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**Enlarging the Union, Widening the Atlantic? EU-US  
Relations and the Eastward Enlargement of the  
European Union**

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(M.A.)

This thesis is submitted for the degree of Ph.D.

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**Enlarging the Union, Widening the Atlantic? EU-US Relations and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union**

Theodore Kiosses, M.A. Politics and International Relations, University of Lancaster

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***Abstract***

Transatlantic relations have entered a prolonged period of tension. Europe and America have different worldviews. They are driven by divergent interests and clashing ambitions. American leaders pursue unipolarity, while their European counterparts try to facilitate the emergence of a multipolar world. Europe is increasingly seen by the US as a rival that needs to be contained. European integration makes the EU's voice louder in world affairs and strengthens demands for a partnership of equals. Domestic developments in the two continents cast further doubts over the viability of a close EU-US relationship. Europeans and Americans seem to drift apart culturally. They often give the impression that they do not share the same economic and political system.

These trends are likely to be reinforced by the eastward enlargement of the European Union. The eastward expansion of the EU could lead to more European integration, a greater EU involvement in its new neighbourhood and beyond and a closer relationship with Russia. It is, therefore, likely that it will usher in the development of a more integrated, more ambitious and more

powerful European Union, which could be seen more as a US competitor than a partner, determined to pursue its own, independent agendas on a global level.

Thus, the eastward enlargement of the European Union looks set to widen the current rift between Europe and America.

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***Abbreviations***

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
APEC	Asian-Pacific Economic Forum
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BRIC	Brasil, Russia, India, China
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CEECs	Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CME	Crisis Management Exercise
Coreper	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CPE	Civilian Power Europe
EC	European Communities
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	European Monetary Union
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	gross domestic product
GNP	gross national product
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MEP	Member of the European Parliament

Mercosur	Common Market of the Southern Cone
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation in Europe
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PHARE	Poland/Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of Economies
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEA	Single European Act
Tacis	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US/USA	United States (of America)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

## Introduction

Relations between Europe and America<sup>1</sup> have never been without problems. Even during the Cold War, crises were frequent and intense. Henry Kissinger was the author in 1965 of *The Troubled Partnership*<sup>2</sup> and long before George W. Bush, it was American president Lyndon Johnson who, in the late 1960s, was labelled by the president of France, Charles de Gaulle “the greatest danger in the world today to peace.”<sup>3</sup> Today, however, a strong consensus has been built around the proposition that the problems which currently beset EU-US relations are of a different nature and therefore far more serious. They bear little resemblance to the differences which were the precursors of earlier crises between the two partners.<sup>4</sup>

The Iraq War is often considered to be the main reason behind this development. The lingering legacy of Iraq, claim some analysts, has led to the erosion of European trust in Washington’s judgment and leadership and the

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<sup>1</sup> The term Europe is used throughout this work as a synonym of European Union. The term America has long been used as shorthand for the United States of America. Such use of the two terms has become common practice in texts on transatlantic relations. This is also the case with the term ‘European Union’ (EU), which is often used, mostly for reasons of brevity, instead of the terms ‘European Communities’ (EC) and ‘European Economic Community’ (EEC). Furthermore, references to ‘European’ and ‘American’ attitudes and policies do not aim at obscuring or belittling the fact that a great pluralism of opinion exists in both continents but at describing general tendencies which often reflect majority preferences.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). See also Smith, ‘The EU: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations’, p. 103.

<sup>3</sup> Kahler, ‘US politics and transatlantic relations: we are all Europeans now’, p. 81.

<sup>4</sup> Early crises were generally in the nature of family disputes, according to Kissinger, and had nothing to do with differing interpretations of the requirements of an agreed common security, whereas today both the definition of common security and, indeed, of common purpose are being questioned. Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 33. Lundestad agrees, adding that “a divide is opening up between the two sides of the Atlantic both at the leadership and the public opinion level. No longer are the differences tied to one or a few particular issues; now they are related to several broad sets of questions.” Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, p. 281.

erosion of American confidence in Europe's solidarity.<sup>5</sup> For the first time, key NATO partners of the US adopted as official policy during the diplomatic crisis over the Iraq issue in 2002-2003 the aim of opposing Washington on an issue considered by the latter as of supreme importance while at the same period Washington was giving the impression that the diplomatic conflict with European opponents of the war was more exhilarating than the prospect of removing Saddam Hussein from power.<sup>6</sup>

According to another explanation, the main force behind the deterioration of transatlantic relations has been the administration of George W. Bush. The "Bush Revolution" in American foreign policy since 2000 accounts for the dramatic turn in transatlantic relations, maintain many political observers.<sup>7</sup> The idea of an 'axis of evil,' propagated in Bush's 2002 State of the Union speech, was treated in Europe as simplistic, crude and moralizing and the president's demand that the rest of the world follow America's lead or face the consequences made Europeans think that this was not the kind of solidarity they had signed for in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.<sup>8</sup> Both the policies of his government and his unique political style have made G. W. Bush a highly controversial figure in Europe. Most Europeans, for instance, find it outrageous that a US president could have claimed that he has no doubt that a higher authority is looking after and guiding him.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Pond, 'The dynamics of the feud over Iraq', p. 55.

<sup>6</sup> Andrews, 'The United States and its Atlantic partners', p. 56.

<sup>7</sup> See for example, Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, Hoffmann, 'On EU/US Relations', p. 105.

<sup>8</sup> Lindberg, 'The Limits of Transatlantic Solidarity', p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Woodward, *State of Denial*, p. 334. Woodward quotes Bush as saying: "I get guidance from God in prayer".

On the other hand, many openly blame some of Europe's political leaders. In the run-up to the Iraq War, they maintain, the US was betrayed by its allies, especially the French. The diplomatic process had been going well until France "stabbed the United States in the back."<sup>10</sup> And in 2002 German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder turned his back on his American allies and pursued reelection by endorsing a pacifist unilateralism.<sup>11</sup>

Such explanations, however, cannot fully account for the present state of affairs. The reasons which explain transatlantic disaccord are more serious and complicated. Henry Kissinger, for instance, finds that far from being caused by specific policies of individual leaders, the drift in Atlantic relations reflects reactions to four fundamental changes in the traditional relationship: the disintegration of the Soviet Union; the unification of Germany; the increasing tendency to treat foreign policy as a tool of domestic policy; the burgeoning of a European identity.<sup>12</sup> In Europe, many argue that the rift is caused by the resurgence of serious differences that have their roots in the Cold War years but were only allowed to surface after 1989.<sup>13</sup> Geir Lundestad identifies eight points which could explain the current state of relations between Europe and America and serve as reasons for concern about the continued close relationship between the United States and Western Europe:

1. The Cold War *is* over,
2. unilateralism is growing stronger in the United States,
3. the EU is slowly but steadily taking on an ever stronger role,
4. out-

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<sup>10</sup> Trachtenberg, 'The Iraq crisis and the future of the Western alliance', pp. 203-206. According to this account of events, French foreign minister De Villepin had promised to his American counterpart Powell full French support in the UN but at the last moment France reversed course and refused to cooperate with the US. See also Weisman, 'A Long, Winding Road to a Diplomatic Dead End'.

<sup>11</sup> Erlanger, 'Anatomy of a Breakdown', p. 12.

<sup>12</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 36.

<sup>13</sup> See, for instance, Mireur, 'Retour sur l'antiaméricanisme', p. 100.

of-area disputes are becoming increasingly frequent and they have been notoriously difficult to handle for the two sides of the Atlantic, 5. redefinitions of leadership and burdens are always difficult to do, 6. economic disputes are proliferating, 7. even cultural disputes are becoming increasingly numerous, 8. demographic changes are taking place, particularly on the American side of the Atlantic, that in the long run are likely to challenge the existing relationship.<sup>14</sup>

Undoubtedly, one of the most significant factors behind the current transatlantic drift is the end of the Cold War. Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall different thoughts about the future of NATO started to cloud the transatlantic relationship.<sup>15</sup> Domestic political agendas have assumed a new importance in the absence of a clear external threat. Reversing a long Cold War pattern in EU-US relations, economic disputes have come to shadow, on many occasions, political-military considerations.<sup>16</sup> Crucially, Europe and America appear to have much different worldviews. On the fundamental issue, for example, of how international order in the twenty-first century should be promoted, most if not all European countries no longer see eye to eye with the United States.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, increased European integration renders the European Union stronger and more ambitious. Most Europeans are unhesitatingly calling for a more substantial EU role in world affairs, defying Washington's efforts to preserve 'the unipolar moment'.

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<sup>14</sup> Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, p. 281.

<sup>15</sup> Smith and Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe*, p.1.

<sup>16</sup> Lundestad, 'Toward transatlantic drift?', p. 23.

<sup>17</sup> Bertram, 'The EU and the Future of Transatlantic Relations', p.41.

Another important development with potentially serious implications for EU-US relations is the eastward enlargement of the EU.<sup>18</sup> Although enlargement has often been characterized as the most important event, along with the EMU, in post-Cold War European integration, its implications for transatlantic relations have attracted very little interest so far. The present thesis has as point of departure the hypothesis that the eastward enlargement of the European Union will have a significant impact on many of the forces which help define the course of EU-US relations. It will try, therefore, to take an analytical look at enlargement, in an attempt to identify the ways in which the latter can influence the shape of transatlantic relations. The point of focus of this thesis is, however, the transatlantic relationship and more specifically the direction in which it is likely to move in the near future. Subsequently, the main purpose of this work is to address the following question: How is the eastward enlargement of the European Union going to affect the factors which determine the course of transatlantic relations?

This study attempts to shed light on a very interesting parameter of transatlantic relations which has so far received little and sporadic attention. Indeed, the issue of the eastward enlargement of the European Union and its overall impact on EU-US relations has been inadequately explored. In the broad field of transatlantic studies, events such as the war in Iraq and the ensued crisis in transatlantic relations and the EU constitutional crisis have

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<sup>18</sup> The term eastward enlargement of the European Union is used to describe the accession of eight Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union on 1 May 2004: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although the current analysis focuses predominantly on the 2004 enlargement, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007 does not alter its key findings and conclusions. On the contrary, on a number of issues, such as EU-Russian relations, it seems to reinforce them.

monopolized scholarly attention, driving it away from the issue of enlargement. The debate on this issue has been mostly limited to the question of Europe's division into 'new' and 'old' in the wake of Donald Rumsfeld's remarks in January 2003. Even in this case, however, little analytical and systematic research has taken place and almost always isolated from the bigger issue of the eastward enlargement as a variable in the study of EU-US relations. Furthermore, crucial aspects of the relationship between Europe and America, such as its cultural dimension, which in recent years have acquired a greater importance and have had an increased impact on the direction of transatlantic relations, are often neglected by researchers, accustomed to focusing on more traditional elements and aspects of the transatlantic relationship. The thesis takes the view that this dimension can no longer be ignored as an object of research by any work which looks into relations between the EU and the US. Of course, the extent to which political differences can be attributed to cultural differences and the real impact of the latter, remain a matter of debate. The fact that they do play a role, however, is not open to dispute.

### **Methodological considerations**

The present research is underpinned by a number of methodological assumptions.

Firstly, a detailed presentation and analysis of the various factors which account for the adoption by the EU and the US of specific stances towards each other is absolutely necessary for gaining an understanding of the

evolution of transatlantic relations and trying to make predictions about their future course. The way Europe and America perceive their respective international roles, the way they interpret the structure of the international system, the way they form their views about each other, are all essential issues for the study of transatlantic relations.

Secondly, in order to understand and explain policy-making processes and policy outcomes in Europe and America both material interests and ideational parameters need to be taken into account. Foreign policy preferences cannot always be explained by cost and benefit calculations. The way an international actor perceives its mission, for example, can sometimes be a direct consequence of the way they perceive their own identity and the limitations the latter imposes on their actions.

Thirdly, a pluralistic theoretical approach is essential in order to provide plausible explanations for the issues at hand, as no single theory of international relations (or European integration) can by itself fulfil the complex task of analyzing transatlantic relations by taking into account both interests and ideas. Constructivist analysis, for instance, is in a position to offer convincing arguments when it comes to the examination of the role of ideational factors in transatlantic relations or European integration. Rationalist (in this case realist and liberal) approaches, on the other hand, provide clear and valid explanations about the power of material interests to determine policy outcomes. This kind of approach is premised on the thesis that "...interests and ideas could be used concurrently in an explanatory argument without having to assume a causal primacy of either factor from the outset.

Social actors can be rational without being either narrow-minded materialists or quixotic idealists.”<sup>19</sup>

The study focuses on events of the post-Cold War era, covering mainly a period of nearly ten years, from 1998 to 2007. During this period, post-Cold War trends in transatlantic relations became clearer, after a period of transition in the early 1990s and negotiations for the admission of new members into the European Union were completed, with ten new states joining in 2004 and another two in 2007. However, the study also makes use of sources which fall outside the aforementioned timeframe when this is deemed essential for the formulation and support of its arguments.

It focuses mainly on the political and security dimensions of the transatlantic relationship and not on economic and trade relations. This is also the case with the analysis of the eastward enlargement of the European Union. References to economic and trade issues are usually made only when there is a need to stress their political implications. Chapter Two, for instance, discusses American attitudes towards the EU's Economic and Monetary

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<sup>19</sup> Jachtenfuchs, 'Deepening and widening integration theory', p. 655. Jachtenfuchs refers to theories of European integration, but his remarks apply to the study of international relations as well: "When it touches empirical ground, the current controversy between rationalists and constructivists seems to boil down to a debate about the explanatory power of material interests, on the one hand, and ideas or interests, on the other. At first glance, this seems to be a welcome operationalization of a controversy that appears sometimes to be quite esoteric. On closer inspection, however, the assessment is less positive. First, as material interests stand for rationalism and ideas or identities for constructivism, the relative importance of one or the other factor seems to amount to a victory of a theory over the other. Linking the fate of metatheoretical orientation to one single causal factor seems unfortunate. Second, this dichotomic either/or view is a hindrance to pursuing the more important question about the conditions under which interests, ideas and identities matter respectively. That both material interests and ideas or identities matter for political outcomes is a truism for those not familiar with the rationalism-constructivism controversy. However, the desire to see one theoretical side win the battle leads to hypotheses about the influence of interests or ideas/identities in an either-or way or to unconvincing statements about what rationalism allegedly cannot explain or even see and the premature refutation of constructivist claims. Ibid, pp. 653-654. For a similar conclusion see also, Hill and Smith, 'International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues', p. 7.

Union since the latter is also a political project with serious implications for the process of European integration and EU-US relations in general.

### **Overview of the chapters**

Chapter One establishes the theoretical framework of the study and offers a general introduction to the issues covered by it. It starts by offering an overview of some of the factors which have been crucial in shaping post-Cold War EU-US relations and makes a reference to the three leading theories of international relations, realism, liberalism and constructivism, presenting a summary of their main points and predictions. The second part of the chapter takes a look at the phenomenon of enlargement as part of the process of European integration. It lists the areas in which enlargement can have an impact on the process of integration and examines the main theories of European integration, neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism. The third part of the chapter covers the issue of the identity of the European Union, analyzing the notions of ‘civilian’ and ‘normative’ power which have come to define the EU as an actor in recent years. It focuses on the characteristics of ‘civilian power Europe’ and the issue of whether the acquisition of military means alters the nature of the Union. The last part of the chapter refers to the concept of ‘soft power’. Drawing on the work of Joseph Nye, it focuses on the nature and use of soft power, its sources and the way it is viewed by European and American policy-makers.

Chapter Two takes a look at American post-Cold War foreign policy preferences with a particular focus on Washington’s ‘EU’ policy. The first

part of this chapter deals with the issue of post-Cold War global order and describes how and why 'unipolarity' has come to define American perceptions of the structure of the post-Cold War international system. The second part presents and analyses the debates within America around the issues of its international role, its foreign policy objectives and the methods to achieve them. American attitudes toward Europe are discussed in the third part of the chapter. Attitudes toward European integration in general, the EU's EMU and the role of NATO in post-Cold War Europe are examined in detail, in an effort to evaluate the key elements of Washington's 'EU policy'. The role of domestic factors on the US stance towards the EU is also explored here, with the purpose of identifying and analyzing a number of internal developments which have had an increasing impact on American attitudes towards Europe. The final part of Chapter Two addresses the issue of the influence the realist school of thought has traditionally exerted on the formulation of US foreign policy.

Chapter Three discusses developments in post-Cold War Europe. It begins with an examination of European reactions to the end of bipolarity. It looks at conflicting views about the potential role of the EU in the post-Cold War world and tries to evaluate its status as an actor within the global arena. The second part of the chapter focuses on integration trends within the Union. It presents and assesses the arguments of those who claim that European integration is in crisis and those who believe that further integration is bound to take place. The third part of the chapter is concerned with the analysis of the relations between the US and the EU's three most powerful member

states, trying to assess their implications for the direction of EU-US relations.

<sup>20</sup> It also examines the attitudes of European publics towards America in general and American foreign policy in particular. The final part of the chapter revisits the issue of Europe's identity through a discussion of the factors which help determine what Europe is and what it does as an international actor.

Chapter Four, deals with the eastward enlargement of the EU and its impact on European integration. It presents two different scenarios concerning the possible impact of enlargement. The first part of the chapter discusses the views of those who expect this enlargement round to lead to a less integrated EU. It takes a look at arguments that advance the idea that more integration in areas of great importance for EU-US relations (CFSP, ESDP) will be impossible after enlargement as the new members of the EU are not in favour of more integration. It also analyses predictions that claim that cultural diversity in the new EU will lead to a less united entity. The second part of the chapter, examines the arguments of those who predict a more integrated Europe in the aftermath of enlargement. It discusses the reasons for which it is believed that the new member states will be in favour of further integration, even in sensitive areas such as defence and security.

Chapter Five assesses the impact of eastward enlargement on the EU's external relations with a focus on the EU's new 'near abroad' and Russia. The first part of the chapter addresses the challenges with which the EU will be

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<sup>20</sup> The field of CFSP remains intergovernmental since there is no official EU 'US policy'. Relations between Washington and the three big European capitals determine, as a rule, the state of transatlantic relations on political and security issues. The EU has often managed to present a common front in its dealings with Washington ( ICC, Middle East) but as the Iraq War has showed no common 'US policy' exists at the moment.

confronted in its new neighbourhood. It also presents the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy, the new EU policy through which the Union hopes that it will help its new neighbours to stabilize and prosper. The second part of the chapter discusses EU-Russia relations. It presents the factors which have the potential to lead to confrontation between Russia and Europe and render EU plans to forge a strategic partnership with Moscow a dead letter. The last part of the chapter evaluates the chances of the ENP to achieve its ambitious goals and takes note of the arguments of both its defenders and its critics. It then moves on to examine the likely direction of EU-Russia relations in the near future discussing both the view that a partnership is inevitable and the view that rivalry and confrontation are much more likely. Finally, it analyses the implications of enlargement for the EU's international role, trying to assess whether enlargement will lead to a self-absorbed and diluted EU or to an EU with a greater role in world affairs.

Chapter Six, assesses the impact of enlargement on EU-US relations by looking at its effect on factors which have so far played a crucial role in the evolution of the transatlantic relationship. The first of these factors is European integration. So, the first part of the chapter examines the argument that after enlargement Washington will be under more pressure to make a decision on the attitude it wants to hold towards integration. It focuses on US options and tries to estimate what their implications would be for transatlantic relations. Part two deals with the issue of EU-Russia and US-Russia relations and looks at Washington's strategy towards Moscow and American calls to Europe for coordinated EU-US policies towards Russia. It explores American

motives and European options, trying to anticipate the potential impact on EU-US relations. Part three of the chapter tries to calculate the impact of an anticipated greater EU involvement in the Asian continent. After its eastward enlargement an energy-hungry EU is expected by many to look for a greater involvement in the energy-rich areas of Central Asia and the Middle East and such a move would certainly have an impact on its relationship with the US. The fourth part of Chapter Six deals with the impact on EU-US relations that the enlarged EU's efforts to promote globally its unique model of cooperation and integration generate. It examines, more specifically, the impact of the EU's support for global governance in the form of multilateralism and interregionalism, its efforts to promote international law and limit the use of military power and its attempt to manage globalisation. Part five of the chapter focuses on American reactions to the enlarged EU's demand for a greater role in global politics. It also examines the possible ways in which the EU might pursue such a role and their implications for EU-US relations. The chapter ends by looking at the argument that after its eastward enlargement the EU might try to boost its cohesion by promoting the construction of a common European identity against its transatlantic ally.

Chapter Seven, starts by offering an assessment of how EU-US relations are likely to evolve in the near future. It examines closely the forces which have, arguably, the power to hold Europe and America together, and the arguments that claim that the rift between the two partners has become so great that the special relationship cannot be restored. The chapter concludes by summarizing the main arguments and findings of the study.

## Chapter 1

### *Theoretical perspectives*

#### **1. Conceptualising EU-US relations**

The study of EU-US relations in the post-Cold War era has mainly been premised on the widely shared observations that the relationship between the EU and the US is “the most important relationship between any two major international actors”<sup>1</sup> and that “what happens between the EU and the US matters, both to those directly involved and to those within the broader world arena by whom the effects of EU-US interactions are felt.”<sup>2</sup> Research has focused on a number of crucial factors and issues which have come to determine in the last two decades the state and prospects of transatlantic relations.

The most important of these has been the demise of bipolarity as the defining feature of the international system.<sup>3</sup> The emergence of the EU as a new centre of power in a more multipolar world has been viewed as a corollary of this development, with the EU trying to assume a greater role in the field of defence and security through its European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).<sup>4</sup> The EU was, post-1989, “both motivated and encouraged” to find new security roles within an entirely new security context, facing however the potential of competition and conflict with the US.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the readjustment of European security structures “has the potential to generate

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<sup>1</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, pp.7,9.

<sup>5</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, pp.2-3.

considerable acrimony, testing the durability of the transatlantic alliance.”<sup>6</sup> The evolution of the EU as a ‘power’ has inevitably become a point of friction with the US.<sup>7</sup> The recognition of the EU as a power in international relations, however, raises other interesting questions, leading scholars on both sides of the Atlantic to debates on issues such as the nature of power itself or the EU’s role in the broader international arena, where some think that the EU can be seen as an alternative player to the US under certain circumstances.<sup>8</sup> The ideology of ‘civilian power Europe’, which has become a key element in the EU’s self-perception in international affairs, has been a very important development in this respect.<sup>9</sup> The same is the case with the debate on the nature of power itself, which has revolved around the distinction between a European type of power, based on a predominantly ‘soft’ notion of power and an American type of power, based on a ‘hard’ notion of power.<sup>10</sup> The economic dimension also started to weigh heavier in the relationship bringing the two parties closer but at the same time increasing the potential for conflict in the areas of trade and investment, for example.<sup>11</sup> Thus, Europe and America, partners and, increasingly, rivals in world politics have reached a situation which has aptly been called ‘competitive cooperation’.<sup>12</sup> The potential for conflict has been further enhanced by three distinct developments: the absence of the monolithic Soviet threat which had acted as a force of unity in the European and American foreign policies, the increasing

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<sup>6</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 135.

<sup>7</sup> Smith and Steffenson, p. 357.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 358, 360.

<sup>9</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, p. 200.

<sup>10</sup> Smith and Steffenson, p. 358.

<sup>11</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>12</sup> Smith and Steffenson, p. 344.

importance of domestic politics, especially in the US where members of Congress have once again been able to oppose the American government on issues of foreign policy and the appearance of new economic challengers on the world stage who are now in a position to curb the combined power of the EU and the US to dictate the terms of global trade and investment.<sup>13</sup> Fault lines, such as social and cultural differences and divergences, which had been at least partly masked by the Cold War, have acquired a new significance leading many to take a more critical view of the assumption that Europe and America really share common values.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, a fundamental change has taken place in the way the meanings of national and international security are defined, rendering the traditional equation of national security with military strength almost obsolete, as new threats such as environmental degradation, rising ethnic and regional conflicts and the widening gap between the rich North and the poor South cannot be met by a military balance of power.<sup>15</sup>

The interplay of these factors has led to new realities in the three key areas of EU and US interaction. In the area of political economy, the 'balance of power' has shifted inexorably towards the collective EU position, and America and Europe find themselves today in a situation of intense but still uneven interdependence, in which they operate as 'adversarial partners' at both the transatlantic and the global level.<sup>16</sup> In the diplomatic field, where the actors are mainly national governments, the US still finds itself in a leading

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<sup>13</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Smith and Steffenson, p. 346.

<sup>15</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 9.

<sup>16</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, pp. 59-60, Smith and Steffenson, p. 345.

position and is able to take the initiative both at the transatlantic and the global level.<sup>17</sup> In the area of defence and security, almost exclusively intergovernmental so far, the balance is even more firmly in favour of the US, with Washington possessing and being capable of mobilising ‘hard power’ and the EU infringing on US predominance in certain tightly specified areas of activity.<sup>18</sup>

A critical issue in the study of EU-US relations has been the inability of the EU to formulate a coherent ‘US policy’ and Washington’s indeterminate ‘EU policy’. Identifying the US as the ‘significant other’ of the European integration process has been much easier than developing a coherent and coordinated ‘European policy’ towards it.<sup>19</sup> This has not been entirely the Union’s fault however: “The diplomatic coordination that lies at the heart of the CFSP is strongly conditioned by the positions of the United States, not only because they affect the environment within which CFSP emerges but also because they strongly shape the policies of key EU member states. The existence of ‘special relationships’, of which the most celebrated or notorious is that between the US and the UK, is thus a key element of transatlantic politics. The achievement of diplomatic coordination and consistency has always been an issue for the EU, and the United States has the potential both to promote it and to erode it – often both at the same time.”<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, p. 60. What is of great importance, here, is “a significant move towards policies of ‘soft balancing’ by EU member states in respect of the US, facilitated by the development of the EU’s diplomatic machinery and practices.”

<sup>18</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, pp. 60-61, Smith and Steffenson, p. 353.

<sup>19</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, pp. 48-49.

<sup>20</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, p. 48. See also, Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 97.

The formation of a European 'US policy' is further hindered by "the shifting policymaking balance between institutions in Washington, complicated by the different levels of government in the US federal system and by the fluctuating effects of US domestic politics."<sup>21</sup> On the American side of the Atlantic, the development of the EU's CFSP and then ESDP has increasingly led to important questions about US leadership and Washington's capacity to define the foreign policy consensus in the Atlantic area, challenging some key assumptions in US foreign policy.<sup>22</sup> Many in the US (and in Europe) are of the opinion that the growth of ESDP might lead to a new institutional competitor for NATO, whose existence came under question after the fall of the Berlin Wall.<sup>23</sup> This has generated a US tendency to revert to 'special relationships' with key partners within the EU.<sup>24</sup>

Departing from different assumptions about the nature of power, cooperation and competition in the international system, the dominant theories of international relations provide competing and often entirely contradicting explanations for the analysis of post-Cold War EU-US relations.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, p. 50.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>23</sup> Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, p. 278, McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, p. 58.

<sup>24</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, p. 52.

<sup>25</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, pp. 23-24. As Peterson points out, p. 23, "Using theory to guide the study of empirical political events means being selective. Competing theories are always on offer and they inevitably provide competing explanations for the same events or outcomes. The most important criterion to guide the selection process is the validity of the *assumptions* which underpin different theories." This study is no exception to this rule. Therefore, it will limit itself to the presentation and brief analysis of the assumptions of some of the main international relations theories who have been used by many analysts as compasses for the study of EU-US relationship. Thus, realism (with a particular emphasis on neorealism at some points) and liberalism, as the two main schools of thought in international relations (Andreatta, *Theory and the European Union's International Relations*, p. 23) are examined here, while a number of theories, collectively named alternative theories (or reformist according to Peterson), with constructivism being singled out for special consideration, are also presented.

Realism, and more specifically neorealism, which, by some accounts, “has proved to be a remarkably resilient model for understanding international politics despite new challenges to its central assumptions,”<sup>26</sup> is still considered to be the dominant theory in international relations. Realism constitutes for its proponents a research programme which contains a core set of assumptions from which a variety of theories and explanations can be developed.<sup>27</sup> Classical realism, neorealism, ‘rise and fall’ realism, neoclassical realism, defensive structural realism, and offensive structural realism are just a few of its variants.<sup>28</sup> It is by no means a monolithic construction and disagreements among its adherents are neither rare, nor insignificant. There are however, a certain number of assumptions commonly shared by most of its proponents. According to one account these are six: 1. States are the most important actors on the world scene. International organizations merely reflect the interests of their member states, 2. Anarchy is the central characteristic of international life, 3. States seek to maximize their security or their power, 4. The international system is mostly responsible for state conduct on the international scene, 5. States adopt instrumentally rational policies in their pursuit of power or security, and 6. States rely on the use of force or on the threat to use force to protect their interests and enhance their security.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 27. As Peterson admits, neorealism has emerged “to refine and systemize realism while retaining most of its major assumptions,” *ibid*, p. 24.

<sup>27</sup> Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment’, p.50.

<sup>28</sup> See, Elman, ‘Realism’.

<sup>29</sup> Frankel, ‘Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction’, pp. xiv-xviii. Another account reduces their number to four: 1. States are the central actors on the world stage, 2. State behavior can be explained rationally, 3. States seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power and the international situation they face, and 4. Anarchy is the defining characteristic of the international system, which implies that states ultimately must rely on themselves in an inherently competitive environment. Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment’, p.50, n.4.

