of action as a result of the individual’s behavioural actions. An action is considered behaviourally, committing, when certain characteristics are present in the nature of the action (discussed in chapters 3 and 7), and when such an action is performed in the presence of certain favourable contextual variables (discussed in chapters 4 and 7). I propose that through his actions a leader who is shifting from confrontation into dialogue becomes committed to the latter means of resolving conflict.

My analysis in Chapters 3-7, importantly, demonstrated the salience of the *interplay* between the conditions of behavioural commitment. By itself, a public action, such as a unilateral gesture of conciliation, initiating formal dialogue or signing a peace agreement, may not necessarily be committing for leaders. Rather it is the combination of the publicity of an act and, for instance, the presence of important audiences that influence the extent to which an action is behaviourally committing on a leader. This was illustrated in the case of President Sadat and his visit to Israel’s Knesset. It was the publicity of his action and the concomitant social context, of the euphoria as well as strong criticisms from grassroots and the international community, which made the action highly committing for Sadat.

I also found that the degree of irrevocability of an action is crucial in committing leaders to future consistency, especially when volition is lacking (chapter 3). For example, an effective implementation of demobilisation of combatants makes it a highly irrevocable action. This may be why the rebel leaders in Angola and Sierra
Leone resisted and avoided demobilisation of their private troops (chapter 10). While high irreversibility of actions could commit leaders to remaining in peace processes, it is equally desirable to preserve the volition of leaders when peacemakers attempt to induce them to perform behaviourally committing actions (chapter 3). This is because behaviour perceived as volitional creates a sense of personal responsibility, which subsequently leads to the formation of or changes to personal attitude in congruence with the behaviour. Two situations where the mediators and guarantors successfully maintained the fine balance between preserving the leader’s perception of volition and the use of rewards and threats to induce behaviourally committing actions from the local leaders are the Mozambican peace process (chapter 3) and the Northern Ireland peace process (chapter 7).

Actual volition is however not always necessary for the binding influence of an action — an ‘illusion’ of freedom could be sufficient. The latter was illustrated in the issue of decommissioning of paramilitary weapons in Northern Ireland. The precondition requiring that the IRA decommission its weapons, which had been a stumbling block to inclusive negotiations, was removed when the Labour party came to power in Britain in May 1997. Acting as peacemakers and guarantors the Irish and British governments, as well as the International Decommissioning Body presented the gesture as voluntary for the purpose of advancing the peace process (chapter 7). Yet, this did not mean that there was no pressure applied to procure IRA decommissioning. The pressure to decommission became internationalised with the appointment of external independent parties to oversee its implementation. The release of prisoners associated with the IRA and the initiative to reform policing in Northern Ireland, i.e. the governments implementing the other aspects of the
Agreement, formed an additional pressure on Sinn Fein and the IRA to deliver on their side of the bargain.

However, as the series of decommissioning actions by IRA was presented as voluntary and accepted as such by republican leaders (and their followers), this would suggest that they could not rely on *external justification* for their actions. Social-psychologists argue that to seek internal justifications leads to *self-persuasion*, which in turn produces far more permanent attitude change (Aronson, 1994, 95).

While a peace agreement is not inherently irrevocable (chapter 3), the case studies of the leaders involved in the Northern Ireland peace process, Adams and Trimble, suggested a procedure which would enhance the behavioural commitment of leaders to remain in the peace process, following the reaching of an agreement (chapter 7). Following the GFA, in the period leading up to the referendum, the two leaders took on the roles of proselytisers of the Agreement and they expended considerable effort to convince their followers to support it. According to previous research, effort invested produces a drive to continue with the line of action, because the expended effort constitutes a psychological cost (Gerard, 1968). Another drive for leaders to continue with a line of action, as identified by one insider to the Northern Ireland peace process, was the social implication of being seen as proselytisers by followers. The political credibility of Adams and Trimble became at stake when they took a stand in favour of the Agreement (chapter 7).

