RHETORICS OF JUDGE-PENITENCE

HOW MORAL SUPERIORITY IS PUBLICLY CONSTRUCTED THROUGH

ADMISSIONS OF PAST WRONGDOING

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A thesis submitted to Lancaster University for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

April 2011
ABSTRACT

Given the increasing number of public admissions of wrongdoing by official representatives of states, other institutions and individuals, as well as the subsequent scholarly attention directed to this phenomenon, this thesis investigates one potential misuse of such practices. Here, I take Albert Camus’ novel *The Fall* as a starting point and ask if such admissions cannot ultimately be directed against ‘others’ through *rhetorics of judge-penitence*. Such an argumentative pattern aims to project the in-group as a penitent sinner which has faced its dark past and thus learnt the lessons provided by history. This creates, in turn, the possibility to construct an ‘other’ discursively as having failed to do so, i.e. as being morally inferior.

Utilising Critical Discourse Analysis in the context of the debate over the Iraq crisis in 2002/3 in three European countries – Germany, Austria and Denmark – I focus on the (mis)use of self-critical references to the Holocaust and World War II in general. Through a qualitative analysis of particularly argumentative sections of broadsheet newspapers in each of these countries, the study illustrates the, albeit restricted, existence of such a phenomenon as well as its varieties.

By exploring Maurice Halbwachs’ notions of collective memory, (non-)constructionist approaches aiming to explain the rising significance of admissions of wrongdoing and Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics in the context of the public sphere, I explain the influence of different historical contexts and national narratives on the existence and realisation of rhetoric(s) of judge-penitence. By applying Jürgen Habermas’ Critical Theory when elaborating the moral significance of memory, I theoretically justify normative evaluations of both admissions of past wrongdoing and their rhetorical misuse. In conclusion, and going beyond my chosen test cases, the thesis illuminates how admissions of wrongdoing may be (mis)used in political discourse.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my PhD supervisors, Andrew Sayer and Ruth Wodak, for their hard work and constant advice, often making this thesis different from what I initially imagined but always a more fruitful piece of work.

I would also like to thank Jan Ifversen and Christoffer Kølvraa from Århus University, Denmark for helping me to organise my research stay there and for their illuminating discussions. This stay – as well as the entire thesis – would have not been possible without the financial support of two organisations. My wholehearted thanks thus go to the Austrian Academy of Sciences for supporting me with a generous scholarship and the Economic and Social Research Council for paying the significant tuition fees.

Thanks go also to my colleagues Alexander Dworzak, Marko Markovic, Alexandra Polyzou, Paul Sarazin and Manuel Winkelkotte for their insightful discussions.

Finally, I want to thank my parents for their support over the last 30 years; clearly, I would have never come so far without them. My biggest acknowledgment must, however, go to my family: my wife Simone, my son Max and my daughter Ruth – not only because I was reading, writing or away too often but much more because doing all this would feel utterly pointless without them.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td><em>Berlingske Tidende</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td><em>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td><em>Frankfurter Rundschau</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td><em>Dagbladet Information</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td><em>Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>KUR</td>
<td><em>Kurier</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td><em>Politiken</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PRE</td>
<td><em>Die Presse</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td><em>Salzburger Nachrichten</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STA</td>
<td><em>Der Standard</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td><em>Süddeutsche Zeitung</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>WELT</td>
<td><em>Die Welt</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Collective Memory Studies</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>Discourse-Historical Approach</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview of the Thesis

1.1.1 Introducing Judge-Penitence

This thesis departs from a bar in Amsterdam's red-light district, metaphorically speaking at least, as it is in *Mexico City* that Albert Camus' last complete published work *The Fall* starts. First appearing in 1956, Camus (2006) presented a fascinating monologue by Jean-Baptiste Clamance who reflects on self-righteousness, guilt and the impossibility of innocence in order to arrive at the following conclusion:

> In sackcloth and ashes, slowly tearing out my hair, my face ploughed with scratches, but sharp-eyed, I stand before the whole of humankind, going over my shameful actions (...) The more I accuse myself, the more I have a right to judge you (87f).

This quote, to me at least, illustrates the book's leitmotif as well as the main subject of this thesis. Camus' core message seems to be that although admitting wrongdoing might threaten one's status, we often get credit for it as well. This, in turn, enables adopting a superior position from which judging others appears legitimate. Thus, Clamance (6) introduces himself as a “judge-penitent” who turns potentially self-reflective admissions of wrongdoing, which seem to hinder a positive self-representation, self-righteously against an 'other'.

This thesis elaborates on the significance of such a pattern in public debates and narrative constructions of in-group identity (on collective identities as narrative constructs see, e.g., Eder (2009) and Section 2.2). Memories of the past have always been crucial in narrating identities whereby what is remembered has largely been determined by groups' desire for positive self-
representation. This is summarised in, e.g., Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1973:§68) following aphorism: “‘I have done that,’ says my memory. ‘I cannot have done that’ — says my pride, and remains adamant. At last — memory yields”. Whilst such observations still carry truth, another tendency has emerged over the last two decades as groups increasingly admit past wrongdoings. However, going through the state of research in the growing field of memory studies reveals a research gap: many studies focus on how such admissions are publicly performed, affirm their progressive potential or reject them as either cheap and hypocritical, or a new, subtle (post-colonial) way of dominating victims of past oppression (Section 2.3.1). However, to my knowledge, no study has systematically looked at the counterintuitive misuses of apologetic performances as described by Camus.

The following three examples are supposed to give an initial idea of the kind of utterances this research is interested in, i.e. self-righteous constructions of identity through remembering and admitting past wrongdoing.¹ The first passage is taken from a paper by the German political scientist and sociologist Otwin Massing, a loose proponent of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School since the 1960s. The second quote is from a leading figure of the Austrian Greens, the country’s second-largest parliamentarian leftist party, Peter Pilz. The final excerpt is taken from a conference introduction on European security policy after the Iraq War by Holger K. Nielsen, then Chair of the second-largest leftist party in the Danish parliament, the Socialist People’s Party:

If all these pasts [National Socialism and the German Democratic Republic] are worked through, even if they should be resolved and overcome to our utmost satisfaction, we should not cede to a division of responsibility: on the one hand those responsible for remembering, commemorating, for ‘cathartic self-

¹ Throughout this study, analysed Danish and German content – short examples as well as entire articles – will be provided in English translation. The translation aims to be accessible for the purpose of understanding the passages in question whereby it is the original and not the translation which is actually analysed. The focus is on providing meaningful representations instead of one-to-one translations whereby an attempt is made to retain, e.g., grammatical forms such as active and passive intact.
reflexion', on the other hand those who are responsible for dealing with daily business, competent in political building work and economic efficiency, coping with the present, the current perpetrators. But who stops the perpetrators, the unscrupulous, unwilling to reflect, too lazy to remember (Massing, 2000:81)?

That's true, the National Socialists were above all Germans and Austrians. In principle the EU is nothing other than a successful attempt to draw lessons from fascism in Europe. American learning from its own history has yet to happen (Pilz, 2003:244).

(...) Europe has learnt from the bloody conflicts of the past. The EU was formed in part as an attempt to create a civilised counter-strategy to the centuries-long tradition of bloody wars and nationalism. Past experience can be used to give the EU a role in international politics in the face of American military prowess. Europe does not wish to reassume a warlike stance (...) (Nielsen, 2003:4).

I do not analyse these passages in detail here but want to point to their main characteristics: far from being 'ideal examples', they illustrate to varying degrees what appeared to me as being carried by a 'Clamanceian leitmotif'. In all three cases, in-group wrongdoing is, firstly, acknowledged: Massing mentions German National Socialism and authoritarian Communism, Pilz points to Austrian National Socialists, and Nielsen rejects Europe's past as consisting of "bloody wars and nationalism" (supposedly including Denmark). Secondly, and based on these admissions, all three cases claim that the in-group has morally improved: Massing speaks of working through this past and, consequently, the existence of a more or less satisfactory "'cathartic self-reflexion'". Pilz, more explicitly, identifies "a successful attempt to draw lessons" from this evil past and Nielsen, similarly, constructs Europe as having learnt the lessons. Thirdly, this representation of a reformed in-group is turned against an

2 Whilst I do claim that these cases can be read as instrumentalising admissions of wrongdoing, I do not imply that admissions of wrongdoing are always insincere or that references to them are illegitimate criticism of 'others' not having learnt (I will return to this differentiation in the course of the thesis).
'other': Massing speaks of the United States of America (USA) as being "current perpetrators" (note the double link between the contemporary USA and Nazi Germany through "current" and "perpetrators"). Pilz points to the USA and denies them any learning-process while Nielsen too contrasts Europe with the USA's warlike stances in the face of its military prowess.

The contribution to understanding contemporary links between memories and identities made in this thesis via Camusian vocabulary thus lies in both conceptualising judge-penitence as well as exploring its empirical status. In other words, I aim to fill a research gap by taking current trends towards apologetic performances seriously whilst, simultaneously, investigating their subtle (mis)use. This is accomplished within a research design in which, firstly, the Holocaust and World War II are expected to be particular wrongs to be regretted. Secondly, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Republic of Austria and the Kingdom of Denmark serve as cases. Thirdly, debates over the war against Iraq in 2002 and 2003 are viewed as potentially historic moments in which such arguments emerge. In the remaining parts of this chapter, I elaborate on this design in order to introduce and illustrate its theoretical and empirical meaningfulness.

1.1.2 The Holocaust, Collaboration with Nazism and World War II

Both the examples cited above and the scholarly literature point to an increasing significance of World War II and, in particular, to the Holocaust as tokens via which good:evil is nowadays demarcated. This is part of a development over the last two decades which commentators have labelled an "age of apology" (Gibney et al., 2008). Its paradigmatic case is the FRG, though many other countries have joined in this 'confessional practice' (cf. Cunningham, 1999; Brooks, 1999b; Barkan, 2000; Gibney et al., 2008). Whilst many of these practices have severe shortcomings, they often represent steps forward.

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3 Throughout this thesis, I prefer the phrase 'admissions of wrongdoing' in order to avoid tendentiously religious connotations of 'confessions of guilt' or the strong notion of 'apology'.

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Elizar Barkan (2000:xx) describes this development in terms of the emergence of a “neo-Enlightenment morality”, viewing it as a rather recent phenomenon. Although colonialism has also been an issue, it is the recognition and, in specific cases, admission or acknowledgment of involvement in the Holocaust that has served as a pacemaker of this development (Levy & Sznaider, 2001). Not only have successive German governments and heads of states publicly expressed regret but collaboration with Nazism has also been added to national narratives in, e.g., Austria at the beginning of the 1990s, the Netherlands and France in 1995, Poland in 2004 and Denmark in 2005.4

Tony Judt (2007:803) thus labels such admissions as the “contemporary European entry ticket”. In line with this, Dan Diner (2000:1) describes the Holocaust as “the epoch’s marker, its final and inescapable wellspring” and Hermann Kurthen (1997:46), based on quantitative surveys, claims that for “Western democracies, including Germany, the international comparison reveals that the Holocaust has been accepted as a central event in modern history that should not be forgotten”. Amongst various reasons, the following six seem particularly significant:

- The end of the Cold War enabled previously suppressed memories to become “unfrozen” (Müller, 2002:6). In this climate of now confused demarcations between good:evil, Jan-Werner Müller (2002:19) suggests that “memory has turned into a new secular religion”. In a similar vein, Bernhard Giesen (2004:10) views memory and remembering as “replac[ing] progress and revolution as the master metaphors of history – at least for large parts of the Western public sphere”. Similarly, Susannah Radstone (2000:3-9) emphasises the link

4 This has not been confined to either the Holocaust or to Europe. Recent examples include the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd who apologised to the stolen generation in 2008. In 2010, the Russian parliament acknowledged that Josef Stalin had ordered the execution of about 22,000 members of the Polish elite in 1940 in the forest of Katyn; the Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan offered an apology for Korea’s suffering under colonisation; and US officials apologised to the people of Guatemala for infecting prisoners, soldiers and mental patients with syphilis and testing penicillin on them (for literature on more examples, cf. Section 2.3.1).
between the ambivalences surrounding past and present truth in late modern societies and a general interest in the Holocaust.

- Closely connected to this question is the so-called Stockholm process and policy consequences in the wake of the Stockholm Holocaust conference in 2000. Here, the Holocaust was defined and performed as one of the main ‘founding myths’ of a democratic, peaceful and unified Europe.\(^5\)

- In Europe – especially after the signing of the treaty of Maastricht and the finalisation of its economic space – this very question of Europe’s identity was posed, following Ernst Renan’s (1996:32, my translation) remark in 1882 that a “Zollverein is not a fatherland”.

- The extraordinary role of the Holocaust might further be due to the destruction of the European Jewry as (for the time being) the last genocide affecting all of Europe, and therefore suggesting itself as the basis for constructing a common narrative.

- These debates must also be seen in relation to the massive use of violence in ‘ethnic’ conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda which reminded Europeans of their past. They highlighted the importance of human rights whereby subsequent humanitarian

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\(^5\) The first Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in 2000 is one of the institutionalised landmarks in commemorating the murder of six million Jews. Its concluding declaration (http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Affinity/SIF/DATA/2000/page1192.html [21.06.2010]), signed by over 40 high representatives of (mainly but not only European) governments, spoke of the Holocaust’s “universal meaning” and stressed “its commitment to plant the seeds of a better future amidst the soil of a bitter past” in order to “reaffirm humanity’s common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice”. Pledges to promote “education, remembrance and research” also included a suggestion for an annual Day of Holocaust Remembrance (on 27 January, the day Auschwitz was liberated in 1945). Besides various individual states, the United Nations established in Resolution 60/7 (01.11.2005) that “lessons [have] to be learnt” and that 27 January should thus become an annual international day of commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust (http://www.un.org/holocaustremembrance/bg.shtml [21.06.2010]).
interventions were routinely justified as moral crusades. It is particularly in this context that ‘Never Again’ became once more a public point of reference.

- Given that the majority of the last generation of those involved in the events of the 1940s, in particular the survivors, have died since the 1990s, communicative memory has to be replaced by more institutional means.

1.1.3 Comparing Three Paradigmatic Cases of Relating to the Past

These six reasons as well as the three examples given above indicate a transnational dimension of the increasing acceptance of public admissions of wrongdoing. Transnational influences such as the Stockholm Process (see above) indeed penetrate national contexts, but it is important not to assume the withering of national narratives too quickly. After all, transnational influences do not simply impose meaning onto a national context. Instead, they are recontextualised and gain new meaning according to pre-existing nationally specific narrative-frames in this penetrated context. This is even visible in the three brief examples above where both German and Austrian contributions address National Socialism while Nielsen, given the different Danish historical context, addresses a problematic past much more vaguely (the analyses in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 illustrate this forcefully).

This inspired a comparative research design instead of looking at only, e.g., Germany with its long history of political apologies. On the one hand, a comparative design makes the thesis sensitive to similarities and differences, over-generalisations and over-particularisations and enables the testing of a wider range of hypotheses. On the other hand, it raises the question of case selection. Besides the above-mentioned coincidental encounters with German, Austrian and Danish texts, there is a substantial theoretical reason to choose these three cases as I assume that they can be heuristically separated following an ideal-typical scheme proposed by Rainer Lepsius (1993:232f). Following

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6 Ideal-types are analytical/heuristic tools, defined as "one-sided accentuation[s] of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete
Lepsius, I identify three ideal-types of relating to the past: internalisation, externalisation and universalisation.

*Internalisation* stands for the admission of the in-group's past wrongdoings and its inclusion into dominant official narratives of the nation. As such, the positive self-representation of the contemporary in-group's identity is achieved through demarcation from its own past as the evil 'other'. In contrast, *externalisation* denotes those narratives which do not include an admission of one's own wrongdoing, e.g. the popular involvement in National Socialist wars and annihilation efforts. Wrong might be viewed as such, however, it is not linked to the in-group but is attached to an external actor. Instead, in-groups remain a positive self-image as innocent and glorious through demarcation from a negative external 'other'. In both cases, I follow Lepsius by taking the FRG as a case of the former and Austria as a case of the latter.

Lepsius' third ideal-type, *universalisation*, was initially represented by the third successor state of the Third Reich, the German Democratic Republic (GDR). According to Lepsius, the GDR did not engage with its National Socialist past but constructed 1945 as a radical break. Through becoming communist, the bourgeois source of fascism was erased and, by definition, vanished as a domestic problem. Thereby, guilt and responsibility were radically politicised as well as universalised, i.e. losing their German background. Given the lost relevance of Lepsius' case, the entire concept of universalisation has to be rethought if it is still to serve a heuristic purpose. In my adaptation, universalisation denotes a rather unsituated trans-political awareness of the Holocaust as a token of evil. Denmark, like France and others due to post-1989 developments such as the Stockholm Process, in which the post-1945 victim status of many European countries has been questioned, might

*individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified *analytical* construct (*Gedankenbild*). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (*Gedankenbild*) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a *utopia*” (Weber, 1949:90).
represent such a development. Parties – who did often, at least partially, collaborate with Nazism – now look for ‘lessons to be learnt’ from what is perceived as a universal breakdown of humanity. As such, universalisation might resemble ‘belated internalisation’. However, universalising an event such as the Holocaust with all its particularities by focusing on abstract ‘lessons’ does, potentially, enable a radical dilution of these specificities, e.g. the particularities of German modernity in the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th century. In other words, narratives within the frame of universalisation might be less restricted by their object of concern but more easily utilised. This is summarised by Dirk Rupnow (2009:75) who warns “against a memory that makes the past disposable to the present”. Related to this is a further reason to choose Denmark as my third case because the country was a belligerent power in 2003 and its government needed to legitimise its stance (for detailed reflections on legitimation and/through language in general, cf. Chilton, 2004).

The assumption is thus that Germany, Austria and Denmark illustrate three different frames, constraining the nations’ debates in salient ways which, in turn, might affect both the existence and form of judge-penitence. However, the claim is not that these cases are ideal-types as all three tendencies are found to some degree in all three countries (Footnote 6).

1.1.4 The Crisis over Iraq as a Playing Field for Judge-Penitence

Given that identities, i.e. narratives about ‘us’ and ‘them’, only need to be thematised in moments of crisis, i.e. when routines are suddenly problematised, debates over the USA’s stance towards Iraq and European responses in 2002 and 2003 seem to be ideal moments when judge-penitence might emerge. Concerning the cases of Germany, Austria and Denmark, all three countries experienced heated debates (for one of the few coherent surveys on how their national publics saw a potential military intervention, cf. Table 1. As this table is relevant for understanding the context of these public debates, I will refer to it throughout the thesis.).
Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq? If the United States intervenes militarily in Iraq without a preliminary decision of the United Nations?

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Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq? If the United Nations Security Council decides on a military intervention in Iraq?

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Table 1: Levels of acceptance and resistance to military intervention against Iraq in Germany, Austria and Denmark (EOS Gallup, 2003:4-8)

As presented below, I aim to identify a key period of investigation around the quantitative peak of these debates in the most argumentative sections of broadsheet newspapers of diverse political orientation. I assume that subtle argumentative forms, like judge-penitence, might be found – if they exist at all – exactly in such genres and during periods of ‘existential’ debate on self and other.

Having opted for the Iraq crisis as the period of investigation, I want to stress that my analysis and evaluation of a particular argument possibly used during these debates neither evaluates nor addresses the decision to go to war itself. To include this would go far beyond the scope of this thesis. Put simply, it is the argumentative form of judge-penitence, not the Iraq War, that is the subject of this thesis.
In sum, this study uses the crisis over Iraq in 2002/3 as a test case to assess whether Clamance’s leitmotif can shed light on the subtle construction of symbolic boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The study thereby proposes a coherent framework in order to explain, understand and evaluate a phenomenon in late-modern, increasingly post-heroic societies in which admissions of wrongdoing become common but might also be instrumentalised. In the following, I refer to this process as *rhetorics of judge-penitence*, emphasising, firstly, its various manifestations, secondly, its discursiveness instead of personalising the phenomenon and, thirdly, viewing it as a *modus operandi* instead of a hypothesised structure.7

This focus connects well with my research design, i.e. the investigation of discourses on, firstly, the Holocaust and World War II, secondly, three particular nations and their pasts and, thirdly, the Iraq crisis. I thus conclude this introductory overview with a brief remarks on my methodological framework, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) within Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA investigates language use beyond the sentence level as well as other forms of meaning-making, such as visuals and sounds, by seeing them as irreducible elements in the (re)production of society. As Critical Discourse Analysis, it aims to denaturalise the role discourses play in the (re)production of unjustifiably non-inclusive and non-egalitarian structures and challenges the social conditions in which they are embedded. As such, discourses stand in a mutual relationship with other semiotic structures and material institutions, and shape and are shaped by them (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997:258). It is within this wider perspective on discourse as a social practice with causal powers that the following research questions (RQ) emerge and will be addressed.

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7 *Rhetoric* here denotes neither exclusively a Sophist understanding of rhetoric as an intentional way of persuading, because rhetorics of judge-penitence are not necessarily intentionally applied, nor an Aristotelian understanding. The latter views rhetoric as the art and science of expressing oneself, including persuasive speech, but only to the extent to which it helps to establish the truth concerning a particular subject matter (Aristotle 1982, I, 1, 12-14 and III, 7, 4). The latter contrasts with judge-penitence as a regressive mode of self-legitimation.
1.2 Research Questions

RQ I: Do rhetorics of judge-penitence exist in the public debates investigated?

RQ II: How are rhetorics of judge-penitence empirically separable from other discursive micro-strategies of positive self- and negative-other representation?

RQ III: Do self-representations of Germany, Austria and Denmark since 1945/1989 allow the linking of these empirical cases to Lepsius’ ideal-types of internalisation, externalisation and universalisation?

RQ IV: Do dominating narratives concerning the past influence the debate on the war in Iraq, especially concerning the existence and/or realisation of rhetorics of judge-penitence?

RQ V: How and to what extent can admissions of wrongdoing be understood as contributing to successful moral learning processes?

RQ VI: In case of the existence of rhetorics of judge-penitence, can admissions of wrongdoing be understood as potentially blocking moral learning processes?

RQ VII: In case of the existence of rhetorics of judge-penitence: are there differences between rather left/rightist applications of this form of argument?

RQ VIII: Who is constructed as the ‘other’ by users of such a rhetoric; is there one particular ‘other’?

1.3 Thesis Outline

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 aims to clarify my understanding of the notion of collective memory in terms of a selectively constructed, fluid and dialogical narrative frame. As such, collective memory is neither hypostatised nor based on psychological analogies. Given that rhetorics of judge-penitence rest on admissions or at least acknowledgments of wrongdoing, this chapter further
elaborates on increasingly widespread ‘confessional practices’. It assesses (non-)constructionist explanations of these practices and, in order to avoid the shortcomings of purely constructionist approaches, presents a link between historical events and societal constructions by referring to Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics and the concept of the public sphere.

Chapter 3 introduces the key concept of this thesis, i.e. the rhetoric of judge-penitence as an ideal-type while, simultaneously, illustrating empirical varieties. The former will be achieved through making recourse to Camus’ *The Fall* as well as to other sources. In so doing, I aim to go beyond viewing public admissions of wrongdoing as either (potentially) progressive ways of relating to one’s past, or as subtle ways to downplay past wrongdoings. Instead, I point to counterintuitive ramifications of (at least in some cases) serious and sincere admissions of past failure. This is accomplished by making rather heuristic use of some aspects of Stephen Toulmin’s argumentation theory. Via this operationalisation, I outline the functioning of rhetorics of judge-penitence and present some indicative analysis.

Up to this point, I have presupposed the reader’s compliance in understanding admissions of wrongdoing as progressive and normatively desirable, and rhetorics of judge-penitence as regressive. Whilst it is true that all “identities are constructed through, not outside difference” (Hall, 1996:4), it seems equally plausible that not every construction of difference is equally problematic. Justifying this claim is, in a nutshell, the subject of Chapter 4. By discussing Jürgen Habermas’ language philosophy, I elaborate on how this might be done. Given that Habermas’ approach has attracted ample criticism, I furthermore juxtapose it with three critical positions relevant to the subject matter of memory: communitarianism, ethical naturalism and Foucaultian post-structuralism. Whilst I would generally defend a Habermasian approach, this thesis neither seeks to provide an exhaustive defence of it nor claims that further arguments cannot be made on all sides. Instead, criticism by these rival approaches should, hopefully, clarify a Habermasian position on memory and morality.
Chapter 5, firstly, presents the methodological framework of this thesis, the DHA in CDA. By placing this chapter at the centre of my study, I will be able to implement insights from previous chapters, in particular the elaborations on Habermas, in order to make the emancipatory dimension of CDA explicit. In particular, this will enable a comprehensive justification of CDA’s notion of critique. Secondly, the chapter gives an account of the data in my analysis. In particular, I outline a method of data selection and downsizing in order to prevent, as far as possible, accusations commonly made against qualitative studies such as that of ‘cherry-picking’ data.

The three subsequent chapters, Chapters 6, 7 and 8, constitute the empirical core of this thesis by, in each case, firstly, outlining the historical context of the respective country, secondly, presenting the situational context of the particular debate and, thirdly, conducting a detailed analysis of three articles. Although I will discuss more examples in order to illustrate the varieties of judge-penitence, analysing nine examples in total can clearly not fully represent the discourses on the three nations’ narratives of the past during the Iraq crisis. However, this is not the point of this study which, first and foremost, aims to explore and illustrate rhetorics of judge-penitence, showing their realisation instead of making claims about their prevalence.

In my conclusion, in Chapter 9, I bring together my key findings by means of reflecting on the above research questions. That chapter furthermore addresses the limitations of this study. Finally, it briefly touches on the role of intellectuals as a carrier group of rhetorics of judge-penitence and warns against allegedly progressive but ultimately (mis)uses of admissions of wrongdoing.
2. COLLECTIVE MEMORIES AND/THROUGH APOLOGETIC PERFORMANCES

2.1 Overview of the Chapter

Given that the human species is significantly less determined by instincts and other faculties than are (other) animals, the ability to recall and learn has proved to be a central evolutionary trait. But beyond such a functional reading, the very individuality and sociality of human beings is constituted by what is (chosen to be) remembered. In other words, memories are about identities are about meanings (Casey, 2000:309; Rose, 2003; Conway, 2005). As such, identities which are established, among other things, through what is recalled, consist not of every experience but are selective constructions. This is true both in the case of constructing individual autobiographical memories and their social frameworks, i.e. what is called collective memories (see below). This link between identities as well as memories is emphasised by Giesen (2004:109; also Eder, 2005:202) who states that "[n]o construction of collective identity can entirely dispense with memory. Memory supports or even creates the assumption of stability that demarcates identity in distinction to the incessant change of the phenomenal world". In short, memories provide reasons which justify identities, i.e. narratives which establish particular demarcations from ‘others’.

Even against this background, the “commemorative fever” (Misztal, 2003:2), “memory wave” (Fogu & Kansteiner, 2006:285) or “memory boom” (Winter, 2006:17) of the last 20 years is anything but self-explanatory. After all, what seems to occupy at least ‘the West’ are not memories per se but the in-group’s past wrongdoings and subsequent apologetic performances (In the following, this will include not only high-profile political apologies at commemorative events but also relevant interventions by intellectuals or, even more mundane, journalistic articles.). In order to be able to approach the core theme of this thesis, judge-penitence, i.e. the construction of others as morally inferior through admissions of one’s own past wrongdoings, such admissions have to be examined.
Given that the notion of collective memory is not in itself the central theme of this thesis, the review of several of its relevant dimensions will of necessity be brief. I start by clarifying the notion in terms of a shared framework. Taking into consideration that the recent “memory boom” is particularly concerned with apologetic performances, Section 2.3 discusses public admissions of past wrongdoings as increasingly significant elements of collective memories and thus the construction of groups’ symbolic boundaries. Section 2.4 consequently addresses explanations of the emergence of such admissions through misleading references to psychoanalytical concepts and radical constructionist counter-proposals. This leads on to a discussion of Peirceian semiotics and public deliberation as alternative explanatory devices via which collective memories should be approached. The chapter ends by synthesising the various sections.

2.2 What is Collective Memory?

In contrast to the intuitive idea of the brain as a storage device for memory units or traces of past experiences, recalls are rather imaginative, dynamic (re)constructions. As Frederic Bartlett put it (1995:212), memories are “interest-determined, interest-carried traces. They live with our interests and with them they change”. In other words, what is recalled is not necessarily what was perceived at a particular moment but what is selectively constructed in the present. This raises the question of how these processes are realised. Is it solely through individuals who are truly in charge of their memories? After all, contemporary neuroscientists who look at brain activity already show in which areas we remember. Thus, talking of collective memories might seem obscure as there is no collective brain or unconsciousness. This has been one of the persistent issues in collective memory studies (CMS) since its origins in Durkheimian sociology at the beginning of the last century, in particular the seminal work of Maurice Halbwachs (cf. Olick, 2007a). The latter elaborated at least two key insights concerning the study of collective memories.
Firstly, and this is only touched briefly as it is of secondary importance now and will be addressed again in Section 2.4.3, Halbwachs (1985b:66-77) separated collective memory, i.e. representations of the past which are alive, practised and have functions in and through groups, from history, i.e. knowledge of past events that are kept alive in the works of, e.g., historians. Thus, there are many collective memories but only one history. Although CMS does not necessarily attack the classical principle of historiography, i.e. to show how it really was (wie es eigentlich gewesen), it emphasises the constructionist element in what has become shared, often ideological ideas of the past. To that extent, CMS emerges out of an awareness that dealing with the past is also always to deal with the present and the future, with contemporary identities and interests (Wodak et al., 1994:11). From such a perspective, history remains a matter of profane science whilst collectively shared memories often achieve a sacred status, e.g. in founding the myths of nations. The difference between CMS and historiography can therefore be summarised as one in which CMS is interested primarily in functions and consequences, i.e. legitimacy through memories, in contrast to the search for truth by historians.8

8 More concisely, Peter Novick (2000:3) describes collective memory as "ahistorical, even anti-historical". Pierre Nora (1992a:3), another seminal scholar in the field, deploys similar vocabulary when describing the memory:history dichotomy. "Memory is life, always embodied in living societies and as such in permanent evolution (...). Memory, being a phenomenon of emotion and magic (...). History, being an intellectual, nonreligious activity, calls for analysis and critical discourse. Memory situates remembrance in a sacred context. History ferrets it out (...). Memory wells up from groups that it welds together (...) history belongs to everyone (...). Memory is rooted in the concrete (...). History dwells exclusively on temporal continuities (...). Memory is an absolute, while history is always relative". With the vanishing power of the nation-state as well as churches, the past loses its organic character and has become an artificial means, and thus the move from memory to history, for Nora (1992b), becomes regrettable. An author to whom I will turn in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1, Avishai Margalit (2002:67), similarly describes history as "cold, even lifeless whereas memory can be vital, vivid, and alive". For a comprehensive juxtaposition of history versus memory, cf. Wertsch, 2002:44.
Secondly, Halbwachs (1985b:34-66) separated autobiographical from historical memory whilst relating them to each other in that memories of what the individual has experienced are only possible through group membership. Even autobiographical memories thus rely on social memory-frames, i.e. individuals remember by being a member of a group which constitutes shared knowledge. In consequence, to forget means "to lose the connection to those people, who surrounded us at that time" (Halbwachs, 1985b:10, my translation). As such, the concept of collective memory is a sociological one and does not rely on psychological traces as, e.g., Kerwin Lee Klein (2000) criticises.\(^9\)

This idea has been embraced by Jan Assmann who also views collective memory as bonding, embodying and enabling group identity and agrees with Halbwachs' instrumental understanding of collective memory. However, Assmann (2006:24) differentiates the notion into, firstly, communicative memory, i.e. memory which is interactionist and generational.\(^10\) Its cycle of life is 80 to 100 years, roughly the period of three generations after which a new cycle emerges. Secondly, Assmann introduces the category of cultural memory which provides wider symbolic and cultural frameworks through being stored in symbolic forms such as monuments. "Cultural memory, in contrast to communicative memory, encompasses the age-old, out-of-the-way, and discarded; and in contrast to collective, bonding memory, it includes the non-instrumentalisable, heretical, subversive, and disowned" (27). In contrast to collective memory which is mainly instrumental – "presentist" as, e.g., Barbara Misztal (2003:56-61) calls it – cultural memory is non-instrumental as it is only loosely linked to particular manifestations of group identity. As such, cultural memory precedes or rather frames Halbwachsian collective memory frames, serving as a horizon which offers different traces. In

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\(^9\) This does not rule out the (mis)use of psychological jargon when explaining collective behaviour in some parts of the literature. For more details, cf. Section 2.4.

\(^10\) Aleida Assmann (2001) further differentiates the concept of memory by speaking of (a) individual, i.e. communicative, (b) social, i.e. regional and generational, (c) collective, i.e. strictly instrumental and (d) cultural memory, i.e. long-term, not directly partisan knowledge (see below).
Assmann’s (29) words again: “[c]ultural memory is complex, pluralistic, and labyrinthine; it encompasses a quantity of bonding memories and group identities that differ in time and place and draws its dynamism from these tensions and contradictions”.

Collective memory as described above, i.e. shared knowledge which enables individual and collective identity, is therefore not about the aggregation of individual memories in whatever kind of collective subject but the social frame in and through which individuals actively recollect past events. To paraphrase Karl Marx, individuals have their own memories, but they do not have them just as they please. In line with this, Halbwachs’ (1985b:31, my translation) described “each individual memory as a ‘viewpoint’ [Ausblickspunkt] on the collective memory” and emphasised the mutual relationship between both by saying that “[o]ne can just as well say that the individual remembers by taking the standpoint of the group and that the memory of the group realises and reveals itself in the individual memories” (1985a:23). Thus, there is no strictly individual memory which Halbwachs (1985b:16-22) outlined by referring to the lack of memories of our early childhood when we had not yet established enough links to the relevant group, e.g. our family.11

While our ability to recall is also a product of neurological development, neuro-scientific research has shown that the beginning of childhood memories after infantile amnesia relies on communication within the primary group, e.g. the family (Peterson et al., 2009). That is to say, autobiographical memories start at different points due to different (cultural) patterns of socialisation. At the same time, neurochemistry has revealed that what is persistently repeated and meaningful, e.g. the frames we live in, is memorised through the growth (in numbers) of synapses in the brain (Rose, 2003).

11 Besides the family, Halbwachs points to other frames such as the nation, religious groups and class. There are as many frames as groups exist, and such frames overlap with each other in one particular individual. Interestingly, Halbwachs repeatedly identifies language as an elementary frame of collective memory. To paraphrase Ludwig Wittgenstein’s private-language argument (1968:§243, §256), there is no private memory, memory is necessarily social.
Thus, collective frames are (re)produced in a dialogical way – including mediated communication. In Jeffrey Olick’s (2005:333) words: “collective memory [is] as a reflexive process in time in which people create meaning not only by remembering a particular past, but by remembering and reviving previous ways of remembering”. The significance of the concept of dialogism, taken from Mikhail Bakhtin’s work (cf. Section 5.2.1), can hardly be overstated and has been most comprehensibly applied in the study of collective memories by James Wertsch (2002) and Olick (2007b). Notably, it is through this notion that criticism which argues against collective memory as risking to hypostatise memory (Gedi & Elam, 1996; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Klein, 2000; Winter, 2006:4f) can be countered. But while memories are processes, they also segment and materialise at particular points (in time), e.g. in monuments and commemorative ceremonies. Paul Connerton (2003:34, 72-104) stresses that collective memory as a performance is always also “social habit-memory”, i.e. the past as incorporated and inscribed bodily practice.

Frames are selectively constructed by groups and are more or less continuously adapted to present needs whilst, at the same time, warranting a degree of continuity (Halbwachs, 1985a:162, 231, 242). They reduce complexity and create meaning which has legitimating functions through remembering and silencing (382). Therefore, Halbwachs’ social-constructionist perspective also accounts for the role of power in and over discourse, e.g. when discussing the influence of aristocratic elites in shaping collective memories in the 19th century (321). In the area of nationalism studies, this is a well-known theme. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (2003) encapsulate this when speaking of invented traditions which are not only selectively constructed but often entirely new narratives.

Furthermore, nationalism studies illustrate what cognitively-orientated research has long claimed, that those narratives, i.e. memories, which become influential are often cognitively less demanding (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:125). A ‘good story’ is one which is intuitively understandable and immediately able to integrate events. To that extent, national myths and fairy tales can be perceived as ultimate narratives: they consist of a beginning, a middle and an end, and they provide distinct
roles which fit into clear dichotomies like good heroes and bad villains. Teun van Dijk (1980:14) makes this point clear when stating that “stories which do not have such a narrative structure will be considered as lacking a ‘point’”, a characteristic of ‘good stories’ which Paul Ricoeur (2002:36, my translation) calls “narrative coherence”. So it is therefore that heroic identities, identities based on harshly exaggerated positive self-images and negative representations of ‘others’, e.g. scapegoating, are pervasive. Already, in 1882, Renan (1996:14) noticed that forgetting, or as he put it “historical

12 A not so distant illustration of such an extreme heroic self-understanding is given by Klaus Theweleit (1989) in Male Fantasies, a study concerned with members of the German Freikorps (Free Corps). These volunteer units were largely responsible for quelling revolutionary uprisings in Germany after the end of World War I. The Freikorps consisted of former soldiers (mostly shock troops) of the German Army who did not reintegrate into society after years of military life and ultimately became the Vanguard of Nazism (cf. Waite, 1969 for a detailed account of the Freikorp’s history and role). Theweleit’s approach to Nazism focuses on the masculinity of these men, their desires and anxieties often in relation to their own sexuality and their image of women. An illuminating account of their fantasies of a new heroic man is given by the author and former shock-troop commander Ernst Junger (quoted in Theweleit, 1989:160f): “These are the figures of steel whose eagle eyes dart between whirling propellers to pierce the cloud; who dare the hellish crossing through fields of roaring craters, gripped in the chaos of tank engines; who squat for days on and behind blazing machine-guns, crouched against banks ranged high with corpses, surrounded, half-parched, only one step ahead of a certain death. These are the best of the modern battlefield, men relentlessly saturated with the spirit of the battle, men whose urgent wanting discharges itself in a single concentrated and determined release of energy. As I watch them noiselessly slicing alleyways into barbed wire, digging steps to storm outward, synchronizing luminous watches, finding the North by the stars, the recognition flashes: this is the new man. Pioneers of the storm, the elect of central Europe. A whole new race, intelligent strong men of will”. Junger’s (1926) The Battle as an Inner Experience is entirely devoted to the elaboration of this theme, affirming war as a law of nature and viewing the struggle between two fighters as an existential, indeed mythical experience (cf., in particular, Section Six on pacifism). However, much more influential was Junger’s (2004) first book Storm of Steel which sold in six-digit figures in the Germany of the 1930s. Although the book is less extreme in comparison to the The Battle, its popular success can still give an impression of the mood of that time as passages like the
error”, is crucial in (re)producing national sentiments. Thus, ‘good stories’ are not automatically morally good. However, Ricoeur (1984) points out that this cannot imply any questioning of the form of narrativity itself as it is an ontological condition of humans. Walter Fisher (1987:64, cf. also Somers & Gibson, 1994:38f) also points out that human beings are “essentially storytellers” and that our behaviour is not simply dominated by rational choices but is structured by narratives which draw symbolic borders. Narrativity thus structures memories and “there is no memory outside those frames, which are used by those living in the society in order to locate and recover their memories” (Halbwachs, 1985a:121, my translation).

2.3 Apologetic Performances, Collective Memory and Collective Identity

2.3.1 Introducing the “Age of Apology”

As indicated above, collective frames have mostly been about mythologised and legitimised in-group heroism and suffering whilst narrating an external ‘other’ negatively. Only rarely have in-groups remembered their own past wrongdoings. In contrast, the recent interest in collective memories is largely due to increasingly widespread apologetic performances. Although we might not yet live in an “age of apology” (Brooks, 1999; Gibney et al., 2008), a significant development can be identified following are common: “What a beautiful country it was, and eminently worth our blood and our lives (...) this war was more than just a great adventure” (33). And, when finally in battle, Jünger (99) notes that “[n]ow and then, by the light of a flare, I saw steel helmet by steel helmet, blade by glinting blade, and I was overcome by a feeling of invulnerability. We might be crushed, but surely we could not be conquered”. As these quotes illustrate an extreme form of the heroic type, they also indicate the (not entire) dissolution of this discourse in the public (cf. Section 2.3.1).

Ricoeur explicitly points to the morally neutral character of narrativity when emphasising the limits of representing the Holocaust. To the extent that only “narrative coherence” is central to narrativity, truth would have to become secondary. For Ricoeur (2002), this dilemma can only be accounted for via stressing the importance of documentation and explanation in the work of the historian.
which serves as a starting point for this thesis (cf. Section 1.1.2 for some examples; for collections of apologetic performances, cf. Cunningham, 1999; Brooks, 1999b; Barkan, 2000; Gibney et al., 2008).

Whilst theorists such as Barkan (Section 1.1.2) and others (Section 2.3.2) have largely affirmed and addressed the progressive potential of public admissions of wrongdoing, some critics picture political apologies as a “fad” and “literally meaningless” (Tolmach-Lakoff, 2000:30f; he, however, acknowledges that they can signal that “times have changed”). Others address the increasing commodification of apologies, e.g. in legal contexts where they might become profane elements of a deal (Taft, 2000), or point out that groups increasingly compete for recognition of their suffering, thereby jeopardising solidarity between these groups on which democracy rests (Buruma, 1999). In Europe, such a conflict might emerge in cases of competing memories of Nazism and Stalinism (Leggewie, 2007). Pascal Bruckner (2010) warns of Western masochism, i.e. apologetic attitudes which ultimately curtail the capacity to act due to a fixation on self-accusation.

Most radically, however, post-colonial and post-liberal critics have rejected apologetic acts as “lifeline[s] to the restitution of a legitimate sense of belonging” (Gooder & Jacobs, 2000:243). Consequently, in their criticism of the (Australian) “settler psyche” (ibid.), Haydie Gooder and Jane Jacobs (2000:244) characterise apologies as “act[s] of narcissistic will and desire as [well as] of humility and humanity”. Similarly, Amanda LeCouteur (2001:153-8), in her analysis of Australian apologies, stresses the possibility of reproducing racism by way of representing the event and those addressed. More universally, Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2000) criticises the contemporary “memory wave” by viewing it as a projection of an ahistorical atomistic subject onto collectives, instead of recognising communal responsibilities. It is thus liberalism’s “inability to face structures of inequality [through] (...) gestures that cannot meet their own criteria” (184) which is viewed as the reason for the failure of these rituals. In sum, these radical critics of the potential of apologies view the latter as “the latest technique of colonial domination”, as Danielle Celermajer and Dirk Moses (2010:46) put it (I will turn to a fundamental criticism of this perspective in Chapter 4).
However, for now the question is rather why there is a need for apologetic acts at all. That times have changed becomes visible when, e.g., considering the following quote by the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1988), which serves as a reminder of how common explicitly non-, indeed anti-apologetic, performances previously were:

Too often, the history of Europe is described as a series of interminable wars and quarrels. Yet from our perspective today surely what strikes us most is our common experience. For instance, the story of how Europeans explored and colonised—and yes, without apology—civilised much of the world is an extraordinary tale of talent, skill and courage.

Instead of such chauvinism, a phenomenon which can be summarised under the heading of ‘saying sorry’ has gained international importance. However, given the rising significance of public apologies, the linguistic study of (political) apologies remains rather ambivalent. A. Meier’s (1998:225) review of relevant papers reveals a “fragmentary, inconclusive, and inconsistent” scene but is able to identify three reoccurring aspects. Firstly, formulaic expressions of apology, such as ‘sorry’, serve as common devices. Secondly, excuses, in particular the denial of intent, are used to mitigate one’s own responsibility. Thirdly, justifications are the most common apology strategies. In a similar vein, Zohar Kampf (2009) outlines four discursive strategies of how to minimise responsibility in political apologies, i.e. compromising the verb through which the apology is performed, blurring the nature of the offence, questioning the identity of the offended and/or questioning the identity of the offender. Sandra Harris et al. (2006:734) focus on political apologies in particular, noting that although it is unlikely that apologies are “ever to be defined precisely as a fixed set of semantic components (...) [they] contain also a quite considerable degree of predictability”. Nevertheless, they aim for a categorisation which considers the seriousness of the act involved and the subsequent significance for both the public and the politician (ranging from political gaffes to symbolic apologies concerning past wrongdoings and present events which directly impinge on those involved).
Another typology is offered by Nora Löwenheim (2009). Like Harris et al., she identifies the seriousness of the event and the extent to which it is perceived as face-threatening as explanatory variables. These are then structured by three degrees of internalisation (coercion, self-interest, legitimacy). Thus, the seriousness of past wrongdoings can be addressed: by way of coercion, e.g. due to pressure by a powerful ally, as in the case of (West) Germany in the late 1940s; due to self-interest in order to gain prestige, e.g. in Austria in the early 1990s; via legitimacy which denotes an awareness of the moral reprehension of the in-group’s past deeds as is evident in German politics since about the late 1980s. Coming from a linguistic perspective again, Adina Abadi (1990) notes that not only are apologies in political life often negotiated beforehand by the parties involved, but also that the likelihood of an insincere apology is greater than in other areas (467). This points to differences between intro-personal and political apologies (see below). However, even more interesting at this point, is his model of the speech act of apology (Figure 1).
Taking this model as a starting point, let us briefly look at two cases of political apologies that illustrate changing patterns in (linguistic) realisation whilst not aiming for a detailed analysis. For matters of coherence, I have chosen two German apologies. The first example is taken from a speech by the then German Federal Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, in the Bundestag in 1951, which was an Israeli precondition for the historic reparations agreement of 1952/3 between West Germany and the State of Israel (quoted in Segev, 1993:202).

The government of the Federal Republic and with it the great majority of the German people are aware of the immeasurable suffering that was brought upon the Jews in Germany and the occupied territories during the time of National Socialism. The overwhelming majority of the German people abominated the crimes committed against the Jews and did not participate in them. During the National Socialist
time, there were many among the German people who showed their readiness to help their fellow citizens at their own peril – for religious reasons, from distress of consciousnesses, out of shame at the disgrace of the German name. But unspeakable crimes have been committed in the name of the German people, calling for moral and material indemnity, both with regard to the individual harm done to the Jews and with regard to the Jewish property for which no legitimate individual claimants still exist. In this field, the first steps have been taken. Very much remains to be done. The Federal Republic will see to it that reparation legislation is soon enacted and justly carried out. Part of the identifiable Jewish property has been restored; further restitution will follow.

This part ended Adenauer’s speech and can be classified in terms of Löwenheim’s category of self-interest, as official relations with the State of Israel were seen as a huge political boost for Germany’s international position. It contains much vagueness and mitigation and, most strikingly, there is little acknowledgment of full responsibility and only a weak and implicit (if at all) apology (line 1f). For example, perspectivising “the German people” as being abominated might be read as a renunciation of the Holocaust (also line 8) but much mitigation is applied too (lines 4-8). Furthermore, the identity of the offenders is blurred explicitly via the passive constructions used in line 2. This is of little surprise given that Adenauer had to address multiple audiences – his own electorate, Israeli officials as well as, possibly, Western officials. However, the speech ultimately offered amends which, by the end of 2009, added up to around €67bn. My second example on how political apologies are linguistically realised concerns a speech given by the then German President Johannes Rau on 10 May 2003 (for more on German development and seminal interventions, cf. Section 6.2).

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The Second World War, knowledge of guilt, of responsibility for another’s suffering and the experience of one’s own suffering – that has left a very deep mark on the Germans up to the present day and it will continue to accompany them. (...) If protecting what is right plays such a large role in the public debate, a people that has fallen as far as we have need not be ashamed. (...) We Germans have come a long way. We have learnt from our history. (...) We have drawn a further consequence from the Second World War. In the rubble of Europe it has risen to our awareness that we have to act together. Europe’s integration was and is thus the overriding aim of German politics. Europe is truly more than bureaucracy and commissions. Europe is a historical contract which the people who suffered endlessly from persecution, war and displacement have given to us.

This example is taken from the primary corpus underlying this study as the speech was reprinted in the Frankfurter Rundschau on 30 May 2003 (for a detailed discussion of my corpora, cf. Section 5.3). It was not given to parliament but on a public occasion. Although the speech was concerned with Germany’s role in the world in general, here too, past wrongdoings by Germans are directly addressed – similar to almost all relevant speeches by German officials over the last 30 years (exemplifying Löwenheim’s category of legitimacy). In contrast to Adenauer’s speech, which often remained vague, Rau admits German guilt explicitly (lines 1-3 and 5f). Although I do not aim to discuss judge-penitence at this point (neither do I claim that the above is necessarily to be understood in terms of a rhetoric of judge-penitence), it is noticeable that this admission of wrongdoing already serves to proclaim a German learning process through which Europe is predicated as a peace project of historic dimensions. At the same time – although not included in this passage – the USA’s intervention is, very carefully, juxtaposed to this European modus.

Going back to the three examples quoted in the introduction, apologetic performances may take different forms in different contexts. For example, the narratives offered by Massing, Pilz and Nielsen presuppose and imply an understanding of the past as being wrong. While they, as well as relevant journalistic pieces, (implicitly) admit past wrongdoings, one would be mistaken to expect pathos and
explicitness as strong as in, e.g., Rau’s speech. This is not explained by the speakers’ intention but, first and foremost, by the genre of official speeches in contrast to more profane settings of, e.g., newspaper articles or popularised books (cf. Section 5.2.1 for the concept of genre). Recognising this difference is crucial as this thesis does not primarily deal with political speeches but with newspaper texts. Therefore, Abadi’s model, although indeed helping in understanding apologetic practices, is useful primarily when approaching political apologies by officials such as heads of states.

2.3.2 Public Admissions of Wrongdoing – A Double-Sided Coin

Whilst the above touched on the changing significance and forms of official admission of past wrongdoings, little has been said about their potential meanings and consequences concerning both the possible effects on inter-group relations and collective identities. Elaborating on these two aspects demands a more sociological perspective on apologetic performances, which I now offer.

Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider (2001) have been at the forefront of conceptualising the Holocaust and the pacemaker role it has had in the current “memory boom” concerning symbolic apologies and material reparations, and as an emerging benchmark for human rights. They claim that the Holocaust illustrates the extent to which collective memories have become detached from national contexts and increasingly global, or rather, cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitanism, here, refers to an overcoming of two previously separated realms, the national versus the transnational. Concerning the Holocaust, they claim that nations have lost their grip over national memory while, instead, through the global mass-media, the Holocaust has become a decontextualised global cipher of evil. At the same time, cosmopolitanism includes the local adaptation of such transnational influences as other groups frame their memories in terms of the Holocaust. Levy and Sznaider thus speak of cosmopolitanism as glocalisation (15-24), as not simply overriding particular, e.g. national, memories but recontextualising transnational ideas. Olick (2007c) aims for an analytical framework that is both different and similar to Levy and Sznaider’s when discussing the “politics of regret”. On the one hand, he aims to provide an explanation of the cultural, social and political roots of this phenomenon by
describing this politics as a contemporary “principle of legitimation” (122). On the other hand, he demarcates his attempt not only from explanations of “politics of regret” as being linked to processes of political transition but also those referring to the Holocaust as playing a crucial role in promoting human rights internationally. Instead, Olick (130) links the emergence of the politics of regret to modernity by pointing to Max Weber’s ethics of responsibility as being the most adequate and ethical modus operandi in a pluralist world in which awareness of previous crimes against ‘us’ is on the rise (134f). Apologies are thus viewed as a feasible means to ‘manage’ group relations, such as in the paradigmatic case of Germany and the State of Israel (see above). Even more explicitly, Melissa Nobles (2008:3) develops a “membership theory of apologies” by examining official apologies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. She argues that the symbolic (much more than the material) repair achieved through official apologies by political elites enables the inclusion of minorities, e.g. previously harmed indigenous populations, into the national community. Nobles (35f) explicitly rejects an overestimation of international actors and norms whilst identifying the intentions of national political elites to apologise as “overriding determinants”.

Nick Smith (2008:1) identifies “apologies as a source of moral meaning in modernity” and a universal way of repairing broken intersubjectivity. The first part of his book provides a detailed account of relevant dimensions of individual apology (17-152) which, in a second move, are transferred to the study of collective apology. Probably due to this approach, Smith is sceptical when it comes to collective apologies. Among other things, he points to institutions which “absorb all blame” and, thereby, could be accused of “obfuscating lines of responsibility” (192). Collective apologies are viewed as “a pretence of moral etiquette preceding merciless legal and economic dealings” (240) whilst, most importantly, the absence of collective emotions and the question of to what extent collective forgiveness is possible at all, cast doubt on the usefulness of the concept. Nicholas Tavuchis (1991:viii) opposes such conceptions of collective apologies as mirroring individual apologies by viewing the former as speech acts, i.e. as “secular ritual[s] of expiation”. In this context, the speech act consists of naming the offence, an apology and a response. Like Smith, he acknowledges that
emotions like sorrow have little meaning in the case of collective apologies. However, he goes beyond Smith in saying that it is the public character of an apology which constitutes the apologetic fact (102). In other words, through symbolically identifying itself as a co-offender and uttering this fact, a group aims for repairing relations via self-positioning itself.

Following Levy and Sznaider, I recognise the importance of transnational influences on national memories, in particular their focus on the Holocaust in shaping contemporary understanding of past wrongdoings. However, it has to be stressed that this does not imply a total decontextualisation. Rather, it is through existing national frames that these influences are contextualised meaningfully – an issue which is strikingly illustrated in almost all of my analyses in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. As a consequence of this increasingly widespread tendency to regret, Olick and Nobles emphasise the importance of public apologies in repairing inter-group relations.

However, this should not lead to an understanding of public apologies in terms of individual ones. In particular, political apologies are only to a limited degree about true feelings and empathy and are happy public performances through which relations between official entities can be resumed (a point I take from Tavuchis). The illocutionary force of happy speech acts, e.g. a public confession of guilt deemed to be sufficient by the addressee due to acknowledging responsibility, renunciation of the act, a promise to refrain and an offer of amends and/or an explicit apology, might be able to re-establish relations between collectives of victims and perpetrators. This is perhaps best illustrated in the case of Adenauer’s speech which was carefully drafted beforehand by Israeli and German officials. Although the meaning of a collective apology cannot be disconnected from an interpersonal understanding, public apologies are, firstly, linked to the very general meaning of ‘restoring relations’. Politicians especially perform strategically as they are interested in ‘moving on’. As

15 Similarly, in his discussion of face-work in relation to offensive acts, Erving Goffman (1967:21) speaks of “self-castigation” as one way to repair the relation. The person thereby shows “that he can still be used as a
Rhoda Howard-Hassmann and Mark Gibney (2008:5) state, a “political apology, then, might not be a sincere act of contrition so much as one in an arsenal of symbolic diplomatic moves”. Still, even as one form of “diplomatic moves”, the apology has to be accepted by the addressee – otherwise the apology is a monological exercise and fails. In other words, the apology, even if made purely out of strategic reasoning, can only create some legitimacy if the addressed party at least listens.

As mentioned above, there is a second dimension to apologetic performances, the civil-religious aspect of public admissions of wrongdoing which can be understood as attempts to implement a new order where “a new universalism of mourning patterns the public rituals of national identity – the victims assume the position that, before, was the place of heroes” (Giesen, 2004:3). As such, admissions of wrongdoing are about the redrawing of the in-group’s symbolic borders, e.g. their "national identity", through successfully narrated "public rituals of confession of guilt" (130). Giesen (109) calls this the “trauma of perpetrators” which describes the in-group as having to recognise that “instead of being heroes, they have been perpetrators who violated the cultural premises of their own identity”. In contrast to performances which uncritically reproduce a positive self-image, this redraws the in-group’s symbolic boundaries in a more universal and egalitarian way by performing an ‘exorcism’, e.g. via commemoration ceremonies, of past wrongdoing. Such a self-representation enables the recognition of one’s own identity by others who were previously excluded and therefore "provide[s] the only way of getting the recognition of national identity beyond reclaiming artificial primordialities and questionable utopias" (153). Giesen (150f) thereby adds a global audience which judges whilst feeling repelled by chauvinistic celebrations of the past. Successful apologetic performances will be understood in the following, within Giesen’s framework, whereby I replace his responsible participant in the ritual process, and that the rules of conduct which he appears to have broken are still sacred” (ibid.). Geoffrey Leech (1983:125) notes that apologetic speech-acts can “be seen as the restoration of equilibrium, or at least the reduction of disequilibrium” because the offender owes (“mercantile metaphor”) something to the offended".

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term, “trauma of perpetrators”, by ‘perpetrator narrative’ in order to avoid mistaken associations in what is discussed below. Such perpetrator narratives influence collective frames and thus collective identities, carrying a utopian element of egalitarian and universal self-transformation of the community’s identity. Hence, they are about the symbolic borders of the in-group as much as they are about restoring inter-group relations and, consequently, concern the present and the future, what the community decides to remember, how it views itself and how it wants to be seen.

2.4 Explaining Apologies: Psychoanalytical Analogies or the Public Sphere?

In this final section, I turn to the emergence of apologetic performances. However, the following does not aim to explain in detail how these take place (for a variety of dynamics on the empirical level, cf. Sections 6.2, 7.2 and 8.2) but is restricted to a broad conceptual clarification. I start by problematising what Jeffrey C. Alexander (2004a:2) calls “lay trauma theory”, in particular the role psychoanalytical categories often seem to play in making sense of apologetic acts. In a second step, I question Alexander’s proposal and argue for the inclusion of Periceian semiotics and the public sphere as an explanatory device.

2.4.1 “Lay Trauma Theory” and Psychoanalytic Analogies

Tendencies to self-critically address the in-group’s past by admitting wrongdoings have often been understood by drawing on Freudian categories such as unconscious, trauma, repression, latency and working through the past.16 When, e.g., describing dynamics in the FRG’s official memory, Norbert

16 For an introduction into the concept of memory in Sigmund Freud, cf. Terdiman, 2010. The case of psychohistory, e.g. Erik Erikson’s (1993) paradigmatic Luther study, is slightly different. Psychohistory applies psychological insights in order to enable the historian to impute motives, wishes and fantasies so that the non-rational aspects of behaviour can be examined. Although the method might have some benefits when dealing with biographies, Hans-Urich Wehler (1980:536) describes psychohistory ultimately as a “cul-de-sac”, criticising in particular its atomistic individualism.
Elias (1996:429) viewed National Socialism in post-war Germany as “an open wound in the we-consciousness of the Germans”. There is no doubt that people like Elias, who ultimately provides a sociological account, do not explain societal changes through psychoanalytical analogies but use them heuristically. However, more significant is Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarete Mitscherlich’s (1969) influential application of Freudian psychoanalysis to the dynamics of memories. Their formative book, with its programmatic subtitle *Principles of Collective Behaviour*, on how post-war West Germany dealt with its Nazi past aims to approach “some fundamentals of politics with the help of psychological interpretation” (7, my translation). Further examples are discussed by Radstone (2000:87-91), Alexander (2004a:5-8), Kansteiner (2004) and Fogu and Kansteiner (2006:289f). Psychoanalytical vocabulary is also employed in Example III, Section 6.4.3, in which the “irrationality” of the German peace-movement is explained through “neglected re-working” of a “suppressed” past. Similarly, Example V, Section 7.4.2 explains public reactions to war in Europe through reference to a “collective consciousness”. By penetrating academic as well as everyday language, psychoanalytic vocabulary has become a “common coin” (Gay, 1985:17), providing a means via which dynamics of memories are often understood. However, such allusions are problematic for at least two reasons.

Firstly, the use of such analogies is questionable and indeed politically dangerous as the underlying perception of society is that of a more or less homogeneous societal body, a collective subject with its own psychological devices. Unfortunately, Sigmund Freud himself saw the same dynamics operating in individuals and societies, e.g. individual and collective neurosis. This is expressed most clearly in *Moses and Monotheism* with its belief in the biological inheritance of memory traces. Here, Freud (1939:100; also 80) stated that “[i]f we assume the survival of these memory traces in the archaic heritage, we have bridged the gulf between individual and group psychology: we can deal with peoples as we do with an individual neurotic”. Instead of communicative transmission, Freud

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17 Traumatology derives from ancient Greek, referring to a physical wound, a rupture of the skin (Pikoulis et al., 2004). However, its current meaning is due to the writings of Freud, i.e. it relates to a psychological wound.
(ibid.) refers explicitly to “inherited” traces (the communicative element is also stressed by Bernstein, 1998:27-74). While Gay (1985:146) reminds us that for “Freud, sociology and the other social sciences are parasitical on psychology”, such an approach neglects the fundamentally different mechanisms at work in psychological and social processes, thereby diffusing categorically different toolkits. The case of Germany is again a telling example. Its dealing with the Holocaust is frequently explained by describing the killing of Jews as a traumatic event which had been repressed by German society and could only be worked through after a period of latency. But how could a society – which has neither a brain nor constitutes a collective subject – repress past events in a way individuals can?

Secondly, such analogies concerning, on the one hand, a ‘return of the repressed’ seem to derive from a desirable moral impetus, i.e. a therapeutic Freudian position in which traumata are seen as authentic memories as the historic truth finally breaks through and justice prevails. In other words, trauma is assigned the role of solving the problem of CMS, i.e. memory’s constructedness, after its split from history. On the other hand, such an impetus desocialises a societal issue and, in combination with my first criticism, assumes a deterministic relation between experiences and the emergence of memories. In other words, events literally speak for themselves and while there might be limits to its (linguistic) representation, individuals as well as groups are faced with the task of learning to listen. However, such references to traumata rest on a misconception of Freud’s doctrine of neuroses. The early Freud (1896:149f) understood traumata as being caused by sexual abuse at an early stage of childhood. That is, what needs to be worked through was due to “material reality” (Freud, 1917:368). In contrast, Freud’s (ibid.) mature position, in which traumata are due to repressed “wishful fantasies” related to sexual drives, moved from “material reality” to “psychical reality”. Neill Smelser (2004:33) points out that not even Freud’s early doctrine of neuroses views

18 For an overview of the early Freud’s so-called seduction theory, cf. Israels & Schatzman, 1993. Freud’s later move from “material reality” to “psychical reality” has been strongly criticised by some as being an opportunistic suppression of the seduction theory, e.g. Masson, 1984.
events in themselves as being “a sufficient causal condition for the development of hysterical symptoms” but as dependent on contextual, i.e. social, aspects as well. After all, Freud himself – already in the middle of the 1890s – included a constructionist element. Discussing the case of a patient, Freud (1954:413) notes that the neurosis

was linked to the memory of the assault; but it is a highly noteworthy fact that it was not linked to the assault when it was actually experienced. Here we have an instance of a memory exciting an effect which it had not excited as an experience, because in the meantime the changes produced by puberty had made possible a new understanding of what was remembered. (...) We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma after the event.

