FOREIGN POLICY FORMATION AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

A Study of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy (1980-1991)

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Motivated by both increased international interest in Turkey and concerns over its future and the directions its foreign policy is taking in the face of the systemic changes that have swept through world politics since 1979 onwards, this thesis attempts to study contemporary Turkish foreign policy from a dynamic-analytical perspective by concentrating on the dynamics of change, instead of stability.

In this context, this study sets out to assess the argument that, although a high level of continuity in Turkish foreign policy had followed on both from the basic features of the country's situation, and from the attitudes entrenched in the foreign policy making elite, shifts in emphasis - which had hitherto occurred within this pattern of continuity - came to a point during the 1980s when a different set of attitudes, patterns and directions became discernible, and as such demanded new explanations as to what determines and affects the basic directions of Turkish foreign policy.

In explaining this "change", the foundations of Turkey's foreign policy-making in the 1980s are analyzed from both the theoretical and practical aspects, and two sets of variables are identified as being instrumental in stimulating change: domestic socio-political and economic developments, and environmental circumstances. Moreover, it is shown that these variables, in the Turkish context, function in such a way as to remain interactive and to continually reinforce each other and also induce changes in foreign policy, which in turn excite reactions in the former. Therefore linkage patterns are used in this study both to show the interaction between different variables, and to emphasize connections between these variables and the changes that occurred in Turkey's foreign policy setting.
When applied to a case study of the period 1980-1991, these variables corroborate the view that a certain set of changes occurred in the fundamental principles and directions of Turkish foreign policy, without upsetting its pro-western orientation as yet, because of:

- changes in the nature of the political regime and the reactions received from abroad, especially from Europe where Turkey's linkage patterns are most strong;
- changes in the economic nature of the country and the necessities of the new development strategy;
- changes within the policy-making system which came to operate in such a way as to incorporate and uphold those who favour change because of their ideological inclinations or cultural values;
- and changes in the international environment which affected the country's perceptions of itself as well as others.

As a result, this study concludes that Turkey entered the decade of the 1990s with diversified external connections, more active and balanced pursuits in international relations, and a purposeful and multi-dimensional foreign policy with a certain emphasis on Turkey's immediate neighbourhood, that is the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSECR</td>
<td>Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCEC</td>
<td>Islamic Conference Standing Committee for Economic And Commercial Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECA</td>
<td>Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democrat Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPT</td>
<td>State Planning Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC/EEC</td>
<td>European (Economic) Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EECD</td>
<td>European Economic Cooperation for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>South Anatolia Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GTP</td>
<td>Great Turkey Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Justice Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDO</td>
<td>Middle East Defence Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mot.P</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>Nationalist Democracy Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Salvation Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUC</td>
<td>National Unity Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdish Worker's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Populist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Forces</td>
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<td>RPP</td>
<td>Republican People's Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAL</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Loan of the World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democrat Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDPP</td>
<td>Social Democrat People's Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEEs</td>
<td>State Economic Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGNA/TBMM</td>
<td>Turkish Grand National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Turkish Worker's Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>Welfare Party</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Context of the Study

Turkey is not one of the great powers of the Twentieth century. Her geopolitical location, however, has enabled her to play a potentially higher role in world politics than otherwise would have been possible. She holds the key not only to the Turkish Straits but lies along the roads from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. She is a member of the biggest surviving military bloc and most European organizations, as well as an associate member of the European Community. Her political involvement and exposed position assign her an importance hardly matched by any other medium power. Accordingly, the correct evaluation of this country's policies is of crucial importance. Furthermore, as one of the small number of non-Western societies successfully struggling to modernize both country and people, together with the aim of evolving workable parliamentary democracy, she has long seemed to offer lessons and insights into an important political process.

Yet, the interest she is getting in the Western media and the amount of the scholarly works on Turkey, produced especially from an international relations perspective, do not match the importance conferred upon her by other players in international politics. Given her frequently expressed strategic importance on the edge of Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union, this may seem surprising. For to this very reason, however, it is difficult to place Turkey into any neat category that the area specialists and foreign policy analysts like to draw before starting their research. Not only does Turkey not appear to fit any one geographical category, but it does not fit any one cultural, political or economic category either. About 97% of her landmass lies in Asia, and yet Turkey's progressive elites consider their country as part of Europe. About 98% of her population is Moslem, and yet Turkey is a secular country by choice and her religious development through the years has taken a different path from that of other Islamic countries. Culturally, most of the country
reflects the peculiarities of wider Middle Eastern culture, and yet she, with an equal persistency, participates in European cultural events. She professes to have a liberal economic system, but the remnants of the planned economy still hamper the country's development. In religious, historical and geographical senses she is a Middle Eastern country, yet any development impinging upon the status quo of the Balkans and the Caucasus directly affects Turkey just as much. Thus these conflicting facts indicate wider uncertainties about the placing and the role of the country.

A sense of confusion about Turkey seems to reign not only in external appearances, but also in the deep-rooted convictions of her people. Age-old discussions within the country between the "eastern ideal" and the "western ideal" about the exact nature of the country and her people appear to be as lively today as they have ever been. Hence, while on the one hand, the conviction that Turkey should be part of Europe was demonstrated by her application for membership of the European Community in 1987, on the other, one could hear calls for the severing of relations with the West and the establishment of an Islamic Common Market instead.

This uncertain self-identity and sense of confusion has likewise been reflected in Turkey's domestic political structure that has alternated between periods of civilian governments and military rule, which has had important implications for her external relations. While the military has emerged since 1960 as the defender of the Kemalist principles, especially the unitary and republican-secular character of the state, and the most pro-western segment of the society, the periods of civilian supremacy - though, strictly speaking, total civilian control over the military has always been questionable - has brought to power policy-makers of various creeds with their varying emphasises on different aspects of Turkey's ambivalent identity. Consequently political struggle between grass-root politicians, with their less than "modern" appearances and attitudes, and the alliance of "westernized" civil-military elites has been keynote to these periods. Moreover, during the period immediately before the 1980 military takeover, Turkey was riven by domestic conflicts which, in part, reflected this ambivalence and plunged Turkish foreign policy into depths of uncertainty and
indecisiveness, due to the inability of various opinion-holders to effectively take control of the decision-making body. The takeover itself meant that foreign policy, as well as all other aspects of Turkish socio-political life, was thereafter determined by the peculiar national mission of the Turkish military, which by this time had differentiated itself even from those of western-minded civilian elites and bureaucrats. Though their overall foreign policy stance seemed to conform with the long-standing guiding principles of Turkish foreign policy, they, nevertheless, due to various unforeseen reasons, dealt with in chapter three, had to experiment with different variations; thus came Turkey's forced isolation from Europe and her opening towards the Middle East and former Communist Block. The civilian governments from 1983 onwards, however, unlike their military predecessor, were more open to popular pressures as well as more representative of popular images. On the other hand, they too, being true to popular Turkish tradition, created a "father figure", Mr Ozal, whose distinctive sense of Turkey's place in the world came to dominate the country's foreign policy in the second half of 1980s as well as affecting some of its fundamental principles.

As even the Turkish intelligentsia has demonstrated doubts from time to time about the way their country has been conducting her policies, both domestic and foreign, it is hardly surprising to see that a sense of uncertainty also reigns among Western statesmen, scholars, and journalists alike about Turkey's intentions and foreign policy priorities.

Particularly since the 1970s, Western political analysts, statesmen, and media spokesmen have seemed increasingly confused about Turkey's intensified rapprochement with Islam in both the domestic and international spheres. Although they seem to agree that the implications of a reversal in Turkey's Western-oriented, secular foreign policy could be serious for Western security interests, since had Turkey been "a less stable country - or a less pro-Western one - the last four decades of European and Middle Eastern history would have turned out very differently", they do not appear yet to comprehend the extend of changes both in Turkey and her foreign policy.
There was a time - during the 1950s - when Turkey's resolute renunciation of the idea of an Islamic conference was unceasing, and it was then that Turkey was taken for granted and greeted as a reliable - that is, unquestioning - ally of the West in the international arena. This was, however, a long time ago, and one thing appears to be certain today: that through the 1970s, while Turkish trust in West was corroding, general confidence in Turkey as a faithful ally of the Western world, too, has been shaken considerably. There were increasing concerns, specially after Turkish-US relations had received heavy blows from the continuing Cyprus crises, about Turkey's perceived shift from the West and questions were raised about whether the tensions would cause Turkey to leave the alliance.

Certainly, the Cyprus crisis of 1974 led to consequences far beyond Turkey's boundaries and affected some of the fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy. The disappointment Turkey felt with its Western allies during and after the crises, the immediate embargo imposed upon her, and the loneliness in international forums, forced Turkey to search for additional and "reliable" friends. Obvious targets for this search were culturally and religiously close Islamic countries, and geographically near but, due to ideological reasons, hitherto neglected Communist countries. As a result, Turkey's relations with the Islamic countries and the Communist bloc afterwards increased. However, this forced-enlargement in Turkey's international environment did not bring with it an immediate change either in her orientations or to her pace of foreign policy. Thus the much sought after dynamism and activity in Turkish foreign policy was yet to come and international interest in Turkey dissolved as quickly as it had amassed.

From 1979 onwards, however, there was a new focus on Turkey because of what was perceived as a sudden threat against Western interests in the Middle East. The occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Iranian revolution and the closure of US military bases almost immediately, and above all the strength of the Islamic revival in the region, meant that the "loss" of Turkey, the only remaining
Western ally in the region with the exception of the US's bilateral relations with Israel, would have dealt a major blow to Western interests in the region.

After the 1980 military takeover in Turkey, concern about its future in the Western alliance further increased as contacts between Turkey and the Islamic states intensified, paralleling the increased activity of the Muslim groups in Turkey. In the meantime, the fact that Turkey's relations with the West, especially with Europe, were passing through a bad patch generated further worries and questions about the country's future. Was Turkey's "strengthening of her ties with the Arab world to the detriment of relations with Western Europe"? Did it not seem to be "political risks to increasing trade with the Soviets and with those Middle Eastern countries"? Could Turkey "take a radically different line from its present political course and go Islamic or Communist"? The fact that these and similar questions have been given negative answers numerous times by Turkish statesmen did not seem to matter much; why, then, it was asked, "Turkey's markedly closer relations with the Islamic world which have been visible" during the 1980s? The questions kept coming at a changing rate and regularity depending on the situation in the region. The Iran-Iraq war, for example, again intensified the questions about Turkey's interests and policies. As the issues of water, the Kurds, and the spread of Islamism have all served to drag Turkey more firmly into Middle Eastern affairs during the 1980s, both the interest in and questions about Turkey intensified. At the same time, the almost simultaneous break-up of the former Soviet Union, while further generating international interest in the region, brought about yet more unanswered questions. Would Turkey have any grand designs towards the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union?

If one looks through recent literature and polemics about Turkey, it appears that almost everyone seems to agree that something is happening in Turkish foreign policy that has not been satisfactorily explained by either Turkish statesmen or Turkey specialists. But there seems to be no agreement as to what is happening and where it leads the country. While some argue that Kemalism is "in the process of being buried with Ozal", and Turkey "...is facing the most serious threat from Islamic forces since
the inception of the modern republic sixty-three years ago, others do not seem so sure as to whether "Turkish secularism is likely to be compromised" in the international and domestic spheres. They all maintain, however, that "...if pressures from international politics become too strong, it is not inconceivable that they will strengthen those who would like to see greater emphasis on Islam as a guide in the conduct of internal affairs." Such a development could, naturally, have serious foreign policy implications for Turkey. Others disagree. They argue that a "newly diversified Turkish foreign policy is bound to weaken even further the demagogic appeal on the Turkish domestic scene of such themes as Islamic fundamentalism and neutralism. Thus it will contribute indirectly but materially to the country's political stability." Moreover, they maintain that "the tendency to move away from Western culture", which has been enjoyed only by the elite, was natural in a "democratic age of consumerism".

Some warn that even if the changes taking place in eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, and growing economic relations with the Middle East do not cause Turkey to turn more firmly towards the Eastern option, then "the rejection of Turkey from Europe certainly will." Others urge that the improved political relations between Turkey and the Arab world need "to be watched carefully for indications of changes in Turkey's foreign and domestic politics alike."

One may ask, then, why there are so many and often such conflicting arguments about Turkey and her intentions, and what has happened to Western trust in Turkey? Why did confidence in Turkey's future with the Western alliance disappear in the late 70s and early 80s?

The obvious answer to the first question is that, in the absence of in-depth studies covering exclusively different aspects of Turkish foreign policy and its fundamentals, it would be too optimistic to expect any analysis to be accepted without further critical inspection. The truth is that studies of Turkey in general, and Turkish foreign policy in particular, have not yet progressed to the point where a "standard" view of the country and its prospects has emerged. Isolated by the Ottoman history,
language and culture from the West, and by the Republican history and political choice from the East, Turkey thus stands as an unique case, one which has not often been considered to be of great interest to scholars of international relations in general. Hence, Turkish foreign policy appears to be of interest only to Turks and a narrow circle of Turkish-speaking scholars, who, under the various constraints, seem to concentrate their studies on the relatively narrow paths of practical descriptions of Turkey's relations with number of countries such as Greece, the US and more recently the EC. As a result the very small number of general ideological and foundational analysis of Turkish foreign policy and various attempts to present Turkish reality as a coherent whole have long been outdated by the rapidly changing character of the country. As for the polemical coverage of the country by the Western media, one bound to say that it is restricted in scope and often confusing, if not misleading. Therefore there seems to be an urgent need for a comprehensive in-depth study of contemporary Turkish foreign policy since the most recent work in this regard appears dating from early 1970s and is now, of course, out of date.14

Finding answers to the latter questions is not easy, and appears to generate more questions to be answered. It is true that, as we mentioned earlier, Turkey's relations with the Islamic countries and the Communist bloc increased after the 1960s. But can this justify the conclusion that there has been a "shift" from the West? Do we need more evidence to show that a shift has, in fact, taken place? Why do official Turkish statements that Turkey remains tied to the West not carry the same weight as they did in the 1960s? Are Turkish leaders, who do not seem as concerned as some in the West, mistaken? Or are they deliberately misleading world opinion? If so, why, and what has happened to traditional Turkish contempt for the Arabs and fear of Communism and the Russians? And are there obstacles to Turkey's further rapprochement with the Muslim and Communist countries? Where did the partial rejection of the EC leave Turkey?

To find answers to the above questions is the main motivation behind this study. It is not the aim of this study, however, to answer the question about whether
there has been a deviation from the Western-oriented and secular Kemalist line in Turkish foreign policy during the 70s and 80s. Since this dissertation presupposes that there has been a change in Turkish foreign policy, it is aimed at studying this change and its results. Therefore, the main focus of this study will be to identify the changing patterns of Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s; to find the reasons behind them; and to show linkages between both external and internal environmental conditionalities, and changing patterns and the actual foreign policy actions of Turkey. Moreover, an attempt will be made to answer the question of whether the increasing orientation of Turkish foreign policy toward new centres reflects a definite transformation or is merely a passing phase. In other words, are the changes Turkey experienced throughout 1980s, and continues to experience today, here to stay or likely to revert back in the foreseeable future?

(Non)Theoretical Framework for Analysis

It should be mentioned right from the beginning that this study will not make an attempt at theorising about either international relations or foreign policy based on assumptions from this dissertation. Rather, this study wishes to emphasize that "the foreign policy of every single state is an integral part of its peculiar system of government" and reflects its special circumstances. As such it does not allow generalizations embracing all states, since this may cause us to lose sight of the political realities that we are studying.

Clearly, there is a temptation among scholars, not only of foreign policy, but also of other areas of learning, to generalise when evidence of apparently similar experiences and development processes is readily to hand. It is generally assumed that there are patterns in the foreign policy of nations and not just single acts. A knowledge of the pattern - the "policy" - of an actor is expected to be useful for explaining and predicting actions. If it can be shown that an action fits into a pattern - that is, the actor behaves as he usually does, or says that it is his policy to do - it means in one sense
that his action is explained. Similarly, if a pattern is known, it could be anticipated what
the actor will be likely to do in the future. In other words, a regular feature of
international politics would be brought into the open - a feature that may, however, be
more or less amenable to change. But there is also danger that such generalisations
may prevent us from recognizing the diversity of forms which foreign policy, or any
other development for that matter, can actually take. Therefore, our understanding not
only of Turkish experience but also foreign policies elsewhere, is likely to be much
more productive if we avoid starting from the assumption that there are general forms
of behaviour in international relations which could explain all the relationships between
states. Instead each case needs to be located in its specific conditionalities within the
uneven international system. Rather than imposing general labels on states, we should
aim to understand the development of the international system by trying to explain the
varying forms which foreign policies could take in different situations and at different
times. In this context, Turkey is one part of the international system, and needs to be
understood as a unique part of that system, yet as a part which is in a complex set of
interrelations with other parts. Although one part or another of her interrelations could
be fitted into, or explained by, one of the various different international relations and
foreign policy analysis approaches, almost all of them, however, fail after a certain
point to explain Turkish foreign policy as a coherent whole.

Much writing on foreign policy suggests that we can compare countries with
similar characteristics and that particular types of countries have matching particular
types of foreign policies. Leaving aside the contentious question of whether we can
justifiably define types of society, the literature on foreign policy seems to focus on five
components that are eventually used in labelling the various countries: (1) Size, status
and international involvement; (2) Economic, social and political development; (3)
Internal political order; (4) Ideological orientations; and (5) Organizational
engagements.

One of the favourite categories of foreign policy analysts that comes
immediately into mind, especially when thinking in terms of development, is the group
of states loosely termed as the "Third World". Turkey, undoubtedly, shares important features with many other "developing" or "newly industrialising" countries of the world, a possible sub-group of more general classification: Third World. It is clear that they are experiencing similar economic, political and social upheavals. Yet, differences arising from distinctive historical experiences and geographical setting compel Turkey to react differently to international developments.

Most of these countries have been hounded by their colonial past which has affected their position in the world and responses to events. In contrast, Turkey was never colonized, and was thus spared the after-effects of colonialism. Consequently while the great majority of the "Third World" states chose non-alignment after the Second World War, when most of them achieved their independence, Turkey consistently remained within the Western alliance system. This, being the only "Third World" country in constant alignment with the West to the point of belonging to NATO, set her apart right from the beginning and, especially in the foreign policy arena, demanded a different set of actions, aims of which have been in contradiction with the wishes of other "Third World" countries.

Even if we were to ignore the significant historical and geopolitical differences, Turkey still does not appear to fit into any one clear category even in terms of strict economic indicators. Although the World Bank classifies Turkey as a middle-income country, a category that she shares with many other "Third World" countries, she is also a member of the OECD, known as the "rich man's club" which essentially comprises the developed industrial nations that operate market economies, and which with the exceptions of Greece, Portugal, and Turkey are all in the World Bank's "high-income" group.

In theoretical terms, the schools of thought which have dominated development studies since the early 1970s, the various dependency and underdevelopment approaches, see the world as divided into "developed" and "underdeveloped" areas. In many respects, Turkey may appear to be typically underdeveloped, but this appearance of underdevelopment is misleading and cannot taken for granted. While Turkey is
rapidly industrialising country, and thus "her incorporation into the world capitalist system, and her disadvantaged place in the international division of labour, has created economic, political and social problems which are common in other parts of the world", a systemic analysis of the development of her economic and political structures, makes it clear that while there are many similarities with other "typically underdeveloped" nations, there are also significant dissimilarities. This makes the use of the label "underdeveloped" problematic, since in many respects Turkey has not been subject to what are widely thought of as typical processes of "underdevelopment".

There has been a tendency in development studies for the dominant theories to be general theories and to emphasise the common characteristics of typical development process. However, the case of Turkey has already been used to show the inadequacies of world-wide generalisations of this sort.

While still within the general framework of the "Third World", another approach, that is modernization theories, comes to mind which was especially used during the 1950s and 1960s to explain the process of massive socio-economic and political change that began in Europe towards the end of the Middle Ages and has become a world-wide phenomenon in the Twentieth Century. Broadly speaking, modernization theory suggests that societies move through a developmental process from a relatively simple and primitive state to one of increasing complexity. Although each society may have its unique traditions, the process of modernization involves elements that are characteristics of all modernizing societies. If we assume that each society starts from a traditional pattern, we can describe a general set of structures, values, and interactions that all modernizing societies will manifest.

Sure enough, contemporary Turkey has participated in this revolutionary development that has swept across the world. Consequently, there have been studies to explain Turkish modernization and also attempts to use Turkey as an example for other modernizing countries. However, the problem with this approach, apart from the fact that it has been widely criticized for being Euro-centric and partially discredited by later theories of dependency, is that the Turks, in many respects, experienced
modernization a generation earlier than other modernizing Twentieth century countries, in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War One. In a sense, in fact, "she blazed the trail that other Third World countries were to follow a quarter of a century later". In particular, they successfully defended their claim to political independence and statehood and to the development of their autonomous industry and economy. Consequently, these historical differences in experiences make it difficult to study Turkey comparatively. Moreover, though Turkey is still a modernizing country, especially with regard to concepts of authority, democracy and economic development, Turkish foreign policy of today is a result of a much more complex interplay of factors - to be studied by this dissertation - than can be explained simply by modernization theories.

Another category of states which comes to mind immediately when talking about Turkey is that of the Middle Eastern/Islamic countries, because of similarities in culture and religion. However, this category, too, is not as strong as it implies in the first instance when it comes to explaining Turkey. Above all, Turkey does not share two dominant characteristics of the region. Firstly, with the exception of Iran and Israel, all other countries in the region share a common ethnicity, that is they are all Arab countries. Obviously Turkey cannot be part of any groupings in the Middle East based on ethnicity. The other common factor uniting the Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of Israel, is their adherence to Islam. This, too, is problematic for Turkey since her religious evolution took a different path in the Twentieth century from the rest of the Islamic world and she consciously chose to be a secular state, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of her population is Muslim. Indeed since the "Kemalist revolution" of 1923, Islam in Turkey has been redefined. Secularism emerged as one of the key principles of the new state, and religious expression came under strict government supervision and control. Thus through the years "Turkish Islam in effect became more standardized, circumscribed and compartmentalized, while republican ideology and associated institutions came to dominate much of everyday life". As a result, it was argued that "there is...a specific
Turkish national, political, cultural and religious tradition coming together to form a Turkish national identity quite separate from that of the Arabs to the South and the Persians to the East." Consequently, these differences led to the claim that Turkey is different from other Muslim societies, "the exception that proves the rule." 

The one category of states that Turkish elite consider their country to be part of, i.e. Europe, is also problematic as Europeans do not appear to share the same conviction, and, in addition to geographical distinctiveness, her cultural, religious and historical development set her apart from Europe, if not against it.

Turkey has also been categorized in the past as a "small state" and depicted as sharing the same conditionalities as other small states vis-a-vis her relations towards the "big powers". This approach again proved unreliable as Turkey, because of her exceptional strategic location, has been able to act in international politics in a considerably more independent and influential way than other small states. Moreover, Turkey of 1980s could hardly be considered a small state, especially compared with her neighbours.

In terms of country size, Turkey is thrice the size of United Kingdom, and sits comfortably with her neighbours when her 769,630 sqkm compared with Bulgaria's 110,550; Greece's 130,850; Cyprus's 9,240; Iraq's 437,370; and Syria's 184,060. In terms of population, her 57.08 million in 1988 stands impressively against Greece's 10.01; Bulgaria's 8.99; Syria's 11.34; Iraq's 17.25; and Cyprus's 0.55 million. The only other countries in the region which could be compared with Turkey are Iran and Egypt, both in terms of population, 52.52m. and 51.90m. respectively, and in terms of area, 1,636,000 sqkm and 995,450 sqkm respectively. However, Iran's "Islamic Republic" and Egypt's low-level income and development, put them apart from Turkey.

Consequently, Turkey's categorisation as a small state in international relations seems to be restricted to the early republican period and the only later application of this approach appears to be during such an extreme international situation as the
Therefore, both because the foreign policy analyst needs to examine combinations of factors which are often unique to each country, and because Turkey stands aside remarkably distinctive from her surroundings both historically and geographically, and does not appear to fit any one regional or sub-regional system, this study puts emphasis on a historical and country-specific rather than a theoretical and comparative approach. Consequently, it concerns itself only with the foreign policy of Turkey during the period of 1980-1991, and attempts to find out why Turkey acted as she did during this period.

Nonetheless, although various methods of comparative foreign policy analysis do not appear to fit Turkey, in order to study anything we must be equipped with some notions of what it is important to look for. Let us therefore now review some of the relevant literature on foreign policy analysis.

Foreign policy analysis starts from the supposition that, despite the significant differences, "there are enough similar and, therefore, comparable patterns of behaviour" between the foreign policies of states "to enable the observer to make certain generalized statements". The assumption appears as that foreign policies of various states could be explained by devising appropriate analytical techniques. However, right from the beginning, foreign policy analysis poses a number of conceptual and empirical problems which start with defining the basic terms of "foreign" and "policy". Wallace once separated foreign and domestic policies in terms of territorial boundaries and defined foreign policy as a "area of politics which bridges the all-important boundary between the nation-state and its environment". It follows from the fact that foreign policy, like domestic policy, is formulated within the state, but, unlike domestic policy, is directed at and must be implemented in the environment external to that state. Another way of identifying an area of governmental activity which is concerned with "foreign" would be to base our separation on a particular type of policy which is concerned with the "raison d'etat" of the state. Of course, the
problem appears with both of these distinctions as the changing patterns of international relations since Second World War made the rigid differentiation between the state and the international environment difficult to sustain and thus the separation of "foreign" and "domestic" politics look rather arbitrary. It is obvious today that an increasing number of governmental activities are not self-evidently foreign or domestic. Typically, most of the issues that the governments have to deal with, have foreign and domestic dimensions and there is often an overlap between the two. Hence, in today's complex society, foreign policy analysis requires the analyst to be competent not only in understanding the international environment and interactions between states, but also the domestic political dimensions of foreign policy-making. This creates what Wallace calls "boundary" problems, by which he means the study of foreign policy crosses the boundary between two academic disciplines, international relations and political science. It follows that if the analyst views foreign policy behaviour from the perspective of international relations, he will be predisposed to see elements of the international environment as the major determinant of foreign policy. A political science perspective, on the other hand, predisposes the analyst to highlight domestic determinants like governmental politics, pressure group activity and public opinion. In this context, although an approach which touches both sides of the "boundary" is employed here, this study, as will gradually become clearer, is more partial to the political science perspective.

It has been suggested that analysis cannot begin until certain choices are made. Indeed, the analyst must specifically decide, either explicitly or implicitly, what foundation to base the analysis upon and at what level to set it up. Basically three levels of analysis are recognized in foreign policy: the influences on foreign policy; the making of foreign policy; and the implementation of foreign policy. These basic choices are important because they help the analyst to select significant facts and figures from the trivial attention; but more importantly they determine the nature of the ensuing analysis and the sort of explanations produced.
Traditional foreign policy analysis approaches, despite the differences in stress on different variables,\textsuperscript{42} generally assume that foreign policy is the product of rational behaviour\textsuperscript{43} and the state, rather than any other international actor, is the foreign policy-making unit. More importantly, the state, or rather the government acting on behalf of the state, is treated for analytical purposes as a unitary monolithic actor. These two assumptions, as Nye suggested, are indicative of a realist analysis which explains state behaviour in terms of an inter-state struggle for power.\textsuperscript{44} Since the Realist approach characterizes the international environment as hostile and dangerous, it follows that state behaviour is analysed from the perspective of that environment; forces external rather than internal to the state are regarded as the major determinants of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{45}

While we know today that the state, especially in the Third World, is not generally an "all-powerful monolith",\textsuperscript{46} the most important challenge to traditional assumptions and sort of analysis derived from them has come from the application of a decision-making approach to the study of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{47} There are three central concepts related to this approach: decision, decision-maker, and the decision-making process, and the major assumption employed is that foreign policy is, in essence, a series of decisions made by a group of people who can be labelled as decision-makers. It follows that foreign policy decisions do not simply emerge in response to external stimuli, rather they are processed through an identifiable machinery within the state. Adopting this approach inevitably directs foreign policy analysis to the task of explaining the behaviour of an individual or, more typically, a group of people operating within a structured environment who decide or choose to pursue one course of action rather than another.\textsuperscript{48} Thus the object of the study is no longer the state, which is both abstract and ascribed with human qualities by traditional analysts, but the behaviour of those who make decisions on behalf of the state, and who, by definition, become "the state". As a result, instead of trying to explain state behaviour in terms of its international environment, Snyder et al. suggests that the "key to the explanation of
why the state behaves the way it does lies in the way its decision-makers define their situation.49

Naturally, the emphasis on the domestic or internal sources of foreign policy represents a significant departure from traditional analysis which, as indicated earlier, tends to focus on the impact of external factors on policy. There are of course problems with the assumption that all foreign policy behaviour is a product of specific identifiable decisions. But the clear implication is that anyone who wants to understand foreign policy must be as concerned with the making of policy as they are with the substance of that policy. Obviously if foreign policy-making is part of a broader domestic political process it will also involve a range of actors, many more than merely those who hold the official positions. Therefore, our analysis has also to focus on the governmental machine - the organizations and the political actors involved in the policy process.50

Clearly, foreign policies are not made in a vacuum. Foreign policy making bodies of any state receive inputs (demands for action, values, threats, feedback) from outside world and respond to them. If we wish to make sense of the foreign policy process we need to look at these inputs and their interrelationship. However, what makes it difficult to use these factors (inputs and outputs) as a useful tool of analysis is their elastic character which need to be adjusted and changed to fit a given historical and concrete situation. Therefore, it is hardly possible to specify a precise number of factors that affects foreign policy making of all countries in the same way all the time. Nevertheless, Morgenthau suggested nine factors ("elements of national power"): Geography, National resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government.51

Of course, analysis of a specific policy, or a specific situation may require a different emphasis on various factors; also new factors may emerge.52 Therefore, especially when studying the foreign policy formulation of a specific country in a specific time period, some thought should be diverted beforehand to the question of
which factors contribute to the foreign policy making of that country. As suggested earlier, in today's complex society foreign policy formulation is by no means a simple process. The factors that can determine and condition the plans and choices made by foreign policy officials are too many and too varied to be enumerated. Every aspect of a society becomes relevant when one starts to explain the orientations and actions of a state. As improved technology, increasing communications, growing military capabilities, and expanded trade increase the interdependence of the states of the world, the variables that can underlie the foreign policy choices of any state become more and more complex. And the fact that foreign policy formulation is more often a response to immediate pressures from other states and the flow of events rather than a result of long-range planning, makes it all the more difficult to get at the root of a matter.

Nevertheless, experience and tradition over time - in combination with basic values and norms - create a set of relatively inflexible principles. What affects the process of formation of these principles varies from state to state. Yet, while looking at the elements that shape the foreign policy of any country, one can see, with some degree of over-simplification, the interplay of two kinds of variables.

One kind, which may be called "structural variables", are continuous, and rather static. The other, which may be termed "conjunctural variables", are dynamic and subject to change under the influence of domestic and foreign developments.

The structural factors are not directly related to the international political medium and the daily happenings of foreign politics. They can exert a long term influence over the determination of foreign policy goals. Geographical position, historical experiences, cultural background together with national stereotypes and images of other nations, and long term economic necessities would fall into the category of "structural variables". " Conjunctural variables", on the other hand, are made up of a web of interrelated developments in domestic politics and international relations. Although not displaying any long term continuity like the structural static factors, these conjunctural dynamic factors do exert temporary influence on a country's
foreign policy and especially on its daily implementation. Conjunctural changes in the international system, such as the end of the cold war, shifts in the world's present balance of power, domestic political changes, daily scarcities of economic factors, and the personalities of specific decision-makers, would fall into this category.

With these general observations in mind we may suggest a working proposition of the following factors as contributing to Turkish foreign policy formulation during the period under consideration (1980-1991): (1) the nature of the domestic political regime, including balance of power within, and composition of, the policy-making system; (2) Socio-Economic dynamics; (3) military attitudes and the national security; and (4) External environmental circumstances.

The Nature of the Political Regime

In any political system domestic issues have an important bearing on the formulation and substance of foreign policy, though the extent and nature of this influence varies with a nation's political system. There are differences between parliamentary democracies; guided democracies - of which Turkey was an example during the second half of 1980s; authoritarian governments - as the military regime of 1980-1983 could be categorized; and totalitarian regimes. In democracies, the government has to contend with political parties, the interests these parties represent, the desire to further improve standard of living, traditions, ethics, religion, and a multitude of pressure groups. Most important of all is the role of the electorate which in the last analysis determines what kind of government is to reflect the objectives of the winning party. This is a truly enormous accumulation of factors, all of which influence the international position of a nation. Moreover, in democracies, the very nature of democratic multiplicity of interests rarely, if ever, permits unanimous approval of a policy. Thus to maintain political equilibrium, democratic governments must rule by compromise. They have to trade one principle against other. Consequently, democratic administrations may make internal concessions to gain endorsement for foreign policies or, vice-versa, sacrifice foreign policies in order to carry out domestic measures.
The political system of a country is also significant in terms of the decision-making process and responsibilities, and it determines powers and focus and the mechanisms of decisions in foreign policy. The mechanisms of decision making in a democracy are different from those in a dictatorship. Those differences are of major significance. The democracies have their constitutional provisions for the organization of international affairs. Though there may be some manoeuvrability within the framework of this law, fundamentally whoever is in power must conform to the constitution. These provisions sometimes render policy formulation and implementation awkward except in emergency when the nation closes ranks behind its leaders. Nonetheless, parliamentary supervision remains active, and not even in wartime can the leader of a parliamentary democracy assume that he is above accounting to the legislative body which holds the power to question. Yet, the parliaments are rarely agree on vital issues, thus it may take too long to get a concession on any given subject that the policy-makers might be tempted to by-pass the parliament.

Dictatorships, on the other hand, permit decision-making without the supervision of parliamentary bodies. The fact that in a dictatorship a foreign policy decision is made secretly, without controls and restrained, contributes to the speed of decisions and swift action. In a democracy, on the other hand, foreign policy decisions are made as a part of public, parliamentary debate; their enforcement is slower and subject to moral restraints. Moreover, any certain course of action can easily be reversed in dictatorships, in contrast to the latter which "must be more concerned about the domestic costs of altered policies than the former".

This brings us to the much debated question of the role of public opinion in international affairs and foreign policy. The general assumption is that, in democracies, public opinion exerts considerable influence on policy-makers. But how articulate is it? Can it be accurately measured? Moreover, it was said that public opinion offers abundant criticism but rarely, if ever, has constructive advice.
On the other hand, the masses may be swayed by irrational ideologies and charismatic leaders. Therefore, not institutions alone, but institutional behaviour is also relevant as the democratic and non-democratic way of life is mirrored in institutional behaviour, behaviour within the institutional framework, attitudes towards institutions, and techniques of adjustments. Even between democratic countries there are significant differences in that respect.

The institutional structure in a country, at a minimum, "determines the amount of the total social effort which can be devoted to foreign policy". Aside from the allocation of resources, the domestic structure crucially affects the way the actions of other states are interpreted. Without denying the importance of other factors, the actual choice of policies within states are determined to a considerable degree by the interpretation of the environment by their leaders and their conception of alternatives. Their understanding of the nature of their choice in turn depends on many factors, including their experience during the rise to eminence, the structure in which they must operate, and the values of their society. In this context, the personality of leaders, who control the focus of power, may have important influences on foreign policy. This is especially important in totalitarian countries, where power of dictators is not restrained by democratic bodies, and where they exercise decisive influence over the conduct of foreign policy.

Moreover, in the contemporary period, the very nature of the governmental structure introduces an element of rigidity which operates more or less independently of the convictions of statesmen or the ideology which they represent. Daily issues are usually too complex and relevant facts too manifold to be dealt with on the basis of personal intuition. Therefore, vast bureaucratic mechanisms emerges within the states to aid the leaders to chose between options. In today's society, there are few government offices which do not contribute to foreign policy-making in one form of another. While doing this, however, in time, they, too, develop a momentum and a vested interest of their own, and certain governmental influences may be brought to bear upon the administrators of foreign affairs. When this happens, of course,
bureaucracy becomes an obstacle to policy-makers and thus they may try to overcome it.66

Another effect of institutional structures could be seen in the concentration of authority: in the difference between centralized and decentralized government structures. "The greater the concentration of authority in a single individual or small group, the greater the likelihood that subordinate policy-makers will withhold criticism and seek to provide the information and recommendation that they perceive their superiors to want".67

**Socio-Economic Dynamics**

The socio-economic conditions of a country, which are closely connected with its political evolution, form an important factor of foreign policy. The standard of living, the distribution of income, and the social structure related to the facts of production and consumption are elements of social strength or weakness, while political institutions, civil rights, political stability are measure of political vigour, and both are closely interwoven.

The degree to which the economy of a state has developed may have important consequences for its foreign policy as different states at different levels of developments have different needs and therefore different links to their environments.68 In addition, the level of economic development greatly contributes to the internal demands from governments to formulate external policies that reflect and serve the diversity of interests that it produces.69

Moreover, the level of economic development may also be effective in determining a nation's capability to implement foreign policy plans.70 "The more a country is develop, the larger is the proportion of its GDP that is likely to be devoted to external purposes, whether these be military ventures, economic aid programs, or extensive diplomatic commitments".71

The cultural and socio-psychological factors, which also belong to this factor, are possibly the most difficult to analyze in precise terms However evasive this factor
is, it still exists and perhaps even more enduring than those associated with economic development. No statesmen make decisions in foreign politics without evaluating a pattern of political behaviour of a nation which is either his partner or his adversary. Foreign policy, whether for cooperation or conflict, sooner or later becomes a social process. Patterns of political behaviour, or of general cultural patterns are thus paramount, and statesmen usually base their decisions on their own and historical experiences. Moreover, values and memories may be shared widely within the country, thus producing a bonding effect between people, or they can be divisive forces among different parts of the society. Obviously, the societal unity may have important effects on the formulation of the country's foreign policy and the conduct of its external affairs.

Foreign policy formation, and its effectiveness once formulated, clearly depends on many factors, but the extent of the support which officials would get from people is quite certainly one of them. Furthermore, the importance of social and cultural unity as foreign policy input could be observed from the many nation-states which are affected by internal dissension among different groups. Though the implications of this fragmentation for the conduct of foreign policy are not easily discernible, its importance for Turkey, which was almost torn apart by ideological strife during the 1970s and came to be affected by an ethnic separatism during the 1980s, is quite clear.

Moreover, a nation's history produces stereotypes of behaviour and attitudes which are the consequences of the cultural and social environment and the political atmosphere that has historically prevailed. They are also the result of the physical and political geography of the country and its role in the concert of neighbouring countries, thus they may bring forth not only national customs but also fairly consistent attitudes toward neighbouring countries in particular and the outside world in general. Consequently, historic prejudices may shape a people's national character and also colours the views of the men in responsible policy-making positions.
As mentioned above, the characteristics and personality of decision-makers may have affects on their decisions, and therefore on a country's foreign policy. The office gives the decision-maker certain responsibility for making objective decisions when confronted with objective situations, but whether he actually makes those decisions may depend on his "decisiveness". Equally, the office gives him certain powers, but whether he enlarges the power of the office may depend on his "assertiveness". The objective situation would obviously influence the decisions of any man, but his personal views of national interest and his own personal interests and his personal style would also shape the decision. Therefore, it should be remembered that personality of official decision-makers is an important determinant of their decision and, hence, of the nation's foreign policy, and "the higher in the hierarchy of the foreign policy organization an individual's role is, the more likely are his personal characteristics to affect foreign policy decisions".76

It was argued that man's motivation is deeply rooted in his values, which are "both goals of his actions and yardsticks to measure his behaviour".77 Apart from personal expediences, ideological inclinations and societal pressures, man's values are formed, in part, by his religious beliefs. Therefore, it is also relevant to our assessment that the role of religion, in this case Islam, in foreign policy-making should be considered, especially since Islam, unlike Christianity, does not prescribe the separation of religion from politics.78 Indeed, devout Muslims argue that Islam is a complete social, political, leal and cultural system, and has its law: the Sharia. Consequently, it is the only legitimate rule and there can be no separation between politics and religion. The importance of Islam's influence on foreign policy of Islamic countries, therefore, should to be considered. As an influence, "it can act...as an integrative force, creating consensus on foreign policy objectives...(providing) l'esprit de corps...to a population, and...mobilizing external sources in support of state....In other cases, Islam can be constraint on policy".79 According to Dawisha, an important problem which foreign policy analysts face all too frequently when trying to uncover the effect of Islam on specific foreign policy actions, is the question of whether "a particular policy
pronouncement or decision motivated by Islam, or was it motivated by some other value or consideration...whereby Islam would be used to simply to bestow credibility and legitimacy on the policy". This problem, as will be discussed in chapter six, also relates to the Turkish case, where even an attempt to put Islam's role in determining general Turkish foreign policy has so far been missing. The only foreign policy related question most often asked in very few studies, seeking to explain the apparent revival of Islam in modern - supposedly secular - Turkey, has been whether the "Islamic revival poses a political threat to the survival of modern Turkish state...and the rarely articulated role of (Western fear of Islam) in determining Turkey's relation to Europe". Thus, Chapter Six of this study will attempt to fill the apparent gap in looking beyond the visible manifestations of "Islamic revival", such as turban issue, events which attracted foreign media attention.

**External Environment**

Unlike in domestic politics, where the political leadership exercise relative control over their environment, in foreign policy political decisions are aimed at an environment over which political leaders have very little, if any, control. On the other hand, although, in practice, the conduct of states in the international arena seems to be constrained only "by the decisions of the states themselves, not by an authority external to them", thus the basic feature of international society appears to be its "anarchical nature", foreign policies, as stated earlier, are not made in a vacuum but in relation to other bodies similarly acting in the global arena, which creates certain sets of restraints, "be it conventional, customary, ethical, legal or institutional". In this context, as foreign policy consist of "decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others", it can be defined as "the actions of a state toward the external environment and the conditions under which these actions formulated". Therefore, while formulating foreign policies, policymakers have to take their international environment into account, since the success in achieving their goals may be affected by other states' responses and the level of their
accurate reckoning of others' policies. Moreover, the structure of the international political system and the geo-political position of the state vis-a-vis the international system are also important determinants of a country's foreign policy and its success.\textsuperscript{87}

Of course, the more an association is valued, the more it imposes constraints on its members, and the degree of influence members of an association can exert over each other depends upon the relative priorities they attach to maintenance of the association and of membership in it.\textsuperscript{88} This effect will be observed in the text on Turkey's relation with the Council of Europe and The European Community during the period under consideration.

Obviously, a major part of the external environment of decision-makers is formed by the actions of the other governments in the international arena. Since all the governments act in order to further their own interests, a competition and/or conflict between states is the natural outcome. However, the nature of the relationship, that is dependent, inter-dependent, oppositional, etc., will also be affected in the first place "by the extent to which the two governments fell they need to the support of the other in question".\textsuperscript{89}

In this context, an important part of the effects from the international environment is brought upon states by their linkage and influence relationships with other states and state groupings.\textsuperscript{90} The essential variables which affect the exercise of influence have been identified as: (1) "the amount of influence a state wields over others can be related to the capabilities mobilized in support of specific foreign policy objectives",\textsuperscript{91} (2) the "extend to which there are needs between the two countries";\textsuperscript{92} (3) "the ephemeral quality of responsiveness";\textsuperscript{93} (4) the maximum utility of the resources available;\textsuperscript{94} and (5) the probability of reactions.\textsuperscript{95}

However, this approach should be treated carefully when studying Turkey during the 1980s, since after the experience of Cyprus intervention of 1974 and attempts by the US to use its influence patterns extensively on Turkey to obtain a certain set of outcomes which were not favoured by Turkey, she became much more restive in her relations with other states and much more sensitive towards any influence
attempt or intervention. Moreover, the apparent failure of US influence attempts during the second half of the 1970s made her an unlikely target for new attempts during the 1980s, though there were limited European attempts to affect the outcome of Turkey's democratization process, they are treated in this study as a result of Turkey's conscious linkages with Europe rather than influence relationship.

Military Attitudes and The National Security

In the modern world, the political leadership in most societies acts in order to maintain the security of their national state: so much so that foreign and security policies have merged to the point where statesmen and military strategists must collaborate closely. Therefore, it goes without saying that military leaders are needed for expert advice, and it is possible that their considered opinion can strongly influence policy decisions. However, it is the responsibility of the decision-makers to determine, if he can, "how much influence the military may be permitted to exert on foreign policy decisions and whether military personnel should be permitted to state conflicting views in public." 

Whether the influence of military leaders can be kept within bounds by a civilian government will always be crucial to a nation's position in international affairs and to its own internal politics. Since Turkey was under outright military dictatorship between 1980-1983 and even after 1983 the military was effective in determining policies in the country, the civil-military relationship and the foreign policy-making of the military regimes are important aspects of this study.

Though there is a lack of scholarly study dealing with the foreign policy formulation of the military regime because foreign policy analysts have not regard military regimes as another variable in foreign policy studies, Parakala, in a recent work, attempted to provide a comparative framework for analysing the foreign policies of the military regimes, which he concluded there does not exist what can be termed as a typically military regime's' response to any particular foreign policy issue. Yet, there appear to be some similarities between military regimes regarding their attitudes
to national security and foreign policy issues. Hence Parakala's two hypotheses also seem relevant to the Turkish case.

His first hypothesis, moving from the observation that the orientations and attitudes of the military personnel towards the political activity are clearly different from those of the civilian politicians, assumes that armed forces personnel, whose main preoccupation is to defend the country, "perceive national interest and the means to effectively serve it differently", and as such "it is reasonable...to expect that once they come to power...the country's foreign policy undergoes a change".  

The second hypothesis is based on the observation that following the military coups, civilians' influences on key policy-making units are replaced by the military, and that the military regime usually restrict, if not totally prevent, "the participation of hitherto influential groups in the decision-making process". Consequently, it is argued that this change in the decision-making process, also affects the regime's structure, and as the "regime structure is one of the important determinants of the country's foreign policy", it is "reasonable to expect that the transformation of a civilian regime into a military one affects a country's foreign policy".

Sure enough, "change" was one of the consistencies of Turkish daily life during the 1980s. Starting with the military coup d'état of September 12, 1980, Turkey had experienced fundamental changes in every field. Her political structure, her economic system, social strata, cultural patterns, religious expressions, and of course her foreign policy, all had their share from fast evolving developments. Turkey at the end of the decade is a largely transformed country and the impetus for change is still visible. The transformation of various aspects of Turkish foreign policy may not be discernible all the time for outsiders and the changes may not always be as momentous as we have witness during the last part of the 1980s and early 1990s across Europe and the former Soviet Union, but it has nevertheless been there.

According to Dina A. Zinnes change, another word for "transformation", implies that "something is happening through time" and that "what was true at one
point is different at a subsequent time point". In this sense, "change" has become one of the watchwords of Turkish foreign policy, certainly after 1983 when civilian government took over power.

A change in any policy is usually based on a change in ideas, on rethinking or reappraisal, and a variety of factors may have impact on specific foreign policy reappraisals or changes. When and what factors determine whether and to what extend pressure for change in policy will in fact produce a change in hitherto rigid policy patterns is an important issue in foreign policy theory. If we relate this problem, together with the above definition, to our study it is fairly obvious that a study of change in Turkish foreign policy means an analysis of how and why differences occurred through time, that is during the period under consideration.

In theory, a reappraisal of ideas may occur because of:

- changes in the composition of the policy-making system; that is shifts in domestic politics may place new people in positions of power and these new policy-makers may have "normative, descriptive or theoretical ideas that differ from those of their predecessors", thus leadership change may also imply a policy change. In this context, Mr. Ozal's "different" ideas and "vision" about various aspects of governmental policies, including foreign policy, made the country susceptible to change once he had taken over political power.

- changes in the balance of power within the policy-making system; that is if the policy-making system contains advocates of competing policies, the balance of power between the camps may determine which policy will be pursued. The struggle within the executive over Turkey's policy during the Gulf Crisis is a good example of this and thus will be studied in detail.

- finally, changes in environmental circumstances may bring about foreign policy reappraisals. It should not be forgotten that the international system and the relationship between the state and conditions existent within that system determines how the state will behave. Also it has been emphasized that nations under pressure adapt to changing conditions in their environment. Thus, systemic changes, for
example, may generate an important impetus for change by altering the conditions for foreign policy. In this context, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent transformation of world politics were the most important systemic changes that had taken place since the emergence of the bipolar system after the Second World War, thus as such it provided tremendous momentum for national policy changes as well. System transformations may also involve the extension of new - or abandonment of previous - commitments and therefore signify a change in the goals and/or objectives of participating actors. Turkey's new commitments during the 1980s towards the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region and transformation of the Regional Cooperation for Development to the Economic Cooperation Organization and her relations with the European Community, may constitute ample examples to this.

Moreover, as stated earlier, nations also take into account the way in which the international environment responds to their policies. Accordingly, the "spill-back process" or the negative feedback from the international environment may create pressures for change. As a result, the answers to the questions of whether Western pressure had an impact on Turkey's democratization-human rights policies, and of whether the negative feedback Turkey received from European countries and organizations after the 1980 coup d'état forced her to look for new areas of linkage, will be particularly interesting.

While the first two categories of above-mentioned possible determinants of change are related to the internal domain of the country in question, the latter is to the international. Since the governments make foreign policy in the context of domestic as well as international pressures, studying change in foreign policy should involve an understanding of both the domestic and external environments and the interaction between the two. Therefore, we must also look at the institutional structure by which governments make and implement their foreign policies, and arguably at the whole domestic process as it also affects their policy-making. In this context, the type of political or economic regime in a state can be crucial in determining foreign policy actions. Moreover we also have to look at the linkages between the two as
the national and international systems function in such a way as to continually reinforce each other, and no matter what the state of international politics, the impact of an action "on a polity will vary according to particular nations, structures and groups to which the polity is linked and the nature of that link. Nations do not react to the international system as a whole, but to the way it is reflected in particular actors with whom they have most contact". In connection with this, Turkey's vocational linkages with the West in general and Europe in particular will be emphasized in this study, with particular references to the effects of European criticism on Turkish decision-makers and their responses to them. However, while doing this, it should not be forgotten that the linkage patterns, like foreign policy patterns, can be highly dynamic and susceptible to change.

Hence in the context of changes and linkages, this study will examine the various factors which brought about changes in Turkish foreign policy, and which may be broadly categorised as domestic, regional and international ones. These factors include disillusionment with Turkey's Western allies after 1974 and a desire for new political friends; a desire for new economic opportunities because of inadequate economic benefits from the West; the new attitudes from domestic factors shaping foreign policy, particularly the recent visibility of Islam in popular attitudes and governmental circles; the end of the Cold War and changes happening through Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; and Mr. Ozal's own peculiar understanding of foreign policy and what should be given priority in the Turkish foreign policy agenda, will be discussed through the text in detail.

Needless to say, one of this study's principal contentions is that the type of political and economic regime in a state can be crucial in determining its foreign policy. Further it is acknowledged that these two - domestic environment and foreign policy of a country - are intimately related and that each serves better to explain and shed light upon the other. Thus it will also be shown that the peculiarities of the Turkish governing system, her chosen economic strategy, and the "Turkish style of democracy" have all had important effects on determining her foreign policy. Moreover, it will be
illustrated that this was not only because any country's foreign policy is a by-product or reflection of its domestic political system, but also because it is affected by other states' responses to a particular country's perceived political system, which also crucially affects the way the actions of other states are interpreted.

Organization of the Study

This study is in three parts. Part one examines the traditional inputs of Turkish foreign policy and changes in their relative importance through the years up to 1980. It also explores the relevant literature through these years.

In this context, Chapter Two deals with the effects of Turkey's highly strategic geographical setting, its imperial background, and the views and foreign policy implementations of Ataturk, founder of the Republic and the one who set forward an ideological guideline for Turkish foreign policy. The aim of this chapter is to clarify the traditional-ideological foundations of Turkish foreign policy and, as part of it, the concept of Kemalism which affected Turkish foreign policy through the years.

The third chapter will deal with the internal and external factors which forced Turkey to reevaluate its foreign policy during the period up to 1980. Such factors as the changing pattern of the international environment from the cold war to detente; the Cyprus crisis; changes in Turkey's domestic political scene and problems relating to them; the relations between Turkey's economic problems and its dependence on Middle Eastern petrol and Western economic aid, and their complications on foreign policy during the 70s, will be dealt with. Finally, the concluding remarks of this chapter will set Turkey's domestic and international scene as it was on the 12 September 1980.

Although the main part of this study is concerned only with developments since 1979, when the latest international and domestic challenges for Turkish foreign policy had come about and when most of the basic changes manifested themselves, the inclusion of these two chapters was deemed necessary in the hope that an explanation of earlier periods from the perspective of foreign policy fundamentals and changes would deepen the understanding of contemporary Turkish foreign policy and show its
historical linkages. Besides, the claim of this study is to be of help with the general understanding of Turkish foreign policy.

Part Two is the crux of the study. It will deal with impetuses for change in Turkish foreign policy, during the period under consideration, with an added emphasis on Turkey's domestic environment as it relates to foreign policy. The highlights of this part will be Mr. Ozal's particular understanding of Turkey's place in the world and the foreign policy which Turkey should follow to reach this "respectable" place; the increasing Islamism in Turkey as it relates to foreign policy; alternatives of economically dependent Turkey in the foreign policy arena; restructuring of Turkish democracy and its effects on country's foreign policy; and the traditional importance and influence of the Turkish military on foreign policy, and society in general.

Some interest will also be directed towards the decision-making process of foreign policy. In this context, differences not only between reality and legality, but also within the executive will be shown. Furthermore, an evaluation of the influence of Turkey's external relations on the practice on her foreign policy during the period under consideration (1980-1991) will be incorporated into various chapters in this section. This will include analyses of the economic and political relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries in general, including Turkey's neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war, and her participation in the Islamic conference; relations between Turkey and the former Communist bloc in general and the Soviet Union in particular, with an emphasis on more recent developments; and relations between Turkey, the United States, the European Community, and the Council of Europe.

Accordingly, the object of Chapter Four is to explain the impact of the September 12, 1980 coup d'etat on both Turkey's domestic evolution and on her foreign policy orientations. In this context not only the priorities of the military regime but also the responses of the external environment to these priorities, and their combined effect on Turkish foreign policy will be of interest to us.

Chapter Five will follow the trail of the previous chapter in that it examines the democratic development of Turkey, the reactions it generated outside the country, and
the combined effect of country's democratic maturity over her foreign policy. This will include not only the particulars of Turkish democracy and decision-making process, but also the responses from abroad, especially from Europe, to them and the linkages between the two.

Similarly, Chapters Six and Seven will deal respectively with the effects of the resurgence of Islam in Turkey, and her chosen economic development strategy over her foreign policy. In this context, the momentum given by the world-wide Islamic revivalism to Turkish Islamists and their effects, if any, over Turkish foreign policy will be discussed in Chapter Six. On the other hand, discussion of Turkey's economic relations with the EC, the Middle Eastern and the Black Sea countries will be of interest to Chapter Seven. Further connections between Turkey's economic system and her foreign policy, and the effects of the internationalization of Turkish economy will also be shown in this chapter.

Part Three of this study will analyze Turkish foreign policy in practice, and evaluate the influence of various, domestic and external, factors. The chosen case-study, that is Turkey's response to the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, also aims to show the extent of Mr. Ozal's domination over, and personal touch on, Turkish foreign policy decision-making.

The last part of this thesis offers, first, a number of conclusions, which will present a multi-faced picture of Turkey's contemporary foreign policy, its changing ideological stance; and, secondly, speculations on how the economic and commercial rapprochement between Turkey and the Muslim world might affect Turkey's future attitudes toward NATO and Middle Eastern matters as well as its domestic political stability. Further speculations will be made as to how the break up of the former Soviet Union and the creation of the independent Turkic states might change Turkey's foreign and domestic policy priorities; and on whether the continuation of being kept out of Europe will affect Turkey's orientations. Hence, in short, the conclusion will assess the decade of 1980s under the light of the preceding analyses, leading up to investigating future prospects.
It should be mentioned, however, that no attempt will be made in this study to
detail and document the international developments of foreign governments' action
and/or reaction towards Turkey, except in so far as they help to explain shifts and
trends in Turkish foreign policy. The emphasis, then, will be on Turkey's action
patterns and the reasons behind them.

Finally, a few words about the way in which this research was carried out is
needed before proceeding to main body of the text. While the secondary sources, both
in English and in Turkish, provided useful information particularly about aspects of the
operational environment of Turkey's foreign policy, the main research effort of this
study was directed to various official statements, speeches, interviews and memoirs of
the major actors in Turkish politics during the period under consideration.

In this context, the collections of the Directorate General of Press and
Information, Prime Ministry, which, among others, included all the speeches,
statements, messages and interviews of the presidents, premiers and foreign ministers
of the period, were extremely useful. In addition, their archives also included a review
of foreign press for the news related to or about Turkey. Moreover, reference series of
the same Directorate General and the Foreign Ministry Information Bureau were useful
in presenting official views. Insight for the official attitudes towards various issues was
also readily available from the English edition of the weekly digest Newsport and from
press releases of Turkish foreign ministry. Further, my access to the Library of Turkish
Grand National Assembly enabled me to look at the minutes of the national parliament
which provided invaluable understanding of opposition parties' as well as government's
attitudes towards the country's foreign connections. Although the minutes of the
discussions within the National Security Council for the period of 1980-83 were not
open to the public at the time of my research in Turkey during spring 1993, this was
compensated partly by the detailed memoirs of General Kenan Evren, leader of the
Junta that took power on September 12, 1980 and later president of the country
between 1982-1989. Further gaps were filled by an interview with General Evren,
conducted on March 2, 1993, in Marmaris, Turkey.
Another valuable source of information about Turkish views on specific subjects has been the Turkish press which, though restricted under the military regime, has acquired relative freedom and a lively form since 1983. Despite its disadvantages and highly emotional attitude in times of crisis, the press coverages and especially comments were nevertheless useful in providing information about the thinking of particular political movements with which they were associated. Moreover, the press was also worth looking at from the point of view that it reflected, and to a certain extent shaped, public opinion. In addition to various Turkish dailies, some English language newspapers and news digests were also consulted for accuracy of information and western opinion on issues under consideration.

Although, because of the contemporary nature of the work, the official documents were only partially available, I believe this disadvantage was minimalized by the fact that this research is mainly interested in general directions and fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy rather than the daily dealings of the foreign ministry.
NOTES

5. Weiker, W., "Turkey, the Middle East and Islam", Middle East Review, Special Issue on Turkey, Vol. 17 (3), Spring 1985, p. 30.
9. Ibid., p. 32.
20. Ibid.

23. Tachau, ibid., p. 3

24. Ibid.


31. Turkey's GDP in 1988 was $72.42 billion, of which 36% came from industry, while Egypt's was $29.50 billion, of which about 27% was as a result of industrial output. Ibid.

32. For application of this approach to Turkey in studying her foreign policy during the second World War see Fox, A. B., The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).


35. White, op. cit., p.5


38. Rosenau argues that this boundary-crossing characteristic of foreign policy requires the setting up of a separate study which he calls linkage politics. See, Rosenau, J. N.
39. White, op. cit., p. 9


41. White, op. cit., p. 10

42. Jacobson, H. K. & Zimmerman, W., _The Shaping of Foreign Policy_ (New York: Alherton Press, 1969), p. 7 categorized traditional approaches to foreign policy analysis according to the variable stressed as systemic, environmental, societal, governmental, and idiosyncratic or psychological. Briefly, theorists of the systemic school assert that states act as they do because of the nature of the international system of which they are a part, or because the role which they have been assigned or have chosen to play within the system. More specifically, in this perspective states are seen to act as they do because they are part of the multistate system, which is characterized by the existence of a number of territorially organized, independent decision centers. Theorist in the other four categories take a diametrically opposite approach from that adopted by theorists in the first category. They regard the individual characteristics of each state as providing all-important inputs, and argue that a state's foreign policy will be the consequence of these characteristics. The second category subsumes a long tradition in foreign policy analysis, namely the tendency to project foreign policy behaviour from the nature of the nonhuman environmental characteristics of the state, that is from such phenomenon as its geographical position or raw material base. Those in the third category, on the other hand, have seen foreign policy behaviour as the external manifestation of domestic societal forces, such as national character, political culture, or the socio-economic organization of the society (Marxists). The fourth category focuses primarily on the nature of the regime and the system of government. Traditionally it has been asserted that authoritarian regimes are likely to pursue self-aggrandizing policies in the international arena, while democracies or republics will probably be pacific. Finally that last category sees foreign policy behaviour in terms of the personal characteristics of leading individuals - their anxieties, aspirations and perceptions.

43. Allison, G., calls this "rational actor assumption" in his _Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis_ (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) For examples of studies which put emphasis on to one of the variables see Easton, D, _A Framework for Political Analysis_ (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965); and his _Varieties of Political Theory_ (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), chp. 7; Almond & Powell, op. cit. On the application of systems to foreign policy see, Modelski, G. A., _Theory of Foreign Policy_ (London: Pall Mall, 1962); Wallace, op. cit.; Jones, R. E., _Analysing Foreign Policy_ (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970); Rosenau, _Scientific Study of Foreign Policy_.

39


47. For a more developed attempt to evaluate the impact of a decision-making approach on the study of foreign policy, see White, B.P, "Decision Making Analysis" in Taylor, T., (ed.), Approaches and Theory in International Relations (London: Longman, 1979), pp. 141-164.


49. Ibid., p. 65.

50. Allison, op. cit., p. 5

51. Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 113-177


53. Rosenau, The Study of Foreign Policy, p. 17.


55. Ibid., p. 141.

56. This line of categorization of the sources brings to mind Rosenau's time continuum, in which he puts the sources that tend to change slowly at one end, and the sources that tend to undergo rapid change at the other end. His categorization also includes the systemic aggregation, which includes systemic, societal, governmental, and idiosyncratic sources. On the other hand, Reynolds only differentiates domestic and international factors in terms of influences on foreign policy decision-makers. Legg/Morrison also make the same distinction. In more descriptive terms Coplin presents four general areas: the international context, the behavior of decision-makers, the role of domestic politics, and the impacts of economic and military conditions. See Rosenau, Study of Foreign Policy, and Scientific Study of Foreign Policy; Reynolds, P. A., An Introduction to International Relations, Third Edition (London, New York: Logman, 1994); Coplin, W.D., Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical Overview (Chicago: Markham Publishing House, 1971); and Legg/Morrison, Ibid.


60. Ibid., p. 59.
61. Rosenau, Study of Foreign Policy, p. 25.
64. Ibid., pp. 141 and 151.
65. Gros, op. cit., 123.
68. Ibid., p. 20.
69. Ibid.
70. Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 133-134.
71. Rosenau, Study of Foreign Policy, p. 20.
73. Rosenau, Study of Foreign Policy, p. 21; Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
74. London, op. cit., 39.
75. de Rivera, J., Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: E. Merrill, 1968), p. 165.
77. Gros, op. cit., p. 119.
78. For a comparative discussion of Islam's place in determining foreign policy mainly in the Middle Eastern/Arab context see Dawisha, A. (ed.), Islam in Foreign Policy (London, New York, Sydney: Cambridge University Press in Association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983).
80. Ibid., p. 5.
84. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 97.
85. Frankel, op. cit., p. 1. Same explanation was also offered by White, B., "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches" in Clarke & White, op. cit., p. 1.
89. Ibid., pp. 114-115.
The affects of Turkey's influence relationship with the US in regard to Turkey's Cyprus policy is discussed by Bolukbasi, S., The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus (New York, London: University Press of America, 1988).

Holsti, op. cit., p. 149.

Ibid., p. 151.

Ibid., p. 153.


London, op. cit., p. 73.


Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., p. 12.

Ibid., p. 13.

Coplin, op. cit., p. 140.

Goldman, op. cit., p. 4.


Genco, S., "Integration Theory And System Change in Western Europe: The Neglected Role of System Transformation Episodes" in Holsti (et. al.), op. cit., p. 68.

Goldman, op. cit., p. 4.

Wallace, op. cit., p. 12; Reynolds, op. cit., p. 54; Rosenau, J.N., "Introduction: Political Science in a Shrinking World" in Rosenau, Linkage Politics, p. 7.

Wallace, ibid., p. 12.


1. Introduction

It was suggested earlier that every country's foreign policy reflects its special circumstances, though similarities between factors contributing to the foreign policies of different states could be found. Moreover, it was proposed that those variables, the interplay of which may shape any country's foreign policy, could loosely be categorized as "structural and "conjunctural". Since, in this context, in order realistically to portray any country's foreign policy, one has to appraise carefully, first of all, the elements and principles which shape it, let us now first look at the structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy. 1 In order to see "changes" after all, one needs first to see the foundations from which changes occurred.

During the early years of the Ottoman Empire, its foreign policy was motivated by its military-offensive character. Subsequently, when the Empire first stagnated and then started to crumble, the main foreign policy objective was the preservation of the status quo by military and diplomatic means, of which the latter had had very little significance until that time. 2

When, finally, the Turkish nation-state came out of the ashes of the Empire, she was surrounded with a new international environment which was no longer identical to that which existed prior to World War I. First of all the breakup of the Ottoman, the Russian and the Austria-Hungarian Empires - empires that had played significant if not crucial roles in the international political and economic system - signaled change for the international system. The disintegration of these three empires increased the number of actors in the international system. Most of the new actors were politically unstable and economically weak compared to the victorious powers of World War I.
The political indicators of this period in which the new Turkish state found itself were colonialism, industrial-capitalist growth and its counterpart, communism.

Furthermore, throughout the war the international system ceased to be a "European System" and became a global one in which Europe was no longer predominant. The whole world had become what only Europe had been before: an indivisible field of international action. Moreover, the new Turkey was no longer an empire, but a nation state. She had no desire for territorial conquest and had no power to do so even if she had desired it. She needed a new, realistically sound foreign policy which could respond to the challenges of the new international system without endangering the existence of the state. Atatürk's new directions for Turkish foreign policy were enormously important for this point and, therefore, will be discussed at some length. His foreign policy objectives reflected a departure from the militant expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire. He was genuinely concerned with independence and sovereignty. With his motto of "peace at home, peace in the world", he was essentially a realist in his foreign policy. He sought a deliberate break with the Ottoman past in virtually every aspect of life.

Nonetheless, the new Turkey could not totally disassociate herself from her Ottoman heritage. Today, the Turkish nation carries the deep impressions of the historical experiences of being reduced from a vast empire to extinction, and then having to struggle back to save the national homeland and its independence. The struggle for survival and the play of realpolitik in the international arena, together with an imperial past and a huge cultural heritage left strong imprints on the national philosophy of Turkey and the character of her people.

Furthermore, historical experiences cannot be separated from the present day life of a nation. Like individuals, nations react to both internal and external forces within the international political arena, based on their historical impressions, prejudices and national image of themselves and other nations. Good or bad, right or wrong, historical experiences colour a nation's reaction to events and forces in the political system. As Legg & Morrison state, past relations between nations (the centuries of
ennity between Ottomans and Russians, for example) do have relevance for contemporary international politics. They limit the foreign policy options of the political leadership and are filters for viewing international reality. Therefore, the historical foundations of Turkish foreign policy will also be discussed.

Some other important foreign policy inputs of Turkey grew out of the country's geopolitical reality. As Rosenau puts it:

The configuration of the land, its fertility and climate, and its location relative to other land masses and to waterways... all contribute both to the psychological environment through which officials and publics define their links to the external world and the operational environment out of which their dependence on other countries fashioned.

The Turkish Republic, which has inherited, from the Ottoman Empire, the historic role of serving as both a land bridge and a fortress connecting Europe, Asia and the Middle East, constitutes a very good example of how and to what degree geography determines a country's foreign policy. The foreign relations of Turkey, and the Ottoman Empire before her, have been in large part, governed since the eighteenth century by the attempts of the Russians to gain control of the straits, and the efforts of Britain and France (and lately the United States) to stop them.

Turkey has undergone profound changes since the 1920s. But one thing, that is her location and its strategic value, has not changed. Even if her relative importance to other states has changed, what the Turkish decision-makers perceive about their geographical importance and threats reasoned from this particular location have not yet radically changed. And as far as the foreign policy making of a country is concerned, the perception of decision-makers about themselves, their country and other countries, is the most important factor to take into account.

Therefore, in this chapter, I shall deal with three main traditional inputs of Turkish foreign policy; namely the Ottoman experience and its long lasting legacy; the geopolitical realities of Turkey; and the ideological foundations defined under the leadership of Ataturk.
2. The Legacy of Empire

Turkish imperial history ended with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed after three years of nationalist struggle on July 24, 1923, replaced the dictated Peace Treaty of Sevres and established the new Turkish nation-state with complete sovereignty in almost all the territory included in the present day Turkish Republic. Although it contained restrictions on the Straits, the Treaty of Lausanne was essentially international recognition of the demands expressed in the Turkish National Pact.

The Sevres Treaty in contrast was detrimental to Turkish independence and destructive of its homeland. It stipulated that Greece was to receive the remaining portion of the Empire's European territory as well as Izmir (Smyrna) and its hinterland in western Anatolia. In addition to the abandonment by the Turks of all Arab lands, a sovereign Armenian state and an autonomous Kurdistan were to be formed in eastern Anatolia. Furthermore, France, Italy and Britain were allowed to carve out "spheres of influence" from the remaining Anatolian heartland. Capitulations, abolished during the war, were to be restored, and the Straits were to be governed by an international regime. Thus the Turks were only allowed to keep a small part of desolate central Anatolia under various restrictions. However, the Treaty of Serves remained still-born as the Nationalists, organized around M. Kemal in Anatolia, refused to accept it and successfully fought to overturn its terms.

Nonetheless, the fact that the sovereign rights and independence of the Turkish people had been disregarded by the Entente powers, and that the Turks were forced to fight to regain their independence and the territory they considered as their "homeland" after rapidly losing an empire, was to have an important effect upon both subsequent Turkish attitudes vis-a-vis foreign powers and on their nation-building efforts. Moreover, it should be mentioned that, though displaced by a later treaty, the Treaty of Sèvres, together with the arguments and counter-arguments about the killings of Armenians during the first World War by the Ottomans, formed a basis for subsequent
Armenian claims on Turkish territory. Furthermore, perhaps more relevant to the discussion of Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s, the Treaty of Sévres had given form and inspiration to Kurdish nationalism and today Kurdish nationalists still refer to it as an international recognition of their aspirations for independent Kurdish homeland. However, it should not be forgotten that at the time most of the Kurdish tribes sided with the Turks against the "invading powers" as both nations' primary identification was based on religion rather than along ethnic or racial lines. It was only after the full-fledged development of Turkish national consciousness and the dissolution of the religious characteristics of the new state from 1924 onwards that the Kurdish and Turkish interests seemed to diverge and various Kurdish uprisings, motivated by a mixture of nationalist and religious feelings, took place against the Turkish state during the 1920s and 1930s.

2.1. Constructive Legacies

The Turkish Republic was born out of the Ottoman Empire, but bore little resemblance to its forerunner. The new Turkey was not an empire, but a relatively small nation-state; not autocracy or theocracy, but a parliamentary democracy; not a state founded on expansionist principles, but a nation dedicated to peaceful coexistence; not a multinational, multi-racial, and multi-religious state, but an almost homogeneous society. Her aims were not to create and expand an empire, but to build and perpetuate a strong, stable nation within the boundaries of her homeland. Those were not ephemeral happenings (at that critical time of history) but the facts created by the deliberate choices of the leaders of the new Republic.

Though at one time the Turks formed an important part of the ruling classes, they were actually one of the smaller nations within the multi-ethnic empire. Moreover, the Ottoman sultans did not consider themselves as Turks as such, but as Ottomans. Therefore when the Turks fought for their independence after the First World War, they did not fight only against the Entente' invaders, but also against the Ottoman
Sultan and the forces of the old system: a point that is usually overlooked. Hence, it is not surprising to see that the leaders of the new Turkish state sought to break with the Ottoman past which they identified with ignorance, corruption, backwardness and dogmas. To establish a truly new state, they had to clear away the ruins of the Empire, disown its legacy and discover new virtues based on the Turkish nation. The new Turkey had to have no relationship with the old. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the Turkish Republic did not inherit some of the fundamental features of the Ottoman Empire. A closer look at these features would help one to understand the background of Turkish Foreign Policy.

The new Turkey was established not only in the very heart of the old Empire's geo-political setting, that of Asia Minor and Thrace, therefore acquiring its complications, but it also retained many of its ruling elites. Since the bureaucratic elite of the Empire in its last days was dominated by Turks, the new Turkish state had found an experienced bureaucracy, an important value of which other post-empire states ran into scarcity. Fortunately 19th century experiments with Western education had produced an educated official class. Later this elite group of administrators, under Ataturk's guidance and within the one-party authoritarian regime, formed the nucleus of Turkey's modernizing elites - the Republican People's Party, and imposed revolutionary changes from the top. Though these elites, on the one hand, secured a strong political power base for Ataturk and thus enabled him to carry out the most needed radical reforms to break down the traditional social and spiritual culture of Turkey and transform it into a secular and Western culture, on the other, they somewhat contradictorily supplied a material connection between the Empire and the new Turkish Republic. This pattern of elite, one-party politics with its dual character, was to set the trend in Turkish politics for many years to come.

One of the fundamental features of Turkish foreign policy has been its Western orientation. Despite the fact that Turkey had fought against the Western powers during the First World War, after independence she opted for the Western World. This was expressed first in cultural and, after World War II, in political and military terms. This
orientation has been so deliberate and continues to be a policy choice that can not be explained with the limited aim of "countering an imminent threat" or such formulations as "the economic interests of the ruling elite". These kinds of explanations would not only be unsatisfactory, but also misleading. Instead, one should look into Turkish history which has helped to shape Turkish understanding of its environment and its governmental philosophy.

Throughout history, the Turks have been connected to the West, first as a conquering superior and enemy, then as a component part, later as an admirer and unsuccessful imitator, and in the end as a follower and ally. Before anything else, the Ottoman Empire was a European state. After the Mongol invasion throughout Anatolia, a small tribe of Turks which later became known as Ottomans settled in the Valley of the Karasu, where they were in direct contact with the Greeks and Western influences. This was the beginning of the influence which had such a profound effect on their subsequent history. They began, indeed, to face the West; before they had any status in Asia Minor, the Ottomans were already an empire based largely on South-east Europe.

It is an important historical fact which is not often appreciated that the Ottoman Turks started their career as a people in extreme north-west of Asia Minor, facing Europe; that they founded their Empire not in Asia but across the Sea of Marmara in Thrace and the Balkans, in other words in Europe, and that then expanded eastwards into Asia Minor a century after they had already become a European power. It was, in fact, only during the course of the fifteenth century that they became an Oriental power as well as a European.16 Not only did Europe have an effect on the Ottoman Empire, but the Turks, from the time that they first entered the European continent, played a role in the destiny of Europe. They were not only the enemy of the European monarchs, but frequently allied themselves with one or more of the European countries against the others, and operated within the European system. It is, however, one of the ironies of history that the Ottoman Empire, whilst it had progressively become more and more alienated from Europe through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was "officially" re-admitted to the European legal system at the Paris Congress of 1856.
It is only natural that the Ottoman rule over one-third of Europe for four hundred years would have important effects on Empire's outlook. Its adaptation of a somewhat secular state system, especially in the conduct of foreign affairs and in the administration of the various millets, was part of this influence. Although it must be admitted that serving the cause of Islam was an important element behind most of the Ottoman conquests, but it is also a fact that, so long as the state was strong, the Ottoman rulers did not use the title "caliph", the religious leader of the Muslim community. It was only after the continuous dismemberment of the Empire's non-moslem subjects in the 19th century that the sultans, notably Abdulhamit II, upheld the idea of Pan-Islamism in order to prevent the disintegration of the Empire's Moslem subjects. In fact, the Ottoman Empire, though essentially a theocratic state, had come to create its own peculiar understanding of Islam, somewhat "secular" and different from that of the Arabs. It is no wonder that the Arabs, orthodox Muslims, called Ottomans "Atrak Rum", meaning the Turks of Rome or Byzantine. Moreover, it must be remembered that there was no institutionalized religious authority independent from the state. Therefore, it was easy for the Ottoman Sultan to make peace with the infidels, whenever he considered it necessary, and to look for Western help when modernization of empire was needed.

Given this background, the introduction of the western-oriented secular state in the 1920s was not totally contradictory to the overall experience of the Turkish people. In fact, modernization in terms of the West was started after a series of Ottoman defeats at the hands of the Western powers. Most Ottoman and Turkish modernizers did agree upon one basic assumption, as put by Abdullah Cevdet, that "there is no second civilization; civilization means European civilization, and it must be imported with both its roses and thorns". Turkey owed a great deal to the late Ottoman intellectuals, who advocated most of the reforms, which were finally realized under the guidance of Ataturk in the 1920s and 30s. Ataturk's success derived from his belief in European civilization and his willingness to accept "both its roses and its thorns", whereas earlier reformers had only tried to imitate them with limited success.
Another point of historical significance is the realistic outlook of Ottoman diplomacy, which was shaped during the nineteenth century with extraordinary success. During the last hundred or so years of its life, the Ottoman Empire was weak in comparison to the Western Powers and was forced to pursue its foreign policy among the tensions between its own interest and those of other powers. Nonetheless, by playing one great power against another for survival, the Ottomans were able to maintain the territorial integrity of much of the Empire for a long time. Thanks to the contemporary international system of the "balance of powers", and the Ottomans' understanding of its main features, the Empire's decline took three hundred years and its collapse came only with a world war.

As a student of this remarkable diplomacy, Ataturk would later use all the advantages of the international system, such as the differences between England, France and Italy at the end of the First World War, and the greater antagonism between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. One can also see that after the second World War Turkey's well-played role as a continuously threatened nation (by the Soviet Union) gained resulting American aid which mounted to the point of $738.9 million to the year 1986, at its highest point, only third after Israel and Egypt.

2.2. Problematic Legacies

Along with above-mentioned constructive elements, Turkey also inherited some complications from its Ottoman past which still show themselves today in Turkish foreign policy construction. The line of foreign policy, which the Ottomans pursued through their last years, that is of playing powers off against each other for survival, necessitated the Ottomans to be extraordinarily wary about their environment and suspicious about other powers' intentions. They also learned, as a result of centuries-long hostilities with their neighbours, not to trust any state, to rest on nothing but their power, and to be ready to fight at any given time, which is reflected in the common Turkish saying as "water sleeps, enemy never sleeps".
Consequently, Turkish diplomats are famous today, among other things, for being sceptical and cautious. The Foreign Ministry always takes its time in answering any given foreign statement or memorandum as if they were searching for the real intentions behind the lines. There is also a sense of insecurity in Turkey, a direct legacy of the Ottoman Empire, reflected even today in those kind of statements as "Turkey's historical position indicates that she is obliged to pursue a policy based on being strong and stable within her region... (since) she is surrounded by unfriendly neighbours."

When discussing cautiousness and scepticism in Turkish foreign policy, one should bear in mind the fact that the Empire had been subjected repeatedly to propaganda attacks, exploitation and outright aggression by the self-appointed protectors of her minorities. The Ottoman Empire restricted itself to minimum interference in the affairs of the subject peoples. The authority granted to the head of millets, or religious communities, included church administration, worship, education, tax collecting and supervision of the civil status of their co-religionists. Because the Turks did not seek to impose their language, and the traditional tolerance of Islam for "peoples of the book" reflected as the Ottoman rulers did not oblige conversion of Christians and Jews but rather used the religious leadership of these communities to administer their co-religionists, the persistence of strong non-Muslim religious identity and linguistic differences served as a natural basis for the growth of nationalism and eventual separatism by the subject peoples in the nineteenth century. These religious communities, by attracting European attention, therefore caused the continued involvement of the West in Ottoman affairs. Thus, when the central authority weakened, the millet system, once an excellent instrument of governing, precipitated the self-destruction of the empire. In particular Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities had been used as a means of interfering in Ottoman authority throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Hence, Turkish sensitivity about Greece's efforts on internationalizing Orthodox patriarchy in Istanbul or any possibility of accepting alleged Armenian genocide claims, has to be seen against this background.
Naturally, Western Christian nations' interference in Ottoman authority, at one
time, on behalf of her Christian minorities, caused a follow-up feeling among Turks
that this difference in religion, though rarely articulated, is relevant to their
international relations. This is especially true for the Islamists who usually refer to the
European Community as a "Christian Club" and sarcastically mention their worries
about whether these Christians would accept an Islamic country between them.

Another bitter legacy of the late Ottoman Empire for the Turks is the memory
of financial control exercised by European powers through Duyun-u Umumiye, Public
Debt Service, on Turkish soil after the Ottoman Empire went bankrupt in 1881. Thus it
was not surprising to hear from Ataturk that "...by complete independence we mean of
course complete economic, financial, juridical, military, cultural independence and
freedom in all matters. Being deprived of independence in any of these is equivalent to
the nation and country being deprived of all its independence".22

Knowing that the Ottoman Empire, in its last years, had lost its independence,
to a large extent due to foreign interventions, privileges granted to foreigners, and the
capitulations, the Ankara governments were thus very sensitive about infringements
upon their sovereignty as well as about foreign economic entanglements. Hence, for
example, Turkey had been very uneasy about even the suspicion that United States
forces could use Turkey as a stepping stone for operations in the Middle East.23 In the
economic sphere, this suspicion showed itself by very tight control over foreign
companies operating in Turkey and strict rules governing financial problems.

Still another point of historical significance is that there is a sense of greatness,
in the common Turkish mind, based on belonging to a nation which had established
empires and been master of a world empire, which was only brought down by a world
war. Given that in the final years, the empire was nothing more than a name, devoid of
all real power, nonetheless it was a name, a symbol to which most of the Turks
responded and in which they took pride. Though the grandeur of empire and its pride
are matters of the past for contemporary Turks, it is still frustrating for them to be in
the position of, and regarded as, a second-rate power. This frustration, perhaps in large
part, explains Turkish sensitivity to insult and criticism, related to her dependence upon the great powers, and to exclusion from important international conferences. On the other hand, centuries old Ottoman supremacy over the Arab states and the Balkans left the Turks with a conviction of their superiority. The ordinary Turk is inclined to look down upon the Arab as a man who really cannot control his own affairs in a civilized fashion. The periodical reoccurrence of conflicts in the Middle East tend to confirm, in the ordinary Turkish mind, this prejudice. A vicious circle is thus established as the Arabs react to Turkish haughtiness.²⁴

On the other side of the fence, the long, and in its last days inefficient and presumably unpopular, Ottoman domination in these countries left ill will against the Turks, and modern Turkey had to face the legacy of neighbours who have bitter memories of Ottoman rule. Certainly, the Imperial past has something to say about the bitterness between Turkey and Greece. The late nineteenth century witnessed rising Greek nationalism and the modern Greek state was the first nation-state in the Balkans to come out of clashes between nationalism and the Ottoman Empire. In the early twentieth century the Turkish struggle for independence reached a climax when the Greek army landed in Izmir in 1915 to attain the Megali Idea (long-lived Greek dream of reconstituting the Byzantine Empire), and at the end the Turks had to fight against the Greeks to claim their independent nation-state. The frustrated hopes of reaching the Megali Idea on the Greek part, and having been forced to fight against ex-subject people for its independence on the Turkish part, together with the stories about wartime atrocities on both sides, were enough reasons for the continued bitterness in the early 20s and 30s. Though some of the potential for conflict was eliminated between Ataturk and Venizelos by the arrangement of a compulsory population exchange in the 1920s, past bitterness provided a base for hostility when differences erupted from 1950 onwards.

Another important historical fact is that one of the main principles of Turkish foreign policy ideology, namely, that of the Soviet Union representing the primary threat to Turkey's security, also had its roots deeply embedded in history.²⁵ Since the
seventeenth century, Russia's expansionist policies had helped it to become the "arch enemy" of the Ottomans. A succession of major defeats at Russian hands had consistently confronted the Ottoman Government with the realities of its declining power. Moreover, it was Tzar Nicholas I, who described the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe" when he proposed to the British in 1853 that the Ottoman Empire be partitioned. The last of the thirteen Russo-Turkish wars was, of course, the First World War.

This course of conflict over the past four centuries, had generated a full measure of hostility and distrust between Turks and Russians. Even during the period of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, when good neighbourly relations were enjoyed by both sides, the historical Turkish distrust of the Soviets was well evident. In 1934, during a conversation with General Douglas MacArthur, Atatürk predicted a major war in Europe around 1940 and also saw the real victors of the war as the Soviet Union.

We Turks, as Russia's close neighbour, and the nation which has fought more wars against her than any other country, are following closely the courses of events there, and see the danger stripped of all camouflage...The Bolsheviks have now reached a point at which they constitute the greatest threat not only to Europe but to all Asia.

A history of distrust, hostility and continued wars, made the Turks extraordinarily wary. Hence they did not hesitate to accept American aid when the Soviet Union placed great pressure on Turkey after the Second World War for territorial cessions and special privileges on the straits.

3. Geographical Realities

Modern Turkey, thanks to her geo-strategic location with borders on Europe, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union, has been able to play a role in world politics far greater than her size, population, and economic strength would indicate. Historically, Turkey is located on one of, if not the most, strategic and traditionally most coveted pieces of territory. She controls not only the Turkish Straits, which link the Black
Sea to the Mediterranean, but also the historic invasion routes from the Balkans and the Caucasus mountains onto the high Anatolian plateau, which in turn commands the entire Fertile Crescent down to the oil rich Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

Moreover, Turkey is also at the crossroads of major air, land, and the sea routes, of modern times, joining the industrially advanced lands of Europe with the petroleum-rich lands of the Middle East. Furthermore, she possesses the sources for most of the water irrigating lands as far as the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, she was also on the line of conflict between the zones of two military superpowers and their respective alliances. And from the North to the South, she was in a rather sensitive part of the Mediterranean, where both superpowers have tried to expand their spheres of influences and counter-balance each other.

This particular geographical position makes Turkey a Balkan, Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern country all at the same time. It also makes Turkey doubly susceptible to international developments near and far and, therefore, greatly sensitive to the changes in the international political balance as well as the regional one. Thus the peculiarities of the Anatolian peninsula are worth looking at, before anything else, since the various effects of Turkey's geographical position, which influence Turkish foreign policy, are derived from these peculiarities.

The settlement in Anatolia dated back to as early as 7500 B.C. Being at the crossroads of land connections between Europe, Asia, and Africa, on the one hand, has increased the importance of any state established in Anatolia. However, on the other hand, being also the main channel for migrations from the East, and invasions from both the East and the West, has encouraged a sense of insecurity as well.

The Anatolian peninsula is highly mountainous in the East, permitting only small gateways between them. Each side of Anatolia is surrounded by the sea, and against the coasts on the North and the South run parallel mountain ranges with forests and rivers, which make this area all but impermeable. As Toynbee describes "...only towards the West does the plateau sink in long fertile river valleys to a clement, and sheltered coastline". This geographical setting has forced all states located on the
Anatolian peninsula, including the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, to look to the West rather than to the East for trade and cultural exchange.

The physical features of a land may make it easy to defend or penetrate from outside. From the military point of view, the Anatolian peninsula is a "strategical region". The seas on both sides and the fortress-like mountainous terrain in the East are difficult to penetrate by using force, and make natural boundaries for Turkey. European Turkey, on the other hand, is difficult to defend and the Straits are also vulnerable to air attacks. It is true that possession of the Straits conveys political and military advantages, and raises Turkey from the position of a purely local power to one having crucial international influence. Simultaneously, however, the Straits pose one of Turkey's major security concerns by attracting potential aggressors. The fact that Turkey deployed her most powerful First Army to protect the Straits and the area surrounding them, shows the full realisation of this phenomenon by Turkey.

Another important factor in Turkish security thinking is that the Aegean Islands, if under the control of an enemy power, would deny Turkey the use of her two principal harbours, Istanbul and Izmir, and could prevent access to the Straits. In this case, navigation would be safe from the eastern Mediterranean so long as the island of Cyprus, which could block the area, was controlled by a friendly government. Hence, the scenario that Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) would cut Turkey off from the open sea, encouraged Turkey's resistance to such designs since the 1950s. It is the very same fear that is behind the Turkish declaration of casus belli against the Greek claims about twelve-mile territorial waters in the Aegean, thus putting all open-sea exits from the Aegean within her territorial seas.

Another important reason for Turkey's geographical insecurity is the fact that she is surrounded by many neighbours with different characteristics, regimes, ideologies, and aims; and that the relations between them and Turkey would not always be peaceful, and especially in the Middle East, may occasionally take the form of armed clashes.
A country's borders may be a source of strength or of weakness depending on their length, the number and intentions of the neighbours, and the relative power available to the affected parties. In the early days of the Republic, Turkey had borders with seven states, including four with major powers; Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Great Britain (mandate in Iraq and possession of Cyprus), France, and Italy (possession of the Dodecanese Islands). Although the Soviet Union and Iran posed no threat at that moment, their predecessors, the Russian and Persian Empires respectively, had deadly quarrels with the Ottoman Empire. Bulgaria, though an ally during the First World War, had fought against Ottoman Empire for its independence and the memories of Balkan Wars, during which she had advanced as far as the fortresses of Istanbul, had not been forgotten by Turks.

In the interwar period, though she enjoyed good neighbourly relations in general, Turkey had problems with Britain (concerning Mosul), with France (concerning Hatay or Alexandretta), and with Italy because of her open imperialistic tendencies towards the eastern Mediterranean after the 1930s. After the Second World War, Turkey's borders dropped to six, leaving Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq and Syria as neighbours, and the Republic of Cyprus joined them in 1960. This composition of neighbours left no need for further explanation and Turkey's sense of insecurity proved what Most and Starr argue;

...a nation that borders on a large number of other nations faces a particularly high risk that it may be threatened or attacked by at least some of its neighbours...and confronts its neighbours with uncertainty because it must protect and defend itself against many potential opponents.

To counter-balance potential opponents and to reduce her sense of insecurity, Turkey sought alliances with regional states and outside powers. Between 1920 and 1955 Turkey entered a number of pacts and alliances, as well as signing friendship declarations with all her neighbours and bilateral security treaties with the United States. This sense of insecurity went too far as she entered the Balkan Pact (1953) and Alliance (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), all of which meant nothing any more, as far as Turkey's security was concerned, after Turkey's adherence to NATO in 1952.
Another geographical influence on Turkish foreign policy derives from the facts that Turkey controls the only seaway linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean; that the Soviet Union was the major Black Sea power as well as being a superpower; and that Turkey also shared a common border with the Soviet Union. As mentioned above, by possessing internationally important waterways Turkey had been able to exercise much more influence on world politics than would otherwise have been possible. As summed up by Vali "...an Anatolian state that did not control the bridge toward Europe would only be another country of the Middle East; united with this historic region however, it is bound to play more eminent role either offensively or defensively".34

This intercontinental position has proved an element of strength as well as of weakness. For five centuries, Istanbul provided a homebase for the Ottomans "from which they were able to exercise control in all directions, in the Balkans and central Europe, the Black Sea region, the Aegean and Mediterranean, Mesopotamia and Arabia, Syria and North Africa".35 The Straits have also supplied a resource for the Ottoman Empire and its successor, the Turkish Republic, that could not be duplicated in manpower as a means to influence the actions of the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union.36

On the other hand, however, controlling these vital waterways brought the Ottoman Empire into perennial conflict with the Russians, beginning in the seventeenth century when Peter the Great began his drive to the south. It has always been vitally important for Russia to have its outlet to the Mediterranean unimpeded, independent of its neighbours' goodwill. Once Karl Marx said that "Constantinople [Istanbul] is the golden bridge between the East and the West, and Western civilization cannot, like the sun, go round the world without passing that bridge; and it cannot pass it without a struggle with Russia".37

But it has been equally important for Western powers not to let Russia gain control over this important passage. So much so that Napoleon is said to have placed such importance on the Turkish Straits that he declared his willingness "to abandon
mastery over half the world rather than yield Russia those narrow Straits. 38 Indeed, during the nineteenth century, the struggle for control of the Ottoman Empire in general, and of the Straits in particular, was the major part of the assertions of European diplomacy. And in the latter half of the nineteenth century the "Eastern Question", in essence the fate of the Ottoman Empire, became the major factor in the global balance of power. Consequently, the Ottomans, "even though militarily weak, economically bankrupt and politically anomalous", were still able to subsist for another century "on the conflict of interests between Russia, on the one hand, and Austro-Hungary, France, Britain, on the other". 39 This went so far that, in 1854, Britain and France fought against Russia to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The struggle over the mastery of the Straits between Russia and the West continued until the first World War with "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire", based on freedom of navigation for merchant ships with a denial of passage to men-of-war, in force. During this period no hostile navy ever managed to enter the Straits by force, neither from the Bosphorus, in the North, nor the Dardanelles, in the South. 40 During the first World War, control of the Straits had a major impact on the military and political developments of the war. The geopolitical significance of the Straits have never been more clearly demonstrated than by the role they played between 1914 and 1918. With Turkey as an enemy, Russia's most important route of supply was cut off and the Western Entente powers were largely unable to send her badly needed weaponry and ammunition, a circumstance which greatly contributed to her eventual collapse.

The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the first World War gave the West the opportunity to achieve the internationalisation of the Straits. The Lausanne Conference, signed with the new Turkish Republic in 1923, established an international regime with the freedom of navigation to be supervised by an international commission. 41 Under the Convention, the Straits area was demilitarized and jurisdiction over all navigation passed into the hands of international authority.
Then in 1936, prior to the second World War, Turkey regained full sovereign rights and control of the Straits area with the Montreux Convention. The Convention, while authorising unrestricted freedom of commercial navigation, established very strict regulations for warships, except Turkish ships, hence giving full consideration to Turkey's military security as well as to that of Black Sea powers it conceded the "ancient rule of the Empire". Practically it eliminated any possibility of an offensive drive to the Black Sea, but did permit limited passage from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. After the Second World War the Soviets raised some objections and sought changes in the status of the Straits, but they were refused by Turkey, backed by the United States. Since then no challenge has been made to the status of the Straits and the Montreux Convention remains in force today.

While the question of the Turkish Straits and the historic hostility between the Russians and the Turks has been at the heart of Turkish-Soviet relations for many years, having a superpower neighbour also had its effects on Turkish foreign policy. The Turkish-Soviet border was not confined to land but was extended by a long sea border which merged with that of Bulgaria, a close ally of the Soviet Union.

During the first two decades of the Republic, relations with the Soviet Union, which supplied political and material support to Turkey, were good and were strengthened by the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression of 1925. This era of mutual understanding came to end on March 15, 1945, with the Soviet's unilateral denunciation of the 1925 Treaty and demands for a new treaty "in accord with the new situation". They further demanded territorial concessions from Turkey and bases on the Bosphorus. These Soviet demands strongly influenced Turkish foreign policy attitudes and reinforced its Western orientation. Since Turkey was only able to refuse these demands with the United States' backing, the Turkish Government sought a formal alliance with her, and the link with the Western defence system was formalised with Turkey's accession to NATO on February 18, 1952.

Though, after Stalin's death, the Soviet Government officially declared that its policy towards Turkey had been wrong and that the Soviet Union had not any kind of
territorial claims on Turkey, the time had already been passed for the Soviet Union to revise its relations with Turkey since the historic Turkish distrust of the Russians reappeared on the horizon. The belief that the Soviet Union posed a primary threat to Turkey's security dominated relations between the two countries during the cold war, and it was only after the blow of Johnson's letter that Turkey showed interest in Soviet efforts to normalize relations. It took nearly a decade for her to accept the fact that detente between the Soviet and the Western Blocs had been started in the 1960s, and a further decade to improve its relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, having a common border with the Soviet Union was still a cause of concern and remained one of the factors contributing to Turkey's extremely cautious foreign policy and her continued membership of NATO.

Another complication for Turkey's political and security thinking is the fact that Turkey is a Middle Eastern country as well as a Balkan and Mediterranean one. The strategic importance of the region does not need further elaboration. The single fact that the Middle East owned most of the known oil resources made the region one of the most important in the strategic thinking of all parties concerned. Turkey, like most of the Western countries, is dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Not only is the functioning of the Turkish economy dependent on continuous flows of Middle Eastern petrol, but also mounting a viable conventional defense during international crises and war, for military strategy has become increasingly reliant on massive wartime fuel needs, which are normally larger than under peacetime conditions. Therefore, Turkey's growing political and diplomatic concern in the region has been, in part, a result of the intensifying economic ties which were forced upon her by her dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

The significance of geography on Turkey's destiny has never been more clearly demonstrated than by the fact that losing the oil-rich Arab lands, which the Ottoman Empire once controlled, after the first World War had left Turkey with a need to import oil that encouraged financial dependence on the West and contributed to periodic economic crises, which in turn caused social and political instabilities within
the country. Though the consecutive governments in Ankara continuously declared that Turkey had no territorial demands on any country, the memories of losing these territories with their extensive resources is still fresh in the ordinary Turkish mind. This can explain, in part, Turkish sensitivity about developments concerning the Aegean seabed. Not to give up possibly oil-rich areas once again is one of the reasons behind Turkish arguments that the eastern portion of the Aegean seabed is an extension of the Anatolian continental shelf and, therefore, Turkey should have jurisdiction for purposes of exploration and exploitation of seabed and subsoil resources. The fear of losing another potentially oil-rich area (though any prospect of finding substantial oil resources in the Aegean is fairly remote) is so strong in Turkey that she will not, in the near future, waive her claims to the Aegean seabed, even at the risk of a military conflagration with Greece while the dispute remains unresolved.

Apart from oil, there are other reasons why the Middle East possesses a great place in Turkish security thinking. The region has been continuously unstable since the First World War and the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, while depending on status quo, requires stability, and any destabilising development in the region would create security problems for her. Thus the general insecurity of the region has attracted great deal of concern from Turkey. It is sufficient to point out that four Arab-Israeli wars, the unending Palestinian problem, the Lebanese civil war and foreign interventions, the Suez crises, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the latest Gulf War, have all occurred within the immediate reach and security zone of Turkey. Such developments, and the ever-increasing possibility of superpower involvement, have inevitably created great concern in Turkey over her immediate security. Beside cultural aspirations and ideological, economic, and political factors, the stability of Europe in comparison to the Middle East since the Second World War has also encouraged Turkey to remain in the Western camp. A secure place within the multinational fore, which have created stable political, social, and economic conditions in Europe, has always had a considerable attraction for Turkey, a country which is placed in one of the most unstable and insecure regions of the world.
4. The Impact of Kemalism

Although experiences and memories of the Ottoman past, together with its geo-strategic location, served as a foundation for and influenced the subsequent foreign relations of Turkey, it was Atatürk's theory and practice of foreign policy which has been the most important factor in shaping Turkish foreign policy.

He not only completely controlled Turkish foreign policy in his life time, but he also put forward an ideological framework by which the pursuit of Turkish foreign policy could be achieved. Though the original Kemalist goals of national foreign policy underwent various mutations, especially under the relatively free democratic system of the 1961 Constitution, practically all Turkish governments, regardless of their standpoints, put his "indisputable dogma" into their programmes and have not (or alternatively could not) implemented policies that ran counter to Kemalist principles. And even the "conflicting interpretations were often attributed to them". His influence over the Turkish people, in general, and Turkish foreign policy in particular, has been so deep and so fundamental that there are at times intimations, and often open warnings, that anything other than his principles would be disloyal to him and to the country in general.

In particular, Turkey's foreign policy has been influenced by the following goals and principles laid down by Atatürk: establishment and preservation of a national state with complete independence conditioned by modern Turkish Nationalism; promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization by means of Kemalist principles; and attachment to realist and peaceful ways in foreign policy actions.

Atatürk's foreign policy views, like his political views in general, represented a break with the past. He aimed at a renunciation of three strains which had been important during Ottoman times: the imperial-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turanism. Incidentally, policies which could break these strains coincided with the
three of his political principles; Republicanism, Secularism and Nationalism respectively.

Ataturk's foreign policy was clearly an extension of his domestic policies. He recognized the vital relationship between the internal organization of the new Republic and its foreign policy. He also realized that a peaceful foreign policy was needed in order to achieve his far-reaching reforms inside Turkey. Once he said, "What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is founded is the internal organization of the state. It is necessary that foreign policy should agree with the internal organization". Therefore it is not surprising to see that in his famous motto - "peace at home, peace in the world" - while he was connecting internal stability with international peace and order, he put the home front first.

Ataturk did not want to see the Turkish nation as a foreign or hostile community set apart from the nations of the world and did not want the nation to belong to a group holding such views. He wanted Turkey as a part of civilized world. However, in order to achieve this, a change was necessary, apart from in the system of government, "in the mental disposition of the Turkish people". His political reforms were directed to this aim, namely, to change the centuries long backwardness and ignorance of Turkish people, and to accustom them to the modern way of life. The ideological guidance, which was necessary to achieve this end, was to be derived from his political principles, which were formalised at the 1931 Congress of the Republican People's Party and written into constitution on 1937. They were symbolised by the emblem of the RPP: "six arrows". Each of them actually represents one of the key words of Kemalist ideology: Nationalism, Secularism, Republicanism, Populism, Etatism, and Revolutionism. These six key words did not encompass all aspects of the Kemalist ideology but they did, in a concise manner, represent its pillars and many of them had foreign policy implications.

As the foundation of Kemalist ideology, Republicanism comprises the notions of popular sovereignty, freedom and equality before the law. It was against the totalitarian tendencies and the notion of the Empire, which was revisionist and
imperialist. While accepting the existing status quo as a main foundation of the new state, Ataturk said that "...the state should pursue an exclusively national policy...I mean...to work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country..." Republicanism was not only a change in the governmental system, but also a turning point in the political philosophy of the new Turks. The new Turkish Republic was a nation-state founded by the Turkish nation, by its own accord. Throughout history all Turkish states had been dynastic. Therefore, the extra stress on republicanism was necessary to help accustom the Turkish people to the idea that the change in regime after the War of Independence was non-reversible. From this point of view, republicanism constituted a doctrinal barrier against those who still hoped for a return to the Sultanate and the Caliphate.

Secularism was a necessary component of modernisation, covering not only the political and governmental but the whole social and cultural life. From the foreign policy point of view, it has a much more general meaning than one which refers more narrowly to a specific process of separating religion from the state. Indeed, the main struggle of Kemalist secularists was not over the question of separating the spiritual and temporal, but over the difference between democracy and theocracy. A theocratic Islamic state, as a way of government, was obliged to see Christian powers as infidels and according to Islamic belief the state of warfare never ended between believers and infidels. By choosing a democratic system of government and dismissing the idea of Islam-protector nation, the new Turkish state ended centuries of hostility and established the basis for peaceful relations with Western Christian countries.