For realists, the chances for enhanced cooperation and harmony between states in a more multipolar world are almost nonexistent while multipolarity is believed to lead inevitably to shifting alliances and instability.<sup>30</sup> Actors such as the US and the EU can certainly cooperate on specific issues if this cooperation is based on clear and genuine assessments about the distribution of power between them but sustained cooperation between sovereign states within international organizations such as the EU should rather be deemed impossible.<sup>31</sup> Realists tend to consider domestic political forces which shape state preferences theoretically irrelevant, maintaining that the internal characteristics of states have little or no effect on their behaviour as international actors.<sup>32</sup> State behaviour is either driven by leaders' flawed human nature or by the pre-emptive unpleasantness mandated by an anarchic international system.<sup>33</sup> Based on their maxims that alliances do not survive the disappearance of the threat against which they were directed and that when one power becomes much stronger than its rivals, the latter will 'gang up' against this 'hegemon', realists have long predicted that the EU-US alliance would not survive the end of the Cold War and the realities of the new world order.<sup>34</sup>

Liberalism departs from the principle that "the more that states trade with one another, the more they may specialize and the more all benefit. Liberals view international relations as a positive-sum game: if states would

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<sup>30</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 74, Andreatta, 'Theory and the European Union's International Relations', p. 25.

<sup>31</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 25.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. 101.

<sup>33</sup> Elman, 'Realism', p. 11.

<sup>34</sup> Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, pp. 279-280 and Duffield, 'Transatlantic Relations after the Cold-War', pp. 96-97.

eliminate all barriers to economic exchange between them, all states would benefit from the economic growth engendered by free trade.”<sup>35</sup> In contradistinction to neorealists, liberalists claim that it is not the distribution of international power which determines the degrees of cooperation or competition between states but the extent to which national preferences converge on particular issues, which in turn is determined by the demands of powerful domestic interest groups.<sup>36</sup> They pay more attention to ideology and practical needs than to the alleged dictates of power politics.<sup>37</sup> Liberalism is not only about (free) trade, however, and economic relations. Since free trade has consistently been pursued only by states which have embraced more general liberal values, liberalism has asserted a close relation of democracy and peace, not just as the first determining the second, but as an interactive process, leading many of its proponents to the contention that liberal states do not make war upon each other.<sup>38</sup> And although it is particularly strong in its analysis of the political economy of international trade, liberalism is also credited with plausible explanations for the behaviour of states on matters related to human rights and international law.<sup>39</sup> This partly stems from the fact that liberalism recognises that states are not the only actors in world politics.<sup>40</sup> Liberalism, therefore, claims that interstate anarchy can be tamed by a network of relations between states, between states and other types of actors,

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<sup>35</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>36</sup> Andreatta, ‘Theory and the European Union’s International Relations’, p. 24, Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 30.

<sup>37</sup> Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, p. 280.

<sup>38</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 31.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>40</sup> Andreatta, *Theory and the European Union’s International Relations*, p. 24. International organizations, multinational corporations, religious organisations, interest groups and political parties are all, following this analysis, actors at the supranational, transnational and subnational level respectively.

and between other types of actors themselves.<sup>41</sup> Liberals acknowledge the role domestic politics can play in international relations but downplay its importance as they think that ultimately politics can be subordinated to markets through free trade so long as the political commitment to liberal principles is in place.<sup>42</sup> Friction between Europe and America has, according to liberals, as a root cause the “deviation from the liberal prescription that each side eliminate barriers to economic exchange with the other.”<sup>43</sup> Though they think that there might be even more strain in the future, they maintain that Europe and America will not drift apart since both of them are based on the same ideals of democracy and free markets and need each other politically, economically, and culturally.<sup>44</sup>

The failure of the main theories of international relations to provide satisfactory explanations for the end of the bipolar order and its aftermath, have brought to the fore, or even led to the emergence of alternative schools of thought which have as departure the claim of many theorists that international politics is no longer simply about what is necessary given practical realities but about what may be possible if new ideas and assumptions replace existing ones.<sup>45</sup> They are mainly characterised by the following principles: there should be a ‘holistic’ approach to international relations, stressing interconnections between issues which are usually viewed

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 24.

<sup>42</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 103.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 31.

<sup>44</sup> Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, p. 280. For a similar conclusion, see also Duffield, ‘Transatlantic Relations after the Cold-War’, pp. 98-100.

<sup>45</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 32. Labelled as ‘reformists’, these theorists include, according to Peterson, p. 33, feminists, ecologists, various kinds of Marxists and advocates of ‘critical theory.’ Duffield calls these alternative theories transformational, Duffield, ‘Transatlantic Relations after the Cold-War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future’.

as distinct and separate by governments; states are the problem in international relations and not the solution; international cooperation is desirable in principle, despite the fact that international organisations are usually slaves to state interests; the moral content of foreign policies must supersede abstract and increasingly meaningless notions of national interests.<sup>46</sup> They mainly seek to explain international relations and state behaviour in terms of ideational factors, such as belief systems, images, cognitive maps, collective identity, and culture.<sup>47</sup> For these approaches national sovereignty should be viewed as an increasingly artificial and meaningless construction as it leads national governments to piecemeal, ineffectual responses to global problems.<sup>48</sup> They do not just condemn neorealism as 'ahistorical', since neorealism could not predict and cannot explain the end of the Cold War but above all they strive to refute its assumptions and prescriptions.<sup>49</sup> They are highly normative, often generating prescriptions for international relations insisting that a more humane world requires an end to the existing state system.<sup>50</sup> America and Europe are therefore warned that their foreign policies have to stand for something, such as democratic principles, human rights or environmental protection, if they are to inspire and sustain popular support in a post-Cold War world.<sup>51</sup> Though often accused of utopianism and of offering little of practical use in the day-

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<sup>46</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, pp. 32-33.

<sup>47</sup> Duffield, 'Transatlantic Relations after the Cold-War', p. 100.

<sup>48</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, p. 104.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34. As Peterson explains, the reformist strategy is summed up by the motto: 'think globally, act locally,' with reformists believing that international relations can be transformed by revolutionizing domestic politics at the grassroots through non-violence, ecology and social responsibility.

<sup>51</sup> Peterson, *Europe and America*, pp. 104-105.

to-day management of EU-US relations and dismissed by mainstream scholars, i.e. neorealists and liberals, as ‘advocates of a severely iconoclastic intellectual and political position,’ reformists have seen their arguments strengthened in the aftermath of the Cold War and these schools of thought “now seem less of a pious and sanctimonious rehash of idealism and a more credible starting point for thinking about how to transform international politics.”<sup>52</sup>

Constructivism has achieved a predominant position among alternative/reformist theories. Defined by its “emphasis on the socially constructed character of actors’ interests and identities” and by its “concomitant faith in the susceptibility to change of even the most seemingly immutable practices and institutions in world politics,” constructivism is now considered to have matured as a distinctive approach to the study of global politics.<sup>53</sup> Even some critics of constructivism admit today that it has become inescapable as a phenomenon, acknowledging that its significance is underlined by the claim of many scholars that ‘the debate’ between constructivism and the mainstream theories of IR currently is, or is about to become the most significant one in the discipline.<sup>54</sup> Constructivists are often presented as the fiercest opponents of rationalists, namely realists and liberals, who treat state actors as unitary and rational and maintain that social phenomena may be explained in the same way as the natural world, and that

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p. 34.

<sup>53</sup> Phillips, ‘Constructivism’, p. 60. It is exactly for these reasons, argues Phillips, that “constructivists are well placed to enhance our understanding of fundamental normative and institutional transformations that are currently reshaping the world polity.”

<sup>54</sup> Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: the politics of reality*, p. 2.

facts and values may clearly be separated.<sup>55</sup> They claim that they are free to move in directions which cannot be explored by their theoretical opponents: “Constructivists seek to push the empirical and explanatory domains of international relations theory beyond the analytical confines of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in all directions: by problematizing states’ identities and interests; by broadening the array of ideational factors that affect international outcomes; by introducing the logically prior constitutive rules alongside regulatory rules; and by including transformation as a normal feature of international politics that systemic theory should encompass even if its empirical occurrence is episodic and moves on a different time line from everyday life.”<sup>56</sup>

Constructivists do not accept the rationalist position that “actors and concepts are exogenously given” with actors acting in a “pregiven world according to the demands of instrumental reason.”<sup>57</sup> On the contrary, they observe, the social world is constructed, not given, since practice influences outcome.<sup>58</sup> Realism and liberalism have drawn increasingly close to one another over time, argue constructivists, and view the world in utilitarian terms: “an atomistic universe of self-regarding units whose identity is assumed given and fixed, and who are responsive largely if not solely to material interests that are stipulated by assumption.”<sup>59</sup> Constructivists, on the other hand, see behaviour as “essentially norm-driven, with states seeking to

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

<sup>56</sup> Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity*, p. 27.

<sup>57</sup> Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: the politics of reality*, p. 3.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 4. This is highlighted by the words of one of the leading constructivist theorists, Alexander Wendt: “Anarchy is what states make of it”. Ibid. Anarchy, for constructivists, is clearly not a permanent and unavoidable feature of international politics.

<sup>59</sup> Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity*, p. 3.

ensure a correspondence between their own conduct and internalized prescriptions for legitimate behaviour that states have derived from their identities. Far from being of purely ornamental value, norms exercise a profound influence on state behaviour both by helping to constitute states' identities and interests in the first instance, and by conditioning and constraining the strategies and actions undertaken by states in the furtherance of these interests."<sup>60</sup> Regarding the course of EU-US relations, they suggest that "independently of the continued existence of common threats, interlinking international institutions, and shared liberal democratic traditions, transatlantic relations after the Cold War should be different from what they might otherwise have become because of fundamental changes in the nature of the United States and the European countries, or at least in the beliefs and values held by their elites, mass publics, or both."<sup>61</sup>

## **2. The EU's eastward enlargement**

Being the most challenging yet, the eastward enlargement of the EU has raised a number of issues, which could broadly be grouped into four categories<sup>62</sup>:

1. The impact on the EU's institutions and decision-making procedures.
2. The financial and economic implications.
3. Political and security issues.

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<sup>60</sup> Phillips, 'Constructivism', p. 63.

<sup>61</sup> Duffield, 'Transatlantic Relations after the Cold-War', p. 101.

<sup>62</sup> Gower and Redmond, 'Introduction', p. 5, Croft et al., *The Enlargement of Europe*, p. 68.

4. The impact on the future orientation of the European Union, that is, the direction and form that European integration will take post-enlargement.

The first category includes issues which revolve around two crucial parameters: the size of the EU and the balance (or representation) between small and large member states.<sup>63</sup> Such issues are expected to divide large and small countries.<sup>64</sup> The second, and most studied one, is characterised by questions concerning mainly the costs of enlargement and the ability of new members to absorb EU funds and adjust to the new economic realities. Financial issues, some warn, will cause a split between the rich states (contributors to the EU budget) and the poor states (net beneficiaries).<sup>65</sup> The third category comprises issues which affect the external perspective and policies of the EU as well as relations with neighbouring states which have no (or very little) prospects of becoming one day members of the European Union.<sup>66</sup> The fourth category, deemed as the most important, is mainly concerned with the stance of the new members on the fundamental question of the future direction of European integration: preoccupied with gaining admittance to the EU and prepared to write a blank cheque (in principle) to pay for their admission, CEECs have spent, arguably, little time thinking about the direction of European integration and the form they would prefer it to take, making analysts wonder about their final and true position, and, specifically, their willingness to endorse the federalist principles of the EU's

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<sup>63</sup> Gower and Redmond, 'Introduction', p. 5.

<sup>64</sup> Croft et al., *The Enlargement of Europe*, p. 83.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, p. 83.

<sup>66</sup> Gower and Redmond, 'Introduction', p. 6.

founding fathers, as members of the Union.<sup>67</sup> The focus, here, has been on the likely scenario of differentiated integration in an EU of nearly thirty members. Three basic versions of differentiated (or flexible) integration have thus been offered for study<sup>68</sup>: 1. Multi-speed, where all member states pursue all policies but not necessarily at the same speed. 2. Ordered multi-tier, where all member states pursue the ‘core’ policies and then groups of them pursue progressively more. 3. Disordered multi-tier, where all member states pursue the core but then select their own subset of non-core policies (i.e. Europe *à la carte* or an EU with individual opt-outs/opt-ins). Policy questions and the issue of the future direction of the EU are expected to divide the EU into its federalist and intergovernmentalist camps (broadly speaking.)<sup>69</sup>

Despite its political significance the enlargement of the EU has been a largely neglected issue in studies of European integration.<sup>70</sup> It is true that the theoretical study of enlargement has been dominated by analyses of the economic costs and benefits of membership and expansion - due to the fact that the EU has mainly been viewed as an economic association – and that it is relatively recently that the political science analysis of enlargement started to improve understanding of enlargement as a political process driven by more

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p. 6. For the terms of admission, which the CEECs agreed to adhere to, see European Commission, *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe*. Among other things new members were required to subscribe to the emerging *acquis politique*, that is, the developing common foreign and defence policy and to the *finalité politique* (the long-term objective of the EU.) Croft et al., *The Enlargement of Europe*, p. 61.

<sup>68</sup> Gower and Redmond, ‘Introduction’, pp. 6-7, Croft et al., *The Enlargement of Europe*, p. 84.

The EU is already a combination of (1) and (3) argue Gower and Redmond, since no member has excluded itself indefinitely from any EU policy. For a more detailed analysis (where for example the terms ‘variable geometry, concentric circles, core Europe’ are examined) see Croft et al., *The Enlargement of Europe*, pp. 81-82, Aggestam, ‘The European Union at the crossroads’, p. 94 and Nugent, ‘Conclusions’, p. 270.

<sup>69</sup> Croft et al., *The Enlargement of Europe*, p. 83.

<sup>70</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU enlargement’, pp. 500-501, Miles, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, pp. 253-254.

and other factors than just economic interests.<sup>71</sup> And when this happened, studies of eastern enlargement focused predominantly (some would say exclusively) on the macro dimension of EU politics, addressing the key question of why the EU decided to open enlargement negotiations.<sup>72</sup>

It has, therefore, been suggested that there are three main elements on which enlargement theory should be focused<sup>73</sup>: 1. Conceptualizing the EU accession process – the enlargement perspectives, conditions and procedures of the Union, and the problems of negotiation and entry for candidate countries. 2. Addressing the transition processes emanating from EU enlargement on existing and new member states as well as for candidate countries – the complex interrelationship between the EU and the nation-state. 3. Analyzing the ‘impact’ of past and future enlargements on the European Union – the wider perspective of the pressures and nature of reform of the Union to accommodate past and future accessions.

The impact of enlargement is arguably one of the least studied areas, in this regard.<sup>74</sup> Enlargement has an impact both on the organization and the state to which the organization’s institutional rules are extended<sup>75</sup>: “With regard to the organization, it is most often asked how enlargement affects the distribution of power and interests in the organization, and how it influences the identity, norms, and goals as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization, and about the effect of a widening of membership on the prospects for a deepening of integration within the organization.” The

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<sup>71</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU enlargement’, p. 523.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 520.

<sup>73</sup> Miles, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, p. 254.

<sup>74</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU enlargement’, p. 507.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 507.

academic debate, in this area, has tended to be focused on “whether widening requires deepening of integration or whether enlargement will have the opposite effect, perhaps burying forever the federalist aspirations of the founding fathers.”<sup>76</sup>

Several theories of European integration strive to provide insights and explanations regarding the aforementioned issues. Neofunctionalism has been among the most influential ones. According to Ernest Haas, ‘founding father’ of neofunctionalism, “Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”<sup>77</sup> States are not the only important actors, say neofunctionalists, and supranational institutions, and non-state actors, such as interest groups and political parties are the real driving force behind regional integration efforts.<sup>78</sup> This leads to the three main theses of neofunctionalism: the spillover thesis; the elite socialisation thesis; and the supranational interest group thesis.<sup>79</sup> Neofunctionalist integration proceeds incrementally and spontaneously by a process of spillover: “Integration – even in a secondary and technical area – creates pressures to integrate contiguous areas for which the original area is crucial and which, therefore, can no longer be controlled at the national level. Functional spillover, from one area to the

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<sup>76</sup> Gower and Redmond, ‘Conclusion’, p. 185.

<sup>77</sup> Quoted in Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, p. 84.

<sup>78</sup> Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, p. 81.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid*, p. 82.

next, generates a technical spillover, which enlarges at the supranational level the dimension fit to deal with the issue. Technical spillovers – in turn – can create a political spillover, meaning that formal control is necessarily transferred from the national level, and political loyalties and attentions are shifted to the supranational level.”<sup>80</sup> ‘Elite socialisation’ takes place within supranational institutions: “Supranational institutions are likely to have their own political agendas. Over time, neofunctionalists predict, the supranational agenda will tend to triumph over interests formulated by member states. As an example one might look at how the European Parliament operates. ...Members of the EP are not divided into groups relating to their national origin. They are organised along party political and ideological lines. ...MEPs tend to become more European in their outlook, as a consequence of these working practices, though in practice this may be disputed empirically. This is often referred to as ‘elite socialization’. The fact that MEPs work together across borders makes it difficult for them to focus solely on national interests. This also makes the EP a natural ally for the European Commission in its discussions with the EU Council, even if the institutions do not always agree wholeheartedly on matters of policy.”<sup>81</sup> The formation of supranational interest groups can follow in a similar manner: “According to neofunctionalist theory, civil servants are not the only groups that develop a supranational orientation. Organized interest groups are also expected to become more European, as corporations and business groups formulate their own interests with an eye to the supranational institutions. As economic and political

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<sup>80</sup> Andreatta, ‘Theory and the European Union’s International Relations’, p. 22.

<sup>81</sup> Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, p. 84.

integration in a given region develops, interest groups will try to match this development through a process of reorganisation, to form their own supranational organizations. For example, national industrial and employers organizations established a common European organization, UNICE, in 1958, at much the same time as the European Community was established. In so doing, their intention was to influence future Community policy. Early neofunctionalists also saw a similar role for political parties. Furthermore, neofunctionalists believed that interest groups would put pressure on governments to force them to speed up the integration process. These groups were expected to develop their own supranational interest in political and economic integration, which would ally them to supranational institutions, such as the European Commission.”<sup>82</sup>

The process of integration is endogenous according to neofunctionalists (i.e. the current level of integration determines – by facilitating and amplifying them – future levels) and the final expectation can only be an ‘ever closer union’ based on original intentions as well as on the integration already reached.<sup>83</sup> In other words, the process is automatic, meaning that it is beyond the control of political leaders.<sup>84</sup> The notion of (political) spillover could be useful in explaining why some European states want to become EU members.<sup>85</sup> Nevertheless, it is claimed that

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p. 87.

<sup>83</sup> Andreatta, ‘Theory and the European Union’s International Relations’, pp. 21-22.

<sup>84</sup> Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, p. 82.

<sup>85</sup> Miles, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, p. 255. It has plausibly been argued, for example, that the 1995 enlargement of the EU (also known as ‘Northern Enlargement’) has been the result of three different kinds of spillover, of which political spillover has played a catalytic role: “...neofunctionalism is based mainly on the idea of spillover, which supposes that integration feeds upon itself. Northern enlargement could be explained as the consequence of three different kinds of spillover. The first was *functional* spillover as the creation of the European

neofunctionalism is less useful when it comes to explaining the impact of enlargement on European integration: “Enlargements have tended to emphasize the Union’s diversity – something neofunctionalism is largely uncomfortable with in its traditional form.”<sup>86</sup>

Many theorists point out that there is a connection between neofunctionalism and federalism: “...Sometimes neofunctionalism is seen as a theoretical approach that supports a federalist agenda. ...like federalists, [neofunctionalists] talk about processes of political integration, and about the advantages of this process.”<sup>87</sup> Some have even come to the conclusion that “Neofunctionalists agree with federalists on the desirability and feasibility of a continental union and of a superstate, eventually with its own foreign and defence policy.”<sup>88</sup> Neofunctionalists, however, maintain that their theory is devoid of a political agenda.<sup>89</sup> The confusion partly stems from different understandings of federalism.<sup>90</sup>

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Economic Area (EEA) between the EU and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) harmonized policies of low political salience that then led to further integration of a wider range of policies. Second came *institutional* spillover: The EEA was based on a sort of imperialism whereby the EU made rules and the EFTA states adjusted to them without any institutionalized means for influencing their content. This system eventually became politically untenable, leading to *political* spillover: Neofunctionalists have tended to miss the point that ‘political spillover will also occur from the outside in’ as elites from non-EU states become acclimated to operating in a new political environment and increasingly appreciate the benefits available to insiders.” Peterson and Bomberg, ‘Northern Enlargement and EU Decisionmaking’, p. 44.

<sup>86</sup> Miles, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, p. 256.

<sup>87</sup> Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, p. 87.

<sup>88</sup> Andreatta, ‘Theory and the European Union’s International Relations’, p. 21.

<sup>89</sup> Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, p. 88.

<sup>90</sup> For a relevant analysis, see Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, pp. 23-31. As Rosamond, p. 24, writes: “federalism is a very broad church indeed, ranging from calls for world government at one end of the continuum to near anarchism at the other. This also explains why federalism has become such an elastic and controversial concept in the politics of European integration.” References made to federalism and federal European Union/Europe by this thesis treat federalism as a process and not a political goal. Federalism is viewed here as “an evolving pattern of changing relationships, rather than a static design regulated by firm and unalterable rules.” Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, pp. 27-28. Federalism as an end goal of European integration does not appear in any official document and even among

Liberal intergovernmentalism tries to explain European integration by emphasising domestic structures.<sup>91</sup> Its main claim is that “European integration can best be explained as a series of rational choices made by national leaders.”<sup>92</sup> It incorporates within it both realist and neoliberal elements and deals explicitly with the interface between domestic and international politics.<sup>93</sup> National leaders have, according to intergovernmental accounts, “consistently pursued economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macro-economic preferences of ruling governmental coalition – that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global economy.”<sup>94</sup> They negotiate at the supranational level only on those issues which are favoured by their domestic constituencies, since their primary interest is in being re-elected and this ultimately means that integration is a process under strict governmental control.<sup>95</sup> Security concerns, ideological visions of politicians and public opinion have an impact on political decisions of state leaders, but economic interests remain primary.<sup>96</sup> Intergovernmentalist approaches to the phenomenon of enlargement are characterised by a serious shortcoming: by acknowledging executives as quasi-exclusive determiners of EU policy intergovernmentalism is cutting them off from rich debates over the character

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analysts “there is no consensus as to whether federalism (as a goal) is the explicit end point of EU development.” Miles and Redmond, ‘Enlarging the European Union: the Erosion of Federalism?’, p. 288.

<sup>91</sup> Andreatta, ‘Theory and the European Union’s International Relations’, p. 29.

<sup>92</sup> Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, p. 18.

<sup>93</sup> Cini, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, p. 103.

<sup>94</sup> Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, p. 18.

<sup>95</sup> Andreatta, ‘Theory and the European Union’s International Relations’, p. 29.

<sup>96</sup> Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, p. 7.

of ‘domestic politics’, state theory and public policy-making which constitute central features of domestic debates on EU enlargement.<sup>97</sup>

According to constructivist approaches, “enlargement politics will generally be shaped by ideational, cultural factors. The most relevant of these factors is ‘community’ or ‘cultural match’, that is, the degree to which the actors inside and outside the organization share a collective identity and fundamental beliefs. Studying enlargement in a constructivist perspective, then, primarily consists in the analysis of social identities, values, and norms, not the material, distributional consequences of enlargement for individual actors.”<sup>98</sup> Constructivist theorists also claim that they are best placed to study integration as a *process*: “If we think about European integration as a process bound up with change, then it makes sense to draw on a metatheoretical position that treats reality as contested and problematic.”<sup>99</sup> Yet, despite its claims, constructivism is often seen as “less confident in terms of differentiating between groups of candidate countries and indeed, in explaining the nuances of why the expanding Union has differing levels of integration between the member states. ...influential factors such as the role of state executives, domestic responses to external or structural stimuli, and the relationship between material preferences and ideational influences are hard to explain from a constructivist perspective of enlargement.”<sup>100</sup>

It is thus obvious then, that enlargement as a phenomenon within the process of European integration cannot be systematically analysed by current

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<sup>97</sup> Miles, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, p. 258.

<sup>98</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU enlargement’, p. 513.

<sup>99</sup> Rosamond, ‘New theories of European integration’, p. 122.

<sup>100</sup> Miles, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, pp. 263-264.

integration theories. This is particularly the case with the two most popular theories: “Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism are both essentially macrotheories of European *integration*, which seek to explain its broad pace and direction. They shed considerable light on ‘history-making’ decisions taken at the highest political level, including those taken to enlarge the EU. However, macrotheories are far less well equipped to tell us why or how enlargement may lead to change in day-to-day EU policy outcomes.”<sup>101</sup> It is, therefore, concluded that “Scholarship is far from having developed anything like a comprehensive ‘theory’ to enable us to understand the all-embracing nature and impact of EU enlargement.”<sup>102</sup>

### 3. ‘Civilian power Europe’

Several terms have been used in recent years by analysts who try to define what the European Union is and what it does as an actor: ‘Civilian power’, ‘magnetic force’, ‘a gentle power’, ‘normative power Europe’, ‘European superpower’, ‘quiet superpower’, ‘Kantian paradise’, ‘post-modern state’, ‘middle power’, ‘neo-medieval empire’, ‘responsible Europe’.<sup>103</sup> Today, however, a consensus amongst scholars seems to have finally been reached: “Notwithstanding its various ambiguities, the EU is already in fact a civilian power. This is the starting point for any analysis, despite the sometimes radical criticisms that are directed at particular EU policies and structures from the viewpoints of a normative theory of democracy or

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<sup>101</sup> Peterson and Bomberg, ‘Northern Enlargement and EU Decisionmaking’, p. 44.

<sup>102</sup> Miles, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, p. 264. This holds true for other approaches as well, such as multi-level governance and new institutionalism, *ibid.*, 260-262.

<sup>103</sup> Orbie, ‘A Civilian Power in the World?’, p. 2.

international justice.”<sup>104</sup> The term ‘civilian power’ was introduced by François Duchêne in the 1970s and has been central in the political and academic debate about Europe’s global role: “Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the 20<sup>th</sup> century citizen’s notion of civilised politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centers of power.”<sup>105</sup>

The notion of civilian power can mean a lot of different things to different people.<sup>106</sup> It is generally accepted, however, that a civilian power is characterised by three key features: the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use legally binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress.<sup>107</sup> One of the most debated topics in the study of civilian powers is the extent to which the possession and use of military force is compatible with the goals, or even the very nature, of a civilian power.

A growing number of scholars find that a civilian power is not on a mission to eliminate the use of force, although it strives to limit it.<sup>108</sup> The EU,

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<sup>104</sup> Telò, *Europe: a Civilian Power?*, p. 51.

<sup>105</sup> Duchêne, François, ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’, in M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager, (eds), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the EC* (London: Macmillan, 1973), quoted in Orbie, ‘A Civilian Power in the World?’, pp. 4,5.

<sup>106</sup> Morgan, *The idea of a European superstate*, p.150.

<sup>107</sup> Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, pp.236-237. Karen Smith, claims that there are four elements to being a civilian power: means; ends; use of persuasion; and civilian control over foreign (and defence) policy-making. Smith, ‘Beyond the Civilian Power EU Debate’, p. 65.

<sup>108</sup> Stavridis, ‘Why the ‘Militarizing’ of the European Union is strengthening the concept of a ‘Civilian power Europe’’, p. 10. Moreover, “civilian power means nothing if it is only referring to non-military means . How one uses those means is what makes a civilian power. ...Integration in Europe is a negation of traditional power politics but it does not mean that

arguably, needs military means in order to add credibility to its image of a world actor. Without the existence of such means the range of possibilities becomes more restricted and less credible.<sup>109</sup> The argument is best summed up as follows: “The primary new challenge which presents itself at the beginning of the twenty-first century is that economic global governance alone cannot guarantee a world order. Terrorism, fragmentation and WMD proliferation, on the one hand, and unipolar security policies, on the other, hinder efforts by civilian powers and multi-level multilateral networks to improve global governance. ...Europe thus finds itself at a crossroads. If the securitization of the international system is going on and the EU responds to the new challenges with mere inertia, it risks becoming a declining civilian power, floundering and divided, the object of a world history written elsewhere. ...and it would no longer be able to promote multilateralism...For as long as there remains a frustrating ambiguity about that choice, (development of substantial military capabilities) the EU will not only be left on the sidelines, but will be profoundly shaken whenever it is faced with the re-emergence of the politics of power in the post-Cold War world (e.g. the first Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Iraq War).”<sup>110</sup> Civilian powers are neither incapable nor unwilling to use military force but they would use it only under certain conditions: never unilaterally, but only collectively, only with international legitimacy, and only in their struggle to ‘civilize’ the international

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power is irrelevant.” *Ibid.*, p. 15. An example of the above principle is the German intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

<sup>109</sup> Stavridis, ‘Why the ‘Militaryizing’ of the European Union is strengthening the concept of a ‘Civilian power Europe’’, p. 18.