Relating this back to his mature position, Freud (1917:368) noted in his Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis that “in the world of neurosis it is psychical reality which is the decisive kind”. Deferred action due to an individual’s context – and not simply the event “when it was actually experienced” – is therefore crucial and mirrors CMS’ insight into the constructedness of memories.

2.4.2 “Cultural Trauma” as Narrative

Although psychoanalytical concepts such as trauma might be adequate when dealing with individuals, such analogies mystify social phenomena. Instead of focusing on particular societal forces in order to explain, understand and, in some cases, criticise apologetic performances, the latter are still too often perceived as the outcome of a disruptive real event which is repressed, followed by a period of latency and neurosis and, finally, are successfully worked through. However, psychoanalytical analogies between the individual and the collective as well as implied naturalism must be rejected. Instead, the phenomenon they refer to has to be viewed in light of public narratives.
Analogy should be replaced by an explicit look at the power struggles between different societal groups which lead to the emergence of particular memory frames, i.e. shared knowledge through which groups are integrated.\(^{19}\) Instead of addressing the failure of a society to acknowledge past wrongdoings in terms of 'societal repression', particular societal frames put forward by particular societal groups silence the narratives of victims or anti-chauvinist voices. That is, victim-narratives are not simply forgotten but might exist at the fringes of the general public sphere and/or are reproduced in partial publics, e.g. victim associations and private settings.\(^{20}\) Such narratives might not be addressed directly in public, however, they exist as non-dominating elements in, or as empty spaces within, discourses on the past. Thus, there is a 'loud silence' surrounding such a 'repressed' issue. In turn, openly racist positions, which are largely de-legitimised in contemporary liberal publics, are similarly reproduced through presuppositions, implicatures, allusions, etc. while not necessarily being made explicit.

Concerning the hope that historical truth, i.e. the event, speaks for itself, it has been outlined above that even Freud – already in his early studies – recognised the importance of deferred action in his

\(^{19}\) With regards to remembering the Holocaust in the United States, this process is paradigmatically reconstructed by Novick, 2000.

\(^{20}\) It could be questioned whether the focus on the public is meaningful at all as, e.g., family-narratives, i.e. the private as a resource of meaning, are ignored. However, the crucial point defended here is not that the private is irrelevant but that public narrations serve as a ‘firewall’ which influences the (re)production of family memories. For example, the public’s belittling interpretation of the Wehrmacht’s war in 'the East', in fact a war of annihilation, enabled constructions of (grand)fathers as normal soldiers. Harald Welzer et al. (2002) provide a detailed case study of how public and private memories have interacted in post-war Germany. Investigating Austrian family memories, Margit Reiter (2006:283f) argues convincingly that the dominance of an official Austrian narrative, the victim thesis (Section 7.2.1), did not set limits on what has been passed on in families and has thus reinforced misleading perceptions of this past (for a different overlap of official and family memory in Denmark, cf. Breuer & Matauschek, 2007).
doctrine of neurosis. Alexander (2004a:8) consequently states that “[e]vents are not inherently traumatic. Trauma is a socially mediated attribution”. As such, Alexander (1; also Smelser, 2004:44) provides a notion of “cultural trauma”, as “a collectivity[’s] feel[ing that] they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness” which is thoroughly located in the public realm. This concept underlies Giesen’s already discussed perpetrator narrative which has been helpful in understanding public admissions of wrongdoing. Alexander (2004a:11-24) further provides a list of categories in order to understand the successful emergence of such a phenomenon, e.g. coding, weighting and narrating by carrier groups, institutional setting, etc. However, even this attempt has been criticised for sticking to the trauma metaphor, thereby still committing a “category mistake” (Kansteiner, 2004). Taking this point seriously and in accordance with my treatment of Giesen’s concept (see above), I henceforth refer to “cultural trauma” in inverted commas.

Beyond that, Alexander’s remarks touch on a second, more substantial issue: while putting forward a necessary criticism of psychological analogies, his approach does, theoretically, imply the possibility of every event becoming traumatic. This becomes apparent in the following quote in which Alexander (2004a:9) states that his theory of ‘cultural trauma’ is not

primarily concerned with the accuracy of social actors’ claims, much less with evaluating their moral justification. We are concerned only with how and under what conditions the claims are made, and with what results. It is neither ontology nor morality, but epistemology, with which we are concerned.

2.4.3 “Cultural Trauma”: Epistemology and Morality

On the one hand, Alexander’s assessment has some prima facie plausibility, given that historical truth is not automatically realised. Indeed, wrongdoings are often silenced, as widespread public ignorance of the murder of millions of Jews until the 1960s illustrates. Nevertheless, it is questionable to what extent such a position is coherent and appropriate. Here, Smelser’s (2004:36) comment that there
are “certain candidates for trauma” but even they “do not qualify automatically”, although reasonable, does not help either. After all, Smelser, by claiming that some events qualify somewhat as traumatic in contrast to others, does point to the significance of the ontological with which theorists of “cultural trauma” are explicitly not concerned.

Sure, the intersubjective creation of meaning can only be studied adequately if culture is considered seriously because claims are always raised in particular contexts, in and through which they gain meaning. However, as claims necessarily address somebody about something, thereby becoming tested, this cannot imply that the accuracy of a claim and its justification become secondary. In other words, creating meaning does not only involve a form (i.e. a signifier, e.g. the word <clouds>) and the concept it represents (i.e. a signified, e.g. the thought of clouds) but also an object (i.e. a referent, e.g. a visible mass of water droplets or frozen ice crystals in the atmosphere). This seems best represented in Peirce’s (1907:410) semiotics in which:

(... ) a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this ‘sign’.

There is no need to dwell upon Peirceian semiotics here apart from a brief clarification of Peirce’s (1909:237) notion of the object:

Suffice it to say that a sign endeavours to represent, in part at least, an Object, which is therefore in a sense the cause, or determinant, of the sign even if the sign represents its object falsely. But to say that

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it represents its Object implies that it affects a mind, and so affects it as, in some respect, to determine
in that mind something that is mediately due to the Object.

While there is thus a reality (and, consequently, truth) independent of an individual’s evaluation,
Peirce (1902) recognises that “the object of a sign (...) can itself only be a sign”. Thus, there is no
absolute separation between a sign and reality and, consequently, no sign can ever represent reality
unmediated. Peirce’s (1906:422) solution is to split the object into a dynamic object “which is the
Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation” and the
immediate object, i.e. “the Object as the Sign itself represents it”. Concerning the Holocaust, the
murder of six million Jews constitutes the dynamic object which, however, does not speak for itself
but is always socially mediated in the form of an immediate object. However, the latter is not entirely
coincidental. Both dimensions, the stubbornness of every sign’s underlying reality, e.g. a historical
event, and the intersubjective public constructedness of its meaning are brought together in Peirce’s
(unpublished:344) conclusive remark on truth as “the predestined result to which inquiry would
ultimately lead”.

But while Alexander and even Smelser put much emphasis on the intersubjective processes of
meaning-making, both avoid discussing the referent of this process. Similarly, Alexander (2001:115)
notes that only “through direct experiences – provided via interaction or symbolic communication –
do members of society come to know evil”. Here again, he is right in suggesting that events are not
necessarily viewed as evil but need “interaction or symbolic communication”. However, it is exactly
because this common understanding is created via “interaction or symbolic communication” that the
scope of interpretation is not indefinite. Taking seriously what Alexander himself views as central, i.e.
public interaction, inevitably includes – besides the performance itself – reasoning about the claims
made by social actors and thus the object. While not implying any naive realism, e.g. describing
events such as the Holocaust as being automatically seen as traumatic, this calls for the inclusion of
as many relevant voices and their experiences of the historical event and its traces as is possible.
This points to a concept of the public sphere which recognises the importance of egalitarian, inclusive and deliberative exchange. Deliberation, broadly understood as the public use of reason as inclusively as possible, is developed in, e.g., Habermas’ political philosophy (1989b, 1992, 1997:287-328, 2008b). It is rational to the extent that claims are exchanged in an egalitarian, inclusive and discursive context (for a justification of such an account, cf. Section 4.2; for a collection of criticism, cf. Calhoun, 1992). Bernhard Peters (1994) revised these three concepts in order to make them suitable for the actual condition of contemporary societies integrated through mass media while retaining their normativity. Firstly, the concept of equality (69-82) is empirically restricted, as not every person can actually participate (equally). Peters (77f) himself pointed to the unequal access to mass media when presenting a typology of roles such as journalists, moral entrepreneurs (who make an issue their own which was not ‘public’ before), experts (respected specialists in their own field), advocates (virtual representatives of groups which cannot defend their position yet) and public intellectuals (interpret with a universal aspiration). However, what can be aimed for is a model of equal chances for issues and perspectives to be heard. Secondly, the openness of the public is empirically limited by both external, e.g. societal and political power structures, as well as internal differentiation, e.g. the fact that agenda-setting in the mass media is done by a few gatekeepers and journalists. In consequence, Peters (82-89) suggests understanding openness with regards to the selection process of public issues thus: are particular subjects (systematically) silenced or do inconsistencies exist which distort the selection process(es)? Thirdly, discursivity (89-97), as a particular kind of interaction through giving reasons, is not the only mode of public activity, although it is implicit also in, e.g., mainly descriptive newspaper articles or entertainment TV shows. As such, Peters (87-97) does not doubt the principle itself but encourages reflection on the condition of its application.

The above provides concepts to think both intersubjective exchange and an underlying common reality. But as egalitarian and inclusive debates acquire a crucial role, critics of the latter must be considered too. Paradigmatically, Walter Lippmann (2008:11) denounced the ideal of an informed
“sovereign and omnicompetent citizen” as resting on “the mystical fallacy of democracy” (28). Instead of a notion of democracy and public debate which can, accordingly, never live up to its own ideals, such critics note systemic complexities and, consequently, favour governance through experts. Such notions almost certainly fail to take into account all views by operating on the basis of a limited number of perspectives. True, experts, e.g. historians, are needed to provide factual input, but this should not mean that experts determine what is to be remembered. Alexander certainly does not fall into this trap. However, Alexander (2004b:544) too rejects a rationalist understanding of the public sphere as a forum for deliberation and argues for an apparently more sociological concept of “a public stage, a symbolic forum in which actors have increasing freedom to create and to project performances of their reasons, dramas tailored to audiences whose voices have become more legitimate references in political and social conflicts”. As conceded above, such objections seem to have prima facie plausibility. However, Alexander fails to recognise the consequences of performing claims – which are, after all, still claims about something. Furthermore, it is not clear why the fact that we perform ourselves in order to create meaning via the construction of binary oppositions – good:bad, sacred:profane, etc. – cannot go hand in hand with rational deliberation (568). Even as actors perform their reasons on a public stage and thereby establish, e.g., the Holocaust as the token of evil, the empirical reality of these performances and the claims made, remain – to varying degrees – *internally* linked to notions of equality, inclusivity and discursivity, to presuppositions of intersubjective exchange (for a detailed elaboration of this argument, cf. Section 4.2).

2.5 Summary

In this first chapter, I have aimed to lay the groundwork for understanding what I call *rhetorics of judge-penitence*. I, firstly, recapitulated the concept of collective memory as being a selectively constructed, instrumental frame. This implies that memories are never purely individual but are informed by social contexts. As such, collective memory is neither a somehow collective consciousness nor a static structure but denotes the dynamic cultural and social framing of individual
memories. These frames emerge in the course of societal struggles, are fluid and — often — mirror existing power relations instead of historical truths. I, secondly, specified the kind of collective frames this thesis focuses on, i.e. apologetic constructions of the past. Memory frames based on admissions of the in-group’s past wrongdoings can play a role in reshaping a group’s symbolic boundaries, i.e. its collective identity, in a more egalitarian and inclusive way as outlined in Giesen’s theory of perpetrator narratives, enabling a “utopian form of remembering” (Assmann, 2006:23). It is only in such a context of increasingly widespread public awareness of the in-group’s own past wrongdoings that rhetorics of judge-penitence become possible.

However, as such narratives are an important part of this thesis, questions arose, thirdly, as to how they emerge in the first place. Here, I rejected Freudian analogies as mystifying the causes of such societal phenomena. Instead, the focus shifted to public performances. However, it became equally clear that memory frames should not simply be viewed in relation to successful performances. Whilst issues of power are indeed crucial, performances still include subjects who make meaning about something, i.e. common referents. I therefore, fourthly, argued that in CMS also, a purely epistemological perspective, as advocated by Alexander and his colleagues, is mistaken as issues of morality and truth are inherently bound up in public debates and their object(s). I made sense of this via a tentative encounter with Peirce’s semiotics and subsequently claimed that this inclusion might even help to illuminate the relation between history (dynamic object) and memory (immediate object) in CMS which should neither be exaggerated (there is no direct access to the referent, i.e. wie es eigentlich gewesen) nor collapsed (the immediate object is not the dynamic object). Here, I briefly introduced Peters’ update of key categories of Habermas’ understanding of the public sphere. This should have indicated how, following Peirce, (historical) truth, i.e. the dynamic object, is intrinsically connected to public performances. Thus, a dual perspective on both the way meaning is created in various forms of (mediated) interaction as well as the conditions of this interaction is necessary in order to explain, understand and evaluate collective memories.
3. THE RHETORIC(S) OF JUDGE-PENITENCE

3.1 Overview of the Chapter

In this chapter, I develop the most distinctive aspect of this thesis: the rhetoric(s) of judge-penitence. It is linked to the previous chapter at least via the significance of Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov’s concept of dialogism. That is to say, judge-penitence can only be understood properly as a ‘reply’ to previous reassessments of the past. In other words, to judge others on the basis of self-accusation can only develop illocutionary force if admissions of wrongdoing are already a (more or less) accepted aspect of the group’s collective identity.

In Section 3.2, I conceptualise judge-penitence, firstly, by introducing some literary and historical sources and, secondly, by outlining the phenomenon’s meaning in an ideal-typical way (Footnote 6). To indicate this ideal-typical character, I use the term (rhetoric of) judge-penitence in the singular while the previous and following chapters generally refer to rhetorics of judge-penitence in the plural, thereby emphasising the various ways in which the phenomenon is linguistically realised. In order not to lose sight of these grey zones, I discuss a variety of examples throughout this chapter. They are, however, not analysed in detail but serve purely heuristic purposes (for detailed analysis, cf. Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Section 3.3 operationalises judge-penitence via a selective reading of Toulmin’s argumentation theory and discusses the cultural mechanism on which convincing rhetorics of judge-penitence rest. Section 3.4 summarises the findings and relates them to previous elaborations.
3.2 Conceptualising Judge-Penitence

3.2.1 Literary and Historical Background of Judge-Penitence

As mentioned above, the concept of judge-penitence is inspired by Camus’ novel *The Fall* in which the main character, Clamance, follows the motto “[t]he more I accuse myself, the more I have a right to judge you”. Camus elaborates this through a staged dialogue between Clamance who narrates and a silent listener. The former is a previously successful and altruistic Parisian lawyer. However, through a series of incidents, most importantly his reluctance to help a probable suicide victim, Clamance recognises pure vanity behind the facade of altruism and becomes haunted by memories of his own failings and self-pity. Suddenly, his pride in being an altruistic lawyer seems to him to be purely selfish in order to feel good. He takes the outbreak of the Second World War as an opportunity to cross over to Africa where he is soon interned by German forces close to Tripoli. In front of comrades, he publicly confesses his weaknesses and, thereby, becomes their leader. Within this community, he is now responsible for the distribution of water. When, on one occasion, he drinks the water of a dying comrade, he recognises that nobody, not even Christ, can remain innocent in this world and that justice has necessarily become disconnected from innocence (cf. also Meyers, 1974 for an insightful interpretation). Clamance (Camus, 2006:86) concludes that since one could not condemn others without at the same time judging oneself, one should heap accusations on one’s own head, in order to have the right to judge others. Since every judge eventually becomes a penitent, one had to take the opposite route and be a professional penitent in order to become a judge. This, in turn, provides a solution to a problem previously raised by Clamance.

Was I to get up in the pulpit, like many of my illustrious contemporaries, and curse the human race? Very dangerous! (...) The judgement that you are passing on others eventually blows right back in your face and may do some damage (ibid.).
Clamance is thus cautious about simple ‘othering’, i.e. the negative representation of an external other, and proposes to take “the opposite route”. Here, he stresses the legitimatory value of admitting one’s own wrongdoings in order, ultimately, to be able to be above the ‘other’. Although not elaborating the connection in detail, Clamance’s position towards admissions of wrongdoing and judging alludes to the Judeo-Christian tradition of, on the one hand, ecclesiasts such as Ijob, Jeremiah the Prophet and Jesus of Nazareth calling for repentance as a sign of regret and conversion. On the other hand, and arguably much more relevant, he alludes to preachers of the High and Late Middle Ages such as Berthold of Regensburg, Girolamo Savonarola and John of Capistrano who galvanised huge crowds by visualising humanity’s sinfulness and warning of God’s imminent punishment. It is the subsequent practice of public self-flagellation by groups, sometimes of several thousands, which was particularly widespread between the 13th and 15th centuries, in order to gain forgiveness for their sins, which is of interest here (Cohn, 1970:127-140).

Andrzej Szczypiorski (1993) colourfully pictured this mentality in his novel A Mass for Arras. The novel addresses events in a small French town, Arras, in the 15th century, hit by the plague and subsequently exploding into violence against scapegoats, such as Jews and witches.

In air musty from hissing torches, amidst fumes from censer, in the presence of the Almighty, who watches over altars, we beat our foreheads against the stone floors. We shriek out our sins in the belief that naming our acts will liberate us from their burden (44).

This account of self-flagellation is given by Jan, the narrator, while the following quote already indicates a link between those preaching and practicing penitence and the phenomenon of judge-penitence. Now, it is another main character, David, the bishop of Utrecht, who speaks.

22 Interestingly, Freud’s (1939:136) explanation of Christian anti-Semitism seems to mirror judge-penitence when arguing that Christian anti-Semites say that “‘[t]hey [the Jews] will not accept it as true that they murdered God, whereas we [Christians] admit it and have been cleansed of that guilt’”.

56
I do not doubt that you [the citizens of Arras] have been through cruel suffering, but where is it written that this is cause for glory? (...) Perhaps the days of hunger and plague have ennobled you greatly, but there is no reason that your suffering should become an example for others. The plague afflicted Arras, but it did not afflict Ghent. Does that give you the right to claim you are better (55f)?

The suffering to which David refers here is of a very different kind of that thematised in rhetorics of judge-penitence; while the people of Arras were directly suffering in the first place, judge-penitence is located in a perpetrator context. Here, ‘suffering’ denotes the uncomfortable admission of one’s own past wrongdoings, i.e. the rejection of a smooth and self-righteous positive self-representation.

In contrast to A Mass for Arras, this is also the case in The Fall where Clamance draws pride from facing his past wrongdoings, thereby threatening a one-dimensional positive self-image. I argue that although not on the same ontological level, these examples are telling as far as they refer to a past which is made useable through its characterisation as wrong. In the following section, I aim to provide a clear and rigorous conceptualisation of this phenomenon.

3.2.2 A More Transparent (Re)formulation of the Concept of Judge-Penitence

Having outlined some literary and historical sources of the key concept in this study, this section translates these insights into a transparent concept of judge-penitence. Following Clamance’s motto, a rhetoric of judge-penitence rests, first and foremost, on an admission of wrongdoing, here, of a painful and problematic historical past. That is, one’s own past becomes the ‘other’. Put differently, identity is still created through difference, albeit through demarcating ‘us’ not from an external ‘other’ but an internal one, the in-group’s own past. Such an admission might be more or less intentionally put forward but, even if truly calculated, it cannot be dismissed as meaningless. After all, the hope of generating legitimacy through such an argument rests on the prior assumption that admissions of past wrongdoing might find public acceptance. The second aspect of judge-penitence concerns a subsequent claim regarding moral progress, i.e. a moral learning process is claimed as ‘we learnt the lessons from the past’. Thirdly, this move is utilised in order to judge: as we learnt the
painful lessons from the past, so we can legitimately proclaim that the way they behave illustrates a stubborn refusal to do so, i.e. their moral inferiority (I say more on this argumentative move in Section 3.3).

This subtle move represents an instrumentalisation based on ‘pride in atonement’. In line with this, Robert Solomon (2004:48) speaks of The Fall as illustrating a “pathology of pride”, and a “condemnation of resentful pride and superiority, pride that refuses to recognize itself as such and superiority that proves itself only by stealth and subversion”. This does not reject satisfaction with oneself when having faced one’s problematic past and neither does it make impossible criticism of others based on such a development. However, acknowledgments of past wrongdoings become tendentious as soon as they serve as a means to construct others as being morally inferior. Aurel Kolnai (2007:93, my translation) described such resentful pride (Hochmut) in similar fashion.

[U]nmasking and humiliating an opponent can indeed be an objective imperative and is not necessarily an act of pride [Hochmut]. However, it is prideful [hochmütig] to push the humiliation to the extreme just as if one wants to insult the other in his wholeness and entire depth of his being, or to simply seek an occasion in order to expose and humiliate humans.

Thereby, previous self-reflection is regressively instrumentalised and replaced by an instrumental self-righteousness which blocks the emancipatory tendencies inherent in sincere admissions of wrongdoing. No longer is the circle of we widened by acknowledging the harm we, the in-group, have done. Instead of, at least for now, recognising the ‘other’ and his suffering through remembering and, thereby, transforming the moral boundaries of the community in an egalitarian and inclusive way, the process of communicating with an ‘other’ is closed. Wrongdoings are no longer the primary focus. Rather, the claim that the in-group has successfully dealt with its disturbing past enables a positive self-representation of being a penitent sinner, serving as a means not to criticise an ‘other’ in a differentiated way but to justify her/his representation as morally inferior. Thus, admissions of
wrongdoing become problematic when enabling self-righteous unreflective pride in atonement. In 1993, Habermas (1994:28) pointed to such a danger. He rejected claims by the Czech historian Jan Kren, who praised the process of coming to terms with the past in the FRG, saying that “maybe this is something that someone else can say. But the moment we [Germans] were to compliment ourselves in this way, such a claim (...) would be rendered null and void”. Remaining critical towards our own tradition remains central and should not convey self-complacency. However, this is exactly the function of rhetorics of judge-penitent.

Nevertheless, it is only through contextualising oneself within a burdened past that rhetorics of judge-penitence can be adopted. Self-critical narrating of the past is normatively welcome as it enables the inclusion of the previously excluded and recognition between former enemies (Section 4.2.3). Indeed, it could be that the confessor rightly claims the moral high ground. That is to say, a negative evaluation of the ‘other’ due to one’s own historical experience is not necessarily a regressive instrumentalisation. Instead, it might be justifiable and principled. But even if this is the case, the discursive realisation could still follow the purpose of a regressive positive self- and negative other construction. Thus, even if a confessor might rightly claim the moral high ground due to the in-group’s own historical development and the ‘other’s’ current behaviour, it is still possible that the discursive act follows the purpose and/or has the effect of instrumentally constructing a self-righteous positive self-image. Therefore, the analyst must present his material, the context and his interpretation, which is open to criticism and alternative interpretations, in as comprehensible a way as possible.
Figure 2: A schematic representation of relevant reassessments of the past (cf. Benke & Wodak, 2003:124)

Figure 2 presents an analytical separation of relevant ways of reassessing the past. Fundamentally, the figure illustrates different ways of ‘coming to terms with the past’, either via traditional strategies of shifting blame (i.e. no or very little acceptance of the in-group’s past wrongdoings) and more recent tendencies to include such admissions in in-group narratives. However, the figure does not claim to be exhaustive and more forms are imaginable (this openness is indicated by the arrow at the left). More importantly, narratives of denial as well as counter-narratives are still widespread. Nevertheless, given this thesis’s research questions, narratives which continue worshipping the community’s innocence, heroism or even glory are of only secondary interest here. The same is true for ways of reassessing the past via, in principle, admitting in-group wrongdoings which uphold a
positive self-image by ultimately belittling these wrongs, e.g. through relativisation and offsetting.\textsuperscript{23}

In contrast to the above, the rather unambiguous admissions of wrongdoing (the shaded area in Figure 2) are, first and foremost, normatively desirable. It is via admitting in-group failures that the symbolic borders of the community become more egalitarian and inclusive. However, this thesis investigates how even admissions of failure may ultimately distort argumentation, as in the case of the judge-penitent who self-righteously instrumentalises them in order to draw new regressive boundaries which potentially block moral learning processes.

Let me now turn to a couple of examples. As in most of the following cases, I am unable to discuss the entire article and therefore do not claim that the entire contribution represents judge-penitence. However, I aim to offer an indicative interpretation and to point to degrees of judge-penitence, depending on the levels of differentiation and the use of modal qualifiers. The first example illustrates well the difficulties encountered in identifying judge-penitence. It is taken from the thesis's primary newspaper corpus (Section 5.3) and authored by the Social Democrat Wolfgang Thierse, then president of the Bundestag. It was published in the Forum section of the conservative broadsheet Die Welt on 7 April 2003 and entitled: Taking Europe's experiences seriously!

\textsuperscript{23} There might be cases in which it is appropriate to argue that 'we could not do more'. Whilst this might belittle the in-group's wrongdoings, it does so by historicising the past instead of relativising or offsetting the in-group's wrongdoings. After all, the in-group's activities are not played down but contextualised in accordance with factual knowledge (which is fallible and might be revised at a later point). As such, historicising serves a different role; it does not simply enable the construction of a positive self-image but points to dilemmas as it still stresses an acknowledgment of the wrongdoing we can relate to.
(...) However, this [a Europe able to act] will only work if the European states reflect on two fundamental experiences which they have in common and which substantially distinguish Europe from other parts of the globe. First: for centuries Europe was the continent of wars which experienced both of the most terrible world wars – the responsibility of the Germans – in the 20th century. The European states didn’t just lead these wars, their peoples also suffered on their very own soil. This, after all, distinguishes the European experience from the American one. With fundamental support from the USA the European peoples – at first in the West – drew a central and long-lasting lesson from that: the great work of peace that is the European Union. Secondly: in the second half of the past century, Europe has – again with significant help from the United States – overcome the seemingly unbridgeable contrast between East and West by peaceful means. The European Union neither wants to nor can step into a race with the last remaining military superpower on earth. But, if it reflects on its own experiences, it can put its civilising and cultural power in the balance (...).

On the one hand, the author predicates the USA in positive ways (lines 6 and 9). Even more importantly, Thierse frames his argument as conditional (“if”, line 1). These two aspects work against understanding the piece in terms of judge-penitence. On the other hand, there seems to be a regressive construction of Europe and the USA. In the course of portraying the European past as being deeply problematic, including a particular reference to Germany (line 4), Thierse predicates Europe as “substantially distinguished” from ‘others’ (line 2, also lines 1-2) and explicitly the USA (line 6). This concerns, firstly, Europe’s experiences and, secondly, Europe’s ability to overcome its differences peacefully. Regarding the former: does Thierse really imply that Europe is exceptional in that its people “suffered on their own soil”? At this point, the argument put forward has unspecifically referred to “other parts of the globe” (lines 2-3) but Thierse does single out the USA in the following sentence (line 6). Whilst this makes the proposition theoretically more likely, it remains factually ambiguous given, e.g., the American civil war (concerning the use of ‘experience’ in order to demarcate Europe from the USA, see below and Example V, Section 7.4.2). These experiences enabled Europe to draw a conclusion (“drew” in line 7, note the past tense, i.e. learning the lessons as a completed process). Arguably, this is not the case for the USA given that their experiences are
different and, thus, “European peoples” – and not the USA – drew a conclusion (lines 6-7). Regarding the second claim, it is only Europe which has been able to overcome “seemingly unbridgeable” differences peacefully (line 9). The final two sentences bring these two lines together. While Europe should not compete with the USA – in particular, not on the military playing field –, the continent seems able to do so in another dimension: due to its experience, Europe should put its “civilising and cultural power”, based on its experience, in the balance (line 12).

The text seems deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, Europe is repeatedly demarcated harshly from the USA due to “fundamental” and “substantial” differences. On the other, the USA is credited with having facilitated a rather unified and peaceful post-1945 Europe. Thus, the USA can hardly be entirely different as it somehow participated in this process. Different readers will consequently process the article with different outcomes. But it is likely that at least some might understand it in terms of a rhetoric of judge-penitence, given its insistence on Europe as having learnt the lessons and it’s subsequent “civilising and cultural power”.

The second article in this series of examples was written by the Swiss literature professor Alfred Muschg – who headed the Academy of the Arts in Berlin from May 2003 to December 2005 – and is taken, in its entirety, from the German primary corpus. It was published in the Feuilleton section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 24 January 2003 and is entitled: Too high a price.

1 ‘Old Europe’, to which Rumsfeld issues his censure, is finally a new one. France and Germany have managed to show ‘bravery in the face of the friend’ whom they thank for the liberation from Hitler: with that they have committed themselves to a long memory, but not to blind following. The Second World War was a product of a unilateral propensity to violence, from which the world after 1945 should become safer. To that end the old continent banded together to an epochal peace community, also to that end, however, the fragile, yet indispensable instrument of the United Nations was created. It must serve the newly-called war on terror as a binding organ of control. A war in Iraq would have the
consequence of the immeasurable destabilising of a whole region in the world; that is too high a price for the overthrow of a local tyrant. To signal this to the Bush administration is the opposite of upping the pressure: their experience with their own imperialism commits Europeans to this service. The consequences of imperialism are still within arm’s reach in the Middle East, but cannot be got rid of with weapons.

Muschg’s argument hardly applies a rhetoric of judge-penitence, although Europe’s dark past and its imperialism play a central role (lines 3-4, line 10). Whilst he certainly implies that lessons from past wrongdoings should be learnt and subsequently argues against a war in Iraq, at no point does Muschg construct a European subject as having learnt these lessons. Neither does he construct the USA as a homogeneous ‘other’ unwilling to learn but refers explicitly to “the Bush administration” (line 9). Making his stance clear, he avoids pejorative predications while making a point in favour of the rule of law through the United Nations.

At this point, it might be helpful to look at relevant existing elaborations. Whilst, to my knowledge, the concept of judge-penitence has neither been discussed nor operationalised in detail to date, other authors have shown similar interest. This is most obvious in the case of Alain Finkielkraut (2003:123) whose philosophical reflexions on contemporary European anti-Semitism draw on Camus’ The Fall. As far as I am aware, Finkielkraut is the only author to have done so when claiming that European critics of the State of Israel take their pride and justification from regretting and promising Never Again. Also relevant is the post-colonial criticism mentioned in Section 2.3.1 which stresses the narcissistic dimension of apologies. The German journalist Henryk Broder (2000), when writing about a documentary series broadcast on the second German national channel (ZDF), criticised its apparent Sündenstolz (pride in sins). Concerned with “public rituals of confession of guilt” in general, Hermann Lübbe (2001:22) emphasises their pitfalls as they are sometimes blown out of proportion, becoming “pharisaic” and enabling condemnation of apparently lesser developed confessions of guilt.
However, it was particularly a debate prompted by Habermas and Derrida's essay *February 15* which provoked remarks on self-congratulation as a potential basis for constructing 'others' as morally inferior (given the significance of this debate, I analyse their essay in detail, cf. Example II, Section 6.4.2). Andrei Markovits (2007:210), in a book concerned with the link between anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism, briefly touches on this essay, noting that it seems to draw on "a special kind of moral qualification due to Europe's dark past". Wehler (2003:127) defines the piece as "anti-American pacifism", while Krishan Kumar (2008:96) speaks of "a certain self-congratulatory air" which "can become a source of European superiority". Jan Ifversen (2007:179-181) aims to deconstruct such discourses and, by pointing to *February 15*, proposes that claiming civilisation through learning lessons from the past becomes a new European ideology. Similarly, Volker Heins (2006:439) criticised German intellectuals, among others the authors of *February 15*, for orientalising the USA by imposing binary oppositions which, he argues, are "critical only toward Europe's others whereas the imagined European Self is conjured into existence as the best of all worlds".

These pieces illustrate that the phenomenon, although neither conceptualising nor operationalising, has been noted. Finkielkraut is most explicit and claims its relevance concerning an issue other than the Iraq crisis investigated here. Broder points to self-righteous use of the past although I would argue that rhetorics of judge-penitence are more about Sühnestolz (pride in atonement), rather than "Sündenstolz" (pride in sins). After all, what elevates a judge-penitent is not pride in the wrongdoing but how this wrongdoing has been dealt with. However, the authors clearly identify the pitfalls of such feelings of superiority through the construction of a binary opposition which lacks the necessary differentiation and becomes ideological. Whilst homogenisation and generalisation must thus be focused on, it is equally necessary to keep in mind that not every construction of in- and out-groups is necessarily ideological (again, I refer to Chapter 4).

Summing up the previous conceptualisation, rhetorics of judge-penitence operate on the basis of three main topics:
• an implicit or explicit acknowledgment of guilt or at least a self-critical reference to one’s own past. Without this, no pride in atonement – and thus no judge-penitence – is possible;
• the implicit or explicit assumption that ‘we learnt the lessons from the past’, backed by a reference to the in-group’s ‘painful’ past;
• implicitly or explicitly, there has to be an ‘other’ which is constructed as not having learnt the lessons from the past.

To what extent these claims are legitimate or serve a shortened positive self-representation, i.e. constitute judge-penitence, depends on the particular use of this argument within a particular context. How this kind of argument operates in detail is the subject of the following section.

3.3 Operationalising Judge-Penitence

3.3.1 The Toulmin Model of Argument and Judge-Penitence

Whilst I have already discussed some examples, it is only now that I put forward an operationalisation of judge-penitence through heuristic references to argumentation theory in order to make the structure of judge-penitence more transparent. Argumentation is here understood as a particular mode of interaction, i.e. a social practice, in which statements, supported by reasons, are put forward, defended and challenged. This should enable a shared understanding which, at the bottom line, includes a mutual understanding of those involved in that they agree to disagree. Although I relate to elements of Toulmin’s model of argumentation (Toulmin et al., 1979; Toulmin, 2003:87-134), I do not endorse his entire position. Instead, the use of Toulmin’s scheme is indeed heuristic and does not dwell on his philosophical claims.

In the context of this study, such a selective use of Toulmin’s argumentation theory is nevertheless revealing as it makes transparent crucial elements of an argument – in this case the argumentative form of judge-penitence – by illustrating its structural composition. Toulmin’s scheme follows
Aristotle for whom an argument, what he referred to as a syllogism, consists of, traditionally, three elements: two premises and one conclusion. Toulmin reformulates this in his simple model of argumentation, speaking of data and warrant on the one hand, as well as a claim on the other. Furthermore, he speaks of backings, (modal) qualifiers and rebuttals, which need not always occur, and, together with data, warrant and claim form his extended model (Figure 3).

What Toulmin calls the claim, and which I refer to as validity claim, describes the point of arrival, i.e. what is at stake.\textsuperscript{24} It can be identified by asking, e.g., ‘What exactly are you claiming?’. Data, in contrast, form the point of departure on which this validity claim is based and can be identified by asking: ‘On what grounds is your conclusion based?’. Warrants are those kinds of “statements indicating the general ways of arguing being applied in each particular case and implicitly relied on as ones whose trustworthiness is well established” (Toulmin et al., 1979:43). Alternatively, Toulmin (2003:4) describes them as “proper inferring-habits” and “rational canons of inference”. They are those elements which determine the acceptance of an argument and can be identified by asking ‘How is this data justifying the validity claim?’. To that extent, warrants enable an inference from an argument by every audience which has the relevant background knowledge. In other words, as soon

\textsuperscript{24} The following is taken from Toulmin (2003:87-134), Toulmin et al. (1979:29-81) and van Eemeren et al. (2009:139-149).
as the audience lives by such a warrant — and different audiences have knowledge of different warrants although some might be more general than others and be even universally shared — then the conclusion appears almost natural. Although the warrant itself stays implicit most of the time, sometimes the speaker might be asked to provide further backing in order to show that this conclusion rule can really be relied upon, e.g. through statistical tables or other kinds of references. A question to identify such backings might be: ‘What other information do you have to back up this warrant?’ Another element, (modal) qualifiers such as ‘possibly’ or ‘usually’, restrict the scope of the argument. In order to detect such qualifications, one might ask ‘How reliable is this warrant actually?’ Finally, rebuttals clarify under which circumstances the argument might not hold, i.e. in which cases the force of the argument is disturbed. A possible question to detect a rebuttal might be: ‘In what circumstances are you concluding this?’.

In the context of the empirical analysis in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, I will only make use of Toulmin’s simple model as not even the warrant is made explicit most of the time and there is thus rarely any accounting for the backing. Figure 4, below, nevertheless, draws on Toulmin’s extensive model in order to illustrate a comprehensive conceptualisation of the judge-penitence described above.
We acknowledge our past wrongdoing; we did wrong.

Since, on the one hand, through admissions of wrongdoings we lose status but, on the other hand, we get credit for making them.

So, we are certainly morally superior to the 'other'!

Unless the (wording of the) argument makes clear that there is no danger of any "pathology of pride".

On account of, e.g.,
• the implicit (or even explicit) persistence of religious codes such as in Luke 18:14: "everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and whoever humbles himself will be exalted" and/or
• political experiences such as re-education efforts after 1945 in Germany or the effect of political apologies as an "utopian form of remembering".

Figure 4: A schematic representation of the rhetoric of judge-penitence following Toulmin's extensive model

3.3.2 The Warrant – Making it Explicit

Having reconstructed an abstract judge-penitent argument, it is implausible that such a pure form is mirrored in actual everyday-argumentation. The latter is conducted mostly on the basis of incomplete or informal syllogisms, what Aristotle (1982:1, 2, 8) called a "rhetorical syllogism" or an enthymeme. That is, parts of the argument, most notably the warrant, remain implicit. Although "warrants are not self-validating" (Toulmin et al., 1979:58), there is generally little backing needed and this is normally only supplied upon request. In addition, the border between warrant and backing is often very fuzzy. Rhetorics of judge-penitence rely on a widely shared warrant – those who humble themselves by acknowledging wrongdoing get credit for doing so – which makes explicit backing in a newspaper article unlikely. Thus, it is even more important to clarify the background of this warrant as it represents naturalised, potentially ideological knowledge par excellence. In this case, much points to the Christian doctrine, in particular one of Jesus’ parables aimed at those who are sure of their own goodness, "[f]or everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and whoever
humbles himself will be exalted” (Luke 18:14, The New English Bible). While few people mobilise (or accept) such a straightforwardly religious backing nowadays, and might point to a variety of backings, amongst others experiences of post-war West Germany, it nevertheless illustrates the persistent significance of a Christian cultural code (for the following, cf. Forchtner, 2011b). This does not imply that only (post-)Christians are capable of (judge-)penitence, forgiveness, etc. or that secularism is unable to support such (re)actions on its own. It does not even imply that the Christian cultural code is the only influence. Otherwise put, the central idea in Christian thought, that humility ultimately exalts, has long spilled over beyond the religious variant into myriad secular forms. It is only due to this formative character that I single out this backing in the following.

In Christianity, the aforementioned remarks on exaltation and humility are linked to the idea of forgiveness, probably its most crucial element, which shall enable reconciliation and the restoration of previously violated relations (e.g. Eph 1, 7). However, Christianity links such an understanding of forgiveness not only to the relationship between God and humans but to interpersonal relations as well. The most significant example for this is in the Parable of the Lost Son (Luke 15, 11-32): after the younger of two sons had demanded his inheritance, he left home and lived a life of dissipation. But when he had spent everything and famine struck the country, local citizens did not even give him pig feed. Returning to his father, the latter reacts with compassion and forgives. What is crucial here is that forgiveness is, firstly, granted by God as well as another human (also verse 21), and that, secondly, through forgiving, shattered relations are restored and, most important in the context of this thesis, that, thirdly, forgiveness has a price as it is linked to repentance.

25 Although notions of forgiveness existed in ancient times, these concepts were much more restrictive than our contemporary understanding. In fact, the classical perfectionist outlook leaves no central place for forgiveness as virtuous men and their perfect souls have no requirement for such (Griswold, 2007:2-18). Therefore, it does indeed make sense to focus on Christianity in order to become aware of, among others, the cultural origins of the warrant in question.
This Christian code can become significant due to contemporary cultural changes which have further enabled admissions of wrongdoings. That is to say, heroic patterns, as illustrated in Footnote 12, have been increasingly replaced by rather post-heroic attitudes as is visible in the diminishing relevance attached to warrior virtues, such as blind discipline, national honour and a military ethos, coupled with the increasing importance attached to civilian values. Jones Sheehan (2008:221) notes that European states “are now dominated by civilian institutions, focused on civilian goals (…) representing what citizens regard as important: managing the currency, promoting economic growth, providing welfare, and protecting people from life’s vicissitudes”. Similarly, Barry Schwartz (2008:180-218; for a broader discussion of heroism and post-heroism, cf. Münkler, 2006) speaks of post-heroic eras as lacking epic struggles and greatness which might be linked to postmodernist themes concerning the end of grand narratives (Lyotard, 1984). Empirically, Ronald Inglehardt (e.g. 1997) has provided fruitful insights into changing value systems which broadly support Sheehan’s and Schwartz’s arguments. A more discourse-analytical perspective could take this up by focusing on the long-term evolution of ways of public communication and deliberation as part of a wider (not solely discursive) public culture (e.g. Eder, 1985; Peters, 1997). In other words, wider cultural changes are mirrored in the structure underlying public debates, i.e. in the networks through which information and points of view are processed, filtered and synthesised (Habermas, 1997:360). This constrains the long-term development of discourses (on the past) which filter the actual emergence of particular narratives, thereby setting up a horizon that delineates a possible past and future, i.e. prescribes the reading and writing of past events.

What is important here is that due to a Christian code, as well as contemporary developments, showing humility through admissions of wrongdoing generates the potential legitimacy to judge others, to narrate convincingly a symbolic border from an allegedly reformed and morally superior position. It is because we are credited with admitting our failures, due to the persistence of a naturalised cultural code in a particular social environment, that arguments following a pattern of judge-penitence seem legitimate and have illocutionary force.
One of the reasons why this warrant still ‘works’, and which enables an argumentative move in which judging others is justifiable through publicly admitting one’s own wrongdoings, is thus the persistent significance of a Judeo-Christian cultural structure for a wider (Western) audience. It should be noted this has been criticised by, e.g., Lew Kopolew, a survivor of the Warsaw ghetto, who described the paradigmatic knelling of the then German Chancellor Willy Brandt in Warsaw in 1970 as follows: “[h]e [Brandt] knelt down and elevated his people” (quoted in Giesen, 2004:154). Probably also against the background of the influence of the Christian doctrine, Jean Améry (1999) insisted on the rightful cultivation of resentments by victims who feel a social pressure to forgive.

Returning now to rhetorics of judge-penitence, I move to another example. It is taken from the Swiss lawyer and politician Gret Haller’s (2003:227) book on Europe and the USA, concerning their different relations to state, nation and religion. Its main concern is not the Iraq War but her experiences in the post-war former Yugoslavia. While the book includes valuable as well as doubtful points, here I am interested only in a passage at the end of the book:

1 (...) Europe has such a long and guilt-laden history, not only within its own continent but also in the colonised areas of other continents, which it – definitely after the Second World War – had to start anew and so no longer has a claim to do missionary work with others for its own convictions. If Europeans participate in aid and development projects, they are furthermore deterred by something else from considering only one (their own) approach as being possible and right. It is the experience of inner-European pluralism. Not so for the US-Americans who have a pronounced awareness of their mission [Sendungsbewuβtsein] (...).

Haller is characterising Europe through a “long and guilt-laden history”, including its imperialistic past in order to state that it “had to start anew” (lines 1-3) and lose its missionary zeal (Haller’s additional comment, “furthermore” in line 4, is of less relevance here). This constitutes the claim while her
conclusion, the 'point' of her utterance, is that US-Americans lack this learning-process and are still full of *Sendungsbewusstsein*. In German, the latter is a rather pejorative term often referring to religious fanaticism. And indeed, Haller continues her argument on the following page by referring to religion, claiming that "wide parts of the US public" perceive their convictions as absolute (for a discussion of religion as demarcating the USA from Europe, cf. Section 6.4.2). What is important here is that this statement is intensified by using the adjective "pronounced", which widens the gulf between Europe and "US-Americans" (line 6). Understanding what enables the move from claim to conclusion is warranted by the cultural pattern outlined above, i.e. "everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and whoever humbles himself will be exalted". By affirming the end of Europe's missionary zeal, which has caused much harm in the past, she generates legitimacy which she can utilise against "US-Americans" (it is noteworthy that "US-Americans" are not differentiated). As assumed above, there is no backing, which is of little surprise as even the warrant remains implicit and no chance of challenging her move exists due to the genre. For a visualisation of relevant aspects of Haller's argument, cf. Figure 5:

Europe is freed of its missionary zeal as it had to "start anew" and face its "guilt-laden history". Since, on the one hand, through admission of wrongdoing we lose status but, on the other hand, we get credit for making them. So, the "US-Americans" can be identified as still having not learnt and being full of regressive *Sendungsbewusstsein*.

Figure 5: A schematic representation of Haller (2003) following Toulmin's simple model

3.3.3 A Final Note: Rhetorics of Judge-Penitence and/or *historia magistra vitae*?

Putting forward rhetorics of judge-penitence is crucially linked to the idea of learning the lessons from the past, i.e. the ancient topos of *historia magistra vitae* (history is life's teacher). This topos is about history providing a reservoir of experiences from which contemporaries should draw in order to avoid mistakes. Whilst of almost unbroken persistence for about two thousand years, Reinhart
Koselleck (1985:32) describes how the Enlightenment led to “the destruction of the exemplary nature of past events and, [put] in its place, the discovery of the uniqueness of historical processes and the possibility of progress”. That is to say, reason replaced history. But this does not imply that history becomes obsolete when contemporaries face the present. Instead of being a straightforward recipe for how to deal with something, history now influences reactions to a problem by being reflected upon in the light of current contexts. In line with this, Jörn Rüsen (1990:181-184) describes historia magistra vitae as an “exemplary form of narrating”, via which the future becomes foreseeable and stabilises identities. Habermas (1998:10) emphasises that such a narrating is still of public relevance. However, he insists that learning from the past must no longer be about the affirmation of positive aspects but rather reflection on disappointments and acceptance of past failures. But what kind of relationship do rhetorics of judge-penitence and historia magistra vitae have? On the one hand, rhetorics of judge-penitence claim a learning process by apparently drawing the right conclusions from what history teaches. On the other, rhetorics of judge-penitence go beyond historia magistra vitae by taking its illocutionary force not simply from a claimed learning process, but as implicit or explicit acknowledgment of wrongdoing. It is this latter aspect which makes judge-penitence a specific case of historia magistra vitae, if not altogether different from it.

The following examples illustrate this difference. Whilst the first one makes use of historia magistra vitae, it is the second which rather performs a rhetoric of judge-penitence.

(...) But even the end of the Second World War does not justify the collective renunciation of the willingness to take up arms. If we ourselves were freed under American leadership from a dictatorship, all the more do we lack a moral legitimation to withhold other peoples a similar fate. But even the end of World War Two does not justify the collective wavering of being ready to go for one’s weapon. If, worse still, you add to that that a country like Iraq could have weapons of mass destruction which could reach Israel, then I ask myself what those who come out with all means against a disarming of Saddam have really learnt from the time of National Socialism. (...)
This example is entitled *Austria and the (Iraq) war* and was published in the guests’ comments pages of the rather conservative Austrian broadsheet *Die Presse* on 10 January 2003 (this article is, again, part of the primary corpus of this thesis). The author – Georg Vetter, a lay member of the public – argues that taking up arms might be necessary precisely because of our past (lines 1-3) as “we ourselves were freed under American leadership” and therefore “lack moral legitimation” to oppose war (lines 2-3). Consequently, those who oppose the disarming of Saddam Hussein have not learnt the lessons from history. This is intensified by a warning that the State of Israel’s existence might be in jeopardy. Besides the argument that we “lack moral legitimation” to oppose the US, the argument does resemble a type of appeasement argumentation (much clearer in Example VI, Section 7.4.3): in order to prevent a second catastrophe, we have to learn “from the time of National Socialism” and act now (line 7). Although there is a weak implicit acknowledging of the in-group’s failure (lines 2-3), the Austrian allusion to involvement in National Socialism remains secondary and hardly mobilises illocutionary force via a rhetoric of judge-penitence (cf. Example III, Section 6.4.3 for a rather pro-war case which, arguably, draws on judge-penitence). Instead, it is a general appeal to history which carries the argument.

The final example of this chapter combines a rhetoric of judge-penitence with *historia magistra vitae*. The following passage is taken from a speech by Dieter Lutz (2003:156), then director of the Hamburg-based *Institute for peace studies and security policy*.

1 (...) Against the background of its history before and after the Second World War, Europe wanted (and wants) the [civilising] project. (...) [1989/90 offered] the chance of a century to relate the lessons and insights from the past conceptually to new dangers and threats which highly developed states and societies face, among others also worldwide terrorism. The dominant power of the victorious ‘West’ was, however, not interested in this chance, and in contrast left it to elapse unused. (…)

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Lutz begins with a reference to Europe’s problematic past which led the continent to aim for “the [civilising] project” (zivilisatorischen Projekt) as the lesson provided by history. While Europe is thus predicated positively as facing its history (“[a]gainst the background of its history”, line 1) by which means the continent “wanted (and wants)” (lines 1-2) progress, the USA has apparently not learnt and is not even “interested in this chance” (line 4). Problematically, both Europe as well as the USA are homogenised. This leaves no space for, e.g., a consideration of Europe’s internal divisions, the USA under President Bill Clinton, or doubts over Europe’s status as a civilising project given the continuous existence of anti-Semitism, racism, etc.

3.4 Summary

I started this chapter by emphasising again the processual character of collective memories, i.e. the fact that dialogical connections exist between different ‘phases’ of the evolution of memory frames. The significance of this should have become clear throughout the chapter as I have conceptualised and operationalised the rhetoric of judge-penitence as a phenomenon relying, first and foremost, on admissions of past wrongdoing. Only if speaker and audience share an acceptance of their past being wrong do rhetorics of judge-penitence ‘make sense’. Here, specific (historical and contemporary) cultural patterns were discussed in order to understand better the latter’s illocutionary force. Given that there is no systematic account of judge-penitence in the social sciences yet – at least to my knowledge – a comprehensive discussion was necessary. The notion of judge-penitence has, I hope, also become accessible thanks to the literary and historical background worked into the chapter. And whilst this was supported by a series of examples discussed briefly, these are not definitive analyses but serve, at this point, as heuristic means, as does the use of Toulmin’s structural model. Both the actual analysis and the value of Toulmin’s layout of argument should become more transparent in Sections 6.4, 7.4 and 8.4, where more space is devoted to the analysis of empirical sources.
For now, the question remains of why judge-penitence should actually be criticised. How can a rhetoric of judge-penitence be theoretically separated from legitimate criticism of others based on the in-group's own past? And how can such an evaluation be justified theoretically? This also includes the question of why (and if at all) apologies are potentially emancipatory – or if they are ultimately just subtle forms of domination as some critics have claimed. I address these questions in the following chapter.
4. THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MEMORY: MEMORY AND CRITIQUE

4.1 Overview of the Chapter

While previous chapters have welcomed apologetic acts and challenged the rhetoric of judge-penitence as a misuse of such admissions of wrongdoing on grounds of conventional wisdom, this chapter offers a theoretical justification of this evaluation. It is therefore necessary to elaborate in detail the link between a wider social theory, which is able to validate its own critical standards, and the more specific issue of collective memory. I resort to Habermas’ theory and stress the importance of intersubjective will formation concerning collective memories in order to understand the latter’s significance for morality. This enables, in turn, the rational justification of criteria which, in principle, make possible the justified rejection of particular uses of admissions of wrongdoings as moral misuses of the past.

In Section 4.2, I introduce Habermas’ formal pragmatics in order to clarify his justification of critique and his related theory of moral learning. I then draw together notes on the role and significance of the past in his work and how these link to his wider approach. Section 4.3 touches on three strands of criticism mounted (implicitly or explicitly) against Habermas which are relevant to the subject of memory and admitting wrongdoings. These are, firstly, communitarian objections against the idea of a thin morality of memory, secondly, scepticism by ethical naturalism towards Habermas’ theory of discursive rightness, and, thirdly, poststructuralist rejections of Habermas’ emancipatory project. In Section 4.4, I discuss and respond to these positions, clarifying how admissions of wrongdoing can be evaluated as normatively desirable while, simultaneously, providing a rational rejection of rhetorics of judge-penitence. In Section 4.5, I connect these elaborations with Chapters 2 and 3 in order to justify my view on apologetic acts and their misuse.
In this section, I review Habermas’ language philosophy, focusing on his understanding of language, action and validity claims, his concept of discourse, discourse ethics as well as (blocked) moral learning, and the role the past occupies in this theory. This will illustrate how he aims for a rational justification of a moral point of view and to what extent this is linked to self-critical assessments of the in-group’s past.

4.2.1 Language, Action and Validity

Habermas’ point of departure lies in the following question: what happens as soon as we start to interact? Here, he draws on two traditions in particular: Wilhelm von Humboldt’s philosophy of language and the late Wittgenstein. Concerning the former, Habermas (2003c:52-62) emphasises Humboldt’s third function of language, i.e. the communicative functions of exchanging views, objecting and agreeing (the other two being the cognitive function of world representation and thought-formation and the expressive function of manifesting emotions and feelings). Language is thus understood not just in functional terms, as a tool to represent and exchange ‘facts’, but as a holistic concept via which societies reproduce the meanings they rely on. ‘Communication’, in this sense, means to activate and reproduce these meanings intersubjectively. With regards to Wittgenstein, Habermas is interested in the concept of language games and their underlying rules (Wittgenstein, 1968:§3, §71, §75, §567), i.e. the intuitive know-how of competent language users in contrast to a reflected know-that. Giving the late Wittgenstein a particular twist, Habermas aims for a reconstruction of these rules in order to identify unavoidable presuppositions of every kind of communication, a programme he calls universal pragmatics (later, formal pragmatics).²⁶

²⁶ Although Habermas is interested in everyday language use, i.e. pragmatics, his efforts to reconstruct unavoidable presuppositions in interaction are formal and thus to be separated from an empirical-pragmatic approach (Habermas, 1984:328-337). Note also that this does not necessarily limit his approach to making
This programme rests on a twofold evolutionary development of human language: firstly, the freeing of “pragmatic universals” such as personal pronouns, deictic expressions, performative verbs, non-performative intentional verbs, modal adverbs, etc. from bodily expressions (Habermas, 1971c:77f; for a broader view on this evolutionary development, cf. Tomasello, 1999). Secondly, Habermas (1987:77) identifies “the linguistification of the sacred” through which “the spellbinding power of the holy is sublimated into the binding/bonding force of criticisable validity claims”. These developments enable, firstly, putting forward propositions and, secondly, the possibility to either accept or reject their validity as they are no longer treated as unquestionable. What counts as valid becomes evaluated in everyday talk. In the course of this evolution of the species and its communicative abilities, human beings have developed three reflexive relations between the actor and three worlds:

- a reflexive stance towards the objective world enables demarcation of the Ego from the environment, the ‘real’ world of objects;
- the awareness of norms as being societal products enables demarcation from the social world. The subject perceives itself as being able to create society;
- individuals become reflexively aware of themselves, their subjective world, as they increasingly perceive themselves from the perspective of third persons.

To these worlds, humans relate with different kinds of action (Figure 6). Instrumental action refers to the non-social objective world and its manipulation, e.g. through our ability to apply tools and meaning with language but can include every social activity (bodily gestures, sounds, etc.) with an identifiable propositional content.

27 Religious texts which could not – and often still cannot – be questioned are a paradigmatic example. The sacred norms entailed in scriptures are given to the believer who risks committing a heretical act by questioning what is there revealed. In contrast, modern societies have steadily moved away from this model and instead derive at their validity through – at least in their normative ideal – contested debates.
develop technologies. In the realm of linguistically mediated interaction, strategic action too is based on agents' calculation of success in order to reach a goal, however, this time by taking into account a second agent's decisions. Strategic action is thus purposive rational by aiming to influence the other in order to fulfil the speaker's perlocutionary intentions. However, such action cannot integrate societies (Durkheim, 1997:149-177), and Habermas (1984:101) therefore proposes a prior mode of social action: communicative action. The latter is oriented towards understanding, i.e. the creation of lasting, shared definitions and meaning, and warrants the (re)production of a unified life-world.\(^{28}\)

Only the communicative model of action presupposes language as a medium of uncurtailed communication whereby speakers and hearers, out of their context of their preinterpreted lifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to negotiate common definitions of their situation (95).\(^{29}\)

\(^{28}\) Habermas (1984:101) acknowledges that all action is teleological. However, in the case of communicative action, goal orientation becomes of secondary importance as cooperation takes over as the prime principle. In Habermas' (1988:300) words: "the teleology of the individual action plans and of the operations for carrying them out is interrupted by the action-coordinating mechanism of reaching understanding". This has remained stable over the development of Habermas' theory. However, the concept of understanding itself has changed, in particular through a recent publication in which Habermas (1996:326-334) differentiates communicative action into weak communicative action and strong communicative action. Whilst the latter represents what previously characterised communicative action, the former is only concerned with the validity claims of truth and truthfulness. In other words, weak communicative action operates with a reduced notion of understanding as it concerns purposes but not normative validity.

\(^{29}\) It is important not to confuse communicative action with communication in general, the former being only one mode of the latter (Habermas, 1984:101).
Figure 6: Types of Action (Habermas, 1984:333)

Referring to these worlds via conversation (representation of states of affairs in the objective world), norm-regulated action (reproduction of interpersonal relations in the subjective world) or dramaturgical action (performing our subjectivity) constitutes limit cases of communicative action as just one function of language is activated (Habermas, 1984:95; for an overview of these classifications, cf. Table 2). However, these limit cases are crucial as different kinds of validity claims are carried by them.\footnote{Thus, Habermas (1976:66f) speaks of communicative action only if all three types of action – conversation, normatively regulated action, and dramaturgical action – come together in one speech act, although one aspect will normally stand out.} In other words, the illocutionary force of speech acts, which creates interpersonal bonds, is differentiated on these three axes too, according to the world the speech act refers to.\footnote{Cf. Habermas, 1976 and 1984:319-328 for his criticism and usage of John Austin's (1978) and John Searle's (1969) speech act theory.} Accordingly, validity is rooted in: firstly, truth claims referring to the objective world being true or false, e.g. “I hereby say that the table is broken”; secondly, rightness claims referring to the social world being right or wrong, e.g. “I hereby claim that killing is bad”; thirdly, truthfulness claims referring to the degree of sincerity in our self-representation, e.g. “I hereby promise to come back”.

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Table 2: Pure Types of Linguistically-Mediated Interaction (Habermas, 1984:329)

For example, a teacher might suggest that, because the day will be hot, the remaining classes should take place outside. S/he could simply force the pupils to do so by way of her/his professional authority. However, s/he could also tell the class that s/he listened to the weather forecast and thus knows the day will be hot (truth claim). S/he could add that the rooms will soon be stuffy and that some pupils might therefore be unfairly disadvantaged due to declining concentration (rightness claim). By pointing out, linguistically and/or via her/his body language, that s/he really thinks classes would not be enjoyable if they were to be held inside (truthfulness claim), a communicative act
would be performed. After a brief discussion, the pupils might agree and move outside. Alternatively, some could reject her/his suggestions by pointing to there being many hay fever sufferers among them whose breathing would worsen outside. Consequently, the class might stay in the building. In both cases, a binding shared definition would be established – not through constraint (or relatively little) but the “force of the better argument” (Habermas, 1984:28).

Therefore, validity claims are Habermas’ (1971b:103) “point of departure for a critical theory of society”: whenever we mean what we say, we implicitly or explicitly raise, object to and/or justify such claims, thereby accepting the “force of the better argument” in order to coordinate action.\(^3\) Here, although participants in communicative action do pursue goals as well, their success orientation is not driven by egocentric calculation but by the aim to reach a common understanding of their situation. Most importantly, this implies that, according to Habermas, rationality is not the capacity of a monologically working mind, i.e. self-reflection, but a property of intersubjectivity where validity claims can be raised, criticised and refuted freely. Rationality is in fact “communicative rationality”, built into formal pragmatics, and carries connotations based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained unifying consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely

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\(^3\) Habermas has always stressed the motivating force of good arguments. However, he has also acknowledged that good reasons alone are not always enough to motivate (moral) action. In consequence, Habermas’ (1997:114) more recent work has stressed the importance of law which, although internally linked to formal pragmatics via deliberative practices and relying on appropriate socialisation, supplements the agent’s moral intuition as “legal norms have the immediate effectiveness for action that moral judgements as such lack”. Law is seen as a medium of morality in modern, plural societies (Habermas, 1997; 2003a:42-49) and autonomously develops a “gentle force” (Habermas, 2003b:266) towards moral learning processes.
subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld (Habermas, 1984:10).^{33}

4.2.2 Discourse, Discourse Ethics and (Blocked) Moral Learning Processes

In most cases, misunderstandings and open questions can be solved via communicative action on the basis of a shared lifeworld, the totality of a group's knowledge and symbolic understanding from which members can never step outside. Yet, as soon as contested issues which are not covered by such an intuitive common understanding are discussed, participants have to justify their acceptance or rejection of the validity of the proposition in question. Thus, they enter what Habermas defines as Discourse.\(^{34}\) In Discourse(s), validity claims become problematised which enables a reflective stance to be taken towards them. In other words, what has been naively carried along with communicative action is now tested. Consequently, Habermas (1997:109; also 1983b:125, 130; 1984:25; 1990:235) views Discourse as "a reflective form of communicative action" in which the "attitude" or "perspective" towards claims raised changes (1983b:125, 158f; also 1997:323).

Since Habermas (1971b, 1972) initially presented this idea in the form of an ideal-speech situation (ISS) – consisting of four aspects: publicness, equal rights to participate, absence of coercion and truthfulness on the part of the participants – it has evoked widespread criticism as being idealistic and out of touch with factual conditions. However, since then, Habermas (1984:25) has

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^{33} More recently, Habermas (1996:308f) has described the role of such discursive rationality as integrating (a) epistemic rationality concerning propositional knowledge, (b) teleological rationality concerning action, and (c) communicative rationality concerning speech. However, this re-arrangement of his theory still does not lead him to reduce rationality to individual self-reflexion within a vacuum, it always being "due to a priori dialogical relation".