Another reflection of Secularism in terms of Turkish foreign policy can be seen in its rejection of the idea of Pan-Islamism. To unite different Muslim nations, under one common name, to give these different elements equal rights, and found a mighty state, was seen as a brilliant and attractive political solution for the Empire's problems in its last years. But it was a misleading one. The new state would not be world-conquering or Islam-protecting any more. Such claims could endanger the existence of the state.
There is nothing in history to show how policy of Pan-Islamism could have succeeded or how it could have found a basis for its realisation on this earth. History does not afford examples as regards the result of the ambition to organise a state which should be governed by the idea of world supremacy and include the whole humanity without distinction of race. For us there can be no question of the lust of conquest...

Since the Islamic Ottoman Empire could not try its Christian subjects with Sharia (Islamic law), it allowed them to be tried before Christian courts, which in turn resulted in foreign interventions and caused the Ottoman Empire to become involved in conflicts against the Western powers over the supremacy of the Millets. Hence, it seemed that the Islamic religious establishment of the Empire had played a major role in accelerating and enhancing the Empire's decline and decay. Consequently, M. Kemal was determined not to allow the same thing happen to the new Turkish state. In other words he could not give a reason to the Western powers to intervene in Turkish affairs.

Nationalism, as a source of Turkish existence, stood for a Turkish-nation state in place of Ottomanist or Pan-Turanist ambitions, and was bound up with the national borders, which were first laid down by the National Pact of 1920 and later legalized by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Nationalism, a movement which was re-discovered by the Empire's Christian subjects in the early 19th century, and was therefore partly responsible for its disintegration, had come in touch with the Turkish population only in the early 20th century. When the Entente powers started to partition the Empire's heartland, it became clear that they were taking advantage of the lack of a unified nationalist movement. It was obvious to M. Kemal, that the main requirement for the independence of a nation was the effort towards a common goal and public awareness of the nation's historical consciousness. The creation of nationalism on the European model was essential for a successful independence struggle against the supremacy of the Imperialist European powers. Therefore, the idea of a Turkish nation in Turkey was the basic innovation in the early days of the Kemalist revolution.
M. Kemal's declaration in the Amasya circular of June 21-22, 1919 that "only the will and the determination of the nation can save the independence of the nation", became the main principle of the National Independence Struggle. This principle invited every individual of the nation to share a common obligation and responsibility. Atatürk had realized the necessity of basing his movement on the reality of "nationhood". But it was no easy task to accustom a people who had been attached to a religion and a dynasty, to the new meaning of Turkey. Even the expression "Turkey" was neither used nor known by the people. The concept of nationalism, and the establishment of a national state, which had begun in the West centuries before and had slowly spread and become the very property of the people, was unfamiliar to the Turks. Therefore, with the war of Independence and realization of the reforms following it, non-national political and social values had to be replaced by the values of the Turkish people.

Yet, he also realized that any nationalist claims must be supported by a very strict definition of National identity. He was opposed to the expending of the country's energy on a quest for virtually unobtainable goals. "We know our limitations. We are not worldly-minded". Directing the country in the path of adventurism could very well result in the loss of what had already been achieved. Therefore, he rejected the utopian ideas of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism and did not build Turkish nationalism on religion or race. He defined nation as "a political and social body formed by citizens bound together by the unity of language, culture and ideas". Hence, Turkish nationalism, like that of Europe, was based on common citizenship and did not extend its aims beyond the national borders. It was not imperialistic but rather realistic.

Basing Turkish nationalism on a common citizenship instead of "ethnicity" was a realistic option for the population of Turkey consisted, and still does, of "individuals from many different ethnic backgrounds but, according to the Turkish Constitution, all citizens of Turkey are Turks". This official, legalistic, approach to Turkish "national homogeneity" allowed the early Turkish leaders, in accordance with the principle of populism, to be representative of all the peoples of Turkey irrespective of their class,
religion, or ethnic origin. People was officially defined as "all individuals who, without demanding any privileges, accept absolute equality before the law". In this context, the nation was regarded as resulting from "historical and sociological conditions", different from race which "is a biological occurrence", and from ummet "which is a group of people believing in universal religion". The role of nationalism then, was to "form a bond between the people's collective memories of the past and adherence to the goals of the future".

From this point of view, various ethnic groups within the Turkish state were accepted as "building blocks of the nation" which "joined together to create the national culture". In connection with this, the demands of ethnic groups for national status, "regardless of the social anxiety causing the demand", were considered contradictory to "the spirit and law of history" and thus "unrealistic and wrong". As a result, when faced with different ethnic claims emerging within the "unified Turkish nation", the Kemalist regime chose to dismiss them as plots of "enemy agents", an attitude continued until 1990s:

In today's Turkish national, political and social community we have patriots and citizens who have been subjected to propaganda about the Kurdish, Caucasian, and even Laz and Bosnian nations. But these misnomers, which are a result of despotic ages long past, had no influence on the individuals of this nation, except for a few enemy agents and brainless reactionaries, and have left our people in grief and sorrow. Because the individuals of this nation, as members of the integrated, unified Turkish Community, have a common past, history, morality and law.

In the process, however, what started as an attempt to create a homogeneous Turkish nation through constitutionalism using public consensus, turned to an attempt to force various elements within the Turkish state into a homogenous society through demographic homogenization. This, on the one hand, contradicted with the original claims of the Kemalist ideology, and on the other hand, alienated the masses who felt ethnically distinct from the Sunni-Turkish speaking majority. When coupled with the persistent denial of the Turkish ruling elite of the latter's existence, especially since mid-1970s onwards when the latter groups started to express and demand their
cultural distinctiveness through organizational structures, "ethnicity" issue came to determine the ideological boundaries of Turkish national identity, and also constrained its constitutional evolvement. This aspect of Turkish nation-building is especially relevant to our discussion of Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s as it essentially interacts with the Kurdish issue which became an element of both Turkey's domestic and external policies during this period. In this context, while the Kemalist emphasise on the Turkish Language as "the heart and mind of the Turkish Nation" still prevents the ruling Turkish elite from recognizing the Kurdish Language as equal to that of Turkish, the adherence of the latest Constitution to the above-mentioned Kemalist principles continues to conflict with the social reality of Turkey.

Turkish national liberation should also be distinguished from the anti-imperialist movements of the post-1945 period during which the African and Asian peoples who struggled for their independence came into conflict with the colonial powers in so far as political, economic and social ideas were concerned. Nationalism in Turkey, however, was an anti-imperialistic program for independence, on the one hand, but it was also, paradoxically, a program for cultural and political Westernization. Ataturk himself often reiterated that his struggle was directed against Western imperialism rather than against the West itself. Turkey fought the West, but by fighting with the West, entered into the Western sphere and Western system of society.

Other Kemalist principles, each of which were interlocked with the others, also had somewhat indirect effects on the foreign policy of the new state. Populism, by referring to the equality of citizens and by denying existence of classes in Turkish society, would expect to avoid creating class conflicts and, therefore, would maintain internal peace and stability, a concept, according to Kemalist ideology, that international peace and order should be based on.

Statism was a program of economic development and a way "to attain a rank worthy of...new Turkey". Since "...we live in an economic era...the new Turkish state will not be a world conquering state. The new Turkish state will be an economic state".
All these principles were protected by nationalism against foreign aggression, and kept alive by the revolutionary dynamic process of the transformation of the Turkish state and society toward the modern Western ideal. To modernize the country and to assimilate the Turkish people into the nations of the modern West were the underlying motivation for Kemalist principles and reforms. For a Kemalist, to be a revolutionary means to devote oneself to the cause of modernisation and to struggle to transform Turkey into a rapidly advancing country capable of playing an important role among the developed nations of Europe. The revolution meant a transformation in outlook, the adoption of a Western way of life, a fight against ignorance and superstition, the import of new techniques, economic development, and, in particular, a constant change in people's minds.

In this sense, Kemalist revolutionism was different from other new revolutionary states' intentions. Due to its very nature, Kemalist revolutionism had no intention of exporting its revolutionary ideas. Its main aim was to protect the results of the Turkish reforms from counter-revolutions, not to export its ideas and influences outside the boundaries of Turkey as many contemporary revolutionary movements did. Like Turkish nationalism, the revolution was an internal not an external phenomenon.

Such ideas as these Kemalist principles led Turkey to develop good neighbourly relations and join in with international collaborations for collective security and peace. Moreover, Turkey's Western orientation in foreign policy was a natural adjunct to Ataturk's overall embracing of the West and rejection of the East. At the end of the War of Independence in 1923, Ataturk spoke in the following way:

There are many nations, but there is only one civilization. For the advancement of a nation, it must be a part of this one civilization... We wish to modernize our country. All of our efforts are directed toward the establishment of a modern, therefore Western, government.

As can be seen, Ataturk identified "modernization" with "Westernization" and used them synonymously.

In the Ataturk period Turkey's Western-directed foreign policy was carried out in conjunction with the establishment of cultural ties with the West. The victories won
against the Western states during the National Struggle gave a psychological boost to the Turkish nationalist movement and thus, as stated above, enabled swift Westernization to take place. Turkey's peculiarity of never having been a colonised country and consequent lack of post-colonial resentments, unlike other Third World countries which gained independence after World War II, was also an important factor affecting Turkey's attitude towards the West. But above all, the influence of M. Kemal, who even during the period of National Struggle favoured a Western style of thinking, was of great importance in this orientation.

At the beginning of the National Struggle, M. Kemal's major goal was the liberation of the country from foreign occupation and the establishment, within national boundaries, of a Turkish national state which would be master of its own fate. In its foreign policy actions, the government of the Grand National Assembly favoured the application of the basic principles arrived at during the peace deliberations following the First World War. Since every nation was to be permitted to form a state of its own, it was felt that Turkey also should be allowed to enjoy this right of establishing an independent country. In fact, the Grand National Assembly was the result of one of the newest national movements in 1920; which was very similar to the European national independence movements that took place in the course of the last century. This Turkish belief, too, attracted Turkey to the West's democratic ideals.

After the War of Independence, the main concern of Ataturk's foreign policy was complete independence. Because of foreign interventions, privileges granted to foreigners, and the capitulations, the Ottoman Empire in its last years had to a large extent lost its independence. Following its defeat in the First World War, the last Turkish state was in the position of being completely erased from the map. This was the reason for M. Kemal's initiation of the War of Independence and it was stated in the following terms in the 6th Article of the National Pact:

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\text{In order to render possible our national and economic development and to succeed in achieving orderly administration, like all states we must possess absolute independence and freedom in the achievement of our development. For this reason we are opposed to all limitations on our political, juridical or}\]

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financial development. In the settling of our assessed debts there shall no change in this matter...

Mustafa Kemal made it clear that, even at the beginning of the War of Independence, one of his major goals was the establishment of a completely independent Turkey, free of all foreign interference and privileges. "By complete independence" he said to H. Franklin-Bouillon, representative of France, on June 9, 1921: "we mean of course, complete economic, financial, juridical, military, cultural independence and freedom in all matters. Being deprived of independence in any of these is equivalent to the nation and country being deprived of all its independence".

Nothing could have been more natural than for M. Kemal to insist upon "complete independence", since he intended to liberate the country from the limitations imposed by foreign hegemony which had been forced upon the notion of the sovereignty of the state. Furthermore, he in no way accepted the idea of a "mandate" or a "protectorate". But this principle was not against the alliances or the political and military agreements made with other countries. Article 7 of the Sivas Congress Resolution reads that "...we shall gladly accept technical, industrial and economic aid from any state which will show respect for the ideals of nationalism and will not pursue the aim of seizing our country...". Therefore, "complete independence" does not mean that a state cannot enter into military and political cooperation with other states for the purpose of balancing its own power with that of potential aggressors, as long as these allies are respectful of the country's right to existence. Ataturk himself, played the leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Pact in 1934 and the Sadabad Pact in 1937, and accepted economic aid from the Soviet Union.

One of the key elements of Ataturk's foreign policy was that the new Republic would seek to preserve the national territory encompassed by the armistice line of 1918, and would renounce any other territorial claims. In the Treaty of Lausanne, the borders determined by the National Pact were, for the most part, realised. With Turkey's territorial situation settled by the Treaty of Lausanne, Ataturk embarked upon a foreign policy based on his motto, "Peace at home and peace in the world". Satisfied
with its new borders, there was no reason for military adventurism on Turkey's part. This was one of the overall principles of M. Kemal's foreign policy. He was opposed to the use of force as a policy instrument. Both in the War of Independence and in the subsequent period, Ataturk always first attempted to secure and preserve Turkey's independence by peaceful means. Only when peaceful means failed to secure the legitimate rights and interests of his country did he then resort to force.

As a state which was defeated in the First World War, the position of Turkey with regard to the situation existing in Europe after the war is noteworthy. If Turkey had acted emotionally it would have been natural for her to join the bloc of nations opposed to the status quo. But Ataturk, who had taken the responsibility of determining the direction of Turkish foreign policy, avoided leading the country down the general path of adventurism. Thus, although Turkey attempted to maintain good relations with all states, she nonetheless established closer ties with non-belligerent states in their opposition to those states which were attempting to destroy the international peace.83

In contrast to a good number of other contemporary states, Turkey showed great willingness to solve its major problems by legal means. During the interwar period, it could have been possible to resolve some of Turkey's problems left behind by Lausanne (such as those of Straits and the Sanjack of Alexandretta) by force or fait accompli without patiently waiting for an opportunity to solve them peacefully, but Ataturk, who was always against the policy of fait accompli, rejected such adventures.84 One can point to many examples of the allegiance to legality in Ataturk's foreign policy. Only five years after signing the Treaty of Lausanne, at a time when there still remained problems unsolved by this treaty, Turkey clearly demonstrated its allegiance to the rule of law and to world peace by signing the Kellog-Briand Pact on August 27, 1928, thereby renouncing "the use of war as an instrument of foreign policy".85

Later, Turkey signed the Geneva General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Although Turkey was still not yet a member of the League of Nations, by
signing this agreement for the use of legal means in the solution of international disputes - an agreement signed by only twenty Western states - she occupied an unique place among the nations defeated in the First World War.

Yet another example of this allegiance during the Ataturk era could be seen in the course followed by Turkey in the signing of the Montreux Conference of 1936 and in the solving of the Mosul dispute. At Lausanne, Turkey accepted that the Mosul question could be taken to the League, which she was not a member of, if no solution could be reached by bilateral negotiations with Britain. Eventually the problem was solved by the League of Nations and Turkey renounce her claims over Mosul in favour of a British mandate, though the area had been designated as a part of the Turkish homeland in the earlier Turkish National Pact. Similarly, in the Montreux case, Turkey based her claims on the international law principle *rebus sic stantibus*, and called for an international conference to change the Treaty of Lausanne, in a way to allow Turkey resume full control over Straits and re-militarize the area around them, instead of acting militarily by herself, like many of her contemporaries had done. It would be possible to multiply these examples. The common point of all of these is that the Turkey of Ataturk, as he himself, was a firm believer in the necessity of the allegiance to legality in Turkish foreign policy actions.

Further, he regarded humanity as one body, and each nation as a part of this. Accordingly, the prosperity and happiness of the nations of the world could not be divided.

Pain in the finger-tip of the body causes all the other members to suffer...If there is an illness in some part of the world or other...it must concern us exactly as if it were among us. It is this idea that saves nations from selfishness. Whether selfishness is personal or national, it must always be regarded as bad.

After stressing the definite need of peace for all the civilised world, he indicated also the measures which he thought necessary for the continuation of world peace:

If a lasting peace is desired, international measures must be taken to better the conditions of communities. The prosperity...of mankind must replace hunger
and oppression. The world must educate its citizens in a way that will remove them far away from envy, greed and vindictiveness. As a military man, he knew the horror of war very well and promised in 1920 "to refuse absolutely to waste the nation's time and resources in the pursuit of dreams of domination." It has been observed by Most and Singer that "success may embolden a nation's leaders' notion of confidence and optimism and thereby stimulate their entry into subsequent conflicts." The Turkish case, however, has proved otherwise; the victory over the Entente powers decreased the likelihood of subsequent conflicts. As Edward Weisband concluded, of all the "great socio-political revolutions in the history of the modern state...the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey represents the only one that has produced an ideology of peace." This line of foreign policy also shows, on the part of Turkish leaders, the full realisation of the country's limitations. As Lenczowski puts it, "...perhaps the greatest merit of Kemal [Ataturk] and, his followers was their sober realization of limitation and their moderate, realistic foreign policy. There was nothing romantic or adventurous in Kemal's foreign policy." In fact, his foreign policy had to be free from adventurism in order to give him time to initiate the socio-economic reforms necessary for the modernization and reconstruction of the Republic. Once he said:

The government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly is national and material in its labours. It is realist...We are not swindlers who, in pursuit of great dreams, seem to do what we can not do...This is the whole trouble. Instead of pursuing ideas which we can not accomplish and increasing enemy pressure against ourselves, let us return our natural, our legal limits. Let us know our limits...

Bearing in mind these principles, Turkey, during the interwar period, was able to establish a long-enduring peace with the Western powers by renouncing her claims on Mosul and Western Thrace, which would cause problems. Ataturk's realism further showed itself in Turkish-Soviet relations. Although he was a life-long enemy of communism, he agreed to sign the Turco-Soviet Friendship Pact of 1921. This cooperation was the natural outcome of the conditions prevailing at the time, and the product of Ataturk's realistic foreign policy. According to him states had no eternal
enemies, and no eternal allies. They do have national goals. A state which recognizes these goals and can help to achieve them could be a friend. At any particular time, it was not ideology, but national and international realities which determined his foreign policy towards any particular state.

5. Concluding Remarks on Governmental Foreign Policy

For a correct evaluation of Turkish foreign policy, it is important to distinguish between the fundamental goals of Turkish national foreign policy and its long or short term objectives. Although the short-term policies for the realization of the national goals have undergone considerable changes through the years, the fundamental goals of national policy, as determined under Ataturk, have not radically altered until recently.

Ataturk attempted to replace the traditional beliefs of the Turkish people with "national" values in order to transform the old imperial society into the modern nation-state. Since then her foreign policy, too, has been appraised in terms of national interest. Because the evaluation of the national interest is more often than not a controversial issue, Turkish decision-makers have based their individual decisions on Ataturk's "dogma" and terminology thereby guaranteeing, at least, the support of the ordinary Turk and often the Ataturkist military and civilian elites. As long as Ataturk's "dogma" remained unquestioned foreign policy could be based on his ideological framework. The national goals, put forward by Ataturk, together with the effects of Imperial history and the geostrategic location, are the traditional inputs which have long governed Turkish foreign policy.

Since the traditional inputs are not only confined to the past, historical legacies that continue to contribute to Turkish foreign policy may thus be summarized:

- Turkey's important and sensitive geo-strategic position has meant that national security concerns have always been paramount in foreign policy considerations. A critical element in these concerns has been Turkey's proximity to and traditional
distrust of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the fact that Turkey has borders with the Balkans and the Middle East, areas of traditional conflict, makes Turkey very sensitive to changes in both the international and regional political balance.

Turkey's security thinking is also coloured by the historical experiences of foreign intervention and economic dependency. As a result, the foreign relations of Turkey, since Ataturk's times, have been dominated by concerns for genuine independence and sovereignty. Though the Soviet threat after the Second World War persuaded Turkey to move away from Ataturk's uncommitted posture to seek politico-military alliances, she is still sensitive to any real or implied infringements on her sovereignty.

Turkey's location at the intersection of the "West" and the "East" (the USSR and the Arab and Islamic World) also resulted in an identity crisis, both national and international. The tendency of the Kemalist ruling class to look towards the West for inspiration has not alienated the cultural and religious affiliation to the Arab-Islamic world by the general public.

As Turkey moves into the 1990s, the question of religion and secularism on the one hand, and the related issues of ethnicity, nationhood and the territorial state on the other, are coming to the fore. Although the old certainties of the ruling class' self-image as belonging to a modern, European-oriented, secular Turkey, which has been based almost exclusively on the territory of Anatolia, is coming under increasing challenges both from the left and the religious right, the legacy of the Turkish state and nationalism, embodied in a ruling class or elite with a strong commitment to Kemalist principles, still greatly affects Turkey's internal and external policies. In this context, despite the emergence of a seemingly homogeneous Turkish-speaking, traditionally Sunni-Moslem, society within Turkey's borders, the obvious failure of the Kemalist attempt at homogenizing Turkey, based on a majority language and Western ideals, continues to haunt both the Turkish identity and the Turkish state, as the ruling elite still refuses to acknowledge the ethnic and structural pluralism of Turkish society.
"Which should be understood as essential to the formation of a modern multi-ethnic democracy." 97

Turkey's self-desire to become an economically developed country has not changed since the early days of the Republic. Apparently, her economic development is not only a social need but also a source to strengthen the power of the nation. Moreover, economic development, in the eyes of the Kemalist elites, is one of the prerequisites of a European identity. Turkish ambition for development and modernization is not confined to technological equality with the industrially advanced Western countries. They wish to be recognized as Europeans and to be assimilated into European civilization, which had been acknowledged as superior by Ataturk.

Another important factor which Turkey's foreign policy should be seen through is the legality of her actions in international arena. It has been seen in Turkey as honourable to comply with international commitments. 98 Any intimation to the contrary, such as the US intimation about her NATO commitments during the Cyprus crisis of 1964, usually causes widespread surprise and astonishment as well as disappointment in Turkey. Although her inflexible policies, which have often resulted from an all too legalistic approach toward international questions, would delay and sometimes prevent possible solutions, Turkey still insists on abiding by rigid legality. This could be as Vali argues, 99 a direct result of the memories of the last years of the Ottoman Empire when the only way to preserve its existence and independence was the reliance on international agreements. Or it is still possible to argue that this attitude could be simply a continuation of a tradition established and carefully followed by Ataturk in the early days of the Turkish republic.

Another factor which should be kept in mind when evaluating Turkish foreign policy is Turkey's desire to improve her image among international community. Though the Turkish politicians and diplomats usually argue otherwise, contemporary Turkey cares for "international public opinion" and responds to pressures from the international arena. Given the fact that one of the most insistent national foreign policy goals of Turkey is to become a member of the European community of nations, it is
not surprising to see that even the military junta of September 12, 1980, both before
and after the intervention, had been sensitive to perceptions abroad. 100

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that structural factors, as discussed
above, have played a stabilizing role in, and ensured the continuation of, Turkish
foreign policy. Therefore the characterization of Turkish foreign policy as having a
high degree of rationality and sobriety, 101 has much to do with the heritage of the
Ottoman Empire, which was forced to pursue its foreign policy amid tensions between
its own interest and those of other powers. 102 At the same time, it is also in
accordance with the demands placed upon Turkey by her geopolitical situation: the
fact that Turkey lies on the boundaries of Europe, the Middle East and the Soviet
Union necessitated, during the past and in more recent times, a balanced, multi-sided
foreign policy.
NOTES:

1. Conjunctural factors that affected Turkish foreign policy up to 1980 will be discussed in chapter three.

2. For a detailed study of early foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire and the system of the "foreign office" see Lord Kinross, J.B., The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall Of The Turkish Empire, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977). For more general account of Ottoman Diplomacy see, Sander, O., Anka'nın Yükselisi ve Dususu: Osmanlı Diplomati Tarihi Uzerine Bir Deneme (The Rise and Fall of the Phoenix; An Attempt on Ottoman Diplomatic History), (Ankara; AU.SBF Yayinlari, 1987). Also Shaw, S. J. & Shaw, Z.K., History Of The Ottoman Empire And Modern Turkey, (London, New York, Melbourne; Cambridge University Press, 1977) gives information about the nature of foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire.


7. The National Pact, which was proclaimed by the last Ottoman Parliament, controlled by Nationalists, on 28 January 1920, may well be regarded as the fundamental cornerstone of the foreign policy of the new Turkey. In fact, principles of the National Pact, what Turks called "minimum acceptable rights" for the Turks, had not only been pursued during the National Struggle, but were maintained as the main text in Turkish foreign policy till today. For text see Ataturk, M. K., Nutuk (The Speech, delivered on October 1927 by Mustafa Kemal), 3 Volumes, (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1981), Vol. 3, Doc No. 41, "Nutuk" from now on; Also reprinted in Hurewitz, ibid., pp. 74-75.

For detailed study of Turkish nationalists struggle for independence and its external relations see OTDP, pp. 3-48; Sonyel, ibid.; Vere-Hodge, op. cit., pp. 23-50; and Nutuk.

Robins, P., "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue", International Affairs, Vol. 69 (4), 1993, p. 659; and Sim, R., "Kurdistan: The Search For Recognition", Conflict Studies, No. 124, November 1980, p. 4. The Treaty itself, although it did not define the exact territory of proposed autonomous Kurdistan, stipulated that after one year it might ask the League of Nations for a conformation of its status as an independent state. Conformation of this status was to be based on the evaluation of mandatory power(s).

Sim, ibid., pp. 17-18; Lewis, G. L., Turkey (London: Ernest Benn, 1955), pp. 84-88; For contemporary discussion of how the Kemalist Turkey dealt with the Kurdish issue see Toynbee & Kirkwood, op. cit., pp. 259-274.

12. Homogeneity is used here in a very broad sense as the Lausanne Treaty presumed and also in a sense that would have been used by early Kemalists whose understanding of "Turkish nation" was constitutional rather than ethnic-based and included Moslem minorities, such as Kurds, but excluded Christians and Moslem Arabs, left behind in Anatolia by the dying Ottoman Empire. Also bear in mind the distinction made by Salomone between homogeneous and homogenous. According to this interpretation, a homogeneous society is the one which aims at creating a uniform public consensus through differential incorporation. Homogenous society, on the other hand, necessitates a uniform culture obtainable thorough homogenization. For a further discussion see Salomone, S. D., "The Dialectics of Turkish National Identity: Ethnic Boundary Maintenance and State Ideology - Part Two", East European Quarterly, Vol. 23 (2), June 1989. See also pp. 42-45 of this volume for discussion of Kemalist nation-building. And of course if compared with the Ottoman Empire, despite the fact that the national and linguistic homogeneity of modern Turkey is not complete, it can be easily assumed to be a fairly homogeneous nation-state. According to estimates based on 1985 census 98 % of the population is muslim and about 90 % speak Turkish as their mother tongue. Figures taken from US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Turkey Background Notes (Washington, March 1988). However within this broad "homogeneity" there exists various ethnic groups and sub-groups in Turkey as excellently detailled by Andrews, P. A. (ed.), Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989).

13. In early 1920, Sheikh-ul-Islam issued a "fetva" encouraging the killings of rebels as a religious duty. Accordingly, a court martial in Istanbul condemned Mustafa Kemal and other nationalist leaders to death, in absentia. And irregular troops, the "Army of the Caliphate" were organized to fight the nationalists. For more detailed analysis of the early nationalist struggle against "internal opposition" see, Nutuk, Vol. I, and Ergil, D., Social history of the Turkish National Struggle, 1919-22: The Unfinished Revolution (Lahore, Pakistan: Sind Sagar Academy, n.d.), pp. 10-95.


17. For analysis of the impact of the West in Ottoman Empire see Toynbee & Kirkwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-61.


19. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) was one of the co-founders of the Society of Union and Progress and most farsighted of the Young Turk political writers. Quotation taken from *Ictihad*, 89 (Istanbul, 1909) by Lewis, *ibid.*, p. 236.


23. The reasons for the US use of Turkish soil to bombard Iraq during the Gulf War will be discussed in length later on in chapter eight.


26. The Tzar's proposal to dismember and partition the Ottoman Empire was first mentioned during his official visit to London in 1844 but met with a guarded refusal. Later in 1953 in St. Petersburg during a discussion with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador, the Tzar insisted that England and Russia should come to an understanding concerning the future of the Ottoman Empire, because "we have a sick man on our hands - a man gravely ill. It would be a grave misfortune if one of these days he slips through our hands, especially before the necessary arrangements are made". Quoted in Shaw & Shaw, *op. cit.*, p. 483. For excellent history and bibliography of the Russo-Ottoman rivalry see also Lewis, B., *op. cit.*


28. See chapter three below, pp. 92-97.


32. Under present arrangements, about 35% of the Aegean is designated as Greek territorial sea and about 9% as Turkish territorial sea. An arrangement employing the twelve mile limit would result in a disposition where Greece's share of total Aegean Sea space would increase to 64%; Turkey's would remain at less than 9%, with the remaining area being designated as international waters. Figures taken from Wilson, A., *The Aegean Dispute*, (Adelphi Papers, No. 155, 1980), pp. 36-37.

33. Most, B.A. & Starr, H.I., "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics and the Spread of War", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No. 4, p. 935. In the early 1990s, the break-up of the former Soviet Union added yet more neighbors - Armenia, Azerbaijan due to Nachivan, Russia and Ukraine - and thus created more uncertainties for Turkey.

34. Vali, op. cit., p. 44.

35. Ibid.


40. The only amphibious attempt to force the Dardanelles was the so-called Gallipoli Campaign undertaken by British, ANZAC, and French forces during the First World War. But, both the initial naval action and subsequent landings failed to defeat the Turkish defences of the Dardanelles and the action had to be called off.


42. For the text of Montreux Convention see Vali, ibid., pp. 200-223.


44. For N.S. Khrushchev's letter, dated June 28, 1960, to General C. Gursel, prime minister of Turkey, see Vali, *Turkish Straits*, pp. 302-305.

45. See chapter three below.

46. The fact that the Soviets supplied money and arms to subversive elements in Turkey and continued to support clandestine broadcasts to Turkey (two stations) long after abandoning all other such operations certainly affected relations by encouraging Turkish suspicions about Soviet intentions. For more information about Soviet destabilization program in Turkey see Benningsen, A., et. al., *Central Asia in the 1980s: Strategic Dynamic in the Decade Ahead*, (Foreign Area Research, Inc., FAR/NA-1001, July 1984, pp. 39-54. Also see Yalcin, A., "Terrorism in Turkey", a statement to the Sub-committee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee, US Congress, 25 June 1981.


50. Wilson, ibid, p. 4 and 30.

51. Vali, Bridge Across The Bosporus, p. 57.

52. Ibid., p.55.


54. Vali, Bridge Across The Bosporus, p. 55.

55. The 1982 Constitution (as well as 1961 Constitution) presented a modified version of Kemalist principles declaring in Article 2; "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble". The preamble gave renewed credit to the Kemalist achievements and ideology by expressing "absolute loyalty to...the direction of concept of nationalism as outlined by Ataturk...[and] the reforms and principles introduced by him". It also expressed its "desire for, and belief in peace at home, peace in the world", and its determination not to protect any "thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish National interests...the nationalism, principles, reform and modernism of Ataturk, and that as required by the principle of secularism...".


58. Ibid., p.6.

59. Nutuk, op. cit.


66. Sander, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 119.
71. From a speech delivered at the Fourth National Convention of the RPP by its Chairman and one of the influential Kemalist ideologists, Recep Peker, on May 9, 1935. Cited in Armaoglu, op. cit., p. 46.
73. Quoted from M. Kemal by Inan, op. cit., p. 23.
74. For further discussion see Salamone, op. cit.; Also refer to note 16 of this chapter.
75. Robins, Overlord State, p. 658.
83. OTDP, p. 8.
85. OTDP, p. 80.
86. For Turkish National Pact see Nutuk, Vol. 3., Document No. 41. For the text of the 1926 Treaty between Turkey, Iraq and G. Britain see Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 143-146 and 390-391. For the Mosul controversy between Turkey and Great Britain during the early 1920s see Ataov, op. cit., pp. 103-106; Silier, O., "The Place of Anglo-Turkish Relations in the Foreign Policy of Turkish Republic (1923-1939)"; The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. 10 (2), 1969-70, pp. 88-91; Vere-Hodge, op. cit., pp. 58-64; Toynbee & Kirkwood, op. cit., pp. 274-278.


98. "There is a pervasive sense among Turkey's foreign policy makers that international commitments extend beyond changes in party, government and even constitutional regime, and that international treaties are to be scrupulously observed". Rustow, D. A., *Turkey: America’s Forgotten Ally* (New York, London: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989), p. 85.


CHAPTER THREE

CHANGING PATTERNS: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UP TO 1980

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we looked at the structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy. We examined the factors that have traditionally influenced and shaped the foreign policy of Turkey from imperial times, through the interwar years with Ataturk, to the present day third Republic. Thanks to these structural determinants and their strong influence upon Turkey, she has been able to display a remarkable degree of continuity in her foreign policy, in contrast to frequent internal changes. It is, to a large extent, due to these factors that Turkish foreign policy has been praised for its high degree of rationality, sense of responsibility, long term perspective, and "realism found in few developing nations and far from universal even among the democracies of the West". 1

Yet, there are other factors that have affected Turkish foreign policy and its daily happenings. These conjunctural factors, the result of international and domestic changes over the years, have also helped to shape Turkey's contemporary foreign policy. Due to their dynamic and changeable character, however, they exert a temporary influence on the country's foreign policy, especially on its implementation. But due to these factors, Turkey's foreign policy has undergone some rapid changes in its implementation, even if no major deviations have occurred in the ultimate national goals. These factors have modified the foreign policy of Turkey through the years to establish a better defined and more relevant foreign policy to meet the requirements of the contemporary world.

Though there are several of them, we shall deal, in this chapter, with only a few major conjunctural factors that have affected Turkey's foreign policy and its international environment. Bearing in mind that almost every happening in domestic or international politics could affect and change a country's foreign policy in one way or another, it is imperative to be selective. One should not forget that a change of
government, even a minister, can affect attitudes and policy implementation. Besides, a selective approach is certainly appropriate from an analytical perspective when researching a country like Turkey where eight presidents, three military coups d'etat, four different constitutions, and forty eight prime ministers with an average tenure of seventeen months, have been squeezed into sixty seven years.  

The selection of factors has been determined by the importance of the changes that they caused. In this respect, the most decisive reason for choosing certain conjunctural factors was the sudden shift they had caused in either the implementation or more importantly the foundation of the foreign policy of Turkey.

An overview of Turkey's foreign relations shows that the single most important development has been the transition from the cold war, which dominated relations between the East and the West in the 1950s, to the process of detente.

Another important factor in the making of Turkey's foreign policy has been the Cyprus issue, which became a permanent problematic of Turkey's foreign relations since its inception. In the mid-to-late 1960s, it was the continual Cyprus crisis which gave impetus to a process of reconsideration of the basic orientation of Turkish foreign policy. And in the 1970s it was another Cyprus crisis which led to fundamental changes in foreign policy, though not as dramatic as pulling the country out of the Western states system.

Other important factors which caused some considerable changes in Turkey's attitudes to certain groups of states, have been the constitutional and political development of the country, together with its economic ambitions and problems; the different views of political parties and groups which came into existence after the 1960 military intervention; the 1961 Constitution, together with social and political evaluation it embodied; and the changes in attitudes of certain states towards Turkey.

Some of the conjunctural factors that had affected Turkish foreign policy were ephemeral in character. Others continued to affect its patterns for some time and were usually interrelated with each other. Since it is virtually impossible to identify the exact result of each factor separately and any foreign policy action is influenced by a
combination of factors, this chapter follows a slightly different line of arguing from that of the first chapter. Instead of looking at certain factors and their effects through the years, I have chosen to deal with Turkish foreign policy in different periods, distinguishable by their distinctive patterns in foreign policy. The above-mentioned conjunctural factors, then, are discussed in-depth in their relevant periods, under the overall "guidance" of the traditional inputs.

During the first and second Republics of Turkey (between 1923-1980), one can distinguish at least three different periods which could be identified with their distinct patterns in the country's foreign policy attitudes.

The interwar period under the leadership of Ataturk and Inonu had seen Turkey Western in its inclination but jealously guarding against any intimation that her independence, either economically or militarily, might be jeopardized. The foreign policy of this period was essentially shaped by the factors that we have labelled traditional or structural. Particularly M. Kemal's understanding and practice of foreign policy was important. As these factors were discussed in the previous chapter, there is no need to engage in further discussion about this period.

The second period, 1945-1960, during which Turkey's foreign policy was dominated by total Western dependence, was followed by a period of disillusionment with the West, late detente with Eastern Block and rapprochement efforts with the Third World (1960-1970).

The 1970s, in addition, saw a pattern of alienation from the West encouraged by the Cyprus crisis of 1974, which in turn showed Turkey the cumulative result of the foreign policy she had been following since the end of World War II: loneliness in the international arena. Hence, the 1970s witnessed Turkey's efforts to come back to the international arena as a reliable and friendly nation, just as she was during the interwar period.
Modern Turkey's Western orientation and rapidly modernizing features were, as mentioned above, firmly consolidated under the leadership of Ataturk. His foreign policy was dominated by the priority of peace, sovereignty and national development over expansionist-revisionism.

After Ataturk's death, one of his close associates, Ismet Inonu, took over the Presidency of Turkey and the Republican People's Party (RPP) in a one-party political system. He was so committed to the Kemalist ideology in general, and foreign policy principles of peace and sovereignty in particular, that Turkey under his leadership "faithfully followed the Kemalist regime in every domain and the foreign policy remained unchanged". After the gathering storm over Europe in 1939 forced Turkey to enter into an alliance with France and Great Britain, she was able to stay out of the war until the last minute.

Despite surviving the Second World War virtually unscathed, by showing one of history's best examples of small state diplomacy in great powers politics, Turkey however, was soon to see that the situation after the war was demanding careful diplomacy as much as it had done previously. Throughout the war, Inonu came to the conclusion that Turkey's biggest problem after the war would be the prospect of facing all alone the more powerful Soviet Union. In fact, he was convinced that if Turkey entered the war, the Soviets would occupy Turkey either as a member of the Axis or as a "liberator". He also foresaw the Soviet post-war domination of Eastern Europe. Hence, he was determined not to give the Soviets an excuse to set foot on Turkish soil. However, Turkey was soon to learn that all her careful manoeuvring to avoid alienating the Soviet Union had been to no avail.

The Second World War marked an important watershed in Turkey's foreign policy as well as in her domestic developments. Although Turkey's political and economic alignment with the Western countries after the Second World War may be treated as a natural outcome of her desire to become a fully modernized (=westernized)
country, her dependence on the Western powers went too far to represent a reversal in her earlier policies. It is true that the prewar Republic under Atatürk's leadership attempted to adopt the institutions and the values of the West in order to accelerate the process of modernization and economic development. This inclination to the West did not, however, imply a dependency on the Western powers, either militarily or economically. Moreover, she was reluctant to form any economic bonds which might lead to any real or imaginary dependency, as a result of the foreign domination of the Ottoman economy in the 19th century. On the contrary, Turkish foreign policy before the second World War was independent in nature, despite a series of regional pacts, and based primarily on conciliation with all big and regional powers. During this period, Turkey maintained friendly relations with all the major states of the time but avoided any formal attachment with any of them until 1939. Even during the Second World War, her main foreign policy aim was to find a way to stay out of the war and not to endanger the delicate balance of her relations with all the parties. Why then did Turkish foreign policy reverse itself following the Second World War?

A number of domestic and systemic factors had pushed Turkey towards Western tutelage in general, and Western-dependent foreign policy in particular. It was no accident that significant changes occurred simultaneously in both foreign and domestic policies, for as we shall see there was a linkage between the two.

2.1. External Factors: Meeting the Soviet Threat

In the international arena there were basically two more important and interrelated developments that were instrumental in Turkey's decision to establish closer ties with the Western countries. First of all, there was a change in the nature of the international system which rapidly evolved from a "balance of power" structure to a "bipolar" structure. In such a structure, as Aron's paradigm states, a policy of neutrality was not very realistic or possible at all for a country like Turkey, a middle-range power situated in such a geopolitically important area. Other important developments in the
international arena were the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower, and, more delicately for Turkey, her subsequent demands upon Turkey. As most observers noted, the impetus for Turkey's shift to Western alignment did not come from the West, but rather resulted from her reaction to Soviet pressures.

Already during the war, it became obvious to Turkey that the Soviets were pursuing a policy designed to gain territorial concessions from Turkey. During the secret German-Soviet negotiations in November 1940, Turkey was one of the bargaining pieces, and was a price asked by the Soviets to enter the Berlin Pact. Subsequently, allied with the West, the Soviets brought their demands to Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945. Having received Churchill's acquiescence at the Moscow Conference (October 1944), Stalin presented Soviet position at Yalta (February 1945) vis-a-vis the Turkish Straits. "It is impossible" remarked Stalin at Yalta "to accept a situation in which Turkey has a hand on Russia's throat".

Having already received these hints about Soviet intentions on her territorial integrity, and alarmed by the Soviet note of March 19, 1945, denouncing the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression, Turkey was terrified by another Soviet note on June 7, 1945, demanding Soviet bases on the Straits in addition to the territorial adjustments in the Soviet-Turkish border as the price for renewing the Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression. President Inonu's response was sharp and emotional, telling the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) that they were "under no obligation to give up Turkish soil or Turkish rights to anyone...We shall live with honour and die with honour". The Assembly speaker further warned Soviets in a firm and equally emotional manner that "if the Russians insist on their demand, we shall fight to the last Turk".

When Turkey refused these initial demands, from mid-1945 onwards, the Soviets started to exert heavy political pressures on Turkey. In this situation, Turkey unsuccessfully tried "to involve the United States in defending Turkey against the Soviet Union", and "bring the United States position on the Straits into harmony with the minimum Turkish view". However, the United States and Great Britain, under
the mistaken belief that meaningful cooperation with the Soviet Union after the war would be possible, stood aside. What they did not know at the time was that the Soviet demands on Turkey were a part of Stalin's efforts to take advantage of the power-gap of the wartime and immediate post-war international situation by provisional demands just beyond Soviet borders. Furthermore, Turkey's neutrality during the war had left her future status in ambiguity in contrast to most European countries where the post-war spheres were clearly defined. While this ambiguity made Turkey a tempting target for Stalin's post-war expansionism, the Western (US and UK) attitudes at the end of the war, which were slow to adopt a firm position against Soviet demands, must have encouraged Stalin about his proposals upon Turkey.

Meanwhile, at the Postdam Conference (17 July-2 August), the Soviets sought to obtain an Allied consensus that the problem of the Straits was a matter between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Though the Conference broke up without resolving the matter, it was agreed in principle upon a revision of the Montreux agreement. In the meantime, the Western attitude towards Turkey, and the Soviet demands in general, began to change gradually. Taken in conjunction with Soviet actions elsewhere, and in the light of the unsuccessful conference of foreign ministers in December 1945, the Soviet demands started to appear to President Truman to demonstrate an intention to invade Turkey and control the Straits.

With the declaration in March 1946 by the Great Britain that the 1939 Treaty of Alliance was still in force and obliged the UK to help her in the event of aggression, Turkey realised that her post-war isolation had now ended. Turkey was further relieved by another sign reflecting the changed American stance: the battleship Missouri anchored at Istanbul on April 15, 1946, carrying the remains of Turkish Ambassador M. Ertegun, who had died in Washington during the war. This was seen by many Turks as a sign of American readiness to protect Turkey. Nevertheless, the dispute over the Straits continued until the end of 1946.

On August 7, 1946, Soviets presented their proposal over the Straits as authorized at Postdam. The proposal called for control of the Straits to be in the
hands of Turkey and "other Black Sea Powers", with Turkey and The Soviet Union sharing joint defence of the waterways. They also sent strong notes to Turkey to complain about the administration of the Straits during the war. This time the Americans and the British backed Turkey in her rejection of Soviet demands, and in September 1946, shortly after proposed regulations presented by the Soviets, the United States announced its intention to maintain a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. Although later in September the Soviets repeated their earlier demands, they dropped the issue toward the end of October 1946 after another refusal from Turkey, backed by the United States and Great Britain.

The answer to the question as to what actually persuaded the Soviets to back out of their demands on Turkey is difficult to give, and has been controversial. Many, especially foreign observers, tend to emphasize Western support. And the Turkish officials, who tried to persuade the US to continue her aid to Turkey, tend to reinforce this connection. On the other hand, many Turkish scholars, specially since the mid-1960s, have argued that the years of maximum threat were 1945 and 1946 and Turkey, without any formal connection with the US, had to stand all alone against Soviet demands. They further argue that when finally the US agreed to give aid to Turkey through the Truman Doctrine (12 March 1947), the Soviet Union had already backed down in her claims. It seems fair to state that it was the combination of determined Turkish resistance, opposition of the Western powers, and the loss of will on the Soviets' part, as Yapp argues, that caused the Soviets to back down.

Whatever the reasons for the USSR's failure to follow up her claims, Turkey, thoroughly alarmed by the Soviet actions, reverted to its historic animosity for its Russian neighbour and continued to seek protection from the West, mainly from the United States. To this end, she attempted to dramatize the Soviet threat, and continued to argue that Turkey's geographical position made her the key to the Middle East, supposedly final target of the alleged Soviet aggression.

Although by the end of 1946 the Allied position had hardened in opposition to Soviet demands on Turkey, it was not until 1947, in reaction to Communist activities in
Greece and the British announcement of their intention to withdraw from her responsibilities in the area, that the United States became actively involved. The result was the Truman Doctrine which forged the initial bonds between Turkey and the United States, despite the fact that United States personnel, who began to be stationed in Turkey, quickly aroused memories of the Capitulations.\textsuperscript{28}

One of the main Ottoman foreign policy aims for a lengthy period was to ally herself with a powerful state, against her traditional antagonist Russia. Now, in the bipolar international system, modern Turkey, facing with renewed Russian threat, was forced to find an ally to protect her interests against the Soviet Union. There were a number of reasons why the United States was the natural candidate for the post. Apart from the fact that the United States was now assuming the leadership and protectorship of the Western democracies, and she was the only country capable of lending money which Turkey's economy badly needed at the time, it was also significant to the Turks that the United States had no history of colonial domination and was geographically located a considerable distance from Turkey.

2.2. Domestic Factors: The Interaction Between Multi-Party Democracy, Economic Development and Foreign Policy

Though the Soviet threat in the late 1940s stands out as the most instrumental factor in pushing Turkey into Western camp, there were other reasons for Turkey to choose the Western course. Firstly, as war ended with a victory for the Western democracies, the future seemed to be on their side and with their political system. This belief in the Western democratic system must have contributed to Turkey's willingness to alter her position of non-alignment and seek closer links with the West. Moreover, apart from international and systemic factors, internal political and economic pressures also played an important role in Turkey's new orientation in foreign policy. Most importantly, a dramatic change in the Turkish political system, that is the transition to a multi-party system, was occurring concurrent with above mentioned international developments.
Turkey's post-war foreign policy goals, at least in part, affected this change in her domestic politics which in turn had an effect on Turkish foreign policy.

Although there can be little doubt that the real impetus behind change was President Inonu's accurate assessment of Turkey's domestic scene, it would also be fair to argue that desire for Western support against Soviet demands strongly influenced his decision to promote truly democratic, multi-party elections. Internally, there was mounting criticism about RPP's one-party regime, which failed to produce viable economic policies and generated strong opposition with its capital levy during the war. At the same time, similar criticisms by the United States Congress must have had considerable impact upon Inonu, who was now seeking closer relations with the United States and wishing to join the Western community.

The social changes and specific events which were instrumental in the formation of a multi-party system in Turkey are too numerous and beyond the scope of this study. Whatever the reason for its introduction, however, this political experiment challenged RPP's almost exclusive privilege of governmental policy-making and offered the rural groups an opportunity to gain political influence alongside an urban elite composed of former high ranking military officers and bureaucrats. This in turn had inescapable effects on the implementation of Turkish foreign policy.

Beyond the political factors, economic needs necessitated a Western leaning in foreign policy. Although Turkey, by the end of 1946, had gold and foreign exchange reserves around $262 million, this was mainly due to favourable prices that the fighting powers offered Turkey's agricultural products and raw materials such as chromium. Moreover, at the end of the war Turkish officials, who were now considering the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, did not want to use these reserves and, therefore, tried to utilize international loans in order to enable Turkey to maintain a large army with its economic consequences.

Under the RPP government, Turkey had already started to receive American aid through the Truman Doctrine (1947), and later Marshall Plan (1948), although both schemes were not primarily arranged for Turkey, and there were restrictions on the use
of American aid.\textsuperscript{34} Further, Turkey had also established additional formal links with the Western Community. In 1948 Turkey became a member of the newly established Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which in turn enabled Turkey to be automatically included in the Marshall Plan, and in 1950 she joined the Council of Europe. Turkey's participation in these purely European organizations was of primary importance for her future economic and political relations and policies.

This pattern of economic dependency continued under the Democrat Party (DP), which won a decisive victory over the RPP in 1950. Democrats were at least as anxious as the Republicans to tie Turkey politically and economically to the West, and particularly to the United States. Although they encouraged free enterprise in their campaigns, they soon found it convenient to continue to build up the state enterprises after gaining power, thus came to rely heavily on foreign, mainly American, economic and military assistance. As a result, Turkey's need for foreign aid became an integral part of her foreign as well as domestic policy.

Turkey's economic system under the DP was modelled along Western lines and relied heavily on private initiative and foreign investment, and during the period 1947-1961 Turkey received $1,862 million in military assistance and $1,394 million in economic assistance from the United States.\textsuperscript{35} As a result of this extensive assistance, Turkish leaders apparently became insulated from economic reality, and consequently established Turkey's long standing dependency on foreign assistance.

After an impressive economic start which lasted through 1953, the economic situation in Turkey deteriorated rapidly. Its initial success was due mainly to the expansion of private investment, the boom in agricultural production as a result of government subvention in prices and opening of new farming areas, the mechanization of farming, and favourable weather and high world prices for agricultural products because of the Korean war.

Despite early indications and Western warnings of serious economic problems, the Menderes government, encouraged by early successes, continued to pursue
ambitious but uncoordinated development policies. After 1953, however, Turkey's economy began to deteriorate and her foreign trade deficit grew.\textsuperscript{36}

Even though the Turkish government refused to follow its economic advice, the United States continued to provide essential assistance under the, sometimes exaggerated, view of Turkey's geographical importance. Finally, when faced with bankruptcy in 1958, Menderes accepted the stabilization programme imposed by an international consortium composed of the United States, Germany, Great Britain, the European Payments Union, and the International Monetary Fund. In return the consortium rescheduled Turkey's debts and provided an aid package of $359 million.\textsuperscript{37}

In addition to establishing Turkey's dependency on foreign assistance and creating a less than favourable image of the Turks' ability to manage their finances, the fiscal policies of the DP government led to significant social changes in Turkey. The increased correlation of status with power and the rise of the new middle class, based on economic activity, resulted in a concomitant decline in the status of the salaried bureaucrats, intellectuals and military officers. And the danger was the Democrat Party government did not understand the new forces of instability developing in the society. Thus the stage was set for domestic conflict.

Meanwhile, Turkey's main foreign policy objective was to be a full member of NATO. This desire for membership was based on political and economic factors rather than strategic and military concerns, since, by 1950, the main Soviet threat was already averted. Although Turkey's wish to enter NATO should be seen as a natural outcome of the foreign policies that Turkey had been following since World War II, the economic concerns must also have played a considerable part, and the idea that her exclusion might lead to a decrease of US interest and subsequent reduction in American aid must have had its weight in the government's decision. Furthermore, domestic political considerations of the DP also played a significant role in this decision. First of all the DP, which was advocating liberal economy in Turkey, might have seen that it was difficult to establish such a system without attaching Turkey to the West. Secondly, the leaders of the DP genuinely believed that Turkey's entrance to NATO
was necessary for the future of the democratic system in Turkey and their own existence. In fact, it was quite clear from their statements during the election campaign of 1950 that the DP leaders, under the earlier experiences of multi-party system in Turkey, were afraid of the possibility that the RPP would not deliver the government even if they lost the election. They thought that joining NATO would prevent the RPP from playing such games. Finally in 1952, after the Korean War, and Turkish participation in the conflict, Turkey and Greece joined into NATO, which marked the Turkey's military commitment to the West as well as her economic dependence.

2.3. Reflections on Turkey's Western Dependency in Foreign Policy

As a result of her economic and military dependency on the West, Turkey's foreign policy also started to tilt toward the West. Turkey's active role in the creation of such alliances as the Baghdad Pact and the Balkan Treaty which gained her no additional security and the awkward role she played at the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in championing the cause of Western powers may all be interpreted as a part of Democrat Party's efforts to appear as an indispensable ally in order to secure greater aid from the West. Likewise, her support of the Western powers at the Suez crisis of 1956; her fierce opposition to the 1958 Iraqi coup; her threats to Syria in 1957, in the heat of the US-Syrian crisis, to invade should the Communists, or the Soviet Union, gain control over the Syrian government, were all the parts of Turkey's efforts to exacerbate the Communist threat in her immediate borders in order to get more economic and military aid as well as the result of the Democrat Party's foreign policy thinking which was essentially anti-Soviet.

As one could expect, relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Block countries were far from friendly during the period under consideration. After Soviet territorial demands on Turkey, relations further deteriorated proportionate to Turkey's alignment with the West through the Truman Doctrine (1947), and her membership in NATO (1952), the Balkan Pact (1954), and the Baghdad Pact (1955). Turkey's
political preference of multi-party system based on free elections, and economic choice centred on free enterprise were also reflections of her commitment to Western style democratic system. Soviet harsh and often threatening responses only helped Turkey to move closer to her Western allies.^39 Turkey's suppression of the leftist parties and their organs during the 1940s and 1950s was also caused, in part, by Soviet hostility.

On the other hand, the Soviet fear that Turkey might be used as a base for a Western attack against the Soviet Union dictated Soviet policies toward Turkey for a long time, which remained openly hostile and intimidating until 1953 when a culmination of several factors resulted in change. In May 1953, barely three months after Stalin's death, the Soviet government renounced its territorial claims for Turkey's eastern provinces and its desire for control of the Straits.40

Since the Turkish government regarded these peace moves as a new Soviet tactic designed to separate her from the West, there were no immediate positive results in Turkish-Soviet relations.41 Consequently, Soviet efforts to establish intimate relations with Egypt in 1955 and the Syrian and Iraqi crises of 1957 and 1958 invoked further fears in Turkey about being surrounded by hostile pro-Soviet states and the crushing of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 by the Red Army only helped to confirm Turkish suspicions about Soviet moves.42 As a result, when the Cold War entered a period of limited detente in 1954, Turkey was left behind in the process of normalization of East-West relations.

Finally, when Turkish premier Menderes agreed on exchanging visits with Krushchev in April 1960 as a result of mainly Turkey's need for economic assistance, and the basic changes in Soviet policy, which was no longer insistent on radical change in Turkish Foreign Policy as the price for improved relations, it was too late, because Menderes was to be ousted by the military coup of May 27, 1960, which caused a Turkish-Soviet standstill for another four years.

During this period, Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern Arab countries, and Third World states in general, were literally an extension of her Western-dependent foreign policy, as well. Even before Turkey's accession to a Western defense system,
there were enough factors leading to a deterioration of Turkish-Arab relations. First of all, historical experiences, i.e., the relationship between the rulers (Ottoman Turks) and the ruled (Arabs), surely coloured the relations. Secondly, Atatürk's reforms created a difference between two Islamic peoples, and the general secularisation of Turkey in the name of modernization (Westernization) created profound resentment and mistrust among Arabs. Moreover, the question of Alexandretta, which resulted from the attachment of the region to Turkey in 1939, was still a matter of tension between Turkey and Syria.

Furthermore, Turkey's Western orientation, which led Turkey to adopt political, social, cultural and economic ideas from the West and eventually to join NATO, had significant impacts on Turco-Arab relations. In her Middle Eastern relations Turkey was looked upon by the Arabs as a pawn of the West. This perception was not altogether untrue, but it would be unfair to assume that Turkey was acting only as a Western proxy. Indeed, Turkey had a real desire to secure her southern borders. Beyond, the emergence of Israel had an immediate and long lasting effect on Turkish-Arab relations. Originally Turkey opposed the partition of Palestine, but, after establishment of Israel, changed her stance to be the first Islamic nation to recognize her and exchange ambassadors.43

Further, Turkey's efforts in 1951 to help establish a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) and the Arab states' resentment against this as another form of Western and Turkish imperialism in the region worsened the relations. Though MEDO had failed, Turkey later joined the Baghdad Pact of 1955, which was also opposed by many Arab countries, especially Egypt.44 Though the effectiveness or utility of the Baghdad Pact had certainly been questionable, the role it played in the alienation of Egypt and her allies from the West in general and Turkey in particular are obvious. It most assuredly cast Turkey in the image of a tool of the Western powers.

During the period Turkey's foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, as mentioned above, mirrored her pro-Western alignment and reflected Turkey's fears that the Soviet Union was enlarging its influence over Middle Eastern countries, and Turkey
could be soon contained by pro-Soviet and hostile Arab states.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, it could be said that, by contributing to Turkey's rapprochement with the West, and placing great pressure upon her, the Soviet threat indirectly influenced Turkey's further alienation from the Middle East.

Turkey in the 1950s certainly failed, as Karpat assesses, to understand the trend of development, the political objectives and resentments of her Arab neighbours.\textsuperscript{46} On the other hand, the Arabs, too, failed to understand Turkey's security needs and fears from the Soviet Union. They were geographically removed from the Soviet Union by the buffer that Turkey and Iran had created between the two areas. For the Turks, the Russians were not merely a dangerous historical enemy but, because of their proximity, a credible threat to the existence of themselves, as well. As Aykan assesses, "no matter how the Arabs could have felt about the Soviet danger, their feelings could not have been so deep-seated as Turkey's feeling".\textsuperscript{47}

Meanwhile, Turkey's defence of the West at the Bandung Conference in 1955 further strained her relations with the Third World Countries.\textsuperscript{48} Originally Turkey did not even want to join this conference. But later, under the pressures from the West, she changed her mind and went to the conference in order to warn these states against the threats caused by "middle of the road measures".\textsuperscript{49} At this conference of Afro-Asian nations Turkey strongly defended her Western alliance (NATO) with harsh attacks on non-alignment, socialism and communism.\textsuperscript{50} As a result, Turkey became isolated from the Third World, an isolation which would later be felt in the United Nations.

Throughout the 1950s Turkish foreign policy was clearly a product of her Western alignment and an extension of Western policies toward both the Soviet Union and the non-aligned countries. The leaders of Turkey, during this period, did not agree that a "detente" would be possible between two blocs, and did not believe in the sincerity of "peaceful coexistence" policy which they regarded as another tactic by the Soviet Union to deceive the free world.\textsuperscript{51} They did not accept non-alignment as a viable solution and further believed that it would help the Soviet Union to dominate the world in the long run.\textsuperscript{52} However, in the 1960s, due to systemic and internal changes
as well as American policy toward Cyprus, Turkey began to reevaluate her strict Western orientation.

3. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Inter-Coup Period (1960-1980): The Western Tie Weakened

It would have been hard to imagine in the late 1950s that the Turks would ever be disappointed with the West and would join in the world-wide anti-American sentiment with shouts of the familiar "Yankee Go Home". Yet, the Turkish-American friendship, which began with the Truman Doctrine and flourished in the 1950s, began to cool during the 1960s and deteriorated in the 1970s. What happened to the Turkish-American "honeymoon" in such a short time? What had changed in Turkey and in the international arena that affected Turkey's relations with the United States in particular and generally with the Western alignment?

In fact, it was not only Turkish-American amity that was altered throughout the inter-coup period. The whole of Turkish foreign policy thinking, actually, was experiencing a reevaluation and reorientation process along with the rise of anti-American sentiments in Turkey.

Although the 1964 Cyprus crisis is commonly regarded as the turning point in Turkish-American relations and Western alignment in general, in reality the process of reorientation in the mind of intellectuals and some politicians started well before that year. Admittedly, the Cyprus question stands out as being the most significant factor in bringing about the reappraisal and diversification efforts of Turkish foreign policy during the inter-coup period. In point of fact however, there were other factors both domestic and international involved in Turkey's policy shift.

3.1. Detente in East-West Relations and Turkish Foreign Policy, 1960-1970

The detente process and the consequent loosening of the bipolar balance, which had initiated important changes in world politics, also greatly affected Turkey's international position. The cold war had earlier necessitated, on the one hand, Turkey's dependency
on the West, but on the other, also sustained unquestioning Western support either militarily or politically including economic aid. During the 1950s the Soviet threat was felt by Turkey so much that there was no reason on the Turkish part to question her total dependence to the West, as long as the West (mainly the United States) committed itself to protect Turkey from Soviet aggression.

But, the 1960s saw a softening of inter-bloc tensions. Furthermore, the rise of China and France as rebellious countries against bipolar arrangement of the postwar years signalled a change in the power balance of the world which has eventually turned to be a multipolar one. Although, international relations continued to be overshadowed by the two strong poles, the growing interdependence among nations, and increasing roles of the secondary states in world politics have caused a loosening of the bipolar balance and the emergence of a more complex and multidimensional configuration.

This multidimensional interplay can also be observed in economic developments. While seeking a fulcrum between East, West, and the other focuses of power, the world, at the same time, had to sustain the discrimination of the North towards the developing countries of the South. On the other hand, the rising economic consciousness of the South has brought along a set of political consequences and has introduced new actors to the world political stage. Of these actors, the "Group of 77" on the economic stage, and the "Group of Non-aligned Countries" on the political stage became the representatives of rising consciousness of the so-called "Third World" countries. These events have introduced the concept of economic development to world politics and have also resulted in considerable cross-alliance relations.

While the world became more inter-dependent, both economically and politically, the period of detente, which slowed down inter-superpower rivalry, also made it possible for small members of alliance systems to have broader economic and political relations with the other states disregarding military blocks. In such a fragmented world Turkey had to expand its relations to these new centres of economic, political and military power in order to take full advantage of her economic and political potential.
Moreover, an official NATO report, the Harmel Report, issued in December 1967, gave way to inter-alliance relations and must have dispelled possible Turkish apprehensions that her changing relations with the Eastern bloc could jeopardize her position in NATO. The report stated that since all NATO members are "sovereign states, the allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision...each ally can decide its policy", and called the Allies to seek improved relations with the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe.53

The expansion in Turkish foreign policy, however, would have required more developments both domestic and international level other than detente itself, though they were not far away in the early 1960s.

3.2. The Effects of Pluralist Democracy: The 1960s

During the inter-coup period, Turkey went through important socio-political changes, a combination of which affected the thinking of Turkish people in general and their approach to the matters of foreign policy in particular. The internal evolution of Turkey after the 1960 coup, therefore, deserves further attention.

Since the 1960 coup was a result of various social, economic and internal political factors rather than based on any foreign policy consideration,54 its immediate affect on foreign relations was minimal.55 The only visible foreign policy modification of the military junta was an attempt to improve relations with the Arab countries, and a desire to establish closer contacts with the newly emerging nations.56 The military government also attempted to regularize the various bilateral agreements with the US and emphasized Turkish national interests in this connection.57

Although the 1960 coup and the military government afterwards did not produce any immediate real foreign policy changes, the relatively free political atmosphere after the coup and the "liberal" constitution of 1961 had a significant impact on Turkish domestic politics, and subsequently affected Turkish foreign policy. Up to the early 1960s, Turkish foreign policy-making remained in the almost exclusive
privilege of a small elitist group. Public criticism of government foreign policy was generally considered unpatriotic. Under the presidencies of Ataturk and Inonu, the very nature of the authoritarian single-party politics precluded any real opposition in the foreign policy area as well as in domestic policies. Under the DP governments, too, public discussion of foreign policy, and indeed all other issues, were tightly controlled chiefly in parallel with Menderes' efforts to suppress opposition in the country.

Besides suppression, it is evident that the opposition RPP's views on foreign policy were very similar to those implemented by the DP governments. Although Menderes did not consult with the opposition party on matters of foreign policy, he was usually criticised only on matters of implementation rather than decision itself. For example, the opposition criticized his decision to send Turkish troops to Korea, one of if not the most important Turkish foreign policy decision of the 1950s, more on the way it was made than for its content.58

Apart from this, one of the foreign policy acts of the Menderes government did in fact create great unrest among Turkey's intellectual community and the RPP, shortly before the 1960 military coup. This was the 1959 bilateral agreement between Turkey and the United States, which stated that the United States would come to Turkey's aid in the event of "direct or indirect" aggression.59 Soon, the term "indirect aggression" created great concern among intelligentsia and the opposition who saw an American commitment in the agreement to intervene on behalf of the Menderes government in the event of a coup or even an electoral defeat.60 The criticism directed against the government was so strong that the submission of the agreement to the Grand National Assembly for ratification was postponed for a year.61

But still discussion of foreign policy matters was limited, and in any case, confined to the intelligentsia. However, after the 1960 coup and the reconstruction of the constitutional government, Turkey's foreign relations entered inter-party discussions, together with relatively pluralist political life, and attracted people's attention.
Moreover, the constitutional and electoral changes introduced by the National Union Committee (NUC, the military junta) have influenced Turkish politics, both foreign and domestic, for a long time. The new electoral law introduced a system of proportional representation which allowed small parties to enter parliament and therefore created multiplicity in foreign as well as domestic policies. The new constitution, moreover, put a series of checks and balances to prevent democratic system to turn, in effect, into one-party totalitarianism as happened during the 1950s.

On the negative side, however, the new electoral system made it increasingly difficult for a single party to obtain a majority. What followed was a series of weak and generally ineffective coalition governments. Due to the major ideological differences between Turkey's various political parties, the long periods of coalition rule created an atmosphere within which a general consensus on policy, either foreign or domestic, was rarely reached. This, of course, created ineffectiveness and inactivity in Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s.

The new system also created a plural society alongside the pluralist parliament, by spelling out in the 1961 Constitution the "fundamental rights" - freedom of thought and belief, freedom of press, of publication, of association, and many others. Under this air of freedom, foreign policy, like domestic policies, became a topic of open public discussion. This was contrary to the previous practice of the Republic, in which the public, as mentioned above, was generally silent on matters of foreign policy.

Another factor which was to contribute indirectly to the reorientation of Turkey's foreign policy was the emergence for the first time in Turkey's history of a genuine socialist movement. The emergence of the new Turkish left was signalled by the publication of the weekly Yon (1961) and the establishment in 1962 of the Turkish Worker's Party (TIP), which was later outlawed after the 1971 military intervention. They advocated the demolition of Turkey's ties with the West and the normalization of relations with the neutral and communist countries. As a natural extension of their socialist ideology, they were against the strong American presence on Turkish soil and ran an anti-American campaign throughout the country.
Although these callings of the new Left attracted many followers from the intelligentsia, its anti-Western campaign did not attract widespread support from the masses until the Cyprus crisis of 1964. It was, however, at least in part responsible for a basic policy shift within the RPP, which adopted a "left of centre" stance on the eve of the 1965 general election in an apparent attempt to win back the intellectuals from TIP and to gain support from the working class.66

Concomitant with the Worker's Party, other splinter parties advocating nationalistic and religious ideas also emerged. Parties, and indeed any other organization, acting on these grounds were not allowed before the 1960s. With the free atmosphere the new constitution created, however, these parties found a chance to come out and be represented in the parliament. The fragmentation of the Turkish political system after the 1960 coup also played a part in this result.

Another significant feature of the inter-coup period was the extraordinary degree of radicalism espoused by the Turkish youth. Though in the late sixties it was undoubtedly affected by the world-wide trend, especially by student insurrection in France in 1968, the relatively free atmosphere and extreme fragmentation in Turkish political system created after the 1960 intervention were, at least, partly responsible for the result. What began in the late 1960s as peaceful student demonstrations against poor social and educational conditions, soon assumed political significance, grew radical, and became polarized between the Right and the Left and turned into bloody armed clashes in the 1970s.67

Anti-imperialism was a common platform for both sides. But, while the Leftists attacked Turkey's alliance with the West, which they believed restricted Turkey's freedom of action, the Rightists were strongly anti-communist and opposed Soviet imperialism, which at the time was no longer an obvious threat to Turkey.

The clashes between extreme Left and Right grew in the 1970s and spread outside the political arena. More importantly, in the 1970s another wave of violence surrounded Turkey with its roots in cultural and religious grounds as well as politics.68 As far as foreign relations were concerned, increasing political and social instability
generated by political violence and terrorism seriously damaged Turkey's world image at a time when Turkey was in great need of economic and political support.

Moreover, it was quite certain that during the late 1970s any foreign policy, like any domestic policy, of the government would generate a strong challenge from at least one of the extreme groups. Under these circumstances, governments had to restrain themselves to the daily happenings of the foreign relations instead of trying to map out general guide-lines for Turkey's foreign policy problems. This strategy in turn contributed to Turkey's inactivity and isolation on the international front.

3.3. Cyprus as a Foreign Policy Determinant and Turkey's New Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy

3.3.1. The Impact of the Cyprus Question: The 1960s

In terms of fostering a new direction in Turkish foreign policy, the factors outlined above involved only a limited circle of politicians and intellectuals until the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964. The democratization of Turkish politics, with the growth of a vocal and fragmented opposition and the emergence of foreign policy as a political issue, created an atmosphere in which a shift to a more independent foreign policy was not only likely, but also considering Turkey's need for foreign capital, very probable. However, not until the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 did the emerging independent policy trend at the top find wide support. Wide-spread anti-American sentiments emerged. But more importantly, events surrounding the Cyprus crisis forced Turkey's leaders to recognize that their strict adherence to a pro-Western alignment in a period of a changing international system had left Turkey virtually isolated in the World Community. Cyprus then was the catalyst which forced Turkey to re-examine her foreign policy in the light of a rapidly changing world system.

While the history of Cyprus and developments of crises over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey are not of prime importance to this research, it is sufficient to
know that various forces made the Cyprus issue one of vital importance, for both the Turkish government and the Turkish people.70

First of all, the geographical position of the Island of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean made it strategically important for Turkish security thinking. The scenario that Greek-held Cyprus would cut Turkey off from the open sea encouraged Turkey's resistance to Greek designs on the island since the 1950s. Secondly, the large Turkish community on the island which the Turks felt compelled to defend against the Greek majority made the issue highly emotional. Furthermore, Enosis (union with Greece), then the Greek position on the island, was seen by many Turks as a first step for achieving the Megali Idea (re-establishment of the old Byzantine Empire), and therefore the Cyprus issue became a matter concerning national pride.

This highly emotional and therefore political appeal of the Cyprus issue can clearly be seen in the statement issued by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, in late 1963, in reply to President Makarios' proposed constitutional changes, which would have reduced the status of the Turkish community in the island from a community with equal rights to a minority. The statement ended; "A government that can abandon some 100,000 dear members of our race to the arbitrary administration of foreigners will never come to power in Turkey".71 It is obvious that the fragile Turkish coalition governments of the 1960s could not dare to negotiate a compromise when Turkey was drawn into the crisis by the violent clashes between the two communities on Cyprus at the end of the year 1963.

Initially, Turkey sought support for her position in NATO where the United States had the dominant voice. Although NATO seemed to be a natural forum for Turkey and Greece to seek a solution, it was soon evident that the other NATO states, especially the United States, were reluctant to enter into what was seen as a local discord between two members of the same alliance.72 Moreover, the United States was restraining itself from imposing any solution on the Cyprus dispute for fear of alienating either Greece or Turkey.73
Turkey, on the other hand, was fully expecting American support under the, what is now apparent us faulty, appraisal of the extent of support the United States could or would extend. It is evident that Turkey, at the time, had failed to take into account the changed circumstances in which international relations were operating during the 1960s. It was easy for the United States to use leverage on Turkey and Greece to reach compromise on Cyprus in the 1950s when the effects of Cold War still felt and both countries were in need of American aid. By the 1964, however, both Greece and Turkey were feeling less strained by the Cold War. Furthermore Greece, due to her association with the EEC, became much less dependent on American economic aid, and therefore American economic leverage on Greece had greatly diminished. Moreover, Cyprus had became an independent state in 1960 and Makarios was now taking an independent stand from Greece.

Another faulty assumption, on which Turkey based her expectations, was that the relative importance of Turkey to the United States was more than that of Greece because of her more strategic location. But what Turkey could not see at the time was that the thaw in the Cold War and the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles diminished the American need for Turkish bases to maintain the nuclear balance of power. Ulman also points out the effect of the large and well organized Greek-American community and the scope of world Christian protest against the restrictions Turkey placed on the activities of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul.

When all these factors were considered, it is not surprising that the American and NATO position on Cyprus was one of neutrality between Greece and Turkey.

Thorougly frustrated by America's and NATO's neutrality on Cyprus; faced with public outcry at home; and fuelled with the Cypriot parliament decision of June 1964 to establish general conscription for the Greek Cypriot defence forces, Inonu's government informed its allies that Turkey decided upon unilateral intervention. The American response was the now infamous Johnson letter of 1964, which was described by Inonu in his reply as "disappointing" both "in wording and content".
The contents of the letter, which was not made public until 1966 but nevertheless partially leaked to the press, was shocking for many Turks who now came to the conclusion that Turkey could not rely on its allies unconditionally. In the letter, Johnson warned Turkey that her "NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies". He further reminded that "the United States can not agree to the use of any US supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances".

The second part of the letter, which was to play a most important role nearly ten years later, passed more or less unnoticed. The questioning of NATO support, however, as Inonu's reply reflected, created great concern among Turks and forced them to rethink the reliability and trustworthiness of the alliance with the West. They realized, as Inonu put in his reply to Johnson, that "there are...wide divergence of views" between Turkey and the United States "as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance". In Turkish understanding, the NATO Treaty "imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression" unconditionally, and to debate the issue of "whether aggression was provoked" and "whether they have an obligation to assist" would jeopardize "the very foundation of the Alliance...and it would lose its meaning". They further realized that the national interests of Turkey were no longer identical with those of the United States or the Western alliances. From then on, the question of re-examining and redirecting Turkey's foreign relations, a notion that the progressive intelligentsia had been advancing for a long time, spread out to cover the hitherto silent mass; and put all Turkish governments, as Harris notes, "on the defensive in regard to the American connection, and memories of the Johnson letter would colour popular impressions of the United States for many years to come".

114
Beyond the deteriorating effects of the Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter, there were other problems concerning Turkish-US relations. As noted above, in the 1960s, because of domestic developments there was growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey even before the 1964 Cyprus crisis. The general areas of friction, such issues as American sovereignty over military bases on Turkish soil; misuse of US installations in Turkey; alleged covert activities of the CIA; what the Turks considered to be American abuse of the "status of forces agreements"; alleged US involvement in domestic policies; and the lack of sufficient American military aid, were already pressurising the Turkish government to re-examine the relations with the United States.

In addition to these, two specific events which were to have an impact on Turkish-American relations took place during the 1960s - the Cuban missile "deal" and NATO's adoption of the "flexible response" strategy. Although the two events probably did not arouse the general Turkish public, as much the Cyprus crisis did, they surely created concern among Turkey's political and military leaders.

At the risk of further alienating the Soviets and making Turkey a prime target, the Menderes government had agreed in 1958 to the deployment of medium range atomic warhead Jupiter missiles in Turkey. In point of fact, the Missiles had been rendered obsolete even before they became operational in July 1962. And in 1961 the US had begun negotiations with Turkey for closure of missile sites. Under pressure from the military, however, the Turkish government opposed the idea and the United States dropped the matter. As a result, the missiles were still in Turkey when the Cuban missile crisis broke out and became a bargaining point when the Soviets proposed that the Jupiters be withdrawn in exchange for their withdrawing the missiles from Cuba. Although the State Department denied any kind of "deal" over the missiles, they were in fact removed from Turkey in 1963, apparently without consultation with the Turkish government, which actually owned the missiles but not their warheads.
The removal of the Jupiters gave rise to several issues which would make a deep impression on Turkish-American relations. First of all, the suddenness with which the Cuban crisis occurred and the limelight which Turkey shared because of missiles on her soil brought about a basic change in Turkish attitudes. The experience had demonstrated that a war could occur almost without warning and the possession of strategic offensive weapons makes any country a primary target. The realization that Turkey might became a target for a Soviet nuclear attack because of the US bases, and that having bases that would attract such an attack might not be in the security interests of Turkey, gave rise to the sentiment in Turkey, as Harris states, "in favour of removing weapons systems which the Soviets considered especially dangerous, in order to decrease the likelihood that the country could be dragged into a conflict against her will." Equally important, was the impression given by Kennedy's unilateral action that during a crisis the United States could and would act in her own best interest without consideration of, or consultation with her allies. The Turkish public was also offended by the idea that the US treated Turkey as a client whose interests were negotiable. This, coupled with the strategy of "flexible response" and the doubt cast upon United States commitment to Turkey by the Johnson letter, created great concern in Turkey.

Soviet development of thermo-nuclear weapons in the 1960s necessitated a rethinking of the concept of "massive retaliation", whereby an attack on an American ally would elicit an automatic nuclear strike against the aggressor. The United States opted for a strategy of "flexible response" which did not entail an automatic nuclear response. In light of previous American actions surrounding Cuba and Cyprus, this new strategy doubtfully created great concern in Turkey. The outcome of this concern was reappraisal by Turkey of her role in NATO.

3.3.3. Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy Concept

In the late 1960s, all these frictions and problems abroad and the basic changes in Turkey's socio-political life outlined above were showing only one direction - the need
for a new and fresh foreign policy. But, as Ahmad pointed out, "throughout the sixties...the intelligentsia was able to inhibit the activities of the government by constant criticism but...never able to force the government to reformulate the policy". 89

Although, after the Cyprus crises of 1963-1964 and 1967, the signs of reevaluation of basic fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy were evident even in the governmental circles, 90 soon the outcry that Cyprus and other problems created died out, or at least shadowed, due to mounting pressure of the domestic politics as a result of growing violence and economic problems.

Nevertheless, there were basic changes in Turkey's attitudes, if not in main directions, towards certain countries in an apparent attempt to break her loneliness in the international forums and find support to her position on Cyprus. One of the major changes in Turkish foreign policy in the late 1960's was the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Although there had been a movement towards rapprochement with the Soviets as early as 1959 because of economic needs, the real thaw in Turkish-Soviet relations started after 1964 and was undoubtedly influenced by American actions during the Cyprus crisis. But attempts by Turkey to better her relations with the Communist Bloc were motivated by other factors as well. The Turkish desire for Soviet economic assistance in view of declining American economic and military aid; 91 the development of a highly vocal political opposition; and growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey all contributed to Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

In his memoirs, Turkish Foreign Minister F. C. Erkin, claims that Turkey moved to normalize relations with the Soviet Union because the Soviet threat to Turkey had decreased due to the NATO alliance, the rise of China as a balancing force, her economic difficulties on the domestic front, and demands for autonomy by the Soviet Union's allies in Eastern Europe. 92 Just as important were the signals from Moscow that the Soviets had abandoned their harsh policy toward Turkey and that better relations between the two countries would not be contingent on Turkey loosening her NATO bonds. Clearly, there were a variety of factors dictating the desirability for
better relations, but just as clear is the fact that Cyprus was the catalyst for rapprochement.

Ulman/Dekmejian acknowledge three factors, related to Cyprus, that forced Turkey to consider rapprochement with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{93} First of all, the Turks probably felt that signs of a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement would pressure the United States and NATO into inducing the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to accept a solution favourable to Turkey. Secondly, Turkey hoped to win positive Soviet support for her position on Cyprus, and therefore, secure the support of the Communist Bloc in the United Nations. Finally, the least they could expect was a neutral Soviet position, thereby denying support for the Greek position. Taken into consideration with Turkey's isolation in the international arena, the lack of Western support, and the Soviet warning to Turkey during the 1964 Cyprus crisis about the integrity of the island, this attempt to secure Soviet support on Cyprus issue seemed all the more appropriate.

What began as a tactic to secure support for her position on Cyprus soon became a firm conviction of Turkish foreign policy. Talks and visits between Turkey and the Soviet Union increased after 1965 and the dialogue was extended to other matters of mutual interest to the two countries. Perhaps most significant was the increase in trade and the beginning of a Soviet aid program for Turkey. As a result, Turkish exports to and imports from the Soviet bloc rose rapidly and the share of the Soviet bloc in Turkey's total trade increased from 7% in 1964 to 13% in 1967.\textsuperscript{94}

A basic tenet of Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union was the belief that the Soviets had abandoned their harsh, militarist policy and would accept, however unwillingly, Turkey's membership in NATO. Therefore, the Soviet's armed repression of the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Brezhnev doctrine claiming the right of intervention for the Soviets to uphold the socialist regime in any country must have had more than a sobering effect in Turkey. It was, according to Harris, "a blunt reminder that Moscow had not renounced force where its interests were concerned".\textsuperscript{95} The most immediate reaction to the Czech crisis was the decision
of the Demirel regime, in a reversal of its previous position, to cooperate in a multilateral force to be created in the Mediterranean under NATO auspices.  

Although Turkish-Soviet dialogue continued after a short break, two ominous developments outside the realm of diplomatic relations caused growing apprehension in Turkey. The first of these was the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and the other was the growing ideological impact of socialist doctrines within Turkey. These two developments were to impact on Turkey's foreign and domestic policies of the 1970s in that the former again highlighted Turkey's strategic location, and the latter created instability in both the political and social life of Turkey.

Concomitant with her rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Turkey also attempted to improve and expand her relations with the non-aligned countries, especially those in the Middle East. Although many factors, such as obvious cultural, geographic and religious affinities; the idea that Turkey, for strategic political reasons, must become a bridge between East and West; and the commercial opportunities in the new markets in the Arab countries undoubtedly influenced this shift in Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-Third World relations in the 1960s, however, were conditioned above all by the Cyprus dispute.

The almost total lack of Third World support in the UN for the Turkish position on Cyprus forced Turkey to realize that her policy toward the nonaligned nations in general and the Middle East in particular had isolated her from the rest of the world. As could be expected Turkey moved to break away from this isolation. Therefore, behind Turkey's new Arab policy was the desire to marshal support in the UN for her Cyprus stand, as well as to indicate to the United States that Turkish support on various issues could no longer be taken for granted.

Despite the fact that Turkey's rapprochement policy with the Third World initially ended with failure, as the 1965 UN vote showed, Turkey nevertheless went ahead with her multi-faceted foreign policy initiatives. Illustrative of Turkey's new policy in the Middle East was the diplomatic position taken by Turkey in the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the period following the 1964 Cyprus crisis up until the 1967
Arab-Israeli war, Ankara's position on the Middle East dispute was one of guarded neutrality. It was characterized by extreme caution designed to avoid antagonizing the United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab nations. In the aftermath of the war, the new direction of Turkey's foreign policy became evident in the UN. Mindful of the importance of the thirteen potential Arab votes in the UN, as well as of future Communist Bloc support for her position on Cyprus, Turkey voted for the Yugoslav resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from captured Arab territories. Yet at the same time, in an apparent attempt to balance her interests with the West, Turkey abstained on the Soviet resolution that labelled Israel an aggressor.

Another event manifesting the diversification of Turkey's foreign policy was the creation by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). It was an economic and cultural agreement parallel to but separate from the Western dominated Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and as Harris states, reduced the importance of it. Although Turkey's leaders initially were not enthusiastic about turning back towards the East, on cultural and especially Islamic grounds, Pakistan's proposal for RCD was timely and caught the Turks in the moment of their political isolation.

Thus Turkey, whose credit with the nonaligned bloc had been bankrupt in 1964, began to pursue a more independent foreign policy in the Third World designed to alleviate the impression created at Bandung that she was running errands for the West. However, at the end, there were few Third World countries who actually accepted Turkey's eagerness to improve relations with them. And despite the adoption of the "multi-faceted" foreign policy, most of the Third World states continued to act in favour of Makarios' position over the Cyprus issue in international forums.
3.4. Turkish Foreign Policy During The 1970s

3.4.1. The Domestic Environment and External Problems

As stated earlier, towards the end of the 1960s Turkey became preoccupied with her internal economic and political problems, and therefore ignored the international situation. Although Turkey continued to follow a multi-faceted foreign policy, and her restrained position in the 1967 Cyprus crisis paid off as some Arab states started to take a more favourable stand with regard to Turkey in the international forums, soon Turkey was dragged into domestic conflicts and consequently inactivity in the foreign policy area.

The period of caretaker governments of 1971-73 after the 1971 intervention can be identified with the lack of foreign policy initiative. The bureaucrats who occupied government posts without much authority and with limited popular bases of support were in no position to undertake courageous steps in foreign policy. Before another Cyprus crisis dominated Turkey's foreign policy, there were two developments, one internal and one foreign, that would affect Turkey's and the United States' policies during and after 1974 Cyprus crisis, which in turn positively determined Turkey's foreign policy for the rest of the 1970s.

Turkey's biggest problem with the United States between 1966 and 1974, was the cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey and the US reaction to it. As early as 1968 the United States started to pressure Turkey to adopt strictest control to prevent the illegal trafficking of opium in Turkey, which they believed constituted 80% of the heroin illegally consumed in the United States. By 1970, the US Congress started to take an interest in the issue, and in 1971 required the President "to suspend all military sales and aid (and) economic assistance" to governments that failed to prevent narcotics produced in their countries from reaching the United States. In 1971 criticism of Turkey grew and even went so far as to question Turkey's utility to the United States.
Finally, US pressures had an effect on Turkey's caretaker government after the 1971 military intervention, and the Prime Minister announced on June 30, 1971 that he banned poppy cultivation because of Turkey's "humanitarian obligations". However, this American pressure, which finally caused the Turkish Administration to ban poppy cultivation, contributed to anti-Americanism and to a decrease in American prestige in Turkey. Further, Turks were outraged in August 1972 when they learned that the United States had decided to ask India to increase its opium production to meet the world-wide shortage estimated by the International Narcotics Board.

Although very unpopular, the ban remained active until the RPP-NSP (National Salvation Party) coalition government revoked it on 1 July 1974. The United States immediately signaled its displeasure by recalling its Ambassador to Washington for consultations. And he was still in Washington when the Cyprus crisis broke out.

Congress reacted more harshly to the poppy crisis than did the Executive. Members of the House and Senate proposed a number of draft resolutions asking for the imposition of embargoes. Finally when Resolution 507, which provided authority to President "to terminate all assistance to the Government of Turkey", was approved by the Congress on 5 August 1974, the Cyprus crisis had already been on the way. As a result, Congress did not pressure the President to implement the resolution because after the second Turkish intervention in Cyprus on 14 August 1974, congressional opponents of the poppy cultivation chose to support the arms embargo favoured by the Greek Lobby and "the rule of law" opponents.

The Turkish government and the Turkish public were outraged at Congress's eagerness to adopt coercive measures against a loyal ally. The Ecevit government further judged Congress's action as an indication of, at the least, insensitivity toward Turkish national interests. The fact that when the coup took place in Cyprus, the United States ambassador to Turkey had already been recalled to Washington and Congress was discussing ways to penalize Turkey symbolically illustrates the lack of trust between two countries.
Meanwhile, an important development took place in Turkey, specifically inside the RPP, which would later have effects on subsequent Turkish foreign policy in general, and Turkey's Cyprus policy in particular. B. Ecevit, who had been advocating a "left-of-centre" stand for the RPP, replaced Inonu as RPP chairman in May 1972. Most importantly for Turkish foreign policy, Ecevit believed that Turkey could afford to adopt an assertive, in contrast to Inonu's cautious, foreign policy vis-a-vis the superpowers. His argument that smaller allies did not need to correlate all of their foreign policy actions with those of the Superpowers did in fact reflect the widely shared belief within the RPP and Turkey. He suggested that Turkey should disassociate herself from the cold war rhetoric of NATO.\(^{107}\)

There was no question of Turkey abandoning her alliances, such as NATO and CENTO, but within the alliances Turkey would pursue a policy designed to serve her national interests and not those of others. That, according to Ecevit, was to be the difference between his foreign policy and that of his predecessors.\(^{108}\) He also criticized Turkey's assumption of the role in the Middle East on behalf of the US. He consistently maintained that Turkey's participation in the 1950s in schemes like the Baghdad Pact was harmful to Turkey's national security interests.\(^{109}\)

Though his insistence on more independence within NATO distinguished him from his predecessors, the major characteristic of his administration was his assertiveness in Turkish-Greek relations. As his foreign minister told the National Assembly in 1974 that Turkey wanted to live in peace with Greece, but that "just because this is so, Greece will certainly not be allowed to gnaw away at Turkish interests in any manner whatsoever or to upset the balance between the two countries".\(^{110}\) Ecevit was a risk taker when he felt the stakes were high enough, unlike his predecessor's cautiousness, as his behaviour concerning the Aegean dispute had shown.\(^{111}\)
3.4.2. The Cyprus Intervention of 1974 and Its Aftereffects on the Turkish Foreign Policy

With the above-mentioned developments inside and outside Turkey, the stage was set for another Cyprus crisis which would be the catalyst for change in Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s. The 1974 Cyprus crisis served to intensify animosity between Greece and Turkey. It not only precipitated a sharp deterioration in relations between these countries, but also stretched Turkish-American relations to near breaking point. The background to the crisis and specific events that participated the Turkish intervention in July 1974 and subsequent invasion of Cyprus in August 1974 are too involved and varied to permit adequate description here. However, a brief examination of some of the perceptions and motives of the various actors is necessary within the context of this study.

The coup against Makarios in 1974 was apparently inspired by the Greek junta's need to find a foreign policy success abroad to offset their domestic weakness, and was based on a total misreading of United States policy and the international situation, just as Turkey had done in the 1964 crisis. The colonels apparently felt that the United States, based on her tacit approval of their regime, would condone, or at least tolerate, the coup and restrain Turkey as she had in 1964 and 1967. But the circumstances in 1974 were different from those that had existed in those earlier years; Turkish-American relations had undergone a transition, and the United States no longer had the leverage on Turkey that she had in 1964 and 1967. And the impression given before the Turkish intervention in 1974 was that the US would not use her leverage even if she had any.

Furthermore, detente and Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union had decreased the threat of Soviet intervention. In 1964, the Cold War tension was still felt between two countries and the Soviets had publicly announced that they would "defend" Cyprus' "freedom and independence from a foreign invasion", and warned Turkey that the USSR could "not remain indifferent to the threat of an armed conflict" near the Soviet Unions southern frontier. In 1974 however, Turkish-Soviet relations
were much improved and the Soviets, furthermore, no longer opposed Turkey's Cyprus thesis. In addition, they chose to remain silent about Turkey's intervention preparations, indicating that they did not oppose it.115

Moreover, Turkey's isolation in the UN had diminished since 1965. Relations with the Soviet Bloc and Third World countries became "friendly" and therefore the fear of anti-Turkish resolutions had been reduced. And the fact that the Colonels Junta in Greece had erased her favourable image in world public opinion, hence meant that they faced world-wide disapproval when they arranged the Coup in Cyprus in 1974.

Within Turkey the situation was also quite different from that of the earlier Cyprus crisis. The earlier crisis had boosted rising anti-Americanism and contributed to a polarization of domestic policies in Turkey. In turn, these forces contributed to increased political instability. Given the fact that it was not possible to argue that the Greek supported coup was an internal affair in which the quarantor powers - Great Britain, Turkey and Greece - had no legal right to intervene, Ecevit's weak coalition government had no viable option other than intervention.116

The aftermath of Turkey's intervention and subsequent invasion of part of Cyprus is well-known. By the end of the summer of 1974, the Turkish army had occupied about forty percent of Cyprus. In February 1975, the United States Congress, under pressure from the Greek-American community, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey.117 Turkish-American relations reached a "low", when later in 1975 the Turkish government suspended the activities at all American bases in Turkey except those related to NATO. It is important to note that the arms embargo was imposed by Congress but opposed by the President, the State Department and the American Military. This difference of opinion allowed the Turks to maintain their relations with the United States, such as they were, and still save face. The embargo, which was partially lifted in the late 1975, was fully lifted in the summer of 1978.

Aside from its impact on Turkish-Greek and Turkish-American relations, foreign reaction to the 1974 Cyprus invasion once again created a sense of diplomatic isolation in Turkey. The failure of her diplomatic efforts, begun in the 1960s, to gain
support among Arab and non-aligned countries for her policies in Cyprus was strikingly displayed at the 1976 Colombo Conference of non-aligned nations (as it had been at Lima in the previous year), while a UN General Assembly vote on a draft resolution on Cyprus in November 1976 showed 94-1 against Turkey, with 27 abstentions. Consequently, Turkey redoubled her efforts to expand friendly relations with not only the Eastern Bloc countries, but also the Arab and non-aligned countries.

After 1974, Cyprus became both a main problematic for, and a determinant of, Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, because of its emotional and political character, the Cyprus problem has affected Turkey's domestic politics, which in turn determined foreign policy of Turkey with feedbacks. This new direction in foreign policy must however, be viewed against the background of Turkey's internal political, social and economic problems, as described earlier.

3.4.3. Economic Factors

Apart from a political and social evolution of Turkey and international developments, economic considerations also played an important role in influencing the course of Turkish foreign policy in the inter-coup period, specially in the 1970s. As mentioned in the preceding section, as far back as the late 1950s economic necessities had led the Menderes government to consider rapprochement with the Soviets in order to obtain economic aid. Among many other considerations, the mismanagement of the economy by Menderes was at least in part responsible for the military takeover in 1960. Seeing the damage done by the short-sighted and uncoordinated economic policies of the previous government, the NUC established a State Planning Organization (DPT) and initiated the First Five Year Development Plan in 1963, which emphasized the importance of speeding up the rate of economic development.

Economic planning placed a new emphasis on Turkey's requirements for external capital. And when the NATO countries refused to sponsor an aid consortium, Turkey turned to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
in order to assure a steady flow of external financing for her development plans. Although the OECD consortium for Turkey was established in July 1962 after strong American behind-the-scenes pressures, it never came up to Turkish expectations. Also a sharp cut in American aid, under the supposition that European allies would come forward to fill the gap, only helped to offend the Turkish authorities.

Under the Menderes government, Turkey had further tried to link her economic policies to the West through the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1959 she applied for an associate status in the EEC. Her application was probably motivated more by political considerations than economic realities. Undoubtedly, Turkey's desire to be considered "European" influenced her decision to seek closer ties with the EEC, but the fact that it followed so closely a similar request by Greece indicates that the Greek application prompted the Turkish action; for as Birand points out, "traditions of Turkish foreign policy required that Greece be watched very closely so that it would not use the political and economic weight resulting from a new relationship with Europe against Turkey". Finally, in 1962 Turkey negotiated an agreement of association with the EEC.

In the 1970s, economic factors continued to play an important, if not crucial, role in influencing the course of Turkish foreign policy. In a series of Five Year Plans, Turkey committed herself to a massive economic modernization effort during the period. Beside, at the same time, for reasons related to her NATO commitments and her rivalry with Greece, she had been compelled to maintain a high degree of military preparedness. The economic trends of 1970s both within Turkey and in the international arena, however, made balancing of these objectives increasingly more difficult. Although Turkey's economic growth rate in the 1970s was relatively high, averaging between 7 and 8 percent annually, it was not due to healthy growth of the economy. This high rate of growth was achieved at the expense of massive imports without any significant increase in exports, and was financed by heavy foreign loans. At the same time high unemployment and inflation became endemic in Turkey.
Turkey's economic difficulties had been exacerbated and complicated in the 70s by her own policies as well as world events. Though Turkey's economic policies are to blame to some extent, it would still be unfair to argue that Turkey's economic woes were solely a result of her domestic policies. Certain international events such as the economic recession in Europe, the world-wide energy crisis and the 1974 Cyprus crisis, along with its repercussions, all adversely affected Turkey's economy and forced her to diversify her foreign policy.

Turkey's balance of trade and foreign currency reserves were affected by the recession in Europe. While her trade deficit with the EEC, her main trading partner, was rising, at the same time remittances from Turks working in Europe, Turkey's only self generated source of income other than exports, dropped off significantly. These set-backs were further exacerbated by the world-wide energy crisis which was set-off by the 1973 Arab oil embargo. According to 1978 figures, the cost of oil imports equalled Turkey's entire export earnings.

A dramatic rise in military defence expenditures following the 1974 Cyprus crisis also strained severely Turkey's economy. The American arms embargo, the intervention in Cyprus and the following arms race with Greece, together with aimed self-sufficiency, required high defence spending, which competed for scarce domestic resources.

With the factors outlined above, Turkey's need to obtain outside credits and loans became all the more pressing. Hence, it is not surprising that Turkey, faced with a long list of austerity measures as requirements for future loans from the IMF, wanted to expand her foreign relations to include the Soviet Union and oil rich Arabs.

Meanwhile, Turkish-EEC relations continued to be strained. The preferences given by the EEC to the former colonies and to several Mediterranean countries, and the failure of the EEC to extend what Turkey considered sufficient credits led to charges of discrimination in Turkey. Her failure to gain new agricultural concessions and the restrictions imposed on her textile exports disappointed Turkey and created dark suspicions about the Community's attitude and motives. Additionally, the
probability of Greek accession to the EEC led to worries in Turkey that the unanimous voting rule in the EEC Council might be used by the Greeks to block pro-Turkish EEC initiatives. Moreover, relating the close link between economic concerns and foreign policy objectives, Turkey's association with the EEC further polarized Turkey's political parties, which in turn had adverse effects on Turkish-EEC relations.

4. Concluding Remarks and The Setting for Foreign Policy at September 12, 1980

In the intercoup period, Turkish foreign policy changed its structure but not its foundations. While still resting upon the principles of identification and alliance with the West, it was now marked by a trend which stressed the pursuit of Turkey's national interests in her foreign relations and greater independence in decision making.

This new orientation was influenced by psychological factors introduced in the 1960s, such as the reversal of the intimidating Soviet attitude towards Turkey; the Cuban crisis and subsequent removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey; the American attitudes towards the continuous Cyprus crises; the formation of the EEC; NATO's adoption of the "flexible response" strategy; and the lack of support in the UN for her Cyprus policy.

These psychological factors were exacerbated in the 1970s by such events as the 1973 Middle East War and the ensuing oil crisis; a sharp deterioration in relations between Turkey and the United States, first on the poppy question and then on Cyprus; tension between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus and Aegean problems; Turkey's differences with the EEC; and, again, lack of support in the UN for Turkey's Cyprus policy.

These significant international events paralleled domestic developments in Turkey. Increases in communication, education and social as well as physical mobility led to higher expectations and a greater politicalization of the Turkish people. In turn these factors, together with the factors discussed earlier, resulted in ideological polarization and party fragmentation. The net result was weak coalition governments,
which proved to be ineffective in the field of foreign relations. Thus, at the time when international political and economic imperatives called for solutions to Turkey's outstanding foreign policy problems, such as Cyprus, the Aegean, her relations with the EEC and the US, Turkey did not have a government with enough political prestige to make compromises necessary for a lasting settlement to those problems.

On the other hand, the insistence on a more autonomous Turkish foreign policy from both the Right and the Left was strengthened by international events, outlined above, particularly the energy crisis which had a devastating effect on Turkey; and the American arms embargo which brought into question Turkey's Western defence alliance. Therefore, while little or no progress was made on the Cyprus and Aegean issues, Turkey exhibited strong moves in this period toward developing good political and economic relations with the nonaligned countries, particularly those in the Middle East and the Balkans, and the Soviet Bloc countries.

The emergence of diversification in Turkey's foreign relations also coincided with Ecevit's rise to power in the RPP. His political philosophy, which was quite similar to that of the European "social democrats", was most closely associated with pursuit of national interests and independence in foreign policy making. Therefore, it was clear when B. Ecevit won the 1973 election that his government would attempt to exercise more independence in its foreign policy, Hence, on the eve of the world-wide energy crisis and the Cyprus intervention, with all its ramifications, the stage had already been set for a search to find new orientations for Turkish foreign policy. Where this search led Turkey is a question that the following chapters seek to answer.
NOTES


4. For the text of the treaty, see Hurewitz, J.C., *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 2nd. volume, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 226-228. Under the terms of this tripartite pact, Turkey was obligated to enter the war only if it extended into the Mediterranean, and was exempt if the hostilities involved conflict with the Soviet Union. Turkey used these clauses for a long time as an excuse for not entering the war.

5. Turkey declared war against Japan and Germany on February 23, 1945, only after Yalta summit which announced that only states which were in war with Germany and Japan by March 1, 1945, would join the United Nations. Hence this declaration of war was only a token attempt directed to join the United Nations as an associate member.


8. See Turkish Foreign Ministry note to German ambassador Von Papen on January 5, 1942, in Dupont, P., (ed), *Almany Daisisleri Bakanligi Arsivinden Almanya'nin Turkiye Politikasi, 1941-1943* (German Foreign Policy Documents on Turkey, 1941-1943), translated into Turkish by Muammer Sencer, (Istanbul: May Yayinlari, 1968), Document No. 16, January 5, 1942.


14. At the time, Soviet territorial adjustments meant a return to the Soviet Union of the Eastern Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan, captured from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and returned to Turkey by the 1920 Treaty of Alexandropol, which was confirmed by the 1921 Friendship Treaty. There were, moreover, hints that the territorial demands would include a larger area on the Black Sea coast southwest of Batum; for on December 20, 1945, Moscow newspapers published an article by two Georgian professors, claiming Ardahan, Artvin, Trabzon and Gumushane. See Vere-Hodge, E.R., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1918-1948, (Geneve: Ambilly-Annemasse, 1950), p. 171; Golan, G., The Soviet Policies in the Middle East, (Cambridge, New York, Sidney, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 32; Kilic, A., Turkey and the World, (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 125-126.


17. Golan, op.cit., p. 32.

18. For example, Churchill made no remarks about Turkey in his talks with Stalin in Moscow in 1945, whereas he specifically told to him that Greece was in the UK's sphere of interest. See Churchill, W., The Second World War, (London, Toronto, Melbourne, Sydney, Wellington: Cassel & Co. Ltd., 1954), Vol. VI, pp. 198-199, 204 and 211.


20. In January 1946, Truman warned Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in his memorandum that there was "no doubt that the Soviets intend to attack Turkey". Quoted by Harris, op.cit., p. 19 from Truman, H.S., Memories, Vol. I; Years of Decision (Garden City, 1955), p. 522.

21. Ibid.


24. Yapp, op.cit., p. 395; Harris, op.cit., p. 22.

25. See Harris, op.cit.; and Vali, F., Bridge Across the Bosporus; The Foreign Policy of Turkey, (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). They put the American and British diplomatic support back to early 1946 and even late 1945.

27. Yapp, op. cit., p. 396. He seems to give more credit to the loss of Soviet will to follow her claims up. He argues that if the Soviet Union had chosen to use force, she could have succeeded since there was "no power could or would have resisted Soviet force in that region", for Britain had no strength to resist and the United States did ever give "unequivocal support" to Turkey.


29. B. Lewis emphasized the importance of Turkey's long experience in the liberal and constitutional movement and general change in the climate of opinion in Turkey during the Second World War, and dismissed the idea that the rulers of Turkey changed the form of government merely to please foreign states. See his The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 306-309.

30. Though Inonu always resisted such implications that foreign pressure was instrumental in his decision, this was quite evident in that Inonu instructed his delegation to the United Nations conference in San Francisco to announce Turkey's transition to a multi-party system. See Harris, op. cit., p. 16. Rustow further quotes an anecdote from his interview with Inonu in 1954 in which Inonu, after categorically denying any organic relations between foreign pressure and his decision, remarked "...suppose I had been swimming with the stream; that, too, is a virtue". See Rustow, D.A., "Turkey's Travails", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58, Fall 1979, p. 87.