This study also highlighted the tension leaders experience between the demands of external peacemakers and the need to maintain internal cohesion. This can
happen when, for example, the cue from a peacemaker is for the leader to perform certain committing action but the leader’s core supporters resist this. However, the leader is likely to feel ‘pushed-and-pulled’ between his audiences only if they are significant to him (chapter 4). The attributions made by and cue from the peacemaker matters to the leader when he relies on resources (tangible and non-tangible) from the peacemaker. Core supporters are no doubt the most valued audience for the leader. I argue that the political capital of a leader is an important consideration when cues contradict. When a leader lacks political capital, he is unlikely to respond in a positive manner to the cues of the peacemaker if they contradict those of the core constituency. This is evident by looking at Adams in the early 1990s. Despite strong pressure to denounce IRA violence, Adams refused to do so. At that time, it could be said that it was impossible for the leader to condemn violence without alienating a substantial majority of his grass root members. From this I conclude that when peacemakers are attempting to commit leaders of groups who are shifting from confrontation to a peace process, they need to keep in mind that such leaders are only able to transform their groups gradually. Thus, in the early stages of building a peace process, demands for grand gestures that go beyond the group’s latitude of tolerance are likely to be rejected. The use of excessive pressure may produce behavioural compliance but it will negate volition, hence weakening the committing effect of the compliant behaviour. It is likely to be easier (and a better strategy) for peacemakers to induce a series of consonant actions gradually increasing in effort but which does not initially challenge the core values and belief of the group (chapter 6). Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of the series of consonant acts could be similar to having performed a grand gesture.
The analysis of Adams and Trimble as case studies was particularly informative since these leaders represent contrasting types of leadership. Adams is a charismatic leader, whereas Trimble is a transactional one. Although peacemakers and guarantors of the Northern Ireland peace process provided rewards to Adams in order to build his political capital, Adams has to a large extent been successful in building trust in the relationship with his republican followers and in convincing them of his vision. As a transactional leader, Trimble has had to provide immediate rewards to sustain the loyalty of his followers. Until the referendum period, the guarantors and peacemakers in the peace process were only able to ensure that Trimble acted upon their cues by providing him with rewards which then were used by the leader to ‘buy’ the acquiescence of his followers. But when the guarantors stopped providing rewards, Trimble found himself in a difficult position. Trimble, having acted in committing ways in the peace process, needed to justify his previous decisions and actions (chapter 5 and 7) to his constituency, which had not accepted the peace process (chapter 10). I submit that the deindividuation of the unionist constituency during the referendum meant that they could easily shift their position on and support for the peace process (chapters 7 and 10). Thus, in the case of a transactional-type leader with a constituency which does not favour dialogue with the enemy, it is insufficient for peacemakers to provide immediate rewards that temporarily produce acquiescence from the leader’s constituency for their leader’s actions in the peace process. It would be more fruitful for peacemakers to invest their efforts into transforming negative perceptions within constituencies that lack commitment to peace processes. The peacemakers and guarantors in Northern Ireland appear to have failed to do so (chapter 10).
In chapter 5, I explained that the presence of the conditions of behavioural commitment gives rise to certain psychological and social implications which mediate future behavioural consistency. In my view, the self-justification motive on its own is not sufficient to explain the behavioural commitment of leaders in the context of peace processes. Rather, I argue that the ‘need-to-justify’ to others is a more compelling explanation. An additional factor of importance for behavioural commitment is the potential for tension between the justification motives as forms of retrospective rationalisation (influenced by past actions), and prospective rationality (objective cost-benefit analysis). One problem which is recognised to affect the objective calculation of costs and benefits of continuing with a course of action, is informational uncertainty (chapter 5). Such informational uncertainty facilitates selective processing of information. Previous research has found that justification motives similarly cause selective information processing, leading to deviation from rational calculations (chapter 5). In the light of these findings I analysed the presence and direction of retrospective rationalisation and prospective rationality in the two main case studies, i.e. Trimble and Adams, at the juncture in the peace process when they had to decide whether to support the draft peace agreement (Chapter 7). I found evidence for the operation of justification motives in both of the leaders. The lack of a better alternative to the peace process was also an important factor in their calculation of costs and benefits of supporting the GFA. Thus, at this particular juncture in the peace process, for each of the leaders considered, prospective rationality and retrospective rationalisation were not contradictory, but rather, could have reinforced each other in the leaders’ decision-making processes.
Additionally, the decision-making process in the case of Trimble was affected by informational uncertainties. Whether the IRA would decommission its weapons after the Agreement was an uncertainty and related to this was the ambiguities of whether Sinn Fein’s members would be barred from holding office should the IRA fail to decommission. Although the British Prime Minister’s side-letter of assurance failed to dispel this ambiguity, Trimble decided to accept it (chapter 7). I argue that Trimble shouldered the responsibility for keeping UUP within the negotiation process, which is indicative of a strong ego-involvement to the course of action. It is highly probable that the ego-involvement could have led to selective information processing whereby Trimble saw the side-letter as a real assurance. In contrast, other members of the UUP negotiation team were able to discern that the letter was no better than the GFA in dispelling the ambiguity regarding the barring of Sinn Fein from taking ministerial positions if IRA failed to decommission its weapons. Trimble’s engagement in selective information gathering and processing is substantiated by the fact that he failed to take into account the unequivocal statement by Bertie Ahern, the Irish Taoiseach, on the day of the Agreement, that the only thing that will bar Sinn Fein from taking office is the IRA’s reversion to violence.