^{34} In order to avoid confusion, henceforth, I refer to Habermas' concept of discourse as <Discourse>, i.e. with a capital <D>. In contrast, a wider notion of discourse, as discussed in Section 5.2.3, will be denoted as <discourse>, i.e., uncapsitalised. Hence, Habermasian Discourse is an element of discourse.
acknowledged some unsatisfactory details in his earlier explanations (Habermas, 1971b:103; 1972:181) and has clarified that we

would misunderstand the discursive character of public opinion and will-formation if we thought we could hypostatize the normative content of general presuppositions of rational discourse into an ideal model of purely communicative social relations (Habermas, 1997:322).

Thus, the concept of the ISS is not to suggest a correspondence between reality and an ideal. It is not the about-to-be-realised blueprint of a concrete form of life but a counterfactually anticipated presupposition of every meaningful debate. According to Habermas (1997:332), the former would be an “essentialist misunderstanding”. However, he claims that, already, we have to adopt such idealising assumptions when entering into argumentation. Aspects of the ISS are necessary presuppositions that we have to accept whenever we performatively engage. According to Habermas, participants have counterfactually to assume that they are contributing quite freely and equally, that they are participating in a cooperative search for truth and/or rightness, and that the interlocutor is not manipulative but is raising claims which s/he considers to be true, right and truthful. It is against such a background that indeed the “force of the better argument” decides over the outcome of the discussion.

De facto, limitations of time and space as well as social conditions always exist and are not totally bracketed out by participants; and so, consequently, Habermas (1983a:92) argues that institutional measures should “sufficiently neutralize empirical limitations and avoidable internal and external interference so that the idealized conditions always already presupposed by participants in argumentation can at least be adequately approximated”. But even if Discourses are, as Habermas (1982:235) himself suggests, like “islands in the sea of practice”, they remain necessary reciprocally-
anticipated conditions of social life. A social fabric not based on such counterfactual assumptions would ultimately have to collapse, as it would be unable to reproduce the symbolic resources without which no commonness can exist. To that extent, the notion of ISS captures what communicative action implies: the emancipatory potential inherent in exchanging validity claims which we cannot simply reject.

We have seen that formal pragmatics ultimately reconstructs unavoidable presuppositions. However, Habermas did not stop with this reconstruction but developed a discourse theory of morality – i.e. discourse ethics – out of it. For this purpose, Habermas reformulates these unavoidable presuppositions in the principle of universalisation (henceforth <U>) – what he sees as the logic of argumentation – which acts “like a knife that makes razor-sharp cuts between evaluative statements and strictly normative ones, between the good and the just” (Habermas, 1983a:104). Evaluative statements concern what a particular individual or group perceives as good, e.g. culturally specific

35 Besides spatial, temporal and social limitations to the “force of the better argument”, Habermas also recognises the strategic use of validity claims in order to deceive the listener. Nevertheless, he insists that strategic action is only a parasitic form of communicative action. In Habermas’ (1974a:17) words: “distorted communication is not ultimate; it has its basis in the logic of undistorted language communication”. For example, lying only functions because, under normal circumstances, we expect the other’s claims to be true, right and/or truthful. Otherwise, lying would not work.

36 The term discourse ethics conceals an important difference that Habermas himself has endorsed between ethics and morality. According to Habermas, the former is concerned with questions like ‘Who am I’/‘Who are we?’ and ‘What do I/we want to be?’. Ethical issues thus concern questions of particular visions of the good life. In contrast, moral questions are about justice, i.e. about universal rights and duties which regulate interaction. Counterintuitively, given the name of his concept, discourse ethics is concerned only with moral issues. For a view on the difference between ethics and morals, and the respective Discourses they operate in, cf. Habermas, 1993a. For a critique of the ethics:morality divide, cf. Harper, 2009. For a comprehensive overview of discourse ethics, cf. Outhwaite, 2009:49-55.
ways of living. In contrast, normative statements, according to Habermas, concern what might be
just for all. Hence, \(<U>\) aims to ensure impartiality by insisting that everyone should take into
account the perspective of all others affected in order to balance their views (Habermas, 1983a:65).37
That principle is important here, to the extent that it serves as theoretical justification for the
principle of discourse ethics \(<D>\): “[o]nly those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse”

This formulation reveals \(<D>\) as a procedural principle. That is to say, it does not postulate goods
(fLOURISHING, COMPASSION, etc.) as criteria but properties of Discourse, i.e. the unconstrained exchange
of validity claims. Consequently, \(<D>\) justifies Habermas’ (1997:299) broader claim for deliberative
democracy which “reckons with the higher-level intersubjectivity of processes of reaching
understanding that take place through democratic procedures or in the communicative network of
public spheres”. Deliberative democracy is thus to be understood as the consistent further
development of formal pragmatics on the macro-political level, i.e. the concrete realisation of those
idealisations we have to make when arguing.

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37 The (controversial) assumption underlying this split is that what is seen as morally just can hardly be defined
in terms of concrete ethical ‘goods’, given diverging life-forms and increasing pluralism. Debates over the oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 can illustrate the difference between evaluative and normative statements.
In June 2010, a discussion arose in the United Kingdom (UK) over the treatment of British Petroleum (BP), the
company responsible for the disaster. Criticism was direct against the US administration for being too harsh on
BP, thereby threatening BP’s dividend payments to UK pensioners. In the main, these statements were not
concerned with broader issues of environmental legislation or the impact of such catastrophes, wherever they
might happen, on local people, or with claims for compensation by those affected, but concentrated instead on
parts of the British electorate only. To that extent, they were driven by rather particularistic considerations
regarding what might be good for Britain instead of normative ones.

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Rather unrestricted communication, Discourses, have another macro-sociological effect: they enable collective learning processes.

Whereas the openness of rational expression to criticism and the grounding merely points to the possibility of argumentation, learning processes – through which we acquire theoretical knowledge and moral insight, extend and renew our evaluative language, and overcome self-deceptions and difficulties in comprehension – themselves rely on argumentation (Habermas, 1984:22).

As Habermas points out, learning processes cannot be understood in terms of monological thinking alone but via argumentation processes which are the only source of novel knowledge.\textsuperscript{38} According to Habermas, this is true for learning processes concerning the objective world as well as the social world. The former, cognitive learning processes, improve our instrumental capacity to manipulate the objective world, e.g. through the invention of new technologies. However, even in this case, Habermas does not subscribe to a strictly realist position: although agents are able to refer to

\textsuperscript{38} Following Jean Piaget’s (1997) late theory of cognitive development, Habermas (1979:162) initially perceived individual learning-processes as running ahead of social learning, as “peacemakers of social evolution”. Individuals learn and the aggregation of these processes leads to societal learning which, in turn, enables further development of individual cognitive structures. For an overview of criticism of such a correspondence between individual and societal processes, cf. Outhwaite, 2009:56-61. In response, Habermas (1995, 2003a, 2003b) has put more emphasis on intersubjectivity as the medium of development and learning. Max Miller (2006:207-218) encapsulates this when elaborating on Plato’s \textit{Meno Paradox}. The paradox rests in the fact that structurally new knowledge can neither derive completely from already established old knowledge, nor can it be completely new as knowledge arises in contexts and through reference to existing knowledge. Individuals can acquire new knowledge by, e.g., reading (students); however, individuals cannot create structurally new knowledge in isolation as the subject being learnt always depends on their selective mental patterns. The paradox can be solved by moving from the individual to the intersubjective paradigm, in which structurally new knowledge develops through the exchange of arguments and perspectives (cf. Tomasello, 1999 for a recent account of the significance of interaction for the development of human cognition).
something in the objective world, the success of this representation, its ability to prove itself, is not independent of communication. Habermas’ (2003a:38) weak naturalism still emphasises argumentation and thus “the concept of rational discourse retains its status as a privileged form of communication that forces those participating in it to continue decentring their cognitive perspectives. (...) There is no unmediated, discursively unfiltered access to the truth conditions of empirical beliefs”.

While learning processes concerning truth about the objective world of physical objects depend on Discourses, things are different when it comes to the issue of moral learning processes which are far more significant here. The latter refer not to an objective world but an ‘objective other’ in the social world and its claims of normative rightness. As such, Habermas claims that they lack an unconditional point of reference, e.g. the hardness of this table in front of me. Although the ‘other’s’ opinion might be objectively opposed to mine, solving moral issues remains a discursive exercise as it is only through arguments that we get insights into the experiences and expectations of others and can reformulate our perspectives.

For moral beliefs do not falter against the resistance of an objective world that all participants suppose to be one and the same. Rather, they falter against the irresolubility of normative dissensus among opposing parties in a shared social world. (...) The “objectivity” of an other mind is made of different stuff than the objectivity of an unanticipated reality. The resistance of “objective spirit” can be overcome by moral learning processes that lead the disputing parties to broaden their respective social worlds and to include one another in a world they jointly construct (Habermas, 2003b:256; also 2003a:42).\(^{39}\)

\(^{39}\) For a somewhat similar moral realist perspective on learning via feedback mechanisms (although putting less emphasis on the discursive element), cf. Railton, 1986.
If learning processes are possible and grounded in the egalitarian and inclusive potential of interaction itself, then the question arises: why is the world still in the condition it is? In other words, how is it possible to block this immanent potential? Disagreement is indeed not always resolved, and often not even identified. In cases where participants in arguments deceive themselves systematically over shared presuppositions of argumentation, Habermas, by initially drawing on Freudian thinking, speaks of systematically distorted communication and pathological learning processes, i.e. the unrestricted exchange of arguments is systematically hampered both interpersonally and intrapersonally. Thus, Habermas (1987:378) states that: “deception and self-deception can gain objective power in an everyday practice reliant on the facticity of validity claims”. Strategic action and manipulation occurs when “at least one of the parties behaves with an orientation to success, but leaves others to believe that all the presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied”. Communication becomes systematically distorted if “at least one of the parties is deceiving himself about the fact that he is acting with an attitude oriented to success and is only keeping up the appearance of communicative action” (Habermas, 1984:332).

However, Habermas has never conceptualised this suspension of the potential inherent in human interaction in detail. I therefore point to two of his students (Eder, 1985; Miller, 1986:428-440; 2006) who have elaborated on the blocking of egalitarian and inclusive argumentation. By, firstly, stressing consensus or dissensus between or inside groups, arguments can become closed and the exploration of difference hampered. However, to develop into a serious blockade, the closer has,

40 For example, the colonisation of the lifeworld through solely purpose-oriented rationality of the economic sphere works against the free development of a strong Ego by putting pressure on families. In the case of the individual, pathologies might lead to distortions of the structure of communication itself and psychopathologies (Habermas, 1974c:169; 1984:21). On a collective level, identities become uncertain and societal orders might lose legitimacy. For the most explicit discussion of Freudian traits in his work, cf. Habermas, 1971a.

41 For the following, cf. Miller, 2006:227-257.
secondly, to be legitimised via concrete agents or shared mental entities. Thus emerges a 2x2 table with four ideal-typical learning blockades (Table 3). Dogmatic learning blocks argumentation through reference to unquestionable authorities, e.g. holy books. Similarly, regressive learning too identifies an agent. In this case, arguments by the ‘other’ are simply rejected because of the person putting them forward, i.e. communication between the two parties cannot even start, e.g. in the case of a radical anti-Semite who will automatically turn away as soon as a ‘Jew’ speaks. Defensive learning blockades are different in that they reproduce a consensus through a more or less implicit pressure to conform. In consequence, the in-group feels reassured instead of questioning group norms and decisions. Ideological learning, finally, rests on the construction of an unbridgeable divide between apparent belief systems. Although particular agents, e.g. lobbying groups, play a role in distorting argumentation, these learning blockades only count as such if they become collectively shared. In other words, a single argument put forward by a speaker does not count as a blocked learning process – as long as it does not spread and ultimately structure the public discourse in question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority of (collective) agents</th>
<th>dogmatic</th>
<th>regressive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority of Ideas and Institutions</td>
<td>defensive</td>
<td>ideological</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Four ideal-types of learning blockades and their discursive mechanisms (Miller, 2006:241, my translation)

4.2.3 **Habermas on the Past as a not so Foreign Country**

If the idea of societal learning processes is accepted, then it is plausible to apply the concept to issues of ‘coming to terms with the past’. Habermas has actively participated in various public debates over the German past, e.g. the Historikerstreit (Habermas, 1989a), the Goldhagen-debate (Habermas, 2001a), or the debate over the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (Habermas, 2001b). In
these debates, he made it clear that the way a community relates to its (problematic) traditions affects the quality of its political culture. Accordingly, the cognitively demanding acceptance of past wrongdoings can become an instrument of self-enlightenment by opening the in-group’s horizon to the ‘other’s’ experiences (Habermas, 2001a; 2001b:49f). By being confronted with the “‘objectivity’ of an other mind” and the subsequent recognition of wrongs being part of the in-group’s tradition, the group’s perspective might be de-centred, thereby enabling moral learning.

History may at best be a critical teacher who tells us how we ought not to do things. Of course, it can advise us in this way only if we admit to ourselves that we have failed. In order to learn from history, we must not allow ourselves to push unsolved problems aside or repress them; we must remain open to critical experiences (...). If we learn from such disappointments, we keep coming up against a now questionable background of disappointed expectations. Such a background is constantly being constructed from traditions, life-forms, and practices we share as members of a nation, a state, or a culture – from traditions that unsolved problems have suddenly aroused and challenged (Habermas, 1998:13).

In emphasising the potential of a critical appropriation of the past, this quote also describes moral learning processes explicitly as phenomena of the public sphere. Reconstructing traditions hardly occurs at an individual level alone but does so through a web of interaction via which meanings become collectively relevant. The way publics transmit, thematise and create collective memories is therefore crucial – and it is this process which might be blocked by learning pathologies.42 This

42 It is an interesting question to ask to what extent external pressure plays a role in learning processes. Habermas (1995:174) acknowledges that “[o]nly when the European powers, under the nuclear umbrella of the superpowers, were denied the exercise of their own foreign policy did the self-understanding of the democratic, legally constituted state detach itself, not only in theory but also within the population in large, from the patterns of national self-assertion and geopolitical power politics. (...) This tendency towards a certain ‘postnationalist’ self-understanding on the part of the political community may have asserted itself more
emphasises the process nature of collective memories, in contrast to misunderstandings of the latter as static entities dispatched from action. Furthermore, it illustrates that memories take a central role in Habermas' wider project. Unfortunately, this link between his procedural project in general and critical reassessments of the past seems theoretically underdeveloped although, in a rare moment, he mentions that

if a [rational] collective identity emerged in a complex society, it would have the form of an unspecified (...) identity of a community of those who discursively and experimentally cultivate their identity-related knowledge through competing projections of identity, thus via a critical reassessment of their tradition or stimulated by science, philosophy or art (1974b:121, my translation).

While the first part points to procedurality as the only way forward in a modern pluralist world, the latter stresses the potential role of self-critical assessments of the in-group's traditions. As such, formal pragmatics, which reconstructs unavoidable presuppositions of social interaction, can unfold its normative potential in learning processes through public debates about the in-group's problematic past. Particular self-critical memories can become the fuel for an abstract procedural programme. Thus, particular memories can have a motivational force for implementing moral arrangements. Habermas (1989a:261f) summarises this link in the concept of constitutional patriotism where

identifications with one's own forms of life and traditions are overlaid with a patriotism that has become more abstract. (...) National traditions continue to confer privileged status on one form of life (...) but no strongly in the special situation of the Federal Republic, which had been deprived of the essential rights of sovereignty, than it did in other states". What does this mean for the concept of moral learning based on egalitarian and inclusive interaction? Can one indeed speak of learning processes if these are driven by external pressures? I assume that there is no reason to perceive external pressures as devaluing learning processes per se, given that external pressures can be made meaningful in different ways.
longer need a central point around which they can be grouped and integrated into a national identity. Instead, the abstract idea of the universalization of democracy and human rights forms the hard substance through which the rays of national tradition (...) are refracted.\textsuperscript{43}

While thick national identities have often been about the in-group’s suffering and triumphs, victims and heroes, constitutional patriotism transcends such a particularistic conception of belonging by linking these traditions and narratives to universal ideas. However, ‘cold rationality’ does not replace cosy national identities. Instead, the latter’s particularities are restructured by procedural universal principles, and by the “hard substance” of democratic ideas and human rights which are rationally grounded in formal pragmatics.

In this section, I presented Habermas’ reconstruction of egalitarian and inclusive presuppositions underlying intersubjectivity. Such relations can be enabled by apologetic acts which open the possibility for moral learning (instead of being subtle ways of domination). However, intersubjective relations can also become distorted by not recognising the ‘objective other’, e.g. when denying recognition of past suffering or regressively construct the ‘other’ as morally inferior. In his concept of “constitutional patriotism”, Habermas himself has pointed to the moral significance of memory, an argument I adopt in order to justify my evaluations (cf. Section 4.5).

\textbf{4.3 Criticism and Alternatives}

This section reviews alternatives and objections to a Habermasian approach in which I focus on aspects relevant to the subject of memory and the evaluation of admissions and (mis)uses of past wrongdoings. More importantly, this section is neither able to provide a comprehensive review of these alternatives and objections nor to discuss their relation to Habermas’ programme in depth.

\textsuperscript{43} For an excellent introduction to constitutional patriotism, cf. Müller, 2007.
Thus, I do not aim for a carte blanche for Habermas’ programme here but restrict myself explicitly to juxtaposing three criticisms relevant to the issue of memory and morality. Firstly, I introduce communitarian criticism, focusing on Margalit’s paradigmatic Ethics of Memory. Secondly, I illustrate objections which can be summarised under the heading of ethical naturalism, in particular theories of compassion. Thirdly, I look at Michel Foucault’s poststructuralism and his conceptualisation of confessing.

4.3.1 Communitarian Criticism: Against Proceduralism

Communitarian criticism of neo-Kantian justice theories, such as that of Habermas, is directed against the idea of individuals as free-floating, abstract and autonomous units who are concerned, first and foremost, with their universal rights and issues of justice. Communitarians argue that this is a liberal illusion as individuals are interwoven into their communities and this interweaving implies the supremacy of particular goods over procedural justice.44

In other words, the focus on procedures in order to find a just-as-possible answer to contradicting interests and the emphasis on individuals deciding what good they prefer, overlooks its entrenchment in a particular world of goods which structure the procedural search for justice itself.

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44 Michael Sandel (1998:62) criticises the idea of individuals detached from their communities in terms of “a self so thoroughly independent as this rules out any conception of the good (or of the bad) bound up with possessions in the constitutive sense. (...) It rules out the possibility of a public life in which, for good or ill, the identity as well as the interest of the participants could be at stake”. Charles Taylor (1989:89) comments illustratively on the issue of particular goods underlying communal life and thus preceding justice: “[T]he good is always prior to the right (...) in that the good is what, in its articulation, gives the point of the rules which define the right. (...) They [theories of justice] utterly mystify the priority of the moral by identifying it not with substance but with a form of reasoning, around which they draw a firm boundary”.
This controversy is by now too vast to be recapitulated here.\textsuperscript{45} However, recently, Margalit (2002) has paradigmatically extended the communitarian critique to the field of memory in his widely acclaimed \textit{Ethics of Memory}. Although it does not address Habermas explicitly, the points he makes are worth considering when aiming for an outline of the moral significance of memory.

Margalit makes three interrelated claims: memory makes communities, such communities have a duty to remember even their death and this duty exists only in cases of thick relationships spanning from families to nations in their size, i.e. those with whom we share substantial memory. While the first is undisputed, the second and third claims remain controversial. According to Margalit (9), the human species in the 21st century cannot be described as a thick community. Therefore, Margalit (34) draws a line between ethics and morality whereby only the former is made up of thick relations based on shared memories which demand caring for other members of the group. However, people can only care about a limited number of others. Hence, he assigns morality to the role of saving human beings from total indifference to other fellow humans. Margalit (41-44) illustrates this via the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10, 25-37): although tensions between Jews and Samaritans were running high at the time, it is neither a priest nor a Levite (both fellow Jews) who stop and help a robbed and badly injured Jewish traveller lying on the wayside but a Samaritan who treats the injured not as a Jew but as a fellow human being.

However, for Margalit (8), only those sharing thick relations\textit{ ought} to be concerned with their own kind, including their death, as memory “is the cement that holds thick relations together”. Commemoration in such communities becomes a quasi-religious duty in order to secure the victims’

immortality (25). Therefore, Margalit is clearly concerned with communal issues, what Habermas calls ethical issues, surrounding the questions: ‘Who am I?’, ‘Who are we?’, and ‘Who do I/we want to be?’ The ‘we’ in question is a community formed by its memories which, although socially constructed, can be treated as natural kinds (69f), i.e. groupings of elements due to shared characteristics which are not simply constructed. What Margalit (70) means by constructed natural kinds is that how they emerge is “usually quite spontaneously and sometimes with the help of manipulation”.

Margalit (63) locates shared memories of such communities between the poles of critical historiography and myth but, ultimately, positions them much closer to myth. Only thus, according to Margalit, are communities bound together. Being closely related to myth, shared memories are “authorized by the tradition of the community as its canonical line of memory” (60). Consistent with the assumption that memory forms thick relations, Margalit (60) states that other interpretations of the past “may be tolerated and even welcome as long as they confirm the version of the traditional memory, but they are prohibited if they contradict or conflict with the traditional line of shared memory”. Thus, in order to ensure their binding capacity, self-critical assessments of the in-group’s tradition are restricted. At the same time, Margalit (86, 103f) identifies ethical relations as good only if they are caring relations and do not rely on ‘othering’. In line with this, the recently opened Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin is seen as enabling the Germans to constitute themselves as an ethical community (81). Although the Holocaust was an attack on the whole of humanity, i.e. on morality, and should be commemorated, Margalit (79) is cautious to establish a link between memory and morality as he sees it as “immeasurably difficult (...) due to a lack of relevant institutions”.

This first round of criticism suggests that thick memories are central to the ethical life of a community. In contrast, Habermas stresses the pluralistic nature of modern societies and therefore the need for a primarily procedural, non-particularistic understanding of memory. For sure, Margalit
does not deny the value of morality as a means to conduct relations between strangers. However, he is sceptical as particular memories of a community remain distinctively separated from such universalism and attain a degree of sanctity – even if he demands the latter to be caring and open. In this perspective, admissions of wrongdoing (and rhetorics of judge-penitence) are primarily important inasmuch as they affect thick intra-community relations (ethics) instead of supporting evaluations of their effect on inter-community relations (morality).

4.3.2 Ethical Naturalism: Against Discursive Rightness

Often associated with communitarian ideas are those under the header of ethical naturalism, i.e. the assumption that some principles or goods objectively concern the well-being of others. Here, in contrast to Habermas’ discursive approach, normative rightness depends, first and foremost, on pre-linguistic insights and not on conscious deliberation. This criticism too is linked to an anti-Kantian stance with its seemingly abstract norms and duties. Taking into account the popularity of mini-series and movies like Holocaust (1978) and Schindler’s List (1993), their success was probably not primarily due to arguments but to images of suffering which gave rise to affective responses, e.g. compassion. After all, even Kant spoke of the latter as being “one of the impulses placed in us by nature for effecting what the representation of duty might not accomplish by itself” (quoted in Nussbaum, 2001:380). When acknowledging the motivational force of feelings, would it not be consequent to assign, e.g., compassion as the benchmark for elaborating on the moral significance of memory?

Such a position is exemplified by Arthur Schopenhauer who viewed compassion as a process of identification with the other’s pain. Compassion, for Schopenhauer (1965:165), allows for feeling the other’s pain, “feel it as my own, and yet not within me, but in another person”. Schopenhauer’s emphasis on compassion is rooted in a fundamental criticism of Kantian rationalism, suggesting that

46 Schopenhauer’s approach becomes questionable as soon as he (has to) ground(s) compassion in a metaphysics of the will. Egoism is overcome in moments of intuitive realisation that the ‘other’ is as vulnerable
[g]enuine goodness of disposition, disinterested virtue, and pure nobleness of mind, therefore, do not come from abstract knowledge; yet they do come from knowledge. But it is a direct and intuitive knowledge that cannot be reasoned away or arrived at by reasoning: knowledge that, just because it is not abstract, cannot be communicated, but must dawn on each of us (1969:369f).

Thus, for Schopenhauer, knowledge as being communicable, i.e. propositional speech, has little meaning when it comes to morality which is, instead, grounded in intuitive compassion.

Nussbaum (1996), who also sees compassion as the "basic social emotion", conceptualises this feeling slightly differently. For her, not only is separateness a crucial feature of this emotion (it is as I am, i.e. in moments of true love and compassion. However, it remains unclear whether these mysterious moments are about the elimination of difference “to a certain extent at least” (Schoppenhauer, 1965:144), or the total abolition of the barrier between ego and non-ego (166). Adam Smith (1966:3) represents a different, less metaphysical view on compassion: to him, it is clear that we do not have “immediate experience of what other men feel”. However, although we place ourselves in the sufferer’s position by imagination only, we nevertheless “conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him (...) and feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them” (4). A few pages later, Smith even addresses our affectedness by the dead and the duty not to forget them. “Surely, we imagine, we can never feel too much for those who have suffered so dreadful a calamity. The tribute of our fellow-feeling seems doubly due to them now, when they are in danger of being forgot by everybody [sic]; and, by the vain honours which we pay to their memory, we endeavour, for our own misery, artificially to keep alive our melancholy remembrance of their misfortune. (...) from our putting ourselves in their situation, and from our lodging, if I may be allowed to say so, our own living souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence conceiving what would be our emotions in this case. It is from this very illusion of the imagination, that the foresight of our own dissolution is so terrible to us, and that the idea of those circumstances, which undoubtedly can give us no pain when we are dead, makes us miserable while we are alive” (9). For a general overview of how the philosophical debate over compassion has developed since ancient Greece, cf. Nussbaum, 2001:354-400.
because we comprehend the other’s pain as not being ours that compassion is significant) but, also, compassion is rational as it involves evaluations concerning flourishing and suffering. Following Aristotle’s account of compassion, the latter depends on the seriousness of the harm, the undeserved nature of the harm and the eudaimonistic judgement, i.e. the fact that the spectator values the harmed and is concerned about the sufferer’s flourishing. Furthermore, and here she is somewhat close to Schopenhauer, her cognitive understanding of emotions implies that while compassion includes propositional content, this content is not necessarily linguistically formable (Nussbaum, 2001:125-138). The rationality of an emotion depends on its relation to flourishing but not on rational deliberation. In other words: the good and normatively right are not a matter of agreement but lie in the nature of human beings’ capacity for flourishing and suffering (for a recent list of what enables flourishing, cf. Nussbaum, 2007:76-78).

In a further step, Nussbaum aims to deduce political principles from compassion. Although she admits to doubts about the political significance of compassion, this includes the need for a welfare state (Nussbaum, 1990; more generally Nussbaum, 2001:401-454). Underlying this Aristotelian social democracy is a “thick vague concept of the good” (Nussbaum, 1990:217) which, while being based on various components of human flourishing such as being well-nourished, secure, able to use one’s senses and intelligence and able to participate in social life, remains vague enough to ensure pluralism when it comes to the question of what this good might actually be. Nussbaum, by linking compassion to institutional arrangements, notices and stresses a public-political dimension through which the discussion of how to evaluate (mis)uses of the past can take place. Pursuing her line of argument, it could be proposed that not only should compassion be a natural reaction to a suffering

47 In contrast to feeling theories of emotions, e.g. classics like William James (2003) and, more recently and with more sophistication, Jesse Prinz (2006), and authors such as Martha Nussbaum (2001) and Solomon (2003), have rejected such a view on emotions as passive ‘gut’ reactions. Instead, they stress the cognitive dimension of emotions, that feelings are directed towards an object (we are angry about something) and that their propositional content can thus be rationally assessed and cultivated.
other close to us and with no fault in her suffering. Rather, remembering the dead and their suffering too – and not misusing them as a means for other ends – should be an element of a well-functioning society in which the needs of its population are satisfied.

Both Schopenhauer and Nussbaum address similar issues by pointing to a lack of motivation and an alleged emptiness of (neo-)Kantian thought when it comes to emotional responses to suffering. While Habermas proposes a theory of discursive rightness, based on the procedural identification of a moral point of view, Schopenhauer defended intuitive non-discursive insight as the only human source of moral judgement. Nussbaum agrees with an emphasis on compassion but goes beyond Schopenhauer by stressing public processes and political institution-building, making compassion a politically relevant emotion. In both cases, ethical naturalism provides a possible basis for understanding and evaluating admissions of wrongdoing and their misuse.

4.3.3 Foucaultian Criticism: Against Understanding

The persistent attractiveness of Foucault stems from his broad conceptualisation of power as local, capillary and productive. Here, a sovereign, centralised and prohibiting notion of power is replaced by a notion of power being everywhere and consolidating everything (Foucault, 1979:93). This “ultra-radical view” on power (Lukes, 2005:88) questions Habermas’ core assumption regarding the meaning and possibility of validity claims being rooted in human intersubjectivity. For Foucault, the “force of the better argument” has nothing emancipatory about it as there is nothing to be emancipated. In his radical anti-naturalism, there are just autonomous discourses with distinct rules of formation (Foucault, 1972). While there is more to Foucault’s view on ethics and power than this, the following focuses on his conceptualisation of confession as a key technique in the process of indirect subject constitution, making it potentially relevant for the issue of (mis)uses of the past.48

48 I refer to the middle Foucault only, although some of his later writings on “take[ing] care of oneself” as a “constant attitude” (Foucault, 1988:63), i.e. a way of subject self-creation, might be interesting to consider too.
Foucault initially introduced confessions via the concept of the soul, the latter serving as a nexus where decentred power relations meet in the process of subject formation. According to Foucault's broad definition of power, there is nothing pre-discursive, be it rooted either in anthropology or interaction, which constitutes bodies as social beings (1964:275, 1972, 1977:170). Consequently, the soul is not seen as a quasi-sacred core of the subject but viewed as an interface of power relations. In Foucault's (1977:29) words: the soul is a "present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body (...). [I]t is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge". As a wagging finger, the soul articulates the effects of power relations. It is through the idea of the soul that Foucault’s will to knowledge, i.e. that truth has to be found and knowledge has to be liberated or confessed, operates. This obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different points, is so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, “demands” only to surface; that if it fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power weighs it down, and it can finally be articulated only at a price of a kind of liberation (Foucault, 1979:60)

Foucault (61) then, even more explicitly, connects the concept of power with confessions by stating that a confession

Here, it was the antique practice of *hupomnemata* which drew Foucault’s attention: memory aids, such as letters, notebooks and diaries, as manifestations of personal recollection. However, he made it clear that their "intent is not to pursue the unspeakable, nor to reveal the hidden, nor to say the unsaid, but on the contrary to capture the already said, to collect what one has managed to hear or read, and for a purpose that is nothing less than the shaping of the self" (2000:210f, my emphasis). Thus, it is questionable to what extent Foucault’s ethics of the self is relevant for an “age of apology” and I therefore do not inquire along this path.
is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile.

Within his framework of power as local, capillary and productive, Foucault views confession as a practice which does not rely on subjects but speaker:listener positions within a discourse. However, the question arises of whether Foucault’s listener-centred model is useful in the context of my thesis at all. After all, while the confessor is unburdened and redeemed by his confession (the effect of the confession), it is the listener in whom the agency of domination rests. However, is not exactly the opposite true in the case of judge-penitence? Is it not the confessor who is in charge? This is certainly true to an extent, as rhetorics of judge-penitence aim for moral superiority by imposing an interpretation of the past. However, as I have spelt out in Chapter 3, the warrant in rhetorics of judge-penitence is based on the audience accepting the confession. In other words, the speaker is only able to perform judge-penitence if the confession made is (at least implicitly) accepted by the audience. To that extent, there seems to be common ground between my conceptualisation of judge-penitence and Foucault’s understanding of confessing.

However, in Foucault’s middle period, confessions are, like other phenomena, part of decentred power relations, i.e. self-regulating discourses. As such, welcoming admissions of wrongdoing and rejecting their misuse on the basis of an understanding of human interaction as having an emancipatory telos is fundamentally challenged.

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49 It is necessary to note that Foucault made these observations in the context of the discourse about sexuality and was not concerned with, e.g., commemorative rituals. Still, I perceive his comments as primarily methodical ones and thus not restricted to sexuality.
4.4 Habermas, Memory and Critique

Having reviewed both Habermas and three relevant objections, it is now time to discuss the latter which, as I have mentioned above, cannot serve to reject the critics but should help to clarify and elaborate a Habermasian position. This, in turn, provides resources through which particular memories can be welcomed or critiqued, i.e. through which the moral significance of memory can be illustrated.

4.4.1 Concerning Proceduralism

The serious questions raised in Margalit's *Ethics* affect Habermas in two ways. Firstly and more generally: to what extent is Habermas' approach too much concerned with autonomous individuals, i.e. is a thin procedural evaluation of collective memories reasonable at all? Or is there a particular good underlying Habermas' proceduralism? Secondly and specifically concerned with Margalit's *Ethics*: to what extent ought (not) we to remember those who are dead and lie beyond quasi-religious thick relations of our own community? Are thick communities indeed natural kinds? How open are these traditions to criticism and how compatible are they with other forms of life?

Concerning the first set of questions, Habermas, in contrast to traditional justice theories, does not take isolated individuals as a starting point but rather their intersubjective relationship. To that extent, he is not affected by one of the main points of criticism put forward by communitarian thinkers. While liberal thinkers like John Rawls have to take this point seriously, Habermas has never understood the individual as being isolated because the latter's very individualisation depends crucially on his/her socialisation (Habermas, 1995). Communitarian criticism would indeed be relevant if Habermas' proceduralism was solely to refer to atomistic negative freedoms and not to intersubjective ties which are always already in place. These relations are more than just supplements to his proceduralism, they are rather the other way round. Habermas has always used an emphatic notion of understanding that goes beyond the linguistic transmission of information and
is directed towards accord, insight and even reconciliation. Such an interest in “undamaged intersubjectivity” (Habermas, 1990:337) goes far beyond any procedural proposal.50

Rather, it is based in a human desire for “symmetry and reciprocal recognition” and seen as “profoundly integrated in the structure of human society” (Habermas, 1986:206). This thin moral intuition is a rather unspecific concession to moral naturalism which nevertheless implies a material concept of the good which is not supposed to be a means like some of Rawls’ (1972:§15) primary goods. Instead, I understand it as an end in itself, constitutively underlying Habermas’ framework and “renewed with each act of unconstrained understanding, with each moment of living together in solidarity, of successful individuation, and of saving emancipation” (Habermas, 1982:221). It is thin in the sense that it is not as specific as, e.g., Nussbaum’s list of capabilities. However, it is a substantial good in itself which also explains his emphasis on solidarity which “has its proper place in linguistic

50 The following can be read as putting as much emphasis as possible on a material norm within Habermas’ conception while remaining within his overall conception. Seyla Benhabib (1985) did this when pointing to the “utopian dimension” in discourse ethics which, according to her, is not realised as long as the particular other and its concrete needs is ignored in favour of the general other and generalisable rights. An even more fundamental point is made by Axel Honneth in his emphasis on pre-linguistic recognition, in particular his interest in the early years of socialisation. Although not denying the importance of justice, Honneth bases his criticism not so much on speech act theory but on object-relations psychoanalysis. That is to say, for Honneth (2008:40-85), that recognition enjoys a categorical priority over cognition. Concerning Habermas, Honneth (Fraser & Honneth, 2003:247) asks if Habermas puts normative weight into communication itself or if these normative presuppositions of communication have their origin in the lifeworld. Whilst Honneth rightly identifies this ambiguity, I think it can be solved within a Habermasian frame. After all, Habermas (1996:315, 337) answers the question himself by pointing to the primacy of the lifeworld. However, he then moves to linguistic interaction which is plausible as long as it does not entirely deny pre-linguistic factors, as the latter are only relevant for us within a linguistic frame from which we cannot possibly exit. In sum, the idea of undamaged intersubjectivity, as I understand it, carries emphatic notions whilst insisting on the unavoidable fact of humans’ linguistic constitution.
intersubjectivity (...) in which the structure of language inscribes the gap between I and Thou. The structure of linguistic intersubjectivity makes harmony between the integration of autonomy and devotion to others possible” (Habermas, 1993c:143). As even autonomous individuals are in fact never isolated but are always interwoven into a particular lifeworld (whereby the universality of validity claims always transcends its borders), justice is necessarily accomplished by solidarity in order to protect these relations. Here, it becomes clearer how Habermas’ thin good brings together communal solidarity and the respect for individual autonomy. Material solidarity and procedural justice are “two aspects of the same thing” (Habermas, 1990:244). Only therefore is Habermas (1989a:251) able to state that Auschwitz “touched a deep layer of solidarity among all who have a human face” and establish a link between his good underlying formal pragmatics and memory.

If there is a good at the heart of Habermas proceduralism, does it affect the second set of points raised by Margalit? These concern those who are dead but lie beyond the thick relations of our own community and the question of how open traditions are to criticism and other forms of life. Firstly, Margalit’s reference to memory as the sacred cement of thick relations might well lead to irreconcilable memories between groups, e.g. nations. Indeed, the fact that often one side’s heroes are the other side’s perpetrators has been a major obstacle in inter-group relations. True, Margalit speaks of good, thick relations as caring and not othering (this probably includes the rejection of a denial of past crimes). However, there remains a real tension between this and his wider observation of shared memories as having a strongly conformist note. In contrast, Habermas’ discourse ethics encourages open debate of the past and lays out a just way to resolve conflict, i.e. it is concerned with different forms of life, their memories, and how they might come to terms with each other.

Although Margalit sets conditions for good ethical relations, it remains unclear how shared memories can be legitimately criticised. In an article written together with Moshe Halbertal (Halbertal & Margalit, 2004:529), they state that “[t]he right to culture [i.e. memories] may involve a group whose norms [and memories] cannot be reconciled with the conception of the individual in a liberal
society”. They even demand active support from the state for such communities of memory (536).

And although they mention a “right to exit” (545), Amy Gutmann (2003:58-64) rightly elaborates on the practical (im)possibilities of such a right in the cases of individuals who want to exit their peer group. While Margalit is right to acknowledge that groups have particular memories and that these are of prime importance for them, this points, secondly, to the question of who we are. In line with many communitarians, Margalit perceives the in-group as being rather homogeneous. As outlined above, the in-group comes into being “spontaneously” and, by way of natural reproduction, has a duty to remember. However, this again overlooks heterogeneities within the group and makes Margalit’s stance towards communal traditions and memories ambivalent.

This is in sharp contrast to Habermas for whom a critical discussion of one’s own past is central. Here, Margalit might object to the motivational lack of morality and, as post-heroic memories are cognitively much more demanding, question Habermas’ concept of moral learning. However, Habermas’ own proposal does not include a rationalist utopia but argues simply for the universal restructuring of particularistic traditions. As such, moral learning and Discourses are always necessarily situated in a web of particular narratives although they do, at the same time, aim for universality. They are not based on free-floating rationality but are embedded societal agents which challenge existing orthodoxies and might even be able to expand the circle of the in-group.

4.4.2 Concerning Discursive Rightness

I now turn to those points raised in Section 4.3.2, on the significance of compassion. Here, Habermas’ concept of normative rightness as a discursive product is criticised, the general objection being that feelings are related to objective, pre-linguistic moral facts, intuitive in their nature and vested with motivational force. Connected to this point are two more particular issues, i.e. the question of feeling compassion towards strangers and the politico-institutional implementation of this emotion.
Concerning motivation, a valid point is made by the critics: people are more likely to be touched by movies than by educational lectures. However, this does not answer the question of how this emotion originates. Habermas argues that “the violation of legitimate expectations, to which these feelings are reactions, already presupposes the validity of the underlying norms” (1993b:41). As such, emotions are implicit judgements and carry propositional content which can be put “into explicit linguistic form (...), feelings, too, can take on the role of reasons that enter into practical discourses” (2003b:241f). So far, at least Nussbaum could agree with Habermas though the latter understands emotions such as compassion primarily as sanctions based on internalised norms, i.e. Habermas (1999a:13f) views compassion as significant but also as too narrow a basis for complex societies.

Nussbaum (2001:386-391) accepts that compassion is narrow and uneven. As a consequence, she argues for moral education – but the fact remains that compassion mostly kicks in only if the suffering other is seen as important by the spectator. We often feel compassion for strangers – but more often we do not. To that extent, we value thick relations and feel compassion for those who belong to us but remain indifferent to memories of suffering by most others (this is the descriptively true core of Margalit’s Ethics). This is not a principal argument against compassion but points to the limited range of the alleged benefits of such intuitive notions of morality. Nussbaum’s valuable thoughts on the political dimension, on compassion as a force in the media, the character of political leaders, political institutions, etc., work only partially against this problem of narrowness. After all, Nussbaum’s (404f) argument that good institutions depend on good citizens raises strong expectations of virtue which Nussbaum (234f) herself has discussed sceptically. Are not these expectations, especially within the global political arena, overstraining people? Would not a (neo-)Kantian approach which focuses on just political institutions – even if it concerns a horde of devils – be more adequate?

In the context of Habermas’ theory of law and the public sphere, the issue of emotions as pre-linguistic, i.e. not necessarily linguistically formulable, comes up again. For Habermas, the “meaning
of “moral rightness”, unlike that of “truth”, is exhausted by rational acceptability”, i.e. moral rightness is, first and foremost, fallible discursive rightness. However, a self-transcending force remains “built into the practice of argumentation – and the self-understanding of its participants – with the “disruptiveness” of idealizing anticipations” (Habermas, 2008a:57). As such, the good of undamaged intersubjectivity remains a driving force, even if its specific meaning can only be clarified discursively. Although Nussbaum herself acknowledges social constructionist elements within emotional responses and the necessity of moral education, there is relatively little on the role the public plays in the emergence (and subsequent evaluation) of compassion. After all, it is often in public processes that compassion is developed through new arguments and perspectives – but also commodified and misused (Moeller, 1999). Nussbaum (1996:37) acknowledges that “the concrete specification of flourishing will be different in different times and places and forms of life”, but how – if not through public deliberation – is its meaning to be found? While criticising a discursive notion of rightness, her political model ultimately relies on public deliberation through which the circle of those ‘deserving’ compassion is widened.

As questions of collective identity and memory are therefore (though in no way exclusively) issues of the public sphere – in particular with regards to events such as the Holocaust which took place about three to four generations ago – an approach starting from a discursive premise closely tied to the dynamics of the public sphere seems best suited. Every interest and every emotion – if claiming an ethico-moral status – must be collectively interpreted, i.e. by the public. The intersubjective basis of morality is not restricted to a simple speaker-listener model but extends to the public, as democratic procedures are best suited to warrant just outcomes through the “higher-level intersubjectivity of processes of reaching understanding”. Whilst they are first and foremost bound to procedural rules such as open access, etc., rational public debates incorporate feelings such as compassion as they have propositional content which can be formulated.
Accordingly, the “anamnestic power of a solidarity (...) [can only be practised] in the medium of a remembrance that is repeatedly renewed” (Habermas, 1989a:233).\(^{51}\) This connects well with Habermas’ emphasis on solidarity as a counterweight to the possible rigidity of an ethics of principled conviction: “the ethics of compassion does not dispute the legitimacy of morality of justice but merely frees it from the rigidity of the ethics of conviction” (Habermas, 1993c:134). In line with this, Habermas (1982:245-250) acknowledges the importance of an ethics of compassion which must include previous suffering and states that compassionate or anamnestic solidarity are ultimately limit concepts of discourse ethics, as the former naturally flows out of the latter’s universality.\(^ {52}\)

This takes up some of the criticism levelled by ethical naturalists against Habermas. In a nutshell, the difference between (Nussbaum’s) ethical naturalism and Habermas’ approach is that the former emphasises what deliberation is or should be about whilst the latter foregrounds public deliberation. Given that feelings such as compassion are dependent on their public framing, i.e. in the case of compassion: the inclusion of individuals as worthy of compassion, the latter, to me, seems a more appropriate point of departure.

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\(^ {51}\) Anamnestic reason denotes reason based on the capacity to recall past human suffering.

\(^ {52}\) Whilst it is visible how and why Habermas’ proceduralism can help in clarifying issues of inter-generational justice, e.g. nuclear warfare and climate change, it is questionable to what extent discourse ethics helps to clarify duties when it comes to the dead. After all, intersubjective exchange with them is impossible. Wingert (1991) discusses this problem and proposes that we ought to feel solidary with the victims, i.e. recognize them as fellow human beings as they are part of a universal communication community (for the concept of such a universal community and its moral relevance, cf. Apel, 1980:276-281). Thus, Lutz Wingert concludes that there are reasons to see death victims as having the right to expect the restoration of their moral integrity, i.e. their full recognition via the act of commemorating.
4.4.3 Concerning Understanding

Foucault’s criticism is potentially most damaging for a Habermasian approach as the former doubts the very essence and possibility of intersubjective understanding as egalitarian and inclusive. Instead, the emancipatory element of intersubjective relations is replaced by a discourse-totalitarianism which leaves no place for a foundational approach. More specifically, Foucault’s conception of confessing does raise the question of who is in charge of the confession: the speaker or the listener?

Concerning his general criticism, critics have accepted the empirical insights provided by Foucault, e.g. his discussion of surveillance, but criticised the lack “of any normative framework” (Fraser, 1989:18; also Honneth, 1993:197-202). In the context of this thesis, this raises the question of which confessions are to be criticised and for what reasons? Foucaultian genealogy understands critique as being about the denaturalisation of ‘facts’. It is not directed against particular conditions as being ‘bad’ or ‘ideological’, and neither is it grounded. Its aim is solely to “make harder those acts which are now too easy” (Foucault, 1981:456). In his later life, he gave this genealogy a particular foundation – in Kant. In an anonymous article, Foucault (1984c:459) located himself within “the critical tradition of Kant, and his [i.e. Foucault’s] project can be called a Critical History of Thought”. However, this does not imply a (neo-)Kantian turn but advocates a lifestyle of constant questioning.  

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53 Poststructuralist empirical critique has been impressive; however, it failed to exemplify why its critique is directed against a particular power/knowledge nexus at all. After all, a dominant as well as an oppressed power/knowledge nexus are rooted in power. It is hard to see why even the ‘ethical turn’ of the late Foucault (1984b, 1988) has satisfactorily clarified this. Thus, poststructuralist analyses in support of particular countervailing powers are ultimately based on the analysts’ voluntarism. Insofar as it goes, such analysis can well be described as “crypto-normative” (Habermas, 1990:276). Thus, Habermas accuses poststructuralism of a performative contradiction. If every use of language is indeed only one more power-contaminated action, why should we believe in their particular attempt to enlighten us about the ideological character of modernity? In other words: ‘I hereby tell you, that truth does not exist’ is a contradiction in itself as the speaker raises the claim of truth in his utterance while he/she simultaneously rejects the idea itself.
At roughly the same time, when recapitulating the polemical way in which he was treated by the orthodox Marxist establishment in France, Foucault (1984a:111), however, said that it is not my way of doing things [polemics]. I insist on this difference as something essential: a whole morality is at stake, the morality that concerns the search for the truth and the relation to the other. In the serious play of questions and answers (...) the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion (...). The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, and so on.

Here, suddenly, the search for truth becomes something not simply driven by power concerns but by immanent rights. By defending the right to say yes or no, Foucault attacked the polemicist for whom the person he confronts is not a partner in the search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat (...). The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied (...) polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for truth (Foucault, 1984a:112).

This amounts to little other than a radical shift to a discourse-ethical position. It advertises a “search for truth” based on partnership which, in turn, is rooted in the immanent legitimacy of a serious discussion. In light of this, Foucault’s “ultra-radical view” on power cannot be sustained. It is as if Foucault finally dissolved the performative contradiction which had been present in his approach for so long. In fact, we can relate even Foucault’s own concept of resistance – when one says no – with Habermas’ normative presupposition when exchanging validity claims, i.e. what Habermas (1997:119, 127) calls “communicative freedom”, i.e. the actual possibility to refute a proposition. The reason why Foucault did not realise these communalities may lie in his (1984b:298) apparent misunderstanding of the Habermasian ISS as a hypostatized institution, “a state of communication”.

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More importantly, confessing was viewed by Foucault (initially) as the outcome of power relations while the content of the confession and the sheer fact that two people come together and renegotiate their state of affairs was neglected. In this respect, already his focus on the listener is misleading. His perspective ignores the immanent qualities of intersubjectivity and reduces confessing to an element in ever-ongoing power struggles. Instead, ‘saying sorry’ is not necessarily just a normatively unmarked element in a catch-all power net, but listening to the other and being able to open one’s own narratives and social world can be grounded as normatively desirable. As mentioned above, my argument is not simply designed as an external criticism. Rather, I find it striking that Foucault himself acknowledged some degree of discourse ethics relevant to this study: ‘saying sorry’, after all, recognises the ‘other’ and this person’s “immanent (...) rights”. In consequence, admissions of wrongdoing can be thought of as being able to, as in Habermas’ approach, repair “the relation to the other” while rhetorics of judge-penitence could be viewed as “parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for truth”. Despite this surprising twist (or precisely because of it) in Foucault’s thinking, I view a Habermasian approach to admissions of wrongdoing and rhetorics of judge-penitence as more promising and understand Foucault’s late contribution rather as a confirmation of this course.

### 4.5 Summary

This chapter started by reviewing Habermas’ aim to build a rational foundation for emancipatory critique by means of formal pragmatics. Here, necessary presuppositions of argumentative speech are reconstructed which, if not blocked, enable learning processes. I then discussed the link between formal pragmatics and Habermas’ approach to the past in which critical questioning of the in-group’s tradition becomes a catalyst for moral learning processes. Finally, I addressed three common criticisms levelled against this programme as being: firstly, too abstract due to its proceduralism, i.e. the (complementary) relation to ‘ethics of memory’; secondly, overlooking the pre-linguistic, intuitive basis of morality by putting forward a discursive theory of rightness, i.e. the role of emotions such as
compassion; and, thirdly, denying the significance of intersubjectivity, i.e. the pragmatics of intersubjectivity. Discussing these objections has illuminated Habermas' position whereby the discussion was always concerned with memories and their evaluation. In order to clarify this point, I now bring these threads together with the phenomenon of judge-penitence. Here, constitutional patriotism and the idea of perpetrator narratives become key concepts again.

As indicated above, Habermas' theory has been criticised by communitarians as being empty and oriented towards abstract norms; and whilst this was never entirely true, I suggest an explicit linking of the sociologically-rich notion of the perpetrator narrative with Habermas' constitutional patriotism. It thereby becomes clearer how the latter is situated in an explicit way, i.e. through a particular perpetrator narrative. This narrative consists of "public confessions of guilt" via which groups symbolically re-establish, or at least improve, previously shattered relations. However, while constitutional patriotism thus becomes situated through a particular narrative, this does not affect the universal tendencies inherent in the former. Rather, through embedding Giesen's concept in constitutional patriotism, which remains internally linked with formal pragmatics, Alexander's radical social constructionism is neutralised. By critically addressing one's own past, as described in Giesen's work and justified in Habermas' writings, the community's moral boundaries are extended in more egalitarian and inclusive directions. Apologetic acts can thus not only go beyond 'cheap talk' but also new and subtle forms of dominating previous victims.

However, communication can be distorted. It is exactly because I embed the concept of the perpetrator narrative into Habermas' constitutional patriotism that phenomena can be evaluated as distorted. Such distorted communication occurs if the public sphere is not able to problematise, e.g. its traditions, freely. In consequence, learning processes might be blocked – be it through conscious manipulation of the audience or unconscious systematic self-deception. In the case of judge-penitence, this leads to a seemingly indissoluble conflict between forms of life in terms of more or less unbridgeable moral-cultural differences as, e.g., abstractly outlined in Miller's dissensus
pathologies. Arguments of judge-penitence distort communication by establishing patterns which construct others as deeply inferior. By transforming continuous self-reflection into self-righteous means, argumentation is closed, thus contributing to the blocking of learning processes. Hence, the grounded claim can be made that the rhetoric of judge-penitence is normatively undesirable.

Here, I can reconnect with the primary objective of this chapter: to outline the moral significance of collective memory. As we have seen, memory plays a crucial role in establishing identity narratives and, in the case of perpetrator narratives, enabling constitutional patriotism. The latter, however, remains linked to formal pragmatics via the logic of the public sphere. Therefore, a rational justification is given for the inclusion of the ‘other’ based not on one particular memory but on situated memories, perpetrator narratives, which are open to each other due to their egalitarian and inclusive character. To that extent, memory is significant for morality.
5. FROM METHODOLOGY TO DATA

5.1 Overview of the Chapter

Having introduced the wider theoretical framework of this study, I now turn to more methodological issues concerning how this study approaches and understands its object of research before outlining methodical aspects such as my tools of analysis and the process of data collection and downsizing. The former includes a discussion of the general framework of this study, i.e. the DHA in CDA, an approach which interprets texts by situating, i.e. contextualising, them in order to reveal their functional constructedness (Richardson, 2007:15) in Section 5.2. Besides discussing key concepts of the DHA, I focus on the notion of ‘critical’ in CDA by discussing the concept and linking this to Habermas’ Critical Theory in Chapter 4 in order to present a solid theoretical foundation for the DHA’s moral position. Section 5.3 presents what kinds of data underlie this study, and how they were collected and downsized. The chapter closes with a brief summary.

5.2 The Discourse-Historical Approach in Critical Discourse Analysis

5.2.1 Linguistic Categories

The DHA is one approach within CDA (for an overview, cf. Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Although, in the following, I briefly summarise the concepts of the former, many of these definitions are equally valid for other strands in CDA – even if their contexts of emergence have led to different toolkits. Still, these approaches draw on each other, thereby reproducing a common conceptual frame, whilst developing their own distinct orientations. The DHA is distinguished both on the level of research interest and methodical orientation (an interest in identity-construction, and related unjustified discrimination, and thus a focus on the historical dimensions of discourse-formation) as
well as with respect to its theoretical foundation (being oriented towards the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School and Habermas’ language philosophy in particular).

Starting with the notion of discourse, the latter is viewed, firstly, as action which is, secondly, not disconnected from material processes. As such, discourse is understood as the social activity of making meaning through semiosis, i.e. meaning-making not only through written and spoken language but also through gestures, images and music (for this multimodal character of discourses, cf. Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001). A seminal elaboration is provided by Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak (1997:258) who describe discourse as

a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it. (...) To put the same point in a different way, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped.

Discourses are seen as crucial elements in the (re)production of the social relations of a given society. However, discourses are not seen as free-floating or singular factors in this (re)production but rather as embedded in a social context, referring to each other (interdiscursivity) as well as to material conditions which enable/constrain them. Despite such a common denominator, the concept is used in a variety of ways, i.e. multidimensionally, ranging from style (‘the discourse of academics’) and genre-related understandings (‘the discourse of editorials’) to communication on a particular topic (‘the discourse on racism’) or even as producing the respective object, i.e. as a network of knowledge (for a detailed account of differences, cf. Reisigl, 2007). This leads van Dijk (2009:67) to doubt that “a more or less complete ‘definition’ of the notion of discourse” is helpful. However, instead of abandoning a definition of discourse, this multidimensionality should rather enforce clear and explicit definitions of how the concept is being used in the respective studies. Here, I draw on the DHA’s understanding of discourse (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009:89) as being
• “a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action
• socially constituted and socially constitutive
• related to a macro-topic
• linked to argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several actors who have different points of view”.

This understanding resembles many of the points noted above; however, the DHA’s explicit definition of discourses as being ‘discourses on’ something and its argumentative focus stand out. Furthermore, it should be noted that even such a macro-topic related definition does not imply an automatic separation of one discourse from another. Rather, discourses remain analytical constructs which are established as objects of investigation by the analyst (ibid.).

Analysing discourses is done by looking at specific semiotic events which are defined as texts, again being written, spoken, visual, multimodal, etc., and analytically separated from discourse. Concerning the relation between discourses and texts, Lemke (1995:7) states that on each occasion when the particular meanings characteristic of these discourses are being made, a specific text is produced. Discourses, as social actions more or less governed by social habits, produce texts that will in some ways be alike in their meanings.

Texts can be identified according to seven criteria: cohesion, coherence, intertextuality, informativity, intentionality, acceptability and situationality (Beaugrande & Dressler quoted in Titscher et al., 2000:22f). Most intuitively, the notion of text evokes images of newspaper articles or a book which seem to be separated from each other naturally. However, demarcating one text from another is often not as easy, as Figure 7 illustrates.
The page is taken from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and consists of a collection of smaller contributions discussing the comments of the then US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, concerning 'old and new Europe' in January 2003 (for more information, cf. Section 5.3.1; for a methodical note on this example, cf. Footnote 62). One might argue that each of these contributions acts as a single text in its own right. However, it could similarly be argued that these short articles are ordered around the (sub)heading as well as the image of Auguste Rodin's *The Thinker* and the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. The whole entity could therefore be perceived as one text.

While Figure 7 thus illustrates the difficulties in demarcating texts from each other, it also shows the often multimodal character of newspaper articles, going beyond written language use. In particular, Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen (2001:1f) have fiercely argued against the monomodal bias in CDA in general (but cf. Richardson & Wodak, 2009 for a recent example of how multimodal analysis enriches the DHA). Figure 7 illustrates the importance of their argument. Besides the heading (“Old Europe answers Mr. Rumsfeld”), what is eye-catching is *The Thinker* which, for most German readers of this newspaper, establishes a link to France/Europe. Beyond that, the caption tells us that Rodin's masterpiece can currently be visited in Berlin because of the opening of the new French embassy and the 40th anniversary of the French-German Treaty of Friendship. This link is supported by the inclusion of the Brandenburg Gate in the right-bottom corner. Thus, already, the combination of heading and image will evoke in many readers' minds a representation of France and Germany representing high art and civilisation (such inferences might further be supported by the visual dominance of *The Thinker*) rooted in a long history of not always peaceful relations which now stand united, in a European framework, against Mr. Rumsfeld.

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54 A multimodal perspective is not necessarily at odds with a Habermasian approach. Although it might seem as if Habermas' model is restricted to a small number of standard utterances or amount of written/spoken language only, symbolic/non-verbal communication and images do not necessarily lack propositional content. They are thus criticisable as well by calling to mind the propositional content, and therefore multimodality can also be accounted for in Habermas' theorising.
Das alte Europa antwortet Herrn Rumsfeld


Der Tod der anderen


Die Geschichte der Pfeile

Die Geschichte der Pfeile ist ein Roman, der sich mit der Verwirklichungskultur der Westdeutschland im Jahre 1989 auseinandersetzt. Der Roman ist eine historische Fiktion, die die Geschichte des deutschen Wiedervereinigungsprozesses darstellt. Die Geschichte der Pfeile ist eine spannende Erzählung, die sich mit der Problematik der Wiedervereinigung und der Verwirklichungskultur auseinandersetzt.

Zwickel der Vergangenheit

Die Zwickel der Vergangenheit ist ein Roman, der sich mit der Geschichte der deutschen Geschichte und der Verwirklichungskultur auseinandersetzt. Der Roman ist eine spannende Erzählung, die sich mit der Problematik der Verwirklichungskultur und der Geschichte der deutschen Geschichte auseinandersetzt.

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Figure 7: An example of multimodality (and judge-penitence)
Those who turn the page in order to read further contributions will find them arranged around another image of a sculpture, this time by a German artist, which was then on view in Paris. Arguably, this further supports the representation of a unified and cultured (Franco-German) Europe.

Besides the question of how to demarcate texts, the relation between texts, i.e. intertextuality, does affect meaning-making. This concept, coined by Julia Kristeva (1986:37), views texts as “constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another”. Hence, no text is seen as a monological self-sufficient unit, which follows Bakhtin (1986:91) who stated that any concrete utterance can be understood “as a link in the chain of speech communication (...), filled with echoes and reverberations (...). Every utterance must be regarded primarily as a response to preceding utterances”. Similarly, Vološinov (1973:72) made the point that “the monological utterance is, after all, already an abstraction, (...) the written monument included, is an inseverable element of verbal communication. (...) It is but one link in a continuous chain of speech performances”. Thus, a text’s heterogeneity is established through external and/or internal, explicit and/or implicit, synchronic and/or diachronic relations to various other texts. More technically, John Richardson (2007:100-106) speaks of external intertextuality as being established through discourse markers such as ‘another’, ‘further’, ‘additional’, wh- questions, etc. which refer to text-external events, discourses, etc. In contrast, the most obvious case of internal intertextuality is a direct quotation. Fairclough (1992:105) views intertextuality as a “source of much of the ambivalence of texts”. Such ambivalence and its consequences are exemplified in what Josef Klein (1996:206; also Reisigl, 2002:168, 170-174; Engel & Wodak, 2009) calls ‘strategies of calculated ambivalence’. That is to say, the strategic reference to a range of positions in one text is intended so that different audiences feel affected. In line with this, Wodak and Michael Meyer (2009:10) view texts as “sites of struggles” as texts are indeed never closed entities but are informed by a range of positions.

Simultaneously, texts are always situated and, as such, are part of distinct genres. It is again Bakhtin (1986:60) who provided a comprehensive definition: “[e]ach separate utterance is individual, of
course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances. These we may call speech genres”. This is taken up by Fairclough (1992:126) when giving one of the most popular definitions in the field, defining genre as a “relatively stable set of conventions that is associated with, and partly enacts, a socially ratified type of activity”. In other words, particular discursive practices, as other social activities, follow particular sets of rules which are crucial factors in meaning-making (for an overview of further definitions, cf. Wodak, 2008:14-20).

Finally, recontextualising describes the process of de-contextualising a given text element and transferring it to another by which means (a partly) new meaning is created (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009:90). In addition, Lilie Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999:93f) point to the role of recontextualisation in struggles due to the emancipatory or regressive consequences that a transfer of an argument into new contexts might have. For example, Marx’ essay On the Jewish Question, first published in 1844, has often been accused of being anti-Semitic. Given its often problematic formulations, the text can indeed facilitate a limited understanding if recontextualised without proper explanation or even with bad intentions. However, if properly contextualised, the article might still help to understand Marx’ point as On the Jewish Question ultimately identifies the means of production as key – and not religion or ‘race’. Figure 8 illustrates the connection between some of these key categories.
It has been noted above that discourses are crucially linked to contexts. The latter are defined in the DHA as taking into account four levels (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001:41, 2009:93):

- the immediate language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse, i.e. the immediate environment of an utterance;
- the diversity of intertextual and interdiscursive relations between texts;
- the extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of the specific situational context in question;
- the broader socio-political and historical context which provides particular symbolic resources for action and the creation of meaning.