33. The first Turkish attempt to obtain an international loan was the request from Export-Import Bank credit of $500 million in October 1945, of which Turkey subsequently received only $25-50 million in October 1946 with 4% interest. See QTDP, p. 12.

34. Ibid., pp. 439-447; and Harris, op. cit., pp. 25-28.


37. For the background and impact of the 1958 stabilization program see Harris, ibid., pp.74-76.


Text in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1953, V. 5, No. 29, pp. 21-22. For an analysis of Soviet note and Turkish respond see Vali, F., Turkish Straits and NATO, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 77-78.

For statements from President Bayar and other Turkish leaders on Soviet efforts see OTDP, pp. 311-313.


Karpat, "Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations" in his ed.) Foreign Policy in Transition, p. 114.

Ibid., pp. 115-116; OTDP, pp. 255-261.

Karpat, Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations, pp. 114-115.

Ibid.


OTDP, pp. 273-276.

Turkish Foreign Minister's speech at Bandung quoted in ibid., p. 274.


Foreign policy philosophy of DP leaders summarized by Ulman/Sander, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

See Premier Menderes' statement shortly after the Bandung Conference, quoted in OTDP, p. 276.

Quoted in Ahmad, op. cit, p. 409. See also, Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 158.


In fact, in its first communique, the military junta emphasized that the new regime would honor Turkey's foreign policy commitments and expressed its believe in NATO and CENTO. See, Resmi Gazete, July 30, 1960, quoted in Ahmad, op. cit., p. 399.

As a result of this drive, for the first time in history Turkey voted with the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations on the issue of Algerian independence.


The decision itself was taken by a small group, consisting of President Bayar, the Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff, the Commander of the Army, and Menderes had consulted neither the opposition nor the Turkish Grand National Assembly, where he enjoyed overwhelming majority. In fact, he informed the TGNA and took necessary mandate from it only after Turkish troops dispached to Korea. See Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 390-391.

This view was expressed by Bülent Ecevit, a spokesman for the RPP, who pointed out the important resemblance between the agreement and 1958 American intervention in Lebanon, which was based on President Chamoun's invitation on the face of internal opposition. For actual speech see Cumhuriyet, 6 February 1960, cited in Ulman/Dekmejian, ibid., p. 774.

Ulman/Dekmejian further speculate about proximity of the military coup of May 27, 1960 that ousted Menderes regime and the ratification of the agreement by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on May 14, 1960. See ibid., p. 773.


Between 1961 and 1980, only one party, Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel, formed a majority government, first in 1965 and then in 1969. All other times, however, Turkey governed by either coalition or minority governments, except military-supported above-party governments after both 1960 and 1971 interventions.

In Western constitutional thinking it would have been obscure to write fundamental rights down in the constitution since they are attached to human existence. In Turkish tradition, however, there seem to be an "unwritten custom" to suppose that all the things - rights etc. - which are not specifically mentioned in the law are forbidden or its lawfulness is, at least, in question.


Both sides in the conflict were deeply divided. On the right the ultra-nationalistic "Grey Wolves" were challenged by the Islamic ideology of the "Akıncılar". On the left, a multiplicity of groups all broadly adhering to Soviet Marxism faced fierce attacks from extremely radical Maoist groups. For an account of extreme radical groups in Turkey see Yayla, A., "Terrorism in Turkey", Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. 10, Summer 1982, pp. 65-82; also Munir, M., "Turkey's Student Uprising; The Deeper Implications", The Middle East, April 1977.


Ankara Radio, 13 Augus, 1963, as cited in Ahmad, op. cit, p. 405.

Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 109.

Ibid.

Ulman/Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 776.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 777.

For political developments and pressures upon Inonu previous to his decision to land Cyprus see Bolukbasi, S., The Superpowers and Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse, (Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, co-published with the Miller Center, University of Virginia, 1988), pp. 47-74; Also see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp.112-114. He maintained that Inonu, who had shown himself throughout his career to be wary of foreign adventures, never wanted to intervene. He further speculates that when Inonu decided for a landing, he was expecting that the Americans, when they learned, would exert pressure on the Greek side to back down and would warn Turkey to use only peaceful means to find solution - a warning that could help Inonu to resist mounting pressure at home.


President Johnson's warning on this account was based on July 12, 1947 "Aid to Turkey Agreement". According to Article IV, any article furnished by the United States could not be used "for any purpose other than that for which the article...is furnished". There was no precise definition in the agreement about the nature and purpose of aid except declaration in its preamble that assistance "will enable Turkey to strengthen the security forces which Turkey requires for the protection of her freedom and independence". This vague formula, which would constitute a pretext for American embargo in 1975, did not bother Turkish statements at the time of signature as Inonu in his lengthy reply to President Johnson did not touch upon this subject, at all. For the text of the 1947 Agreement see US Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 1629, reprinted in Harris, Troubled Alliance, appendix 1, pp. 213-215.

Harris, ibid., p. 116.

The Turks have always been sensitive about the use of American bases in Turkey for purposes other than the defence of Turkey or NATO. A major problem aroused when Incirlik Air Base was used by the US in 1958 to support its military operations in Lebanon. While the Turkish government authorized this action after it happened, the press and the opposition created considerable uproar in the country, see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 66-68; Ahmad, op.cit., pp. 296-297; and Howard, H., "The Bicentennial In American-Turkish Relations", Middle East Journal, Vol. 30 (3), Summer 1976, pp. 306-307.
82. For allegations see, Ulman/Dekmejian, op. cit., pp. 781-782.
83. Large-scale black market operations involving the American military postal system; the number of incidence caused by the drunk American soldiers while "on duty"; the garrison mentality of the US community and its isolation from the Turkish environment; their ignorance of Turkish customs, were just some of the complains that contributed to the growing anti-American publicity in Turkey. See Ahmad, op. cit., p. 395; Ulman/Dekmejian, ibid., p. 781; Campany, R., Turkey and the United States, The Arms Embargo Period, (New York, Westport, London: Praeger, 1986), pp. 22-23.
85. Ibid., p. 142; Gonlubol, M., "NATO and Turkey" in Karpat, (ed.), Foreign Policy in Transition, pp. 40-42.
86. Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 94.
87. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 402.
89. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 104.
90. Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 141-143.
92. Cited in Karpat, Turkish-Soviet Relations, p. 90.
94. Karpat, Turkish-Soviet Relations, pp. 97-98.
95. Harris, Soviet Union and Turkey, p. 53.
96. Ibid., pp. 53-54.
97. The 1965 vote which limited Turkish rights on the island was 47 for and 6 against with 54 abstentions. Apart from Turkey, Iran, Pakistan (CENTO allies), Libya, Albania and the US, who was trying to make amends for Johnson letter, voted against the resolution. While the fact that all the Eastern bloc countries abstained, together with the members of NATO, showed the result of Turkey's recent rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the against votes that Afro-Asian countries cast were the clear indication of the extend to which Turkey's Western policies had alienated the Third World.
99. Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 70.
102. Ibid., p.174; Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 194-198.
The Aegean dispute emerged in February 1974 as a result of Greek government's announcement that Greece discovered oil and natural gas in the area, which Greece claimed its continental shelf. Since Greece claimed that the Greek islands also had their own continental shelfs, the seabed of most of the Aegean Sea would belong to Greece. When Greece did not respond Turkey's proposed negotiations, Ecevit reacted more strongly then would have previous Turkish governments and exacerbated situation by sending Turkish naval survey ship Candarli to the disputed areas accompanied by a navy squadron. Although Candarli's mission ended without incident despite a number of Greek warships followed it closely in the disputed area, it shows Ecevit's risk taker personality.

The US-Turkey influence relationship throughout the three Cyprus crisis studied by Bolukbasi, ibid.


Apart from the factors that are mentioned in here, many factors such as Turkey's ability and readiness to undertake a military intervention; personal differences between the leaders who handled the crises; position of public opinion, played part in the Turkish premier Ecevit's decision to intervene. See ibid., pp. 175-179, 187-190, and 219-226.

Many factors contributed to Congress decision. The weak position of the President vis-a-vis Congress because of Watergate crisis; Congress' disapproval of the methods used by Kissinger in handling foreign policy issues; the activity of the Greek lobbies and Greek Orthodox Church; Turkey's unfavourable position in Congress because of the recent opium question; and the alleged violation of the law by the Administration who had continued its assistance to Turkey which had used American arms outside of the borders of Turkey, were just few of them. For a general analysis of the subject see ibid., pp. 212-219. Also research had been done by the Library of Congress at the request of the US House of Representatives about the background of Turkish arms embargo, see Laipson, E.B., Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo, CRS Congress and Foreign Policy Series No. 3, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981). Also see Stern, L., The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and The Failure of American Diplomacy (New York: Times

118. OTDP, p. 57.


120. American aid reached Turkey through an OECD consortium in 1963 totalled only $66 million. See ibid., p. 101.


123. MEED, 14 July 1978, pp. 3-5.

124. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 421.
1. Introduction: Early Indications And Immediate Reactions To The Coup

When the third "successful" military coup within two decades took place in Turkey on September 12, 1980, some people would have expected that the new leaders of the country would introduce changes in foreign policy just as they were expected to do in all other walks of life. There was, however, no indication to show that the NSC - five man junta - had any intention of doing anything to change the country's foreign policy course. Nor was there any reason, at the time, to expect that anything decisive or effective in the long run would happen in Turkish foreign policy just because the policymakers at the top of the state had changed.

To begin with, Turkey was known for her stable, pro-Western and above-party foreign policy, which had been generally treated as national rather than party-political and therefore supported by the main parties, in government or otherwise. Besides, the basic principles and directions, which had been set up by Kemal Ataturk and which were influenced and guarantied by the military after his death, have not been changed or challenged enough to degrade their values. In view of the military's well known role in Turkish politics in general and, to a certain extent, its influence in designing Turkish foreign policy beyond the country's security interests, it was not unrealistic to expect that, once they were in power, they would continue to pursue the general direction of the previous civilian governments in foreign policy matters, though some nuances would have been expected in handling daily proceedings.

Moreover, the coup of September 12 was prompted by the obvious inability of the civilian bureaucratic and political elites to come to terms with each other in order to
contain growing civil-war-like terrorism and the deteriorating economy of the country.\textsuperscript{3} External threats to the territorial integrity of the country or foreign influences as well as intervention had played, if any, only a trivial role in triggering the military coup. It was essentially an internally arranged and conducted coup against internal threats to the country's integrity and independence, as the military leaders conceived them.\textsuperscript{4}

At the root of the matter lay the conflicting aims and desires of the state elites, who posed as guardians of Kemalism and were increasingly represented only by the military, and their continuous clashes with political elites whose indifference towards what state elites considered as fundamental led to the crises of integration and legitimacy, which in turn resulted in military intervention on three occasions.\textsuperscript{5}

In explaining why the military had felt it necessary to intervene, Kenan Evren, the head of the Junta, declared in the Military Communique No. 1, broadcast at about 6 o'clock in the morning of September 12\textsuperscript{th}, that;

\textit{...the Turkish Republic...has been facing...physical and ideological aggressions...[from] its...enemies, against its regime and its independence. The state...has been rendered unable to function, the Constitutional institutions have assumed a contradictory and muted silence and the political parties have failed to bring about the unity and togetherness and to take the necessary measures...}

After enumerating endlessly what the enemies of the Turkish Republic had done to the country, state, educational institutions, administration, labour organizations, judiciary organs, and so on, he flatly declared that "in short, the state has been incapacitated".\textsuperscript{6}

It is obvious that the generals' main concern before the coup was centred around internal disorder and chaos which continued to attract their immediate attention after the coup, too. The purposes of the coup were summarized, then, as "to preserve the integrity of the country, to restore national unity, to avert a possible civil war, to re-establish the authority and existence of the state and to eliminate all the factors that prevent the normal functioning of the democratic order".\textsuperscript{7} Further, in his first press conference on September 16, 1980, General Evren, as Head of State, Chief of General Staff and Chairman of the five-man National Security Council, elaborated the targets of the coup by mentioning: "to establish security of life and property by curbing anarchy
and terror, to establish social peace, national understanding and unity, to secure the functioning of the republican regime based on social justice, individual rights and freedoms and human rights, and to re-establish civil administration after completing the legal arrangements in a reasonable time".\(^8\)

As people were wondering how these admirable aspirations and ideas would be translated into action, and cynics were starting to ask what outstanding good new leaders could do about the country's long standing problems, and what the long term affects of the measures they would obliged to take to attain these forcible sentiments would be, one thing was beginning to emerge quite certainly from the very first day of the coup: that the new regime did not intend to make changes in the directions of the country's foreign policy, and was going to follow a pro-Western line in its foreign policy just as the previous government did.\(^9\) After all, they, during their stay in power, were to be too preoccupied with remaking the domestic political scene to be able to devote sustained attention to devising major foreign policy initiatives.

One other striking point in the early days of the coup was that, despite their obvious readiness to tackle any problem in Turkey, the military, it appears, had not thought much about the foreign policy during their long preparations. Alternatively, it could be argued, of course, that they did think about it but found nothing to change, or that the intensity of domestic problems forced the generals to turn their attention first and foremost into internal affairs and try to avoid external problems, if possible. Yet, the fact that the first volume of General Evren's memoirs, which covers the pre-coup preparations and plannings, contain no reference about what they intended to do with foreign policy shows otherwise. A most probable explanation for this is that, since they agreed with Turkey's long term foreign policy goals and principles, they simply chose to let the experts run this much specialized business - a typical characteristic of many newly formed military regimes. Accordingly, throughout his memoirs, General Evren talks about foreign policy only in a very casual and most general terms. Indeed, it seems that neither he nor the members of the NSC had much to say about Turkey's foreign
policy, save the national security aspects of it and General Evren's frequent complaints about European misunderstanding of his regime and their unwarranted criticisms.

Nevertheless, General Evren's early clarification of his coup's position vis-a-vis foreign affairs was satisfactory. In his first televised speech at noon, September 12th, he took care to emphasize that the new regime would remain a staunch ally of NATO, would honour all international agreements, and would continue to have good relations with its neighbours on a basis of "mutual respect for independence and non-interference in domestic affairs". Assurances were also given by him that the NATO military exercises planned to take place in Turkey would continue to do so as arranged.

Further signs of continuity were given by Ilter Turkmen, then Secretary General of Foreign Ministry, when he organized a briefing for the NATO ambassadors at 3 o'clock on the same day. He heavily stressed the theme of returning to democracy as soon as possible, reaffirmed Turkey's commitment to the West, and assured the allies that Turkey would continue to adhere to the NATO.

Apart from these pronouncements on the day of the coup, there were other indications of the military junta's pro-Western stance vis-a-vis foreign policy. One of the early hints was their initial selection of Professor Turhan Feyzioglu, leader of the small right-wing Republican Alliance Party, as prime minister. He was the most pro-Western of the country's party leaders and had been known for his rigorous Kemalist views. Although in the event he was passed over, partly because professional politicians were then in disgrace, and partly because an alliance of mainly JP and RPP MP's under his premiership, as envisaged by the generals, was not conceivable, the junta's respect for him, nevertheless, says much about its politics.

It was no surprise, of course, for the observers of Turkish politics that the military regime of Kenan Evren, along with its Ataturk laws, would reaffirm its attachment to NATO and its alliance with the West as one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy. After all, it was one of Kemal Ataturk's basic principles, of which the military was supposed to be the guardian and ardent supporter, that Turkey should disconnect from its quasi-oriental past and associate itself fully with the West.
The line which the military regime was going to pursue became clearer when the new government, under retired-Admiral Bulent Ulusu, established and presented its programme on 27 September to the NSC and subsequent to the public. Although the new government programme added nothing to but only confirmed what General Evren said in his first speech, it was now quite obvious that the new regime had fully approved the previous government's pro-Western foreign policy and sought to build on it. The programme dealt with foreign policy only briefly, and said nothing to indicate that there would be radical departures from the policies of the past. In fact, what the new programme expressed was essentially the JP views on foreign policy. Though the ideas were presented in the broadest and most general terms, the basic themes were that Turkey would be committed to the West while seeking to maintain sensible relations with her Muslim neighbours; that she would act in accordance with her agreements with the IMF and honour all existing treaty obligations; and that she would aim at eventual membership of the EEC.

There was further promise of continuity when Ilter Turkmen, a professional diplomat who had interpreted Turkey's foreign policy at the UN and the NATO, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new government. And he confirmed this during his speech at the opening session of the 35th General Assembly of the UN.

After stating that the "move" made by the Turkish Armed Forces was a response to the "total paralysis" of the political system and "increasing violence, terrorism and anarchy" as well as to the "imminence of civil war ", he declared that until civilian rule returned under a democratic system, the foreign policy of Turkey would remain unchanged, and "Turkey will continue its attachment to the principles embodied in the Charter of the UN and uphold all its Treaty commitments". Further, during the speech, the continuity and many dimensions of Turkish foreign policy were most evidently present:

She (Turkey) will seek to develop her relations with the EEC within the framework of an Association Agreement aiming at eventual full membership. Her relations with the Council of Europe will be guided by her dedication to democratic principles and her resolve to return to Parliamentary rule. Her ties
with the member countries of the Islamic Community will be enhanced and she will endeavour to achieve further cooperation among them. She will strive for better relations with all neighbouring countries and pursue vigorously her efforts to settle existing outstanding issues with them peacefully.19

It seemed that the military regime consolidated the continuity and multilateral foreign policy, initiated during the mid-1970s.

Of course, the assurances, given by the new regime immediately after it took power, and their timings were well received by the Turkey's Western allies who had became increasingly worried about the chaotic political situation in an exposed but vital area on NATO's southeastern flank. Also, they had considered the obvious collaboration of normally opposing groups of Turkish politics on the ground of their general opposition to NATO and dominant position of the Western states in Turkey's foreign relations, as, at the least, dangerous and destabilizing. Therefore, they were alarmed when strongly pro-Western foreign minister, Mr. Hayrettin Erkmen, was forced to resign just a week before the coup by an alliance of opposition parties -left of centre RPP and religious NSP- who argued energetically that Mr. Erkmen had involved Turkey too closely with Israel and with the Western economies, to the neglect of the Arab countries of the Middle East.20

Given the military's moderate, pro-Western and modernist views and their anti-extremist conservative stance in Turkish politics, it was safely concluded in Western states that the coup would help to stabilize the situation in Turkey and counter the growth of anti-NATO and anti-Western forces. The view in Whitehall, for example, was that there was "no reason to fear that Turkey's commitment to the West and the Atlantic Alliance" would be weakened.21 And the generals, who adopted so openly a pro-Western position in foreign policy as no civilian government could have done against the leftists and pro-Islamic forces, were evidently ready to reverse the trend.22

Therefore, a certain relief was evident in the initial reactions of the Western states to the coup. Though they usually acknowledged worries about the future of democracy and human rights in Turkey, their responses were generally cordial and mild. While the W. German Chancellor Schmidt announced immediately that "Turkey
will remain an ally of W. Germany" and continue to receive military and economic aid, the British foreign office announcement saw no reason not to recognize the new regime. Although both governments also expressed their hopes that "Turkey's difficulties will be sufficiently overcome to allow an early return to a parliamentary democracy", they did not seem particularly troubled with the overthrown of the civilian government which "was not altogether unexpected" by their respective governments. Even the Scandinavian countries and the French government, which later became Turkey's foremost critics at the governmental level, seemed restrained for the moment, and chose not to condemn the military regime openly.

It appeared that the generally accepted view in Western capitals during the early days was that the military would "clean up the mess", would put the country back on to the right track, and would soon go back to their barracks as they did previously. To this end, they were quite content, in the early days of the coup, with General Evren's promise to return the country to democracy as soon as possible, even if the road to democracy would pass through a certain amount of restrictions, repressions, and imprisonments. After all, the war-like situation previous to the coup necessitated some extraordinary measures. As one Western diplomat advised his government that there was nothing they could do, at the moment, for "a prompt and effective return to representative government" and their goal "should be not to do anything that might affect them negatively". In the end the Western governments did not see any reason not to give the new regime the "benefit of the doubt", and therefore restrained their complaints and tried to avoid any accusations, at least for the time being.

2. Factors Influencing Actual Foreign Policy:

The military regime in Turkey after 1980 thus never intended to damage its relations with their Western allies, on whom they also depended economically as well as militarily. On the contrary, they were, with their dedicated Westernism, anxious to get closer to the West, or at the least, preserve the existing ties. The Western states - both
the US and Europe - were, as indicated above, also helpful in their attitude toward the Turkish generals and gave some time to the new regime to prove itself. Of course, it was difficult to tell how long the West was prepared to condone the military regime in Turkey, though obviously not as long as the generals would have wanted. In fact, there was a feeling from the very beginning that the military coup, in spite of its promise of continuity, would add new complexities to Turkey's relations, especially with the Western states, whose ideas about military regimes were quite different from those of the Turkish people. It seems that, the military regime of 1980 was destined to have a far more important affect on Turkey's foreign relations than any previous junta, either by attracting foreign reactions to their domestic security measures much more than before, or by their frustrated responses to developments usually beyond their control or above their imagination.

However, there are questions that need to be addressed before claiming the correctness of this anticipation. What were the differences of this military regime that escaped unnoticed from Western eyes at the time of the coup, and that were going to be decisive in their future relations with Turkey? What happened in a matter of months that affected Turkey's relations with European states and led to their deterioration, despite the obvious willingness on both sides to continue friendly relations? What happened to the cordial welcome the generals had got from the West? And why was even the breaking of their relationship seen as imminent at one point or another?

Since the new regime's intention in foreign policy was continuity, unlike its domestic politics, and it never desired that its relationship with the West should deteriorate, we should look for other inputs, "external imperatives" not originating from within the NSC, in order to be able to explain complications of Turkish foreign policy under the military regime, and in the transitional period followed it.

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2.1. The Nature Of The Regime

Clearly, during the period under consideration (1980-83) the single most effective factor over Turkey's foreign policy in general, and over its relations with Western Europe in particular, was the nature of the political regime in Turkey.

It is argued that this factor, in a broader sense, operates at two levels. At one level, the regime, with its powers to define broad framework of the country's overall political philosophy, determines the general guidelines for country's foreign policy and limits its options in external relations. At another level, the nature of the political regime in a given country generates perceptions and assumptions - some correct, while others are imagined - in the world outside about the country's political value system and identity. Responses of foreign powers to these perceptions in turn generates counter-reactions from the subject state according to its political values and how it sees the outside world. Moreover, negative external responses to the changes in country's political system may create pressures in the subject country to either change its policies or to distance itself from the centres of pressure. In this context, the subject country may look for alternative supports against these pressures.

2.1.1. The Effects of Governmental Philosophy

As far as the military regime of 1980 in Turkey and its foreign policy objectives are concerned, one would expect to conclude that this should have had little effect since, as explained above, the new regime's foreign policy, unlike its domestic policies which were marked by change, emphasized continuity in general directions and thus adherence to the Western alliance accordingly. However, in determining the overall effect of the military's political philosophy over Turkish foreign policy after 1980, one must not forget that the 1980 intervention differed greatly from previous military incursions into the political life in that it had by far the most important revolutionary effects across the entire social, economic and political fabric of Turkish life. There should be no doubt that the generals of the 1980 intervention set their mark firmly on every aspect of
Turkish society, a phenomenon which is sometimes compared with changes the country had experienced under the revolutionary governments of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Moreover, believing that they were now the sole representatives of the Kemalist tradition, the military leaders of the 1980 coup d'etat, unlike their predecessors in 1960 or 1971, gradually chose to govern the country themselves instead of allying themselves with, or trusting it to, the civilians. Therefore their value system, way of thinking and working style effectively replaced their civilian counterparts more than ever.

Furthermore, apart from laying down ground rules for the state apparatus and the government machinery at the most structural level, they, in fact, by appointing liaison officers during the initial phases of the coup to every and each of the bureaucratic units, attempted to scrutinize and openly effect day to day policies. Although the bureaucrats at the foreign office had probably more influence upon matters than their counterparts in other ministries, this by no means represented an immunity from direct interventions of the military leaders. Hence the new regime's militarist philosophy of governing and directing affairs had more effect on Turkish foreign policy than otherwise possible. In fact, in many cases, strategic thinking and primitive military reasoning replaced political and ideological thinking and the realities of international politics. For example, despite its obvious political and arguable weakness and disadvantages for Turkey in the long run, the military leaders actively promoted the idea, against its international and domestic critics, which argued that Turkey, being economically, socially and politically underdeveloped to implement full democracy, should have its own brand of democracy, in fact one which would suit more to Turkish needs. They also argued that the West should drop its criticisms and condone the shortcomings of the Turkish style of democracy on human and political rights because of Turkey's strategic importance to the West. The same idea was also picked up by many sympathizers of the new regime, both internationally and domestically. They argued in different ways that a new set of criteria, different from the ones used in judging European democracies, should be used for Turkey, mainly because of her geo-political situation and different historical development. Of course, what
they did not realize was that this line of reasoning, if accepted by the West Europeans, would put Turkey into the second league of the European democracies and therefore would seriously hinder Turkey's bid to become a truly European country and full member of the EC. Without realizing its political or long term effects, the military leaders with their short-sighted logic, tried to promote Turkey's own brand of "geopolitical democracy" with the hope that it would contain international criticism in the short term.

The governmental philosophy was also important from the point of view that most of the reasons for aggravated relations between Turkey and the West European states, after the takeover, would be found in the divergent world views on such matters as democracy, the position of political, social and human rights against concepts of internal security, method of governing, etc. - which were largely ignored, or the importance of which could not be appreciated at the early stages of the military regime. As mentioned above, the Western states, like the broad segments of Turkish opinion, were inclined, at the time, to take the generals at their word that this was a coup to restore democracy, not to destroy it. Therefore they thought that they could remain content with the military regime for some time, even if it was at cross purposes with the Western democratic ideal. After all, the military rule would be transitional, and once civilian rule was restored, they would be able to redress the damages inflicted.

Popular expectation that the military would do all the necessary "dirty business" and retire to their barracks was to be proved wrong, however, on this occasion. Thoroughly disappointed with the politicians, the military was determined to "finish the business" this time. "Never again" was the popular saying among the generals, and it became clear within months of the intervention that the military intended to stay until they saw the results of the changes they were going to make, changes which would include restructuring whole political and social structures along Kemalist lines. Therefore, different understanding on such subjects as democracy, national security, state, people, etc., affected Turkey's relations with Western Europe, which in turn had implications for the whole of Turkish foreign policy. It seems now that most of the
complications after 1980 between Turkey and Europe originated from this basic matter; what is and what should be the position of the Turkish military vis-a-vis civil society, the political structure and democracy in Turkey? The different answers given by the West Europeans and the military leaders in Turkey originated from their different political philosophies and were the main causes of most of the problems in Turkish foreign policy during the period under consideration.

The overall governmental philosophy is also important because it determines how the regime sees itself and other countries. The military regime of 1980 saw itself as a reincarnation of the Kemalist regime, protector of the state and its people. It gave more importance to national integrity over individuality, state security over human rights. Its main aim was to re-establish respectability of the state, by force if necessary. Individual and political rights were of secondary importance. The consequences of this vision are obvious.

2.1.2. The Effects of External Perceptions and Responses

The above-mentioned second level of analysis, namely the effects of external perceptions and responses to the country's political regime, proved quite important in terms of Turkey's relations, particularly with Western Europe.

In principle, similar regimes are assumed to be responsive to each other although one can cite several important exceptions. The frequency of abundant military takeovers in Turkey indicates the important role the army plays in Turkish political life. For all that, however, Turkey has been considered in the same league with military dictatorships, at worst, or with guided democracies, at best. In particular during the period under consideration (1980-83), Turkey was under a full military regime, though one can differentiate it from other military regimes in various points. Its officially proclaimed aim was to guide the country into full democracy as is understood in the West. However, in practice, democratic identity was denied to Turkey, both under the military regime and during the period immediately following it (1983-1987), by a
combination of factors, ranging from continued restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms to explicit (implicit for the 1983-1987 period) usage of military's control and authority on various aspects of daily life.

Not surprisingly then, being less than a full democracy created tensions for Turkey during this period, not only in domestic politics but in foreign policy, as well. Since the military regime, or the quasi-democracy for the 1983-87 period, clearly contradicted with the fundamental values of Western Europe, with which Turkey endeavours to identify itself, it created tensions for Turkish foreign policy where it seemed to matter most. As a result, Turkish foreign policy had to operate under strain during this period as the military regime in Turkey attempted to "reconcile the divergent objectives of moving towards integration with Western Europe while defending the rationale of being less than a full democratic regime".  

France and the Northern Europeans, in particular, while ignoring the dynamics of social changes the country had experienced during the late 1970s, professed themselves unable to understand why the generals had stepped in; they especially seemed to view the restrictions on Bulent Ecevit, the leader of the centre-left Republican People's Party then, as an indication of deep military disdain for democracy, and they doubted that General Evren would keep to the timetable he had announced for returning to civilian rule. Rejecting the rationale for the military in Turkey, European opinion led a number of Turkey's allies to join in pressures in the Council of Europe to penalize "the Turks" until they had satisfied the "Europeans" that their regime was truly democratic. As a result, the Council of Europe was so critical of Turkey's regime that the Turkish delegation withdrew in May 1981. Economic aid from Europe slowed and the fourth financial protocol of the 1963 Ankara Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC was suspended for the time being. The Europeans initially seemed dissatisfied with the new Turkish constitution, which instituted a form of state corporatism against individual pluralism, and with the start-up of political party activity preceding the 1983 elections, as well. Critical comments in Europe continued to focus on the number of parties prevented from participating in the elections and on the
number of candidates vetoed by the generals shortly before election day. Eventually, the
Council of Europe refused to seat the members of the new parliament representing
Turkey in September 1983.41 Europe's own history of democratic struggle meant that
it was unable to accept the representatives of what it saw as a repressive and
undemocratic constitution.

In a more general sense, the frequency of military regimes in recent Turkish
political history, together with a general tendency toward the suppression of certain
ideas and freedoms even under civilian governments, have become impediments for
Turkish foreign policy in her overall relations with the West. Such practices, especially
the Turkish human rights record, have been instrumental in creating a general lack of
sympathy for Turkey in Western public opinion.42 Therefore, it was hardly surprising
to see that most European organizations and public opinions concentrated their
criticisms towards Turkey and its military leaders when they faced a huge number of
allegations about human rights abuses, repression, mass trials and sometimes seemingly
unlawful detentions of political prisoners. In this context, there were strong correlations
between the nature of the government in Turkey during the period and the
unprecedented dimension of torture allegations and their "popularity" in the
international public opinion after the 1980 intervention.

As General Evren once mentioned, the torture and human rights abuse
allegations had been continuously raised against Turkey from mid-1970s onwards, but
the military government was the first one "to take action" against it and actually punish
persons who were found guilty of torture.43 Why, then, were these allegations
increased by number and also reached a stage that some states felt necessary to take her
to the European Commission of Human Rights? The answer is threefold, all of which
related, directly or indirectly, to the 1980 intervention.

First of all being under military rule, away from public scrutiny, would have
encouraged some self-appointed personnel to take responsibility into their own hands.
The harsh measures prompted by the concern to contain violence in the shortest
possible time, also would have exaggerated the process.
Another reason for increased publicity was the self or enforced banishment of some intellectuals and/or some members of pre-1980 (il)legal organizations to the Western Europe.

When the intervention took place, many former terrorists left the country at once. And after the intervention many intellectuals and political activists, who were not happy with the regime or whose activities were restricted by the military, continued to head to Western Europe. These "political refugees" together with "economic-minded refugees" constituted quite a big Turkish (including Turkish Kurds) community in Europe which was politically enlightened. In fact, it was these political refugees who continued to keep in touch with what was going on in Turkey. By means of their personal relations with people who were detained or arrested by the security forces in Turkey, they were able to relate human rights abuses and torture cases, both actual and sometimes invented, instantly to the Western media. They also kept pressure going on the Western governments by means of open letters in the press, publishing books, pamphlets and newsletters, demonstrations and hunger strikes, therefore arousing interest within public opinion in what was happening in Turkey.44

The last, but not the least important, aspect of the popularity of these allegations was the psychological factor that originated from directly being a military regime in Turkey. As mentioned above, there had been torture allegations before the intervention, but these had only appeared in the reports of some human rights organizations such as Amnesty International or Helsinki Watch, and had never found a way to generate public reactions, in general, on this scale. Not only the Western governments, but even the organizations such as the Council of Europe had not attached too much attention and preferred to ignore them. After the intervention, however, these allegations not only appeared in the public but also found sympathetic ears, ready to listen and act, even in the government circles. Although the insistence of the socialist members in the European Council and the continual efforts of Greece in all the European forums affected these sympathies, it was the image of being a military regime that determined the ultimate Western interest on the subject.
Of course, the nature of the political regime in Turkey and its professed goal of fuller democracy gains meaning as a foreign policy determinant primarily in the context of Turkey's Western orientation. Since one of the 12 September regime's expressed aims in foreign policy area, apart from driving towards more integration with Europe, was to apply for full membership of European Community, the importance of the type of regime became more apparent. By postponing the application until such a time that Turkey returns to democracy, the military regime, in fact, recognized the importance, and preconditioned position, of this factor. On the other hand, however, by expressing their intention for closer integration with Europe, the generals, in a sense, invited more scrutiny and consequently more criticism from European organizations, the media, and public opinion in general. It is quite obvious that the announcement of Turkish intention in Spring 1981 to apply for full membership of the EC as soon as the civilian regime was restored, created a feeling in the European public opinion to look into, and talk about, what the Turkish public opinion, in general, considered as internal affairs of their country. It further seems that, after the Turkish intent was publicized, the European states, organizations and public, in general, who had come to see themselves more and more as a club of political democracies, saw it as their right to judge the country's credentials on such issues as human rights and democracy. Of course, this unprecedented international attention in what the generals considered the domestic affairs of the country, annoyed the military regime, who continued to consider these interests and criticisms of the Europeans as direct interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. The foreign interference with Turkish affairs had always been a most delicate subject in Turkey because of historical experiences. This was, however, particularly important for the military regime who tried to put on a bold face publicly and act in defiance of Western criticisms.

In the mean time, General Evren and other leaders of the military government continued to complain about unwarranted European criticisms. Yet, whatever the military tried to do, the interests of European public opinion in Turkish affairs resulted in internationalization of Turkey's domestic problems. And from then on Turkey's
internal political developments, as well as measures taken by the military regime to curb the anarchy, to reorganize society, to prepare a constitution or even to change a law, became matters of international discussion and were subjected to close scrutiny. This, obviously, created tensions for Turkish foreign policy at a time when international support was most needed.

The military regime's decision to apply for membership of the EC had important long term affects, as well. They, by taking such a decision which would necessitate the long term commitment of Turkey, actually limited the country's options without considering future popular will on the subject. Moreover, even if the prospective civilian government wanted to go ahead with the application, it would mean that the will of the military would still be observed in the country. In other words, this decision put the future democratic government in a dilemma either to defy or carry out the military regime's "order". The complications of either option are obvious.

We mentioned above that the nature of government gained meaning as a foreign policy determinant in the context of Turkey's European connection and also that similar types of regimes are assumed to be responsive to each other. In this context, the militarist nature of its government did not affect Turkey's relations with the East European or Middle Eastern countries, which did not raise objections about democracy, or indeed about torture allegations or human rights abuses in the country. In fact, Saudi Arabia was the first state to congratulate the Turkish military administration, and others followed suit. Unlike the Europeans, the Islamic Conference did not send human rights delegations to Turkey to tour prisons and talk to dissidents.

For that matter, the change of the regime did not affect Turkey's relations with the US either, whose considerations for human rights and democracy were overwhelming by its global strategic interests in the Middle Eastern region after the developments of 1979 and 1980.

Therefore, while Turkey's relations with Western Europe, which felt unable to understand the rationale behind the continued level of military intervention, were souring, its relations with the Middle Eastern countries and with the US, who gave a
supportive shoulder, were improved. Turkey's search for alternative courses of action was also reflected by Presidential visits during 1982 to Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and even China, while no invitations were extended by Western governments. It was obvious that while the military government needed the West for political, military and economic support, it could not bear to be forced into a position of isolation, as had occurred over the Cyprus issue and, as a consequence, was concerned to increase Turkey's links with the Islamic World.

During the period, the growing political importance of, and Turkey's increasing reliance on, the Middle Eastern states and desire to use them as a balance against West European criticisms was increasingly evident in the official speeches. The declaration from General Evren in April 1982 foreshadowed a new direction for Turkey. He affirmed that Turkey was a European country and, at the same time, a Middle Eastern country. The cool relations with Western Europe constituted, together with economic necessities, the principal reason for Turkey's new drive toward the Middle East. At a political level, Ankara had been striving to break out of its isolated position among the countries of the Third World by intensifying its relations with the Islamic world. At this juncture, the sympathetic attitudes of the Islamic states towards the military regime helped Turkey to turn more eagerly towards the East. Together with sharp upsurge in economic relations, Turkey saw the need to assume a more active role in the Middle Eastern region. As a result, Kenan Evren became the first Turkish President to attend an Islamic Conference in January 1984. Turkey also shared the Conference's efforts to mediate in the Iran-Iraq war, and since 1984 has hosted the Economic Development and Cooperation Committee of the Islamic conference.

The result of the growing political importance of the Arab world in Turkey's foreign policy was to be seen in Turkish-Israeli relations, which were continuously downplayed by Turkey during the period. Also "because of Israel's disagreeable politics in the Middle East problem" Turkey reduced its diplomatic relations with Israel to the second-secretary level.
2.2. Changes In The International System And Turkey's Security Perceptions

Another set of factors that affected Turkey's foreign relations during the 1980s in general and 1980-1983 period in particular, originated from the state of East-West relations and developments taking place in the chain of the states along the southern border of the Soviet Union, which enhanced the importance of strategic considerations in world politics.

2.2.1. The Effects of the Second Cold War and Tensions in the Middle Eastern Sub-system

As political instability in the region heightened into tension and raised the possibility of direct foreign intervention from early 1979 onwards, Turkey's strategic location, alongside its domestic crisis, captured new attention in the Western capitals. This was particularly true for the US whose President was going to declare the region, in coming months, one of vital importance to American interests. Ramifications of this were expressly evident in the US response to the "12 September Takeover", and continued to affect Turkish-American relations during the tricky period of diplomacy under the military regime.49

The fall of the Shah in Iran on 16 January 1979 was the first of the continuous problems in the region from the Western perspective. The closing down of all US military bases and monitoring installations on Iranian soil by the new regime meant the end of vital electronic surveillance which penetrated into the Soviet heartland and areas of the Soviet Union bordering Afghanistan, thus increased the value of already important intelligence sites in Turkey.50

Another important factor influencing the American approach to the junta after the 1980 intervention was the strength of the Islamic revival in the region, which had already thrown aside one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East. Thus, the US's evaluation of Turkey had to take this Islamic revival into account. The prospect of an Islamic revival in Turkey was totally unacceptable to US interests. It would have
delivered a blow worse than the "loss" of Iran for the West. The Iranian role in monitoring the Soviet Union could be replaced somehow by Turkey, but Turkey's vital position as the most important buffer zone in the defence of the Middle East was irreplaceable. It was as if the collapse of the Shah's regime not only removed the key Western outpost in the region, but also created a gap through which Turkey suddenly became visible as the only barrier in the Middle East which, if stable and powerful, could prevent a possible Soviet push into Iran or to the Persian Gulf. Moreover, it was the only Middle Eastern state which could supply, if necessary, a stepping stone for the Western forces into the region. Therefore, any form of internal turmoil resulting in a weakening and wavering Turkey could have dealt a major blow to the Western, especially American strategic, interests in the region.

Against this background, the most single dramatic development before the Turkish coup occurred, was when the Soviet Union moved into Afghanistan on 26 December 1979 - a date which marked the end of detente and the beginning of the second cold war. The occupation not only showed the Soviet willingness to use its military power, and therefore intensified Turkish military's apprehensions about the country's security, but also, by leading to speculations that Turkey might be the next country to sink into chaos and instability, transformed, if not revolutionized, Turkey's geo-political importance to the Western alliance. At the same time, the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 and the failed rescue operation of the on-going Carter administration, widespread discontent in Pakistan, disturbances in Egypt, and the friction between Iran and Iraq only helped to exacerbate the situation in the region.

Under these circumstances, and given the fact that in Greece the anti NATO pan-Hellenic Party was considered to be the most likely winner in upcoming parliamentary elections, the Western governments, especially the US, became increasingly concerned at the threatened loss of Turkey's capability as an effective partner with its 500,000 man army and over 16 NATO bases. The so-called Carter Doctrine (January 1980), which introduced new dimensions both to Middle Eastern
affairs and equally to East-West relations, was formulated at this juncture. Under the auspices of the doctrine Turkey was expected to host the RDF (Rapid Deployment Forces) and allow the full participation of Greece in NATO.53

Given the above-mentioned circumstances, when Turkish armed forces intervened and seized power on 12 September 1980, there was a sense of relief among the American officials.54 Even President Carter admitted later on in an interview that "the situation in Turkey before the '12 September Movement' was posing a threat for security reasons, and after the Iranian revolution and the occupation of Afghanistan, this move towards stability relieved" them.55

Although there were strong allegations and circumstantial evidence to the contrary, the US government has denied knowing anything about the coup until "minutes" before it occurred56. Nonetheless, the American administration, under strategic considerations, welcomed the coup led by the Turkish Chief of Staff General Evren, a veteran of the Turkish contingent in the Korean war, who was known for his anti-communist, secularist and pro-Western ideas, and announced that it would continue to support Turkey's aid request before the IMF.57

Moreover, the ideological inclinations of, and common threat perceived by, both the conservative military government in Turkey and the Reagan administration in the US, which took over the presidency in January 1981, led naturally to an expanded and more harmonious bilateral relationship between Turkey and the US.58 As a result, while the military coup in September 1980 led several Western European countries to make an issue over human rights, the US, under strategic considerations, remained unconcerned and gave priority to establishing a stronger and more long-term relationship with Turkey. They signed a defence co-operation agreement with Turkey covering the future of more than two dozen military bases and in return provided over $2.5 billion for military and economic aid in four years 1980-1983 - a greater rate of increase than to any other country in the world.59 Consequently, political and diplomatic relations between the two countries were particularly accommodating during the military regime and appeared to be better than they had been for a generation.60
It appears that Washington's sympathetic understanding of the reasons for the military takeover paved the way for greater intimacy and the frictions, accumulated under the arms embargo, were dispersed during the military regime in Turkey. While the signing of the new Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in 1980 put mutual relations back on course, the US was also in the forefront of the IMF's program to provide relief to Turkey's hard-pressed economy. And, perhaps, because the Europeans were so unsympathetic to Turkey's plight, Turkey's discussions with the US over such sensitive topics as economy and military aid levels were not marked by the bitterness these matters had generated only a few years earlier. And the American media's interpretation of circumstances that brought the military to power in Turkey also helped erase lingering ill-feeling over the embargo years. Clearly, Turkey's military establishment valued the strategic relationship with the US. And the willingness of successive American administrations to give priority to aid to Turkey and the relatively high level of this aid provided a solid base for cooperation. Exchanges of visits by senior officials emphasized the relative closeness of the relationship.

The geographical and strategic position of Turkey meant that not only the US but also the Soviet Union was ever ready to exploit Turkey's foreign relations to its own advantage. In this context, although the Soviets saw in the generals regime a willing collaborator with Washington and doubted that the generals could, or indeed would, resist pressures to cooperate in military preparations for action in the Gulf area, they, nevertheless, were very sensitive to the extremely mixed and conflicting relations that Turkey was experiencing with the West in particular.

It was obvious that the Soviet Union had its own share of anxiety about the possibility of nuclear weapons modernization and the upgrading of the American military capability and influence in Turkey in the 1980s. Even though, it was clearly the American military presence in Turkey that instilled a sense of vulnerability in the Soviet south facing Turkey, and in this context, the conclusion of a defence agreement with the US in 1980 led to massive attacks on Turkey by Moscow, the Soviets were
equally careful not to upset Turkey, officially, and they, too, tried to improve their relations with Turkey during the military regime.

On the other hand, relations with Moscow cooled considerably at the beginning of the military regime, because not only were the Soviets annoyed with the new regime in Turkey, but also the generals were anxious about Soviet intentions. Particularly, the invasion of Afghanistan had reasserted their belief that the old realities of the Cold War were not dead yet. The generals also believed that Turkey's main antagonist was the Soviet Union, rather than any other country. Moreover, the NATO estimates which showed greater vulnerability of the southern flank exacerbated the generals' apprehensions about the Soviet intentions. However, the disparity in size between Turkey and the Soviet Union also meant that responses to the Soviet threat should be diplomatic as well as military. Therefore, "good neighbourliness" and the avoidance of provocation were constantly emphasized by the Turkish government. Consequently, they refused to join the Western allies in introducing sanctions against Aeroflot in September 1983 as a retaliation for the shooting down of a South Korean airliner by a Soviet jet.

The official Soviet reaction to the coup, which refrained from criticism, also helped to improve relations between two countries. Even though the Soviet media made much of alleged persecution of "progressive politicians and trade union activities, who are being tortured and killed" in Turkey, but who had not committed any crime, and the Soviet sponsored "Bizim Radyo", operated from Berlin by the illegal Turkish Communist Party, appealed to the Turkish people during the military regime to overthrow the "fascist junta", the official pronouncements were, on the other hand, as pointed out by Foreign Minister Mr. Ilter Turkmen, "in contrast" with these public attacks and even encouraged the resumption of technical talks on economic cooperation between two countries. As a result, trade relations with the Soviet Union increased and Turkey became the largest recipient of Soviet economic aid in the non-communist Third World. Also, a new trade agreement, despite US efforts to limit
Western economic ties with the Soviet Union because of the Polish question, was signed in 1982 and aimed to stipulate a 33 per cent increase in commerce.\(^6\)

Thus, despite serious misgivings and suspicions on both sides, reinforced by the emergence of second Cold War, Turkish-Soviet relations continued to be cordial, if not friendly. That much tested Turkish practice of keeping a constant balance between her suspicions about her superpower neighbour and need to accommodate it, was again being applied. Moreover, fine balance between complying with the requirements of the Western alliance and, at the same time, not antagonising the USSR was observed by the military regime even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In this context, while Turkey strongly condemned the Soviet invasion and supported all UN actions, she nevertheless refrained from joining in active measures against the USSR as proposed by the US. Thus, at the October 1980 military parade in Moscow, Turkish diplomats, alongside Norwegians, were the only Western diplomats not to boycott the ceremony.\(^67\) Consequently, though the Afghan events did facilitate the conclusion on January 10, 1980, of the DECA agreement between Turkey and the US, Turkey's approach towards the USSR was not materially changed.

On the other hand, the tense international environment was useful to Turkey as her declining strategic importance for the Western alliance was re-emphasised once again by the reviving Cold War. Hence, while the reinforced suspicions of Soviet intentions kept the military regime on guard and prevented further political rapprochement, they did not appear as obstacles to improved trade relations, as well as helping to improve Turkey's standing in the West, especially in the US.

### 2.2.2. Turkey's Evolving Security Perceptions

A factor related to the renewed importance of Turkey's strategic situation, or otherwise deriving from it, was how the new leaders of Turkey actually interpreted the country's national security doctrine in the face of a revived cold-war and how they responded to
what they saw as security needs of the country, which they interpreted in its most general sense.

In the broader meaning of the concept, there has always been a dominant preoccupation with security matters in Turkey - a continuation of Ottoman tradition and a result of continuing influence of the military in Turkish political life. Though there is not an integrated consensus in Turkey as to the definition of the threat, the location and the type of threat to Turkish security, the military, by imposing its ideology and security concepts as state ideology and security doctrine, have been able to determine, at least, the official definition of the threat to the Turkish state.

Another continuing pattern in Turkey is its strict definition of the concept of national sovereignty and preoccupation with its maintenance. Though Turkey is not a creation of colonial aftermath, her policies indicate a strong nationalistic fervour. Special characteristics of her history and geographical situation, together with her traditional confrontation with the Soviet Union and the realization of the proximity to an unstable and violent area, provided Turkey with a unique sense of national sovereignty. This overriding objective of the Turkish foreign policy as to the maintenance of the state and its independence was very much evident when President Evren said on several occasions, while discussing strains with Western Europe, that the "Turkish state will continue to exist, no matter what".

2.2.2.1. Factors Related To External Security

In an extra-territorial sense, a feeling of encirclement with unfriendly neighbours had always prevailed in Turkey's security thinking. During 1979 and 1980 this sense of insecurity enriched by the developments taking place in the region where Turkey situated. As mentioned above, the invasion of Afghanistan, by showing the willingness of the Soviet Union to use its army, terrified Turkish military elites who had always believed in the indivisibility of detente. They further shared Demirel's views, rather than Ecevit's, on the issue of East-West relations, who had said a year ago that there could
be no meaningful detente in one region of the world while aggression was taking place in another (an obvious allusion to Afghanistan). 70

Similarly, the generals believed that the country's security could only be assured through NATO and the US, on any permanent basis. It was obvious that, despite Turkey's complaints about her allies and desires for a more detached relationship from both, Turkey continued to derive significant military benefits from them. 71 Detente and the Cyprus issue might have made possible and desirable Turkey's more independent position within the alliance and from the US. But for political, economic and security reasons, the generals were not going to push too far. Further, despite the rapprochement of the mid-1960s, they remained suspicious of Soviet motivations and objectives and the Afghan invasion reassured them on the fact that severance of Western security and political ties could only have helped to open the way to new Soviet pressures. Such a severance would have also eliminated Turkey's influence and participation in allied and security policy planning and even would tip the regional balance in favour of Greece, whose policies in the Aegean were increasingly becoming nationalistic under the premiership of A. Papandreou. Moreover, Turkey's military leaders, like its political and bureaucratic elites, were "Western" and "European" in their values and orientation. They wanted the country to be considered a member of the Western family of nations. For all these reasons, despite their occasional threats to opt out from the Council of Europe or sever relations with Western Europe on the face of their criticisms and the threatened expulsion of Turkey from the Council, the military leaders of Turkey were fully aware that only through Western association could Turkey achieve her economic and social objectives and establish herself as a major military and political force in the region, a goal sought since the end of the Second World War. Therefore, they were actually determined to hang on to Europe until the last minute, no matter what. 72

The military leaders further believed that, on the political level, as well as military and economic levels, neither Islam nor the non-aligned countries offered realistic alternatives to continued close cooperation with the Western nations. In view
of Turkey's proximity and strategic importance to the Soviet Union, they did not trust that "Finlandization" was a credible option, and further a Finish solution, according to them, would have meant the end of the proud record of Turkish independence. Therefore, they had regarded Mr. Ecevit's "sedulous cultivation of the non-aligned world and the Soviet bloc as either foolish or dangerous". They had neither liked nor officially accepted Mr. Ecevit's "New Defence Concept". Further, they had not understood what was wrong with the old one, and therefore once in power, they committed Turkey openly to NATO and the West generally, reversing Ecevit's "leftward aberrations".

Thus, it was not surprising to see Mr. Ilter Turkmen, as foreign minister of the new regime, reaffirm the regime's conviction in the Madrid Review Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, that "detente is indivisible" and it could not be confined to Europe. The consolidation of detente would require "mutual restraint and maximum degree of responsibility in other parts of the world", too.

Another important development for Turkish security, apart from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and attempts to influence the new regime in Tehran, was the deployment, from early 1980 onwards, of the new Soviet army divisions into the Caucasus. In the face of the estimations that the Turkish forces defending the Straits and the northeastern border were outnumbered by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, and continuing animosities with Greece which frustrated cooperation in order to reduce these disparities, Turkey became increasingly worried about its security and had to turn to NATO and the US more eagerly.

Moreover, the acquisition of Scud missiles by Syria, which was becoming increasingly hostile in the region and which had lodged several complaints about Turkey's Ataturk Dam project, from the Soviet Union only helped to add new dimensions to Turkey's security concerns.

On the other hand, the Iran-Iraq War, which found the new military regime in Turkey barely ten days old, was harbouring more important security apprehensions for Turkey. Apart from the dangers of the deliberate or inadvertent incursions from both
sides into Turkish territory, the war on its borders offered opportunities to Turkey's foreign and internal antagonists, both real and imaginary, to exploit Turkey's psychological and real sense of vulnerability.

Any rational antagonist could have calculated that at a time when an important portion of Turkey's strategic thinking and energies must be kept on a high state of readiness for any contingency emanating from the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey would be in a relatively weaker position vis-a-vis himself. Therefore, for example, the task that the Greek PM Papandreou had set for himself from 1981 onwards to pursue a crisis diplomacy with Turkey had been made immeasurably easier by the exposure created in the East.

Another source of strain was Turkey's interest in the Iraqi oil pipeline from Mosul to Iskenderun, which generated revenues for Turkey. She was prepared to protect this and the corresponding road links by military force if necessary and said so to the Iranian officials. Further, Turkey's interest in containing the Kurdish dimension of the ground war was also posing threats of conflict, particularly with Iran whose aim to use Iraq's dissident Kurds in its war with Baghdad stirred up Turkey's concerns about its own "mountain Turks" (i.e. indigenous Kurds) and security of its frontier.

Moreover, the threat of escalation of war to involve direct military engagement by third parties, raising the spectre of a general war just on the borders of Turkey, was highly salient and worrying for Turkey. Also the dangers of superpower involvement, and the possibility that the US might eventually find it imperative to use the Incirlik Air Base and other airfield and facilities in Turkey for expanded air operations in the Gulf region worried Turkey's leaders.

On the other hand, Turkey's wishes to end the war which was causing security threats to her, were clashing with the economic gains she was deriving from it. Moreover, because of the possible Soviet push through it, Turkey wished to see a strong Iran capable of holding its own. Yet, that wish was at cross purposes with her fears of a hegemonic Iran in the region, after an unconditional victory over Iraq, which would have an important impact on domestic developments in Turkey by enhancing the
influence and power, on the one hand, of the pro-Sheria forces, and, on the other, of the Kurdish separatists.

Furthermore, the possibility of a peace settlement based on scenarios entailing major changes in the region was injecting new inputs into Turkish assessments of its interests in the region, i.e. adventurist nostalgia for the return of Kirkuk and Mosul to Turkey. Therefore, to forestall such misguided emotions from turning into powerful pressures on Turkish foreign policy, the best possible post-war peace settlement from the Turkish perspective was seen to be the one that would replicate the pre-war status quo as closely as possible. Hence, after taking in view the economic gains and security dangers of the situation, the generals choose to remain neutral towards the war and sought an earlier and just end for it.

As if all these were not enough, the election of A. Papandreou in Greece on a nationalistic platform, as mentioned earlier, aroused suspicions that at some stage he would start up a war with Turkey. However, under the strategic reasons, during the military regime, relations with Greece suffered less than those with other European states.

The Turkish military had been the element of Turkish society most interested in compromise with Greece. The generals were convinced that the outstanding problems between Turkey and Greece had reached a point which required swift solutions. They were further agreed that Turkey should engage in confidence building measures designed to mend fences with the Greeks. Therefore, even before the coup they had abolished the so called "purple line" in the Aegean on 23 February 1980, without actually asking the foreign ministry. In addition, they were ready to move Turkey's so called Aegean Army to Konya, in mid-eastern Turkey, if the Greeks were to respond to this with good faith by demilitarising the Aegean islands.

Consequently, after the intervention, civil air traffic between Greece and Turkey was allowed to resume with the military leaders taking the initiative to back away from the demand that Turkey be notified of flights in the eastern Aegean. Similarly, late in 1980, they dropped Turkish objections to returning Greece to the military wing of
NATO. Several reasons would help to explain Turkey's change in policy. The new military government undoubtedly sought to concentrate on domestic problems, the reason for its takeover. Turkey also shared with other NATO states considerable concern over above mentioned developments in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the on-going instability in the Middle East. The generals believed that, regardless of their country's clashes with Greece in the Aegean, Turkey's security interests were better served by Greece remaining within NATO than by leaving the alliance. Therefore, despite popular opposition to it, the generals allowed Greece to return to the military wing of NATO, under the so called "Rogers Plan", by not using Turkey's veto right. Though many officials, since then, have regretted that Turkey did not use its veto power to obtain fairer Aegean command and control arrangements, the decision provides an insight into the strategic thinking of the senior military leaders in Turkey.

In the end, however, the worst happened and the hopes of further progress were cut by the election of A. Papandreou in Athens on a platform calling for a tougher line toward Turkey. He did not comply with the arrangements and refused to talk with the Turks. Turkey, in fact, was puzzled by Athens' actions throughout Papandreou's premiership. The leaders were actually convinced that Greece under Papandreou was seeking to undercut Turkey's position in NATO and to delay the normalization of Turkey's relations with the EEC.

2.2.2.2. Factors Related To Internal Security

Turkey's internal security concerns also affected Turkish foreign policy during the military regime. The sense of domestic vulnerability or insecurity was high in the security thinking of the Generals, and, in the broader sense, it affected their perceptions and therefore actions against certain states.

In addition to the activity of rightist, leftist and separatist groups, the government also considered sympathizers, supporters, overseas activists, and "those
who have not been identified by the security forces" as posing a threat. The military government believed security threats were located in the prison population (which protested conditions and undertook hunger strikes), in smuggling activities (especially in the arms-drugs trade) with or without terrorist connections, and in "propaganda terrorism", which was thought to have destabilizing links to subversion and terrorism. These activities, by hampering security operations and impeding efforts to gain foreign sympathy and material assistance, were considered anti-state activities.

Consequently, the military regime, in addition to the rounding up and trials of members of armed illegal organizations, also arrested and tried thousands of persons accused of political offences but affiliated to legal associations in order to suppress "potential threats" -meaning opposition to the military regime. Although General Evren justified this repression in terms of security threat to the state and continued to call them "traitors", the explanation did not satisfy the Western Europeans who increased their criticisms after every trial.

Of course, the fears of the regime about its security were not altogether groundless. The Turkish government after 1980 seized some 800,000 firearms, including 1,371 Soviet made Kalishnikov rifles, plus some 500 anti-tank rockets and more than five million rounds of ammunition. Total value of this weaponry has been put at $250 million which was 50 times the take from all of the bank robberies and all of the successful extortion attempts in Turkey during the late 1970s. In view of government estimates that, apart from the money spent for arms purchases, financing of terrorist activities in Turkey during the period of 1977-80 would need another $750 million, the suspicions of foreign involvement in Turkish terrorism became probable, if not proved.

These suspicions inevitably led to conflicts with those states which the Turkish leaders associated with anti-Turkish activities. In this context, Turkey's relations, at one time or another, were strained with Syria and Lebanon over their role in providing training centres for Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian terrorist groups; with Bulgaria over its involvement in arms shipment to, and drug smuggling from, Turkey; with Iran
because of its encouragements to pro-Sheria groups; with Greece because of its sympathetic attitudes towards any opposition to the military regime; with West European states because of their leniency towards the members of what Turkey considered as illegal terrorist groups, for granting them political asylum, and for their (particularly France's) failure to protect Turkish diplomats from Armenian terrorists.

Another internal security concern of the military government which turned out to be more important in the longer term than all the others, was the threat posed by Kurdish separatist groups. Although main thrust of Kurdish separatism came after 1984, the Kurdish question was perceived by the military as a threat for country's unitary status long before that. Thus after the coup, alongside the members of Turkish armed groups hundreds of members of Kurdish separatist groups were tried and sentenced for separatist activities and terrorism. During this period, since even the existence of Kurds in Turkey was denied by categorising them as "Mountain Turks", the term "separatist terrorists" was used as a substitute for Kurdish organizations.

As mentioned above, the Iran-Iraq war by weakening authority in the northwest Iraq, further heightened Turkey's concerns over political fugitives, mainly Kurds, who took refuge beyond the border and used this area to regroup and sometimes attack Turkish transit routes. Moreover, the safety of the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline was a major concern to Turkey, as well as Iraq, since it provided lucrative returns. Thus in May 1983, with Iraq's consent, the Turkish army carried out a limited military operation inside the Iraqi border as a warning to such groups. After the operation, Kenan Evren warned during a rally in Hakkari, eastern Turkey, that, "everybody should know that our target is peace at home and abroad, but this does not mean that we will accept peace in the worst of all conditions...If terrorists insist on their...attacks, the response will be much harsher". In the same year, Second Army's headquarters moved from Konya, central Anatolia, to Malatya, eastern Turkey, thus increasing military's supervision in the area. The fact that two of Turkey's four armies then were based in the eastern Turkey showed the military's uneasiness, in contrast to their denial.
Although the strong-arm tactics of the military were able to suppress Kurdish separatist groups for the time being, it seemed that they failed to eradicate them as from 1984 onwards the re-grouped PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) started its guerrilla warfare against Turkish state. In the mean time, the military regime also introduced further political and cultural restrictions on ordinary Kurdish people, including a ban on the Kurdish language, which in the long run proved to be counter-productive as the repressed Kurdish masses gradually drifted towards PKK as the representative of Kurdish rights in Turkey.98

2.2.2.3. National Defence Industry

Another subject related to Turkey's geopolitical position, and to security needs originating from it, was the generals' desire to build Turkey's own national defence industry, including an ambitious war plane production plant. These plans could be seen as a natural result of being under a military regime but, apart from security needs of Turkey which absolutely required some dramatic efforts and long term commitment for the foreseeable future,99 they were also prompted by the belief that these investments would eventually bring high technology and industrial base to Turkey, and therefore would help Turkey's economic development in the long run even though in the short and medium periods it would run the danger of draining the Turkish economy. However, one must not forget that Turkey's requests for partnership in co-production shames of NATO and joint ventures with the US, in spite of their merits, have the characteristic of creating a greater dependence of the national economy upon size of military forces and security oriented policies.

2.3. Economic Policy

A third set of factors that affected Turkey's relations with foreign countries during the period was the results of Turkey's chosen economic policy. It was essentially
important for Turkey's new drives towards the Middle East and Soviet block as well as for its renewed commitment to the West.

In the most general sense, the economic needs and priorities of a country are known for their role in determining a government's stay in power. Though the military regime in Turkey had no such direct fears, nevertheless, it was responsive to the masses' economic needs in general.

Similarly, they enjoy a very great influence on foreign policy. Any given country's foreign policy is responsive to the interests and needs of economic development strategies pursued by the governments, economic priorities and targets defined by them, and economic issues and pressures that emerged with respect to and/or independently of the basic strategies and priorities. Of course, the other side of the coin is also true. In other words, any chosen economic policy is part of, and also reflects, the more general world outlook, including domestic political arrangements and foreign policy attitudes.

Broadly speaking, the structural changes introduced into the Turkish economy in the 1980s reflected a basic political-ideological choice anyway. A full-fledged commitment to a liberal economic system had been undertaken not only with economic imperatives and priorities in mind but also as a clear political signal, particularly to the US and Western Europe, of the government's resolve to turn Turkey into a free market society integrated with world economy. A subtle political bond was hoped to be created with the free market economies of the West even if the political dimension of liberalism was yet to be expanded. The free market economy was thus counted upon to bind Turkey more intimately to the world economic system while hopefully creating opportunities for extensive economic and business relations with the West in general and with Western Europe in particular. Since the ultimate goal was to pave the way for integration with Western Europe, it was thought that the initial attempts to restructure the economy could lend credibility to Turkey's professed resolve to seriously tackle the inherent contradictions and wide disparities between the Turkish and the EEC economic systems.
The military leaders' decision to continue with the economic liberalization programme, which was initiated by the Demirel government, showed that a profound change in the mind of Kemalist-military elites had taken place since the last military coup. Unlike their predecessors, the post-1980 military elites did not consider Kemalism - and etatism as far as economic policy was concerned - as a political manifesto. Realizing the changes that the country had experienced, they adopted the monetarist economic policy, and let the economy be run by those whose economic knowledge was much wider than that of the military men, but also "whose philosophy they did not necessarily endorse". Their surprising action in the early days of the military regime to let Turgut Ozal remain in charge of the economy should be seen in this context.

Keeping Ozal in charge of the economy was, then, partly designed to reassure Turkey's financiers that the new regime would continue implementing the IMF agreements, which had been negotiated by Turgut Ozal few months earlier. The decision showed quite clearly that the generals were no longer insistent on long-gone etalist developmentalism. His removal might have sent the wrong signals to the IMF, which in turn might have resulted in cutting Turkey's most needed economic aid.

The economic strategy of the so called "January 24th Decisions" (austerity measures introduced by the Demirel government with Turgut Ozal as economic supremo behind them) had called for, in addition to domestic measures, greater reliance on foreign trade, international borrowing and direct foreign investment in order to achieve its domestic targets. The implications of this strategy, in turn, affected Turkish foreign policy in general, and reflected heavily in Turkey's relations with the EC and the Middle Eastern states.

During the process, Turkey's domestic economic targets became heavily connected with international economic developments and with other states' willingness to buy Turkish products, to lend money to Turkey or to invest in Turkey. In other words, Turkey's economic policies after, or concurrent with, its domestic policies became internationalized and international public opinion and foreign governments'
actions became an important determinant for Turkey's political and economic policies, thus also for its foreign policy.

Moreover, these economic policies, recommended by the IMF and the World Bank, were undertaken under the supervision of these organizations. Since international borrowings were usually connected with the IMF's positive signal which in term depended on Turkey's compliance with their advice or requirements, Turkey and its foreign policy had to take into account opinions and requests of these organizations, as well.

One of the tools of the new economic strategy was to depend on more international borrowing. A need to borrow large sums, however, is more often than not a potential source of constraint on any country's foreign policy. There were precedents in the use of economic pressures as instruments of policy against Turkey in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s. Indebtedness of this size also has the potential to put in jeopardy the autonomy and the negotiating power of the governments with the creditor countries.

Complications arising from this factor were seen in the period of 1980-83, during which the EC and West European states, despite strong responses from Turkey, attempted to use economic pressures (i.e. holding of the fourth protocol of the 1963 Association Agreement) on her as a political leverage to get a speedy return to democracy. 104

On the other hand, the US readiness to support Turkey's borrowing needs when the European organizations and states were refusing to lend money on political grounds gave more credibility to the US as a reliable ally and significantly helped Turkish-US relations to move away from the strains of the 1970s.

Another external pillar of this economic strategy was to expand exports which, because of international economic conditions, was not at all easy. One must also consider the need for export markets as a new source of political tension. The shift to an outward-oriented economic development strategy, with its emphasis on expanded exports, was imbued with potential tensions particularly because the Turkish drive had
to transpire against the backdrop of rising protectionism in world trade and intimations of international trade wars in the horizon. For example, during the period, the row between Turkey and the EC over Turkey's textile quotas had its part in worsening of Turkey's relations with Western Europe. In both 1982 and 1983, with the European textile industry in a very depressed state, the Community took the unusual decision to restrict imports of Turkish cotton goods which led Turkey to retaliate and impose an import duty on community steel in April 1982. They also criticized the Community, in vain, because of the fact that Europe, whenever it suited it, did not want to practise the free-trade policies it preached.

Turkey's relations with individual Western European states also deteriorated over trade rights during the military regime. French exporters, for example, claimed that during 1983, when relations between France and Turkey were at an all time low because of human rights and Armenian terrorist issues, the Turkish authorities were discriminating against their products. There was also an "unofficial" trade boycott on French products by the Turkish people because of what was conceived as France's supportive attitude towards Armenian terrorists.

Moreover, the world recession had also affected relations between West Germany and Turkey. The 1,6 million Turks living in W. Germany, at a time when unemployment was extremely high, had led to the growth of resentment and outbreaks of violence against this very visible ethnic minority, which in turn prompted strong Turkish condemnation and strained the relationship.

Against this background, the ready and vast market of the Middle East was a welcoming option for Turkey's new export drive. Apart from the economic factors, that is opening up markets for Turkish exports; getting hold of oil at as favourable a price as possible; and obtaining loans from the oil rich Middle Eastern states, the cool relations which Turkey was experiencing with Western Europe also had their share behind this new drive. In particular, opening up new markets for Turkish exports, was of vital importance in the long term. In view of the slow growth of Turkey's industrial production, the difficulties encountered in selling agricultural and industrial products to
the Western industrial nations and the growing rate of unemployment, the Middle East as a region was likely to become increasingly important as a market for Turkish goods.

As a result, from 1980 to 1982, while Turkey's exports to the EC dropped from %42.7 to %30.5 of total exports, the percentage that went to the Middle East and North Africa doubled - %22.3 to %45. Turkish construction firms found support from government in their efforts to get contracts from Middle Eastern countries. By the end of 1982, there were also approximately 250,000 Turkish workers in the region - one should bear in mind that this time coincided with the return of large number of Turkish workers from Western Europe.

The outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq, and Turkey's neutrality, also helped greatly to increase her commercial links with the both countries. Bilateral trade with Iran, for example, rose to the level of $2.3 billion in 1983-84 and continued to increase, reflecting an interdependence which was not easily reversed and which caused occasional strains for the Turkish foreign ministry's attempts to balance country's security concerns with its economic gains. As a result, Turkey had to tolerate the growth of a large Iranian exile community, numbering upwards of half-a-million. Turkey was similarly tolerant of occasional lapses in good neighbourliness, showing restraint when Iranian officials sought to promote Islamic fundamentalism in its secular system. Meanwhile, the volume of Turkey's trade with Iraq in 1983 was second only to that with West Germany.

2.4. Domestic Political Stability

Another factor that helped Turkey during the 1980s to expand and diversify its foreign relations and stabilize its foreign policy, was the new stability achieved in domestic politics under the military regime. The instabilities noted earlier (section 2.2.2.2) regarding domestic security, were largely resolved, or, at least, subdued for the time being, by the military government towards the end of its first full year in the power. Moreover, the lack of political opposition, and thus squabbling between political
parties, enabled the government to take and apply decisions pretty quickly while the concentration of powers in the hands of the NSC meant the end of political strife in the country which prevented pre-1980 governments from being effective. Consequently, especially in the Middle Eastern context, aided by the new dialogue with the conservative Arab states and with the opportunities created by the Iran-Iraq War, the new stability provided Turkey with a sense of confidence in itself as a credible regional power.

During the second half of the 1970s, the perceived serious internal threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey had forced an important portion of Turkey's internal energy and resources to be diverted to the management and the resolution of the issue. Such diversion automatically undermined and restricted the ability of Turkey to confront important foreign policy issues and choose alternative policies. In other words, as long as Turkey was not in full control of the domestic situation, her freedom of movement in foreign and defence policies was necessarily subjected to and limited by the requirements of her struggle with domestic violence. Hence, the success Turkey achieved under the military regime in containing political violence and terrorism helped Turkey in the middle-to-long term to diversify its energies other than internal security problems and enabled Turkey to look for alternatives in foreign policy.

On the other hand, in the short term, however, the military dimension of the official approach to the problem of containing terrorism confounded the military regime's willingness and movements towards greater democratic freedoms, which in turn threatened to jeopardize relations with Western Europe.

From the Turkish perspective, the frustration worked both ways, for the generals knew that as long as restrictions on democratic freedoms and human rights continued to exist, their relations with Western Europe could not be normalized. On the other hand, they were determined to see the end of their struggle with terrorism before finally retiring to their barracks. The process, however, they believed, was hampered and prolonged by the Western states which allowed "suspected terrorists" to go freely under the false pretensions of "political refugee" status. Further, they believed that
the terrorists derived a considerable amount of support for their actions in Turkey from their activities in the West and from the sanctuary they found in those states.

Hence, Kenan Evren complained several times bitterly about European public opinion which protected and nurtured terrorists and criticized Turkey for punishing them. He was particularly forthright in his criticism when, after a Turkish terrorist, Mehmet Ali Agca, shot the Pope, he said that he hoped the attempted assassination would encourage foreign critics of his regime to "come to their senses".113

In the pre-1980 period, not only acute internal security problems, but also instability of the political system had caused problems for Turkish foreign policy. Against the backdrop of fiercely competitive party politics, the major parties, before 1980, had tended to refrain from taking any politically risky, though innovative, foreign policy initiatives. Also, to all intents and purposes, the pattern of coalition, or weak minority, governments as functioned in Turkey had seriously limited Turkey's flexibility in the foreign policy arena, as seen on the case of Mr. Hayrettin Erkmen's forced resignation on the ground that the government had neglected the Arab world in favour of the West and Israel. In the same pattern, Demirel government in 1980 was unable to push Turkey's application for full membership to the EEC because of well-known opposition of NSP to it and the JP minority government's need of its support in the parliament. Likewise, the DECA agreement, negotiated between Turkey and the US during the 1979 and 1980, could not been brought before the TGNA for ratification due to possibility of defeat. Hence, the instability of domestic political situation had limited and dictated Turkey's foreign policy choices, particularly during the months immediately prior to the coup.

In this respect, the military government, and to some extent the following Ozal governments, had little restraint on themselves. The military government, in particular, because of its peculiarity as being not answerable to anybody, including the judiciary, and to the public in general, was at ease in foreign policy and able to take initiatives which civilian governments would not dare. As a result, after the military regime, Turkish foreign policy became increasingly more assertive as evidenced by frequent
official emphasis on the need for a Turkey-centred approach, which can be seen in the continuing efforts to broaden external contacts, notably with the Soviet Union and the Arab World.

2.5. Military Attitudes

A last, but not least important, factor that had influence over Turkish foreign policy during the 1980-83 period was the military leader's understanding of, and attitudes against, the foreign perceptions of their regimes. In other words, how the military regime responded to its critics from abroad.114

First of all, the long term linkage with Western Europe and the US had affected closely the vision of both the Turkish people and their governments have about what type of society and what type of a future they would like to have. This vision includes a modern political democracy characterized by high levels of economic prosperity. Therefore, the difference between the NSC and its Western European critics was not actually on the principle but in the substance. In other words, the friction was not over the question of whether Turkey would return to democracy again, because the military leaders, as a result of their Kemalist training, were sincere in their conviction that democracy is the best form of government for the country.115 Therefore, General Evren for example was sincere in his claim that they "have not eliminated democracy" but they "were forced to launch this operation in order to restore democracy with all its principles, to replace a malfunctioning democracy".116

From the moment it took over the government on September 12, 1980, the NSC regime made it clear that it intended to eventually return power to democratically elected civilian authorities.117 It made equally clear, however, that it did not intend a return to the pre-1980 situation.118 Rather, the Council aimed at a major restructuring of Turkish democracy to prevent a recurrence of political polarization, violence and crisis that had afflicted the country in the late 1970s.119 Hence, the conflict was rather over the question of when and what kind of democracy it would return the country to.
Obviously the generals' conception of democracy did not correspond to that prevailing in Western Europe. Nor was it at peace with the democratic ideal of Turkish intelligentsia. The democracy, so often talked about by the generals, was the kind of democracy valued in their own world, which is, as Birand rightly notes, totally different from that of the civilians, and deeply rooted in their training and education, their martial lifestyle, and their way of thinking. In this model, the ideal democratic order was one where "national unity" is not affected by any disharmony, and where everyone shares a common opinion about the common good, which so convincingly corresponds with the ideas of the man at the top. Indeed, General Evren considered European democracies weak from this point of view, and did not hesitate to criticize them.

The military wished to see a political regime in Turkey that was a pluralist system of government but, at the same time, one in which such Republican norms as secularism, territorial-integrative nationalism, and populism would not be overlooked and the necessary measures for further modernizing Turkey would be taken.

Their democratic model combined discipline, proper organization, disregard for self-interest in favour of the nation and the homeland, cooperation, unity and constructiveness. In this model, a powerful state, not the individual freedoms, was respected as the most effective means of achieving democracy, that is Kemalist democracy. The contradictions of this model with European style democracy are so obvious that no further discussion is needed here, but the results of European criticisms of it and the military regime's responses to them are both worth looking at.

Much of the governmental sensitivity towards Western Europe tended to be along the lines that Europe should "drop its criticisms" on such matters as human rights, because they believed that the harsh measures the military exercised in combating problems that led Turkey to brink of civil war, were justified by circumstances and supported by a national referendum in 1982. They frequently argued that there was no democracy before the coup, only governmental paralysis, economic chaos and political terrorism. Hence, the "12 September operation" had to be initiated "in conformity with the wishes of the Turkish nation", and therefore, as
"our friends no doubt will understand", the final word on the process of democratization "rests with the Turkish nation". They further argued that every country must find its very own democratic system, suitable to its needs and conditions rather than some pre-set principles; and that Turkey, as I already mentioned (pp. 149-150), should be treated differently from the rest of the Europe on the ground that her conditions, both socio-economic and strategic, were different.

The generals were also sensitive about comparisons between their regime and that of the Communists in Poland. They asserted several times that they had saved democracy in Turkey, while Polish generals aimed to destroy any move towards establishing democracy in their country.

Beside, they believed that the European criticisms of their regime were unjust and originated from the leftist propaganda of the terrorists, who had escaped from Turkey, and supported by the Communists, Socialists, and Greeks in the European forums. They were also very sensitive about the poor information the European governments seemed to be getting from the "unreliable sources", meaning any opposition of the military regime. As a result, General Evren was very critical about what he termed "Byzantine intrigues" to expel Turkey from the Council of Europe, to restrict Turkish exports, and to criticize its human rights records. Turkey could do without the West, he said, if the West continued to make things difficult.

Of course, European criticisms of the military regime in Turkey gained meaning in terms of the NSC's Western orientation in its outlook. Like other parts of the Turkish governing elite, the military leadership, as a result of historical experiences, economic relationships, defence needs and the vision of the future, has looked to the West as being the most advanced representative of contemporary civilization, and in time has come to view itself as a part of Europe. Since then it has persistently followed policies to achieve higher levels of integration with Western European countries and organizations. Therefore any kind of criticism which would result in a severance of Turkey's relations with Europe, was unwelcome for the military regime. In this sense, they regarded being a member of the otherwise politically unimportant Council of
Europe as a symbol of Europeanness. Thus, the question of acceptability in the Council became a matter of domestic as well as international prestige for them.\footnote{127}

While discussing European criticism, one also has to keep psychological factors in mind. As a result of Turkish pride and sensitivity towards criticism, for example, the generals, when they faced unfavourable judgements from Europe, usually felt that their pride and face had been wounded and complained about being rejected by the West.\footnote{128}

Moreover, because of the above-mentioned peculiar Turkish sense of "complete sovereignty", the government regarded any criticism of its internal affairs as interference.\footnote{129} In this context, raising Turkey's human rights record in the European Commission of Human Rights in July 1982 by the five states was regarded by the military government as an intolerable infringement of Turkey's internal affairs. The criticisms became more unacceptable to Turkey, when particularly they were accompanied by pressures from European states that were regarded as hostile to Turkey.\footnote{130}

In turn, General Evren likened European allegations of human and political rights violations in Turkey to a European intervention into internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire during the period of its decline, which aimed mainly to disintegrate it. Moreover in 1982 he attacked Council of Europe critics from countries which condoned often brutal racism against Turkish workers and which harboured the Armenian terrorists who were murdering Turkish diplomats.\footnote{131}

The Turkish reaction to European criticism was also, undoubtedly, related to a sense that the international community was neither fully aware of Turkey's recent difficulties nor appreciated the constructive role the military traditionally played in Turkish politics.\footnote{132}

The disturbance from the Western criticism was, however, so intense at one time or another that some people even started to argue about political will of self-isolation from Europe in order to create a critic-free environment.\footnote{133} Indeed, the idea was sometimes advanced that defiant attitudes and actions of the military regime - such as the imprisonment of Mr. Ecevit two days before a visit by the West German foreign
minister Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was coming to convey European displeasure at the military regime, and who had asked in advance to meet Mr. Ecevit; the closure of some newspapers on the eve of a meeting of the Council of Europe where the issue of Turkish expulsion was on agenda; or the trials of the members of the Turkish Peace Association, Jehovah's Witness, and Writers Union - may even be intended to be deliberate gestures of self-isolation. Although, in view of the military regime's Western orientation, one can argue that the weight of this kind of considerations could not be so high in the NSC, it should also be borne in mind that these events all undoubtedly followed high-level political choices in Turkey.

One last matter we should discuss in the context of international criticism of the military regime in Turkey is whether the critics of the regime were successful in their attempts and whether, and how, they affected the regimes' attitude towards its internal commitments, i.e. early return to democracy and full human rights.

Of course, to assess the degree of influence these criticisms had on the military regime is a very difficult matter but one can, at least argue that, by keeping alive international attention on Turkey, these critics continuously pressurized and reminded the generals of the existence of international public opinion. Also, it is fairly clear that the military regime, despite the contrary official rhetoric, was sensitive to European criticisms, and cared about the perceptions of the international opinion, both before and after the intervention. And, keeping in mind the importance the military leaders attached to Turkey's relations with the West, we can argue that the European factor certainly counted, though its effect as to speed up the democratic process was not so clear. In other words, although the military leaders had to take European opinion into account, and therefore, probably, were not comfortable with what they were doing, they, nevertheless continued to do what they set out to do. Beside, even if they could not do everything they would have done otherwise, they stayed long enough to see the end of political terrorism, economic chaos and political instability, reasons for their intervention in the first place.
2.6. The Ozal Factor

To all these factors which had affected the conduct of Turkish foreign policy under the military regime, or originated from it and affected Turkish foreign policy afterwards, we can also add another indirect result of the military regime, that proved to have important imprints on Turkish foreign policy during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s; that is, creating a peculiar political environment from which Mr. Turgut Ozal emerged as prime minister of the country.

Without denying the existence, or underestimating the importance, of other factors in his success, it is certainly arguable that the newly restructured political system, which did not allow former politicians to participate, provided Mr. Turgut Ozal, whose influence on Turkish foreign policy will be discussed in next chapter, with an opportunity to run for the office and to emerge in 1983, among restricted candidates, as prime minister.

3. Concluding Remarks

As has been shown here, after the September 12, 1980 intervention, a high level of continuity in Turkish foreign policy followed both from the basic features of the country's situation, and from the attitudes entrenched in the policy-making elite which were particularly marked in the officer corps.

Within this pattern of continuity, however, shifts of emphasis could be expected as a result of:

- the nature of the regime and the attitudes of its leaders towards both external developments and foreign, especially Western European, perceptions of their regime;

- changes in the external environment, taking into consideration Turkey's revived strategic importance together with her enhanced security concerns, both external and internal;
- domestic political and economic developments, which aspired the ruling elite to look to Europe but, at the same time, forced them to turn to other parts of the World for greater economic and political cooperation.

The cumulative effect of these shifts on Turkish foreign policy was to place increased emphasis on Turkey's relations with the USA and with neighbouring Islamic states, while leading to a cooling of relations with Western Europe.
In addition to three major instances of military intervention (1960, 1971 and 1980) and two abortive coups led by colonel Talat Aydemir (February 1962 and May 1963), there have been other intrusions into the political arena by the Turkish military. For a detailed and lively discussion about the secret societies and coup-plannings within the Turkish military see Oymen, O., *Bir Ihtilal Daha Var* (Yet There Is Another Coup), (Istanbul; Milliyet Yayinlari, 1987).


7. 12 September, p. 222.


10. 12 September, p. 230; The Times, September 13, 1980, p. 12, Sinan Fisek.


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18. Ibid., p. 50.
19. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
27. The comments of Sir Ian Gilmor, the Lord Privy Seal, after a meeting of EC foreign ministers, seemed to reflect prevailing sentiment in Europe at the time: "No one likes army coups. But when you have 24 killing a day and you have spent five months trying to elect a president, then democracy does not appear to be working very well". See The Times, September 17, 1980, M. Hornsby, "EEC Refrains From Condemning Army Takeover in Turkey", p. 30545.
34. "Why do they (Europeans) keep criticising us?" Asked prime minister B. Ulusu in 1983 and proceed to warn "if we don't manage to hold Turkey together the West might wake up one day and find the 600,000-man Turkish army pointing its guns to Europe under orders from Moscow". Cited in Robert Manning, "Key Role in NATO", The Middle East, April 1983, p. 26.
35. See, for example, George, B. & McInnes, C., "The Turkish Armed Forces And The Southern Flank of NATO", ADIU Report, Vol.5 (6), November-December 1983, pp. 8-10; Spain/Ludington, op. cit.; "Although Turkey in not much richer than most of the third world, it has shown that it can operate a democratic system well above its economic situation", said The Economist, July 9, 1983, "Fumbling in Turkey", p.16, implying a correlation between economic development and the level of democracy.
36. K. Evren told to the reporters in his press conference that they were forced to intervene in order to restore democracy. See Anilar, Vol. 2, September 16, 1980, p. 47; FBIS, 7, September 17, 1980, p. T-1.
37. P. Henze in his article called "Turkey; On The Rebound" mentions a dialogue with one of the five generals in the NSC, who told to him "We want to do it right this time because we might not be able to intervene again". Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 6 (5), 1982, p. 125.


43. In 1983, the Evren government acknowledged 15 deaths by torture, making it the first Turkish administration to have done so. Government figures also showed that twelve security personnel had been convicted of the crime of torture. Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1983; Spain/Ludington, op.cit., p. 165.

44. Robins, op.cit., p. 663.


49. The American administration preferred to use "takeover" and "military regime" instead of "coup" and "military junta". They even sometimes used the word "movement", copying the generals, to refer to the 12 September coup de'tat in Turkey. Spain, op.cit.

51. About the effects of the developments in Iran on Turkey's strategic importance to the West, prime minister of the time, Mr. Demirel, reported to comment as, "Turkey has been here for a long time, you know. It seems we must thank Iran for enabling people see us again." Munir, M., "Turkey: Last Domino? - New Headaches For Old", The Middle East, April 1979, p. 50.

52. For speculation of Turkey's collapse see, ibid., pp. 50-52.

53. Briand, Generals' Coup, pp. 119-120.

54. Reportedly, the response of Paul Henze, the US National Security Council adviser and the Head of the Turkish Desk, to the coup news in Turkey was, "Is that so, great". And his advice to the President was that the intervention was "in our interests" and "should be supported openly by the US". Briand, General's Coup, pp. 85-86 and 196.


56. Briand, Generals Coup, pp. 65, 75, 125 and 185-186; Guldemir, ibid., pp. 17 and 95; Paul, J., "The Coup", Merip Reports, no. 93, January 1981. For American responses to the allegations see Spain, op. cit., pp. 18 and 24-25.

57. The response of the US to the coup was reassuring for the generals. A week after the coup, Secretary General Muskie send a cable through US Embassy to Foreign Ministry, in which he set forth US understanding and sympathy for generals' cause. In addition, President Carter, too, send a letter to General Evren on 6 October, expressing Washington's understanding that the Turkish Generals had had no choice but to do what they did. See Spain, op. cit., pp. 22-23.


61. Ibid., p. 49.


64. MERI Report, Turkey, Middle East Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania (London, Sydney, Dover: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 43.

65. For Turkmen's statement see his interview with Sedat Ergin in Cumhuriyet, August 23, 1982; Also Turkmen-Speeches, pp. 270-271.


Barchard, Turkey and the West, p. 43.


Mackenzie, Turkey under the Generals, p. 11.

After the 1975 American arms embargo, taking in view the Soviet overtures for a od relationship after Stalin's death, former prime minister B. Ecevit formulated new defence and foreign policies for Turkey, based on establishing an atmosphere of mutual confidence with Turkey's neighbours and seeking a more balanced posture between East and West. There were also inclinations towards the non-alignment movement. See the text of an address Ecevit gave to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, on May 15, 1978; and also his "Turkey's Security Policies", Survival, October 1978, Vol. 20 (5), pp. 203-208.

Mackenzie, Turkey Under Generals, p. 12.

For the whole speech see Turkmen-Speeches, entry dated November 14, 1980, pp. 151-154.


Ibid.


Turkmen-Speeches, pp. 290 and 305.

Officially referred to as the line of demarcation, it was drawn after the Cyprus crisis of 1974 to stake Turkey's claims in the Aegean over the territorial sea limits and air
traffic space. With this gesture, taken solely by the General Staff, which went unnoticed and without respond from the Greek side, Turkey lost what could easily be described as an important concession in the Aegean. Birand, The Generals' Coup, p. 131.

84. Ibid., p. 84.

85. Bahcheli, T., based on his interviews with foreign ministry officials, states that General Evren endorsed the Rogers Plan, which allowed Greece to return NATO, by consulting only the foreign minister and another senior member of the Ministry. See his Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 (Boulder, San Francisco, London: Westview Press, 1990), p. 149.

86. Ibid.


88. Prime Ministry, Directorate General of Press and Information, Towards A Sound Democracy, (not dated); Anarsi ve Terror, pp. 3-4.

89. As of March 1983 there were 4,040 union members on trial, of whom 3,561 were affiliated with DISK; 15,001 members of other legal organizations such as the leftist Teachers Union, TOB-DER; and 303 former parliamentarians, 98 journalists and 71 lawyers. 3,518 members of formerly legal associations were still under arrest as of March 1983. See Anarsi ve Teror, p. 155.


91. For concern of the military leaders about Kurdish separatism before the Coup d'etat in Turkey see Birand, General's Coup, pp. 39-41, and 139.


93. During period under military regime (1980-1983), the semi-official Turkish Cultural Research Institute published at least six books arguing that the Kurds are of Turkish origin and their language is corrupted under influences of Persian and Arabic. See Bruinessen van, M., "The Kurds in Turkey", MERIP Reports, Vol. 14 (2), February 1984, p.7. At the same time, those academics who challenged this official view, most
eminent of whom was Turkish sociologist Ismail Besikci, were harrassed and tried for separatist activities.


97. See Evren's speech in Malatya in October 1981, during which he denied that the planned move of second army has anything to do with Kurdis problem. Speeches, Vol. II, p. 49.

98. A Kurdish woman was quoted in the Times, January 5, 1988, saying that they "support the PKK because they are the only ones who remained in Kurdistan. Maybe they do amke some mistakes, but we shall get our rights through fighting, not words".

99. It was admitted by NATO experts that Turkey's armed forces had suffered from the poorest quality of equipment in the alliance, due primarily to Turkey's relatively weak economy and to the damaging effects of the American arms embargo. The urgency to modernize Turkish forces was so intense that the Reagan administration had to place Turkey high on the priority list for increased security assistance, calling its needs "urgent", "pressing", and "most demanding", in clear contrast, for example, to the merely "necessary" modernization needs of Greece. See Laipson, Friendly Friction, p. 22. For Turkey's modernization needs, see Turkey's Problems and Prospects, p. 20.

100. Though the NSC regime even surpassed previous military regimes in its allegiance to Kemalism, their "neo-Kemalism" seemed different from old forms of Kemalism in many points of view. They did not refrain, for example, from closing down the RPP, the party of M. Kemal. Though it meant severing a major link with the Kemalist legacy the generals did not hesitate to do it, since the old "army-party-bureaucracy" alliance that had sustained the Kemalist tradition had already been broken down. For the new state elites, Kemalism became only a justification for state elites' taking upon themselves responsibility of supervising the general interest. Defining general interest, however, was not viewed as an all-embracing task. In other words, the Kemalist thought now served as a justification for rejecting radical ideologies of both the left and the right, but the demands of the other sectors of the society were not ipso facto rejected any more. For a more general discussion of neo-Kemalism as interpreted by the military elites of 12 September see, Borovali, A. F., Kemalist Tradition, Political Change and The Turkish Military, P.hD. Thesis, Queen's University, Canada, April 1985, p. 147; Heper in Heper/Evin, op. cit., p. 8; Birand, M. A., Shirts of Steel; An Anatomy Of The Turkish Armed Forces (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1991), chapter 5.


102. This was particularly striking when taken into account that the NSC dismissed many bureaucrats who, they thought, were closely associated with the old politicians, and that Ozal was regarded by many as Demirel's right-hand man in economic affairs.

103. In his memoirs, General Evren explains that when the question arose in the early days regarding a selection between Turgut Ozal and A. B. Kafaoglu as finance
minister, they preferred Turgut Ozal because he "was conducting negotiations with the foreign countries and finance organizations". Moreover, they wanted to keep him in a position where he could continue to implement January 24 decision that he had initiated. See Anilar, Vol. II, p. 68.

104. For Turkish resentment see, for example, New York Times, May 5, 1981, And February 17, 1982, both cited in Kuniholm, B., "Turkey And NATO: Past Present And Future", Orbis, Vol. 27, 1983, p. 433. Keeping in mind generals' usual dislike of any kind of political pressure and the size of money in consideration ($45 million), which was not so substantial even for Turkey's economy, we would not be wrong to argue that Turkey's complaints about the Fourth Protocol grew more out of humiliation rather than the need for this money. It became more important political symbol that its economic significance would ever attach to it.


106. Barchard, Turkey and the West, p. 62.


113. The Economist, May 1981, "Give The Turks Time".

114. While discussing the importance of the nature of the government, I already touched upon some aspects of this factor and how it affected military regime's relations with foreign states. Therefore check with parts 2.1 and 2.2.2.1 of this chapter.

115. Birand, Shirts of Steel, pp. 60 and 80; Kemal, op. cit., pp., 12.

116. Refer to Note 36.


118. Ibid., pp. 36-38.


120. Birand, Shirts of Steel, p. 80. In this innovative book, the author, for the first time, attempts to give inside story of the Turkish army and strikingly unveils, through interviews with cadets and military personnel, the background of the tendency in the Turkish military to intervene. Particulary see part one; The Making Of An Officer.


125. Spain/Ludington, op.cit., p. 151.


127. Barchard, Turkey and the West, p. 59.

128. Ibid., p. 60.

129. Refer to Note 46.

130. Barchard, Turkey and the West, p. 61. See also an article in The Economist which criticise European Communities for holding Fourth Protocol from the point of view that "Turks do not respond well to nagging...and dig their heels in even deeper". January 1, 1982, pp. 17-18, "Seing Turkey Plain Is What The EEC Isn't Doing".


133. Cemal, op.cit., p.239 relates an interview with the Ambassador of West Germany who asked him whether there was a junta within the military regime which wanted to isolate Turkey from Europe and got more dependent to the US.

134. Barchard, Turkey and the West, p. 45; Cemal, ibid., p. 239.

135. Birand, Generals Coup, notes that the actual intervention was delayed several times particularly when the government was about to make important contacts with monetary bodies abroad. Also see Mackenzie, K., Turkey in Transition (Ankara: nd., Approx. 1981), p. 25.
CHAPTER FIVE

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE REVIVAL OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY

1983-1991

Political Aspects of Change

1. Introduction

The previous chapter examined how the nature of the political regime in Turkey after the 1980 intervention affected its image and identity vis-a-vis the outside world and how, in turn, this had impacts on Turkey's foreign relations. The conclusion was drawn that being less than a full democracy, as understood in the West, created constraints on Turkey's foreign relations and limited its courses of action.

Broadly speaking, the military leaders of Turkey, being true to their promises and the military's long-lasting tradition, pulled the army out of politics and gradually allowed democracy to take its path. On November 6, 1983, the Turkish people went to the polls to replace Turkey's military government with a civilian one. On November 14, the Higher Election Council announced official results which were hailed in and outside Turkey as a victory for democracy. The Motherland Party of Turgut Ozal won the elections by obtaining 45.1% of the votes cast and nearly 53% of the seats in the assembly. On December 7, one day after the official dissolution of the National Security Council, President Kenan Evren asked him to form the new government, which he duly did on December 14, thus becoming the 45th prime minister of the country. When the government programme was approved in the parliament on December 25, the transfer of power to the civilian government was completed. This, however, did not mean that Turkey reached, once again, a stage of full democracy overnight. What followed was described variously as a "transitional period", "guided democracy", "democracy under military tutelage", "halfway-house democracy", or a
"two tiered regime". Whatever name was chosen to describe the state of the political regime existing in Turkey after 1983, it was quite certain that the type of regime, with its peculiar characteristics from both democratic and authoritarian regimes, was bound to affect the country's international standing. Turkey's relations with the Western Europe were likely to be especially vulnerable for some time to changes in the domestic political situation, since under the military regime these relations had been strongly influenced by European perceptions of Turkey's domestic politics. In this respect, it should be recalled that critics of Turkey had been casting doubt on the democratic credentials of the forthcoming Parliament even long before the elections. Therefore it was obvious that the transitional period would not be smooth in respect to Turkish-European relations because of its connections with the existence of a democratic regime in Turkey.

Hence, a broad survey of the nature and the participants of the regime that followed military government after 1983 is justified here. Moreover, the political system that was created by the military regime, which involved preventing Turkey's top political echelons from participating in politics for five to ten years and establishing a system of elimination for new political aspirants, was, in a sense, primarily responsible for the composition of the country's political decision-makers for at least next few years. It is only a natural consequence that Turkish foreign policy was to be determined by those who were raised to power by circumstances beyond their control, namely the military regime's designs to re-shape Turkey's future and political system. One should keep in mind that without the political vacuum caused by the military junta, Mr. Turgut Ozal would not have been able to emerge in the 1980s as a strong political figure and certainly could never have come to power through the general elections of 1983.

Therefore in this chapter, a sketch of Turkey's democratic experience after 1983 will be given, together with the consequences of military intervention in Turkey's subsequent political structure, as a part of the domestic inputs of Turkey's foreign policy configuration during the second part of the 1980s.
2. The Legacy of The Military Regime: Political Reconstruction and Social Depoliticization

If the first and most immediate task of the military regime of September 12 1980 was the restoration of order, it soon became clear that the long term aims were the reconstruction of the political system and depoliticization of social strata. However, the extent to which the Evren regime would exclude the old parties and politicians from Turkish politics only gradually became clear.

Upon the announcement of the NSC on September 12, 1980, all political party activity throughout the country was banned and the leading political figures were taken into "protective custody". Although the leaders of the Nationalist Action Party (ultra-nationalist right), Nationalist Salvation Party (religious right) and Turkish Labour Party (Marxist left) were arrested and tried later on for their activities before the takeover, Demirel and Ecevit, the leaders of two major of-centre parties - JP and RPP respectively - were both released from custody on October 11, 1983, upon signing an undertaking that they would "refrain from making political statements or engaging in any kind of political activity until such time as the military regime permitted the resumption of party politics". Although they were allowed to return to their homes and no restrictions were put on their correspondence, their political rights were further restricted during the summer 1981 by the NSC decree, No. 52, which forbade them to make political comments and statements.

It soon became clear that the military was actually trying to eliminate minor parties of the Second Republic by way of judicial process, and was not so keen either on seeing the leaders of the two main parties take leadership of their respective parties again, though they certainly did not intend to close political parties at this stage. Despite the contrary statements from General Evren during the first year of the coup, however, the NSC decree of October 16, 1981 ordered all political parties then in existence to disband, thus ending more than a hundred years of existence of political parties in Turkey.
A "third blow" for the political cadres of the pre-1980 period came with the 1982 Constitution, which, with a provisional article, banned all members of the last parliament from politics for five years and all major political leaders for ten years. The ban was seen by many as one of the last attempts by the military to eliminate old cadres and to build a "new democratic order" in which new leaders with new discourses would dominate the political scene and preserve the "12 September order".

The major cornerstones of the restructured Turkish political system were laid, in addition to the new Constitution, by the new political Parties and Election laws, all of which prepared by the Consultative Assembly and approved by the NSC. The former was also put to referendum on November 7, 1982 and received an overwhelming acceptance by more than 92% of the electorate who voted. Despite misgivings about the fairness of the referendum, the size of the positive vote was interpreted by many, among them General Evren, as popular respect for General Evren who became automatically president with the endorsement of the referendum. The generals also concluded that the result of the referendum showed popular dislike and dismay of pre-1980 period and people's tacit approval of and support for the military's policies of past two years.

The Presidential powers were the key for the new Constitution and it seems that they were prepared with General Evren in mind. Apart from the powers to dissolve parliament, to choose the prime minister, to appoint and dismiss cabinet members, and to declare emergency and rule by decree, the president could now lead the Council of Ministers whenever he wished and have rights to appoint the leading members of the high courts, the Chief of General Staff, and the Council of Higher Education together with all University Rectors (Article 104).

One of the most effective but not openly declared aims of the military regime, along with the restructuring of political life, was the depoliticization of society. To this end strict limits were put on the activities of associations, the press, the universities, and on the rights and freedoms of individuals. Article 14 of the Constitution defines the limits of permissible political ideologies and objectives, excluding ideas based on
"hegemony of one social class over others" (Marxism) or on discrimination "of language, race, religion, or sect" (Kurdish separatism, religious fundamentalism and sectarianism respectively).

Moreover, the Constitution restricted politics to political parties. It prohibited political parties from establishing auxiliary branches for the youth and women (Article 68). Similarly, cooperative political action among different associations and between political parties and associations were forbidden. Accordingly, the 1983 Law of Associations further specified that teachers, high school students, civil servants, and soldiers were prohibited from forming or joining associations, including political parties.26

Further, the Constitution determined the limits of the political activity in which political parties could engage themselves. Article 68 stated that no political party "shall be in conflict with the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, human rights, national sovereignty, and the principles of the democratic and secular Republic".

With the Electoral Law, the generals also attempted to increase political stability by preventing small parties from entering parliament. Article 33 stipulated that only those parties which had received 10% of the national vote would have representation in the parliament. Article 34 of the same law introduced further cut-offs in the district level.27

In order to prevent the frequent party changing of deputies, another source of instability in the pre-1980 parliaments, Article 84 of the Constitution made it possible to terminate membership of a deputy who did so. The Political Parties Law also regulated intra-party politics under judicial control.

Furthermore, the formation of new political parties was indeed complicated by bureaucratic red-tape28 and more importantly an elimination system introduced by the NSC. First of all, the NSC prohibited the new parties and their founders from having ties to the pre-1980 political parties. To foresee this the NSC empowered itself with the veto power to prevent unfit individuals from forming a party. Moreover to qualify for
the November elections, the parties had to have approved party list of at least 30 founding members by August 25, 1983. Further restraint was put on the prospective parties by insisting that they had established organizations in at least 34 provinces and at least half of the towns connected with those provinces, and completed their general congresses by the above deadline.

In addition, the NSC had rights to veto any founding members and/or prospective deputies of the parties even after the elections until the Higher Election Council officially announced the results (provincial Article 4 of Political Parties Law).

With all the restrictions on individual and associational rights and limits over the role of political parties, the 1982 Constitution, together with supplementary laws, was intended to create a strong state which could prevent challenges to national unity and security. Further, it demonstrated the military leaders' preference for unity over freedom.

3. Emergence of New Political Parties

Under the above mentioned environment, it goes without saying that to establish and maintain a political party which would represent and articulate interest groups in the country would require a high level of organizational capability. Nevertheless there was enthusiasm among prospective politicians to form political parties when the ban concerning political activities was lifted on April 24, 1983, and immediately after the NSC allowed political parties to be formed on May 16, 1983, several parties emerged hoping to fill the vacuum created by the disbanding of former political parties.