<sup>110</sup> Telò, *Europe: a Civilian Power?*, pp. 58, 59, 207.

environment.<sup>111</sup> The majority of scholars hold that military means are indeed necessary but can only be used a. as a last resort, when all other ‘civilian instruments’ have been deployed and b. only in order to support ‘civilian values’ such as democracy and human rights, rather than serving geopolitical and economic interests.<sup>112</sup> This is also the predominant view amongst EU policy-makers.<sup>113</sup> Some academics and policy-makers, however, are of the view that “European military integration repudiates Europe’s (potential) identity as a civilian power – even if the emphasis remains on diplomatic and economic instruments.”<sup>114</sup> A few among them hold the view that as some of the activities of the EU, peacekeeping operations is a case in point, are not, strictly speaking, civilian the EU has ceased to be a civilian power.<sup>115</sup> Others fear that military integration could usher in an arms race with other countries, reducing the Union’s magnetic force and restoring the traditional balance of power logic between the EU and neighbouring regions.<sup>116</sup> Others emphasise the possibility of a more aggressive EU: “With military means at its disposal, the EU would be able to make credible threats. It would not need to pay too much attention to other actors’ interests, perspectives, or arguments in order to get its way. The option of ‘going alone’ and/or imposing its own interests or

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<sup>111</sup> Maull, ‘Europe and the new balance of global order’, p. 781.

<sup>112</sup> Orbie, ‘A Civilian Power in the World?’, p. 14.

<sup>113</sup> Speaking about the Petersberg tasks, Xavier Solana has pointed out that “We are not talking about collective defence. Nor are we talking about building a European army or ‘militarising’ the EU. But we cannot continue to publicly espouse values and principles while calling on others to defend them....In the final analysis, as a last resort, after all possible instruments had been tried, the Union has to have the capacity to back up its policies by the use of military means.” Quoted in Orbie, ‘A Civilian Power in the World?’, p. 14.

<sup>114</sup> Orbie, ‘A Civilian Power in the World?’, p. 14.

<sup>115</sup> Smith, ‘Beyond the Civilian Power EU Debate’, pp. 70, 73. Smith, also argues that there is a problem with the definition of civilian ends as well: “...not only do we not have a good idea of what ‘civilian ends’ are, but also we cannot (and should not) state uncritically that the EU is actually pursuing civilian ends and therefore is a civilian power.” Ibid, p. 74. Hence she has no hesitation to declare that “...civilian power EU is definitely dead”, *ibid*, p. 76.

<sup>116</sup> Orbie, ‘A Civilian Power in the World?’, p. 15.

values would be a more realistic one than what it has been so far.”<sup>117</sup> Finally, it has been argued that “the Europeanization of defence politics leads to a democratic deficit because national parliaments’ capacity to control executive decisions to use military force has been weakened by the ESDP and neither the European Parliament nor the former WEU assembly has been able to compensate for this loss of parliamentary control.”<sup>118</sup> Democratic control of security and defence policy, is argued, has often been quoted as a feature of a civilian power and the democratic deficit in security and defence politics may damage the EU as a civilian power, undermining the legitimacy of EU-led military missions and compromising its ability to lead by virtuous example.<sup>119</sup> As is often pointed out, however, that there are simple, practical reasons why Europe cannot develop its civilian power into a classic military one: “...the indisputable fact is that the majority of European states, political parties, associations and citizens, rightly or wrongly, refuse to devote a significant share of their wealth (4 percent instead of today’s 2 percent) to the creation of a military power comparable to the US providing the guarantee of security in the classic sense of the term.”<sup>120</sup> It is, therefore, concluded that, “The adoption of security and defence competences has not led to a role conflict within the EU, using instead a more flexible interpretation of the civilian power idea.”<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Sjørnsen, ‘The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?’, p. 237.

<sup>118</sup> Wagner, ‘The democratic control of military power Europe’, p. 200.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, pp. 212-213. Such fears, however, are deemed rather excessive: “...a look at the institutional structure of Europe’s foreign and security policy somewhat qualifies the argument of a democratic deficit. Member states are clearly in the driving seat and have at their disposal a veto in important decisions. Given Europe’s relatively open decision-making system ‘groupthink’ is less likely to occur in EU foreign policy compared with more hierarchical decision-making systems.” Orbie, ‘A Civilian Power in the World?’, p. 16.

<sup>120</sup> Telò, *Europe: a Civilian Power?*, pp. 152, 208.

<sup>121</sup> Orbie, ‘A Civilian Power in the World?’, p. 3. Whitman adopts a similar thesis: “Civilian forms of power have been retained and strengthened, in Europe and remain the hallmark of the

As a civilian power, the EU follows a ‘structural foreign policy’, the nature of which is to “foster long-term change of the world structure and the traditional logic of power politics, ... gradually reforming globalization and the Westphalian system and reducing structural anarchy, both internally and at continental and international levels.”<sup>122</sup> A ‘civilian power’ needs to promote democratic and civilian standards both internally and externally because if it fails to do so, it risks jeopardising its own future.<sup>123</sup> Civilian powers try to ‘civilize’ relations between states and this means in practice: a. deprivatization of force and the abolition of sources of military power other than that of the state or international institutions; b. rule of law and institutions as a means to control the monopoly of force; c. the encouragement of interdependence; d. representative, democratic participation in decision-making; e. protection of the weak and the pursuit of social justice; f. culture of non-violent management of conflict.<sup>124</sup> Thus, Europe, as a civilian power, “distinguishes itself in its vast arsenal of non-military policies, such as external trade relations, development and humanitarian aid, and international initiatives in the environmental and social areas.”<sup>125</sup> Often, however, the EU finds itself accused of trying to promote ‘hard’, material interests under ‘civilian

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European international identity beyond the continent. EU military power is developing as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction.”, Whitman, ‘The Fall, and Rise, of Civilian Power Europe?’, p. 25.

<sup>122</sup> Telò, *Europe: a Civilian Power?*, p. 58.

<sup>123</sup> Stavridis, ‘Why the ‘Militarizing’ of the European Union is strengthening the concept of a ‘Civilian power Europe’’, p. 7. In the case of the EU, Stavridis states, this is a necessity since if the EU fails to do so it (in the words of Francois Duchene back in 1973) ‘will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself.’

<sup>124</sup> Maull, ‘Europe and the new balance of global order’, pp. 780-781. Consequently, civilian powers support the promotion of international law, international regimes and organizations, and the transfer of elements of national sovereignty to supranational institutions. See also, Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, pp. 122-141.

<sup>125</sup> Orbie, ‘A Civilian Power in the World?’, p. 12.

objectives'. Such accusations, though, are usually viewed very critically: "Some critics allege a connection between (neo-liberal) economic motivations and the EU's promotion of human rights. ...Certainly promotion of political and economic reform goes hand in hand in EU policies, and economic reform for the EU tends to imply liberalization (though this can be accompanied by support for social inclusion and the role of civil society). But it is a step too far to argue that human rights are promoted *because* they serve economic interests..."<sup>126</sup>

Scholarly discussions about the conceptualisation of the EU have in recent years been dominated by the concept of 'normative power Europe', which has been articulated by Ian Manners, partly in reaction to the overemphasis on civilian instruments.<sup>127</sup> The concept revolves around three distinct characteristics of the EU which suggest that the EU holds a normatively different identity than other actors and that its external action cannot simply be explained as the pursuit of material interests: a. the EU itself is a normatively constructed polity; b. this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics; and c. a normative power Europe diffuses these norms internationally without resorting primarily to coercion and military means, but by the ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations.<sup>128</sup> Six factors shape the diffusion of EU norms: contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the cultural filter.<sup>129</sup> The relative absence of physical force in the imposition of EU norms

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<sup>126</sup> Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, p. 122.

<sup>127</sup> Orbie, 'A Civilian Power in the World?', p. 18.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Manners, 'Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads', p. 184.

and the importance of cultural diffusion have led Manners to the conclusion that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is.”<sup>130</sup> The broad normative basis of the EU has been developed over the past 50 years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions and it is now possible to identify five ‘core’ norms within this vast body of Union laws and policies which comprise the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique*: the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.<sup>131</sup> Since the end of 2003 (when the EU presented its ESS), however, Manners has been alarmed by “a sharp turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention, as the ESS suggests.”<sup>132</sup> Yet, he does not go as far as to dismiss the use of force altogether, arguing instead that “the military tasks (‘tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization’) should only be attempted under a UN mandate, in a critically reflexive context, on a clear, normative basis.”<sup>133</sup>

#### 4. ‘Soft’ and ‘hard’ power

“What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”<sup>134</sup> This is the definition

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<sup>130</sup> Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, p. 252, and Manners, ‘Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads’, p. 184

<sup>131</sup> Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, pp.242-243.

<sup>132</sup> Manners, ‘Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads’, p. 189.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, pp. 194-195.

<sup>134</sup> Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. x.

Joseph Nye, who coined the term, has given to a concept which has become an increasingly crucial parameter in almost every debate on transatlantic relations and their future. Power, says Nye, is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants.<sup>135</sup> “Sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs”, he claims, and soft power can do exactly that, being the “indirect way to get what you want” or, as it has sometimes been called, “the second face of power.”<sup>136</sup> However, one should not associate soft power strictly with influence: “Soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it.”<sup>137</sup>

‘Hard power’, on the other hand, seems to be a concept which does not need any special definition: “Everyone is familiar with hard power. We know that military and economic might often get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”).”<sup>138</sup> The connection between soft and hard power, is not one of dependence: “soft power does not depend on hard power. The Vatican has soft power despite Stalin’s mocking question “How many divisions does the Pope have?”<sup>139</sup>

Soft power is important, as it helps actors like the US and the EU to get the outcomes they want: “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, p. 9.

example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.”<sup>140</sup> Its importance seems to have grown in the post-Cold War period, mainly due to the fact that the nature of threats to global peace and stability has changed: “Today the threats we face are different. Think of climate change, migration, or international terrorism. They are different not only because of their non-military nature, but also for their disrespect for national borders.”<sup>141</sup> Indeed, argues Nye, the limitations of The use of military power has today certain limitations, argues Nye: “The progress of science and technology had contradictory effects on military power over the past century. On the one hand, it made the United States the world’s only superpower, with unmatched military might, but at the same time it gradually increased the political and social costs of using military force for conquest.”<sup>142</sup> In addition, “...social changes inside the large democracies also raised the costs of using military power. Postindustrial democracies are focused on welfare rather than glory, and they dislike casualties.”<sup>143</sup> The use of force can also put at risk the achievement of other goals : “...in a global economy even the United States must consider how the use of force might jeopardize its economic objectives.”<sup>144</sup> Yet, military force has not lost its usefulness: “None of this is to suggest that military force plays

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid, p. 5. See also Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>141</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Union and the world: a hard look at soft power’.

<sup>142</sup> Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 19.

<sup>144</sup> Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 20.

no role in international politics today.”<sup>145</sup> Soft power has its own limits and this is admitted even by its most willing proponents: “Yet soft power alone is insufficient to deal with the threats we face. Europe’s central historical experience may be that military victories produce only temporary peace. But as Spain and the United Kingdom so sadly testify, international terrorists do not respect the EU’s self-declared space of freedom, liberty and security. Rich though we may be in so-called ‘attractive power’, there are those who do not succumb to our charm.”<sup>146</sup> There are certain areas where soft power cannot have a strong impact: “If one considers various American national interests, for example, soft power may be less relevant than hard power in preventing attack, policing borders, and protecting allies.”<sup>147</sup> Furthermore, even in the fields where soft power can make a difference, its success is sometimes conditioned and should not be taken for granted. The case of popular culture, as a source of soft power, is revealing: “Popular culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft power in the sense of preferred outcomes in situations where cultures are somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar.”<sup>148</sup>

Nye argues that a country’s soft power rests primarily on three resources: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.”<sup>149</sup> Culture is about values: “Culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid, p. 21.

<sup>146</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Union and the world: a hard look at soft power’.

<sup>147</sup> Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 17.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, pp. 15-16.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid, p. 11.

for a society. It has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.”<sup>150</sup> A distinction has to be drawn between soft power and ‘popular cultural power’: “Some analysts treat soft power simply as popular cultural power. They make the mistake of equating soft power behaviour with the cultural resources that sometimes help produce it.”<sup>151</sup> The impact soft power can have, is determined by the actions of policy-makers: “Government policies can reinforce or squander a country’s soft power. Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power.”<sup>152</sup> For example, “in the 1950s racial segregation at home undercut American soft power in Africa, and today the practice of capital punishment and weak gun control laws undercut American soft power in Europe.”<sup>153</sup>

America’s soft power has routinely been deemed by scholars as unrivalled. However, as Nye finds, Europe is catching up: “Currently the closest competitor to the United States in soft power resources is Europe. European art, literature, music, design, fashion, and food have long been served as global cultural magnets.”<sup>154</sup> The United States and the European Union have seen their respective levels of soft power move into different directions in recent times.

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, p. 14. The Iraq War, for instance and the Vietnam War.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, p. 13.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, p. 75.

America has at its disposal a vast array of resources that can potentially provide soft power, especially when one considers “the ways in which economic prowess contributes not only to wealth but also to reputation and attractiveness. Not only is America the world’s largest economy, but nearly half of the top 500 global companies are American, five times as many as next-ranked Japan. Sixty-two of the top 100 global brands are American, as well as eight of the top ten business schools.”<sup>155</sup> Social indices show a similar pattern, Nye observes, as, for example, the US attracts the biggest number of foreign immigrants, is by far the world’s number one exporter of films and TV programs, attracts thousands of foreign students and foreign scholars, publishes more books than any other country, etc.<sup>156</sup> Despite this, however, America watches its soft power fade and diminish, especially after the Iraq War.<sup>157</sup> This emanates, according to Nye, from opposition to American policies worldwide, but this opposition should not be perceived as a general opposition to the United States.<sup>158</sup> Political values like democracy and human rights can be powerful sources of attraction, but it is not enough just to proclaim them, as perceived hypocrisy is particularly corrosive of power that is based on proclaimed values.<sup>159</sup> America’s record in implementing its values at home, Nye shows, is mixed: “The US ranks at or near the top in health expenditure, higher education, books published, computer and Internet usage, acceptance of immigrants, and employment but America is not at the top in

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid, p. 33.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid, pp. 33-34.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid, p. 35, Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Union and the world: a hard look at soft power’.

<sup>158</sup> Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 35.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid, p. 55.

life expectancy, primary education, job security, access to health care, or income equality. And high rankings in areas like the incidence of homicide and the percentage of the population in jail reduce attractiveness.”<sup>160</sup> American soft power has particularly suffered in the wake of the terrorist attacks in 2001: “Attitudes toward immigration have hardened, and new visa procedures have discouraged some foreign students. A decline in religious tolerance toward Muslims hurts the image of the United States in Muslim countries.”<sup>161</sup> The way America pursues its War on Terror is also taking its toll: “Also damaging to American attractiveness is the perception that the United States has not lived up to its own profession of values in its response to terrorism. It is perhaps predictable when Amnesty International referred to the Guantanamo Bay detentions as a ‘human rights scandal’.”<sup>162</sup> American unilateralism is also contributing to the deterioration of America’s image abroad: “In recent years, other countries have increasingly complained about the unilateralism of American foreign policy.”<sup>163</sup> Style also matters in the exercise of foreign policy and humility is an important aspect of foreign-policy style, but all too often statements of US officials are received abroad as arrogant, strengthening the image of the US as an arrogant superpower which poses a great danger to world peace.<sup>164</sup>

Nye admits, however, that “there has also been Anti-Americanism in the sense of a deeper rejection of American society, values, and culture.”<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid, p. 57.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid, p. 59.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid, pp. 59-60.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid, p. 63.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid, p. 67.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid, p. 38.

There are, Nye says, a number of reasons that account for this. It is, sometimes, an issue of class and intellectual snobbery: “European elites have always grumbled about America’s lack of sophistication, but polls show that America’s pop culture resonates widely with the majority of the people across the continent.”<sup>166</sup> Anti-Americanism can also be structural: “The US is the big kid on the block and the disproportion in power engenders a mixture of admiration, envy, and resentment.”<sup>167</sup> In addition, “the United States has long stood for modernity, which some people regard as threatening to their cultures. ...In some areas, there is not only a resentment of American cultural imports, but also of American culture itself.”<sup>168</sup> It is also a corollary of the equation of globalisation with Americanisation, since several characteristics of the US make it a centre of globalisation and many of the mechanisms driving globalisation are characteristic features of the US culture and economy (e.g. the information revolution.)<sup>169</sup> Anti-Americanism is especially strong in the Islamic world and this is a major concern for US policy-makers given the connection between Islamist extremists and terrorism.<sup>170</sup>

Europe’s soft power, however, has kept growing steadily. The EU is increasingly viewed in positive terms all over the world: “The EU as a symbol of a uniting Europe itself carries a good deal of soft power. ...The idea that war is now unthinkable among countries that fought bitterly for centuries, and that Europe has become an island of peace and prosperity creates a positive

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid, p. 39.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid, pp. 40-42.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid, pp. 42-43.

image in much of the world.”<sup>171</sup> People often see Europe as a force for good: “A measure of the EU’s emerging soft power is the view that it is a positive force for solving global problems.”<sup>172</sup> On issues such as environmental protection, climate change and energy security, for instance, the EU is today leading by example.<sup>173</sup> The EU’s internal policies also seem to be popular, especially with younger generations: “At the same time, many European domestic policies appeal to young populations in modern democracies. For example, European policies on capital punishment, gun control, climate change, and the rights of homosexuals are probably closer to the views of many younger people in rich countries around the world than are American government policies.”<sup>174</sup> It is no surprise then that others, want to emulate Europe’s models: “The new constitution of South Africa bears more resemblance to the European Convention on Human Rights than to the American Bill of Rights.”<sup>175</sup> Europe’s socio-economic model is attractive, too: “On economic policies as well, though many people admire the success of the American economy, not all extol it as a model for other countries. Some prefer the European approach, in which government plays a greater role in the economy than it does in the US.”<sup>176</sup> Finally, what the EU does abroad seems to be much appreciated: “Europe also derives soft power from its foreign policies, which often contribute to global goods. ...Europe gains credibility

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<sup>171</sup> Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 77.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78. This is the case for many Americans too, according to Nye.

<sup>173</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Union and the world: a hard look at soft power’.

<sup>174</sup> Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 79.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.* Nye claims that this is becoming a trend that not even the US can sometimes resist: “It is also interesting that European precedents are now being cited in American law. When the American Supreme Court decided the case of *Lawrence v. Texas* regarding sexual privacy in 2003, the majority opinion cited a 1981 decision of the European Court of Human Rights for the first time.”

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

from its positions on global climate change, international law, and human rights treaties. Moreover, Europeans provide 70 percent of overseas development assistance to poor countries – four times more than the US.”<sup>177</sup>

America and Europe do not attach the same importance to soft power. Military power has its usefulness in today’s world but power in the twenty-first century cannot be measured by the number of aircraft carriers or divisions and successful leadership requires above all not the ability to win military victories but the ability to build consensus, to persuade and make others appreciate such leadership.<sup>178</sup> That is today the mantra of Europe’s political elites. In other words, soft power is as important in world affairs as military power. Besides, Europeans argue, most of the world’s problems cannot be solved by military power.<sup>179</sup> Furthermore, soft power is the key to the shaping of tomorrow’s global system: “And soft power is the key to strengthening alliances with China, India, and new emerging markets, so vital for shaping the international system of the future.”<sup>180</sup> Many hold that the EU’s global influence can be attributed to its power of attraction more than its projection of power and it is thanks to this power of attraction that the EU can claim that it is one of the most formidable machines for peacefully managing differences ever invented.<sup>181</sup> Europe is not adopting a worldview centred less on military power and more on the rule of law and soft power because it is militarily weak but it is military weak (or more precisely weaker than the US)

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<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Ischinger, ‘Pax Americana and Pax Europea’, p. 82.

<sup>179</sup> Grant, ‘The Decline of American Power’, p. 1.

<sup>180</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Union and the world: a hard look at soft power’.

<sup>181</sup> Nikolaidis, ‘Living with our Differences’, p. 100.

because it holds this specific worldview.<sup>182</sup> It can afford such an option because it has managed to make hard power less necessary through massive deployments of soft power, such as economic clout and cultural appeal.<sup>183</sup> For these reasons Europeans also invest more in public diplomacy than Americans do.<sup>184</sup> Europe's approach is far more efficient than traditional approaches which are premised on the use of 'hard power', say many in the Old Continent. This, to a great extent, is explained by the fact that the EU's behaviour at home and abroad enjoys high levels of legitimacy. The EU, for instance, is often portrayed as a leader in issues of international morality.<sup>185</sup> And this is often used by many Europeans as an opportunity to proclaim the superiority of the 'European way' over the 'American way': "While the USA has remained a seemingly more dynamic society, Europe has been pulling ahead as a civilized one, its democracy less beholden to corporate interests, its secular societies less divided by religion, more able to use science, its foreign policy freer from special interests and less heated about other civilizations."<sup>186</sup> There is a strong belief among Europeans that their methods of interacting with the world have more relevance for others than the US story of "liberal imperialism".<sup>187</sup> Many political observers have come to acknowledge that "by cleverly deploying both its hard power and its sensitive side the European Union has become more effective and more attractive than the US on the

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<sup>182</sup> Nikolaidis, 'The power of the superpowerless', p. 95.

<sup>183</sup> Khanna, 'The Metrosexual Superpower', p. 67.

<sup>184</sup> Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 82.

<sup>185</sup> Chaban *et al.*, 'The European Union As Others See It', p. 259.

<sup>186</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 139.

<sup>187</sup> Nikolaidis, 'The power of the superpowerless', p. 94.

catwalk of diplomatic clout.”<sup>188</sup> Crucially, there are areas in which European intervention is highly appreciated and sought after: “In crisis management, the ‘demand for Europe’ is and will remain strong. In fact the more we act the more we are asked to act.”<sup>189</sup>

American policy-makers on the other hand, do not have such a high esteem for soft power: “Some of our leaders do not understand the crucial importance of soft power in our reordered post-September 11 world.”<sup>190</sup> Many are sceptical and ready to dismiss its value, discounting the impact a negative view of the US can have abroad: “Skeptics about soft power say not to worry. Popularity is ephemeral and should not be a guide for foreign policy in any case. The United States can act without the world’s applause. We are so strong we can do as we wish.”<sup>191</sup> Therefore, producing soft power is not a top priority among US policy-makers, who are not ready to devote significant resources toward that goal.<sup>192</sup> Nye, warns that this may not be a smart response: “It would be a mistake to dismiss the recent decline in our attractiveness so lightly. It is true that the United States has recovered from unpopular policies in the past, but that was against the backdrop of the Cold War, in which other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil.”<sup>193</sup> “It is not smart”, Nye concludes, “to discount soft power as just a

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<sup>188</sup> Khanna, *The Metrosexual Superpower*, p. 66.

<sup>189</sup> Solana, ‘Les acquis de la Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense’, p. 434.

<sup>190</sup> Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. ix.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 128.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 129.

question of image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity. ...It is a form of power – a means of obtaining desired outcomes.”<sup>194</sup>

## **5. Conclusion**

The end of the Cold War bipolarity led to a redefinition of the basic parameters of the transatlantic relationship. The emergence of the EU as a new centre of power with a greater role in the field of defence and security has inevitably become a point of friction with the US. The absence of the Soviet threat has increased the importance of domestic politics, social and cultural differences and divergences between Europe and America, which had been at least partly masked by the Cold War, have acquired a new significance, and a serious change has taken place in the way the meanings of national and international security are now defined. These developments have accentuated the element of rivalry within the transatlantic relationship. Today Europe and America, partners and, increasingly, rivals in world politics have reached a situation which has aptly been called ‘competitive cooperation’. This is a natural development according to realist theorists, who kept predicting that the transatlantic alliance, in its Cold War form, would not survive the elimination of the Soviet threat. On the contrary, liberal theorists have argued that based on the same ideals of democracy and free markets, Europe and America could continue to have a fruitful relationship in the new era. Constructivists on the other hand, predict change and more confrontation due to the different nature, values and beliefs of the two actors. The eastward enlargement of the

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<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

European Union has far-reaching consequences for the process of European integration, which is one of the most important factors in the shaping of EU-US relations. It has the potential to transform the way the Union works and makes decisions and define decisively its future orientation. Europe could become a stronger, more united, global actor in the wake of this enlargement. There are concerns however that this particular enlargement could have the opposite effect: an inward-looking Union, beset with problems and unable to assume a global role. Several theoretical approaches have tried to shed light on the issues associated with the impact of enlargement on the process of integration. Yet, their efforts have met with limited success and in this respect, the phenomenon of enlargement still remains a largely neglected issue in studies of European integration. Defining the nature and the role of the European Union is another issue of fundamental importance for the EU-US relationship. The EU is recognised today as a civilian or normative power, despite the fact that it has recently developed substantial military capabilities. As such, it relies mostly on its economic power to achieve its goals, diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems and legally binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress. It is on a mission to 'civilise' relations between states trying to change the structure of the international system by moving it away from the logic of power politics. This, unavoidably, renders the EU a revisionist actor. As a civilian power, the EU attaches special significance to the notion of soft power, 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion'. Despite its limits, soft power has acquired great importance in the post-Cold War era as new global

problems often defy remedies based on traditional means. Europe and America possess large deposits of soft power. Europe's soft power however, is on the ascendant while American soft power is in decline. Given that soft power rests on culture, political values and foreign policies, this trend could be interpreted as a strong indication that the transatlantic partners have different worldviews and different, or at least divergent, values which predispose them to act in different ways and pursue different, often diametrically opposed, objectives. This seems to validate constructivist approaches, which stress that actors' identities are crucial in explaining their actions, something that even realists, to a certain degree, are ready to admit.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> See for example, Hyde-Price, 'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', p. 217.

## Chapter Two

### *Directions in American Foreign Policy after the Cold War*

#### 1. A unipolar world

The abrupt end of the Cold War saw foreign policy analysts in the United States embark on a debate over the nature of the new international order. A number of them saw the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity as the most plausible scenario, arguing that the end of the East-West conflict and the relative decline of the US power could usher in an era of several major powers with the US being just one of them.<sup>1</sup> Such assumptions were however countered by an array of scholars who not only dismissed fears of erosion of American power, but also insisted that US leadership in world affairs remained unchallenged and the US was bound to dominate the post-Cold War era.<sup>2</sup> For them unipolarity was destined to be the most important feature of global affairs. In September 1990, Charles Krauthammer declared that ‘the unipolar moment’ had already arrived, as the US was “the only country with the military, diplomatic, political, and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself.”<sup>3</sup>

In the late 1990s Samuel Huntington added a third perspective, contending that global politics had moved from a brief unipolar moment at the

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<sup>1</sup> American leadership would still be a key feature of the new order, but not the decisive one. Lieber, ‘Eagle Without a Cause: Making Foreign Policy Without the Soviet Threat’, p.5. The argument of US decline was advanced by, among others, Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony*, Wallerstein, ‘Foes as Friends?’.

<sup>2</sup> See, Nau, *The Myth of America’s Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s*, and Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*.

<sup>3</sup> Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, p.24.

end of the Cold War into one or perhaps more uni-multipolar decades on its way towards a multipolar twenty-first century.<sup>4</sup> In this kind of world structure, his argument goes, we find a superpower (US), which has a strong preference for a unipolar world and tends to act as if such a world really exists, and several regional powers, which would like to live in a multipolar environment. Joseph Nye, finally, has suggested that power today is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game.<sup>5</sup>

Post-Cold War American administrations chose to delineate their foreign policy on the basis of a clear unipolar order with the US at the apex of world power.<sup>6</sup> The belief that the US can shape world affairs pursuing its ambitious foreign policy goals without risking much of its resources, has characterized the actions of US leaders since the early 1990s.<sup>7</sup> With few notable exceptions, America has been hailed as the leading power in almost every field of activity,<sup>8</sup> with analysts asserting that “if today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will”.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Huntington, ‘Global Perspectives on War and Peace or Transiting a Uni-Multipolar World’.

<sup>5</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, p. 39. Thus, military power is unipolar, economic power is multipolar, while in the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control power is distributed so widely that talk of unipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony has no meaning.

<sup>6</sup> Huntington has defined a unipolar world as “one in which a single state acting unilaterally with little or no cooperation from other states can effectively resolve major international issues and no other state or combination of states has the power to prevent it from doing so.” Huntington, ‘Global Perspectives on War and Peace or Transiting a Uni-Multipolar World’. Layne defines a unipolar system as “one in which a single power is geopolitically preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition against it.” Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, p.5, n.2.

<sup>7</sup> Walt, ‘Beyond Bin Laden’, p.58. Furthermore, their actions have been premised on the assumption that US primacy is here to stay. Kupchan, ‘The Rise of Europe, America’s Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy’, p. 206.

<sup>8</sup> America bestrides the world like a colossus, Krauthammer has argued (Krauthammer, ‘A second American century?’); Kennedy finds that a statistician would have a wild time compiling lists of the fields in which the US leads. Kennedy, ‘The Eagle Has Landed’. With

Militarily, the US is “the only one player on the field that counts.”<sup>10</sup> Entrepreneurially, America’s corporations have a permanent advantage over their competitors as they know better than anyone how important it is to remain flexible in a global economy, hence they are constantly innovating, finding ways to do more, to do it better, and to do it with fewer resources.<sup>11</sup> Technologically, America leads the world in inventions and innovations of all kinds, spending on research and development nearly as much as the next seven richest countries combined.<sup>12</sup> Culturally, the American leadership is unquestionable as the world is brimming with symbols of American culture like popular music and movie stars: “Parents the world over vainly fight the tide of T shirts and jeans, of music and movies, of video and software pouring out of America and craved by their children. There has been mass culture. But there has never before been mass world culture. Now one is emerging, and it is distinctly American. Even the intellectual and commercial boulevard of the

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the end of the Cold War, the United States became and has since remained the world’s pre-eminent nation-state in all measures of power and without a ‘peer competitor’ in sight. Haass, ‘Multilateralism for a Global Era’.