However, referring to levels evokes a rather hierarchical idea of context which might in fact be better understood in terms of four concentric frames, e.g. the image of a stone causing concentric circles when thrown into a lake (Figure 9).
From the DHA’s understanding of context it follows that, e.g., van Dijk’s (2008a) ideas on context as subjective mental representations which mediate discourses and their social environment, i.e. in subjective-cognitive terms, are not fully accepted. While mental models do frame our perceptions of situations, the DHA also acknowledges the significance of material context as enabling and construing meaningful social activity, i.e. as framing discourses through objectively existing (though alterable) sets of discursive and material conditions. Therefore, its understanding of context is also a realist one (Sayer, 2000, 2010). Although rejecting a naive naturalistic link between reality and what is perceived as being unmediated, it is one world (be it the non-social world of objects or, e.g., dominating narratives in the social world) which affects the recipients’ cognitive processes.
In its analysis, the DHA proceeds along three dimensions, identifying, firstly, the contents or topics of a particular discourse, secondly, the discursive strategies deployed in order to realise a positive self- and negative other representation and, thirdly, those linguistic means through which these strategic aims are realised. While the particular content and topics relevant to this thesis are introduced later, the concepts of discursive strategies and categories of their linguistic realisation are outlined in the following.

Reisigl and Wodak (2001:44-56, 2009:95) describe five discursive strategies: nomination, predication, perspectivation, intensification/mitigation and argumentation for positive self and negative other presentation. These strategies are viewed as “more or less institutional plan[s] of practices” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 44) and follow Bourdieu’s notion of strategy (Wodak et al., 1999:31f). Bourdieu (1977:22-30) developed his notion of strategy in his studies of kinship following the Wittgensteinian idea of practised regularities, instead of a structuralist notion of rules as static or even somehow transcendental. However, although the DHA does not apply related Bourdieuan concepts such as ‘field’ and ‘habitus’ extensively, it rejects notions of strategy too which are either overtly subjectivist, e.g. theories of rational choice, or mirror Foucault’s “ultra-radical view” on power and strategies (Sections 4.3.3 and 4.4.3).

But what do these strategies of positive self and negative other presentation actually mean? Firstly, strategies of nomination establish actors, objects, phenomena or events and actions by, e.g., naming them or applying metonymising and/or synecdochising manoeuvres. Metonymy describes the substitution of A with something which is associated with A – similar to, although in a more direct way than, metaphors. The latter are understood in terms of conceptually thinking and talking about A in terms of B (Lakoff & Johnson, 1981; Section 5.2.3). Synecdoches either present a part standing for the whole (pars pro toto) or the whole standing for a part (totum pro parte). For example, Nielsen speaks of “wars and nationalism” in the third example introduced in this thesis. Here, already the nomination carries meaning as a different reference, e.g. ‘glorious battles of the fatherland’, could
also describe this period; however, it clearly puts these events in a different light. Secondly, strategies of predication allot attributes to these categories through, e.g., the use of adjectives, via implicature, i.e. what is meant by the speaker although not explicitly expressed, and presuppositions, i.e. meaning which is not made explicit (at least as long as it is not questioned) but “treated as commonly known and accepted” (Chilton, 2004:64). Nielsen, in the very same example, refers to Europe as having “learnt from the bloody conflicts of the past”. The predication of these conflicts as “bloody” arguably creates a different image from characterising them as ‘glorious’ or ‘heroic’. Thirdly, strategies of perspectivation indicate how the text-producer stands in relation to the issue in question. They thus influence what is projected onto the reader (or is inferred by the latter) through, e.g., deixis or the use of personal pronouns. For example, the very first text by Massing repeatedly uses the personal pronoun “we” to position the author as well as the reader. Fourthly, strategies of intensification/mitigation modify the status of an utterance by, e.g., using modal verbs such as may, could, must, etc. which indicate the speaker’s attitude. For example, Nielsen uses “can” when referring to the possible role that “[p]ast experiences” might play in Europe instead of either ‘must’ or ‘may’. Fifthly, argumentative strategies legitimise or challenge claims made in the text. In Section 3.3, I have already illustrated the argumentative scheme in the case of judge-penitence rhetoric and the analyses in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 all point to various warrants and fallacies.

5.2.2 Power, Ideology and Critique

In general, neither the DHA nor CDA is interested in discourses and other linguistic categories for their own sake but because “language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power” (Wodak, 2001:11). As such, language and discourses are not powerful on their own but are nevertheless crucial in the (re)production of power relations. It is this contemporary importance of language in the (re)production of unjustified power-relations with which the DHA in CDA is concerned. The DHA’s (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009:88) notion of power is mainly influenced by Weber’s (1964:152) definition as being “the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance” (more specifically rendered in
the definition of “imperative control” as “the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed”). This understanding of power is most clearly visible when speaking of “power in discourses” and “power over discourses”. The former denotes the power to influence and create dominant meaning in, e.g., concrete meetings, whilst the latter is concerned with issues of regulating access, e.g. to the above meeting, as well as the ability to include/exclude ideas, etc. (Holzscheiter quoted in Wodak, 2009:35). This conceptualisation mirrors Steven Lukes’ (2005:16-25) first and second dimensions of power. The former understands power as the ability to make and impose decisions in blatantly observable situations and conflicts of interests, e.g. in a meeting. The latter “involves a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of the first view” (24) by also considering non-decision-making and potential issues “over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests” (25). These two understandings of power mirror Weber’s notion in their orientation towards subjective interests, thereby missing out more abstract and systemic, Foucault would say “productive”, and non-conflictual power relations. Lukes (25-29) refers to the latter as the third dimension of power, i.e. the ability to suppress latent conflicts based on diverging interests between those able to realise their interests and the excluded who might not even be consciously aware of their real interests. The DHA addresses this third dimensions in terms of “power of discourse” (Holzscheiter in Wodak, 2009:35f), which includes historically evolved (meaning) structures. In addition, such a wider notion of power might also support the DHA’s more reciprocal understanding of the relationship between economic, intellectual and political elites and other strata of society. This avoids a simplistic top-down understanding of manipulation which views exclusion first and foremost as a function of elite discourses (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001:24).

Linked to the concept of unjustified power relations and, in particular, to the third dimension of power, the concept of ideology also has significance in CDA. The concept is generally understood in terms of latent, naturalised types of everyday beliefs and particularistic worldviews which inform action (e.g. Wodak & Meyer, 2009:8f; Fairclough, 2010:25-84). As such, it describes action “independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these” (Marx
& Engels, 1847:48). I follow such a basic understanding as the concept cannot meaningfully be discussed in this thesis (cf. Eagleton, 1994 for a collection of relevant texts). However, what is of importance here is the fact that ideologies, at least in the DHA, are linked to a normative point of view. Thus, ideologies are viewed as mystifications of power structures which (re)produce unjustified discrimination and inequality by passing off a particular worldview as universally accepted (Wodak, 2001:10). Thus, not every perspective is simply ideological (for such a position in critical discourse analysis, cf. Fowler, 1991:10-24; van Dijk, 1998).

I have mentioned above that the DHA is not interested in discourses for their own sake. Instead, the critical study of language aims to challenge semiotic relations through which unjustified discrimination and inequality are obscured and (re)produced. In a first step, the DHA (in line with CDA in general), defines its critical stance through self-reflexivity on the side of the researcher coupled with some distance from the data, transparency when analysing the data, and an intent to apply findings, e.g. through advice for doctor-patient communication or rewriting schoolbooks (Wodak, 1996; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009:87f). However, its notion of critique must not only be conceptualised in such categories of academic honesty (Sayer, 2009; Forchtner, 2011a). Rather, its "socially transformative agenda" (McKenna, 2004:9) goes beyond that and contrasts with more descriptive forms of discourse analysis. Like Fairclough (2010:43), who explicitly rejects approaches which "describe without explaining" or explain while just taking the immediate micro-context of the situation into account, the DHA accepts Max Horkheimer's demarcation of critical from traditional research. Whilst the latter tends to perceive the world as a sum total of facts whose genesis is not questioned, the former "has society itself for its object (...) [and] is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the present order" (Horkheimer, 1972:206f).

The DHA thus aims to denaturalise the use of categories which help to (re)produce unjustified power relations and thereby provide resources for those struggling against semiotic forms of injustice. As
such, the DHA does not only criticise apparent social problems but calls “for emancipation, self-determination and social recognition (...) [which] is motivated by the perhaps utopian conviction that unsatisfactory social conditions can, and therefore must, be subject to methodological transformation towards fewer social dysfunctional and unjustifiable inequalities” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001:34). Its critique is thus negative, i.e. denaturalising and demystifying, as well as positive, i.e. proposing more egalitarian and inclusive solutions. This notion of critique is conceptualised in three dimensions (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001:32f, 2009:88):

- immanent critique: problematises contradictions in the text/discourse internal structure. This kind of critique can be ‘objective’ as logical contradictions are perceivable by every competent language user;
- sociodiagnostic critique: seeks to demystify propagandist, populist, etc. discursive practices. This kind of critique takes a normative standpoint insofar as the criticism refutes such positions and has thus to justify its point of view;
- prognostic/retrospective critique: at this level, the DHA tries to transform the current state of affairs via direct engagement by referring to guiding principles such as human rights or the rejection of suffering. Here too, a justification of one’s own standpoint is needed.

5.2.3 A Rhetoric of Critique or a Critique of Discourse? Habermas and the DHA

As reviewed above, the DHA and CDA in general understand critique as being, firstly, related to a self-reflective, transparent stance, secondly, as intervening against the (re)production of unjustified power relations and, thirdly, as contributing to the emancipation of unjustifiably marginalised issues and groups. However, whilst the first should be an academic virtue, the second and third aspects need further discussion. After all, the DHA and CDA do not, in general, only want to provide methodical tools in order to describe how manipulation works but, much more than that, aim to provide a framework which also answers why something is actually manipulative and what kind of marginalisation is unjustified. This is most obvious in Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001:70) aim to
differentiate between überreden, i.e. persuasion and manipulation, and überzeugen, i.e. rational acts of deliberation and convincing argumentation. Furthermore, this touches on notions of ideology and power, demanding an explicit theoretical justification of one’s position.

Concerning this issue, a number of critics have pointed to a lack of theoretical justification for CDA’s moral position, i.e. treating the validity of its critical approach as obvious (e.g. Hammersley, 1997:239). Michael Stubbs (1997:103f) and Henry Widdowson (e.g. 1998) also, although for different reasons, criticise its apparently unprincipled politically-motivated interpretations. Although different again, Michael Billig (2003) points in a similar direction by warning against a “rhetoric of critique”, i.e. CDA constructing itself as critical by little more than insisting on its capital ‘C’. At least implicitly, he thus calls for more theoretical work to be done in order to justify CDA’s emancipatory rhetoric. Even van Dijk, who saw no need for justification of his anti-racist point of view (1991:6) and consequently claimed to be “biased – and proud of” (2001:96), has recently admitted “the lack of theory about the norms and principles of its own critical activity, that is, a detailed applied ethics” (2008b:823). I (Forchtner, 2011a) have discussed these issues within CDA, making the point that in the case of the DHA, there is already a strong and coherent tradition of validating its own critical standards through references to the Frankfurt School and Habermas’ language philosophy in particular. By doing so, the DHA can follow a ‘strong programme of critique’ which goes beyond mere ‘genealogical critique’, i.e. problematising what appears as fixed or causing suffering, and can champion “emancipation, self-determination and social recognition”.

However, Habermas has sometimes been criticised for the apparent idealism of the (in)famous IS S (Section 4.2.2, Forchtner, 2011a:7f). Instead of repeating these arguments, let me briefly rephrase the point by making heuristic use of Saussure’s (1960:11) circuit model (Figure 10).
From a CDA point of view, an understanding of language in use as, e.g., illustrated in Figure 10 appears entirely ideological, running counter to its understanding of discourse as being interwoven with power given that the heads seem to suggest an unlikely symmetry between the participants. Everyday distortion of interaction due to power differences is not an issue. But is this not exactly the kind of symmetry and transcendental ahistoric idealism that Habermas’ ISS apparently supposes? Peter Ives (2004:168) has extended this criticism and recently argued that Habermas’ apparently idealist view of language ignores the latter as being a “historically evolving modus operandi”. He concludes that “meaning is socially produced in history, [and thus] consent is the product of past coercion and non-coercive structures” (136).

However, this criticism can be rejected by putting forward a Habermasian interpretation of the figure, in order to reveal its counterfactual truth. As discussed extensively in Section 4.2, Habermasian Discourse rests on the idea of pragmatically unavoidable presupposition for every meaningful interaction. This is not idealistic but idealising, inasmuch as the necessary implicitness of validity claims in speech acts is a condition we are not fundamentally able to reject. Therein rests Habermas’ foundation for social transformation. Formal pragmatics illustrates that we interact on the basis of weak idealisation, that egalitarian and inclusive interaction is inherent in our social practice. Emancipatory critique is thus grounded in the species’ intersubjective condition. A critical
position grounded in Habermas' (1983a:92) language philosophy can therefore argue for institutional measures which “sufficiently neutralise empirical limitations and avoidable internal and external interference so that the idealised conditions pragmatically presupposed by participants in argumentation can at least be adequately approximated”, and against mystifications of unjustified power relations, i.e. ideologies. To that extent, Habermas (1977:360) criticises certain language use as well by stating that “language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. In so far as the legitimations of power relations, (...) are not articulated, (...) language is also ideological”. However, this statement, which echoes the DHA general stance, is accomplished by saying that “distorted communication is not ultimate; it has its basis in the logic of undistorted language communication” (Habermas, 1974a:17). It is only through this double perspective on language, in other words taking Saussure’s circuit model as being both ideological and true, that what marks something as non-emancipatory, ideological and/or power-misuse can be identified at all.

However, not only does a more detailed and explicit discussion of the links between the DHA and Habermas’ language philosophy validate the former’s moral position, it also helps to avoid judgements based on conventionalism and a regression into a sheer rhetoric of critique. Much more, the empirical toolkit of the DHA could benefit from a stronger inclusion of Habermasian concepts (Forchtner, 2011a:8-11).

What can link the theoretical level of justification with the DHA’s key interest in the detailed analysis of semiosis is the concept of validity claims. This started recently by including the category of validity claims in the DHA’s empirical analysis (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; for similar attempts, cf. Cukier, 2004; Chilton, 2010). As outlined in Section 4.2.2, the ISS as a hypostatised ideal cannot serve as a measure for real interaction – and Habermas himself has rejected such an “essentialist misunderstanding”. A better way is indeed to draw on validity claims. That is to say, speakers perceive their arguments as being true, right and/or truthful, whilst hearers have other beliefs and must be convinced by better
arguments. Here, it is the interaction between two persons, their claims and justifications, which generate an always fallible dynamic towards truth, rightness and truthfulness (Habermas, 2003a:45). A Habermasian approach concentrates on exactly this dynamic, i.e. on (procedures which enable the) exchange of arguments to be as egalitarian and inclusive as possible.

Applying the concept of validity claims in an analysis of texts cannot therefore simply focus on the content of claims raised. Instead, analyses, applying the concept of validity claims, should focus on the form of arguments, in particular the form of their justification. In other words, whilst Habermas (as well as classical rhetoric, see below) presupposes a dialogical exchange of arguments which should be raised and refuted freely, this thesis analyses “mediated quasi-interaction” (Thompson, 1995:87-100), i.e. written texts, such as newspaper articles. From a Habermasian point of view, an argument can, nevertheless, be scrutinised concerning the openness and inclusiveness of its form as mentioned above. As such, examining arguments concerning their distortedness seem possible, even within a dialogical frame. This is supported by Aristotle’s (1960:8, I) dialectics in which a monological examination of the ground of arguments is possible, i.e. an examination of the very structure of an argument, such as that presented by Toulmin. Consequently, this analysis must, to a degree, be less concerned with content as what would be accepted by the participants in the course of an exchange cannot be known (The content of claims, in particular truth claims, does nevertheless play a crucial role insomuch as it is relevant in terms of the premises of an argument.).

The question is rather about a text enabling an undistorted exploration of differences, i.e. does it allow open and critical discussion? Or does it serve the construction of boundaries which lead to closed worldviews? This is particularly difficult in the case of evaluating the author’s truthfulness as readers of written texts have no access to, e.g., the gestures or facial expressions of the author. However, the analyst can criticise, e.g., the heavy use of metaphors as the latter might counter the transparency of an argument, its openness, by creating an extremely coherent and suggestive text, making it much harder for the audience to reflect on arguments. To that extent, such texts are
tendentially non-rational whilst rational, as defined above, is the raising of validity claims which can be critically questioned in an open, inclusive way.

This empirical extension of Habermas can be substantiated by a rather heuristic reference to Andreas Musolff's (2004:173-177) discussion of open and closed metaphor scenarios. Metaphor scenarios are rooted in the conceptual mapping of elements, e.g. 'age', 'experience', 'wisdom', etc., from a source domain, in this case: OLD, onto a target domain, e.g. EUROPE (Lakoff & Johnson, 1981). In a scenario, conceptual mapping is understood to lead to "a set of standard assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community about the 'prototypical' content aspects (participants, roles, 'dramatic' story lines) and social/ethical evaluations" (Musolff, 2004:17). For example, Europe might be thought of as having had ample experiences of suffering and war and thus being in a position to give superior advice to other collectives, e.g. other nations. This would follow from widespread assumptions about the wisdom that ageing allegedly brings and the apparent need of the hasty young for such advice. Whilst open scenarios remain open to criticism, scenarios can support the closure of ways of thinking, mirroring what Habermas (1984:43-74) discusses more generally under the heading of open and closed worldviews (for two examples of rather closed metaphor scenarios, cf. Example I, Section 6.4.1 and Example VI, Section 7.4.1). The concept might thus be another promising tool, however cursory, to link Habermasian, necessarily abstract social theory to empirical research in CDA.

Applying the concept of validity claims empirically does have a further effect related to the analysis of argumentation strategies. Here, I make recourse to the concept of fallacy in order to clarify how and why particular validity claims (potentially) distort communication. The notion of fallacy emerged, in the context of Aristotle's dialectic, as a deliberative deceptive move in a dialogic exchange of questions and answers. His text On Sophistical Refutations which outlines the concept has thus even been seen as an appendix to his main work on dialectics, Topica (cf. for example the introduction to the latter's English translation in Aristotle, 1960:265). On Sophistical Refutations investigates
“arguments which appear to be refutations but are really fallacies” (Aristotle, 1955:1). That is, fallacies are (counter-)arguments which seem to be valid but are not, and Aristotle differentiated them into depending on language, i.e. being ambiguous in meaning (IV), or being independent of language (V). Here I swiftly move on to relevant dimensions of, on the one hand, the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (for a most comprehensive overview, cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004), which has criticised this understanding as overlooking the fallacious consequences of unexpressed premises or sacrosanct standpoints for a dialogical exchange of arguments. From this perspective, every “speech act that prejudices or frustrates efforts to resolve a difference of opinion” (van Eemeren, 2001:158) counts as fallacy. To the extent that this resembles a Habermasian concern with (at least a weak) consensus, this approach to fallacies seems to provide a useful starting point. On the other hand, this attempt seems to go too far as I would argue that not every hindrance to resolving differences is equally serious and deserves to be called fallacious. Douglas Walton (1995:15) stresses this point when demarcating tendentious validity claims or doubtful blunders from “fundamentally flawed” arguments. I will thus use the notion of distortion as an overarching category which entails both serious fallacies and less serious, although still questionable, discursive practices.

As the DHA is particularly interested in the historical context of text production, and thus takes the longue durée into account, the concepts of successful and failed learning processes, i.e. the question of evaluating social change, provide a further, yet ignored, resource. By following a discourse over a long period, the ways in which forms of arguing change and become more open or closed can reveal developmental tendencies. Similarly, do institutions and societal structures become more or less


56 Note that pragma-dialectics refers to Karl Popper and Hans Albert when presenting their rules for a “critical discussion” which should warrant a free exchange of perspectives and resolve a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004:42-68). For criticism of the application of pragma-dialectics with its Popperian element in the DHA, cf. Forchtner & Tominc, under review.
egalitarian and inclusive? Is a particular historical period or place characterised by higher degrees of systematically distorted communication, e.g. through colonisation of the lifeworld? Hence, discourse analysis becomes a necessary, even inevitable, tool to analyse the evolution of society and criticise distorted communication.

Following on from the concept of systematically distorted communication, I can now return to the DHA’s notion of ideology. Although I still do not aim to discuss the concept in great detail, it can now be situated in a more coherent theoretical framework. Understanding ideology as systematically distorted communication within a Habermasian frame (Figure 6) provides the DHA with at least three benefits. Firstly, its theoretical coherence is maintained. Secondly, a dogmatic Marxist notion in which ideology can only be demystified from a particular standpoint is avoided (e.g. Althusser, 1971). Thirdly, (criticism of) ideology, *Ideologiekritik*, as a subject-centred practice is replaced by a view on intersubjective relations – which are ultimately what is ideologically distorted. At the same time, the concept remains linked to truth and emancipation – in contrast to Foucault’s (1976:119) position.

Concerning rhetorics of judge-penitence, some cases might not intentionally apply such a rhetoric and, speaking of manipulation, might thus miss the point. Instead, such remarks might also be analysed in terms of systematically distorted communication, i.e. as potentially blocking learning processes (Section 4.2). As such, these texts should be criticised as modes of communication in which in-group representation is unjustifiably and unconsciously distorted at the expense of an ‘other’.

I close this discussion on the validation of the DHA’s critical standard by relating the above to the DHA’s three-dimensional model of critique.

- Immanent critique refers to text-internal contradictions and is more or less independent of the investigator’s point of view. For example, an argument is contradictory if the speaker brings forward two logically opposing opinions. To that extent, Habermasian grounding does not necessarily affect this kind of critique. However, Habermas has outlined elements which
could benefit an inherent critique of texts. For example, inconsistency as well as ignoring others’ arguments might signal individual or societal communication pathologies.

- Sociodiagnostic critique seeks to demystify discourses, e.g. right-wing populism. Arguing on the basis of a progressive consensus, critiquing such populism might seem unproblematic and comprehensible to some groups but could be perceived as biased from another position. An explicit reference to Habermas’ formal pragmatics grounds such judgements, whilst particular texts, e.g. a speech by a politician, can be checked with regards to the claims made. Are these claims true, right and/or truthful? To what extent do they support or prevent rational understanding and undamaged intersubjectivity?

- Prognostic/retrospective critique aims to transform conditions. The DHA has already pointed to Habermas’ concept of deliberative democracy which rests on egalitarian and inclusive communication. But such a goal has to be theoretically justified as the merits of deliberative democracy are not necessarily self-evident. Against a Habermasian background, tendencies pointing in the direction of more egalitarian and inclusive institutions illustrate a process of successful learning. Thus, current conditions and the development of discourses can be criticised prognostically against the backdrop of such a concept of democracy. At the same time, prognostic critique is linked to retrospective critique which asks: what should we remember (in order to achieve a more deliberative community)? Consequently, studies inspired by the DHA (e.g. Wodak et al., 1990; Heer et al., 2008) can draw on Habermas’ insights that critique has to promote an inclusive self-critical reference to one’s own tradition, e.g. the recognition of one’s own past wrongdoings, instead of exclusionary, chauvinistic narratives (cf. Section 4.2.3).

5.3 Data Selection and Data Downsizing

The following section discusses the data on which this study is based, both with regards to the selection of countries and genres involved. Furthermore, it outlines how the data were selected and,
finally, which procedures of downsizing were applied. The latter element will be of particular importance given there has been much criticism of CDA generally putting forward “politically motivated” (Stubbs, 1997:102) interpretations and being “essentially unprincipled and inconsequential” (Widdowson, 1998:149; cf. Wodak, 2006 for a reply).

5.3.1 What data? The Historical Contexts, Genres and Period of Data Collection

Given the fact that the object of investigation, rhetorics of judge-penitence, is a complex and highly demanding form of language use, an initial decision was made to look at argumentative language use only. In consequence, two main genres were identified (for an overview, cf. Table 8, Table 10 and Table 12). On the one hand, I collected data from editorials and comments pages which voice opinions and are mainly written by journalists of the respective papers. On the other hand, I took into account a similar, and at the same time different, genre: the Feuilleton. The latter lacks a clear equivalent in, e.g., the British press but comes closest to the Comment & Debate and arts pages. It forms a significant and prestigious part of German newspapers. Some Austrian newspapers also have a Feuilleton section, whilst Danish newspapers offer comparable spaces, in the arts-section and, particularly, Kronik. The Feuilleton is a truly argumentative form of semiosis but lacks clear stylistic homogeneity. However, it is demarcated as a genre to the extent that it serves as a particular “place of mediation” of literature, journalism and reflections on art, economy, politics and society (Kauffmann, 2000:11f, my translation). Hence, introductions to archaeological sites in Iraq can be found side by side with debates on the ethical dimension of stem-cell research, a review of theatre plays or the reprint of a speech by, e.g., a politician. The heterogeneity of this ‘super-genre’ is also visible in my corpora (see below), as the latter consist of rather brief comments (e.g. Example I, Section 6.4.1), long essays (e.g. Example II, Section 6.4.2) and reprinted speeches (e.g. Example V, Section 7.4.2 and Example VII, Section 8.4.1). For the specificities of political speeches as a genre, both in ancient times as well as in modernity, cf. Reisigl, 2008.

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57 As is already visible in the introduction, I have also drawn on passages taken from a handful of books. However, these only serve as additional material and have not been systematically collected.

58 The heterogeneity of this ‘super-genre’ is also visible in my corpora (see below), as the latter consist of rather brief comments (e.g. Example I, Section 6.4.1), long essays (e.g. Example II, Section 6.4.2) and reprinted speeches (e.g. Example V, Section 7.4.2 and Example VII, Section 8.4.1). For the specificities of political speeches as a genre, both in ancient times as well as in modernity, cf. Reisigl, 2008.
amusement, criticism, news and comments. In contrast to much more formal and rigid editorials, articles in the Feuilleton, although often addressing the same subjects, are less determined in the way they elaborate an argument. Whilst many contributions are made by journalists, much more significant are those by external authors, e.g. academics and politicians. Stylistically, articles in the Feuilleton often include a more complex variety of lexical and syntactical choices (unusual diction and convoluted sentence structures) as well as the use of ironical, metaphorical and polemical language.

The following example illustrates such genre-typical features and is taken from the primary newspaper corpus of this thesis. The article was published in the Feuilleton section of the rather conservative German broadsheet FAZ by one of the newspapers co-publishers, Frank Schirrmacher, on 24 January 2003. It introduced a series of replies to the then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s remarks concerning ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe (for the multimodal framing of the article, cf. Figure 7; for a detailed analysis of one of the replicas, cf. Example I, Section 6.4.1).

1 Old Europe answers Mr Rumsfeld.
2 “France is a problem, Germany is a problem” – French and German intellectuals react to an American provocation.
3
4 What do you answer to Donald Rumsfeld? Suggestions are given on these pages. They certify Rumsfeld’s speech as the stuff of political break-up. His provocation opens a new conflict. America, that is the final political authority: a president, Europe, that is the final moral authority: a pope. America describes Europe’s core as old and frail like the Pope. But not that taunting France and Germany as elderly and infirm raises a contradiction. It is much more the case that Americans only want to recognise stubbornness, not experience, in the unwillingness for war in half of Europe. Whatever election tactics might be at play for German and French politicians – ‘old Europe’ consists of experiences from countless generations who without exception were experiences of war. The scepticism towards war from all parties shows just how seriously they should be taken. We recently wanted to tick off the anniversary of Franco-German friendship as a celebration. Now, we say with Paul Valéry from the year 1919: “This day
today places us in the face of a question of the highest importance: will Europe become what it is in reality: a little mountain range before the Asiatic continent? Or, however, will Europe remain what it seemingly is: the most precious part of this earth, the crowning glory of this planet, the brain of a surrounding body?".

I start by pointing to the particularities of this genre, e.g. the crucial role of metaphor. With Musolff, we might identify a metaphor scenario as indicated above, i.e. the mapping of conceptual elements of YOUNG (inexperienced, hasty and bodily strong, etc.) and OLD (wisdom, elderly and bodily weak, etc.) onto the target domains of AMERICA and EUROPE. In this case, the personification of the USA through Bush and Europe through to the elderly John Paul II supports this mapping in particular, as does the juxtaposition of political:moral. Assumptions from the abstract domains YOUNG and OLD might thus be drawn, e.g. that the elderly are often right but not listened to or lack powers of self-assertion, whilst inexperienced youngsters have the strength to push things through – but might later recognise their mistakes and ultimately recognise the experience and even the moral authority of their elders. Via this, a positive evaluation of Europe is achieved and, simultaneously, a “political break-up” and the opening of “new conflicts” (line 6) is thought and justified. Thinking of the crisis in this way ultimately supports a sharp divide between Europe and the USA. Furthermore, the highly emphatic quote from Paul Valéry, a French intellectual who lived in the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, is hardly imaginable in other genres.

This style, although not always as extreme as in the above case, is not just due to personal aesthetic judgements by journalists but is crucial for constructing the **Feuilleton** as a distinct place and, subsequently, the author, reader and their relationship. It has fuelled criticism of the **Feuilleton** as being a rather elitist desk, e.g. in Peter Glotz and Wolfgang Langenbucher’s (1969:95f, my translation) characterisation of the **Feuilleton** as an “intellectual golf-club” and a “ghetto of the initiated”. As a distinct place, the **Feuilleton** has thus given room for readers to practise distinction – although much has indeed been changed since Glotz and Langenbucher’s criticism by, in particular,
providing space for public debates. Interestingly, this development has, in some papers, most notably the FAZ, led to a certain independence from other desks in terms of the opinions voiced. Whilst the FAZ is generally a rather conservative paper, its Feuilleton often provides space for opposing views (Höhne & Russ-Mohl, 2005). However, although other papers also give room to a variety of voices, this independence is rather limited in most of the other cases.

A subsequent decision concerned the selection of weekday newspapers in which argumentative genres can be found. This led to a focus on main broadsheet newspapers along a '(centre-)right/conservative' and '(centre-)left/liberal' continuum. The political orientation is deliberately put in inverted commas, given the nowadays unclear status of these categories and difficulties in mapping them into different national contexts. The selection is thus primarily a relational one according to their relative position on a continuum of nationwide newspapers. In a first step, I identified (from right to left) in Germany: the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), in Austria: Die Presse (PRE) and Der Standard (STA), and in Denmark: Jyllands-Posten (JP) and Politiken (POL).

Identities, one's self-representation as well as one's image perceived by another, become particularly contested during crises when questions of 'Who are we/ am I?', 'Who do we/l want to be?' seem to demand answers. It is consequently in such periods that identities are (potentially) renegotiated in argumentative semiosis. Additionally, Georg Simmel (1964:42) states that conflicts become particularly heated in antagonisms over norms and values between groups which already share many characteristics. Looking back over the last decade, there is one situation in which all three countries experienced particularly intense debates over what to be(come) in relation to a close out-group, such as the United States, as the inner-Western other, i.e. the Iraq crisis. The issue of a potential war came to be intensively discussed in public in the light of the United States President George W. Bush's axis of evil comment in his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002. The very beginning of 2002 was thus set as the starting period of my investigation. In contrast, 31 December 2003, i.e. 24 months
and a war later, was set as the endpoint of my principle period of analysis. Although the end of major combat operations was announced by President Bush in May 2003 and coincided with a shift in the public debate towards discussing practical issues concerning the occupation instead of ‘our’ position towards the war, I included the rest of 2003 as well. This was due to the fact that Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003, which could have fuelled relevant end-of-year reviews.

5.3.2 Compiling the Corpus

The next step was to identify search words which would enable the collection of articles via digital archives. Given the theoretical decision to investigate debates surrounding the Iraq War, articles in all three cases had to contain at least one of the following five words and their derivates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Amerika</em></th>
<th><em>Bush</em></th>
<th><em>Irak</em></th>
<th><em>Saddam</em></th>
<th><em>USA</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The broadness of these terms meant that many articles were in fact not concerned with the Iraq crisis but scandals, e.g. the collapse of the American energy company Enron or political issues such as the Second Intifada which involved the United States. This set of search words was thus combined with five further context-sensitive ones, again including diverse derivates in order to reduce the

59 The following archives were used: in Austria, WISO-Presse; in Denmark, INFOMEDIA; and in Germany, various CD-Rom archives provided by the respective newspapers. Unfortunately, both in the Austrian as well as in the Danish cases, the archives were incomplete. In the case of Der Standard, most articles in January, February, March and April 2003 are not digitised whilst in the case of INFOMEDIA, Dagbladet Information (see below) was also not digitised for the period under investigation. In both cases, every single edition of the respective newspapers was read in order to filter out relevant articles manually. Furthermore, given that the arts and Feuilleton sections also contain TV and radio programmes, book, cinema and exhibition reviews, as well as comments on research in the natural sciences, it was necessary to delete such material from the Austrian and German corpora. This was done not on the basis of individual judgement but through identification of subcategories marked by headers.
number of articles by indentifying only those contributions which potentially addressed the in- 
groups' past wrongdoings (Table 4). This second set of search words had to be context-sensitive as  
triggers for debate of the in-group’s past differ in the respective national contexts. As such, a uniform  
set of lexical items is hardly helpful. At the same time, these words should not determine the content  
of how texts relate to this past. The selection of these particular search words resulted from a  
detailed analysis of the German, Austrian and Danish historical contexts (Sections 6.2, 7.2, 8.2). In  
sum, in the first phase of data collection, articles which contained the following search words in the  
relevant sections of two daily broadsheet newspapers were collected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Search Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>(<em>Amerika</em> [<em>America</em>]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>(<em>Anden verdenskrig</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>(<em>Amerika</em> [<em>America</em>]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Combination of search words for Germany, Austria and Denmark

All three cases include <*second world war*> as a basic and rather neutral but nevertheless relevant  
expression. Austria and Germany share <*experience*> which is a commonly used reference to what  
happened when referring to the past, whilst avoiding explicitness. Such ambivalence might be  
particularly useful for speakers addressing an in-group’s past wrongdoings. For similar reasons,  
 <*past*> was chosen in the cases of Denmark and Germany. However, the term is of additional  
significance in Germany as Vergangenheitsbewältigung, coming to terms with the past, has become a  
dictum when addressing the German discourse on the Holocaust after 1945. Given the centrality of
the <*Holocaust*> in Germany in particular, this term was also included. For similar reasons,
<*Europe*> was chosen as another search word, given that the country’s post-1945 national identity, due to the lack of an affirmable past (Jarausch, 2006:64; Wolfrum, 2007:12; Outhwaite, 2008:127), has been linked to (and projected onto) Europe to a degree (long) unknown in other countries. To that extent, it could be argued that discussions concerning Europe are of particular significance in Germany. Moving on to Austria, I start with <*fascis*>, i.e. fascism/fascist/etc., due to its particular ambivalence. It can, firstly, refer to the violent fall of the first Austrian republic and the takeover by a clerical fascist government in 1933/34. As I explain in Section 7.2, this is still perceived as a central event in large parts of the Austrian ‘left’. Secondly, <*fascis*> can refer to the rule of National Socialism in Austria, being thus represented as a subcategory of fascism. Thereby, the particular wrongdoings of ‘German fascism’ can be downplayed as fascist regimes ruled in various countries. <*1938*> refers to a related, equally central date in Austrian history: the Anschluss. The way Germany took control over Austria – was Austria the first victim of German Nazism or did it welcome the latter? – is still a dividing line and determines to a large extent how this past is viewed, i.e. as one in which the in-group did wrong or did not. For most parts of the second half of the 20th century, Austria saw itself as the first victim of Nazi aggression. This stance was not substantially challenged before the mid/late 1980s when a scandal broke out over the alleged knowledge of, and even involvement in, Wehrmacht war crimes by the then candidate for the Austrian Presidency, Kurt Waldheim. As this conflict marks the starting point of the Austrian debate over its past and is still a contested issue in the wider public, <*Waldheim*> was identified as another search word. Finally, in Denmark, the basic historical narrative is still that of the German occupation, <*period of occupation*>, and the way politicians and the wider society reacted to this with a <*policy of cooperation*>. To what extent this policy was justified or not has been discussed since occupation

60 Following current conventions, I address this practice in terms of samarbejdspolitikken, i.e. policy of cooperation. It has, however, to be noted that this term was introduced by the resistance movement in order to delegitimise political parties working with the German occupants. Alternative formulations are

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and cooperation began. {*1943*} refers to the end of this policy of cooperation when public unrest arose in various Danish cities and a new political arrangement between Denmark and Germany was put in place. At the 60th anniversary of this change in 2003, the then Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, gave a speech concerning its meaning which caused a public debate which is analysed in Chapter 9. The results of these search strings are illustrated in Figure 11, Figure 12 and Figure 13.

5.3.3 Further Data Downsizing and Compilation of the Final Corpora

In a second phase, given the high number of articles, particularly in the German case, this large quantity of data had to be systematically reduced. At this point, the corpus consisted largely of articles concerned with the role of oil, religion and the position of the churches, the sanctions against Iraq and inner-European disagreement in relation to the war. Thus, I identified a peak month for each country: March 2003, in Austria and Germany; September 2003 in Denmark. I then restricted my analysis to a period of two months before/after this peak which was considered sufficient to enable grasping the development of intertextual relations in these discourses.

However, given this radical reduction in the number of articles, I added articles from two further daily broadsheets within this five-month period. Concerning the Danish case, this led to the inclusion of Berlingske Tidende (BT), a paper with a rather coherent conservative agenda right of Jyllands-Posten, and Dagbladet Information (INF), a paper left of Politiken. Similarly, the existing ‘(centre-right/conservative’ and ‘(centre-)left/liberal’ dichotomy in Germany was extended to include Die tilpasningspolitik (policy of adaptation), kollaborationspolitik (policy of collaboration), indrømmelsepolitik (policy of concessions) and forhandlingspolitik (policy of negotiation). These terms are not neutral either but carry particular interpretations of the occupation. The last, e.g., was introduced by the most infamous politician of that time, Erik Scavenius, when defending his approach. For further discussions on this terminology, cf. Dethlefsen (1990:195) and Kirchhoff (2004:13). Struggles over these terms have seemingly ceased and, at least in public debates, Samarbejdspolitikken has achieved a hegemonial status without, however, the public necessarily being aware of the particular meaning the term initially had.
Welt (Welt), right of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and the Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), left of the Süddeutsche Zeitung. In contrast to Denmark and Germany, extending the data pool proved to be problematic in Austria as positions to the right and left of Die Presse and Der Standard are not occupied. There are manifold reasons for this problematic lack of differentiation, amongst others the dual break of 1933/34 and 1938 and media policies after 1945 which have favoured the dual left/centre continuum cf. Frank Brettschneider (2002:258) in the case of Germany. For Denmark, cf. Hjarvard (2007). With regards to the Danish newspaper landscape, it should be added that Jyllands-Posten often takes a pronounced ‘right-wing’ position concerning issues of immigration, etc. However, its stance on issues such as social policy is often more ‘left(liberal)’. In contrast, Berlingske Tidende is more coherent in its support of ‘conservative’ parties and thus positioned at the ‘conservative’ end of the scale. Concerning Austria, no clear dividing line could be identified regarding the two additional newspapers as both are centrist papers. Ultimately, the latter was classified as centre-left while the former was classified as centre-right. The following table shows the paid circulation of the relevant newspapers. Note that at least in the German and Danish cases, the two newspapers at the ‘centre’, which provided the basis for deciding which months should be analysed, are also the ones with the highest paid circulations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paid circulation in:</th>
<th>Austria, 2003</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Die Presse</td>
<td>77,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Der Kurier</td>
<td>171,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salzburger Nachrichten</td>
<td>74,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Der Standard</td>
<td>67,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark, second half of 2003</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlingske Tidende</td>
<td>130,251</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyllands-Posten</td>
<td>161,718</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiken</td>
<td>133,302</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagbladet Information</td>
<td>19,958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany, 2003</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Die Welt</td>
<td>215,172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
<td>380,210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süddeutsche Zeitung</td>
<td>431,271</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurter Rundschau</td>
<td>184,817</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

concentration of the media market to an extent unknown in other Western European countries. Therefore, the Austrian corpus was extended by including two mid-market newspapers: Der Kurier (KUR) and Salzburger Nachrichten (SN). However, not only are these two not broadsheet newspapers but, furthermore, they are situated neither to the left nor the right of Die Presse and Der Standard. Instead, they lack a clear tendency towards the ‘right/conservative’ or ‘left/liberal’ end of the scale and, viewed relationally, occupy the centre. Using the same search words in these additional six newspapers completed the second phase of data collection (Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7).

Given that I only intended a qualitative analysis, the number of articles in these three secondary corpora was now too high again for any reasonable processing (Austria: 173, Denmark: 188, Germany: 1735. This roughly corresponds to the size of these countries, although Denmark is slightly overrepresented, probably due to the particular debate raging in Denmark at that time and the traditional richness of Scandinavian newspaper markets). However, a brief look at these articles showed that whilst the inclusion of two more papers proved to be a valuable move as, at least in Denmark and Germany, the range of comments was substantially widened, a significant number of articles were still not the least concerned with matters relevant to the past. However, reducing the corpora size simply on the basis of the author’s personal judgement would rightly fuel doubts over possible bias in the analysis. Instead, only those articles were ultimately taken into consideration which contain at least two context-sensitive search words in the case of Austria (Figure 15, Table 11) and Denmark (Figure 16, Table 13), and three context-sensitive words in the case of Germany (Figure 14, Table 9). Although many remaining articles are still not (entirely) relevant, this systematic move created manageable primary corpora which became the basis of this thesis, i.e. the data pool in which to investigate the rhetorics of judge-penitence. The findings are introduced in the following three chapters.

62 Problematically, this procedure entails a bias against shorter articles as they contain fewer words, and thus there is a smaller likelihood of including more than one context-sensitive search word. As a consequence, long
5.4 Summary

In this chapter, I started by introducing key concepts of the DHA in CDA. This concerned both linguistic categories as well as wider theoretical concepts. The review enabled me to link insights taken from Chapter 1, such as Bakhtin's dialogism, and Chapter 4, on Habermas' language philosophy, to categories in the DHA, in particular its notion of critique. In doing so, I aimed to provide a more explicit and detailed theoretical justification for the DHA's moral stance, as currently available, as well as pointing to the empirical benefits which such a connection might have.

Having thus established the methodological and methodical frame of this study, I moved on to introduce my data. This included, firstly, a general introduction to the data in terms of genre and the period of analysis. Given the persistent criticism of CDA (and qualitative approaches in general) being biased in its 'cherry-picking' of specific examples, I, secondly, selected and downsized the data according to a rigorous procedure. Although this cannot rule out biased decisions and interpretations, the same holds true for many quantitative approaches which, behind a veil of seemingly objective statistical calculations, are just as problematic. In both cases, it is both transparency and intersubjective verifiability which ultimately count. The outcome of this approach is presented in the following three chapters.

63 articles such as those published in Feuilleton sections in general and the Dokumentation section in the Frankfurter Rundschau in particular, appeared in high numbers. In contrast, short editorials and opinion articles are probably underrepresented.

I give an overview of the topics in these primary corpora at the end of Sections 6.3, 7.3 and 8.3. These overviews, however, do not derive from an extensive quantitative analysis but are based on reading and categorising each article according to topic(s) and stance. They thus only provide some further contextual information.
Figure 11: Development of relevant published articles in Austria between January 2002 and December 2003

Figure 12: Development of relevant published articles in Denmark between January 2002 and December 2003

Figure 13: Development of relevant published articles in Germany between January 2002 and December 2003
Figure 14: Number of articles per newspaper per month in the primary German corpus

Figure 15: Number of articles per newspaper per month in the primary Austrian corpus

Figure 16: Number of articles per newspaper per month in the primary Danish corpus
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feuilleton</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommentar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Süddeutsche Zeitung</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feuilleton</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meinungsseite</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Die Welt</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feuilleton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frankfurter Rundschau</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokumentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feuilleton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommentar</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Table 5: Number of relevant articles published in four German daily broadsheet newspapers
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<tr>
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<th>Meinung</th>
<th>Kultur &amp; Feuilleton</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meinung</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kultur &amp; Feuilleton</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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### Der Standard

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<th>Kommentar der Anderen</th>
<th>Kultur</th>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommentar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommentar der Anderen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kultur</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
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### Salzburger Nachrichten

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<th>Kultur</th>
<th>Seite 3</th>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Standpunkt</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kultur</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seite 3</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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### Kurier

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<th>IPO</th>
<th>Kultur</th>
<th>Seite 1</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kultur</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 6: Number of relevant articles published in four Austrian daily broadsheet newspapers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

**Table 7: Number of relevant articles published in four Danish daily broadsheet newspapers**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Kronik</th>
<th>Ledende Artikel</th>
<th>Debat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politiken</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kronik</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ledende Artikel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Kronik</th>
<th>Ledende Artikel</th>
<th>Debat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kronik</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ledende Artikel</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Kronik</th>
<th>Ledende Artikel</th>
<th>Debat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dagbladet Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kronik</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ledende Artikel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Kronik</th>
<th>Ledende Artikel</th>
<th>Debat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlingske Tidende</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kronik</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ledende Artikel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec |

| 2003 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |

| Kronik | 1      | 0    | 1    | 0    | 1    | 0    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 0    |
| Ledende Artikel | 1      | 0    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 0    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 0    |
| Debat     | 1      | 0    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 0    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 0    |
| Total     | 6      | 5    | 7    | 7    | 9    | 6    | 5    | 7    | 7    | 9    | 6    | 5    |

154
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Die Welt (WELT)</th>
<th>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)</th>
<th>Die Süddeutsche (SZ)</th>
<th>Frankfurter Rundschau (FR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorials and opinion pages Feuilleton</td>
<td>Forum, Titel, Feuilleton</td>
<td>Kommentar, Feuilleton</td>
<td>Meinungsseite, Feuilleton</td>
<td>Kommentar, Dokumentation, Feuilleton</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 8: Analysed German Newspapers including relevant sections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Die Welt (WELT)</th>
<th>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)</th>
<th>Die Süddeutsche (SZ)</th>
<th>Frankfurter Rundschau (FR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Feuilleton (FEU)</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum (FOR)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titel (TIT)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of texts</td>
<td>9,463</td>
<td>39,752</td>
<td>17,426</td>
<td>32,356</td>
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<tr>
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<td>738</td>
<td>9,463</td>
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Table 9: Primary German corpus
Table 10: Analysed Austrian Newspapers including relevant sections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Die Presse (PRE)</th>
<th>Salzburger Nachrichten (SN)</th>
<th>Kurier (KUR)</th>
<th>Der Standard (STA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorials and opinion pages</td>
<td>Kommentar</td>
<td>Kultur/Feuilleton</td>
<td>Der Standpunkt/Site 1</td>
<td>Kultur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feuilleton</td>
<td>Kultur/Feuilleton</td>
<td>Der Standpunkt/Seite 3</td>
<td>Kultur</td>
<td>Aussenpolitik/Innenpolitik/Seite 1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 11: Primary Austrian corpus

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Kurier (KUR)</th>
<th>Salzburger Nachrichten (SN)</th>
<th>Der Standard (STA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Kommentar (KOM)</td>
<td>Kultur/Feuilleton (KUL/FEU)</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Innenpolitik (IPO)</td>
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<th>PRE &amp; SN &amp; KUR &amp; STA</th>
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<td>Jyllands-Posten (JP)</td>
<td>Politiken (POL)</td>
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<td>-------------------------</td>
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Table 12: Analysed Danish Newspapers including relevant sections

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<th>Politiken (POL)</th>
<th>Dagbladet Information (INF)</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Number of words</td>
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<th>Debat (DEB)</th>
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<th>Kronik (KRO)</th>
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<th>Kronik (KRO)</th>
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Table 13: Primary Danish corpus

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Table 13: Primary Danish corpus
6. CASE STUDY I: GERMANY

6.1 Overview of the Chapter

Like the following two chapters, this one investigates the existence and possible realisation of rhetorics of judge-penitence. I start in Section 6.2 by introducing the wider historical German context since 1949, illustrating how the dynamics of memories have changed over the decades. For heuristic purposes, this development is described via a three-step periodisation – rejecting responsibility, public struggles over interpretation of the past, and the emergence of a perpetrator ‘trauma’. Periodising the development of (Germany’s) official self-imagination emphasises the

\[\text{Basic Law}\]

Objections might be concerned with my focus on West Germany in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, though this thesis ultimately focuses on discourse in unified Germany. Indeed, Nazism played very different roles in East and West Germany (Herf, 1997) – with consequences for both political life and culture (Weidenfeld, 1993). However, similar to the transfer of West German Basic Law in course of unification, the West German discourse on the past has also been transferred to the former GDR, e.g. via its education system and the media. The acceptance of a perpetrator narrative, at least in the public discourse, is, e.g., illustrated by the current Chancellor Angela Merkel who was born in the GDR.

There are various proposals concerning the periodisation of German dynamics of memories after 1945. Although a thorough debate about these different ways of presenting the development is not necessary here, a brief look at two influential periodisations might, nevertheless, be helpful. Firstly, Norbert Frei (2005) identifies four phases: denazification and detention between 1945 and 1949; the politics of the past in the 1950s, e.g. integrating Nazis as well as establishing close relations with the State of Israel; ‘coming to terms with the past’ in the 1960s and 70s; and, since the 1980s, ‘preservation of the past’ [Vergangenheitsbewahrung]. Secondly, by applying Karl Mannheim’s concept of generation which focuses on common patterns of socialisation, norms and experiences, Assmann (2007:59) speaks of seven relevant generations involved in the making of past-war collective memory. The 1910’ers being shaped by World War I and the 1930’ers by National Socialism and World War II; the generation of 1945 who experienced Nazism consciously while not getting involved to a
procedural nature of collective memory (Section 2.2) as one of constant revision and reaction to dominating frames. Thus, the emergence of a highly conflictual period since the late 1950s and early 1960s (Section 6.2.2) must be seen in relation to the silent 1950s (Section 6.2.1) — and only on the basis of these struggles could the current frame emerge (Section 6.2.3). Thus, this development is not idealised in terms of continuous directed evolution towards ever more extensive acknowledgments of past wrongdoings, but contains various positions struggling against each other.

Having described the broader historical development, Section 6.3 introduces the immediate context of the German debate over the Iraq War taking place at the beginning of 2003, its main positions and trends. This section also includes details about the content of the German primary corpus. Against this background, Section 6.4 analyses three texts which — to different degrees — represent rhetorics of judge-penitence. As stated above, I do not aim for a quantitative representation of the rhetorics of judge-penitence in this wider political debate. Nor do I investigate the use made of the past when legitimising (resistance to) the Iraq War in general. Instead, analysing these three instances in detail provides an understanding of how rhetorics of judge-penitence are applied — and to what extent they depend on collective memory. In Section 6.5, I draw together these different aspects and insights.

6.2 The Historical Context

6.2.1 Shifting the Blame

Nationwide surveys conducted by the High Commission for Occupied Germany in 1951/52, found an average of 41% seeing more good than evil in Nazi ideas, whilst 36% saw more evil than good. Furthermore, only 4% thought that all Germans bore a “certain guilt” for the Third Reich’s evil degree the 1930’ers were; the 1968’ers who experienced an ambivalent socialisation between American mass culture and the FGR’s dreary atmosphere; the 1978’ers as a generational reaction to the moralisation of the 1968’ers; and the generation of 1985 whose primary points of reference are German unification, globalisation and a more postmodern way of life.
actions and 21% felt some responsibility (Merrit & Merritt, 1980:7). The authors concluded that while there was little desire for Nazism to reemerge, Germans “felt little sense of personal or collective responsibility” (10). Hannah Arendt (1950:44, my translation) made a similar observation when visiting Germany in 1950, speaking of a “manifest heartlessness, a deeply entrenched persistence and occasionally brutal rejection to face what actually happened”. Indeed, the total breakdown of 1945 was rarely perceived in terms of moral responsibility. Instead, Germans stylised themselves as the new pariahs (cf. Adorno, 2010 for various defence mechanisms revealed in focus-group interviews conducted during the early 1950s). Particularly important were two discourses on, firstly, the integration of those affected by denazification and, secondly, German prisoners of war (POWs) in the East and West. Although the main parties shared a basic anti-Nazi consensus which, e.g., led to the banning of the Socialist Reich Party in 1952, smaller parties such as the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the German Party showed little distance from the past and served as havens for National Socialists. This, in turn, pushed the major parties, the conservative Christian Union (CDU and CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), towards a “past-political populism” (Frei, 2002:304).

Concerning the popular demand for wide-ranging de-denazification, the step-by-step return to semi-sovereignty under the conservative Chancellor Adenauer after 1949 enabled his government to put in place an “extraordinarily wide-ranging effort at integration and an amnesty policy that cannot be considered anything but generous” (235). In effect, theamnesties of 1949 and 1954 reversed the Allied denazification taking place in the second half of the 1940s. By 1958, most war criminals imprisoned in the Western Zone were freed. In a similar vein, Robert G. Moeller’s (2001) study of the post-war FRG’s image of POWs held in the Soviet Union concludes that social integration and political legitimacy after the early 1950s was not due to the establishment of the Basic Law in 1949 but to cultural, political, popular and academic efforts to construct Germans as victims.

By telling stories of the enormity of their losses, West Germans were able to reject charges of “collective guilt”, briefly levelled by the victors immediately after the war, and claim status as heroic survivors. By
focusing on the experiences of expellees and POWs in the Soviet Union, they could talk about the end of the Third Reich without assuming responsibility for its origins. In this abbreviated account of National Socialism, all Germans were ultimately victims of a war that Hitler had started but everyone lost (3).

Public campaigns and movies in favour of POWs gave German ‘victims’ a face which other victims lacked. Frei (2005:141; also Adorno, 2010:82-84) points to a particularly useful defence strategy when tracing the discourse on collective guilt in the FRG. Accordingly, all Germans were seen as perpetrators by the Allies – an accusation which was never officially formulated in such a crude manner – which served many Germans as a reason to reject responsibility while constructing themselves as victims. Such self-righteous attitudes were accelerated by the lively anti-communism in the FRG and stabilised through its integration into the West, in particular after the start of the Korean War in 1959 and the subsequent so-called economic miracle. Hence, both politically and culturally, a self-critical stance towards one’s own past was hardly possible on a broad scale. This was one of the reasons why voters turned to Germany’s long-term Chancellor Adenauer in West Germany’s first free elections in 1949 as he had expressed much less desire to continue denazification than his Social Democratic opponents (Herf, 1997:226).

Consequently, Frei (2002:306) concludes that “in reality, the latent threat of Allied intervention was inestimably important in the development of the young West German state”. But, while guilt and responsibility in the two other successor states, Austria and the GDR, and indeed collaboration in most occupied European countries, was silenced soon after the war (Judt, 2007:808-820), this provided the possibility for an alternative reading of the past. Being still ‘under observation’ whilst striving for its place in the West, Konrad H. Jarausch (2006:15) stresses that already, in the 1950s, the first steps towards internalisation were taken. These included events such as the publication of the German edition of *The Diary of Anne Frank* in 1950, the already noted ban on the *Socialist Reich Party*, and magazines such as *Merkur* and *Die Wandlung* (Rabinbach, 2003). Academics such as Karl Jaspers (2000:84) called for “unreserved self-analysis” and proponents of the Frankfurt School were
involved not only in public debates but also in academic struggles concerning Germany’s Nazi past (Demirovic, 1999). 1952 saw the opening of the Federal Agency for Civic Education which has had long-term effects. Whilst Frei (2005:75) describes the courts as mirroring wider society in the 1950s by systematically obstructing the prosecution of war criminals, this became a public issue in the late 1950s as the result of a trial against the Ulmer Einsatzgruppe responsible for the killing of more than 5,500 Jews in 1941. The feeble prosecution in a regional court led to the opening of the Central Office of the State Justice Administration for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes in 1958. Most significantly, the Central Office prepared the ground for the Auschwitz trials in the mid-1960s which caused huge upheaval. The veil of ignorance which lay over such war crimes was further lifted by external events such as the Eichmann trial, in Jerusalem, in 1961. Finally, revelations of and campaigns against former Nazis serving in the FRG’s top positions by the GDR as part of their efforts to delegitimise the West German government – the most significant case involving Adenauer’s close adviser Hans Globke who worked in the Ministry of Interior during the Third Reich where he was involved in the legal organisation of racial policy, including a commentary on the Nuremberg Laws which revoked the citizenship of German Jews – generated constant pressure (Frei, 2005:76).

6.2.2 Struggles over How to Understand the Past
Together, these debates gradually enabled more profound challenges to the conservative hegemony, in particular when the first post-National Socialist generation became politically relevant in the 1960s. Whatever the exact reasons for the protests of 1968 were (understood here as a symbol for wider societal changes), instead of shifting blame and searching for possibilities to maintain a heroic understanding of the in-group, they pushed the debate about the Germans’ crimes into the centre of the FRG.

This change became most apparent with the takeover of governmental power by the Social Democrats in the late 1960s which was itself condensed into the then Chancellor Willy Brandt’s kneeling in 1970, in Warsaw, symbolising the birth of Germany’s perpetrator narrative. Guilt, as
Christoph Schneider (2006) argues, became uncoupled from individuals whilst, at the same time, being transformed into a crucial part of the nation’s memory and identity. Yet, it was not only Brandt’s performance but a wider net of discourses which enabled this broader change. Among others were four parliamentary debates concerning the statute of limitations of murder committed during the National Socialist era in 1960, ’65, ’69 and ’79 which made changes in the perception of mass murder strikingly visible (Dubiel, 1999). Whilst the debate in 1960 was still dominated by the term war criminal, indicating a primarily juridical approach, after 1965 moral aspects became important. Conservatives claimed that German history could not be reduced to 12 years of National Socialism so that national honour could remain a source of national identity. In other words, Germans should be able to affirm their tradition. In contrast, it was argued that such concepts were discredited. Especially in 1965, this struggle over definitions became crucial and Ernst Bender (CDU) forcefully rejected a revisionist concept of national identity and patriotism by stating that national honour includes the idea that “this German people is not a nation of murderers” (quoted in Herf, 1997:338).

On another level, the US-American TV mini-series Holocaust was first shown in Germany in 1979 and aroused huge public interest (Märthesheimer & Frenzel, 1979). It tells the story of the Holocaust from the perspective of a family of German Jews and a rising member of the SS via which the viewer is introduced to various historical events and places such as the pogroms on 9-10 November 1938, Jewish ghettos, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943, sites of extermination, and the successful revolt of prisoners in the Sobibor extermination camp in 1943. While its style has been criticised as sensational, the mini-series undoubtedly helped to transform the killing of six million Jews into the “the epoch’s marker, its final and inescapable wellspring”. After 1989, Schindler’s List had a similar effect, pushing forward the creation of a new narrative which demarcates good:evil (for more problematic aspects of current television productions concerning the Third Reich, cf. Kansteiner, 2003). Whilst it has been argued that this kind of ‘hollywoodization’ is nothing more than inadequate banalisation, it is equally questionable to what extent elites could or should impose their apparently
superior interpretations. In any case, the fact that moving pictures since the 1960s have been provided mostly by the USA, and the imploding significance of the German *Heimatfilm* which had great influence throughout the 1950s when depicting Germans as victims (Moeller, 2001:123-170), has almost certainly had an impact on public memory.

However, as the FRG experienced more and more crises, most importantly the end of the economic miracle, a desire for continuity and tradition was reawakened. Exhibitions opened which attracted huge numbers of visitors by casting a nostalgic glance backwards, e.g. *The Period of the Staufers* (1977), *Wittelsbach and Bavaria* (1980), and *Prussia* (1981). Interestingly, similar legitimatory tendencies operated in the GDR which, already in 1978, was stressing the continuities between Prussia’s reforms and the GDR while 1983 saw exhibitions on the Saxonian king August and Martin Luther as reformers. The West German conservative Chancellor Helmut Kohl aimed to materialise this so-called *Tendenzwende* (change of direction) through the creation of a *House of History* and a *German Historical Museum* which liberals feared would downplay the crimes of Nazism over the longue durée. Similar fears were fuelled by Kohl’s ambiguous “grace of a late birth”, a remark made during a Knesset speech in January 1984. Similarly, in 1985, Kohl met the then US President Ronald Reagan in Bitburg, at a military cemetery, in order to demonstrate the alliance between the USA and the FRG. However, it was revealed that members of the Waffen-SS are also buried there and this scandal raised further fears regarding the possible collapse of a still evolving “negative memory” (Kosselleck, 2002).

One of the most powerful political interpretations working against this *Tendenzwende* was offered by the then President of the FRG, Friedrich von Weizsäcker, in a speech entitled *To the 40th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe and the National Socialist dictatorship in Europe*. Given in the West German parliament on 8 May 1985, Weizsäcker acknowledged the pain felt by many Germans due to the lost war. Nevertheless, he defined the date not as a day of defeat but of liberation, a synthesis described by Dubiel (1999:211) as being both a “confession and a sermon”. This set the scene for the
famous Historikerstreit which started in 1986 and developed into a major discussion about historical responsibility and national consciousness (cf. Maier, 1988 for a comprehensive account). Whilst conservatives claimed there was similarity between Auschwitz and the Gulag system, explaining (and justifying) Auschwitz in terms of a reaction to Bolshevism, in order to draw a line (Schlussstrich) under the self-critical dealing with Germany’s past, this attempt was rejected by authors like Habermas. Importantly, this discussion was not restricted to academics and politicians arguing behind closed doors such as the ‘museum-politics’ of Kohl. Instead, it became a public debate on the nation’s official self-understanding. Ever since, this dynamic of public debates seems to repeat itself, e.g. in the debate over the Wehrmacht exhibitions (see below). The effectiveness of this cultural code became strikingly visible when the then president of the Bundestag, Phillip Jenninger, had to resign because of an ambiguous speech on 10 November 1988.66

6.2.3 Routinisation of the Perpetrator Narrative

German reunification in 1989/90 called this development into question. While liberals feared the return of the nation, conservatives hoped for an end to emerging negative memories in the FRG (for an overview of the positions, cf. Jarausch, 2006:222-238). The formers’ fears did not seem unjustified given a series of violent riots against foreigners in 1991 and 1992 as well as the rise of the New Right which aimed again for historicising the Holocaust as being only one aspect among others in German history (Müller, 2003). Although its proponents gained influence in the newspaper Die Welt and the publishing house Ullstein, public protest and internal resistance led to its diminishing by 1994. Some members then tried to gain control of the FDP in the federal states of Berlin and Hessen but were ultimately prevented from doing so by the federal leadership around the end of the 1990s.