It is significant that despite the NSC's attempts to put obstacles in the way of new party formation in order to prevent the party inflation of the 1970s, the new parties emerged "as mushrooms coming out of the ground". In all, 15 political parties were formed prior to the November 1983 elections, but only three were allowed to participate in the elections by means of NSC veto and banishment of 15 leading
politicians, including Demirel, to Zincirbozan, a former radar base on the Dardanelles, where they remained until October 1.31

The initial intention of the NSC seemed to be "to create a broad centrist, Kemalist movement along the lines of the French Gaullists".32 But as popular support for such a movement was not forthcoming, the generals had to content themselves with centre-right Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), under the leadership of retired-general Turgut Sunalp instead of Premier Bulent Ulusu who did not want to form it as the generals hoped. Hence NDP became the first party to enter the political arena on May 16.33

It seemed that the generals' concept of multi-party democracy amounted only to a two-party system with one party on the left and the other on the right of the political spectrum. This led to the relatively unproblematic emergence of the Populist Party (PP) under Necdet Calp on May 19 as the tolerated opposition party along side the NDP as the government party.

The only other party which was allowed to be formed in order to enrich the "party landscape"34 was the Motherland Party (Mot.P) of Turgut Ozal, former undersecretary of PM Demirel, and deputy prime minister of the Ulusu government until his resignation in June 1982. His party was looked upon at this date as an eventual coalition partner.

Although it has been much publicized that the NDP enjoyed the backing of the military junta, it should be noted, however, that the other two parties which were eventually allowed to enter the elections, namely Mot.P and PP, were also had NSC's blessings from the very beginning.35 In effect, those parties which were established by three men who worked closely together with the military leaders after the intervention were allowed to participate in the Generals' "guided democracy".36

However, this was not the end of the military's intervention in the election process. Similar to their control of party formation, the generals also set guide-lines for the prospective candidates for office in the November elections. According to the figures in table-I, about 20% of all party candidates were vetoed. By comparison, the
NSC vetoed 89% of the independents. Apparently, the members of the NSC were determined to allow only candidates of the three original parties to take up public office. Following these vetoes, all of the powerful challengers of the NSC-approved parties - individuals, as well as other parties - were temporarily eliminated from the political scene.

**TABLE-I. Breakdown Of Candidate Vetoes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Candidate Numbers</th>
<th>Number Of Vetoes</th>
<th>Candidates Vetoed %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mot.P</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEPENDENT</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1628</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As if these were not enough, President Evren went on television on November 4, to give last minute support to the NDP. The same evening, PM Ulusu made a party propaganda broadcast on behalf of the NDP, ending the fiction of the government's neutrality. He reminded the people of the situation before September 12, 1980 and asked them to bear that in mind when they voted the next day.

Although the process of returning to competitive politics in Turkey began with the general elections of November 6, 1983, as one observer put it, the "mockery of an election" was "merely a secondary election designed to elect 400 members of parliament among 1230 candidates who have repeatedly been tested by the junta".

Contrary to expectations and calculations however, it was Ozal's Motherland Party which received the largest support, thus lending some credibility to the elections.
TABLE-II. Results of General Elections 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
<td>7,833,147</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist Party</td>
<td>5,285,804</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Democracy Party</td>
<td>4,036,970</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>195,588</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>None**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Art. 63 of the Electoral Law imposes obligatory voting and provides for financial fines for voters' abstinence.
** One seat remained empty in the parliament because of a veto on a MP-elected by the NSC.

Source: Resmi Gazete, November 14, 1983, No. 18221, p. 13

Many reasons could be given for the defeat of NDP. It was, nevertheless, indicative of the fact that the citizens did not want a continuation of military regime under civilian disguise and voted for the party which was conceived as the most detached one from the military regime. Also it seemed that TV appeal of President Evren gave a counter-productive result. Though the Turkish people appreciated what the generals had done and were grateful for the end of terrorism - which they showed by endorsing the military's constitution with 92% of the vote - they expected the officers to withdraw to their barracks and certainly did not like to be dictated to from above. In fact, from the day the NDP was established and the NSC's preference was rumoured in the press, a resentment grew among the voters with regard to this party. Significantly, this was not a new development in the Turkish politics. Twice before, in 1961 and 1973, the voters ignored the appeals of the military in favour of certain parties and acted on their own in voting for their favoured political parties.

Although there were rumours for some time after the elections as to whether the generals would except the result, the worst did not happen and the generals duly handed over the government to the new cabinet established by Turgut Ozal. However, this did not mean that free democracy was established in Turkey with the 1983 elections. The NSC was quite clear about this and said that the elections would only mark the beginning of a "period of transition to democracy".

By extending martial law for another four months and by promulgating a harsher press law immediately after the election, allegedly because of the continuing
threat of terrorism, the generals showed that they intended to guide the return to
democracy over the provisional period, that they reserved the right to intervene if they
felt that the situation required it, and that despite the elections, they still remained the
 arbiters of politics in Turkey, at least for the coming six-year period.

4. Developments Since the 1983 Elections

Political developments in Turkey since 1983 elections should be examined at different
levels. In the strictest legal sense, the transition to democracy was concluded when the
parliament was convened on 4-6 December for the first time since September 1980 and
the NSC dissolved itself on December 6, 1983. Even on the broader legal sense,
however, the remnants of the military regime continued to haunt Turkish democracy.
Legal restrictions on press, professional associations and individuals continued to exist
and most of the country remained under martial law for a long time as a reminder of
Turkey's restricted democracy.

On the political level, too, transition to full democracy was painful and took a
considerable time. Abadan-Unat sketched out five stages, each marked by ballot boxes,
for Turkey's political transition: the guided election of November 1983; the provincial
and communal elections of 1984; the September 1986 by-elections with 12 parties; the
referendum concerning the return of former politicians of September 1987; the 1987
early general elections.45

Her classification was done after the general elections of November 1987 which
had been "hailed unanimously in the Western world as the culminating point of Turkey's
return to 'genuine' democracy, the elimination of military tutelage and the reaffirmation
of legitimacy as expressed by popular will".46 Yet, looking from the first part of 1990s,
it seems somewhat misleading to argue that the 1987 elections marked the end of the
road to Turkish democracy, for the leader of the last junta was still president of the
Republic, with four other generals remaining as Presidential Advisory Council.
Moreover fragmentation of and anomalies within Turkey's party system, created by the
abnormal process of the post-1983 democratic transition imposed by military rule, were very much in evidence and continued to evolve. Hence, looking back from a greater distance and a broader context, we might argue that though the 1987 elections essentially marked a turning point in Turkey's democratic history, it was nevertheless one of the phases rather than the end of Turkish democratic evolution. In this context one might spell out four other equally important developments:

1 - The election of Turgut Ozal as president on October 1989, which apart from putting a civilian into the post for only the 2nd time in the Republic's history, also meant an end to constant reminders of the 1980 coup; the presidency of Kenan Evren and the existence of the Presidential Advisory Council.

2 - The election of Mesut Yilmaz on June 1990 as Chairman of Motherland Party which forced President Turgut Ozal to sever his relations with that party, thus ending another legacy of military regime: unwarranted presidential tutelage over governments.

3 & 4 - The municipal elections of 1989 and the early general elections of October 1991 which replaced the Motherland Party, representing the last remnants of the 1983 elections, both in local and national levels respectively by a coalition of TPP and SDPP, representing fresh hopes for democracy, "by which was meant full, participatory, liberal democracy protective of all rights and freedoms and hence loyal to the Charter of Paris which...Turkey had signed earlier in the year".47

Although looking through various elections as a growing indication of Turkey's democratic tradition would be helpful, it could also be defective if we do not include the changes to the conceived order and the changes in the intra-party politics in our analysis. The challenges to the generals' intended political system emerged even before the 1983 elections in the form of unendorsed parties. Apart from the insistence of former politicians not to give in and continue to fight for their political rights, the establishment of new parties under the apparent tutelage of those leaders, especially Demirel and his relations with the GTP, were seen by the generals as a direct challenge to their intents and authority.48 Although these parties were prevented from
participating in the election and the generals' conceived political order was thus secured for the time being, it became clear soon after the elections that the "September 12 parties", as they became known, were not consolidatory but transitional movements and only the Mot.P would generate any following in the mid-to-long term. The two parties, which were dubbed by the military regime as government and loyal opposition before the 1983 elections, were not even able to reach to the next general elections. The Populist Party of Calp merged with the Social Democracy Party of Inonu in November 1985 to form Social Democratic People's Party (SDPP), while the National Democracy Party of Sunalp was forced by circumstances to dissolve itself in May 5, 1986.

When the dust covering the 1983 general and 1984 local elections settled down, it became obvious that the parties outside the parliament - TPP on the right and SDP on the left - replaced those parties as the real centre of opposition. In the 1984 local elections all the parties which met the requirements of the Political Parties Law were admitted to run. Thus those parties prevented by the NSC from being established in time for the 1983 elections were able to test their strength this time. The results proved the Motherland Party, obtained 41.5% of votes, as the most credible political organization at the time. But it also showed that the NDP and PP had already become anachronistic groupings, obtaining only 5.4% and 7.8% of votes respectively, while the TPP and SDP received 11.8% and 24.8% respectively.

The results also showed that more than 40% of electorate were not represented in the parliament, and thus helped to clarified the "paradoxical peculiarity of the politics of transition". The artificial composition of the parliament after the 1984 local elections had dangers within for Turkey's peaceful transition to democracy. The Motherland Party's programme, which was virtually unchallenged in the parliament, was in danger of encountering nasty resistance in the streets because of the powerful opposition forces outside the parliament.

Another consequence of powerful parties being left outside the parliament was the gradual reemergence, between the two parliamentary elections, of the familiar
picture of the pre-1980 period of changes in party allegiance by deputies, thus demolishing another intention of the generals and making a mockery of its safeguard, Article 84 of the Constitution. To overcome the threat deputies found an ingenious way of establishing "hulle partileri" (interim parties), which after 1983 meant in Turkish political usage that a number of deputies, who resigned from their parties to become independent, came together to establish a new party within the parliament, only to merge after short existence with another party outside the parliament.

In the end some extra-parliamentary parties became parliamentary forces without actually having been voted into the parliament. Thus, in May 1987, the distribution of seats in the parliament was as follows: Mot.P, 255 seats; SDPP, 63 seats; TPP, 40 seats; DLP, 23 seats; Independents, 17; and two seats were vacant. Finally, the November 1987 elections legalized this situation, which was caused by the out of touch and rigid approach of the generals' intended political system to socio-political realities, thus ending the anomaly of the existence of powerful extra-parliamentary parties. Along the way, an important milestone was the referendum of September 1987 held in regard to the removal of the political prohibition of "old politicians". Though the outcome was a narrow escape (50.16% yes and 49.84% no with only 75,066 votes difference), it enabled the "old politicians" to return officially to politics and soon they all took up their respective parties' leadership. Moreover many other small parties representing some interest groups or cleavages emerged accordingly. In all, twenty-two parties were founded until 1987, out of which only nine were in existence after the general elections and only three were able to enter the parliament; Mot.P, TPP and SDPP, receiving 36.3%, 19.1%, and 24.8% of votes respectively.

It seemed that after the 1987 general elections only Turgut Ozal was able to remain as a major political figure out of the new names to whom the military leaders of 1980 tied their hopes for the future of their restructured Turkey. While the 1987 elections, as indicated earlier, were taken in the Western world as a fresh start for democracy in Turkey, the election process, thus the results, raised some doubts in
Turkey. Apart from causing nearly one fifth of the electorate to be not represented in the parliament, the results carried within themselves the seeds of political instability as well as questions of governmental legitimacy. After the elections, Demirel, now back in parliament again, started to exploit popular dissatisfaction over increased inflation, and seemingly widespread suspicions of corruption and nepotism in government circles. By 1989, the popularity of Mot.P had definitely decreased. The apparent decline in Ozal's following was exposed by the March 1989 local elections in which Mot.P came third by obtaining only 22% of the votes after the SDPP (28%) and more importantly its centre-right rival TPP (25%). Despite immediate calls for resignation Ozal stayed on, commenting "people gave us only a warning." But the support for Ozal continued to fall off and a poll in late May 1989 showed only 15% support.

The year 1989 represented another important watershed for Turkish democracy; the election of new president, which had earlier brought the parliament into stalemate for more than six months prior to the military coup of September 12. Consequently, the deadlock of the Parliament over the issue of choosing the President of the Republic was among the reasons for the military's intervention. Although there were some speculations earlier in 1989 that a way might be found to allow Evren stand again, it was Mot.P majority in the parliament that in the end determined the outcome. In spite of unpopularity of Mot.P and fervent opposition of other parties, on October 31, 1989 Turgut Ozal was elected as 8th President of Turkey by a simple majority of 263 votes of Mot.P. His election was an important mark for civilian supremacy in Turkey, by not only removing one of the last bastions of the military regime, Kenan Evren, but also securing a civilian only for the second time in republican history in his place. On the other hand, Mr. Ozal's low popularity cast inevitable shadows over his presidency.

Nevertheless, Turgut Ozal went ahead with his presidency and nominated the Speaker of the Assembly, Yildirim Akbulut, as prime minister. The Akbulut government proved no more than a puppet of President Ozal, hence allowing him to govern the country effectively until the succession of Mesut Yilmaz over Akbulut in
June 1990 as Mot.P chairman and consequently prime minister. In the meantime, however, Turgut Ozal guided Turkey during one of its most important foreign policy challenges: the Gulf War, which will be discussed later on. And the 1991 early general elections replaced Mot.P as government with a coalition of TPP and SDPP, and thus started a period of uneasy cohabitation between president and government in Turkey, which only came to an end with President Ozal's untimely death in April 1993.

5. Political Parties and the Parliamentary Supervision of Foreign Policy during the Third Republic

As shown in early chapters, Turkish foreign policy was traditionally considered as bipartisan and above party politics. However, political upheavals of 1970s had their effects on foreign policy, too. Especially during the last part of that decade foreign policy issues, like all other issues, became explosive tool and part of political struggle in the parliament as well as the streets. Finally, parties came to regard foreign policy as just another tool to undermine the power of the governmental party. In this context one remembers the bitter experience of Hayrettin Erkmen, who, as discussed earlier in chapter two, was forced to resign by opposition parties not so much because of the foreign policy he followed, which was the governmental one in any case, but in order to destabilize the government. As we previously stated, before 1980 governments were unable at times to go on implementing their foreign policy decisions or to secure ratification of treaties they had signed because of their weak positions in the parliament which increased the power of parliamentary supervision and influence of opposition parties.

In the 1983 and 1987 Assemblies, however, a combination of different factors resulted in a reversal and weak parliamentary supervision over foreign policy as well as other political issues. Although most of the below mentioned legislative and socio-political factors emerged within and were directed to domestic politics, their connections with foreign policy are evidence as far as parliamentary control over, and
approval of, foreign policy is concerned. And particularly, if one remembers the Turkish
political tradition of putting the government's foreign policy in front of parliament for
general support, their importance become more obvious.

5.1. The Effects of Legal and Political Restructuring

Above all, the legal and political restructuring of the parliamentary democracy
in Turkey by the military regime had immense effects on parliamentary control after
1983.

In its effort to regulate democracy, the 1982 constitution attempted to reduce
the importance and power of parliament vis-a-vis the executive, compromising both
president and the Council of Ministers. Parliament was reduced to a single 400-member
house elected every five years instead of four yearly elections for bi-cameral house of
600-650 members. The system also forced the parliament to organize and support the
government in order to avoid dissolution. In an answer to pre-1980 parliamentary
deadlocks, which left country without government for long periods of time due to
absence of constitutional means to force dissolution, the generals inserted Article 116
to the new constitution. Accordingly the President was empowered to dissolve
parliament and call for elections if the PM were to lose a no-confidence vote or was
unable to obtain a majority within 45 days. Also, if the Parliament was unable to choose
a new president in four ballots it had to be terminated automatically. The president was
additionally given powers to choose the prime minister from any member of Parliament
(Article 109). Together with Article 116 this could result in establishment of a
government which was not voted by the electorate for the office.

The President also now had power to return laws to the Parliament for
reconsideration. Although the latter retained the right to readopt the returned laws
without change, the President could appeal in that case to the Constitutional Court or
submit them to referendum (Articles 89 and 104).
The 1982 Constitution, in order to avoid deadlocks caused by the shaky equilibrium between government and opposition and to prevent minor parties having leverage over government, also strengthened the powers of the political wing of the executive vis-a-vis other parties and of the prime minister vis-a-vis the Council of Ministers. The Article 84, which, as already mentioned above, aimed at preventing frequent party changing of deputies in order to gain political advantages (i.e. ministerial post), favours the majority - i.e. governmental party - since the absolute majority is necessary to decide loss of membership in respect of any deputy who changed his party.

Furthermore, the President was given the power to declare economic or security emergencies in conjunction with the Council of Ministers and then rule by decree, subject to parliamentary approval (Article 104). Also, according to Article 91, the Council of Ministers would be given power by the Parliament to issue decrees having the force of law. In effect, this meant giving the Parliament's right to enact laws to the Council of Ministers. Except during periods of martial law and states of emergency, however, the fundamental individual and political rights cannot be regulated by decrees.

Moreover, in order to ensure cabinet consistency, the President was given power to dismiss ministers on the proposal of the prime minister (Article 104). This of course, strengthened the prime minister's leverage over his cabinet. It is obvious that most of these arrangements worked in favour of government and prevented sufficient parliamentary supervision.

5.2. The Effects of Psychological Factors

Apart from legal arrangements, the Parliament's power to supervise the government was also affected by psychological factors and political developments, caused by the 1980 military coup and the subsequent treatment to which the political elites were subjected.

First of all, as a result of being part of the pre-1980 disorder and also being deliberately identified by the military as one of the main sources of that disorder, feeling
of self-remorse and apologetic behaviour were high among the political elite. Thus, particularly in the first Assembly, the MPs were strikingly ready to compromise in their arguments or attitudes in favour of the government. Also being publicly denounced as self-seeking, and by implication as unpatriotic, and being persecuted for a long time, the professional politician's self-esteem was running low. Moreover the psychology of being subjected to vetos and eliminations again and again before the elections and therefore, in a sense, to be appointed as much as elected to the office must have had its impact on MPs at least for some time.

Furthermore, the actual inexperience of the deputies also prevented the parliament from exercising its already limited powers. As mentioned earlier, as a result of legal prohibition of most of the pre-1980 politicians from politics for 5 to 10 years, and the threatened veto for any person affiliated with pre-1980 parties, the new party founders were forced to look for candidacy of people who were previously inexperienced and uninterested in or even unqualified for politics. As a result in the first parliament after the 1983 elections only 15% of all deputies had previous parliamentary experience and only 9% of them had been national deputies.

Furthermore, according to a survey conducted by Kalaycioglu in September-November 1984, nearly half of the deputies had never been a member of a socio-political association or of a political party and only about one third of the deputies had previous party affiliation over lengthy periods, that is six years or more; and only about one fifth of the deputies had held some administrative posts in the political party organization. Also it showed that about a quarter of the deputies developed an interest in politics only after 1983. These findings point to the fact that the 1983 parliament in Turkey hosted an overwhelming proportion of "non-professional" political actors, hence most of the deputies had to learn and practise the role of being a legislator and supervisor at the same time.

Also, the establishment of parties in 1983 by people who were previously not involved in any political establishment meant in effect that most of the deputies were named for office as a result of personal favour or relation with the leader. Therefore,
personal affiliation and the gratefulness of MPs to their leaders, particularly in the Motherland Party for it commanded majority in the Parliament, ensured the prime minister's patronage over the parliament through his party.

Moreover, the realization of the artificial characters of their parties, especially after the 1984 local elections, and the fact that most of them would not be reelected in the face of powerful extra-parliamentary parties, made MPs more docile and compromising vis-a-vis government. It also increased the loyalty of Mot.P deputies to Mr. Ozal, who had proved by this time to be an able politician and leader, and many of them remained loyal to him to the end. Likewise, the high percentage of turnover among the MPs in the 1987 early general elections meant in effect that the same patterns of inexperience and loyalty would take form in the 1987 Assembly, too.

As a result of the lack of the institutionalization of parliament, because of deputies' inexperience, together with the personal tutelage of premier Ozal over Motherland Party deputies who commanded majority in the parliament, the Mot.P governments were able (especially between 1983-1989 when Ozal was premier) to avoid "every issue that the Mot.P leaders did not wish to tackle" in the parliament, including those of foreign policy.

Looking through the records of parliament for an indication of parliamentary control, particularly in the foreign policy arena, for it constitutes our main interest, one comes across frequent complaints particularly from opposition MPs about the government's avoidance of parliament in decision-making, its unwillingness to give information about developments in Turkey's international relations, MP's difficulty in getting answers to questions and their insufficiency when answered, lack of debates and so forth. For example, only three out of twenty-two requests for general debate or parliamentary inquiry about the government's foreign policy in both 1983 and 1987 Assemblies were accepted and debated later on. Not surprisingly two of those accepted were tabled by either government ministers or Motherland Party MPs.

The information about foreign policy given by the foreign ministers to the assemblies was also irregular. Although during the 1983 Assembly foreign minister Mr.
Vahit Halefoglu gave information to the Parliament about every two weeks, the practice, it appeared, to be less frequent during the 1987 Assembly.\(^7^5\)

Furthermore, having squeezed the question time to only once a week, the foreign ministers, along with other ministers, tended to ignore the urgency of the questions asked by the MPs and the answers usually came after long delays and more often than not after the relevant development had passed. Examination of the records shows that only once did the government of Ozal agree to bring its comprehensive programme of foreign policy in front of the Parliament for general debate beforehand.\(^7^6\)

It appears that most of the parliamentary effort to supervise the government's conduct of foreign policy during the period of 1983-1991 consisted of questions, general debate and inquiry requests after the problems had occurred and actions had been taken by the government. And also governments seemed to avoid giving detailed information about the problems and the causes and the reasons of the governmental actions taken in the foreign policy arena as long as possible and frequently not until they were pressed by the parliament and public opinion in general. Hence one of the most frequent complaints about the conduct of government's foreign policy during the both 1983 and 1987 legislature sessions was "secrecy" in foreign relations.\(^7^7\) After Ozal moved to the Presidency, complaints about his intervention into foreign policy and suspicions over would-be deals made by the President without consultation with the foreign ministry, particularly over the Cyprus issue, became frequent.\(^7^8\) His personal handling of the Gulf War in particular generated great irritation among deputies, as well as public opinion, culminating in a request for "general questioning" in parliament of the Council of Ministers on the grounds that on the face of important developments regarding Turkey "they followed secret diplomacy, avoided the Parliament and brought Turkey into loneliness in foreign relations".\(^7^9\)
5.3. Political Parties and Turkey's External Relations

Another important factor for the relatively calm nature of foreign policy debates in the Parliament after 1983 was the existence of a broad agreement on overall foreign policy issues among major political parties. Hence, before proceeding further, it is worth sketching out roughly the main notions of the major political parties of post-1983 Parliaments on foreign relations.80

The Motherland Party advocated an active role in Turkey's relations with all countries. It stressed that the fundamental foreign policy principle of the Party was the preservation of world peace, and that the stability of the state lay in the foundation of its philosophy of foreign policy. The platform also stated that Turkey should continue to honour the international agreements she had signed, including the NATO Treaty. Moreover, it favoured further relations and cooperation with the EC and with the Western World, of which she was a member from the standpoint of political, military and economic cooperation. It also stressed, however, that relations with the West, should be furthered in such a way as to balance the interests of all the parties involved. As far as Turkey's relations with the Middle East and other Islamic countries were concerned, the MP believed that because of her geographical location and historical ties it was only natural for Turkey to develop closer relations with those countries.

The Populist Party pledged to protect Turkey's national interests in the world and especially in its region by means of a dynamic foreign policy. It also promised to exert extra efforts for detente in international relations, the strengthening of peace and the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. In addition, the party argued that it was necessary for Turkey to broaden the scope of her international relations without discriminating on the basis of the countries' internal social order, so long as her interests and relations in international alliances and communities were not endangered. It was especially in favour of developing close relation with the countries in the region and with developing countries, and stated that moral and cultural ties with the Islamic countries should be taken into consideration in
formulating foreign policy. It believed in continuing membership in NATO and supported the desires for full EEC membership.

The Nationalist Democracy Party declared that the basic principle of their foreign policy was "peace at home, peace in the world", thus implying their allegiance to Ataturk. Also, it pledged to exert efforts in developing cultural, economic and political relations with the Western alliance and the Arab and Moslem countries. It emphasized the fact that Turkey was a member of free world and the Western alliance. While taking an anti-communist stand, it stressed that Turkey's place in NATO should be strengthened and one of the aims should be full association with the EEC.

The Social Democrat Populist Party pledged sound foundations for national security adhering to Ataturk's principle of "peace at home, peace in the world", which would be realized with a dynamic foreign policy. The party prime aims were given as protecting the interests of the Turkish nation and contributing to the happiness of all mankind. Its understanding of international cooperation was based on the principles of friendship, mutual respect and non interference in internal affairs, and attached equal importance to the political and economic aspects of foreign relations. It favoured the role of NATO as a common defence organization which was a contributor to the security of Turkey and therefore believed that membership in it should be maintained. The party also favoured membership in the European Community in the belief that it would not be to Turkey's interests to remain outside Europe politically and economically.

The True Path Party stated that its foreign policy was based on ensuring equality of rights and treatment and balance of interests in bilateral relations. It pledged that foreign policy would be conducted on the basis of securing continuous security for the country through peaceful co-existence, contributing to world peace and developing foreign relations in line with the general principles of the UN Charter. Finally, it favoured developing economic and social relations especially with Turkey's immediate neighbours.
It seems from the foreign policy platforms sketched out above that there was an overall agreement between the political parties, representing more than 80% of the electorate, on the main issues of Turkish foreign policy.

It is striking that all the parties, which had representation in either 1983 or 1987 Assemblies, had agreed on the need for Turkey to follow more active or dynamic foreign policy. This, of course, indicates a common unhappiness among political parties about the hitherto followed supposedly "inactive" foreign policy. A strong desire for change in the country's foreign policy stance was also apparent. Moreover, there was a clear determination to vary and broaden Turkey's relations with even those countries whose domestic systems or foreign policy orientations were different from Turkey, that is Islamic and Communist countries. Apparently this willingness to move Turkey to more dynamic stand vis-a-vis relations with other countries came as a reaction to Turkey's immediate past, during which the inability of weak coalition governments to facilitate their foreign policies often resulted in an unproductive, passive, and at times inadequate Turkey in its relations. Also the effects of domestic changes and international dynamics were obvious in this new willingness on the part of political parties, for the detente in international relations and revival of Islamic consciousness inside Turkey helped Turkish leaders to overcome their and the public's, in general, fears for closer contacts with Communist and Islamic countries respectively. Also, restructuring Turkey's economic system along side free market economy, which all the major parties agreed on, heavily depended on exports earning and foreign investments that in turn demanded good neighbourly and steady relations with all countries, especially regional ones.

Another common point among parties seemed to be on the issue of Turkish membership to EEC. In fact, when Turkey under Mot.P government applied for full membership in 1987, only small, fringe parties representing at the time about 10-12% of the electorate openly opposed it. They were the Prosperity Party (7.16% in 1987 elections), Nationalist Labour Party (2.93%), Reformist Democracy Party (0.82%), and Socialist Party (established in 1988 with no real power base). 81
Again on the NATO membership issue, all the parties represented in both parliaments seemed to have a common understanding.

Since all the parties in both Assemblies seemed to have an informal consensus between them about the basic fundamentals of foreign policy with which Turkey should be identified, most of the disagreements appeared over, most of the requests for general debates were tabled about, and criticisms were directed at specific actions of the government rather than on principles behind those actions. One major exception to this was the continual annoyance of the opposition parties in the face of frequent intervention in governmental foreign policy by Turgut Ozal after he became president. As will be shown below, most of the time they were more disturbed by his interference rather than by what he actually did.


Even in Western states, where societies are more conscious about their united efforts and participatory democracy is more developed, foreign policy is generally of the secondary interest to the public in general and "public opinion" has relatively little to do with its formation. Most people remain uninterested in foreign policy unless a specific issue captures their attention. This is even more correct in a country like Turkey where democracy is wavering, common access to decision makers is prevented by restrictions and limitations, and where foreign affairs, generally speaking, is rather a latecomer into the interest of public opinion. Therefore, while examining the connection between public opinion and foreign policy in Turkey, one has to give priority attention to those in positions more likely to influence ultimate or immediate decision making.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that, although the public in general is, even in the 1990s, far from dictating governmental foreign policy in Turkey, the common priorities and perceptions of the people are reflected, however general it may be, in the country's foreign policy. In this context, especially emotional issues, such as
the Cyprus problem or the rights of Turkish minorities abroad, which frequently arouse
general concern, would cause the governments to be more vulnerable to the leverage of
public opinion than usual. When this happens, while the governments would still try to
manipulate public into their way of conducting foreign policy, decision makers, in turn,
most probably, felt restrained by the common emotional reaction and hence would
comply with public opinion generally.

Traditionally in Turkey, the military, the students, and the trade and commercial
unions constitute the origin of the most of the pressures exerted onto governments. To these groups we could include the press which, at times, plays an important role in
forming public opinion and whose interest in foreign policy by means of expert and
leading articles, though usually coloured with chauvinistic nationalism, is more
profound and continual than others.

Although the above mentioned groups had enjoyed the freedoms of the 1961
Constitution previous to the 1980 intervention, their activities were curbed greatly by
the arrangements of the 1982 Constitution and other related laws. As mentioned earlier,
the generals of the 1980 coup tried, through depoliticization of the society, to limit
political activity to professional political groups and asked others to engage only in
non-political actions in order to promote their self-interests. In the same manner the
post-1980 depoliticized society of the generals did not allow the press, the associations,
unions or the universities to air views which would be harmful to national unity and
order, a phrase which would include, as for as foreign policy was concerned, the
mention of possible trade war between Turkey and the EEC, growing frictions between
Greece and Turkey, allegations of support to Armenian terrorists by Syria, or even
personal information about a visiting Saudi minister, in short, anything that was thought
undesirable by the government to be said.

As some of the legal restrictions for associational activities have already been
mentioned, there is no need to reiterate them here, but it is sufficient to say that at the
end of the military regime the activities of the press were directed to publish news
rather than opinions, of the universities to teach rather than research, of workers'

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unions to economic rather than political struggle, and of other associations to self-interest rather than general interests of the public. As a result of this forced political inactivity, there was no genuine interest by these groups in foreign policy, even long after the restoration of a civilian regime. The notable exceptions were the highly emotional ones that actually captured the interest of the whole nation, such as the repression of Turkish minority in Bulgaria or in Western Thrace, or proposed Armenian resolutions in the US Congress. Concomitantly with political and societal normalization of Turkey during the second half of the 1980s, however, the foreign relations of the country attracted more interest from public opinion, the press and the specialized associations. In contrast, the trade and workers' unions seemed to neglect foreign policy altogether in their activities. The important exceptions were, of course, the commitment showed by the commercial unions and industrialists towards full membership of the EC and their constant pressure on government to continue its liberalization and export-supported economic policies, which in turn necessitated good economic relations with both Western Europe and neighbouring countries.

The press, which was so closely scrutinized and controlled during the 1980-83 period, gradually revived its colourful and lively coverage. Although, as stated above, much of the press coverage of Turkey's international relations were made from the nationalist point of view, the more objective and serious series about Turkish foreign policy in general and its certain aspects in particular also frequently appeared in the more prestigious papers.

The subject which attracted most attention in the press, be it series, articles or news, during the period was Turkey's relations with Greece, followed by the Cyprus problem. Together they constituted about one third of all news coverage of foreign affairs. Then came Turkey's relations with the US, with Western Europe (including the Council of Europe and EC), the Middle East (including Iran-Iraq wars) and others. Although the interests of the press coverage of foreign affairs usually follow the events, the articles by resident correspondents tended to offer more general outlook and insight on Turkey's foreign relations and at times helped to produce public opinion. The press'
role in drawing the public's attention to the repression of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and in creating an anti-war public opinion during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 was particularly important. Also, the press added greatly to the suspicions about premier and later President Ozal's personal dealings with foreign policy and about alleged concessions made by him without the knowledge of foreign ministry.

Apart from the press, such institutions as the Foreign Policy Institute, the Foundation of Economic Development (IKV), Aydinlar Ocagi (The Guild of the Enlightened), Mulkiyeiler Birligi (Association of Political Science Faculty Graduates), etc., and the Universities were also instrumental in Turkey's search for policy over certain subjects by organising conferences, meetings and publishing their proceedings. Moreover societies representing certain groups of people, as, for example, immigrants of Bulgarian Turks or Balkan Solidarity Society etc., were active in promoting certain ideas in the public opinion. Students, who were severely restrained by legal means and whose activities were constantly checked through the Higher Education Council, seemed on the other hand seemed to be passive observers of happenings during the period and their influence over foreign policy could also be disregarded.

7. Foreign Policy Making and the Ozal Regime

7.1. The Setting

During the military regime, continuity was the main feature of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's tight international setting, exacerbated by her geopolitical situation, had its share in this continuity as well as the military leadership's desire to maintain it. During most of the period, Turkey and the Turkish foreign ministry found themselves in situations where they had little room to manoeuvre and repeatedly had to do a balancing act which on the whole, though risky at times, was well suited to Turkey's multidimensional links. During the period Turkey had not only seek to balance between the East and the West, but also had to resist pressures to sever her relations with Europe.
Although Mr. Vahit Halefoglu, who replaced Mr. Ilter Turkmen after the 1983 elections as foreign minister, was considered, like his predecessor, to be highly sophisticated diplomat who would be expected to personify the continuity of Turkish foreign policy, the advent of the Ozal government, nevertheless, provoked speculations that there might be a shift in foreign policy of Turkey, at least in emphasis if not in substance. The main reason for this was that Mr. Ozal had repeatedly made it clear that he wanted to promote Turkey's links with the Islamic countries, particularly in the economic field. In his government programme, presented to the National Assembly on December 19, 1983, however, Mr. Ozal dealt with foreign policy only in general terms and said nothing to indicate that there would be radical departures from the policies of the past.

As stated earlier, it is one of the major aims of this dissertation to concentrate on the general directions of Turkish foreign policy and highlight their connections with domestic, as well as external, inputs. Therefore, and in keeping with the essence of this chapter, I will deal here only with the peculiarities of the Mot.P governments and more importantly with some of the personal characteristics of Mr. Ozal, which might have had bearings upon the making of Turkish foreign policy. Since the political system that had been created by the military regime actually produced the Mot.P and its chairman as credible political forces in Turkey after 1983, it seems appropriate to include this analysis in this chapter.

Before proceeding further, the extremely docile character of the Motherland Party governments and their subservient attitude towards Mr. Ozal should be noted and evaluated. The political and legal factors that led to this docility were mentioned earlier. The control of Turgut Ozal over his party, especially at the early stages, was so intense and absolute that it led a political observer to comment that "Motherland Party is not really a party but the Ozal Fan Club".

Early indications of Ozal's tendency to rule alone were seen in the selection process of cabinet appointments. He was said to have appointed ministers without consulting the party and this was supported by the fact that most of the newly
appointed ministers learned of their appointments from the radio after the Cabinet list was released to the press. Such practices were continued throughout his premiership despite growing uneasiness within the party and the Turkish public in general. Although various groups within the party did not like the process, they nevertheless found it expedient to accept it as reality since all the fractions within the party needed Özal's personal support for their bid to takeover the control of the party, and Özal, well aware of this situation, both encouraged these divisions and took full advantage from them to further his personal hold. Moreover, it was frequently reported in the press during the 1980s that Mr. Özal was taking the most important decisions with his close associates, separate from the party or the government organs and often in unofficial circumstances such as family gatherings. The existence of the "Hanedan" (Royal Family), as it came to be known, was cited by many analysts among the reasons for Motherland Party's failure in the 1989 local elections.

Among the legal changes that were carried out by the first Mopot.P government within a few days of its formation was the creation of all-powerful undersecretaries directly responsible to the prime minister. This was in keeping with Özal's election promise to streamline the bureaucracy, cutting the red tape and increasing efficiency in implementing decisions. Although the appointment of undersecretaries for carrying out special tasks which had been undertaken hitherto by different ministries undoubtedly helped to by-pass most of the bureaucracy and speeded up the process of decision making, it also made the undersecretaries, personally attached to the prime minister to whom alone they owed their jobs, more powerful than ministers, and thus "undermined the principle of cabinet responsibility by placing virtually all the power in the hands of the prime minister and his entourage of undersecretaries".

Although gradually spread out to comprise most of the bureaucracy, this process went furthest in the reorganization of economic affairs, Özal's main preoccupation and an area in which he considered himself an expert. He created a new secretariat for the "Treasury and Foreign Trade" which became responsible not only for foreign trade, but also for foreign loans, banking, money policy, the organization of
stock market, foreign exchange, and even public enterprises. In theory, it was attached to the Finance Ministry, but in practice it was independent of and more powerful than that ministry, and was directly accountable to the prime minister.

Together with the above mentioned factors, these undersecretaries gave prime minister Ozal absolute control over the bureaucracy and let him run the government as he pleased. Moreover he started out with a good majority in the parliament and an ineffective opposition which offered neither criticism nor any alternative. While this fact led him to consider himself "without an alternative", he even attempted to by-pass the control of that docile parliament, or what was left of it, with an extensive usage of governmental decrees, thus in reality ruling without control.

In this context, it has been argued that Ozal favoured the American political system, but it seems that his admiration was essentially based on a superficial understanding of that system, which provided, according to him, a powerful president, liberal economy and religious freedom. However, his lack of in-depth knowledge of the country and its system because of his shallowness in ideological terms, led him to reach wrong conclusions. For example, it seems that he never considered the importance of the separation of powers principle or the existence of various checks and balances in the American political system since he never liked the power sharing and strings attached to such a system.

Although he had to get along with the military in the early days of his premiership, the pressure from this channel faded in time and especially after 1985 he started to have absolute control over all policy making, at times by passing ministers and the cabinet. Thus Mr. Ozal's personal characteristics and beliefs are important factors that should be looked at while discussing Turkish foreign policy.

7.2. The "Economy First" Principle

The economy was Ozal's first priority when he became prime minister in December 1983. He knew that the future of his government was dependent first and foremost on
the country's economic balance. Economic development and "ortadiregi kurtarmak" (to save the middle classes) were his catch phrases during the election campaign and he knew that the Turkish people cared about their economic well being more than anything else. Besides, people knew him because of his success in economic affairs in the early 1980s, and this constituted an important part of the reason why the people preferred him in the 1983 elections to others. Therefore it was logical in a sense that he should tie everything else, including the democratic evolution and foreign policy of the country, to the "economy first" principle.

It was reported that one of his earlier orders to the foreign ministry was to provide a ten year time span free from external conflicts and pressures, during which Turkey could concentrate on economic recovery and development. The economic dimension of his foreign policy was ably summarized by Cemal as "he thinks that if nations connect each other with profit, they would orient themselves towards better relations. Let us develop foreign trade, tourism, banking, let us develop cooperation in every aspect of economy, better political relations will follow". According to Ozal,

...the more individuals and societies engage in meaningful dialogue, the more will be the likelihood of their reaching common ground and consensus. At that stage cooperation is possible and it is only through cooperation that mutual advantage in collaborating becomes visible and peoples start to have a common stake in each other's well-being and prosperity. To have something precious in common is the basis of interdependence.

In the creation of this interdependence, the most important role was to be played by economic cooperation. He believed that economic cooperation and interdependence would eventually lead to peaceful and beneficial political relations, too, overriding regional and bilateral conflicts.

His economic pragmatism showed itself foremost in Turkish-American relations. It was reported that he, noting the usage of US economic pressures during its embargo to Turkey after 1975, warned his close associates several times about upsetting the US which "has long arms and could create inconveniences on all fronts". This led many to criticise him on account of his foreign policy exhibiting a
was in a very "conciliatory mode" with the US and was thus degrading for Turkey. In turn he, on one such occasion, argued to a journalist that the US had monopoly over arms supplies to Turkey and to change this dependency would be, in addition to difficulties of adaptation, training and logistic problems, economically impossible. In another occasion he further argued that,

...world banking system evolves around America. American Banks outweigh all others among the banks which came to Turkey. Further most of the foreign investments come from that channel. Even if it comes from another country, it would certainly have American capital behind it. Therefore while dealing with the US you should calculate all the pluses and minuses. It's not easy to amend relations with the US once you have broken them. We have to be very careful.

It seems that in his foreign policy thinking US-Turkish relations attracted a great deal of attention and the economic side of it was the most essential. This connection was also important in affecting Turkey's relations with many other countries. For example Ozal knew that "America supports Israel in the Middle East and the Israeli lobby has a considerable weight in the US Congress", and therefore he concluded "relations with Israel should be kept cordial without attracting much attention from the Arab World".

In Greek-Turkish relations, too, his economist approach was self-evident: "If both nations would prefer better future, they should know that nobody would gain from conflict. If they want to develop economically, they should cease conflict and spend money for economic development instead of military advancements". With this in mind he, despite widespread opposition, was favourably disposed from the beginning towards rapprochement with Greece. In this context he also thought that the Cyprus problem had burdened the Turkish economy and foreign policy more than it should. His attitude in this area was shaped, among other things, by the belief that the solution of the Cyprus problem and the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece would create a favourable international environment for Turkey which would also affect foreign inflows positively.
Moreover, as will be elaborated further in the next chapter, his policy of "active neutrality" during the Iran/Iraq war was mainly prompted by economic considerations, though this was also in line with traditional principles of Turkish foreign policy. Further, despite various anti-secular and anti-Ataturk attempts of the Khomeini regime, he resisted pressures to change his policy of non-retaliation and react against Iran. As a result Turkey, as mentioned earlier, despite President Evren's opposition became the only NATO country to lower its flag upon Khomeini's death.

Together with his emphasis on economic necessities before other considerations, his "businessman attitude" towards foreign policy frequently created uneasiness among foreign ministry and military circles. However, Ozal responded to his critics on this front by arguing that he did not believe that a country, which was forced by its economy to look for foreign aid, could have political credibility either:

Economic development brings political weight. I believe that economy has 80% weight in foreign policy of a country. Today all countries use their ambassadors, ministers and prime ministers to sell goods, and arrange political weight according to it. I have met many of them, there are those who say "buy this product, we'll accommodate your business". That's why we have to be realist in this respect. I don't understand politics as making nice speeches in meetings. All depends on mutual benefit. And of course economy gains special importance in this benefit.  

In this respect, he did not hesitate to use economic leverage, whenever he could, to obtain political advantages in international relations as well as domestic politics. Especially soon after his advent to power, big public contracts were used, to a certain extent, to normalize relations with particular European countries which had deteriorated under the military regime. When this is understood it becomes clearer why, despite widespread criticisms, he insisted on taking hundreds of businessmen with him on state trips: he simply believed that political relations could be improved by doing profitable business.

His "economy first" principle had other rather indirect affects on Turkish foreign policy as well. In domestic politics it meant that democracy and basic human rights had to wait until the economy was put on the right track to development.
According to this principle, economic liberalism has to precede the transformation into liberal democracy with full human rights. These were necessary sacrifices for long term economic and democratic development.

First the economy to be purified from prohibitions, full liberalism will be attained. In this way economy will be powerful and grey economy and easy earning will be eliminated. In parallel to all this democracy will be enhanced. Is it not the same in the West that in the foundation of the democracy lies liberal economy? Democracy could not be established with black market and queues. For democracy it is necessary that the economy should be on its feet. Where has it been seen otherwise, that is democracy evolved first and then capitalism came? \(^\text{118}\)

On another occasion when asked whether he was going to change undemocratic regulations in labour laws that had been put there by the military government and had been criticised by Western Europe ever since, his answer was very illuminating, showing his perception of democracy and freedoms vis-a-vis economic development:

Some of our labour laws could be in contradiction with the ILO regulations. They would warn us in those aspects. But every country has its special conditions and problems. Most of the Western countries have already reached industrial development. \textit{They had settled most of their problems, related to economy, while they had not got this much freedom.} It is easy for a country, which had solved everything, to argue about our short-coming. But it should be remembered that societies do not accept changes easily. There is the September 12 example which we had experienced. We have to be careful. \(^\text{119}\)

It seemed that Mr. Ozal and his governments had separated the economic and political sides of liberalism. While preaching economic liberalism, they crudely ignored its political components and clung to the political and human rights restrictions that had been placed by the military dictatorship as well as becoming in time the biggest protector and advocate of the "September 12 regime". \(^\text{120}\) Their attitude vis-a-vis democratic principles was best demonstrated by their "no" campaign before the 1987 referendum regarding political rights. \(^\text{121}\) The complications caused by this attitude in relations with the western European countries which had been sensitive in developments of political and human rights in Turkey is self evident and unnecessary to dwell upon any further.
7.3. Tactlessness and Irregularity of Thought and Speech

Another personal characteristics of Ozal was his tactlessness and "off the cuff" speeches. His sudden ideas, announced without consultation with officials or further proper thinking, frequently resulted in embarrassment for the foreign ministry which was often left alone to deal with the situation afterwards. One of his biggest blunders was of course his handling of the problem of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. While bargaining was going on behind the scenes by virtue of Soviet mediation, he, quite unexpectedly and apparently outside the knowledge of foreign ministry, announced in the heat of a political meeting that Turkey would accept every Turk Bulgaria chose to send, and was quite untactful, to say the least, in adding:

...they are called Bulgarian pigs. They are sending people without their belongings We will take them, we will get their belongings with force. They can't do anything. In reality, Zhikov is in limbo. We are pressing, don't worry what they have done will stick in their throats. I will force Zhikov to the negotiation table. I will bang his head. They are afraid of the Russians, too. They will listen to them. We saw Bulgarian bluff. I told them send the Turks. They were not expecting this, they were bewildered. Don't worry, we will take all of them.122

Naturally all the deals were off after this speech and Bulgaria started to send the Turkish minority in their thousands every day, which at the end forced Turkey to close its borders to immigrating Turks, hence another long standing principle of Turkish foreign policy was gone.

On another infamous occasion, at a meeting during the 1987 referendum campaign, when some people among the crowd chanted "blue blue" - the colour of the "yes" vote in that referendum - he, quite naturally and apparently without giving any deal of attention to the shaky and very emotional character of Turkish-Greek relations or that this remark might have instigated the crowd against the Turkish citizens of Greek origin, was able to say that blue was also the colour of Greek flag, thus hinting that the blue and therefore "yes" votes were symbolizing treason.123

It should be noted that these speeches were made during political rallies and in front of a Turkish audience. Ozal's mistake was in his thought that different messages
could be delivered to different audiences, in this case domestic and international. In the final analysis, however, this attitude frequently resulted in misrepresentation of Turkish positions on the international front. For example after the announcement of the EC's decision not to consider Turkish application, Ozal, apparently in an attempt to undercut possible political criticism at home, went on Turkish Television without actually seeing the report to claim that the report's content was "better than expected". After this it could not be expected that the official Turkish announcement, which came few days later, or Ozal's own appeal during his visit to France that the report was deeply disappointing, would carry the intended weight.  

Similarly, it was noted by Guldemir that resembling mistakes were made by Ozal when conveying Turkey's uneasiness about for example the proposed Armenian resolutions in the US Congress. He further argued that since the US administration was receiving impressions from Ozal that Turkey could leave with a compromise solution in the Congress if this was to close the subject forever, they did not see any reason to oppose the Armenian resolution when it came up in 1990. The same could be said in connection with the Kurdish issue after the Gulf war. It was argued that Ozal again gave the wrong signals to the US which, by leading Coalition forces to establish security and no-fly zones in northern Iraq, effectively allowed and helped the establishment of a de facto Kurdish state there. Another example was given by the former Turkish ambassador Coskun Kirca who argued that after the Davos meeting, the US and Greek officials received impressions from Ozal's statements that he would make bold moves towards the settlement in Cyprus in spite of opposition from the Turkish military and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas. This attitude, which raised expectations abroad without foundation because there was no room to manoeuvre for a Turkish statesman at the time, inspired Bush to state that the meeting of Ozal, Papandreou and Vasiliiu, disregarding Denktas, could solve the problem, and further caused apprehensions within Turkey that Ozal was trying to get rid of the Cyprus problem by simply giving it away. In the final analysis, these accusations were not true, but it was Ozal himself who gave the wrong impressions.
Apparently, and maybe more significantly for the conduct of Turkish foreign policy, the Turkish foreign ministry was also getting at times wrong signals from Ozal about his intentions. Under his rule, the foreign ministry never quite got rid of the popular impression that Ozal was trying to by-pass the foreign ministry and thus could not see what he really wanted to do in more broader picture. As a result they could not cooperate efficiently with him during either his premiership or presidency. The main responsibility for this failure should belong to Ozal who, because of his style, gave the wrong impressions. In reality most of the ideas and policies pursued by Ozal were quite in line with the foreign ministry's policy programming studies. Most of the time some sort of study was already taking place within the ministry before Ozal's personal involvement in the specific issues. But once he got involved, because of his image and style, the foreign ministry always found it difficult to admit that they would have done the same thing even if Ozal had not intervened. For example, during the Gulf war, quite obviously there was no option for Turkey but to follow UN decisions. Ozal's mistake in this context was not that he followed the UN decisions, which was also the general advice of the foreign ministry, but he intervened aggressively without authority and prudence. Had he not intervened the foreign ministry might have still taken the same decisions since the international environment and Turkey's own historical developments were such that Turkey could not have followed any other option regardless of who was eventually conducting the foreign policy. But the difference between Ozal and the foreign ministry's approaches could have still been recognised easily from the more subtle and diplomatic tone in official statements and also from more cautious approach, a possible wait-and-see attitude, in policy initiations. Therefore the deepest dissension between the foreign ministry and Ozal seemed to be confined to differences of style and authority not substance.

This observation was also quite true for most of the time in relations between Ozal and foreign ministry officials, who never quite accepted him as "one of the family", and because of his image and style could never get around to say that they would have done the same things had it not been Ozal who publicized the ideas. In
turn, Ozal himself could not see this fact as well, and accused foreign ministry of using backward methods, hindering his reforms in foreign policy and opposing him with the intention of preserving their hold over foreign policy initiation. His general dislike towards bureaucracy and his frequent by-passes of official channels also played an important role in this officially unexpressed misunderstanding between Ozal and the foreign ministry.

7.4. One-Man Attitude and The Usage of Personal Connections

Apart from his tactless remarks, Ozal, during his period in office, also made frequent speeches touching on foreign policy issues and offered concessions in specific policy matters without actually consulting the foreign office. Foreign ministry officials, for example, learned one day from the press together with the rest of the country that the prime minister had suggested four-sided (Greece, Turkey, Greek and Turkish Cypriots) meetings to solve the Cyprus problem, and also announced the abolition of visa requirements for Greek citizens.130

This attitude was explained by some with his precipitateness and pragmatism. He liked to see concrete results as soon as possible and did not like bureaucratic procedures which tended to slow down developments. This was expressed by one Mopot.P party leader as "...because his rush. He knows that if he follows official channels it will take time. But our premier likes to put his ideas into action first thing in the morning."131 His former mentor, Demirel, offers another evaluation: "He doesn't like paper work. He likes new things and enjoys experiments. Everyday he wakes up with new inspirations but doesn't like further calculation. Therefore he usually jumps to conclusion. He can take off the plane but can not land it."132 As a result one comes across many sudden turns and twists in Ozal's daily foreign policy conduct. Fast and quick decision-making and speeches given in haste were characteristics of Ozal's foreign policy.133
This attitude, of course, also shows, in addition to his desire to obtain results as quickly as possible, his low regard not only to bureaucratic red tape but also to legal strings. He frequently overrode his legal limits both during his premiership and presidency. During his presidency he meddled with government affairs instead of acting neutral as required by the constitution, and during his premiership he by-passed ministers and dealt with undersecretaries and even some times with plain secretaries. This attitude was taken by his critics as indicative of Ozal's lacking of ideological insight and notions of legality and state.\textsuperscript{134}

Although pragmatism was one of his foreign policy's positive characteristics, especially during his premiership when he had more power and freedom of movement, it also admittedly led to differences between Ozal and the foreign ministry from time to time since the ideological and legal stands were still constituted as important parts of the latter's policy planning. In this context once he wrote that idealism, being a politician, was not his creed and that he tried to "Work out what is possible and feasible within the constraints of a given system".\textsuperscript{135} He believed that Turkey's long-standing foreign policy problems could be solved by pragmatic thinking and rational acting instead of being doctrinaire all the time. In this context, it could be argued that his approach towards the Middle East and the Arab world was oriented by his pragmatism which dictated that closer relations with the Islamic world could boost Turkey's both economic and political credibility, rather than his emotional disposition towards Islam.

Resulting from his pragmatism and desire to achieve quick results, another aspect of Ozal's foreign policy was his insistence on using his personal connections instead of official channels. This was of course in line with his overall relaxed-style of governing and his distrust against official system. We already mentioned how he by­
passed the bureaucracy using his close associates whenever he did not agree with it. He believed that bureaucracy creates formalities in order to expand its influence over government machinery and society in general, and argued that the foreign policy making should not be left in the hands of the bureaucrats who were only interested in preserving the \textit{status quo}.\textsuperscript{136} This kind of action in the foreign policy area, however,
created not only embarrassments for the foreign ministry but also problems for Turkey because of the peculiarities of the subjects it deals with.

The famous Davos meeting with the Greek premier Papandreou, for example, was primarily arranged outside the official channels, whose opposition was overwhelmed by Ozal's desire to meet Greek premier on the grounds that this could be the beginning of a very fruitful relationship between the two countries. It was also reported that his connections with Saudi Arabia were realized by his brother Mr. Korkut Ozal who had business cooperations with Saudi partners. His meetings with American bankers and businessmen during his various visits to the US were usually arranged by his American friends rather than the foreign ministry. His confidence on outside channels was so great that when he could not meet Gorbachev during his visit to the USSR while he was prime minister, it was reported that he got angry with the foreign ministry officials and said to his entourage "if you have left this to me I would have arranged it".

Using outside channels was also consistent with his belief that personal contacts were very important in foreign relations and for further rapprochement between states. Therefore he always tried to use his personal friendship with other world leaders, especially George Bush and Margaret Thatcher, to create a more responsive attitude towards Turkey. His reliance on personal experience rather than official evaluation was evident, for example, in his comment on President Bush' remarks that only Ozal, Papendrou and Vasiliou could solve the Cyprus problem, thus excluding Denktas from the process. Ozal answered the critics by arguing that he was a friend of president Bush and knew him well, that he probably made a mistake or simply forget to mention Denktas's name and this should not be interpreted as an official US attitude. Of course he, at the time, was disregarding the fact that Bush's remarks were made in a press release which is normally prepared beforehand.
7.5. The Islamic Connection

It was argued that Ozal was an undercover Islamist and wanted to lead the Islamic World. His remarks of the sort that "Islamic countries looked at one time to the Ottoman Empire as a leader of the Islamic World. We will lead these countries and this will give Turkey more importance in Western minds" only helped to establish these allegations. Of course, it was a contradiction for an Islamist to apply for EC membership. How could this be explained? According to those who believed that Ozal was in reality an Islamist, this was not really a contradiction because, they argued, he was a very pragmatic man. He knew that in order to attain a powerful economy it was inescapable for Turkey to opt for Western Europe.

I doubt that Ozal feels himself as European. I also doubt that he wants European Community membership in the context of the 100 years of Turkish development process. Personally, I believe he is a Turkish nationalist and a Muslim. His orientation towards EC derives from his pragmatism. He thinks that EC is a powerful club, thus could provide economic benefits. He doesn't see this in ideological context. For Kemalism, on the other hand, becoming a part of Europe is an ideological target. Ozal only wants to be member of a powerful club while governing the country. While feeling inside that Turkey is an Islamic country and should be positioned within the Middle East, he thinks that being an EC member at the same time is a good thing.

According to more conspiratorial opponents, he showed the boldness of applying to EC, because he knew well that the Community would not accept Turkey, and thus he then could use this refusal to take Turkey into the Middle East, overriding the opposition of the military and bureaucracy. And even if Turkey was accepted, they argued, he hoped that, after strengthening its economy, Turkey could have more easily led the Islamic countries.

For others, those who did not believe that Ozal was trying to take Turkey into the Islamic world, and for his followers, he was aiming to place Turkey in a unique position between the East and the West. This was a favourable option because it would have allowed Turkey more manoeuvrability in foreign policy as well as being more economically advantageous. They believed that Ozal had reached a personal synthesis
of the West and Islam. They say he was a devout Muslim but favoured American-style secularism, as opposed to the Turkish version. Daniel Newberry, American Consul General in Istanbul during the 1980s was one of them who argue that:

Turkey turned towards the East because of economic problems, not because of Islamic or fundamentalist explorations. The willingness of the Islamic countries to do business with Turkey and Turkey's wish to find support for Cyprus problem also played a part in this. ...I don't believe that Ozal is a captain of a ship which travels towards the East.

Although doubts were frequently expressed about how Islamic belief and western capitalism could be harmonized within a person or a state, Ozal apparently did not see any contradiction when he attempted to explain correlations between Western style capitalism and the Islamic market system, thus showing that they were actually compatible and complementary not competing:

Both Islamic and Western systems are based, before anything else, on free markets. In the Islamic market system, too, the prices are determined by the market forces. Both in Islam and in Western capitalism everything works according to a minimum number of laws. In these systems the state only has minimal role. Because of certain organic obstacles which prevent monopolies in Islam, Islamic market system is better equipped for free competition. Almsgiving (zekat) and profit sharing instead of usury (tefecilik) constitutes this obstacles. On the other hand, because of moral reasons, competition is not as ruthless and merciless in the Islamic market as in the West.

7.6. Concluding Remarks: Visionary or Adventurer?

The officials of the Turkish foreign ministry were among the worst sufferers of Ozal's one-man rule and de-bureaucratization attempts. Once he established his power domestically he did not leave foreign policy to experts either and whenever he faced problems in domestic politics, he turned to foreign relations as a way out. For the foreign ministry officials, however, his foreign policy style, based on hasty made speeches, one-man decision making process, and a tendency to turn to extraordinary and irregular tracks, was a major cause for uneasiness.

On the positive side however, he had a general vision of Turkey in the year 2000 and also a vision of foreign policy that should accompany her economic
development. Existence of a long term vision and initiative taking attitude were two things that had been curiously missing in Turkish foreign policy.

He wanted to lead a country which would have a say in world politics. According to him Turkey was one of the important rings of the chain of states in the world and Turkey's problems could be tackled best by capturing the world's imagination, becoming a leading country in her region, and associating closely with the world's leaders. As he regarded the US as an undisputed world leader, there was no question in his mind but to lead Turkey to a closer economic and politico-strategic cooperation with the US. As a result, he believed, Turkey could claim her place among the countries which were building the "new world". Obviously during this process he was going to be the leader of his country.

If one looks closely at Ozal's statements during the Gulf war, it becomes clearer that Turkey, coached by Ozal, left its long-watched motto of "peace at home, peace in the world". True, the foreign ministry officials and government leadership were still arguing that Turkey did not possess any notion of expansion or adventuring foreign policy, but the vigour that had been felt earlier in such statements was somehow not there any more. One almost gets a sense of feeling that Turkey under Ozal's leadership could have attempted almost anything in order to attain his vision of Turkey, that is becoming one of the leading nations of the world by reaching a credible regional power status. It was quite obvious that Ozal would have taken Turkey easily into the Gulf war in order to realise his ambition of Turkey in the year 2000 if he was not opposed and prevented by the general opposition within the country and more significantly lack of support from the military and indeed the government, too.

It was one of the cornerstones of Ozal's foreign policy philosophy that Turkey should became a "regional power". He described the situation created by the end of cold war and breaking up of the former Soviet Union as an "historic opportunity" for the Turks, and urged the TGNA not to "throw away this change which presented itself for the first time in 400 years".
According to him Turkey had to use its geographic position between the East and the West positively, and, instead of acting like a "static bridge" whose only function was to witness things that passed over it, Turkey should become a "connecting bridge" where the East and the West would meet and their culture would melt together to create a unique Turkish contribution to the World. Only in this way could Turkey solve her domestic problems and, at the same time, become a powerful country whose word would be listened to and respected in world politics. And this was to make the 21st century truly a Turkish one.153

It was this foreign policy understanding that stretched the foreign ministry to its limits during his premiership. He used to criticise foreign office bureaucrats and the foreign policy they were representing as being passive agents and spectators of the world events that evolved around them. According to him keeping Turkey away from international conflicts and problems alone, which meant in the past isolation of the country from the world, would not help to build a powerful Turkey.154 He believed that what Turkey needed was a powerful and determined foreign policy and that foreign ministry bureaucrats were not up to it and could not keep pace with his active foreign policy.155 Therefore, when opposed by the foreign ministry, he left them behind and conducted Turkish policy during the Gulf war alone. During the process he criticised the foreign ministry by arguing that,

Turkey can not continue with its former foreign policy any more. She cannot act with the principle of "bana dokunmayan yılan bin yasasin" (~keep away from troubles which are not of direct concern to us - "live and let live"). To retreat into a shell without any intervention when faced by problems is not a contemporary idea. There is no such a thing for Turkey as neutrality. We have to be on the side of the modern world.156

Although Ozal's "active foreign policy" notion was more or less in line with the foreign ministry's "multi-dimensional foreign policy" concept, which was first formulated in the mid-1970s, the difference between them, however, was still substantial and was not confined only to the foreign ministry's resistance to change. While the foreign ministry favoured more detached and risk-free foreign policy based
on keeping Turkey out of regional troubles and maintaining a balancing act between
different states, regions and ideologies in general, Ozal favoured policy initiation
instead of reaction to developments and more involvement in international issues and
taking part in regional problems, which carried a certain amount of risk for active
involvement in military conflicts as well.\textsuperscript{157} He argued that:

\begin{quote}
Turkey is not small but a big state in her region. In connection with her
geographic location Turkey is indeed in a position where regional problems
inevitably have impacts on her. In this sense it is in Turkey's interest to follow a
more active policy. Beyond the policies of independence and reservedness, my
approach is interdependence and cooperation.\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

He wanted to see a foreign ministry which would create new ideas, open new options
and initiate new policies. Moreover, in his "active" foreign policy, armed conflict
became just another tool which could be used "when necessary" to reach higher ideals.
On the other hand, it was also chilling to hear from Ozal on Television, while listing his
reasons in favour of sending troops to the Gulf, that he was the last person who wanted
to enter the war,

\begin{quote}
but you make war when necessary. Also there is the education side of it. This
war is not in our control. It is not us who decides for war. But when it happens
it is better to be there to see the organization of it. This kind of opportunity
would present itself maybe in 100 years, which could be very important for
those who dedicated themselves to this job.\textsuperscript{159}
\end{quote}

Sending troops to a war in which Turkey did not have a say about its start or conduct,
for the sake of observing modern military techniques, is at the least a dangerous and
strange idea and goes a long way to show how far Ozal could have gone had he been
left alone.

According to him, in order to attain big power status Turkey had to think
big.\textsuperscript{160} Being able to think big meant to take "calculated risks", as he liked to describe
it. But this was not to be confused with mindless adventurism. During the Gulf War he
told an American TV station that he was not gambling, "Had I gambled I would have
taken Saddam's side. I am an engineer and I approach to my subject with mathematical

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calculation. I am looking at it like a chess game.\textsuperscript{161} He further elaborated this approach on Turkish Television by arguing that

...you don't gamble with such things as war. In the press they talk about President's gamble. If you gamble, there is losing as well. However in this kind of situation winning should be the only basis, not losing. You have to play strong. I mean our play is not a gamble. Why? Because we are on the side of the UN, our whole policy parallels UN. We imposed UN decisions, we are together with the UN, how could this be a gamble?\textsuperscript{162}

"Think big and move bold" gradually became the watchwords of his foreign policy, especially during his presidency. Thus, just before his death he was criticising the government for inaction and being unable to "think big and act swiftly" in the Bosnian and Caucasian conflicts.\textsuperscript{163}

It was also argued that he wanted to be remembered among the world's greatest leaders, thus especially after becoming president, he was more interested in world politics than specific foreign policy problems of Turkey, and that Cyprus question, for example, was, for him, only one of the world's problems that needed be solved and was important only as far as its connections with other world issues.\textsuperscript{164} At one stage it was also argued that he wanted to get the Nobel peace price, and to have this, he figured, he had to either end the Iran/Iraq war or find a solution to Turkish-Greek disputes. Once it became clear that Turkey was unable to mediate a durable peace between Iran and Iraq, he turned to Greece and met Papandreou, an action which actually got him a nomination for the prize.\textsuperscript{165}

Gokmen argues that Ozal did not think the world as big as some others thought and saw Turkey's place in the world politics bigger than it actually was.\textsuperscript{166} Indeed, one of his consistent complaints was that the Turks, entangled with their domestic squabbles, did not realise how important Turkey was in the world: "Our biggest mistake is to see Turkey smaller than it is. Foreigners think Turkey 3-4 times bigger than we do. They consider her as an important regional power. We on the other hand think otherwise, and cannot unite against problems...".\textsuperscript{167} This belief led him to
conclude that Turkey should play a more important role in world politics, and especially in the organization of the "new world order":

I expect to see a beautiful world in the 21st century... Of course war is not a good thing. But if somebody comes and tries to prevent our ideals to reach this beautiful world, and if other people, who want to remove this obstacle, come forward and ask our help to put this man away, we should give this help. Otherwise we become short-sighted and selfish people. I want to ask our people, who say "we don't want war", whether they realize, while opposing war, that we are losing peace?  

The remaining question in here of course is whether such noble aspirations are compatible, or indeed realizable, with the capabilities of a middle-power state like Turkey, the answer to which could only be given in the longer term and would inevitably determine the ultimate judgement on Ozal's foreign policy.

8. Conclusions: Foreign Policy Implications of The Post-1983 Political System

First of all, especially during the first part of the transitional period (1983-1987), the military's influence over foreign policy as well as domestic politics was evident. The agents of this influence were the President Kenan Evren and the NSC where the military was able to convey its views to the government.  

The NSC was given an important role by the Constitution in the "formulation, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the state" (Article 118). One should not forget that in the Turkish context, the national security policy, in addition to "the preservation of the existence and independence of the state", included maintenance of "the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society", evident references to Kurdish separatism and extreme political ideologies, which at this time included religious fundamentalism as well as communism and ultra-nationalism. Further, according to the Constitution (Article 118), the Council of Ministers should give "priority" to the recommendations made by the NSC, and most of the time the government had to follow the NSC's advice, especially regarding the continuation of Martial Law. The existence of martial law, and subsequently the state of
emergency, long after the return of civilian government, in spite of pressures from outside the country especially from Western Europe, can best be explained by the military's insistence on that. There were also rumours that prime minister Turgut Ozal was talked into bombing Kurdish guerrillas inside Iraq by the military. And it was the military which restrained him making too great concessions on the Cyprus or Aegean issues. Certainly, the 1987 near-war situation with Greece over the Aegean continental shelf had much to do with PM Ozal's absence from Turkey at the time of the crisis.

Another important side of civil-military relations in the early years of the third Republic was the arrangements and accommodation between President and the Prime Minister. Although president Evren talked against Ozal before the elections, afterwards they developed a good working relationship. The harmony was so much smoother than it had been expected that it has been argued that some sort of symbolic power sharing existed between president Evren and premier Ozal. In this relationship Ozal's responsibilities involved economy and day to day politics while internal security, defence and foreign policy would be controlled by the President. It is difficult to certify these claims, for both Evren and Ozal denied the existence of such a division of labour. The speculations of this nature were, of course, particularly embarrassing for the prime minister and he complained publicly of not being asked questions by journalists about the country's foreign policy. "I am responsible for the foreign policy, you know. Why don't you ask some questions about it" said Ozal in one of his press conferences.

Of course, it is almost certain that, while trying to manage through the difficult period of transition, Ozal was particularly careful of not provoking the military by insisting on actions to which they would object. In this context President Evren emerged as mediator between government and the military. This coordination between Evren and Ozal allowed the government to move quicker towards democratization than previously expected. It seemed that, as time passed, president Evren became more reluctant to use his excessive powers and allowed the government to exercise more
independence. In fact, in his risky move in June/July 1987 of appointing a new chief of staff, while ignoring the military's candidate, Ozal secured the support of President Evren against the military.

In the foreign policy arena Evren's involvement seems to appear more frequently in the early days of the government. In his memoirs Evren made frequent entries between 1983 and 1986 about foreign policy issues and discussions with prime minister Ozal during the government's first year, whereas he made fewer entries concerning the period of 1986 to 1989. Keeping in mind that difference could be the result of the number of important foreign policy issues Turkey had faced during the periods, the disparity also goes a certain way to explain the President's involvement in foreign policy.

The extensive powers entrusted by the 1982 Constitution to the President, coupled with his elevation to that post with 92% of popular vote as well as his immediate background as the leader of an all powerful military junta, enabled, and in fact forced at times, President Evren to take stands and be counted in foreign policy as well as domestic issues. Of course the inexperience of Ozal and his government in handling issues had its share, at least in the early months, in Evren's visibility in foreign policy. He explains, for example, in his memoirs that he, though unwilling to attend, went to the IVth Islamic Conference in January 1984 because "Ozal did not know subjects in depth and therefore he might have accepted some decisions in the summit that we should not endorse".

Leaving aside the military's continual involvement in foreign and security policies, the political system, which they had devised, also caused its share of problems in Turkish foreign policy.

Firstly, the restricted character of the 1983 elections generated criticisms outside Turkey, especially from Western Europe, and preconditioned Turkey's future democratic development vis-a-vis its relations with those countries. Even before the elections, the results were condemned by many Western critics as "undemocratic and unrepresentative of the Turkish people". Most of the criticism at this point was
directed at the "limited" participation in Turkey's domestic political scene after several parties which wanted to run in the elections were disqualified by the military. As a result, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe aired its suspicions about forthcoming elections and advised against the return of Turkish parliamentarians from the new parliament to the Council's Assembly. It also instructed the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to begin proceedings in January 1984 for the complete exclusion of Turkey. During the discussions, it was argued that the new Turkish constitution had not been applied democratically, that new laws had not been freely discussed, and that the military junta had curtailed the formation of political parties.

Though the victory of Motherland Party in the elections rather than NDP or PP lent credibility to the elections and pleased the Western governments, it was still unacceptable for Turkey's critics in western public opinion or organizations such as the Council of Europe since it looked at this time only like the lesser of three evils. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Council of Europe at first strongly resisted the idea of letting Turkish parliamentarians take up their seats in its parliamentary assembly. Although they were, finally, allowed to take up their seats, the European critics continued to concentrate on dissatisfaction with Turkey's "progress toward democracy", and further problems were aroused when Turkey wanted to claim the presidency of the Council of Europe from January 1985 onwards.

The European Community, too, did not hasten to normalize its relations with Turkey, an attitude which caused a Turkish journalist to comment in June 1984 that Turkish - European Community relations were at "dead point". The mutual distrust were such that, even a year after the 1983 elections, the European Parliament could still advise the Council of Ministers to keep relations with Turkey on halt.

Although the victory of Motherland Party in the March 1984 local elections, in which all the existing political parties were allowed to participate, was interpreted by many as conforming Ozal's popular mandate and allowed him to claim his legitimacy in a democratic system, his lenient attitude toward political, legal and social restrictions and the continued state of emergency maintained criticism at a high level. Also the
repeated allegations of torture and human rights abuses were of great concern to both Turkey's critics and policy-makers.195

A celebrated incident that immediately captured widespread attention in the West and which also caused great embarrassment to the government, was the martial law authorities' decision to prosecute 56 intellectuals, soon after the March 1984 Local Elections, who were accused of being the "ringleaders" of some 1300 scholars, writers, artists, politicians, who petitioned the President for wide ranging democratic freedoms and an amnesty for the political prisoners.196

However, it was not in the monopoly of the martial law authorities to cause embarrassment for Turkey in the international arena. The government, too, had its share. In June 1985, the government brought forward and, despite the fierce opposition from all quarters, passed a new police bill which gave excessive powers to the police.197 What complicated the matter, as far as Turkey's foreign relations were concerned, was the involvement of the EEC representative in Ankara, Mr. Gwyn Morgan, who had warned several deputies and journalists "informally" that enactment of the bill in its original form could deliver a severe blow to Turkish hopes of eventually joining the EEC. Prime minister Ozal immediately denounced both Mr. Morgan for interference in Turkey's internal affairs, and Mr. Claude Cheysson, the EEC Commissioner for external relations, who came to Mr. Morgan's defence.198 The row was only cooled down by Mr. Morgan's extended leave from Turkey.

The responses of the Ozal governments to this European critics were not fundamentally different from those of the military regime. They, too, argued that the problems of Turkish democracy were exaggerated in the West, and denied the allegations of human rights abuses and torture by arguing similarly that they were originated by those who did not want to see a powerful Turkey taking up its rightful place among the democracies of western Europe. Mr. Ozal even defended the military regime's record on human rights, claiming that it had been "too much exaggerated by Amnesty International".199 The visible difference was only on the style they used not in the substance; Turgut Ozal was more "political" than the supposedly "indifferent" and
bitter Evren. He recognized the importance of the human rights and torture issues on the normalization of Turkish-European relations. Consequently, while still denying most of the allegations, Ozal accepted individual application to the European Commission of Human Rights, in January 1987, albeit with many reservations. Turkey also endorsed the European-wide convention against torture in 1988. Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz told the state radio that the decision to sign the convention signalled the "government's determination to protect and progress human rights." This more conciliatory attitude, despite the fact that many restrictions on individual rights continued to exist within the country and allegations of torture and abuses of human rights persisted all the time, allowed Turgut Ozal to claim Turkey's respect for human rights, and thus helped to put Turkey's relations with Western Europe on the right track. In December 1985, for example, five West European countries which had complained against Turkey to the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe dropped their charges in return for promises from the Ozal government that martial law would be entirely lifted within 18 months, that some sort of amnesty would be introduced, and that visitors from the Council of Europe would be admitted to monitor progress. And soon after the 1986 by-elections, which further proved that a Western definition of democracy was slowly returning to the country, relations with the EC resumed after a six-year break. And this was followed in November by Turkey's election to the chairmanship of the Council of Europe's Ministerial Committee, which was viewed as recognition of progress towards full democracy, although misgivings about Turkey's position on human rights were thought to remain.

Though Turkey evolved towards democracy all the time during the 1980s, the democratization process was yet to be completed when MHP lost the elections in 1991. Despite the fact that most of the lost ground, as far as political and human rights concern, was recovered especially after the 1987, the criticisms continued albeit sporadically, over such issues as minority rights, academic autonomy, ban on Communist parties, hunger strikes, maltreatment of prisoners etc.
Another important result of the political system, forcibly created in 1983, was the credibility loss of the official opposition parties soon after the elections, which allowed the emergence of extra-parliamentary opposition parties, and thus impeded powerful parliamentary checking over the government's foreign policy as well as its other policies. This continued to be the pattern even after the 1987 elections because of the large majority that the Mot.P was able to obtain in the elections through the changes in the election process.

Moreover, the legitimacy discussion of the new system and the parties, and concentration of the major political forces in the country about that issue, left foreign policy, at least until 1987 when the alliances within party system seemed to be settling down, in the hands of government leaders who most of the time were able to keep it unchecked by the public. Of course, apart from the preoccupation of public opinion and pressure groups with domestic politics, the actual legal arrangements, as mentioned earlier, kept the government for some time free from public pressure on foreign policy.

Finally, the political system created by the military regime affected Turkey's prospective foreign policy, as its domestic politics, by opening the way to Turgut Ozal to become first prime minister and then the President. The examination of his role in the changing patterns of Turkish foreign policy confirmed that, once Mr. Ozal diverted the military's pressure from his back, the system, on the one hand, allowed him effectively to challenge the traditional grounds of foreign policy making, but, on the other hand, created tension within the policy-making bodies of the state.
NOTES

1. The heading of an article in the Economist on November 12, 1983 was "A Cheer And A Half For Democracy".

2. For official results see Resmi Gazete, November 14, 1983, No. 18221, p. 13; They were also reprinted in Keesing's, December 1983, p. 32581.


11. Reactions of European organizations to 1983 elections were summarized in Black Book on the Militarist "Democracy" in Turkey, Published by Info-Turk (Brussels: Info-Turk, 1986), pp. 140-150.


14. For the text of NSC degree, No. 52 see Anılar, Vol. II, pp. 339-340. The degree also banned all political activity for individuals and associations, in addition to political parties, and publication of any material concerning past, present or future political or legal structure of Turkey.

15. As early as 16 September 1980, General Evren warned a would-be minister, who had asked the permission of his party leader to take up the post in the military government, that "should you have thought that they (former party leaders) would
become party leaders again, you are mistaken". See Anilar, Vol. II, p. 49. Also, in a personal interview with President Evren in Marmaris on March 2, 1993, he confirmed to me that they (the generals of the NSC) had no intention for letting the former leaders, who were largely to blame for Turkey's pre-1980 bloodshed, to destroy what have had achieved under the military regime. But he also firmly argued that, despite of "advices" and "suggestions" they were getting all the time, they did not want to close down the parties and repeat the mistake of 1961 Junta, but they (the politicians) left them no choice and brought closure on themselves by insisting on to continue their political manipulation over bureaucrats and their old cadres and repeatedly defying the NSC decrees. He also said that they wanted to "clear the way" for Consultative Assembly which was soon to start working.

16. In his first radio-TV speech on the day of the coup he said "...the political parties, whose activities are banned under compulsion, will be reactivated in line with the Electoral Law and Political Parties Act to be drafted following the preparation of the new constitution, in time for the next elections which will be announced later.", see 12 September, p. 231. Also, in his first press conference when challenged about future of the parties he firmly answered: "All political activities have been banned. I did not say closed down, just banned" and confirmed that "party politics would resume in time for the next elections.", see Anilar, Vol. II, p. 43. Further, as late as June 1981 when the Consultative Assembly was established it was announced that suspended parties would participate in elections following approval of the new constitution in referendum.

17. For the "law concerning dissolution of political parties", dated October 16, 1981 and numbered 2533, see Anilar, Vol. II, p. 419. The first national political party in Turkey was established in 1859 under the name of "Fedailer Cemiyeti", and since then political parties had been able to exist, some 120 years, despite various constraint. In October 1981, however, Turkey was entering a new phase of its history in which there was sadly no place for political parties. For this and other political developments surrounding dissolution of parties see Dogan, Y., Dar Sokakta Siyaset: 1980-1983 (Politics in Narrow Street; 1980-1983), (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1985), chapter IV, pp. 129-156.

18. Phrase belongs to general Evren who, citing the ban on political activity as first and dissolution of parties as second blows, said in Mersin on 13 March that third blow might fall on those self seeking politicians who are still trying to trick Turkish people into their ways. Cited in Dogan, ibid., p. 235.


21. Voting was compulsory, with absentees without proper excuse facing fines and disbarment from voting for the next five years.

22. Campaigning for or against the referendum was forbidden while General Evren, actually in defiance of the NSC degree, toured the country for 15 days to "explain" the new Constitution to the people. Along the way he said he was the guarantor of the Constitution and people should vote for it if they endorsed what they have done so far. For the speeches of General Evren during his campaign for the Constitution see T.C.
Devlet Baskanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren'in Yeni Anayasayı Devlet Adına Resmen Tanıtma Programı Gereğince Yaptıkları Konuşmalar, 24 Ekim-5 Kasım 1982 (Speeches of the Head of the State General Evren in Connection With the Official Introduction Program to Present the New Constitution), (Ankara: TBMM Basimevi, 1982). Also, it was pointed out that translucent envelopes for the ballots revealed the color-coded responses. Moreover, remarks before the referendum by Evren, and PM Ulusu had made it clear that if faced rejection they would continue to rule until such time that a new and an acceptable Constitution to the public would be prepared. See Financial Times, July 27, 1982; Turkish Daily News, 1 July 1982.


28. For some of the difficulties faced by the new party founders before the 1983 elections see Dogan, op. cit., chapter XVI, pp. 364-390.


30. General Evren's own description. More than once, he warned the newly emerging parties about being conscious of "party inflation", and urged them to join forces together. See his speeches at Sinop And Giresun on 17 and 19 June respectively. See T.C. Cumhurbaskani Kenan Evren'in Soyleyi ve Demecleri, 12 Eylul 1982-9 Kasim 1983, (Speeches of the President of Turkish Republic Kenan Evren, 12 September 1982-9 November 1983), (Ankara: TBMM Basimevi, 1983), pp. 296-299 and 301-307 respectively.

31. The banishment came together with the closure of the GTP on May 31, 1983 by the NSC decree, No. 79, on the ground that it was continuation of a pre-1980 party, JP of Demirel. See Milliyet, June 1, 1983, pp. 1 & 7; Gurdilek, R., "Turkey's Rulers Crush New Political Party", The Times, June 1, 19823, p. 1.Other three parties likely to get some considerable following, TPP, SDP and WP were also prevented from participating in the elections by way of executive vetoes. In all, some 453 out of 750 party founders were veteod. Pevsner, op. cit., pp. 118. 23 of those veteod belonged to the parties which at the end were allowed to enter the elections. The NDP was the least hurt with only three vetoes, followed by Mot.P, seven vetoes, and PP, thirteen vetoes. Milliyet, selected issues during May 1983-August 1983.


33. For developments concerning the establishment of a centrist party by Ulusu see Dogan, op. cit., pp. 202-204, 208-213 and 222-225; Anılar, vol. IV, pp. 30-31, 50 and 162.

35. Both Ozal and Calp as well as Sunalp went to President Evren to ask and obtain his blessing beforehand. Other party leaders, however, either did not seek his permission or were discouraged to form a party. See Anilar, Vol. IV, pp. 25, 305 and 312-13; Dogan, op. cit., pp. 228-230.

36. The NDP was initiated under the leadership of PM Ulusu before passing it over to Sunalp. The PP was established under the leadership of PM's permanent undersecretary Mr. Necdet Calp who had also been personal secretary of Ismet Inonu. And Mot.P was organized by Turgut Ozal who, unlike his earlier master and benefactor, Demirel, worked closely with the military and was a government minister until his resignation in 1982. See Dogan, op. cit., p. 206.

37. In his speech he described Turgut Ozal as irresponsible and urged his audience to vote for an administration which would continue the policies of the NSC; "If you are happy with the activities of the NSC over these three years, I am convinced that you will bring to power an administration which will continue the Council's policies and will not again push the country into confusion". See Milliyet, November 5, 1983.

38. Ibid.


40. For Sunalp's evaluation of the results in the first parliamentary group meeting of the NDP on 25 November 1983 see Dogan, op. cit., pp. 413-420.

41. This resentment was quite rightly captured by the opinion polls, publication of which banned later on precisely for that reason. According to a poll, which could not printed in Turkey, in the first week of the November 1983 only %16.6 of a sample of voters expressed their support for the NDP, whereas %21.3 supported the PP and %39.15 said they would vote for the Mot.P. The Times, November 5, 1983, p. 5. Also, it should be noted that, as the election campaign progressed, the military, as well as people, did not like the Sunalp's militaristic and authoritarian style and arrogance. He acted during the election campaign as if he was already elected as PM though his appearance in public and on TV was so poor. Similarly, although the military clearly preferred a centrist party, they wanted to see somebody like Ulusu as PM who was both "general and gentleman" not Sunalp who appeared as "general and hardliner". See Dogan, op. cit., pp. 411-413.


43. Ozal's cabinet was approved by President Evren on 13 December 1983. He read his government programme in the TGNA on 19 December and received confidence vote on 24 December by 213 to 115 with 65 abstentions. Keesing's, June 1984, pp, 32925-32926. For the debate of the programme in the parliament see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Minutes of the TGNA), Term: 17, Year: 1, Vol. 1 (5), December 22, 1983, (Hereafter referred as TBMM-TD).


46. Ibid.

The generals were particularly furious when 150 former JP MP joined together to GTP with much excitement. Anilar, Vol. IV, pp. 95-104.

Keesing's, July 1986, pp. 34496-34497.


There had been some lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the government since it had been widely claimed that Mot.P would not have won the 1983 elections if it had to face SDP and TPP, both were prevented by the generals to run. Thus, the March 1984 local elections acquired the character of an early referendum on Mr. Ozal as well as those parties. See the Economist, March 31, 1984, "A Boost For Ozal", p. 56.

Ibid.

For the results of 1984 local elections see State Statistic Institute, Mahalli Idareler Secim Sonuculari, 1985 (The Results of the Local Elections, 1985).


The Economist, March 31, 1984, p. 58.

The Article 84 states that "the loss of membership by deputies shall be decided by an absolute majority...in respect of deputies who...resign from their party in order to join another party, or take up a ministerial post in the Council of Ministers...".

Dodd, op. cit., p. 97.

For results of 1987 Referendum see Resmi Gazete, September 12, 1987, No. 19572. After the referendum Demirel assumed the leadership of TPP, Erbakan of the RP, Turkes of the NAP and Ecevit of the DLP.

State Institute of Statistics, Results of General Election of Representatives, 29.1, im No. 1273, pp.2-3.

As a result of the new election system device by the Ozal government to ensure MP winning, serious imbalances appeared between the percentage of votes the political parties received and the seats they obtained in the parliament. The Mot.P obtained 64.9% of the seats in the Assembly with only 36.3% of all votes. Ibid.


Before the elections prime minister Ozal implied that he would resign if the popular support drop to an unsatisfactory level (=~%30). See Cemal, H., Ozal Hikayesi (Story of Ozal), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1989), pp. 11-16 and 279-284.


For example in 1979 PM Demirel was unable to press ahead with the desired Turkish application for full membership to the EEC because of minority status of his government in the parliament, and the well-known opposition of NSP for such a move.

This was particularly true for the Motherland Party which could not attract many experienced politicians at first because it had widely believed that it would not be
allowed to run in the elections, and, even if it did so, would not get too far. See Dogan, op. cit., pp. 390-391; Heper, H., "The State, Political Party and Society in Post-1983 Turkey", Government and Opposition, Vol. 25 (1), 1990, p. 332. It was also argued elsewhere that the Motherland Party was largely composed of opportunists "who jumped on to Mr. Ozal's bandwagon" in autumn 1983, when he emerged as the likely election winner. The Economist, June 16, 1984, "Growing Pains", p. 47.

68. Kalaycioglu, E., "The 1983 Parliament in Turkey; Changes and Continuities" in Heper, M. & Evin, A. (eds.), State, Democracy and The Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1988), p. 51. The first figure includes all the deputies who served in all of the national parliamentary bodies, including 1961 Constituent and 1981 Consultative Assemblies. If we exclude the above-mentioned assemblies from our calculation, it would give the result as only %9 of all the deputies being served previously in the multi-party parliaments.

69. The fact that the author refers to a common resentment among the deputies being designated as "professional politician" shows the strength of psychological low-esteem of being politicians after the 1980 experience. Ibid., p. 59, footnote 21.

70. For findings and their interpretation see Ibid., pp. 54-60.

71. Heper, op. cit., p. 332. Also for more general question of party loyalty in the 1983 parliament see Kalaycioglu, Ibid., pp. 56-58.

72. For the analysis of the turnover pattern in the 1983 Assembly see Kalaycioglu, ibid., pp. 49-51.

73. Ibid., p. 61.

74. The three were; the general debate on 11.2.1986 about government's general foreign policy; the general debate, in closed session, on 13.2.1985 about repression of Turkish minority in Bulgaria; and the general debate on 2.9.1986 about Turkish military operations in Iraq, which tabled earlier by the government. There were none accepted in the 1987 Assembly. See TBMM-TD, 17-1, 2 & 4, above mentioned dates.

75. TBMM-TD, 18-1, 5.


78. See, for example, TBMM-TD, 18-3, 40 (95), 23.5.1990.


82. Although it could be argued that farmers form the biggest group of pressure in Turkey as far as prices and taxes for agricultural produce concern, since it is an unorganized pressure group and their influence do not fell onto foreign policy of the country, they together with the military, which much attention diverted to in the previous chapter, are omitted from discussion here.

83. For the difficulties of running a newspaper during the military regime and various examples of the ridicules prohibitions see Cemal, H., *12 Eylul Gunlugu; Demokrasi Korkusu* (12 September Diary; Fear of Democracy), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1986).


85. Much of the findings here are drawn mainly from the personal observation of various Turkish dailies during the period and supported by a through-search of daily Milliyet. Also Kilercioğlu, O., *Basinda Pis Politika, 1984-1987* (Foreign Policy in the Press), (Ankara: Nurol Matbaacilik A.S., n.d.) and various bulletins of Directorate General of Press and Information, labelled as *Yerel Basin ve Dis Politika*, (Local Press and Foreign policy) were consulted.

86. See, for example, *Newsspot*, September 7-10, 1984, "Fundamental Principles Shaping Turkey's Foreign Policy"; *Milliyet*, July 20-22, 1991, "Kibris Dosyasi" (Cyprus File); *Milliyet*, September 27-October 1, 1992, "ABD'nin Kurt Karti" (Kurdish Trump of the USA).

87. It was later argued that the ministership of Mr. Halefoglu was proposed by president Evren and accepted by Ozal. See Yavuz Donat, *Ozalli Yillar* (Years With Ozal), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1988), p. 43. In this context it is significant to note that Mr. Halefoglu was, at the time of his appointment, about to retire as ambassador to Moscow and was not known personally by Turgut Ozal. It was also reported in the Turkish press that Mr. Halefoglu, through his son, had connections with ENKA, a holding cooperation whose owner Mr. Sarik Tara was a close associate of Mr. Ozal and was reported to be influential even in the policy making. See *Nokta*, 5-11 November 1984, p. 15.

88. The most important reasons for docility and personal attachment of the Mot.P MPs to their leaders were derived from their election process. Mot.P, which had very little intra-party democracy, never used preliminary election system to determine its candidates. All the candidates were chosen by Ozal himself usually on the basis of personal attachment rather than achievement. Being elected because of Ozal's wish and favour in a sense later affected personality and attitudes of the MPs. The same argument was also put forward by Mot.P's deputy chairman Mr. H. Ozalp. See his interview by Emin Colasan in *Hurriyet*, "Pazar Sohbeti", March 13, 1988.

89. Gungor Uras, *Nokta*, December 26, 1983 - January 1, 1984, p. 48. The literal translation of the phrase he used was Ozal Lovers Society (Ozal Sevener Dernegi). Similarly Yavuz Gokmen, *Ozal Sendromu* (Ankara: Verso, 1992), p. 110 argues that all the ministers and Mot.P MPs in the early days were worshipping Ozal. He also records an occasion when Minister of Culture Mukerrem Tascioglu, being asked
whether Mot.P MPs loved Ozal very much, told to him "how could I not love him. I was selling water pipes in the Persembe Market, he made me minister", p. 100. One-man show character of the Mot.P was also so evidently demonstrated by the fact that, apart from Mr. M Kececiler, Ozal's close associate, and Mr. H. Dogan, Ozal's nephew, the 30-odd founders of the Mot.P learned the name and the emblem of the party they were establishing just before the official establishment day. The name and the emblem of the party was chosen by Turgut Ozal himself and kept like a "state secret". See Yalcin Dogan, op. cit., 332-333.


91. For example after the 1987 elections Mehmet Barlas wrote in the daily Gunes editorial on December 22, 1987; "...take the new ministers in this latest Cabinet list, they learned their appointments only at the last minute like national lottery winners. Even themselves cannot explain who is appointed where on what grounds". Even Ozal's own brother Korkut Ozal, who was not active in politics at the time, was critical of his anti-democratic actions within Mot.P; "There is a party, and there is its leader Turgut Ozal. Anything and everything which have been done belongs to him. Nobody else is responsible either for rights or wrongs...The last word always rests with him. For instance I heard and could not believe that in the latest local elections all the 1300 mayoral candidates were chosen by central committee, that is Turgut himself. Can you imagine...". Interview by Nokta, April 23, 1989, p. 15.

92. Ozal's belief in his one-man hold over the party was so self-evident in these remarks regarding party management; "Nobody knows what I do". Hurriyet, August 14, 1989, p. 14. These were of course quite unfortunate remarks for a leader of a governing party in a supposedly democratic system.

93. This was criticised even by the high ranking party officials, normally close to Ozal. See an interview by Emin Colasan with two Mot.P Central Committee members, Mr. E. Asik and Mr. A. Pehlivanli in Hurriyet, January 22, 1989.

94. For an analysis by Mr. Mehmet Kececiler, strong man of the Mot.P constituencies, see an interview by M. Yasar Bostanci, Yeni Asir, April 1989. The existence of "Hanedan" was even reported in the foreign press. See for example Financial Times, December 12, 1988; The Economist, November 6, 1987; Reuters, February 1989. For the analysis of Hanedan phenomenon and its members see Cemal, *Ozal Hikayesi*, pp. 136-153; Gokmen, op. cit., pp. 125-127.

95. It was reported that most of the ministers did not know what was happening at the time or what role these undersecretaries were going to play in the longer run, because of the fact that most of the ministers had not had any previous political experience and were not aware of the working principles of Turkish governmental system. It was argued that in the first cabinet meeting ministers, who were still in shock of both being elected as MPs as also being suddenly elevated to ministerial posts, were forced by Turgut Ozal to sign empty government decrees which were later filled up by him and used in his early-day sweeping bureaucratic reforms. Moreover, it was later alleged that signing of empty decree papers became a frequent process in the Mot.P governments whose ministers were required, upon their appointment to submit their undated resignation to Mr. Ozal to be used in an appropriate time. See Cemal, ibid., pp. 122-125.
96. Feroz Ahmad, "The Transition to Democracy in Turkey", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7 (2), April 1985, p. 219. This was seen by some as a step towards American style centralization in which under-secretaries, appointed by the political regime, not the ministers were in control. See Yalcin Dogan, Cumhuriyet, "Bakanlar UstU Mustesar" (Above-ministers undersecretary), December 16, 1983. Correctness of his early predictions became all too apparent only towards the end of 1989 when, while the tenure of president Evren was coming to end, prime minister Ozal started to talk about desirability of establishing an American style presidency in Turkey.


98. The right to use governmental decrees with a force of law was formally put into the constitution after the 1971 military intervention. However, it was not widely used until Mot.P government which at the end was accused of abusing this power by extensive usage. Until September 1980 (9 years) only 34 (about 11.5% of the total) governmental decrees were issued, and during the military regime between 1980 and 1983 91 (31.1%) decrees were used. However during Ozal's first five years in the government he issued 161 (56.2%) governmental decrees. If we consider the fact that during the same period only 354 full-fledged law were enacted by the parliament, the extensive usage of decrees (about 1 decree per 2 laws) by the Mot.P becomes obvious. Moreover, 63% of those 161 decrees had not yet by March 1989 been brought before the Parliament to receive approval. These figures were taken from a research by SDPP MP Mr. Cahit Tutum, cited in TBMM-TD, 18-2, 29 (100), 13 June 1989, pp. 41-45.


100. Gokmen, Ozal Hikayesi, p. 175; His lack of in-depth understanding of American culture was effectively demonstrated by Guldemir, ibid, pp. 54-72.


102. Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, p. 72 argues that towards the end of 1984 premier Ozal started to tell to opposing Evren, regarding firstly economic and later on political subjects, that those were the "government's appreciations".

103. A survey published by daily Milliyet on January 15, 1984 showed that Turkish people put the economic recovery on the top of their priority list.

104. Cemal, Ozal hikayesi, p. 288.

105. Ibid., p. 114.


In a meeting with journalists and businessmen in Istanbul on September 16, 1984. The journalist was Hasan Pulur and printed this argument in Hurriyet September 19, 1984.


112 During his visit to the "Society of Parliamentary Correspondents" on April 10, 1987, cited in Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, p. 291. According to 1988 figures, Turkish military expenditures reached 30% of National budget.


115 One of the more important examples was the Turkish effort to obtain Swedish neutrality in the Council of Europe during the debates and vote about Turkish presidency in 1984. It was estimated before the vote that Turkey was going to lose with one vote. In the event Turkey's Stockholm representative, with direct instructions from prime minister Ozal, hinted to Swedish authorities that they might lose a multi-billion dollar contract concerning the establishment of a light-metro system in Istanbul. It may have been just a casual connection but the Swedish vote was at the end turned to neutral from negative and Turkey obtained the presidency. This connection was mentioned later by Turgut Ozal himself in a dinner with a group of journalists and writers in Istanbul in September 1985. Cited in Cemal Ozal Hikayesi, p. 115.


117 This phenomenon is looked into more closely in Chapter Seven.

118 In a luncheon with a group of journalists in October 1986 in Istanbul. Quoted in Cemal, op. cit., p. 307.


120 During the eight years of M o.t.P government none of the anti-democratic regulations put into effect by the military regime were corrected, despite the fact that there was a broad political consensus on this. There were two exceptions for this; the "Police Authority Law" which actually increased police powers with more restrictions on people's rights and the "election law" which was amended several times to give M o.t.P winning edge in the elections.

121 Their double-faced and opportunist attitude forced one eminent Turkish political sociologist to ask herself "who is liberal in Motherland Party?". Her answer is self explanatory; "...they call liberal those who let his wife to drink alcohol, sent his children to private schools, travels to Europe, in short they call normal urban life as liberal. This party campaigned 'no' in the referendum and nobody in the party rebelled against it. Hence there is no liberal in this party. In my understanding this party is not even modern, but only conservative". Nur Vergin, Nokta, May 1, 1988, p. 27. Ozal's attitude towards political rights in general and during the referendum campaign in particular is dealt in detail in Cemal, Ozal Hikayasi, pp. 205-221; and Erbil Tusalp's Tarible Yuzlesme: Evreninki mi, Ozalinki mi? (Confrontation with History: Evren's or Ozal's?), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1992) is wholly dedicated to exposing similar attitudes of Ozal and the military government towards human rights, torture and democratization issues in Turkey.

259

123. Cemal, ibid., p. 85


125. For further evaluation of impression given by Ozal to American officials about Armenian efforts to pass a resolution to commemorate alleged Armenian massacre of 1919 see Guldemir, op. cit., pp. 260-293 where he quotes Ozal saying that Armenian efforts were like "one-shot bullet. Once fired it would be all over and we can get along with our business as usual".

126. Turan Yavuz, ABD'nin Kurt Karti (USA's Kurdish Card), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1993), pp. 149-218; Guldemir, ibid., pp. 396-418.

127. Personal Interview, April 5, 1993, Ankara, Turkey.


129. Ibid, pp. 122-124 argues that foreign ministry officials with their highly sophisticated traditional educations and western minds neither liked Ozal and his "arabesque" style, as eastern culture is wrongly labelled in Turkey, both in life and in government, nor entirely trusted his intentions about the future of the state, secularism, or anything related with foreign affairs.

130. Cemal argues that the abolition of visa was initially suggested to prime minister Ozal by a newspaper owner, Mr. Haldun Simavi, before his second press conference where he made the announcement. The reason was apparently being that of "calling a press conference to announce goodwill is not good enough by itself, you have to have something important to say or to give". See Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, p. 107.


133. Guldemir, op. cit., p. 111.

134. See an interview with A.B. Kafaoglu in Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, p. 116; Guldemir, ibid., pp. 51-52 comments that he "never got the impression that Ozal had a substantial idea about state. The two notions that were lacking in Ozal were law and state philosophies. Absence of these notions were preventing Ozal from becoming a true 'statesman'...It cannot be forgiven that an intelligent man like Ozal did not know these things". Both Cemal and Guldemir cite the number of annulled laws during the Mot.P governments as a proof of Ozal's lack of legal-state notion. Between December 1983 and April 1989 37 laws were annulled by the Constitutional court, which was a high proportion in Turkish standards. See Cemal, ibid., p. 117. Also a remark made by Ozal during a debate in the Parliament about the constitutionality of a proposed law was taken by many as self-explanatory; "What could happen had the Constitution breached once?"


137. It was reported that the preliminary soundings for a dialogue were carried out by Mr. Sarik Tara, a close friend of Ozal and a leading businessman, with a Greek
businessman. Ibid., p. 108 and Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi p. 290. If this was true it makes more sense that the meeting took in Davos during a conference organized by the World Economic Forum, whose director Swedish professor Karl Schwapp was also an executive committee member of Mr. Tara's ENKA holding's.

138 Cemal, ibid., p. 119. Guldemir, ibid., p. 108

139 Among his American friends, Mr. Frank Zarb, associate partner of an American firm Lazare Frere, Mr. John H. Berson, director of Turkish branch of Citibank between 1981 and 1984, and Mr. Rodney Wagner, deputy president of Morgan Guaranty which undertook the evaluation of Turkish privatisation, were named several times in the Turkish press. For further references see Cemal, ibid., pp. 118-122, who had interviews with them in May 1988, and Guldemir, ibid., pp. 107-110.

140 Cemal, ibid., p. 119.


145 See Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, pp. 179-180 and 17-20 where he repeated his interview with an American diplomat who put forward this argument.

146 See for example interviews by Guldemir with American scholars Graham Fuller and Edward Luttwak in Guldemir op. cit., pp. 372-386.


148 Interview by Guldemir is cited in Cemal, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

149 Taken from a speech delivered in an international conference on Islam and the West", Paris, November 14, 1985. Turkish version of the speech was published by Prime ministry Directorate General of Press and Information (Ankara, 1986).

150 This sentiment was taken up by the foreign press as well. Financial Times, for example, argued during the Gulf crisis that Ozal was "preparing to play a much bigger role, whether or not Turkish forces participate in the Gulf War". Financial Times, Kerin Hope, "Ozal Prepares to Fill Regional Power Vacuum", January 28, 1991.

151 This issue is dealt in detail in chapter eight.


153 Sami Kohen, Milliyet, "Ozal'ın Dis Politikası" (Foreign Policy of Ozal), 19.4.1993.

154 Guldemir, op. cit., p. 16.


156 Guldemir, op. cit., p. 16.

157 This basic difference between Ozal and foreign ministry caused deep distrust in their relationship and his over intervention in daily foreign policy matters led to the resignation of two foreign ministers of Akbulut Cabinet within a year. For evaluation of connections between resignations and his disregard for foreign ministry hierarchy see Nur Batur, Cumhuriyet, October 14, 1990, "Ozal ve Disisleri"; Hurriyet, Derya

For further discussion about the fundamental differences between the foreign ministry and Ozal consult with chapter eight where these issues are discussed in the context of Turkish foreign policy management during the Gulf war.