<sup>9</sup> Brooks, and Wohlforth, ‘American Primacy in Perspective’, p.21.

<sup>10</sup> Kennedy, ‘The Eagle Has Landed’. Even more astonishing is the fact that, as Kennedy points out, the US is the world’s single superpower on the cheap: whereas in 1985 the Pentagon’s budget equalled 6.5 per cent of gross domestic product, in 2002 that figure had come down to around 3.2 per cent. The gap in military capabilities grows steadily. In 2000, US defence spending equalled that of the next six countries combined. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, p.37 By 2002, America was spending per year on its military more than the next nine largest national defence budgets combined, while its maritime supremacy could not be threatened even if all the other navies in the world were combined. Kennedy, ‘The Eagle Has Landed’. Finally, in 2004, US defence expenditures exceeded the expenses of all other nations combined. Kegley and Raymond, ‘Global Terrorism and Military Preemption’, p. 44.

<sup>11</sup> Feulner, ‘What Are America’s Interests?’. The willingness of the country to open itself to the sometimes painful transformation that capitalism entails, is seen here as crucial: “As long as Americans are willing to live with fewer restraints on the destructive as well as the creative aspects of market capitalism, American society will continue to generate new technologies, new companies, new social patterns, and new ideas that will keep the United States ahead of the rest of the world.” Russell Mead, ‘American Endurance’, p. 172.

<sup>12</sup> Feulner, , ‘What Are America’s Interests?’, and Brooks, and Wohlforth, ‘American Primacy in Perspective’, p.23.

future, the Internet, has been set up in our own language and idiom. Everyone speaks American.”<sup>13</sup> Diplomatically, “nothing important takes place without the involvement of the US and where the US decides not to decide, things get out of control.”<sup>14</sup> Economically, Americans dominate the globe and it is no wonder that globalization bears a “made in the USA” label.<sup>15</sup> The US share of total world product stands at a staggering 30 per cent.<sup>16</sup> The US economy is currently twice as large as its closest rival, Japan, while California alone has become the fifth largest in the world, ahead of France and just behind the United Kingdom.<sup>17</sup>

In this unipolar world, it is widely held by American policymakers and foreign policy experts alike that no other power can rival the United States. Firstly, because no other country can individually match American might. Russia has ceased to be an imperial power; it is too busy trying to stage an economic and social recovery and predominantly focused on preventing its far eastern territories from falling in Chinese hands.<sup>18</sup> China, which has come to be considered by many scholars as the only possible future rival, might be a serious challenger to US predominance only if its recent growth rates continue

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<sup>13</sup> Krauthammer, ‘America Rules: Thank God’. Kennedy adds that almost half of all internet traffic occurs in the US, almost seventy-five per cent of the Nobel laureates in the sciences, economics and medicine live and work there, American universities are the envy of the world leaving other famous institutions like Cambridge, Oxford, the Sorbonne, Tokyo, Munich far behind. Kennedy, ‘The Eagle Has Landed’.

<sup>14</sup> Krauthammer, ‘America Rules: Thank God’. “The decisions we make or fail to make, the actions we take or fail to take, and the words we say or fail to say have widespread repercussions.” Haass, ‘From Reluctant to Resolute: American Foreign Policy after September 11’.

<sup>15</sup> Fukuyama, ‘Does “the West” still exist?’, p. 141. Fears that the American economy is in decline because of its huge deficits are often dismissed as groundless. See Levey and Brown, ‘The Overstretch Myth’.

<sup>16</sup> Kennedy, ‘The Eagle Has Landed’.

<sup>17</sup> Brooks, and Wohlforth, ‘American Primacy in Perspective’, p.22.

<sup>18</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 3.

for the next 30 years and internal strife is avoided.<sup>19</sup> In military terms, it is a paper tiger as it has approximately 150 strategic warheads compared with America's more than 7,000.<sup>20</sup> India cannot overcome its status as an underdeveloped state, having to cope with hundreds of millions of poor and illiterate citizens.<sup>21</sup> Japan is struggling with a declining economy and an aging population and the conventional wisdom of the late 1980s and early 1990s that it was going to become America's next big rival has now "the ring of historical irony."<sup>22</sup> The European Union cannot be viewed as a contender either: "The notion that economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence is a materialist illusion. 'Europe' does not yet qualify even as a player on the world stage."<sup>23</sup> Moreover, there is no evidence that Europe will ever spend enough on its military to be taken seriously as a competitor to the US.<sup>24</sup> So, the assertion that Europe already is America's sole serious economic and political counterweight and potential rival<sup>25</sup> does not find many adherents in the US. Even a coalition of some or all of the above powers would fail to push America off its pedestal, as it would lack the necessary

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<sup>19</sup> Kennedy, 'The Eagle Has Landed'.

<sup>20</sup> Chace, 'American Newness Revisited'.

<sup>21</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>22</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', p.24. Most American foreign policy experts seem to believe that even if Europe managed to realize its full potential as a political and economic power, the geopolitical consequences would still be minimal. Kupchan, 'The End of the West'. A great number of US foreign policy experts also believe that Europe's economic importance is dwindling: "Europe's share of the global population peaked at the turn of the century at 25 percent; by 2000 it had fallen to 12 percent and by 2050 is expected to drop to 7 percent." Russell Mead, 'American Endurance', p. 168.

<sup>24</sup> Erlanger, 'Anatomy of a Breakdown', p. 17.

<sup>25</sup> Pfaff, 'Present and Future of the Tensed EU-US Relations', p. 37. Analysts who beg to differ and view the EU as America's top competitor, admit that their views do not have a great audience in the US. See for example, Kupchan, 'The End of the West'.

cohesion, muscle and energy.<sup>26</sup> The asymmetrical relationship between the US and the rest of world's big powers is unquestionable. And since roughly equivalent power produces balancing and contestation over leadership while asymmetry produces hierarchy and a core-periphery pattern of relations, the U.S. global preeminence cannot be put into question.<sup>27</sup>

Secondly, because the rest of the world not only acknowledges U.S. predominance but welcomes it because it's something it benefits from and because it's benign.<sup>28</sup> This has been a permanent feature of US policies: "Ever since the United States emerged as a great power, the identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defense policy. Americans have made second nature the conviction that their own well being depends fundamentally on the well being of others. ... For at least 50 years Americans have been guided by the kind of enlightened self-interest that, in practice, comes dangerously close to resembling generosity."<sup>29</sup> People around the globe know that the United States will use its unprecedented power to promote the good of the international system rather than to advance its own selfish aims and for this reason they

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<sup>26</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, pp. 3-4. The only challenge to American power can only come from within, Brzezinski argues: either from the repudiation of power by the American democracy itself, or from America's misuse of its own power on the global scene.

<sup>27</sup> Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.45. By the end of the 1990s, most serious thinkers in the US foreign policy community had effectively reached the conclusion that threats to American primacy, if any, were at best distant. Andrews, 'The United States and its Atlantic partners', p. 68.

<sup>28</sup> "The main reason for the absence of a serious challenge to American hegemony is that it is so benign. It does not extract tribute. It does not seek military occupation. Economically, the world has prospered under the open trading system the US supports. And culturally, America is a hit. Arnold is a universal icon. Latvians like their Levi's. And everyone loves McDonald's." Krauthammer, 'A second American century?'. The US has no territorial objectives, and its gains are not measured in the losses of others. Bush, 'A Distinct American Internationalism'. In stark contrast to empires and their predatory habits, today, "it is the United States that pays and the rest of the world that benefits without having to pay." Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*, quoted in Rieff, 'We are the world'.

<sup>29</sup> Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire", p.28.

don't fear U.S. geopolitical pre-eminence.<sup>30</sup> So, it must not come as a surprise that the rest of the world has no incentive to oppose US supremacy and the unipolar world, which has ensued from it.<sup>31</sup> In fact, people all over the world have such a strong preference for a system dominated by the US that they are willing to forgo a certain degree of their countries' sovereignty: "One of these days the American people are going to awaken to the fact that we have become an imperial nation...because the world wanted it and needed it to happen. ...No European nation can have -or really wants to have- its own foreign policy. There are not even any signs that European nations want a European foreign policy independent of the United States. They are dependent nations, though they have a very large measure of local autonomy. Europe is resigned to be a quasi-autonomous protectorate of the United States. Latin America, ever hostile to "Yankee imperialism," nevertheless is coming to recognize the legitimacy of US leadership. And the nations of Southeast Asia are far less frightened by the prospect of a relatively light-handed American 'imperium' than by the prospect of Chinese domination."<sup>32</sup> Signs of hostile public opinion abroad have been ignored until 11 September 2001, but even

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<sup>30</sup> Schwarz, Benjamin and Layne, Christopher, 'A New Grand Strategy'. Throughout the Clinton years, for example, the US was recognised as a driving force in support of peace, democracy, economic opportunity, a more open trading system and the rule of law. Albright, *Madame Secretary*, p. 504.

<sup>31</sup> "No nation really wants genuine multipolarity. Whatever America's failings, were any other nation to take its place, the rest of the world would find the situation less congenial, no nation has shown a willingness to take on equal responsibilities for managing global crises, no nation has been willing to make the same kinds of short-term sacrifices that the United States has been willing to make in the long-term interest of preserving the global peace. ...The truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner." Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire", pp.26,28,31.

<sup>32</sup> Kristol, 'The Emerging American Imperium'. Europe, in particular, will always prefer an imperfect American order to the conflicts that would arise without it and should American mismanagement create regional crises the US will always be there to help Europe in its hour of need. Russell Mead, 'American Endurance', p. 179.

after that point, anti-American outbreaks and accusations of a selfish, interventionist America have been treated mainly as proof of America's failure to spread its message across the globe, and of the jealousy others feel because America is so successful.<sup>33</sup>

Thirdly, because the US is immunized from a global backlash against its preponderance by its so called 'soft power': the attractiveness of its liberal-democratic ideology and its open, syncretic culture.<sup>34</sup> And this acts not only as a shield but also as a means of further spreading American influence. In this sense, it has been argued, "the ultimate source of America's influence in the world is ... the appeal of what it represents, the seemingly universal attraction exerted by its culture and ideology. Advances in communications technology are speeding the spread of America's message to every corner of the globe. And each country that adopts capitalism and democracy as a result will further amplify the power of the American example.<sup>35</sup> As a result, American ideals of free markets and individual rights are more widely accepted than ever.<sup>36</sup> The American model of economic management is so successful that has become

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<sup>33</sup> Addressing this 'communication failure' has become a priority of the US government. See for example, DeYoung, 'White House moves to promote positive US image'.

<sup>34</sup> Schwarz and Layne, 'A New Grand Strategy'. The term 'soft power' was coined by Nye who has defined it as "the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others". Nye and Owens, 'America's Information Edge', p. 21, n. 1.

<sup>35</sup> Friedberg, 'The Future of American Power', pp. 14-15. Moreover, it is impossible and futile for other powers to try to match this power: "Soft power is cultural and economic power. The US is definitely in a class of its own in the soft-power game. On that table, China, Russia, Japan, and even Western Europe cannot hope to match the pile of chips the U.S. holds. People are risking death on the high seas to get into the US, not China. There are not too many who want to go for an M.B.A. at Moscow University, or dress and dance like the Japanese. Sadly, fewer and fewer students want to learn French or German. English, the American-accented version, has become the world's language. This kind of power cannot be aggregated, nor can it be balanced" Joffe, 'How America Does It', p. 24.

<sup>36</sup> Walt, 'Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy', p. 65.

the standard in most parts of the world and other governments are embracing privatization, deregulation and removal of trade barriers.<sup>37</sup>

Opposition and acts of resistance to this extraordinary influence of the American culture abroad, expressed by those who fear the so-called 'Americanisation' of their ethnic cultures, are dismissed as the product of elitist thinking and attitudes. It is elites around the world that are afraid of 'Americanisation', and they are out of touch with their own people who love everything America produces and exports, from movies and music to the concept of the market economy and who would emigrate to the US on the first chance.<sup>38</sup> To those who accuse the US of trying to promote its own values worldwide the answer is that such worries are irrational, since American values are universal: "what America offers, is what people all over the world want. People want to say what they think, worship as they wish, and elect those who govern them; the triumph of these values is most assuredly easier when the international balance of power favours those who believe in them."<sup>39</sup>

Well established and premised on healthy foundations, American predominance is also seen as destined to last for a considerable period of time. The proponents of the 'unipolar moment' do admit that a multipolar world will eventually emerge but they add that this is not going to happen soon.<sup>40</sup> Krauthammer wrote in 1990: "no doubt multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the

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<sup>37</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 212.

<sup>38</sup> Wattenberg, 'Bush's Foreign Policy: Should America Go It Alone?'

<sup>39</sup> Rice, "Promoting the National Interest", p. 49.

<sup>40</sup> For those who oppose the logic of a unipolar world, this will happen much sooner. Layne has argued for example that multipolarity will come sometime between 2000-2010, Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion', p.7.

United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades.”<sup>41</sup> Most scholars seem to have followed his lead.<sup>42</sup> American leaders, too, seem to think that America’s preeminent position will not end in the foreseeable future.<sup>43</sup>

Against this backdrop, it is becoming increasingly difficult for US scholars and officials alike, to resist the temptation of triumphalism and exceptionalism. The United States has been described as the world’s “indispensable nation”,<sup>44</sup> “a size XXL Bismarckian empire- the indispensable impresario of all critical endeavors, and not the object of encirclement”<sup>45</sup> and “the modern successor of Rome”,<sup>46</sup> with Washington being hailed as “the imperial capital”.<sup>47</sup> The idea that America should be seen as an empire gained weight in many circles, especially after 9/11. Even the Pentagon was reported

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<sup>41</sup> Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, pp. 23-24. Seven years later he felt that he had been unnecessarily cautious. Krauthammer, ‘America Rules: Thank God’.

<sup>42</sup>Brooks and Wohlforth agree that “no global challenge to the United States is likely to emerge for the foreseeable future.” Brooks, and Wohlforth, ‘American Primacy in Perspective’, p. 27. Nye and Owen are sure that “the 21<sup>st</sup> century, not the 20<sup>th</sup> will be the era of US preeminence”. Nye and Owens, ‘America’s Information Edge’, p. 35. Walt also thinks that the extraordinary US position of power will endure well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century because the fact that the US leads the world in higher education, scientific research, and advanced technology (especially information technology) will make it hard for other states to catch up quickly. Walt, ‘Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy’, p.64. Only a few analysts warn that multipolarity is not as distant as it is commonly assumed and suggest that it is not too early for the US to start planning a grand strategy for the transition to a world of multiple power centres. Kupchan, ‘The Rise of Europe, America’s Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy’, p. 208.

<sup>43</sup> Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, p.37.

<sup>44</sup> Madeleine Albright quoted in Huntington, ‘The Lonely Superpower’, p. 37. “We can afford whatever foreign policy we need or choose. We are the richest country in the world, the richest country the world has ever known. And we are richer today than we have ever been before. We command not fewer but more resources than ever.” (Muravchik, Joshua, *The Imperative of American Leadership*, (AEI Press, 1996) p.44, quoted in Posen, and Ross, ‘Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy’, p.35, n.51.

<sup>45</sup> Joffe, ‘How America Does It’, p.27.

<sup>46</sup> Walker, ‘Bush’s Choice: Athens or Sparta’. Walker points out that at the age of American hyperpower all roads lead to the modern Rome on the Potomac and visiting foreign leaders make time to pay their respect to Congress as well as the White House because lesser powers measure their standing by their access to their rulers.

<sup>47</sup> Sullivan, ‘America can’t and won’t hear Europe’s wobblers’.

at some point to have commissioned a study on great empires of the past.<sup>48</sup> Characteristically, a senior aide of President Bush is quoted as saying to a *New York Times* journalist in October 2004: “We are an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”<sup>49</sup> It has even been suggested that America’s world role “has something in common with the sun’s relationship to the rest of the solar system. Both confer benefits on the entities with which they are in regular contact. The sun keeps the planets in their orbits by the force of gravity and radiates the heat and light that make life possible on one of them. Similarly, the United States furnishes services to other countries, the same services, as it happens that governments provide within sovereign states to the people they govern. The United States therefore functions as the world’s government.”<sup>50</sup>

Not surprisingly, US officials have been inclined to think that as the world’s only superpower, the US is the main guarantor of peace and stability around the world and therefore it can not be treated as any other nation. That would defy reality.<sup>51</sup> Americans are urged to be proud of the fact that of all the nations in the history of the world, theirs is the most just, the most tolerant, the most willing to constantly reassess and improve itself, and the

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<sup>48</sup> Andréani, ‘Imperial Loose Talk’, p. 67. For these reasons, Andréani states, “the notion that the time has come for an American global empire cannot just be put alongside black UN helicopters, millenarian and pagan cults, and other bizarre U.S. beliefs but now calls for serious analysis and discussion”.

<sup>49</sup> Suskind, ‘Without A Doubt’.

<sup>50</sup> Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*, quoted in Lieven, ‘Realism and Reality’.

<sup>51</sup> Dao, ‘US Argues Need for Doing It Alone’.

best model for the future,<sup>52</sup> and that America really is the standard-bearer of moral, political, and military might and right, an example towards which all others aspire.<sup>53</sup> America is on the cutting edge of world history and the America of today is the tomorrow of the rest of the world.<sup>54</sup>

## 2. The US role in a unipolar world

At the moment of unipolarity, should the US renounce its dominance and work towards the establishment of a multipolar world order or should it try to preserve the current order? Which of the numerous grand strategies, offered by analysts, should US leaders opt for?<sup>55</sup> U.S. scholars and officials are almost unanimous on this issue: the US must preserve -and if possible perpetuate- its predominance and continue to lead the world. This has become the major goal of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. In other words, the US has chosen to pursue a grand strategy of primacy.<sup>56</sup> Policymakers and

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<sup>52</sup> Rothkopf, 'In Praise of Cultural Imperialism', pp.48-49.

<sup>53</sup> Helms, 'Entering The Pacific Century'.

<sup>54</sup> Russell Mead, 'American Endurance', p. 171.

<sup>55</sup> The point of reference here are Posen and Ross, who present and analyse five different strategies: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, collective or cooperative security, containment, and primacy. Posen and Ross, 'Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy'.

<sup>56</sup> It would be a great mistake to treat American foreign policy debate as unitary. Halliday, *The World At 2000*, pp.98-99. However, one cannot ignore the fact that contributors to the debate on US grand strategy after the Cold War have made US post-Cold War hegemony a common starting point. Layne, 'Offshore Balancing Revisited', p.236. The voices of true isolationists are hardly heard in the US today. The desirability of US hegemony is questioned by ever fewer analysts, who express little doubt that the US has opted for the grand strategy of primacy: "Under the administrations of George H. G. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, the overriding aim of U.S. grand strategy has been to ensure that the US maintains its lofty geopolitical perch by preventing the rise of new great powers or the resurgence of old ones, such as Russia, that could challenge the US as king of the hill". Schwarz and Layne, 'A New Grand Strategy'. "US officials have in fact followed a consistent strategy in pursuit of a clear objective—the preservation of the United States' pre-eminent global position. The US has in fact chosen to pursue primacy." Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.51.

academics agree that a unipolar world is highly conducive to American interests.<sup>57</sup>

For this goal to be accomplished, American governments must be “shaping” the world, rather than reacting to it, creating a secure environment for American interests and preventing the rise of other superpowers.<sup>58</sup> American dominance must be all encompassing. The US has to keep leading economically, militarily, politically, technologically, and culturally. Some place emphasis on cultural domination: “it is in the economic and political interests of the US to ensure that if the world is moving toward a common language, it be English; that if the world is moving toward common telecommunications, safety, and quality standards, they be American; that if the world is becoming linked by television, radio, and music, the programming be American; and that if common values are being developed, they be values with which Americans are comfortable.”<sup>59</sup> The new ‘information age’ is, according to them, determining the future battlefields: “Just as nuclear dominance was the key to coalition leadership in the old era, information dominance will be the key in the information age, and the US

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<sup>57</sup> Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, pp.5-6. The Commission on America’s National Interests declared in July 2000 that vital U.S. national interests would be enhanced and protected by promoting singular US leadership. The Commission on America’s National Interests, ‘America’s National Interests’, p.5. The US should sustain global hegemony for as long as it can. Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment’, p.77. The US remains the world’s anchor. And that is where we must stay. Helms, ‘Entering The Pacific Century’. Even those who do not feel comfortable with the conventional wisdom of a unipolar world, like Huntington, admit that it is in America’s interest to maintain for as long as possible its position as the only superpower. Huntington, ‘Global Perspectives on War and Peace or Transiting a Uni-Multipolar World’. The idea of world dominance has become so entrenched within the US establishment that is now “shared by the leaders of both political parties and by a large majority of American politicians, soldiers, bureaucrats, and Washington policy intellectuals.” Lieven, ‘Realism and Reality’.

<sup>58</sup> Lemann, ‘The Next World Order’, and Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, p.33.

<sup>59</sup> Rothkopf, ‘In Praise of Cultural Imperialism’, p.45.

must win the battle of the world's information flows."<sup>60</sup> Others stress the increased significance of economic matters after the Cold War.<sup>61</sup> Market liberalization and deregulation rank high on the US foreign policy agenda and the US is by far the most fervent supporter of globalization.

Most important however, remains the task to prevent the rise of other powers, strong enough to challenge American preeminence. The 1991 Summer Study organized by the Pentagon's Director of Net Assessment defined a 'manageable' world, as one in which there is no threat to America's superpower role.<sup>62</sup> In 1992 the writers of an initial draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-99 revealed their thoughts about the future role of the United States in the world, stating that "we must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order, ...we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."<sup>63</sup> The 2002 *National Security Strategy* leaves little room for doubts about the overarching strategy of US foreign policy and its goals. It unambiguously states: "our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build up in hopes of surpassing, or

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<sup>60</sup> Nye and Owens, 'America's Information Edge', p.26.

<sup>61</sup> According to Rice, international economic policies that leverage the advantages of the American economy and expand free trade are the decisive tools in shaping international politics. Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest', p.50.

<sup>62</sup> Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion', p.6.

<sup>63</sup> Quoted in Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion', p.6. Although US officials publicly distanced themselves from the above document at the time it was leaked to the press, its logic and arguments have in fact shaped US security policy. Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.66.

equaling, the power of the US".<sup>64</sup> In sum, the United States in the post-Cold War era is seeking to preserve the status quo in security relations with its Cold War allies, and is seeking to engage and integrate its Cold War adversaries, Russia and China, into an order that continues to reflect the design and preserves the dominant position of the United States.<sup>65</sup>

At the same time US policymakers, consistently stress that the maintenance of US primacy matters for the world as well as for the United States.<sup>66</sup> They maintain that the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity depends on continued American dominance and that the world is a freer, safer, more stable place when America pursues its own vital national interests.<sup>67</sup> In the absence of American dominance, they say, the world would be a far worse place: "a world without US primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the US continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs".<sup>68</sup> In sum, the case for American leadership in the world is compelling.<sup>69</sup>

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, some analysts advanced the argument that the attacks demonstrated the risks of America's active involvement in world affairs and for this reason the US might start to reappraise its role in the world, opting for policies that would reduce the risk

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<sup>64</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.

<sup>65</sup> Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', pp.58-59.

<sup>66</sup> Huntington, 'Why International Primacy Matters', p. 82.

<sup>67</sup> Kagan, 'The Benevolent Empire', p.34 and Feulner, 'What Are America's Interests?'

<sup>68</sup> Huntington, 'Why International Primacy Matters', p. 83.

<sup>69</sup> Lake, 'A Second American Century'. In the words of Gingrich: "We are the only country capable of leading the planet in the next half-century: if we fail to lead, the level of chaos will be substantial" Gingrich, 'American Engagement in Europe', p.65. Krauthammer too, is categorical: "the alternative to unipolarity is chaos." Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment", p.32.

of further violent reactions against US predominance.<sup>70</sup> The opposite view seems to have prevailed: “the September 11 attack was a result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their implementation.”<sup>71</sup>

Multilateralism and unilateralism have been viewed as the two methods of action, available to US government for pursuing its goals. Multilateralism is, according to its advocates, a strategy based on the view that American security and national interests can be best advanced by promoting international order organized around democracy, open markets, multilateral institutions, and binding security ties.<sup>72</sup> Its emphasis is on cooperation mainly through international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and to a lesser degree, the UN. Transnational issues like climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, the stability of global financial markets, the international trade system, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, international crime syndicates, and terrorism are inherently multilateral, multilateralists claim, and cannot be managed without the help of other countries.

Multilateralism is a means to get others to share the burden of providing public goods, and sharing also helps foster commitment to common values; international rules bind America and limit its freedom of action, but they serve US interests by binding others as well.<sup>73</sup> Multilateralists claim that the US should be defining its national interests broadly to include global

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<sup>70</sup> Miller, ‘The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux?’, pp.16-17.

<sup>71</sup> Max Boot, quoted in Eakin, ‘“It takes an empire”, say several US thinkers’.

<sup>72</sup> Ikenberry, ‘American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror’, p 26.

<sup>73</sup> Nye, ‘Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism’.

interests thus turning the current predominant US power into an international consensus and widely-accepted norms that will be consistent with American values and interests as American dominance ebbs later in the century.<sup>74</sup>

Unilateralism on the other hand, propagates the advantages of a 'go it alone' approach to US involvement in the world. Unilateralists are not willing to make the necessary compromises for the smooth functioning of alliances and oppose any transfer of substantial authority to international organizations.<sup>75</sup> They brand any relinquishment of sovereignty to international organizations as betrayal of the national interest and they seek to prevent any further integration of the U.S. in international rule systems.<sup>76</sup> Unilateralism, they maintain, maximizes speed and freedom of decision-making and implementation, including the elimination of problems of military interoperability with others.<sup>77</sup> In short, unilateralism envisions American power acting in the world but not being entangled by it.<sup>78</sup>

American governments since the end of the Cold War have signalled a clear preference for unilateralism.<sup>79</sup> Evidence of their unilateralist tendencies abounds.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Nye, 'The New Rome meets the New Barbarians', p.25.

<sup>75</sup> Haas, *The Reluctant Sheriff*, pp. 86-87.

<sup>76</sup> Nuscheler, 'Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism'.

<sup>77</sup> Haas, *The Reluctant Sheriff*, p.87.

<sup>78</sup> Ikenberry, 'American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror', p.26.

<sup>79</sup> Ikenberry believes that multilateralism has been the dominant strand of American foreign policy in the decade after the Cold War. Ikenberry, 'American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror', p.25. Ruggie also thinks that multilateralism has been the strategy US governments have used and will continue to use for the foreseeable future. Ruggie, 'Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War', pp.567-568. Such views, however, are not dominant. Gaddis points out that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Americans have turned insensitive to the interests of others, have neglected the cultivation of great-power relationships, and seem to have assumed that they no longer need the cooperation of the others to promote their interests. Gaddis, 'Setting Right A Dangerous World'. Lemann observes that the G.W. Bush administration appears to be committed to acting forcefully in advance of the world's approval. Lemann, 'The Next World Order'. Walker points out that US congress has

In the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York some analysts foresaw a change in American foreign policy arguing that the unilateralist strategy had been rendered deeply problematic.<sup>81</sup> Critics of unilateral America hoped that “the arrogant hyperpower, so suspicious of international regimes and institutions, cannot effectively utilize these instruments in the battle against terrorism while also criticizing, undermining, or rejecting them. Washington, in short, will need to change its ways, adopting a foreign policy more suited to the war it is now waging.”<sup>82</sup> Subsequent events nevertheless, proved that commentators had announced the demise of unilateralism too soon, exposing the Bush administration’s commitment to multilateral action as tactical rather than strategic.<sup>83</sup> The message the US government has sent is not that the US will bend and shift in order to attract support but that those

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passed legislation on trade and sanctions that seemed to have forgotten Thomas Jefferson’s “decent respect for the opinions of mankind.” Walker, ‘Bush’s Choice: Athens or Sparta’. The idea that the Clinton administrations had adopted multilateralist policies, (under the name of ‘assertive multilateralism’ or ‘pragmatic multilateralism’ or ‘pragmatic neo-Wilsonianism’) is dismissed even by former officials in those administrations. Characteristically, Levine admits that: “Mr Clinton’s too frequent international mode was to agree-so long as he knew that Congress wouldn’t go along or that the agreement was just paper anyhow.” Levine, ‘Yes, France, America Will Keep Acting Unilaterally’. Writing in his diary about the Gulf War and the US decision to seek UN approval for attacking Iraq, Bush senior has admitted that “never did we think that without its (UN) blessing we could not or would not intervene.” Chace, ‘New World Disorder’. Thus there is little evidence to support the claim that Bush senior, in contrast to Bush junior, was a confirmed multilateralist. FitzGerald, ‘George Bush and the World’, p.81. In fact, it is claimed that unilateralism in US foreign policy has been a perennial tendency and the current absence of a serious peer US competitor makes this propensity all the more tempting. Andrews, ‘Is Atlanticism dead?’, p. 258.