66 In his speech, Jenninger tried to ask: what would contemporary Germans have done back then? However, he did not manage to communicate adequately the dividing line between ‘hermeneutic understanding’ and a naive justification of German bystanders, which forced him to resign (for a detailed discussion, cf. Wodak et al., 1994:163-190).
More fundamentally was an emerging differentiation: while the English language separates victims from those who sacrifice themselves, German does not know this differentiation. There is just one word: **Opfer**. This became striking obvious in the debate over the *New Sentinel*, inaugurated in 1993 and dedicated to all “victims/the sacrificed of war and dictatorship”. However misleading this fusion by the conservative government was, it ultimately facilitated a differentiation of the two meanings. The recently opened *Memorial to the Murdered Jews in Europe*, promised by Kohl in return for the *New Sentinel* (Reichel, 2000:181), has not triggered debates comparable with those of the 1980s as the principle difference between victims of National Socialism and those who sacrificed themselves for National Socialism is now broadly accepted. The significance of this difference again became apparent in the debates over the Wehrmacht exhibitions in 1995-1999 and 2001-2004. Here, former soldiers not only felt accused of being guilty but also saw their own status as Hitler’s victims come into question. These debates were of particular importance as they transcended the public sphere and challenged citizens to think about their familial involvement, i.e. the role of (grand)fathers, brothers, uncles, etc. Whilst there has been ample criticism of the debate as failing to enlighten the public (Heer, 2008b), the debate ultimately led the CDU as well as the FAZ, both centre-right parties, to support the exhibition which they had initially fiercely opposed. Whilst the Wehrmacht had mainly been seen as a patriotic, non-political and non-criminal organisation – a narrative relevant for almost every family due to its male members –, the increasing public acceptance of at least some ambiguity added another mosaic to the public representation of National Socialism as its other.

Recent debates related to the German past also illustrate the routinisation of a perpetrator narrative. Following unification even better off West German federal states experienced the rise of far-right parties. For example, *Die Republikaner* in Baden-Württemberg had electoral success in both 1992 and 1996 but were ultimately pushed back due to political cooperation by the main parties and wider
societal pressure.\textsuperscript{67} Political debates, e.g. the case of Martin Hohmann and Reinhard Günzel, are even more telling. Hohmann, a member of the conservative wing of the CDU, gave a minor speech on German Unification Day in 2003 in which he claimed the joint guilt of Jews as they too were “Tätervolk” (perpetrator folk) due to the fact that Jews fought in the Red Army.\textsuperscript{68} Günzel, a high-ranking member of the army supported him in public and was subsequently fired by the Ministry of Defence. Hohmann was expelled from the parliamentary party in 2003 (the first CDU member ever) and ultimately expelled from the CDU itself in 2004. Of more significance is the case of one of the CDU’s main politicians and the then Minister President of Baden-Württemberg, one of the most important powerbases of the CDU, Günther Ottinger. When Hans Filbinger died in 2007, Ottinger (2007) held a eulogy in which he described Fillbinger as “an opponent of the Hitler regime like millions of Germans”.\textsuperscript{69} Even large parts of his own party did not (publicly) follow him in this view, and after a week of immense public debate, he distanced himself from his comment.

Although these examples illustrate the force of a particular collective memory frame, they must not lead to inflated expectations or an uncritical affirmation of the current state of affairs (this is true for the entire ‘apology-wave’ and not restricted to Germany). Neither do they imply detailed knowledge of what happened in the 1930s and 40s, nor the ability to generalise appropriately the lessons from

\textsuperscript{67} More recently, the neo-Nazi party National-Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) achieved some electoral breakthroughs in former East German federal states. However, the party has also suffered setbacks and it is therefore too early to assess its future.

\textsuperscript{68} The speech can be found at \url{http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/15/15981/1.html} [25.11.2010].

\textsuperscript{69} Filbinger was one of Ottinger’s predecessors and a leading conservative figure in the CDU. During the war, he worked as a judge and decreed death penalties, even in the last days of the Second World War. He became infamous through his comment: ‘What was right before 1945 cannot be wrong after 1945’. Even if he only referred to the issue of law, this statement shows that he never realised the change which took place in the 1960s when the perspective on the War was moralised. Exemplarily, Filbinger (1983:171-173) identified “negative infiltration” and “discrimination of our people” as consequences of the lost war.
the Holocaust. Quantitative research by Silbermann and Stoffert (2000) suggests that Auschwitz, although a token of evil, has not yet been properly understood and a silent majority might still favour a Schlussstrich. More recent research (Decker et al., 2010; Heitmeyer, 2011) shows that there is still a strong minority cultivating anti-Semitic, xenophobic and neo-Nazi attitudes. In a similar vein, even the so-called “progressive patriotism” (Lau, 2006:804) during the FIFA World Cup in Germany in 2006 fostered xenophobic attitudes (Becker et al., 2007). Paradigmatic for this new patriotism is Mathias Matussek’s (2006) bestseller We Germans which, while undoubtedly taking the Holocaust seriously, favours a “naive passion for Germany” (32) and criticises “processions of self-castigation” (108).

Nevertheless, this does not imply that a neo-German ‘cult of sacrifice’ has not affected the position of the Holocaust as a negative point of reference. A “wash up and shake off” (Habermas, 1985:264, my translation) of the bitter past seems unlikely. Rather, self-representation will refer further and extensively to the Holocaust as an “open wound”. Only inside this frame can normalisation be further developed – mirroring neither an old school revisionism surrounding the bombardment of Dresden or the expelled (for an overview, cf. Niven, 2006), nor a completely realised post-conventional identity. Hence, while Frei (2005:7) comments that “[t]here has never been so much Hitler”, this does not imply solely the existence of self-critical references to the past but it has opened up ways to address German victims, although only within this frame.

As such, German reunification in 1989 did change the discourse on the nation’s past. However, in contrast to certain fears, a one-dimensional neo-nationalistic revival is not visible. The Holocaust has probably even gained importance in the official discourse of the new Germany whilst becoming more and more interwoven in a European context as symbolised by the Stockholm process. However, the memory-landscape has become more complex. The ‘Holocaust-frame’ has enlarged and, nowadays, gives place to more or less different understandings of the past. Investigating rhetorics of judge-penitence is thus concerned with one aspect of this increasingly complex and diverse situation in which the frame of a perpetrator narrative gives rise to various ways of making this past usable. In
consequence, whilst previous struggles over the interpretation of the past led to a recognition of the Holocaust as part of Germany’s tradition, the 1990s and 2000s have seen the transformation of this contested memory into consensual, although complex, characteristics of German official self-representation.

6.3 The Situational Context of the Debate

Given that Germany was one of the key players in the debate over the Iraq War, this section situates the German stance within a more general review of the development. Following the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration turned to an openly interventionist policy in the course of 2002. This became manifest, in varying degrees, in the United States President George W. Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ comment in his State of the Union Address on 29 January, his speech to graduates at West Point on 1 June, the publication of the National Security Strategy, his speech to the UN General Assembly on 12 September, and in the US-Congress’ joint resolution Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 in October of that year. All these statements point to a more unilateral and pre-emptive stance, sometimes publicly referred to as the Bush doctrine, and which found a cool reception in Europe. In particular, the then French President, Jacques Chirac, and the then German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder – who faced elections on 22 September – spoke out against a possible military intervention. This position became cemented on 5 August when Schröder announced a “German way”, which included the rejection of a war against Iraq, at the opening rally of the above-

mentioned general elections.\footnote{The author is grateful to the SPD for providing him with the speech manuscript, entitled \textit{Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zum Wahlkampfaufakt am Montag, 5 August 2002, in Hannover}.} Exactly one month later, Schröder gave an interview to the \textit{New York Times} in which he categorically rejected any support for a war, even if conducted under a UN mandate.\footnote{The interview can be found at: \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/05/world/traces-terror-perspectives-gerhard-schroder-no-one-has-clear-idea-about-what.html?scp=2&sq=gerhard+Schröder&st=nyt} [25.11.2010].} This announcement was even more significant given the fact that Germany took over one of the non-permanent seats in the UN Security Council at the beginning of 2003. In November 2002, the Council unanimously voted in favour of \textit{Resolution 1441} which demanded that Iraq give weapons inspectors full access and disarm or face “serious consequences”.\footnote{The resolution can be found at: \url{http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm} [07.12.2010].} The nature of these consequences, i.e. whether this wording includes military action or not, would become another publicly debated issue in subsequent months. After winning the election, amongst other things due to Schröder’s categorical rejection of a war against Iraq, in contrast to the ambiguous position taken by his conservative opponent, the then Minister President of the State of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber, the frontlines hardened further when, on 22 January 2003, the then US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, called France and Germany the “old Europe”.\footnote{Rumsfeld made his controversial remarks at the end of a press conference after he had been asked by a Dutch journalist about his assessment of the relatively small public support for military action in many European countries. In his brief comment, he stated that “you’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe”. He then described the two countries as “a problem” and contrasted their position with that of countries in support of the USA. This caused major debates not only in France and Germany (where it became \textit{Word of the Year}) but was often recontextualised as standing for Europe’s experience and moral integrity. The press conference in question can be found at: \url{http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330} [07.12.2010].} This was symbolically charged as, on the very same day, the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, i.e. the groundbreaking friendship treaty between France and Germany signed in 1963, was being celebrated. As shown in Figure 13, it was
indeed in January 2003 that the public debate took off. This was further fuelled by the then Secretary of State Colin Powell’s justification, in front of the Security Council, of an attack against Iraq, and by peace demonstrations all over the world, both occurring in February 2003. In Berlin alone, some 500,000 people demonstrated, making it the biggest post-war demonstration in Germany. As already noted in the introduction, throughout the debate, the German public strongly opposed the war with around 80% of the population constantly opposing it. All in all, it can be concluded that although the German situation was, politically, extremely complex, the stance of most parts of the public and the political and intellectual elite was clearly opposed to a military intervention.

Concerning topics and stances in the primary corpus (89 articles in total), both leftist newspapers, SZ and FR, voice almost no support for the USA’s Iraq policy. While sharp criticism prevails in these newspapers, both rightist newspapers, FAZ and WELT, give room to supporters as well as critics, which mirrors doubts even in rather conservative audiences. Overall, at least WELT took a pronounced, often polemical, stance against opponents of a military intervention. Although the data have been filtered several times, still a good quarter of the corpus concerns pieces not at all related to the crisis. For example, the corpus includes articles on Berlusconi’s eclecticism or the prospects for the State of Israel joining the European Union (WELT), reports dealing with the anniversary of the publication of faked Hitler-diaries or the reprint of a letter by Golo Mann from 1985 (FAZ), articles on a human rights prize or a popular German TV series (SZ) as well as the murder of the then Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and an emerging worldwide water crisis (FR). Recurring topics relating to the Iraq crisis concern, among others, the role of Eastern European states, in particular Poland, and their support for the USA, the damage done to the United Nations and international law, the role of religion in the USA, Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s fall and parallels to Germany right after May 1945, criticism of analogies between Hitler and Saddam Hussein as well as reflections on the role of images in the public conception of this conflict. Potentially more relevant articles, i.e. articles reflecting on Europe and its past, constitute a little under a quarter of the primary corpus. This group of articles addresses the seemingly emerging rift and differences between Europe and the USA due to historical
experiences, the future of the European Union and the ‘West’, as well as, although perhaps not as dominant as expected, discussions of Rumsfeld’s old-Europe remark. While the downsizing has helped to create a manageable and verifiable corpus, only about 20 articles thus potentially provide the context for rhetorics of judge-penitence. The following section picks out three of them in order to illustrate the potential existence and argumentative form of judge penitence.

6.4 Analysis

6.4.1 Example I: ‘Old People Know Better’

The first newspaper article to be analysed was written by the author Georg Klein and published on 24 January 2003 in the Feuilleton of the leading broadsheet FAZ. Even the FAZ, a centre-conservative newspaper, did not fully reject the war as at least its Feuilleton gave plenty of room to critics of the war as well. The article was published as part of a series of comments by European intellectuals following the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s assessment of Western European states as “old Europe” (cf. Footnote 74, Figure 7 and related remarks on the multimodal character of this article in Section 5.3.1). Although Klein’s article can thus not be understood without considering Rumsfeld’s brief remark – cf. my remarks on dialogism and intertextuality – the former are neither discussed nor evaluated here given that Klein was able to react in a variety of ways. I will argue that he aimed discursively to construct the in-group as morally superior to those having, apparently, not learnt these lessons.

1 Happy days
2 Does the United States need this Europe? Are we, the old people’s home "Old World" [Abendland], a place which this superpower cursed with being young still keeps in the corner of its eye at least when it starts to go on the military offensive [Kriegszug]? Old people become unbearable when they claim to have all that behind them which young people get ready to look forward to. The USA has assembled to
eradicate [auszurotten] the evil of the world root and branch. Every American who carries his heart on his right sleeve feels the unconditional "now" of this mission. It goes against the grain of the soul of every American patriot that of all times in the glory of the bolstering of the campaign one should remember comparable, failed, hapless wars against evil. However, exactly that role falls to Europe's political and cultural representatives now: they play the old, surly know-it-all, the appeaser of the great moral emphasis. The arch evil one? – We have played "Punch, Devil, Policeman" long enough in Europe. The puppets went all around. Germany has held its hand in the mould of the Prince of Darkness quite enough. And the worst thing is: we can even still remember it. The USA will not forgive us for exactly that: we know the game which is to be played. And in the former superpowers of Europe, in our dithering and in our scrupulous thinking, America, once more on the offensive, senses its distant future, a state, in which things just have to go on without ecstatic outbursts. The USA must not forgive us for that! The tunnel vision of the American commanders is starting to flicker irritatedly. Europe, however, is experiencing happy days: in the eye of American paranoia, there where their pupil [the eye] is really black, our truth also sparkles.

I start this analysis by focusing on the fact that very little differentiation is made when addressing either the USA or Europe. In most cases, it is simply "the" USA (lines 3, 6, 14, 17; cf. also the generalising reference to "America(n)" in lines 16, 19). Similarly, "Europe" is hastily homogenised in lines 3, 12 and 18. In addition, homogenisation is achieved through the repeated use of personal pronouns such as "we" (lines 3, 12, 14, 15), "us" (lines 14, 17) and "our" (lines 15, 16, 19). As such, references to the in-group are as inclusive as possible. This homogenisation serves the construction of a rigid us:them division. Such a dichotomy is further accomplished through a spatial contrast such as between "behind them" (Europe) and "look forward" (USA) in line 6. This dichotomy is stabilised further by separating Europe metaphorically ("the old people's home", line 3) from the USA as being "young" (line 4). Indeed, this is one example of a rather coherent closed metaphorical scenario. Based on the above-mentioned source domains of OLD and YOUTH, conceptual elements such as caution, experience and wisdom are mapped onto EUROPE whilst the opposite (being unburdened, rash in actions and inexperienced) is linked to the USA. This juxtaposition remains important
throughout the text, e.g. when Europe’s position is characterised as “unbearable” in the eyes of the USA (line 5) by drawing on the old people’s home metaphor. This furthermore commits a fallacy of improper analogy between individuals and collectives. Another linguistic detail which emphasises this dichotomy via the metaphor scenario is the use of “exactly” in line 10, linked to “old people” (line 11). By constructing such monolithic representations, a dichotomy is established which ignores diverging positions, e.g. the peace movement in the USA or those Europeans who supported the war.

What might call this interpretation concerning a homogenised dichotomy into question are a couple of qualifications made by Klein. Concerning “Europe”, two specifications are made which do not, nevertheless, affect the wider argument as they concern specific aspects but not the overall pattern of argumentation (lines 10-11, 15). The qualification in lines 10-11 (“Europe’s political and cultural representatives”) indeed specifies the meaning of “Europe”, but these ‘representatives’ stand for what is apparently common to the collective, hence the subsequent link between these representatives (“they”, line 11) and us (“we”, line 12). Predicating Europe as a “former superpower” could be viewed as another qualification – as if Klein is only concerned with entities, e.g. Austria or Denmark, which have ceased to be superpowers (line 15). However, it seems more plausible to read this sentence as a predication of the whole of Europe, i.e. again homogenising the continent, which serves to juxtapose Europe (“former superpower”) and the USA (“superpower”, line 2). In addition, this predication implies that many of the problems attributed to superpowers and the USA in particular (see below) are of no relevance for “this Europe” (line 1, my emphasis) – a doubtful truth claim given European (military) involvement from Afghanistan to the Middle East and Africa.

In the case of the USA, Klein’s qualifications are more detailed and potentially significant for what might be inferred by the reader. Firstly, line 18 speaks of “American commanders”, a qualification with possibly less significance (in that sense similar to the first qualification regarding Europe), given previous parts of the texts and that it is immediately followed by a blunt homogenisation in line 19 (“American paranoia”). Secondly and possibly more significant, lines 7-10 seem to restrict Klein’s
evaluation to “[e]very American who carries his heart on his right sleeve” and “every American patriot”. This qualification might indeed direct readers away from hasty generalising and homogenising, i.e. away from establishing a distorting us:them dichotomy as it only concerns a section of Americans which could be criticised. Still, it is questionable if this qualification is indeed strong enough to influence readers’ perceptions, given that, throughout the entire text, homogenisation dominates. After all, both before (lines 3, 6) and after (lines 14, 17, 19) this passage, homogenisation is applied. Furthermore, it could be argued that “every American patriot” entails a qualification of the qualification. After all, US citizens are generally perceived as being very patriotic. Thus, if patriotism is understood as a widespread feature of American society – for good or evil –, Klein’s characterisation might be processed as not being limited to Americans who carry their heart on the right sleeve but Americans in general. As mentioned above, when analysing texts, the analyst should neither assume the meanings of words and phrases are stable nor should s/he claim superiority over the ‘unknowledgeable’ reader unconsciously deceived by the text. Instead, it is the analysts’ task and responsibility to outline how potential meanings are created whilst acknowledging that different readers may understand texts and text passages in different ways and in different contexts, a fact illustrated by this passage.

Having so far looked at rather formal patterns of us:them demarcation, I now switch to the content of this demarcation and how it is made meaningful through a rhetoric of judge-penitence. As discussed in Chapter 3, such rhetoric consists of three elements: firstly, an admission or acknowledgment of one’s own wrongdoings, secondly, the (implicit) claim of having thus learnt the lessons from the past and, thirdly, the construction of an ‘other’ who has (apparently) not learnt such lessons. An acknowledgment of wrongdoing can be found in lines 12-14. Here, the wrong is metaphorically addressed (“The arch evil one”, “Punch, Devil, Policeman” and “Prince of Darkness”),
whereby the inclusive “we” is used. Taking into account that this text addresses a German audience, the particular reference to “Germany” in line 13 is significant as it prevents any exculpatory or self-righteous interpretation of the metaphors used or the sentence “The puppets went all around” (lines 13). Additionally, the reference to a wrong past is intensified twice via the use of “long enough” (line 12) and “quite enough” (lines 13-14). Thus, the in-group is characterised not by a reference to a heroic and innocent past but quite the contrary. The fact that neither the Holocaust nor the World Wars are named does not cast doubt on this part of my interpretation given that, at least in the case of this audience, the reference is clear enough (in particular due to the explicit mentioning of Germany). It is also with regard to this passage that the construction of Europe as being experienced, old and cautious is significant again.

Already, the first reference to the in-group (“this Europe”, line 3) points to a particular Europe which is subsequently specified as “old” and related to the concept of “Abendland”. This is a significant nomination as the term is certainly familiar to readers of the FAZ. It often denotes a culturally essentialist, Greco-Roman, (Judeo-)Christian notion of Europe favoured by conservative Germans since the Romantic period. The concept has played a colourful role in German politics throughout the first half of the 20th century, particularly in demarcating a Germanic Europe from a Bolshevist threat, and experienced a revival in the 1950s under Adenauer’s government (Schildt, 1999). Intellectually, it featured prominently in diagnoses of the times, e.g. Oswald Spengler’s (1963) culturally pessimistic Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West), published in 1918. Consequently, the Abendland concept has been described as one of the main conservative “combat terms” (Faber, 75). The punch (Kasperl) is a traditional puppet character well-known to almost all children in Austria and Germany (similar figures can be found in other countries as well, although their popularity, such as that of Mr. Punch in the United Kingdom, is often much less). While stories including the punch are not canonised, as are the fairy tales by the Brothers Grimm, they include a stable host of characters. Amongst others, there is a friendly policeman who supports the punch in sabotaging the villain’s, e.g. the devil’s, plans. In Klein’s remarks, the devil stands for Germany in the first half of the 20th century.
Although its heyday seems to be over, it still serves as a rallying point, e.g., *SOS Abendland*, a book by the conservative writer Udo Ulfkotte (2008), warns against the threat of Islamisation. It cannot be assumed that readers (or even authors) share all of this background knowledge but the term’s romantic, portentous and slightly nostalgic connotation combines well with the text’s old-young dichotomy.

The second element, the claim that ‘we learnt the lessons’, is raised at various stages of the text. Most explicitly, it can be found in lines 14, 15, 19-20. Line 14 states that “we can even still remember” and therefore “we know the game which is played”, i.e. we know the consequences of *realpolitik*. The fact that we remember our wrongdoings can be read as the product of an alleged collective learning process which has had consequences for ‘the European language-game’, becoming one of a post-heroic “appeaser of the great moral emphasis” (lines 11-12). This is further illustrated by the predication of Europe as “dithering” and “scrupulous thinking” (line 16), proving “our” successful learning process. Here too, the metaphor scenario mentioned above supports the construction and thinking of Europe as old and experienced.

If the in-group is a penitent sinner (and learner) – then how is the out-group represented? In contrast to Europe, the US is introduced as a heroic superpower which still goes on a “military offensive [Kriegszug]” (line 5). Here again, the German original, *Kriegszug*, is ideologically loaded: it is a rather archaic term which carries connotations like ‘savage’ and ‘barbaric’. German readers might be particularly familiar with the term due to popular stories about the American Wild West and the romantic concept of noble savage Native Americans. Images of the latter and their struggles against decadent and greedy American cowboys have been forcefully disseminated in the writings of Karl May since the end of the 19th century. In May’s representation, these Native Americans are heroically supported by German emigrants such as Old Shatterhand. The passage might thus legitimise the author’s construction of the USA in a far more wide-reaching way, i.e. as uncivilised.
This is also accomplished in lines 6-7 where Klein claims that the “USA has assembled to eradicate [ausrotten] the evil of the world root and branch”. Here again, the German original is significant. The fact that the Nazis aimed to ausrotten (“eradicate”) the Jews, using this lexical item when proclaiming their goals, is certainly known to the audience of this paper. And even if readers do not link it to National Socialism, the term, at least, refers to the destruction of vermin (the German word for it, Ungeziefer, is again from NS vocabulary). Consequently, the verb ausrotten is rarely used in German political debates as it carries National Socialist connotations. By using it, Klein appears to link contemporary US politics with the practices of the Nazis – a practice, as the text makes clear, overcome by Europe.

This lack of development on the side of the USA is further emphasised by Klein portraying “America once more [my emphasis] on the offensive”. In contrast, Europe is, by now, “dithering” and “scrupulous[ly] thinking”. Ultimately, he seems to suggest that learning from the past is not even possible for the USA: it goes against the grain of every American patriot’s “soul” (line 9) while they feel the “unconditional” now (line 8). And predicking the USA as “cursed to be young” enables Klein at the very beginning to establish his essentialist dichotomy of old/remembering/learning: young/militaristic/unable to learn. Given that the USA is “cursed”, its condition appears not simply as having not yet learnt the lessons due to a lack of experience (which could indeed be a true validity claim) but as its fate which can hardly be cast off. True, Klein refers to a future state in which the USA too will have abandoned “ecstatic outbursts” (line 17); however, this remains “distant” (line 16). This condition of not having learnt is further exacerbated in lines 14 and 17 where the USA is constructed as not even being willing (“will not”, “must not”) to forgive us the fact that we are able to remember the past. It is carried to an extreme – and here the regressive aspect of judge-penitence becomes most clearly visible – when America is pathologised in the final two sentences. But while line 18 does specify this pathology (“tunnel view”) as one of the “American commanders” (a truth claim which, again, could be considered), the last sentence generalises this pathologisation in a fallacious way when diagnosing an “American paranoia” (argumentum ad hominem). The consequence of this
American illness is the essentialisation and further radicalisation of the difference between Europe and the USA, between the penitent sinner who has learnt, and the half-savage militarist who cannot be trusted. It is in this last sentence that, finally, the title “Happy days” becomes meaningful. It seems to denote the condition of a collective which experiences its truth in facing a mentally ill, other collective: we see ourselves, i.e. our truth, in “their pupil”, i.e. their eye, as the latter is so black (line 19).

We Europeans “can even still remember” our past wrongdoing!

Since, if one acknowledges and remembers past wrongdoing, one learns.

So, the USA is indeed pathological and thus morally inferior to civilised Europe.

Unless the qualifications in line 5-8 are understood as limiting Klein’s dichotomisation to just “[e]very American who carries his heart on his right sleeve” and “every American patriot”.

Figure 17: A schematic representation of Klein (2003) following Toulmin’s model

6.4.2 Example II: ‘Europe as a Beacon of Hope’

The second example to be analysed looks at probably the most famous contribution in this debate — not only in Germany but Europe- and maybe even world-wide: Habermas’ and Jacques Derrida’s (2003) February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe (Figure 18). The essay originally appeared in the FAZ on 31 May 2003 and was presented as a concerted answer by a group of intellectuals to the Letter of the Eight, i.e. the letter in which eight high representatives of European states publicly declared their support for US-led regime change in Iraq.76 February 15 has, however, been criticised by various scholars (Section 3.2.2). In the

76 A copy of this letter can be found at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/article858456.ece [07.12.2010].

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following, the claim is neither that Habermas nor Derrida is a judge-penitent, nor that *February 15* serves as a paradigmatic example of such a rhetoric, as both authors have put forward more subtle claims. As outlined in Chapter 3, judge-penitence should not simply be traced to an author’s intention – something discourse analysis cannot possibly account for. On the contrary, rhetorics of judge-penitence have to be seen as potential distortions of intersubjective relations because such an argumentative form – if picked up by the reader – excludes the other, to various degrees, as not being reasonable, civilised, etc. At least some traces of such an argument – and this makes this example interesting – can even be found in a highly elaborated text such as *February 15*.

Given the length of their article, exceeding 3,000 words, this is the only case in which I limit my analysis to a particular segment of the text. That is, I restrict myself to the climax of their argument, i.e. the relevant two paragraphs at the very end when Europe is constructed in relation to its past. Given the specific research interest of this study and space restrictions, references to other dimensions of difference between the USA and Europe, such as secularisation, scepticism towards market forces combined with a degree of trust in the state to guarantee some form of social justice and an awareness of the paradoxes of capitalist modernisations in general, are not discussed. However, these other dimensions also mirror the problematic discussion of the past as homogenising and creating tendentious dichotomies. While the existence of, e.g., a welfare state and widespread secularisation in Europe can be presented as differences with the USA, i.e. as correct truth claims, their presentation is often hastily generalised and loses sight of contemporary tendencies. After all, the European welfare state has been under severe attack for about 30 years and profound differences regarding the degree of secularisation exist too. For example, the Republic of Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy, Greece and Poland might be as far away from attitudes in Scandinavia as those of the average New Yorker from Arkansas.
(...) Contemporary Europe has been shaped by the experience of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century and by the Holocaust – the persecution and the annihilation of European Jews in which the National Socialist regime made the societies of the conquered countries complicit as well. Self-critical controversies about this past remind us of the moral basis of politics. A heightened sensitivity to injuries to personal and bodily integrity reflects itself, among other ways, in the fact that both the Council of Europe and EU made the ban on capital punishment a condition of membership.

A bellicose past once entangled all European nations in bloody conflicts. They drew a conclusion from experiences of military and spiritual mobilization against one another: the imperative of developing new, supranational forms of cooperation after the Second World War. The successful history of the European Union may have confirmed Europeans in their belief that the domestication of state power demands a mutual limitation of sovereignty, on the global as well as the nation-state level.

Each of the great European nations has experienced the bloom of its imperial power. And, what in our context is more important still, each has had to work through the experience of the loss of its empire. In many cases this experience of decline was associated with the loss of colonial territories. With the growing distance of imperial domination and the history of colonialism, the European powers also got the chance for reflective distance from themselves. Thus [So], they could learn from the perspective of the defeated to perceive themselves in the dubious role of victors who are called to account for the violence of a forcible and uprooting process of modernization. This could have supported haben the rejection of Eurocentrism, and inspire the Kantian hope for a global domestic policy.

Analysing this text, I start with a few words about Salvatore Dali’s España 1938, placed at the centre of the page, and its potential effect (Figure 18). Dali’s painting deals with Spain (depicted by a beautiful woman) and the civil war overshadowing the nation. In a remarkable effort to recontextualise the image, the caption notes: ‘Europe’s impotence started as it tore itself apart in civil wars’. That is, the powerlessness of Europe is traced back to the two World Wars and, subsequently, linked to contemporary Europe and its quarrelling. The painting itself does therefore already raise a problem which demands an answer – possibly given by the article.
Führung: Jürgen Habermas


Habermas betont, dass die EU in der gegenwärtigen Krisensituation starken politischen Willen und konsequenten Entscheidungsfindung bedürfte, um ihre Zukunft zu sichern. Er sieht die EU als eine Institution, die in der Lage ist, den Herausforderungen der globalisierten Welt zu begegnen, und fordert nach einer stärkeren Einbindung der Bürger in die politischen Prozesse. In seiner Ansicht ist die EU jedoch nicht in der Lage, diese Herausforderungen alleine zu meistern, und sie bedarf einer grundlegenden Reform.

Zentraler Aspekt seiner Analyse ist die Notwendigkeit einer "anthropologischen" Reform der EU, die sich auf die grundlegenden Werte und Ziele der Europäischen Union konzentriert. Habermas fordert nach einer "Reform der Europäischen Union" in der Weise, dass die Union die Menschenrechte und demokratischen Prinzipien in den Mittelpunkt ihrer Arbeit stellen sollte. Er schlägt vor, die EU zu einer "reckonstruktiven" Union zu machen, die sich an den Werten der Demokratie, der Menschenrechte und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit orientiert.

Habermas argumentiert, dass die EU in der Lage ist, diese Aufgaben zu erfüllen, wenn sie sich an die grundlegenden Werte der Demokratie und der Menschenrechte hält. Er sieht die EU als eine Institution, die in der Lage ist, die Herausforderungen der globalisierten Welt zu meistern, und erfordert nach einer stärkeren Einbindung der Bürger in die politischen Prozesse.

Die Veröffentlichung von "Unsere Erneuerung" ist ein wichtiger Beitrag zur aktuellen Debatte über die Zukunft der EU, und sie zeigt, dass die EU nicht nur in der Lage ist, die Herausforderungen der globalisierten Welt zu meistern, sondern auch die Möglichkeit bietet, die Menschenrechte und demokratischen Prinzipien in den Mittelpunkt ihrer Arbeit zu stellen.
In a first step, I looked for implicit or explicit admission of wrongdoing or at least self-critical references to one’s own past which are easily detectable from the very beginning. Instead of self-glorifying and self-heroisation, problematic totalitarian experiences and the Holocaust are mentioned (lines 1-3). References to “a bellicose past” and “bloody conflicts” point in the same direction (line 8) and the sheer mention of “imperial power” in line 14 could be seen as another self-critical reference as there are rarely any positive associates with “imperial” left nowadays (although the article overlooks that, probably still significant sections of the European population view this past at best ambiguously: as at least civilising the ‘other’, albeit with a few unfortunate excesses). In a similar vein, Europe’s past is mentioned in terms of its “imperial domination and the history of colonialism” (line 17). Again, neither “domination” nor “colonialism” represent this past positively.

The second topic which has to be found in a text in order for it to be possibly understood in terms of judge-penitence concerns the claim that ‘we learnt the lessons from the past’. Such a claim can be found in *February 15* too. Line 3 mentions “[s]elf-critical controversies” which successfully “remind us of the moral basis of politics” (line 4) and line 15 predicates Europe as having “had to work through the experience of the loss”. Based on these experiences, the essay is able to claim a European learning process, explicitly mentioned in line 8 (“drew a conclusion”) and twice in lines 17-18 (“reflective distance from themselves” and “they could learn”). Ultimately, these European achievements enable what can be perceived as the end point of such a learning-process: “a global domestic policy” (line 21).

What is missing so far is a reference to the ‘other’. And one might indeed be surprised that the USA is not even mentioned once in this final section. However, the USA is mentioned in the preceding part of their essay and, for every reader of *February 15*, it is entirely clear that it is the USA which is separated from those moral achievements associated with Europe. To that extent, *February 15* indeed shows some traces of rhetoric of judge-penitence, although not as explicit as, e.g., in Example I, Section 6.4.2. Most of the above claims are truth claims which cannot be simply rejected as
depicting an untrue state of affairs — and also it could be argued that criticism of the USA was necessary and that, in particular, this final passage of *February 15* is by no means problematic. However, it is the form of these claims which is of interest, as is stressed in Section 4.2.3, and it is thus with regards to each of these three elements that I problematise their linguistic realisation.

Firstly, Habermas and Derrida do not mention differences but describe a *uniform* European learning. Whilst they briefly acknowledge different experiences — different totalitarian regimes, the Holocaust, collaboration, imperialism and colonialism as well as a bellicose past in general — this final section of *February 15* is structurally similar to its predecessors on welfare, religion, etc. It hastily generalises the meaning of these experiences as mirroring a rather Western European or even German development. After all, the widespread collaboration in, e.g., the Baltic States, based on virulent anti-Semitism, has hardly been reflected. Instead, what remains formative there is the experience of Soviet occupation and the national suffering (Leggewie, 2007). Similarly, the contested character of much of the ‘memory work’ done in European countries is not mentioned. Instead, readers are inclined to move directly from a cause, i.e. “experience(s)” (lines 1, 9, 16), to the effect, i.e. “self-critical controversies” (line 3) or “conclusions” (line 8) without considering the different societal causes behind Western apologetic performances. Given the emphasis put on “experience” (already in Example I, Section 6.4.1), differences between Europe and the USA thus run the danger of being ontologised. After all, if the USA lacks these experiences, then how can it ever reach a similar stage (I will return to this issue in more detail in Example V, Section 7.4.2).

Secondly, the truth claim that these “experiences” have led to a “heightened sensitivity to injuries to personal and bodily integrity” (lines 4-5) might be correct but is backed by a somewhat tendentious reference to the “death penalty”. Not only is the death penalty not allowed in the whole of the USA but, also, this punishment might be legalised in some European countries if subjected to a popular
vote. In one of the most recent considerations of the issue, Andrew Hammel (2010) emphasises that it is the political system in the USA which makes centralised, elite-driven abolition, as practised in Europe, much harder. Nevertheless, Habermas and Derrida are right in that even the elite-driven institutionalisation of this ban is welcome but what remains questionable in this passage is the somewhat extreme example of the death penalty as one proof of Europe’s “heightened sensitivity”.

That is to say, referring to the death penalty evokes a representation of the USA as approaching all “injuries to personal and bodily integrity” in a similar way to the death penalty. On the one hand, the hedging in line 5, “among other ways”, concedes that the death penalty is just one aspect of many while, on the other hand, enabling the example of the death penalty to be generalised.

It is not necessarily the broad claim made which is problematic but the hasty generalisations and homogenisations which accompany it. For example, speaking of Europeans as believing in the EU, making the latter a success story, runs into trouble given the EU’s notoriously low public approval rates. Furthermore, even if the idea of a uniform European learning process is correct, contemporary problems, which are clearly related to a supposed moral-practical learning process, i.e. the rise of right-wing populists in nearly every European country, are not mentioned at all. Another crucial aspect of this learning process is, likewise, only briefly addressed in February 15: the role of the USA as having provided a frame during the Cold War which enabled such a claimed learning process at all (Habermas & Derrida, 2003:9). In fact, the USA is not even mentioned. Instead, the authors speak of a West European “mentality” which could develop in a “fortunate historical constellation (...) in the shadow of the Cold War”. This learning process can therefore appear to the reader as being a rather European achievement – disconnected, indeed different, from the USA. Karl W. Deutsch (1963:111) famously noted that power is “the ability to talk instead of listen and to afford not to learn”. In line with this, Europe might have only had the possibility to learn as its “ability to talk” was severely

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limited between 1945 and 1989, given that only the USA had to do the talking, i.e. the military spending. To simply ignore these aspects adds another tendentious note to this essay.

The problematic closure of the argument, instead of a criticism which nevertheless enables further engagement, is also reflected in some grammatical features applied in February 15. For example, the use of the simple past instead of present perfect tense in line 8 ("drew") and 18 ("could learn") implies that we learnt the lessons. However, learning is a rather ongoing process which, by definition, does not end. By claiming its closure, the argument can conveniently be instrumentalised against others. This is particularly obvious in lines 17-18 when, initially, the authors speak of "a chance for reflective distance", a "chance" which is swiftly transformed into a result ("Thus [So] could") and, more cautiously, in line 20 ("could have [könnte (...) haben]"). Here, the German conjunctive formulation of könnte haben does not draw into question the "rejection of Eurocentrism", "Kantian hope" or the learning-process itself, i.e. the fact that "they could learn" (line 18). Rather, it refers to the cause of this process, using modality to mitigate it. It is through such linguistic closures that a claimed learning process (which, again, might be an accurate truth claim) enables some readers to view the USA as morally inferior through and through and block serious consideration about this ‘other’.

We Europeans have faced our dark past. 

So, EUrope “could learn” and is thus morally superior to the USA.

Since, if one acknowledges and remembers past wrongdoing, one can learn.

Figure 19: A schematic representation of Habermas and Derrida (2003) following Toulmin’s simple model

6.4.3 Example III: ‘The Irrationality of the German Peace Movement’
The final example by the writer Hans Christoph Buch was published in the conservative daily *Die Welt* on 9 April 2003. The paper’s *Feuilleton*, as well as editorials and opinion pages, adopted a rather coherent position of rejecting the widespread opposition to the war. This was not necessarily always an explicit (or even implicit) argument in favour of joining the US-led alliance but was mostly driven by criticism of what a journalist on the paper, Alan Posener (2003), had called “national-pacifism”. This pun – referring to National Socialism – gave the impression that not only should the current mass mobilisation against the war efforts be understood in light of the German *Volksgemeinschaft*, but also that the consequences of current public behaviour were similarly gloomy. The text analysed below follows a similar pattern and is thus very different from rhetorics of judge-penitence seen above. Nevertheless, as it acknowledges past German wrongdoing, it might be understood as a particularly conservative adaptation of judge-penitence, thereby going beyond simple support for the war and criticism of its opponents.

The wrong lessons from Europe’s history

“Never again may war start on German soil.” For decades this declaration of intention was seen [gelt] as the only correct consequence from the war started and lost by Nazi Germany. It united the ideological opponents Erich Honecker and Helmut Kohl and made overcoming the separation of Europe, as well as the peaceful re-unification of Germany possible. To that extent history has proved the politics of the détente [*Entspannungspolitik*] to be right in retrospect. What, however, if the war doesn’t start on German but on Yugoslavian soil, if Afghanistan or Iraq slip into the target of the anti-terror alliance? The sentence cited above doesn’t have any operating instructions ready for this case and this has plunged not only Germany’s political class but the entire public into deep perplexity. They believed for themselves that they had drawn the correct lessons from the catastrophes of the last century: Never again war!

Recently, Nobel-prize winning laureate Günter Grass strengthened this still unbroken consensus at a talk in Halle with the words: “I can say that the rejection by the majority of citizens of my country of the
preventive war now started made me a little bit proud of Germany. After we were responsible for two
world wars with criminal consequences, we have learnt from history, which was difficult enough, and
understood the lessons dealt to us.”

Already during the debate on re-armament in the eighties, a minority of intellectuals had raised
objection to the apparent logic [Scheinlogik] of this argumentation. Not “Never again war” but “Never
again dictatorship” or “Never again Auschwitz” is the correct conclusion to draw from the genocides of
the 20th century, which could have been prevented by timely military intervention – be it only by
bombing the train tracks leading to the death camps. Dissidents like Wolf Biermann, Herta Müller and
Günter Kunert, André Glucksmann, Václav Havel and György Konrád have emphasised this again and
again: the same intellectuals who protested against the naive slogan of USA - SA - SS! and against the
demagogical equation of democratically elected US presidents with Nazi leaders. Their pointing out that
a connection exists between military expansion and police-state repression remained unheard and the
fact that the fall of an inhumane dictatorship is somewhat different to the cruel annexation of a foreign
territory is not reflected upon by the German peace movement to the present day.

From where does it take its assurance of salvation to want to explain peace to the rest of the world,
after Germany unleashed two world wars? And how is it so that the peace movement has attained
another quantity and quality than in other European countries where there are likewise actions of
opponents to war?

The answer to this question has to do with the respectively different perception of their own history
which allows the children and grandchildren of the perpetrating generation to stylise themselves as
victims, whilst the objections to the war, where this motif has been removed, sound more sober and
more pragmatic – one only has to think of the protests in the USA. And one more thing comes in
addition: the neglected re-working of one’s own past and by that we mean for once, as an exception
[ausnahmsweise], not the Holocaust, but the bombing of German cities, the injustice of the deportation
and mass poverty of the refugees, which only now is emerging in the public consciousness. The
suppressed is coming back in an aggressive form and perhaps this explains the irrationality of the
German peace movement, which has become the stage of a subordinate war \(\textit{[Nebenkriegsschauplatz]}\) for the re-construction of a battered national identity.

In order that not everything goes wrong, a point of correction to conclude: standing up for peace is to be favoured over its opposite and, also, those who take the military action of the allies against Saddam Hussein’s regime to be politically justified, may not close their eyes to the human price of the war, which has already overtaken its economic costs. There are means which discredit every cause: suicide bombers for example, the bombing of residential areas or the massacre of civilians, because once Pandora’s box has been opened, justice becomes injustice, and the sought after liberation turns into repression.

In contrast to, in particular, Example I, Section 6.4.1, already the heading (line 1) prepares the reader for what is going to follow: speaking of “wrong lessons” presupposes, after all, that there are right ones available as well, i.e. that history, “Europe’s history”, can indeed serve as life’s teacher. Readers might also infer, given the genre, that Buch is going to present these right lessons, thereby providing an alternative answer to the then raging public debate and its allegedly leftist orientation.

However, this is not made immediately clear. Instead, the author starts by establishing an intertextual link to an important aspect of Germany’s post-war self-understanding. That is, “Never again may war start on German soil”, a quote generally associated with the former Chancellor of the FRG, Brandt but also the GDR’s first head of state, Wilhelm Pieck.\(^7\)\(^8\) This declaration is not relativised, pejoratively attributed to the left or followed by the discourse marker ‘but’ in order to mitigate its meaning or introduce a different message. Instead, Buch goes on to link it rightly to the centre-right’s

\(^7\) Among others, this has been recontextualised in speeches by the then President of the FRG Rau in 1995 (http://www.bundestag.de/kulturundgeschichte/geschichte/gastredner/bartoszewski/rede_bartoszewski.htm) and, in course of the early 2000s, by the former leader of the SPD and co-founder of Die Linke (The Left), a party to the left of the Social Democrats, Oskar Lafontaine (e.g. http://die-linke.de/parlei/organe/parbeitage/gruundparbeitage/reden/oskar_lafontaine/) [07.12.2010].
most eminent recent politician Kohl (line 5). The rather unexpected – at least in this newspaper – praise of the politics of détente, usually associated with the left, in particular Brandt, points in a similar direction (lines 6-7). Furthermore, and in contrast to traditionalists in the Christian Union as well as the New Right, the declaration is linked to the unification of Europe as much as to German unification, thus going beyond a simple nationalist narrative. This is even more strongly illustrated by Buch’s repeated acknowledgments of German wrongdoing, stylistically realised in line with those in Example I, Section 6.4.1 and Example II, Section 6.4.2 (lines 4, 11, 38; partly also in lines 16 and 41).

However, this stance is already, in line 3, implicitly challenged as it “was seen [galt]” as the only “correct consequence”. Thus, the choice of simple past, i.e. a completed activity, instead of past perfect tense, i.e. an activity stretching into the present, implies that drawing these conclusions was correct but that this cannot be taken for granted any more. This becomes explicit from line 7 onwards when Buch rhetorically connects, or rather contrasts, this new situation with the pre-unification period through the repeated use of “soil” which connects Germany and World War II to Yugoslavia (lines 3, 8). Interestingly too, this sentence is based on another presupposition, i.e. the existence of “the anti-terror alliance” as being rather coherent and sharing a common set of goals. However, since its beginning, cracks in the Afghanistan operation have been apparent – not to speak of the quarrels over the Iraq War. Thus, this question in line 8 is not as unproblematic and self-evident as his proposition might suggest. The consequences of this new situation in which it is no longer German but foreign soil which causes danger is spelled out in lines 9-10. Not only does the author claim that the declaration “Never again may war start from German soil” is of no immediate use any more, rather it has become a danger in that it plunges the “entire public into deep perplexity”. This involves a hardly justifiable truth claim in that not only parts of the public are perplexed but that this perplexity is not manageable (strategy of intensification). The use of “believed”, in contrast to a more rationalistic lexical choice, in line 11 further emphasises the shortcomings of the conviction of “Never again war” and marks it as being directly responsible for the current “deep perplexity”.

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The following reference to one of the country’s most outspoken intellectuals representing this conviction, Günter Grass, provides Buch with the possibility to link an apparently “still unbroken consensus” with authority (“Nobel-prize winning”, both in line 13). Here, Buch presents his position as somehow oppressed, a doubtful claim, in particular in this context, as few readers of Die Welt will appreciate the activity of the Social Democrat Grass but will read this passage as a confirmation of their beliefs.

After having introduced his claim concerning a still authoritative yet outdated conviction, Buch proceeds with his argument by putting forward a more positive message. He legitimises his argument, in a first step, by referring to authorities, i.e. to well-respected dissidents (lines 19, 23-24) who have criticised the (Germans’) belief in “Never again war” and perspectivises himself as agreeing with this group, thus benefitting from their authority. Instead of “Never again war”, these intellectuals have “emphasised again and again” – predicking them as having strong convictions – that “Never again dictatorship” or “Never again Auschwitz” are the correct conclusions to be drawn from European history. However, why it is that their role as intellectuals provides them with particular legitimacy is not specified (argumentum ad verecundium). Buch’s reference to the authority of these dissidents is furthermore incoherent as he affirmatively introduces their criticism when addressing the rearmament in the 1980s (line 19). This is probably an issue which resonates with the readership of Die Welt, given that the left vehemently opposed this conservative policy. However, this policy was criticised on the ground that it contradicts the “politics of détente” – a policy which Buch himself gave credit to in lines 6-7. Finally, the nomination of this group as “dissidents” is ambiguous: while most of them are indeed Eastern European dissidents, Glucksmann, a proponent of la nouvelle philosophie, is not. Instead, these names are united in being publically perceived as arguing against orthodoxies which connects with Buch’s predication of them as a “minority” (line 20) and reinforces the image of an oppressed opinion. This truth claim is, however, hardly convincing, given the influence and prominence of these intellectuals.
Whilst it is not up to this analysis to decide if “Never again war” is indeed an “apparent logic [Scheinlogik]” or not, the justification Buch puts forward for his validity claim seems rather distorted. After all, the reason he puts forward in order to justify pre-emptive military strikes, i.e. bombarding train tracks leading to Nazi death camps (line 23), is fallacious as, firstly, such destruction could not have happened pre-emptively as death-camps did not exist before 1942 and, secondly, few people objected to this strategy which was in fact applied against Iraq under the heading of containment after the end of the Second Gulf War in 1991. This, of course, does not imply that the Allies should not have bombarded the tracks leading to the camps. However, it is Buch himself who fallaciously alludes to the death camps – probably because of being aware that such a reference has a much greater impact on readers than an accurate analogy.

The position the author puts forward on the back of some intellectuals is further legitimised by pointing to their rejection of USA-Nazism and Bush-Hitler comparisons (lines 25-26). Rejecting such comparisons made by many in the peace movement – which do indeed distort the argument by effectively excluding the ‘other’ from the community of potentially reasonable discussants – is valid. However, the way Buch constructs this position leads to just another tendentious dichotomy. On the one hand, those following the dictum of “Never again war” are linked to making such improper comparisons whilst, on the other hand, there are those exemplified by the group of dissidents who rightly reject such “naive slogans”. But, as the former are also identified with those opposing the Iraq War in lines 30-31 (“by the German peace movement to the present day”), opposition to the Iraq War is delegitimised. Like those he criticises, Buch thus commits a fallacy of improper comparison. This argument furthermore entails a hasty generalisation, as if all opponents of the Iraq War and proponents of “Never again war” have compared the USA or one of its representatives with National Socialism.

79 Google finds 1,420,000 images when searching for ‘Bush Hitler’ [07.12.2010].
The final sentence of this paragraph (lines 27-31) puts forward two detailed criticisms levelled against the opponents of war and do indeed carry some truth. However, even here, a fallacious move can be identified to the extent that these two points are not necessarily relevant to the peace movement when rejecting the war (straw-man fallacy). For example, opponents of the war might have supported the efforts to disarm Iraq and remove the “inhumane dictatorship” (line 29) of Saddam Hussein. However, the reason for their opposition might be due to the way the war was actually pushed through, thus lacking legal justification and public support: a position most eloquently put forward by Habermas and Derrida (2003). As such, opponents of the Iraq War do not even necessarily dispute the propositions put forward in lines 28-30, as implied by Buch. Furthermore, it is clearly a fallacy of hasty generalisation to assume that “the” German peace movement (line 30) adopted a certain position. Instead, the claim predicates the whole movement as unreasonable due to its lack of reflection (line 30), thereby taking up an argumentative strand initiated in line 11.

However, Buch does not stop here but develops this claim of a lack of rationality into his ultimate argument. He does so by presenting the entire peace movement as if it claimed to provide an assurance of salvation (line 33) – a religious-messianic concept reinforcing the movement’s image as unreasonable – a common conservative criticism of moralising tendencies in the left. Crucially, this criticism is not justified by references to the honour of the nation but, on the contrary, to an acknowledgment of the nation’s wrongdoing (line 34). It is exactly in sentences like this one that the specifics of this kind of rhetoric of judge-penitence shine through. In order to back his argument concerning the movement’s “assurance of salvation”, he adds the question of why the German peace movement “has attained another quantity and quality” (line 35), different to other European countries. Again, the underlying validity claim that the German peace movement is somehow extreme could be true. However, neither the quantity of those actually demonstrating nor the quality of their demonstrations actually suggests any particular specificity on the German side. Although Buch’s argument, that perceptions of the past imprint on the movement, might factually be true (line 38), he does not provide any proof for a German Sonderweg concerning the demonstrations. Again,
the claim thus distorts the argument instead of providing an opportunity for mutual understanding. (The brief reference to the US-movement in line 41 is of little help as the situation after 9/11 is hardly comparable to the German situation. Much more relevant comparisons would have included France or the United Kingdom which, however, did not show fundamentally different patterns.)

Ultimately, this claim functions as a prelude for a much more serious one: according to Buch, the self-presentation of the German peace movement serves the purpose of stylising itself as a victim. That is to say, Buch paints the peace movement as ultimately perverted – whilst he makes these claims from a moral position which has no problem referring to German perpetrators (line 39). Identifying the wrongdoing immunises him against criticism of proposing a traditional conservative agenda whilst going hand in hand with his criticism of the left’s attitude to the past. Suddenly, those who protest against war are pathologically imagining themselves as victims – an interpretation which is not disputable as Buch simply makes the connection (“has to do”, line 38).

It is on this basis that Buch presents his final argument in an inconspicuous way: “one more thing comes in addition” (lines 41-42). What is responsible for the peace movement’s “irrationality” (line 45) is its repression of those Germans who were truly victims: the bombarded and the refugees (lines 43-44). It is also noticeable that Buch uses the often pejorative “an exception [ausnahmsweise]” which can be read as a rejection of ‘too much’ concern with the Holocaust. Here, the fallacious analogy between individual psychology and collective behaviour, as discussed in Section 2.4, is obvious when Buch speaks of the “suppressed” (line 45) via which he constructs the movement as being sick, i.e. excluded from the reasonable. By again predicating the movement as irrational, this time due to its inability to deal with the “aggressive” consequences of its own failure to come to terms with the past, Buch naturalises the movement’s apparent shortcomings, leaving the reader with an image of the movement as a patient in need of treatment. As such, the pathologisation of the ‘other’ is similar to Example I, Section 6.4.1 but, this time, directed not against the USA but against a homogenised German peace movement.
He does so within a frame of — and this proves my hypothesis — acknowledging German past wrongdoings, i.e. not in terms of traditional revisionist arguments. However, claiming that it is “only now” (line 44) that such recognition is possible, that political correctness had prevented the acknowledgment of German suffering, is another truth claim which is factually wrong but helps in constructing the other as a self-righteous pseudo-victim. As outlined in Section 6.2.1, German suffering was, immediately after 1945, a central theme for the public and crucial for the popular German self-representation of being a collective of victims. The paragraph closes with making explicit what the above has all been about: German national identity is “battered” and needs “reconstruction” (line 47). As such, it is the image of an undamaged national identity which drives the author.

The final paragraph (lines 49-55) fits strangely into the overall argument by serving as a disclaimer situated at the very end. The style is different, lacking the pathos, intensity and intellectual weight of his previous argument. Instead, it is a transparently formulated plea not to understand the above in terms of a simple pro-war statement but as a warning against reckless conduct of the war. True, the reference to “bombarding residential areas” could be understood as being directed against the Allied aerial warfare in 1944-45, i.e. the targeting of civilians, in order to represent the initially legitimate war against Nazism as, according to this interpretation, criminal too. However, whilst such a revisionistic association is possible, there is no linguistic indication which suggests it.

The opponents of the war have learned the wrong lessons from the past! Since if one reflects only on parts of the past, one cannot have learned the correct lesson. So, I oppose a human price of the war rising too high but the opponents of the war are nevertheless psychologically ill and morally inferior.

Figure 20: A schematic representation of Buch (2003) following Toulmin’s simple model
6.5 Summary

Although one cannot be sure if all readers interpreted these articles in the way I suggest, each of these three examples has the potential to be understood in terms of rhetorics of judge-penitence (Figure 17, Figure 19 and Figure 20). At the same time, they illustrate to what extent its empirical realisation differs from the ideal-type rhetoric of judge-penitence and, just as important, show both similarities as well as differences between various empirical forms of judge-penitence.

Firstly, and concerning similarities, it is striking to see that admissions or at least acknowledgments of past wrongdoings are a common practice, made without much hedging (keeping the genre in mind, i.e. that linguistic realisations of such admissions are less dramatic than in, e.g., commemorative rituals). This is in accordance with the historical context outlined in Section 6.2 and the hypothesis regarding the significance of *internalisation* as a collective memory frame in Germany. To that extent, the German case has proved useful for studying rhetorics of judge-penitence, even if I can only provide tentative indications, given the limited size of the corpus. Whilst these indications include the claim that judge-penitence exists, that does not imply that such a pattern is in any way dominant. Additionally, Examples I and II share a strong European focus in their rhetoric of judge-penitence. This can partly be explained by the need for German intellectuals to gain legitimacy by building bridges to non-German actors through situating themselves within a wider European frame. A further reason might be Rumsfeld’s attack on old Europe which was, thankfully, taken up by actors within Germany and beyond. However, the fact that this potential was indeed realised instead of reacting differently might ultimately again be found in the historical context and the socialisation of all these intellectuals in the FRG, where identification with Europe instead of Germany was not uncommon.

Secondly, and concerning differences, it is noticeable that whilst Klein as well as Habermas and Derrida might be understood as applying a rhetoric of judge-penitence in opposition to the USA, the
argument is nevertheless different. Klein’s text forcefully constructs a European ‘we’ through sometimes brutal predication of the USA. In contrast, Habermas and Derrida do not even name the ‘other’, the USA, but ostensibly speak about Europe. It is, however, remarkable that both texts, written by respected intellectuals, put forward a semi-orientalist position in their homogenising and juxtaposing of the other (bad) and the self (good) in such binary ways. In contrast, Buch’s text comes closest to avoiding essentialist characterisations but is special in directing a rhetoric of judge-penitence against opponents of the war. Nevertheless, we find similar linguistic means applied, e.g. fallaciously putting validity claims through hasty generalisations and homogenisations. In his criticism of the peace movement, Buch not only echoes more conservative positions but also pathologises this movement via making doubtful recourse to what Alexander calls “lay trauma theory”. However, it is far too easy to reject Buch’s position by reference to its conservatism, as many opponents of the war might be inclined to do. After all, he too stresses Germany’s past wrongdoings. Thus, he goes beyond renewed criticism of the policy of appeasement during the 1930s which was indeed used by some in order to legitimise the war but can be criticised for its unhistoricity (for more details, cf. Example VI, Section 7.4.3). Buch’s article is specific in yet another way as he seems less concerned with the actual war but with Germany’s moral-cultural values which he aims to alter through a struggle over the representation of its past.

Keeping in mind that these examples are taken from a context of internalisation, I now turn to Austria as an apparent example of externalisation, in order to see how this might affect rhetorics of judge-penitence.
7. CASE STUDY II: AUSTRIA

7.1 Overview of the Chapter

Having analysed the German case as a paradigmatic example of internalisation and the unfolding of rhetorics of judge-penitence in such an environment, I now turn to externalisation represented by the discourse on national identity in Austria. That is to say, instead of constructing National Socialism as its negative point of reference, Austrian public discourse shifted the blame and responsibility to an external 'other', Germany. Thus, the chapter outlines the dynamics of memories behind this move in Section 7.2. I then briefly introduce the particularities of the Austrian debate on the Iraq War and give a short overview of the content of the Austrian primary corpus in Section 7.3. In Section 7.4, I analyse three representative newspaper articles, the question being whether, here too, a relation exists between the wider historical context and performances concerning the past. Are there admissions or acknowledgments of wrongdoing when describing the in-group? Are there claims made concerning a learning process made by the in-group? To what extent is this used to exclude an 'other'? Are references to the past (if any) linguistically realised in a way that resembles the rhetorics of judge-penitence? Finally, key insights are summarised in Section 7.5.

7.2 The Historical Context

7.2.1 The Resistible Rise of the Victim Thesis

Although Austria, like Germany, was occupied by Allied forces after 1945 (until 1955), the Austrian situation was different. An elected government had already been established in 1945 which became one of the reasons why Austria experienced legal and bureaucratic de-nazification but no re-education comparable to that of Germany (Heinemann, 1981). As in Germany, there was a brief period of anti-Nazi sentiment which manifested itself in the removal of members of the Nazi party
from jobs in both the private and public sectors, the stripping of their voting rights and punitive
taxes. However, these attempts ceased at the beginning of the Cold War and due to the fact that
public discourse in Austria on the country’s Nazi past quickly seized upon a useable element in the
Austrian section of the *Moscow Declaration*.

Keyserlingk (1997:10) has argued that this declaration, made by the three Allied foreign secretaries in
November 1943 concerning (military) cooperation then and after the war, must be understood as a
strategic-political act in order to encourage resistance in Austria. The *Moscow Declaration* (1944:7)
did this by stating that the annexation (*Anschluss*) “imposed upon Austria” in 1938 was “null and
void” but that Austria “has a responsibility (...) and that in the final settlement account will inevitably
be taken of her own contribution to her liberation”. Given that the *Anschluss* was not simply
enforced by domestic and foreign National Socialists but, firstly, had widespread popular support
with the Wehrmacht and Hitler being cheered by the masses and welcomed with flowers (Haas,
2002:45), secondly, was followed by an immediate outbreak of anti-Semitic pogroms and ‘wild
aryanisation’ which caused economic chaos, leading to concerns even by National Socialist officials
(Botz, 2001:32-37), and, thirdly, caused only modest resistance even after the war had started
(Neugebauer, 2002), this passage was hardly unreasonable. However, it has largely been ignored
ever since, while the official discourse quickly made use of another part of the *Moscow Declaration*
(1944:7) in which Austria is described as “the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression”.

The so-called victim thesis could thus become the prime vehicle in legitimising a positive Austrian
self-representation by externalising wrongdoing and has framed discussions about Austrians’
involvement in NS crimes. Viewing Austria as Hitler’s first victim had at least three benefits. Firstly,
similar to the German discourse on PoWs, it facilitated a public discourse portraying the nation as a
victim so that negative self-representation through acknowledgment of wrongdoing was avoided.
Imagining Austria as a victim taken over by Germany combined well with existing popular anti-
Prussian sentiments and images of Austrians as the better Germans. For example, Leopold Figl (1945,
my translation), Austria’s first prime minister after 1945, described his country as having been an outpost of “the European spirit” for “a little more than 1000 years” against (Prussian) barbarians. Secondly, being recognised as a victim provided an argument against paying reparations to victims of National Socialism (Knight, 2000). Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, viewing Austrians as victims unified a nation which was deeply divided due to Austrofascist rule by the Christian Social Party/Patriotic Front (1933-1938). The story goes that the social democratic party (SPÖ) and the (former) Austrofascists who established the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) after 1945 found themselves side by side in German concentration camps (the myth of the so-called Lagerstrasse/camp street). Hence, it was through the Nazi dictatorship, which was directed both against opposition from Communists and Social Democrats on the left and Austro-nationalist Catholic resistance on the right, i.e. often activists from the previous Austrofascist regime, that the two political camps found themselves side by side. This inspired a consensual model of politics which has characterised Austria’s political scene for most of the second half of the 20th century. The crucial point here is that it was only under the banner of a suffering victim that all members of society – regardless of their pre-1938 (and even pre-1945) positions – could be integrated. The provisional government under the leadership of Karl Renner (SPÖ) had already started to do so in August 1945.

In 1946, the government published a so-called Rot-Weiß-Rot Buch which brought together documents ‘proving’ the nation’s resistance to Nazi domination (Wodak et al., 1994:26-28). This implementation from above was not artificial but mirrored broader sentiments, strikingly expressed by Rosa Jochmann (quoted in Bailer, 1997:106), a Social Democrat and prisoner in the concentration camp at Ravensbrück. She stated in 1949 that

80 The provisional government consisted of all four major parties: the SPÖ, the ÖVP, the Federation of Independents which later became the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), and the Austrian Communist Party. Ironically, the claim for unity through silence ultimately silenced those who indeed resisted, mainly Communist activists.
[we] were all victims of fascism. Victim was the soldier, who experienced the war at the front in its most terrible form. Victim was the population that was waiting in the hinterland full of horror for the call of the cuckoo in order to flee to their shelters and who, with longing, wished for the day which would take this fright from them. Victims were those who had to leave their native country to carry the mostly sad loss of the emigrant. Finally, we were victims, who in prisons, penitentiaries and concentration camps were defenceless prey of the SS.