158 TRT, pp. 1-2
159 TRT, p. 3.
161 These remarks were made to the CNN and later repeated by Ozal in an interview on Turkish Television on January 18, 1991 by Ugur Dundar. See TRT, pp. 8-9.
162 Ibid., p. 9.
165 Ibid., p. 119. Ozal and Papandreou were nominated together for the peace prize by Karl Schwap, director of the World Economic Forum. In the event, however, nomination was late and therefore not considered.
166 Ibid., p. 16.
168 TRT, pp. 17-18.
169 The NSC of 1982 Constitution should not be mixed with the NSC of 1980-83 period - the 5-man military junta. The NSC was originally created by the 1961 Constitution after the first military intervention in Republican Turkey in order to create an organ of communication between military and civilian elites.
170 Soon after the elections the martial law replaced by state of emergency in 15 provinces. However, the process of further replacements and later abolishments were painfully slow and in 1989, when Ozal elected as president, nine provinces were still under emergency rule. The military was particularly sensitive and adamant about the continuation of Martial Law in Istanbul, where most of the dailies are published, and in southeastern Turkey, mostly populated by Kurds. The Economist, July 7, 1984, p. 47, "A Turn of the Screw"
171 Keesing's, May 1987, p. 35135.
173 For the developments and the role of the military in escalating the crisis see Milliyet, various issues between 28 February -8 April 1987; and Keesing's, May 1987, pp. 35129-35130.
175 Ahmad, Transition to Democracy, p. 217; The Economist, Ibid.; Tanor, Ibid., p. 66. The daily Milliyet of 15 October 1984 appeared with an instructive title; "An ideal division of tasks at the summit of the state: the Economy to Ozal, security to Evren".
176 Personal interview with president Evren in Marmaris on March 2, 1993.
177. In an press conference when asked about the president's interventions premier Ozal responded by saying "there is no such a thing". See Press Conferences of the Prime Minister Turgut Ozal: 1-24 (Ankara: T.C. Basbakanlik, 1988), p. 31. Hereafter referred as "press conferences".

178. Ibid., p. 154.

179. In his first meeting with foreign press as prime minister-designate, when it was suggested that his aim was to defeat "military and civilian bureaucracy" in Turkey, Mr. Ozal quickly corrected foreign journalist; "Not military, civilian...". See The Times, November 12, 1983, p. 4, Mortimer, M., "Ozal Indicate Change of Policy on Applying For EEC Membership".


182. See Anilar, Volumes 5 and 6.

183. Tanor, op. cit., pp. 64-65, catagorized the reasons for Evren's visibility even after the elections as constitutional, historical, psychological, political and repression.


185. From the draft resolution adapted by the Political Commission of the Council of Europe, see the Times, September 19, 1983, p. 8.

186. For the decision of the Assembly dated September 30, 1983, see Milliyet, October 1, 1983, p. 5; Keesing's, December 1983, p. 32581.


188. The leading article of the Times the following day of the elections dissapointingly asked; "If this is democracy, why was the people's choice of representatives so narrowly and arbitrarily restricted by administrative measures, taken in violation of the constitution?" November 8, 1983, p. 15, "One in the Eye For the Generals".


190. Despite the misgivins from the Council, Turkish paliametarians took up teir seats on January 1984 meeting, risking permanent expulsion from the Council. Milliyet, 27 January 1984, pp. 1 & 6-7. In the meeting itself, the final decision was narrowly prevented due to strike of the Council's interpreters. Turkish delegates finally allowed to join with full voting rights in May 1984. See Milliyet, May 9, 1984, pp. 1, 5 & 9; Keesing's, August 1984, p. 33039.

191. In a resolution approved on May 10, 1984, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted that Turkey was now clearly on the way to democratic normalization but was still far from enjoying a true democracy, and called upon the Turkish authorities to continue the removal of all undemocratic conditions, to respect
human rights and the rights of minorities, to revoke martial law, and to allow full freedom of action for political parties. See Keesing's, August 1984, p. 33039.


For a detailed and comparative study of human rights violations and torture cases both under the military regime and during the Ozal governments see Tusalp, op. cit.


The most worrying provision was the wide range "morality" powers that enabled the police, broadly speaking, to arrest anybody whose behaviour offends public morals. The initial draft also included such rights as tapping phones freely, intercepting mails, using firearms at own discretion and arresting people merely on suspicion, but they had been eliminated thanks to the opposition's efforts. The reason for the necessity of the new policy bill was the lifting of martial law from most of the country, which worried the government and the president about maintaining law and order. See The Economist, June 22, 1985, p. 57, "Hard Law"; Keesing's, July 1986, pp. 34500-34501.

Although Turkey allowed its citizens to appeal to the Commission, it did not accept the authority of the European Court of Human Rights on the ground that it would undermine Turkish sovereignty and might lead to verdicts which conflicted with the Turkish Constitution or penal code. See the Economist, February 7, 1987, p. 63, "Well done, pity about the strings"; Keesing's, May 1987, pp. 35135 and 35127A.

The Amnesty International submitted in 1986 to the Turkish authorities the names of more than 100 people alleged to have died from torture since 1980. See the Economist, November 1, 1986, p. 53, "The Shadow Over Turkey". It also argued in July 24, 1985 that torture remained "systematic and widespread" in Turkey even after the advent of the civilian regime. Cited in Keesing's, July 1986, p.3500. Moreover, in March 23, 1985, the heads of the London and New York branches of the International Pen Club, Harold Pinter and Arthur Miller, ending a 5-day visit to Turkey alleged that "human rights were still widely abused", The Times, March 23, 1985, p. 5. Further, in February 12, 1987, the Human Rights Association of Turkey published a report which outlined the cases of 149 people who allegedly had died in detention in Turkey since 1980.


For example, the return of two leading communist, Haydar Kutlu and Nihat Sargin, in November 16, 1987 from exile to form the United Communist Party of Turkey, and their subsequent imprisonment, stirred up much European criticism. Milliyet, November 17, 1987; The Times, November 17, 1987, p. 8. It was also argued that their real intention was to create doubts in Europe about the Turkish democratic system and in particular about the legality of 1987 elections, which they did successfully. The Economist, November 21, 1987, p. 53, "Hard Landing".

Yesilada, op. cit., p. 371.
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAM IN TURKEY

1. Introduction

During the 1980s Turkey's foreign policy drew markedly closer to the Islamic World, while, quite simultaneously, an Islamic reassertion was taking place in the domestic scene. The most important aspect of these developments, for our purposes, lies behind the question of whether the new orientation in foreign policy was a deliberate extension of Islamic revival within the country, or whether the revival was a natural outcome of Turkey's warmer relations with her Middle Eastern Islamic neighbours? The simple truth was that both developments were taking place at the same time and constantly reinforced one another. The query remains then as to the relative influence of each of these developments on the other, and vis-a-vis other factors that brought about Turkey's new orientation in foreign policy. Since the "other factors" fell into the interest of other chapters, we shall only deal here with the scale and nature of Islamic reassertion in Turkey, so as to enable us to determine its effects on and connection with her foreign policy in the 1980s.

2. Domestic Developments

2.1. The Military Regime and Islam

The success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in replacing the Shah's monarchy with an Islamic Republic gave new impetus and created a new turn in both Muslim fundamentalist activity and Islamic reassertion in Turkey, as happened throughout the Islamic world.

While the leader of the National Salvation Party (NSP), Prof. Erbakan, was calling on the Muslim countries to unite against both the Soviet Union and the United
States, and claiming that Turkey was a "tool" in the hands of the West, the extremism of his party and its sympathizers, displayed in a rally for the "liberation of Jerusalem", constituted one of the reasons for the military intervention of September 12, 1980. Consequently, the Military government was relentless against Muslim fundamentalism, which the generals considered to be as dangerous as communism for the country's integrity. Erbakan, who, together with other political party leaders, was taken immediately into "protective custody" on the day of takeover and, like NAP leader Turkes, arrested a month later, was tried with 33 other NSP members, starting from April 24, 1981, with charges of attempting to create an Islamic state in Turkey.

Moreover, the secular nature of the Turkish state was once again emphasized in the new constitution, and restrictions were placed on wearing beards and turbans for students and civil servants, which triggered an immediate and widespread reaction in religious quarters and became a controversial subject among the Turkish public as well as in the Press and the Consultative Assembly.

Although the military attempted to crack down heavily on fundamentalists, they, nonetheless, did not fail to recognize the important role which religion could play in achieving the "unity and togetherness" of the people and in eliminating influences of "foreign ideologies" on the younger generations. Hence, the military regime, despite its initial alertness about Islamic resurgence, attempted to use government-controlled religion as a means of depoliticisation of the masses. The spiritual and mystical message of moderate Islam, which was also seen as an antidote to Communism, was thought to be the best cure for an overly politicized society. Therefore, while all the political and social groups were under significant pressure from the military regime, the non-violent Islamist groups found leniency and enjoyed great deal of freedom in their activities. With these ideas in mind and also in order to eliminate the harmful influences of religious "ignorant fanatics", "opportunists", and "political manipulators" on the younger generations, the military regime went further than any other government and in the fall of 1981 made religious education compulsory, albeit by the lay teachers and under the strict control of the state. Though its implications for the principle of
secularism were hotly disputed, providing compulsory religious education was, in fact,

a part of a damage control operation aimed at keeping the growth of Islam within certain boundaries to prevent it from posing a threat to the secular foundation of the Turkish state in the future.

Thus the purpose of the course on religion and ethics was established with this in mind as:

- to provide students with knowledge on religion in general, the Islamic religion, ethics...in line with the Turkish national educational policy and its general goals and principles as well as Ataturk's principle of secularism; thus, to strengthen from a religious and ethical angle, Ataturkism, national unity and solidarity and humanitarianism as well as to bring up ethical and virtuous human beings.

Moreover, courses on religion were also introduced to the prisoners from spring 1982 onwards. It was thought that citizens, with a better knowledge of Islam, would be less vulnerable to religious exploitation.

This new attitude towards religion by the military, while showing a growing rapprochement between the concept of the secular state of Kemalism and social reality of popular Islam, formed another part of the new understanding of Kemalism by the state elites. As mentioned earlier, though the military still regards itself as the guardian of the Kemalist principles, the interpretation of those principles is made now with a more conciliatory effort. Thus secularism is no longer seen as being at odds with day-to-day Islam and, with an acceptance of usefulness of traditional and religious symbols for national unity and solidarity, the state elites of today are not adamant as far as reaching a new Turkish socio-cultural identity, embracing Islam, is concerned. This new understanding meant, at the end, an unprecedented recognition of Islam as a religious and social phenomenon capable of contributing towards restoration of cohesion and unity within Turkey. And it seemed, at least for the time being, the measures that followed the September 12, 1980 intervention were successful at reaching that cohesion and unity, together with reducing the exploitation and abuse of religion for political purposes.
However, the appearance was deceptive. The strategy of using religion as a tool to disarm the society from "harmful ideologies", thus acting leniently towards Islamic groupings, carried within it the seeds of a potential danger for radicalization of society, a result from which the military was professedly trying to protect the masses. In fact, the first signs of increasing popularity of religious order and radically different Islamic groupings were seen in 1983-1984. There was a boom in the publication of Islamic journals and translated books which brought the influence of radical Islam from other parts of the Muslim world. Moreover, since all potential opposition to the military regime was suppressed and strictly supervised, the Islamic groups emerged successfully after 1980 as the chief opponent of the regime, which in the long run attracted more radical and extremist groups into their ranks. Consequently, instead of the Marxists and ultra-nationalists, who were under criminal investigation and therefore lost most of their power and supporters, Islamists for the first time posed a bigger threat to the state. Their real power did not lie in the actual number of Islamists but in the potential appeal of Islam for the frustrated people of the urban centres, the adventurous new middle classes, and young university students with a rural background who were shocked in the big cities and looking for a new identity.

Towards the end of their regime, the military leaders, disturbed by the momentum that the Islamist tendencies were gathering and conscious that Islam was emerging for the first time as an independent and oppositional political force which would continue to have a role in Turkish domestic politics, seemed to have lost their earlier certainty about the country's future regarding Islamic radicalism. Confident enough in the fall of 1981, general Evren responded to a question that he did "not the least" fear any upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey.16 A few years later, however, he felt compelled to warn against attempts to restore theocracy in Turkey.17 Former premier of the military government Bulent Ulusu was also troubled, hardly after a year he left power to the Motherland Party of Ozal, about Islamic radicalism which he reportedly regarded as posing even more threat to the country than the communists.18
2.2. Islam During the Motherland Party Governments

In the above atmosphere, the future of the state's secular nature seemed rather bleak to the old-guard secularists after the advent of Mr. Ozal to the premiership. The suspicions of the former were not altogether groundless, especially if one considers the latter's previous record. His appearance as a devout Muslim; his unsuccessful bid for deputyship on the NSP list in the 1977 general elections; his alleged family bond to Islamic circles through his close associate Mr. Mehmet Kececiler who was former NSP mayor of Konya previously to 1980 intervention, and through his brother Mr. Korkut Ozal who was MP for NSP, too; and his apparent collaboration with former NSP and NAP followers within his party made him somewhat untrustworthy in the eyes of the secularists about his intentions. Hence the suspicion never died away as to whether he was a liberal modernist, somewhat revolutionary in the eyes of his supporters, who tried to consolidate Islam within secular, modern and democratic Turkey to reach a "Turkish-Islamic synthesis", or whether he was simply an Islamist under the disguise of liberal democrat, essentially another "Erbakan with a swallow-tail coat". The moves made by the Mot.P governments towards Islam were not helpful in dispelling these fears either. The influence of pro-Islamist groups on the first Ozal government became apparent from a series of measures taken by the government in 1984, ranging from clothing restrictions for teenage-girls taking part in sport displays, and efforts to introduce Arabic language courses into the secondary and high schools, to the introduction of bills in parliament that would classify beer as an alcoholic beverage and authorize the building of a mosque on the premises of the Turkish Parliament.

These activities were not missed by President Evren, or the Press, who kept a watchful eye over the government's business. Apart from giving warnings during his various inspections and tours of the country, he openly exerted pressure over premier Ozal in the NSC, which frequently "advised" the government to look into Islamic fundamentalism seriously. Moreover, he pressed for and obtained the replacement of
Education Minister Mr. Vehbi Dincerler, who was associated with the religious-leaning wing of the MHP and was at the forefront of introducing the above mentioned bills, as well as trying to prevent the teaching of Darwin's theories.\(^{21}\)

Premier Ozal, however, seemed content with the existing situation and continued to give assurances that, according to government figures, there was no serious threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey.\(^{22}\) He also resisted being drawn into discussions about Islamic fundamentalism because, he argued, "...this can hurt the feelings of the true believers".\(^{23}\) However, in early 1987, he, too, was forced to acknowledge the threat of Islamic extremism.\(^{24}\) There were already reports that several brotherhoods were conducting subversive activities in their established underground centres and in schools.\(^{25}\) The most alarming aspect of their activities, for the future of the country, was their efforts to infiltrate the Turkish Armed Forces and the Police.\(^{26}\) Though alarming for the regime and secular elites, neither these extremist - i.e. fundamentalist - groups nor their activities seemed to command a large following among the Turkish people at large. A public opinion poll, published in Milliyet on January 23, 1987, showed that only 7% of those who described themselves as Islamist supported the concept of an Islamic state based on Sharia. Also, in November 1987 general elections, the Islamic oriented WP obtained only a disappointing 7% of the poll. It seemed that premier Ozal was correct in claiming that Turkey was different from Iran in that Turkey did not have an institutionalized priesthood and therefore an Iranian style Islamic revolution in Turkey was not conceivable.\(^{27}\) This was true in the sense that Turkey's secular and democratic roots are embedded much deeper in society than those of Iran at any time.

However, the irritation from the growing Islamic activism was such that the 54 SDPP MPs submitted a motion to the TGNA on January 20, 1987, requesting a parliamentary investigation to determine the dimensions of the activities directed against secularism and to determine the measures to be taken against these activities.\(^{28}\) During the discussions Prof. Erdal Inonu, the leader of SDPP, seemed to be disturbed most by the apparent leniency showed by some government ministers towards Islamic
activities and argued that the government should not assist those groups that wanted to encourage antisecular behaviour. The motion, however, was rejected at the end by the Mot.P majority who seemed unwilling to cooperate in actions to be taken against religious groups.

Moreover, after TPP's entrance into the parliament as a result of November 1987 elections, which proved the seriousness of the threat posed by the TPP to the MP in centre-right politics, the intra-parliamentary competition between those two parties for conservative votes acquired a new turn. The TPP deputies, for example, joined Mot.P in campaigning against the ban on female students wearing "turban" (Islamic headgear) during classes, in accordance with Islamic practice. Though the draft law was threatened with veto by President Evren, they were able to get around that veto by an administrative change in university regulations. What followed was the ruling of the Constitutional Court against the move, leading to counter-changes in university regulations, which in the end created widespread irritation among common believers, demonstrations by religious students and many more discussions and controversy around the general principles of secularism and freedom of belief, worship and dress.

In the middle of the dust created by the turban controversy there were voices within the parliament demanding that Ayasofya Mosque - St. Sophia Church before 1453 - which was turned into a museum under Ataturk, be re-opened to Muslim worship.

More important, perhaps, for its possible impact on the formation of decision-makers and thus on government policy, was the proclamation of Mot.P itself as "nationalist and conservative" and its offer of a "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" for Turkey's identity problem. It could be argued that this was a pragmatic response by premier Ozal to the existing balance within his party which was increasingly swinging into the control of the former NSP loyalists who were referred to as "Selametciler" (salvationists) and of the former NAP sympathizers who were called "Hareketciler" (activists). The so-called liberals at the time - between November 1987 and June 1990 - were also struggling for power along these powerful groups but with no avail. Premier Ozal's
own solution to this power struggle within his party was the adaptation of "Turk-Islam Sentezi" (Turk-Islam Synthesis) as the party motto.

It was not, however, an altogether new idea. The synthesis was first formulated during the 1960s by the members of the Aydinlar Ocagi (The Guild of the Enlightened) as an attempt to conceptualize the common beliefs and ideas of the right in Turkey. Premier Ozal's acknowledgement of it, albeit under the mounting pressure of that group within the Mot.P, led to the realization of their long-waited ambition: religion as a state ideology in a secular setting.34

The stand of the "Turk-Islam Sentezi" argues that the solution to Turkey's problems encountered on the way to becoming a powerful country could be found only by the unity of Turkish nationalism and Islam.35 It also, among others, calls for realignment of religion and state, creating a moral, patriotic and ordered society with Islamic conscious, closer relations in foreign policy with Islamic states, and elimination, or at least control, of the atheists, materialists, communists, separatist, humanists, other religious groups, leftist, elitist and statist intellectuals.

One of the interesting points of these developments was the fact that the Mot.P did not publicly adopt this ideological stand in its party congresses. It was rather an evolutionary process which came about with the occupation of more and more seats in the Ozal Cabinets and the party central organization by the members of the "holy alliance".36

Although after the humiliating defeat of Mot.P in the March 1989 local elections, most of the members of the Islamic faction within his cabinet were replaced with liberals by Mr. Ozal, thus putting the responsibility of failure squarely on the alliance, their strong bid for power became more apparent after he was elected President and chose his own successor as prime minister on November 9, 1989, two days before the Mot.P Congress, which was expected to perform the task, could do so.37 Among the new ministers to join the cabinet were a leading Islamist, Mr. M. Kececiler and a nationalist, Mr. M. Tasar, both of whom had hitherto been left out of Mot.P cabinets because of president Evren's opposition to such appointments. It
seemed "the alliance" was collecting due rewards for its vigorous campaign and fervent support for Mr. Ozal's presidency. Although, "the liberals", who were not contented with the outcome, finally succeeded in replacing Mr. Akbulut with Mr. Yilmaz as Party Chairman and then as Prime Minister in the Mot.P Congress of June 1991, the fundamentalist activities, until then, had reached alarming proportions. Fundamentalist university students had begun wearing Islamic dress, public rallies had taken place in the name of Islam, religious programmes had increased on state radio and television, and fundamentalists had been appointed to key positions in the state bureaucracy. In particular, the ministries of Interior and Education seemed to be increasingly dominated by Islamic groups. Also, the 1990 budget, putting it ahead of many ministries, had increased the spending of the Presidency of Religious Affairs by 237%, which had been apparently directed to hire more personnel in a time when the Presidency was, for the first time, demanding to be made an autonomous body. The above mentioned calls for the conversion of the Museum of Ayasofya into a mosque were aired, then again, around the same time with a nation-wide campaign which was openly supported by several Cabinet Ministers without any opposition from the premier Akbulut and the President Ozal. A further demand for the setting up of an Islamic Institute to give civil servants refresher courses on religious doctrine was rejected by the Parliament, while a mosque was opened in the TGNA on January 12, 1991 with Mot.P deputies declaring that the Turkish nation was Islamic.

Also in 1990, Islamic fundamentalism, too, took a new turn with assassinations of prominent figures who were outspoken against it. This was a new phenomenon in Turkish political life since before 1980 Islamic fundamentalists were - unlike the Marxist left and the nationalist right - not linked with political violence. The series of fundamentalist assassinations started on January 31 with the killing of Prof. Muammer Aksoy, a former Social Democrat deputy and president of the Turkish Legal Profession Foundation, by a group called "Islamic Action". On March 7, Mr. Cetin Emec, a prominent journalist of the daily Hurriyet and a staunch Kemalist, was also shot to death by the fundamentalists, named as "Islamic Revenge Movement". Although
these killings deeply horrified ordinary people, who had not forgotten the horrors of the political killings of the pre-1980 period, many intellectuals, who were also affected and alarmed to a certain extent, began to argue that the intelligentsia must try and create a dialogue with Turkey's resurgent Islamic movements, even if one of the goals of those movements is to eliminate secular and westernising values from Turkish political life. At the same time, however, the fundamentalist killings continued with an increasing rate, culminating in the killing on January 1993 of Mr. Ugur Mumcu, a columnist in the left-wing daily Cumhuriyet, who was still writing forcibly in defence of secularism and whose assassination generated huge spontaneous demonstrations from common people who were reminded by these series of assassinations about the dangers of fundamentalist takeover in the country and intensified the debate on religious extremism ever since.

As a result of this radicalization of Islam, the view, mainly from abroad, was aired to the effect that the enhanced role of religion was an important problem for Turkish democracy. Excepting the preoccupation of the fundamentalists with the religion, the political life in Turkey, however, evolves more around social and economic issues than issues dictated by religion. Though the views of political parties on religious issues could be of importance during election times, they are certainly not the determining factor.\textsuperscript{43} The realization of this factor had led Toprak to conclude that Islam in Turkey, unlike other Muslim countries, is not a sufficient catalyst for mass mobilization.\textsuperscript{44} As demonstrated by the electoral returns of the Islamic parties in Turkey through the years, economic development and other secular policies take precedence over religious issues. Thus, the issue that remains is that if the religion had become a "vehicle rather than a goal" in domestic politics,\textsuperscript{45} what role would it can play in the determination of foreign policy?
2.3. The Domestic Revival of Islam and Foreign Policy Formation

2.3.1. Public Opinion Level

Chapter IV already highlighted that public opinion in Turkey, as in other developing countries, carries less weight in the formulation of foreign policy than say in Western Europe. It also touched upon the idea that the revival of Islam at a popular level might have helped to dispel the long lasting hesitations of state elites towards having closer relations with other Islamic countries. Those hesitations had been mostly encouraged by the fears that closer relations with Islamic countries might increase the general Islamic awareness inside Turkey, which might result in a greater impact of Islam on political and social life. In the extreme, some sort of Islamic takeover of the state was most probably pictured by the state elites, including the military. However, once those elites came to terms with, or at least accepted the existence of, the new enhanced platform of Islam in Turkish social and political life through resurgence of popular Islam during the late 1970s and early 1980s, on the one hand, and through realization that the state-controlled Islam could be used for their own purpose - that is to provide unity and togetherness, on the other, a question was frequently raised as to what harm could come, leaving the profits aside for the moment, from establishing friendlier relations with other Islamic countries. In this context, the role of the Islamic revival at a popular level in affecting foreign policy would seem rather flimsy and disingenuous. But it should be remembered that there was a time when even the idea of being remotely connected with the Islamic Conference, let alone joining it, created many fears in Turkey. The enhanced role of Islam in daily Turkish life and consequent pressures from public opinion must have had some sort of impact on change of hearts at the elite and governmental levels vis-a-vis Islam in general and contacts with Islamic countries in particular. Also, one must not forget that the public chooses its representatives to govern and elevates them to positions from where they can effect the formulation of foreign policy at much higher levels. And if we can assume that the public chooses
people who are like-minded with common contemporary feelings and ideas, the
contribution of people in general towards foreign policy formulation became more
apparent. Of course this contribution has still been rather subtle, when compared, for
instance, with the more decisive effects of the army or the elite in general.

It was noted earlier that Islam, replacing the left, became the main opposition
force in the 1980s for the established order. The change, however, was less than
sudden, and although radicalization and effectiveness of political Islam became more
visible in the late 1970s and 1980s, its psychological, socio-political, and economic
roots have their own pasts. Its inception in the 1970s was not accidental, but rather a
result of interactions of many variables. Among them were economic and social
changes, which resulted in a widening gap between poor and rich, and between
traditional small town settings and modern city dwellings. Other factors included social
injustice, political and economic underdevelopment of certain groups and centres,
political repression, a need for an indigenous ideology for explaining the ambitions and
needs of those groups after the failures of nationalism and socialism to do so, and
above all a realization of the political potential of Islam as an ideology of opposition.
There is no need here to go into the details of Turkish socio-political developments
during the 1970s and Islam's role within it, but what eventually followed in the 1980s
was the realization by the state elites, mainly and perhaps more importantly by the
military, that Islam as a popular political force in the region would not go away in the
foreseeable future; that "Kemalism" and "Westernism" cannot serve the purposes of
religion for the growing number of Turkish people who were unhappy with the
increasing dependence on the West and unsatisfied with the western answers to their
problems, and that the Islamic reaction in Turkey was one of increased observance in
people's private life, which could be directed to supplement the government's policies,
and not a desire to project Islam as political system, though this was also on the
increase. Whatever the nature of the Islamic revival in Turkey, however, there is no
doubt that the influence of Islam in Turkish politics and society had increased
dramatically under the military regimes and the Mot.P governments. What followed
was a broad recognition of Islam in unprecedented levels since 1923 as a component of public life. Be it a genuine belief in the capacity of Islam acting as a socio-cultural medium in modern world; be it a desire to use religion as an instrument of conservative social control; or be it a wish to undercut the disturbing manifestations of religious fanatics and the exploitation of Islam for political ends, the underlying reason for this recognition does not matter much for our purposes so long as it is understood that the re-Islamization of the society reached, since the 1980 coup, to governmental and elite circles and the developments at the popular level have contributed, in this way, to formulation of government policies, including foreign policy. In this context, it could be argued that the slow reassertion of Islamic values in society as a whole and its recognition by the State in general have helped in establishing more open and receptive attitude toward overtures from Islamic countries, and consequently bridge the way for Turkey's closer contacts with the Middle East.

The Islamic revival in Turkey could have affected Turkey's Middle Eastern reorientation in another, albeit more obscure, way. Seeing that the reassertion of Islamic values in the society was well under way and thus tempted to use religion in a petty political way, the governments might have felt that showing friendlier attitude towards the Islamic countries would generate votes from certain groups if not the whole society. This was essentially true for the second government of Mr. Ozal, who had increasingly to rely on Islamic values to split the conservative votes, and had to resort to the Turk-Islam synthesis for creating cohesion within his otherwise divided party. On the other hand, it should be noted that Turkish public opinion, which has always been divided over Islamic policies and relations with Islamic countries, has no real power to force the government into unwanted policies, especially in foreign affairs. However, the government might chose one policy or other in order to win sympathies of certain sections of the society, regardless whether there is strong desire in the public for such policies. This, at times, could lead to contradictory stands by the government, as demonstrated by prime minister Ozal's eagerness, while applying for full membership of the European Community, to have it known that he was still a practising Muslim.
Therefore, we can conclude that the resurgence of popular Islam in Turkey could influence its foreign policy only in the above mentioned indirect ways. Of course, the extent of that influence - or even existence of it for that matter - is too vague to be measured.

2.3.2. The Elite Level

Up to 1980, the elite in Turkey had a long tradition of secular attitude. Especially the military and civilian bureaucratic elites, having the history of being in the forefront of both the late Ottoman modernization efforts and the Kemalist reforms, had carried the banner of the secular state. On the other hand, deviations from a secular stand had been seen on the side of the political elite from time to time, though they too, were careful not to ally themselves with religious fanatics.

However, since the 1980 coup d'etat and following socio-political upheaval with its Islamic elements, the Turkish elite is no longer a homogeneous body. We have already seen how the military elites' understanding of Kemalism, in particular the principle of secularism, had changed and given way to the existence of Islam within society as its corporate part. Once the biggest defender of secularism (the army) gave way to collaboration, many of the individual elites, also increasingly started to feel that the existing state ideology (i.e. Kemalism) was no longer enough to provide a comprehensive world view which would satisfy their personal and moral needs. Consequently, some of them turned to religion, at least in their private lives, to find a way out.

Also after the 1980 coup d'etat, the Turkish elite found it impossible to express themselves through parties and associations, which had all been banned. They were further intimidated by the widespread arrests and reports of torture in detention. Under the circumstances, with the above mentioned relatively relaxed attitude toward religion, most of the elite realized that there was no other way than either to become apolitical
or to make recourse to Islam to express their opposition to the existing regime. Many chose Islam. Even a number of former leftists became Islamists.53

Finally, they increasingly started to argue that the secular intelligentsia must understand the needs and desires of religious-minded ordinary people, and a dialogue, which in the end would elevate Islam to its rightful place within the society and in the secular state system, should be created.54 Mr. Ozal, then, came to be regarded by many of them as an ideal prototype politician; a religious personality with a spirit of free enterprise.

Most of the non-Islamist elites, too, excepting old guard secularists, did not openly oppose such an idea, because, as already mentioned, after the traumatic experiences of political violence and social disorder during the 1970s, they too came to realize that acceptance, not complete rejection, of religious moral symbols could strengthen the social cohesion.55 Of course, this does not mean that they would accept anti-secular options for Turkey's future. Far from it. Most of the elite have remained committed to the pro-Western outlook of Kemalism. But at the same time, under the mixed influences of international and domestic developments, they have started to have second thoughts about Turkish identity for both internal and external purposes. Consequently, they began to question Turkey's place in the international system. Although most of the intelligentsia is in agreement with political elites that Turkey's NATO membership should be continued, they now question the necessity of being a member with closed eyes. They emphasize that Turkey's national interests would not always correlate with those of the US or other Western allies.

As a result, most of the elite now not only accept religion as an integral part of Turkish identity, but also refer, when talking about the Middle East, to religious, in addition to historical and cultural, links between Turkey and them.56 It seems that the Turkish elite has now came to terms with the reality that "Turkey is after all by history and geography a Middle Eastern country, by religion a Muslim country, and by economy a developing country."57
There are of course still controversies and disagreements about the extent to which Islamic influences should be allowed and tolerated. Nevertheless, the positive foreign policy towards the Middle East, initiated on the basis of economic, political and security concerns and followed with enthusiasm by Turgut Ozal, nevertheless, fits quite well with the new world view of Turkish elites.

On the other hand, as in the case of the public opinion, it is difficult to determine the actual extent of the influence of this new understanding of Islam by the elite over country's foreign policy. However, it could be argued that tolerance on the secular elite level and conceptualizing by the Islamist intellectuals have considerably aided formulation of Turkey's new orientation in foreign policy.

2.3.3. The Government Level

The Motherland Party governments' encouragement of the revival of Islam within the country was pointed out earlier. Prime Minister Ozal and his governments were also at the front of the new opening towards the Middle East. The correlation between the two events seems obvious, yet it is difficult to pin down the extent of interaction. Although the Islamists within the party, like those outside, were calling for more intimate and steady relations with the Islamic world, the influence of these calls on the formation of foreign policy and opening towards the Middle East is difficult to assess since many other variables - such as economic benefit, national security, and political gains - were also involved. It should also not be forgotten that, even though the Mot.P called itself nationalist-conservative and opted for Turk-Islam synthesis, it was the same Mot.P which has reaffirmed Turkey's commitment to the West and under Ozal's leadership applied for European Community membership.

Moreover, most of the Islamists within the party, like everybody else, were rarely interested in foreign policy and were usually locked into either intra-party power struggles or in one of the many controversies concerning religion, secularism, the state or other such issues. Further, premier Ozal's governing style, which used a small group
of experts, tightly knit and loyal to him, made outside intervention very difficult. Especially in foreign policy, which became premier Ozal's pet interest particularly after 1985, sometimes even the foreign minister did not know what specifically was going on, let alone cabinet ministers or Mot.P deputies.

In this context, the effects of the Islamic faction were probably slight and indirect, slightly more than the influence of popular religious revival in the country as a whole. On the other hand, Ozal did not want to alienate the Islamists within and without his party because he hoped they would bring more votes. While he tolerated and even supported them in domestic politics, it should not be unnatural to expect that he would act in foreign affairs sometime or another with this in his mind. For example, the hastily taken decision in November 1988 to grant immediate recognition to Yasser Arafat's newly proclaimed Palestinian state, rings some bells. Although it was in accordance with Turkey's Middle Eastern policy and was approved by all parties, the swiftness and the speed of the decision, which was so unlike the Turkish Foreign Ministry, brings into mind the memories of preoccupation of Islamists with Israel and the Palestinian cause in foreign affairs. On the other hand, the government would not have suffered from any damage if it had adopted a more cautious line and waited for sometime. But the immediate recognition, though most probably not pressed by the Islamists, would without doubt have warmed their hearts as well as pleasing the Arab states. Therefore, like small deeds in domestic politics towards Islam, with the quick and enthusiastic recognition, the government might have hoped to capitalize on the feelings of people, who, to the extent they were concerned, were favourably disposed toward the Palestinian cause, thereby winning their favour. The argument that the government was playing to domestic opinion for fresh political support at a time when the economy was going downhill, was made more plausible by the fact that the announcement to recognize the Palestinian state was made by prime minister himself, a hardly necessary gesture. Also, Turkey's subsequent reluctance to upgrade the status of the PLO office in Ankara to full embassy level even after 30-odd states had done so, apparently in order to balance her earlier rush, strengthens our argument.
In this context, one must also bear in mind the characteristics of Mot.P's approach to foreign policy issues, which was aimed at times at maximisation its domestic gains and which was ably described by one of its foreign ministers as an explanation of Turkey's haste to recognize the Palestinian state; "while there is a national consensus on foreign policy", announced Mr. Yilmaz, "the Motherland Party government believes in taking initiatives rather than waiting on events."^{60}

The Turk-Islam synthesis was not, however, always on the side of the general consensus on foreign policy. The question of Turkey's future EC membership was one of those areas that highlighted the difficult and awkward situation premier Ozal was in. His support for the synthesis for domestic political reasons alienated the members of the liberal wing of the Mot.P who favoured Turkey's membership in the EC along with modernization of society. Yet Ozal, while supporting synthesis, also advocated Turkey's membership of the EC, which undoubtedly would encourage further emphasis on Turkish westernization, contradicting the synthesis. This contradictory stand could well be one of the reasons for the challenge against Ozal, administered by the holy alliance during the 1988 Mot.P convention.

At the state level, Turkey's sensitivity over secularism and scepticism about Islamist, especially fundamentalist, movements is best documented in the debate about lifting the ban on Turkish Communist Party.\textsuperscript{61} After Turkish application for full membership in the EC, Turkey became subject to criticism from European countries due to its ban on communist political parties. Taking into account the crisis that communist political practice was experiencing after the developments in Eastern Europe, the Turkish government wanted to lift the ban. However, the main dilemma for Turkey was that the ban covers religious and fascist parties as well as communist ones, and it would have to be lifted on all political tendencies. That meant the legalization of Islamist political parties at a time when fundamentalist Islam was becoming stronger and anti-secularist waves growing rapidly in Turkey. Thus, also taking the region's shaky political situation into account, to give full political rights to the Islamists alongside with communists seemed too risky a step for the existence of the state, and
Turkey declined to do so for a long time, even if meant facing European criticism of being less than a full democracy.

Another irony in Turkey's foreign relations, created by the religious revival, was demonstrated by the "Turban" issue. At the end of long controversy, touched upon earlier, the government, in order to appease popular sentiments and escape from responsibility, finally issued a decree in March 1990 which authorised individual universities to decide whether or not to allow Islamic headscarves on campuses. However at this time a powerful threat was promptly raised by those female students who might be affected by the reinstatement of the ban by the universities that they would take the government to the European Court of Human Rights on the grounds that their individual right to wear a headscarf at the university was denied. The European Court was bound to rule in their favour. Ironically, this would further darken Turkey's image on human rights. The issue seemed to place Turkey in yet another vicious circle when some advocates of the ban vigorously defended it on the ground that "this show of influence" by the fundamentalists would be bad for Turkey, especially in her application to join the EEC. The irony, of course, is that it has been abuses and restrictions of human rights that has kept Turkey far apart from Europe.

3. External Developments

3.1. Foreign Intervention in Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

As already shown above, Islamic activities in general and fundamental extremism in particular became gradually more and more evident during the 1980s, and especially after 1987, coinciding with the advent of "holy alliance" into power within the Mot.P and thus in the government, there was a boom in both the number of extremist Islamic organizations and their activities. But what was more disturbing for the state was the external connection of anti-secularist, Islamist groups. Again gradually, it became public that many of those groups were supported by - or receiving aid from - some other Islamic countries, mainly Iran and Saudi Arabia. But the involvement of other
countries, such as Libya, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon was also mentioned in aiding these
groups though to a lesser extent. There were frequent reports in the press to the effect
that while some of these countries affiliated themselves more closely with the activities
of certain sects, they also helped in general to promote Islam in Turkey, as in other
countries, by sponsoring and encouraging the circulation of Islamic publications.

A major scandal about foreign involvement in the promotion of Islam emerged
in 1987 when a prominent Turkish journalist uncovered that in the period of 1982-1984
the salaries of Turkish clergymen, employed by the government to serve Turkish
immigrants in Europe, were paid by a organization called Rabita-ul Islam (The Muslim
World League), founded and sponsored by Saudi Arabia. The payments were made
in connection with the office of the Presidency of Religious Affairs which allowed the
organization to operate within the Turkish communities abroad to promote Islamic
values and morals despite the fact that its purely Islamic goals contradicted the secular
principles of the Turkish state. The scandal got even worse when it was revealed that
President Evren himself had signed his consent.

What is more significant, however, is that a Turkish offshoot of Rabita was
established by, among others, Mr. Salih Ozcan and Mr. Ahmet Gurkan, who later
became founding partners of Turkish Faisal Finance Corporation, the first non-interest
Islamic banking institution in Turkey, which distributed shares among mainly Mot. P
politicians, including Mr. Korkut Ozal. While the establishment of the former
organization internalized a foreign organization with its characteristics contrary to
secularism, the latter provided a further legal springboard to offer financial support to
wider Islamic activities. Moreover, while the participation of same people in the
establishment of both organizations were seen as suggestive of dubious intentions, the
involvement of politicians from the government circles and other individuals who were
close to premier and thus likely to exert significant influence on his policies, e.g. his
brother, caused discontent particularly among the secular intelligentsia who considered
these activities being contrary to the secular nature of the state.
Iran, too, in connection with its aim to export revolutionary Islam to other Islamic countries, was very active in Turkey. Apart from the smuggling of propaganda literature into Turkey, the transmitting of radio programs to agitate religious feelings, the attempts to win over university students and trying to work its way into Turkey through Turkish communities in Europe, Iran also openly intervened in Turkish domestic politics by way of statements and speeches from leading members of the Iranian government. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq, Iran intensified its activities among Turkish Islamists, and its attacks on secular principles of Turkish state and insults on Ataturk's person became frequent. Further, during the turban controversy, Iranian denunciation of the banning of the Islamic headdress in Turkish universities led to angry exchanges between the two countries.

However, there were other incidents even before the end of the war which provoked controversy between the two countries. Especially critical behaviour of Iranian prime minister Mir Hossein Moussavi, while visiting Turkey, about the westernizing reforms of Ataturk and his refusal to pay a courtesy visit to his mausoleum, an established stopping point for official visitors, were taken by many, among them the military, as insults to the Turkish state.

Relations with Iran were also strained when the Iranian government gave a warning to Turkey, after President Evren's speech on TV on January 8, 1987, during which he tackled mostly what he described as the mounting threat of Islamic fundamentalism, that future cooperation depended on Turkey's "respect for Islamic values".

Furthermore, Iranian activities in Turkey did not only take the form of propaganda or intervening statements. Especially from 1987 onwards, the threat of violent extremism in Turkey appeared to have been either planned and directed or otherwise actively supported by Iran. In February 1987, a pro-Khomeini group was discovered by the Turkish security forces. It was reported that the militants of the Nationalist View Organization, based in West Germany and led by a former Turkish clergyman Mr. Cemalettin Kaplan, were receiving military training in Iran with funds...
and arms supplied by the Islamic regime in Iran, and were later infiltrating Turkey to set up organizations for the purpose of destroying the existing regime. Also Iranians, along with Afghans, were caught during the fundamentalist demonstrations in Istanbul, and it was reported in early 1987 that the Iranian consulate in Erzurum was taking an active part in fundamentalist movements around the region, after which Turkey was compelled to warn Iran to desist from missionary activity in eastern Turkey.

Under these circumstances, it seemed that behind Turkey's policy of handing back the Iranian refugees who had crossed the border during the Iran-Iraq war, although this was criticised internationally, lay the concern to stop Iranian efforts to infiltrate Islamic militants and propagandists into the country.

It should be noted here that, although Khomeini's rhetoric failed to generate great appeal among Turkey's sizeable Shia minority, who have traditionally been committed to secularism as an antidote to Sunni zeal and domination, the Islamic revolution in Iran, nevertheless, was bound to attract some attention from Turkish Islamists generally. Therefore, the Turkish government was sensitive to any intimation from Iran about the country's Islamic nature. As a result, relations almost reached breaking point when the Iranian envoy to Turkey, Mr. Mottaki, attended a meeting organized by the Welfare Party in Konya. The irritation and tension between the two countries were such that in March 1989 both countries temporarily withdrew their ambassadors. Although the new Iranian Ambassador, Mr. Mohammed Reza Bagheri, visited Ataturk's tomb in a markedly conciliatory gesture, Turkish-Iranian economic and political relations, which boomed during the war with Iraq, have continued to suffer from deteriorating diplomatic relations and prevailing mutual distrust.

The sources of international involvement in fundamentalist activities in Turkey, as mentioned earlier, were not limited to Iran and Saudi Arabia. An indication of wider involvement was brought into the open by a police operation in November 1982, during which the members and founders of the Turkish off-shoot of Hizb-ul Tahrir (The
Liberation Party) were caught. Seventeen out of 22 arrested were Jordanian and Palestinian students in Turkey while five were Turks.85

When one observes that these interventions from the Middle Eastern Islamic countries increased after 1980 and coincided with Turkey's economic and political opening toward the Middle East, the inevitable double-edged question comes into mind: did, as the Kemalist elite had feared all along since the birth of the Republic, meddling with Middle Eastern affairs bring about this foreign interference? Or was it the other way around, with foreign intervention contributing to the resurgence of Islam in Turkey and consequently leading to changes in foreign policy?

Although the correlation between these two developments seems clear in the first instance and some sort of plausible connection could be formed between Turkey's political, and especially extensive economic, links with the states like Iran and Saudi Arabia and their intervention in Turkish affairs, a more thorough enquiry and understanding of Turks and Turkish foreign policy would indicate negative answers to both questions, indeed more so in the second instance than in the former.

If we take the second question first, it should be mentioned at once that the Islamic resurgence in Turkey is, for reasons that cannot be taken up here, due more to domestic political and social conditions and to the spill over effects of the similar feelings and examples abroad than to direct foreign intervention or encouragement.86

As far as Iranian efforts to light up a revolutionary change in Turkey were concerned, they seemed, almost from the beginning, doomed to failure. In the first instance, as I have already mentioned, the Shia minority in Turkey, the most likely group to be targeted by the Iranian propaganda due to sectarian similarities and the close proximity to Iran of the area they occupy, seemed adamant in facing Iranian propaganda and agitation. The Sunni activists, too, though impressed by the success of Islamic revolution in a neighbouring country, largely remained indifferent, at best, towards Iranian advances.87 Moreover, as indicated by almost every Turkish expert, Turkey's socio-political and economic developments as well as its experiences with Islam and secular settings, have been very different from those of Iran, and these
differences, together with the absence of an established Islamic hierarchy (like the Mullahs in Iran) signify the difficulty, if not impossibility, for Iranian style revolution in Turkey. Also, being originated from and directed by a country that represents both one of the historic enemies of the Turkish state and a "heretical sect" to Sunni Islam, considerable reduced the changes of success of Islamic propaganda by Iran. Had the Islamic revolution taken place in some other Islamic country, then one might speculate that the spill over affect of the revolution would have been much greater.

We must also bear in mind that Turkish nationalism has been traditionally in direct opposition to any sort of foreign involvement in Turkish affairs, and does not accept the legitimacy of intervention on any grounds, including religious brotherhood. Therefore, it is only natural to expect that the Turkish state would act more swiftly towards efforts from abroad to widen the recognition of Islam than to a domestic resurgence of Islam, which, as already noted, was treated with some leniency. One might expect to see the same effect of a nationalist emotional reaction toward foreign involvement in Turkish affairs on former NAP sympathizers, some of whom joined the Islamists after the 1980 coup while others lent their votes and support to Mot.P. Hence, foreign involvement in Turkish affairs would have been counterproductive due to possible nationalist reaction, and because it would inevitably invoke fears of fundamentalism among the governing state elite, it could reduce the chances of both Islamic revival in Turkey and closer relations with other Islamic countries.

As for the first question, it is only natural that Turkey's recent interest in the Middle Eastern affairs should generate, in turn, more interest from other states in the region in Turkish affairs and more interstate connections should be expected. It is also arguably correct that the strong economic ties with states like Iran, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia, and the necessity of sustaining growing export markets in the Middle East for the Turkish economy, might have generated more tolerance on Turkish side towards foreign intimations. And the principle of reciprocity would call for less strict observance of non-interference as Turkey, too, was increasingly willing to play a more important and active role in Middle Eastern affairs. However there are, of course, limits
to this tolerance and susceptibility towards foreign interventions, and especially the secular nature of the state is something that neither the army nor the government would like to see meddled with from outside Turkey. In this sense, only the very indirect interests of "conservative" Islamic states, such as contributions towards mosque restorations or funding joint research promoting Islam as a cultural identity, would have been allowed, not the promotion of revolutionary Islamic change by hard-line states, including Iran and Libya.

Furthermore, it should be noted here that the main reasons behind the Iranian efforts to infiltrate Turkey or intervene into Turkish affairs were the revolutionary zeal and aim of the Iranian regime to export its ideas into neighbouring countries. In this context, Turkish tolerance for such activities, if there was any and whatever the reasons behind it - i.e. domestic Islamic resurgence, economic necessities or a new reorientation in foreign policy, had only a secondary importance in generating these interferences.

3.2. The Revival of Islam, Western Perceptions and Responses, and Turkish Foreign Policy

As demonstrated before, the Turkish state since its establishment in 1923, has moved consistently despite occasional set-backs, towards becoming a modern and democratic nation state. The way she chose to attain this goal has differentiated her fundamentally from other Islamic countries; that is westernization and secularisation.

The concept of national identity however, has never been clear cut either inside or outside Turkey. Although there was no question about it in the minds of the modernizing elite, the place of religion within this identity, however, has always been the cause of a certain amount of anxiety, not necessarily only within Turkish society, but also in the minds of Turkey's Western allies. The root of the problem, perhaps, is that no one knows for sure where Turkey belongs. Is it a European country, as its ruling elite claims? Or is it part of the Middle East, which is what it looks like on the map and recent Islamic resurgence tends to confirm? It seems somehow anomalous to
many Europeans that a major Muslim country should be member of NATO and the
Council of Europe, and an associate member of the EEC - eligible eventually for full
membership under the terms of the association agreement. Under the circumstances it is
only natural that the ambiguity of Islam coexisting with secularism in Turkey would
become even more pronounced during the 1980s when both the country's internal
developments and its external relations were affected by the world wide Islamic
resurgence.

After the Iranian revolution in 1979, it seemed that there was a common
perception in the West that Turkey was going to be the second place for an Islamic
show-down. There were frequent questions in the western press as to whether Turkey
would be the next country to fall to the fundamentalists' grab. Coupled with Turkey's
own socio-economic problems and political violence, an extremist Islamic resurgence
was thought to be the end of Turkey as a Western ally.

It seemed that Turkey's Western allies had become even more worried than she
had about both the country's future and its place within the Atlantic Alliance. In this
context, one remembers a western journalist asserting that "the West Europeans still do
not know what to think about Turkey, and most of them manage not to think about it
at all for most of the time". The statement seems true so long as it is remembered
that, maybe because of this "ignorance" of Turkey, they tend to exacerbate things when
they do think about Turkey, like the constant danger posed by Communism for so long,
and more recently by Islamic fundamentalism to the country's future.

The commonly accepted fact by Turkish experts that secularism in Turkey was
firmly established and that the possibility of Islamic takeover seemed dim, did not
matter much in the eyes of western journalists and politicians alike, who already started
to see Islam as another challenge for Western liberal democracies after communism.

However, the recent exaggeration of the strength of Islam in Turkey created
double sided responses from the Western World. On the one hand, it forced the
Western states, as a result of the fear of "loosing her altogether to religious fanaticism",
to be careful in their criticism and dealings with Turkey by creating a common feeling
that something should be done to help her to overcome this "menace". Consequently, the military coup was welcomed in the West, generally as a mean to end all these uncertainties. Although the West European welcome later turned to bitter criticism on other accounts, like restrictions over democratic and human rights, the military's crack-down on Islamic groupings generally went unnoticed, if not welcomed. The US, on the other hand, continued to back the military regime with an eye on growing Islamic fundamentalism elsewhere as well as on other strategic considerations.

On the other hand however, it reimposed, at another level, the old uncertainties and suspicions about the country's Islamic nature and led to questions about the wisdom of allowing her to be part of Europe. Of course, the argument in connecting rising Islam and Europe's reluctance to open its arms to Turkey works both ways, as militant Islam in Turkey tends to see itself as a response to domination of western values and life style as well as an extension of the world wide resurgence of Islam. Thus, it may also equally be argued that "unless Europe recants, Turkey may drift away into unpredictable paths".93

The truth is somewhere in between. There has been widespread presupposition among western observers, just as among many Turkish intellectuals, that Turkey was suffering from acute Islamic radicalization. Like their Turkish counterparts, they, perhaps wrongly, interpreted Turkey's search after 1980 for social and psychological formulas for her future identity as deviations from secularism and modernism, and sometimes excessively as fundamentalism. The confusion seems to have originated from the lack of commonly agreed definitions for "Islamism" or "Islamic Fundamentalism". As noted earlier, in 1987 only 7% of those people who called themselves "Islamist" favoured a Sharia-based Islamic regime in Turkey.94 One might expect that this survey, which also showed that only the most poorly educated people who are unemployable in a fast developing country have lost their hope in the system and favour turning to the Islamic past, should have helped to dispel some fears and miscategorizations of "Islamism", at least in Turkey. However, the reality is much too intricate and complicated by a variety of factors, among them the laicist attitude toward Islam, to be
resolved with such ease. It might be too much to expect from the western observers to understand the "reality" behind the bogey of an "Islamic threat to the secular Turkish Republic" while even most of the Turkish people cannot agree on the true nature of the Islamic reassertion in Turkey or Islam's place within the secular setting in general.

Again after the Iranian revolution there was another common perception in many western minds as to the fact that Western institutions, such as secularism, pluralism, democracy and modernization, were inappropriate for Muslim countries and Islamic resurgence would finally substitute and destroy the efforts of democraticization. The "failure" of Turkish democracy for the third time in 1980 and subsequent events of torture allegations and human rights abuses only helped to reinforce this belief to put Turkey in the same picture with other Islamic countries. Also, perhaps as a result of the simultaneous revival of Islam throughout the Islamic world, there was a strong tendency in the West to regard the present Islamic world as an integrated "entity". Thus Turkey's moves toward closer relations with other Islamic countries, which coincided with a domestic revival of Islam that was seen as an extension of world wide Islamic resurgence, were regarded, quite mistakenly, as efforts to become part of that "entity".

Under the influence of the above mentioned assumptions and against the backdrop of an Islamic revival in Turkey and the radicalization of Islam in the world in general, the Western states tended naturally to regard such issues, like downgrading of her representation to Israel, her refusal to side with Britain on the "Salman Rushdie Affair" or with the USA on Tripoli bombing, and lowering her flag as a sign of respect for the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, as signs of Turkey's new realignment with Islamic countries in the world system. They wrongly related these moves in foreign policy to the revival of Islam domestically. Consequently, these moves were used in Brussels and other Western capitals to intensify the argument that Turkey was not a "European" country. Of course the reality is somewhat different and could only be understood by examining both Turkey's relations and frustrations with western Europe.
and the USA during the 1970s and 1980s, and also the reasons behind her needs to widen her options and extend her relations toward the Middle East.

Although Islam has some influence on the configuration of power in the Middle East, and thus indirectly on the international system, it would be wrong to assume that all Islamic states would act in the same manner when facing given conditions. Equally wrong was the assumption that, since she was extending her relations with Middle Eastern states both in economic and political terms, Turkey would act in accordance with either Islamic principles or the perceptions of other Islamic states in international politics.

It also seemed difficult for some to comprehend the Turkish desire to keep separate, on the one hand, the secular nature of the state and Islamic revival within Turkey, and, on the other hand, Turkey's behaviour in international politics. Whatever happened in Turkey during the 1980s with regard to the Islamic revival, it seemed that the decision making process was still working rationally, and secularly, between given options without resorting to religion as a source of inspiration. However, as Weiker perceives, it is not entirely impossible to see that "those who would like to see greater emphasis on Islam as a guide in foreign relations would gain the upper hand if pressures from the international (that is Western) community become too strong", which in the end would have implications on Turkish attitudes towards Europe and NATO as well as the Islamic world.

Western observers, while calling for the establishment of truer democracy in Turkey, may also find it difficult to understand that the further consolidation of Turkish democracy would inevitably lead to further reassertion of certain Islamic values which had hitherto been suppressed under the authoritarian secularism. It should be further noted here that Western Europe was also less than honest in dealing with the democratic rights of the Turkish people. Possibly because of their perceptions of an Islamic revival, the western Europeans were silent throughout the trials and repression of both NSP and other non-partisan Islamic groups, in direct contradiction to their attitude toward centrist and leftist parties and groups. The trials of members of the NSP
or any other religious groupings did not receive much media coverage in the West either, except from time to time to reassure and hail the Islamic crack-down in Turkey. Hence, one still comes across such profound ironies as "despite the alleged dominance of Western values in Turkey...which purports to be secular state, the banning of the headscarf can still cause passionate protest". The author seems to forget the existence of such "Western values" as freedom of belief and of dress, and is obviously unaware of the "passionate" defence of the headscarf by some secular Turkish intellectuals on the ground that in democracies everybody should be entitled to chose his/her clothing. Also the fine line of similarity between the actions of a democracy to force women not to wear Muslim dress and those of an Islamic state to force them to wear it seems to be missed altogether.

As a result of these misperceptions, while the Western observers tend to regard the revival of Islam as an important obstacle in front of Turkish democracy, the Turkish leadership, keeping in touch with Islam as well as Kemalist principles, sees no contradiction between an opening towards the Islamic world and the strengthening of its ties with the European Community. It was the ultra - secularism of the old guard westernizing elite that created imaginative barriers for so long for the existence of such a double - edged relationship. It should not be forgotten that, without denying the importance of other factors, the conspicuous turn of Turkish foreign policy towards the Islamic world in the 1980s was initially triggered by the crisis in Turkish - European relations.

4. Concluding Remarks: Islam and Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 1980s

At the beginning of this chapter, two intermingled questions were posed as to whether the recent reorientation of Turkey's foreign policy toward the Middle East has been the result of an Islamic revival within the country, or vice versa. After necessary considerations given above, it seems that the correct answer is that neither of them has been the determining factor although each of them was influenced by the other.
Behind the reorientation lies a complex web of factors, both internal and external. Among domestic factors, religion has played a certain part, but this does not mean that such an important move on the Turkish side has come about solely as a result of the revival of Islam in Turkey.^{104}

It is true that the foreign policy manifestation of an Islamic revival in Turkey appeared in a form of calls for Turkey's greater involvement in the Islamic world and its organizations. But the process had already begun in the mid-1960s when Turkey, a traditionally loyal ally of the West, began to reorient her foreign policy towards greater cooperation with states belonging to Soviet or non-aligned blocs, and towards a more flexible approach in foreign policy. The change had originally been formulated under the pressure of a need for an adjustment in a changing international system, and Turkey's disappointment with western policies on the Cyprus issue, and her desire to gather more international support for her cause were largely responsible for this reorientation.^{105} Because of common historic, cultural and religious affiliations, the Middle Eastern Islamic countries in particular were the cornerstone of Turkey's new rapprochement efforts to the Third World. Other important reasons were Turkey's economic difficulties and her urgent need to seek out new trade partners and new sources of financial aid. As the country's economic difficulties grew, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis, this latter factor became even more crucial, and Turkey's courtship for friendship of oil-rich Arab states increased dramatically. Apart from cultivating bilateral relations with individual states, Turkey began to take an increasingly active part in the Islamic Conference and various other associations of the Islamic world. After the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1979 and Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Turkey from 1984 onwards, the security dimension was also added to the reasons for which Turkey sought closer relations and collaboration with the Middle Eastern states. Also, it should not be forgotten that the Middle Eastern markets have assumed an increasingly important role for Turkish exports, especially after the advent of Turkey's new export-oriented development policies.
Therefore, the post-1980 reorientation of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East was, by all means, in accordance with general principles of Turkish foreign policy, though the economic and political openings were followed with much more enthusiasm. In this new drive the revival of Islamic conscience in Turkey, along side economic necessities and affects of international and regional imperatives, played its part by means of, probably, clearing fears from the minds of decision makers about the possible domestic repercussions of such a move.

It could also be argued that the revival of Islam in Turkey gave domestic political justification and incentive to policy makers for following more vigorously the foreign policy option on which Turkey had already embarked. Further, it enabled governments to claim credibility in the eyes of Islamists, and thus obtain more votes.

However, to argue that it was only the result of the Islamic revival in Turkey would be not just a great exaggeration but also a great error. Although domestic factors, including religion, have played a certain part, this reorientation can only be explained through a wider analysis of significant changes that have taken place in the international system, in the Middle East regional sub system, and in Turkey's bilateral relations with the USA and the Western European states during the time period of the 1960s to mid-1980s.106

The above mentioned arguments also hold for the second part of our query, that is, as conventional experts of Turkish foreign policy might put it, the belief that Turkey's closer involvement with "shifting sands" of the Middle East, which she should have kept apart from, brought both foreign intervention into Turkish affairs and greatly affected Islamic revival in Turkey, thus in the end influencing the country's stand in foreign affairs.

Another question that has been raised from time to time, both inside and outside Turkey, was whether the secular nature of the Turkish state contradicts Turkey's closer involvement with Middle Eastern affairs, and also whether is it an obstacle to her participation in the Islamic Conference.
It would seem that, after dealing with each other long enough, Turkey and other Islamic countries came to an informal understanding, in which neither part preconditions any change in the other's stand in world politics and in its political system. In the bargain, the Arab-Islamic countries seem to have accepted, though not necessarily endorsed, Turkey's secular and westernised outlook and her special arrangements with the Western alliance system, while Turkey in turn no longer acts as an agent of the West in her dealings with the Middle Eastern states. Each side seems to be content with the collaboration they are having and does not aim, at least openly, to challenge the other's standing vis-a-vis Islam and the international system. Any deviation from this understanding, as Iran tried to affect the course of Islamic action within Turkey during the 1980s, causes a cooling-off in relations.

As for the Islamic Conference, the Turkish Foreign Ministry sees no conflict and actually supports Turkish membership on account of various reasons. It seems that again Turkey and other member states have worked out a way of coexistence for a secular country within essentially a religious-oriented organization. Although Turkey usually tries to emphasize the economic cooperation side of the organization and inserts reservations at each conference, she, at the same time, enjoys her full membership by taking part in its activities at the highest level, as much as her constitution and fundamental principles of her foreign policy allowed. And the other members seem perfectly happy with the role Turkey is playing within the Organization and do not force Turkey to accept its recommendations if they contradict the principles she is attached to. The question has also been raised as to whether the increased level of Turkey's representation in the Islamic Conference has connections with the increased visibility of popular Islam in Turkey. The answer to this query seems negative, too. In response to this question, in March 1993 ex-president Kenan Evren pointed out that increased representation had been demanded by the foreign ministry since the late 1970s and argued that the aims of Turkish foreign policy, namely to widen her relations and to be an influential partner in the Middle Eastern affairs, demanded this increase. He also added in passing, that, considering deteriorating relations with western Europe
and the pressures she was facing from those countries, Turkey needed new friends and "every support she could get". 108
NOTES

1. In this chapter I tried to avoid usage of the term "Islamic fundamentalism", a much tried phrase by the Western media and analysts which came to bear much connotations since it was first used. Instead I employed such phrases as "resurgence", "resurrection", "renewal", or "revival" interchangeable to refer to the powerful claim in the 1980s by the masses in Turkey for their religious rights, which had previously been restrained by the laicist principles of the state. Differentiation was made necessary by the fact that the Islam which we are interested in this chapter is the one that has succeeded in gaining major significance within political and social life of Turkey and that has infiltrated into the domains of government and state without undermining their secular nature. The fundamentalist Islam, which is at odds with the principle of secularism and which has, too, become more active in Turkey in the 1980s, then remained largely out of our interest because of its limited affects on country's foreign policy.


3. During the rally organized by the NSP in the city of Konya on September 6, 1980, crowds sat down when the Turkish national anthem was played, insults to Ataturk and calls for the restoration of Sharia Law were made, and banners with Arabic script calling Islamic revolution in Turkey were carried. Milliyet, September 7, 1980 and Cumhuriyet, September 7, 1980. When, five days later, the army intervened, the junta made it one of the cornerstone of their justification for intervention. See General Evren's first radio-TV speech on September 12, 1980 in NSC, General Secretariat, 12 September in Turkey: Before and After, (Ankara: Ongan, 1982), pp. 225-233 (referred hereafter as "12 September"), and his press conference of September 16, 1980 in Kenan, E., Kenan Evrenin Anıları (Memoirs of Kenan Evren), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), Vol. II, pp. 36-48. Hereafter referred as "Anıları". Also see Milliyet, September 13, 1980; 12 September, pp. 215-217; Dodd, C. H., Crisis of Turkish Democracy, 2nd ed. (Eothen Press, 1990), p. 53; Pevsner, L., Turkey's Political Crisis: Background, Perspectives, Prospects (Washington: Praeger Pub., 1984), p. 26; Ahmad, F., "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10 (2), April 1988, p. 750.

4. He was later (24 July 1982) released pending the outcome, received a four-year sentence in February 1983, but was finally acquitted by the Appeal Court in May 1984 for lack of evidence, which was finalized in September 1985. 22 other NSP members were sentenced to terms up to three and half years. See Keesing's, January 2, 1981, p. 30640; January 22, 1982, pp. 31286 and 32288; August 1984, p. 33038; and October 31, 1985, p. 30545; The Times, September 13, 1980, p. 12, Sinan Fisek, "Turkey Under Martial Law After Bloodless Down Coup", and October 15, 1980; the Economist, September 20, 1980, "The Night of the Generals", p. 14; Milliyet, April 10 and September 20, 1985; Dodd, ibid., pp. 45-46.

5. See Article 24 in The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (Ankara; BYEGM Matbaası, June 1990), p. 12. While the Constitution grants everyone the right to
freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction, it specifically forbids the exploitation or abuse of religion in any manner whatsoever. It also puts the instruction of religion and ethics under the control and care of the state.

Secularism, in addition to preamble and Article 2 which stipulates the characteristics of the Republic, is also mentioned specifically in Article 13 which stipulates that radio and television stations must uphold the fundamental characteristics of the Turkish Republic as described by the Article 2; in Article 68 which forbids the formation of political parties on non-secular grounds; in Article 76 which cites abuse or exploitation of belief among offences preventing eligibility for deputyship; in Article 136 which cautions the Presidency of Religious Affairs to exercise its duties in accordance with the principle of secularism; and in Article 174 which states that the Reform Laws, by which meant Kemalist revolutionary laws related with secular nature of the regime, are totally in line with the Constitution.


7. In spite of all the strict measures, some fundamentalist organizations, like Hizb-ul Tahrir, continued to exist even after the intervention until they were crushed in 1982 and 1983. See Hurriyet, November 18, 1982, pp. 1 and 11. Also it was argued that many of the qualified members of the fundamentalist organizations were "exported" to Germany, where they can easily spread their ideas among Turkish workers. The Middle East, May 1981, "How Much Time For Turkey's Augean Stables?", p. 31. Moreover, many of the illegal Islamic organizations grew in strength after the advent of the civilian regime in 1983. In January 1986, the daily Milliyet enumerated nine religious groups active at the time in Turkey. Four of these groups - Nurcular, Suleymaniclar, Naksibendiler and Ticaneler - were militant sects and had long been active in Turkey. The fifth was Akincilar ('the raiders'), paramilitary youth organization of the banned NSP. The other groups - Hizb-ul Islam, the Islamic Jihad Organization, Hizb-ul Tahrir, and the National View Organization - were pro-Iranian radical activist groups and were flourished after 1983. The report cited in The Middle East, "An Islamic Revival?", January 1986, p. 12.


9. The compulsory religion courses were to be taught every year from grade four of elementary schools to the last grade of high schools. See Hurriyet, December 8, 1981, p. 3 and July 7, 1982, p. 3.

10. Although Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu argued that the compulsory religious education was never against the principle of secularism, traditional Kemalist secularists especially found it undigestable. The editor-in-chief of centre-of-left daily Cumhuriyet; Hasan Cemal, considered the decision as "severest blow to laicism in the history of the Republic", March 28, 1982, p. 1. On the other hand, Hurriyet columnist Hasan Pulur strongly supported the courses on religion on the same ground as the military leaders, that people would gain an awareness of religion which would prevent them from falling into the hands of ignorant fanatics, opportunists and political manipulators. See footnote 8.


13. Ibid.
19. Caglayangil, I. S., *Anilarim* (My Memoirs), 3rd ed. (Istanbul; Yilmaz Yayinevi, August 1990), p. 14. Mr. Caglayangil held many ministerial portfolios in various Demirel governments, including foreign ministry, later became speaker of the Senate of the National Assembly, and was acting President of the Republic for six months prior to the 1980 coup.
20. In his 1987 New Year address, President Evren warned against an increase in anti-secular activities and stated that secularism was a foundation of the Republic and ideals and reforms of Kemal Ataturk. Furthermore, in a speech on January 8 in Adana, he warned that "concessions to Muslim fundamentalism would be just as dangerous to Turkey as communism" and called on the country's politicians to unite against it. *Milliyet*, January 9, 1987; *Keesing's*, May 1987, p. 35132. Few months earlier, in October 1986, while speaking in the central Anatolian province of Kayseri, he had forcefully denounced the "religious reaction", along side communism and fascism, as the greatest danger facing Turkey at the time. *The Middle East*, January 1986, "An Islamic Revival?", p. 12.
21. Dincerler was recorded stating that "the evidence in support of Darwin's theory of evolution is based on scientific fraud, that the theory is false and is service to materialism, being in contradiction with both science and religion". See Gultekin, M., *Laikligin Neresindeyiz?* (Where Are We In Secularism?), (Ankara: Ogretmen Yayinlari, 1987), p. 235. For Evren's efforts and pressures on Premier Ozal to change his Education Minister see *Anilar*, Vol. 5, pp. 103, 259-260, 275 and 282-283. *Cumhuriyet*, December 12 and 21, 1987. Although Premier Ozal gave in at the end to President Evren's pressures and changed his Education Minister, he still kept Mr. Dincerler within his cabinet as State Minister in order to "protect balances within the party". *Anilar*, Vol. 5, p. 282.
22. In one of the meetings of the Council of Ministers, headed by President Evren, Premier Ozal, facing pressures again from the President, argue that according to a survey the Motherland Party had conducted, Turkish society is modern and looking ahead yet attached to its traditions, and that the traditions should not be mistaken with reactionary actions. He also argued that struggle against reactionary movements, if there was any, should be conducted with "scientific (i.e. educational) methods" rather than police actions. For extracts from the meeting, dated 25 July 1986. See *Anilar*, Vol. V, pp. 438-441. The same scenario was repeated in a later date NSC meeting. See *Anilar*, Vol. V, pp. 521-522.
26. In March 1987, seventy-three students were expelled from military schools for engaging in reactionary activities and another eighty-eight had been withdrawn by their families. Hurriyet, March 26, 1987; the Economist, May 23, 1987, "The Guns Are Stacked, Maybe", p. 68. Also in his speech of January 8, 1987, which severely shaken Turkish public, President Evren admitted that underground Islamic organizations had begun to infiltrate the armed forces and revealed that nearly one hundred cadets had recently been expelled from military academies for Islamic activities. Milliyet, January 9, 1987; Keesing's, May 1987, p. 35132.
29. He said that unless the government actively encouraged anti-secular conduct, the Turkish nation would not voluntarily deviate from secularism. TBMM-TD, ibid. Also cited in Kushner, D., "Turkish Secularists and Islam", Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 38, 1986, p. 98.
30. Another inquiry, however, despite premier Ozal's opposition, had been conducted in late 1986 by the general secretariat of the NSC in connection with the office of Chief of Staff, the Presidency of Religious Affairs and other related ministries in order to determine the measures to be taken against reactionary activities. After discussing the findings of the inquiry, the NSC, upon President Evren's insistence, took an advisory decision to warn the government about seriousness of the situation. Anilar, Vol. V, entries dated September 29 and December 27, 1986, pp. 485 and 521-522.
34. I took this phrase from the title of an article by Toprak, B., "Religion as State Ideology in a Secular Setting, The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" in Wagstaff, M. (ed.), Aspects Of Religion In Secular Turkey (Durham Centre For Middle East and Islamic Studies, 1990).
35. Information about the synthesis was gathered from Guvenc, B., et. al., "Turk-Islam Sentezi", Cumhuriyet, April 19, 1987; Toprak, ibid., pp. 10-15; and Yesilada, B., "Problems of Political Development in The Third Turkish Republic", Polity, Vol. 21 (2), 1988, pp. 364-366. Also see Aydinlar Ocagi, Aydinlar Ocag' inin Gorusu:
The openly expressed cooperation between nationalists and religious activists within the Mot.P organization after the 1987 elections to challenge liberals for power came to known popularly as "holly alliance". Their strength was well evident in the June 20, 1988 convention of the Mot.P where they attacked to the liberals and indirectly challenged Mr. Ozal's authority by producing separate lists for the election of party executive committee, as a result of which they won 30 of the 50 seats in the committee. The inevitable clash between groups and division within the Party was only prevented by the emotional outburst following the assassination attempt to premier Ozal life. Keessing's, Vol. 35 (3), p. 365 and the Economist, "Twice-Hit Ozal", June 25, 1988, p. 57. Also see Erguder, U., "Motherland Party, 1983-1989" in Heper, M. & Landau, J. (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey (London, New York: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1991), pp. 160-162.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Also Mackenzie, K., "Muddy Waters", MEI, No. 369, February 16, 1990, pp. 11-12; and "Storm Warming For Turkey", The Middle East, March 1990, pp. 6-7.


An analysis of the speeches of the NSP chairman from 1973 to 1980 found out that day-to-day secular politics gradually pushed religious issues to the background, and concluded that any religious political party in Turkey would have to, in the long run, play politics according to the rules of secular life. See Alkan, T., "The National Salvation Party in Turkey" in Heper, M. & Israeli, R. (eds.), Islam and Politics in Modern Middle East (London: 1984), pp. 79-102. A more recent study shows that the emphasis on religion by the Welfare Party, the successor of NSP, is implicit only "between the lines" of otherwise "down to earth" party literature, and quotes from a Turkish commentator that with its calls for social welfare, social justice, political freedoms and independent foreign policy "the WP is probably attempting to reach" beyond small religious groups to "civil servants and workers as potential party supporters". See Toprak, B., "The State, Politics And Religion In Turkey" in Heper; M. & Evin, A. (eds.), State, Democracy and The Military (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1988), p. 129. Quotation from Bora, T., "Politikanin Musluman Kanadi: Refah Partisi" (Muslim Wing of Politics: Welfare Party), Yeni Gundem (Istanbul), July 16-31, 1985, p. 13. The change in the propaganda tactics of the WP was also noticed by Ahmad, op. cit., p. 768, who singled out that in the 1987 general elections the Party, though rated poorly overall, did very well in southeastern Turkey where it presented itself as the party struggling against "feudalism, imperialism and fascism".

Toprak, ibid., p. 135.


48. Steinbach, op. cit., p. 245.


50. This argument was put forward by many who, for example, forcefully claimed that his pilgrimage performance - he became the first Turkish prime minister to go to Haj while in office and was shown long hours on state-run Television while performing his Haj duties - in July 1988 was calculated to pull in the votes of devout Muslims at the coming local elections and more immediately to pre-empt the growing challenge to his leadership from the Islamic faction of his party. For the domestic controversy see the Economist, "Haji Ozal", July 16, 1988, pp. 49-50.

51. For an analysis of the attitudes of Turkish secular elite toward religion before and after 1980 coup see Kushner, op. cit., and Ahmad, op. cit.


56. Kushner, op. cit., p. 103.


58. Turkey's announcement to recognize the Independent Palestinian State came only hours after it had been proclaimed, in any case even before directly involved Arab states could make similar announcements. Briefing, "Palestinian State", November 17, 1988, and "Is Turkey Dragging Her Foot on the Palestinian Question?", February 13, 1989, pp. 3-4.


60. At a meeting in Bolu on November 20, 1988, cited in Mango, op. cit., p. 28.

61. For domestic debate over amendments of articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Penal Code see Briefing, No. 764, December 4, 1989, "Fears for Secularism Dominate Penal Code Debate". When prime minister Akbulut in the winter of 1989, suggested that an agreement should be reached with the opposition on what to do about the articles concerning the ban on Communist and Islamist parties, leader of the opposition Social Democrat Party, Professor Erdal Inonu, accused the government of lack of seriousness.

62. Their case was already strengthened by the fact that a Turkish court had earlier in 1990 repealed the "ban of Turban", amid protests from the President and the Turkish High Court, on the grounds that it was an infringement of personal human rights. See the Middle East, December 1990, p. 10.

63. The Middle East, March 1989, p. 21.
It was claimed in the press that 'Suleymanci' and 'Naksibendi' sects enjoyed Iranian support, while Saudi Arabia helped to promote 'Nurcu' doctrine. See Briefing, No. 616, "Islamism in Turkey", January 12, 1987, p. 14. It seems that more traditional orthodox Islamists have sympathy toward and from Saudi Arabia whilst revolutionary activists and extremists have connections with Iran and Libya.

There was a boom in publication of both religious newspapers, magazines and books. By 1986, it was reported that the weekly circulation of religious magazines reached about 450,000. See Briefing, "Islamic Revival in Turkey - Is It A Serious Treat?", No. 604, October 20, 1986, pp. 9-10, and The Times, Mario Madiano, "Islamic Ferment in Turkey - Part 2", November 11, 1984, p. 12. According to January 1991 figures, daily Turkiye, the major Islamic newspaper which advocates a return to religion, has average daily sale of 785,776, being only second nationally. See Turkey at a Glance, a pamphlet published by the Directorate General of Press and Information (Ankara: Unal Offset, April 1991). The significance of this in a country where the aggregate daily circulation of newspapers is around three million is obvious.

For a full account of this scandal see Mumcu, U., Rabita (Ankara: Tekin Yayinevi, 1987). Also Keesing's, May 1987, p. 35133.

See Evren's press conference of March 28 in Milliyet, March 29, 1987. Though speculative in its nature, the truth seemed that it was more embarrassing for him to admit publicly that he did not control his office and the papers went through without his notice than to argue that he agreed to such a move on the ground that the Turkish migrants abroad should be protected from the influences of "foreign ideologies". Anilar, Vol. VI, p.57.

Mumcu, op. cit., pp. 171-175. Also for a detailed analysis of Ozal brothers' financial ties with the Saudi Arabian institutions, like the Al-Baraka and the Faisal Finance Corporation, through joint investments in Turkey, worthed billions of Turkish liras, see Yeni Gundem (Istanbul), February 15, 1987, cited in Yesilada, op. cit., p. 364.

According to a report issued by the University of Missouri, it is through the Islamic finance operations that funds are channelled to support Islamic activism in Turkey, particularly in the education system. Reprinted in the Middle East, "Return of the Fundamentalists", March 1990, p. 8.

Mumcu revealed that Khomeini's speeches were translated into Turkish in Berlin before being sent or taken to Turkey. See ibid, pp. 94-97.

For example, visiting Iranian Minister of Industry, Mr. Muustafa Hashemi, was recorded while criticizing the secularisation of Turkey as saying that "there is not much sign of Islamic atmosphere in Istanbul". Keesing's, November 12, 1982, p. 31800.


Although the Iranian outbursts against Turkey and President Evren, as well as the Constitutional Court, had prompted at first only muted and marginal response from the Turkish government, upon public outrage, the Foreign Ministry came out with a statement telling that "it was impossible to countenance efforts from outside to become
a party to Turkey's internal affairs which solely concern its own people and state". See ibid., p. 15.

76. For controversies created by the refusal of Iranian Prime Minister to visit Ataturk's moseloum during his trips to Turkey see the Economist July 4, 1987, p. 59, "Dismiss Oztorun", Keesing's June 1988, p. 35986; Briefing, ibid., pp. 15-16.


82. Roberts, J., "Turkey in Ozal's second Term."Defense and Foreign Affairs, Vol. XVI (2), February 1988, p. 13. Allegations in May 1987 by the Amnesty International that Turkey was forcefully repatriating Iranian refugees were rejected by Turkish foreign ministry officials. See Keesing's, June 1988, p. 35986.


84. The Middle East, "Invitation to the Tomb", March 1990, p. 8.


86. For discussion of the reasons of recent Islamic resurgence in Turkey see Toprak, State, Politics and Religion; Kushner, op.cit.; and Stienbach, op.cit.

87. This does not mean that there was no pro-Iranian groups in Turkey (see footnote 7). These groups, however, were largely confined fundamentalist groupings which, at any rate, attracted almost no popular following.

88. For example Ahmad argues that Turkey has gone too far towards adopting capitalism to be able to turn to Islam now. He also states that she has a "substantial socio-economic and political infrastructure, including a developing bourgeoisie and working class, which makes the adoption of an Islamic ideology virtually impossible". See op.cit., p. 753.

89. In his book titled "Islam in Modern History" (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 89), Smith, W. C. describes the several approaches of Islamic states towards modernization as fundamentalism, liberalism, nationalism, apologetic and dynamism (Islamic Revolutionarism could be added to this classification) and contrasted their failure to cope aspects of modern world with Turkish experience of "secularism", cited in Weiker, W. F., "Turkey, the Middle East, and Islam", Middle East Review, Vol. 17 (3), 1985, p. 27.

90. For example an article in The Middle East, April 1979 issue carried an instructive heading about Western feelings: "Turkey; The Last Domino?"


92. For example, on January 18, 1987, a British journalist with research experience on Turkey reported two days after a demonstration held in Istanbul that "Turkey...is
facing the most serious threat from Islamic forces since the inception of the modern republic". The demonstration was against a ban on the wearing of the headscarf which led the writer, in an attempt to dramatise the gravity of the Islamist threat, to quote a commentator that "if it is the headscarf today, it will be the fez tomorrow". See Mackenzie, K., "Turkey Rocked By March Of Islam", Observer, January 18, 1987. The significance of the fez of course comes from its association with the long-gone Ottoman empire which also had Islamic connotations itself. However, the truth is the fez no longer carries any significance for the Islamic cause. It is so totally out of fashion in Turkey that it is very unlikely to be worn by anybody. The same is also correct for the rest of the Islamic world where the fez is hardly worn and sought after only by tourists.


95. Karaosmanoglu argues that in the West, under the influences of the Orientalist tradition, "Islam is viewed as an undifferentiated entity having almost the same total political impact in every context". See op. cit., p. 64.


97. Although Turkey did not approve the death sentence issued by Iran, she, nevertheless, banned the distribution of "The Satanic Verses" in the country. Also Prime Minister Ozal equivocally showed his unwillingness to condemn Khomeini's injection to kill Mr. Salman Rushdie. See Briefing, "Satanic Verses Controversy", No. 724, February 27, 1989, pp. 8-10 and "The Rushdie Affair", No. 725, March 6, 1989, pp. 5-7; the Economist "Europe v Islam", March 18, 1989, p. 75. It seemed that just a week before the local elections Prime Minister Ozal did not want to upset devout Muslim votes by condemning Iranian action. Also the fact that the Iranian Prime Minister was in Turkey, discussing an important business deal, when the controversy broke out created much discomfort and embarrassment to the government. Finally, in Spring 1993, Mr. Aziz Nesin, a Turkish humorist and atheist, started to publish some extracts from Mr. Rushdie's book but met strong protests from conservative quarters.

98. Despite the fact that Turkey did not approve of Libya's extremism and support for terrorist groups, she, nonetheless, declined from openly supporting US action in April 1986. See Mackenzie, K., "Damned Both Ways", MEI, No. 274, May 2, 1986, pp. 10-11.

99. The Turkish flag was the only one to be lowered among 16 NATO flags in its headquarters in June 1989. See Mackenzie, K., "Flag Fuss", MEI, No. 353, June 23, 1989, pp. 12-13. The flag issue also caused controversy within Turkey. Westernized intellectuals felt especially outraged, and protests to the government's move were recorded by public as well as press. One of the biggest outrage was caused by what appeared to be Prime Minister Ozal's personal decision to lower the flags even at the Mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk, who had long been one of the principal targets of Iran's Islamic regime. And the fact that during the mourning, the flag at the presidential palace kept at the top of the pole showed that the President was also taking side
against the government and that the decision to lower the flags was taken personally by Prime Minister without consulting the President. As the lowering of flag was unnecessary in protocol terms since Khomeini was not a Head of State, Ozal's decision also generated astonishment in Brussels and further weakened Turkey's modest changes of early entry to the European Community. For domestic controversies over flag issue see Briefing, "Official View Versus Public Opinion", June 12, 1989, No. 740, pp. 5-7.

100. Karaosmanoglu, op. cit., p. 69. He argues that as a result of the assumption that the Islamic world compromises an entity, the West easily accepted the idea that fundamentalism was a real possibility in Turkey, as in all other Muslim countries. Thus it was convincingly concluded that though Turkey appears to be an ally of the West today, it might well turn its back to NATO under fundamentalist or other pressures tomorrow. See p. 64.

101. Ibid., p. 32.

102. Same argument has also been put forward by Ahmad, op. cit., p. 759; and Karaosmanoglu, op. cit., p. 77.


104. The Same conclusion was reached by Karaosmanoglu, op. cit., pp. 77-78; and Weiker, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

105. Developments leading to Turkey's new foreign policy posture in 1970s were discussed in chapter three.

106. For the same argument see Karaosmanoglu, op. cit., p. 77.

107. There have been several examples of this. For instance, Turkey refused to join in the agitation at many Islamic Conferences for a Holy War (Jihad) against Israel over the question of Jerusalem, and resisted a similar call made against the Soviet Union at the Islamabad Conference over her invasion of Afghanistan. Likewise, Turkey did not support the "Mecca Declaration", adopted in solidarity with Iran "who had made the Shariat law part of her political and social life". See Kushner, op. cit., pp. 101-102.

108. Personal interview of March 2, 1993 in Marmaris, Turkey.
CHAPTER SEVEN
FOREIGN POLICY AND REVITALIZATION OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY

1. Introduction: The Political Economy of Foreign Policy and The Turkish Case

The economic system of a country, which is the result of a political process that reflects a general world outlook of a government as well as the economic needs and priorities of a country, may exercise significant influence on a country's foreign policy in addition to its economic development.

Broadly speaking, the process of choosing an economic development strategy for a country usually reflects a basic political-ideological choice in the first place. Once chosen, however, any economic strategy has its constraints on, and prerequisite needs from, the political system. A centralized economic system, for example, requires a strong state and is complemented by a centralized (sometimes totalitarian) political system. This system in turn may alienate liberal states in foreign relations while attracting attention from other centralised governments. A de-centralized market economic system, on the other hand, may help to build favourable foreign relations with the states that share the same world outlook. Economic costs to pay for this option for a developing country, however, may prove to be higher than expected, in reality including threats to existence of national economy under the competitive pressures from the outside world. Nonetheless, it is increasingly apparent in the post-cold war era that choosing an economic development strategy is usually linked with the country's stand in world politics as well as priorities of its domestic political system and economic needs. Therefore, states may sometimes prefer one option to another under the political considerations, though some economic deficiencies may later emerge from their politically-oriented choices. Since, as already stated in previous chapters, a country's foreign relations could be affected, and sometimes determined, by its domestic political system, the importance of selecting a suitable economic system to the priorities of country's political system and its general foreign policy became clearer.
In this context, it was argued that Turkey's economic crisis during the late 1970s was derived from her political and economic position on the periphery of the world capitalist system; that therefore, a major economic reconstruction and changes in her development strategy were necessary; and that her position in the international political system should also be reconsidered accordingly. As a way out, some analysts were arguing in favour of free trade option and membership of the European Community, while others were advancing mainly the idea of regional cooperation. The main argument actually derived from the peculiarities of the history of Turkish economic development.

During the 1950s Turkey, as a peripheral country with a special geographical position, developed under American hegemony. After Turkey became an associate member of the European Community in 1963, however, Common Market countries began to replace America in dominating of the Turkish economy, though not necessarily its position as main supplier of foreign aid. Further, prompted by the labour shortage in Western Europe and exacerbated by the labour surplus in Turkey, there were, by the late 1970s, about a million Turkish workers in Europe sending home remittances of around $1 billion a year. At the same time the EEC countries were accounting for 60% of foreign trade, while the US share declined to less than 10% and trade with the Middle Eastern states was largely confined to one commodity; oil.

Also in the late 1970s Turkish industry, expanded in the previous two decades within a protected environment and orientated mainly to the internal market, was forced to turn to export markets, both because it was impossible in the late 1970s to find foreign exchange in order to buy raw materials, intermediary goods and technology, and because the internal market was by then soaked with cheap and low quality durable consumer goods. Such a turn, however, could not be realized unless Turkey had closer links with markets provided by the underdeveloped countries, both because competitiveness of Turkish products in the developed countries was low and also European recession was affecting markets in the developed world. Even though Turkish industrialists had accordingly in the late 1970s attempted to established trade
relationship with the immediate Arab countries of the hinterland, such an economic re-orientation, however, required a political transformation, too, and a step in that direction was not forthcoming from the government because such a Third-Worldist stance was associated at the time with the greater state control over the economy and a leaning towards the Soviet bloc.

At the same time, Turkish resentment of the West on economic grounds was also evolving. Basically, Turkish reassessment of its post-war western orientation had come after the US embargo in February 1975 because of Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Together with the reduction of financial help coming from western Europe because of recession there, the economic problems caused by the embargo forced Turkish elites to reconsider the wisdom of Turkey's western orientation. Also, since the 1950s Turkish economic dependence on the West and reliance for continued economic assistance had become a regular part of Turkish politics. But, at the same time, the frequent pleas for western help created a growing disenchantment with both the EEC and the US. Therefore, there was also a parallel drive to diminish Turkey's reliance upon the West in favour of expanding economic and political ties with states in Turkey's immediate geographical environment. It was a major argument that to ensure independence in its foreign and economic policies, Turkey must pay attention to its immediate neighbourhood and that friendly ties with states in the Middle East, Balkan, Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean would permit flexibility in Turkish foreign policy, reducing her dependence upon military alliances centred outside the region as well as allowing different models and expanded assistance for Turkey's goal of rapid modernization.

Therefore by 1980, discussions about the manner in which Turkey should be rescued from her economic crisis was inevitably included in ongoing debates about her future political, economic and international orientation and about the merits and possibilities of an increased regionalization of her policies. Thus, the various questions arising in connection with the economic development problem brought, at the same
time, the most basic foreign policy issues, such as the principle of westernization, into the discussion.

In the discussion, the growing awareness that the West no longer possessed the ability or the inclination to make an effort to better Turkey's condition without a major restructuring of her economy made the option of a deliberate regionalization of Turkey's political and economic policies increasingly attractive for Turkey. On the other side of the coin however, the economic need for huge foreign aid, which could come only from the West, and Turkey's traditional modernization drive were heavily drawing on to the EEC option. At the same time, however, it was clear that continuation of Turkey's close relations with the West, without changing her economic policies carried within, at least in the short run, serious risks of economic and social unrest which might have placed the very existence of Turkey's modernization drive in question. Moreover, in the event of Turkish membership of the EC, the country would have been put in a difficult position due to both the absence of compatible development strategy and competitive economy with the developed members. It was obvious that in order to opt for the EC option, the government needed to draw up a clear development concept, compatible with other Community members. It was certain that Turkey's economic system, as it existed then, would have created special difficulties with a view to full EC membership as it would lead to a distortion of market forces in the domestic as well as the external market, thereby creating heavy burdens on her economy, too. Hence the question facing the government in the late 1970s was not a simple choice of strategy which Turkey would follow in her quest for development, it was also the major challenge relating to Turkey's future socio-political existence and her place in the international system. In this context, the so-called "January 24 decisions" embodied a much higher significance for the country's future than their economic importance alone.

When the government finally decided in early 1980 which development strategy Turkey was going to pursue for the coming decades, it was clear that the authorities opted for the EEC option, even though they also empathized the importance of diversifying Turkey's trade relations. The political considerations seemed to play a
major role in determining the government's decision. There were those among the Turkish intelligentsia, press and technocrat class who argued that Turkey lives on a ten year cycle of economic growth, decline, political violence, military intervention and stabilization. It was thought that economic development would break this cycle, and, in this context, Turkey's eventual membership to the EC was seen as guarantee both to further sustained economic development and also against another military intervention. Therefore future EC membership was an overriding political aim, in addition to obvious pressing economic necessities, in the minds of government officials when they decided to embark on the January 24 programme. It was thought that the reforms would pave the way for Turkey's greater integration into the world economic system and would bind her more closely to the West in general and to western Europe in particular. At the end of the road, there seemed EEC membership, promising help both in economic development and political stability. Further it was thought that Turkey's economic liberalization would eventually secure her political liberalization, too. Although economic liberalization in a country does not necessarily have to lead to political liberalization or democratization, it seems that both processes are, at least, loosely connected with each other since history shows that liberal changes in economic policies have either preceded or sometimes followed the moves toward more political freedoms.

This connection, imaginary or real, between the level of economic development in a free market economy and democracy, heavily weighed upon the final decision. Moreover, closer links with the West, particularly membership of the EC, were also regarded as important in checking the growth of extremist groups such as religious fundamentalists, communists or Kurdish separatists, which were regarded as being dangerous for both economic development and Turkish democracy.

It was argued in Chapter III that the economic system of a country is generally in close accord with its political system and understanding of its place within outside world, and in principle similar regimes are assumed to be responsive to one another, though there may be exceptions to the rule. In this context, the chosen economic
system of a country is a helpful indicator of a country's political system and eventually its foreign policy. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that the officially pronounced economic system of a country may differ, at one time or another, from the one that may appear as more compatible to the existing political system. To be specific, this seemingly contradictory appearance between political system and economic policies existed, for example, in Turkey during most of the 1980s. In the first instance, the military government's decision to go ahead with liberalization policies, adopted by the previous civilian government, was seemingly contradictory while they were embarking to create an all-powerful central state machinery. From the outside, the chosen economic system did not seem, to say the least, compatible with their overall governmental philosophy which aimed at re-establishing respectability of the state, by force and in defiance of individual and political rights if necessary. The economic system they embarked upon, on the other hand, aimed at integration with the world trade system in general and called for greater cooperation with western Europe in particular. One of the main prerequisites of such intimate cooperation with the European states was, of course, that of having liberal democracy as a political system, not military dictatorship or some sort of guided democracy, which they envisaged to attain in the medium term. This basic contradiction between liberal economic systems, which was pronounced as the choice of the Turkish authorities for the country's future, and centralised political system with its restrictions on basic rights, which they admittedly wanted to sustain in Turkey, continued to exist during most of the 1980s even after the advent of civilian government in 1983. Though the civilian governments of Turgut Ozal proved to be much more dedicated to liberal economic policies than any previous government, they still found it economically expedient to ignore the political essentials of the economic system that they were so wholeheartedly following and hold on the restrictions on basic individual and political rights as long as possible. This limitation, in turn, allowed the continuation of austerity policies and politico-economic restructuring without much opposition or unrest. This of course created an awkward position within Turkey and also caused embarrassment in external relations.
The dilemma between "fast but disciplined" and "slow but democratic" way of development was nothing new for Turkey. What was new, however, was that the advocates of the idea that a certain amount of concession from the basic freedoms were acceptable, if not desirable, for the long-term success of development and modernization, were in power and others, that of supporters of the belief of development within democracy, were trying to stage a comeback. Their domestic political struggle, however, had repercussions for Turkey's foreign relations since the liberal democracies of western Europe, which Turkey was inspiring to join one day, were deeply involved in reshaping Turkey's future economic and political development. In this context, questions of whether Turkish democracy would have much more chance of survival in a market-oriented economic system, and whether further political liberalization would undermine Turkey's economic development, were to be asked increasingly both inside and outside Turkey in the discussions concerning Turkey's future economic system and attained further importance to it, in regard not only to the country's economic development, but also to her democratic evolution, and consequently her place in the international system.

At another level, any given country's foreign policy is responsive to the interests and needs of the various economic development strategies pursued by governments. The connection between these two concepts, i.e., foreign policy and economy, is also important for bilateral relations between countries as well as between economic systems and blocs. Disagreements on the economic front can cause political tension and problems, while political tension between states would also result in creating unfavourable situations for bilateral economic relations and for world trade in general.

In this sense, the future of world economy is increasingly related not only to solving the problems of production, energy, transfer of raw materials and technology, demography, inflation or recession, but at the same time to protecting peace, solving political conflict, preventing armaments and diverting those funds to economically productive areas and so on. If we take up the Turkish case in this context, we could see, as former foreign minister Turkmen put it, that not only "Turkish foreign policy in
general and attitudes against international and especially regional developments and bilateral relations with those countries heavily affect economic relations", but at the same time "our economic interests also affect our political choices".

As already mentioned in Chapter III, for example, Turkish-European economic relations were affected by the political problems existant during the military regime in Turkey. A decline in the volume of trade and postponement of economic aid were the consequences of, among other things, continuing political tension between Turkey and Western Europe. By the same token, while political tension was affecting negatively Turkey’s trade with European countries, her export markets rapidly grew during the early 1980s throughout the Middle East and North Africa, as a result of not only expansion in the markets of oil-exporting countries but also Turkey’s renewed political efforts there. The reverse was also true that sometimes officially unspoken economic reservations inevitably affected political realities, thus created a vicious circle. The net result was that by 1982, the Middle East and North Africa replaced western Europe as Turkey’s main trading outlet and Iraq displaced West Germany as her main trading partner.

Beyond this, international economic developments would affect a country’s economic system and national interest, and in turn therefore, its foreign policy stand. To mention one among many examples in Turkish case we can cite that one of the biggest problems that both Turkish economy and Turkish representatives abroad were faced with in the late 1970s was to conclude deals to compensate the country’s desperate shortage of energy through oil which had became an expensive commodity after the oil crisis of 1973-74. It still creates bitter criticisms among the older generation of foreign ministry staff to mention the fact that during the winter of 1979 when Turkey needed just enough oil to heat the ministries, her "Muslim brothers" in the Middle East, contrary to the established international custom, squarely refused to deliver it on credit because they thought that Turkish bankruptcy was imminent. During the 1980s, however, Turkey was offered much more oil than she needed at very favourable prices, because of decline in oil prices in the world market, that in the second half of the 1980s
she felt strong enough to make cuts for the first time in the heavy subsidizes of the
domestic oil market. These attitudes in turn affected the psychological, if not actual,
environment for political cooperation with such states.

On the other hand, international political realities also have economic
consequences. The above-mentioned price cuts were specially aided by favourable
offers from both Iran and Iraq in their efforts to win Turkish sympathy, or at least to
prevent it from falling to the other side, in their continuing war. Likewise Turkey's
tourism earnings have largely fluctuated in connection with political developments
within and outside the country. In 1986, for example, concerns over terrorism in
Europe and escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, and in 1992, the war over Kuwait sharply
reduced the number of tourists coming to Turkey. Similarly, current Kurdish insurgency
in the southeast of Turkey is having adverse effects over Turkey's tourism earnings.

Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, development has been one of
the major aims of both Turkish domestic and foreign policies. Influenced by the semi­
colonial status of the late-Ottoman empire in its last years, early republican leaders were
adamant in economic independence of the country as much as political survival. After
the Second World War the Soviet threat replaced the danger of Western colonialism
and continually helped to reinforce the belief that economically and industrially
developed Turkey was the only viable option for independent survival. Her experiences
of economic domination by the West during this period only strengthened Turkish
desire for economic development and its role as a foreign policy goal. In this context,
industrialization, higher agricultural production, better training and education, and
higher level of living standards became necessary prerequisites for political
independence as well as ultimate challenge on the way to raise the Turkish nation to the
level of modern world. This way of thinking, though adapted to suit contemporary
requirements, has remained one of the basic cornerstones of both Turkish economic
philosophy and foreign policy ideology.

Moreover, Turkey's exacerbated economic problems during the late 1970s and
early 1980s, and premiership of Turgut Ozal, who was a technocrat rather than
statesman and economist more than politician, raised the economic issues further into the limelight during the 1980s as well as increasing their influence over foreign policy.

Also during the 1980s, realizing that Turkey's foreign relations were affected by her economic policies and problems with other countries, the Turkish foreign ministry restructured itself to cover the economic dimension of foreign policy and Turkish ambassadors and special envoys increasingly started to tackle economic issues with their host countries. Furthermore, during the 1980s, official visits to various countries became much more closely linked with the export drive, and manifestations of the importance attached to the economic side of international relations by the Turkish government were apparent in the increasing number of businessmen who constantly accompanied Turkish statesmen during their foreign trips.

Therefore, although a detailed analysis of Turkey's economic development and its problems are beyond the purposes of this study, we cannot escape from dealing with the economic incentives of Turkish foreign policy, more so because this dissertation aims at providing an explanation for Turkish foreign policy in an era during which the most dramatic changes in Turkish economic history took place. On the other hand, although economic policies and, to certain extent, ideology, prevailed in Turkey today, differ from those of the late 1960s and 1970s, the economy still bears reminders of the events of those years. Therefore, while explaining foreign policy-economy relations in the Turkish context, a broad summary of Turkey's latest economic crisis and subsequent measures taken by the Turkish governments, sketchy as it may be, is necessary in order to be able to single out connections and contradictions between the aims of economic strategy adopted after 1980 and directions of Turkish foreign policy during the same period. Moreover, Turkey had been perceived by international monetary opinion as one of the few examples of a successful transition from an inward to an outward oriented economy, as well as a model of stabilization and adjustment. Therefore Turkish experience in the 1980s as emerging successfully from a debt crisis in an adverse world environment through market-oriented economic policies may provide an ample case study for other heavily indebted developing countries in regard
not only to economic side of her experience but also foreign relations side of it, especially in connection with her dependency relations with the lending countries and international organizations and how these relations affected her conduct of foreign policy.

2. The Basic Problem: Background, Responses and Results

During the first eight months of 1980, prior to the military coup on September 12, the Turkish government was fighting an uphill battle against an ever-worsening economic situation, while political stalemate in the parliament and elsewhere was slowly eating away precious foundations of Turkish democracy, and deaths on the streets as a result of political violence and terrorism were amounting to civil war proportions.

Basically, the economic problems that were faced by Turkey towards the end of 1970s included "an acute shortage of foreign exchange, a large balance of payments deficit and a growing stock of external arrears". Together with high and rising unemployment and inflation, declining growth and a bottle-neck in production, the above mentioned deficiencies forced Turkey into the worst economic crisis of the republican era. Beneath the surface, however, lay more important structural inconsistencies that culminated into a "crisis of the system". Although adverse economic developments in the world environment and external shocks, such as quadrupling of oil prices, an increase in world interest rates and tight monetary and trade policies adopted in the West as a result of World recession, had aggravated Turkish economic problems, the crisis was admittedly brought about mainly as a result of "often inconsistent, unstable and irrational" domestic policies. These included postponement of structural adjustments, large public sector deficits, an overvalued exchange rate, preferential treatment for industries aimed for domestic market, and a lack of incentives for the export sector, most of which were side effects of the inward-looking development strategy, based on import-substitution. Of course, severe socio-political instability and ensuing anarchy in the
country had their shares as well by disturbing work peace thus reducing productivity and increasing work losses.

The origins of Turkey's 1978-79 economic crisis dated back to the first oil crisis of 1973-74, after which Turkey, unlike many developed and developing countries that opted for slow growth rate or even recession as a way out, did not adapt herself to post-crisis economic realities and attempted to sustain her high-level growth rate, mainly geared by huge public sector investments based on foreign borrowing and inflationary money supply. At the same time, with the clear intent of import substitution, prices and interest rates were controlled and the exchange rate held constant despite over-valuing of the Turkish Lira (TL) in order to protect Turkish industry. This proved temporary, however, as the policies applied aggravated the adverse balance of payments effects of external shocks by giving way to reduction in export market shares and increases in import shares. As a result, throughout the 1970s Turkey's current account deteriorated sharply, moving from a surplus of $600 million in 1973 to a deficit of $560 million in 1974 and $1,648 million in 1975.

Furthermore, workers' remittances from abroad, which had been used in the early 1970s to balance trade deficits, decreased significantly from 1975 on, as a result of the unrealistic official exchange rate (TL was overvalued by 35 to 40%), low level of interest rates in contrast to the high interest rates in Europe, resulting from recession, and cut backs on foreign labour in the European firms. Consequently, the burden of financing the balance of payments deficit was left almost entirely to reserves and increasingly to the short-term foreign commercial debts and rescheduling of old arrears. Although foreign borrowing allowed the government to cover the deficit in the short term, added debt and debt-servicing, however, further aggravated the crisis. Finally by 1978, Turkey's borrowing possibilities were virtually exhausted and it became increasingly difficult to obtain foreign exchange necessary to purchase the imports needed for the normal functioning of the industry. With increasing foreign exchange stringency, there came considerable shortages of energy, raw materials, and spare parts. Faced with this crisis, Turkey's creditors, under the leadership of the IMF,
initiated a "rescue operation" while the governments continued to try various *ad hoc* adjustment measures. Among the conditions asked by the IMF for conclusion of a stand-by agreement and for the extension of further credits were; reduction in the economic growth rate, a wage freeze, 20-25% devaluation of Turkish Lira (TL), and a further increase in consumer prices. To carry out the "rescue operation", in concert with the IMF "austerity package", a consortium of seven foreign banks began work in early 1979 on the rescheduling and reordering of Turkey's massive foreign debts, which the Financial Times called "one of the largest such operations in financial history, involving some $6 billion".