<sup>80</sup> Huntington, ‘The Lonely Superpower’, p.38, provides a long list of cases up to 1998, where the U.S. has endorsed unilateral action to promote its interests, and Ikenberry, ‘American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror’, p.26, refers to some more examples, such as opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapons Convention and UN action on the trade in small arms and light weapons.

<sup>81</sup> “Unilateralism is likely to become another casualty of September 11” according to Barber, ‘Beyond Jihad Vs. McWorld’. “The logic of the Bush administration’s war on terrorism necessarily reorients the administration’s foreign policy in ways that will push it back in the direction of post-war liberal multilateralism”, predicted Ikenberry, ‘American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror’, p.25, while Haass talked of a hard-headed multilateralism suited to the demands of this global era.. Haass, ‘Multilateralism for a Global Era’.

<sup>82</sup> Miller, ‘The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux?’, p.26.

<sup>83</sup> Hoffmann, ‘On the War’, p.6, and Daalder and Lindsay, ‘Unilateralism Is Alive and Well in Washington’.

who choose to join the other side will be sorry, and that those who join the US team are clearly expected to follow the US lead.<sup>84</sup>

Shortly after the terrorist attacks in New York, the basis of a unilateralist blueprint of action against terrorism had been set in undisputable terms: “the US should avoid trying to form a broad-based, unwieldy coalition of military forces that give everybody a seat at the decision table. ... There may be instances when some of its closest allies (certainly the United Kingdom and perhaps even other NATO allies) will join its military operations, but the price of entry must be unreserved support for America’s political and military objectives to eradicate terrorism.”<sup>85</sup> American officials stated that in the fight against terrorism there would not be a single coalition but rather different coalitions for different missions in which US units will hope to work with local forces against terrorists or regimes that back terror.<sup>86</sup> Fearing that US allies might try to dictate terms or conditions for the war on terrorism, the American president himself has appeared unfazed by the possibility that other countries might not join the US into all its war efforts: “At some point we may be the only ones left. That’s OK with me. We are America”.<sup>87</sup> It is obvious that, at least for the time being, the US does not feel the need to abandon its preferred unilateralist course, vindicating those who have predicted that the United States will continue to act as a unilateral

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<sup>84</sup> Miller, ‘The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux?’, p. 19.

<sup>85</sup> Holmes, ‘Responding to the Attack on America: Beware of Constraints Imposed by International Coalition’.

<sup>86</sup> Fitchett, ‘Pentagon in a League of Its Own’. “The war against terrorism and the quest for Middle East peace, then, are examples of one model for our engagement with the world. Call it the “posse” model, in which we assemble “coalitions of the willing” to deal with the issue at hand.” Haass, ‘From Reluctant to Resolute: American Foreign Policy after September 11’.

<sup>87</sup> Woodward, *Bush at War*, p. 81.

superpower, simply, because it can.<sup>88</sup> In fact, it is questionable whether it could really employ truly multilateralist strategies while simultaneously pursuing the goal of global predominance. The evidence so far suggests that these two goals cannot be combined.<sup>89</sup>

### 3. US attitudes towards post-Cold War Europe

#### *I. Maintaining the status quo*

Since the main preoccupation of American foreign policy after the Cold War has been the preservation of a unipolar world, it is not surprising that Washington's top European policy priority is to prevent the emergence of a single power, which could dominate Europe.<sup>90</sup> Therefore, the possibility of a politically united Europe with the capacity to provide for its own security and act independently is undoubtedly not in US interest.<sup>91</sup> Instead the United States should seek to promote evolution of the European Union in the direction of a looser, purely economic entity with broader membership rather

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<sup>88</sup> Levine, 'Yes, France, America Will Keep Acting Unilaterally'. Other factors too help explain the tendency for unilateralism, such as the gradual realization that globalisation, felt through devastating terrorist strikes, is finally challenging the sovereignty even of the US, the Republican control of both Congress (since 1994) and the presidency (since 2000) and the frustration many Americans feel when their country, despite its truly good intentions (as most Americans believe) and phenomenal power, is voted down in international fora. Lundestad, 'Toward transatlantic drift?', pp. 18-19.

<sup>89</sup> There have always been a high number of voices in the US, supportive of the view that multilateralism means the abandonment of America's leadership role in the world. See for example, Feulner, 'What Are America's Interests?'

<sup>90</sup> Geipel and Manning, 'Introduction', p.4.

<sup>91</sup> "The political integration of the European Community, if that should occur, would also bring into existence an extraordinarily powerful entity which could not help but be perceived as a major threat to American interests" Huntington, 'America's Changing Strategic Interests', p.12. Thus, support for European integration or the EU tends to be seen in critical light-not in public and official pronouncements, but in influential foreign policy analyses and diplomatic comments. Kahler and Link, *Europe and America: A Return to History*, p.100. Some analysts, though, are not so diplomatic: "The European Union is and must remain a relatively inefficient military power." Russell Mead, 'American Endurance', p. 177.

than a tighter political entity with an integrated foreign policy.<sup>92</sup> Officially, the US has always been and will continue to be a true supporter of European integration: “Support for European integration has been a hallmark of US foreign policy for decades, both Democratic and Republican administrations have believed that a politically and economically united Europe would be better able to advance our mutual security, prosperity, and democratic values.”<sup>93</sup>

Since the end of the Cold-War, developments in Europe have not received sufficient attention in the US. As some commentators have put it, the EU is simply “not on the US radar screen”.<sup>94</sup> Diminishing contacts between American officials and their European counterparts seem to prove this point.<sup>95</sup> As a rule, the EU has at best been seen as an impressive trade bloc and at worst as “a collection of feckless allies that regularly complain about America’s heavy hand even as they do little to bear the burdens of common defense.”<sup>96</sup> The consequences of this fact are only gradually beginning to be

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<sup>92</sup> Huntington, ‘America’s Changing Strategic Interests’, p.13.

<sup>93</sup> Bandler, ‘The Euro-Atlantic Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century’. Prominent European historians however, have repeatedly stressed that it has always been assumed in Washington that this integration could only happen within an Atlantic framework, meaning that American leadership should always be guaranteed. Washington never meant to allow Europe become an independent third force in international relations during the Cold War. Lundestad, ‘Toward transatlantic drift?’, p. 28.

<sup>94</sup> Larrabee, ‘Reshaping US-EU Relations: Toward a Broader Strategic Agenda’, p. 61. This is particularly evident in Congress, where the level of knowledge about the EU and its role in the world is low. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>95</sup> “The unwillingness to engage in this kind of personal give-and-take underscores the declining importance of Europe to Washington policymakers and raises questions in Europe about whether the United States is more interested in stating firm American convictions than in forging common positions.” Daalder, ‘The End of Atlanticism’, p. 47.

<sup>96</sup> Kupchan, ‘The End of the West’. For much of the 1990s in particular, “America’s Atlantic policies oscillated between imperiousness and indifference, between treating Europe as an auxiliary or as a photo opportunity. ...A series of initiatives was undertaken unilaterally and made the subject of consultation – if at all – only after a decision had already been taken.” Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 49.

grasped.<sup>97</sup> The focus on the domestic front since the collapse of communism, the almost blind faith in American global power, and the deep seated belief that European countries are unlikely –if willing at all- to overcome their suspicions about each other and join their forces, are the main reasons behind this information shortage.<sup>98</sup> In the field of CFSP, and ESDP in particular, the prevalent thought is that “the confusion in Europe over Iraq has made the idea of a common European defense and security policy look farther away than ever. Even as an aspiration, a unified policy now seems more than faintly ridiculous on any issue that actually matters to member nations, or that requires rapid decision-making”.<sup>99</sup> The 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands have, according to many American scholars, put the final nail in the coffin of European integration: “Ever closer union is now a matter of history.”<sup>100</sup>

However, as political integration progresses and the EU shows a willingness to formulate more independent policies, the US stance is shifting from indifference and ambivalence to outright opposition and hostility.

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<sup>97</sup> As US diplomats who have served in Europe admit, there is a considerable lack of awareness about the EU in Washington and the rest of the US, and this constitutes a real problem. Schnabel, ‘US-European Relations: Implications for the Candidate Countries’. The few steps which are taken to address this problem are often seen as inadequate. See US Mission to the European Union, ‘U.S. Lawmakers Introduce Congressional European Union Caucus’

<sup>98</sup> On Europe’s inferior status *vis-à-vis* the US, see Kagan, ‘Power and Weakness, Bullock, ‘Eurocepticism Inside the Beltway’, and Stelzer, ‘Is Europe A Threat?’.

<sup>99</sup> Erlanger, ‘Anatomy of a breakdown’, p. 13. In general, the EU has no clear identity, no single citizenship or army, no larger European patriotism for which, so far, any young European man or woman is likely to want to die in battle, European summits are competitions for national politics and policies, European decisions are judged in terms of national wins and losses, there is no sense of any common good, nor is there any praise for the politicians who are willing to make sacrifices for it, however perceived. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16. Hence, few US policymakers take seriously the predictions of some scholars that it is Europe and not China that is poised to become America’s ‘next great rival’. Garton Ash, ‘The new anti-Europeanism in America’, p. 130.

<sup>100</sup> Hulsman, ‘The European Union is dead’.

Traditionally, Washington has not been comfortable with the prospect of European military infrastructures that could be developed and used outside the NATO framework. Successive American administrations have feared that an integrated European security approach would mean that Washington would find itself at a disadvantage faced with a European consensus or a demand for equal voice in security decision making, and have therefore always treated this prospect with deep suspicion or outright opposition.<sup>101</sup> Of paramount importance for the US has been the existence of a strong NATO as the sole provider of Europe's security, within which U.S. leadership remains unchallengeable.<sup>102</sup> This has been and still remains the cornerstone of Washington's European policy. This is the reason why European initiatives for the creation of EU military capabilities are welcomed,<sup>103</sup> as long as they do not undermine NATO. At the opening of the Rome summit of NATO in November 1991, President Bush stated: "our premise is that the American role in the defence and affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European Union. If our premise is wrong-if, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defence, the time to tell us is today".<sup>104</sup> In the ensuing years, the Bush administration opposed the Franco-German initiative to turn the WEU (Western European Union) into the defence arm of the EU and Eurocorps into the core of an independent European military structure, while the first version of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance

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<sup>101</sup> Kelleher, 'The European Security Strategy and the United States', p. 141.

<sup>102</sup> Daalder and Goldgeier, 'Putting Europe First', p.79.

<sup>103</sup> A stronger European military contribution will make the Alliance stronger, lift some of the burden from the US, and make the US-European relationship much more of a partnership in this arena. Pickering, 'America's Stake in Europe's Future'.

<sup>104</sup> Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs*, p.97.

for Fiscal Years 1994 to 1999 argued that “while the United States supports the goal of European Integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the Alliance’s integrated command structure”.<sup>105</sup> Talking on EU plans for the creation of ESDI (European Defence and Security Identity), the then Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbot warned Europeans that while the American support is sincere, it is not unconditional.<sup>106</sup> And a few months later he made it clear that the US would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO.<sup>107</sup> Indeed, there is a growing and widespread concern in Washington over the likelihood that, led by France<sup>108</sup>, the EU could one day start acting as a counterweight to the United States.<sup>109</sup> Therefore, initiatives such as the 2003 EU’s first *European Security Strategy* are usually met with a ‘yes-but’ attitude or direct opposition by US government circles.<sup>110</sup> The logic behind a dominant NATO in Europe is that “the US must protect the interests of virtually all potential great powers so that they need not acquire the capability to protect themselves—that is, so that those powers need not act like great powers. Thus, for instance, Washington

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<sup>105</sup> Quoted in Kahler and Link, *Europe and America: A Return to History*, pp. 100-101.

<sup>106</sup> Talbot, ‘The New Europe and the New NATO’.

<sup>107</sup> Talbot, ‘America’s Stake in a Strong Europe’.

<sup>108</sup> France has, indeed, signalled in recent years a growing readiness to prepare for such a role, concentrating on efforts to “specialize in the two military missions that are most likely to be the dominant mode of engagement in the years to come: crisis prevention and crisis intervention.” Hofmann and Kempin, ‘France and the Transatlantic Relationship’, p. 4.

<sup>109</sup> Larrabee, ‘Reshaping US-EU Relations: Toward a Broader Strategic Agenda’, p. 64. Many members of Congress, according to Larrabee, fear that either consciously or unconsciously ESDP is designed to weaken NATO.

<sup>110</sup> For an in-depth analysis of how the ESS has been received in Washington, see Kelleher, ‘The European Security Strategy and the United States’, pp. 152-158.

must protect Germany's and Japan's access to Persian Gulf oil, because if these countries were to protect their own interests in the Gulf, they would develop military forces capable of global "power projection".<sup>111</sup> Strong emphasis is put on the need to derail major initiatives that should do much to improve the EU countries' military effectiveness.<sup>112</sup>

Yet, in the absence of a clear threat to Europe's security in the post-Cold War, the survival of NATO depends on its ability to redefine itself, and dismiss fears that it has become obsolete.<sup>113</sup> Those who see NATO as a defunct organization assert that the so-called 'capabilities gap' between Washington and its European allies has reached the point where the alliance has absolutely nothing to offer to the US. Their conviction is strengthened by current trends in military spending, with the US increasing its defence budget and Europeans refusing or being unable to spend more on their militaries.<sup>114</sup> In effect, some maintain, the only use the Pentagon can envisage for NATO is that of a "useful joint-training-and-exercise organization from which the United States can cherry-pick 'coalitions of the willing' to participate in U.S.

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<sup>111</sup> Schwarz, 'Why America Thinks It Has to Run The World'.

<sup>112</sup> Two European projects, the Airbus A400M military transport aircraft that can give European armies their own heavy airlift capacity and the Galileo satellite navigation system that has the potential to make Europe independent of America's Global Positioning System, have been met with strong opposition from American officials, who have called for their abandonment. Merritt, 'European Defense May Be on the Way'.

<sup>113</sup> For some, NATO has long been dead and nothing can revive it: "NATO is history. An obituary for the Alliance has not been published because some things don't have to be published. Today the most powerful policymakers in the White House and the Pentagon have lost interest in NATO." Pfaff, 'Allies look to the EU for future security'. For others, NATO "looks increasingly irrelevant to anything but a political effort, however valuable, to preoccupy the Russians and civilize the Central Asians". Erlanger, 'Anatomy of a Breakdown', p. 12. Though shared by a growing number of security experts, such attitudes with regard to the question of NATO's future are not shared by many US officials.

<sup>114</sup> There is another reason for pessimism concerning the viability of NATO, and that is the fact that Europeans do not seem to agree with Americans on the question of what and how serious the threats in the post-Cold War era are. Gedmin, 'The Alliance Is Doomed'.

led operations".<sup>115</sup> A decision to officially dismantle NATO would not be a catastrophe for the US according to this strain of opinion. On the contrary, it would relieve the US from the burden of providing for Europe's defence at the time when the most important threats to US security lie elsewhere. It could also put an end to the complaints of those Americans who have never ceased viewing Europe as a 'freeloader'.<sup>116</sup> The problem with this particular approach, however, is that it does not take seriously into account the possible consequences for the US of such a radical action. It avoids addressing the question of what would replace NATO. Without American military presence in Europe, the EU would be – devoid of any other options – compelled to fully and institutionally develop its own defence structures.<sup>117</sup> A new pan-European arrangement under the aegis of the EU would certainly not be welcomed by the US. And the possibility of letting individual states make their own defence provisions is running the risk of leading Europe back to the old and discredited system of the balance of power, which twice in the 20<sup>th</sup> century led to conflict and forced the US to intervene. The survival of NATO is thus much more important for the US than it looks at first sight, and the reasons why it should not be treated as a relic of the Cold War era have been analyzed extensively.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> James Kitfield, 'US to NATO: Change or Else', *National Journal*, 12 October 2002, pp. 2978-2979, quoted in Daalder, 'The End of Atlanticism', p.50.

<sup>116</sup> This is, indeed, the average American's perception of Europe. Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 89.

<sup>117</sup> Reichard, *The EU-NATO Relationship*, p. 44.

<sup>118</sup> See for example, Haass, 'Charting A New Course in the Transatlantic Relationship', and Brzezinski, 'A Plan for Europe'. Arguing that the EU is potentially the only power which in the long run could compete with the US for the top position in international affairs, many analysts consider it self-defeating for any American administration to sign the end of NATO at the moment when there is nothing else to take its place. Lundestad, 'Toward transatlantic drift?', p. 28. Brzezinski, thinks that such a choice would have catastrophic consequences for

Hence, the US is expected to use all the arguments it can muster to ensure NATO's existence. Europeans are warned that without the American presence in Europe, they risk endangering the entire European architecture by becoming vulnerable again to internal rivalries and external threats, rekindling historically rooted animosities and causing to resurface the spectre of a German dominated continent<sup>119</sup> Moreover, Europe is reminded that geopolitics has not disappeared as an element of international politics and NATO is still needed as an insurance policy against a new Russian imperialism.<sup>120</sup> US efforts to ensure a viable future for the Alliance have also focused on the strong political role that NATO can and must perform.<sup>121</sup> It is claimed, in this sense that NATO does not need a hostile Russia to justify its existence and that it can be useful in efforts to coordinate larger regional strategies in Europe with the EU, OSCE, and other key organizations.<sup>122</sup> For the US, NATO will continue to play a political role in reflecting the values of democracy and freedom of the great North Atlantic community and it will remain the indispensable nexus for broadening and deepening Euro-Atlantic security, democracy, free markets, and the rule of law.<sup>123</sup> US officials have

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America's global power: "A politically powerful Europe, able to compete economically while militarily no longer dependent on the United States, would inevitably contest American pre-eminence in two regions that are strategically vital to America: the Middle East and Latin America. ... Thus a Europe that became simultaneously an economic giant and a militarily serious power could confine the scope of US pre-eminence largely to the Pacific Ocean." Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 91.

<sup>119</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 94.

<sup>120</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 52.

<sup>121</sup> "NATO has also always had a political function. ... Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has served as a catalyst for strengthening democracy, rule of law, respect for human, civil, and minority rights, including among non-members. The Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are institutional manifestations of this mission." Talbott, 'America's Stake in a Strong Europe'.

<sup>122</sup> Geipel, and Manning, 'Introduction', in *Rethinking the Transatlantic Partnership*, pp.8-9.

<sup>123</sup> Powell, 'Interview with European journalists at the State Department', and Jones, 'US and Europe: The Bush Administration and Transatlantic Relations'.

also indicated that NATO must make serious preparations in order to be able to undertake missions beyond its territory.<sup>124</sup> The shift of American attention from Europe towards Asia is rendering the need for such a dramatic change in NATO's focus even more urgent. Developments in South-East Asia have indeed received much more attention in the US during the 1990s.<sup>125</sup> This comes as a natural development, since the US has found in the case of China a strategic competitor, a power that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favour.<sup>126</sup> In addition, since US trade volumes with Asia surpass today those with Europe, it would only be natural to expect, in the long run at least, a relocation of American foreign policy interests from Europe to Asia.<sup>127</sup>

The need for the US to turn its focus to Asia, while maintaining NATO as a means of securing its preeminence in Europe, is presenting US leaders with the imperative task of finding the necessary resources to respond to the new situation. As a first step, US officials have asked their European counterparts to do more in the direction of sharing the burdens of American

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<sup>124</sup> Talbott, 'The New Europe and the New NATO'. Rumsfeld concurs: "We will have to very deliberately engage NATO and our alliance partners in the Pacific". Quoted in Campbell and Norton-Taylor, 'George Bush's America'. "NATO can act collectively in its self-defense, and increasingly it will have opportunities to perhaps operate outside of the confines of Europe and North America." Powell, 'Interview with European journalists at the State Department'. When under pressure from Europeans who do not look favourably upon such a transformation, US officials tend to be dismissive of the idea that there is a blueprint for "a global NATO": "I spend a lot of time on those premises (White House, State Department, and the Pentagon), and I assure you there is no such a thing." Talbott, 'The New Europe and the New NATO'.

<sup>125</sup> "It is now an axiom of the US foreign policy establishment that economic, technological, and demographic changes are making East Asia the world's most dynamic arena, a driving force --increasingly the dominant force--in the international economy." Schwarz, 'Why America Thinks It Has to Run The World'. "In identifying the 21<sup>st</sup> century as the Pacific Century, I am merely stating the obvious." Helms, 'Entering The Pacific Century'.

<sup>126</sup> Rice, "Promoting the National Interest", p.56. Though Europe, in general, and the EU, in particular, received scant mention in the 2002 NSS, China and India loomed large in it. Kelleher, 'The European Security Strategy and the United States', p. 149.

<sup>127</sup> Reichard, *The EU-NATO Relationship*, p. 29.

leadership.<sup>128</sup> More and more Americans, they insist, feel uneasy with the present situation in Europe: “The current strategic bargain between America and Europe is increasingly unprofitable for the US. The old bargain forged in the Cold War is outdated and even harmful to American interests. ...The inequitable security burden the US must carry in Europe is beginning to undermine America’s ability to defend and advance its interests outside of Europe.”<sup>129</sup> It is a widespread belief in the US that for the last half century, NATO has allowed Europeans the luxury of building comfortable welfare states while the United States footed the bill to protect them and that this may have been acceptable during the Cold War, but it isn’t today.<sup>130</sup> Consequently, the American government is urging its allies to do more to improve their defensive capabilities and bridge the ‘capabilities gap’ between them and the US.

Although the NATO question has received plenty of attention, the same has not happened with Europe’s monetary union, which is slowly becoming a matter of great importance and an issue of concern in the US. In the mid 1990s it was still acknowledged that the US had not treated European monetary integration as a serious policy issue, as both the Bush and the first Clinton administrations underestimated the impetus towards monetary integration in Europe.<sup>131</sup> Three reasons were often given for the alleged

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<sup>128</sup> This is actually a call to all of America’s allies, since burden-sharing, the effort to convince other states to shoulder a greater share of the costs of US foreign policy commitments, has become increasingly prominent in US statecraft since the end of the Cold War. Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment”, p.77.

<sup>129</sup> Holmes, “The United States and Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Partners or Competitors?”.

<sup>130</sup> Hulsman and Scardaville, “Clarifying Europe’s Defense Intentions”.

<sup>131</sup> Henning, “Europe’s Monetary Union and the United States” pp.83-84. Indeed, most Americans saw the EMU as “an obscure financial undertaking of no relevance to the United States.” Feldstein, ‘EMU and International Conflict’, p.60.

implausibility of monetary union: the economies of the member states were not sufficiently harmonized and would not meet the convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty; Germany would not be persuaded to surrender the stable Deutsche mark for a common currency; and countries that would be excluded from early membership by a multi-speed approach would oppose this strategy, thereby blocking monetary union.<sup>132</sup> There is no doubt that the EMU will be in many ways beneficial to American interests. A growing European market cannot but be seen as good for American exports and American firms would definitely benefit from the elimination of transaction costs in the same way as their European counterparts. America's support for European integration after the Cold War is fundamentally linked to its vital interest in a free-market, democratic, stable Europe, able to absorb a great deal of American exports.<sup>133</sup> Some even argue that US firms are better prepared to benefit from the introduction of the single currency.<sup>134</sup> Thus, US administrations have always expressed their full backing for the project. Gradually, however, the sentiment is changing. European leaders have repeatedly stressed that EMU is primarily a political endeavour. Their American counterparts watch warily statements which cast Europe's monetary integration as a tool of countering American interests in order to create a monetary system which will promote Europe's own interests.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Henning, 'Europe's Monetary Union and the United States', pp.84-85.

<sup>133</sup> Wattenberg, 'Bush's Foreign Policy: Should America Go It Alone?'

<sup>134</sup> Many in the business community believe that because US firms active in Europe have always sought pan-European solutions, while European firms, with the exception of a few multinationals, have sought refuge in their national markets, they are going to have an advantage over their European competitors who on the contrary are going to be punished for being nationally minded. Barnard, 'What the Euro Means to the US', p.8.

<sup>135</sup> Hutton, *The World We're In*, p. 324. Monetary union should not be seen as a quixotic act, warns Hutton but, instead, as "a deliberate assertion of economic sovereignty in a global

Gradually, US leaders recognize that it may pave the way for a political union with an independent military and foreign policy, and could usher in “a new bipolar international economic order” which could put an end to the predominant position the US has been enjoying since World War II.<sup>136</sup> It will help insulate the European economy from the negative effects of exchange rate volatility and misalignment vis-à-vis non-European currencies, and it will enhance the power and influence of Europe in global monetary affairs.<sup>137</sup> In the long run, after EMU, the EU has the potential to turn into a global centre that will rival the US as a pole of attraction for the rest of the world; businesses will look to it for standard setting and investment, educators will look to it for new ideas and as a place to educate their youth, intellectuals and politicians will be attracted by the EU’s “consensus” model of government.<sup>138</sup> Moreover, the existence of the euro as a competitor to the US dollar (as a reserve currency) could mean that the US will have to pay higher interest rates to attract foreign capital to finance its large external deficits, a possibility that at least in the short term would not be in US interest.<sup>139</sup>

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monetary system that for thirty years, ever since the collapse of Bretton Woods, has increasingly ceded power to the judgements of the international financial markets.”

<sup>136</sup> Feldstein, ‘EMU and International Conflict’, Rohatyn, ‘The US, Europe and Globalization’, and Fred Bergsten, ‘America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?’, p.20.

<sup>137</sup> Henning, ‘Europe’s Monetary Union and the United States’, p.94. According to Henning “during most of the postwar period, the United States, because of its lessened dependence on trade, has not been as vulnerable to fluctuations in exchange rates as the European countries. When clashing with European governments over macroeconomic policies or the balance of payments, American officials often took advantage of this asymmetry. In several instances, the threat of a precipitous exchange-rate movement pressed European governments to reflate or dampen their economies in accordance with American preferences. Monetary union in Europe, however, would eliminate this asymmetry. It would help to insulate the economy of the monetary union from fluctuations in the US dollar, to reduce the costs of transatlantic monetary conflict for Europe, and to thereby shield European policymakers from American pressure.”

<sup>138</sup> Schnabel, ‘US-European Relations: Implications for the Candidate Countries’.

<sup>139</sup> Bergsten, ‘America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?’, p.28.

What these developments indicate is that the EU is taking clear steps in the direction of augmenting its clout, making evident that its position as a supporter of the existent *status quo* cannot be taken for granted anymore.<sup>140</sup> This can no longer be ignored by the US: “we would be burying our heads in the sand if we ignore the competitive challenge of the EU.”<sup>141</sup> It is not certain what form US reactions could take. American positions on European efforts to build military capabilities within the EU framework have been lucidly demonstrated. In the case of EMU, American attitudes have not crystallized yet. Until now, the US has restricted itself to asking Europe to consider the repercussions of a possible failure to take into account American interests, when initiating new trade rules.<sup>142</sup> But with EMU threatening to undermine one of the pillars of American preeminence, the prospect of stronger and more radical actions cannot be lightly dismissed. Those who advocate a more dynamic US stance, have no doubt about what America should do: “the US must ‘rethink’ its stance to Europe; it should concentrate on the strengthening of its bilateral relations with European nations and prevent Brussels from intervening between Washington and the national capitals of Europe and it should recognize that the new Europe is not an ally to rely on with respect to its relations with third countries.”<sup>143</sup> Strong bilateral relations with the

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<sup>140</sup> Walker, ‘Bush’s Choice: Athens or Sparta’.

<sup>141</sup> Schnabel, ‘US-European Relations: Implications for the Candidate Countries’.

<sup>142</sup> “The size of the new European market allows EU authorities to turn European standards into global standards, something that up to now was the reserve of the US government. The US government and US business interests must be fully engaged in influencing the regulatory rule-making processes. When the EU is setting new policies or writing new regulations, we need to be there to protect our interests. If we fail to get our needs accepted, the resulting conflicts can be protracted, sometimes politically nasty and always economically costly for business.” Schnabel, ‘US-European Relations: Implications for the Candidate Countries’

<sup>143</sup> Feldstein, ‘EMU and International Conflict’, p.72. One of the fiercest critics of the EMU, Feldstein has predicted that it will turn to a disaster for a number of reasons: EMU and further

members of the EU as a counterweight to the power of Brussels, is not a novel tactic. The immense influence of the US in European affairs has largely been possible due to its ability to play effectively divide and rule tactics, a strategy named by some American analysts 'divide and lead'.<sup>144</sup> The same can be said with regard to the special relationship between the US and Britain, which a lot regard as a leverage against the emerging power of a united Europe.<sup>145</sup>

On the face of it, the gap between US rhetoric and actions regarding European developments is startling. Washington praises the benefits of European integration and appears to support even closer cooperation among European countries, while at the same time, directly and indirectly, tries to limit its effects. Some can find no logical explanation for this phenomenon: "The US suffers from schizophrenia on the international front. On the one hand, it claims that Europe should assert greater international responsibility

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political integration in Europe cannot prevent the outbreak of an intra-European war, as the American Civil War suggests; the notion of a politically independent central bank is contrary to European traditions and it will be stubbornly opposed by countries which do not share Germany's fixation on price stability and insulate monetary policy from political influence and which will seek more aggressive expansionary policies in their attempt to fight unemployment; the pressure for tax harmonization that EMU generates would mean the loss of national control over taxes and transfers and will irritate member countries; EMU will make impossible changes in national labour laws or national transfer payments that would reduce structural unemployment and increase national competitiveness, and will therefore prevent member countries from competing with each other and render them unable to compete with the rest of the world increasing as a consequence the pressure for more protectionist policies; it will lead to Franco-German conflict for power while smaller countries will soon realize that they have made sacrifices without gaining the ability to influence European policies.