The victim thesis soon became the dominant element of Austrian self-representation and, consequently, a survey in 1947 found that 71% of the population saw no Austrian co-responsibility for what had happened (Albrich, 1997:58). Whilst this left room for approving the resistance that occurred, as in the Rot-Weiß-Rot Buch, this stopped at the end of the 1940s as veteran associations and political parties integrated returnees and started to influence the policy of the past (Vergangenheitspolitik). In consequence, monuments remembering ‘heroic’ soldiers fighting in the Wehrmacht flourished all over the country (Uhl, 2006:50). In a similar way, the legal system developed (for the following, cf. Garscha, 2002). Whilst people’s courts, based on the Kriegsverbrechergesetz of 1945, were established soon after the end of the war and operated successfully, particularly in 1946 and 1947, they were abolished with the ratification of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. In 1957, the Kriegsverbrechergesetz itself was abolished and the number of prosecutions dropped dramatically. Trials often had controversial outcomes but did not cause public scandals as they did in Germany. Perhaps most noticeable are the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials of Fritz Ertl and Walter Dejaco (responsible for the construction of gas chambers in Auschwitz) and Otto Graf and Franz Wunsch (responsible for the killing and selection of prisoners) in 1972. Both trials ended with verdicts of not guilty. Between 1975 and 2000, not a single case was brought to jury trials. Similarly, a law concerning former National Socialists (Nationalsozialistengesetz, 1947), which categorised party membership de facto, paved the way to a rapid de-denazification for most of them: illegal National Socialists (those who had been members even before the Anschluss in 1938, approximately 100,000), incriminated National Socialists (approximately 40,000), and fewer
incriminated National Socialists (approximately 500,000). The last group had already been granted a full amnesty in 1948 while a general amnesty followed in 1957. Besides the political and legal dimension, public responses showed a similar pattern. Helga Embacher (1995) collected evidence of how Jewish displaced persons and returnees were threatened in various parts of Austria. For example, in 1947, protestors demonstrated violently against the presence of Jewish displaced persons in their village, there were (violent) protests against the theatre play *Anne Frank* as well as cinema screenings showing returning Jews, there was a wave of grave desecrations in 1966 which caused very little public concern in comparison to similar incidents in Germany in 1959, and there were massive anti-Semitic outbursts during trials in 1966.

According to Heidemarie Uhl (2006:61), it was not until the 1960s that some changes, although within the frame of the victim thesis, took place and resistance to National Socialism became publicly acknowledged. However, the victim thesis itself was hardly challenged and scandals were rare. Two notable exceptions were the play *Der Herr Karl* in 1961 (a conformist Austrian reflecting on the years preceding 1945) and the case of Taras Borodajkewycz in 1962/1965 (a former member of the Nazi-party who became professor at the College of World Trade in Vienna and infamous for his anti-Semitic and National Socialist remarks during his lectures). The latter is of particular interest as protesting students could have triggered a dynamic similar to that in Germany. However, although the generally rather restrained Austrian student movement of the 1960s and 1970s bolstered a liberalisation of societal values and changed the university system, it did not induce wider political change (Schwendtner, 1995:166). One of the main reasons for this might be found in the approach taken by the SPÖ towards the FPÖ, the latter being the main gathering place for (former) National Socialists. As the SPÖ needed their support to replace the conservative ÖVP, the party chairman of the SPÖ, Bruno Kreisky, appointed four ministers who had been members of the Nazi party in his minority government in 1970. Thus, while Brandt’s kneeling in the very same year demonstrated a change in attitudes at the highest level, a very different example was set in Austria. This was publicly criticised by the Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal who, five years later, revealed that the party
chairman of the FPÖ Friedrich Peter had been part of an SS unit involved in the extermination of Jews (the so called Peter-Kreisky-Wiesenthal affair, cf. Rathkolb, 2005:383-388; Wodak et al., 1990:282-322). It was not until 1986, when Jörg Haider took control of the FPÖ and moved the party into a more nationalist and populist direction by disempowering its slightly more liberal leadership, that the SPÖ turned away from the former and ended the coalition with the FPÖ which had been in place since 1983.

At the end of the 1970s, the transnational dimension of collective memory started to affect the Austrian public. Uhl (2003) stresses such influence in the realm of popular culture by investigating the role of the highly influential American TV mini-series *Holocaust*, and much the same can be said of later examples such as *Schindler’s List*. However, comparable national products such as the tremendously popular *Der Bockerer I* (1981) subtly countered these influences. Depicting the life of an ordinary Austrian from 1938 to 1945, the movie does not deny Austrian anti-Semitism or National Socialist crimes but does manage to reproduce the victim frame and is, in contrast to *Holocaust*, still broadcast regularly (Forchtner & Kølvraa, under review). Nevertheless, in reviewing public reaction to *Holocaust*, Uhl (2003:173f) identifies a new sensitivity which, among other things, prepared the ground for the Waldheim Affair, triggering the end of the hegemonial status of the victim thesis.

7.2.2 Waldheim and the Renegotiation of the Victim Thesis: the Co-responsibility Thesis

In 1985, Kurt Waldheim, a successful international diplomat and former Secretary General of the United Nations, ran for president on an ÖVP ticket. During the campaign, he was accused of having given deficient information in his autobiography and CV concerning his involvement in war crimes during his deployment as a Wehrmacht officer in 1942 and 1943 in Greece. He was ultimately cleared of accusations of direct involvement in such crimes but his behaviour, crystallised in saying that he joined the Wehrmacht like “hundreds of thousands of Austrians who fulfilled their duty” (quoted in Gehler, 1997:358, my translation), caused a historical controversy. The scandal erupted in the same year as the German Historikerstreit – and its effects could have outstripped the latter. After all, it
occurred during an election campaign and affected large sectors of the general public, i.e. former Wehrmacht soldiers and their relatives. It is certainly true that the affair manifested a point behind which elites cannot easily fall as one of the two major parties, the SPÖ, by attacking Waldheim, revoked the consensual frame of the victim thesis. However, it cannot be ignored that the debate itself also enabled an outburst of blatantly anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (Wodak et al., 1990:59-120) and furthered the rise of the FPÖ as an openly right-wing populist party.

For some of the political elite, the Waldheim controversy did indeed lead to a replacement of the victim thesis with a so-called “co-responsibility” thesis (Uhl, 2006:63). Most crucial in this development were statements made in the Austrian parliament in 1991 and in Jerusalem in 1993, both by the then Austrian Prime Minister Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ), and a speech by President Thomas Klestil (ÖVP) in 1994 in Jerusalem. However, it has to be noted that although Vranitzky’s (1991:3282) groundbreaking remarks explicitly mentioned “co-responsibility”, he in no way rejected all aspects of the victim thesis. Meanwhile recent surveys (Guggenberg in Rathkolb & Ogris, 2010:50-60) have found that the co-responsibility thesis is accepted by a majority of the population but 36.5% still believe that “Austria was the first victim of National Socialism”. Similarly, David Art (2006), on the basis of interviews, argued in 2004 that still not even the political elite uniformly supports the co-responsibility thesis. Particularly ÖVP and FPÖ parliamentarians remain solidly within a victim thesis framework. This was visible in the 1980s and 1990s during public debates over the Memorial against War and Fascism in Vienna (Wodak et al., 1994:105-114) and the Wehrmacht exhibition (Heer et al., 2008). The latter case is particularly telling: while the CDU, after intense internal debates, supported the exhibition, the ÖVP publicly opposed it but voted in favour of providing financial assistance (Uhl, 2008:158f). As in Germany, the exhibition caused heated public debates and could have altered the overall Austrian narrative, but while it certainly questioned parts of the Wehrmacht image, the ambivalent political stance of the political elite and fierce criticism by many newspapers prevented a lasting redefinition of Austria’s relation to its past.
In 2000, the ÖVP entered into a coalition government with Haider’s FPÖ, causing (international) headlines and sanctions and forcing the new government to put forward a series of official policies aiming to solve the previously largely neglected area of restitution. Based on a commission of historians and international negotiations, a Fund for Reconciliation, Peace, and Cooperation and a General Settlement Fund for Victims of National Socialism were created. Further money was provided to a National Fund which had already been created in 1995 under the previous government. Together with private businesses, Austria has paid between €1.5-1.7bn. since 1945 in reparations and welfare payments (Bailer-Galanda, 2002; Bischof & Maier, 2010:213-217). These steps towards material recognition of past wrongs were, however, countered by symbolic memory politics of the government. Most significantly, then Prime Minister Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP), although not rejecting co-responsibility, described Austria both in 2000 (Die Presse, 2000; Schüssel, 2000) and 2005 (Schüssel, 2005), as the first victim of Nazi Germany. In line with this, events organised by the government, in the course of the so called Year of Thoughts in 2005, emphasised the past in a way that fell behind many achievements made in the early 1990s (de Cillia & Wodak, 2009; Bischof & Maier, 2010:217-227).

Whilst there has certainly been change in the official discourse about the country’s past, those arguing for a self-critical approach remain in a precarious position. The difference to, e.g., Germany lies not so much in a lack of events and statements which could have caused debates, but in the failure to scandalise them successfully, i.e. to redraw the moral boundary of the community. It is therefore of little surprise that hardly ever have politicians had to resign over openly racist or revisionist comments. One of the few exceptions is Friedrich Peter who, in 1983, did not take the office of third president of the national parliament as he did not want to jeopardize a coalition between the SPÖ and FPÖ. Much more representative was Haider who, although forced to resign as governor of Carinthia after praising the Third Reich’s “proper employment policy” in 1991 (quoted in Czernin, 2000:31, my translation), established his party as the second largest in the general elections in 2000. In 2008, Martin Graf (FPÖ), a member of a far-right student fraternity, was elected as the
national parliament’s third president. And although he has been criticised for inviting people with proven connections to neo-Nazi organisations into the parliament and edited a book in which he questions the country’s supposed “antifascist basic consensus” (quoted in Lackner, 2010a:31, my translation), Graf is still in place. Also in 2008, the public learnt of a variety of connections between the current leader of the FPÖ, Heinz-Christian Strache, and (neo-)Nazis (Horaczek & Reiter, 2009). Again, this has had no consequences and has not prevented Strache leading the Viennese FPÖ to second place in the local elections in 2010. Earlier that year, the FPÖ nominated Barbara Rosenkranz, who has a history of highly ambivalent comments on Austria’s past and the contemporary debates on Nazism (Lackner, 2010b), as their presidential candidate. For once, these were successfully scandalised and Rosenkranz was forced to distance herself from National Socialism in a solemn statement. She ultimately achieved 15.24% of the vote which was viewed as a disappointing result for the FPÖ. However, the sheer fact of her nomination and the inability by the ÖVP to recommend the Social Democratic candidate Heinz Fischer (mirroring the French Socialists who recommended voting for Chirac in order to reject the then leader of the Front National Jean-Marie LePen in 2002) suggests that, in Austria, still “anything goes” (Wodak & Pelinka, 2002:xxi).

In sum, while the Austrian scene has certainly changed since the Waldheim Affair, the country is still far from internalising its involvement in National Socialism. In other words: while the co-responsibility thesis is established, its exact reading is still contested and often not even taken for granted by the elite. Whilst shortcomings exist in Germany too, the official public stance is nevertheless unambiguous in marking the National Socialist past as the country’s ‘other’. Whilst most Austrians have no problem in rejecting National Socialism, they do not necessarily view its wrongdoings as their wrongs.
7.3 The Situational Context of the Debate

With regards to the particular context of the Iraq War, the Austrian case diverges substantially from those of Germany and Denmark. While Germany was one of the key European states opposing the war (Section 6.3) and Denmark – although small and not central to the US operation from a military point of view – supported it (Section 8.3), the Austrian role can be seen as rather insignificant. Since 1955, the country has been officially neutral and has no military forces worth mentioning.

Concerning the political elite as well as the public, the country took an overwhelmingly critical stance towards the war (Table 1) and Prime Minister Schüssel did not sign the above-mentioned Letter of the Eight. With the beginning of the war, Austria activated the neutrality clause in its constitution. Neutrality, which is still regarded as a guarantor of peace and prosperity, thus made headlines again and forced the ÖVP-FPÖ government to abandon any potential plans to join NATO (Kovács and Wodak, 2003). As a consequence, Austria closed its airspace to American airplanes being relocated from Germany to Italy and further south (during the second Gulf War, this was permitted given the UN backing). Although some criticism by US officials was reported in Austrian newspapers, the issue did not cause a major diplomatic crisis. Another particularly Austrian element concerned Haider’s visit to Saddam Hussein in February 2002 and apparently anti-American comments made by some public figures, e.g. the already mentioned book by Pilz (cf. Winder, 2003). In hindsight, the public debate over the war against Iraq was, nevertheless, rather similar to that in Germany, e.g. concern with the future of Europe, the issue of oil and the stance of the Pope. Whether Austria’s past had any specific influence on the then raging public debate and the extent to which this past has been addressed at all is the subject of the next section.

Concerning topics and stances in the snapshot of the Austrian discourse on the Iraq crisis as represented in the primary corpus (19 articles in total), it can be noted that at least four of them are unrelated, dealing with the 80th birthday of the US-American writer Norman Mailer or restitution
laws in Austria. The small size of this corpus is mainly due to a striking lack of articles to be found in two of the four newspapers, KUR and SN. Articles which do not construct Europe in relation to its past but, nevertheless, discuss the Iraq crisis deal with the role of international law and the damage done to it due to the USA’s policy. Given the size of the corpus, there are no other topics which are predominately put forward in more than one article such as, e.g., the role of the public sphere or a film review concerning the attacks on 9/11. There are, however, a couple of articles which elaborate on the apparent rift between Europe and the USA whilst also considering memories of the past (about seven, i.e. half of the relevant articles). These are articles in which rhetorics of judge-penitence might be applied. Four of them, all published in the rather leftist Der Standard, take an unequivocal position against the war and narrate cultural differences between Europe and the USA. In contrast, two of them, both published in the rather rightist Die Presse, criticise the peace movement. In the following, I look at three of these articles in order to see if they contain rhetorics of judge-penitence, i.e. argumentation moves similar to those seen in the German discussion.

7.4 Analysis

7.4.1 Example IV: ‘European Enlightenment versus US-American Stone Age’

The first example taken from the small Austrian corpus (19 articles in total) was read out at an anti-war demonstration on 22 March 2003 and reprinted on the same day in Der Standard’s comments section. Its author, Robert Menasse, is a well-known writer who is also known for his public interventions against xenophobia and public ignorance of the country’s National Socialist past. Accordingly, Menasse himself can hardly be seen as a typical Austrian, and thus his contribution might be similar to those in the German case. In fact, his article is one of only two which might be considered to include a rhetoric of judge-penitence. Nevertheless, even in the case of Menasse, there are substantial differences. Although making the past an important element of his argument, Menasse’s article does not resemble a clear-cut rhetoric of judge-penitence as it remains tied to the dominant Austrian discourse on the past. The article is accompanied by an image (Figure 21).
Bush’s Law

“This war isn’t self-defence – but it will produce defenceless selves”: the advance release of a speech by Robert Menasse on the occasion of the star-shaped demonstration in Vienna starting at different points and converging, ‘Stoppt den Krieg [Stop the war]’.

‘Violence is primitive – even if it is conducted with ‘intelligent weapons’ - whereby the issue arises of whether weapons could be described as ‘intelligent’ if they could say: ‘This war is stupid!’ instead of complacently obeying every idiot.

Violence, if it doesn’t stem from self-defence, is always a symptom of backwardness: it ends every contemporary conflict in next to no time with the only method of conflict resolution that was available in the Stone Age. From the question of who is right in a conflict an enlightened legal system developed right through to the idea (and still incomplete practice) of public international law. From the question of who has the bigger club the world dominance of the USA developed.

Bush’s Law of ‘only still conduct wars against those countries which can also pay for the war afterwards’ is admittedly the first innovation in the realm of war theory since Clausewitz, but: as avant-garde as this thought is, it is but merely a primitive reflex to the structural backwardness of the USA in contrast to Europe.

European politics is already post-national whilst the USA still only conceives politics as one of national interest. European politics has rightfully gone the route of peace politics after the experiences of the first half of the 20th century, whilst the USA continues to opt for military conquest and the securing of its markets and resources despite its experiences in the second half of the 20th century.

The USA might be forerunners in technological development and thus quantitatively ahead of Europe in the production of social wealth, but on the question of the distribution of social wealth the States are beaten stragglers in comparison to Europe.
The difference between the US market economy and the European social market economy is about as large as that between cuneiform script and the offerings at the Frankfurt book fair. The ideas of the Enlightenment might have been taken further towards completion than back then on the ‘old continent’, but in the meantime the USA has even become a straggler behind its own ideas: from the influence of religion on politics through to the death penalty, even to its sympathisers the USA today seems like a developing country of the Enlightenment.

The bourgeois revolution was done in France and thought out in Germany. To want to play these two countries out today against the complacency of the political elites, which only a few years ago still ruled totalitarian states, shows what the alienation between Europe and the USA fundamentally consists of today – and why it will continue to grow: ‘old’ Europe defines democracy and the legal situation today as a system of responsibility and as a relationship of responsible partners. Here, finally, the leading ideas of the Enlightenment ("Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity") meet in practice with the consequences of the contribution that the USA made to the liberation of Europe from fascism. The USA, however, today defines democracy and the legal situation as a relationship between leading power and vassals. There cannot exist any agreement here, except in ideologically transparent soap-box speeches or helpless diplomatic cocktail receptions.

Though it also shows that the history of the American liberation from European fascism has always only ever been a half-truth: the USA left Franco and Salazar fascism in Europe just as intact as they protected high-ranking Nazis, as far as they were useful in the Cold War.

In principle Europe and the USA are separated today by their common history: Europe, as far as we learn and want to learn to identify ourselves with the continent, has to make a whole [ganze] out of the half-truth [hat aus der halben Wahrheit versucht, eine ganze zu machen]. The USA, however, has tried to build an entire [ganze] legitimation for its hegemonial attempts from the half-truth.
It’s only for that reason that the democratically inexperienced, Eastern-European countries are seen by
the USA as ‘new Europe’: because they offer themselves as the new vassals. For precisely this reason the
Iraq War will become a new Vietnam for the USA – not necessarily in a military sense, undoubtedly
though with regard to the reaction of the world’s public at least, above all the ‘old’ European public.

There is no argument which could reason why an Arabic country should be ‘democratised’ now with all
available violence [mit aller Gewalt], if there is no Arabic country which is democratic. In the USA
sheriffs are elected. But this is exactly what the USA doesn’t permit to the world that it wants to
democratise: Self-appointed they legitimise themselves as the world’s police.

“It’s our job!” said Bush. The self-evidentiality and certainty, with which an American believes that this
sentence legitimises what he’s doing shows the difference between the USA and Europe in the face of
history and with a view to the future: Here the sentence “I only did my duty” is rightly disavowed for all
times. But the American can never understand what the great European lesson is: no one has the right
only to do his duty!

In contrast to those listening to the text being delivered at the demonstration and thus who were
likely to anticipate criticism of Bush, the USA and/or the war, the heading (“Bush’s law”) provides
those possibly approaching the written article without much expectations with some indication of
what is going to follow. It brings together the idea of law, ideally viewed as impartial and
independent, with a very particular standpoint, i.e. “Bush’s”, thereby creating a tension between
these two elements which will guide Menasse’s argument. The subsequent anti-war truth claim in
line 3 (“This war isn’t self-defence – but it will produce defenceless selves”) is hardly problematic in
its formal structure. True, there have been arguments as to what degree the attack against Iraq could
be seen as “self-defence” but not even readers who support such a position will doubt the
consequence: suffering civilians. In addition, the heading might be seen as polemical by some but
hardly distorts the argument given that it neither contradicts the way the Bush-administration dealt
with the UN nor generalises it as it explicitly refers to the US president.
Das Buch "Bush’s Law" von Robert Menasse

"Dieser Krieg ist nicht Notwehr - aber er wird wehrlos. Not produzieren": der Vorabdruck einer Rede von Robert Menasse anlässlich des Wiener Sternmachers "Stopp den Krieg".

KOMMENTAR

Der Unterschied zwischen US-Marktwirtschaft und europäischer sozialer Marktwirtschaft ist etwa so groß wie der zwischen der Keilschrift und dem Alphabet der Frankfurter Buchmesse. Die Ideen der Aufklärung mögen vor zweihundert Jahren in den USA weitergehend verwirklicht gewesen sein als damals auf dem "alten Kontinent"; mittlerweile sind aber die USA Nachzügler sogar ihrer eigenen konstitutiven Ideen geworden. Der Einfluss der Religion auf die Politik bis zur Todesstrafe zeige sich die USA heute sogar für ihre Sympathisanten als Entwicklungsland der Aufklärung.

In Frankreich ist die bürgerliche Revolution gemacht, in Deutschland ist sie gedacht. Diese Länder heute ausspielen zu wollen gegen die Willfähigkeit der politischen Eliten, die vor wenigen Jahren noch totalitäre Staaten regiert haben, zeigt, worin die Entfremdung zwischen Europa und den USA heute im Wesentlichen besteht - und warum sie weiter wachsen wird. Das "alte" Europa definiert Demokratie und Rechtszustand heute als ein Verhältnis zwischen Leitmacht und Vasallen. Hier kann es keine Übereinstimmung geben, außer in ideologisch durchdrungenen Sonntagsreden oder hilflosen diplomatischen Cocktails. Es zeigt sich allerdings auch, dass die Geschichte von der amerikanischen Befreiung vom europäischen Faschismus immer schon nur die halbe Wahrheit war: Die USA ließen den Franco- und den Salazar-Faschismus in Europa ebenso intakt, wie sie hochrangige Nazis schützten, so weit sie ihnen im Kalten Krieg nützlich waren.

Im Grunde werden Europa und USA heute durch ihre gemeinsame Geschichte getrennt: Europa, soweit wir lernen und lernen wollen, uns mit dem Kontinent zu identifizieren, hat aus der halben Wahrheit versucht, eine ganze zu machen. Die USA aber haben versucht, aus der ganzen Wahrheit eine ganze Legitimation für ihre Hegemoniebestrebungen zu zimmern.

Die Geschichte der USA, die das Muster der Nachbarn sind, die den Krieg anschließend auch weiter und verantwortungsvoll durchzuführen, zeigt den Unterschied zwischen Leitmacht und Vasallen. Hier wird der Satz "Ich habe nur meine Pflicht getan" zu Recht auf alle USA-Staaten und Vasallen gleichermaßen zutreffen.

"It’s our job!", sagte Bush. Die Selbstverständlichkeit und -gewissheit, mit der ein Amerikaner glaubt, dass dieser Satz legitimiert, was er tut, zeigt den Unterschied zwischen USA und Europa, zwischen der Weltmacht und dem Kontinent, der mit der Geschichte und in Hinblick auf die Zukunft: Hier ist der Satz "Ich habe nur meine Pflicht getan" zu Recht auf alle Zeiten desvaut. Das kann ein Amerikaner nie begreifen, was die große europäische Lehre ist: Keiner hat das Recht, nur seine Pflicht zu tun!


"This war is stupid!" Robert Menasse.
In line with these legitimate anti-war indicators, Menasse proceeds with a genre-typical pun in lines 7-9 and contrasts primitive violence with “intelligent weapons”. Questioning their intelligence in line 8 supposedly establishes a link to the discourse on “intelligent weapons” which might legitimate military intervention as they apparently act with clinical precision, i.e. avoiding civilian dead. However, the paragraph also includes a first rather problematic claim by connecting “primitive” (line 7) – via his elaboration of “intelligent weapons” – to “idiot” (line 9). Although the latter is not linguistically specified (“every idiot”, line 9), recipients might activate existing background knowledge about Bush and link him to “idiot” given that he has already been mentioned in line 1 and the many ways he has been ridiculed.81 However, such speculations are not necessary given the image (Figure 21; the cartoon reads “Fire!!! Go! Come on!”; (Bush) and “Protest! – I am not stupid!” (rocket); “intelligent bomb”) which depicts Bush as an “idiot” and “primitive” (cf. the ape-like physiognomy). From an argumentation standpoint, this representation is problematic, firstly, by putting forward an argumentum ad hominem as this depiction hinders the potential development of an open discussion or at least the open-minded, although monological, processing of the argument. Secondly, it limits those opposing Bush in their understanding of his policies. If the ‘other’ is an idiot, then the understanding of his activity is restricted as “idiots” are hardly putting forward reasonable claims (As I will show, this seems to occur in the following.).

Whilst the claim concerning violence being “a symptom of backwardness” (line 7) is legitimate, it runs into trouble to the extent that it does not explain in any detail the qualification made with regard to “self-defence” (line 11). It can be argued that this war is not self-defence, however, what constitutes self-defence needs to be indicated in order to conduct a rational argument over this claim, especially given its intensified character (“always”). More importantly, violence is linked to the “Stone Age”, a connection which works even better given the previous predication of violence as “primitive”. Through reference to a tool associated with the “Stone Age” (“bigger club”, line 15),

81 Google finds 5,850,000 instances when searching for ‘Bush idiot’ [23.10.2010].
Menasse is consequently able fallaciously to link “backwardness”, “primitive” and “Stone Age” to Bush (argumentum ad hominem). What seemingly takes shape here is a Musolffian metaphor scenario based on the source domain of STONE AGE by mapping related conceptual elements (e.g. “backwardness” and “primitive”) onto targets such as Bush and, ultimately, the USA (see below). As noted above, this scenario is supported by the multimodal character of the text, i.e. the ape-like representation of Bush which graphically situates Bush in a “primitive” past. Those using force other than in self-defence are thus rooted in “the Stone Age”, while law is established as an alternative (lines 13-14).

Importantly, at this point, the alternative remains unconnected to any actor and its ‘other’ has still only been nominated as Bush. However, this changes in line 15 where the link between “backwardness”, “primitive”, “Stone Age” and “bigger club” justifies the separation of the entire “USA” from rational, “enlightened” conduct (line 13, fallacy of hasty generalisation). In addition, even if the claim that the USA is dominating the world is true (line 15) – again, a claim which is not formally problematic – Menasse avoids any explanation of how this dominance developed, i.e. a debate about the collapse of European imperialism and, in particular, Austro-German aggression during the first half of the 20th century. Instead of putting the rise of the USA into context, i.e. developing a disputable argument and pointing to in-group responsibilities, Menasse explains it in terms of a rampant savage, building further on the STONE AGE scenario.

Menasse draws further upon this construction of the USA in lines 19-20 which depict Bush and his law not as temporal mistakes but as the causal outcome (“reflex”, line 19) of the very condition of the USA. As such, “Bush’s law” is not linked to a specific individual as might be suggested in line 1 but is portrayed as being synonymous with US law. Menasse’s truth claim concerning the content of
Bush’s law in line 17 is also incorrect as it has not proven to be true that Iraq could pay for the war.\textsuperscript{82} It can be argued that, given the author’s knowledge at that time, his claim was not fallacious. However, there were alternatives to narrow ‘no blood for oil’ explanations, e.g. strategic considerations concerning the creation of a counterweight to Iran and/or Saudi Arabia which, correct or not, are not considered by Menasse. Interestingly, this failure by Menasse might be caused by the continuous representation of Bush/the USA as a backward idiot. It is here, finally, that the alternative is nominated: “Europe” (line 20). This opens up another metaphor scenario, drawing on the source domain of ENLIGHTENMENT and conceptual elements such as law, progress and rationality which are mapped onto (Western) Europe. As an enlightened actor, the assumption is projected that this Europe is not only culturally and morally advanced but also very different from the USA. Both scenarios remain crucial in the following and support the evaluation of the USA and Europe.

So far, Menasse’s speech mirrors a rather conventional anti-war position but it is from line 22 onwards that the more subtle topos of having learnt the lessons of history comes into prominence. Having introduced Europe as the alternative to the USA, above, the former is predicated as “post-national” (line 22). This was a topos in the German debate too, describing the outcome of Europe’s learning process and thus its superiority to the USA. Menasse’s demarcation of a post-national Europe from the USA which still follows its national interest is, however, fallacious. Although the claim that “the route of peace” (line 23) as chosen in Europe is correct, this leads Menasse to hasty generalisations. Firstly, he creates the impression that only the USA uses force to pursue its interests without a mandate from the United Nations, ignoring French policy in Africa, the United Kingdom in Iraq, or NATO missions in Yugoslavia. Secondly, although European integration has overcome many rifts between European states, this does not imply that their different interests have vanished. This becomes visible as soon as internal or foreign policies are negotiated. Indeed, diverging national

\textsuperscript{82} Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes (2008) estimate that the war against Iraq will probably cost the USA more than £3 trillion in the long term, much more than Iraq could pay back.
interests have been a constant obstacle to a common European policy, as the reaction to the current banking crisis and, much more, the Iraq crisis illustrate. Instead of giving a balanced account of the undoubted success of European integration, Menasse’s homogenisation of Europe (and the USA) is serving a self-righteous representation of Europe as having learnt the lessons from the past.

Lines 27-29 are, despite generalisation, hardly disputable as the European welfare state is still more generous than the US-American counterpart. However, even this claim becomes distorted when Menasse introduces it through the opposition of “cuneiform script”, probably standing for “primitive”, and the world’s largest annual book fair in Frankfurt, probably representing sophisticated Enlightenment. Here again, the metaphor scenario introduced above is reproduced, in that the difference between Europe and the USA becomes one of about 5,000 years of (intellectual) development. While Menasse concedes that the Enlightenment was lived in the USA first — although using the mitigating “might have” and thus casting immediate doubt on the proposition (line 33) — the country is now not simply mistaken in some of its policies (a formally correct claim) but a “developing country of the Enlightenment” (line 36). In other words, it is the USA which needs moral tutoring.

Here, my interpretation could be rejected as Menasse provides reasons by referring to religion and the death penalty (line 35). However, Menasse again, by not specifying his argument, enables self-righteous interpretations. While there is no doubt that many US Americans attach more significance to religion than other wealthy nations do (Baldwin, 2009:163-172), no religion is — in contrast to many European states — an officially supported doctrine in the USA. Weekly church attendance is lower than in Ireland, Portugal and Italy and the USA does not lead the tables concerning the number of Christian congregations or membership of religious denominations (ibid.). The role of religion is thus a complex one as Alexis de Tocqueville (1998:120) has already observed: “[i]n the United States religion exercises but little influence upon the laws and upon the details of public opinion; but it directs the customs of the community, and, by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state”. For a
historical and contemporary image of the dynamics of religious life in the USA, cf. Butler et al. (2003). Menasse’s argument might also be fallacious because he neglects the religious roots of Enlightenment itself (Barnett, 2003) in order to use religion as yet another element for constructing a sharp dichotomy instead of seriously considering existing differences. For example, Immanuel Kant, whom Menasse quotes in line 43 in order to prove Europe’s enlightened status, was a religious person and, nevertheless, one of the Enlightenment’s key figures.

In the above, Menasse establishes a uniform Europe as the new bearer of the Enlightenment whilst representing the USA – and not only its administration, certain religious groups, etc. – as structurally backward. This becomes the key warrant in justifying the remaining part of his speech: if Europe has experienced progress in accordance with the ideals of the Enlightenment (but not the US), it is only Europe which can claim (moral) authority. Lines 38-39, e.g., link the enlightened activities of France and Germany in the 18th and 19th centuries to the countries’ stance in 2003, thereby justifying their current position ("today", line 39). Menasse’s subsequent claim that the USA wants “to play these two countries out today” might be true but is nevertheless tendentious. Firstly, its justification relies on something already 200 years old. Secondly, the claim regarding France and Germany in line 38 is of interest as it might, intertextually, connect to remarks which describes Marxist doctrine as being based upon “classical German philosophy, English classical economics and French political activity and science” (Gramsci, 1971:431; also Lenin, 1977:23f). Given that relatively few readers are probably aware of this (given Menasse’s political stance, he probably is), this omission is not formally fallacious but, at least, illustrates how Menasse avoids references to aspects which do not fit into his uniform representation of Europe. After all (and independent of any Marxist background knowledge), the UK has been one of the three main powers throughout European history but, as Europe is viewed as enlightened, inclusion or even mentioning of the UK – as a belligerent power – would cause dissonance. Thirdly, the claim is problematic as it links the current stance of former Eastern-European countries, i.e. the apparent “complacency of the[ir] political elites”, by reference to their totalitarian past (lines 39-40). Whilst this argument could be made in a proper way, the way
in which it is formulated ignores the possibility that these elites might have serious historical reasons for their support of the USA. In addition, such a hasty generalisation ignores democratic activists such as Vaclav Havel. It ignores the experiences of these countries and many of their leaders in the civil democratic revolution of 1989. Again, it becomes visible here that, by representing parties in a fallacious way, understanding, e.g., the stance of these elites due to their historical experiences becomes almost impossible.

Although Menasse has largely homogenised Europe, he therefore also acknowledges Europe’s internal divisions with regard to the former East. In consequence, the question of ‘What is Europe’ is now pressing. However, instead of elaborating this, he insists on the alienation between “Europe and the USA” (line 40) and predicts a growing rift. Again, the justification for this claim relates to the enlightened nature of Europe and its being a “relationship of responsible partners” (line 42). This is backed by Menasse’s possible reference to Marx, in line 38, and by explicitly quoting Kant in line 43. In contrast, the USA views others as “vassals” (line 46) which, again, prevents him from considering serious reasons – be they good or bad – for joining the US-led coalition. As we will see, the Danish justification for joining the coalition was made in terms of its national interest and historical experience, i.e. similar to Eastern-European countries. However, Menasse, due to the confines of his own argument and the metaphors used, seems unable even to consider these explanations (for the possibly self-delusive power of metaphorical thinking, cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1981:10-13).

Interestingly, Menasse at this point represents the USA in a positive way by acknowledging its contribution to the liberation of Europe (lines 44-45). He does so by nominating the ‘other’, i.e. from what liberation was needed, as fascism in general. However, it was the rise of German and Austrian National Socialism which made Allied efforts necessary. One interpretation could be that references to fascism in Austria either imply criticism of Austrofascism or serve apologist tendencies by blurring the specificities of Austrian and German National Socialism in comparison to European forms of fascism. The former would fit into Menasse’s left-liberal political background and, probably, the
political orientation of most of his audience, whilst the latter would not and is thus rather implausible. However, the former is tendentious given that the USA did not intervene in Europe in order to liberate the continent from Austrofascism. However, by speaking of the USA’s fight against “European fascism”, a link can be established between the horrors of World War II and Spanish and Portuguese fascism (which, in fact, did not play a significant military role) in line 50. By not fighting all fascisms, the USA’s efforts can ultimately be described as a half-truth (line 50), i.e. turning its contribution to Europe’s liberation into a liability. In terms of a truth claim, this cannot be disputed: US-American realpolitik has included the acceptance of many non-democratic regimes as well as making use of researchers who formerly worked in, e.g., National Socialist Germany. However, Europeans too, i.e. Germans, Austrians as well as collaborating governments, did little to oppose high-ranking Nazis and have had few problems with the fact that the USA did most of the military spending during the Cold War. This does not imply that the USA cannot be criticised for particular actions and that only those who pay are eligible to voice concerns. However, it implies that predications of Europe and the USA in terms of a strict dichotomy are tendentious if they self-righteously include only those parts of history which serve positive self- and negative ‘other’ representations.

Beyond this, lines 49-51 serve not only to predicate the USA as somehow morally dubious, but lead to another claim warranted by the now established argument of the ‘primitive USA versus enlightened Europe’: the USA and Europe are separated through their commonness (line 53). Firstly, the emphasis – given what has already been said – rests on separateness, a condition which is intensified by the introductory “[i]n principle”. Again, the basic reason for the current conflict is thus not to be found in different interests and particular assessments but is of a more fundamental nature. Given the fact that Menasse did not talk critically about the in-group, the ‘other’ must be responsible for this rift, e.g. through its unenlightenedness. Secondly, the truth claim concerning this principle rift is justified in lines 53-56 whereby Menasse qualifies his positive predication of Europe (“as far as we learn and want to learn”, my emphasis; “has to make a whole out of a half-truth [hat
(...) versucht[""). But whilst Europe at least aims for the “whole [ganze]” truth, the USA “has tried” to build an “entire [ganze]” legitimisation for its hegemonic attempts”. In the German original, there is a stylistic juxtaposition via the word ganze (whole/entire) of Europe and the USA which further emphasises the dichotomy. As there is specification neither of Europe nor the USA, e.g. in terms of the Bush administration, both truth claims, even if they would carry factual truth, become fallacious due to hasty generalisations which enable a strict dichotomy.

Relying on the claim that the USA has not learnt – in fact: does not even aim to (line 25 and lines 55-56) – Menasse (lines 58-60) returns to the role of Eastern-European countries which he had already attacked in lines 39-40. But while line 39 only put responsibility for the failure of these countries to act in an enlightened, i.e. European, way on the shoulders of their political elites, line 58 goes beyond that by predicinging these countries, as a whole, as “democratically inexperienced”. Again, this denies the fact that these countries – in contrast to almost all other European countries in the 20th century – upheld civil revolutions in 1989. Thus, even if these countries have less experience with representative democracy in terms of numbers of years, it is fallacious to simply exclude them from the body of enlightened states. However, this is what Menasse does when sticking to his argument by linking the USA to “new Europe”, presenting the latter as “democratically inexperienced”, and stating that “new Europe” equals “new vassals” (line 59, also line 46). Instead of considering strategic interests and, possibly, historical reasons for the position taken by Eastern-European countries, Menasse nominates them as “vassals” unable even to comprehend the key ideas of the Enlightenment. They are thus represented as unenlightened due to their essential lack of experience (lines 42-43) instead of acting responsibly by using their own capacity to reason. If that is true, then there is no change (at least for the moment) to emerge from their “self-incurred immaturity”. Lines 60-61 are less controversial, as the war against Iraq was indeed publicly rejected all over the world – even by Eastern-European countries (EOS Gallup, 2003). This is thus a correct truth claim whilst it nevertheless helps Menasse to reproduce his argument through predicating the “European public” as “old” in opposition to “new [and inexperienced Eastern] Europe”.

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Line 63 raises a rightness claim which, however, does not provide a moral reason for why Iraq “should” not be attacked but an apparent fact (“there is no Arabic country which is democratic”). Whilst this truth claim is correct (or was so at least in 2003), the argument itself seems doubtful. Saying that there is “no argument” for an attempt to democratise an Arab country just because there was no Arab democracy in 2003 is an exaggeration which – never mind how these arguments are evaluated – unburdens him and the audience from considering activities by the USA as having any rationale. That is, the ‘other’ remains represented as idiotic, primitive, pre-enlightened, etc. After all, it could be argued that precisely because there is no democratic impulse in the region, and given Iraq’s human rights record, democratisation from outside is necessary. Whether this is a good argument or not or whether it was the actual reason behind the war is another thing, but it is an argument which can be evaluated. Menasse’s subsequent argument against the war (lines 64-66) rests on a smart analogy by evoking an American archetype: the sheriff. On the one hand, even this reference might draw on his metaphor scenario given that the analogy might call to mind images of the unlawful, i.e. pre-enlightened, Wild West. On the other hand, such an interpretation seems hard to justify as Menasse stresses that sheriffs are “elected” (line 65). But whilst the analogy is thus unproblematic in general, the subsequent claim is slightly doubtful. Speaking of the USA’s “self-appointed” legitimacy is correct, but it ignores the wide-ranging support of many European countries (and beyond). By not even considering these positions, Menasse is able to uphold his dichotomy of the enlightened Europe versus the primitive USA.

However the above interpretation is evaluated, it is the final paragraph (lines 68-72) which adds a remarkable flavour to this speech. Line 68 is not necessarily distorting possible communication. Menasse might quote Bush correctly but could be rejected. Still, Menasse’s claim becomes problematic due to the vagueness concerning “an American” and whether it refers to Bush or to Americans in general. In German, both are possible but the latter reading is more plausible as replacing “an American” by ‘he’ would refer clearly to Bush and would have been easy for Menasse. “[H]e” in line 69 does not necessarily refer to Bush either as the personal pronoun ‘he’, in German as
in English, is traditionally used in a generic way. A reading following this line of reasoning is ultimately supported by Menasse’s reference to differences in terms of collectives in line 69, i.e. between “the USA and Europe”. Thus, there is again a fallacy of hasty generalisation from Bush to all Americans as negative characterisations of Bush – which may be correct – are transferred onto a collective.

Still more interesting are lines 70-71 in which, first of all, a rightness claim is made which few in the audience would dispute: “‘I only did my duty’ is rightly disavowed” in Europe. While the formal structure and lexical choices are unproblematic, Menasse situates himself as being clearly in support of the claim (“rightly”) and intensifies his statement through “for all time”. However, what is remarkable here is not the formal structure but the content as “I only did my duty” was the most notorious attempt by Waldheim (and his generation) to defend their role during World War II. This argument has been refuted again and again: no soldier was forced to kill civilians or contribute to the extermination of Jews. And although ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers were conscripted and thus had to “do their duty”, they could have admitted the criminal nature of their orders, at least in hindsight. Given the gravity of the Waldheim Affair in Austria, the statement has become synonymous with the country’s shortcomings concerning its involvement in National Socialism and would, at least by the supposedly rather leftist audience of an anti-war demonstration and Der Standard, be understood as a reference to Waldheim. For this audience, “I only did my duty” is linked to National Socialism, its silencing and a pre-Enlightenment position. Whilst it is in itself remarkable that Menasse, in a discourse which has little to do with Austria’s past, recontextualises a key aspect of the country’s discourse, he goes on to say that such a remark is “disavowed for all time” in Europe (lines 70-71) and claims, “the American can never understand” this “great European lesson” (line 71). Not only does “the American” not understand this lesson, which justifies her/his exclusion from the reasonable and the enlightened, but also will “never” do so.
Firstly, this claim can only be seen as tendentious given that Waldheim was ultimately elected, the continuous resistance by his party, the ÖVP, to view his nomination as problematic even today and the strength of right-wing populists all over Europe, in particular in Austria. Secondly, the claim is doubtful as the rift between Europe and the USA is represented as an essential one between two civilisations: one which is responsible and capable of using its reason and another which is limited to ‘doing its duty’. Although initially perhaps concerned with Bush (see above), it is now plausible to argue that Menasse is indeed representing Americans in general, i.e. that Bush has become the ‘generic American’. Hence, potentially valid truth claims regarding Bush’s judgements are generalised to serve the construction of a positive self- and negative ‘other’ representation. It is in this final passage, through reference to Europe’s lesson which presupposes a wrong, that wrongdoing is (implicitly) acknowledged. Consequently, this example could be categorised as ultimately applying a rhetoric of judge-penitence. However, the reference is rather implicit and Europe’s enlightened status is not primarily justified via admissions of its wrongdoings. What instead carries the main burden of his argument is a rather one-dimensional positive self- and negative ‘other’ representation via the dichotomy of enlightened versus primitive.


Since whoever is stuck in the Stone Age, or is at least a "developing country of the Enlightenment" in which democracy is viewed not as a relationship between partners and "I only did my duty" is not disavowed (whilst Europe has finally realised the "leading ideas of the Enlightenment"), is by definition excluded from the reasonable and the enlightened.

Figure 22: A schematic representation of Menasse (2003) following Toulmin’s simple model
7.4.2 Example V: ‘Forgotten Austrians and Gratified US Americans’

The author of Example V, Barbara Coudenhove-Kalergi, is a well-known Austrian journalist who was born in Prague from where she was driven out in 1945. In her professional career, she has worked for various newspapers as well as for the national broadcasting agency. The following article was taken from her column in Der Standard and published on 2 March 2003, i.e. before the outbreak of the war on 20 March.

Dividing images of war

"What war really is, that has been deeply engraved into the collective conscience of the European peoples." [Das sagt der] The German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder said that recently. It’s [Das] true.

It’s the historical experience which has caught up the overwhelming majority of Europeans against the Iraq War, regardless of the position of their governments. It’s different with the Americans because their historical experience is also different.

Obviously the USA has also taken part in wars. But it is a different type of war that US citizens remember. Whether in the First or Second World War, in Korea, in Vietnam or in the Gulf War — what the average citizen experienced was the sight of soldiers who went off to a distant land and, except for the case of Vietnam, came back victorious after a while.

Some didn’t come back, a painful blow for the affected families. An occasion for proud remembrance for the remaining population. But the stage of war was far away. Those who stay at home only see the battles, suffering, and destruction on television.

Very different to the Europeans. They got to know the horrors of war in their own country. Cities destroyed, women raped, hunger and poverty, deprivation and indignity — Europeans know at first hand all the suffering which the civilian population has to bear in every war. The old ones experienced it, the young ones know it from their grandparents and parents’ stories.
Since television existed, our collective conscience lives off images. Every political concept generates the corresponding image in our heads – and these images are fundamentally different in Europe and America.

The most obvious example: the "bombing war" [Bombenkrieg]. For every American this word evokes an aeroplane cockpit, from a bird’s eye view the landscape, towns and villages lying below appear tiny. Whenever a target is hit, a small mushroom of smoke rises upwards. Like little white clouds the mushrooms sway across the panorama, instinctively one feels gratification when another little cloud rises up.

And the Europeans? For us a very different image appears in the mind’s eye on hearing “bombing war”: the air-raid shelter, in which one sits together with others and fears, overhears the thunder of impacts and into your thoughts comes the question: was that our house? Was it the house of people we love? No wonder that, by all rejection of the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, the likes of us automatically identify more with the people of Iraq than with the invading armies.

For the Germans, after the atrocities of the Second World War, the reaction frequently added is: just not to be on the side of the perpetrator once again, just not to be guilty for the suffering of civilians once again.

Most average Americans see the impending war as a war of liberation, in continuation of the liberation of Europe from Hitler’s regime.

The Europeans think of conquest at the expense of innocent people. Not only political strategies divide the old continent from the New World today, but the long chain of images from our respective histories.

While the heading in line 1 evokes unspecific expectations concerning images of war, line 3 already specifies them by speaking of “What war really is”. The implicature here is that there are other
perceptions of war which are not authentic and that presumably those in possession of the real image(s) are superior. This introductory claim is backed by an argumentum ad verecundium through reference to Schröder (line 4). In the same line, the author perspectivises herself by explicitly agreeing, “[it’s true”, which is stylistically applied by introducing both sentences with the German definite article das (that). Readers who are aware of the discourse then raging on the nature of war in the television age, e.g. the images CNN provides, might infer that unauthentic representations are in fact mainly an issue in the USA.

Lines 6-8 introduce the division explicitly by referring to “historical experience” which is framed as the agent. Note that Coudenhove-Kalergi does not say that Europeans (or US-Americans) have become aware of whatever experience in the course of public debate but that experience has “caught up” Europeans which not only frames their perception and reasoning but drives them. Experiences are not questioned in terms of how, why and when they have emerged but fallaciously appear as hypostatised objective forces (non-sequitur). However, Europeans are qualified as Coudenhove-Kalergi speaks of a “majority” (line 6) and, to that extent, her truth claim might indeed be true whereby the fact that she also intensifies her claim (“overwhelmingly”) does not alter this. However, she drops her caution when she addresses “the Americans” (line 7) as a homogeneous entity (fallacy of hasty generalisation). Given that the USA is an extremely pluralistic society, indeed an immigrant society encompassing various backgrounds, such a claim is not self-evident. A relevant example is the ‘Jewish-experience’ and the importance the Holocaust has gained in the USA — although not having been directly experienced by US-Americans (Novick, 2000). Thus, crucial at this point, is the question: how are these different experiences characterised? Are they naturalised in the sense that historical events determine what is seen as an experience? Or are experiences understood as memories a society has constructed?

Lines 10-11 suggest an answer as the author collapses experiences (“the USA has also taken part in wars”) with what “US citizens remember”. Note that she does not speak of, e.g., ‘remembering
differently’ but ontologises her claim by speaking of “a different kind of war” (line 10). However, what is remembered, and this is the point of CMS, is not necessarily linked to what has actually happened (although the construction of memories depends on interacting perspectives via which a connection to the object, i.e. history, is likely to remain). Her subsequent characterisation of American memory as built on television (line 17) might well be true although one could also ask why there is no mention of 9/11 as an example of suffering in the USA. Given the use of “only” in line 17, lines 16-17 might lead to an inference of US memory as inferior due to its artificial character. However, nowadays, the USA is hardly special when it comes to the significance of television in covering images of war. For example, both the Second Gulf War and the Kosovo war brought similar images of aerial bombings to audiences in Europe and the USA.

In contrast, Europe/ans, from now on homogenised as in lines 19, 20, 25, 34 and 47, is/are different, a difference intensified by the use of “very” in line 19 (similarly, line 25 speaks of “fundamentally different” images). Whilst American memory is “victorious” (line 13, also line 15), Europeans “know” the horror (line 19). Again, this truth claim regarding history and its remembrance (lines 19-21) is not necessarily incorrect but what remains questionable is, firstly, the function of predicating European knowledge as “first hand”, i.e. authentic, which supports a hastily generalised dichotomy. Not so much in the case of “[t]he old”, who indeed made these experiences and might well be traumatised. However, to what extent does it make sense to say that therefore the young “know it” (line 22) too? Over how many generations are they transmitted authentically? Welzer et al. (2002) and Reiter (2006) have revealed the dubious dynamics behind inter-generational memory, in particular the constructed, i.e. unauthentic nature, of transmitted images with regard to Germany and Austria respectively.

No doubt, many Europeans imagine large-scale destruction when recalling war and aerial bombardment, e.g. images of Coventry in the United Kingdom or Dresden in Germany. However, it is, secondly, this stressed uniformity in experiences of destroyed cities, “raped women, hunger and
poverty, deprivation and indignity” (lines 19-20) that makes Coudenhove-Kalergi’s argument genuinely problematic. After all, her claims are those made by an Austrian, i.e. part of a group which was to a large part responsible for both World Wars and thus destruction, rape, hunger, etc. However, these differences vanish in her account of European experiences. In particular, what is absent are happy experiences of Austrian and German troops on the march at the beginning of the wars, the popular support given to the regimes and the benefits enjoyed by the population (Aly, 2005). In this sense, her narrative of suffering is useful as it integrates Europe by portraying everybody as having somehow experienced victimhood. Here, the difference to how Germany was constructed in Examples I-III, Section 6.4, i.e. through admissions of in-group wrongdoing, is striking.

In line with this, she justifies her example of “the bombing war” being “[t]he most obvious” one (line 28). Aerial bombings have become a particular focal point in German and Austrian debates over the past via which victimhood is often constructed (Kettenacker, 2003). For Americans, in fact “every American” (line 28), aerial bombings are represented by a particular set of images, i.e. those with which television viewers are familiar: a bird’s-eye view, hits indicated by rising smoke, etc. (lines 28-31). Like her previous claims, this truth claim is not formulated in a distorted way. However, while these images are nowadays the same all over the world anyway, her claim becomes distorted as soon as she notes that “instinctively one [man] feels gratification” (line 31). “[O]ne”, here, refers to “every American” as she positions Europeans in opposition to these images (line 34). It is hard to say if “gratification” is, perhaps, felt by some viewers (or horror, compassion, indifference, etc.). However, it is fallacious (argumentum ad hominem and hasty generalisation) to construct Americans in general as feeling “gratification” over aerial bombings. It presents them as almost joyful perpetrators, as sick and thus necessarily different to Europeans who once suffered and were the targets of such bombings.

As in lines 19-20, lines 35-36 describe European experiences again solely in terms of victimhood. While Americans feel “gratification” over little clouds rising after a target is hit, Europeans are linked
to positive emotions (concern and “love”, line 36). In addition, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s argument becomes inclusive at that point by using the possessive pronoun “our” (line 36) and “us” (37). Thereby, she demarcates the audience and indeed all contemporary Europeans from those who feel “gratification” when viewing bombardments. Through this, she also explains the anti-war movement in terms of these feelings and the subsequent solidarity with Iraqis as being “[n]o wonder” and “automatically” felt. At the same time, lines 37-38 claim a rejection of Saddam Hussein’s regime, thereby safeguarding here, in an intensified way (“by all”, line 37), against a potential accusation of ignoring the latter’s criminal energy.

Probably the most striking passage in this article follows in lines 40-42. The author acknowledges wrongdoings concerning the atrocities of World War II – stylistically in a similar fashion to Examples I-III. However, it is only the guilt of “the Germans” she speaks of. If written by an, e.g., American journalist, equating ‘perpetrators’ with “the Germans” would be understandable but it is indeed remarkable that an Austrian intellectual refers to German perpetrators while failing even to mention Austrian atrocities as well – which perhaps indicates the persistence and formative nature of the victim thesis. This does not necessarily imply that Coudenhove-Kalergi is a proponent of such a view but that World War II atrocities are still linked to Germans in the Austrian discourse on National Socialism. Against this interpretation, it could be argued that she singles out “the Germans” due to her initial reference to Schröder and the German peace movement in general. However, this is not convincing as Austria (and most other countries) saw widespread anti-war demonstrations and public opposition to a possible war too (indeed, it is therefore that Coudenhove-Kalergi speaks of Europe and Europeans throughout the article).

Coudenhove-Kalergi’s final predication of Americans in line 44 is qualified (“[m]ost average Americans”, my emphasis) and lines 44-45 might represent correct truth claims. At least formally, the claim is thus not distorted. In contrast, her final characterisation of Europeans and their thinking of war reproduces the fallacious representation she has made above. It might well be that Europeans
think negatively of “conquest at the expense of innocent people” (line 47). However, it is a misrepresentation of the past, in particular in Austria and Germany, to homogenise European memory (“our”, line 48; fallacy of hastily generalisation) and, consequently, overlooks the harm done to innocent people by Austrians and Germans. Her final sentence encapsulates the entire article and its shortcomings. Although Americans and Europeans have made and are influenced by different experiences and images of the past, an intellectual in one of the two most prestigious Austrian broadsheets should at least also thematise the constructedness of these images. That is to say that Austria’s silence on suffering the in-group caused needs to be addressed or, at least, should not be reproduced by making one’s own argument on the basis of the country’s traditional narrative.

Americans and Europeans have “fundamentally different” images of war.  

So, US-Americans are morally inferior to us Europeans as we all share the same experiences.  

Since viewing war as being at the expense of the innocent and causing suffering (as Europeans do) is different from those who “feel gratification when another little cloud rises up”.

Figure 23: A schematic representation of Coudenhove-Kalergi (2003) following Toulmin’s simple model

7.4.3 Example VI: ‘Appeasing Europeans are not Learning Europeans’

The final example to be analysed in this chapter is taken from the centre-conservative daily Die Presse and written by Fritz Molden. It was published not in the Feuilleton but as a guest comment on the second page of the newspaper on 11 February 2003. Molden was chief editor of Die Presse between 1953 and 1961, and since then has worked as a publisher and is a comparatively well-known public figure due to his participation in (and self-representation as part of) the Catholic resistance to Nazism. While Der Standard mainly published sceptical voices concerning a war against Iraq, Die Presse did rather support the possibility of an attack – often via reference to the topic of appeasement as in this article.
As a former fighter in hot and cold wars against Hitler, Stalin and other inhuman dictators, I would like to allow myself a call to order to the anti-America hysteria currently running through Europe on matters of the "Iraq War": of all places, in Paris and Berlin, but also in Vienna and elsewhere, they seem to have completely forgotten that already [schon] sixty-five years ago there was a call to resistance from the civilised world against a peace-endangering and – admittedly much more powerful – dictator and mass murderer, Adolf Hitler.

Back then, too, public opinion in those states still free was predominantly against the purported "warmongers" who wanted to put an end to Adolf Hitler’s ado [Treiben] after the formation of National Socialist rule in Germany, including persecution of the Jews, concentration camp atrocities [Greueln] and the absorption of Austria [Österreich-Schlucken].

France and England’s heads of government Édouard Daladier and Neville Chamberlain repeatedly tried to convince the "Führer" into friendship, to correct his overtly evil intentions and to behave properly.

The result was the Munich conference, the famous "Appeasement" of autumn 1938, which should have assured "peace in our time", as Prime Minister Chamberlain hoped. A year later that was all shot to pieces. Hitler’s assault on Poland followed and with it the Second World War. That claimed over 60 million people’s lives and left large parts of Europe in soot and ashes.

Saddam Hussein is not Hitler. And Iraq is not the Greater German Reich. But the Iraqi dictator has proved in two invasions (Iran and Kuwait) and mass murders costing tens of thousands of victims that he is not a lot different from his predecessor in Berlin. Even if his army does not seem anything near as dangerous as the "Wehrmacht" did in its time, he does obviously have other fighting methods, as well as extremely close connections to the globally feared international terror network on standby. Nevertheless, as shown by surveys, eighty per cent of Europeans are against the preventive attack planned by Bush.
The – no doubt partly clumsily formulated and cockily proclaimed – stance of the USA announced to the
world has now obviously not only plunged public opinion into rage, fear and terror, but also the opinion
of several leading statesmen. Thus, for example, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder said that
under no circumstances would “German soldiers participate in a war in Iraq, not even if the UN were to
endorse such a war.” France’s Jacques Chirac spoke out similarly, if somewhat more bindingly.

Well done! It already sounded like that anno 1938. This time too, two generations later, there is no
longer a trace of gratitude to be seen for Europe’s liberation from Nazi rule by the USA or for the
Marshall Plan. Anti-Americanism has asserted itself. Already [schon] 65 years ago, the Western powers
should have had the courage for a preventative war against Hitler. Then Europe would have been spared
the agonies and victims of the Second World War. That shows that the wise Europeans in contrast to the
"Texas cowboys" à la Bush have not learnt anything from their own history – and almost seem to yearn
for an "Appeasement 2003."

Already, in 1938, the West should have struck against Hitler – just like now against Saddam.

Of the three examples taken from the Austrian corpus, the title of Molden’s article is most forceful in
establishing at the very beginning a direct connection between the (failed) appeasement of Hitler in
the 1930s and the debate about how to deal with Saddam Hussein in 2003. Through blending two
different domains, knowledge related to National Socialism is activated in order to direct the
understanding of Saddam Hussein. Using various forms of temporal deixis, Molden erases the 65
years time gap and establishes a connection between the 1930s and 2003 that enables him to make
his argument for a pre-emptive strike.

In lines 3-4, Molden nominates himself as a “fighter” who defended his position in various kinds of
conflicts (“hot and cold wars”) and against various “inhuman dictators”. Although there is nothing
incorrect in this first sentence, the presentation of his enemies as “Hitler, Stalin and other inhuman
dictators” does, firstly, enable him to connect with a conservative audience. For the latter, and in line with theories of totalitarianism (Aron, 1968), there is no substantial difference between, e.g., Hitler and Stalin. Secondly, referring to “other” dictators enables him to argue that the struggle against Saddam Hussein is to be seen as an extension of these, i.e. his own, fights. Thirdly, by describing himself as a fighter against such evil forces, Molden claims legitimacy. This is apparent in the second part of this first sentence, lines 4-5, where he perspectivises himself through the use of a stylistic device (“I would like to allow”). Whilst this is a polite expression, it is also, at least in Austrian German, a firm one, i.e. enabling him to raise a “call to order to the anti-American hysteria”.

Firstly, whilst it may be true that there was anti-American hysteria at that time, he introduces the thesis not by giving reasons but as a presupposition. In other words, he defines the situation as anti-American which needs a call to order without debating the situation itself. Secondly, by explicitly linking the alleged hysteria to “matters of the Iraq War”, i.e. those who oppose it, Molden fallaciously predicates these opponents as “hysteric”, i.e. as overreacting and not rational (argumentum ad hominem and non-sequitur). However, these hysterics are not referred to directly and although the reference to Paris, Berlin and Vienna (line 5) makes it more likely that Molden thinks of the political elites, due to its vagueness, this could also include the wider public. When directly referring for the first time to this group in line 6, it is simply called “they”, which leaves the ambiguity intact. Content-wise, line 6 continues to label this ‘other’ as not reasonable by claiming that they have “completely forgotten” (intensification) the lessons from the past. Back then, what he names “the civilised world” faced a “peace endangering situation”. Crucially, through the use of “already”, there is a continuity established between the 1930s and the present. That is to say, not only the former but also the latter are presented as a “peace endangering situation”. Although both are correct, it can be argued that such a scenario fallaciously exaggerates the danger posed by constructing Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a straw man.
Two additional remarks have to be made concerning lines 6-8. Firstly, by describing those opposing Hitler as “the civilised world”, a correct truth claim, Molden introduces a tendentious implication as this enables him to put those who call for resistance to Saddam Hussein in this very same category. This is achieved linguistically by, secondly, the use of “already” (see above) and the, albeit mitigated, “much more” in line 7 which presupposes the existence of someone less powerful than Hitler, i.e. Saddam Hussein. Although the latter is not named explicitly in this sentence, given linguistic devices, the reference to Iraq in line 5 and the situational context, the catastrophic consequences of not answering the call to resistance in the case of Hitler are set in relation to contemporary Iraq.

At this point, let me draw attention to the fact that Molden tends to talk about Hitler (lines 3, 8, 11, 20, 23, 45) instead of National Socialist institutions (lines 11, 23, 37), as if it was Hitler who was the sole agent. However, such an intentionalist view – in comparison to functionalist analyses of the Third Reich and its underlying dynamics (cf. Mommsen, 2007 for an overview) – can have a relief function by shifting blame from ‘ordinary Germans’ to the National Socialist elite. The intentionalist perspective dominated, in particular, in the late 1940s and the 1950s (for examples, cf. Adorno, 2010:77-79), and is still visible in public debates (Heer, 2008a). Apparently, it is also put forward as an explanatory device by Molden. This too can be viewed as an incorrect way of transmitting the past in a debate which has otherwise little to do with Austria’s relation to National Socialism.