However, two consecutive gradual stabilization programmes, initiated by the government in April 1978 and again in July 1979 under the IMF pressure and in connection with stand-by agreements with that organization, failed mainly because the authorities were unable to sustain the adjustment efforts due to primarily lack of commitment in the government circles to the programmes and difficult socio-political upheavals that country was experiencing. Also, the limited nature of the measures taken, such as devaluation of the Lira without sufficiently adjusting prices and financially balancing state enterprises, largely affected the outcome.

By January 1980, the government, however, realized that there left no choice but to undertake a comprehensive and far-reaching economic programme if Turkey was to be saved from bankruptcy. It was obvious that the policies applied in Turkey after 1973, rather than adjusting to the external shocks, aggravated the situation.

Against the backdrop of political deadlocks, violence and worsening economic situation, January 24, 1980, marks an important date in Turkish economic history. On that day, the Demirel government approved a new economic programme which included IMF-type orthodox austerity measures for stabilization and later liberalization. The programme, which included strong macro-economic stabilization measures as well as fundamental reforms aimed at liberalization, was prepared by technocrats working under the leadership of Mr. Turgut Ozal, then undersecretary responsible for the State Planning Organization, and supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Essentially, the underlying novelty of the January 24 1980 policies, within Turkish economic history, was their common aim to reorient economic policy from state intervention toward greater reliance on market forces. Before January 1980, the primary feature of the Turkish economy had been the high degree of state involvement, dating from the 1930s. The most obvious characteristic of the modern Turkish economy, distinguishing her from her OECD counterparts, had been the important role played by the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in every aspect of economic life. The January 1980 programme, however, aimed at moving away from the determining role of the SEEs in national economy in favour of private enterprises.

The most dramatic break with past policies, however, was the decision to open up the Turkish economy to foreign competition and investment whereby Turkey for the first time embarked on a set of policies aimed at permanent transformation of the economy and the nature of government - economy relations. It was indeed, as a Turkish weekly magazine called it, an "economic earthquake". Until 1980, Turkey had pursued autarkic economic policies in order to protect domestic industry from foreign competition, and placed emphasis on import-substitution and production for the home market as a development strategy. The motivation underlying these policies was defensive rather than economic and dated back to the country's 19th century experience, when, because of the large foreign debts and following state of default in 1875, the Western powers forced the ailing Ottoman empire in 1881 to put its major public income facilities under the control of an international "Public Debt Administration" whereby lender countries directly administered and collected most of the tax revenues to service the debt. The Administration was not formally abolished until 1928 and the final payment on the Ottoman debt was made by Turkey in 1954, exactly a century after the first loan. Moreover, Allied powers attempts after the first world war for the continuation of the "capitulations", economic privileges given to the western powers by the Ottoman empire, and their insistence on fixed lower tariff barriers for western products even after the establishment of the Republic generated strong resentment towards western capital and high consciousness about "national
Thus, as soon as the tariff restrictions of the Lausanne treaty had expired in 1929, higher barriers were introduced not only to protect local industry but also to make it difficult for foreigners to operate in and infiltrate to Turkey; a philosophy that remained unchanged more or less until 1980. Moreover the national, as opposed to foreign controlled, economy and self-sufficiency were heavily stressed by the administration. Under these conditions Turkish industry, mainly producing consumer durables for domestic market, grew up artificially, and therefore, when it faced a capital bottle-neck in 1978-79, was not able to adopt itself to the changing international environment. In this sense, the 1980 break with the past represented a major and definitive change in economic philosophy, which amounted to an interesting confrontation in Turkey between the etatist tradition of bygone Kemalist era and the prescriptions of Milton Friedman's monetarism. At the end what used to be closed, self-sufficient, low growth economy, built on state capitalist lines laid out in the 1930s was suddenly opened to the World.

The Programme also included drastic measures to stabilize the economy by reducing inflation, encouraging exports, improving the balance of payments situation, and gradually removing both trade barriers and foreign exchange restrictions. As a start, the Lira was devaluated 48.6%, a much higher level than the IMF was asking, which was followed by seven other devaluations in 1980, reaching 144% combined nominal devaluation rate at the end of 1980. Then price controls were eliminated, and restrictive monetary and flexible interest rate policies, aimed at raising the domestic savings, were implemented. Further, in order to keep the domestic price structure in line with that of the world market, a flexible exchange rate policy with daily adjustments was adopted after May 1981. The trade and external payments were liberalized, and various measures providing direct and indirect incentives for export were introduced. The programme emphasized export promotion as the only lasting remedy for Turkey's chronic balance of payments problem. In an effort to reduce government spending, SEEs were denied subsidies and were placed under an independent management. The investment programme was rationalized and priority was
given to the key sectors of agriculture, energy and transport. And a more favourable climate and extended guarantees were called for attracting foreign capital.

Although these radical measures and other structural reforms involving the fiscal system and the financial markets ended fifty years of protectionism in Turkey and marked the beginning of a period with far-reaching structural changes that could lead to a western style free-market economy, by then, however, the political situation in the country had deteriorated to unprecedented levels and to govern the country properly, let alone to implement extremely unpopular austerity measures, became almost impossible. And at that moment, the military stepped in to end the rampant anarchy and terrorism, and instituted a series of sweeping institutional changes. These changes, as explained earlier, included such amendments to the political-legal framework as a new constitution, a new law on political parties, and an election law. There were also speedy changes to the economic legal framework, as opposed to the inability of the civilian government to promulgate the January 24 programme into a law and use of government decree to by-pass the need for parliamentary approval. The military government speedily implemented changes in the tax law, labour relations and collective bargaining law, and banking and financial markets, as well as going ahead with social changes like the creation of new arrangements for education, birth control, and the provision of health services in general, most of which had not been possible before because of parliamentary paralysis.

Also as part of the January programme, many administrative changes, such as the centralization of wage negotiations under the auspices of the Supreme Arbitration Council, the establishment of a Money and Credit Committee to co-ordinate monetary and credit policies and by implication determine the level of interest rates, and the setting up of new departments to process foreign investment applications and promote exports, were speedily implemented. These far-reaching institutional changes were expected to put Turkey on a higher economic, social, and political development track, with especially Western Europe.
The commitment of the military government to the implementation of the programme was crucial for its subsequent success, for before the coup d'etat the civilian government, despite initiating it, was not able to fully comply with the programme because of possible short-term political consequences of the programme, such as rising unemployment and a decline in real wages. The military, however, free from political and electoral constraints, was able to leave the economy to technocrats and execute tight-monetary policies with precision. Their decision to follow up the plan and elevate its planner, Mr. Turgut Ozal, to a position in charge of economy enabled the programme's continued enforcement during the military regime. Moreover, restrictions on political rights and a ban on union activities allowed the military government to ignore social consequences of the economic measures they were taking, in addition to increasing productivity by preventing strikes and pay rises, and by assuring work peace. Restrictions on social and political rights, however, were the prices to be paid in the short-term for economic recovery in the longer term.

Despite frequent official pronouncements to the contrary, the programme showed great deal of resemblance to orthodox stabilization packages introduced in a number of other developing countries, often by authoritarian governments and under the IMF's auspices. As a result of the military regime's almost scrupulous implementation of the economic programme, initiated by the last civilian government, and the fact that the first step in the direction of liberalization corresponded with the beginning of the military regime, arguments were forwarded to the effect that the success of the programme depended on total, and almost ruthless, execution of its entirety in detail from a central control position; that some sort of a centralized, if not authoritarian, government was preferable; that execution of policies by a one man/group dedicated to the programme and free from political constraints was essential; and that in fact the advent of the military regime into power ensured the initial success of the programme and was the real intention of the country's elite bourgeoisie right from the beginning.
The argument runs as follows: the coalition governments formed in Turkey during the period of 1973-80, numbered thirteen, were not able to resolve the mounting economic problems within the democratic framework, which had brought Turkey to the brink of major collapse and, at the same time, led to increased unrest and militancy among the masses that alarmed the military and caused the intervention. According to this argument, put forward mainly by "left-leaning" academics, the 1971 military intervention, too, was a response to the deteriorated economy, the mass strikes and demonstrations which followed. Moreover, the generals had an added interest in preserving the "neo-colonial" status quo because of their involvement in the economy. Since the early 1960s, the armed forces had, through the establishment of the Army Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK), emerged as one of the largest industrial and commercial interests in Turkey and become an integral part of the economy. Moreover, starting with the Demirel government in the late 1960s the army had received much better pay and conditions, with subsidised housing and well-stocked PX stores, and had become more part of a conservative establishment, at a time when the Turkish economy and society had been opened to the liberal ideas of the rest of Europe.

It naturally follows that given its important position in the economy the military, alongside the rising Turkish monopoly bourgeoisie, had a substantial stake in the maintenance of economic and social stability. Therefore, the argument concludes, when deterioration emerged in both areas, there left no choice for the army but to intervene, and their implementation with a vengeance of the policies adopted by the Demirel government, which was essentially the representative of Turkey's rising small and monopolistic bourgeoisie, was a logical consequence.

It is true that the social and political transition in Turkey, with its economic connections, has not been smooth and has led to violence at times within the country, which of course at the end became one of the most pronounced reasons for the 1980 military takeover. Moreover economists generally believe that increasing poverty resulting from maldistribution of income, uneven development of different geographical
areas of the country, unemployment, and a decrease in the standard of living have been
the main causes of this political and social unrest, and without military intervention, the future of the programme with its socially destabilizing effects and with a shaky minority government looked bleak.

These arguments notwithstanding, however, whatever the reasons for the military intervention and their adherence to the January 24, 1980 programme, one thing was clear that the response of the country to these policies was impressive and represented a welcome break both for the hard-pressed Turkish people and also for the IMF, which had to face unfavourable reviews of other austerity programmes that were implemented earlier in Latin America and other heavily indebted nations.

Initially, marked and rapid progress was achieved especially on the balance of payments, inflation and growth fronts. Inflation, which had been running well over 100%, fell to about 40% in 1981 and 30% in 1982. GDP, which had declined to a negative growth of -1.1% in 1980, grew about 4.5% in 1981, mainly because of the better export performance, realizing 4.3% real growth rate in 1982. The annual growth rate of the GNP, which declined to 3.0% in 1978, - 0.3% in 1979, and - 0.7% in 1980, came back up, following the broad based stabilization measures at the beginning of 1980, to 4.3 and 4.45 in 1981 and 1982, respectively. There was significant improvement in both the trade and current account balances. Compared to 25% in 1980, exports rose by 55% in 1981, reaching $5.69 billion in 1982 while imports steadied at around $8.5 billion. The value of work taken on by Turkish contractors abroad, mainly in the Middle East, rose from $1.5 billion to $7.5 billion within one and half year. Workers' remittances reached $2.35 billion in 1982 in response to more realistic exchange and interest rates. As a result, also by virtue of keeping expenditures low in real terms while increasing revenue, the current account deficit was reduced from a peak of $3.2 billion in 1980 to $2.1 billion in 1981 and $1.2 billion in 1982.

This early success was achieved mainly through a better public sector performance and restructuring, while the private sector initially adopted a wait and see
attitude. Although the still prevailing high tariff protection and export compensation schemes raised questions about the real success of the programme, the improved foreign debt situation and a superior export performance became leading indicators of progress as well as hopeful signs of what more could be accomplished by furthering liberalization efforts in Turkey. In recognition of this fact, Turkey's performance was accepted by the IMF and the international lending community as meeting the requirements of sound development.

The success of the Turkish experience was all the more remarkable as the world economy had been in prolonged recession, accompanied by rising protectionism and retrenchment in international financing as an increasing number of developing and Eastern Block countries sought to reschedule their foreign debts. In 1982, while the OECD-area GNP stagnated and the balance of payments of many countries became major policy concerns, the GNP in Turkey increased about 4.5%.

Mr. Ozal's elevation to the premiership in November 1983 and his identification with the programme were taken as further reassuring signs by the business circles and international monetary organizations of stability and continued adherence to the outward-oriented development policy. In fact, during the election campaign, Mr. Ozal called for further reduction of constraints on the private sector and for creation of incentives for private industry and trade. Among the major aims of his party were efforts to strengthen the middle class, reduce unemployment, provide low-cost housing, promote more balanced regional development within Turkey, and reduce bureaucratic red tape. He interpreted his party's election victories in November 1983 and March 1984 as signifying a strong mandate to carry out his broad programme of liberalization and continued to implement radical policies vis-a-vis foreign trade and payments, liberalization, and export orientation of the economy.

When he came to power in 1983 through general elections, Mr. Ozal was labelled a "technocrat" in western press and government circles, and had some highly able technocrats around him executing his policies. After becoming prime minister in
1983, he immediately relaxed import controls, while keeping the export incentives, and virtually abolished restrictions on foreign currency transactions.

The initial results of the new economic measures were again positive. As the government moved to devalue the currency to approach convertibility with daily adjustments of the exchange rate, the value of the dollar on the black market fell to an insignificant premium over the bank rate. The provision to allow Turks to have foreign currency accounts for the first time in recent Turkish history reduced the need to go outside official channels. As a result of the more realistic exchange rate and additional export incentives, export earnings rose sharply in the first months of 1984, even though some of the claimed transactions may not, in fact, have taken place. The improvement in the balance of payments received favourable comments from the international banking community.

Despite the signs of progress, however, the debate on economic policy in Turkey did not abate and the initial wave of optimism on the potential success of the programme faded, at least for some, towards the end of 1980s because of lingering trade and budget deficits and continuing problems of high inflation and unemployment. The strains accumulated en route to transition from inward to outward oriented economy were becoming all too evident towards the 1990s. Especially the gradual liberalization of the political system following the military rule of early 1980s, which had led to a series of important elections, caused growing pressures on fiscal balances because of the mentality of election economy. While the public-sector deficit had started to get out of control, the inflation rate, too, reached its pre-adjustment period levels. These developments, together with the growing burden of external debt service, raised serious doubts about the sustainability of the programme.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Turkey did manage to recover in the early 1980s in a difficult world environment, in which a world debt crisis and a recession in the industrialized countries made the outward-oriented strategy particularly risky. Nevertheless, her performances especially on the growth and export sides, have
been impressive and change in mentality from import-substitution to export-led open market economy marked a very important watershed in Turkish economic history.

The success of the programme in the 1980s was generally attributed to its coherence, to the general shift in policies, and to the continued political commitment of the authorities despite adverse short-term effects on employment and real wages. Moreover, the adjustment process was greatly facilitated by huge capital inflows resulting from debt rescheduling, balance of payments support from OECD countries (led by the US and Germany) and an increase in workers' remittances, which permitted the higher level of imports that was necessary to sustain growth and alleviate supply bottle-neck.

Above all, the continuity of political commitment among government circles, personal attachment to and the clear authority of Mr. Ozal regarding the programme throughout its implementation were crucial factors for the success of the programme. Mr. Ozal's connection with the January 24 Programme was so intimate that the Turkish economic transformation after 1980 came to be associated with him, both inside and outside Turkey. He was author and initial conductor of the "24 January Rehabilitation Programme", which he, after the military coup d'etat, continued to oversee as a technocrat Deputy prime minister until his resignation from the government in 1982. After the November 1983 elections he was back again to the government with the same economic policies, but this time as prime minister. Thus, from the viewpoint of continuity within economic policy, the decade of 1980 could be treated as a whole since all the forms of political regimes, the parliamentary, military, transitional and once again parliamentary, which followed each other during the 1980s, pronounced their adherence to the same economic programme which was controlled all the time, except for an interval of sixteen months in 1982-83, by Mr. Turgut Ozal.

The importance of a political commitment to the success of the programme becomes more apparent if we compare the post-1980 experiment with earlier Turkish attempts at stabilization. Both attempts in 1958 and the late-1970s were seen by the Turkish governments as merely short-term expedients to provide fresh facilities and get
them out of the immediate impasse. Once the impasse was over, the government would backtrack from the programmes and violate their stipulations. In contrast, the 1980 programme was more rapidly welcomed and was implemented over a longer period of time with much greater firmness and determination.69

While the reforms were comprehensive, the rest of this chapter focuses primarily on those aspects of Turkey's post-1980 economic policy having to do, directly or indirectly, with foreign policy such as external debt, foreign trade, and relations with the international monetary organizations.

3. Instruments of The New Economic Programme and Foreign Policy

3.1. The Role of External Debt and International Organizations in Turkish Economic Recovery

One of the main tools of the new economic strategy was dependency upon more international borrowing. Essentially, the preoccupation with trade liberalization, especially in the initial years of the programme, and with short-term objectives like coping with inflation and balance of payments difficulties, entailed, in addition to relying on demand restraint through tight monetary and fiscal policies, resorting to external borrowing.

Although Turkey could be categorized economically as a highly indebted developing country, her experience during the 1980s, regarding foreign aid and external debt issues, has been clearly different from other members of developing world. The reason for this is that the debt crisis caught up with Turkey in 1977-1978, well before other leading debtor nations engulfed in a debt crisis from 1982 onwards.70 In between, Turkey's performance on economic stabilization effort, as stated earlier, was successful and by 1982 Turkey emerged again as credit-worthy country with a relatively high level of economic growth based on an export boom.71 Being caught up with debt crisis much earlier than other debtor countries, thus before private creditors started to worry about returns on their lending, Turkey was able to undertake a series of debt renegotiations with her debtors before 1982, which involved the largest sums.
ever to be rescheduled.\textsuperscript{72} Between 1978 and 1981, $9.8 billion of foreign debt was rescheduled, amounting to 70% of Turkey's total debt at year-end 1981, of these $5.5 billion (56%) was debt owed to OECD governments and $2.8 billion (29%) to commercial banks.\textsuperscript{73} In turn, by 1982, while the private creditors were pulling out of Latin America due to chronic debt crisis over there, Turkey was ready to re-enter private capital markets and thus benefit from favourable conditions. Since then both Turkey's credit-worthiness in international capital markets and debt service ratio have been clearly superior to that of other heavily indebted countries.\textsuperscript{74} While Turkey, as one of the first countries to arrange debt rescheduling, recovered from her serious liquidity crisis, most of the other debtor nations have struggled unsuccessfully since 1982. The relative success of Turkish economic stabilization programme had threefold reason behind it.

While not denying that the market-oriented reforms undertaken after 1980 were instrumental in achieving success on the external front, that the internal social and political costs of the transformation, especially the repression of workers' rights and declining real wages, should also be emphasized. Also and that the favourable developments in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood, such as the Iran-Iraq war, greatly helped the Turkish recovery by creating a thriving export market for Turkish goods, the most important factor for the success of the Turkish recovery programme, however, was the exceptionally advantageous treatment that Turkey received from the multilateral institutions (IMF and World Bank) and bilateral creditors, mainly OECD governments, in terms of both debt relief and new capital inflows. To grasp the importance of international support in Turkish case, it is enough to compare Turkish experience with those of other heavily indebted nations that tried to implement the same policies.\textsuperscript{75}

Apart from the major debt operation, which included the above mentioned unprecedented size of debt rescheduling and renegotiations, after 1979 Turkey was also beneficiary of a coordinated effort on the part of western governments to prop up her economy. Between 1979 and 1981, $1.5 billion was poured into the Turkish economy.
under OECD auspices as special assistance. In addition, during the same period, the IMF and the World Bank lent $1.2 billion and $1.0 billion, respectively. Turkey also became the first country to receive World Bank structural adjustment loan in addition to obtaining major loans from Saudi Arabia and oil credits from other OPEC countries. The financial boost created by these sums was not only sufficient to relieve Turkey's short term foreign exchange crisis and help to alleviate the impacts of the second oil crisis shock but also enough to provide an important space in which the reforms of the early 1980s could be carried out. Rodrik's comparisons show that Turkey had been the recipient of proportionately larger capital inflows in the aftermath of her debt crisis than any other country. This has reduced the squeeze on the current account of the balance of payments.

The OECD countries' commitment to the success of Turkish economy derived from different sources. In the first place, Turkey had became a test case of monetarist policies of IMF, which had previously received unfavourable blows in Latin American experiences. Initially, the January 24, 1980, stabilization programme was introduced under the auspices of the IMF and therefore received immediate recognition and support from the other international organizations like the World Bank and the OECD. The IMF's desire to play a significant and constructive role in Turkey's debt recovery was reflected in its June 1980 stand-by agreement with Turkey, which amounted to $1,65 billion over a three year period, the largest ever IMF stand-by at the time. In turn Turkey's desire to satisfy the Fund's requirements was also evident during the drawing up process of the January 24 Decisions. When Mr. Ozal, as chief Turkish economic negotiator, approached the IMF at the end of the 1979 with a new stabilization programme, his and the Turkish government's, main aim was to arrange an agreement so that the Fund would release more credits to Turkey in order to finance the imports required to maintain domestic and export production. Turkey's other creditors were also looking for a IMF green light to extend any further credits to Turkey. Therefore, especially in the early days of the programme, the IMF's performance criteria, embodied in a three-year stand-by agreement, was the overriding
influence in the selection of economic policies in a wide range of spheres, particularly in the field of monetary, fiscal, trade, and industrialization policies. The support of international organizations such as like the World Bank and the IMF for the programme further increased especially after the 1983 elections and they, having played an important role in the shaping of Turkish stabilization and liberalization efforts since 1980 and having received favourable reviews about its early successes, started to identify themselves more closely with the experiment. Moreover, by the mid-1980s, Turkey was the only major example of a country which had managed so far to recover from a debt crisis and achieve a respectable growth rates afterwards. This success was universally linked to the outward-oriented policies put in place since 1980 under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank. Therefore the implications of the outcome extended far beyond Turkey. The uncertainty regarding Turkey's fate could have led to serious doubts as to whether such policies were either necessary or sufficient to grow out of a debt crisis. It was considered that had Turkey failed, then the so-called Chicago School Formula (Friedmanist Monetarism), backed by the IMF, regarding adjustment via liberalization, would have to be regarded as having failed as well. Accordingly, having put their name to the programme, the IMF and other international organizations felt obliged to see it through.

Political factors had also had their share in determining shape and volume of OECD aid, and indeed other western help to Turkey. The initial rescue operation was clearly influenced by the events in neighbouring Iran. The fall of the Shah in 1979 and following Iran-Iraq war highlighted Turkey's both strategic and shaky position in that particular hot spot of the world for the western Alliance, and therefore triggered an avalanche of aid from strategic-minded OECD governments. During 1980, for example, the OECD countries came through with a $1 billion special aid assistance package. This connection between the Iranian revolution and the increased interest of the western governments in Turkey was clearly pronounced by the then prime minister Mr. Suleyman Demirel who, as mentioned earlier, reportedly said "it seems we must thank Iran for enabling people see us again". Although the civilian government was
replaced by a military regime in September 1980, the OECD packages continued both in 1981 and 1982 with $940 million and $960 million, respectively.85

The continued backing of the IMF and the World Bank, along with the OECD, was crucial for Turkey's balance of payments support, especially in the initial years of the 1980 programme,86 because, after the debt crisis of late 1970s, Turkey was shut out of private capital markets and in fact was unable to raise any new loans from commercial banks until 1983.87 In order to determine the importance of official external backing for Turkish "success story", it is enough to look closer to the overall financing of the current account after 1977, which shows that during the 1978-1981 period, the major role in closing the gap in balance of payments was played by debt relief (29% of the total), official bilateral lending (26%), and flows from international organizations, mainly the World Bank and the IMF (22%).88 Altogether, official inflows to Turkey in 1980 reached an all time high $2.1 billion. She further received $1.5 billion in 1981 and $1.8 billion in 1982 from official sources.89 Her outstanding credit from official sources totalled to some $4.2 billion in 1984. Moreover, proportion of the long-term debts to total amount of the debt was over 26%, far greater than any other debtor nations at the time. This figure, compared with 4% for Argentina, 6% for Mexico, and 10% for Brazil, shows the peculiarity of Turkish case among other debtor nations and proves the importance attached to Turkey by the western governments.90 As these figures reveal, it is hard to downplay the role of official and multilateral balance of payments assistance during this period. While comparing Turkey to other highly indebted countries, it is of course worth remembering that during the 1978-79 period, just before heavy OECD involvement and the reforms of 1980, Turkish performance did not look much different from the typical pattern after 1982.

In the 1982-85 period, however, debt relief played a much reduced role (19%) and had no part at all by 1985. The same pattern is also evident for special OECD assistance. On the other hand, short-term private capital inflows, which amounted only to $50 million in the 1980-83 period, increased substantially after 1983 and between 1983 and 1985, commercial banks undertook $1.9 billion of new lending to Turkey.91
Also in 1983, export credits, which had dried up for Turkey in 1979, became available once more. In this context, backing of international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank have been important, if not absolutely necessary, in encouraging the resurgence of international bank lending to Turkey in the aftermath of three debt reschedulings of the late 1970s and 1980.92

Although the rising inflows of private capital to Turkey was ample testimony to found confidence in her creditworthiness, this shift in borrowing pattern still did not diminish the potential constraints of the need to borrow large sums for the country's foreign policy and independent stance in the world. There were precedents in the use of economic pressures as instruments of policy against Turkey in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s. Indebtedness of this size also had the potential to put in jeopardy the autonomy and negotiating power of the governments with the creditor countries.

Complications arising from this factor were seen in the period of 1980-83, during which the EC and West European states, despite strong responses from Turkey, attempted to use economic pressures on her as a political leverage to get a speedy return to democracy. West Germany, second biggest aid donor of Turkey, though continuing to participate in the OECD Turkey Consortium, refused in January 1981 a Turkish request to coordinate another OECD loan package as it had done in both 1979 and 1980. Moreover, under the mounting pressures from number of politicians and organizations for general reductions in aid to Turkey because of the NSC's reluctance to commit itself to a timetable for return to parliamentary democracy, the W. German government's final aid figure under the OECD auspices for 1981 ($200 million) was substantially lower than its previous offers. Even that figure didn't seem secure at one point as it was reported in mid-November 1981 that W. Germany was considering whether withhold its participation in the OECD package.93 Furthermore, following the dissolution of political parties by a decree on October 16, the Commission of the EC announced its intention to delay the implementation of fourth protocol until Turkey's political course became clearer.94
On the other hand, US readiness, in contrast to European's attitude, to support Turkey's borrowing needs after the military intervention and its substantial participation in international economic assistance efforts to rescue the Turkish economy from collapse in 1980, were recognized as a key to signing of new Turkish-American Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1980. Of course US readiness to back up Turkish needs generally derives from her strategic value as an American ally and therefore varies from time to time depending on US assessment of it. For example, at the height of the second cold war Turkey after 1980, despite the existence of a military regime, became the third largest recipient of economic and military aid from the US after Israel and Egypt, reaching $900 million in 1986. However, after the thaw in superpower relations, Turkey's share in US foreign aid started to diminish together with her strategic value. As a result US aid to Turkey for the fiscal year 1988 amounted to only $526 million.  

This dependence of Turkey on one ally's willingness to support her economic development, of course, created tension at times between the two countries, and solutions usually required Turkish perseverance in supporting US aims in the region, if not necessitated concessions from Turkey in return for America aid.  

Therefore, in order to diversify her aid donors, and to reduce her dependence on one ally, Turkey was reported to have requested aid from Saudi Arabia, capitalizing on the latter's preference for Muslim aid recipients. The total amount Evren was said to have requested in his trip to Saudi Arabia in 1984 was $6 billion. By the same token, Turkey further raised a total of $125.5 million in syndicated loans supplied by Islamic governments and quasi-governmental institutions in the first quarter of 1984, including $35 million Islamic Development Bank loan. For the same reason, that is in order to reduce her dependence to her western allies, Turkey tried to emphasise the role of the Islamic Development Bank in enhancing economic cooperation between Islamic countries. Therefore, in contrast to her reserved attitude towards political cooperation among Islamic countries, Turkey has been more than willing to join into economic cooperation, as seen in her strong presence in Islamic Development Bank and her
acceptance of the leadership of the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Istanbul.

Also, it should not be forgotten that high state spending, especially when it has been financed in part by foreign borrowing has extremely inflationary effects on the economy, as seen in Turkey after 1983. Moreover, foreign debt of this size generally has a tendency to grow in the middle-to-long term because of its spin-over affect and put burdens over the country's future generations and development. Although debt reschedulings of the 1978-1980 period relieved Turkey from the immediate danger of a debt crisis, nevertheless the heavy repayments burden of debt incurred in the 1970s is still being felt. After the rescheduling of Turkey's foreign debt in 1979 and 1980, for example, her debt repayments amounted to $585 million in 1981 and $700 million in 1982. Moreover, in 1983, apart from compensating trade deficit of the year, Turkey had to make debt interest payments of $1.3 billion and foreign debt principal repayments of $1.05 billion. Although reliance on foreign aid had diminished after 1983, Turkey still needed some $1.5-2.0 billion foreign aid yearly in order to be able to meet her debt repayments as well as trade deficit and the needs of the economy since her debt repayments jumped to $2.2 billion in 1985 and $2.6 billion in 1986. In the peak year of debt servicing, 1987, Turkey had to repay $5.600 million, of which $2.000 million was interest payments. To finance these repayments and current account gap, Turkey has increasingly resorted to short-term borrowing. Between 1983 and 1986, the share of short-term debt in total went from 13% to 21%. However, Turkey's experiences in the late 1970s are important reminders of the dangers of a rapid build-up of short-term debt which usually results in liquidity problems and foreign exchange bottle-neck. Further, burden of debt repayments usually generates more needs for foreign borrowing and thus forms a vicious circle for the recipient country. As an example, Turkey's outstanding foreign debt increased from $16.3 billion in 1980 to $38.5 billion in 1988, with debt service obligations of $7.2 billion of which $3 billion represented interest and $4.2 billion principal.
The IMF's and the World Bank's support for the Turkish economy was also important beyond their major role in debt arrangements and rescheduling. Most of the major reforms of the Turkish economy and the redirectioning of policy occurred in conjunction with the World Bank and IMF programmes. The World Bank tended to concentrate on institutional reform and structural problems emphasizing the liberalization of trade, encourage production for export, better resource allocation and further mobilization of domestic savings in order to reduce external debt, whereas the IMF focused on monetary and fiscal stabilization, concentrating, in particular, upon the flexible exchange rate policy, the restructuring of the SEEs, monetary discipline and market-determined interest rates. While the IMF tried to use stand-by agreements to assert its influence over general economic policy in Turkey,\textsuperscript{101} the World Bank's efforts were institutionalised in series of Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) agreements with Turkey.\textsuperscript{102} In other times, both the stand-by agreements and the SALs were backed up by continuous studies and reviews of the programme by IMF and World Bank staff.

The finance provided by the Fund and by the World Bank was undoubtedly a vital injection into the cash-squeezed Turkish economy. The support of the IMF also lent credibility to the Turkish case and paved the way for debt renegotiations with private creditors. Whatever the longer term outcomes, of the January 24 programme and the various criticism directed towards the short-sightedness of the IMF policies, the reforms undertaken by Turgut Ozal from 1980 onwards, which received support from the IMF, have enabled the Turkish economy to proceed through the 1980s without the repeated debt problems which haunted so many other debtors. On the other hand, Turkey's case was probably peculiar in the history of the debt crisis because of the high degree of official debt in its total debt portfolio. Its strategically important position, together with the timing of its payment crisis, probably made its creditors more willing to contribute new money which was vital to recovery in the external sector. Turkey's experience, however, shows how a combination of policy re-orientation and substantial financial support can bring about a long-term recovery in external payments.
3.2. Export Performance: Its Determinants And Effects On Foreign Policy

Although the availability of foreign inflows and support received from international organizations, as discussed in the preceding section, were important factors in igniting the recovery of the Turkish economy since 1980, they probably would not have been enough alone to sustain healthy growth of the economy in the longer run if it was not for the country's rather miraculous export performance. According to the programme, rapid export growth was a crucial factor in improving the balance of payments situation, in gaining international credit-worthiness, and indeed in securing the survival of the entire economic programme by compensating for the depressed domestic demand because of the austerity measures. Turkey's export boom in the 1980s has shown rather interesting turns for a country which had been long stuck in "the traditions of export pessimism". Notwithstanding short lived experiments with free-market economy, throughout the entire republican period Turkey's economic policy had tended to favour import-substitution at the expense of exports. Being made the official development strategy of the late 1960s and 1970s, the import-substitution policy gave little encouragement to production for exports and progressively tightened restrictions on imports, and had thus effectively gone a long way to cut Turkey from rest of the world market which undoubtedly had effects on the politically isolationist and pro non-aligned ideas, put forward in the 1970s regarding Turkey's international stand.

However, under the economic stabilization programme of 1980 incentives were introduced to encourage exports. Direct policies to encourage exports were backed by equally important indirect policies, such as flexible exchange rate policy which ensured the competitiveness of Turkish goods, and by change in attitudes and minds of government officials toward export and trade in general.

Official export statistics tell a spectacular story. From around $2.5 billion in 1979, exports steadily increased to $8 billion in 1985 and $10.3 billion in 1987.
Even if one deducts 10% plus to allow for "fictitious exports", realistic figures for 1987 would be $9 billion. Although this figures still gave away $5 billion deficit on visible trade account in 1987 (imports were a bit over $14 billion in 1987), the deficit, in proportional terms, was much less important than it had been at the beginning of the 1980s, when imports were more than double exports.

Two transformations came with this increase. First, the share of manufactured exports grew faster, raising their share in total exports from 36% in 1980 to 75.3% in 1985, with a corresponding decline in the share of agricultural products from 57.4% in 1980 to 21.6% in 1985. Second, there was also a marked shift in geographical distribution and the country pattern of exports. In an attempt to overcome the problem of slow growth of OECD markets, which was accompanied at times by barriers against imports, Turkey had to rapidly explore the market possibilities in the Middle Eastern and North African countries. As a result, although exports to all regions grew substantially, trade with the regional countries literally exploded in the early 1980s.

Before 1980, the Middle East and North Africa were underdeveloped as Turkish export markets. The rapid growth of income and wealth amongst the oil-exporting Middle Eastern countries after 1979 as a result of increases in the oil prices meant that they suddenly were able to embark upon major development and rapid growth programmes. As a regional supplier Turkey greatly benefited from this drive by providing transport equipment and machinery for the investment projects, and consumer goods and food stuff to the fast growing markets in the region. Prime Minister Ozal was particularly keen on promoting greater cooperation among the Islamic countries via Islamic Conference Organization. Consequently, the share of Middle Eastern and North African markets in total exports of Turkey increased from 17.3% ($400 m.) in 1979 to 44.3% ($2.5 b.) in 1982, eventually declining to 31% by 1986, while exports to OECD countries fell from 58% in 1980 to 45% in 1982. Moreover, exports to these countries accounted for 72% of the increase of total exports in 1981 and 63% in 1982.
It is fair to say that this export boom has been the clearest success of the adjustment programme of the 1980s. The success on this front, apart from allowing the country to maintain its growth rate in healthy proportions, has also played a key role in attracting commercial bank lending since 1982.\textsuperscript{110}

Success on the export front would become more apparent if one considers the fact that the rapid expansion occurred in an inhospitable and not particularly receptive world environment. The recession in the western world meant that overall trade was stagnant or growing only slowly in the early 1980s. Despite this adverse external environment, Turkey still managed to expand her export shares even in the hard-pressed markets of the OECD countries, with an increase of 35% in 1981, following a 4% decline in 1979 and a 16% increase in 1980. The increase in 1981 seemed more impressive when it was set against the 5% decline in the total imports of the OECD countries that occurred in the same year.\textsuperscript{111}

What have been the determinants of the boom? Several factors have been frequently cited.\textsuperscript{112} From our foreign policy and international environment perspectives, the most important factor, and in a sense most fortunate for Turkey, determining the success of Turkish export boom was the Iran-Iraq war which created an important market for Turkish manufactured goods in the two belligerent countries and became the predominant source of expansion for exports to the Middle East. Within the above mentioned figures about the increases of Turkish exports to the Middle East in general, Iran's and Iraq's combined share in total exports was particularly fast growing, with an increase from 5.5% in 1980 to 26% in 1985, though eventually declining to 15% in 1986 as a result of the fall in oil prices. With these figures Iran, having overtaken W. Germany; became Turkey's largest export market in 1982 and 1983.\textsuperscript{113} Moreover, the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq put Turkish road transport in an attractive position as the only secure route for trade between Europe and the Middle East which allowed her to capture a major share of the rapidly expanding transit market of the region.\textsuperscript{114}
Furthermore, Turkey played a major role in construction works in the Middle East, where they have the advantage of geographic proximity, familiarity with the terrain and business practices, a history of good relations, reasonable labour costs, and a common religious identity, especially important in Saudi Arabia where major works were undertaken in the holy cities, not open to non-Muslims. In 1982, Turkish firms had 3.7% of the Middle Eastern market and 2.2% of the world market, major construction clients being Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Further, particularly up to 1985, contracts obtained in the Middle East provided a new employment destination for Turks after the closure of European labour markets and helped to keep workers' remittances, needed for balance of payment reasons, high.

Another important factor for the export boom in this period was the active role the government played in arranging bilateral trade deals with, and organizing trade missions to, especially, regional countries. Moreover, for increasingly political rather than economic reasons Turkey's major oil suppliers (Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia) became more willing to enter into barter deals, in which crude oil was exchanged for Turkish goods and construction works. The same sort of agreement was also eventually reached with the Soviet Union as well in 1985 in exchange for the latter's natural gas.

Although it is difficult to assess the precise effect each factor might have had on Turkey's performance, Rodrik, after complicated economic calculations, asserts that $1.9 billion worth (or 42% of total) exports between 1979 and 1984 was due to the Iran-Iraq war and other non-economic (political) changes after 1981. His calculations, rough as they are, highlight the critical roles played by three variables; together with the export subsidies and the active real exchange rate policy, the Iran-Iraq war and possibly the overall change in the domestic policy environment around 1981 emerges as one of the more important inputs in export boom and consequently in the Turkish economic recovery.

Once it is established that part of the explanation for this favourable export performance lies in the fact that Turkey increasingly exploited the market possibilities in
the Middle East and North Africa, it follows naturally that one of the main aims of
Turkish foreign policy during this period should surely be directed to the preservation
of those markets. Turkey's "active neutrality", as described by prime minister Ozal, in
the Iran-Iraq war derived, as much as security concerns, from the fact that both
countries counted among Turkey's largest trade partners and she was reluctant to do
anything which might have endangered this situation or curtailed favourable-priced
 crude oil supplies from either country. In this context, considering prime minister Ozal's
preoccupation with the economic side of politics and his belief in economic
development bring more political power and influence in the region, it is not surprising
to see that prime minister Ozal was more interested at times with possible trade deals
with, for example Iran, rather than Iranian efforts to export revolutionary religious
ideas to Turkey or the defiant attitudes of Iranian officials regarding the secular
character of the Turkish state. Essentially all other issues had been played down while
series of trade agreements and joint economic schemes being signed.

The poor growth performance of the OECD countries in the 1980s was
accompanied by increased protectionism, particularly severe in traditional (labour-
intensive) lines of production. Given the concentration of Turkish exports on these
lines, it was foregone conclusion that protectionist tendencies in industrial countries had
undoubtedly adverse impacts on Turkish export growth and caused at times frictions
between Turkey and other OECD countries. Although export growth to the OECD
countries averaged about 20% annually during the 1980s, calculations of Anand, et.al.,
suggest that exports could have grown even more rapidly if the macroeconomics
situation in Europe had been more favourable. 118

The extent of protectionism against Turkish exports was the repeated complaint
of Turkish exporters. The problem related primarily to the US and the EC countries.
Protectionism affected mainly Turkey's major export products, textile and agricultural
goods. Especially textiles were felt to be highly competitive in the world market thus an
important foreign currency earner for Turkey as well as employing a large proportion
of the industrial workforce. Nevertheless, it was subject to quotas which were usually
substantially lower than those imposed on the other developing countries of the Far East. As a late entrant to the Multi-Fibre Agreement, Turkey has argued that its textile exports have been discriminated against by the US, in favour of much larger export shares by countries in the Far East, and took her complaints in 1985 to the GATT, claiming that Turkish exports to the US were too small to justify American fears about the damage done to their domestic textile industry.

In this context, it is significant that the Turkish government after 1983 came to ask consistently from the US for "more trade not aid". Although it was clear that US aid, particularly military aid, had been crucially important for Turkey, prime minister Ozal signalled time and again that, for the long-term economic sustainability, he would rather see expansion of Turkey's trade with the US, and particularly a dramatic increase in her exports, than continued reliance on US economic aids.

The European Community also imposed quotas on Turkish textile products during this period, restricting the value of Turkey's textile and apparel exports to the Community to some $1.2 billion in 1985. An earlier attempt by the Community to restrict the entry of Turkish textile products had been met by a 15% Turkish counter levy on Community's steel. Nevertheless, an agreement was finally reached between the Community and the Turkish textile exporters on April 12, 1986 on import levels of 12 kinds of textiles from 1986 to 1988 whereby Turkish exporters accepted a "voluntary" restrictions on their products, Turkish government acting only as go-between as it refused officially to accept one-sided imposition of quotas on Turkish products. Consequently, Turkish textile exports to the Community was allowed to rise by 6% in 1987 and in 1988, after the growth in the region of 25% in 1986.

The response of Turkish exporters to these problems, under the government's leadership, was to put pressure on the EC and the US for larger quotas on the one hand, and on the other, to try to develop new markets in the Far East since Turkey's trade balance with most Far Eastern countries, primarily Japan, has been in deficit. The authorities, as well as encouraging exports to these countries to improve the trade position, had in the past proposed offset financing, whereby foreign companies would
agree to arrange offset deals for Turkish exports as part of their payment for a project to be carried out in Turkey. Such an arrangement was concluded with General Dynamics of the US which, from 1988, started to assemble 106 F-16 fighters in a new factory in Ankara. Along similar lines, Turkey also secured a commitment from the Soviet Union to buy a certain amount of Turkish exports as payment for 65-70% of Turkish consumption of Soviet natural gas following the opening of the gas pipeline in 1987.

4. Economic Cooperation For Development: Regional Alternatives

During the 1980s, Turkey, as a newly developing country situated uniquely between East and West, attempted to profit from its foreign connections, developing a strong export base and deregulating the domestic economy to encourage greater economic efficiency. As a result she has been able to make good use of her geographical positions despite the economic, political and social diversity of her neighbours. While the foreign ministry had to steer a careful course in foreign relations, which have not always been trouble-free, Turkey had successfully sustained economic links with its neighbours. She also attempted to strengthen her links with the outside world, both institutionally, for example as seen in the membership application to the EC, in the re-activation of the RCD agreement, or in the establishment of Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, and informally, for example in the active encouragement of foreign direct investment and joint-venture participation in major Turkish projects. As a result she was a major supplier to both Iran and Iraq during their 8-year long war, became a consumer of Soviet gas through a direct pipeline link and an important target for Soviet and Eastern European infrastructure investment, a potential European Community member and major trading partner of several EC states.

The current climate in Turkey contrasts sharply with that prevailing before 1980, when an inward-oriented development strategy cut economic links with the outside world to a minimum until substantial foreign borrowing became necessary in
the aftermath of the first oil crisis. However, economic relations, even if separated from political developments whenever possible, were not always trouble free and smooth running. In the following part of this chapter therefore, I will discuss Turkey's attempts to promote economic cooperation for development and the obstacles facing these attempts.

4.1. Turkey and the European Economic Community

In the context of Turkey's modernization efforts since the 19th century, aspirations of her political elite about the future of the country, and her long-standing trading pattern, application for full EC membership in April 1987 could only be considered as a logical outcome for her.

However Turkey's economic relations with the European countries, especially with EC members, have not been exactly eye to eye ever since the late-1970s, when Turkey was forced by adverse economic conditions to halt temporarily her responsibilities to the EEC. Since then political differences, as well as economic difficulties, have prevented both sides from reaching a satisfactory agreement, if not deepened diversity even more. One of the consequences of this uneasy relation was a decline in trading links. In 1975, 44% of total Turkish exports and 49% of imports were with the EEC, but by 1982 these figures were down to 30.5% and 28.2% respectively. Though they have since picked up, Turkey's relations with the EEC are still in a dividend and tentative state, culminating in the lack of direction after the Community's refusal in 1989 even to consider Turkey's full membership application for an unspecified period.

In Turkey's relations with the EEC, political disagreements seem to play as important a role as the economic factors, if not actually more. This was especially true for the first part of 1980s, during which human rights and democratization issues had shadowed all other factors and had economic consequences, too, as seen in the Commission's decision after the dissolution of all political parties in 1981 to freeze an
aid package, granted earlier to Turkey. However, since Turkey's relations with the EEC over human rights improved in connection with her democratization process, and also in keeping with this chapter's aims, I will concentrate here more on economic inputs of Turkish-EEC relations, the most important of which are related to the question of Turkish membership of the Community.

Originally, in the 1970 protocol, it was envisaged that Turkey would become a full member of the Community in 1995. European fears of the consequences of Turkish membership at that time related partly to the weakness of its industry and the economic burden this would impose on other members, but also to the danger of the market being flooded with cheap agricultural products. These problems are still relevant and are the source of continuing conflict. The dispute over Turkish cotton exports to the Community has been resolved for the time being, although not to the satisfaction of Turkish textile producers, but the other issues remain. When the additional protocol was signed there was an agreed timetable of Turkish commitments towards the Community. Beginning in 1973 over of period of 12-22 years Turkey was to abolish all tariff and other barriers with the EEC and harmonize its external tariffs. Because of the threat that these obligations posed for Turkey's developing industries the original timetable could not be met and Turkey declined from fulfilling requirements of the additional protocol. But there is another part of the additional Protocol, referring to the right of free movement of labour in 1986, which was particularly worrying for EEC countries as the dateline approached given the enormous level of unemployment in Europe. The heyday of Turkish labour migrate to West Germany and other destinations had long been over. Workers were now returning, as former host countries found that they no longer had sufficient employment even for their indigenous workforce.

Nowhere was this conflict more apparent than in West Germany. While Chancellor Helmut Kohl's coalition government was arguing on the one hand for the necessity to follow a "humane" policy towards foreigners, they, nevertheless, introduced financial incentives for those who want to return home, including and mainly Turks. It appeared that the German government finally came to a conclusion that it
was impossible to assimilate or even integrate the Turks. One answer would therefore be to abrogate the Treaty of Association between Turkey and the EEC, and thus end the threat of the free movement of labour in 1986. This was a delicate issue since workers' remittances still played a vital role in closing the gap in the Turkish trade balance. However this was actually what the EEC, following German instigation, did in 1986, which created big row between Turkey and the EEC, more so because the EC's action was seen in Turkey as illegal in terms of Additional Protocol. Moreover, it was not just a matter of delaying the 1986 deadline by a year or two. The Community was adamant that no target was politically acceptable at the time. Hence the EEC ministers merely told Turkey that they simply refused to comply with this provision of the additional protocol, and if one day the Community did need more migrant labour, then the Turks would be especially welcome. Most of the indignation felt in Turkey after the row seemed to derive from the Turkish perception, real or imaginary, that western Europe valued "the military contribution of Turkey within the NATO alliance but was unwilling to take on the economic burden that Community membership would bring."

The general consensus at the time in Turkey was that she had not greatly benefited from her association relations with the EEC, especially since mid-1970s. Clearly, the trade deficit with the EC was large in the period 1973-78, but even worse in the period 1980-1982. Turkey's exports to the EC had shown a moderate increase following 1982, but still the gap between exports to and imports from the EC was close to $400 million. Despite this favourable trend on the part of Turkey's exports to the EC, she had not received adequate concessions for exports of agricultural products as laid down in the additional protocol.

Moreover, despite various concessions the EC provided to Turkish industrial goods since the signing of the additional protocol, there was still, by the mid-1980s, a serious dissatisfaction in Turkey that the current transitional agreements with the EC had not produced greater benefits for Turkey as a prospective full member. First of all, trade concessions provided to Turkey as an associate member had subsequently
been given to other non-associate countries in the Mediterranean area, a move which diminished Turkey's preferential status.\textsuperscript{130} Furthermore, promising Turkish exports had concentrated in sectors such as cotton yarn and textile, where Turkey enjoyed considerable competitiveness, the effect of which was greatly felt by EC countries. The outcome was that exports to the European Community failed to record a satisfactory growth due to barriers imposed on Turkish products by the EC. For instance, in view of the fact that textile and clothing accounted for over 18\% of exports,\textsuperscript{131} the quota imposed constituted a considerable restriction for Turkey as an associate member. Moreover, recent studies show a sharp distinction in terms of commodity diversity between Turkish exports to EC, which consist primarily of labour-intensive goods not requiring a high level of skills, and exports to the Middle East, which consist of more capital intensive categories with higher skill content.\textsuperscript{132} Therefore the desirability of sustaining such a trade pattern with the EEC for Turkish industry, without benefiting from the advantages of full membership became questionable.

Further, it was often claimed that the additional protocol was not as balanced as both sides claimed at the time since Turkey agreed to abolish all of its tariff barriers within a given period, while EC concessions were not tied to a time table and especially concessions on agricultural products were restricted by fears of their impact on the Common Agricultural Policy. In fact, Turkey reduced its tariffs by 10\% in 1973 for the manufactured goods which were included in the list for twelve years and it reduced its tariffs by another 10\% in 1976. But the additional reduction of tariffs was not implemented owing to severe economic problems which by then came into existence in Turkey. The postponement of further tariff cuts was also prompted by the fear in Turkey that exports of agricultural products which constitute almost 58\% of total exports then would be set back because of restrictions imposed on them by the EC. It was a widely held view that other fairly competitive manufactured products might also be subjected to the same restrictions as textiles.

While, on the one hand, the question of Turkish workers within the EEC did not reach a satisfactory conclusion for Turkey and did not result in complete free
movement, as envisaged in the additional protocol, the "most favoured nation" status, given to the EEC by the protocol, on the other hand, restricted Turkey's economic relations with third countries as well.

Finally, it should be remembered while evaluating Turkish-EC relations, that Turkey has experienced structural changes in her economy since 1980. As a result of these changes most of Turkish tariff restrictions on imports were removed while others were greatly reduced, closing the gap between Turkish and EC tariffs. Moreover, most of the structural changes after 1980 were introduced with EC membership in mind, thus uniformity with the EC regulations in many areas was reached.

Under these conditions, it was felt in Turkey that Associate membership was not adequate any more in providing the expected economic benefits. Further, given the outward orientation of the economy since 1980 and the importance of the EC as a trading partner, full membership of the EC would have provided Turkey a position from which she could have a say in the decision-making of the various Community policies that had in the past profoundly influenced and affected her development route. Thus Turkey, despite discouragement from the member countries, applied for full membership in April 1987. The opinion of the Commission, released on December 18, 1989, however, was a negative one even in terms of low level Turkish expectations. Many political and economic obstacles in front of the Turkish membership were listed and no date was set for starting of partnership negotiations. The major economic problems of Turkey's application, in the view of the Community members, arose from the gap in wealth between her and the rest of Community members. Her GNP per capita was, only around $1200, well below even that of Greece, Spain and Portugal. If she became a member it would be a huge drain on the various Community funds, and her large and backward agricultural sector would spell disaster for the Common Agricultural Policy. Parts of the Community market, particularly textiles and clothing would be swamped by low-cost Turkish manufacturers.

Although a "cooperation packet" was proposed by the Community in June 1990 in an effort to prevent complete breakdown of relations, it was quite clear by now that
Turkey's full membership became a distant possibility. Furthermore, many important developments, most of which could not be even imagined few years earlier, have taken place in both European and world political conjunctures since 1989. While German unification was further pushing away any considerations for accepting new members, the Austrian application for full membership definitely put her in front of Turkey. Then came the break up of Communist block which led to positive reviews about the possibilities of eastern European membership to the Community before the end of the century. While the offers of a special association agreement in December 1991 to Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia before separation were causing anxiety in Turkey, the application of Cyprus for full membership in 1992 further blurred the Turkish membership question by restressing her political problems with Greece.

Another recent development, which could affect Turkey's position vis-a-vis EC was the creation of the European Economic Space between the EC and EFTA which would probably lead to reorientation of European trade and eventual Community membership of most of the EFTA countries. Although the full economic implications of this for Turkey are still speculative, it is significant that the EFTA countries have agreed to contribute to a compensation fund for the Mediterranean members. Non-member states, including Turkey, were excluded from this programme. In the meantime, Turkey concluded an agreement of her own with the EFTA on December 10, 1991, which included provisions concerning creation of a free-trade area and increase in economic cooperation between Turkey and the EFTA countries. The agreement paralleled Turkey's association agreement and the additional protocol with the EEC and stipulated that reductions on tariffs and other development in Turkish-EC relations will be reflected in the Turkish-EFTA connection as well.136

On the other hand, after the Maastricht agreement which stressed greater political and social integration in Europe as well as monetary and economic union, the very nature of the Community has been changing. While there has been major economic reorganization among member states, discussions on remodelling EC institutions to meet the new demands for membership and the changing international environment
were already taking place. As a result, both the nature and the rules of the membership are changing from the one that Turkey had applied to join.

The net result of all these changes was to push the question of Turkish membership, if there was left any chance for it, into yet even more distant future. Realisation of this has led Turkey to reassess her position vis-a-vis European Community and to consider other regional alternatives if possible in order prevent Turkey from the prospect of being left alone against increasing number of economic blocks. At the same time, however, Turkey, determined not to be discouraged by these developments, committed herself to completing a custom union with the EEC by 1996, thereby fulfilling one of the requirements of full economic integration which was initiated by the 1963 Ankara agreement. Complications which would arise from completing a custom union without having full access to the Community funds and markets are not yet known, even though a new protocol is already in preparation to replace the existing one to foresee the process of union. But it is significant that none of the existing member countries had undertaken such an obligation before reaching full member status. Moreover, in the cases of last three members, i.e. Greece, Spain and Portugal, requirement of full custom union, because of its heavy economic burdens, was deferred further even after those countries became full members of the Community. This goes a long way to show the political determination, which is quite distinctive from the economic capability, of Ankara governments not to be parted from Europe.

4.2. Regional Alternatives to the EEC

4.2.1. Islamic Cooperation Efforts Under The Auspices of The Islamic Conference

Although the Turkish governments, after 1980, increasingly emphasized their desire for greater links with the Europe, primarily through membership of the EEC, they also found it expedient to concentrate increasingly on Middle Eastern markets for various reasons. Initial, also perhaps the most important, reason for this was the inability of
Turkey to engage the Europeans fully in the effort to overcome her economic problems in the early 1980s after the military intervention and emergence of consequent problems between Turkey and the European states. The inability or unwillingness of the European countries to help Turkey's economic needs, in turn, created resentment and disenchantment within Turkey from Europe, thus a vicious circle was set in motion. Moreover, although Turkey had earlier become an associate member of the European Community, the successive Turkish governments found it increasingly difficult to gain the tariff privileges they believed they required for successful trade with Europe. So long as the question of full membership in the European Communities remained in contention, Turkey found it expedient to look more seriously to the Middle East for economic relations than it had in the past.

Furthermore, there were other sound economic reasons for Turkey to increase her links with the Middle East. Much of Turkish industry was still weak, uncompetitive and unable to make major inroads into depressed Western markets. The oil-producing countries of the Middle East, on the other hand, had money for capital investment and Turkish imports. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, most of Turkish exports to the Middle East concentrated on capital intensive goods, such as machinery, cars, buses and other durable goods, which would push Turkish industry to grow further in the technology intensive lines.

In this climate, the share of Middle Eastern countries in Turkish exports rose spectacularly in the early 1980s. For the first time in 1981 the Middle East and North Africa became the single most important market for Turkey's exports. Turkish building contractors and Turkish banks have been particularly successful in the Middle East. Moreover, in the late 1970s and early 1980s many Turkish workers found employment in the Middle East and Gulf states as Turkish contractors have increasingly won large amount of business particularly in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya.

While these developments were taking place on the bilateral level, Turkey also started to look for multilateral cooperation opportunities which might have provided her with both further economic gains and also increasing influence in the region. There
could not be a better venue for Turkey to concentrate her economic cooperation efforts than the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), since promoting economic cooperation among its members has been one of the major aims of the organization since its establishment, though it has been overshadowed by political matters, especially by the Palestinian question which the Arab members of the organization seemed to be preoccupied with.

Turkey's original aim in participating in the Conference, on the other hand, was to secure the political and economic support of the Arab countries. Since then, however, Turkey's interest in the economic side of the Organization grew faster, together with her recognition of Middle Eastern countries as a worthwhile economic asset, and after 1980, concomitantly with her export drive to the Middle East, her efforts to use Islamic organizations as a medium for economic gains gathered particular momentum. So much so that President Kenan Evren, during a summit meeting held in January 1984 in Casablanca, accepted his nomination as chairman for the newly established Islamic Conference Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC), which later held its first meeting in Istanbul in November 1984 with the participation of 35 Islamic States and some international organizations. It was decided during this meeting that the permanent headquarters of COMCEC should be established in Istanbul. The Istanbul meeting further adopted detailed resolutions for establishing a trade information network; strengthening and streamlining of trade promotion activities among the member states; providing financial measures for promotion of intra-trade; harmonizing standards; promoting preferential measures for regional trade; technical cooperation in trade; and supporting the marketing of Palestinian and Lebanese products.

In connection with the Islamic Conference, Turkey had also joined the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), though her initial intention was more political than economic. It was reported at one time that a Turkish finance minister said that "what we expect from the Bank is not financial aid, but we believe that we have a role in the Bank". This attitude, however, has changed and Turkey has been a major
beneficiary of IDB short and medium term trade financing loans. By 1985, Turkey wanted more active involvement into the Bank's management, thus requested to increase her share from 63 up to 166.4 million Islamic Dinar, thereby enabling herself to be represented permanently on the Board of Executive Directors.

Furthermore, on Turkey's initiative two other organizations to further economic cooperation among Islamic countries were established; the Islamic Centre for Statistic, Economic and Social Research and Training in Ankara, and Islamic Chambers of Trade and Commerce in Karachi. Two other OIC institutions have also been based in Turkey; Islamic Heritage Organization and the Agro-hydrological Research and Education Centre. Moreover, Turkey was able to persuade the third general meeting of the Islamic Chambers of Commerce in February 1982 to adopt a resolution accepting the principle that construction firms from Islamic countries would be given preferential treatment in the region against other firms from third countries. And again under a Turkish initiative, the Islamic Cement Union and the Islamic Agricultural Organization were thereby established. It is, needless to say, in both organization that Turkey, as a result of her position as biggest constructing and agricultural exporting country in the Middle East, stands to be the biggest beneficiary from the funds allocated to them.

These efforts initially paid back Turkey handsomely as she, with her bilateral and organizational relations, became one of the few countries in the region which realised an outstanding trade success in their commercial dealings with other Islamic countries. However, this favourable situation have undergone major changes since 1985, when the recession hit the Middle Eastern countries. Further declines in oil revenues after 1985 have meant a slow-down in new construction projects in the region which put an end to further jobs for Turkish labourers, and a decline of Turkish exports to the region by over 20% in 1986 alone. Since then Iran, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia became the most important markets to have suffered from the contraction due to falling oil prices. Earlier concentration of Turkish exports to these countries meant that Turkey, as a major supplier, has suffered the consequences of cutbacks in regional imports more severely than most other exporters. Also, the expense of Iran-Iraq war
eventually drained both countries of resources, so that even imports of essential foods were being reduced. Iraq, for example, accumulated huge payments arrears with Turkish suppliers, totalling some $1.2 billion in 1986. Arrears were also built up from Iran's side, and imports were cut back severely. Anxious to maintain trading links with both countries, and aware of the huge potential for reconstruction work and rehabilitation of consumption once the war is over, the Turkish authorities had agreed to maintain export financing and credits for Iraq, and the Turkish Central Bank established a $1 billion credit line for trade with Iraq. The outbreak of the Gulf war in the aftermath of the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, however, prevented Turkey from gaining advantageous contracts, and the declaration of UN embargo on Iraq further prolonged the reversal of this trend.

One of the biggest supporters of intra-Islamic trade in Turkey was the late president Turgut Ozal. After the second COMCEC meeting in Istanbul he announced that "our objective is to follow this up by serious negotiations leading to the abolition of tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting our mutual trade, which we hope will eventually lead to the establishment of an Islamic free-trade zone". However, this doesn't seem possible, at least at the moment. Although there is no doubt that there is still a big potentiality in Islamic countries to increase the volume of trade and economic cooperation among themselves, and that Turkey's active participation in Islamic Organizations has contributed substantially to her relations with Islamic countries both in the political and economic spheres, cooperation and trade potentiality of the region, as shown by the sharp decline of trade volume after 1985, are still largely volatile, and it is very unlikely that the organizational cooperation efforts with the Islamic countries would substitute the EC's place in the Turkish economy and trade in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Yalcintas draws attention to the "managed trade" character of the majority of Turkey's economic relations with other Islamic countries. In this context, it is appropriate to point out that Turkey's main aim in her organizational cooperation attempts among the Islamic countries seemed, as put by a former foreign minister, to provide "a constructive platform for our bilateral economic relations" with
other Islamic countries, rather than to create a multilateral arrangement whereby an Islamic Common Market, as opposed to European Common Market, would be established.  

4.2.2. Revival of The RCD as The ECO and Its Prospects

The RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development) was established in 1964 between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey to promote trade between member states and to encourage cultural and economic cooperation. The members initially agreed to establish, other than the usual organs, a tripartite Shipping Conference, common post, telegraph and telecommunication offices at different places in the region, to reduce air surcharges on letters and other mail to the domestic levels, and to set up industrial joint ventures. Later on April 21-22, 1976, the meeting of the heads of state of Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, observing that the RCD was successful in the cultural fields but not in economic sphere, drawn up a treaty to provide for; 1-) appropriate measures leading to the establishment of a free-trade area through gradual elimination of tariffs and a protocol on trade within ten years; and 2-) setting up of an RCD investment bank, initiating, promoting and financing projects of a regional character with participation by the private sector. Though the Treaty of Izmir, as it later came to known, thus drew up a blueprint for cooperation and development in the three member countries, political developments in the region prevented further development and the organization came to a standstill in 1979 after the Iranian revolution and Turkish withdrawal from it.

At the time of disengagement, the main organs in operation was the Ministerial Council, Council of Deputies, Regional Planning Council, the Secretariat, the RGD Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the RCD Cultural Institute, the RCD Insurance Centre, RCD Shipping Services, and 7 RCD committees dealing with industry and petroleum, trade, transport and communications, technical cooperation and public administration, cultural affairs, tourism and information, and agriculture.
After nearly six years at a standstill, at a meeting in Tehran on January 27-29, 1985, the representatives of the governments of Pakistan, Turkey and Iran decided to replace the RCD with the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization). They reaffirmed their desire to work together to promote cooperation in various fields like the economy, industry, agriculture, science, education and culture for the well-being and prosperity of their peoples.

For the time being, the ECO's status seems even lower than that of its predecessor and its scope is limited as its technical committees have been reduced from seven to four. These committees are responsible for technical and industrial cooperation, economic cooperation and infrastructure, agricultural cooperation, and cooperation in education and scientific research. Moreover, the High Council, which previously met at ministerial level, would now be composed of deputy foreign ministers or representatives of equivalent rank from the three countries, and this would be the highest policy making body of the ECO.

Significantly however, the participants declared their adherence to the treaty of Izmir, which had originally envisaged the establishment of a free-trade area between member countries. This points to the preference of a political will in the region to restore at least the earlier cooperation, though the three countries seemed more cautious about each other's intentions.

Although the possibilities of economic cooperation among members are diverse and promise advantageous results, its success in operation will inevitably depend on the continuation of the political will for cooperation, which has seemed lacking in recent years. Further, the scaling down of the organization's status compared to RCD is likely to affect the capability of the organization to function at a level necessary for increased cooperation between the three countries. Moreover, in the past the RCD could not achieve priority status in the eyes of either Iranian or Turkish officials as far as economic interests and cooperation were concerned. Because of its oil-based bargaining power, Iran in the past had its own agreements of economic cooperation both with the EEC, the US and other developed countries. Significantly enough, Iran's
fifth development plan, 1973-78, had made no mention of the RCD. Turkey, on the other hand, had her other commitments mainly to the EEC. Her interest in the RCD was mainly derived from her wish to create a complementary economic organization to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which also came to halt after 1979.

Furthermore, the initial desire and enthusiasm of Iran to persuade Turkey and Pakistan to revive RCD seemed to derive from wrong reasons, that is other than economic ones. It was Iran's intention to reduce its isolation in the Islamic world, resulting from its war with Iraq, that prompted its efforts. However, neither Turkey nor Pakistan seemed to share same enthusiasm, mainly because of their desire not to endanger their valuable trading relations with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, which were looking at Iranian efforts at least with apprehension. This was reflected in a meeting held in mid-1983 in Tehran where the possibility of reviving RCD was discussed for the first time. In the meeting Iran was represented by a deputy minister while Turkey and Pakistan only sent ambassadors.

Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent admittance of five Central Asian Republics into the ECO on February 16, 1992 did incite fresh hopes for the ECO, the Turkish-Iranian rivalry, which had emerged in the region as the both countries attempted to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, signalled future difficulties in trying to establish workable relations within the ECO. Moreover, Iran, with an obvious effort to exclude Turkey, created the Caspian Council - between Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia - whose aims and areas of interest overlap with those of ECO, a fact that promoted President Ozal, while playing down the rivalry, to call the caspian Council "one organization too many". At the same time, Turkey's attempts to establish a Turkic Common Market, if successful, would be as damaging to the ECO.

Also, the tariff and non-tariff barriers continue to impede regional trade despite the announcement of will for creation of a free-trade area. If this aim can be realized in the future, and if especially Turkey and Iran can work out a way to cooperate instead of compete in the region for influence, then this would accelerate the socio-economic
cooperation in the region, however, it is obvious at the moment that this cooperation, especially for Turkey, could not replace but only complement her relations with the EEC.

4.2.3. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR), formed in 1992, was one of Turkey's responses to the momentous changes that had taken place around her, and also to the EC's "rejection" of her application for full membership. After the rejection, Turkey seemed to be left out from all the major economic groupings of the world, and from certainly the one that she inspired to join. Moreover, the Middle Eastern markets, which flourished suddenly in the early 1980s, were already diminished as a result of declining oil revenues and increasing competition in the region after the end of Iran-Iraq war.

Under the circumstances, and also given the fact that the Soviets were willing to cooperate more than ever, it seemed natural option for Turkish businessmen to look for new markets throughout eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Economic relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union had already developed on considerable grounds, especially after the signing of an economic cooperation agreement on December 27, 1984.155

Although economic considerations played an important part, and were frequently cited by the governments, the main incentive behind the initiative to set up a economic cooperation scheme in the region seems to derive from Turkish fears about being left behind or out in the process of widespread regionalization of the world economy;

...the region rather than the nation state has gradually become focal point of international attention. Indeed a wide range of integrated regional groupings have been established all over the world. ...Many countries are also considering strengthening some of the existing arrangements or forming new integration groupings. ...The functioning of regional and sub-regional integration arrangements will certainly contribute to the economic welfare of the member countries...(However) these groupings may substitute trade of goods and
services among partners for trade with non-participating states, even if a third country is the more efficient producer.\textsuperscript{156}

Fear of being overwhelmed by the changes taking place around her was also evident. Thus, it was accordingly proclaimed that the "recent great changes throughout the world, globalization of economy and polarization in parallel with these developments are the basic reasons for forming a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region".\textsuperscript{157}

Also, the political necessity of doing something to alleviate EC's rejection played a part. Moreover, Turkey, it seemed, was trying to get back into a some sort of European cooperation in a very indirect way. This was evident, for example, in the first preparatory meeting held in Ankara in December 1990, during which the Turkish delegation stressed their wishes to see the cooperation scheme as an integral part of the process of a European Economic Space, covering the whole continent.\textsuperscript{158} Also it was expressed elsewhere that Turkey, among others, was guided in her attempt to launch the scheme by the "wish to form an integral part of the future European architecture".\textsuperscript{159} Moreover, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has created an economic and military vacuum in the Black Sea and Central Asia regions, which cannot be filled by Russia alone. A number of countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia and China, have been trying to establish their influence among the newly independent states. Turkey has been, from the beginning, at the forefront of these efforts to create networks of friendly relationships in these regions and especially has been trying to establish herself as role-model as well as economic partner in relation to the Turkic republics. Black Sea Economic Cooperation was seen as an appropriate medium to connect all these networks, as well as being suitable forum for Turkey to assert her influence, both economic and political, in these regions.

Economic considerations, such as "the importance of securing the further development and diversification of our economic relations by making efficient use of the advantages arising from geographical proximity and the complementary nature of our economies", were of course also instrumental in bringing the scheme about.\textsuperscript{160}
A retired Turkish ambassador was the first to suggest the idea of a "Black Sea Cooperation and Prosperity Region". The Turkish press immediately welcomed the idea and the government also seemed receptive towards such a move. But it was president Turgut Ozal who gave unequivocal political backing to the idea and enthusiastically supported it. The initial responses of other would-be member were also positive and the first preparatory meeting took place towards the end of same year in Ankara with participation of representatives from Turkey, Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania.

After the meeting, common will for the establishment of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region was announced, and it was agreed that a step by step approach should be adopted and membership should be open to the participation of all states which commit themselves to observing the founding principles and which are unanimously considered eligible. Moreover, it was also noted during the meeting that the scheme was another example of regional cooperation envisaged in the context of CSCE and that the new organization would establish the guide-lines in the light of Paris Charter to provide and facilitate cooperation and joint ventures among private and public sector organizations. And after the meeting president Ozal, noting that the effort to establish BSECR was taking place at a time when international structures were being changed, stressed that the project, through promoting economic cooperation among the parties, would serve to regional peace as well. Although a desire for an eventual liberalization of the free movement of labour, goods, services and capital was also expressed by the four states, it seemed that they were not willing to establish a supranational body to oversee such cooperation. The meeting further entrusted to Turkey preparation of draft documents to be signed for both main scheme and for the proposed Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank, an action which gave her a chance to emphasise her priorities and objectives in the draft agreements. At this time, the anxiety of being a ringleader and inspiration of a multilateral organization for the first time was overwhelmingly present both in the government circles and in the Turkish press which generally described it as a "historic move".
After various contacts, mainly carried out by Turkey, and further preparatory meetings held in Bucharest, Sofia, Moscow and Istanbul, it became clear that the idea was gathering momentum and interest was expressed by even some countries which did not border the Black Sea. There were suggestions to integrate other sub-regional groupings, such as projected Danube River and Caspian Sea schemes, into the BSEC. However political and often armed conflict between would-be members was a major concern. A civil war was going on in Georgia, there was an armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, both of which showed interest and were accepted by the original participants. Elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe ethnic and cultural divisions were leading to increased tension and instability within the region. The war among the former Yugoslavian republics has been of particular interest to the participants not only because it was initially accepted that Yugoslavia, alongside Greece, was to be invited as founding state, but also because a number of members have an interest in the conflict.

By this time nine countries (Turkey, Bulgaria, Moldova, Rumania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) were actively participating in the process of consultations and interest was expressed by the governments of Hungary, Albania and, to a lesser extent, the Czech and Slovak Republics. Further, Greece, although its press initially ridiculed the idea as "the Turk's hallucination of a Black Sea community a' la EC", also responded positively to the invitation.

Despite the evident willingness on the part of the participant countries, the idea still seemed, to say the least, a little bit too ambitious to be realized. Apart from the obvious difficulties to getting warring states together to talk economic cooperation and hope that political animosity would not destroy it, the fact that all the participants were in the process of development further complicated the evolution of the project. What all the states needed at the time was a helping hand in terms of the economy and foreign aid which none of them was able to offer to the others. Nevertheless the interested parties went ahead with their plan and signed the agreement to establish a Black Sea Economic cooperation Organization on June 25, 1992 in Istanbul.
Since the initiative was proposed by Turkey, she also offered to provide the funds for the establishment of a coordinating unit in Istanbul as well as 40% of its annual operating costs. Although the idea of having a permanent central unit in Istanbul, which would reassert Turkey's influence in the organization, was opposed initially by Greece, the problem was solved after changing the name of the unit from "General Secretariat" to "General Coordination Centre". During the process, other participants also seemed to prefer a less powerful body that a general secretariat. This of course further proves their preference for an international organization based on voluntary participation rather than a supranational one with an imposing body.

After the establishment, further preliminary plans were prepared by Turkey for concrete projects, which were based on the private sector and the state contributions limited to legal adjustments to assist business. Decisions had been taken to establish a joint Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank, and a data bank to coordinate the activities of the statistics agencies of the countries involved. Also, further meetings between mayors of the Black Sea capitals were organized by the mayor of Ankara to discuss municipal problems.

Although Turkey, above all, sought to achieve concrete cooperation, most of the initial declarations of the BSECR were decidedly vague and referred to general partnership as a contribution to the Helsinki process and to broad conditions to ensure capital flow, investment and industrial ventures. This largely non-committal attitude by the participatory states derived mainly from the uncertainties in the region and from the indecisiveness of the individual states about the way they wish to shape their future development and about the prospective role the BSECR could play in that future. It should not be forgotten that most of the members of the organization emerged as independent states after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and they are still reluctant to enter any sort of organization or cooperation which even remotely implies a transfer of their sovereign rights of decision making for their countries' future.

Turkey, on the other hand, tried to use the BSECR declarations to put her ties with the former Soviet republics on a multilateral basis. The willingness to tackle some
of the political problems of the region, created in the aftermath of Soviet and Yugoslav disintegrations, through cooperation was also apparent in the Turkish stand. Although during the process she was accused, mainly by the Greek press, of trying to establish a politically pan-Turkic organization, the overwhelming presence of non-Turkic republics among the signatories supports Turkish assurances that her ties to the Caucasus and Central Asian Republics are neither discriminatory nor pan-Turkic.

The countries of the Black Sea region, enjoying a geographical proximity, have a large potential to enhance mutually advantageous economic cooperation. Economic progress is the main concern for all the Black Sea countries at the moment. They share convergent interests, based on their complementary economies and extended bilateral relations. The implementation of intended multilateral projects in the region is likely to advance individual states to meet the common need for development by multiplying a general potential and by more rational utilization of resources available to all.

The BSECR scheme also has its political dimensions. The strengthening of economic cooperation in the region may also generate a political will among its members to stabilize the region politically and militarily. This of course, in turn stands as a direct contribution to the peace and development of the whole European continent.

Although the idea of BSECR seemed to attract enough interest from many states, and its subsequent establishment within such a short time showed willingness of the participants to cooperate on a regional basis, its future depends first and foremost on finding workable solutions to the region's political differences and armed conflicts, and then on the economic ability of its members to realize their aims. Whatever the outcome of this attempt would be in the longer term, it is quite certain the BSECR would, or indeed could, not be either a rival or a substitute to the EEC in the foreseeable future. Its members attitude so far tend to confirm this observation. On the other hand, given that the prospects for Turkey's entry into the European Union in the near future are slim, a major shift to the east could be expected to compensate for sentimental dissapointments in the West. However, it is unlikely that Turkey's "eastern relations" would provide her as much economic, political and military benefits as her
European connection provides. Thus realization of this fact has been reflected in
Turkish rejections of the idea that the formation of the BSEC was designed to be a
Turkish-led alternative to the EC. Rather, it was portrayed, as mentioned earlier, as a
sub-system of a wider global system: a Europe-wide union.170

5. Concluding Remarks: The Political Economy of Turkish Foreign Policy And
The Internationalization of The National Economy

As mentioned earlier, Turkey was frequently cited during the 1980s among the
international economic community as an example of structural adjustment through
economic liberalization. Undeniably, the economic policies applied in Turkey during
this period were more liberal than any since the establishment of the Republic. And this
was often mentioned as *sine quo non* for Turkish success whatever it was. But from
our perspective, Turkey's success in coping with the debt crisis and increasing her
exports to unprecedented levels must be considered with reference to factors relating to
the international political environment rather than the economy alone. Since some of
our findings throughout this chapter have already pointed to the existence of such
factors, all that is necessary now is to put them into the wider context of Turkey's
foreign policy and show the relationship between the domestic development of the
economy and the country's external relations and changes in its international
surroundings.

The importance of the Iran-Iraq war in the initial surge of Turkish exports and
the favourable attitudes of OECD countries regarding Turkish debt problem behind her
economic come-back have been mentioned several times in this chapter. It is now time
to attempt to paint a broader picture of interdependence of economic and political
factors in shaping Turkey's external relations.171

It is generally acknowledged that autonomous factors, i.e. those factors
independent of economic performance, have been instrumental in Turkish economic
development in general. It is common knowledge, for example, that the inclusion of
Turkey in the Marshall Aid programme was a political choice by the USA. The same is also true for massive, economic, military or technological aid, that the US provided Turkey during the 1950s. Further, politico-strategic considerations were also instrumental in allowing Turkey to became a member or associate member of such western organizations as the EECD, OECD or the EEC.

Turkey also benefited from the growing labour demands of the European economies in the late 1960s and early 1970s by providing foreign labour. This increasing number of Turkish" guest workers" in Europe, mainly in W. Germany, helped the Turkish economy in terms of both reducing unemployment in the country and alleviating balance of payments deficits through huge inflows of workers' remittances. However, when the successive oil price shocks forced the industrialized world into stagnation and then recession, the number of unemployed started to rise fast in European countries thereby reducing the need for foreign labour. The closure of the European door for migrant workers meant, on the one hand, that Turkey would not be able to defuse her rising unemployment number simply by damping her excess labour to Europe, and, on the other hand, signalled coming problems on the balance of payments front by ending substantial foreign currency inflows via Turkish workers abroad, which forced the successive governments to look increasingly for short-term debt that ended up in subsequent debt crisis.

Moreover, the impact of the Cyprus crisis and subsequent problems in the Aegean with Greece were heavily felt by the Turkish economy. Military involvement in Cyprus after 1974 not only deprived Turkey of much needed American military aid, but also created an unreceptive, if not hostile, international, especially European, environment for Turkish problems, including economic ones. Gradual re-acceptance of a democratic Greece into the European system, which culminated in its integration into the EC, meant increasing pressures on Turkey as a result of Greece's insistence on internationalization of bilateral problems between two countries and the responsiveness of international community towards that kind of manipulation in the face of what were perceived as aggressive moves by Turkey in the Aegean. Further, the increasing tension
in the Aegean created an armaments race between two NATO members during the 1970s in an, to say the least, economically undesirable period. As a result, Turkey's defence spending was increased while foreign military aid was diminishing due to US arms embargo. Thus, the strains of armament had to be faced increasingly by the national economy.

Still in the 1970s the detente process, while forcing states in both camps to reconsider their situation vis-a-vis the international environment, reduced the importance of hitherto strategically located countries like Turkey in connection with the thaw in superpower rivalry. The direct result of this diminishing role for Turkey in the strategic thinking of the superpowers was amply illustrated in decreases in American aid to Turkey in the 1970s. Further, detente also allowed the emergence of hitherto suppressed regional problems into the limelight. Accordingly Turkish-Greek tension, suppressed during the 1950s and 1960s under the pressure of Block politics, emerged strongly in the 1970s and heightenened the possibility of armed conflict between two NATO allies, thus further aggravated international pressure on Turkey. During this period Turkey's allies, mainly the US, tried to use economic tools, such as reducing aid or increasing its political conditionality, in order to achieve political settlements either in Cyprus or in the Aegean.

As a result of the above mentioned factors, during the 1970s, while the Turkish economy was deteriorating, foreign inflows into the country, either as official aid or commercial debt, progressively dried up. As Aricanli puts it, "official sources of long term debt could not have been tapped within the context of multilateral international sanctions". Therefore Turkey, without its earlier strategic advantage and thus ability to seek bilateral favours for its economic development, had to resort short-term commercial debts. This process which led Turkey into the debt crisis of the late 1970s indeed "seems much different within this broader political context".

The deterioration of Turkey's domestic politics throughout the 1970s was also instrumental, particularly in the reluctance of both direct foreign investments and commercial bank lending to the country, because of the fact that political stability...
heavily weighs in the minds of potential investors, and can also affect the country's credit-worthiness.

Starting from the second half of 1979 however, the international environment radically changed. The first piece in the domino to fall was the Iranian revolution, which kicked off many following developments in the region that eventually redefined Turkey's strategic importance to the West. Many developments between 1979 and 1981, such as the Iranian revolution, the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces which started the second cold war, the election of a socialist government in Greece in 1981, and presidency of Ronald Reagan helped greatly to enhance Turkey's place within the western alliance system, thus resulting in increases in economic aid following the resumption of American military aid at a heightened level. 174

During the 1973-80 period domestic political formation and considerations, in addition to external developments, had consequences on economic development. This period was dominated by ineffective and unstable coalition governments which were committed to high rates of growth and employment under political considerations. The political situation of the country in the late 1970s was described earlier. It is sufficient to say here that any government that attempted to apply an austerity programme during that period would have been digging its own grave. As a result, all the coalition governments during this period, numbering thirteen, despite their ideological differences, had favoured the same economic policies for the same political reasons. Whatever they put in their economic agenda, all the coalition governments of the period ended up doing the same thing; favouring maintenance of high economic growth through big public expenditure in order to maintain their political bases by creating economic favours and employment for their sympathizers. Consequently, patronage and political favour replaced economic rationality that ended the last hopes for economic recovery.

The period 1973-80 was also witness to an intense political and ideological struggle between different political factions to capture the imagination of newly
urbanized, but not necessarily modernized, masses, which at the end led to political violence and the spread of armed struggles out on the streets. Whatever the casual relationship, "there was a close correlation between the intensity of unrest and worsening economic conditions".  

In turn, Turkey's decision to move toward liberalization in the early 1980s was, as shown earlier, motivated by political considerations as much as economic factors. Whatever was the economic necessity to embark on such a course, it also signalled the government's determination to be part of political Europe and its willingness to accommodate political consequences of such a programme both in Turkey and Europe. As stated earlier, one of the factors behind deterioration of Turkish economy during the late 1970s was the unwillingness of the governments to face the political consequences of comprehensive austerity measures. Thus, they opted for ad hoc measures instead of structural adjustment. The Demirel government of 1980, on the other hand, was forced by a combination of economic and political factors, originating both inside and outside Turkey, one of the most important of which was the pressure from the international organizations like the IMF and the Bank and from her allies in Europe and America, to embark on a hitherto avoided structural adjustment programme with a strong austerity package and to face up to its political consequences. As it happened, it was not the same government which initiated the programme, but the military government which enforced its entirely and saw it through. This in turn prevented most of the predicted social and political consequences of the programme which would have inflicted destruction on both the programme and the political system.

It is clear that what made it possible for Turkey to get out of her debt crisis was the huge capital inflows of the early 1980s, which were more or less free from economic performance, at least in the initial phase. This fact led Kiray to assert that the flow of loans into Turkey in the early 1980s "seem to do both with US foreign policy in the region and the need to find an exemplary debtor". Further, the importance of US political readiness to rescue Turkey from economic chaos was also captured by Taylor who argues that "commercial bank capital is not going to flow into Turkey
unless there is a signal from Bretton Woods. The Fund and Bank in turn, will favour or
disfavour Turkey in light of political situation since the US State and Treasury
Departments ultimately call the shots".178

Moreover, the reinforced strategic importance of Turkey was the main reason
behind the US readiness to help Turkey even after the military coup d’etat in 1980,
which eventually led to an increased level of intimacy in Turkish-American political
relations that could be compared only with those of the 1950s. Turkish-European
relations, however, deteriorated during the early 1980s not only because of the political
unacceptability of the military regime to the western Europeans, though this played a
major role, too, but also growing economic difficulties between Turkey and the EC
countries. On the other hand political, more than economic, factors heavily affected the
EC’s decision in the late 1980s to halt the Turkish quest for membership for an
indefinite period. Further political considerations, in addition to economic conditions, in
the early 1980s caused restrictions for Turkish goods in markets, which initially forced
Turkey to look for other market possibilities. Moreover, increased openness in trade
and investment has exposed her to greater tensions in external economic relations, for
the period corresponded with depressed world markets and restrictive measures in
developed countries.

In this connection, the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war was a mixed blessing for
Turkey since it, despite security concerns, allowed Turkey to establish a growing
market in the region and was the main incentive for a Turkish exporting drive that was
repeatedly pronounced as the strong force behind the Turkish economic recovery.

However, the political volatility of the region was also reflected in its economic
fluctuations. First the decline and then the crash of oil prices from 1985 onwards,
directly affected Turkey's export markets on the one hand, while helping her balance of
payments by reducing oil bill on the other. Although it was hoped that the end of Iran-
Iraq war would generate huge construction business in the region for Turkish firms, the
crash in oil prices first and subsequently the crisis and later war between Iraq and the
Allies, which included Turkey from the beginning, did not allow this to take place. In
between Iraqi attacks on Kurds soon after its cease-fire agreement with Iran caused widespread refugee movements into Turkey which put strains on the economy and led to a dilemma in Turkey between the moral and economic sides of the situation.

The same strains were also evident in the handling of Turkish refugees from Bulgaria. To open the border in Summer 1989 for refugees who were fleeing from persecution in Bulgaria was a political decision. However, the economic realisation that Turkey could not cope with such an immediate surge of refugees heavily prompted the decision to close the border after three months, and prime minister Ozal had to turn back from his vow that Turkey's doors would always be open to accept all of them if necessary. However some 300,000 seemed just about enough in mid-August 1989 as finding homes and jobs for the refugees had proved very difficult at a time when the Turkish economy was heading again towards trouble.

Again in the second half of the 1980s, the combined result of normalization of US-USSR relations, following the end of the cold war and the Iran-Iraq war was the diminishing importance of Turkey as strategic ally, which once again was reflected in the advantageous foreign aid that Turkey was receiving as a result of this developments. Consequently, official flows to Turkey from 1985 onwards stopped with the exception of much reduced levels of bilateral aid. Moreover, the end of the Iran-Iraq war also created much more competition in exports to the Middle East and as a result of Turkey's declining share in the Middle Eastern market Turkey, aided by the normalization of her political relations with the EEC countries, had to revert back to her traditional export markets in Europe, and also had to look increasingly to other market possibilities, namely eastern Europe and the USSR.

The end of cold war and the following break up of the Soviet Union, while diminishing Turkey's global strategic importance, opened new economic opportunities to Turkey in both the former Soviet republics and Russia itself because of economic reforms in the latter. Further, the cultural affinity of the Central Asian republics towards Turkey is also a factor worth considering for future Turkish economic attempts in the region.
Moreover, if it was the end of the cold war which signalled the end of Turkey's strategic importance, it was again the end of the cold war which sowed further seeds for subsequent crises virtually all around Turkey, and thus heightened Turkey's position and role in international politics once again. Although it is still too early to comment on possible economic outcomes for Turkey of the current crises in the Balkan and in the Caucasus, it is clear by now that, despite her increased international role as a potential regional power, adverse developments in these regions could have important economic and political repercussions for the country. An important example, which has had adverse effects on the Turkish economy, was the Gulf War and the subsequent UN embargo on Iraq. Primarily as a result of the Gulf crisis the growth rate sharply declined to 0.3% in 1991; exports to Iraq, Turkey's second largest market, were disrupted; the bill for higher oil prices exceeded $900 million; more than a billion dollars was lost from oil pipeline revenue; Iraq ceased to service substantial credits that had been advanced by Turkey; and tourism, which had generated $3.3 billion in 1990, was severely disrupted.

Although the impact of the January 24 programme on Turkish foreign policy is less well documented and agreed than its economic results, nevertheless, it seems that external shocks and some political considerations have guided, if not determined, the Turkish economy in its general course to development since at least 1950. This was especially evident in the "rescue operation" set into motion by the West in the 1980s. The initial reason for Western commitment to Turkish economic recovery was the common belief in the necessity of saving Turkey's political regime from following in Iran's footsteps. Since the Western, and especially the US, interpretation of Turkey's importance after the Iranian "loss" was illuminated earlier in chapter III, I will be content here with two quotations from US government representatives linking economic aid to Turkey to the developments in the region:

What is needed now if Turkey is to remain a viable ally of the Western world is an international rescue operation whose scope has not been equalled since 1945. How much would it take? By all accounts, perhaps $10 billion to $15 billion over a five-year period, mostly in loans and credits...And what is to be gained?
Well, our overall losses in the Iranian debacle are sure to run many times the amount Turkey now needs... We cannot effort to temporize until Turkey, like so many of our erstwhile allies, lies prostrate and dismembered.  

US Assistant Secretary of State Warren Christopher further elaborated the necessity of "saving" Turkey in the Congress by linking it with dire consequences which went beyond the Iranian "loss".

This turbulence - in Iran, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere - affects fundamental US economic and security interests... the importance of a stable, democratic and pro-Western Turkey has never been clearer.  

The enthusiasm in the West to save the Turkish regime was so evident that it led Aricanli to comment in retrospect that the late 1970s and early 1980 was "the best time" for Turkey "to have a major economic crisis without a practical solution", since the West was going to have to back up her, under the strategic considerations, whatever the economic costs or the arguable benefits of such a move. The natural outcome of this enthusiasm was reflected, as shown earlier, in the official capital inflows into the country. Out of $11 billion long term capital inflows to Turkey between 1980 and 1985, $9 billion was coming from official sources. This shows us the dependency of Turkish success in the early 1980s on her strategic connections in the Middle East and the security interests of her NATO allies. Although this interest internationalized Turkey's economic problems, concomitantly with its political developments, it also greatly facilitated her to put herself on a stable economic track which in turn helped Turkey to establish herself as an important part of Middle Eastern politics and subsequently to play a much more vital role in the developments taking place in her close environment.

If one looks at the long-term, Turkey's economic strengths seem heavily to outweigh its weaknesses. The most basic but least tangible reason for confidence is that the mentality of the government and the business community is completely different from what it was ten years ago. The economic and psychological barriers that used to exist between Turkey and the rest of the world have been broken. This, on the other hand, increased the economic vulnerability of Turkish society to international shocks, as
the mostly rural community has been transferred hastily into the money economy and the national market became increasingly interactive with world markets. While the new spirit of enterprise and the outward-looking export-oriented economy have improved the balance of payments, during the process, however, Turkey's national economy became heavily connected with, and at times depended on, international economic developments and on other states' willingness to buy Turkish products, to lend money to Turkey or to invest in Turkey. This in turn allowed international economic opinion and foreign governments to become an important part in developments, economic or otherwise, within Turkey. As a result, Turkey and its foreign policy became more vulnerable towards the country's economic necessities while the foreign ministry came to be more prone to the opinions and requests of both international organizations, like the IMF or the Bank, and individual states. Further, the level of economic relations with these organizations and states came to, at times, determine the quality of political relations.

As a result of the seemingly broad agreement within the country on the economic strategy that Turkey should follow, the future of her economic development seems now to be dependent more on global events, above all on the European economy on which there is so much dependence. The effects of this will undoubtedly reflect and be seen in the future on the country's foreign policy and external relations.
NOTES


2. Lindblom, C. E., Politics and Markets; The World's Political-Economic Systems (USA: Basic Books, 1977), p. ix, asserts that, apart from the difference between despotic and libertarian governments, the biggest distinction between governments is to be found in their positions vis-a-vis market, in other words "in the degree to which market replaces government or government replaces market".


5. Okyar, op. cit.

6. Ferenc Vali argues that the need to rely on and ask for financial help was humiliating for many proud Turks and had become one of the sources of anti-Americanism in the 1960s. See his Bridge Across the Bosporus (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 145-146.


9. The argument that consequences of EC membership for the Turkish economy with "its underdeveloped and crisis-ridden position in the world economy...would certainly be grave" was raised, for example, in Berberoglu, op. cit., p. 283.

10. For further assessment of the connection between economic development, liberalization and democratization see Francis Fukuyama's controversial book The End of History and the Last Man (London, New York: Penguin Books, 1992), especially introduction and parts 1, 9, 10 and 19. He asserts in p. xv that although "there is no economically necessary reason why advanced industrialization should produce political liberty", it is a fact that the "world's most developed countries (which consists of mostly free-market economies) are also its most successful democracies". The relation between democracy and market systems was also elaborated further in Lindblom, op. cit., pp. 3-13 & 161-222.

11. From the beginning, the military government had made it clear that the economic and political measures which they set to undertake were dependent each other.
Political consequences of the economic measures taken by the military government and continued adherence of the Ozal governments to those restrictions were discussed in Ramazanoglu, H., "The State, The Military and The Development of Capitalism in an Open Economy" in Ramazanoglu, H., (ed.), Turkey in the World Capitalist System: A Study of Industrialization, Power and Class (Aldershot: Gower, 1985), pp. 235-240, who argues that the January 24, 1980 measures "...could not successfully be implemented without corresponding political changes. Turkish democracy failed when it was unable to provide an appropriate political framework within which economic changes could be realised and the military regime...did have the power to instigate the necessary political changes...but only at the cost of the democratic system."


13. These phrases, for example, were coined by Vali in order to describe the basic difference of opinion among the Turkish political elite during the 1960s. See, op. cit., p. 346.


15. For example, ex-president Kenan Evren is for one in Turkish high level who believes that especially European Community countries sometimes raise the political complexities in order to avoid complying with their economic undertakings vis-a-vis Turkey or to escape from upsetting Turkey by saying outright "no" to her demands such as application for full membership or free movement of Turkish workers in EC. Personal interview on March 2, 1993 in Marmaris, Turkey.

16. Turkey's exports to the EC in 1982 was 30.6% of her total exports, while the Middle East and North Africa constituted about 45% of total exports. At the same time Iraq replaced W. Germany in 1982 as main trading partner with $2.028 million trade volume with Turkey as opposed to $1.803 million for W. Germany. See OECD Economic Survey: Turkey, April 1983, p. 28 and Turkiye Is Bankasi AS, Economic Indicators of Turkey, 1980-1984 (Ankara: Is-Bank Plc. Economic Research Department, 1985), p. 9.

17. This opinion was formed from the interviews conducted in the Turkish foreign ministry during the period of February - April 1993, and several other informal conversations with various foreign ministry officials on different occasions during the past six years.


21. Both Hewin, S. & O'Brien, R. et al., Turkey's International Role (London: Euromoney Publications, 1988), p. 11 and Business International, p. 19 gave same advice to foreign companies intending to do business in Turkey that they should be aware of the influence of "autarkic, nationalistic and implicitly etatist" economic philosophy of the past even though Turkey has undergone immense change of economic philosophy since late 1970s.


29. Balassa, op. cit., p. 438; The Middle East, August 1978, "Turkey Nears the End of Its Tether", pp. 70-71; Keesing's, November 9, 1979, p. 29921.

30. Keesing's, November 9, 1979, pp. 29921-29922.

31. Quoted in Berberoglu, op. cit., p. 283 from Turkey Today, No. 44, March 1979

32. Kazgan, op. cit., pp. 339-43. Mr Ozal, then undersecretary to premier Demirel described the situation in retrospect as "economic anarchy". He said in an interview that he had advised prime minister Demirel that even the proposed IMF measures were not sufficient and much harder measures should be taken. See Euromoney, February 1982, "Supplement - Turkey; Will The Experiment With Capitalism Work?", p. 7.

34 Ayres/Thompson, ibid., p. 63. For an analysis of background and main achievements of 'etatism during 1930-50 period see Hale, op. cit., chapter four.
35 Before January 1980, 47% of Turkish industry was state-owned and the state was responsible for 60% of new fixed investment. The Banker, op. cit., p. 71.
37 Ayres/Thompson, op. cit., p. 64.
38 For a historical comparison between the Turkish experience of the 1980s under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank and the Ottoman experience after the 1860s under the British guidance with foreign debt and its conditionality see Kiray, E., "Turkish Debt and Conditionality in Historical Perspective: A Comparison of the 1980s With the 1860s" in Aricanli/Rodrik, op. cit., pp. 254-268. She finds striking similarities regarding to conditionality of foreign debt, measures undertaken, and disconcertingly the economic outcomes, too, that is private sector did not recover and the debt burden grew further, eventually taking the Ottoman empire to the default of 1875.
39 Ibid., p. 255.
41 For the details of the January 24, 1980 programme, see Ulugay, O., 24 Ocak Deneyimi Uzerine (On January 24 Experience), (Istanbul: Hil Yayin, 1983); Colasan, E., 24 Ocak: Bir Donemin Perde Arkasi (January 24; Behind The Scene of the Period), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1983), and 12 Eylul; Ozal Ekonomisinin Perde Arkasi (September12; Behind the Scene of Ozal's Economics), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1984); Sonmez, M., Turkiye Ekonomisinde Bunalim (Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1982); Hewin/O'Brien, op. cit.; Baysan/Blitzer, op. cit.; World Bank Country Study, Turkey - Industrialization and Trade Strategy (Washington: World Bank, 1982); and also OECD Economic Survey (various issues in and after 1980). Basic points of the programme were listed in Euromoney, op. cit., p. 7; The Economist, February 2, 1980, p. 70; Keesing's, October 31, 1980, pp. 30541-30542; and The General Directory of Press and Information, Turkey 1987 (Ankara: Kurtulus Yayincilik, 1987), pp. 133-136.
42 Baysan/Blitzer, ibid., p. 11. For a summary of average real exchange rates between 1978 and 1987 see Table 1.1 in p. 12.
43 For the details of various changes in the import and external payments regimes in an attempt to liberalize markets see OECD Economic Survey (various issues) and Milanovic, B., Export Incentives and Turkish Manufactured Exports, 1980-84, World Bank Staff Paper, No. 768 (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1986); Baysan/Blitzer, ibid., pp. 11-13; World Bank, op. cit., pp. 53-109.
44 Meri Report, p. 36.
45 It should be noted that the January 24, 1980 programme was not the first time the Turkish economy had experimented with the free market economy. The first attempt dated back to the early 1920s. For a detailed review of the period see Kazgan, op. cit. There were two other short-lived free market experiments between 1950-52 and 1970-72. For a full account of the 1950-70 period, see Kazgan, ibid.; and Krueger (1974 and
In Contrast to the 1980 experiment, these attempts, were lacked sincere political commitment and were not as extensive, thus resulted in failure.

Measures taken by the military government to reform the Turkish economic structure, alongside political and social strata, were examined in detail in Ramazanoglu, *The State, The Military*, pp. 222-247.

F. Senses argues that the military takeover, which removed the civilian government at a time when the controversy about the January 24 programme was becoming widespread and heated as the first results of the programme were taken, had gone a considerable distance toward reducing inflationary expectations and furthering success chances of the programme. See his "Short-term Stabilisation Policies in a Developing Economy; The Turkish Experience in 1980 in Long-term Perspective" in Ramazanoglu (ed.), op. cit., pp. 140-141.

About 7.7 million man-days had been lost in the first nine months of 1980 - more than in the previous six years put together. *The Economist*, September 12, 1981, p. 9, and *The Banker*, op. cit., p. 75. Not surprisingly one of the first decisions of the military government was to ban strikes altogether, which allowed factories to increase their utilisation of capacity that phased away most of the shortages that the country had been experienced last three years as well as producing surpluses that could be exported. Also see footnote 13 for reduced number of strikes.

Celasun argues that the Turkish economy greatly benefited from the existence of a military regime until November 1983 and, thereafter, a restricted constitutional order. This meant that open social conflict over the adverse distributional effects of the programme with respect to agriculture and labour were avoided. This situation came to be generally accepted as unfortunate, but necessary, by the international public opinion. Cited in Balkir/Williams, op. cit., p. 22. In the UK., this tendency was clearly reflected in two reports which appeared in the Financial Times, May 18, 1981 and in the Guardian Augusts 21, 1981.


Ahmad, ibid., pp. 7-8 stresses that certain political conditions had to be met before austerity measures of January 1980 can be implemented, and, after pointing out that Turgut Ozal's main complaint throughout 1980, until the coup of September 12, was that the political climate did not exist for the proper implementation of the austerity measures, argues that "...men like Ozal had placed all their hopes in an early general election and a Justice Party victory. Once early elections were no longer on the agenda, only military intervention could break this political deadlock, and implement by force the measures necessary for a functioning free-market economy".
The same argument was also put forward by many left-leaning Turkish academics such as Ramazanoglu, *The State, The Military, Keyer, State and Class in Turkey;* Berberoglu, *op. cit.;* and Senses, *Stabilization Policies.* Among them Borotav, K., "Inter-Class and Intra-Class Relations of Distribution Under 'Structural Adjustment'; Turkey During the 1980s" in Aricanli/Rodrik, *op. cit.,* p. 225 argues that "the overall anti-labour and pro-capital orientation of the economic policies of the period has been the unifying force behind the bourgeoisie and resulted in the mobilization of massive moral, ideological and material support provided by all segments of the business community first to the junta, and, later, to the Motherland Party". He further links the adverse effects of the January 24 measures on real wages to the "reactionary / authoritarian" ideology of the official circles. See Borotav *ibid.,* pp. 119-129.

52. Berberoglu, *op. cit.,* p. 281

53. Ibid.


57. It was argued even in the government circles that if there had not been a military takeover, the January 24 programme was bound to fail. See an interview with the Finance Minister Mr. Kaya Erdem by Euromoney, *op. cit.,* p. 12.


59. *The Economist,* April 10, 1982, "Turkish Economy; Creditable", and April 16, 1983, "Turkey Comes in From the Cold".


62. Meri Report, p. 37 and 60
63. Ibid., p. 37.
64. Ibid.

67. "In its broad outlines, Ozal's programme has undeniably been successful in extricating the economy from the depths of a crisis and in re-igniting economic growth. Yet, it is hard to avoid the feeling that the light at the end of the tunnel recedes almost as fast as the Ozal engine advances" was the comment of Dani Rodrik in 1990. See his "Some Policy Dilemmas in Turkish Macro-Economic Management" in Aricanli/Rodrik, op. cit., p. 183.

68. Bogdonovicz-Bindert, op. cit., p. 70; "Introduction" in Nas/Odekon, op. cit., p. 3


70. For an analysis of Turkey's debt crisis, her relations to foreign capital markets, and the place of external debt in Turkish economic performance since 1977, see Rodrik, D., "External Debt and Economic Performance in Turkey", in Nas/Odekon, op. cit. For the background of Turkey's debt crisis see Hewin/O'Brian, op. cit., chapter six, pp. 107-113.

71. Rodrik, ibid., pp. 162 and 169.

72. For details of Turkey's negotiations with her debtors during this period which broke new grounds in the terms of debt rescheduling - for example Turkey became the first country to be allowed to reschedule its already rescheduled commercial debts - see the Economist, April 19, 1980, "Borrow Now, Reschedule Later", p. 69; June 1, 1980, "Carry on Creditors", pp. 67-68; September 13, 1980, "Rolling Over and Over", p. 98; June 17, 1981, "Turkish Tea and Sympathy in the Royal Garden", pp. 73-74; Also see Colasan, 24 Ocak.