<sup>144</sup> Wattenberg, 'Bush's Foreign Policy: Should America Go It Alone?'

<sup>145</sup> Huntington, 'The Lonely Superpower', p.47. The fear that a larger and more confident Europe, led by Germany and France, might not be in US interests, has prompted Washington to quietly encourage Britain to be more 'Atlanticist' and less 'European' (with London being only too eager to accommodate), according to some estimates. Brzezinski, *Second Choice*, p. 187. Some American politicians even urge Britain to withdraw from the EU and join NAFTA. Gurdon and Fenton, "America may offer Britain alternative to EU". However, a strong Britain influencing EU policies from within is considered to be a better choice for promoting US interests in Europe. Working with other like-minded countries, the UK government is expected for example to push for the removal of trade barriers and further market liberalization in the EU, and prevent the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force. Stelzer, 'Is Europe A Threat?', p.19

and ‘share the burdens of leadership.’ On the other hand, its revealed preference is to try to maintain American dominance –even while asking others to pay the bill- and to exploit national differences within Europe whenever possible.”<sup>146</sup> What this stance reveals, however, is the impasse the US policy towards Europe has reached after the Cold War. At the very moment when Asia figures as home to ‘looming rivals’<sup>147</sup>, and the ‘war on terror’ looks set to last for a long time, Europe shows strong signs of assertiveness. The goal of global primacy, which the US has assigned to itself, means that unavoidably Europe has to be seen as a rival in the making. Nevertheless, branding the EU a strategic competitor, like China, is not an option, as American and European interests are highly interconnected. Besides, a fragmented Europe would pose other important dangers.<sup>148</sup> There is a growing number of American policymakers who clearly view European integration as inimical to US interests, pointing to the problems the US has faced when confronted with a Europe who speaks with one voice (ICC, Kyoto, trade disputes) and suggesting that the US should be less supportive of further European integration and pursue instead with greater vigour its policy of divide and rule.<sup>149</sup> Yet, more explicit US opposition to EU efforts to promote political unity in Europe can only result in the worsened ties between the US and the EU. A more shaky transatlantic relationship is therefore a

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<sup>146</sup> Bergsten, ‘America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?’, p.30.

<sup>147</sup> Bush, ‘A Distinct American Internationalism’.

<sup>148</sup> “... a fragmented Europe would be more vulnerable to ‘Eurabization’ or other nightmare scenarios.’ van Oudenaren, ‘Containing Europe’. Van Oudenaren has described succinctly Washington’s dilemma: “the United States needs to steer a course between, on the one hand, an unseemly and in the end probably futile attempt to weaken the EU and, on the other, accepting a partnership on terms essentially set in Brussels, Paris and Berlin.” However, he is not offering any alternative to these options.

<sup>149</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 97.

highly probable scenario. Domestic developments also seem to lead to this outcome.

## *II. The impact of domestic factors*

The end of the Cold War has made it easier for US domestic political change to find its expression in the field of foreign policy.<sup>150</sup> Domestic developments that were denied their ‘spillover’ effect in US dealings with the rest of the world during the East-West confrontation have increasingly been reflected in US foreign policy in general, and in American attitudes to Europe in particular, since the disappearance of the Soviet threat. In the US political arena, domestic politics has become more important to political survival than the handling of foreign policy, is the verdict of some of America’s most respected political analysts.<sup>151</sup> Both Democrats and Republicans in Congress have often treated foreign policy as a mere extension of domestic politics, have tried to legislate for the rest of the world and have imposed sanctions when others did not comply with American law, on trade, for instance, with Cuba or Iran.<sup>152</sup>

This has coincided with a period during which America witnesses a significant shift in its ethnic balance.<sup>153</sup> Immigrants in the US during the last few decades come almost exclusively from areas outside Europe, mainly from Asia and Latin America. An increasing inflow of Asian immigrants, in

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<sup>150</sup> Kahler, ‘US politics and transatlantic relations: we are all Europeans now’, p. 98.

<sup>151</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 27. As Kissinger explains, “What is presented by foreign critics as America’s overweening quest for domination is very frequently a response to domestic pressure groups, which are in a position to put the spotlight on key issues by promising support or threatening retribution at election time and which support each other’s causes to establish their own claims for the future.”

<sup>152</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, p. xii.

<sup>153</sup> Kahler, ‘US politics and transatlantic relations: we are all Europeans now’, p. 96.

particular, has helped to divert American attention away from Europe and towards the Pacific basin.<sup>154</sup> The European elements of America's heritage are becoming less and less accentuated.<sup>155</sup> While at the beginning of the twentieth century there was little doubt that America was in some sense a child of Europe, at the beginning of the twenty-first many no longer think of it as umbilically linked to Europe.<sup>156</sup> Europe will inevitably, by some analysts, suffer a decline in influence and centrality in American foreign policy as the new immigrants will mobilize to influence policy in the direction of their home countries.<sup>157</sup> This may already be happening as party-to-party contacts, contacts with think-tanks and informal contacts have in recent years witnessed steady decline.<sup>158</sup>

In another crucial development, America's Northeastern Establishment, traditionally characterized by its closer ties to America's European roots, has come in recent decades under threat, losing much of its traditional influence to the rejuvenated South and West, which have been the beneficiaries of impressive shifts in population and wealth. The impact of this

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<sup>154</sup> Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe*, pp. 181-182. In 2030 the percentage of Asians and Hispanics is expected to more than double, and these groups will form 6,2 per cent and 20,1 per cent of the total population respectively, while the white population of the US (apart from Hispanics) will be reduced to 57,5 per cent from 69,4 per cent in 2000. Gnesotto and Grevi, *Le Monde en 2025*, p. 24.

<sup>155</sup> Russell Mead, 'American Endurance', p. 177.

<sup>156</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 105.

<sup>157</sup> Kahler, 'US politics and transatlantic relations: we are all Europeans now', p. 96. Kahler finds that such fears in European circles are rather exaggerated as he thinks there is little evidence to support this hypothesis. He sites the example of Latin American immigrants who according to surveys do not seem to be preoccupied with foreign policy issues. *Ibid*, 97.

<sup>158</sup> Larrabee, 'Reshaping US-EU Relations: Toward a Broader Strategic Agenda', p. 64. Larrabee laments this decline and its negative long term consequences, pointing out that by the time people get into office their perceptions are already formed and it is hard to change them. Another worrisome, as Kissinger describes it, development is the fact that despite unprecedented travel between the two continents there is a loss of human contact and what the current generation of Americans knows about Europe grows far more out of business deals than political or cultural ties. Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 35.

change on the political culture of the United States has been immense, as the populism, anti-intellectualism and the deeply moralizing approach to foreign policy (heavily influenced by a fundamentalist brand of Protestantism in which the struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ takes centre stage) which characterize these regions, have been seriously strengthened and have come to define many aspects of US foreign policy preferences and attitudes.<sup>159</sup>

This is nowhere more obvious to see than in the predominance of the Republican Party on America’s political stage. This, political analysts warn, is a transformed Republican Party, more conservative, more aggressive and less willing to compromise and tolerate dissent.<sup>160</sup> The unilateralist and nationalist tendencies of the US Republican Party, of which there is no equivalent in Europe, have inevitably put and continue to put extra strains on US-European

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<sup>159</sup> Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe*, pp. 178-180. As far as socio-economic policies are concerned, some American analysts have not hesitated to talk of the return of the Social Darwinism system of values: “In 1944, in his classic study *Social Darwinism in American Life*, Richard Hofstadter, concluded that this intellectual system, ‘once pervasive and powerful,’ had ‘crumbled and been forgotten.’ He could hardly have foreseen the resurrection, half a century later, of the Social Darwinist mentality, if not the name itself: the belief that government should not intervene to affect the ‘natural’ working of the economy; that the distribution of wealth reflects individual merit rather than historical circumstances; that the plight of the less fortunate, whether conceived as individuals, classes, or races, arises from their own failings. As in the nineteenth century, indifference to the plight of the poor came to be seen as a sign of realism, not callousness.” Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, pp. 325-326.

<sup>160</sup> Since their 1994 triumph in Congressional elections, the attacks of Republicans on their opponents have become fiercer and nastier, sending a chilling message to Europe: “‘Liberal’ (which in the USA means left-wing) became a term of approbation, leaving leftists to duck and squirm and seek new self-descriptions – most recently ‘progressive’. *New York Times* reporter Elisabeth Bumiller captured the new (and derisive) discourse during a Democratic primary debate when she asked John Kerry: ‘Are you a liberal?’ and followed up, as time ran out, with the crucial cultural test: ‘Really quick, is God on America’s side?’ ... What shocked many Europeans was precisely the treatment – and jeering, contemptuous tone – that the new right’s leaders had been dishing out to the American left. After all, Europeans value the same despised policies: environmentalism, universal health insurance, generous social welfare policies, pacifism, statism, and a complex view of the world order. As the Iraq conflict loomed, Republicans made the term ‘French’ a synonym for ‘liberal’. In fact, the 2004 election season introduced a new derogatory: ‘the Latte Liberal’, a deft combination of the ‘L word’ and a taste for things European (i.e. weak, affected, sophisticated, and foreign).” Kersh and Morone, ‘The European Union through an American Prism’, p. 445. As some analysts note, by the 1990s virtually no politician would admit to being a liberal. Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, p. 324.

relations.<sup>161</sup> The grip this strain of conservatism has on US media is the cause of much of the negative stereotypes the average American has about Europe: “The rise in American conservatism has made the relationship even more difficult as the barrage of strident criticism directed at mainland Europe has grown more intense.”<sup>162</sup>

The dominant popular attitude toward Europe is, by some accounts, not anti-Europeanism but “mildly benign indifference mixed with impressive ignorance.”<sup>163</sup> The common American perception of the EU is that of a free-trade zone of sorts, something like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) but more advanced.<sup>164</sup> Americans hear little about the successes of the EU’s foreign policy, in promoting democracy around the world for example.<sup>165</sup> In addition, due to its slow pace and the fact that it has almost always been characterized by acrimonious disputes, European integration systematically tends to be underestimated by a generally impatient American public and American journalists.<sup>166</sup> Even amongst America’s most respected journalists and scholars, the division between ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe’ is seen as an accurate depiction of reality. Donald Rumsfeld is for most of them vindicated: “...he was, as it happens, correct, possibly more correct than he knew at the time. Although all concerned vociferously deny it, Europe is indeed beginning to divide—slowly, unevenly but perceptibly—into two very

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<sup>161</sup> Kahler, ‘US politics and transatlantic relations: we are all Europeans now’, pp. 99-100.

<sup>162</sup> Hutton, *The World We’re In*, p. 49.

<sup>163</sup> Garton Ash, ‘The new anti-Europeanism in America’, p. 125.

<sup>164</sup> Rifkin, *The European Dream*, p. 60.

<sup>165</sup> Schwenninger, ‘Note to the EU Presidency and EU Foreign Ministers’, p. 84.

<sup>166</sup> Lundestad, ‘Toward transatlantic drift?’, p. 21. Neither the nature nor the achievements of the EU are thus grasped by the US public opinion and to make things worse, European studies departments are mostly found in East Coast Universities leaving the West, the South and the Midwest of the US with little knowledge about the EU and its activities. Bruton, ‘Transatlantic Relations: the EU Stance’, p. 144.

distinct camps. One camp, led, at the moment, by France and Germany, retains the traditional skepticism of American power and remains committed to the idea of a 'different' European form of social organization and a European foreign policy. The other camp, led, at the moment, by Britain, Italy, and Poland, welcomes the growth of American power and is even interested, at least some of the time, in following a more American economic and foreign-policy model. New lines are being drawn, tentatively, and new alliances are being created on both halves of what once was a differently divided continent."<sup>167</sup>

Attitudes towards Europe and European publics, in general, are hardening, though, as US mass-media, think-tank scholars and other public opinion-makers increasingly project negative images of Europe. The EU is presented as either irrelevant<sup>168</sup>, due to its inherent weaknesses, or worse, as a potential source of instability and threats that could soon engulf America as well. Europe-bashing is popular and brings media attention and this is something that does not fail to attract the attention of US congressmen, already famous for their aversion to foreign travel and their limited contacts with their European counterparts.<sup>169</sup>

The idea that Europe finds itself in an irreversible process of decline is becoming remarkably widespread. European economies, Americans hear and

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<sup>167</sup> Applebaum, ' "Old Europe" versus "New Europe"', p. 27. See also, Fukuyama, 'Does "the West" still exist?', p. 147.

<sup>168</sup> "Our universities have increasingly moved away from teaching young Americans about European culture and, especially, history; Americans can go for weeks, months, and even years without feeling that European culture, military power, or economic developments have any impact at all on their lives. Europeans think about America all the time. American culture and military power are constant facts of life for them." Russell Mead, 'The Case Against Europe'.

<sup>169</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 97.

read, are in a constant state of crisis and lack the vitality of the American economy. It is easy to pinpoint the factors that condemn European economies, according to US economists, to such a miserable fate: inflexible labour policies, anti-entrepreneurial biases, overtaxation, burdensome welfare programmes.<sup>170</sup> The European model of the welfare state and European attitudes to work, in particular, stand as insurmountable impediments to economic progress: “Cultural attitudes to work, compensation, and the role of the state in providing welfare and pension payments to individuals have led to proliferating and interlocking formal and informal obstacles to economic growth. The European cultural preference for a strong state puts European society at a permanent disadvantage as capitalism accelerates and transforms itself into forms that require ever more flexible practices and autonomous markets and corporations.”<sup>171</sup> On top of that, Europe’s economies suffer from low birth rates which are bound to further question their viability.<sup>172</sup> However, while Europeans have to cope with their sluggish, if not moribund, economies, Americans can feel proud and boast of their vibrant economy, which is underpinned by a unique ability to create jobs and wealth. Higher growth rates for the US economy and America’s superior GDP figures provide, US analysts say, the ultimate proof of the superiority of the American

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<sup>170</sup> Rifkin, *The European Dream*, p. 71.

<sup>171</sup> Russell Mead, ‘American Endurance’, p. 171. Americans in need, on the contrary, basically rely for help on the so-called ‘natural safety-net’: family, friends, churches, and charities. Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, p. 325.

<sup>172</sup> “There is no precedent in human history for economic growth on declining human capital. America will soon find that all its partners have died.” Mark Steyn, quoted in Sommer, ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fertilité’

way of life and stand as evidence that Europe can never catch up with the US in the race to become the world's most competitive economy.<sup>173</sup>

Furthermore, the loss of religious faith and the 'debellicization' of European peoples "make it much more difficult for Europe to compete in a world where most people are neither secular nor instinctively pacifist."<sup>174</sup> Europe's pervasive secularism, warn some in the US, is pushing it to the brink of disaster: "...what is killing Europe and what I believe is most manifestly shown in its demographic rates, is a secularist cast of mind. It foreshortens people's horizons of expectations of themselves and of the future so drastically that they do not even create the future in the most elementary sense."<sup>175</sup> A great number of Americans seem to agree with analyses of this sort, as religion plays a central role in their lives. Indeed, Americans ascribe to religious faith a special importance: 58 per cent of Americans believed in 2002 that American society was strong thanks to the religious faith of the American people; almost 50 per cent of Americans also thought that one had to believe in God to have good values; in 2003 six in ten Americans said that

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<sup>173</sup> Rifkin, *The European Dream*, pp. 71,76. Lecturing therefore Europeans on the superiority of the US business 'know-how' should not come as a surprise to anyone. Ibid, p. 53. Especially, when the welfare of Europe is seen as dependent on the good performance of the American economy: "Europe's inability to generate a stable growth trajectory from within implies continuing dependence on the United States. Europe's economic fortunes remain hostage to the American 'growth locomotive' ..." Cafruny and Ryner, 'Monetary Union and the Transatlantic and Social Dimensions of Europe's Crisis', p. 159.

<sup>174</sup> Russell Mead, 'American Endurance', p. 170.

<sup>175</sup> Weigel, *Europe, America, and Politics Without God*. Weigel sees a "post-modernist melange of scepticism, moral relativism, soft nihilism" leading Europe to a downhill road. In his book, *The Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America, and Politics Without God*, he explains how a soulless secularism has led Europe to crisis, driving it away from America and other democratic powers. Low birth rates (which according to Weigel are a sign that Europe has lost faith in itself) and Muslim immigration can only lead to the unavoidable question: "Can a political community in the midst of depopulating itself and having that vacuum filled by people from another cultural experience...defend itself against that kind of cultural transformation, which, if successful, would mean the end of, or at least the severe attenuation of Europe's commitment to human rights, democracy, the rule of law, civility and tolerance?" Weigel, quoted in Sloan, 'How Does Religion Affect Relations between America and Europe?', p.5.

their faith was playing a role in every aspect of their lives and another 40 per cent stated that a profound religious experience had changed the direction of their lives.; 94 per cent of Americans believe in God and a clear majority believe that their country is not religious enough.<sup>176</sup> This divergence on the issue of religion coupled with the quite popular perception that Europe is sometimes too lenient on Islamic extremists within its borders and too eager to appease them, make some foresee serious consequences for the transatlantic future. Thus, they have even taken the step of addressing thinly veiled warnings to European leaders, suggesting the direction in which the latter will have to move: “If, however, governments lose sight of the important positive contributions religion has made to the development of Western civilization or, on another extreme, incorporate or encourage perspectives from extreme fundamentalist religious groups in their policies, religion-related factors could become a seriously divisive aspect of US-European relations.”<sup>177</sup>

The transatlantic crisis over the war in Iraq also led to a serious deterioration of Europe’s image in the United States. Americans felt particularly irritated at European attitudes during 2002-2003, namely the virulent opposition of European publics and many of their leaders to the way the US decided to conduct its ‘war on terror’. During that period US media were busy spreading the message that Europe was the land where ingratitude and disloyalty towards the US were somehow *de rigueur*.<sup>178</sup> Indignation, anger and sometimes outright hostility were vented at Europeans collectively

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<sup>176</sup> Gnesotto and Grevi, *Le Monde en 2025*, p. 156.

<sup>177</sup> Sloan, ‘How Does Religion Affect Relations between America and Europe?’, p. 6. Since a staggering 58% of Americans believe, according to Sloan, that America’s strength is based on religion, such statements are treated in the US as pragmatic.

<sup>178</sup> Pond, ‘The dynamics of the feud over Iraq’, p. 30.

on an unprecedented scale. A seasoned observer of transatlantic relations was stunned, at the time, by the vehemence of American reactions: “Pens are dipped in acid and lips curled to pillory ‘the Europeans,’ also known as ‘the Euros,’ ‘the Eurooids,’ ‘the ’peens,’ or ‘the Euroweenies.’ Richard Perle, then chairman of the Defense Policy Board, said Europe has lost its ‘moral compass’ and France its ‘moral fiber.’ This situation extends to the highest levels of the Bush administration. In conversations with senior administration officials I found that the phrase ‘our friends in Europe’ was rather closely followed by ‘a pain in the butt’. The current stereotype of Europeans is easily summarized: Europeans are wimps. They are weak, petulant, hypocritical, disunited, duplicitous, and sometimes anti-Semitic and often anti-American appeasers. In a word: Euroweenies. Their values and their spines have dissolved in a lukewarm bath of multilateral, transnational, secular, and postmodern fudge. They spend their euros on wine, holidays, and bloated welfare states instead of on defense. Then they jeer from the sidelines while the United States does the hard and dirty business of keeping the world safe for Europeans. Americans, by contrast, are strong, principled defenders of freedom, standing tall in the patriotic exercise of the world’s last truly sovereign nation-state. A study should be written on the sexual imagery of these stereotypes. If anti-American Europeans see ‘the Americans’ as bullying cowboys, anti-European Americans see ‘the Europeans’ as limp-wristed pansies. The American is a virile, heterosexual male; the European is female, impotent, or castrated. Militarily, Europeans can’t get it up. (After all, they have fewer than twenty ‘heavy lift’ transport planes, compared with the

United States' more than two hundred.) Following a lecture I gave in Boston, an aged American tottered to the microphone to inquire why Europe 'lacks animal vigor'. The word 'eunuchs' is, I discovered, used in the form 'EU-nuchs'. The sexual imagery even creeps into a more sophisticated account of American-European differences, that of Robert Kagan of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace titled 'Power and Weakness'. 'Americans are from Mars,' wrote Kagan approvingly, 'and Europeans are from Venus'-echoing that famous book about relations between men and women, *Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus*'.<sup>179</sup> Though such reactions came mainly from (neo) conservative circles, they were by no means confined within them as "even among lifelong liberal state department Europeanists there is an acerbic edge of disillusionment with Europeans".<sup>180</sup> With Americans convinced that their government was just trying to rid the world of a ruthless, blood-thirsty and peace-threatening dictator, the opposition of European governments to the war was seen as emanating from dishonest motives.<sup>181</sup> It is questionable

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<sup>179</sup> Garton Ash, 'The new anti-Europeanism in America', pp. 122-123. Though the British were sometimes spared these attacks, Garton Ash writes, France was singled out for a 'special treatment'; French bashing became a pastime for ordinary Americans and political commentators alike and tirades against the "cheese-eating surrender monkeys" were a permanent feature in the press and on radio and TV shows.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127.

<sup>181</sup> France continued for a relatively long time to be the main target of America's ensuing ire. Months after the bitter clash in the United Nations between the US and France public opinion and US policymakers were still seething with anger: "France finds a few defenders in the US. The common assumption is that Paris invariably acts from discreditable motives, while America tries to do good....Even in serious circles there seems little acknowledgment that the Iraq war dispute was caused by differences of political principle and different visions of the world, and that the French and German governments were overwhelmingly supported by public opinion in nearly all of Europe. ... France is said to be driven by hatred, national vanity, and the personal vanity of Chirac and as allied with the radical Arab world out of fear of France's unassimilated Muslim population. It is described as incorrigibly and dangerously anti-Semitic. The French, like the Germans, are described as instinctively anti-Semitic and culturally disposed to totalitarianism." Pfaff, 'Seeing mortal danger in a superpower Europe'.

whether such feelings can be easily forgotten and many fear that the damage they have caused on transatlantic relations is beyond repair.

Throughout the crisis over the Iraq War, American media kept disseminating the image of an Old Continent consumed by the twin ‘passions’ of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. Many Americans are resigned to the fact that foreigners often hold strong anti-American views, since this is considered to be the price America is paying for its success. The assertion that “making fun of Americans is one of Europe’s favourite pastimes,”<sup>182</sup> is not treated always as an overstatement. Many, however, saw European opposition to American policies as a consequence of Europe’s inherent anti-Semitism and America’s support for Israel. Many in the US currently think that large, alienated Muslim populations (which are projected to explode as the birthrates of white Europeans fall) restrict considerably the freedom of action of many European politicians when it comes to policies towards the Middle East, helping create a bias against Israel, America’s staunchest ally in the region.<sup>183</sup> Europeans are hence, often denounced as anti-Semites and appeasers of both near Eastern dictators and their own growing Muslim populations.<sup>184</sup>

American officials with first-hand experience of Europe and its problematic relations with its growing Muslim populations, have come to the

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<sup>182</sup> Reid, *The United States of Europe*, p. 8. This pastime, adds Reid, is not popular with just a few regions: “It is a pleasure that knows no borders.” And it should not be seen merely as the result of America’s actions abroad, because America-bashing goes well beyond foreign policy issues. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>183</sup> Fukuyama, ‘Does “the West” still exist?’, p. 149.

<sup>184</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 151. Europeans are even accused of ‘ideological laundering’: “In a dynamic reminiscent of money laundering, in which ill-gotten gains are made respectable, European intellectuals and media elites often engage in ‘ideological laundering.’ If prominent Europeans say that the Jews control the US government and media, or if they embrace elaborate conspiracy theories about 9/11, those theories then circulate to the Middle East with a patina of respectability.” Lebl, ‘Working with the European Union’, p. 124.

conclusion that neither assimilation (as practiced in France) nor multiculturalism (as practiced in Britain and the Netherlands), which constitute the two most common models of integration, are working in Europe, where governments have not yet pursued a conscious integration policy.<sup>185</sup> Due to the deep cultural roots that fortify European social solidarity and social peace, the assimilation of Europe's immigrant populations is seen by many in America as difficult or impossible and, given Europe's anemic birthrates, the rise of an alienated, mostly Muslim, disaffected population is viewed as inevitable.<sup>186</sup> Others find that Europe's experiment with multiculturalism has led to the marginalisation of its Muslim populations who live in ghetto-like-segregation, receive second-class education, are more likely to be unemployed than the general population and most likely to have low-wage, dead-end jobs, and become, ultimately, vulnerable and easy targets for Islamic radicalists.<sup>187</sup> These developments could have grave repercussions for the United States. After all, the majority of the 9/11 terrorists lived for years in Europe, so the possibility of others following in their steps cannot be ruled out, especially now that most Europeans enjoy visa-free access to America.<sup>188</sup> On top of that, one should not forget that more Americans and American businesses are in Europe than anywhere else in the world.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> Fried, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, "Islamic Extremism in Europe".

<sup>186</sup> Russell Mead, 'American Endurance', p. 171.

<sup>187</sup> Benjamin, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, "Islamic Extremism in Europe". Europe, according to Benjamin, has limited hopes of containing this radicalism.

<sup>188</sup> Brimmer, 'Que reste-t-il de la communauté transatlantique?', pp. 70-71, Benjamin, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, "Islamic Extremism in Europe."

<sup>189</sup> Benjamin, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, "Islamic Extremism in Europe".

Even the spectre of a Muslim Europe is often broadcast as an inescapable destiny: “Europe’s Muslim population is growing. The current Muslim population in the EU is estimated between 18-20 million and growing through both birth rate and immigration. If Turkey finally joins the EU in ten years, it would come in roughly tied with Germany with 14.5% of all EU citizens. ...Some experts have projected that, with current trends and attitudes, Europe would be Islamicized by the end of this century, or even sooner.”<sup>190</sup> Some analysts warn that the world, and the US in particular, should at last pay serious attention to the creeping transformation of the Old Continent into a new entity, Eurabia.<sup>191</sup>

#### 4. The power of realism

The policies US administrations have formulated and followed during the post-Cold War period ascertain the enormous influence the realist school of thought (the proponents of *realpolitik* or power politics) has been exerting on American foreign policy.

For a short while after the collapse of communism, it was widely believed that major changes could be expected in the way the US conducted its foreign policy. Critics of Realism were quick to declare its irrelevance as

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<sup>190</sup> Sloan, ‘How Does Religion Affect Relations between America and Europe?’, p. 4. See also, Benjamin, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, “Islamic Extremism in Europe”. Benjamin reckons that it is very likely that Bernard Lewis will be proved right in his prediction that “by the end of the twenty-first century the European continent would be part of the Arabic west, the Maghreb.”

<sup>191</sup> Strong anti-American feeling in Europe and paranoiac obsession with Israel, constitute the cornerstone of Eurabia according to, Ye’or, the coiner of the term. See Steyn, *America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It*, and Ye’or, *Eurabia: the Euro-Arab axis*. Both books have received great publicity in the US and became bestsellers soon after their publication.

the Cold War faded away.<sup>192</sup> Their optimism proved premature, as their arguments have failed so far, to have an impact on the way American foreign-policymakers think. US leaders have not overcome the realist legacy of the Cold War years despite their assurances that they have left the days of West-East confrontation behind.<sup>193</sup> If anything, one may maintain, realism has tightened further its grip on US foreign policymaking through the dominance of the neoconservative movement in post 9/11 America. Neoconservatism, defined as the combination of an emphasis on democracy promotion and an assertive nationalism that reflects the realist tradition, also focuses on the perpetuation of American dominance and the rejection of the constraints that international institutions might impose on American power.<sup>194</sup> In fact, it has been claimed that the neoconservative model is taken from the classic wars of nineteenth-and twentieth-century Europe.<sup>195</sup> The predominance of realism has ensured that, when it comes to fundamental issues such as the interpretation of the post-Cold War global environment, America's mission, its strategies and

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<sup>192</sup> See for example Lebow, 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', and Kratochwil, 'The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik without Politics'.

<sup>193</sup> Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of the first Clinton administration. Clinton was adamant as a presidential candidate in 1992 that "the cynical calculus of pure power politics is ill-suited to a new era", but as a president he made clear that the defining essence of US foreign policy remained the unilateral exercise of sovereign power. Walt, 'Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy', p.78. Indeed, Clinton's foreign policy has not been radically different from his predecessor's: "Although the Clinton administration certainly doesn't want to admit it, 1999 will mark the eleventh year of the Bush administration—at least as far as foreign policy is concerned." Chace, 'New World Disorder', and Legro and Moravcsik, 'Faux Realism', p.82.

<sup>194</sup> Litwak, *Regime Change*, p. 25. Many neoconservatives label themselves 'democratic realists', Krauthammer, 'In defense of democratic realism'.