The connection between past and present is also made explicit in line 10 through the expression “too”. Lines 10-11 fallaciously label those opposing Hitler as “warmongers”. It is fallacious because it, firstly, constructs a straw man by implying that all those who opposed war viewed those warning of Hitler as “warmongers”. Through ridiculing them, Molden furthermore separates those opposing the war from what he previously nominated as “the civilised world” (argumentum ad hominem). In combination with three reasons why opponents of Hitler wanted to put an end to his reign in lines 12-13, which do not appear fallacious at a first glance, the “public opinion” “back then” (line 10) is characterised as misguided. As Molden mitigates in line 10 (“predominantly”), he cannot be accused
of a hasty generalisation but the examples given do nevertheless distort a critical discussion. Whilst the reference to the persecution of Jews is unproblematic, both other reasons given in lines 12-13 are ambiguous. Firstly, by not specifying “concentration camp atrocities [Greueln]”, the text enables the incorrect impression that those opposing a war against Hitler were aware of the extermination of Jews. However, the extermination of Jews in concentration camps did not start systematically until 1942, i.e. long after the period of appeasement ended. To be sure, concentration camps had existed since 1933 and were deadly places. However, they were not death camps and thus the expression “atrocities [Greueln]” is not normally used when referring to those early camps. Hence, although Molden might be aware of this difference, the readership might link “atrocities” to iconic images of the extermination of Jews. This is indeed a plausible interpretation given that extermination developed gradually out of “persecution”, which Molden himself puts before mentioning “atrocities” in line 12. But while the lexical choice “atrocities” might have different effects on different audiences, his third example, “the absorption of Austria [Österreich-Schlucken]”, has a much clearer meaning. Literally translated as ‘Austria-swallowing’, the expression is problematic as it leaves no room for interpretations other than one of the event being driven by Hitler who took Austria by force. However, whilst Molden himself deserves credit due to his activities in the Catholic resistance during the war, vast parts of the country did not oppose the Anschluss. Hence, the incorrect Austrian self-image of being the first victim is reproduced through metaphorical representation – although the text is not concerned with Austria in the first place. Nevertheless, in terms of Molden’s wider argument, these points are of minor significance as the overall structure of his argument so far aims for polarisation: pathological opponents of the war versus “the civilised world”.

Opponents of the war are characterised in line 16 by describing the nature of appeasement efforts, i.e. trying to “repeatedly” engage with Hitler “in friendship”, i.e. without the necessary force. These efforts “should have assured “peace in our time”” (lines 18-19) in 1938 whilst being sharply contrasted with a list of their dreadful consequences (lines 20-21). Thus, an argumentative line is drawn from peaceful aims to resolve a conflict to the most horrible consequences. This
representation is factually correct but becomes a distorted analogy as those seemingly appeasing in 2003 are portrayed as resembling opponents of war in the 1930s. The former are put in an impossible position due to the horrible consequences he lists.

This is taken up in line 23 where Molden for the first time makes the link between Saddam Hussein and Hitler explicit — although at that point negating (“not”) their sameness (“is”). Firstly, this is problematic as the negation of their sameness is, after all, trivial but nevertheless safeguards him against accusations of simplicity through equating Hitler with Saddam Hussein. At the same time, Molden, secondly, brings the two together and, through the disclaimer “[but”, in fact presupposes similarities. Finally, line 25 makes it explicit that similarities exist as Molden claims that Saddam Hussein “is not a lot different from his predecessor”. The use of the personal deixis “his”, instead of, e.g., Hitler’s, furthermore creates a closeness between the latter and Saddam Hussein which is also represented in the choice of the word “predecessor”. Lines 25-27 proceed in similar fashion by, firstly, stating the obvious (not “as dangerous as the “Wehrmacht””). This statement of difference is mitigated by a tendentiously vague warning about “other fighting methods” and terrorist connections. Secondly, through repeated intensification – “obviously”, “extremely” and “close” – the impression of similarity is further boosted. While the truth claim behind this sentence was already problematic before the Iraq War, it can be rejected outright in hindsight. Finally, lines 28-29 make clear his own position in favour of a preventive attack. By linking the latter to crimes associated with Hitler via “[nevertheless”, Molden predicates those opposing action against Saddam Hussein as irresponsible and nominates this opposition to the war as “Europeans”. Given the EOS Gallup survey I have quoted throughout this thesis, this proposition is correct to the extent that a majority rejected an attack against Iraq. However, it constructs wide parts of the population as hysterical, forgetful, irresponsible and risking another catastrophe mirroring that described in lines 10-27. Given that Molden has always located himself in opposition to public opinion, the sentence furthermore positions himself as a supporter of a preventive attack.
The fact that he goes on to downplay Bush’s performance in line 31 indicates that he aligns himself with such a pro-war position. This first sentence is indeed defensively formulated and might even correspond to a red herring fallacy given the interplay of intensification and mitigation (“no doubt partly”), the belittling choice of words (“clumsily formulated”) and the concession to critics of Bush’s vocabulary (“cockily proclaimed”). In contrast to the latter’s seemingly unfortunate choice of words, leading European statesmen and the wider public (lines 32-33), overreact (“rage, fear and terror”). Thus, the impression is created that while Bush is defending a right course, although with unfortunate wording, opponents such as Schröder and Chirac are irrational (lines 33-35).

The use of these examples becomes fallacious in line 37 when Molden equates this position with the policy of appeasement in 1938 (non-sequitur). Linguistically, this is realised through the use of “already” and “[t]his time, too”, i.e. temporal deixis, which links the present to the past. In another step, he accuses the opponents of a war against Iraq of a lack of “gratitude” for Europe’s liberation and economic support given by the USA after 1945. This accusation is rooted in the assumption that “gratitude”, which the USA can indeed expect, equals bondage. That is to say, the way he introduces “gratitude” is based on presupposing a particular meaning which can, however, be contested while not rejecting gratitude for the liberation as such. Gratitude can assert itself in ways other than supporting an attack against Iraq whilst not talking it down as in Example IV, Section 7.4.1. Similarly doubtful is Molden’s conclusion that “[a]nti-Americanism has asserted itself” (line 39). Molden’s claim might be correct – but given the (lack of) evidence provided by him, this claim is not justified. In fact, it only seems to rest on his presupposed meaning of “gratitude”. The following two sentences repeat his previous argument on the history of appeasement, although more forcefully through using a causal if-then construction in lines 39-40: if the Allies had launched a pre-emptive attack, suffering would have been avoided. By neglecting this lesson from history (line 42), Europeans are not superior to the often caricatured Bush but, and here he connects back to his first paragraph, perversely “yearn” for a repeat of this history. The final rightness claim in line 45 encapsulates the whole article by spelling out the need for a pre-emptive strike.
Those opposing a pre-emptive strike against Saddam Hussein are appeasing this "inhumane dictator".

Since if appeasement in 1938 had catastrophic consequences, it will be so again in 2003.

Figure 24: A schematic representation of Molden (2003) following Toulmin's simple model

7.5 Summary

Although the representation of all three national corpora is restricted by the qualitative research design of this thesis, one finding already indicated in Section 5.3 is that, in contrast to Germany and Denmark, there are only two out of four newspapers in which actual debate occurs. Whilst in Germany and Denmark all papers publish subtle argumentative texts, the Austrian Kurier and Salzburger Nachrichten are limited to rather descriptive remarks. However, similar to Germany, the analysed Austrian texts are also characterised by polarisation, exaggeration, generalisation, homogenisation and over-simplification.

Concerning Die Presse and Der Standard, there is a clear divide between a position rather in support of the US-led coalition (in the former) and an anti-war platform (in the latter). An important difference to Germany concerns a lack of rhetorics of judge-penitence. Whilst the latter did not dominate the German debate, some examples existed there. In contrast, only very few examples — all at the level of Menasse’s remarks — occurred in Austria. I therefore opted not to introduce them but to represent strands of the snapshot provided by my corpus as long as they include references to the past. Example IV, Section 7.4.1 can be viewed as applying a weak form of judge-penitence as it implicitly makes use of an admission of wrongdoing in the course of predicating Europe as post-national. However, even Menasse’s argument does not primarily gain its illocutionary force from such an acknowledgment but rather from a simpler reference to Europe’s seemingly enlightened
This demarcates Europe from the USA through what, in line with Ifversen’s description in Section 3.2.2, might be called a civilisational discourse, i.e. the exclusion of the ‘other’ on the basis of her/his construction as unenlightened or uncivilised. This process might, but does not necessarily, include admissions of wrongdoing. Example V, Section 7.4.2 and Example VI, Section 7.4.3 do not represent rhetorics of judge-penitence as they do not even address in-group wrongdoings. It could be argued that at least Example V, Section 7.4.2, which emphasises diverging images of destruction and suffering between the USA and Europe, offers implicit acknowledgment of past wrongdoings. However, both examples rather downplay Austria’s role in National Socialism (Figure 23 and Figure 24). Example V, Section 7.4.2 illustrates an argument of difference through experience which was also heavily applied by opponents of the war in Germany and Denmark, i.e. the claim that different experiences ultimately create a definitive perhaps civilisational rift between the USA and Europe. In contrast, Example VI, Section 7.4.3 makes extensive use of the topic of appeasement which was similarly applied by supporters of the war and opponents of anti-war activists in all three countries.

The key finding in this chapter is that although articles in the Austrian corpus instrumentalised the Austrian past in their different attempts to justify their stance towards a war against Iraq, they did so without or only partly admitting wrongdoing. All three speakers are well-known public intellectuals which makes it even more remarkable that even Menasse and Coudenhove-Kalergi, who are proponents of the centre-liberal Austrian public and do not normally confirm to a wider Austrian pattern of externalisation, are nevertheless dialogically interwoven into this latter frame. This seemingly proves the continued influence of this frame. As such, this chapter illustrates Bakhtin’s dialogism, i.e. that the text author is indeed not the only one involved in the production of a text but that other voices are involved as well.
8. CASE STUDY III: DENMARK

8.1 Overview of the Chapter

The third and final empirical chapter is conducted against the background of a genuinely different case: Denmark. As I discuss below, Denmark was occupied during World War II and, although collaboration took place, the country is not equivalent to the previous two cases with respect to crimes committed. To that extent, choosing Denmark runs foul of Lepsius’ initial differentiation which, after all, concerned only successor states of the Third Reich. However, as I argue in Section 1.1, Lepsius’ categorisation can still be fruitfully applied if adjusted. As outlined, the ideal-type of universalisation might nowadays capture countries which are, due to various post-1945 dynamics, increasingly aware of their involvement in the Holocaust and collaboration with Nazi war-efforts. However, such narratives might be prone to make the past too disposable to the present by departicularising these events through emphasising ‘lessons to be learnt’. If Denmark relates to such a model, this chapter might add further insights into how context affects public debates.

In Section 8.2, I introduce the wider historical, post-1945 context by summarising the traditionally dominating narrative which depicts the nation as united in its moral heroism and resistance to Nazism as well as recent post-1989 self-critical debates. Section 8.3 presents the immediate context of the Danish debate over the Iraq War and the Danish primary corpus. The Danish debate was particular to the extent that, firstly, the country joined the US-led coalition and, secondly, the extraordinary importance of a single speech by the then Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen which triggered a heated national debate by linking this war with the country’s past. Against this background, Section 8.4 analyses three texts which, in different ways, make use of the period of German occupation between 1940 and 1945 while approaching the attack against Iraq. In Section 8.5, I draw together these various strands.
8.2 The Historical Context

8.2.1 From Forced Neutrality to Samarbeidspolitikken and the Myth of Collective Resistance

In order to understand contemporary political and cultural fault lines, including the debate analysed in Section 8.4, it is helpful to go back as far as 1864 when the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austrian Empire defeated Denmark in a war over its German Duchies of Slesvig, Holstein and Lauenburg. Having to sign away the three duchies — although Denmark got back Northern Slesvig after a plebiscite in 1918 — the country was now reduced to a much smaller area. On the one hand, through the disappearance of its German minority (about one third of the population before 1864), the “identity of state, people, landscape and political nation” became “pretty unique” (Østergård, 1992:24, my translation). On the other hand, the defeat made the Danish establishment, across party lines, aware that

[the] next conflict in which Denmark will be involved (with allies or alone) against Germany in all probability will be Denmark’s last conflict. I am therefore of the conviction that in due time we will approach Germany to a degree that Germany will have no doubt whatsoever that Denmark will be on

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83 Additionally, it enabled the breakthrough of what Claus Bjørn (2000:130) calls “the Danish utopia”, i.e. the idea of solidarity and equality supported by a strong, effective and caring state. Although this already existed as a kind of proto-nationalism before 1864, it really took off due to the activities of Nikolej F. S. Grundtvig. This most important national figure claimed that ‘What is lost outwardly shall be won inwardly’ and made use of the confrontation with Germany in order to implement his preferred image of Danishness. He did so by installing a system of folkeskoler (Folk High Schools) which aimed to strengthen folkelighed, a virtually untranslatable notion literally meaning people equality (Østergård, 1992:46-48; Jespersen, 2004:108). It is not linked to the German völkisch with its ethnic connotations but focuses on a democratic ethos of equal cooperation and deliberative decision-making. Strengthening the nation via folkeligheden became the major political drive throughout the first half of the 20th century. Instead of the military, as conservatives suggested, the ruling Social-Liberals and Social Democrats invested in welfare and education.
her side – under *no circumstances* against her (conservative Prime Minister Jacob B. S. Estrup in 1878, quoted in Bjørn, 2000:121).

[...]here must be no shadow of a doubt that we are a trustworthy neighbour to Greater Germany, with no reservations or back-stabbing in any circumstance. (...) Self-preservation obliges us to take this position, not for the sake of Germany, but for our own (Viggo Hørup, founder of the Social-Liberals in 1883, quoted in Jespersen, 2004:204f).

During World War I, Denmark managed to stay neutral and, in May 1939, signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. The treaty was broken on 9 April 1940 when German forces occupied the country without much resistance by the hopelessly inferior Danish forces. Although Denmark became a protectorate under a German Imperial Plenipotentiary, *samarbejdspolitikken* (policy of cooperation) was negotiated (Footnote 60). In consequence, the country’s internal affairs remained largely under the control of a national unity government formed by the four major parties: *Det Konservative Folkeparti* (Conservatives), *Venstre* (Liberals), *Det Radikale Venstre* (Social-Liberals) and the *Socialdemokraterne* (Social Democrats). Whilst all four parties opposed German occupation, the unity government nevertheless encompassed a broad range of positions concerning policies and resistance (for the following, cf. Lund, 2003). For example, both the Social-Liberals and the Social Democrats, in line with their favoured concept of *folkelighed* (Footnote 83), most actively supported *samarbejdspolitikken*. This was exploited in particular by *Venstre* which insisted on farmer-friendly policies, thereby securing vast profits by selling agricultural products to Germany. This went on largely at the expense of the Social Democrats, i.e. their clientele, which backed down repeatedly in order to hold the government together. At the same time, *Venstre* was, of all the major parties, least involved in the resistance movement. Due to their support for *samarbejdspolitikken*, Social Democrats and Social-Liberals – at least until August 1943 (see below) – were rather hostile to the resistance movement too, which threatened the very policy of cooperation. The Conservatives and in particular their youth section were, in contrast, involved in the resistance from early on.
By and large, the fact that the unity government kept working from 1940 to 1943 was due to its public acceptance. This is illustrated by the outcome of two rounds of voting in the national elections of 1943. Given the context, they were surprisingly free and fair and ended with about 90% of the electorate voting for parties in the unity government. The reasons for this satisfaction on the side of the wider population are manifold. Among others, there was no Nazification attempt in Denmark, Copenhagen and other Danish cities were not destroyed and no other kind of collective punishment such as the mass executions of French or Yugoslavian civilians occurred. There was no forced general conscription, the population was relatively well supplied and remained largely spared (approximately 3,200 people died due to the occupation). The country’s institutions survived as did a democratic ethos visible in, e.g., public demonstrations against Denmark joining the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1941 as well as the Danish voluntary SS-unit Frikorps Danmark in 1942 and serious uprisings in both 1943 and 1944. Finally, it was also due to this policy that Jews in Denmark could be rescued in 1943 and that crucial support for those deported to the concentration camp Theresienstadt was possible. Nevertheless, cooperating with Nazi Germany did also involve political and moral failure, e.g. the banning of the Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti as well as the detention of many of their members (more than the Germans had asked for) by the Danish police in June 1941, in violation of the Danish constitution and the subsequent signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941.84 Furthermore, there were the expulsion and rejection of refugees (see below) and the then Prime Minister Vilhelm Buhl’s radio speech in which he condemned anti-German sabotage in September 1942. And in an act of practical collaboration, the Danish navy assisted German forces in minesweeping.

84 The Anti-Comintern Pact goes back to November 1936 when Nazi Germany and the Empire of Japan signed a pact directed against the Communist International (Comintern). In 1941, after Nazi Germany’s assault on the Soviet Union, the pact was renewed and Bulgaria, both Japanese puppet states in China/Mongolia, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Spain signed as well.
Due to popular unease with the occupation, the changing fortunes of war and increasing economic hardship for ordinary employees, *samarbejdsomkikken* came under increasing pressure. Anti-German propaganda had already started in 1940 (mainly by nationalist conservatives) and a first wave of sabotage acts passed through the country in April and May 1942 (between 1941 and 1943, the resistance movement largely consisted of the illegal Communist Party). During the first half of 1943, a second wave of sabotage acts, strikes and demonstrations swept over continental Europe, which also made itself felt in Denmark. Known as *Augustoprøret* (the August uprising), it put the policy of cooperation under severe pressure. As the government did not comply with German demands in order to re-establish public order, in particular emergency rule and the death penalty, Denmark fell under direct German administration on 29 August 1943. In contrast to the *Folkestrejke* (People’s Strike) of 1944 however, the uprising during the summer of 1943 had no broad popular basis but was, first and foremost, driven by workers (Kirchhoff, 2004:194-206).

It was only after the collapse of the policy of cooperation that a much broader resistance movement developed, including more centrist positions. In September 1943, it became institutionally organised in the *Frihedsråd* (Freedom Council), which ranged from national conservatives to communists as well as to the illegal Danish army. Whilst research has indicated that the unified resistance movement was neither very effective in military terms nor particularly big (Kirchhoff (2004:186f) suggests that between 1 and 2% of the population were actively involved), it was indeed active and could rely on public sympathy. Nevertheless, German measures, in comparison to other occupied countries, remained modest and administration was carried out mostly by Danish civil servants in accordance with the political parties’ direction. Germany’s representative, Werner Best, saw it as his main goal to maintain public peace in order to maximise benefits for Nazi Germany. The historian Henning Poulsen (1995:17, my translation) has thus described Denmark’s occupation as follows: “we collaborated with the occupying power, obtained first of all the best and uncontrolled conditions of life in occupied Europe, further a resistance movement for half the price and finally became part of the Allies without experiencing warfare”.

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Another consequence of the collapse of *samarbejdspolitikken* in 1943 was that Best began to plan the deportation of Jews in Denmark (Danish citizens as well as other nationalities) who had so far lived under Danish law and had not been subjected to Nazi policies. Given the specific Danish situation – Best still wanted to avoid widespread unrest – he probably prompted the German official Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz to warn the Jewish community. This happened on 28 September via Hans Hedtoft and Hans Christian Hansen, both Social Democrats. On the 30th, unions, trade professionals, the Danish High Court, universities and the royal house issued letters of protest against anti-Jewish actions (Mogensen et al., 2003:44f). In consequence, when German forces (Wehrmacht, Gestapo, SS and members of the paramilitary Schalburg-corps) attempted to capture the entire Jewish population on the night of 1-2 October, 'only' 284 Jews out of about 7,000 were captured (following the raid, a note of protest was read out during every church service across the country on 3 October).

Supported by decentralised resistance groups, most non-captured Jews were shipped to Sweden by the 14th, whereby 246 of them were captured in the course of these rescue efforts (cf. Mogensen et al., 2003 for an overview of events). Thus, out of around 7,000 Jews living in Denmark in 1943, fewer than 500, of which ca. 300 were actually Danish citizens, were deported to Theresienstadt. Due to support by the Danish government and the wider public, ca. 50 died.\(^8\) Those who "returned home to Denmark in the summer of 1945 found that not that much was missing and that they were very well received by the neighbours" (Vilhjálmsson, 2005:318, my translation).

Thus, after Denmark was liberated on 5 May 1945 by the British, there were legitimate reasons for a positive Danish self-representation. Not only did Denmark succeed in rescuing its Jewish population but also an active resistance movement had existed. However, the subsequently constructed self-image depicted the rescue as an act of moral heroism without recognising its more ambiguous aspects and overestimated the actual relevance of the resistance as well as its popular support (see

\(^8\) Exact numbers are still disputed. For slightly diverging accounts, cf. Sode-Madsen (2003) and Goldbaum Tarabini Fracapane (2008).
Instead of facts, the post-war compromise between the resistance movement on the one hand and the political elites on the other unified the nation around a consensual narrative of ‘heroically resisting Danes’.

After 1945, ‘Aldrig mere en 9. april!’ (‘Never again a 9th of April!’) became the guiding political motto and ‘de fire onde år’ (the five accursed years), i.e. the period of occupation, the central point of reference. Although there were conflicts between the political class and those in the former resistance right after 1945, they remained within the consensual frame of this basic narrative. Even historical research, arguing in favour of either the resistance movement or political parties, stayed within these confines (Bryld & Warring, 1996:60). It was only in the 1970s that the hegemony of the consensual narrative started to fall apart – at least in academic circles. Hans Kirchhoff (1979) deconstructed the consensual narrative by investigating the Augustoprøret while Aage Trommer (1971) questioned the military significance of the resistance’s sabotage of railways linking Norway with Germany. On a popular level, the broadcasting of the TV-mini-series Holocaust in 1979 triggered, as in Germany and Austria, widespread debate (Zander, 2003:277-280) but an alternative, national TV product was arguably even more salient: Matador (1978-1982). This 24-episode long series is firmly rooted in the nation’s traditional post-war narrative when addressing the period of occupation, focusing on the resistance whilst largely ignoring the crucial role of the Communist Party and depicting the rescue of the Jews as a sign of the nation’s moral heroism (Forchtner & Kølvraa, under review). The status of the rescue of the Jews was also reproduced outside Denmark, e.g. by the organisation Thanks to the Danes (nowadays Thanks to Scandinavia) which was launched in 1963, and the first monograph on the rescue by Leni Yahil (1969) who ascribed its success to the morally unpolluted democratic ethos deeply inscribed in the Danish nation.

In sum, the dominant narrative – small Denmark ambushed by Germany but staying true to its values and fighting heroically – was not successfully challenged and “with some minor rhetorical changes, the story was the same 50 years later. Most Danes gathered around this narrative and did not raise
many questions, at least not in public” (Bryld, 2001:40, my translation). Consequently, Claus Bryld and Anette Warring (1996:478) emphasise the often self-righteous way in which Danes, caught in this narrative, pointed to Switzerland or Sweden in order to denounce cooperation while failing to criticise their own country’s role.

8.2.2 Effects of 1989 and the Stockholm Process in Denmark

1989, understood as a cipher for a set of changes, altered the scene fundamentally. As some values and narratives after 1989 were no longer justified via the existence of the communist ‘other’, a second wave of self-critical questioning (after that by historians of the 1970s) emerged. Thus, Bryld (2001:41f, my translation) argues that Denmark has experienced “since the end of the 1990s the setting in of a self-critical and self-reflective process which in two, three years has radically transformed the public understanding of the period of occupation and thereby contributed to change the Danish self-image”.

Attendance at public commemorations had become less and less attractive over the decades, from several hundred thousand in 1945 to a couple of thousand in 1985 and, simultaneously, became coupled with political protest (Sørensen, 1995; Maier, 2010:152-156). In 1995, heroic rituals celebrating the end of World War II were replaced by a laser show stretching from the Danish west coast, via some remaining bunkers, to the German island of Syld. Whilst the wider public appreciated the spectacle, former resistance fighters vehemently opposed the emphasis on reconciliation at the expense of remembering the resistance itself.

Of main importance for the development of a post-1989 “memory-wave”, in particular in Denmark, was the Stockholm International Forum in 2000. The Stockholm process led in 2004 to the introduction of a Danish Holocaust memorial day, Auschwitz-dag, and has been organised ever since.
with much effort. In the course of this process, the government also decided to finance a research project looking into the expulsion of about 130 stateless persons of which about 21 of them, Jews, as a result died in German concentration camps. This issue was first raised in 1998 by Vilhjálmur Örn Vilhjálmsson (2005:8-13) and the project ultimately led to an official public apology by Prime Minister Rasmussen on 4 May 2005 (Rasmussen, 2005). Similarly, Lars Larsen and Thomas Clausen (1997) described the situation of German refugees who were sent back to Germany or were interned in Denmark in order to appease Germany.

In 1999, a series of articles was published in the newspaper Berlingske Tidende on Danish business enterprises and their trade with Nazi Germany, e.g. the Dansk Industri Syndikat which had produced weapons for Germany (summarised in a subsequently published book by Jensen et al., 2000; cf. Andersen, 2005 for a more general assessment of Danish industrial collaboration). Economic collaboration was even more significant in the area of agriculture: according to Phil Giltner (2001:488), Danish agricultural products significantly stabilised the German war effort and Joachim Lund (2005:16, my translation) published Hitlers spisekammer, concluding that agricultural “co-operation meant collaboration”.

Although the significance of the resistance movement had already been challenged in the 1970s, Peter Øvig Knudsen (2001) showed in a newspaper article in 2000 that the glorified resistance had killed innocent people and a documentary on the subject was broadcast in 2003. Whilst it remains unclear to what extent the Frihedsråd was involved in signing off the killing of alleged informers, single resistance cells did kill about 400 people of which an estimated third to a half are thought to have been innocent. These killings have not been investigated by the courts. Knudsen also pointed to the involvement of resistance groups in more profane criminal activities, in particular after the disbanding of the Danish police in September 1944. A more differentiated view of the resistance was

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even observable in *Flammen og Citronen* (2008), the most expensive Danish action movie so far. Research has also dealt with the immediate aftermath of the war. Already, in 1985, Ditlev Tamm had investigated the so called *retsopgøre*, i.e. the juridical treatment of alleged collaborators. Most of the approximately 13,500 sentenced – including 78 death penalties of which 46 were executed – were responsible for minor offences while those who collaborated on a large scale were often able to avoid conviction. Warring (1994) showed how Danish women who had relationships with Germans during the occupation were badly treated after the war. Helge Hagemann (1998) investigated how about 500 German soldiers died while clearing the Danish West coast of mines under extremely dangerous conditions shortly after 1945. Kirsten Lylloff (1999:58-61) showed that Danish doctors actively and passively avoided treating German refugees. As a consequence, 13,741 people, of whom 7,859 children, died of minor illnesses such as diarrhoea.

Research has also challenged the dominant narrative about the rescue of the Danish Jews. It has shown that it was not so much the Danish resistance but rather Best’s act of deception – in order to maintain public peace and keep out the Wehrmacht – that facilitated the rescue in the first place. The fact that boat skippers did not act solely out of altruism when helping Jews to escape to Sweden but rather a desire for profit contrasted with the traditional image of the rescue (Mogensen et al., 2003:47-50). Furthermore, researchers have shown that, although of minor influence, anti-Semitism also occurred in Denmark (Mogensen, 2001) and that Danish anti-anti-Semitism, when becoming hegemonial, had something instrumental about it as it was not just ‘humanitarian’. Rather, it symbolised a political process in the 1930s where a broad alliance of politicians (...) attempted to create internal mobilisation around Danish democratic values in order to cultivate defence against the totalitarian danger from the south and east against which one could not defend oneself outwardly (Rüinitz, 2003:67, my translation).

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Investigating the very foundation of modern Denmark, Cecilie F. Stockholm Banke (2005) linked the emergence of the Danish welfare state to exclusionary policies towards (Jewish) refugees in the 1930s. Her research on Denmark’s administration illustrates how the needs of de facto political refugees collided with the creation of progressive social planning by the then Social-Liberal government. Capping the number of refugees – about 2,000 were allowed to enter the country between 1933 and 1940 – aimed to appease Germany, preventing a ‘Jewish question’ in Denmark and securing a national labour market which, in turn, created a Danish collective capable of withstanding Germanisation, or even Nazification, as military resistance was no sustainable option. Stockholm Banke’s criticism of this particular rationale behind the implementation of the welfare state leads her to conclude that not just governments but the very idea of liberal democracy failed.

Whilst justified pride in the rescue of Jews in Denmark as well as the resistance had been hegemonic for most of the second half of the twentieth century, these examples illustrate that there has been a lively and self-critical debate amongst the Danish public over the nation’s role under occupation since the 1990s. This has enabled a more critical self-image to emerge without which, I claim, the debate subsequently introduced can hardly be understood.

8.3 The Situational Context of the Debate

As in many other European and non-European countries, the war in Iraq at the beginning of 2003 was heatedly debated in Denmark where a centre-right-wing government, headed by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, decided to join the Coalition of the Willing. At the beginning, this was justified via the apparent danger from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In September 2002, Rasmussen had even warned of deadly gas attacks on Danish cities by Saddam Hussein (Kaae & Nissen, 2008:25f), and in a newspaper article in March 2003, Rasmussen (2003a) still referred to issues of security and WMD. Given the collapse of this argument in mid-2003 and the emergence of
new problems (the insurgency in Iraq and rising unemployment in Denmark), the government increasingly needed new arguments in order to legitimise its position.

Although Rasmussen (2003a) had already in March 2003 tried to link his foreign policy to Denmark’s resistance against German occupation and Danish cooperation, and had even indicated such in November 2002 (Rasmussen, 2002), this was first and foremost achieved through a speech at the navy’s Officers Candidate School. The speech was given on the 60th anniversary of the end of the policy of cooperation, i.e. when the unity government was dissolved on 29 August 1943, and in honour of the navy which sank its fleet so that German forces could not take control of it. His argument was widely perceived as an attempt to legitimise Danish participation in the Iraq War, and was flanked by two even more outspoken articles published in the same month. In a foreword to the veterans anniversary paper, Rasmussen (2003c, my translation) claimed that “the lesson of 29 August 1943 is still pertinent [also] in connection with the war that has just ended against Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regime in Iraq”. This claim was repeated in an educational paper distributed to Danish pupils in the 9th and 10th grades (2003d).87

By constructing the policy of cooperation as wrong and equating resistance to it with the war against Iraq, Rasmussen aimed to legitimise the latter by linking two discourses. On the one hand, the speech was controversial as Rasmussen was the first prime minister openly to question the historical consensus that cooperation was necessary (Stockholm Banke, 2009:274). His remarks were thus directly relevant to the discourse on Danish behaviour during World War II. On the other hand, the text was also an intervention in the discourse on Denmark’s role in the attack on Iraq. To that extent, the Danish case is furthermore special as it is a single document, i.e. Rasmussen’s speech, which triggered one of the major debates over the nation’s past and present.

87 My thanks to E. Skov Jørgensen from the organisation Frihedskampens Veteraner (Veterans of the Struggle for Freedom) for kindly supplying me with the document.
The debate in Denmark, i.e. its representation in the Danish primary corpus (50 articles in total), diverges substantially from the debates in Germany and Austria. Instead of being directly concerned with the crisis over the war in Iraq during the early parts of 2003, the discussion instead revolved around the above-mentioned intervention by Rasmussen in mid-2003. While the debate was thus linked to the war in Iraq, its immediate concern was the (mis)use of the country’s past. This debate was extremely lively and was conducted in all four newspapers. In comparison to both the German as well as the Austrian corpus, the Danish one was much more coherent in that relatively few articles addressed entirely different matters. That is to say, only about 10% of the primary corpus is unrelated, such as an introduction to, e.g., the history of another national newspaper (Ekstra Bladet) and an assessment of the 1968 movement.

Articles which were concerned with Rasmussen’s speech included topics such as general reflections on the condition of the country’s ongoing kulturkamp (culture war) between the political camps concerning the predominance of grand interpretations and ideas. Other articles recontextualised Rasmussen’s argument, including, e.g., the claim that the fight for democratic principles and against terrorism must include the cutback of agricultural subsidies in Europe or a more liberal attitude towards immigrants. Of those articles directly addressing Rasmussen and his utilisation of samarbejdspolitikken, about 10 articles were in clear support of his position, stressing the need to learn lessons from history and often thematising Iraq in connection to the Danish past. In contrast, about 20 articles objected to his argument, largely on the basis of its alleged historical inaccuracies. Support for Rasmussen was rather coherently expressed in BT and, to a lesser degree, in JP. In contrast, articles in both leftist newspapers vehemently criticised the prime minister. As I will show in the following section, it was, however, mainly Rasmussen himself whose remarks applied a rhetoric of judge-penitence whilst most other participants – politicians, academics and lay members of the public – retreated to less sophisticated positions.
8.4 Analysis

8.4.1 Example VII: ‘Fighting is the Only Honourable Solution’

This first example is an obvious choice given that it was this speech by Rasmussen which triggered the entire debate (Section 8.3). It is the second example of a speech being reprinted in a newspaper, in this case in the debate section of the liberal daily *Politiken* on the very same day (29 August 2003).

29 August 1943 is a date we should remember – and be proud of. That was the day on which Denmark’s honour was saved. It was when the Danish government finally [langt om længe] abandoned their policy of cooperation with the German occupying forces. Following three full years of cooperation, there would finally [endelig] be clarity. It was not a day too soon.

The date of 29 August 1943 is also a proud day of remembrance in the history of the navy. On that day, German units attacked all Danish military installations. At 04.00 hours, in the morning, German units arrived here in Holmen. The Danish naval officers knew that there was a risk that the Germans would seek to take control of the fleet. They had already taken the decision that, in such a scenario, they would seek neutral Swedish territory or, if this was not possible, sink the ships so that they would not fall into German hands. By far the majority of Danish naval vessels were sunk and some of the units that were at sea managed to reach Sweden.

The situation in Denmark came to the attention of the Allies. There is no doubt that sinking the fleet contributed to an improvement in their estimation of Denmark.

The fact that cooperation with the Germans ceased was not due to any effort on the part of parliament or the establishment. On the contrary, from the start of the occupation on 9 April 1940, the official line had been one of obedience to the Germans. There had been cooperation at all levels and Danish people had been asked to comply in like manner. On taking up the position of Foreign Minister in 1940, Erik Scavenius declared “that the significant German victories” had “shattered and stunned the world”. It was his opinion that Denmark had then to find its place in necessary and reciprocal cooperation with the...
Germans. It was not enough that Denmark’s political leaders of the time decided to follow a passive policy of adjustment with regard to the Germans. The then government made a conscious and open decision to adopt an active policy towards the occupying power in the hope that some sovereignty would be retained. New historical research shows that it was a very active policy of ‘adjustment’. Many were convinced that the Germans would be victorious. Politicians, civil servants and organisations began to prepare Denmark’s place in the new Nazi-dominated Europe. Officials at the centre of things were busy with plans to change the Danish system to follow the pattern of a Nazi planned economy.

The main argument for cooperation was that any Danish resistance against the superior German forces was useless [nytteløs]. By working together with the occupying forces, Denmark and its people would be spared most of the horrors of war. And it worked. The Danes escaped the worst of the destruction. Agriculture and industry benefitted from the war. In a cool appraisal, some might call the policy of cooperation necessary, sensible and desirable.

But that is a very dangerous way of thinking. If everyone had proceeded along the same lines as the collaborators, Hitler would most probably have won the war and Europe would be a Nazi state. Fortunately the British, American and Russians did not share the view of the Danish elite. They fought the Nazis and gave us our freedom.

Ultimately, it was the population’s growing dissatisfaction with the policy of cooperation and the action of courageous resistance fighters which forced the government to give up their cooperation with the Germans. This is something for which we should be both thankful and proud. We owe our thanks to the resistance fighters who managed to thwart the cooperating political class [samarbejdspolitikerne] by means of sabotage against the Germans and cooperation with the Allied forces. They ensured that Denmark was on the right side in the fight against the Nazis.

Of course one should be careful of passing judgment on past events from a modern point of view. Today we know that the Nazis lost the war after the USA and the Soviet Union became involved in 1941 – and this is why the active Danish policy of adjustment appears mistaken and unacceptable. Had it continued
to the end of the war, Denmark would have emerged as a German puppet state and partner. In the light of history, this would have been a catastrophe.

But did things look different at the beginning of the war? If the Germans had won the war, would not Denmark have profited from their earlier adjustment to German supremacy?

This was how many thought. Yet it seems naive to believe that Hitler would have taken particular notice of Denmark, had Germany won the war. Moreover, there were highly placed officials who, from the onset of war, distanced themselves from these naive presumptions. Denmark’s independent representative in Washington, Henrik Kaufmann, and Vincens Steensen-Leth, counsellor at the Danish legation in Berlin, considered from the start that the policy of adjustment was naive and mistaken. They warned that Denmark would not be given any concessions by the Nazis in any particular area because it was the democratic state itself that the Nazis wanted to suppress. The Nazis accepted only one system – that of National Socialism. There was no room for special treatment in what Hitler called a small inconsequential state.

Even judged against the assumptions of the time, the Danish policy appears naive and it is totally unacceptable that the political elite in Denmark pursued not only a neutral but an active policy of adjustment to that extent. In the fight between democracy and dictatorship, one cannot stay neutral. One has to support democracy and oppose dictatorship. This is why the policy of active alignment of the time represented political and moral betrayal.

All too often over the course of history, we Danes simply sailed under a flag of ease and convenience and allowed others to fight for freedom and peace. The lesson to be drawn from 29 August 1943 is that, if we set store by our values, by our freedom, democracy and human rights, then we too should contribute actively in the effort to defend them. Even when the odds are difficult. Even when unpopular and dangerous decisions have to be made. Let us honour our countrymen’s involvement in the resistance movement and the armed forces for freedom and democracy.
As mentioned above, the article is a printed version of a speech which, genre typically, starts by addressing the audience directly (“Dear Sir and Madam”). By recontextualising the speech in a national newspaper, this politeness formula was, however, deleted. As a consequence, the inclusive “we” in line 1 does not simply appeal to the immediate audience but constitutes the audience in terms of the entire nation. This all encompassing “we” becomes even more significant as it is linked to a rightness claim: “we should remember – and be proud of”. While this tells the audience what it should do, the justification for this claim is remarkable. Instead of providing historiographic data first – which is probably the conventional way – Rasmussen’s first reason is that on this day, “Denmark’s honour was saved” (lines 1-2; historiographic backing is provided thereafter via “the Danish government finally [langt om længe] abandoned its policy of cooperation, lines 2-3). This suggests a hierarchy of what is important: national honour is presented first whilst what is actually problematic, Nazi occupation, follows in second place. This is further emphasised by presenting the issue via a presupposition, namely that the honour of nations is something worth saving. Thereby, Rasmussen turns a disputable question into a given, projecting a particular perspective upon the readers and the way s/he might understand the subsequent argument. The paragraph, furthermore, perspectivises Rasmussen not only via his rightness claim but also twice through the use of “finally” (lines 2 and 4) as well as the paragraph’s final sentence in line 4. In sum, the paragraph introduces the two main themes of the article. Firstly, national pride is central. This is, secondly, combined with pointing to the nation’s past failure as Rasmussen, as the country’s first prime minister, condemns samarbejdspolitiken. Whilst national honour – normally opposed to admitting past wrongdoings – is mentioned, legitimation is therefore not simply achieved through praise of the nation’s past. It is the presupposition behind “Denmark’s honour was saved” which indicates its endangerment through wrongdoing, i.e. the “cooperation with the German forces” (line 3) in the first place.

Lines 6-15 can be understood as a tribute to the immediate audience of his speech at the navy’s Officers Candidate School whereby both truth claims are correct. Firstly, the Danish navy sank most of its fleet which could otherwise have been used against the Allies. Secondly, this helped to improve
the Allies’ estimation of Denmark (in particular as the navy had previously helped the Germans in their minesweeping efforts – which is not mentioned by Rasmussen).

However, what constitutes Rasmussen’s main claim in this text follows only now. Whilst Rasmussen already at the very beginning made it clear that *samarbejdsprogrammet* was a mistake, he now allocates responsibility and solely blames the (political) elite for its cooperation (lines 17-20). By and large, this truth claim is not incorrect. However, it already starts to construct a questionable dichotomy between an active (political) elite which cooperated and a passive population which complied as it “had been asked to” (line 20). This dichotomy is developed through a series of juxtapositions and intensifications, such as in line 17 (“not due to *any* effort”, my emphasis), line 18 (“[o]n the contrary”) and “obedience” in line 19. As backing for his claim, Rasmussen turns to possibly the most (in)famous figure of *samarbejdsprogrammet*, Scavenius, whom he quotes in line 21. It is true that the elite – not only the political – did cooperate and defend this policy (Section 8.2.1) and that Scavenius was one of the main representatives of this strategy. However, it is equally true that this cooperation had the support of all four major parties, including Rasmussen’s *Venstre* and was accepted by the vast majority of Danes who behaved in accordance with the politicians’ advice. To that extent, it is wrong to attribute *samarbejdsprogrammet* simply to the (political) elite or, even more personalised, to Scavenius (“his opinion”, line 22) or the Social-Liberals (and Social Democrats) for whom he stood.

This line of argumentation is further developed in lines 23-26 when Scavenius’ remark enables Rasmussen to contrast “a passive policy of adjustment” with “an active policy towards the occupying power”. The focus here rests again on the “political elite” and addresses criticism of Scavenius and others as showing too much accommodation towards Germany. Although this claim might well be correct, there are a couple of problematic assumptions in this passage. As mentioned above, the population and not just the elite did overwhelmingly support *samarbejdsprogrammet*. By not mentioning this support and the good reasons people had for this, Rasmussen, firstly, ignores historical facts which do not support his projection of reality. Secondly, the characterisation of the
“political leaders” through lexical choices such as “decided” (line 23), “made a conscious and open decision” (lines 24-25), “very active” (line 26) and “busy” (line 29) is questionable and helps in creating a scapegoat. After all, this presupposes room for manoeuvre and implies a failure to use opportunities which, however, politicians of this time hardly had as it was ultimately the German side which decided the speed and direction of developments. Rasmussen could have argued against concrete shortcomings of the policy of cooperation, such as those listed in Section 8.2.1. However, he avoids doing so as this would, e.g., mean mentioning the unconstitutional ban on the Communist Party. Thirdly, his criticism, whilst resting on the separation of an active versus a passive policy of cooperation or adjustment, never defines this difference. On the one hand, criticism of the shortcomings by Scavenius or Buhl is not fallacious and Rasmussen might even accept that full-scale resistance was not possible. On the other hand, the way he uses the prefixes “active”, “passive” and “neutral” when referring to the policy of cooperation throughout the text is problematic as its vagueness also immunises him against criticism. In other words, what does the separation of “active” from “passive” cooperation imply, what are the concrete cases, and why are they not named?

This theme is further discussed in lines 26-29 where Rasmussen, correctly, refers to “[n]ew historical research”. Given that that research, in particular since the mid-1990s, is indeed outlining the degree of cooperation across various fields – including politics – Rasmussen’s claim cannot be rejected as historically incorrect. However, the fact that he does not make an explicit reference obscures the difference between passive and active, now even “very active” (line 26). Furthermore, the passage is distorting as it is still the political elite which he focuses upon – in contrast to the bulk of research which has addressed agricultural and industrial businesses (Section 8.2.2). Other groups as well as the wider population, are not included – or only in a very vague way (“[m]any” in line 26 and “organisations” in line 27). Following the previous two paragraphs, Rasmussen’s criticism of the past thus remains directed against a single identifiable group instead of the entire in-group. To that extent, Rasmussen follows a traditional strategy of positive self- and negative ‘other’ representation by externalising wrongdoing to the political elite. However, by doing so, Rasmussen also ignores the
knowledge of the agents back then, substituting it with contemporary insight. As Rasmussen himself mentions, in 1940 (line 20) – but also in 1941 and even 1942, i.e. when Nazi Germany had defeated France and seemed to be victoriously attacking the Soviet Union – he must be aware that more resistance would have been disastrous. And indeed, Norwegian conditions, i.e. harsh measures by the Wehrmacht, were a publicly debated issue (Kirchhoff, 2004:109). However, instead of addressing the dilemmatic character of this situation, Rasmussen’s simplification, intentionally or not, feeds those who want to shift blame overwhelmingly towards one group.

Rasmussen addresses this potential objection in lines 31-35 (also lines 55-56). It is in this section that he also acknowledges the involvement of large parts of society – in contrast to his previous focus on the political elite: “Denmark and its people”, “[t]he Danes” as well as “[a]griculture and industry” are mentioned as beneficiaries of cooperating with Germany. The final sentence in lines 34-35, firstly, constructs those who are still in favour of cooperation and see it as a necessity (“some”) as cold and calculating (“necessary” and “sensible”), something which carries a pejorative undertone and even views cooperation as “desirable”. By linking the three adjectives through “and”, Rasmussen – in line with his strategy of non-differentiation – represents the policy of cooperation as being all three things. However, there is, firstly, a difference between viewing something as “necessary”, as arguably most of the population did and “sensible” or “desirable” which was probably true only for a minority, e.g. the agricultural sector represented by Rasmussen’s party. Secondly, it is interesting that in lines 34-35, Rasmussen refers to the “policy of cooperation” – without any prefix, i.e. active, passive or neutral. Through this lack of differentiation, his counterargument from line 37 onwards (see below), cannot be understood other than as a rejection of the entire policy of cooperation and not just a specific, i.e. active, realisation. Thirdly, the nomination of this other as “some” is problematic. On the one hand, Rasmussen acknowledges a significant number of supporters of this policy (“some” being more than a ‘few’) – which had, in fact, widespread popular support. On the other hand, this relativises their significance (“some” not being precise or indicating a particularly high number)
which, arguably, enables him not to compromise his juxtaposition of good population: evil elite. To that extent, vagueness again has a relativising function.

Rasmussen’s brief reference to “useless [nytteløs]” establishes an intertextual connection to his (Rasmussen, 2003a) previous attempt to justify the participation of Danish troops in the attack against Iraq by criticising an alleged Danish attitude of ‘Hvad-skal-det-nytte’ (‘What good would it do?’). Whilst Rasmussen does not make explicit which parties are meant, at least a ‘rightist/conservative’ audience understood this as singling out the left as being responsible for past wrongdoings. However, by remaining vague, Rasmussen avoided to appear partisan which would have countered his appeal to the entire nation. Having introduced the topic of ‘What good would it do?’, i.e. what can Denmark contribute anyway, this enables his main argument in lines 37-38: if everybody had collaborated, Hitler “would most probably have won the war”. Although this statement is correct from the standpoint of formal logic, it disingenuously overlooks the fact that not everyone had the same means to resist. Simply rejecting this thinking by portraying it as “dangerous” (line 37) hardly does justice to real-world complexities.

In line with this, his reference to “the British, American and Russians” (line 39) is telling. While his conclusion, “[t]hey fought the Nazis and gave us our freedom” in lines 39-40 is correct, its data conceal the fact that, firstly, the Soviet Union did cooperate with Nazi Germany on a massive scale (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and, in particular, its secret protocol). Secondly, Rasmussen’s argument overlooks the entirely different position of these powerful states with their geographical distance from Nazi Germany. They had different means and to set them up as examples seems naive. At the same time, those responsible for these misjudgements are specified, again, as “the Danish elite”. It is thus that Rasmussen indeed constructs the latter as having the same means as “the British, American and Russians”. As they are on a par, the responsibility for their failure rests even more heavily on them. This is furthermore indicated by nominating them in line 36 as “collaborators” instead of just (active) co-operators.
Having thereby identified “the Danish elite” as not only responsible for cooperating but indeed collaborating with the Nazis, the “population” and “courageous resistance fighters” (lines 42-43) take the role of the responsible agent. Although formally correct, the claims are deeply ambiguous. Firstly, the prime agent of resistance, “the population”, is portrayed as if its opposition to the policy of cooperation was largely motivated by moral concerns ("dissatisfaction with the policy of cooperation", line 42) as opposed to strategic calculations by the elite. In fact, at least the uprising in 1943 was largely driven by economic unease and happened against a background of Europe-wide strike action fuelled by expectations of a speedy collapse of the Axis forces. In addition, Rasmussen’s reference to the militant resistance (lines 42-46) is ambiguous as he mentions neither their, at least until 1943, limited appeal, nor the illegal Communists who were of particular importance. Here too, Rasmussen applies the personal pronoun “we” twice in line 44 in order to construct an in-group behind this message. This rightness claim leads to the conclusion that “we” owe the resistance “our” thanks on the basis that they ensured that Denmark was ultimately “on the right side” (line 47).

In addition to the vague character of Rasmussen’s remarks to which I have pointed above, lines 49 and 68 similarly fend off accusations of applying contemporary standards, accommodating those who argue that the past must be historicised, i.e. judged in its own context. He seems to acknowledge this by explicitly stating that “[t]oday we know that the Nazis lost” (lines 49-50) and therefore “the active Danish policy of adjustment appears mistaken and unacceptable” (line 51). Without the resistance, Denmark would have appeared a partner of Nazi Germany. This claim might be true. Nevertheless, several caveats are necessary. Firstly, using “[o]f course” in line 49 (similarly, “even” in line 68), intensifies his self-serving declaration in lines 49-50 but does not actually influence his subsequent conclusion. Secondly, by stating that “the active Danish policy of adjustment appears mistaken and unacceptable”, he presupposes, again, the existence of such an active policy without having sufficiently discussed this. Thirdly, adding to the previous paragraph, Rasmussen gives further backing to why the resistance is important, even for contemporary Denmark (lines 51-53). For sure, such an argument can be made and those who resisted do deserve admiration. However, the form of
the argument, i.e. the lack of differentiation concerning those who resisted, their reasons and the
general dilemma faced by everybody, makes it increasingly useable for other means.

The vagueness in constructing those who cooperated is repeated in line 58 (“many”). As pointed out
above, ‘almost all’ is probably more accurate but would have threatened Rasmussen’s own argument
by indicating how far away from reality his conclusions and representations of history actually are. In
addition, this group is now repeatedly predicated as “naive” (lines 58, 60, 62, 68). Given the
particular context and co-text, this description of the ‘other’ can well be understood as tendentious.
It implies that those who were in charge did not think through their decisions, were not able to fulfil
their duties and behaved irresponsibly (“catastrophe”, line 53). However, the politicians of the 1940s
probably thought extensively about their decisions and, in particular, the consequences of them.
Thus, even if those decisions might have been wrong, to label them naive, again, neglects the
complexity of that period and even serves as an *argumentum ad hominem*. Nevertheless,
Rasmussen’s particular lexical choice of “naive” became salient in the subsequent debate which is
probably also due to its constant repetition in this last third of his article by using the word four
times, thereby making it the second most frequent adjective after “active” (five times).

In order to legitimise his position, Rasmussen points to voices opposed to *samarbejdspolitikken* in
lines 58-64, in particular to two “highly placed officials”. The reference to Henrik Kaufmann is
especially interesting and much more than just an example. Kaufmann was the Danish ambassador to
the USA during World War II and was appointed before the beginning of the occupation. In 1941, he
signed a contract with the USA on his own initiative, authorising the USA to defend Greenland which
was officially (and still is) part of Denmark. This enabled the building of Thule Air Base which is still in
place. Although local officials in Greenland agreed, the unity government in Copenhagen protested
and stripped him of his rank – without consequences. As the relationship to the USA is still seen by
many Danes as being in the national interest (comparable to Poland or the United Kingdom’s
position), the reference to Kaufmann introduces an *argumentum ad exemplum* by insinuating the

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significance of the USA as an ally both back then and now. Thus, the example legitimises the contemporary alliance with the USA by presenting Kaufmann as a role model (van Leeuwen, 2007:95f). It is also interesting to see that in line 62, Rasmussen avoids speaking of a passive/neutral or active “policy of adjustment”, i.e. drawing again the entire policy – not just its mistaken realisation – into doubt. Even more interesting is the justification of this rejection. Whilst warning of the anti-democratic nature of National Socialism is undoubtedly correct, it is not true that Denmark did not get “any concessions” or failed in retaining “some sovereignty” (line 25). As long as, in particular, the agricultural sector supplied German war efforts, Danish politicians had something valuable to offer which enabled Denmark both to come through the war relatively unharmed and to maintain some form of democratic life, welfare and humanitarian activity, most notably the rescue of the Jews. Indeed, if the Germans had won the war, this situation would probably have changed (line 59) but basing one’s, i.e. Rasmussen’s, conclusion on such a future state and judging Denmark’s elite and population by such a standard seems, again, doubtful and tendentious.

Although Rasmussen, in previous paragraphs, has “of course” acknowledged that one should be careful when judging past events, the conclusion he has developed since then enables him to judge now. Lines 68-69 claim that not only was the policy “unacceptable” (intensified via “totally”) from today’s point of view but was also “against the assumptions of the time” (this is further intensified by “[e]ven” in line 68). However, firstly, Rasmussen does again single out the “political elite”, overlooking the fact that they had, for most of the time, massive public support. Ignoring this aspect distorts the argument as it suggests that not only can blame be easily shifted to a small, clearly demarcated group but also that everything would have been different, if only this group had decided to make it so. Secondly, his conclusion concerning what could be “judged against the assumptions of the time” seems problematic as Rasmussen, despite these two examples, has not refuted these assumptions through arguments. Finally, the reference to “pursued not only a neutral but an active policy of adjustment” is distorting too as he has still not elaborated the difference between “active” and “neutral”. Indeed, in what has been said, he seems to reject any kind of policy of cooperation.
After all, his claim that “one cannot stay neutral” and “one has to support democracy” (line 71) is made in support of an outright rejection of neutrality, i.e. a neutral policy of adjustment in the 1940s. However, already in lines 69-70, he again speaks of “active alignment”, perpetuating the obfuscating vagueness concerning the object of his criticism. Furthermore, the deontic character of this claim (“one cannot stay neutral. One has to support democracy”) leaves little room for taking into account the consequences of his suggestions whilst transcending the boundaries of the past and making it relevant to the present. The audience cannot be sure of the particular object of his criticism and, by now, might understand the text as a rejection of every policy of adjustment. Rasmussen concludes this passage by stating that failure of will is nothing other than “political and moral betrayal”.

At this point, Rasmussen is still formally concerned with the early 1940s which, however, changes in line 74: “over the course of history” explicitly transcends the horizon of the occupation and speaks to the contemporary community (arguably, this move is already prepared through the deontic character of the proposition in lines 70-71). This will, at least for some parts of the audience, call to mind the so-called footnote-policy.\footnote{\textit{Fodnotepolitikken} denotes a period during the 1980s in which '(centre-)left/liberal' parties argued for nuclear disarmament and against the deployment of US rockets. They thereby forced a minority conservative government to request 25 footnotes in NATO resolutions, documenting Danish reservations towards NATO policies (Diis, 2005:74).} The rightist parties have stressed this ever since and denounced the left for appeasing the Soviet Union, thereby repeating the mistakes of the period of occupation. Thus, Rasmussen recontextualises these arguments in order to legitimise his stance. Again, as this is not made explicit, Rasmussen can appeal to a '(centre-)right/conservative' audience whilst maintaining a non-partisan image. As Example VIII, Section 8.4.2 illustrates, his supporters did indeed take up this element in a much more explicit way. The alternative to past failure offered by Rasmussen is presented via a problematically sharp dichotomy: “ease and convenience” versus a “fight for freedom and peace”. Rasmussen furthermore perspectivises himself and intensifies this particular
sentence through “[a]ll too often” and “simply”. However, most significantly, the group facing this dichotomy is no longer simply the Danish elite but is the all-inclusive “we Danes”. This marks a radical break in his argumentation as the main point of reference is not any longer the construction of an elite which can be blamed for past wrongdoing (and, in turn, the construction of a heroic resistance), but the inclusion of the entire nation into a narrative of a failing collective.

The use of “we” enables this inclusion of the entire contemporary nation which is today supposed to take up the “fight for freedom and peace”. By referring to the topos of historia magistra vitae in line 75, Rasmussen justifies the claim that “we set store by our values” via a conditional sentence: few would not take one’s values, especially if these are “freedom, democracy and human rights”, seriously. But by using “then”, the affirmation of these values leads directly to an active contribution to defend them. This representation is supported lexically through “fight” (lines 70 and 75) which implies a particular understanding of how “we” should distance ourselves from wrongdoing as the term does not evoke metaphors of discussion and negotiation. This call to arms has been almost exclusively interpreted as a reference to the Danish participation in the war against Iraq. Consequently, critics on both the left and right as well as supporters of Rasmussen have understood his speech to be a retroactive legitimation of the Danish participation in the war against Iraq (Section 8.3). Argumentatively, Rasmussen suggests that if one learns the lessons, i.e. sets store by one’s values, then participation in the coalition against Iraq is a causal necessity. However, through his historical analogy and by presupposing military action through the term “fight”, this conveniently ignores other ways in which these values, i.e. democracy, freedom, human rights and peace, can be promoted.

The references to “difficult” and “unpopular and dangerous decisions” as well as the use of “[e]ven” in lines 77-78 further suggest an understanding of this text as justifying the war against Iraq, given the substantial public opposition to it. At the same time, it enables Rasmussen implicitly to predicate himself as a strong leader who offers leadership in accordance with the lessons offered by history. Much more, it even enables him to present himself as the one who reveals this lesson.
The final sentence has caused particular protest as it includes the armed forces (lines 78-79).

Although this could be understood as an acknowledgment of the navy’s decision to sink the fleet in 1943, it tended to be understood as a reference to Iraq. The latter is plausible given that the armed forces did not really contribute to “freedom and democracy” in the 1940s (their lack of fighting has been criticised in particular by conservatives) and the fact that Rasmussen could have explicitly referred to the navy, which, in the context of this speech, would have been the appropriate choice. In consequence, even some veterans of the resistance movement protested as they did not want to see their legacy being instrumentalised (e.g. Koch, 2003).

“[W]e Danes” have to contribute actively to the “fight for freedom, democracy and human rights” today.

Since if the lesson from history is that sailing “under a flag of ease and convenience”, i.e. not setting store to these values (as “we” did in the past), means “political and moral betrayal” of our values, then “we” must not do so again.

So, those who do not support this “fight” are morally inferior as they betray our values.

Figure 25: A schematic representation of Rasmussen (2003b) following Toulmin’s simple model

8.4.2 Example VIII: ‘There is One Lesson We Have to Learn’

This example represents a paradigmatic response in support of Prime Minister Rasmussen. The article appeared in the debate section of Jyllands-Posten on 8 September 2003 and was written by Niels Arevad Munch, Chairman of De Konservative in Århus, the second-largest city in Denmark.

1 We must learn from history

2

3 At the celebration on 29 August of the 60th anniversary of the civil unrest which led to the departure of the government and a break with the previous years’ policy of collaboration with the Nazis, Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen stated that he found the Danish policy of the time to be naive, and that it was
reprehensible that the Danish political elite pursued not just neutrality but an active policy of
‘adjustment’ to such a degree.

I believe that very few Danes disagree with the fact that the years leading up to the Second World War
and the war years are not one of the proudest periods in the history of our country [fædrelandets
historie] and that only the heroic battle of the resistance fighters, the Danes’ efforts to help Danish Jews
flee to Sweden and the actions of individuals such as the conservative politician Christmas Møller made
it possible for us to manage, by the skin of our teeth, to join the Allies’ side at the end of the war.

Meanwhile, it seems as if the Prime Minister has touched a sore spot for the present political elite. As
soon as Fogh Rasmussen’s words were out, they were dismissed as ‘gratuitous heroism’ and ‘naive and
embarrassing’ by historians, and the former foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen (NHP) called the
Prime Minister ‘wise after the event and resolute [krigerisk] in retrospect’.

This argumentation is based on the assumption that action against the Nazis was pointless and as
everyone expected the Germans to win the war, it was in the interest of the population to collaborate
actively with the Nazis. Knowing the outcome which saw the Allies win the war, it is too easy for us
today to criticise the politicians of those times, said NHP.

These statements are in my opinion a sign of immense cynicism and opportunism. If a nation is to adjust
its principles and actions according to whether an aggressor – either an individual or a nation – appears
to be about to successfully carry out its intention, then NHP in fact waives Denmark’s right as a nation to
assert its sovereignty, the right to maintain democracy rather than dictatorship, the right to think
certain values better than others, and thus the right to establish society as we would wish it.

Two points

The Prime Minister did not express the opinion that the Danish army should have taken up the fight
against the Nazis on 9 April 1940. This would have rendered meaningless the pacifist defence and
foreign policies of previous decades, as run by the Social Democrats and the radicals, including my own forefather, the Minster of Foreign Affairs P. Munch. But the Prime Minister makes two points: 1) every sovereign nation should have a credible defence in order to safeguard its sovereignty, including membership of defence alliances with other democracies, and 2) every democratic nation is obliged, in as far as it can, to actively defend its values against internal and external threats, irrespective of the size of that threat.

If NHP feels any form of gratefulness towards Great Britain and the USA, which, despite not being attacked by the Nazis, sent their soldiers to war to defend democracy and human rights, I think NHP – assuming, by the way, NHP thinks these values are better than those for which the Nazis stood – should explain why it might not be reasonable on a special commemorative day to remind each other that the politicians of the time did not think we should [skulle] object to the Nazis and that we should [skulle] not do our bit in the fight against the common enemy but let other nations do this job for us.

The Social Democrats have been noticeably silent during this affair and have only said that they would rather not spend time and energy on the debate. This is indeed not so surprising, given the considerable interests that the Social Democrats had in the policy that was pursued before and during the Occupation, just as several Social Democrats are not exactly keen to find out who collaborated with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and how. During this period too, several politicians who were part of the political elite refrained from taking sides and from defending the ideals of democracy against those of dictatorship.

The important thing now is not who did what, but that we should learn from history, recognise what we did wrong and remind each other that our values and democracy are worth fighting for.

Line 1 sets the scene by constructing an inclusive we-group and projecting a degree of urgency ("must") whilst implying that history provides lessons in the first place. In the first paragraph (lines 3-7), Munch summarises the state of the debate. The paragraph starts with a factually true claim concerning the end of samarbejdspolitken (lines 3-4). More importantly, however, Munch
reproduces the unresolved tension inherent in Rasmussen’s argument concerning the difference between passive neutrality and an active policy of adjustment by the political elite (lines 4-7). Here, the use of “naive” illustrates the formative nature of Rasmussen’s speech which had successfully established the word as a symbol. Although Munch did not yet clearly perspectivise himself but only echoed Rasmussen’s position, most readers will have nevertheless classified Munch’s summary as affirmative, given that De Konservative were part of his coalition government.

Lines 9-10 seem unproblematic as “very few” is relatively specific while, although not very exact, “not one of the proudest periods” does raise little protest, given the evolution of Denmark’s national narrative since 1989 (Section 8.2.2). What is notable though is the use of the word “Danes” and faedrelandet. The former helps Munch to introduce, like Rasmussen, an opposition between the elite which failed and is failing and the Danish people. The latter, faedrelandet, is a specific conservative-nationalist reference to the nation which has become rather rare in contemporary Denmark but will please a traditional conservative segment of the audience. This emphatic notion can easily lead to the traditional post-war narrative, i.e. the heroism of the resistance as well as the rescue of the Jews. But even if this traditional narrative ignores the less glorious aspects of these events, it does not necessarily distort his argument in this context. However, Munch’s argument becomes tendentious as soon as he emphasises his fellow party member Christmas Møller (line 12). Although the underlying validity claim, i.e. Møller’s unambiguous anti-cooperation position, is correct – the claim is problematic given that Munch avoids mentioning the much more significant Communist resistance. Thereby, he also avoids, firstly, a discussion of the failings of his party which supported the unlawful prosecution of Danish Communists and, secondly, mentioning the more mainstream and significant umbrella organisation of the resistance, Frihedsrådet, which was rather Social Democratic.