73. Rodrik, Economic Performance, p.169; Keessing's, November 9, 1979, p. 29921.

74. According to a survey of debt swap arrangements, Turkey's credit-worthiness was ranked behind only three East Asian countries (Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand). See Euromoney, February 1986.

75. For a comparative analysis of Turkish and other indebted countries experiences with regard to foreign debt and international support and their post-crisis comparisons see Rodrik, Economic Performance, pp. 166-169; and Rodrik, Policy Dilemmas, pp. 184-188.

76. As year end of 1980, Turkey's debt to the OECD consortium amounted to $5 billion, the largest amount ever owed to the consortium. See Hewin / O'Brian, op. cit., p. 43.

77. In 1980, Saudi Arabia produced $200 million while Eurobank came up with $225 million. In 1981 Turkey was able to raise another $100 million from a consortium of


80. This figure (1.25 billion SDR--$1.65 billion) was at the time the highest multiple of a country's IMF quota (at 625%) that had ever been agreed. The Economist, September 12, 1981, p. 13.

81. G. Kazgan argues that Demirel government drafted the January 24, 1980 programme in response to the expectations of international creditors and the aim was to pledge them the implementation of policies which they would endorse and thereby secure their approval for a debt rescheduling and fresh funds. See her "External Pressures and The New Policy Outlook" in Balkir / Williams, op. cit., pp. 71-72. This argument seems to correspond with the reality since even the first offer of the OECD Turkey Consortium in July 26, 1979 to supply loans and credits, worth about a $1 billion, had been conditional on Turkey's successful completion of negotiations with the IMF. Keesing's, November 9, 1979, p. 29922. Same conditionality regarding Turkey's other creditors were also mentioned in Colasan, 24 Ocak. Moreover, the fact that the announcement of the programme preceded by a meeting with IMF delegation in Ankara in December 1979 and followed by the resumption of the OECD and IMF aids, both of which had been withheld in the late 1979 due to Turkey's failure to fulfil IMF conditions, tends to confirm that the January 24 programme was indeed prepared in connection with the IMF and the government's foremost aim was to get IMF's green light for new borrowing. Keesing's October 31, 1980, p. 30541.


83. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who had originally proposed to the Guadeloupe Summit that the time had come to do something about Turkey, was reported to have reasoned his initiative by arguing that had Turkish economy not propped up by western economic aid, Turkey could fall into chaos and uncertainty, and "we would then have a solid headache from Bosphorus to Afghanistan". The Middle East, February 1979, "West to Extend Turkey Lifeline", p. 12.


86. Taylor stressed that there was no question that the money flows to Turkey "were tight to policies sanctioned from Washington; the money would not have arrived otherwise". See his "The Turkish Experience; Summary and Comparative Notes" in Aricanli/Rodrik, op. cit., p. 269.
The first new commercial credit since 1979 was agreed on June 2, 1983, when $200 million worth of loans were arranged by a 12-bank consortium. Signature of a second loan, worth $300 million, soon followed suit on January 31, 1984. Keesing's, August 1984, p. 33040.


Meri Report, p. 111.

Figures taken from Hewin /O'Brian, op. cit., p. 110.

Meri Report, p. 111.

The question of how Turkey, after undergoing a major rescheduling in 1978-82 period, has been able to reestablish market access and to obtain significant amounts of new voluntary money from commercial sources, was taken up as a main subject in World Bank Country Study, Turkey: A Strategy for Managing Debt, Borrowing and Transfers Under Macroeconomic Adjustment (Washington: World Bank, 1990).

Keesing's, January 22, 1982, p. 31287.


Commenting on negotiations between Turkey and the US about new DECA agreement, Washington Post reported on May 9, 1979 that the "US made no bones about the reason for military assistance...[that is] the operation of valuable US intelligence and communications facilities". See "Turkey Demands More US Aid for Use of Basis" by Lawton, J., pp. A1 and A18, cited in Tosun Aricanli, "The Political Economy of Turkey's External Debt: The Bearing of Exogenous Factors" in Aricanli / Rodrik, op. cit., p. 244. In return Ozal government amply reminded Americans, when the time came for renewal of the DECA agreement in 1985, that the agreement was not simply for military but also for economic cooperation and that Turkey would like to see at least some improvements on this account before renewal. See the Economist, "Turkey and America; I Want, You Need, We Haggle", October 5, 1985, pp. 63-64.

Business International, p. 16

Keesing's, June 1988, p. 35983.

Baysan / Blitzer, op. cit., p. 25. After rescheduling of debts by the year end of 1981 Turkey had successfully reduced her short term debt to 11% from a ruinous 36% of three years earlier. The Banker, op. cit., p. 71.


For example, the IMF withheld its assistance to Turkey in late-1982 because of concerns over an increase in inflation rates and because of what it termed an "extremely rapid rate of monetary expansion". The Fund, however, resumed its assistance on December 1982 following statements by the government on its commitment to austerity measures. The period suspiciously corresponded with Mr. Ozal's departure from the government, which had given way to fears, both inside and outside Turkey, that the government might falter from its hitherto followed economic course. See Keesing's, August 1984, p. 33040 and p. 31285.
Between 1980 and 1985 Turkey and the World Bank agreed on five SALs, covering a total of $1.560 million World Bank lending. Since each of the SALs was extended towards improving a certain part of Turkish economy - for example second SAL was approved primarily to finance vital raw material and intermediate imports for industry and agriculture whereas fifth SAL was geared more to the concrete implementation of institutional reforms, the development of an energy plan and improved debt reporting - presence of the World Bank was visible and continuing.

For an examination of Turkey's foreign trade trends and its role on Turkish economic recovery after 1980, see Hewin / O'Brian, op. cit., chapter III; Senses, F., "An Assessment of the Pattern of Turkish manufactured Export Growth in the 1980s and Its Prospects" in Aricanli / Rodrik, op. cit., pp. 60-77. The Banker, op. cit., p. 74 argued in 1982 that even if the "IMF-Ozal medicine" had achieved nothing else, the success of export growth alone would have justified the entire programme.

The main incentives included tax rebates, credit subsidies and foreign exchange allocations which allowed the duty-free import of intermediates and raw materials that would be used in production for export. For the examination of the fiscal and legal measures taken by the governments after 1980 to encourage export see footnote 33, plus Hewin/O'Brian, op. cit., pp. 51-55; Baysan/Blitzer, op. cit., pp. 13-23; Milanovic, op. cit.; Senses, An Assessment; World Bank, Turkey: The 1986 Import and Export Regimes - Developments and Policy Recommendations (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1986).

There is some evidence that at least part of the export growth was actually due to over-invoicing and fictitious exports resulted from exporters attempts to abuse the export subsidies system. On this subject see Milanovic, op. cit.

The increase in Turkish exports, especially during the first half of the 1980s in a protectionist and largely stagnant international environment, was unparalleled by any other country, Turkey's average rate of growth of exports during 1980-85 was by far the highest among the 119 countries listed in World Bank, World Development Report, 1987 (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1987).

Among others most commonly acknowledged factors were export incentives introduced after 1980, restricted domestic demand as a result of tight monetary policies, Iran-Iraq war, increase in revenues of Middle Eastern countries, and government's active involvement in export promotion activities in third countries. The initial low level of exports was also significant in registering huge increases particularly in 1981. See Rodrik, Economic Performance, p. 175; Hewin/O'Brian, op. cit., p. 47; Meri Report, p. 107; Senses, Export Growth, pp. 66-69; Baysan/Blitzer, op. cit., pp. 25-33; The Economist, January 31, 1981, "The Year of the Salesman", p. 63.

Iran's share in Turkish exports was accounted for 13.8% in 1982, compared with only 2.9% in 1980. Keesing's, August 1984, p, 33040.
115. Ibid.; Meri Report, p. 64; The Middle East, March 1985, "Turkey's Middle East Gamble", p. 28.


117. For his calculations and interpretation of the results see Rodrik, Economic Performance, pp. 176-180.


119. Turkey exported $120 million worth of textiles and apparel goods to the $21 billion US market, compared with over $11 billion by the East Asian countries.

120. Especially during 1985 and 1986, the textile controversy between Turkey and the US became so acrimonious that in one occasion Secretary of State George Shultz, while addressing to a group of businessmen in Istanbul on March 22 1986 had to leave meeting in haste as he found himself, in his own words, "sandbagged" by the trade questions as his audience persistently demanded greater access for Turkish textile. For controversy over this issue see Middle East Special Report, July 12, 1986, p. 30; The Middle East, June 1986, p. 60, "Testing Time For Turkey".

121. Mr. Vehbi Koc, doyen of Turkish businessmen, was reported to have said to Mr. Clarence Brown, US assistant Secretary of Trade who was accompanying Secretary of State Shultz in his visit to Turkey in 1986, that "if you are our friends, you must buy $600 million worth of textile from us, not $120 million. That is what we need to survive. We are not asking for aid, but that you buy our products. And we expect to be paid whatever the world prices are". The Middle East, June 1986, p. 60.

122. See for example a special report on Turkey by the Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 30 (28), 1986, p. 30.

123. The Middle East, April 1987, "Turkey Heads Back To Europe", p. 36; Keesing's, July 1986, p. 34500.

124. From December 1983 onwards, the W. German government offered Turkish families DM10,000 (~$3650) to return home. Within a year some 100,000 accepted the offer, more importantly because of increasing racism against Turkish migrants rather than economic attractions of the cash. The Economist, September 15, 1984, "Eastern Promise", p. 66.


126. The Economist, November 29, 1986, "Don't Call Us", p. 66.


128. Istanbul Ticaret Odasi (Istanbul Union of Commerce), Avrupa Toplulugu ve Turkiye ile liiskiler (European Community and Relations with Turkey), prepared by Ozlenen Ozer (Istanbul: Can Matbaasi, 1990), p. 54; Institute of Economic Development, Turkey's External Economic Relations, p. 128.
129. For Turkish dissatisfactions with the consequences of her association with the EC see Istanbul Ticaret Odası, ibid., pp. 54-56; Institute of Economic Development, ibid., pp. 124-126.


132. Senses, Export Growth, p. 66.


134. For an early evaluation of Commission's report see the Middle East, February 1990, "No Room in Europe", p. 22.

135. The Middle East, April 1987, "Turkey Heads Back To Europe", pp. 35-36; September 1987, "What's Jamming the Door to Europe?", p. 38; February 1990, "No Room In Europe", p. 22; Comet Report, pp. 18-19.


137. Turkey is now considered to be pushed to the further fringes, if not aside altogether, of the possibility of membership. For example, in his examination of post-Maastricht Europe, Professor Church puts Turkey into the sixth round of expansion to be concluded, if ever, sometime after the year 2030. See Church, C. H., "Widening The European Community", Politics Review, September 1992, pp. 18-21. Same conclusion was reached by the Economist, July 11, 1992, "A Survey of European Community", p. 15, which putted Turkey into the bottom of the list of eligible members with no predictable date for entry. A more recent model, prepared by the European Security and Cooperation Academy (an independent agency connected with the CSCE) stipulated that the best chance Turkey could have regarding economic cooperation in Europe would be a place in the European Economic Space. The report further stresses that there would be no elevation from the third tier countries, which includes Turkey, Bulgaria, Macadonia, Albania, Caucasian and Central Asian Republics, into the European Community. The Report was reprinted in Milliyet, April 1993, p. 13.


141. The Middle East, May 1987, "Turkey Boots Its Islamic Trade", p. 17.

142. Bagis, op. cit., p. 87.

143. Turkmen, op. cit., p. 8; Euromoney (1982), op. cit., p. 28.


In 1984, just before the fall of petrol prices and subsequent reductions in trade volumes of the regional states, only about 10% of the total trading of the Middle East was among the Islamic countries. Quoted in Yalcintas, op. cit., p. 318 (table. 1) from Islamic Development Bank Annual Reports. Also see the Middle East, May 1985, "Turkey Survey", p. 64.

Managed trade is defined as trade that is subject to some non-tariff control by the governments, and not entirely determined by market forces. Yalcintas, op. cit., p. 325. In the Turkish case it means that the volume of Turkish trade with other Islamic countries has been determined chiefly by the political will and bilateral agreement between countries rather than as a result of market forces. This in turn, suggests that if the political will changes against bilateral cooperation with Islamic countries, so would the trade relations.

Turkmen, op. cit., p. 9.

For further analysis of RCD's achievement see Khan, A. M., "From RCD to ECO: Performance and Prospects", Regional Studies (Islamabad) Vol. 3 (3), 1985, pp. 68-82.


Khan, op. cit., pp. 79.

The Middle East, February 1984, "Iran Seeks Friends", p. 9.


Ibid.

Keesing's, March 1985, p. 33489. Mutual trade agreement, which anticipated $6,000 million worth of goods to be exchanged between 1986 and 1990, was accompanied by a ten-year mutual undertaking on economic, commercial and scientific cooperation.

Tansug Bleda, Ambassador, former Deputy undersecretary for Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Extract taken from his speech delivered at a meeting organized by the Association of Young Turkish Businessmen in Istanbul, reprinted in Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Vol. 5 (23), 1991, pp. 18-19.


Bleda, op. cit., p. 19. Although some suggestions have been made in the Turkish press to the effect that BSECR could form an alternative to the EC, Turkish government does not seem to think so. For example see Hurriyet, "Avrupa Topluluğu Alternatif: KEB" (Alternative to European Community: BSECR), October 14, 1990.

Bleda, ibid., p. 20. There were arguments that this kind of cooperation attempt should be seen as a part of "process for further integration with the EC and Europe as a whole" and that it could contribute "to the solution of the critical problem facing Europe today - the reduction and the gradual elimination of the economic gap between East and West". Ataov, T., "Focus; The Black Sea Region", Turkish Daily News, July 24, 1991; and Bleda, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

Bleda, ibid., p. 20.


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166. Ataov, op. cit.
167. At the 1990 Ankara meeting, the Soviet delegation was made up of the representatives of a number of Soviet republics. When the USSR disintegrated, however, all the interested republics were invited to join the scheme.
171. While writing this analysis I was benefited from the table drawn up by Aricanli, *Turkey's External Debt*, pp. 231-232. See Table 10.1: Exogenous Factors of Major Significance for the Performance of the Turkish Economy.
174. Although it was the Americans who were alarmed most by the developments in the region, the EC countries, too, took care to stress their support to Turkey in the early 1980. A meeting between EEC and Turkish foreign ministers was hastily arranged in February 5, 1980 in an effort to re-activate frozen relations. Also Britain's foreign secretary Lord Carrington, while visiting Turkey, pledged EC states' support for Turkish economy and promised to pay their share of West's $1.5 billion special aid package agreed on at Guadeloupe Summit a year earlier. The Economist, January 26, 1980, "European Community; Welcome Turkey - But Not Just Yet", p. 56; July 5, 1980, "A New Deal For Turkey", p. 50.
176. Kazgan argues that although the requirements of development and domestic economic circumstances had been pushing Turkey's economic policy during 1960s and 1970s from import substitution to export led growth, the macroeconomic impact of external pressures, particularly those emanating from the IMF, was finally forced Turkish government to accept this. See her article *External Pressures*, pp. 69-99, where he traces recent external pressures on the Turkish economy. In this context, the fear that Turkey could be left out of economic arrangements that would shape Europe's future, and the insistence of Turkey's European creditors on her compliance with the IMF conditions before they released $1.5 billion special aid package agreed at Guadeloupe Summit were also important factors that had to be taken into accounts. *Ibid.*, p. 70; The Economist, January 26, 1980, p. 56; February 2, 1980, "Demirel Shakes The Ground", p. 73.
177. Kiray, op. cit., p. 262.
The Middle East, April 1987, "Turkey Heads Back to Europe", pp. 35-36. Turkey exported 70% of its goods to the EEC in 1987, compared to 57.6% in 1986, and only 22% of its goods to the Islamic World compared to 34.9% in 1986. The Middle East August 88, "Buoyant Abroad, Tied Down at Home", p. 28.


See the Economist, August 24, 1991, "The Importance of Being Turkey", pp. 13-14, for an article which, after arguing the importance of Turkey to Europe and stressing the need to help Turks to become true Europeans in facing new world order, advised that "instead of inventing ingenious new pretexts for fending Turkey off, the Community should be inventing ingenious new ways for easing its reintegration into Europe".


Aricanli, Turkey's External Debt, p. 243.
PART THREE
CASE STUDY

CHAPTER EIGHT

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE GULF CRISIS OF 1990-1991

We should not be cowardly; we should not shy away from war if necessary. If we want to create a better world, War is nothing to be afraid of.\(^1\)

The developments and the point we have reached today reveal to both friend and foe that the policy Turkey followed [during the Gulf Crisis] was far-sighted, realistic and correct.\(^2\)

1. Introduction

As has been demonstrated throughout the course of this dissertation, the decade of the 1980s brought profound changes to Turkey. Politically, economically, culturally and socially the country witnessed sharper changes than perhaps at any other time since the 1920s. During this multi-faceted evolution, the foreign policy could hardly have been standing still. Accordingly, previous chapters have looked at the changing environment of Turkish foreign policy-making and the evolving reasoning, that is domestic political, economic and social as well as external inputs, behind the general policies. Thus it seems a good idea now to incorporate all these in a case-study to see the workings of Turkish foreign policy on a daily basis and to make a point of the stage that it came to at the end of the decade. Since we have already looked into the foundations and the state of Turkish foreign policy at the beginning, and through the years, of the 1980s, finding out where it came to rest at the end of the decade would give us a proper sense of the distance that had been covered and the changes that had been experienced. It would also provide us with a platform from which we might try to predict the future direction of Turkish foreign policy.

The reasons for the choice of the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 stand obvious from many aspects. First of all, the Gulf Crisis and the accompanying end of the Cold War marked the most important international development since the Second World War,
that was so close to Turkey and so profoundly affected her. This was the occasion where she came closest to entering an international war - The Cyprus intervention of 1974 was a limited affair, and the only other military conflict she was involved in was fought over the far away lands of Korea. The Gulf War, on the other hand, was painfully close to home and carried with it the dangers of engulfing the whole country into a war that she was neither ready nor enthusiastic for. Yet the Crisis was the one which presented, in the mid-to-long term, the most acute repercussions on Turkey's own national security. Moreover, the Crisis demonstrated very effectively the changes that took place in Turkey and in her ideological underpinnings vis-a-vis her immediate surroundings.

Since the end of the Second World War, for almost forty years, Turkish foreign policy had followed the Western lead. Throughout the Cold War she was a distant outpost on the European periphery, a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, and a contributor to the security of Europe. Her geostrategic "value" was largely limited to her role within the Atlantic Alliance and, more narrowly, her place within NATO's southern flank. During this period, Turkey had, to a surprising extent, ignored the volatile politics of the Middle East and in turn was ignored mostly by her southern neighbours.

However, her traditional foreign policy of non-intervention and non-involvement in Middle Eastern politics had been challenged during the second half of 1980s by two equally important developments; the end of the Cold War and the frustration of Turkey's hopes to join the EC. While the end of the Cold War had reduced Turkey's importance to the West on the southern flank of NATO, and thus signalled an end to the military and economic benefits derived from it, the events in Eastern Europe further undermined Turkey's chances of joining Europe as the EC would give priority to accommodating the newly democratic East European countries before considering Turkey. Thus, after the rejection of Turkey's application for full membership in 1989 by the EC, and the sudden changes in the Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, Turkey seemed, by 1990, to be left alone with fundamental political, orientational and defence dilemmas.

Given the fact that orientation toward Europe and eventual integration in it were the underpinnings of Turkey's Kemalist foreign policy, the recent changes in international politics inevitably came to test their continued validity. It is recognition of these facts that led Turkish officials to look for new principles to guide country's foreign policy, and that shaped many of Turkey's recent foreign policy moves, including her growing activist policy toward the Middle East, highlighted by the high profile during the Gulf Crisis.4

Further, Turkey's foreign policy during the Crisis was a perfect example of "one-man rule a' la Ozal". There is no doubt whatsoever that Ozal dominated Turkish policy making during the Gulf Crisis and thus himself alone deserved any credit or criticism derived from it. While the domestic discussion over the constitutional boundaries of president's rights and responsibilities was heightened by Ozal's controversial standing, the prime minister and foreign ministry officials were both forced, to the embarrassment of the latter, to the background by his highly visible public stance and successfully publicized foreign contacts, including almost daily phone calls to and from President Bush of the United States.5

Although this controversial meddling with the government's business cost him the highly visible and critical resignations of three top officials, the foreign and defense ministers, and the Chief of Staff, who left with protests over his conduct and style of policy making, it was President Ozal again who remained in his place and was able, despite the widespread domestic misgivings, to claim at the end of the Crisis that Turkey had passed this important test "with flying colours".6

Furthermore, the crisis took place at a time when the fundamental paradigms of the bipolar system were dramatically altered and the so-called "new world order" was emerging. Thus Turkey's stand in the Gulf War was also poised to demonstrate, or give us clues about, the response of Turkey to the newly emerging world system that
effectively made it impossible for Turkey to follow her traditionalist foreign policy based on relative safety and stability of the Cold-War politics.

Finally, from a more modest and rather selfish perspective, too, the Gulf War seemed an appropriate choice for the case study, as it coincided chronologically with the end of the period with which this study is concerned.

2. The Prelude

Before proceeding to a day-to-day analysis of the Gulf crisis and the war itself, it would be useful to observe some of the important developments taking place around Turkey that had important effects on her reaction to the crisis.

Although geographically Turkey is an integral part of the Middle East and shares the dominant religion of the region, i.e. Islam, culturally and politically her professed allegiance has been directed towards Europe - and the West in general - ever since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. While the Kemalist tradition urged the Turks "to move consistently towards the West" for "in order to be a civilised nation, there is no alternative"\(^7\), the perceived threat from the Soviet Union forcefully oriented Turkish security and foreign policies to focus on the search for creditable allies. As a result, Turkish foreign policy was set in concrete by membership of NATO, Council of Europe and, later, associate membership of the European Community, representing Turkey's aspirations to be part of the wider Western state system politically, culturally, economically and militarily.\(^8\) Consequently, during most of her republican history, Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern Islamic states were normally of secondary importance to the Turkish foreign policy-makers. Moreover, the obvious insecurity of Middle Eastern politics had discouraged Turkey's few half-hearted efforts at rapprochement with the regional states. Nor were the Middle Easterners very eager to embrace Turkey because of her imperial background in those areas. Thus, Turkey's approach to the Middle East was mainly dictated by the realities of Cold War politics and her desire to remain out of the unstable and conflicting dynamics of regional
politics. The Principles of non-interference and non-involvement in the domestic politics and the interstate conflicts of all countries in the region became the watchwords of Turkey's Middle Eastern policy.\textsuperscript{9} Turkey's brief attempts during the latter half of 1950s to lead regional alliances, such as Baghdad Pact and the Central Treaty Organization, were actually repercussions of the Cold War policies rather than results of Turkey's sincere wish to return to the region.\textsuperscript{10} Nor did her overtures towards the Muslim world in general during the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of the Cyprus problem which forced Turkey to realize her loneliness in the international arena and alienation in the Muslim world, lead to a significant change in Turkey's approach to regional conflicts. Hence, for example, Turkey chose to stay clear of the perennial Arab-Israeli conflict and as late as the 1980s maintained strict neutrality in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.

On the other hand, Turkey's economic ties with her Middle Eastern neighbours had grown closer during the past three decades, and, as was shown in chapter six, came to challenge the principal position of Europe in Turkey's trade balance, although this too, towards the end of 1980s, proved to be a passing phase.

However, these established patterns in Turkey's relations with the West and the Middle East were profoundly affected by the end of the Cold War. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union left Turkey without a powerful Communist adversary along her borders for the first time since the end of World War II. The decline of the perceived Soviet threat dramatically altered the security environment in Europe and it raised fundamental questions about the future of NATO and Turkey's role in European security and defence policies.\textsuperscript{11} As the function and relevance of NATO in the post-Cold War world order was opened up for discussion, Turkey suddenly found itself in a "security limbo" and realized that the end of the "threat discourse" was fundamentally damaging to its Western security connection, and to the military and the economic benefits derived from it. While the emergence of liberal democracies in Eastern Europe created a buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia, Turkey still felt threatened by the lingering uncertainties regarding its
immediate neighbourhood and faced, at the same time, the possibility of being abandoned by its Western allies. Many Turkish observers argued that the West might no longer need strategic outposts such as Turkey in the post-Cold War era. Western press reports and analysis similarly echoed the view that Eastern Europe's shifting political map might come at the expense of Turkey and that the country could face growing isolation from the West. This shook the very foundation of Turkish security thinking and policy, and the need to reassess its post-cold war situation vis-a-vis potential threats was alarmingly expressed at the highest levels.

At this juncture, highly publicized discussions in Western capitals about NATO's lessening influence and its possible replacement with alternative European security arrangements, preferably based on the EC, created considerable anxiety among Turkish policy makers. After the "exclusion" of Turkey from the economic and political integration of Europe by the rejection of her membership application, her "marginalization" in the European security arrangements, too, seemed imminent. Moreover, there has always been a feeling of uncertainty in Turkey about the extent to which NATO would be prepared to defend Eastern and Southern Turkey which has always been a grey area from the Alliance's perspective. Thus, immediately after the end of the Cold War, when the world's attention turned to the massive weapons arsenal amassed by the Middle Eastern states with their regional hegemonic aspirations, the possibility of Turkey being drawn into the regional conflicts dawned on her more than ever. The fact that the military balance between Turkey and its two southern neighbours - Iraq, where Saddam Hussein seemed increasingly willing to use his power in combination with bullying tactics; and Syria, known for its protection of the Kurdish separatist organization PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) which had engaged in terror in Turkey since 1984 - had changed to Turkey's disadvantage during the 1980s, made Turkey feel extremely vulnerable and together with her "exclusion" from European security arrangements, forced her to strengthen bilateral ties with the US and to look for new strategies in order to balance her deteriorating relations with Europe.

However, by the time the crisis suddenly erupted, Turkey's search for a new strategy,
with president Ozal taking the lead, was very much in flux. Thus, Turkey's response to
the crisis was extremely important for the future development of her security
arrangements.

Apart from the end of the Cold War and Turkey's changing security
environment, two important developments closer to home had important effects in the
calculations of the Turkish policy-makers during the Gulf war.

The first of these was the existence of a Kurdish uprising in Southeastern
Turkey since 1984 with secessionist aims. Before the crisis, Turkey and Iraq had
established a security cooperation scheme concerning the Kurds, which enabled both
sides to deal with its own Kurdish community through a series of quiet mutual
understandings. An open anti-Iraqi stance in the crisis would certainly have ended
this cooperation, which was based on the assumption that both governments had a joint
interest in opposing Kurdish nationalism. Once the trust between two states was
broken, the Iraqi regime could easily have backed Kurdish separatist guerrillas
operating in Turkey. Since, until very recently, the Turkish policy had been to deny the
acceptance of Turkish Kurds as a separate cultural entity, considerations relating to this
issue undoubtedly held an important place in the calculations of Turkish decision-
makers.

Another important development in the region was the dispute over the waters of
the Euphrates, which represented a potent source of friction between Turkey, Syria and
Iraq. The fact that a possible crisis over water was dubbed, especially by Western
sources, as a more imminent cause for the next war in the Middle East, made the issue
all the more important.

The tension has been the result of the downstream countries' (Iraq and Syria)
fear that Turkey's South Anatolia Project (GAP), which includes construction of 15
dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and aims to regulate and develop the Turkish
part of the Mesopotamia basin, would, when completed, deprive them of the water.
The matters came to a head shortly before the Gulf Crisis when, on January 13, 1990,
Turkey unilaterally diverted up to 75% of the waters of the Euphrates river for thirty
days in order to fill the giant Ataturk Dam, the biggest single piece of the GAP project. This considerable reduced the flow of the water into Syria and consequently to Iraq and provoked sharp protests from both countries and much outcry from the whole Arab world, which upheld generally the view that Turkey's cut-off was to show that she could use the waters as a weapon and charged her with breaching international law. The crisis was heightened when in late June Turkey once again refused to sign a tripartite agreement to regulate the usage of the rivers and increase the average flow into downstream countries.

Although both countries, in the end, had to accept the Turkish fait accompli, two important developments were not missed by Turkish leaders. Firstly, for the first time in years Iraq and Syria, normally hostile regimes to each other, were brought together by the crisis to form a common front against Turkey. In April 1990 both countries signed a protocol to regulate their share of the water and started to urge other Arab countries to put pressure on Turkey. Though they confined themselves this time to condemn Turkish action, the possibility of a military alliance between Iraq and Syria against Turkey, however remote it was, made her extremely uneasy.

Another important development was the success of both states in creating a common front in the Arab world against Turkey over the water issue. Although the Turkish delegation, which toured the region to explain the Turkish side of the issue, helped to dispel some of the Arab fears and suspicions, this concerted effort was carefully noted by the Turkish authorities who saw in this the possibility of closing ranks among Arabs against Turkey if the tension between Turkey and an Arab country was to escalate into an actual military conflict. Moreover, the more outspoken role played by Iraq, which was in reality affected less by the cuts than Syria, in creating a common Arab reaction toward Turkey's efforts to curb the flow of the Euphrates, which was referred to by Saddam Hussein as "Arab water", was not missed in Turkey. He also accused Turkey of "not acting in accordance with international law" since Turkey's stance took no account of Iraq's "acquired rights" of the water
requirements already under way. Accordingly, when Turkish prime minister visited Iraq on May 30, he found a cool reception and much aggravation there.

Although, during the crisis, Turkey argued that the cut-off was for purely technical reasons, the fact that Turkish government had put Syria and Iraq under heavy pressure in previous few months to curb the infiltration from their borders of Kurdish separatist guerrillas of the PKK, was not missed on international observers.

The water issue was important because it affected the balance of power in the region, and the January 1990 cut-off highlighted both the relative strengths and dangers of Turkey's position in the region. Although various state officials in Ankara issued repeated messages that there was no political side to the decision, it was also no secret that cutting the water - even for a short period - highlighted Turkey's exclusive position in the region. Even though this was not the main aim, the whole affair showed that control over water did provide Turkey with significant leverage. In an interview with the daily Cumhuriyet, State Minister Kamran Inan, in charge of GAP project, was to stress this position by comparing Turkey's military situation with that of her neighbours. Putting bluntly, he said "we have the water and they have the missiles". However, the conflict was also a good reminder of the dangers of alienating both her Arab neighbours at the same time.

The Water issue, in regard to the Gulf Crisis, was also important for the war effort, since it was estimated that Iraq would not be able to keep its troops in action for more than three months if Turkey suspended its water flow. Such vulnerability of course explains the tense relationship shared by Turkey and her southern neighbours, even in the most peaceful of times. Thus the water issue, and the related security threat posed by Syria and especially Iraq, was undoubtedly in the minds of Turkish decision-makers when they were scaling the options for Turkish response to the crisis, for Ozal once said "...there is also water issue. Does nobody think that this kind of expansionist state would turn to us one day?" Before proceeding further, the somewhat unusual character of the Turkish government at the time of the Gulf Crisis should also be noted since most of the
domestic controversies over Turkey's Gulf strategy stemmed from, or were at least exacerbated by, the existing political situation in Turkey. It has already been mentioned that Turgut Ozal had succeeded Kenan Evren as President of the Republic in November 1989. Although his election was perfectly constitutional, it was contested by the opposition on moral grounds that he did not command the backing of the majority in the country (see chapter 5). His election also differed from the Turkish political tradition in that he was an important politician in his own right rather than a politically insignificant candidate, preferably a retired military commander, chosen in compromise between political parties. Moreover, in the Turkish political tradition presidents had normally played a mainly symbolic role, leaving the main executive power to the prime minister and the Cabinet. Although the constitution required the president to sever all official links, if there were any, with the political parties on assuming the presidency, Ozal made it known from the beginning that he would not even pretend to be impartial between political parties, and, in fact, would continue to exercise a predominant power over the government from behind the scenes. Accordingly, the new prime minister, Yildirim Akbulut, was, at most, a stand-in for the president and did not oppose his meddling with government affairs. However, the situation was unacceptable to the opposition which kept a watchful eye on his actions, and created tensions between the president and not only the opposition but also the government backbenchers and the Cabinet, all of which came to the fore during the Gulf Crisis.

3. The Crisis

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, "an event which Turkey could not afford to ignore", presented her with difficult policy choices and limited options. In other words, Turkey's age-long policy of non-involvement in the intra-regional and intra-Arab conflicts was not applicable to the situation caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait because of various reasons.
First of all, from the first day of the crisis it became clear that the affair was hardly going to remain or be contained as a regional matter. The existence of vast quantities of oil on Kuwaiti soil saw to it that the crisis became an international affair in which the US, Turkey's main ally, took the lead in opposing Iraq, one of Turkey's main trading partners and close neighbour. The involvement of the UN right from the beginning and the collaboration between Russia and the US in the Security Council, further made it almost impossible for any state, led alone a regional one with a strategic location, to ignore the situation. Turkey's strategic location, reinforced by her neighbouring position to Iraq and the existence of both Iraqi oil pipelines and the NATO military installations in her territory, meant that she could not have avoided being dragged into the conflict in one way or another.

Moreover, Turkey's position as being the principal land road to and from Iraq - as its political problems with Iran and Syria had blocked other routes - meant that she would came under immediate pressure to join the international embargo against Iraq once it was agreed on. In addition, Turkey was a major trading partner with Iraq and an important market for Iraqi oil. Of course this, apart from being an additional reason for international pressure, was also a major source of concern for Turkey, since any Turkish action against Iraq would have signalled the end of a lucrative market for Turkish goods and contractors, and cheap oil that Turkey received from Iraq.

Finally, as mentioned above, Turkey's security cooperation scheme with Iraq concerning the Kurds was a satisfactory arrangement to Turkey which had allowed Turkish military three times in the past to enter northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish secessionist guerrillas. An action against Iraq would have certainly ended this collaboration and would even have prompted retaliation from Iraq in terms of a helping hand to Kurdish guerrillas.

On the other hand, from the early days on, it was obvious that Turkey's response to the crisis, whichever way it eventually tilted, would certainly have long-term implications on both Turkey's future regional and global role, and on relations with her Western allies as well as Middle Eastern countries. As far as Turkey's
involvement in Middle Eastern affairs was concerned, in the context of post-cold war paradigm and Turkey's response to it, there was a danger of creating a suspicion among especially Arabs of the region that Turkey might have wished to revive the pan-Ottomanism once the crisis was over. After all, there were the bitter examples of the over-enthusiastic Turkish involvement in the Western-sponsored regional security initiatives of the late 1950s, which essentially created deep suspicions and distrust between Turkey and the other regional states and opened way to the charges of Turkey being the arm of western imperialism in the region. Thus the experiences of the Baghdad Pact and the Central Treaty Organization were mistakes that Turkey would not want to repeat in the region. On the other hand, lack of interest on Turkey's part in such a major regional crisis, which was affecting the region fundamentally, would again resulted in her marginalization after the crisis and also would have prevented Turkey from having a say in the post-crisis security arrangements of the region, which were obviously going to affect Turkey's regional interests fundamentally.

From the perspective of Turkey's relations with her Western allies, too, her position vis-a-vis crisis was important. Although inaction on the Turkish side probably would not immediately have caused her relations with the West to deteriorate to the point of unrecoverable break, it would, however, not certainly help them either. Her position next to her Allies, on the other hand, was likely to present new opportunities, both economically and politically.

Also, Turkey had to consider the regional balance of power while formulating her response and calculating its pros and cons. During the 1980s, she had to watch the build-up of the Iraqi military arsenal, including strategic weapon systems and chemical and nuclear capabilities, with growing concern. It was the Turkish military's conclusion that during the 1980s Turkey was overpowered by quantitatively and qualitatively superior armaments of aspiring regional hegemons, Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, Turkey's recent dispute with Iraq and Syria over the water issue carried within it the dangers of military involvement from both sides. Thus, by the time the crisis erupted, there was a growing perception in Turkey that she faced a potentially serious threat
from the South. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait only helped to heighten this perception by highlighting Iraq's willingness to use military means in order to establish an Iraqi hegemony in the region. On the other hand, though the Iraqi armament and aggressive policies had posed a great threat to the regional balance, from the Turkish perspective, the prospect of total break-up of Iraq, which would increase the influence of Iran and Syria as well as Israel, was not a suitable projection either. Therefore, Turkey, as a regional power which attributed critical importance to regional balance of power, had to find ways to prevent both eventualities; that is while weakening Iraq's power, the existing equilibrium in the region should not be altered dramatically.

Thus it seemed that any action or inaction by Turkey was likely to affect both her Middle East and Western relationships, as well as having important repercussions both in domestic politics and for the regional balance of power. In addition, it was likely to affect Turkey's long term standing both in the region and in the world while defining Turkey's security environment and involvements after the crisis.

Consequently, the very first reaction of the Turkish government was extremely cautious, showing signs of reluctance to become part of this intra-Arab dispute and also reflecting hope that the crisis would soon die out or would be settled by diplomacy, long before Turkey was forced by circumstances to take stand, endangering her links either with Iraq or any other Arab states as well as with her Western Allies. Of course, there was no question over which side would Turkey take when it came to diplomatic response to Iraqi action of August 2. In other words, "it was never likely that Turkey would issue anything other than a condemnation of occupation of territory by force". Accordingly, on the day of the invasion, the Minister of Trade and Industry was quoted saying that Turkey "regretted Iraq's occupation of Kuwait" which represented "a threat to the maintenance of friendship in the region". The first statements of prime minister Akbulut and foreign minister Bozer were also cautious and devoid of any strong references to the Iraqi action. There was no indication that Turkey was working on a possible retaliatory move against Iraq, merely a reference to the fact that
Iraq had violated the sovereignty of Kuwait and the wish to see that the situation be solved by peaceful means.  

A meeting of the NSC, held on August 3, produced the same sort of reaction, and the statement issued following the Cabinet meeting that evening, though it spoke of "unjust occupation", still promised no action except to follow developments and "implement the necessary action in time according the changing conditions". Thus, when the Turkish press was reporting, the day after the NSC meeting, that Turkey would not close the Kerkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline or take other steps against Iraq, it became obvious that Turkey was tilting towards, at least for the time being, its traditional neutral attitude in what was seen as a purely inter-Arab dispute.

Meanwhile, the UN acted swiftly to condemn the invasion and to demand an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Although Turkey's initial reaction seemed mild in comparison to the strong UN condemnation, it was in accordance with many other states' first reactions against this largely unexpected move by Iraq. Moreover, Turkey was hardly in a position to criticise Iraq strongly while she herself was keeping troops in Cyprus against UN resolutions, though the conditions and reasons were different. However, the next resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on August 6, which called on all members to "prevent the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait...", put Turkey in the spotlight because of Iraqi oil pipelines passing through her territory, and immediately created pressures from the international community on Turkey to take a tougher line.

The issue of the pipeline closure posed some tricky questions for Turkey regarding its political and economic constraints, as well as its relations with the Middle Eastern Arab countries in the region. First of all, Turkey, as a main transit route for Iraq's trade, had much to lose from enforcing the UN embargo and joining the alliance. The pipelines were source of about $300 million per annum income in the form of transit fees, and another $50 million for port handling charges. Moreover, the bilateral trade in 1989 totalled $2.1 billion of which Turkish imports amounted to $1.7 billion. There were signs that trade could have been higher in 1990 if it were not for the Gulf
Crisis. Turkey estimated the loss in trade with Iraq and Kuwait would amount to $600 million for Turkish exports in 1990; the loss in receivables was put at $750 million; the lost contracting services at $500 million; the increase in its oil bill at $800 million; probable lost tourism revenues at $300 million; and additional losses were due to the appreciation of the Deutschmark and the Dollar, which are the two main currencies involved in Turkish foreign trade. Thus Turkey stood to lose perhaps $3 billion by the end of 1991 in remittances, oil transit dues and building contracts, let alone remittances from 300,000 Turks no longer employed in Iraq. Further Iraq was also withholding $2 billion dollars of debt repayments to Turkey.\textsuperscript{47}

Furthermore, though enforcing an economic embargo on Iraq was requested by the UN Security Council, cutting the flow of the oil would in the longer term bring to mind the possibility of Turkey's cutting the flow of waters of the Euphrates river or of the so-called "peace pipeline" that Turkey was proposing to be build in the region to distribute Turkish waters to the Arab countries. The main obstacle for such a project, apart from its huge cost, seemed to be the unwillingness of the Arab countries to put themselves at the mercy and goodwill of Turkey regarding the continued flow of water, and the fear that Turkey might in one day find it too tempting a political weapon to ignore. Therefore Turkey would not wish to create the wrong implications for the future while trying to do the right thing at the moment. Moreover, once it was established that Turkey was willing to use pipelines, oil or otherwise, passing through its territory as a weapon - special circumstances do not matter much as they would be forgotten in the longer term - this would cause future aspirants to think twice before committing themselves to lay down pipelines through Turkey.

Moreover, there was the possibility of Iraqi retaliation as, in the words of Iraqi deputy prime minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, "the closure of the oil pipeline may create an atmosphere of mistrust between the two countries".\textsuperscript{48} The protection of Turkey's cities and installations, not least the dams in the southeast that were at the centre of the ongoing debate with Iraq, appeared to be unguarded against the threat of an Iraqi missile attack, which was, to say the least, unnerving for Turkish leadership.
There was also the danger of oil shortage, for, before the crisis, some 60% of Turkey's oil imports had come from Iraq, which roughly corresponded to about 9.5 billion tonnes of crude oil for the period of January-July 1990.49

Given the magnitude of the above objections, the first Turkish official reaction to SCR-661 was predictably negative. Immediately after the SCR-661 was made public, Minister of State in charge of energy policy, Mr. Mehmet Kececiler, announced that Turkey would not close its two pipelines so long as the one through Saudi Arabia continued to operate. He further asserted that Turkey had to give priority to its own needs and interests.50 The message was clear enough; Turkey would consider such an action only if there was a prospect of a fully effective international embargo against Iraq.

Given the prevailing conditions, the cautious Turkish approach to the pipeline issue seemed "sensible". When faced with international pressure, it was pointed out that a unilateral closure by Turkey would not be effective so long as the Saudi line was kept open. Even though the argument that Turkish closure would encourage the Saudis to follow suit was put to Turkey, it seemed that prevailing feeling and attitude in Turkey generally, and among the foreign ministry officials particularly, was that if a directly threatened Arab country would not resolve itself to close its pipeline, why then should Turkey, whose national interests were not in immediate danger, block her's, hence with all probability inciting a retaliation from Iraq. Moreover, should the crisis be solved by political means in the mean time between the Turkish unilateral move and Saudi's similar action, or inaction, then Turkey would have found itself alone in a security limbo in the region faced with charges of being the "servitude and the long arm" of the US.

Under these circumstances, the response of the foreign ministry, if left alone, would have been to drag its feet on implementing the UN embargo long enough to see the cooperative action of the world and the regional states. They, most probably, would have adopted a wait and see attitude and after having long considerations and discussions, and seeing the general response of the world to the UN call, would
eventually move to comply with the resolution, provided that most of the Arab world
also approved, at least condoned, this attitude and the Western powers were generally
observing it. Even then the Turkish response would have been very low key without
much publicizing. According to this line of thinking, Turkey, if it dragged its feet
long enough, might even have been saved from formally taking sides and closing the
pipeline as a result of either a blockage by the US navy in the Mediterranean or the
refusal of the Western tankers to transport the Iraqi oil, thus effectively shutting down
the oil flow from Iraq once the terminals in the Turkish port of Iskenderun at the
receiving end of the pipelines were full.

Interestingly enough, as if proving this point, Iraq shut down one of the
pipelines on August 6, while reducing the pumping of oil by 70% to the second one
"due to marketing problems". On the same day, Turkey took a step further and
banned the loading of Iraqi oil from its Mediterranean port at the end of the pipelines,
thus bringing itself closer to actual shut down. This of course effectively meant the
closure of the pipelines without officially shutting them down, because storage facilities
on Turkish side would have been full, as estimated by the state minister Kececiler, after
six days and this would have forced Iraq to shut the pipelines completely by itself.

This approach seemed to conform with the principles of traditional Turkish
foreign policy: that is complying with the international regulations and requirements
without actually boasting about it. Of course, there was the danger with this policy that
at the end of the day Turkey would have ended up with pleasing no one. First of all, so
long as Turkey refused to buy herself or load Iraqi oil from her ports, the fine nuance
between the actual shutting of pipelines and forcing Iraq to stop pumping because the
storage facilities were full, which was incidentally aimed to obtain the same result,
would have hardly impressed the Iraqi regime anyway. What's more, this half-hearted
measure and softly-softly approach would not have pleased Turkey's Western allies
either, and thus would lead to the charges of non-cooperation and tension had the US
decided to blockade the Turkish ports itself in order to prevent any embargo-busting
attempt. Therefore, given this situation and possibilities, the Turkish foreign ministry
at the end, in all probability, would have decided to close down the pipelines itself, but this would have not created same affect on the international arena as Turkey's immediate voluntary cooperation and closure would.

However, despite these dangers and considerations, it appeared that the foreign ministry was leaning towards this policy of "wait and see", when President Ozal came out on August 7 and announced the formal closure of the pipelines, suspension of all commercial links with Iraq and Kuwait, and freezing of all their assets in Turkey. The announcement came at a very awkward point for the foreign minister, Prof. Ali Bozer, because it coincided with a press conference during which he was briefing journalists about the reasons for Turkey's cautious approach and about what Turkey proposed to do regarding the UN embargo. It was obvious that the foreign ministry officials, like the rest of the country, were caught unaware of the decision which seemed to be taken by President himself unilaterally without prior consultation with the foreign ministry or the General Staff.

Further, despite the decision to impose economic sanctions upon Iraq, the Government still appeared to be trying to avoid direct confrontation with Iraq by stressing that "the resolution of the UN, which Turkey is a founding member, is binding. Furthermore, Switzerland, which is not a member of the UN, has announced that she will act in line with the resolution". Although it was doubtful how much ice this apologetic and almost pathetic statement cut with the Iraqi leadership, it was pretty clear that the Turkish leadership was quite anxious about the consequences of "its" decision.

This incident not only confirmed Ozal's single-handed control of national affairs, but also highlighted the lack of coordination among the top executives, and gave early indications of what was coming within the course of a year; that is the serious division within the government, various state organs and the public opinion in general over the strategy to be followed by Turkey during the Gulf crisis.

Although the crisis among the "top brass" erupted and was conducted over Turkey's Gulf War policy, the underlying differences and problems ran much deeper. At
the heart of the matter lay the problem of the perennial confrontation between so-called "traditionalists" and "revisionists". On the one side of the argument, the "traditionalists", combining, at this particular time, much of the foreign ministry bureaucrats, military establishment, and opposition parties together with most of the media and the public opinion, argued for the preservation of Turkey's long-standing and much-tested foreign policy posture in the Middle East, that is primarily cautious approach and neutrality. These people, who were actually not longstanding allies and some of whom had been political opponents, were brought together casually in this heterogeneous coalition of forces by their common wish to keep Turkey clear from the Gulf Crisis as long and as much as possible.

On the other side of the argument were the "revisionists", led by President Ozal and supported by some of his close associates and advisers, who argued basically that the traditionally cautious Turkish foreign policy belonged to the past and Turkey, in keeping with its contemporary composure and the fast-evolving world, should adopt a more flexible, initiative-taking, and indeed more "active" foreign policy line. In contrast, traditionalists argued that "the foreign policy is not supposed to be either passive or courageous, it should be dignified, self-possessed, efficient, sagacious, and prudent".

As far as the Gulf crisis was concerned, the "traditionalists" were of the view that Turkey should preserve her now traditional neutrality in Middle Eastern conflicts and most importantly, should not, as long as Turkey's national interests were not threatened, risk direct involvement in the present conflict for the sake of obscure eventual benefits. One of the most effective arguments they put forward against Turkey's further involvement was that Turkey would have to co-habit with Iraq and more generally with the Arab world within the same geographic conditionality long after the crisis was over and international forces had returned home. They feared that after the crisis was over, the reasons for Turkey's actions would be forgotten quickly while her involvement in the crisis would be remembered throughout the Arab world as a Turkish attempt to resuscitate pax-Ottomana in the region. Ozal, on the other
hand, seemed only too eager to take risks in the Gulf for the sake of the enlarged role which he envisaged that Turkey was going to play in the region after the crisis was over. He argued vigorously that in the emerging post-cold war system Turkey could no longer "act like ostrich", ignoring the realities of the "new world order" and pretending the Gulf Crisis would go away without fundamentally affecting Turkey.  

Thus it seemed after the closure of the pipelines that Turkey was poised for a bitter war, not external but internal between the non-conformist President Ozal and, seemingly, the "rest of the country". In the mean time, the abating of the international interest in Turkey after the pipeline closure and the period of stalemate, during which international actors were trying to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis before it reached the otherwise inevitable military confrontation, provided Turkey with an ample opportunity to stop and reflect about what had happened within past week or so and calculate what the long term consequences would be. The period between the invasion of Kuwait and the closure of the pipelines was marked with an intense sense of shock at first and then chaos of thoughts about what to do, exacerbated by the lack of understanding about the reasons for the conflict and by the international spotlight and pressure on Turkey. It was obvious that during this time Turkey as a whole and its decision-makers particularly stumbled along with the international public opinion while trying to make sense of what was going on and formulate appropriate policies for Turkey to follow if the conflict was prolonged. Even the Parliament, which held the right to declare war if need arose, was not convened until September 12 when the most important decisions were already taken and Turkey's position had become more or less apparent. In the process, the foreign ministry bureaucrats at first almost instinctively turned to Turkey's traditional policy of caution and neutrality to find a way out or at least to spare Turkey for the moment from being forced to take sides before proper evaluations were made. After all, this policy had served Turkey well for almost seventy years, thus it could have done so for another week or two. The then Chief of Staff, General Torumtay, was right when he observed in retrospect that "the wheel of the Turkish state machine", which based its working principles on national policies and
long term decisions, "turns slowly". There lay the crux of the disagreement. The president believed that Turkey could not go on practicing old formulas in her foreign policy in the post-cold war era. She had to change and adapt herself to the realities of the era. She had to react quickly and act decisively. Actually, there seemed to be no difference between the President and the foreign ministry in that Turkey needed to reevaluate her new geopolitics and surroundings in the new era. However, they disagreed on the timing and the style of that reevaluation. With the visible stillness of the Turkish bureaucracy, the foreign ministry opposed the idea of sudden changes, they wanted to conduct inquiries, research, have meetings, reflect on the ideas put forward, and then produce proper policy option for the decision-makers, that is the Cabinet, not the president. In contrast, the president believed that Turkey had to make her move then and there. He also wanted to personalize and dominate national policy-making, which was quite unacceptable to the civil-military bureaucracy. During the crisis, Ozal's many conversations with President Bush of US and other foreign leaders, television stations and newspapers made him Turkey's representative to the world, which caused TPP leader Demirel to remonstrate that "Turkey is not Ozal-land". They vehemently opposed a one-man decision-making process which was justified by the president with the necessity of practicality and speed, the qualities which, he argued, the Turkish foreign policy was in dire need and what the international system towards the 21st century required from a strategically situated modern state like Turkey.

The way the entire debate was conducted during this period suggests that the main disagreement and the basic interest of the participants were concentrated on how the country was - or should be - governed. The confrontation over this issue had been brewing ever since Turgut Ozal became president in late 1989, and it seemed that the nature of the Turkish policy over the Gulf crisis provided an ample battle ground for this more general conflict. In other words, what was at stake during the controversies between the president and his opponents throughout this period was not only the way Turkey's Gulf policy and more generally her foreign policy should develop and be conducted, but also, maybe more importantly, the way that the country should be
governed in the future. President Ozal, who had to all intents and purposes temporarily transformed the government into a presidential style system, was also openly drawing up proposals for the amendment of the constitution. Thus, the confrontation between so-called "Kemalist" and "liberal revisionists" was essentially a struggle for political power, that is who would govern the country and how?

This grandiose political struggle within the country inevitably clouded the external developments during this "period of introspection". As if reflecting the suspense in the Gulf, Turkey's elites, including politicians, journalists, the army and the constitutional bodies, were locked in a passionate discussion while the ordinary people seemed to worry more about the possibilities of a forthcoming war spreading into Turkey as manifested in steady migration of citizens from the border areas.

After the closure of the pipelines and declaration of the economic embargo, Turkey seemed to face more important questions regarding the wider Turkish role in the possible military engagement in the Gulf. The questions raised included the possibility of contributing Turkish troops to coalition forces, allowing allied forces to use NATO bases on Turkish soil for their out-of-area operations, and finally opening a second land front against Iraq if the conditions deemed it necessary.

Before these questions were answered, however, Turkey in the first instance had to make defensive preparations. Although it could be argued from the outset that at least on this point everybody would have agreed easily, a closer look reveals that even this evidently straightforward task embodied the seeds of future confrontations. Especially, the dispute between the Chief of Staff, General Torumtay, and President Ozal could be traced back to this basic point and the early days of the Crisis. In his memoirs, General Torumtay frequently complained about the lack of political directives on the measures to be taken against Iraq. Moreover, he also complained that many speculative actions were entertained by president Ozal at one time or another, including manoeuvres on Iraqi border and possible invasion of part of Iraqi territory, without actually giving directives to General Staff for preparations for such actions. It seems that as the result of a lack of coherent directives from above, the Turkish Armed Forces
preparations were limited only to such defensive measures as putting all forces on alert, cancelling all leave for key personnel, and moving troops to the Iraqi border, which were at any rate contemplated at the General Staff's discretion rather than as a part of a more general plan drawn up by the joint action of the civilian and military authorities.76 At the end, Turkish forces on the Iraqi border, which reached about 120,000 men just before the beginning of the war, however, played an important role, pinning down about eight Iraqi divisions in the north which could otherwise have been used elsewhere against the coalition forces.

While propping up Turkish defences along the Iraqi border, there appeared the question of whether Iraq would attack Turkey and if that happened whether Turkey would be able to defend itself. With this concerns, the fact that the Turkish borders were guaranteed by the NATO treaty inevitably came to minds. However, since the Middle East was traditionally regarded as out-of-area for the NATO operations it seemed, for a brief period, a question mark appeared in Turkey about the NATO's possible response for such an attack. Although a NATO summit, held in Brussels on August 11, had confirmed its pledge to defend Turkish borders against any aggression, the Turkish government asked for the defensive deployment of NATO air forces on November 30, not only because there was a genuine fear that Turkish air and anti-aircraft defences were inadequate against possible Iraqi attack, but also to test the sincerity of the NATO countries' pledge to defend Turkey against aggression from out of NATO's main defence area in the post-cold war era. Though on January 2, 1991, it was announced that Germany, Italy and Belgium would be sending 42 aircraft as a part of an allied mobile force, the unwillingness and opposition to such a move especially within Germany proved, for most part, Turkey's fears that Turkish security needs, especially regarding her Middle Eastern borders, after the end of the Cold War would be ignored. Thus the opposition and discussions within Germany provoked sharp attacks from President Ozal who dubbed the Germans unreliable allies.77

Although it was somewhat disappointing to see mostly obsolescent aircraft when finally Allied forces began to arrive in Turkey on January 6, the Turkish
government did not make any more fuss over the quality of the forces, since their symbolic value was much more important than their actual fire power and strength. In addition to these forces, there were much larger and modern American and British squadrons, based at Incirlik air base, which could also be brought into action if Turkey was attacked. When finally the Patriot missiles against possible Iraqi Scud attacks arrived from the US on January 15, Turkish defensive preparations seemed ready, though there were still the huge shortage of gas masks, shelters against chemical and nuclear attacks, and reliable communications systems.

Ironically, inviting foreign troops onto Turkish soil provoked much more bitter attacks in Turkey than in Germany. This issue had been traditionally problematic in Turkey for historic reasons. One important aspect of the whole affair was that Turkey's request for NATO force to be stationed on her territory was kept secret from the public for about three weeks. This again inevitably raised the issue of whether there was a question of a "second front", being opened against Iraq over Turkish territory in the event of a war. This was denied by foreign minister, K. Alptemucin, who emphasised strongly that Turkey did not wish to see any war on any fronts, but argued that it was the government's task to ensure the security of the country as best as possible and take all measures for defence.

However, sending troops to the Gulf, or allowing the US or other allied air forces to use Incirlik air base for non-NATO operations, that is to attack Iraq in this case, was far more problematic for the government since this required specific authorization from the parliament and could not be done with executive request as was the case in inviting NATO troops to help protect the country's borders.

As in the case of the foreign forces to be invited, President Ozal seemed to be the most enthusiastic person in the country in favour of sending at least a Turkish contingent to join the coalition forces in the Gulf. In a television interview in January 1991, he admitted that he wanted to send a Turkish contingent to join the coalition forces in the Gulf. However, the opposition seemed determined to prevent this. Both opposition parties, TPP of S. Demirel and SDPP of E. Inonu, vigorously attacked
Ozal's "adventurism" as they termed it. More importantly, however, it became clear, when a government proposal was brought before the parliament to obtain authorization for sending troops, that a considerable group of Mot.P backbenchers, led by former foreign minister, Mesut Yilmaz, who resigned in February 1990, were also opposed to such an authorization. It appeared that the proposed bill was seen by many as a request to wage war.85

During the debates of the extraordinary session of the TGNA on August 12, when the authorization bill was first discussed, opposition speakers expressed their reservations about the confrontational policy towards Baghdad.86 More vigorously, though, they used the occasion to attack President Ozal with charges of exceeding his constitutional boundaries.87 "If the president, who is non-responsible according to Constitution, is de facto conducting foreign policy, how can the parliament supervise this policy?", asked the leader of SDPP, Erdal Inonu, and added that "...the necessity for practicality and speed, or knowing world leaders cannot be justifications for using powers that were not mentioned in the constitution by a non-responsible post, especially given the damage inflicted on both our domestic and foreign policies by esteemed Ozal's hasty decisions".88 After bitter exchanges between the opposition and the Mot.P MPs, the final outcome was a compromise that fell short of the government's - that is president's - expectations.89 Without the power to send Turkish troops abroad or to permit foreign troops to be stationed in Turkey before she was attacked, the adopted bill actually gave the government no additional authority than it would have had already during the recess of the parliament.90 The result indicated, if not proved, that even the Mot.P MPs had doubts about the direction of the government's policy and more importantly suspicions about the "undeclared intentions" (hidden agenda) of the president. Their suspicions had been exacerbated by the visit of US Secretary of State, James Baker, just three days before the Bill was discussed in the parliament.91 While it was known that Baker came to give guarantees against an Iraqi attack and ask for Turkey's further cooperation, the result of his discussions in Turkey was unclear and, as far as the official statements were concerned, conflicting. While the Turkish authorities,
including Ozal, were insisting that the US had not even asked for the usage of Incirlik, or any other, air base, the US officials made clear that they believed no problems would be raised about their use in the event of war. The lack of a coherent statement from the foreign ministry about the issue further fanned the uneasiness among the parliamentarians about Ozal's single-handed operation style. As a result, the parliament seemed decisive in tying the president's hands, at least temporarily, regarding Turkish troops to be send to the Gulf as a part of the Coalition build-up.

Although obviously disappointed, President Ozal was not to be disheartened by the outcome. Thus, when he got the chance to speak out, he criticised the MPs and "those who think that Turkey's foreign policy could still be conducted with hesitant indecisiveness" for not seeing what was really happening in the region. He then, stressing the supreme importance of "national Unity", called for a consensus on Turkey's policy in connection with the Gulf Crisis - the policies of other countries in this respect were the product of a national consensus, he said, and it was important that Turkey was not seen to be divided. He went on to state that Turkey's policy throughout had been in line with international law and her own national interests and make clear that Turkey's aim was the withdrawal of Iraq and the restoration of the Kuwaiti regime.

Finally, he explained that with international developments moving as fast as they were doing, traditional diplomacy could be too slow, and the ability to manoeuvre in order to take quick decisions when necessary was essential. Both during the crisis and after it, he said, Turkey's policy would have to be dynamic. Hesitation and indecisiveness would mean losing the advantages that arisen from her own strengths and her important position between West and East. It seemed that most of his agitation was the result of his anticipation that Turkey would not enjoy the full benefits of her stance against Iraq unless she joined the coalition build-up in the Gulf. Thus in conclusion, Ozal "advised" parliament to transfer to the government those powers mentioned in article 92 of the constitution with the exception of the power to declare a state of war, adding that of all the democratic governments concerned, only the Japanese and the West German lacked the powers in question.
It was not long before the matter again returned to the limelight when, on September 5, a new bill was put to vote in the Parliament. This time, thanks to reconciliation of Mot.P rebels, the bill which allowed the government to send troops abroad, and receive foreign troops on Turkish soil, even if she was not attacked, was passed.\textsuperscript{95} Although the parliament still retained its powers to declare war, this seemed a trivial point since the government, in theory, could have participated in an armed conflict without actually declaring war and also it is a fact that "most modern wars have been fought undeclared".\textsuperscript{96}

Thus, although the government gained its "war powers", bitter parliamentary debates and criticisms in the press showed large scale opposition to direct involvement in the Gulf. Moreover, there were popular demonstrations against such an involvement.\textsuperscript{97} It seemed that the stories of "Turkish blood that was shed in those deserts for four hundred years", a folk memory that plunged republican Turkey into decades of distant neutrality to Arab events, were still strongly present in the collective mind of Turkish public.\textsuperscript{98} As a result, by the time the actual war started, it seemed that the president had dropped the idea of sending Turkish troops to the Gulf.\textsuperscript{99} Apart from the fact that there was popular disapproval of such a move, it seemed that the opposition from the Army and from within the Mot.P had played important roles in this turn of events.

In the mean time, President Ozal, taking time from the domestic bickering, started a 10-day tour of the US on September 24. His warm reception from President Bush showed the extent to which Turkey had won back favour with the US due to her firm stand against Iraq. Although Ozal had said Turkey's response to the UN call on economic embargo against Iraq was determined by Turkey's respect for "universal principles" rather than cheap calculations, and taken "without hesitation",\textsuperscript{100} the breakdown of the estimated costs of the embargo to Turkey had been nevertheless made public and expectations for compensations were expressed. Therefore, Turkey's price for keeping up with the "universal principals" was undoubtedly discussed during Ozal's visit. On his return, he argued that the visit was "very beneficial and extremely
favourable" and that he was given assurances that Turkey's annual cost of sanctions, which was officially estimated at the time at about $5 billion, would be somehow be met. During his visit, he especially impressed both the US officials and the public by his calls for "more trade, not aid". Moreover, just before the President's visit, Turkey renewed the expiring DECA agreement on September 18, without the usual huffy negotiations. In return, none of the US bases in Turkey were on the latest list of facilities to be closed by the budget cuts in the Pentagon. Moreover he also triumphantly claimed that President Bush "agreed to everything we asked for". However, what exactly President Bush agreed was not known because they discussed this question, in President Ozal's words, "in principle only with the understanding that details will be taken up in the future". And referring to "details", Ozal said that the US had so far only joined the modernization programme for M-48 tanks, and added, "perhaps our demand will exceed" the proposed American Eximbank credit of $1.4 billion to Turkey if the US won the bidding for construction of military helicopters for Turkey's defence industry.

The first sign of cracks among the top decision-makers came, just two weeks after Ozal's return from the US and partly as a result of it, with the resignation of foreign minister, Prof Ali Bozer, on October 11. His resignation once again highlighted the issue of the president's personal involvement in the country's policy-making. The fact that the resignation came after the reports that Bozer as foreign minister was excluded from Ozal's meeting with President Bush at the White House during the above-mentioned visit, while the US Secretary of State, James Baker, was also present, triggered further speculations about the extent to which he had taken over the policy making from the foreign ministry. It was also argued that Ozal had promised, on behalf of Turkey, far more help to the US with regard to the military situation in the gulf than had been publicly announced. These accusations were strengthened by the fact that, during his meeting with President Bush, Ozal was only accompanied by his personal adviser, Mr. Nabi Sensoy, thus everything discussed in the Oval Office remained between four persons, none of them a member of the Turkish government
who could answer to parliament. It was also argued that, prior to his departure, Bozer was opposing Ozal's determination to take the parliament's powers over troop deployments into his own hands and had been increasingly left out of the decision making process.

The new appointment to Prof. Bozer's former post came as a surprise as the new foreign minister, A. K. Alptemucin, had never held responsibilities related to external relations. His selection was interpreted as that his job would be to ensure that the ministry of foreign affairs would limit itself to diplomacy and leave policy-making to the politicians. And as if proving this point, when questioned on Gulf policy, he told journalists to direct their questions to the president; he did not seem to have an answer of his own. This, more than anything else, proved that he would be only a symbolic minister and would be totally dependent on Ozal's orders.

Following the departure of Bozer, Ozal made Turkish diplomatic history by visiting five Gulf states between 13 and 16 October with no accompanying ministers at all. On his return, his declaration that Turkey's esteem in the region had been heightened following her firm stand against Iraq was spoiled by the resignation of the Defence Minister Safa Giray on the same day, just before a scheduled meeting with the visiting NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner. Although Giray's resignation was attributed to internal squabbling within the Motherland Party, the timing and style of the resignation also suggested that he, too, was not happy with Ozal's one-man tendencies. His letter of resignation, written to prime minister, merely stated that "I have reached the firm conclusion that the relationship of trust which exists between us has been damaged". It was a statement open to interpretations.

A much bigger shock, and consequently a major political storm, came with the resignation of the Chief of General Staff, General N. Torumtay, on December 3. This was an almost unprecedented event in Turkey. His resignation letter, which read "I am resigning of my own free will, because with my principles and my understanding of what the state should be, I cannot continue to serve", further highlighted misgivings among the top officials about Ozal's intentions and governing style. Although General
Torumtay did not reveal at the time any specific reasons for his sudden departure, his thinly veiled attack on the president showed most dramatically that not only the opposition leaders believed that the president was not acting in Turkey's best interest. Moreover, the lack of reference to the prime minister in the resignation letter and the prime minister's statement that they had "no difference of opinion, no disagreements, or no conflict in any subject whatsoever" within the year that they had worked together, were taken as further evidence that the real target of the resignation was the president.\textsuperscript{113}

At the time, it was widely suspected that General Torumtay resigned because of the disagreement with the president over his aggressive Gulf policy and in particular over whether Turkey should allow the US to use Incirlik air base for attacks into Iraq.\textsuperscript{116} However, in his memoirs General Torumtay denies this reasoning. Although he admits that he did not share the views of the president about the policies that Turkey should follow, he nevertheless argues that he would have been content with them and continued to serve provided that those policies were put to him as official directives by the "proper channels", by which he means the government.\textsuperscript{117} It appears that he was much more troubled by the autocratic style of the president and his right to conduct policies than the substance of his ideas, though some of his "mind-exercises" were obviously "adventurist" and "out of tune with the military realities".\textsuperscript{118}

He was most annoyed by the lack of direction emanating from the government and by the non-professional and unprotocol-like attitudes of the executives. He was shocked, for example, when he received written directives from the prime ministry without necessary signatures.\textsuperscript{119} In fact, this incident could only be explained either by negligence and sloppiness of prime minister, or by his doubts and hesitation to commit Turkey into a course of policies which he did not agree but was forced to endorse by the president. In latter case, the implications of the situation, of course, become much more serious as the question of responsibility for the government's actions arises, since the president, according to constitution, could not be held responsible for his actions. Responsibility for the policies lies with the government and the projection that a non-
responsible individual could take and force the implication of decisions that would have fundamental effects on the country's future is indeed a daunting prospect.

Moreover, to the resentment of the Chief of Staff it seemed, at one point, that the president designated him as a "liaison officer" to the Americans without actually informing him. He was most indignant about this because the "Turkish Chief of Staff is not liaison officer, but the highest commanding post, who, as a representative of a dignified state, can not accept any correspondence other than another Chief of Staff of a friendly state". 120

Furthermore, he also seemed resentful of the fact that President Ozal by-passed him when taking decisions and he was not invited to a meeting on December 1, 1990 at the Presidential Palace where the particulars of Turkey's Gulf policy were decided. 121 Moreover, it seemed that Ozal frequently ignored the advice of the General Staff in "matters of military strategy" in favour of his "non-professional" advisers and his "uncoordinated personal interpretations and opinions". 122

In short, it seemed that Torumtay resigned in reaction not to what was being done but to the way certain things were being done. His was not a protest against this or that policy - though he would consider himself entitled to make such a protest - but a refusal to work within a management framework he could not reconcile himself with. 123

On the other hand, President Ozal's own explanation about the real reason for the resignation was that "some Generals are not keeping in step and are acting to preserve the status quo. While we are taking brave steps forward, they are trying to put brakes on". 124 He also presented the resignation as proof of Turkey's democratic maturity in an apparent allusion to earlier preferences of Chiefs of Staff to issue "warnings" instead of resigning. 125 It seemed that the clashes between "tradition" and "practicality" on the one hand, and between the "strict code of practice" of General Torumtay and "relaxed and often unruly" practices of Ozal on the other were responsible for the resignation of the Chief of General Staff. 126
After Torumtay's resignation, and as the UN dateline for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait approached, the question of whether Turkey would allow the use of Incirlik base in the event of a war was still undecided and matters came to head when the US Secretary of State Baker, on his way to tour the Middle East, stopped over in Turkey in the first week of November, apparently to request the full Turkish cooperation. In this, again, the government seemed less enthusiastic than the president. As late as January 15, when the UN-imposed deadline was expiring, the prime minister Akbulut still insisted that no decision had been taken on the use of Turkish bases. However, it was a foregone conclusion that they would be used by the US planes when two days later the parliament voted to renew the government's war powers, making clear that this time it would include allowing the use of Incirlik and other bases against Iraq.

Faced with the fact that the most extensive war powers were conveyed to the government, the opposition, which cast 148 votes against the bill, was not impressed by the assurances of the foreign minister, A. K. Alptemucin, that "Turkey does not want...to become a party to the war...to open up a second front". Thus they attacked during the debate on January 17, to the government and Ozal on the account of war-mongering and accused Ozal of turning Turkey into the "USS Saratoga". Erdal Inonu, the leader of the SDPP, claimed that while the government said it would not strike at Iraq unless attacked, by allowing foreign forces to launch attacks from Turkish air bases it had invited Iraq's wrath and would draw Turkey into the war.

In the meantime Ozal seemed to have his own agenda. He had been urging the US to fight it out with Iraq, arguing on American TV that they exaggerated Saddam's powers too much; "It (Iraq) is basically a Third World country. It's not like Russia; it's not like Germany. After all, what did they do in eight years of war with Iran?" He further argued that "Saddam can not survive any more, unless the US says, well, the war is enough. Then you might be in trouble". His language became, by this time, most harsh against Saddam Hussein, whose back, he said, "must be broken", and he seemed, in the words of a Turkish journalist, to have "burnt all his bridges with
In a television interview, when questioned about the wisdom of his "hawkish" stand against Iraq, he bluntly stated that "the only way to live with a hawk like Saddam Hussein is to be one". It appeared that he based all his calculations on the assumption that the US would, in all eventuality, fight against Iraq, at the end of which Saddam Hussein would be removed from his post. Moreover, he seemed to be convinced that the US and its allies were set to re-draw the map of the Middle East after the defeat of president Saddam Hussein and thus was anxious not to be left out when that happened around the negotiating table. "After the crisis, the map of the Middle East will change completely. If there is a better place for us in the world, we must take it", Ozal told journalists. Thus in this frame of mind, he did not see any reason for not committing Turkey fully to the declared war aim of the US-led coalition forces, that is the full and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, and to the unspoken US wish to remove Saddam Hussein and disarm his war power.

In view of all the uncertainty surrounding whether Turkey would be party to a war if it started, there were, as the January 15 dateline was approaching, signs of limited panic among the Turks. While the official line had been fixed that Turkey would only get involved in a Gulf War if it was the object of a direct assault by Iraq, for the ordinary people in the streets, the threat of imminent war was seen as very real.

4. The War

As mentioned above, once the war had begun, the parliament endorsed the extra powers that the government, that is President Ozal, had been long seeking. This gave the president a freer hand in policy-making and, once the TGNA had endorsed the government's proposals, he immediately indicated that the US could use the air bases whenever it wanted, a move which was widely interpreted at the time as turning Turkey into a second front and putting all Turkey's eggs into one basket.

Hence, on January 18, with the opening of the air war, the first allied raids from Incirlik were duly launched. The government, however, wary of the effect of the air
raids on public opinion, originally played down the importance of Turkish bases and claimed that the waves of American planes, daily flying out of the Incirlik base only to return with their bomb pads empty, were merely on "training exercise". Moreover, a censorship was put into action on the Turkish television, which cut the news that revealed Turkey's involvement while beaming the CNN reports, such as the repeated US strikes from bases in Turkey, the exodus from strategic southeastern towns and the almost total lack of gas masks in Turkey. The government was obviously trying to prevent people from learning the truth about an issue which would faithfully affect their future.

In a television interview on January 18, however, President Ozal appeared to be uninterested in whether the planes had bombed Iraqi targets; "the F-15s, F-16s and F-111s might have gone to Iraq after their training" he said. It seemed even "training" was a relative concept for Ozal when he suggested that had Turkey sent troops to the Gulf earlier, they would have gained some "useful experience".

After the President's admittance that planes from Incirlik "might have gone to Iraq", the government at once dropped its pretence that the aircraft were flying on training mission everyday and accepted that the "second front" was now a reality, at least with regard to the air war. Regular sorties from Incirlik by coalition planes continued up to the time of the cease-fire in the Gulf. In the mean time, while the government was still insisting that allowing Turkish bases "a more comprehensive role" was a far cry from committing Turkish troops on the ground, there was, naturally, a growing anxiety among the Turks that Iraq might counter-attack, and that the second front would also become a land war. Fears became more intense when the context of a letter sent by the Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz to his Turkish counterpart were revealed, in which he pointed out that Turkey had taken a hostile position against Iraq and must be ready to face the consequences. Though he did not clarify what he meant by the "consequences", how it would have been interpreted by the Turkish public at large was obvious.
However, General Torumtay emphasizes in his memoirs that during the Gulf crisis Iraq was never up to a position of attacking Turkey. According to him, at worst Iraq would have fired some missiles or would have tried air bombing missions in the event that an attack from Turkish soil took place. "In other words", he continues, "a war with Iraq could have only started with Turkey's own will“. Then he goes on to reason that since the government did not have any intention to start an offensive war on its own initiative against Iraq, "everything was left to the conduct and decision of the president" who, leaving the government in the background, had started to direct foreign policy personally. 150

In the mean time, the Turkish government, in an attempt to deter any Iraqi counter attack, for this was certainly a possibility, issued threats of retaliating by air power and opening outright second land front with Iraq. Though the weight of such a threat on the Iraqi leadership was seen at best as dubious, given the fact that Iraq was already experiencing "most harsh" onslaught from the Coalition forces, Baghdad, nevertheless, refrained from attacking Turkey and thus effectively opening the second land front. In retrospect, a question comes to mind as to whether Turkey would have escalated the situation had Iraq struck only the Incirlik air base, from which there were certainly offensive attacks against Iraq? At the time, two different arguments were entertained in the media, one of which argued that Turkey would put up with Iraqi attacks without retaliation so long as there were no, or "acceptable" amount of, casualties, and in the case of massive attacks from Iraq, then Turkey would have to retaliate by striking back with air power and then opening the second land front. 152 Some others, on the other hand, argued that President Ozal, who had already admitted that he wanted to send Turkish troops to the Gulf but was prevented by the circumstances, would immediately take up Iraqi challenge by committing Turkish troops into war, with a possible undeclared aim of occupying some part of the Iraqi territory in the north. 153 It is not possible to come down in favour of either interpretation, for there is no way of knowing now what might have been in the mind of the late-President Ozal at the time. It is true that he had advocated a more active role in
the war and entertained the possibility of occupation for some parts of Iraq at one point. However, by the time the war had started, he seemed to drop both notions, probably because of (1) the popular disapproval; (2) the explanation by the General Staff and the foreign ministry about the possible outcomes and pitfalls of such a move, and (3) maybe because he realised that Turkey's existing contribution to the Gulf war effort and extensive cooperation with especially the US were after all enough to obtain his objectives, that is to further Turkey's existing cooperation with the US and to find a place for Turkey in the post-crisis settlement process and security arrangements in the region, thus there was nothing more to gain by simply opening a costly land front with Iraq. In addition, the roles of the suspicions and anticipated oppositions of Turkey's two regional rivals, Iran and Syria, for any such action, and the possible US reluctance to see part of Iraqi territory being occupied, even by an ally, should not be disregarded.

Though the possibility of war with Iraq was thus averted, the existence of prospective conflicts in the region was very much alive since, once the outcome of the war became pretty certain, the future of the Iraqi state and its territory opened up into regional calculations. While there was much reference in the foreign press about the Turkish intentions over Mosul and Kirkuk regions where some Turcomans were living and over which Turkey only reluctantly had to disclaim her rights in 1926, Turkey, too, certainly had her suspicions about the intentions of both Iran and Syria if things came to a point where Iraqi territory might be divided. Therefore, while Turkey found it imperative to deny that she had any territorial claims over Iraqi territory, the government also did not neglect to issue warnings to both Syria and Iran against possible ambitions in Iraq. Thus, while the fighting got under way between Iraqi forces and the domestic opposition immediately after the cease fire in Gulf, it was made clear to both Syria and Iran that military intervention in northern Iraq by either side, would not be tolerated by Turkey.
5. The Aftermath

When Iraq finally resigned itself to unconditionally accepting all the UN resolutions on February 28, 1991, Turkey had reasons for celebration. The war clearly demonstrated Turkey's strategic importance even if the Cold War was over, and firmly put her back to the Western security calculations in the "new world order". Turkey's cooperation during the crisis once again proved her status as a reliable ally to the West. In return she was offered compensations for her losses and sufferings because of the crisis and her collaboration with the Coalition forces.

Also, there was a hope in Turkey that her trusted services during the crisis would provide a suitable platform from which she could jump on the European train. Privately it was expressed that Turkey expected to see European appreciation of her cooperation in the forms of more collaboration and encouraging attitude towards the question of her EC membership. The US too, was expected to put pressure on Europe on behalf of Turkey. Moreover, hopes were also expressed that Turkey could play an important role in building more stable and democratic post-crisis Middle East. Expectations were put forward of a role for Turkey in the post-crisis Middle Eastern security arrangements. Further calls for the creation of a Middle East Economic Zone and/or an Economic Development Fund to accompany these security measures, were also made by the Turkish prime minister.

During the following months, however, these almost euphoric expectations were shattered by the wave of largely unforeseen consequences of the conflict. Of these, the Iraqi Kurdish refugee crisis was the most immediate and probably the most important for Turkey as it also exposed her internal weaknesses to the world. The problem started as a humanitarian disaster as a direct result of half-finished Gulf War and half-hearted US encouragement of Iraqi Kurds to rebel against the regime of Saddam Hussein. However, when the first wave of Kurdish refugees were sighted on Turkish border on March 31, 1991, it presented Turkey with both a refugee problem of unprecedented dimensions and a political problem, since the sensibility of her own
Kurdish question for Turkey made it of far-reaching importance, thus left Turkey with an immediate dilemma.\textsuperscript{161}

After the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi regime, the vast exodus of refugees, terrified by the expectation of retribution, began towards the Turkish and Iranian borders during the first two weeks of April 1991. By the middle of the month, some 700,000 refugees, estimated by Turkish authorities, moved to the Iraqi-Turkish border.\textsuperscript{162} Their situation on the border area was desperate. The mountainous terrain and the severe climatic conditions made the transport and distribution of supplies almost an impossible task. Although at first the local villagers and the Turkish Red Crescent, and later on the international aid agencies, tried to help them, it soon became clear that unless they were brought down to more accessible sites from the mountain-tops, there was no way of coping with the situation. This presented Turkish government with difficult policy choices.

On the one hand, the plight of the refugees and the magnitude of the humanitarian catastrophe made it impossible to turn a blind eye to the situation.\textsuperscript{163} Moreover, international public opinion was soon involved, thus external pressures for solution became considerable. Furthermore, there was a danger that Turkey's own Kurdish population might have got restless if the government remained inactive. On the other hand, Turkish government was most reluctant to allow the refugees to move to more accessible sites within Turkey as demanded by aid organizations. She had ample reasons for the reluctance.

First of all, there were concerns over the long-term responsibility for the refugees. The recent experiences had taught Turkey enough to conclude that she would be left alone with the nearly impossible task of caring and accommodating those refugees long after the international attention moved on to other problems in other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{164} In March 1988, following the Halabje massacre, 51,512 Iraqi Kurds, according to official figures, had taken shelter in Turkey, and after two and a half years later, more than half of them were still living in Turkey as refugees with next to no international assistance.\textsuperscript{165} Moreover, nearly two million Iranians had passed
through Turkey during the Iran-Iraq war, many of whom stayed. Then there were the 300,000 Turks who arrived from Bulgaria. In addition, there were also some Afghan refugees brought by president Evren few years earlier from Pakistan. These were followed by another wave of refugees after Iraqi forces entered Kuwait on August 2. This time about 60,000 people of various nationalities who had been working in Iraq fled to Turkey. Thus, another mass exodus of refugees, who had no intention of leaving soon, would have put pressures on the already-stretched Turkish economy.

The much broader question for Turkey, however, was that during the previous few years, as a result of above-mentioned exoduses, she had arrived at a situation where she had to work out a policy concerning refugees without delay. Turkey was fast becoming the largest recipient of refugees coming from the west as well as the east. The realization was growing in Turkey that things could not be left to chance any more, and that in view of the volatile nature of the environment in which Turkey found herself geographically, a broad policy governing refugees was called for. Thus it was also feared that if it got around that Turkey was offering asylum, the number of refugees asking for it would inevitably multiply. "We do not want another Palestinian camp on our border", was Ozal's reaction to those who criticized Turkey for not allowing refugees to move further inside Turkey.

There were political complications, too. The main reason for Turkey's initial reluctance to permit large number of Iraqi Kurds to enter the country was the fragile situation on the Turkish side of the border. It was feared that influx of Iraqi Kurdish refugees who might remain in Turkey for an undetermined time period, might have a radicalizing effect on Turkish Kurds too. Moreover, security problems were presented by the possibility of infiltration by the PKK guerrillas into Turkey with the refugees, by the difficulty of guarding and appeasing the highly-agitated refugees, and also by the possible resistance to the disarming of the Iraqi Kurdish peshmergas before entering Turkey.

Therefore, Turkey initially seemed determined not to allow the Kurdish refugees to cross the border. In her opposition, Turkey, internationally, played down the role of
political considerations, but raised the logistic and economic objections. However, heart-rending plight of the refugees, brought home every evening on the world's televisions, soon created an emotional response in the Western public opinion, which was reflected on to Turkey by means of immense international and moral pressure to open her border and admit at least some of the refugees. Although under pressure Turkey allowed some 20,000 refugees, mainly elderly, pregnant woman and children, to be moved gradually down to a tent-city at Silopi, she was still adamant not to allow others to move into further inside Turkey to the plains. Turkey wanted them to move back to Iraq as soon as possible. However, they seemed most reluctant to do so because of the fear from further Iraqi reappraisals.

At this juncture, President Ozal's call on the UN, on April 7, to establish "safe havens" in northern Iraq, to which the refugees could return, was a novel idea. However, it also marked the beginning of policy change in Turkey towards Iraqi Kurds and Kurdish question in general. As Turkey's hitherto firm commitment to preserve the status quo of the region by opposing any sort of partition of the Iraqi territory seemed loosening, possible long-term political consequences of this move began to be considered in Turkey in earnest. Though the emergence of some sort of Kurdish enclave in Iraq seemed a little less dangerous than the arrival of millions of Iraqi Kurds inside Turkey, her consent to the establishment of "safe heavens" by the UN for the Kurds, that is no-go areas for the Iraqi security forces, on the other hand, implied the acceptance by Turkey of the idea of Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq, which, under the protection of the UN, would have every opportunity to grow into a semi-independent Kurdish state. Therefore Turkey's initiative in the UN on behalf of Kurdish refugees was met with cautious criticism in Turkish press. Although Turkey, realizing that, in the long-term, the idea of "safe heavens" could eventually be turned into a seminal internationally protected Kurdistan, tried to back down from the original idea in favour of "temporary settlement areas", by then the idea was taken up first by British prime minister John Major, then the EC, and eventually by the US, which warned Iraq on April 10 not to operate any aircraft or helicopters, or engage in
any military action on land, north of the 36th parallel. On the same day Turkey announced that her soldiers had crossed into Iraq to help control the refugees. Finally, towards the end of April, about 17,000 coalition troops, with a mandate to establish a security zone in Iraq north of the 36th parallel, kicked off the "Operation Provide Comfort", and by the middle of June all the refugees had returned to Iraq. Thus from the Turkish perspective the humanitarian aspect of the refugee crisis was successfully brought to a conclusion in a relatively short time.

As far as the short-term refugee problem was concerned, the Turkish policy proved to be the right one. Despite the international pressures, Turkey, by refusing entry to the refugees, was able to limit the immediate problems created by the mass exodus to the border area. At the same time this brought media attention and consequently Western intervention. Had the refugees moved into organized camps in Turkey, then the international interest in them would have died out sooner and Turkey would have had to suffer the long-term consequences of a semi-permanent refugee problem. To judge the success of Turkish policy, it was enough to look at Iran, which was still struggling to cope with about half a million refugees long after Turkey had diverted the problem away.

Turkey's handling of the refugee crisis also scored as a personal success for President Ozal, whose imaginative and flexible approach to the issue at hand opened the way for a short-term solution.

The only drawback experienced by Turkey during the crisis was the indiscriminate criticism by the Western media of Turkey's handling of the refugees. While Turkey was stretched to the limits by the enormity of the task at hand, the images of Turkish officials and soldiers in the region as brutal and corrupt were circulated in the Western press. These, on the one hand, had a negative impact on Turkey's image in the world, and on the other, created a simultaneous outcry in Turkey to the effect that the West, especially the Europeans, while doing nothing to help, was picking on Turkey. Even the idea that the Europeans were especially blackening
Turkey's image in order to make point for their refusal of Turkish entry to the EC was aired in the national press.182

Another problem area was the eagerness of Turkish officials to uphold the niceties of Turkish sovereignty against the multinational force temporarily stationed in Turkey to help to the Operation Provide Comfort. Most of the problems were caused by the loopholes in hastily drawn operation agreements between Turkey and various countries involved.

One particular incident that left a bitter after-taste in Turkey was the case of a Turkish provincial district sub-governor who was man-handled by the British troops while he was investigating an earlier accusation of corruption among Turkish troops. The opposition used the occasion to unleash a wave of protest in the country and criticised heavily both the "unruly attitudes" of foreign troops in Turkey and the government's handling of the matter.183 "An autonomous region under the mandate of the USA has come into being within our borders" was the reaction of TPP's vice-chairman, Mr. H. Cindoruk.184 Although the government tried to play down the incident, and the British marine unit that was involved was immediately ordered out of the country, the furore generated by the incident in the press and indeed among the public showed the need for delicacy while accepting foreign troops in Turkey.

However, the long-term political consequences of the crisis were much more far reaching. In July 1991, "Operation Provide Comfort" was succeeded by "Operation Poised Hammer". Accordingly, coalition forces gradually withdrew from Iraq and replaced by a task force of around 2,500, stationed at the Turkish border town of Silopi.185 Further, extra air power was added to already existing coalition forces at the Incirlik air base. The purpose of this force was to inhibit Saddam Hussein from launching further campaigns against the Kurds.

The establishment of this force was received with suspicion in Turkey amid fears that it might compromise Turkish sovereignty or would lead to an independent Kurdistan.186 The idea of new Western forces being based in Turkey was opposed by the opposition parties on the grounds that "while a Western reaction force might be the
hammer, Turkey would end up being hit as the anvil". They also questioned whether these forces would drag Turkey into undesired cross-border military adventures, and accused the government of disregarding Turkey's national interests for ambiguous aims. In addition, there were the anxieties felt by the Soviet Union to be considered. They were voiced by its Ambassador to Ankara in an interview with the daily Cumhuriyet July 18. Moscow was clearly worried about a force that had, in effect, been established in a somewhat arbitrary manner and outside control of the UN. Given the volatile nature of the Caucasus and the Baltics, Soviet policy-makers were clearly worried that this force may constitute an example that could be activated in the future against the Soviet Union. Moreover, Turkey had for years opposed a NATO, mainly US, idea of setting up a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in southeastern Turkey with out-of-area operations in mind. The new proposal thus appeared to set up exactly that force under different pretensions.

Although President Ozal, anxious to support the Western alliance, and to prevent any recurrence of the huge flow of refugees towards Turkey, had initially given a speedy green light to the force, the change of government in July 1991 brought new attitude to foreign affairs, and indeed to the hegemonic relationship between the president and the prime minister. The new prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz, seemed prepared to use his powers against the president's attempts to dominate the country's policy-making and was also anxious not to give any opportunity to the opposition to charge him with being weak on national security.

Turkey was undoubtedly worried about a repetition of the refugee crisis as the negotiations between Kurdish leaders and Saddam Hussein were going nowhere. In this sense, Turkey had an interest in seeing that the refugee crisis or a similar crisis did not reemerge. Thus, the logic of a deterrent force against Saddam Hussein could be understood in Ankara, but there was also a separate logic dictated by the sensitivities of Turkish public opinion. These stemmed from the not-so pleasant experience the last time round when allied troops came in to help the Kurdish refugees. The fact that, as mentioned earlier, the hastily-worked arrangements had subsequently caused problems
of sovereignty, resulted in the General Staff's insistence that this time the military aspects of the operation should be worked out very precisely beforehand. This meant restricting the number of troops to arrive in Turkey, determining how long they would stay and under whose command they would come.

Thus, after stalling some time on the grounds that the new government needed to obtain a vote of confidence before taking any decision, on July 5, a Turkish foreign ministry statement indicated that Turkey would give the green light soon. However, it also emphasized that Turkish troops would be joining the force and they would not engage in any operations beyond Turkish borders. Moreover, there were disagreements about the size of the force, and claims in the press that the government was trying to put the final decision off long enough to avoid possible US pressure on Cyprus which might be raised during the forthcoming visit from President Bush on July 20-21.

Nevertheless, while the last Western troops were withdrawn from Northern Iraq on July 15, prime minister Yılmaz agreed in principle to the force on July 18. But, under the mounting criticism from the opposition parties for "compromising the country's sovereignty", he felt necessary to stress that the force would be under Turkish control, that cross-border operations must receive the government's permission, and that it would only be allowed to stay until the end of September. On the same day an official note was also delivered to the countries participating in Operation Poised Hammer, stressing again that the open approval of the Turkish government would have to be sought if force was to be used against Iraq from Turkish territory, and that without such approval, the force would "under no circumstances" be able to use Turkish soil, air space or territorial waters for belligerence against Iraq. Moreover, Turkey was to contribute to the force by sending an undisclosed number of troops under the control of a Turkish commander whose status would be equal to that of the coalition forces' commander and would be in constant consultation and cooperation with him.

Hence, towards the end of July 1991, the above-mentioned task force was established according to Turkish conditions. Though the ground troops stationed at
Silopi were gradually withdrawn during the Autumn of 1991, the special air detachment at Incirlik was retained, and its mandate was renewed by the Turkish parliament in six-monthly instalments up to now (June 1994). However, every time the renewal was due, another round of controversy took place in Turkey about the "real purpose" of this force. Accusations were brought against the force to the effect that it was providing logistic and armed support to the Kurds in Iraq and that some of this aid had ended up in the hands of the PKK guerrillas who used them in terrorist activities against Turkey. Moreover, as the semi-autonomous Kurdish regime in northern Iraq moved towards semi-independence, the purpose of this force and the still existing UN security zone were questioned from the point of view of whether these were helping to create an independent Kurdish state in the region, which might eventually contest Turkey's borders, too, thus present the further security threats to her.

However, it should not be forgotten that thanks to the existence of the security zone in the north of 36° parallel, Turkey's security forces were able to enter Iraqi territory and conduct operations against her own secessionist Kurdish guerrillas, without being actually contested by Iraq. Of course, it must also be noted that in the absence of law and order, this area provides a suitable nesting ground for PKK guerrillas, who operate cross-border raids into Turkey before withdrawing back to Iraq. Moreover, there is a strong suspicion in Turkey that the Iraqi regime, since the end of the crisis, has been actively arming and encouraging PKK guerrillas.

In the mean time, Turkish policies towards the Kurdish question, including both the relations with the Iraqi Kurds and the discontent among her own Kurdish minority, were affected by these developments in the region and by the continuing campaign of attacks by the PKK guerrillas.

As mentioned above, the PKK inevitably exploited the collapse of Iraqi power in northern Iraq to consolidate itself there. Moreover, as a result of rapprochement in Turkish-Syrian relations, and that country's wish to be dropped from the terrorist-backing countries list, the PKK was forced to move most of its forces into Iraq where it found support from Saddam's regime and more importantly a secure place to operate.
from. This prompted several Turkish air-raids, and ground-troops incursions into Iraq, which attracted international condemnation and created uneasiness among other regional powers about Turkish intentions in the region.\textsuperscript{197} Both Iran and Syria were suspicious of Turkey's intentions about the local hegemony by playing trustee to the Iraqi Kurds. In order to soothe their fears and dispel their suspicions, Turkish envoys were dispatched to both Iran and Syria to explain the situation. Later on representatives of the three countries met in Ankara on November 14, 1992, to confirm their desire to keep Iraqi territory intact.\textsuperscript{198}

At the same time Turkey's policies towards Iraqi Kurds were shaped by both international interest in their fate and by Turkey's own Kurdish problem. In the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis, Turkish leaders gradually realized the importance of differentiating Kurdish discontent in Turkey from that of the Iraqi Kurds, whose aspirations had already acquired international backing, thus could not be prevented. Moreover, the isolation of the PKK from the Iraqi Kurdish organizations was also important in order to deny them the logistic back-up and secure retreat in northern Iraq. As a result a dialogue was established with the Iraqi Kurdish groups. In this turn of events, president Ozal's personal involvement was an important, if not crucial, factor. When he announced on his way to a state visit to Moscow on March 11, 1991 that Turkish officials had already held a meeting with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders at his own discretion, he created a considerable uproar in the country.\textsuperscript{199} To the astonishment of journalists, who asked the reasons for such a dramatic move, he said he wanted their friendship.\textsuperscript{200} This contact, expectedly, provoked a howl of outrage from the mainstream opposition parties. Both Demirel and Inonu accused Ozal of breaking faith with the country's Kemalist tradition by interfering in the internal affairs of another country.\textsuperscript{201} However the close involvement of both the foreign ministry and the National Intelligence in the process showed that this time the bastions of Kemalism were also thinking along the same lines as the president. Moreover, Ozal reportedly countered the interference accusations by arguing that in effect everybody was interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq at the moment.\textsuperscript{202}
The fact that president Ozal had initiated contact with the Iraqi Kurds by exchanging messages with PUK leader Jalal Talabani back in late February, when the outcome of the war in the Gulf became clear and the calculations for the post-war Iraq had started, suggests that his main aim was to have a say in the forthcoming developments in northern Iraq by befriending the Iraqi Kurds.203

It appeared that the president, rightly calculating that some sort of Kurdish entity was going to be established in the northern Iraq as a result of Gulf War and following western interest in the fate of the Kurds, preferred this to happen under Turkish influence. Further, it seemed, he expected to prevent any further inter-action between PKK guerrillas and Iraqi peshmergas, and to affect developments in the region by playing the role of protector to the Iraqi Kurds. Moreover, in this way Turkey might have been better placed to dissuade the Iraqi Kurds from moving towards establishing an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.204 And if that turned out not to be possible, and that Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq became a fait accompli, then it was much better to be "a guest at the celebrations than a sour onlooker".205 Further, it was argued that by strengthening her position with the Iraqi Kurds, Turkey was also strengthening her ability, if a need or opportunity arose, to occupy the oil fields of Kirkuk and Mousul. As put by Olson, "in short, it could very well be Turkey's position that if it's going to have a Kurdish problem, it may as well have it with oil".206 Whether this was in Ozal's mind is an arguable point, but one thing was clear that about 60% of Turkey's oil imports were from northern Iraq before the war, and thus Ozal wanted to position Turkey to be able to exercise a greater influence and achieve greater access to the oil fields in northern Iraq. Moreover, if Turkey could forge a fruitful relationship with Iraq's Kurds, in the longer term, it would counterbalance the influence Iran was trying to exert through the Shi'ites in the South. Hence, Turkey joined the regional power politics over Kurds. It appeared that Turkey's "active" Gulf Crisis policy had developed into one of not being a by-stander regarding the future of Iraq. The contact also indicated that Ozal's earlier alleviation of the language ban on Kurdish was
indeed a gesture toward international opinion and Kurdish opinion beyond Turkey's borders rather than towards Turkey's own Kurdish minority.

In fact, this modest beginning marked an uneasy, but at the same time compelling, partnership between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds, in which Turkey supplied humanitarian aid to the Iraqi Kurds and presumably supported the idea of enhanced Kurdish autonomy within Iraq, and the Iraqi Kurds in return refrained from helping the PKK, if not collaborating openly with the Turkish security forces.\textsuperscript{207} Although this was not an ideal solution for Turkey, it was the next best thing through which the two Kurdish peoples and issues (Iraqi and Turkish) were successfully separated from each other without further interaction. As a result of this mutually benefiting situation, this partnership, despite the widespread misgivings and suspicions in Turkey and faltering of especially Barzanian forces from time to time in their helpful attitude towards Turkey, appears to have been able to survive up till now (June 94).\textsuperscript{208}

Finally, in addition to the growing militancy of the PKK, the continued international interest and spotlight over the whole Kurdish issue, provoked by the Iraqi Kurdish refugee problem which was a by-product of the Gulf War, also forced Turkey's hands to make some dramatic moves towards her own Kurdish minority. In these, the imagination and personal involvement of President Ozal were again the driving forces. Realizing that Turkey's Kurdish problem had grown to a point where it demanded immediate resolution and had become impossible to isolate from external interests and influences, and believing that Turkey had to solve its own Kurdish problem, which was becoming an obstacle for Turkish-European rapprochement, in order to take up its place within the new world order, President Ozal took the initiative with a succession of gestures towards the Kurds. Thus the ban on speaking Kurdish was repealed on January 25. Moreover, he opened up discussion about giving more cultural rights to Kurds, allowing Kurdish TV, etc., and finally declared that "I am definitely going to solve the Kurdish problem. This will be the last service I perform for my nation".\textsuperscript{209}

The timing of the reforms implied that the Gulf War, or rather the peace talks after it, were the main motive for the president's move. He seemed keenly aware of
the possibility that the Kurdish question would come up at any comprehensive peace conference. And preventing the formation of an independent Kurdish state in post-war Iraq, which would clearly threaten Turkey's security, seemed the priority. It was noted that if Turkey had not moved to reform its bad Kurdish record, she would hardly have been given a chance to speak about the Kurds' future at the peace talks.\textsuperscript{210} Thus, the reform was the least Turkey had to do if it was to present itself as a credible guarantor for a prospective settlement in northern Iraq.

In the meantime, though there was no constitutional change in his position, the Motherland Party's defeat in the October 1991 general elections cost President Ozal the parliamentary support, and thus his ability to affect daily governmental policies, as he had been doing effectively since his elevation to the presidency, was sharply reduced.

Nevertheless, the new coalition government, formed by TPP and SDPP, brought new hopes to the fore.\textsuperscript{211} Though it was emphasized that Turkish would remain the sole official language and Turkey would be preserved as a unitary state, new cultural rights for the Kurdish minority, including freedom to issue books and newspapers in Kurdish and the promise to establish a Kurdish cultural institute, were granted.\textsuperscript{212} As prime minister Demirel put it, Turkey "now speaks of the Kurdish identity", and since it was impossible to oppose this, Turkey must "recognize the Kurdish reality".\textsuperscript{213}

Furthermore, during his visit to southeastern Turkey, where the PKK has been most active, Prime Minister Demirel gave indications that Turkey's policies towards the whole Kurdish issue were changing as her view on her own Kurdish minority was evolving. While talking to journalists, he stated that

...the people in the south-east are our brothers, the people in northern Iraq are their brothers and ought to be our brothers too. ...Turkey was just a bystander in the past when faced with events in northern Iraq. For instance, there was the Halabja incident. We said "that's outside our frontiers, it's nothing to do with us". This policy ought to change. Turkey's new policy should be as follows: if Baghdad commits another barbarity in northern Iraq, it will find us opposing it.\textsuperscript{214}
Although he did not mention any specific way of "opposing" Baghdad, his remarks were indicative of some changes in official thinking vis-a-vis the Kurdish problem and non-involvement in regional intra-state conflicts. In the past Turkey used to regard this kind of "incident", as the prime minister called it, as an internal matter of the country concerned. Now he was saying that Turkey was going to make them her interest too. In his press conference on December 11, 1991, Demirel further warned Iraqi president Saddam Hussein that any attempt to attack Kurds of Iraq would be countered by Turkey: "That would irritate us a lot, I don't think that it can be called a domestic affair...Definitely we'll not sit and watch". Although too much significance should not be attached to the prime minister's words, for these seemed to be directed more to the domestic audience, it was interesting to see that, after all the opposition he put against so-called "Ozal's vision", finally even Demirel himself found it necessary to talk about the need to change Turkish Foreign Policy. This more "pragmatic" approach towards the Kurdish issue in particular and towards the Middle Eastern affairs in general seemed to stem from the realization of the fact that Turkey could not pretend any more as if these problems were non-existent or would go away without affecting Turkey if she waited long enough, while they usually don't go away and fundamentally affect Turkey's interests in the region.

Most importantly, as far as the post-crisis Middle East was concerned, Turkey had to come to terms with the fact that Saddam Hussein, as predicted and feared by the "traditionalists" all along, was left in power in Baghdad, and Turkey, after the withdrawal of Coalition forces, had to, like it or not, live with him. Moreover, the Iraqi Kurdistan was still very much in a political limbo and presented a security threat to Turkey. As the feasibility of an agreement between the Iraqi regime in Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdish leadership was disappearing quickly, Turkey again, like it or not, had to accept the fact that she had to contend with a semi-independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, at least in the medium-term.

According to Turkey's calculations about the post-crisis Middle East, this was, without a doubt, not an ideal option. In a perfect world, Turkey, after she had behaved
as she did during the crisis, would have liked to see the overthrow of Saddam's regime in favour of a broadly representative democratic one in which the Iraqi Kurds - and Turcomans - would enjoy full participation and a degree of cultural autonomy, without of course a territorial autonomy or partition. Thus Turkey was extremely uneasy to see the emergence of a de-facto Kurdish government in northern Iraq in the Spring of 1992.

