U.S. Foreign Policy toward Sino-U.S. Rappraochement in the Early 1970s:A Study of Secrecy in Bureaucratic Politics.

Komine, Yukinori (2005) U.S. Foreign Policy toward Sino-U.S. Rappraochement in the Early 1970s:A Study of Secrecy in Bureaucratic Politics. PhD thesis, UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger as the key feature of the U. S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. It was Nixon's presidential leadership that drove the new China initiative, together with Kissinger as a skilful operator and negotiator. The centralization of power in the White House and the exclusion of the State Department from the direct decision-making process was a 'diplomatic coup. ' Nixon and Kissinger over-emphasized the speed and effectiveness of the transformation in the China policy to counteract the danger of bureaucratic leaks and the possibility of a conservative backlash in American domestic politics. At policy planning level, however, Nixon and Kissinger were still dependent on interdepartmental policy studies by the bureaucracy, mainly the NSC staff and the State Department in order to develop and implement the new China initiative. The National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) papers from 1969 to 1971 on the China policy were much more comprehensive and detailed than were previously estimated. Owing to the excessive secrecy, however, Nixon and Kissinger did not sufficiently use the multiple intelligence sources from the State Department to more effectively operate the China policy. The resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in January and February 1970 was the first major breakthrough during the U. S. opening to China, officially clarifying the U. S. intention to promote a new dialogue with the People's Republic of China. On the other hand, the preparation for the Warsaw talks also revealed the difference between the White House and the State Department; while Nixon and Kissinger wanted to move faster to send a special envoy to Beijing and discuss major security issues directly with the Chinese leaders, the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs remained cautious, still seeking to obtain more substantial concessions on the Taiwan issue. From late 1970, without the State Department's expertise, the White House sought to focus on the U. S. -Soviet-China triangular relationship and pursued back-channel communications with the Chinese through third parties, such as Pakistan and Romania. In direct talks in July and October 1971, and February 1972, Nixon and Kissinger gave an assurance to the Chinese leaders for the U. S. withdrawal from Taiwan in relation to the negotiated settlement in Indochina. Simultaneously, Nixon and Kissinger sought to persuade the Chinese leaders that the remaining U. S. military presence in Asia would serve China's security interests in order to contain the emergence of any other states, such as the Soviet Union, Japan, and India. This thesis concludes by assessing the rapprochement as the beginning of a long process to pursue pragmatic co-existence between the United States and China, neither as enemies nor as friends.