Line 15 identifies, like Rasmussen, the “present political elite” as the ‘other’ – in apparent opposition to “Danes” in general. Here, it becomes clear that Munch has not simply repeated Rasmussen’s position in paragraph one but shares this doubtful perspective. The subsequent sentence (lines 15-
18) even fallaciously constructs a straw man: although it is true that historians and the Social-Liberal politician Niels Helveg Petersen have criticised Rasmussen’s speech, representing criticism of Rasmussen as being limited to an elite does by no means exhaust the pool of critics. In addition, even if this apparent elite was ‘out of touch’ with ordinary Danes, this would not automatically disprove their argument. In line with the above straw-man fallacy, line 20 states that these critics saw resistance itself as “pointless”. However, the rejection of certain manifestations of resistance or Rasmussen’s speech by his critics does not justify such a generalising ascription. Here again, Munch makes recourse to Rasmussen’s ambiguous active:passive dichotomy (“actively”, line 22) which does not help in clarifying this fallaciously hasty generalisation.

Line 25 presents Munch’s own position explicitly (“in my opinion”), showing his “immense” (intensification) rejection of these critics. Still, the claim remains tendentious given that the accusation (“cynicism and opportunism”) again overlooks the real dilemmas faced by politicians of the early 1940s and that critics of Rasmussen were just pointing to this fact. More interesting though is the subsequent conditional which, much more rigidly, aims to project an interpretation onto the reader: *if* a nation adjusts its “principles and actions” according to a successful aggressor, *then* this nation waives its sovereignty, i.e. the right to establish society as it wishes. Firstly, this seems to illustrate a naive belief in the myth of sovereignty, that is, as if any entity is nowadays able to exercise this right in an increasingly interdependent world. Secondly, the use of the personal pronoun “we” (line 29) not only creates a group onto which Munch can project his claims but also denies the fact that what appear as national values are, mostly, the outcome of some kind of societal struggle. The hasty use of “we” overlooks this by hypostatising “the nation”. This is of particular relevance in this case as Communists fought as well whilst having largely been denied recognition.

Thirdly, lines 25-29 imply that sovereignty, democracy and Danish values were wiped out on 9 April. However, while they were certainly not strengthened, critics of Rasmussen have stressed that the policy of cooperation secured them to a degree that would not have been possible if militant resistance had dominated (for which there was no popular support anyway). Thus, it is Munch’s – in
line with Rasmussen’s initial proposition – black:white dichotomy which distorts the evaluation of the merits and pitfalls of samarbejdspolitikken.

This distortion becomes more obvious in lines 33-36. Whilst it is true that Rasmussen “did not express the opinion that the Danish army should have taken up the fight against the Nazis” (lines 33-34), it is the vagueness concerning the difference between a necessary, legitimate passive policy of adjustment and an active, wrong collaboration, as well as the call to arms in contemporary conflicts, which steered the debate. Even more fallacious (red herring) is Munch’s explanation for why militant resistance in the early 1940s was meaningless: according to Munch, resistance was meaningless not because of the strength of the German army, which at that point was overrunning Europe, but due to policies which did not favour the army and were not supported by the Conservatives. Whilst the latter is factually true, is seems unlikely that even a strong Danish army would have been of much concern to a determined Wehrmacht. The two points to which Munch then refers (lines 36-40) seem equally doubtful. Point one ignores insights by politicians of the late 19th and first half of the 20th century, among others the Conservative Estrup quoted at the very beginning of this chapter, who were well aware that positioning Denmark in an anti-German alliance would do little good. And even if Denmark had been a member of such an alliance at the beginning of the 1940s, the value of such a membership seems questionable. In addition, Rasmussen defended particular values but without restricting himself to an entirely defensive position, as suggested by Munch in lines 37 and 38 (“credible defence”, “defence alliance”). Instead, Rasmussen was ultimately clear about the need for linking these values to an interventionist policy. Munch might allude to this second aspect when elaborating point two (lines 38-39) by stating, without any justification, that “every democratic nation is obliged (...) to actively defend its values”. Even if this were true, the sentence’s end ultimately proves the point of Rasmussen’s critics. After all, this call to defend one’s values is not mitigated (the mitigation in line 39 seems to have little effect on this) but holds true “irrespective of the size of the threat”. Thus, Munch commits himself explicitly to a position in which no dilemmas are accepted and in which heroic martyrdom is ultimately preferable to ambivalent politics.
Lines 42-47 are of even greater significance. Here again, it is relevant to point to the conditional form of the sentence (if – should). After all, few will reject “any form of gratefulness towards Great Britain and the USA (my emphasis)”. As in Example VI, Section 7.4.3, Munch does not specify the meaning of “gratefulness” and why it should commit those who should legitimately feel it to every kind of action. But supported by some hedging (“by the way”, line 44; “might not be”, line 45), this premise enables him to question any opposition to Rasmussen’s speech. Lines 45-47, which recapitulate Rasmussen’s thesis, are questionably presupposing “that the politicians of the time did not think we should object to the Nazis and that we should not do our bit in the fight against the common enemy but let other nations do this job for us” (my emphasis). Given the seriousness of this accusation, this might amount to an argumentum ad hominem. Either way, it seems unlikely that politicians thought that Nazism “should” (note the deontic quality) not be opposed. More likely, they saw no realistic possibility to do so on a large (militant) scale. Instead, they tried to secure what was within range and which, indeed, included very concrete questionable decisions (Section 8.2.1). The repeated use of “we” (line 46) and “us” (line 47) should also be noted, as the audience of this discourse is largely not congruent with those who participated in the struggle against Nazi Germany. Given that merging periods is part of every nationalist discourse, this is not too surprising but it helps Munch (as it helped Rasmussen) to establish a group which he can address in the first place. More specifically, this group should “fight” and “defend democracy and human rights”, at least today, instead of “let[ting] other nations do this job for us” (this is almost verbatim with Rasmussen’s remark).

After this passage, few readers will doubt that, due to the reference to “today” and “fighting”, this is actually about Iraq. Notable too is the reference to Great Britain and the USA in lines 42-43. True, Germany did not formally attack these countries first. However, it is naive to assume that, firstly, Britain could have accepted a single militaristic power to control the continent which would have run contrary to its century-old policy in favour of a balance of power, i.e. to give support to varying continental powers according to the state of affairs. Secondly, e.g., the German submarine warfare in the Atlantic did affect the USA long before the country’s formal declaration of war. Munch’s
portrayal of Great Britain and the USA as unselfish moralists is thus at least tendentious. What is even more striking than these two details is the missing third (and to a degree also fourth) ally: France (and the Soviet Union). In particular the former was not attacked either but declared war together with and for similar reasons as Great Britain. And whilst it is true that France soon collapsed, the country’s forces nevertheless played a role in fighting Nazism and one would expect to see it mentioned as well. Given that it is not, and given the contemporary language of democracy and human rights, it is likely that the entire paragraph aims to project a particular distorted reading of the past onto the reader which, due to the conditional sentence structure, should enforce a particular understanding of the present. In other words, by describing the past in terms of present language and political players, i.e. ignoring France which does not fit into this past-present merger due to its resistance to the Iraq War, particular lessons appear compelling.

The claim that Social Democrats were not among the fiercest critics of Rasmussen is true (lines 49-50) but Munch’s reference to the party’s role during the occupation as well as the Cold War is an attempt to score political points well below the sophistication of the above argument. The paragraph even entails a serious accusation of collaboration in lines 52-53 which is problematic for the further development of dialectical argumentation, given the lack of justification for this claim. Instead, the paragraph ends with another reference to “the political elite”, i.e. the left which “refrained from taking sides”. By having talked about Social Democrats before, this latter argument again conceals that the Conservatives too were part of the unity government during the early 1940s. By, adopting a contemporary language of democracy versus dictatorship (lines 54-55), Munch furthermore establishes an intertextual link to the Iraq War without explicitly mentioning the conflict.

The final two lines seem to step back from the party-political argument made above by insisting on the “important thing now” (my emphasis). The focus is thus explicitly shifted into the present. At the same time, Munch’s previous representation remains relevant, given his assertion that “we should learn from history”. The topos of *historia magistra vitae* is therefore as explicit as it can be. But
although Munch acknowledges wrongdoing in lines 57-58 ("recognise what we did wrong"), this text does not really connect this topos to a rhetoric of judge-penitence as its force does not rest on an acknowledgment of wrongdoing but rather the direct application of historia magistra vitae. The text as a whole appears to be in support of the war against Iraq, given that the final reference to “fighting” (instead of other lexical choices) and “values and democracy” (as a common justification of this war) is, again, projecting Iraq onto the reader’s mind, making little sense otherwise.

Figure 26: A schematic representation of Munch (2003) following Toulmin’s simple model

8.4.3  **Example IX: ‘US-Americans are Danes are Nazis’**

This contribution, triggered by Rasmussen’s speech, is a very critical one and was made in the debate section of the centre-right *Jyllands-Posten* on 8 September 2003. The article is written by John West Nielsen, an ordinary member of the public. It is of particular interest as the text does not simply refute Rasmussen’s argument on the basis of historical inaccuracies as do, e.g., Kirchhoff (2003), Villy Søvndall (2003) and Henning Tjørnehøj (2003) to name just three of them, but recognises the legitimising function of Rasmussen’s acknowledgment of past failures whilst developing a counter-argument by reinterpreting this relation between the past and the present.

1 Misuse of the resistance movement
2 In evident agreement, the leaders of the two government parties, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the Minister for Economic and Business Affairs, Bendt Bendtsen, have chosen to mark the 60th anniversary of the August uprising by taking issue with the policy of cooperation during the Occupation.
Remarkably, the two party leaders say nothing of the roles of their own parties, which were the most pro-German parties in the Danish parliament at that time. Both were thus involved in the government established after 9 April 1940 that cooperated with the Germans.

This position taken by both party leaders in choosing to distance themselves from the policy of cooperation now, some 60 years after 1943, comes across in a somewhat sickly light [gustent overlæg, literally: has sallow overtones].

[Suiting their] Own purposes
Most of the people who took an active part in the forging of the cooperation policy are now deceased.

They [the party leaders] are not out to insult fellow party members but can take a historic event and turn it around to suit their own purposes: backing the present government’s war policy.

The educational paper which the Prime Minister has published for the students of the country’s 9th and 10th grades makes it quite clear. It is a matter of daring to take a stance and to act accordingly, as Denmark did in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

The problem is that the comparison does not hold up.

Denmark is not currently part of an anti-fascist struggle for liberation, but has herself become an occupying power in another country, against international law.

And our closest ally in this fight is the superpower USA which, in certain respects, is alarmingly reminiscent of the former Germany.

Germany built concentration camps; the US has its camp at the Guantanamo base. Germany sought Lebensraum; the US seeks world supremacy and control of the world’s most important commodities.
Germany fought Jews and Communists. Today it is Muslims, terrorists and Communists.

To capitalise on the folk uprising in 1943 and the resistance movement to the credit of the government’s current policy is quite simply both hypocritical and outrageous.

There can be no direct line between 1943 and the current Denmark’s grovelling support for US foreign policy.

However the wartime resistance movement can be directly compared with resistance towards Denmark’s membership of NATO, as well as with today’s peace movement.

Already in line 1, the author makes transparent what is going to follow: a rejection of Rasmussen’s remarks as representing an illegitimate instrumentalisation (“misuse”) of the resistance against German occupation. Lines 3-5 primarily serve to set the scene by summarising the state of affairs. While Rasmussen’s speech has been discussed in detail above, the contribution by Bendt Bendtsen, then leader of Det Konservative Folkeparti, is not part of the Danish primary corpus — whereby, in contrast to Rasmussen’s Venstre, Bendtsen’s party was indeed involved in the resistance. There is probably only one remarkable linguistic detail in this passage, i.e. the presentation of the two leaders as being in “evident agreement”. This intensification of their status further homogenises their positions. However, in contrast to many other attempts to homogenise positions, this claim is neither formally nor content-wise distorting, given the specific reference to two agents and indeed the existing similarities between their statements.

Lines 7-9 provide more information by claiming that, firstly, both leaders say nothing about the roles of their own parties during the occupation which were, secondly, the most pro-German in the Danish parliament. Line 9 starts with “[r]emarkably” which stresses the peculiarity of the leaders’ remarks and concerns the former truth claim, Nielsen is correct in doing so. For example, Rasmussen’s
extensively discussed article (Example VII, Section 8.4.1) is quick to condemn the political elite whilst, however, avoiding spelling out the reasons why and how his party was involved. As the predominant representative of the farming sector, it was Venstre and its clientele that benefitted most during the occupation and had almost no links to the resistance. To that extent, Nielsen’s second truth claim is correct, at least with regards to Venstre. However, the homogenisation he introduces in line 3 determines him to claim that Det Konservative Folkeparti too (“their own parties”, line 7) were stern supporters of the policy of cooperation. This is wrongly shifting blame. Although the party was a member of the unity government, it was at least split over this question with, in particular, its youth movement as well as senior figures such as Møller opposing (far-reaching) concessions. Thus, while Det Konservative Folkeparti’s policies can be criticised for various reasons, e.g. Italio-fascist tendencies in its youth movement during the 1930s or the usefulness of Møller’s agitation, the fact remains that the party was probably the most sceptical member of the unity government concerning samarbejdspolitikken. In addition, saying that “[b]oth were thus involved in the government” (line 8, my emphasis) which cooperated with the Germans is therefore fallacious. It is not only based on a factually incorrect premise but applies a non sequitur fallacy by suggesting that because the parties were pro-German, they were involved in the government. However, to suggest that their pro-German stance was not just relative to other parties in a situation forced upon them but did causally drive them into the government does go too far.

The author’s first conclusion, based on the data presented in lines 3-9, is thus ambiguous. On the one hand, Nielsen’s claims are partly distorting the argument. On the other hand, the claim that Rasmussen and Bendtsen’s remarks “now, some 60 years after 1943, comes across in a somehow sickly light” can be made without being fallacious. Indeed, many other critics have addressed exactly this point: that criticism 60 years after the events took place does not consider the consequences that open resistance would have had and is therefore unhistorical and amounts to scoring cheap political points.
The author’s claims in lines 15-23 address this theme when making explicit his opinion that Rasmussen and Bendtsen’s comments suit their own purposes instead of aiming for a serious debate on Denmark’s past. Line 16 states the obvious by pointing out that most of those responsible for the policy of cooperation have since died. The implication is that Rasmussen and Bendtsen need not expect back talk and, potentially, tensions within their own parties. This is made explicit in lines 18-19 which, more importantly, also point to what this, according to Nielsen, is all about: legitimising “war policy”. This truth claim is at the heart of this article along with other criticism of Rasmussen and Bendtsen’s initiative. Its data is the claim that both party leaders misuse the period of occupation, i.e. “turn it around to suit their own purpose”. This is both formally and content-wise non-fallacious as lines 21-23 justify Nielsen’s validity claim. That is, the backing of his argument lies in the distribution of the educational paper mentioned in Section 8.3 which is indeed a remarkable instrumentalisation of schools and explicitly aimed at legitimising the Iraq War.

So far, Nielsen’s criticism of Rasmussen and Bendtsen broadly mirrors widespread discontent with their remarks, mostly on the basis of historical inaccuracies. However, I claim that Rasmussen’s intervention was relatively successful due to the fact that by ultimately including all citizens when acknowledging failure, he argued in a rather moral instead of a partisan way. In contrast, many critics missed this dimension by focusing on the deconstruction of the speech’s historiographic shortcomings. Nielsen’s criticism is different to the extent that from line 25 onwards, the author develops an argument which addresses Rasmussen’s moral argumentation directly and tries to turn it against him.

Taking Rasmussen’s argument – which gains its force through blending his interpretation of the anti-Nazi struggle of the early 1940s with the fight against Saddam Hussein in 2003 – seriously, Nielsen starts by challenging this equation. That is to say, Nielsen casts doubt on the very comparison between the resistance to the occupation of Denmark by Germany and the fight by Denmark against supposedly neo-fascist regimes such as the Taliban and Iraq (line 25). However, in doing so, Nielsen
himself commits various blunders and fallacies. Already, the statement in lines 27-28 is put forward in a fallacious way as being an “occupying power”, even if “against international law”, does not necessarily imply that Denmark is not part of an “anti-fascist struggle for liberation” (if-then fallacy of affirming the consequent). Nielsen is correct to doubt Rasmussen’s narrative and its tendentious recontextualisation of the anti-fascist struggle of the early 1940s in 2003, but this does not mean that Nielsen’s particular reasoning is not distorted itself.

The following characterisation of the USA is subsequently also attached to Denmark by Nielsen (“our closest ally in this fight”, line 30). As “this fight” was introduced by the author as being “against international law” and involving occupation, a negative representation is already achieved. Based on this alone, Nielsen’s validity claim is unobjectionable as the war probably was unlawful and led to the subsequent occupation of Iraq. However, Nielsen goes on to equate the USA and “this fight” with “the former Germany” (line 31). Given the reference to, amongst others, “anti-fascist struggle”, “liberation” and “occupying power” in lines 27-28, few readers will be in doubt that “former” here refers to the Third Reich. Nielsen seems to be aware of the seriousness of this comparison and thus mitigates the statement through “in certain respects”. At the same time, he neutralises this mitigation through an immediate intensification by applying “alarmingly reminiscent” in line 30.

The fact that Nielsen establishes an alternative comparison becomes evident when German “concentration camps” are equated with the US “Guantanamo base” (line 33), Germany’s struggle for “Lebensraum” with the US’ seeking “world supremacy” (line 34) and Germany fighting “Jews and Communists” while “[t]oday it is Muslims, terrorists and Communists” (line 36). Whilst all truth claims concerning Nazi Germany are correct and criticism of US policy with regards to the issues raised remains not necessarily problematic, given the country’s policy, these comparisons are nevertheless problematic at this point. In other words, while comparison is inevitable, equation is not (Pelinka, 2009). Although Guantanamo prison operates in a law-free area, enabling unlawful practices such as torture, concentration camps were of a different nature. Already the comparison of
one, rather small, camp (Guantanamo) with a vast network of camps all over Europe is dubious. This becomes even more so when considering the quality of these two categories, i.e. in one case a problematic prison with many shortcomings but, nevertheless, certain standards compared to the camps in which millions were killed through a deliberate lack of hygiene, forced labour and industrial annihilation. Similar points can be made about Nielsen’s second comparison: a policy which rested on an eliminatory form of racism, i.e. “Lebensraum”, can only unconvincingly be compared to the securing of “important commodities”, even if pursued by the world’s only remaining superpower.

Nielsen’s final claim is weak for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the comparison of how Germany “fought Jews and Communists”, i.e. through active extermination, with the way the USA nowadays threatens its ‘others’ is factually incorrect (the connection here is also established through temporal deixis, “[t]oday”, line 36). However, although the US has declared a ‘war on terror’ which can be criticised, it is hard to see how the USA is “[t]oday” following a Nazi-policy when it comes to Communism. And although the strategy of the US in fighting Islamic terrorism can be criticised for a variety of reasons, the claim that the USA fights “Muslims” in general is hardly supported by facts, e.g. as “Muslims” live and pray in the USA.

By contrast, the claim made in lines 38-39 is rather unproblematic. Formally, the statement is clear and can be disputed by opponents, even if the aim in line 39 to intensify (“quite simply”) is slightly suggestive. Content-wise, it has been disputed to what extent the uprising of 1943 was indeed a popular “folk uprising”, as in 1944, or was rather restricted to the working class and youth groups. However, even if this does constitute a factual mistake, it does not negate the statement, given the massive outbreak of disobedience back then. Evaluating Rasmussen and Bendtsen’s intervention as “hypocritical and outrageous” cannot be rejected as distorting the argument either. Similarly, Nielsen’s rejection of Rasmussen’s attempt to legitimise the attack against Iraq, in lines 41-42, has some distorted features such as the use of “grovelling” as well as the formulation “lige linje” which suggests a direct link between the events. However, at least the latter can be justified, given that Rasmussen himself had claimed such a direct link between 1943 and 2003. In contrast, the author’s
final conclusion, which claims a direct connection between resistance to Nazi-occupation and today's peace movement, is almost certainly projecting tendentious images onto the public given the hardly comparable circumstances (see above).

The final paragraph does not simply draw on previous distortions but adds another two: with regards to the content, it is unclear why "wartime resistance" against Germany is comparable to "Denmark's membership of NATO". Whilst the former was directed against a brutal totalitarian system, the latter concerns a free decision to remain in or leave an alliance. Formally, the argument is also fallacious given that NATO has, at no point, been discussed by Nielsen. True, Nielsen did refer to missions involving the NATO-forces in line 23 ("the Balkans, in Afghanistan"). However, he also mentions "Iraq" there (which has very little to do with NATO) and has consistently argued against the US only (lines 30-36). Given that, in addition to these two points, the audience was primarily concerned with Iraq, a non sequitur-fallacy is committed again as the conclusion (resistance against NATO) does not logically follow from the premise he has established throughout the text.

Since if you and your allies mirror a wrong past (Denmark being "an occupying power (...) against international law" while the USA resembles "former Germany"), then you cannot claim to be fighting for a just future.

Figure 27: A schematic representation of Nielsen (2003) following Toulmin's simple model

8.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have introduced the Danish case. Historically, Denmark has followed a narrative of externalisation for many years since 1945 – with some legitimate reasons as Danes, in a widely
supported effort, rescued their Jewish population and participated in an active resistance movement. However, academic research, political interventions and public debates have led to an increasing awareness of national shortcomings. I argue that it is only against this background that Prime Minister Rasmussen was able to (mis)use acknowledgments of past wrongdoing in order to justify the war in Iraq. In other words: the aggressive way of instrumentalising ‘lessons’ by hastily universalising the policy of cooperation relies on *samarbejdspolitikken* being perceived as problematic in the first place. Although the Holocaust does not play an important role in the above three examples (this changes in 2005, cf. Rasmussen, 2005), the underlying confessional tendencies can only be understood within a European frame of perceiving the Holocaust and World War II as Europe’s negative founding myth.

Although it is not clear to what extent Rasmussen’s speech applies a rhetoric of judge-penitence, given its initial blaming of an external ‘other’, i.e. the Danish elite, it at least illustrates the pitfalls of unreflected universalisation when pointing to past wrongdoings. By recontextualising the fight against Nazism, Rasmussen aimed to legitimise the war against Iraq: as fighting a dictatorship 60 years ago led to freedom, the same must be the case now. Although this covers up the fact that the end of Saddam Hussein did not mean freedom but a period of sectarian terror, my point is that narrow criticism of historical (in)accuracies in Rasmussen’s narrative was hardly able to tackle his fallacious instrumentalisation of an intrinsically moral argument. Something similar is true for descriptions of Rasmussen’s speech as being “neo-patriotic” (Bryld, 2007:100) or representing a “dangerous fundamentalism” (Knudsen, 2003, my translation). By applying some kind of self-critical reference, Rasmussen avoided a simple traditional justification, e.g. referring to a heroic past, for his course.

The rhetorical force of his argument seems indeed to have benefitted from this move by enabling him to dismiss critics as doing ‘old politics’ whilst appealing to a Danish public which is open to arguments based on human rights, democracy and freedom. This became obvious in an attempt by
Rasmussen's predecessor, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. In an interview, the latter defended the policy of collaboration by saying that he too would have negotiated with Hitler (Rehling, 2003). Whilst Anders Fogh Rasmussen played on the field of history in order to justify an attack against Iraq, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen did likewise by pointing out that it was only through continuous engagement with the Germans that Denmark survived. The latter's lesson from history was that dialogue should be at the centre of conflict resolution in 2003 as well. To that extent, Nyrup Rasmussen's reference to the collaboration with Hitler was consistent. However, such a move was doomed to fail given that Hitler is nowadays perceived as a token of evil. Unsurprisingly, the argument thus never set the agenda. Remarkably, Rasmussen has been one of the very few leading supporters of the war who did not fail over it; and although one can only speculate about the significance of his argument, he was reelected twice. When finally stepping down in 2009, he not only defended his intervention but framed it as one of his most central political projects (Rasmussen, 2009).

Example VIII, Section 8.4.2 illustrates an article based on the topos of historia magistra vitae whilst directing the topos against an external other (Social Democrats and Social-Liberals and, arguably, contemporary opponents of the war in general). To an even lesser degree than Rasmussen, Munch made recourse to a rhetoric of judge-penitence (if anything) and thereby represented the predominant majority of those in support of Rasmussen which did not draw on an acknowledgment of one's own wrongdoing. The final example shows an innovative attempt to object to Rasmussen's thesis. Whilst briefly addressing factual inaccuracies in Rasmussen's narrative — as most critics did — Nielsen understood, like Rasmussen, that the past has to be recontextualised and interpreted instead of described. Thereby, he was able to direct its lessons against Rasmussen himself. However, as I have argued, this move failed to provide an undistorting contribution.
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

9.1 Reviewing the Research Questions

I began this thesis with a reference to Camus' novel *The Fall*, introducing its main character Jean-Baptiste Clamance and the monologue he puts forward. The story was further elaborated in Section 3.2, which presented details of Clamance's reasoning about a world lacking meaning, the contemporary universality of guilt and the impossibility of innocence. Whilst I do not share the latter two propositions, Clamance's leitmotif has, nevertheless, informed this thesis fundamentally, serving as a starting point for explaining, understanding and criticising what I have called rhetorics of judge-penitence in public debates. Against this background, I, firstly, revisit this thesis by means of addressing the research questions (Section 1.2). Secondly, I point to some of the limitations this study faces as a result of my research design. Thirdly, I return to admissions of wrongdoing, rhetorics of judge-penitence and those who seem predominantly to perform the latter.

The thesis illustrates that rhetorics of judge-penitence do exist whereby the plural form was deliberately chosen and has proven to be crucial when approaching this argumentative form. Depending on national and situational contexts as well as different agents, various more or less explicit forms became visible. To that extent, this thesis' major research question concerning the existence of rhetorics of judge-penitence (RQI) can be affirmed. This does partly also answer RQII, concerning its demarcation from other discursive strategies of positive self- and negative 'other' representation. Through conceptualising and operationalising the phenomenon, I have identified three elements which, to one degree or another, have to leave some linguistic trace in order to justify speaking of rhetorics of judge-penitence: firstly, an admission of wrongdoing, secondly, the claim that the in-group has, consequently, learnt the lessons from the past and, thirdly, an 'other' who has apparently not done so.
Concerning the comparison of Germany, Austria and Denmark on the basis of Lepsius’ ideal-types (RQIII), the answer is again affirmative. Here, it is notable that elements of all three ideal-types are found in each country. However, the ideal-typical separation was helpful in justifying my case selection. The unified Germany does still represent the paradigmatic case of internalisation and whilst there are shortcomings, due to normalisation, nationalism, etc., it is the comparison with other countries which highlights the persistent significance of internalisation. In contrast, the Austrian public, although recent developments do indicate a dynamic moving towards internalisation, has still not fully embraced even co-responsibility. More recent political developments, whilst being connected to many other dimensions of public life such as the Austrian media market, do indeed illustrate that externalisation is by no means left behind. Again, positive developments also exist but it is through a comparative perspective that one can identify how much is still lacking. In contrast to the former two cases, Denmark does not easily fit into Lepsius’ category of universalisation. Given that Denmark initially constructed itself as an innocent victim which heroically resisted Nazism (with some truth to it) but has, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, increasingly faced the country’s co-operation, it might stand for many countries which collaborated and have recently started to face this past within a wider European frame. This development might enable the instrumentalisation of abstract ‘lessons from the past’ instead of a contextualised and reflexive awareness of it (and from which lessons should, indeed, be learnt). Denmark’s direct involvement in the Iraq War made the disposability of the past to the present even more pressing.

It was through looking at these dominant national narratives that a comprehensive analysis of the empirical material became possible in the first place, as many arguments put forward during the Iraq crisis can hardly be understood without historical contextualisation (RQIV). This study has thereby also illustrated the significance of existing memory frames for emerging narratives. Whilst Europe can indeed increasingly be treated as a whole as, e.g., William Outhwaite (2008) shows, differences in how collective identity is narratively constructed remain important. In other words, the local and the global, i.e. recontextualisations of topics, have to be considered when studying dynamics of
collective memories. The relevance of different dominant narratives is also apparent when approaching texts which applied a rhetoric of judge-penitence and explains the differences illustrated in the analysis. Whilst judge-penitence appears more regularly in the German context, given the country’s established perpetrator narrative, very little of this pattern is visible in either Austria or Denmark. Instead, both countries illustrate the persistent influence of their traditional national memories which frame the debate and confine the utterable. This forcefully points to Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism through which concrete utterances are not atomistically linked to one author but are viewed in relation to various existing narratives.

More theoretically, the discourse theory of Habermas has provided an explanatory framework and justification for viewing admissions of wrongdoing as contributing to moral learning processes (RQV). This is due to the fact that confessional practices can provide more egalitarian and inclusive constructions of in-groups’ symbolic boundaries by recognising what is often important to the victims: their suffering. As such, apologetic acts can serve as thick narratives underpinning constitutional patriotism. In contrast, rhetorics of judge-penitence construct unjustified boundaries between groups and prevent egalitarianism and inclusion by marking the ‘other’ as morally inferior. To that extent, such arguments might support a blocking of moral learning processes (RQVI). It is important to stress that neither single admissions of wrongdoing nor individual applications of rhetorics of judge-penitence thus constitute learning processes or their blocking, but might contribute to or hinder the development of such processes. The inclusion of Habermasian concepts has thus enabled the moral evaluation of admissions of wrongdoing and rhetorics of judge-penitence – in contrast to much research in the field of memory studies which approaches evaluation from rather ethical (or naturalist) perspectives. It has furthermore helped to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater, i.e. ignoring the emancipatory potential of apologetic acts (cf. post-structuralist and post-colonial approaches) while nevertheless conceptualising their misuse (and still avoiding uncritical compliance with admissions of wrongdoing). Finally, the detailed review of Habermas’ work made more explicit the grounds of the DHA’s notion of critique and its emancipatory impetus.
Given the limited amount of data available, RQVII is harder to answer. Many critics of the Iraq War were somewhat 'on the left', a position potentially in family resemblance with rhetorics of judge-penitence due to the greater openness towards criticism of one's own traditions in the first place. To that extent, leftist judge-penitence seems more plausible. Nevertheless, some rightist commentators have also applied this argumentative form — although often in different ways. Here again, I emphasise that this does not amount to an evaluation of overall positions taken towards the war itself as I was only concerned with one particular argumentative practice. The variety of applications indicates a great flexibility of this argumentative form, giving it the potential to be used in other, very different, contexts and ways. Given the initial unsystematic encounter with apparent examples of rhetorics of judge-penitence, I did assume one 'other': the USA (RQVIII). However, as it became clear that there are also instances in which supporters of the war directed such an argument against its opponents, it is then reasonable to understand rhetorics of judge-penitence as a general argumentation form which can be filled with different wrongs, actors and 'others'.

In sum, this exploratory study has filled a research gap by shedding light on a counterintuitive misuse of memories of past wrongdoings in increasingly post-heroic societies. It has thereby provided a framework, both theoretical and empirical, for further research on the misuse of admissions of wrongdoing in potentially very different areas.

9.2 Addressing Three Limitations

The above section indicates that, due to the research design, not all questions could be answered to the utmost satisfaction. On the one hand, restricting the data to a particular genre, the Feuilleton and related sections, constitutes one shortcoming. Data triangulation, e.g. the inclusion of interviews or focus groups, and method triangulation, e.g. through including quantitative approaches such as corpus linguistics, might have been useful. However, whilst limiting oneself to one kind of data is
suboptimal, the focus on the sheer existence of a highly complex argumentative form makes it
doubtful to what extent, e.g., focus groups could have helped. Furthermore, the time gap between
now and 2002/3 would have caused serious methodical difficulties. Concerning the inclusion of, e.g.,
corpus linguistics in order to preempt criticism of CDA as ‘cherry picking’, it was never claimed that
judge-penitence is a major argument in public debates and, thus, lacks clear and widespread lexical
realisation. With regard to such a situation, Gerlinde Mautner (2009:124), herself a corpus linguist,
remarks that if “the phenomenon to be focused on is one that is played out on a larger textual stage,
and with varying und unpredictable lexical realizations, then corpus linguistic methods will be of little
or no help”. Whilst restricting myself to only one genre could be viewed as a limitation, it seems to
be a limitation which had to be accepted. On the other hand, objections can be raised against the
procedure of data collection and downsizing, i.e. the selection of search words and the inclusion of
only those articles into the primary corpus with at least two or three of them. Whilst this probably
excluded some relevant articles and systemically disadvantaged shorter contributions, the
explorative character of this study into a highly subtle argument demanded both such careful
balancing and a systematic and verifiable procedure.

Furthermore, objections might concern the very analysis. In other words, do I not interpret too much
into these texts? This is a problem faced by every discourse analysis. It can only be addressed by
stating clearly that the analyst can indeed neither claim to provide an all-inclusive, definite and final
answer nor reveal the meaning of the utterance. I cannot claim that Klein, Menasse or Rasmussen
‘really meant’ what I lay out: not only is it impossible to access the author’s intentions (at least from
a discourse-analytical perspective) but, also, do readers’ processes of decoding necessarily mirror
what was encoded (Hall, 1980). What discourse analysis can provide are more or less plausible
interpretations of how texts might be understood in particular contexts – even without methods
designed to address their reception. By offering theoretically informed and verifiable running
comments, discourse analysis should provide detailed theoretical and empirical analysis as well as
contextualisation of a text. Such running comments should be viewed in the light of, e.g., law reviews
which aim to provide concise and well-researched background material. In line with this, analysts should not indulge in elitist assumptions of knowing best what is projected onto the reader through lexical or grammatical choices but provide sound explanations, interpretations and criticism in order to enable informed judgements by readers.

Finally, criticism might concern the attention given to elites, here in particular the symbolic elite, e.g. intellectuals in the wider sense. True, it seems implausible to view rhetorics of judge-penitence as a widespread argumentation pattern, but this is in fact not claimed anywhere! Rather, rhetorics of judge-penitence seem to be an exemplary case of an elite argument, separated from more popular ways of making sense of, e.g., the Iraq crisis which did not admit wrongdoing in the first place. In that sense, Wulf Kansteiner (2006:131) is right in stressing that a sociology of memory must be aware of “different layers of memory”. Consequently, rhetorics of judge-penitence should be understood as a subtle strategy of justification, self-legitimation and, also, distinction which probably only resonates with a limited audience. Given the increasingly fragmented nature of late modern public spheres, such restrictedness is not automatically synonymous with irrelevance but can become significant to particular audiences. However, although “layers of memory” undoubtedly exist (various layers of public discourses being connected with private discourse, etc.), they are not entirely disconnected. The fact that, e.g., German intellectuals and politicians seem most ready to apply rhetorics of judge-penitence illustrates this: it is against the background of a comparatively strong perpetrator narrative within the wider German public that rhetorics of judge-penitence become a meaningful possibility within a particular stratum in order to legitimise and demarcate.

9.3 Intellectuals, Pride and a Plea to Exercise Restraint

The peculiar aspect in this thesis, i.e. that admissions of wrongdoing are able to legitimise claims for moral superiority, is in no way self-evident. The sheer possibility that, e.g., a politician like Rasmussen
might put forward an argument based on self-criticism in order to generate legitimacy suggests that Nietzsche’s aphorism “‘I have done that,’ says my memory. ‘I cannot have done that’ – says my pride, and remains adamant. At last – memory yields” is not the last word. Indeed, the ability to “take a reflexive distance” to the past as noted by Habermas and Derrida exists and needs to be defended against post-modern scepticism. However, as memories do not easily yield anymore, even admissions of wrongdoing seem to become a potential source of (unreflected) pride.

In this process of admitting wrongdoing and renarrating symbolic boundaries, intellectuals too play their part. Traditionally, symbolic boundaries relied heavily on their narratives, a fact even acknowledged by Hobsbawm (1992:10-13) who otherwise emphasises bottom-up processes of identification with the nation. Nowadays, increasingly fragmented public spheres and decentralised “means of symbolic production” (Alexander, 2004b:532, 555-559) have reduced this power in and over discourses – even if some intellectuals have gained celebrity status. This withering authority is in no sense problematic, or, as Habermas (1974a:40) puts it: while intellectuals might provide input to debates in the public sphere, they cannot claim more than a participant-role. This study indicates, however, that new interpretations are still offered, making intellectuals, potentially, the primary carrier group of rhetorics of judge-penitence. Here, a Bourdieuan field analysis which focuses on the relations between various actors might reveal objective impulses for demarcation. Whilst this does not personalise such a rhetoric, it would provide a much fuller and systematic picture of the actors involved. It could thereby help to identify the peculiarities of a self-critical rhetoric which nevertheless gives new room to (national) pride, as visible in the following passage by the German author and Nobel laureate Günter Grass on 21 March 2003:

People have often asked us Germans, if we are proud of our country. It was difficult to answer. And there were reasons for our hesitation. I can say that the rejection by the majority of citizens of my country of the preventive war now started made me a little bit proud of Germany. After we were responsible for two world wars with criminal consequences, we have learnt from history, which was
difficult enough, and understood the lessons dealt to us [haben wir, was uns schwer genug fiel, aus der Geschichte gelernt und die uns erteilten Lektionen begriffen].

What is eye-catching is his very explicit rejection of German nationalism and patriotism on the basis of the country’s past (lines 1-2, 3-4). Lines 2-3 are similarly unproblematic but would have benefitted from reflecting on the reasons for such widespread rejection (after all, a wrong can be rejected with both good and bad arguments). However, what is truly important is the final sentence (lines 3-5), i.e. the conclusion that “we” learnt. While German official discourse has indeed developed positively, it is still problematic to construct an all-inclusive in-group (“we”) in combination with portraying this learning-process as completed (lines 4-6). It is this claim which ultimately makes Grass “proud of Germany”. I emphasised right at the beginning of this thesis that my research interest must not be misunderstood as an evaluation – or (de)legitimisation – of the war against Iraq itself. To refer to pride, however, is an ambivalent move and so, with Habermas (and others), we should be aware of the dangers of self-compliments (Section 3.3.2).

This is not necessarily a solely German issue but has the potential for a more European argument through which intellectuals perform themselves, behaving like “Europe-coaches” or “Europe-artists” (Sloterdijk, 2002:56, my translation) and having a “mission of prophetic subversion, inseparably intellectual and political” (Bourdieu, 1996:129). Indeed, Peter Sloterdijk (2002:58f, my translation) himself seems to put forward a rhetoric of judge-penitence. Whilst admitting Europe’s failure to live up to its own standards, he subsequently claims that it is, nevertheless, only Europe which is able to break “up the imperiality of the figure of the major power itself and to transform this into a partner on the stage of a future world internal politics. Europe will be the seminar where people learn to think beyond empire” (48, my translation). Whilst Europe is designated to take such a position due to its post-heroic ethos,
American and Japanese elites, as up till now, can let themselves be carried by strong currents of old imperial enthusiasm and an undecomposed conscience of being the chosen ones, for the Europeans almost everything which could be taken from the new and great has to force itself through a historically gained scepticism (55).

Notably, this text was written before the crisis over Iraq (similar to the text by Massing presented in the introduction) but does not lack the grand emphasis visible in the examples concerned with the debate in 2003. While Sloterdijk restricts himself to the “American and Japanese elites” instead of entire peoples, his ambition is not as modest: “[for] us the new politics begins with the art of creating words which reveal the horizon on board reality” (60, my translation). However, given my explorative study and its core concept, rhetorics of judge-penitence, I hope that such attempts, presented under the banner of reflexivity and often with the best intentions, attract critical scrutiny as much depends on what words and what horizon are imagined.
Glückliche Tage

10.2 Example II (Habermas & Derrida, 2003)

(... ) Das heutige Europa ist durch die Erfahrungen der totalitären Regime des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts
und durch den Holocaust - die Verfolgung und Vernichtung der europäischen Juden, in die das NS-
Regime auch die Gesellschaften der eroberten Länder verstrickt hat - gezeichnet. Die selbstkritischen
Auseinandersetzungen über diese Vergangenheit haben die moralischen Grundlagen der Politik in
Erinnerung gerufen. Eine erhöhte Sensibilität für Verletzungen der persönlichen und der körperlichen
Integrität spiegelt sich unter anderem darin, daß Europarat und EU den Verzicht auf die Todesstrafe zur
 Beitrittsbedingung erhoben haben.

Eine bellizistische Vergangenheit hat einst alle europäischen Nationen in blutige Auseinandersetzungen
verstrickt. Aus den Erfahrungen der militärischen und geistigen Mobilisierung gegeneinander haben sie
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg die Konsequenz gezogen, neue supranationale Formen der Kooperation zu
developieren. Die Erfolgsgeschichte der Europäischen Union hat die Europäer in der Überzeugung
bestärkt, daß die Domestizierung staatlicher Gewaltausübung auch auf globaler Ebene eine gegenseitige
Einschränkung souveräner Handlungsspielräume verlangt.

Jede der großen europäischen Nationen hat eine Blüte imperialer Machtentfaltung erlebt und, was in
unserem Kontext wichtiger ist, die Erfahrung des Verlusts eines Imperiums verarbeiten müssen. Diese
Abstiegserfahrung verbindet sich in vielen Fällen mit dem Verlust von Kolonialreichen. Mit dem
wachsenden Abstand von imperialer Herrschaft und Kolonialgeschichte haben die europäischen Mächte
auch die Chance erhalten, eine reflexive Distanz zu sich einzunehmen. So konnten sie lernen, aus der
Perspektive der Besiegten sich selbst in der zweifelhaften Rolle von Siegern wahrzunehmen, die für die
Gewalt einer oktroyierten und entwurzelnden Modernisierung zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden. Das
könnte die Abkehr vom Eurozentrismus befördert und die kantische Hoffnung auf eine Weltinnenpolitik
beflügelt haben.
Falsche Lehren aus Europas Historie


Kürzlich hat der Literaturnobelpreisträger Günter Grass auf einer Rede in Halle diesen nach wie vor ungebrochenen Konsens bekräftigt mit den Worten: "Ich kann sagen, dass mich die Ablehnung des jetzt begonnenen Präventivkrieges durch die Mehrheit der Bürger meines Landes ein wenig stolz auf Deutschland gemacht hat. Nach zwei von uns zu verantwortenden Weltkriegen mit verbrecherischen Folgen haben wir, was schwer genug fiel, aus der Geschichte gelernt und die uns erteilten Lektionen begriffen."

heute gegen den tumben Slogan USA- SA - SS! und gegen die demagogische Gleichsetzung demokratisch
gewählter US-Präsidenten mit Nazi-Führern protestierten. Ihr Hinweis, dass ein Zusammenhang besteht
zwischen militärischer Expansion und polizeistaatlicher Repression, blieb ungehört, und die Tatsache,
dass der Sturz einer menschenverachtenden Diktatur etwas anderes ist als die gewaltsame Annexion
eines fremden Territoriums, wird von der deutschen Friedensbewegung bis heute nicht reflektiert.

Woher nimmt diese die Heilsgewissheit, dem Rest der Welt den Frieden erklären zu wollen, nachdem
Deutschland zwei Weltkriege vom Zaun gebrochen hat? Und wie kommt es, dass die Friedensbewegung
auf deutschem Boden eine andere Quantität und Qualität erreicht als in den übrigen Ländern Europas,
wo es ebenfalls Aktionen von Kriegsgegnern gibt?

Die Antwort auf diese Frage hat mit der je verschiedenen Wahrnehmung der eigenen Geschichte zu tun,
die es den Kindern und Enkeln der Tätergeneration erlaubt, sich zu Opfern zu stilisieren, während die
Einsprüche gegen den Krieg dort, wo dieses Motiv entfällt, nüchterner und pragmatischer klingen - man
denke nur an die Proteste in den USA. Und noch etwas kommt hinzu: die versäumte Aufarbeitung der
eigenen Vergangenheit, und damit ist ausnahmsweise einmal nicht der Holocaust, sondern die
Bombardierung deutscher Großstädte gemeint, das Unrecht der Vertreibung und das Massenelend der
Flüchtlinge, das erst jetzt ins Bewusstsein der Öffentlichkeit rückt. Das Verdrängte kehrt in aggressiver
Form zurück, und vielleicht erklärt dies die Irrationalität der deutschen Friedensbewegung, die zum
Nebenkriegsschauplatz geworden ist für die Wiederherstellung einer angeschlagenen nationalen
Identität.

Damit nicht alles falsch wird, eine Richtigstellung zum Schluss: Das Eintreten für Frieden ist dessen
Gegenteil vorzuziehen, und auch wer das militärische Vorgehen der Alliierten gegen Saddam Husseins
Regime für politisch gerechtfertigt hält, darf seine Augen nicht verschließen vor dem menschlichen Preis
des Krieges, der schon jetzt dessen ökonomische Kosten übersteigt. Es gibt Mittel, die jeden Zweck
diskreditieren: Selbstmordanschläge zum Beispiel, die Bombardierung von Wohnvierteln oder Massaker
an Zivilisten, denn wenn die Büchse der Pandora einmal geöffnet ist, wird Recht zu Unrecht, und die
angestrebte Befreiung schlägt in Unterdrückung um.
Example IV (Menasse, 2003)

Bushs Law

"Dieser Krieg ist nicht Notwehr - aber er wird wehrlose Not produzieren": der Vorabdruck einer Rede von Robert Menasse anlässlich des Wiener Sternmarsches "Stoppt den Krieg".

Gewalt ist primitiv - auch wenn sie mit "intelligenten Waffen" ausgeübt wird -wobei dahingestellt sei, ob Waffen nicht erst dann als "intelligent" zu bezeichnen wären, wenn sie, statt willfährig jedem Idioten zu gehorchen, sagen könnten: "This war is stupid!"

Gewalt, wenn sie nicht der Notwehr entspringt, ist immer ein Symptom für Rückständigkeit: Sie schließt jeden zeitgenössischen Konflikt unmittelbar kurz mit der einzigen Konfliktlöschungsmethode, die die Steinzeit zur Verfügung hatte. Aus der Frage, wer in einem Konflikt Recht hat, entwickelte sich ein aufgeklärtes Rechtssystem bis hin zur Idee (und noch unvollkommenen Praxis) eines Völkerrechts. Aus der Frage, wer die größere Keule hat, entwickelte sich die Weltherrschaft der USA.

Bushs Law "Führe Kriege nur noch gegen Länder, die den Krieg anschließend auch bezahlen können" ist zwar die erste Innovation auf dem Gebiet der Kriegstheorie seit Clausewitz, aber: So avantgardistisch dieser Gedanke auch ist, er ist doch nur ein primitiver Reflex auf die strukturelle Rückständigkeit der USA gegenüber Europa.

Die USA mögen in der technologischen Entwicklung Vorreiter und daher in der Produktion des
gesellschaftlichen Reichtums Europa quantitativ voraus sein, in der Frage der Verteilung des
gesellschaftlichen Reichtums aber sind sie im Vergleich zu Europa abgeschlagene Nachzügler.

Der Unterschied zwischen US-Marktwirtschaft und europäischer sozialer Marktwirtschaft ist etwa so
groß wie der zwischen der Keilschrift und dem Angebot der Frankfurter Buchmesse. Die Ideen der
Aufklärung mögen vor zweihundert Jahren in den USA weiter gehend verwirklicht gewesen sein als
damals auf dem "alten Kontinent", mittlerweile sind aber die USA Nachzügler sogar ihrer eigenen
konstitutiven Ideen geworden: Vom Einfluss der Religion auf die Politik bis zur Todesstrafe zeigen sich
die USA heute sogar für ihre Sympathisanten als Entwicklungsland der Aufklärung.

In Frankreich ist die bürgerliche Revolution gemacht, in Deutschland ist sie gedacht worden. Diese
Länder heute ausspielen zu wollen gegen die Willfähigkeit der politischen Eliten, die vor wenigen
Jahren noch totalitäre Staaten regiert haben, zeigt, worin die Entfremdung zwischen Europa und den
USA heute im Wesentlichen besteht - und warum sie weiter wachsen wird:

Das "alte" Europa definiert Demokratie und Rechtszustand heute als ein System der Mündigkeit und als
ein Verhältnis mündiger Partner. Hier treffen sich, endlich, in der Praxis die Leitideen der Aufklärung
("Aufklärung ist der Ausweg der Menschen aus ihrer selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit") mit den
Konsequenzen des Beitrags, den die USA zur Befreiung Europas vom Faschismus geleistet haben. Die
USA aber definieren heute Demokratie und Rechtszustand als ein Verhältnis zwischen Leitmacht und
Vasallen. Hier kann es keine Übereinstimmung geben, außer in ideologisch durchsichtigen
Sonntagsreden oder hilflosen diplomatischen Cocktail-Empfängen.

Es zeigt sich allerdings auch, dass die Geschichte von der amerikanischen Befreiung vom europäischen
Faschismus immer schon nur die halbe Wahrheit war: Die USA ließen den Franco- und den Salazar-
Faschismus in Europa ebenso intakt, wie sie hochrangige Nazis schützten, soweit sie ihnen im Kalten
Krieg nützlich waren.
Im Grunde werden Europa und USA heute durch ihre gemeinsame Geschichte getrennt: Europa, soweit wir lernen und lernen wollen, uns mit dem Kontinent zu identifizieren, hat aus der halben Wahrheit versucht, eine ganze zu machen. Die USA aber haben versucht, aus der halben Wahrheit eine ganze Legitimation für ihre Hegemoniebestrebungen zu zimmern.

Nur deshalb gelten die osteuropäischen, demokratisch unerfahrenen Länder den USA heute als "neues Europa": weil sie sich als die neuen Vasallen andienen. Aus ebendiesem Grund wird aber der Irakkrieg zu einem neuen Vietnam für die USA werden - nicht unbedingt im militärischen Sinn, zweifellos aber zumindest in Hinblick auf die Reaktionen der Weltöffentlichkeit, vor allem der "alten" europäischen Öffentlichkeit.

Es gibt kein Argument, das begründen könnte, warum ein arabisches Land nun mit aller Gewalt "demokratisiert" werden soll, wenn es kein einziges arabisches Land gibt, das demokratisch ist. In den USA werden Sheriffs gewählt. Genau dies aber gestehen die USA der Welt, die sie demokratisieren wollen, nicht zu: Selbst ernannt legitimieren sie sich als Weltpolizei.

"Its our job!", sagte Bush. Die Selbstverständlichkeit und -gewissheit, mit der ein Amerikaner glaubt, dass dieser Satz legitimiert, was er tut, zeigt den Unterschied zwischen USA und Europa vor der Geschichte und in Hinblick auf die Zukunft: Hier ist der Satz "Ich habe nur meine Pflicht getan" zu Recht auf alle Zeiten desavouiert. Das kann ein Amerikaner nie begreifen, was die große europäische Lehre ist: Keiner hat das Recht, nur seine Pflicht zu tun!

10.5 Example V (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 2003)

Trennende Bilder vom Krieg

Was Krieg wirklich ist, das hat sich tief ins kollektive Bewusstsein der europäischen Völker eingegraben."

Das sagte vor kurzem der deutsche Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder. Das stimmt.
Es ist die historische Erfahrung, die die überwältigende Mehrheit der Europäer ungeachtet der Haltung ihrer Regierungen gegen den Irakkrieg eingenommen hat. Bei den Amerikanern ist das anders, weil auch deren historische Erfahrung eine andere ist.

Natürlich haben auch die USA Kriege mitgemacht. Aber es ist eine andere Art von Krieg, an die sich die US- Bürger erinnern. Ob im Ersten oder im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in Korea, in Vietnam oder im Golfkrieg - was der Durchschnittsbürger erlebte, war der Anblick von Soldaten, die in ein fernes Land wegzogen und, außer im Fall Vietnam, nach einiger Zeit siegreich zurückkehrten.


Kein Wunder, dass sich unsereins bei aller Ablehnung des irakischen Saddam-Hussein-Regimes unwillkürlich eher mit den Menschen im Irak identifiziert als mit den angreifenden Armeen.


Die meisten Durchschnittsamerikaner sehen den kommenden Krieg als Befreiungskrieg, in Fortsetzung der Befreiung Europas vom Hitlerregime.


10.6 Example VI (Molden, 2003)

Appeasement 2003

mächtigeren - Diktator und Massenmörder, Adolf Hitler, zum Widerstand der zivilisierten Welt aufgerufen wurde.

Auch damals war die öffentliche Meinung in den noch freien Staaten Europas überwiegend gegen die vermeintlichen "Kriegssetzer", die Adolf Hitlers Treiben nach der Errichtung der NS-Herrschaft in Deutschland samt Judenverfolgung, KZ-Greueln und Österreich-Schlucken ein Ende setzen wollten.

Die Regierungschefs Frankreichs und Englands, Edouard Daladier und Neville Chamberlain, versuchten mehrfach, den "Führer" in Freundschaft zu überzeugen, seine offenkundig bösen Absichten zu korrigieren, und sich anständig zu verhalten.


Die - sicher zum Teil ungeschickt formulierte und recht großspurig der Welt kundgetane - Haltung der USA hat nun offenbar nicht nur die öffentliche Meinung in Europa, sondern auch die etlicher führender Staatsmänner daselbst in Wut, Angst und Schrecken versetzt. So meinte etwa der deutsche Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, unter keinen Umständen würden "deutsche Soldaten sich an einem
Irak-Krieg beteiligen, auch dann nicht, wenn die UN einen solchen Gutheißen sollten." Ähnlich, wenn auch etwas verbindlicher, äußerte sich Frankreichs Jacques Chirac.


10.7 Example VII (Rasmussen, 2003)

60 år efter: Samarbejdspolitikken varet moralsk svigt


Datoen er også en stolt mærkedag i Søværnets historie. Den dag angreb tyske enheder alle danske militære installationer. Kl. 04.00 om morgenen ankom de tyske enheder her til Holmen. De danske søofficerer vidste, at der var risiko for at tyskerne ville forsøge at tage kontrollen med flåden. De havde forinden besluttet, at de i så fald skulle søge neutralt svensk territorium eller, hvis dette var umuligt, sænke skibene, så de ikke faldt i tyske hænder. Det lykkedes at få sænket langt hovedparten af den danske flåde, og nogle af de enheder, der befandt sig til søs, nåede til Sverige.

Begivenhederne i Danmark blev bemærket hos de allierede. Der er ingen tvivl om, at sænkningen af flåden bidrog til at forbedre Danmarks omdømme hos dem.


Nu skal man naturligvis være forsigtig med at fælde domme over fortiden på nutidens præmisser. I dag ved vi, at nazisterne tabte krigen, efter at USA og Sovjetunionen blev inddraget i 1941 - og derfor fremstår den aktive danske tilpasningspolitik som fejlagtig og forkastelig. Hvis den var blevet fortsat til krigens ende, ville Danmark have fremstået som tysk lydstat og partner. I historiens lys ville det have været en katastrofe.

Men tog det sig anderledes ud ved krigens start? Hvis nu tyskerne havde sejret, ville Danmark så ikke have profiteret af at tilpasse sig den tyske dominans i tide? Sådan tænkte mange. Det forekommer dog naivt at tro, at Hitler ville have taget særlige hensyn til Danmark i tilfælde af en tysk sejr. Der var da også højt placerede embedsmænd, som allerede fra krigens start tog afstand fra disse naive forestillinger. Danmarks uafhængige gesandt i Washington, Henrik Kaufmann, og legationsråd Vincens Steensen-Leth ved det danske gesandtskab i Berlin anså fra starten tilpasningspolitikken for at være naive og fejlagtig.

De advarede om, at Danmark aldrig ville få indrømmelser af nazisterne, hverken på det ene eller andet punkt, fordi det var selve den demokratiske retsstat, nazisterne ville til livs. Nazisterne accepterede kun én form for system - det nationalsocialistiske.


Alt for ofte i historiens løb har vi danskere blot sejlet under bekvemmelighedsflag og ladet andre slås for vor frihed og fred. Læresætningen fra 29. august 1943 er, at hvis man mener noget alvorligt med vore værdier, med frihed, demokrati og menneskerettigheder, så må vi også selv yde et aktivt bidrag til at forsøvere dem. Også imod svære odds. Selv når der skal træffes upopulære og farlige beslutninger. Lad os ære vore landsmænds indsats i modstandsbevægelsen og forsøret for frihed og demokrati.
Vi må lære af historien

VED højtideligholdelsen 29/8 af 60-årsdagen for det folkelige oprør, der i 1943 førte til regeringens afgang og et brud med de foregående års samarbejdspolitik med nazisterne, udtalte statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, at han fandt datidens danske politik naive, og at han fandt det forkasteligt, at den politiske elite i Danmark i den grad førte ikke blot neutralitets- men aktiv tilpasningspolitik.

Jeg tror, de færreste danskere er uenige i, at årene op til Anden Verdenskrig og krigsårene ikke står som en af de stolteste perioder i fædrelandets historie, og at alene modstandsfolkenes heroiske kamp, det danske folks hjælp til at de danske jøder kunne flygte til Sverige, og enkeltpersoner som den konservative politiker Christmas Møllers indsats gjorde, at vi med nød og næppe kunne slutte os til de allieredes side i slutningen af krigen.

Statsministeren må imidlertid have ramt et rigtig ømt punkt for nutidens politiske elite. Straks statsministerens udtalelser var faldet, blev disse tilbagevist som »gratis heroisme« og »naive og pinlige« af historikere, og tidligere udenrigsminister Niels Helveg Petersen (NHP) kaldte statsministeren for »bagklog og krigerisk med tilbagevirkende kraft.«

Argumentation fra disse går på, at en indsats mod nazisterne var nyttelses, og at da alle regnede med, tyskerne ville vinde krigen, ville det være i befolkningens interesse aktivt at samarbejde med nazisterne.

Når man kender facit at de allierede vandt krigen er det for let i dag at kritisere datidens politikere, sagde NHP.

Disse udtalelser er efter min mening udtryk for en uhyggelig kynisme og opportunisme. Hvis en nation skal afstemme sine principper og handlinger/undladelser efter, om en aggressor, både enkeltpersoner og nationer, har udsigt til at få gennemført sit forehavende, frasiger NHP reelt Danmark retten til som
nation at forfægte sin suverænitet, retten til at fastholde demokratiet over diktaturet, retten til at mene nogle værdier er bedre end andre, og dermed retten til at indrette samfundet som vi selv ønsker det.

To pointer

Statsministeren gav ikke udtryk for, at den danske hær den 9. april 1940 skulle have taget kampen op med nazisterne. Dertil havde Socialdemokratiet og de radikales, herunder min egen forfader, udenrigsminister P. Munch, pacifistiske forsvars- og udenrigspolitik de foregående årter gjort egentlig kamp meningsløs. Men statsministeren har to pointer: 1) Enhver suveræn nation skal have et troværdigt forsvar for at sikre sin suverænitet, herunder indgå i forsvarsalliancer med andre demokratier, og 2) Enhver demokratisk nation er forpligtet til, så godt det lader sig gøre, aktivt at forsandre dets værdier over for ind- og udvendige trusler uanset størrelsen af denne trussel.

Hvis NHP har nogen form for taknemmelighed over for Storbritannien og USA, der, selv om disse lande ikke blev angrebet af nazisterne, sendte deres soldater i krig for at forsandre demokratiet og menneskerettighederne, mener jeg, at NHP, forudsat NHP ellers er af den opfattelse, at disse værdier er bedre end dem, nazisterne stod for, skylder at forklare, hvorfor det ikke skulle være rimeligt på en mindedag at minde hinanden om, at datidens politikere ikke mente, vi skulle sige fra over for nazisterne, og at vi ikke skulle yde vores bidrag til bekæmpelse af den fælles fjende, men lade andre nationer om denne opgave.

Socialdemokraterne har været påfaldende tavse i denne sag og har alene udtalt, at de ikke gider bruge tid og kræfter på denne debat. Det er vel ikke så overraskende i betragtning af det store lod, socialdemokraterne havde i den politik, der blev ført før og under Besættelsen, ligesom flere socialdemokrater næppe er særligt interesserede i at få belyst, hvem og hvordan der blev samarbejdet med Sovjetunionen under Den Kolde Krig. Også i denne periode undlod flere politikere tilhørende den politiske elite at vælge side og at forsandre demokratiets idealer over for diktaturets.
Det afgørende er imidlertid ikke, hvem der gjorde hvad, men at vi lærer af historien, anerkender hvad vi gjorde galt og minder hinanden om, at vores værdier og demokrati er værd at kæmpe for.

10.9 Example IX (Nielsen, 2003)

Misbrug af modstandsbevægelsen

I STOR ENIGHED har lederne af regeringens to partier, statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen og økonomi- og erhvervsminister Bent Bendtsen, valgt at bruge 60-årsdagen for augustoprøret til et opgør med samarbejdspolitikken under Besættelsen.

Mærkværdigvis nævner de to partilederne intet om rollerne for deres egne partier, som var de to mest tyskvenlige partier i Rigsdagen på dette tidspunkt. Begge indgik da også i den samarbejdsregering, som blev etableret efter 9. april 1940.

Når de to partilederer nu, 60 år efter 1943, vælger at tage afstand fra samarbejdspolitikken, er det imidlertid med gustent overlæg.

Egne hensigter

De fleste af dem, som deltog aktivt i at udmærke samarbejdspolitikken, er døde.

De fornærmer ikke deres egne partifæller, men kan tage en historisk begivenhed og dreje den til egne hensigter: En opbakning bag den nuværende regerings krigspolitik.

Problemet er bare, at sammenligningen ikke holder.

Danmark deltager i dag ikke i en antifascistisk befrielseskamp, men er selv blevet en besættelsesmagt, som i strid med folkeretten holder et andet land besat.

Og vores nærmeste allierede i denne kamp er supermagten USA, som på visse punkter betænkeligt minder om fortidens Tyskland.

Tyskland oprettede kz-lejre, USA har sin lejr på Guantanamo-basen. Tyskland søgte Lebensraum, USA søger verdensherredømmet og kontrollen over verdens vigtigste råstoffer.

Tyskland bekæmpede jøder og kommunister. I dag hedder det muslimer, terrorister og kommunister.

At tage det folkelige oprør i 1943 og modstandsbevægelsen til indtægt for regeringens nuværende politik er rent ud sagt både hyklerisk og uanstændigt.

Der går ikke nogen lige linje fra 1943 og til det nuværende Danmarks næsegruse opbakning til USA's udenrigspolitik.

Der går derimod en lige linje fra modstandsbevægelsen til modstanden imod Danmarks indlemmelse i NATO og til den nuværende fredsbevægelse.
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