However, as the existing world is not a "perfect" one, Turkey, given the circumstances, appeared to accept the reality of a de-facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq, at least for the time being, and seemed willing to maintain a working relationship with its leaders. However, Turkey's condition for the durability of this relationship was continued cooperation of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership with Turkey on her struggle against the PKK terrorism. The Kurdish leaders, on the other hand, appeared to realize that their position in northern Iraq was heavily dependent on Turkish goodwill, not least because all the supplies to the area had to come via Turkey. In addition, Turkey was the dominant power in the region, one which had interests in developments taking place in northern Iraq, and whose willingness and ability to pursue her interests in the Iraqi Kurdistan had been demonstrated by frequent incursions of her armed forces. Moreover, they also appeared to realize the fact that the only reason keeping Saddam Hussein from launching another onslaught towards Kurds was the enforcement of UN security zone in the north of 36th parallel by the coalition task force, stationed at the Incirlik air base, whose existence was entirely dependent on Turkey's goodwill and cooperation.

Hence, in return for the continuance of Turkey's existing policy, Iraqi Kurds generally denied support to the PKK and did not forward any claim on "greater Kurdistan". However, neither Turkey's recognition of the "Kurdish reality", without actually offering anything substantial, nor the collaboration of the Iraqi Kurds with her were likely to brake down the PKK campaign, which, together with Turkish countermeasures, claimed the lives of more than 11,000 people in the ten years after 1984.
6. Reappraisal

Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis reflected the existence, or at least emergence, of a new thinking shaping its fundamentals. Although the Crisis had presented Turkey with difficult policy choices and at the end raised more questions than it answered, it, admittedly, had brought about potentially important changes into Turkey's role in the Middle East and forced Turkish leaders to admit the necessity of broader changes in Turkish foreign policy.

Furthermore, the Gulf War proved that it was almost impossible for Turkey to isolate itself from the influences of outside changes and developments, especially from those taking place in the immediate vicinity of Turkey. In this context, the crisis forced Turkish leaders to open their eyes to the reality that Turkey, like it or not, was an important actor in the Middle Eastern politics, and she could not go on pretending otherwise. In fact, the increasing interaction between some of Turkey's internal problems and her external relations in the Middle East - i.e. the Kurdish question, Islamic fundamentalism, and so on - and her growing economic interest in the region during the 1980s had already forced Turkey to break the shell of her traditional isolation in the region and to seek more active involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. The Gulf War, in this context, only highlighted this reality and helped to broaden the base of change in Turkish foreign policy. Also, by crystalising the need to adopt a more active and flexible policy towards the Middle East - and indeed towards the whole of international affairs in general - the crisis enlarged the number of people arguing for a change.

In addition, the Gulf Crisis further enabled Turkey to re-emphasize her strategic position vis-a-vis Western interests in the region. As mentioned earlier, just before the crisis, in security terms, Turkey was feeling very vulnerable because of perceived indifference of the Western powers towards her security needs, mainly in the Middle East and the Caucasus. The Gulf Crisis reminded the West that, even though the Cold War was over, Turkey was still located in one of the most strategic locations in the
World. As demonstrated by the Crisis, her cooperation was essential for the protection of Western interests in the Middle East. The Crisis and following developments in the region proved that even without a Soviet threat, Turkey, with her influence over regional balances, continued to hold an important place in the Alliance against the threat from the Southeast. Realization of this fact put Turkey on a new and more secure footing with the West, especially with the US.

However, the crisis also reminded Turkey that she was in the middle of major changes that were taking place all around her; in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. These were the major centres of change and insecurity in the emerging "new world order" and Turkey was right in the middle of this volatile and unstable region. In this context, the Gulf War left the region as dangerous for Turkish interests as it had been before the Crisis, if not more. This fact again crystalized the need for Turkey of to formulate a fairly complex, flexible and imaginative approach to foreign policy.

Moreover, the response of NATO members to Turkey's request for deployment of Alliance forces in Turkish territory against possible Iraqi attack was not entirely reassuring for the future dependability of NATO regarding possible subsequent out of area crisis. The extent of the debate within each country about the necessity and the wisdom of getting involved in protecting Turkey even by a symbolic force was quite significant. Further, when the force was eventually deployed, its mandate required a strictly limited response if it was attacked. Had Turkey been attacked, it was necessary to obtain another decision of NATO's central committee to respond. This reluctance and bickering to commit forces, of course, raised suspicions in Turkey about what NATO's European allies would do in the future if Turkey was subjected to a threat from the South.220

Furthermore, Turkey's strategic importance to the West was highlighted during the Crisis from the perspective of her proximity to developments in the Middle East, an out of area for NATO purposes, not in European theatre as it had been so far. This, together with the developments in the Caucasus, has brought into mind the possibility
that Turkey's posture within the Atlantic Alliance might be linked in the future increasingly with her out of area role. This was clearly in the mind of Richard Burt, American Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, when he remarked that "...the Turks...can be very useful, particularly as NATO as an alliance has to look beyond its existing boundaries and worry about the extent to which Western interests are at stake in so-called third areas, like the Middle East...like the Persian Gulf". It was obvious that in the absence of permanent Western military bases in the Gulf, Western powers have to continue to rely on Turkey's strategic proximity to the region for access to the Gulf and beyond. This geo-strategic location, of course, meant that Turkey had to be put at the forefront of any Western plans for conventional military engagements in the region.

However, it was almost certain that Turkey would not be entirely happy with either being asked to play a new role as a buffer against the "third areas" or change her posture within NATO to be more concerned with the Middle East than previously. This was something that Turkey had been trying to avoid for a long time, as had been demonstrated by her continual negative response to the stationing of NATO's Rapid Deployment Force in her territory with out of area mandate. There was no reason now to assume that Turkey would be willing to accept that role, especially when she had doubts about European intentions regarding her Europeanness.

During the hectic days of the crisis, which pressed Turkey for practical thinking and urgent responses, some of the most basic principles of traditional Turkish foreign policy had been challenged and decisions were taken mainly by President Ozal without any regard for them. His confident, risk-taking and high-profile style had replaced the cautiousness of traditional approach of foreign ministry bureaucrats. His handling of the Gulf Crisis was so fundamentally different from the usual Turkish style that this immediately brought speculations about the possibility of broader changes in Turkish foreign policy. In this context, President Ozal's television address to the nation, delivered on March 2, 1991 just after the cease-fire in the Gulf, contained important hints about what was expected in the foreign policy by the revisionists:
As I always reiterated, my conviction is that Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy. The reason I made this call is because we are a powerful country in the region. Let me also point out that there are conservatives who prefer that no change should be made to these passive policies. The reason these circles accuse me of dragging the country into an adventure is because I generally prefer to pursue a more dynamic policy for our country.\textsuperscript{224}

Although the speech was interesting in terms of showing the distance that Turkish foreign policy travelled during the Gulf Crisis, it, nevertheless, did not mention any specific action to be taken to implement this "active and dynamic" foreign policy stand.

It was also argued that the dynamism showed by Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis owed more, on the one hand, to the style and personality of Turgut Ozal, and, on the other, to the special circumstances of the Crisis than to a more general change in attitudes towards external relations of the country. Thus it was argued that the country and her foreign policy would revert back to the old style and principles once President Ozal moved out of the way and the circumstances turned to normal.

However, the following developments in Turkey proved otherwise: Turkey had moved beyond a point of no-return in her foreign and domestic policies as far as fundamental changes were concerned. It should also be noted here that, as asserted in Chapter 5/7, since most of the criticism directed against president Ozal stemmed largely from the general distrust of his personalized and single-handed style in conducting governmental affairs rather than his "vision", the October 1991 election, which ended the hegemony of Ozal over Turkey's policy making, considerably lessened the resistance to his ideas and change in Turkish foreign policy.\textsuperscript{225} This was also true for Turkey's Gulf crisis policy. Again, as argued in chapter 5/7 it was quite improbable that Turkey would follow any other course apart from giving unequivocal support to the coalition forces. Thus, once the dominant role that Ozal had played in domestic and foreign policies was brought to end by the October 1991 elections, it became much more easy for most people to consider his ideas and "vision" in a new light. This helped to consolidate the "revisionists" arguments regarding foreign policy. Although, after the

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The Gulf Crisis also had an effect on the development of Turkey's nascent democracy. During the Crisis, President Ozal, as demonstrated through this chapter, transformed the government, for all purposes, from a parliamentary to a presidential-style system. Although his somewhat enthusiastic grasp of the role of a war-time Commander in Chief and his, at best, indifferent attitude towards constitutional bodies created widespread criticism in the country, he was protected by presidential immunity on the one hand and the acquiescence of the government and the Mot.P on the other.

From the beginning of the Crisis, he emerged as one of the key players both internationally and domestically. From the international perspective, all attention was focused on him when dealing with Turkish position in the Crisis. He was the only person addressed by foreign leaders and questioned by the Western media. However, in the process the prime minister and the foreign minister, who were, according to the constitution, responsible for Turkey's actions, were reduced to playing supporting roles. This only added to the already existing criticism in opposition circles and the press. However, it was obvious that Ozal liked the attention he was getting from international circles, which he successfully diverted to accelerate his effective takeover of the powers that are normally attached to the presidency in a fully-fledged presidential systems.

The role of the Turkish parliament in the whole affair was also strongly debated. The president did not seem to have considered consulting the only representatives of the nation while adopting a crucial role on their behalf. Instead, the opposition parties had to gather signatures in order to bring parliament out of recess - and despite the fact that there was an imminent crisis at hand, it was not until August 12 that the meeting
took place. It was evident that with the daily changes in the Gulf, anything could have happened by. This alone showed how much influence the Turkish parliament had on national policy-making.

Leaving parliament aside, there was the question of whether Ozal had even consulted with the Cabinet before taking major decisions, such as the closing of the pipeline or the imposition of trade sanctions. Moreover, there were further speculations whether Ozal even bothered to consult with the Crisis Management Committee that he himself had established as they, too, appeared unaware of the decision to shut down the pipelines.

Thus, Ozal's *de facto* presidential system seemed to develop to the point at which decisions on major national issues, which could bear dramatic consequences for the whole country, were taken apparently without consultation and certainly not through normal channels. The most important aspect of all this was the hurried manner and enthusiasm with which the government on orders from the president allowed the country to drift to a position where she was simply placed face to face with the prospect of war at a time when she was neither ready for it nor desired it.

Ozal's hard-line position against Iraq during the Crisis was, as mentioned earlier, primarily designed to highlight Turkey's importance to Western strategic interest and security concerns in the Middle East. More narrowly, Ozal was aiming to reaffirm Turkey's commitment to US-Turkish bilateral relations in order to get more support from the US on wide-ranging issues. Specifically, he expected greater access to US markets for Turkish exports, an increase in military assistance, help for the modernization of the Turkish armed forces, the expansion of the strategic relationship between the two countries, and US support for Turkish expectations in Europe. In addition, putting Turkey back on the world strategic map, he expected to relieve growing pressure on Turkey from Greece in the Aegean and Cyprus and to raise Turkey's profile in the US to defeat the perennial pro-Armenian bills in Congress and to break the 7/10 ratio in American aid to Greece and Turkey. Moreover, he expected that, as mentioned above, Turkey's Western European NATO allies would be
appreciative enough of the Turkish contribution to reconsider her application for admission to the EC.

Initially, Ozal's uncompromising stance against Iraq during the Crisis enhanced Turkey's and his stature in Western capitals. As he stressed in a live television news conference, to get the same fillip for Turkey's international image through the advertising agencies she had employed would have cost the country millions. Thus "if the Gulf Crisis had not happened, Turkey might have wanted to invent it".227

In this context, especially, Turkish-US relations reached a new level of understanding after the crisis. Appreciating the role Turkey played during the Crisis, the US doubled Turkey's textile quota and provided to her with a $282 million additional assistance for 1991.228 Though this was a far cry from writing-off her total debt to the US, as it was the case with Egypt's $7 billion loan, an action which left the Turks bitter, the initial American help in various other areas was, nevertheless, satisfactory. Apart from being instrumental in securing the purchase of 40 Turkish-manufactured F-16 by Egypt, the American government also took a leading role in arranging the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordinating Group's $4 billion aid pledge to Turkey as well as persuading the Gulf states to contribute $2.5 billion to the Turkish Defense Fund.229 Moreover, the US was also effective in release of delayed World Bank credits that totalled $1.4 billion.230

However, Ozal's expectations regarding his other objectives in the Gulf Crisis were not fulfilled. As mentioned earlier, Turkey expected a warmer response from the EC to her request for closer association and eventual membership. By joining the Americans under the UN flag in Korea, Turkey had earlier worked her way into NATO. It was hoped that something similar might have happened again, regarding the EC. However, the European attitude toward Turkey's EC - and WEU - membership did not change after the war. Although the Western Europeans expressed their appreciation for Turkey's Gulf policy, there was no sign of willingness in Europe towards accommodating Turkey on the issue of closer economic and political ties. If anything, the European doors were even more firmly closed to Turkey after the Crisis than they
had ever been before. The main obstacle that emerged from the Crisis and Turkey's role in the Allied coalition was the belief that Turkey was an important and dependable Middle Eastern ally. It may seem ironic and probably ungrateful in the face of Turkey's sacrifices in holding the coalition intact, but it pretty certainly emerged that, as the EC moved to develop a common security policy, the European countries seemed increasingly unwilling to accept the additional burden of an exposure in the Middle East.231 This unwillingness to be embroiled in a Middle Eastern conflict was amply demonstrated by the reluctance showed by NATO's European partners to participate in a symbolic NATO force that Turkey requested against a possible attack from Iraq during the Gulf Crisis. It appeared, in the words of former premier Bulent Ecevit, that "Turkey's Western allies want Turkey to be a pro-Western and modernized Middle Eastern power rather than a European power situated in the Middle East".232

Furthermore, Turkey's expectations of becoming part of a wider Middle Eastern security arrangement were not realized either, mainly because of Arab suspicions. Although the desirability of Turkey's participation in a "security role" in the region was arguable,233 President Ozal, nonetheless, was keen to obtain a wider role for Turkey in the Gulf when he declared in March 1991 that "nothing will happen in the region without us being involved". Despite the fact that Turkish policy traditionally and instinctively sought to avoid any perception of playing the role of US vigilante in the region, Ozal also added that the US should also be present, or else this force would not be able to keep the peace".234

Although it was suggested that Turkey could play an important role as a model for other countries in the region, with her democratic and secular traditions as well as her liberal economy, Ozal's anticipation that for the "first time in 200 years Turkey had managed to be on the winning side of a war" and therefore could reap some benefits from it was not to be realized.235 As an early indication of what was coming, Turkey was not included in the post-war Damascus meeting where the six Arab Gulf states, Syria, and Egypt set forth new future peace-keeping forces in the region in the "Damascus Declaration".236 Further, when the time came to hold a more
comprehensive peace conference, she was not invited, even as an observer, to the Madrid peace talks between Israel and the PLO either, let alone host them as she had volunteered.\textsuperscript{237} Moreover, Turkey had to cancel a planned meeting on November 1991 to discuss the water issue in the region and her "peace-pipeline" initiative, a subject which was referred to by Ozal as a "supplementary element of peace", because of unwillingness of the Arab countries to attend.\textsuperscript{238}

During this period, Turkey's suggestion that some sort of a process comparable to the CSCE could be established in the Middle East to oversee the establishment of general security and stability in the region was also received with suspicion by the Arab countries.\textsuperscript{239} The traditional suspicions of the Arab world towards Turkish intentions in the region were heightened by the way which the government over-enthusiastically responded to US request to open up her air-fields for the use of the Coalition forces against Iraq, an Arab country for all its transgression. Thus by allowing Iraq to be hit from her soil, Turkey perhaps inevitably lost any potential chance of playing the role of mediator, as Iran was able to do, and also invited Arab suspicions to be developed in the long-term. Whatever the reasons and the prevailing conditions behind her action were - and also despite the truth that Saudi Arabia, too, opened up its soil to Coalition forces - the simple fact that Turkey allowed her territory to be used in a Middle Eastern context could well be interpreted by the Arab world as setting a precedent, once the immediate circumstances, which placed Turkey on the same side as most Arab states, had been forgotten.

More significantly perhaps, the post-war developments in Iraq deviated sharply from President Ozal's best-case scenario. The failure of the allied coalition to remove Saddam Hussein from power and dismantle his regime was particularly worrisome to Ankara. Not only did the Iraqi leader and his regime remain intact, but the Gulf War also vastly complicated Turkey's Kurdish problem. First, the Turks had to deal with the massive influx of Kurdish refugees following the collapse of the Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq. Then, in an attempt to prevent the flow of refugees into Turkey, Ankara supported the creation of a de facto Kurdish controlled zone near the Turkish-Iraqi
border under the supervision of the allied forces. It is one of the ironies that sprung out of this Crisis that whilst one of the rewards Turkey claimed from the West for her support of the Coalition forces was a promise that no Kurdish state would be established in her southern border, she ended up with supporting the creation of an Kurdish entity in northern Iraq which developed into a *de facto* state. Lastly, the Turkish government faced a growing problem in its attempts to control the PKK's violent campaign in southeastern Turkey, which received arms and supply from the Iraqi regime as a retaliation for the support Turkey had given to the Coalition forces during the Crisis. Moreover, the refugee crisis which broke soon after the defeat of the Iraqi army took away in one stroke what credibility Turkey may have gained as a result of the Gulf Crisis because of the massive negative publicity that she got on this score in the Western media. Not to mention much talk of an independent Kurdistan, the geographical outline of which was shown on Western media in detail, with borders which took in a large chunk of Eastern Turkey.

Finally, the internationalization of the Kurdish issue encouraged the Turkish Kurds into further political activism and accelerated PKK violence. Further the Allied humanitarian efforts to help the Kurdish refugees in the aftermath of the crisis set a precedent for challenging the principle of international law concerning state sovereignty. While the coalition forces were intervening on humanitarian grounds to protect a minority population from its state, the grounds were being laid for similar future cases. Given the challenging position of Kurdish resurgence in Turkey, this precedent was certainly a worrying development for Turkey.

Despite these imperfect aspects, as far as the regional power game and hegemony are concerned, the Gulf War, at the same time, created an opportunity for Turkey to establish an influence in northern Iraq that she had not usually enjoyed. Quite significantly her entry into regional power politics was not opposed, if not supported, by Western powers, especially the US, which considered Turkey as a pro-Western and loyal local ally with a strong interest in regional stability, a suitable counter-balance to possible hegemonic aspirants in the region. Moreover, as explained above, the Iraqi
Kurds, too, had to accept Turkey's dominance in the region as she controlled vital lifelines and in the process "became more dependent on Turkey than Iraq as the latter moved to impose an economic embargo" against them. This, in turn, increased Turkey's leverage against Iraq and thus her weight in regional affairs.

The extent of Turkey's influence in the region, of course, had its limitations. First of all, being directly involved in the affairs of some three million Kurds in northern Iraq in addition to some twelve million of her own, was a mixed-blessing. It carried within it the seeds of instability for the region, and Turkey, in this context, had to contain and control the Kurdish nationalist movements both in Iraq and in Turkey, as the two became increasingly inter-active and a Kurdish state or even a fully autonomous region in northern Iraq had an irresistible appeal to the Kurds in Turkey. Moreover, although it was argued that Turkey's biggest gain from the Crisis was the destruction of Iraqi power for the time being, this, as far as regional balance of power was concerned, could hardly be considered as serving Turkish interests exclusively as Iran and Syria, too, benefited from Iraq's weakness, which opened the way for their hegemonic drives in the region.

Furthermore, the Gulf Crisis also clearly demonstrated the importance of water in the regional balance of power. The discussion over the possible cut-off of the Iraqi water supply by Turkey, as mentioned earlier, showed the almost "exclusive privilege" that Turkey possessed in the region. However, the Crisis also showed that this was a privilege which Turkey was extremely reluctant to use. While she quite easily resolved herself, despite the economic disadvantages, to shut down two Iraqi oil pipelines, when it came to impeding the flow of the Euphrates river into Iraq, she resisted various innuendos - and open calls - in the western media. Besides the physical and political difficulties in contemplating such an act and the fact that the river passes through Syria first, which would be affected from any cut more than Iraq, the clarification of Mr. Kamran Inan, State Minister responsible for GAP project, strikingly revealed the difference between oil and water, "when we stop the oil, we stop the engines", he said,
"but when we stop the water, we stop life". This power, too, of course, increased Turkey's influence in the region.

On the economic side, also, Turkey's expectations were not realized. Although, there was much talk of Turkish participation in the reconstruction of war-torn Kuwait, most of the projects were already promised to Americans and British even before the end of the war, and to the great disappointment of Turkish diplomats, when the newly re-installed Kuwaiti government gave full-page length advertisements in Western press, thanking all the states participating in the campaign against Iraq by name, they simply "forgot" to mention Turkey among them. Moreover, the promises made by the Gulf states to make good Turkey's financial losses due to the Crisis and the embargo on Iraq were, despite various diplomatic initiatives, slow to be delivered and in any case not wholly fulfilled. Moreover, the much expected construction market of Iraq, too, could not be tapped by Turkish construction companies because of continuing UN embargo, which, it seems, caused "more damage to Turkey than any other country, except Iraq". According to President Demirel, the war and embargo against Iraq cost Turkey $15-20 billion, of which she had been compensated "three or four billion" by "our friends in the Gulf". Turkey was still owed by Iraq about $2 billion, he added, and was losing about $600-700 million a year that she had collected for the use of the pipeline.

More importantly, the effect of the UN embargo on Iraq was heavily felt, especially in southeastern Turkey, where the economy had depended on trade with Iraq and where Turkey's Kurds had been active, which made the embargo all the more important to Turkey. Thus, not surprisingly, president Demirel spoke of what he called the political and social problems caused by the UN embargo in southern Turkey. Therefore, Turkey wanted the embargo lifted. However, as of June 1994, the embargo was still in place, mainly because of the US resistance in the UN Security Council - but at the cost of more Turkish resentment of the West.

Finally, almost three years after the Crisis, it seemed that the much-praised Turkish-US understanding was also changing. The US military aid to Turkey had
already been cut because of US's overall budget cuts, and Turkish-American relations are strained over what appeared as successful attempt in the Congress, led by Greek lobby, in inserting a clause to the 1995-US aid bill to Turkey, conditioning 10% of the military aid to the improvements in Cyprus and Kurdish questions.

Hence, as a result, it could be argued that although Ozal's foreign policy during the Gulf War was successful in challenging the fundamentals of Turkey's traditional foreign policy, it failed to foresee the long-term effects of the crisis, and thus, while bringing about potentially important changes in Turkey's role in the Middle East, it had, at the same time, raised long-term questions.

The ingenuity of his policy during the Crisis was that it made a virtue of the support that Turkey was, in any way, bound to give to the international effort to isolate Saddam Hussein. The weaknesses were that it exposed Turkey to the Iraqi military threat during the Crisis and its retaliation afterwards, and committed her for the first time since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire to becoming involved in Middle Eastern uncertainties. This fact represented arguably by far the most important development ensuing from the Gulf Crisis with respect to vital Turkish interests. It also stood out as the most important challenge for both domestic and foreign policies to tackle before Turkey could even consider moving along with her new regional and international role.
NOTES

1. Turgut Ozal, during a "public reception" at the presidential palace on January 22, live on TV. Quoted in Briefing, January 28, 1991, pp. 6-7, "Incirlik Produces Acrimony in Domestic Politics".


5. On one occasion, his phone call to Washington caught President Bush in the middle of a press conference, which the latter immediately broke because "President Ozal of Turkey is on the line". Later footage of this incident was shown on Turkish state TV over and over again in an apparent attempt to boost the president's popularity. His close cooperation with the US during the crisis earned him the title, in the words of US president Bush, "the staunchest ally of the US". See Briefing, August 13, 1990, p. 15.


8. Although Turkish accession to the EC remains an uncertain and, at best, rather distant prospect, it seems unlikely that Turkey will abandon the ambition. In December 1991, foreign minister Hikmet Cetin confirmed that Turkey will seek full membership eventually, but admitted that "various problems" would have to be overcome first. See Milliyet, December 10, 1991.

9. For analysis of major principles through which she has conducted her Middle Eastern policies see Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, pp. 65-67; Tashan, S., "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policies in the Middle East: Prospects and Constraints", Middle East Review, Spring 1985, pp. 12-20; Sander, O., "Turkey and the Middle East", TRUD, Winter 1987, pp. 47-62; Karaosmanoglu, A., "Turkey's Policy in the Middle East", Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, Vol. 1, 1986, pp. 159-164.

10. For a perspective overview of Turkey's post-World War II foreign policy orientation vis-a-vis the Middle East see note 9, plus Karaosmanoglu, A., "Turkey's Security and the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, Vol 62 (1), 1983, pp. 157-175; Helms, C. M., "Turkey's Policy Toward Middle East; Strength Through Neutrality", Middle East Insight, Vol. 6 (3), Fall 1988.


Briefing, April 9, 1990, "Turkey Still Groping For a Coherent Policy to Meet the Challenges in Europe".

See Lesser, I. O., Changes in the Character of East-West Relations; Implications for NATO's Southern Region (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1990), who argues that Turkey stood to lose the most among NATO's southern European members from a possible restructuring of the existing security arrangements.


Sayari, op. cit.; and Briefing, April 9, 1990.


Between 1983 and 1988 Turkey, with troops sometimes numbering up to 10,000 accompanied by air power, made constant incursions into northern Iraq with the consent of the latter, especially in 1983, 1986 and 1987. Though these operations ceased after 1987, Turkey and Iraq seemed to be cooperating against Kurdish nationalists right up to the gulf Crisis. see Olsen, R., "The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13 (2), 1992, pp. 476-78 and 488-490.


For the background of the crisis over water and the GAP see Godfrey Jansen "Euphrates Tussle", MEI, February 16, 1990, pp. 12-13; and GCSS Report.
22. The GAP is a wholly state-funded $21 billion project which will irrigate 1.6 million hectares of land in southeastern Turkey, doubling Turkey's agricultural production, and increase the country's power generating capacity by over 70%. The Atatürk dam is planned to be the fourth largest in the world and, when fully operational, will have 315msq of lake behind it. See Turkish-British Chamber of Commerce, New Opportunities, April 1990, p. 19

23. The Middle East, March 1990, p. 7, "Dam Problems With The Neighbours". For a typical article which put Arab case forward see, for example, Al Khaleej, "Important Water File Reopens", May 25, 1990, reprinted in Directorate General of Press and Information, Dis Basinda Fırat Suyunun Paylasımı (Sharing of the Euphrates River in Foreign Press), May 13 - June 22, 1990, pp. 7-13. Hereafter referred as "Dis Basinda".

24. The Middle East, September 1990, "Water Warning".


26. The response of the Arab press was extremely "furious". Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz, visiting Kuwait for a summit meeting with his Bulgarian counterpart, was reportedly shocked during his trip when he saw the amount of reaction in the Arab press. Briefing, January 15, 1990, No. 770, p. 5, "The Water Issue Reaches Its Climax"; The Middle East, March 1990, "Downstream Politics", p. 43. Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, p. 92, quotes a Turkish estimate of about 400 articles that were printed in the Arab press during the one month period that the water was cut.


29. The Middle East, September 1990, "Water Warning".

30. See Frankfurter Rundschau, June 1, 1990, "Euphrates Pushes Turkey Into Insecurity", reprinted in Dis Basinda, pp. 17-18. Premier Akbulut in a written statement, dated June 17, 1991, stated that during his visit to Iraq, he was openly threatened by Saddam Hussein who told him "NATO is dispersing. Your Friend US losing power. A powerful state is the one whose words are listened to around. Nobody listens to the US any more. It won't help you either", and then asked "What is going to happen to you now?" See Cevizoglu, M. H., Korfez Savası Ve Ozal Diplomasisi (Gulf War and Diplomacy of Ozal), (Istanbul: Form Yayinları, 1991), p. 185.


33. GCSS Report, p. 11.

34. See the text of the Interview With Turgut Ozal, conducted by Ugur Dundar live on January 18, 1991 for TV-1 Hodri Meydan, released by TRT, p. 5 (Hereafter
referred as TRT). Former president Evren, too, confirmed that Turkey had long been anxious because of Iraq's aggressive stance regarding water issue. See his comments for Ajans Anadolu, January 22, 1991, reprinted in Cevizoglu, op. cit., p. 108.


37. Ibid., p. 13.

38. For expression of this view see prime minister Akbulut's statement in the Parliament on January 15, 1991, printed in TBMM-TD, 18-4, 55 (66), p. 219: "...of course, we have to take necessary measures...against Saddam, who with his habitual expansionist policies, wants to establish his hegemony in the region and has a nasty habit of using military conflicts for this aim".


41. Briefing, August 6, 1990, p. 4, "Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait Puts the Spotlight on Turkey".


43. Milliyet, August 4, 1990.


45. Even most of the Arab countries stayed silent for a few days and seemed to be waiting for a final development and/or an American response. See Briefing, August, 6, 1990, pp. 3-6.

46. Apparently Turkey's situation regarding Iraqi oil pipelines was already reminded to President Ozal by US president Bush over a telephone conversation that took place on August 3. See Briefing, August 6, 1990, p. 4.

47. The Middle East, October 1990, p. 41, "Firmly Embracing Sacrifice"; The Economist, October 20, 1990, "Will They Win The War They Hope Not To Fight?", p. 96.

48. During his dramatic visit to Ankara on August 5, when he brought a letter from president Hussein to president Ozal, reminding the friendship both country had shared and pleading not to take side with the imperialisit West. Ozal's response was quiete cold and reminded Iraqi deputy prime minister that if Iraq coplies with the UN resolution, nothing would happen and he would be happy to help Iraq. See Milliyet, August, 6, 1990; Newsspot, August 9, 1990, "Turkey Follows Developments in the Gulf With Concern", p. 1. Further there was a small scale scandal when it was revealed in the press that Ramada was allowed to enter president Ozal's presence with carrying a hand-pistol on his belt. See Milliyet, August 6 and 7, 1990; Cumhuriyet, August 7, 1990, p. 1, "What is the Meaning of This?" The argument that the state of war would effectively exist between two countries if the pipelines were "blown up", because they were not exclusive
properties of Turkey but jointly owned with Iraq, was also put forward by the
former British foreign secretary, David Owen. See *The Times*, August, 8, 1990.


51. In fact this intention of the Turkish foreign ministry was captured by the

52. This seemed at least the position of the leader of the TPP and former prime
minister Mr. S. Demirel who, after the Turkish move to close the pipelines,
remarked, during a debate in the parliament, with certain amount of exacerbation,
that "if we could have waited for another day, Iraq would closed down the pipelines
itself because there is no one to buy the oil". See TBMM-TD, August 12, 1990, p.
458.


54. In announcing the decision of the Cabinet to implement UN mandatory
sanctions on Iraq, government spokesman, Mehmet Yazar, underlined that Turkey
had decided "in principle" to do this, and said that what actions were exactly to be
taken in practice were "only details". See *Briefing*, August 13, 1990, Special Issue;
The Crisis in the Gulf, "Gulf Crisis Reinforces Ozal's Presidential System", p. 6. For
developments and discussions within Turkey leading up to the closure see *Briefing*,

55. *The Times*, August 8, 1990. Also see Dannreuther, R., *The Gulf War: A
Political and Strategic Analysis* (London: Brassey's, 1992), printed for the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, No. 264, p. 28.

56. *Chronology of Gulf Crisis*, p. 84; *Briefing*, August 13, 1990, p. 4. In fact, the
announcement of pipeline closure was made by the State Minister Mehmet
Kececiler, and the rest by the State Minister Gunes Taner.

57. *The Times*, August 8, 1990. He was, in fact, stressing that Turkey had agreed to
the sanctions in principle and how they would be put into practice was still unclear.
Thus it must have been quite a shock to him to hear from the journalist that another
6.

58. See Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, pp. 69-70; Hale, op. cit., p. 684. The
Chief of Staff, General Torumtay, after noting the necessity to take precautionary
measures for Iraqi retaliation when faced by such action, complained that he was not
informed about the closure beforehand and further speculated that, given the close
cooperation between foreign office and the General Staff Headquarters, "they (the
foreign ministry) would have informed us had they knew what was happening". See
Torumtay, N., *Orgeneral Ncicp Torumtay'in Anilari* (Memories of Orgeneral Necip
Torumtay), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1993), pp. 102-103. On the other hand,
prime minister Akbulut in a statement broadcast on Turkish television on August 13
said, while explaining developments so far, that the decision to impose complete
embargo, including the pipeline closure, was taken by the *Cabinet* on August 7,
acting on the *NSC's advice* in view of the UN Security Council Resolution-661.
This contradicts General Torumtay's memories in which he did not mention any
decision taken in the NSC of which he was a member. Moreover, president Ozal, in
his later interviews and statements, always talked about the UN decision that was
taken on August 7 and boasted about the fact that Turkey, upon immediate meeting of the Cabinet, implemented it just one hour later. See, for example, his interview with Newsweek, October 8, 1990, "How to Deal With Saddam", p. 60, and his address to an international conference in Davos, September 27, 1990, reprinted in Newspot, November 1, 1990. Further, Newspot, August 30, also stated that closing pipeline was "actually part of the comprehensive economic sanctions that the Cabinet, acting on the NSC's advice, decided to impose on Iraq". Since even the statements of president and prime minister are contradicting - as Ozal mentions no NSC meeting - this may well be an attempt to "institutionalize" a personal decision of president Ozal. The leader of the Opposition, too, restated this position in the Parliament on August 12, 1990, "...foreign minister, while trying to explain Turkey's position about the embargo to journalists, learns from those very journalists that Turkey had already closed the pipeline. Of course, he bewilders, and could not believe". For this statement, which went unchallenged by the government and/or the Motherland Party MPs, see TBMM-TD, August 12, 1990, p. 446. In fact, the most probable explanation might be that after the Cabinet's decision on August 6 to implement UN embargo "in principle", the decision for specific actions was left to the Crisis Management Committee. However, it seems that Ozal, as a president of that Committee, in fact took action even without asking other members of the Committee, that is Defence Minister Safa Giray, Foreign Minister Ali Bozer, Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut, and the Chief of Staff General Torumtay. Finally, the fact that the pipeline closure was announced by State Minister Kececiler and that later in the same day another State Minister Taner explained what further measures would be taken, showed, if not proved, who was involved in the decision-making process.

Briefing, August 13, 1990, pp. 6-7.


60. For an example of a detailed presentation of "traditionalist" view about how Turkey's Gulf policy should have been, see Orkunt, S., "Turkiye'nin Korfez Politikasi" (Turkey's Gulf Policy), Dis Politika Bulteni, October-December 1990, pp. 6-10.

61. "Turkey should not be involve in the inter-Arab disputes; should not infere; should stay above and beyond Arab disputes. We are not and should not be a party to them", argued the opposition leader, prof Erdal Inonu, in vain. See TBMM-TD, August 12, 1990, 18-1, 46(126), p. 445. Also see Robins, Turkish Policy, pp. 75-76.

62. See chapter 5/7 for more detailed discussion of the confrontation of these views.


64. For example an editorial of the daily Cumhuriyet, September 16, 1990, warned that any reckless Turkish involvement with the Americans and the British in an attack on Iraq or occupied Kuwait "could set Turco-Arab relations back to the days of Lawrence of Arabia". See also Demirel in TBMM-TD, August 12, 1990, p. 458, "This crisis will be solved. This way or that way, today or tomorrow, but eventually this will be solved. Why should Turkey be branded [after the crisis] as if she was enemy of the Arab world? We tried hard to go beyond the suspicions. What is the justification now to push Turkey into an impasse without reason?"
Ozkok, E., Hurriyet, April 19, 1993, "Roportaj: Ozal Anlatiyor" (Interview: Ozal Explains).

Torumtay, op. cit., p. 136.

MEI, August 31, 1990, p. 22, "Fillip For Ozal". Former premier Bulent Ecevit, too, complained warily of what he described as concentration of "more power in Ozal's hands than any Ottoman Sultan". MEI, December 7, 1990, p. 17, "Now The Top Generals Goes". The concentration of power within president's hands seemed also to disturb the speaker of the parliament, Mr. Kaya Erdem, one-time close associate of Ozal and co-founder of the Motherland Party, for he gave warning in his 1991-new year message against what he called the "erosion of cabinet rule", and also against Turkey joining in a war with Iraq unless provoked. The Economist, January 12, 1991, p. 58, "Still Needed, Still Stalwart".

Ozal argued that Turkey's Gulf policy should be conducted "in practical and dynamic terms rather than according to bureaucratic and academic studies". Quoted in Torumtay, op. cit., p. 114. In retrospect Ozal, too, admitted that he, during the Gulf Crisis, interfered with government's affairs "little bit more than usual", and that because he was thinking different from "friends and those who were responsible for these matters", it was necessary to "push harder" to obtain "the results we wanted". See Ozkok, op. cit.

MEI, December 7, 1990, p. 17, "Now The Top General Goes". In the words of Cumhuriyet's Hasan Cemal, the Gulf Crisis had turned to be a major opportunity for Ozal to prove his enthusiasm for power. Quoted in Briefing, September 10, 1990, p. 3.

Same observation was also made by Robins, Turkish Policy, p. 75.

This term was coined by ibid., p. 75.

By the time the war started, it was reported that up to 2 million people may have left their homes in the southeastern Turkey. See, Huge Pope, MEI, January 25, 1991, p. 10, "Heads out of the Sand".

Hale, op. cit., p. 64.


See ibid., p. 109, for president's suggestion that something should be done militarily against Iraq; p. 115, for his suggestion that manoeuvres should be conducted on the border with Iraq in order to tie up more Iraqi forces in the north; and pp. 115-116, for his stress on the necessity to conduct a cross-border action and his innuendos about Mosul and Kirkuk.

Ibid., p. 113.

In an interview on January 24, 1991, broadcast on German television, Ozal described Germany as "an unreliable NATO ally" that had been protected by the Alliance for forty years and was "now unwilling to stand by Turkey in its time of need", see The Guardian, January 25, 1991.

This move by NATO was quite important because the "Allied Mobile Force-Air" had never been activated before in response to a real military situation, although it came to Turkey on previous occasions to take part in military exercises. See Briefing, January 3, 1991, p. 3, "NATO Mobile Force Arriving After Historic Decision". This first-ever NATO crisis deployment consisted of 576 personnel and
18 Belgium Mirage 5-b fighters, 16 German Alpha light attack aircraft and 6 Italian RF-104 reconnaissance aircraft.


80. During the First World War, two German destroyers, escaping from British warships, took refuge in the Turkish straits and were then transferred to the Ottoman navy, together with their German commander and crew. Later on Ottoman entry into the War was ensured by an unprovoked attack of these ships on Russian ports under the Ottoman flag but German command, with the conspiracy of the war minister, Enver Pasha, without the knowledge of the rest of the Cabinet. Since then the possibility of being dragged into a war against her own will due to a conspiracy has daunting common Turkish mind. Among those who correlated these two issues was former premier and the leader of DSP, Bulent Ecevit, who argued that Ozal conspired to take Turkey into the war allowing the usage of Turkish bases by the Americans just as Enver Pasha had done with Ottoman destroyers. See his written statement on February 18, 1991, reprinted in Cevizoglu, op.cit., p.115.


82. Ibid., p. 3.

83. Article 92 of the Constitution states that "the power to authorise the declaration of the state of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law and, except where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international courtesy, to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey is vested in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. If the country is subjected, while the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and it has becomes imperative to decide immediately on the use of armed forces, the President of the Republic can decide on the use of the Turkish Armed Forces". The *Constitution of the Republic of Turkey* (Ankara: BYGEM Matbaasi, 1990).

84. TRT, pp. 2-3. "...If I had the opportunity to decide myself, I might have sent troops" to the Gulf "because I had different reasons". In his memoirs, General Torumtay states that, although the General Staff, in cooperation with the foreign ministry, prepared feasibility reports about sending a Turkish contingent to the Gulf and gave them to the government, there was no request at any time from the administration regarding to this, but only "president's wishes". See Torumtay, op. cit., p. 112.

85. The daily Milliyet called it "War Powers Act", August 14,1990. It included empowering the government to send Turkish troops to abroad and to permit the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey without Turkey first being attacked as well as to declare war and allow the usage of the NATO bases for out of area operations. For the original propositions see *TBMM-TD*, August 12, 1990, 18-3, 46 (126), pp. 470-71; Also see Briefing, August 20, 1990, No. 800, "How Ozal Lost the Debate - Who Won?", pp. 10-11.

86. For the text of speeches delivered at the debate by Inonu and Demirel see *TBMM-TD*, August 12, 1990, 18-3, 46 (126), pp. 429-465. The opposition's request for general discussion was defeated by the Mot.P votes, see p. 465. Although opposition parties seemed to approve the governments policy of condemning Iraq and enforcing UN embargo, they both questioned the haste with which Turkey acted in closing the pipelines and criticized Ozal's wish to stay in the
forefront of the opposition against Iraq and to take part in coalition build-up. Demirel justified this stand as "[UN] economic embargo is binding, but use of armed forces is advisory", see p. 453.

87. "Conducting Turkish foreign policy is neither right nor responsibility of esteemed Ozal" protested Demirel, see TBMM-TD, 18-3, 46 (126), August 12, 1990, p. 455. He further accused him of losing Turkey's bargaining power in the region after the crisis by being "more royalist than the king", see p. 459.

88. During the debate of August 12, 1990, see TBMM-TD, 18-3, 46 (126), p. 440 and 442.

89. The amended bill was accepted by a vote of the 216 to 151 with six abstentions. Considering Mot.P's 275 deputies in the parliament, it was pretty obvious that even this compromise was not entirely satisfactory to some of the Mot.p backbenchers, let alone the opposition which cast against vote en block. For the vote see TBMM-TD, August 12, 1990, 18-3, 46 (126), p. 476; Newsspot, August 20, 1990, "Gulf Crisis".

90. See Hale, op. cit., p. 686; For the text of the adopted bill see TBMM-TD, August 12, 1990, 18-3, 46 (126), pp, 477-78; Briefing, August 20, 1990, "How Ozal Lost the Debate - Who Won?", p. 11. The Bill gave the government "permission", not authority, to declare a state of war, and etc., only "in case of aggression against our country" and "with the aim of retaliating immediately". According to Article 92 of the Constitution, the president may decide to use armed forces if Turkey was attacked first without asking parliament's permission. Thus the bill only extended that "permission" to be used even if parliament is in session.


92. MEI, August 31, 1990, p. 22, "Fillip For Ozal"; Briefing, August 20, 1990, pp. 5-6, "The Point At Which Interests Diverge".

93. His opening speech of the Parliament on September 1, 1991. For the text of the speech see TBMM-TD, 18-4, 47 (1), pp. 5-9. This session of the parliament was boycotted by the opposition to show that they did not accept his legitimacy for presidency. See The Middle East, October 1990, p. 32; Briefing, September 3, 1990, No. 802, p. 3, "Ozal Insist on Extra Powers for the Government".

94. Robins, Turkish Policy, p. 77.

95. The vote was carried with 246 to 136, while thirty Motherland Party members were conspicuously absent from the Parliament. See TBMM-TD, September 5, 1990, 18-4, 47(3), p. 135; Huge Pope, MEI, September 14, 1990, "A Better Place in the World"; Briefing, September 10, 1990, pp. 3-4, "Parliament Meets And Ozal Has His Way"; Milliyet, September 6, 1990;


97. One of the biggest of them in Istanbul brought together on January 13, 1991, about 50.000 people in opposition to Ozal's "war mongering". See MEI, January 25, 1991, p. 10. "Heads out of the Sand". A poll conducted by Kamar and published by daily Hurriyet on August 30 indicated that 61.4% of people questioned thought that Turkey should not get involved militarily in the Gulf whereas only 21% believed that Turkey should participate in a military intervention against Iraq. Quoted in The Middle East, October 1990, p. 30, "Wary of Western Involvement", and Briefing, September 3, 1990, p. 5, "The Tug of War Between President and People".

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Robins, Turkish Policy, p. 77. President Ozal wanted Turkey to be one of the first countries to send troops to the region. It appeared that, since he realised that it was too late by this time for any Turkish units to make a meaningful difference in the build-up, he changed his mind. In fact before leaving for US in the middle of September, president Ozal said that he had no intention for the time being of committing Turkish troops to the Gulf. See MEI, September 28, 1990, p. 17, "The Price of Principles".

MEI, August 31, 1990, p. 21; Briefing, August 13, 1990, Special Issue on the Gulf Crisis, p. 4.

Newspot, October 4, 1990, "President Ozal Back from US".

When he was questioned about it in the Parliament, the foreign minister, Ali Bozer, argued that Turkey extended the agreement without negotiations because its content "is basically satisfactory for Turkey", and also because since the evolving situation in world politics, especially in Europe, had not been crystalized yet, it would have been impossible to "negotiate a new agreement to suit prospective conditions that we cannot predict" from today. See TBMM-TD, September 18, 1990, 14-4, 48 (8), pp. 172-173. The opposition, on the other hand, criticized the decision as an act which was directed to obtain American favour and goodwill while disregarding Turkish interests. See speeches by SDPP MPs, Erol Agagil and Birgen Keles, in TBMM-TD, September 18, 1990, pp. 168-69 and 173-74.

MEI, September 28, 1990, "The Price of Principles".

MEI, October 12, 1990, p. 13, "The Emperor's Clothes?".

Newspot, October 4, 1990.

Milliyet, October 9, 12-13, 1990; Briefing, October 8, 1990, p. 8.

Ibid.; MEI, October 12, 1990, p. 14, "The Emperor's Cloth?"

For speculation that Ozal did not take Bozer with him because he did not want the minutes of the meeting to be taken on record, see speech of Mr. Oner Miski, SDPP MP, in the parliament in TBMM-TD, November 10, 1990, 18-4, 49 (16), p. 146.

MEI, October, 26, 1990, p. 14, "Ozal Alone".


Briefing, December 17, 90, p. 8


Briefing, October 22, 1990, pp. 5-6.

For developments and speculations surrounding the resignation see Briefing, December 10, 1990, No. 816, pp. 4-8, "Torumtay's Resignation Seen as a Blow to Ozal". Facts on File, December 14, 1990, p. 935, "Military Chief Resigns".


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121. Apart from the President, the prime minister, foreign minister, and defence minister were present at the meeting. See *Ibid.*, pp. 120-123.


123. "...thus I came face to face with a choice of either sacrificing my beliefs by continuing to work with the President, accepting his disregard and contempt for the the state system and responsibilities, whose views I did not share from military point of view; or to give a serious warning by resigning from my post...". *Ibid.*, p. 125.


125. *Milliyet* December 5, 1990. However, the level of Turkey's "democratic maturity" that Ozal proudly spoke of was amply demonstrated about the same time by the trial, after spending of 75 days in prison, of a 16-year old girl for having hung an anti-war poster in the corridor of her school. See the *Economist*, January 12, 1991, p. 59; Chris Hellier, "Ozal; The Second Front", *Index on Censorship*, 4/5, 1991, p. 26.

126. Even the then Defence Minister Husnu Dogan, president Ozal's nephew, admitted in retrospect that Ozal's working style caused "irritation and difficulties" among armed forces. See the text of his interview with Cevizoglu, dated May 25, 1991, in Cevizoglu, *op. cit.*, p. 207.


128. See *Briefing*, January 14, 1991, No. 821, pp. 3-5, "Turkey's Stance Still Unclear As War Comes Closer".

129. Statement to press after the Cabinet meeting, see *Ayin Tarihi*, January 14, 1991, p. 34/2.

130. The Bill, in addition to permitting the deployment of Turkish troops in foreign countries and allowing the stationing of foreign forces in Turkey, specifically mentioned that the government would have power over the "utilization" of these forces. The government was also given sweeping powers on the "necessity, limit, scope and timing" of the enforcement of such powers. There were 250 for and 148 against votes and one abstention. See *TBMM-TD*, January 17, 1991, 18-4, 55 (66), p. 293, Resolution No. 126; *Financial Times*, January 18, 1991; Also Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 687.


134. *Newspress*, October 8, 1990, p. 60, "How to Deal With Saddam".
MEI, January 25, 1991, p. 11. Also see his speech during the European Security and Cooperation Summit in Paris on November 15, 1990, in which he literally urged President Bush to solve the Crisis with "the stroke of a hand militarily". Briefing, November 26, 1990, "The Gulf Crisis and Ozal's Big Turnaround", p. 10.

The Independent, Hugh Pope, January 19, 1991, "Turkey Looks on With Satisfaction".


See The Middle East, October 1990, p. 30, "Wary of Western Involvement".

Quoted from Sabah newspaper by MEI, September 14, 1990, p. 13, "A Better Place in the World".

Robins, Turkish Policy, p. 71.

There were reports that civilians from border towns in the southeast were moving to "safer places" en masse, and that people all over the country were stocking up basic food stuffs for anticipation of possible shortages. See, Briefing, January 14, 1991, pp. 4-5. For assurances of both president Ozal and premier Akbulut that Turkey would not engage in operations against Iraq unless attacked, see The Washington Post, January 20, 1991, "Interview with Turgut Ozal; An Unavoidable War", reprinted in NewsSpot, January 24, 1991, pp. 3-4; and pp. 1 & 6 for Prime Minister's statement. Also see TBMM-TD, December 15, 1990, 18-4, 53 (49), p. 326, for same assurances repeated by foreign minister Alptemucin.

Ergun Balci, "Bu Savas Bazilarinin Sandigindan Daha Ciddi" (This War is More Serious Than Some of Them Thought), Cumhuriyet, January 28, 1991; Brown, J., "Turkey and the Persian Gulf Crisis", Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol 2 (2), 1991, p. 46. For Ozal's statement to CNN see Ayin Tarihi, January 17, 1991, p. 42/1, and Cevizoglu, op. cit., p. 38. Among those who interpreted allowing the US to use Incirlik as opening second front was the leader of the opposition, prof. E. Inonu, who was quoted asking, "if we are not going to enter the war, then what for these powers are needed?" See Milliyet, January 18, 1991; and Cevizoglu, op. cit., p. 39. Also both Iran and Libya accused Turkey of helping to open the second front, see Cevizoglu, op. cit., p. 97.


See TRT, p. 3.

Hale, op. cit., p. 687. In fact, prime minister Akbulut only admitted this on the fifth day of the war. for his statement to journalists see Cevizoglu, op. cit., p. 105.

Briefing, January 21, 1991, No. 822, p. 3, "Are We At War?"; January 28, 1991, No. 823, pp. 3-4, "Incirlik and Aziz Letter Raise Fears of Attack Temporarily"; The Economist, January 26, 1991, p. 21, "One Eye on the Sky, One on CNN". The reaction of TPP leader Demirel to prime minister's statement was quoted in Briefing, February 4, 1991, "Demirel: No Opportunism", p. 5, as "to say 'our planes won't be in the war; our soldiers won't be in the war; we won't be in the war
but our territory will be in the war is tantamount to Turkey going to war on tiptoes".


150. Torumtay, op. cit., p. 113.

151. Robins, Turkish Policy, p. 80.

152. Briefing, January 28, 1991, p. 4, "East and West Have Reservations About Turkish Policy". President Ozal himself, in an interview to Greek Television "Mega Channel", said that Turkey would be reluctant to use ground forces but will retaliate if attacked. Questioned about the nature of retaliation, he added "if there is a Scud attack we will see what damage it has done and maybe retaliate with our air force, not ground forces". Interview reprinted in Newsspot, February 7, 1991.


154. According to general Torumtay, op. cit., p. 116, it was explained to president Ozal that the initial occupation of northern Iraq would not be a problem for the Turkish armed forces. However, this would almost certainly mean a long-term commitment by Turkey in the region with possible sacrifices from her defensive preparations, especially in Thrace and Cyprus. Moreover, occupation of northern Iraq would have brought in more Kurdish population under Turkish administration. This in turn would exacerbate already existing security problems in the region and thus would demand extra forces.


159. Newsspot, February 2, 1991. Even before the war, Turkish leaders seemed convinced that some sort of a security belt in the region would be created by the western powers after the crisis was over "so that their vital interests would not be jeopardised again". The Middle East, October 1990, p. 30, "Wary of western Involvement".


161. For early day developments regarding "displaced Iraqis" as the Turkish officials called them see, Briefing, April 15-22, 1991, pp. 3-4, "Refugees"; April 29, 1991, pp. 4-6, "Turkey Plays Cautiously As West Seeks To Rid Itself of Quilt"; Newsspot, April 8, 1991, p. 8, "Tragedy of Refugees in Northern Iraq"; April 11, 1991, pp. 1&7, "US and EC Support Ozal's Proposal". Also see Yavuz, T., ABD'nin Kürd Kartı (USA's Kurdish Card), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1993), for details of
Turkish and American responses to Kurdish question, both in Iraq and Turkey, before-during-after the Gulf Crisis.

162. See Directorate General of Press and Information, Special Report on Displaced Iraqis and Turkey, (Ankara, December 1991). Hereafter referred as "Displaced Iraqis". UNHCR estimates, on the other hand, put the number on Turkey's border as of April 11 at 400,000. See, Liesl Graz, MEI, April 19, 1991, p. 6, "Panic on the Borders".

163. The MEI, April 19, 1991, p. 4, described the situation, or what it called "Turkey's Intolerable Burden", as: "...then there is the clinging, ankle-deep mud, the stench, the animal entrails, the fights for food, the excrement, the children squatting where they stood, the shallow graves, the tiny, dehydrated babies' corpses." In one of the first scientific reports, a US group called Physicians for Human Rights found 40 percent of the refugees were under the age of five, 20 percent of the women were breast-feeding and between 400 and 1000 refugees were dying everyday. Quoted in MEI, April 19, 1991, p. 4. These realities reportedly had been instrumental in the US decision, after Secretary State Baker toured the area on April 8, to mount a massive relief operation. See Briefing, April 15-22, 1991, p. 3; The Economist, April 13, 1991, p. 67, "That Slippery Slope", and April 13, 1991, p. 68, "On Misery Mountain".

164. See Newsspot, May 2, 1991, p. 2, for Ozal's Press Conference in which he aired this view.

166. The exact official figure was 62,992. Ibid., p. 10.


169. Turkey's move on April 2 to call for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to take actions and again her proposed resolution on April 4, which condemned Iraq and eventually provided bases for Operation Provide Comfort, showed that Turkey was not running from the problem but was, at the same time, anxious to secure major international aid and not be left alone. See MEI, April 5, 1991, p. 6, "Turkey and The Kurds"; Ayin Tarihi, April 2, 1991, p. 7/2. In this context, president Ozal's call on European countries that Turkey would accept half of the refugees willingly if rest of the Europe would take the other half, both illustrated Turkey's willingness to tackle the situation and turned the pressure to the Europeans, who usually, as Ozal said in an interview to British Channel 4, "talk about human rights, et.c. and make good propoganda, but when the time comes to act, all escape". The text of the interview was reprinted in Newsspot, April 8, 1991, p. 6.

170. By this time, it was estimated that some 400,000 of them had already crossed into Turkish territory as there was no way of stopping frightened people other than shutting at them, which was not an option. However, another 300,000 were estimated still waiting on the Iraqi side. The Economist, April 20, 1991, p. 71, "Chaos in Turkey".

171. For developments during this period see MEI, April 5, 1991, p. 6, "Turkey and the Kurds"; April 19, 1991, p. 5, "Turkey's Intolerable Burden"; The Economist,

Former premier Bulent Ecevit was among those who argued warned that "this arrangement would mean a "counter-state" (karsi-devlet) being established under US hegemony. Even though it is called temporary, it can turn into permanent like Palestenian camps...Since this settlement would have to depend entirely on the US, it would threaten Turkey's soverignty, at least in the southeast". See F. Bila, *Milliyet*, April 15, 1991, "Karsi-Devlet Anlamina Gelir" (It Would Mean Counter-State).


At a summit in Luxembourg on April 8, the EC ministers adopted a British proposal of establishing "security zones", which came very close to promising an international protectorate for whole of Iraqi Kurdistan. See *The Economist*, April 13, 1991, p. 67; *Newspot*, April 11, 1991, p. 1. There was considerable confusion between leaders as well. While Ozal was talking about establishing a "buffer zone", Bush mentioned a "security zone", and Major asked for a "protective enclave". See *Ayin Tarihi*, April 11, 1991, p. 27/6.


MEI, April 19, 1991, p. 5. At a summit in Luxembourg on April 8, the EC ministers adopted a British proposal of establishing "security zones", which came very close to promising an international protectorate for whole of Iraqi Kurdistan. See *The Economist*, April 13, 1991, p. 67; *Newspot*, April 11, 1991, p. 1. There was considerable confusion between leaders as well. While Ozal was talking about establishing a "buffer zone", Bush mentioned a "security zone", and Major asked for a "protective enclave". See *Ayin Tarihi*, April 11, 1991, p. 27/6.


Between April 2 and May 2, 1991, according to official figures, some 400 foreign journalists visited the area. See *Newspot*, May 2, 1991, p. 8. One of the most offending accusations for Turkish side was published by the *Independent*, April 30, 1991, undersigned by Robert Fisk, who claimed rather aggressively that Turkish soldiers were confiscating and selling materials destined for refugees and asserted that American and British troops who had witnessed the looting had come to the point of shooting Turkish soldiers. However, separate investigations by Turkish, British and EC officials later concluded that there were no grounds for the accusations. See *Newspot*, May 9, 1991, pp. 1 and 7. In the mean time, the Turkish response to the accuser was harsh and Mr. Fisk became the first journalist to be deported from Turkey since 1958.

By the time the Operation Provide Control started, the Western aid was still trying to catch up with aid generated by Turkey. Turkey had given 15,000 tons of
aid to the refugees, while they received 2000 tons from abroad by trucks and an additional 9.400 tons were dropped from the air by the Alliance. MEI, May 3, 1991, p. 5. In all, according to Turkish figures, Turkey extended $298.2 million in material aid to those fleeing from Iraq during the period of 1988-1991. With the damages inflicted by the refugees to personal and public properties, environment, and due to loss of labor force, this figure rises to an estimated $398.2 million. During the same period, foreign countries sent 62.405 tents, 1.050.000 blankets and a total of 23.9 tons of foodstuffs to those taking shelter in Turkey. See *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, Vol. 5 (2), Spring 1991, "Facts and Figures on Displaced Iraqis", pp. 47-57.

"...We have been earnestly shocked by the lack of appreciation in the foreign media and public opinion for Turkey's almost superhuman efforts in dealing with a major human disaster, certainly not of our making", wrote Altemur Kilic of the daily Tercuman to the Economist in protest of one of its earlier articles. See *The Economist*, May 25, 1991, p. 4.

182. They pointed out the double standard in these reports. The scenes where Turkish troops opened fire to control desperate refugees were showed over and over, event though more refugees were killed by Western pallets of relief tossed out of the back of allied planes. MEI, May 3, 1991, p. 5, "Americans in Charge". The front page of daily Hurriyet, May 3, was taken up with a photograph of an American soldier taking aim at a group of refugees during a scramble as aid was being distributed. Briefing, May 6, 1991, pp 11-13; May 13, 1991, pp. 5-7. "Forgetting the insurmountable barriers being set up in Europe against a potential influx of people from Eastern Europe, as well as the shoddy manner in which the Albanian refugees were treated recently by Italy, the media in the West is doing its utmost to highlight every incident it can capture on film as evidence of Turkey's inhumanity. ...and seems to have embarked on a concerted campaign of mudslinging", was the response in Briefing, April 29, 1991, p.5.


185. *The Economist*, July 20, 1991, p. 77, "Big Job Few Men". In addition to 800 Turkish troops, the UK, the USA, France, Holland, Belgium and Italy send personnel to join the force.

186. See Briefing, July 8, 1991, pp. 13-14, "Poised Hammer Plan Meets Sceptical Public Reaction".

187. MEI, July 12, 1991, p. 9, "Operation Poised Hammer".


189. Ibid., July 8, 1991, p. 4.

190. MEI, July 12, 1991, pp. 5-6, "Operation Poised Hammer".


Newspot, October 3, 1991, p. 3, "Ground Units of Multinational Force Withdraw From Batman and Silopi".


TPP leader Demirel in an interview to Milliyet argued that behind the eagerness of the US, the UK, and France to help the Kurds in northern Iraq, lay their interest to create a Kurdish state in the region. Quoted in Ayin Tarihi, May 5, 1991, p. 69/5.

Also see Yalcin Dogan, Milliyet, December 5, 1991, "Cekic Guc Tartismasi"; and Yavuz, op. cit., pp. 247-250 for opposing views within the foreign ministry and the General Staff.

The Middle East, November 1992, p. 14, "Caught Between Two Fires".

In first of these raids, which Greek press branded as "invasion", Turkish forces between August 6 and 14, 1991, entered about 16 km inside Iraq, which prompted an arms embargo from Switzerland and angry voices from Germany. Iraqi protest, however, was brushed aside by the Turkish government. The Iraqi Kurdish leaders, who at first denounced Turkey's action, later warned the PKK not to operate from the area. See, MEI, August 30, 1991, p. 12, "Attacks Into Iraq"; The Economist, August 17, 1991, p. 52, "Wages of Defeat"; Milliyet, "Harekatin Bilancosu, Sami Kohen, August 15, 1991; Briefing, August 12, 1991, pp. 4-5; When the raids renewed in October, Germany attacked Turkey for "bombing Kurdish villages". Deputy minister for defence, Ottfried Henning, said in an interview that "if Turkey continues as today to violate Human Rights, then Germany would ask NATO to review its military assistance to her". Around the same time German foreign minister, Hans Schumacher, maintained that Turkey's operation was not only a violation of human rights but also fell contrary to the spirit of CSCE norms. Briefing, October 21, 1991, p. 7, "Bad Feelings Follow Criticism of Cross-Border Operation"; The Economist, November 3, 1991, p. 86, "Eye For an Eye".

The summit was attended by Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin and his Iranian and Syrian counterparts Ali Ekber Velayeti and Farouq el Shara, See Newspot, November 19, 1992, p. 1, "Resolution on Northern Iraq."

See Briefing, March 18, 1991, p. 6-7; and Ayin Tarihi, March 11, 1991, p. 157/1. Among the leaders who came to Turkey was Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and Muhsi Dezayi, senior aide of Mosoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party. It was revealed later that both men arrived Turkey incognito and held talks with representatives from the foreign ministry and Turkey's National Intelligence Organization. MEI, March 22, 1991, p. 13, "U-Turn on the Kurds". See also Yavuz, op. cit., pp. 151-154 and 161-163.

He went further in an interview to Frankfurter Allegemeine saying that the possibility of establishing a Kurdish state in the region would not pose a threat to Turkey. Cited in Ayin Tarihi, March 11, 1991, p. 157/1.


Briefing, March 18, 1991, p. 5.

Briefing, February 25, 91, pp.9-10, "No Denial on Reports That Ozal Contacted Talabani". In a commentary printed in Die Welt it was claimed that at the end of the war Ozal and Bush had agreed on that Turkey should became a protecting power in northern Iraq. Cited in Ayin Tarihi, March 14, 1991, p. 67/19.

Robins, Turkish Policy, p. 84.
205. MEI, April 5, 1991, p. 20, David McDowall.

206. Olsen, op.cit., p. 43.

207. For the response of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and their reasoning see Olsen, op.cit., pp. 492-494. Also in an interview to BBC Turkish service, Talabani claimed that Turkey had promised she would do her best to make the Kurdish cause known, would be a voice for Iraqi Kurds in Europe and America, and would support the cause of direct political relations between the US and the Iraqi Kurds. Outed in Briefing, March 18, 1991, p. 6; and Ayin Tarihi, March 12, 1991, p. 161/7.

208. The most plausible argument against such contacts has been that Turkey would have much more difficulty in persuading other states not to hold any contacts or lend any support to the PKK, given that she has had contacts with the PUK and the KDP itself. See Briefing, March 18, 1991, p.6; and Ayin Tarihi, March 12, 1991, p. 161/7.


211. The government encompassed several Kurdish-origin members including the foreign minister Hikmet Cetin. Moreover, members of a Kurdish Party, HEP, elected into Parliament from the SDPP list, initially gave support to the government, though they later broke away to form a separate parliamentay bloc.


214. Ibid.


216. In fact, as early as February 1991, just before the Iraqi acceptance of cease fire agreement in the Gulf, foreign minister A. K. Alptemucin, during a visit to The Hague, retreated from Turkey's earlier position by arguing that Turkey does "not have any preference actually. She will keep good relations with any kind of regime, even with Saddam". See the Middle East, April 1991, p. 8, "Playing to Win"; Briefing, February 2, 1991, p. 7.


218. For Turkey's initial reaction to declaration of "Federated State of Kurdistan" in October 1992, see Briefing, October 12, 1992, pp. 3-5, "Ankara Upset by Iraqi Kurds"; Yavuz, op.cit., pp. 240-248.

219. Statement by interior minister Nahit Mentese, who also reported that Turkey spends $1.4 billion in her struggle against the PKK. Turkish Press Digest, June 13, 1994, received via E-mail from Turkish Cultural Program List. According to government figures, as of December 1993, 3144 civilians, 2270 members of security
forces, and 4517 PKK guerillas were killed during the 10-year struggle. As announced by president Demirel, see the Middle East, December 1993, p. 11.


221. Quoted in GCSS Report, p. 21.

222. Ibid., p. 20.

223. When I talk about the principles that were set aside during the Crisis, I have in mind principally the "non-interference in intra-Arab disputes; compartmentalization of policy towards the West and the Middle East; and the maintenance of bilateral relations with all the states of the region". See Robins, Turkish Policy, p. 85.


225. Sayari, op. cit., p. 20, who states that "although the actual content of his foreign policy initiatives received relatively little criticism, Ozal's style in directing Turkey's course in regional and international politics was harshly denounced by opposition leaders".


227. MEI, August 31, 1990, p. 21, "Fillip For Ozal".

228. The Middle East, June 1991, p. 23.


231. Lesser, Turkey and The West, p. 35


233. Turkish Islamists for example were not happy with any kind of Turkish security role in the region linked with the West. And most Arab countries "do not have a warm feeling" toward Turkey and could have misgivings about its participation. Turkish Daily News, March 15, 1991, "Ankara Cautious on Defense Pact".

234. Huge Pope, MEI, March 8, 19991, p. 19, "Golden Future".


237. Although Turkey later, as a result of intensive diplomatic initiatives, was invited to the multilateral round of the Conference in Moscow, the initial treatment that she had been accorded was a sad reflection of where Turkey actually stood inspite of President Ozal's frequently-stated argument about the "enhanced respectability" of Turkey abroad as a result of her resolute stand during the Gulf Crisis.

238. See the Middle East, April 1991, p. 8; Briefing, November 4, 1991, pp. 11-12.

239. See Briefing, August 12, 1991, p. 7, "Differences Surface at the OIC Meeting".

241. Ibid., p. 495.
244. Briefing, March 11, 1991, p. 9
245. President Demirel as quoted in Turkish Foreign Ministry Directorate of Information, Turk Basinindan Secmeler (Selections From Turkish Press), transmitted by Turkish Cultural Program List (TRKNWS-L) via E-mail, May, 27, 1994.
CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS

In recent years, the international community has witnessed dramatic changes. None, perhaps, was so greatly welcomed as the end of the Cold War. As the Berlin Wall crumbled, the Eastern Europeans took their future into their own hands and the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Cold War was declared over and the World anticipated the dawn of an unprecedented era of peace, stability and democracy. Today, unfortunately, the wisdom of these anticipations is questioned. The initial optimism and euphoria have been silenced by extremely grave problems which have subsequently developed. The community of nations was either ill-prepared to recognize such problems or simply too slow in preventing them. However, if one thing is certain today, it is the "change" that the international system has experienced and continues to be influenced by.

Amidst the dust created by these momentous systemic changes in international politics, Turkey, once a distant outpost of NATO on the European periphery, has emerged as an important actor, poised to play a leading role across a vast region extending "from eastern Europe to western China". This change in Turkey's status, however, was not accidental, but was due to wider changes experienced within and around Turkey during the 1980s. Without denying the importance of the impetus and options that were provided by the end of the Cold War, this study aimed to explore the transformation that Turkey had experienced in every aspect of human relations during the period under consideration; this is what provided the powerful impetus to grasp the opportunities sprung from the end of the Cold War.

Today, Turkey is a country on the move. The roots and dynamics of this lie in the changes that affected her throughout the 1980s, changes without which she could not have expected to benefit from her new role as it emerged in the international arena after the end of the Cold War.

The introduction of this study identified variables that may effect and bring changes to a country's foreign policy. They were changes in the nature of the political
regime including the balance of power within, and composition of, the policy-making system; in the socio-economic dynamics; and in the external environmental circumstances. Throughout the text they provided a helpful guide for interpreting changes in Turkey's foreign policy.

The Nature of the Regime and External Reactions

During the 1980s, Turkey passed through different regimes: The decade started with a period of multi-party democracy, which was entrapped by mounting terrorism and rampant economic disasters, and which was abruptly interrupted by the September 12 coup d'etat. What followed was three years of outright military dictatorship and a transitional period which finally gave way once again to a multi-party parliament, if not full democracy. Thus, from the outset, it might seem that Turkish politics ended the decade where they had originally started. However, appearances are mostly deceptive in the social sciences. Thus, the Turkey of December 3, 1990, when the Chief of Staff, General Torumtay, resigned because the governing framework at the top clashed with his "principles and understanding of what the state should be", was fundamentally different from that of September 12, 1980, when the then Chief of Staff, General Evren, led a junta to dislodge the elected government because "the state had been rendered unable to function...and the political parties have failed to bring about unity and togetherness".

The difference between these two actions is important because, as Chapter Three demonstrated, the September 12 Coup and the developments following it were hugely important for Turkey's external relations, especially with European democracies. In general terms, it was shown that the nature of the political regime of a country affects its foreign policy and relations. Furthermore, the various aspects of this connection were identified. It was shown that the nature of the political regime of a country and its composition affects its foreign policy for mainly two reasons. Firstly, the political regime has the power to define the broader framework of the country's
overall political philosophy, which, in the final analysis, constrains, if not conditions, its choices in the international arena, since it determines how the regime sees itself vis-a-vis other regimes or state groupings. Secondly, the nature of political regime in a country also creates images outside the country and any change in the "established" political regime of a country tends to attract reactions from other countries, which, again in the final analysis, might result in pressures for change. Accordingly, it is one of the conclusions of this study that during the 1980s, being governed by a military dictatorship or a transitional democracy at best, circumscribed Turkey's options in the foreign policy arena and put constraints on her already existing relationships. Specifically, this effect manifested itself in Turkey's relations with western European countries, mainly because of the nature of her existing linkage patterns with them. Especially the western Europeans, who were non-committal in their early reactions towards the coup, in time became hostile towards it because of what they perceived as the impossibility of condoning a military dictatorship, with its deteriorating human rights record and torture allegations, and especially of accepting it within the European "democratic club". On the other hand, due to the presence of a linkage area between Turkey and Europe, the European countries chose to pressurize Turkey instead of pushing her out of the European system, and thereby their influence area. However, the "ever-lasting" foreign (read: European) pressure created a counter-reactive attitude in Turkey, forcing her to look for alternative options to Europe. In this context, president Evren's reminder that Turkey was "a Middle Eastern country as well as a European one" was indicative of where Turkey's search for new partners would lead her.

Another important aspect of the connection between Turkey's domestic political situation and external perceptions and also reflections of it, was that the effects of the democratic nature of the Turkish politics on her foreign policy gain meaning primarily in the context of Turkey's Western vocation, and external pressures are only effective so long as the subject state is receptive to them. It has been confirmed by this study that the internationalization of Turkey's domestic politics has created a constant restraint on governments, and as such had effects both on the country's domestic political
evaluation and on her foreign relations as well. The crucial factor in this connection has been Turkey's receptivity towards external, that is European, pressures due to the existence of political, economic, military and ideological linkages between her and Europe. While these linkages enabled Europeans to pressurize Turkey on certain aspects of her internal politics, especially over her human rights record and the democratization process, Turkey's own identification with Europe at the same time made her susceptible and responsive to such pressures.

Approached from this angle, it becomes easier to understand why successive Turkish governments have reacted harshly when faced with European criticism, and why they attributed such importance to the opinions of an otherwise marginal European organization, i.e. the Council of Europe. Turkey's membership of the Council was an institutionalized proof of her Europeanness for the Turkish westernizing elite, and their ideological and indentificational linkages demanded being part of that community of nations, namely Europeans.

The strength and importance of Turkey's linkages with western Europe was amply demonstrated by the fact that even during the worst period of European criticisms, the Turkish leadership chose to stay and faced the criticisms instead of taking the country out of the European realm. Thus, during the period under consideration, European attempts to influence were strongly felt in Turkey and, whatever the political rhetoric to the contrary, were responded to. Although this response usually manifested itself in publicly defiant attitudes, most of the time the governments were quietly engaged in diplomatic and propaganda campaigns in western states both to "explain" Turkey's policies and to curtail further public criticisms.

In the process, however, Turkish foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis western Europe, became dependent both on domestic political developments and on European reactions to them. The latter, in turn, were an important input in determining domestic political developments, as well. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact proportion of the effectiveness of European pressures on Turkey's democratization process, it is pretty clear that Turkey's "western vocation" and her long history of westernisation
affected this transition to a considerable extent. On the other hand, during the process, Turkey and the European countries grew apart, both because of the Turkish people's disappointment with the Europeans who "let them down in their hour of need" and also because of considerable coolness of European public opinion towards Turkey, created by what appeared as yet another demonstration of the Turk's inability to sustain a workable democracy and by a constant barrage of criticism directed towards her which highlighted her deficiencies vis-a-vis Europe and as such built up the "otherness" of Turkey.

It was asserted in the introduction that a critical international environment may create pressures on a country for reappraisal of its hitherto followed policies. In other words, it was claimed that international responses to domestic policies of a country may force it to reconsider and if necessary change its foreign policy stand. It is now one of the conclusions of this dissertation that the external, that is mostly European, criticisms and hostile international, i.e. European, environment faced by Turkey after 1980 forced the hands of her leaders to look for new foreign policy patterns and were also instrumental in Turkey's openings towards the Middle East and former Eastern Block countries. All this, of course, denies neither the role of domestic actors and internal factors, nor the effects of systemic changes in general in reformulation of Turkish foreign policy. But the emphasis here, in contrast to the official Turkish view, is on the existence of a linkage pattern between international pressures and Turkey's domestic political developments, a connection which ultimately affects her foreign policy as well.

The Composition of, and Balance of Power in the Decision-Making System

The nature of the political system also affects the combination and/or structure of policy-making bodies. It was mentioned earlier that the 1982 Constitution, prepared by the military regime, gave priority to a strong state and a strong executive within that state, and moreover favoured the president against the Cabinet, as reflected in the strong positions taken both by president Evren and later by president Ozal in their relations with the different governments. This eventually had a spill-over effect on
foreign policy, as well as domestic policies, an area which hitherto governments had tended to leave to experts and foreign ministry bureaucrats.

However, equipped with strong powers and charismatic leadership, president Ozal, for example, was able not only to canalize Turkey's external relations towards realization of his "vision", but was also able to conduct daily foreign policy as well as determining long-term guide-lines for, and thus mapping out future options for, Turkish foreign policy. Although president Ozal's successor, Mr S. Demirel, has so far used his powers with more restraint than his predecessor, the powers and the institutional structure for forceful presidential domination over Turkish politics, both domestic and external, are there for future aspirants. Therefore this aspect of Turkish politics should be kept in mind when considering Turkey's future foreign policy moves. These powers would enable presidents with a political background and strong convictions about the country's place in the world to impose their "vision" on the foreign ministry, possibly against what the latter considered as the "national interests" of the country. Since obtaining a consensus on what constitutes the "national interest" of a country is a difficult, if not impossible, task, this aspect of Turkish politics, with its foreign policy overtures, could create extreme tensions within the decision-making bodies of the country and among public opinion in general, as exemplified in Turkey during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.

In a country like Turkey where the military normally plays larger role in determining what is in the "national interest" of the country than in the liberal western democracies, a clash between the opinions of the executive and the General Staff always carries dangers of another possible attempt to dislodge those who opposed the military's vision. Although it has been argued above that the Turkey of the 1990s is much different from earlier periods, and in this context another military intervention in Turkish politics is highly improbable, it can not be entirely disregarded that the possibility is still there and one can conceive various possible future scenarios where the military might find it extremely difficult to resist intervention. For example, in a hypothetical effort for the sake of an argument, a situation can be imagined where a
break-up of the unitary Turkish state might seem imminent because of a Kurdish uprising in the southeastern corner of the country, or in an Algerian-type situation where the secular outlook of the country was threatened because of a takeover, democratic or otherwise, of power by Islamic forces, that the military might consider it as its "duty" again to "save the nation". Of course, answers to such questions as to which direction Turkish foreign policy might be forced to take if that were to occur, and what would be the external reactions to such an event, which would eventually have an important effect on Turkish foreign policy as we have seen throughout this study, could only be speculative. However, if the past is in any way indicative of the future, it could be argued that yet another military intervention in Turkey, even if it was to keep unitary, secular and pro-western Turkey intact within the western political system, could have devastating affects on Turkey's European relations and its leaders might, ironically, end up severing Turkey's western connections (if she had not already been forced out) because of the impossibility of sustaining them in the face of mounting criticisms and extreme pressures from Europe.

It was also argued in the introduction that changes in balance of power within the policy-making body can affect a country's foreign policy. In connection with this we saw in Chapter Three how the dominance of the military within the system affected both the foreign policy thinking and actions of Turkey. Later, Chapter Five showed that the inclusion of hitherto obstructed Islamic forces into the realm of decision-making bodies smoothed, if not directly called for, Turkey's openings towards the Middle Eastern Islamic countries. It was also documented that the dominance of economically minded administrators, led by the then premier Ozal, within the government led to the "economy first" principle in foreign relations, and that various political and ideological differences were disregarded for expected economic benefits. Of course, the most telling change in the balance of power within the policy-making system during the period was the gradual concentration of powers in the hands of late president Turgut Ozal. Most openly the case study demonstrated that president Ozal, in time, became the
sole policy-maker in foreign policy and in that capacity imposed his style and way of governing on foreign affairs as well.

The Socio-Economic Dynamics

The political system of a country is not, of course, strictly limited to "politics" per se. It also includes the country's economic policies, its cultural affinities, ideological inclinations, and its arrangements for social order. In this context, it has been shown that Turkey's international affinities, in the first place, affected her economic policies. It was demonstrated that Turkey's opting for the liberal economy at the beginning of the decade had much to do with her linkages with, and aspirations to be part of, the western political system. Turkey's partnership in the western political system and her essential role within it for western security interests, on the other hand, provided her with much more foreign aid and help during her economic transition than any other country that tried to do the same thing. Therefore there came into existence yet another linkage between Turkey and its western vocation thorough her transition to a liberal economy.

Furthermore, once Turkey had made her switch, her new liberal economic system demanded a certain set of political actions and international connections. The programme that introduced the liberal economy to Turkey on January 24, 1980, for the recovery of the Turkish economy, necessitated huge amounts of net foreign currency inflows into the country. The ways to generate the necessary amount included heavy borrowing from abroad, persuading foreigners to invest in Turkey, and increasing and diversifying Turkey's export potentials. However, the crucial point to all the economic measures aimed at obtaining the above mentioned results was that they all, in one way or another, depended on the willingness of other countries to respond in a way that would favour Turkey. Since it was clear that the success of the programme depended largely on the availability of foreign assistance, it can easily be imagined how Turkish foreign diplomacy had to exert itself to maintain contact with the various assisting
governments and organizations, as well as with their delegations in Ankara. Therefore, during the 1980s, as the Turkish economy progressively integrated with the world economy, the foreign ministry became increasingly concerned with obtaining necessary foreign loans, opening up necessary markets for Turkish goods, and striking necessary deals with foreign governments and sometimes even with companies in order to bring more investments into the country. Thus, as the foreign policy of the country needed to be in tune with its economic programmes, economic necessities also became an important variable of Turkish foreign policy making. As a result, for example, as Turkey's need for fresh markets was growing, so her political efforts to find openings in the Middle East and Eastern Block also increased. However, at the same time, realization of the fact that the huge sums needed by the Turkish economy could come only from western sources, demanded a continuation in Turkey's linkages with the West. Any severing in political relations would have dealt a blow to her economic transformation as well.

On the social side, too, Turkey had experienced important changes during the 1980s. The repression of the liberal and left-wing intelligentsia by the military regime, and also their efforts to promote orthodox Islam as an antidote to extremism in society, have led to perhaps not totally unexpected, but unforeseen, result of growing visibility of Islam in Turkish society, which was also effected by the world-wide Islamic revival.

Although many high level and influential MHP members were branded as "Islamist", at least partial to Islam, by the secular Turkish intelligentsia, this study did not find particular instances during the period under consideration where the used their influence to get, and obtained, policy changes in foreign relations. Giving allowance to the problems, mentioned in the introduction regarding the difficulties of separating the possible influence of Islam from other motivating values, and also in distinguishing between Islam's motivating and/or justifying roles, a possible explanation emerges from the chapter three in connection with this subdued role of the "Islamists" within the Motherland Party: the "Islamic faction" of the party was pre-occupied most of the time with a power struggle against the "idealistic" and "liberal" factions, and, at the same time,
the leader of the party, Mr. Turgut Ozal, who, as shown in chapter five, controlled the party completely, had strong foreign policy ideas of his own and thus, thanks to his delicate balancing between various factions of the party, did not allow any one faction to dictate his policy-making. Moreover, most of the time, the presence of ever-watchful President Evren against "Islamic" manifestations within Turkish politics, was also a restraining factor for Islamic influences on foreign policy.

As a result, especially up to 1989, the Islamic revival within the country had not particularly affected Turkey's foreign policy-making - provided that there was a desire and pressure for change from the "Islamists" since this is, save sporadic demands for closer relations with the Islamic countries, also difficult to pin down. Therefore, one of the actions that the Islamists were supposed to oppose strongly, that is Turkish application to the EC membership, went smoothly without significant opposition.

However, since 1989, the effects of the Islamic affinities, in connection with the ethnic and historic sentiments, seemed on the rise. Yet again, it was still very difficult to ascertain whether the Turkish public's outcries regarding the Karabakh and Bosnian conflicts were the results of Islamic connections, or rather originated from what was perceived, by public at large, as attempts to wipe out Turkish ethnic brethren in the East and Ottoman legacy in the West. The support displayed by the Turkish public in general to the Coalition war effort during the Gulf War indicates the dominance of the latter - although it could be argued that the Turkish public's support could be seen within the context that the Islamic countries themselves were divided about the issue, it may be sufficient to point out that even within those Islamic countries sided with the West there were strong anti-Western sentiments in contrast to Turkey where most of the opposition came from the outlawed left-wing Revolutionary Youth, and callings from the Islamic extremists failed to mobilise Turkish public in general.

In conclusion, therefore, it could be argued that the role of Islam in Turkish foreign policy during the period under consideration was mostly confined to the justification of the policies for which the government opted for other reasons, and Turkey's reorientation towards the Middle East during the 1980s was the result of a
combination of factors, among which the Islamic revival in Turkey occupied a small part - as indicated by the fact that Turkey turned towards the Western Europe and the Soviet Union (later on former Soviet Republics) when the political and economic incentives for closer cooperation declined after 1985.

This discussion, then, brings us to the question of the Turkish public's role in the changing patterns of Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s. As elaborated in Chapter four, all the channels of public expression were ruthlessly suppressed under the military regime (1980-83) to the point that the public opinion's role in foreign policy-making was minimal. It's affects, if there was any, during this period was only indirect in that the military regime was anxious to keep the public on its side. Thus the military leaders might have taken decisions which, they thought, would go well with the public, although, due to nature of the regime, there was no apparent domestic pressure on the military government.

Even after the return of the civilian government, the recovery of public opinion's freedom for expression was slow as a result of various restrictions formulated by the new Constitution and other related laws. As stated earlier, under the new laws, the activities of the various groupings, through which public opinion could be related to the government, were restricted to non-political areas, which by definition also excluded the foreign policy-making. Thus, most of the period under consideration the governments got a "easy-ride" in foreign policy-making as far as the public pressures concerned.

However, as Turkish public opinion became an progressively important factor in the policy-making process, parallelling the increasing democratization of society especially after 1989, the Turkish government had to resist particularly strong pressures over its policies towards the Karabakh and Bosnian conflicts.

From the government's point of view, both of these conflicts represented no-win situations. As far as the Karabakh conflict concerned, Turkish public opinion sided heavily with Azerbaijan, and the government was under pressure not to sit on the sidelines so long as the fighting continued. Non-intervention by Turkey only stirred up
public opinion and also gave Iran an opportunity to steal the lead from Turkey and play protector to Azerbaijan. Intervention, on the other hand, would have been extremely costly for Turkey in her future relations in the Caucasus, and in her relations with Russia, NATO, and the United States. Hence, in her official approach to the conflict in Nagorna-Karabakh, the Turkish government faced difficult policy choices between domestic pressures, stemming from the sympathy of the Turkish public for the Azeris, who they regarded as victims of Armenian aggression, and its desire to remain neutral and play a moderating role. Moreover, the complacency with which Armenian military advances had been received in the West did not help the severely embarrassed government, which was not only pro-Western but did its best to remain on good terms with Armenia as well as Azerbaijan. Thus, it seems that this conflict firmly underscored the dilemma that would face Turkey in its future efforts to maintain strict neutrality regarding ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet republics.

Moving along from the former Soviet Central Asia and Caucasus to the Balkans, we come across yet another manifestation of growing nationalism in world politics after the end of the Cold War, which aroused great interest in Turkish public, that is the bloody struggle between Serb, Croat and Moslem forces over Bosnian territories. Though Bosnia is several hundred miles from Turkey's borders and the Bosnian Moslems are not ethnic Turks, it seems that Turkish public opinion has developed a feeling of kinship and responsibility for the Muslims left behind by the retreating Ottoman empire from the Balkans after around five hundred years of domination. Moreover, the existence of substantial numbers of "Boshnaks", Turkish citizens of Bosnian origin, about four to five million, in Turkey further increased the identification of Turkish people with the Bosnian Moslems.

What is important for future Turkish involvement in the region is that the importance of religious and historical links, alongside ethnic bonds, seems to be on the increase in Turkey, and the Turkish government, as in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, seems to be caught in between domestic pressure and what are considered by decision-makers as sensible and responsible policies. Thus, while the
Turkish government in its official response to the crisis has been trying to be extremely restrained and has followed a policy aimed at creating coordinated policies with other states through international organizations, such as the UN, NATO, the CSCE and the ICO, in order to avoid charges that Turkey pursues pan-Ottomanist policies in the region, Turkish public opinion, increasingly frustrated by the inactivity of the West, became very critical of what they perceived as the passivity of their government.

Although the Turkish government has so far resisted public pressure and avoided direct military involvement in either of the conflicts, the increased importance of religious and historical bonds may yet result in increased public pressure on the government to act - especially if conflict spreads out, in the Bosnian context, into other areas of the region where Turkish minorities live, or, in the Karabakh context, to the Nachivan Autonomous Region - and thus Turkey may still get involved in situations where neither her security nor her national interests are directly threatened. There are already certain groups in Turkey calling for such an involvement in the Bosnian conflict in the name of Islam or neo-Ottomanism. However, such Turkish actions would be bound to attract strong reactions from a wide number of states and would be disastrous for Turkey in the long-term.

Moreover, there are much wider and maybe in the longer term more important aspects of these conflicts for Turkish foreign policy. Most notably, a reassessment among the vast majority of Turkish people about the "real face" of the "western values" and the place of Turkey vis-a-vis the West seems to be taking place. Especially in connection with the Bosnian conflict, while the Western inactivity towards Serbian aggression is increasingly interpreted as "Western complacency" towards Serbian atrocities, questions are raised about whether the West would have allowed the Serbs to conduct their so-called "ethnic cleansing" if the victims were Slovenians or Croatians, that is Christians instead of Moslems. Thus speculations that Serbian attacks were in fact part of a new "crusade" aimed at expelling the last remnants of the Ottomans from Europe were also aired.
Furthermore, there is also talk of "double standards" as the West continues to keep its hold over Iraq even three years after the end of the Gulf War, and criticisms over alleged Turkish human rights violations are ever-present, yet, at the same time, does "nothing" to prevent Serbs attempts to create "ethnically clean" greater Serbia.

These events in the Balkans, when viewed together with the Karabakh issue, where as mentioned earlier Turkish public opinion again sees a Christian solidarity against Moslem Azerbaijaniis, resulted in the questioning of both Turkey's Western orientation and the desirability of her further integration into Europe. In the meantime, pan-Turkist and neo-Ottomanist ideas made way among at least right-leaning intellectuals. Although it is not clear yet where these discussions will eventually lead Turkey, it would seem that, coupled with the frustration felt as a result of "European rejection" of Turkey, the above mentioned developments in the Balkans and the Caucasus are putting Turkey, under the public pressure, into a process of yet another reassessment of her self-identity in the early 1990s.


The importance of the external environment, especially regarding Western European reactions to the military coup and the subsequent evolution of Turkish democracy, has already been elaborated above. Towards the end of the period under consideration yet another impetus for change, originating in the external environment, came to dominate Turkish foreign policy-making and forced her to reconsider her place and standing in the world. This was the transformation of Eastern Europe and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, which had enormous impacts both on Turkish foreign and security policies and on the Turkish world view in general.

It has been argued that "perhaps no other country outside the former Soviet block has seen its strategic position more radically transformed by the end of the Cold War than Turkey". Throughout the Cold War, as mentioned earlier, Turkey was a distant outpost on the European periphery, a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Middle
East, and a contributor to the security of Europe. Turkey's geostrategic "value" was largely limited to its role within the Atlantic Alliance and, more narrowly, its place within NATO's southern flank.

By the end of the Cold War, however, all these were altered by the appearance of new zones of conflict on three sides of Turkey which arguably enlarged Turkey's role in the world. Further, the emergence of six independent Muslim states to the northeast opened Turkey's eyes to a vast territory inhabited by some 150 million fellow Muslim Turkic-speakers. The years of claustrophobia suddenly ended, and under the prevailing atmosphere of subsequent euphoria, Turkey's common cultural, linguistic, and religious bonds with the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasian republics were frequently mentioned, both within and without Turkey, and she was seen as an economic and political model for these new states. Even limited pan-Turkist ideas were circulated freely. In return, the Turks and Muslims of the former Soviet Union turned to Turkey to help them achieve momentum, consolidate their independence, and gain status and respect in the world.

It was not long, however, before this euphoria become tempered by reality, and it soon became clear that Turkey's financial and technological means were too limited to meet the immense socio-economic needs of the underdeveloped former Soviet republics as Turkey also gradually discovered that the links between the Central Asian republics and Russia, in some cases forged over centuries and reinforced by need and dependency, were far more solid than originally suspected. While optimism gradually replaced by disillusionment, there is even now a suspicion that earlier enthusiasm was merely an empty pretence, "that in reality Turkey is too weak to have more than a marginal impact on these republics".

The truth of the matter is that Turkey today is facing tremendous opportunities and potential new risks in Central Asia and the Caucasus, all of which collectively pose extraordinary and complex challenges. Having based her whole post-war foreign and security policies on the strategic importance for the West of her location vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Turkey, initially hardly welcomed the end of the Cold War. As the
relevance of NATO in the "new world order" was opened up to discussion, especially by the western Europeans who were moving towards a new defence arrangement without Turkey, she suddenly found herself in a situation where she felt threatened both by the lingering uncertainties regarding her immediate neighbourhood and by the fact that her western security connection, the anchor of her European vocation, was fundamentally damaged by the end of the Cold War, which hitherto provided her with a relative safety and stability in the region. The realization that she may find herself facing military threats virtually all around her and it may not be possible to evoke the western security umbrella for protection, shook the very foundations of Turkish security thinking and policy, and the need to reassess its post-Cold War situation vis-a-vis potential threats was alarmingly expressed at the highest levels.

Thus, by 1990, the external stimuli for change in her traditional foreign policy was its utmost. On the other hand, while the disintegration of the Soviet Union came to the fore, Turkey, too, as discussed above, was going through a process of reassessing her foreign policy orientation and some of its essential ideological underpinnings. At this juncture the emergence of the Turkic states beyond her northeastern border was a welcome break, as put by the daily Milliyet, "it has been a great thrill for Turks to realize that they are no longer alone in the world".11

Today there is a growing awareness and a new sense of ethnicity in Turkey, "in a society not very used to talking about such things",12 and the talk of a "Turkish speaking community of states stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" became increasingly common. In the process, however, the lines between "Turkish" and "Turkic" became increasingly blurred.13 In this context, it is not totally unexpected that as the "Turkic power" grows in the world, it will be likely to exert an ever greater impact on nationalism in Turkey itself, spark a more activist Turkish foreign policy, and perhaps a new quest for influence.

In the mean time, a greater Turkish role has also been favoured by the West as a counter-weight against the ambitions of Iran to influence the region. The fear that the vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet Communism could lead to an emergence of
Islamic fundamentalism among the Moslem republics of Central Asia led to the West's promotion of Turkey as a Moslem, yet a secular and democratic model. In President Demirel's words, Turkey had proved that "Islam, democracy, human rights and market economy could go together hand in hand". Although cultural, linguistic, and religious affinities were the stimulating factors for the forging of closer ties, the Turks expect to gain major economic benefits from the development of closer ties with the Central Asian Turkic republics, which are seen as promising for a growing Turkish industry. However, in the more immediate future, the region presents important challenges for Turkey.

A Summary of Turkey's Foreign Relations and Their Determinants in the 1980s

With these general observations in mind we can now draw up some concrete summaries from this study both about the factors that affected Turkish foreign policy and also about her external relations during the 1980s with specific states or state groups.


The September 12, 1980 military coup d'etat had a deteriorating effect on Turkish-European relations. Although the military regime from the beginning declared its distinctly pro-western attitude, the incompatibility of military dictatorship with the liberal democratic tradition of the West, coupled with the slight willingness on the European side to show an understanding of Turkey's political problems, resulted in widespread European criticism and strained relations. Consequently, Turkey's relations especially with the European representative institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, suffered considerably. Moreover, European organizations, and also governments as well, attempted to use their political and economic leverage on Turkey during the period to obtain an early return to democracy and improvements in human rights conditions in Turkey. Although these attempts were partly successful because of Turkey's receptiveness towards such pressures as a result
of her European vocation, they also created counter-reactions among the Turks as they resented being subjected to foreign pressures.

During the same period (1980-1983), Turkish-American relations, however, expanded as the latter, in contrast to the Europeans, showed an understanding towards Turkish problems mainly because of reigning strategic considerations. Thus, in the atmosphere of renewed Cold War, American military and economic aid to Turkey increased and a relatively unproblematic period of Turkish-American relations developed. Strategic considerations and further rapprochement in Turkish-American relations were also instrumental in Turkey's conciliatory attitude in the Aegean where Turkish interests clashed with those of Greece. As a result, the normal flight conditions were allowed to resume in the Aegean air space and, after a personal "promise" from NATO Secretary-General General Rogers to General Evren, Turkey dropped her objections to Greece's reintegration into NATO structures. However, this initial conciliatory attitude by Turkey did not result in further normalization of Turkish-Greek relations as the Pan Hellenic Socialist Party of A. Papandreou came to power in Greece in 1981 with an anti-Turkish rhetoric and propaganda.

During the same period Turkey's political contacts with Islamic and Communist countries also increased as the former needed new outlets and political allies in the face of mounting criticism and increasing alienation from Europe. The latters' largely uncritical attitude towards the military regime greatly facilitated these contacts. Moreover, adoption of a liberal economic strategy based on export-led growth demanded new markets and large foreign inflows. Given the fact that the political standstill in Turkish-European relations further hindered Turkey's efforts to rally any concerted European effort to save her, she had to turn increasingly to US-dominated international monetary organizations for necessary foreign aid, and to the Middle East and former Eastern Block for new export markets. Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq war, towards which Turkey took a neutral stand, was largely instrumental in new economic surge towards the Middle East as both countries were forced by the war to rely
increasingly on Turkey for their necessary supplies and for their connections with the West via Turkish territory.

The most important determinants of Turkish foreign policy during the military regime were, thus, the heightened strategic considerations as a result of the renewal of Cold War; the necessities and demands generated by the revitalization of the national economy; and the nature of the political system in Turkey which largely conditioned Turkey's European connections.

**Return to Democracy: 1983-1991**

Although the gradual return to Turkish parliamentary politics from 1983 onwards should have ideally provided a base for normalization of Turkish-European relations, the reality differed as European criticism continued to focus on the deficiencies of the Turkish political system and persisting practices of torture and other human rights abuses. Consequently Turkish-European political relations were slow to recover, despite the willingness and various attempts of consecutive Ozal governments. Towards the end of the decade, parallelling her democratization process, Turkey had gained most of the lost ground in her relations with the European states and institutions. Yet further progress beyond that point proved impossible, and the Turkish application for full EC membership was clearly refused in 1989 not only in consideration of Turkey's economic deficiencies, but also its political short-comings and alleged "cultural differences". This in turn created a new wave of resentment within Turkey and brought about questions over the sustainability, and indeed the desirability, of existing patterns of relations between Turkey and Europe.

Turkish-European economic relations, on the other hand, recovered from their lowest point during the military regime, despite the inability of Turkey to obtain further concessions from the Community for her exports, especially for textile products, and release of the fourth financial protocol of the EC mainly because of Greek objections. In this recovery, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the decreased purchasing power of Middle Eastern countries as the oil prices declined after 1985 played an important part
since the decline in the Middle Eastern market forced Turkey to turn to her traditional European markets. Of course, gradual relaxation of political tension also played an important role.

Turkish-Greek relations continued to be strained during the period, despite various overtures from both sides for normalization of relations, and in March 1987 reached a point of almost open military conflict over the Aegean Continental shelf. This resulted in consecutive meetings of prime ministers and foreign ministers of the two countries and since then relations remained strained but contained. The declaration of independence by TRNC in December 1983 was particularly instrumental in earlier worsening of relations. Moreover, constant Greek attempts, after its membership to the EC, to make the Community a party to Turkish-Greek disputes and its continuing blocking of the normalization of Turkish-Community relations also created tensions between the two countries. Thus both the Cyprus question and the problems between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean remain today as unsolvable as they have ever been.

Turkish-Middle Eastern relations, on the other hand, continued to develop during the Ozal governments despite the fact that part of the economic incentive for closer relations disappeared gradually after 1985. In continuation of improved relations, important roles played by the growing ideological and cultural affinities of the ruling political elite with these countries and by the insistence of Mr. Ozal to open up Turkish foreign policy towards new centres. Moreover, especially in Turkish-Iraqi relations, the perceived common security threat from Kurdish separatists was a source for closer relations. However, specially towards the end of the decade, and certainly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, relations with Iraq, and also with Syria, were strained because of the water issue, which became so explosive in the region that it was referred as a possible source of the next Middle Eastern war.

However, "the next war" in the Middle East erupted between Iraq and the US-led coalition forces over Kuwait. Turkey's policies during the Crisis, as documented in the case study, both showed deviations from her established Middle Eastern foreign policy patterns and presented important clues about her post-cold war foreign policy.
stand. Again as maintained in the case study, Turkey's Gulf policy, which was marked by active involvement in contrast to the earlier Turkish stand of not getting drawn into Middle Eastern affairs, was heavily determined by president Ozal, and as such represented part of his "vision" for Turkey's future role in regional and international politics. In the process, however, he precipitated a vigorous debate within Turkey over his role as president and the extent of his authority.

Turkish-American relations continued to enjoy cooperation during the decade, again heavily influenced after 1983 by Turgut Ozal, who concluded that the US was undisputed leader of the world and that Turkey should closely associate herself with it in international politics in order to attain her deserved place in the world, if not to prevent US influence over world politics from harming various Turkish interests. It was also true that there was a genuine appreciation, and admiration, of "American ways" in general by Turgut Ozal, which was formed during his stay in and various visits to the US. Moreover, friendship between two presidents, Ozal and Bush, further introduced a personal touch into Turkish-American relations, and strategic cooperation that reached its peak during the Gulf Crisis when Turkey unequivocally supported the American stand against Iraq. However, afterwards cooperation, though continued, somewhat cooled down as the change of governments in both countries brought into power people with more restrained foreign policy priorities. Also the logic of strategic cooperation somewhat changed its character, if not actually declined, with the end of the Cold and Gulf wars and the emergence of new conflict centres in the world. Concomitantly, American aid to Turkey declined, creating a Turkey somewhat more reluctant to commit itself to US priorities in international politics. Moreover, the preference of coalition government in Turkey after 1991 to improve her relations with Europe instead of more dependency to the US, in contrast to president Ozal's earlier preference, appears as an important factor that needs emphasis.

Turkish-Soviet (and later Russian) relations, also, continued to improve during the second half of 1980s and important cooperation especially in the economic realm came into existence. In this context, Turkey's innovative attempt to bring together
those countries bordering directly the Black Sea or neighbouring them is an interesting attempt and, though still in its infancy period, may yet develop into an important organization in the region, enabling its members to cooperate on political as well as economic areas in the future.

In conclusion, it is the assessment of this study that, during the 1980s, despite widening and expanding her connections with new centres, Turkey kept her traditional pro-Western orientation intact. Thus through her explorations, guided by the leadership of Mr. Ozal, Turkey of 1980s, while trying to keep her Western pillar untouched, despite a series of odds, has added new components - the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans - to the substance of her foreign policy. As the balance of relations was being re-ordered to make room for new actors, Turkey's multi-dimensional setting was emphasised once more and her role in bridging different cultures and geographical settings was underlined, without, however, losing sight of her Western vocation.

Finally, it should be mentioned that, in the absence of a driving force like Ozal, exercising a decisive influence in foreign policy, it is likely that the main directives and areas of emphasis in Turkish foreign policy as manifested during the 1980s should be expected continue to exist both in the external and domestic environments during the 1990s and beyond, unless dramatic international changes necessitate widespread reconsideration of its pillars. As far as domestic influences are concerned, the Kurdish separatist movement, possible serious economic difficulties, and the rising power of Islamic forces should be watched as likely factors inhibiting the smooth functioning of Turkish foreign policy in the near future.
NOTES

1. Quoted from the resignation letter of the Chief of Staff General Torumtay in Facts on File, December 14, 1990, p. 935, "Military Chief Resigns"; Also see Briefing, December 10, 1990, pp. 4-8, "Torumtay's Resignation Seen as a Blow to Ozal".


5. For recent analysis of the Turkish position in the Balkans see the Winrow, G., Where East Meets West; Turkey and the Balkans, Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, European Security Study No. 18 (London: Alliance Publishers, 1993).

6. Ibid., p. 25.

7. For representative examples of such views see the special issues of the Turkish journal Turkiye Gunlugu, No. 19, Summer 1992 and No. 20, Autumn 1992.


9. As the then Turkish prime minister Demirel put it, "we share a common history, a common language, a common religion and a common culture. We are cousins cut off from each other for over a hundred years, first by the Russians under the Czars, and then by the Communist regime". See Mushahid Hussain, "Iran and Turkey in Central Asia; Complementary or Competing Roles?", MEI, February 19, 1993, p. 19.


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