While behavioural commitment ensures behavioural consistency, the longer-term sustainability of a leader within an inclusive peace process is conceptualised in this thesis as a function of the development of attitudinal axes of commitment. Part III of the thesis provided an understanding of how deeper motivational states are produced, the prediction of their presence and their influence on leaders. Such knowledge is useful in the design of the peacemaker’s intervention strategies.
Chapter 8 provided a theoretical consideration of the three dimensions of attitudinal commitment: instrumental, affective and normative. I envisaged attitudinal commitment as a continuum, from a surface level, instrumental commitment to deeper value-based commitment. These dimensions may also be present, concurrently. I proposed that even within each dimension of commitment, the experience could vary in intensity. This was illustrated by the difference in the locus of control present in instrumental commitment. Instrumental commitment could be based on externally arranged pressure or internalised pressure. In the former situation, the individual feels a lack of choice for his commitment whereas in the latter the individual may choose voluntarily to maintain his line of action. When an individual feels a lack of choice for his actions, this implies that the commitment is a negative cognition, which was argued as resulting in sub-optimal behaviour.

I highlighted that in reality some costs associated with discontinuing a line of action could be turned around and perceived as benefits of persisting with the line of action. This indicates room for persuasion. Using the model used to assist couples to resolve their marital problems, i.e. the cognitive therapeutic strategy, I suggested that in the context of peace processes, peacemakers could take advantage of circumstances to reframe costs (associated with leaving the peace process) into benefits (of staying in the process). This means that the instrumental commitment would be based on a positive cognition, which in the longer-term could develop into a positive ‘affect’ towards one’s commitment. In chapter 8, I identified some of the antecedent conditions that influence the development of the different axes of commitment. For example, behavioural commitment is an antecedent condition for the development of affective commitment.
The case studies in chapter 9 indicate that it is easier for leaders to shift from confrontation into dialogue when they are not ideologically committed to a particular confrontational strategy. All four leaders, Mandela, de Klerk, Adams and Trimble exhibited pragmatism rather than dogmatism. Also, for these leaders the welfare of their groups was of paramount concern. But I argue that this is not necessarily an obstacle to leaders developing a commitment to dialogue. Although in a leader’s hierarchy of commitments, a commitment to dialogue is likely to be secondary to the commitment to the welfare of his group, both these commitments are complementary, especially from a conflict resolution perspective. Confrontational methods are unlikely to truly promote the welfare of the groups in conflict, certainly not in the longer-term.

The case studies in chapter 9 also highlight that leaders may identify themselves and become identified (by others) with the peace process. To recall, the ‘acting out’ of a particular role means that the role is more salient in one’s memory, which increases the likelihood of the assimilation of the role as a part of one’s identity. The case studies demonstrated that identity could also evolve from the attributions of others. Identification with a particular role forms an affective component of an attitudinal commitment to that role. Evidence for normative commitment to dialogue was however inconclusive in the case of all four leaders (chapter 9).

The leaders’ mutual recognition of commitment to the peace process is the fruition of an interdependence of commitment. To recall, interdependence of commitment signifies that the quality of outcomes for one side become dependent on the actions of the other side (chapter 8). I suggest that such recognition appears likely
in the relationship between Trimble and Adams during the Mitchell Review period, due to their close proximity as well as the lengthy periods of engagement in talks.

There are constraints to leaders becoming committed to dialogue, and some of these were considered in Chapter 10. When leaders are committed to the welfare of their people, like Adams, Trimble, Mandela and de Klerk, a secondary commitment to the peace process can develop. In chapter 10, I distinguished this type of leaders from those leaders whose main ambition is self-enrichment, even if this means creating ‘hell on earth’ for their people. Savimbi in the Angolan conflict and Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone are examples of the latter type of leaders. In such circumstances, an attempt to hold democratic elections is not likely to be a committing event. This study found that even if elections are favoured, an effective process of disarmament and reintegration of combatants into society must complement them. This is one way in which warlords-turned-politicians could become at least behaviourally committed to act in a consistent manner in a peace process.