<sup>195</sup> Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, p. 35.

the ways to pursue them, what characterizes the beliefs and actions of post-1989 US administrations is a remarkable degree of continuity.<sup>196</sup>

Realism constitutes for its proponents a research programme which contains a core set of assumptions from which a variety of theories and explanations can be developed.<sup>197</sup> It is by no means a monolithic construction and disagreements among its adherents are neither rare, nor insignificant. There are however, a certain number of assumptions commonly shared by most of its proponents. According to one account these are six: 1. States are the most important actors on the world scene. International organizations merely reflect the interests of their member states, 2. Anarchy is the central characteristic of international life, 3. States seek to maximize their security or their power, 4. The international system is mostly responsible for state conduct on the international scene, 5. States adopt instrumentally rational policies in their pursuit of power or security, and 6. States rely on the use of force or on the threat to use force to protect their interests and enhance their security.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> No administration, for example, has heaped praises on the wisdom of a multipolar world, or denounced the goal of US world primacy, or resisted the temptations of unilateralist action. 'Fierce' debates between, 'multilateralists' and 'unilateralists', 'realists and neoconservatives' cannot disguise the fact that their differences are usually over style and not substance, means and not ends. A Washington realist today may deplore the emphasis Washington neoconservatives place on the spread of democracy in the world and the means which are used to achieve this goal but he or she most definitely agrees with them on a much wider range of issues. See for example Kissinger, 'Universal Values, Specific Policies', Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy.'

<sup>197</sup> Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.50.

<sup>198</sup> Frankel, 'Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction', pp. xiv-xviii. Another account reduces their number to four: 1. States are the central actors on the world stage, 2. State behavior can be explained rationally, 3. States seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power and the international situation they face, and 4. Anarchy is the defining characteristic of the international system, which implies that states ultimately must rely on themselves in an inherently competitive environment. Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment', p.50, n.4.

Realists are critical of the assessment that the traditional nation-state has been in decline during the last decades. They assert that the withering away of the power of the state, whether internally or externally, is more of a wish and an illusion than a reality in most of the world.<sup>199</sup> They believe that “sovereign states pursue their interests in a setting of shifting alliances where principles could only obstruct the achievement of sovereign ends that interests alone define and serve. Nations have neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies but only permanent interests; the enemies of our enemies are always our friends; the pursuit of democratic ideals or human rights can often obfuscate our true interests; international institutions are to be embraced, ignored or discarded exclusively on the basis of how well they serve our sovereign national interests, which are entirely separable from the objectives of such institutions.”<sup>200</sup> States act through international bodies when it is in their interest to do so, and ignore them when they have nothing to win from participating in international endeavours.<sup>201</sup> The ability of the US to extend the life of a moribund institution like NATO at the end of Cold War, illustrates according to realists, how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests.<sup>202</sup> Moral values and principles represent vulnerabilities in the conduct of foreign policy if not applied with the aim of serving national

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<sup>199</sup> Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, pp.18-19.

<sup>200</sup> Barber, ‘Beyond Jihad Vs. McWorld’.

<sup>201</sup> Praising Clinton’s foreign policy, one of the most prominent proponents of realism in the academic community observes: “Clinton has generally acted precisely as one would expect from the leader of the world’s largest power—relying on international institutions when they suit US purposes but criticizing or ignoring them when they do not.” Walt, “Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy”, p.77. See also Malone, *The international struggle over Iraq: politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005*, pp. 185-221.

<sup>202</sup> Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, p.20.

interests.<sup>203</sup> Thus, there is no contradiction in propagandizing democracy, and human rights on the one hand, and supporting dictatorships that violate or not recognize human rights on the other hand. If it is in a country's interest it will do exactly that. US policies towards the autocratic regimes of the Middle East are often brought up as an example of this basic realist rule. The US still avoids promoting democratic changes in the Arab world because it fears that through democratic processes forces might come to power which would not be so willing to support US interests in the region. So it keeps propping up corrupt regimes, which, however, promote US interests.<sup>204</sup> And this despite the fact that such behaviour inflicts serious damage on America's credibility: "...we have been afraid to push too hard for democracy, especially in Arab countries. We worry, perhaps with reason, that if radical Islamists obtain power through an election, there would be no more elections – the 'one person, one vote, one time' phenomenon. We also worry about the temporary instability that might be created. Whether or not our fears are justified, we're left looking hypocritical as we're stuck supporting regimes whose policies if practiced elsewhere in the world we would condemn."<sup>205</sup>

Issues where no national interest is at stake are, as a rule, to be ignored. American policymakers frequently contend that the US must maintain a disciplined and consistent foreign policy that separates the important from the trivial.<sup>206</sup> In 1994, Rwanda, a country of just eight million, experienced the numerical equivalent of more than two World Trade Center

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<sup>203</sup> Robert Kaplan, quoted in Mufson, 'The Way Bush Sees the World'.

<sup>204</sup> Hawthorne, 'Do We Want Democracy in the Arab World?'

<sup>205</sup> Albright, *Madam Secretary*, p. 327.

<sup>206</sup> Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest', p.46.

attacks every single day for one hundred days, something that on an American scale would mean twenty-three million people murdered in three months, but despite pleas to intervene to stop the catastrophe, American leaders displayed a cynical lack of will to invest the military, financial, diplomatic, or domestic political capital needed to stop it, as no American interests were thought to be at stake.<sup>207</sup> And when Canada tried to organize a rescue force to intervene in Rwanda, the US expressed its opposition and managed to destroy the plan.<sup>208</sup> On the contrary, when Yugoslavia's collapse was followed by genocidal war in successor states, the US after an initial period of inaction, realized that the future of NATO was at stake and felt the compelling need to act.<sup>209</sup> Multilateral endeavours are not seen as capable of fostering new consciousness or fundamentally altering the anarchic state of international relations, and no state is expected by realists to sacrifice its interests in order to serve a larger community."<sup>210</sup> In the last years, American policymakers have taken crucial steps in ensuring that US foreign policy complies with such realist principles: "Multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves. US foreign policy must proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community".<sup>211</sup>

The behaviour of states is for realists, mainly determined by developments in the anarchic environment in which they exist and operate.

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<sup>207</sup> Power, 'America and Genocide'.

<sup>208</sup> Maynes, 'Pax Americana: The Impossible Dream', and Walt, 'Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy', p.77.

<sup>209</sup> Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', p.29.

<sup>210</sup> Frankel, 'Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction', p.xv.

<sup>211</sup> Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest', pp.47,62. Rice mentions the Kyoto protocol on global warming as a case in point.

This is a condition that is not susceptible to change. Even if all states became democratic, realists claim, the structure of international politics would remain anarchic, since the structure of international politics is not transformed by changes internal to states, however widespread the changes may be.<sup>212</sup> In this environment, most international law is obeyed most of the time, but strong states bend or break laws when they choose to.<sup>213</sup> The US can pick and choose the international conventions and laws that serve its purpose and reject those that do not.<sup>214</sup> It can even ignore internationally accepted norms without fearing being isolated because other nations are so desperate to secure access to American markets or make arrangements with the US on other issues, that will often have no option but adapt themselves to American preferences.<sup>215</sup> The more powerful America becomes, the lower is the pressure for it to abide by international law. As a corollary, the role of law is diminishing, especially with regard to international conflict.<sup>216</sup>

The chances for peace in this anarchic world are slim. And peace is far more likely to be enjoyed under a single hegemon.<sup>217</sup> As the most powerful nation on earth the US is responsible for maintaining world order. As Waltz has explained: “England claimed to bear the white man’s burden; France spoke of her mission civilisatrice. In like spirit, we say that we act to make and maintain world order. For countries at the top, this is predictable

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<sup>212</sup> Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, p.10.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid, p.27.

<sup>214</sup> Spiro, ‘The New Sovereignists; American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets’, p.9. Spiro dubs this practice ‘international law a la carte’.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid, p.13.

<sup>216</sup> Robert Kaplan, quoted in Mufson, ‘The Way Bush Sees the World’.

<sup>217</sup> Krauthammer, quoted in Rogers, ‘If it’s Good for America, it’s Good for the World’.

behavior.”<sup>218</sup> US policymakers accept this axiom and declare that the US is the only guarantor of global peace and stability.<sup>219</sup> Reflecting this reality, some tend to depict the US as a modern sheriff, “a realistic sheriff, one who understands that, in today’s world, we still need a sheriff, and that only the United States can play such a role.”<sup>220</sup> For a minority of realists who do not think that the US is in a position to guarantee world order, the solution is to replace the global sheriff with the so-called “community policing”, rendering major regional powers responsible for order in their own regions.<sup>221</sup> The global sheriff sees his mission as a duty: “the realistic sheriff does not celebrate the need for American leadership, but understands and accepts it.”<sup>222</sup>

To maintain its hegemonic position the US has no other choice but to seek primacy in power. Politics is concerned with primacy in power, is the realist position, and to ask whether primacy matters is to ask whether power matters”.<sup>223</sup> No wonder then that the US is pursuing a strategy of primacy, wanting to preserve the unipolar moment. Realists have clearly identified the imperatives of US post-Cold War foreign policy: “After the Cold War we should expect an American effort to prolong the unipolar moment, anticipate that the US will adopt policies of reassurance toward status quo states, confrontation toward revisionist states, and policies of engagement or integration toward undecided states.”<sup>224</sup> The US must provide its allies with what experts have termed ‘adult supervision’: it must not only impose a

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<sup>218</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 200.

<sup>219</sup> Rice, ‘Promoting the National Interest’, p.50.

<sup>220</sup> Haass, ‘From Reluctant to Resolute: American Foreign Policy after September 11’.

<sup>221</sup> Huntington, ‘The Lonely Superpower’, p.49.

<sup>222</sup> Haass, ‘From Reluctant to Resolute: American Foreign Policy after September 11’.

<sup>223</sup> Huntington, ‘Why International Primacy Matters’, p.68. Another reason why states seek power, realists claim, is natural desire. Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 49.

<sup>224</sup> Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment’, p.63.

military protectorate over Europe and East Asia –regions composed of wealthy and technologically advanced sophisticated states—but also safeguard Europe’s and East Asia’s worldwide interests, so that they need not develop military forces capable of “global power projection”.<sup>225</sup> George W. Bush has left no doubt about that: “America has, and intends to keep, military strength beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace”.<sup>226</sup> American involvement in the Gulf region perfectly illustrates this point: “We do not get that large a percentage of our oil from the Middle East. Japan gets a lot more... And one of the reasons that we are sort of assuming this role of policeman of the Middle East, more or less, has more to do with making Japan and some other countries feel that their oil flow is assured...so that they do not then feel more need to create a great power, armed force, and security doctrine, and you do not start getting a lot of great powers with conflicting interests sending their militaries all over the world.”<sup>227</sup> So, in effect, the strategy of preponderance aims at preserving the Cold War status quo, even though the Cold War is over.<sup>228</sup> To maintain its global leadership through the alliances it built during the Cold War, the US has to secure ‘constancy’ of threats: “Constancy of threat produces constancy of policy; absence of threat permits policy to become capricious.”<sup>229</sup> Critics of realism have severely criticized realists for their quest for Cold War style

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<sup>225</sup> Schwarz, ‘Why America Thinks It Has to Run The World’.

<sup>226</sup> Bush, ‘Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the U.S. Military Academy’.

<sup>227</sup> Walter Russell Mead, quoted in Schwarz and Layne, ‘A New Grand Strategy’.

<sup>228</sup> Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”, p.7.

<sup>229</sup> Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, p.29. Waltz quotes General Powell, who as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1991 said disappointingly: “I’m running out of enemies, I’m down to Castro and Kim Il Sung”.

challengers.<sup>230</sup> To such criticism the response has usually been that threats on a par with those of the Cold War era still exist but have not been identified yet: "...it was a dangerous world and we knew exactly who the 'they' were. It was us versus them and we knew exactly who them was. Now we're not so sure who the 'they' are, but we know they're there".<sup>231</sup> Efforts were undertaken by some throughout the 1990s to promote China as the next US strategic competitor.<sup>232</sup> Following the events of 11 September 2001, US Vice President Cheney stated that the 'war on terror' had become the new main purpose of American foreign policy: "the threat is known and our role is clear now."<sup>233</sup> America's allies have to make their choices: "There are only two teams on the planet for this war. There's the team that represents civilization and there's the team that represents terrorism. Just tell us which. There are no neutrals."<sup>234</sup>

Security is for realists a function of power and power is primarily a function of military strength.<sup>235</sup> In an anarchic world, force is integral to political interaction and foreign policy cannot be divorced from military power.<sup>236</sup> Realists are prone to the use of force, or the threat to use force, as

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<sup>230</sup> Nye, 'Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism'.

<sup>231</sup> George W. Bush, quoted in Rogers, "If it's Good for America, it's Good for the World", p.13.

<sup>232</sup> Fukuyama, 'Does "the West" still exist?', p. 155.

<sup>233</sup> FitzGerald, 'George Bush and the World', p.84.

<sup>234</sup> Newt Gingrich, quoted in Miller, 'The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux?', p.19.

<sup>235</sup> Kegley and Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace?*, p.47. Besides, "... without military power all other forms of power are impotent", Nau, 'No enemies on the right: conservative foreign policy factions beyond Iraq'.

<sup>236</sup> Art, 'American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force', p.8. Military force is a multipurpose tool and can be used for both military and non-military aims. Consequently, military power is expected to weigh heavily in US foreign policy, even when economic factors have become more salient and there is no clear and present danger to the United States. *Ibid.*, pp.8-9 In 1991 Nye suggested that the deployment of US forces in Europe and Japan could be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with those countries, while in February 1992,

means of solving problems.<sup>237</sup> The belief in the advantages of the use of force resonates in the current US war against terrorism: “Terrorists and dictators do not operate in a vacuum. They look at what happens to other terrorists. And hopefully now they are looking at what’s happened to the people in Afghanistan.”<sup>238</sup> This war, as George W. Bush has stated, “will not be won on the defensive. ...In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action”.<sup>239</sup> He has also warned that for the US “...there will be no going back to the era before September the 11th, 2001 -- to false comfort in a dangerous world. We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength; they are invited by the perception of weakness. And the surest way to avoid attacks on our own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans.”<sup>240</sup> America’s forward military presence is still the most reliable barrier against renewed great-power rivalries.<sup>241</sup>

Unilateralism constitutes for realists a natural method of US involvement in world affairs given the fact that, as the world’s sole superpower, the US has little interest in agreements that might limit its freedom of action and is especially wary of international agreements that might complicate its ability to meet its various military commitments.<sup>242</sup> The

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then-Vice President Dan Quayle linked the continuance of America’s security commitment to NATO with West European concessions in the GATT negotiations. Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, p.35.

<sup>237</sup> In the 1990s alone, the number of US Special Operation Forces deployed abroad swelled from 38,000 in 92 countries at a cost of \$2.4 billion in 1991 to 47,000 in 143 countries at a cost of \$3.4 billion in 1997, a development that demonstrates that soldiers have in effect been replacing diplomats and development specialists. Maynes, ‘Pax Americana: The Impossible Dream’.

<sup>238</sup> Fallows, ‘The Unilateralist’.

<sup>239</sup> Bush, ‘Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the U.S. Military Academy’.

<sup>240</sup> Bush, Address of the President to the Nation, 7 September 2003.

<sup>241</sup> Walt, ‘Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy’, p.67.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.77-78. Multilateralism on the other hand is interpreted as a sign of weakness. This is why Europeans for example are devout multilateralists. Europe acts multilaterally more

concept of global governance is denounced as an assault on American independence.<sup>243</sup> It is an approach associated with the most extreme form of realism, based on the notion that the strong do what they will, the weak what they must.<sup>244</sup> In fact, some realists stress, the US has no choice in this matter because of its unique role as the arbiter of world order.<sup>245</sup>

Some realists still think that a strategy of primacy can be complemented by multilateralism. They are eager to denounce unilateralism, though they maintain American leadership as a non-negotiable element of US foreign policy: “American leadership yes; but not American unilateralism. There is a successor idea to containment: the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets, integration is about locking them into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more.”<sup>246</sup> They term this unique kind of multilateralism “hard-headed multilateralism”, distinguishing it from “soft-headed multilateralism”: “We need to resist the temptation of unilateralism,

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often than the US because it lacks independent military capabilities and thus seeks to influence the use of US might. Europeans used to behave exactly as the Americans behave today, when they were the rulers of the world, say realists. They were ‘hard-bitten realists’ too. Nau, ‘How to Save the Western Alliance’, p.17, and Dao, ‘US argues need for doing it alone’.

<sup>243</sup> Nuscheler, ‘Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism’, p. 4.

<sup>244</sup> Daalder, ‘Are the United States and Europe heading for divorce?’, pp.560-561.

<sup>245</sup> As one of the most eminent figures of the realist camp puts it, “an America that is scrupulously deferential to international rules, studiously avoids flexing its muscle in economic areas of special interest to major segments of its electorate, is obediently ready to limit its own sovereignty, and is prepared to place its military under international legal jurisdiction might not be the power of last resort needed to prevent global anarchy.” Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 94.

<sup>246</sup> Haass, quoted in Lemann, ‘The Next World Order’. There are several reasons why, according to Haass, the US must be leading in world affairs: “American leadership is fundamental. Without it, multilateral initiatives can go astray—or worse. ...Majorities are not always right. We cannot forget that the US has unique global responsibilities.” Haass, ‘Multilateralism for a Global Era’.

which only in special circumstances can be effective in this globalized world. At the same time, we need to resist going along to get along—that's soft-headed multilateralism. Hard-headed multilateralism is not an alternative to leadership, but its manifestation."<sup>247</sup> In practice, there is little difference between outright unilateralism and Haass's multilateralism, especially when one bears in mind Haass's assertion that: "A commitment to multilateralism need not constrain our options."<sup>248</sup> Translated into action this dogma means that "the purpose of allied consultations is not so much to forge a common policy, let alone build goodwill, as to convince others of the rightness of the U.S. cause".<sup>249</sup> Furthermore, even self-described liberal multilateralists (liberal institutionalists) often fail to offer a distinguishable alternative to unilateralism. Although they appear to be fervent proponents of US participation in international institutions, they do admit that the American vision as to what constitutes a desirable world order does not include endowing multilateral organizations with extensive autonomy, and that rarely if ever has America's multilateral world order agenda included endowing formal multilateral organizations with significant independent powers.<sup>250</sup> Echoing realists, they state that no large power can afford to be purely multilateralist.<sup>251</sup> Welcoming such positions from their opponents, realists feel

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<sup>247</sup> Haass, 'Multilateralism for a Global Era'.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> Daalder, 'The End of Atlanticism', p. 45.

<sup>250</sup> Ruggie, 'Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War', pp.559-560.

<sup>251</sup> Nye, 'The New Rome meets the New Barbarians', p.24.

fully justified in boasting that liberal institutionalism is no longer a clear alternative to realism, but has, in fact, been swallowed up by it.<sup>252</sup>

The case of the EU and European integration in general, is seen as an ‘anomaly’ by most realists. It defies realist explanations. And realists have usually little interest in such cases.<sup>253</sup> With regard to post-Cold War Europe, realists initially assumed that with the end of the Cold War, the European continent would inevitably be drawn back to the ancient and devastating conflicts between its major powers, as their experiment with the European Community would prove to be short-lived.<sup>254</sup> Realist scholars have never considered further integration in Europe as the most probable scenario in the post-Cold War period, considering US leadership as a permanent feature in European affairs.<sup>255</sup> Even after the signing and entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, realists appeared to be confident about their previous views.<sup>256</sup> Europe’s chances of becoming a global player are thus almost non-existent. Realists can hardly accept that Europe can become a global power if

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<sup>252</sup> Waltz, ‘Structural Realism After the Cold War’, p.24.

<sup>253</sup> Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 86.

<sup>254</sup> “... Western European states will do what they did for centuries before the onset of the Cold War-look upon one another with abiding suspicion. Consequently, they will worry about imbalances in gains and about the loss of autonomy that results from cooperation. Cooperation in this new order will be more difficult than it was during the Cold War. Conflict will be more likely. In sum, there are good reasons for being sceptical about the claim that a more powerful EC can provide the basis for peace in a multipolar Europe”. Mearsheimer, ‘Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War’. In the same fashion, Huntington predicted the emergence of a multipolar situation in Europe, with the UK, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union as the major actors. Huntington, ‘America’s Changing Strategic Interests’.

<sup>255</sup> “They (Europeans) complain about the Americans being too domineering-but in the end, they tend to fall into line behind the United States. They will not, however, follow one another.” Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs*, pp.30-31.

<sup>256</sup> According to an estimate, the EU was at the time “a harem of feminists, each wanting exclusivity in relations with the US, each fiercely jealous of rivals, and yet each asserting her sovereignty and independence with great conviction”. Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs*, p.92. Waltz agrees: “Western Europe was unable to make its own foreign and military policies when it was an organization of six or nine states living in fear of the Soviet Union; with less pressure and more members, it has even less hope of doing so now. Only when the United States decides on a policy, have European countries been able to follow it”. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, p.31.

it does not build strong military infrastructures first. Since Europeans seem to be reluctant to spend more on their defence, their aspiration to play a more important role in world affairs cannot be taken seriously.<sup>257</sup> Europe's legalism and multilateralism are seen as evidence of its inherent weakness.<sup>258</sup> European efforts to create the Economic and Monetary Union, were not treated with greater seriousness either. First, EMU and integration in general, were seen as impossible, then it was predicted that they could never work.<sup>259</sup> Quite often, these positions are accompanied by a firm belief that European integration is an elite-driven project, which plain Europeans no longer want to identify themselves with.<sup>260</sup>

As their predictions have repeatedly failed to materialize, realists increasingly see a European Union that takes further steps toward political integration, as a potential threat to American interests. European maturity is seen as a setback for American predominance.<sup>261</sup> And since some realists have warned that after the Cold War the principal conflicts of interests involving the US and the major powers are likely to be over economic issues,

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<sup>257</sup> "The Europeans are all cutting their defense budgets. The real test of the European unity is an independent military force. This will fail." Wattenberg, 'Bush's Foreign Policy: Should America Go It Alone?'. Europe is unlikely to emerge as a dominant actor in the military realm for a very long time, if ever. Brooks, and Wohlforth, 'American Primacy in Perspective', p.26. Waltz claims that only if French and British leaders decided to merge their nuclear forces to form the nucleus of a European military organization, the US and the world will begin to treat Europe as a major force. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', p.32. This, American analysts think, will be, however, a very tall order under current circumstances: "The sad fact is that European defense spending is not going to increase. Indeed, it will be quite a feat if it does not fall. The very real possibility exists that most European militaries will abandon any serious war-fighting capability." Lebl, 'Working with the European Union', p. 121.

<sup>258</sup> Andréani, 'Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship after the Iraq Crisis', p. 51.  
<sup>259</sup> Most American experts prophesied failure every step along the way to the common currency. Mathews, 'Estranged Partners', p.49.

<sup>260</sup> "Americans have always had a healthy disdain for elites. Increasingly the elites governing Europe are subject to the same scepticism from Americans that they receive from their own citizens." Bullock, 'Euroscepticism Inside the Beltway', p.31. The euro has been imposed on Europeans by the same elites. Applebaum, 'Small Change'.

<sup>261</sup> Walker, 'Bush's Choice: Athens or Sparta'.

Americans have every reason to be concerned by a possible challenge to American economic primacy posed by Europe.<sup>262</sup> To ensure that American primacy remains intact, they argue, the U.S. must insist on preserving a strong NATO, as a means of maintaining and lengthening America's grip on the foreign and military policies of European states.<sup>263</sup> Thus, even though the Cold War is over, the United States persists with a Cold War-style policy toward Europe, focusing on maintaining existing transatlantic security arrangements.<sup>264</sup>

## 5. Conclusion

American foreign policy after the Cold War has been designed on the basis of a clear unipolar order with the US being the world's most powerful state. In this unipolar world, no other power can rival the United States even if it wants to. The rest of the world not only acknowledges U.S. preeminence but welcomes it because it's something it benefits from. America is also protected against a global backlash by its immense soft power. US policy-makers think that as the world's only superpower, the US is 'exceptional' and cannot be treated as any other nation. The preservation of US predominance constitutes the major goal of US foreign policy. The rise of other superpowers should therefore be prevented. Unilateralism, in the form of a 'go it alone' approach to US involvement in the world, has become a hallmark of America's foreign

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<sup>262</sup> Huntington, 'Why International Primacy Matters', pp.71-72. Huntington finds that the idea that economics is primarily a non-zero-sum game is a favourite conceit of tenured academics, and he accuses economists of being blind to the fact that economic activity is a source of power as well as well-being.

<sup>263</sup> Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', p.20.

<sup>264</sup> Tonelson and Gaster, 'Our Interests in Europe'.

policy. Fearful of the emergence of a single power, which could dominate the European continent, Washington does not welcome the possibility of a politically united Europe that could act independently on the world stage. A strong NATO as the sole provider of Europe's security is amongst America's top priorities. Gradually, American stances towards further European integration are hardening, causing transatlantic tensions. Some domestic developments, such as a shift in ethnic balance and a more conservative and aggressive Republican Party, also have a negative impact on US-EU relations. Furthermore, mass-media, think-tanks and opinion-makers often project very negative images of Europe, depicting it in a permanent state of decline. The events before and after the Iraq War have also convinced many Americans that Europe is irrevocably anti-American and ungrateful.

American foreign policy, in general, and attitudes towards Europe in particular, can be perfectly explained by realist assumptions and predictions, argue realists. America's behaviour is a natural corollary of the anarchic environment in which it exists, say realists. As the only superpower, it is responsible for preserving peace in such an environment and unilateralism, unlike multilateralism which is an indication of weakness, is a sign of its power.

Liberalism, with its emphasis on economic interdependence and cooperation has difficulties in explaining some important aspects of American foreign policy, such as its unilateralist tendencies. The liberal argument that "as a state becomes more dependent upon the global economy, it exposes itself to a wider range of economic strategies that can be deployed against it

by other states”,<sup>265</sup> is not convincing in this case. This, as realists claim, has a simple explanation: “In large part because the US occupies such a dominant position in the system and other states are generally much more dependent on it than it is on them, the US is in the enviable position of being able to enhance its economic capacity via enhanced trade, financial, and production linkages without simultaneously having to face the prospect that other states will increasingly use economic statecraft to hinder its security policy.”<sup>266</sup> In fact, liberal theorists cannot even argue that the US has really developed an interest for genuine multilateralism: “The United States helped establish numerous multilateral institutions throughout this century. Membership in them, by definition, constrains unilateral degrees of freedom in some measure and over some range of issues. But rarely if ever has it been American policy to endow multilateral institutions with significant independent powers.”<sup>267</sup>

Constructivists argue that the answer to what America’s foreign policy can be like, lies “at least as much in the domain of identity – America’s sense of self as a nation – as in the realm of interests defined by polarity.”<sup>268</sup> Systemic attributes, the analysis goes, “provide only a limited guide to US foreign policy. Structural and functional precepts become national interests only when they tap into, and resonate with, ideas, principles, and norms rooted in the nation’s sense of self.”<sup>269</sup> Such an approach can genuinely account for the role in the shaping of transatlantic relations of important

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<sup>265</sup> Brooks and Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance*, p. 98.

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>267</sup> Ruggie, *Winning the Peace*, p. 21.

<sup>268</sup> Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity*, p. 203.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*

factors, such as domestic politics and American exceptionalism, which are usually neglected by both realist and liberal analyses.

## Chapter Three

### *The EU in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*

#### 1. Europe in the post-Cold War era

##### *I. From euphoria to gloom?*

In contradistinction to America, which hailed unipolarity as the new undisputed reality of world politics, Europe contemplated a rather more balanced world in the wake of the demise of the Cold War's bipolar order. Bipolarity, for most Europeans, would be replaced not by a unipolar world but a new multipolar order with the European Union constituting a strong pole of power. Free from the restraints of Cold War confrontation, the Union had now a unique opportunity to play a more assertive role in world affairs: "Europe was formerly a vulnerable infant, now it has become a lusty adult. It is now willing, in many areas, to shoulder its own share of the burden, for example on supporting reform in Eastern Europe or in helping developing and war-torn countries".<sup>1</sup> The prevalent impression in post-Cold War Europe has been that the world is in a transitory state, witnessing the birth of a new, multipolar order. Few in Europe are inclined to doubt unipolarity in military power but when it comes to economic power they view the EU as an equal partner of America.<sup>2</sup> European politicians and publics want the EU to be seen and treated as America's equal.<sup>3</sup> With the removal of the Soviet threat many

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<sup>1</sup> Brittan, 'Creating a Partnership of Equals'. Europe is ready, determined and able to play an active role as a force capable of spreading peace, stability and prosperity far beyond its borders, says Romano Prodi. Prodi, 'Euro and enlargement'.

<sup>2</sup> Ischinger, 'Pax Americana and Pax Europea', p. 83.

<sup>3</sup> See for example, Brittan, *A Diet of Brussels*, p. 169.

expected that the time had come for Europe to bring to an end its unhealthy dependence on the US<sup>4</sup>

For some, though, it remains questionable whether this is something feasible: Europe is feeble, economically, politically and above all militarily. No unity exists, no common goals. It is in decline. It faces too many internal problems: an aging population, a lack of direction, the disaffection of its own citizens, to name just a few. The EU's status as an economic 'superpower' has been confirmed in the most convincing manner and remains undisputed.<sup>5</sup> However, in the so-called area of 'high-politics' its clout has been considerably less, if not negligible. In this respect, many in Europe are willing to admit that the global system has a unipolar structure and the EU cannot count as a singular pole.<sup>6</sup> From Bosnia to Iraq, Europe has showed that it is incapable of acting with one voice, incapable of displaying global leadership and solving global crises; in short, it is condemned to follow America's lead. Also, many commentators warn that EU action at the global level should not lead to the conclusion that the EU is becoming a global power; it has certainly become a force in international relations but the influence it exerts globally is highly conditioned and circumscribed by what it is and how it operates.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. viii.