The situation is different when leaders rely on grassroots support to sustain the conflict, and when the grassroots provide a stable voice in favour of dialogue. If so, actions such as decommissioning of rebel-weapons need not be essential to committing leaders to the peace process in the short-to-medium term. We are reminded of Albert Reynolds’ remark, who pointed out that the issue of ‘disarmament’ resolved itself in the history of the Republic: “my party [Fianna Fail] went into power, went into government and went into Parliament first — and they didn’t hand over guns to anybody...So I couldn’t have any credibility in asking the present leadership of Sinn Fein to hand over guns, when our own party didn’t hand
them over, and all the other parties in government here didn’t hand them over either” (Mallie and McKittrick, 2001, 186). The decommissioning by the IRA is said to be more symbolic than reducing the actual capabilities of the organisation. Given the highly irreversible assimilation of Sinn Fein into electoral politics, actions to deepen the absorption of the leaders within the political system and to help ex-paramilitary men and women to develop ‘other’ skills so that they feel the benefits of the peace process would be more constructive short-to-medium term alternatives, rather than to have the decommissioning issue impede progress in the political dimension. As David Ervine emphasised, it is important that these people are not ostracised by society (interview, 2002). The real concern with regard to weapons of war which are not ‘decommissioned’ is that they may be transferred to other theatres of conflict.

There is no set formula to commitment-building at the level of local leaders to inclusive dialogue as means of resolving conflicts. Such procedure needs to take account of the nature of the demand-groups and their interests, as well as the nature of leaders and their interests. It is desirable to preserve the volition of the local leaders while they are induced to act in behaviourally committing ways. This is to ensure that such actions lead to the formation of new attitudes consistent with remaining in dialogue. From a conflict resolution perspective, the formation of positive attitudes towards dialogue signifies personal transformation which could open up creative opportunities for the resolution of conflicts. Finally, the role of grassroots must not be underestimated in their influence on leaders becoming and remaining committed to peace processes. The development of a strong commitment to a process of peaceful resolution of their grievances by grassroots members provides room for leaders to make compromises and to act in committing ways. More importantly, such grassroots
commitment means that the peace process itself is capable of surviving leadership changes.

Future lines of investigation

This study has focused on commitment at the elite level. Nonetheless, the importance of the development of commitment at the grassroots for the success of a peace process was also identified. The grass root members of the group are able to change their stand on a peace process and shift their support from leaders who do not symbolise their most current sentiment with relative ease. One consequence of this, as seen from the case of Trimble, is that the leader who becomes identified with the peace process is rejected when grassroots withdraw their support for the process. Grass root members lacking commitment to a peace process are a threat to the sustainability of the process. Peacemakers may attempt to create a sense of grassroots’ ownership of the peace process by for instance holding a referendum to ratify the agreement achieved at the level of top leaders of the groups in conflict. However, acting as a part of a large group provides sufficient anonymity such that the action is not committing for the individuals that constitute the group. This is evident in the Northern Ireland peace process. Future research could help to discover ways to overcome this problem.

In Part II, chapter 9, we came across the notion of hierarchy of commitments. This area is generally under-researched within the various disciplines that have taken an interest in the subject of commitment. While I have argued that from a conflict resolution perspective a commitment to dialogue is not incompatible with a
commitment to the welfare of one’s group, further research is necessary to learn about the ordering of leaders’ hierarchy of commitments and its stability.

According to Miall et al, the cultural dimension ‘is the most important single challenge facing the field of conflict resolution’ (1999, 63). Thus, the influence of culture on commitment of leaders and their groups in the context of peace processes is another important line open for future investigation. It is only recently that commitment theorists and empiricists have looked into the differences in cultural norms and their implications on commitment (Cialdini, 2001; Fiske et al., 1998). For instance, honour and ‘face’ are important in most Asian and Arab cultures, which suggest that the social context could be a strong influence in committing leaders and their people. Nonetheless, as Fiske et al. observe, the resolution of the cultural matrix in the study of social phenomena is a long-term effort, which is insufficiently met by merely exporting an experiment (including its method and design) to different cultural contexts, but that is what has been done by experimenters claiming to study cultural differences (1998, 963).

In conclusion, I hope that this study generates further research interest in the subject of commitment in the field of conflict resolution.
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