<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the twenty-first century seems to have started with Europe and America as equally powerful economic powers: "When US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick meets EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy at the WTO, they do so as equals. With monetary integration of Europe, we are close to a world of two major currencies: the dollar and the euro. In antitrust policy, Brussels applies its law extraterritorially, recently derailing General Electric's planned \$42 billion acquisition of Honeywell International, a merger between two US companies. Europe enjoys an equally dominant position in banking regulation, industrial standardization, environmental policy, telecommunications and many other economic matters." Moravcsik, 'The Quiet Superpower'.

<sup>6</sup> Wolf, 'Hegemon without Challengers? U.S. Leadership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century'.

<sup>7</sup> Maull, 'Europe and the new balance of global order', p. 778. Maull, for example, believes that the EU is wrongly termed a civilian power, not because it is not 'civilian' but because it is a 'force' and not a 'power'. *Ibid.*, p. 779.

The perception of a European Union as an “economic giant but a political dwarf” is thus quite popular.<sup>8</sup> Also, its economic clout does not count as it should because it is not properly backed with the capacity for military intervention.<sup>9</sup> Often Europeans seem to be incapable of coming to an agreement over the scope and the priorities of the EU’s actions. Disagreements exist even over the Union’s nature, with some defining it as a ‘civilian power’ and others as a ‘superpower in the making’. Consequently, Europe often gives the impression that it possesses no strategic vision: “The deficit of the Europeans is not a lack of international potential, but a dearth of strategic direction. They lack the ability to make judgments at the world political level. And they lack a rational, clear definition of their own interests”.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, a growing chorus of alarming voices warns that Europe suffers from some unique internal conditions which make it impossible for it to develop into the kind of international player its leaders and citizens dream of. Its extremely low birth rates are condemning it to a slow death<sup>11</sup>, creating additional problems for its already problematic economy.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The EU is sometimes viewed as incapable of solving even minor problems such as the dispute between Spain and Morocco over Morocco’s seizure of the uninhabited Parsley Island. US secretary of State Powell had to step in personally to resolve the conflict, even though he thought it really was an issue to be settled by the EU. Kessler, ‘Diplomatic Gap Between US, Its Allies Widens’. Proponents of more European integration also reinforce this image, repeatedly pointing out the EU’s shortcomings in order to promote their goal of a European army. Moravcsik, ‘The Quiet Superpower’.

<sup>9</sup> Bentley, ‘Redefining the Transatlantic Partnership’, p. 77.

<sup>10</sup> Weidenfeld, ‘Cool Transatlantic Calculation’.

<sup>11</sup> Without immigration the population of Western and Central Europe is expected to decline by 57 million by 2050 and drop to 415 million. Münz, ‘Old Europe’. And with falling birth rates comes falling clout. Europe is thus doomed to irrelevance on the global scene.

<sup>12</sup> Public finances will be overstretched because of exploding social and medical budgets. Gnesotto and Grevi, *Le Monde en 2025*, p. 224. Moreover, Europe will suffer from a terrible lack of skilled and qualified workers. Münz, ‘Old Europe’.

Its aging workforce<sup>13</sup> is costing Europe dearly in terms of competitiveness<sup>14</sup> with other international competitors like the US, China or India and a pension time bomb could explode at any moment now. Furthermore, Europeans do not seem to be very friendly to the idea of welcoming high numbers of immigrants.<sup>15</sup> Even worse, most of them do not see Europe's ageing society as the problem that needs to be solved but view the suggested solutions to it as the problem.<sup>16</sup>

The omens for Europe's economy are not good either, insist many analysts. It may be strong for the time being, but it is trends that matter and the trends for EU tell a sad story. Europe will soon not be in a position to compete with traditional and emerging powers. Its military power is negligible and it is questionable whether it can assume a global role without it. The EU lacks the ability to project power on its own and this is likely to prevent it from exercising diplomatic leadership, promoting major international initiatives, and pursuing coherent, cohesive and proactive policies with a clear purpose.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> In less than twenty years from now, almost 38 per cent of the EU's population is expected to be between 65 and 79 years old with the average age of EU citizens reaching 45 years. Gnesotto and Grevi, *Le Monde en 2025*, p. 23. People in their sixties are projected to constitute 70 per cent of the EU's population in 2050, while in 1960 they represented only 20 per cent. Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p. 75.

<sup>14</sup> If a great number of European industries want to stay competitive, it is assumed, they will have to delocalize some of their production facilities. Gnesotto and Grevi, *Le Monde en 2025*, p. 224.

<sup>15</sup> Brimmer, 'Que reste-t-il de la communauté transatlantique?', p. 68.

<sup>16</sup> Münz, 'Old Europe'.

<sup>17</sup> Maull, 'Europe and the new balance of global order', p. 793.

## II. The emergence of a new powerful actor?

Many find, however, that such pessimistic views are either premature or seriously flawed. Certain criticisms are not based on facts. Political commentators were quick to stress after the rejection of the EU Constitution by the French and the Dutch electorates in 2005 that “public disaffection with Europe... indicates that there is a disjuncture between views of the citizens and those of their elites as to the benefits of continuous and deepening collaboration within the framework of an ongoing European integration process”<sup>18</sup> and that “the declining levels of support for European integration across the Union, and the debate about the alleged ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU, are further indicators that the EU is embroiled in political malaise.”<sup>19</sup> Polls, however, consistently show that even after the ‘no’ vote in the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 support for further integration is very high.<sup>20</sup>

Falling birth rates are not irreversible. In fact, in recent years many EU states have managed to reverse the trend thanks to their emphasis on new maternity and paternity rights and better childcare facilities.<sup>21</sup> France is currently showing the way out of this problem, with increased fertility rates in the last few years. Following its lead, many other governments have started adopting the same approach, (long maternity leaves, guaranteed return to work, generous family allowances and a daycare and school infrastructure that permits women to both work and have babies) with very encouraging

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<sup>18</sup> Whiteman, ‘No and after: options for Europe’, p. 673.

<sup>19</sup> Maull, ‘Europe and the new balance of global order’, p. 795.

<sup>20</sup> This is confirmed both by the Commission’s *Eurobarometer* surveys and the *Transatlantic Trends* findings for 2005 and 2006.

<sup>21</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p. 75.

results.<sup>22</sup> The EU could also start recruiting skilled and qualified young adults from abroad.<sup>23</sup> The ‘pension problem’ is also exaggerated. Numerous studies have showed that by simply raising the retiring age and encouraging more women to work, a potential crisis can be averted.<sup>24</sup> Besides, this is not just Europe’s problem. Europe’s competitors, such as China and America, are facing similar problems.<sup>25</sup>

Europe is indeed a force to be reckoned with, exerting its power in different style and not always getting the credit it deserves. Europe is above all a ‘civilian power’.<sup>26</sup> As such, it has assumed, as a mission, the promotion of civilian standards both at home and abroad. It exercises civilian power: “Europeans already wield effective power over peace and war as great as that of the US, but they do so quietly, through ‘civilian power’. That does not lie in the development of battalions of bombers, but rather in the quiet promotion of democracy and development through trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping.”<sup>27</sup> Some even see Europe as a superpower.<sup>28</sup> It is a real global player thanks to its wide-ranging and comprehensive set of soft-power tools.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Sommer, ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fertilité’. According to Sommer, such measures have helped Sweden reverse the trend and Britain to register, in 2006, the highest birthrate in 13 years. In Germany, the introduction of “Elterngeld” (a form of parental allowance) is also expected to lead to similar results.

<sup>23</sup> Münz, ‘Old Europe’.

<sup>24</sup> Gnesotto and Grevi, *Le Monde en 2025*, p. 23, Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, pp.75-76. In many European states today few women over the age of 55 and hardly any men over the age of 60 are still in work, with the average retirement age being at 58. Münz, ‘Old Europe’.

<sup>25</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p.76. The Chinese population is growing older and the US is taking steps to restrict immigration due to security and political concerns. In fact, according to Leonard, what really matters is finding ways to stabilize dependency ratios and Europe is among the first to have realized this, taking some of the measures necessary for overcoming the problem.

<sup>26</sup> “An entity that does have influence in the international system by using mainly economic, financial and political means, but not military power.” Stavridis, ‘Why the ‘Militaryizing’ of the European Union is strengthening the concept of a ‘Civilian power Europe’’, pp. 3-4.

<sup>27</sup> Moravcsik, ‘The Quiet Superpower’.

Europe's special weight is often felt through its 'transformative' power, its ability to transform the states that come into its sphere.<sup>30</sup> This power cannot be measured in terms of military budgets, smart missile technology and short term victories.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, no one should underestimate the increasingly important status of the EU as a 'normative power', as an actor with an ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations.<sup>32</sup> By making access to its market conditional on compliance with its mores for example, the EU not only can often force countries like the US to review some of their policies but has also the power to set standards in global regulation.<sup>33</sup> Overall, "Europe does a lot even if it looks less spectacular than what America can do".<sup>34</sup>

The basis of Europe's strength is its economy. The EU is rightly seen as an economic superpower.<sup>35</sup> There are also serious reasons for Europeans to believe that the EU economy will perform well in the future. One such reason is the euro. As it is on a steady course to become an established reserve

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<sup>28</sup> See Haseler, *Super-State: The new Europe and its challenge to America*.

<sup>29</sup> Landaburu, 'Hard facts about Europe's soft power'.

<sup>30</sup> Leonard, 'Europe's transformative power'.

<sup>31</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p. 5.

<sup>32</sup> Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', p.239. Manners finds that the ability to define what passes for 'normal' in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all. *Ibid.*, p.253.

<sup>33</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, pp. 53-54. Such clout, Leonard suggests, allowed the EU to create a vast sphere of influence (the 'Eurosphere') which extends well beyond its own borders, comprising more than 80 states and representing around one fifth of the world's population.

<sup>34</sup> Verhofstadt, 'Europe's Response After September the 11<sup>th</sup>'. The EU is also described as rather modest about its most remarkable achievements. Glenny, 'Pursuing Common Security Goals', p. 118.

<sup>35</sup> An updated summary of the EU's economic strength informs us that "Its (the EU's) gross domestic product is roughly the same as that of the US, twice as big as Japan's, four times bigger than China's and ten times bigger than Russia's. With over 450 million citizens with high levels of spending power, its internal market is crucial for many countries around the world. The EU is the biggest exporter of both goods and services. The advent of the euro has also increased the EU's standing in the world. It is the second largest reserve currency in the world (with roughly 30 per cent of global reserves compared to the US dollar, roughly 60 per cent)." Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, pp. 5-6.

currency, it could bring the EU all the benefits the US dollar has accrued for America in the last decades.<sup>36</sup> Another reason to be optimistic for future European economic performance is energy. The EU seems to be securing a lead over its competitors on world stage in the attempt to end dependence on natural resources.<sup>37</sup>

In recent years close cooperation between EU members started expanding into new areas, many of which have traditionally been seen as falling exclusively within the remit of the nation-state. Although different approaches on how to deal with them exist, Europeans seem to agree on the nature and intensity of the security threats they face in today's world. They realise that complicated issues such as environmental degradation, health pandemics, proliferation of weapons of mass distraction, illegal immigration, terrorism, drug trafficking, global poverty, can never be tackled in an effective way if resources and expertise are not pooled together on a pan-European scale.<sup>38</sup>

And although European leaders make clear that the foreign policy of the EU will never have as strong a military orientation as that of the US and will continue to be characterized by a greater reticence towards military action,<sup>39</sup> with the Treaty on the European Union, they have declared their

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<sup>36</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, pp. 77-79. The shift to the euro is indeed gathering pace. Of particular significance are Russia's and China's moves to rearrange the composition of their foreign currency reserves, favouring shifts from the US dollar to the euro.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.79-80.

<sup>38</sup> The creation of the first ever *European Security Strategy*, which was presented in December 2003, is considered to be the culmination of such thinking.

<sup>39</sup> Fischer, 'European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany's responsibility at the centre of Europe'. Europe will never be able or want to rival the US militarily, according to Fischer. Moreover, due to demographic trends, the EU's ability to invest in its military development is also questioned: "If Europeans are unwilling to spend

determination to develop a defence dimension to the international identity of the Union.<sup>40</sup> Towards that end, European leaders announced in 2001 the new EU objective of being able to field operational combat-ready troops by 2003 and contrary to the predictions of many strategic experts around the world, who thought that such an initiative had almost no chances of success, the 2003 deadline not only was met but by 2006 the EU had organised sixteen missions on three different continents, with six of them being primarily military.<sup>41</sup> The adoption of the *European Security Strategy* further indicates that not only is Europe willing to strengthen its defensive capabilities but also plans to tackle global security threats in a more strategic manner.<sup>42</sup> Many therefore argue that the EU is a powerful actor but in a different, unconventional way, and is seen as weak only when looked at through American eyes and filtered through American definitions of power and weakness.<sup>43</sup>

## 2. Trends in European Integration

Mainly due to Washington's aim of preserving a 'unipolar world', the issue of integration in Europe lies at the heart of EU-US relations. A politically integrated Europe would inevitably lead to a dramatically redefined transatlantic relationship. An entity of this kind would probably identify the United States as a competitor rather than a partner.<sup>44</sup> Such a prospect, many

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what is needed to be full military partners of America now, when 65-year olds amount to 30% of the working-age population, they will be even less likely to do more in 2050, when the proportion of old people will have doubled". *The Economist*, 'Half a billion Americans?'

<sup>40</sup> Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', p.237.

<sup>41</sup> Howorth, 'The European Security Strategy and military capacity', p. 81.

<sup>42</sup> Papandreou, 'The Importance of Transatlantic Relations and Dialogue', p. xiii.

<sup>43</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p. 5.

<sup>44</sup> Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe*, p. 188.

claim, looks remote in the foreseeable future due to the Union's serious internal problems.

***I. Has further integration become impossible?***

The idea that European integration has been derailed in recent years has become an article of faith in many analyses of the EU. Events such as the resounding rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referenda of 2005 and the deep divisions among EU members during the war in Iraq seem to underpin such views.

The 'democratic deficit' of the EU is usually at the centre of the debate on integration's shortcomings: "The EU today is no longer merely a union of states, but also of citizens, in other words a union of states and citizens. Nevertheless, European decisions are still almost exclusively made by the states. Thus there is a democratic deficit in the EU which needs rectifying".<sup>45</sup> There also is a crucial shortage of national leaders who would be eager to promote further cooperation, projecting a clear vision of the purpose of current and future European integration.<sup>46</sup>

Quite often, an image of paralysis and inaction is seen as the trademark of integration: "... the EU doesn't resolve things. It fudges, it negotiates, it compromises, it settles, from day to day, from year to year. It's a completely different sort of political game to the one that we're used to in

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<sup>45</sup> Fischer, 'European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany's responsibility at the centre of Europe'.

<sup>46</sup> Whiteman, 'No and after: options for Europe', p.679.

political systems like the US and the UK, where ultimately someone decides.”<sup>47</sup>

The locomotive of integration, the Franco-German axis, is allegedly showing signs of exhaustion. The French failure to ratify the EU Constitutional Treaty clearly demonstrates that there is unprecedented fallout between the erstwhile close allies. French and German leaders, not only fail to provide leadership by launching grand objectives at the European level, but they actively undermine unity as their breach of the Stability and Growth Pact (that underpins the EMU) shows.<sup>48</sup> In addition, many observers claim that Franco-German relations are not as smooth as the political leaders of the two countries want the rest of the world to believe. In France, for instance, part of the public opinion feels quite uneasy about too close a relationship with Germany, since the latter is deemed to pursue the federalisation of Europe along German lines and this entails potentially grave dangers for the unity and stability of France.<sup>49</sup> Such uneasiness is reinforced by analyses which see in recent years a transformation of Germany into a less inhibited actor in world affairs, inclined to follow policies which disregard the interests of its closest allies.<sup>50</sup>

The system of rules governing the EU is seen as undecipherable: “At present, the EU’s rules are laid down in its governing treaty, which has been amended at successive inter-governmental conferences and by the judgments

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<sup>47</sup> Anand Menon, quoted in Dembart, ‘The future of Europe takes place’.

<sup>48</sup> Whiteman, ‘No and after: options for Europe’, p.684.

<sup>49</sup> Soutou, ‘Three rifts, two reconciliations: Franco-American relations during the Fifth Republic’, p. 125.

<sup>50</sup> Zimmermann, ‘Security exporters: Germany, the United States, and transatlantic cooperation’, p. 128.

of the European Court of Justice. The treaty texts run to 80,000 words almost none of which, as one MEP put it, are comprehensible, 'without the assistance of several lawyers' ".<sup>51</sup> Even integration experts find it difficult to explain all the governance rules of the EU, it is time and again claimed.<sup>52</sup>

The passion for Europe is also fading away. After 1990-1991, support of EU membership is in constant decline among European electorates.<sup>53</sup> European citizens are watching the integration of the Old Continent from a distance: they have little knowledge of how the Union works, information on EU affairs is presented to them in an almost unfathomable jargon, they can barely name any of the MEPs who are supposed to represent them in Brussels and they find it less and less worthwhile to turn out to vote at European elections.<sup>54</sup> There is not doubt, observe some commentators, that the construction of a transnational, multileveled European political system is taking place without its citizens.<sup>55</sup> An elite project from its very formation, critics say, integration was hardly meant to bring citizens on board. But now citizens are realizing how big a role Brussels plays in their lives and how little input their national leaders have to the making of EU policies and, as the referenda of 2005 in France and the Netherlands show, they are starting to express their concern.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Castle, 'Trust and accountability remain key in framing of a new Europe'.

<sup>52</sup> Mayhew, 'A certain idea of Europe: Can European integration survive eastern enlargement?', p. 5.

<sup>53</sup> Heins, 'Orientalising America? Continental Intellectuals and the Search for Europe's Identity', p. 435.

<sup>54</sup> Mayhew, 'A certain idea of Europe: Can European integration survive eastern enlargement?', p. 6.

<sup>55</sup> Heins, 'Orientalising America? Continental Intellectuals and the Search for Europe's Identity', pp. 434-435.

<sup>56</sup> Mayhew, 'A certain idea of Europe: Can European integration survive eastern enlargement?', p. 6.

Emblematic integration projects are crumbling. EMU is a case in point: “The euro has to be a success if Europe is to flourish. Unfortunately, diverging trends in competitiveness within the Eurozone threaten its stability. If they persist, a break-up of economic and monetary union cannot be ruled out, raising questions over the future of the single market.”<sup>57</sup>

Finally, there are EU members, namely Britain, which are fiercely opposed to integration and have the power to derail it.<sup>58</sup> The prospects for a strong, united Europe may have disappeared when Britain and some Scandinavian states entered the EU, it is often argued.<sup>59</sup> With all these problems in place, the idea that a political union might be built along federalist lines is frequently dismissed as sheer wishful thinking: “We are still far from the creation of a European public space which is a precondition for a European state; there can exist no European public opinion, no European

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<sup>57</sup> Tilford, ‘How to ensure the eurozone does not unravel’.

<sup>58</sup> Britain is still the only member of the EU which does not appear to have come to a definitive answer to the question of whether it wants to remain in the EU or to leave. Bogdanor, ‘Footfalls echoing in the memory. Britain and Europe: the historical perspective’, p. 700. There are no signs, as yet, that the British political elites and the British people are even contemplating a change in the hostile way they view Europe. These negative attitudes towards Europe are almost impossible to change, is the conclusion of many analysts, because of the influence the British euroskeptic press exerts over public opinion and British governments. As a British commentator puts it “there is a distinct, domestic history of two generations of conservative journalists who, deeply influenced by Margaret Thatcher, and traumatized by the pound sterling’s bad experience with the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, found in opposition to the EU their new great fight after the end of the Cold War. For them, Brussels was, and perhaps still is, the new Moscow. Then there’s the intense commercial competition between British newspapers. Good ‘knocking copy’ sells well, and knocking the French is the oldest British pastime of all. Whatever the precise mixture of causes, the result is plain to see on any news-stand almost any day of the year. It’s strictly impossible to prove how much these ‘Eurosceptic’ papers shape popular views, and how much they merely echo and reinforce them, but it seems reasonable to assume that what some 22 million people read every day in their newspapers does influence their politics. In any case, one essential point is clear: British governments have, for more than a decade, ceased to believe that they can safely defy these papers on the issue of Europe.” Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 32.

<sup>59</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, p. 31.

press, no European political class capable of dealing with issues that affect the whole of Europe.”<sup>60</sup>

## ***II. The inevitability of a more integrated European Union***

There are strong reasons to believe that further integration is not only feasible but even inevitable. The obstacles to more integration seem to have been overstated: “The flaws in Community integration, which definitely exist and must be ironed out, are nothing when compared with what we have managed to build and what we can and must still achieve”.<sup>61</sup> And critics of the way the EU works, it is countered, are often exaggerating: “The case against the current institutions of the Union has often been made: lack of legitimacy, efficiency and readability. These criticisms are sometimes expressed excessively.”<sup>62</sup> On the contrary, many insist, the future of integration must be seen in a rather optimistic way: “The long view also inspires optimism. Europe has progressed a long way from the customs union established by the Treaty of Rome 40 years ago. No one thought it would work because of productivity differences between countries. See where we are today with the single market. This is extraordinary. This is historical.”<sup>63</sup> This is especially so,

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<sup>60</sup> Sauger *et al.*, *Les Français contre l'Europe?*, p. 143.

<sup>61</sup> Prodi, Speech at the Opening session of the Convention on the future of Europe. “Critics are quick to point at the difficulties Europe encountered in Bosnia and to the massive unemployment figures to portray it as being ‘adrift’. Europeans themselves have often been inclined to ponder their own fate with gloom and scepticism. But when trying to pass judgement, one shouldn’t lose sight of Europe’s real achievements and compare the state it is in today with what it was fifty years ago. The prospect that France and Germany could again come to an armed conflict is inconceivable to the current generations. The same is true of all members of the EU”. Bujon de l’Estang, ‘Remarks at the Cleveland “City Club” ’.

<sup>62</sup> Badinter, ‘A European Constitution’.

<sup>63</sup> Lamberto Dini quoted in Buerkle, ‘After 40 years, EU Arrives at Crossroads’. Fervent supporters of integration recall with amusement the numerous occasions on which the future of European integration was contemplated with scepticism: “When I attended my first EU summit as German Chancellor in 1982, the word ‘Eurosclerosis’ meant a disease linked to the

when one bears in mind that “the emergence of a unified Europe is one of the most revolutionary events of our time.”<sup>64</sup>

Europeans are not against further integration. A cursory look at the distribution of political power in national parliaments or the European Parliament reveals that the pro-integration forces vastly outnumber the opponents of further integration, while pan-European polls and surveys consistently show a steady support for it among European publics.<sup>65</sup> In France the forces which opposed most vociferously the Constitutional Treaty, suffered heavy electoral losses in the 2007 presidential and general elections.<sup>66</sup> Euroskepticism is not as widespread as it is sometimes implied. In many cases, analysts do not seem to differentiate between true euroskeptics (who are genuinely against any integration initiative) and those who are not opposed to European integration *per se*, but only to the specific course of current integration as it is or they think it is.<sup>67</sup>

Given the will to advance integration, it is maintained, even the crises which the EU finds itself into must often be seen as opportunities, since they have proved to be real facilitators of further integration. Indeed, it is claimed, it is historically proven that integration has often propelled forward in the

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notion of Europe. When you ask today those who wrote all those articles on the future of Europe they say: ‘it must have been someone else’; ‘I’ve nothing to do with that’. At that time there was no sign of hope that great steps to European unification could be taken”. Kohl, ‘Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas’, p.9. One is also reminded that until the early 1990s the idea that the EU should see itself as an effective actor in the field of security (i.e. taking more responsibility for the security of the European continent) was too uncomfortable to old strategic and popular habits bred in the decades of the Cold War. Reichard, *The EU-NATO Relationship*, p. 3.

<sup>64</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 47.

<sup>65</sup> According to Eurobarometer 66, 61 per cent of the respondents still wanted, in Autumn 2006, an EU constitution to be adopted by EU members.

<sup>66</sup> Sauger *et al.*, *Les Français contre l’Europe?*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17. Thus, it is suggested that one should make the distinction between euro-skepticism and EU-skepticism. EU-skeptics are not bent on reversing integration but either want to apply the brakes on it or reorient it in a different direction.

aftermath of serious crises.<sup>68</sup> One should not forget, for example, as EU officials stress, that the roots of the CFSP, and the ESDP in particular, are to be found in the Balkan crises of the 1990s, which had plunged the EU in one of its most serious crises.<sup>69</sup> The recent crisis of 2005 should not be seen as an exception: “Ironically, the rejection of the European Constitution by a majority of voters in France and in the Netherlands in 2005 has triggered the first public constitutional debate in Europe....The referenda have also accelerated new dimensions of European integration. For example, more than ever, the idea of a European wide referendum has been discussed across the EU. ...For the time being, some scholars do already diagnose an emerging European constitutionalism without a Constitution.”<sup>70</sup>

The so-called ‘democratic deficit’, is arguably, a creation of academics and intellectuals, and this has been proved on many occasions, by the reluctance of ordinary citizens to focus their attention to the prospect of democratizing EU institutions.<sup>71</sup> A number of worrisome phenomena at the national level, such as “greater electoral abstention, decline in party identification, more frequent turnover in office and rejection of the party in power, lower prestige of politicians and higher unpopularity of chief executives, increased tax evasion and higher rates of litigation against authorities, and skyrocketing accusations of official corruption”, indicate that there is something wrong with democratic practices and rules, but it would be

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<sup>68</sup> Kühnhardt, ‘European Integration: Challenge and Response’, p. 12.

<sup>69</sup> “The EU has a special responsibility for the Balkans. In a sense, the CFSP and the ESDP were born in the region.” Solana, Speech at the Annual Conference of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union.

<sup>70</sup> Kühnhardt, ‘European Integration: Challenge and Response’, p. 10.

<sup>71</sup> Schmitter, ‘The European Union is Not Democratic-So What?’, p. 3. The Convention on the Future of Europe was according to Schmitter an important forum where such concerns could have been raised, but European citizens showed little interest in doing so.

too hastened a conclusion to attribute them to the EU and accept the existence of a general crisis of legitimacy at the EU level.<sup>72</sup> A much more convincing argument about a 'democratic deficit' at the national level has been put forward. At the heart of it lies the fact that although national political practices have changed within the EU, with state sovereignty being transferred to Brussels, national ideas of democracy have not, due to the tendency of national politicians to pretend that nothing has changed and that traditional visions of nation-state democracy are still valid.<sup>73</sup> By playing this game, governments at the national level can reap significant benefits: on the one hand they can use the EU as a scapegoat when unpopular measures have to be taken, while on the other hand they feel free to 'appropriate' popular policies designed and executed by Brussels, 'forgetting' to give the EU the credit it deserves.

Pessimists and doubters of integration are often reminded that the introduction and subsequent success of the euro should be seen as proof that integration is alive and kicking. EU officials keep stressing that the euro symbolises the determination of Europe's people to share a future together.<sup>74</sup> And analysts are keen to point out that we should not forget that the arguments behind EMU are economic but the motives are political.<sup>75</sup> For this reason, the widespread idea that the common currency was the result of a

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3. Schmitter, however, admits that rightly or wrongly, more and more Europeans feel themselves at the mercy of an integration process which they can neither understand nor control and that no matter how much they benefit materially from it, they feel increasingly uncomfortable with it.

<sup>73</sup> Schmidt, 'Democratic Challenges for the EU as "Regional State"', p. 4. Also, Delors, "Many Countries Are Sliding into Nationalism".

<sup>74</sup> Prodi, 'Euro and enlargement'.

<sup>75</sup> Cohen, and Pisani-Ferry, 'Les paradoxes de l'Europe-puissance: un detour par l'economie', p.209.

Franco-German compromise<sup>76</sup> generates strong reactions from the proponents of integration: “It is simply not true that we have given up the mark in return for the unity of Germany. The idea of a common European currency is much older. Since the 1980s we had agreed with Mitterrand that we wanted the political unification of Europe and that a politically united Europe had as a prerequisite a common currency. ...I have always been in favour of the introduction of a common currency not putting as a precondition a swift reunification of Germany”.<sup>77</sup> In the words of German Chancellor Schröder: “European monetary union has to be complemented with a political union – that was always the presumption of Europeans, including those who made active European politics before us”.<sup>78</sup>

It is also stressed that through the common European currency the process of European unification has become irreversible.<sup>79</sup> And despite some initial signs of weakness,<sup>80</sup> the euro is proving a success: “The euro area has already weathered a number of external shocks. The last three years have been a turbulent period. We had the Asian and the international financial crises in 1997-99, the oil price hike in 2000, the bursting of the information-technology bubble and the global slowdown in 2001 and 2002. Yet EMU has proved it is

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<sup>76</sup> The euro was the price the rest of Europe extracted from Germany in return for its own reunification. Islam, ‘A farewell to marks (again)’. “The euro is a French invention. Mitterrand talked Kohl into submerging the all-conquering mark into a broader currency in return for French support for German reunification in 1991”. Hoagland, ‘In France, Time Is Money’.

<sup>77</sup> Kohl, ‘Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas’, p.5. Kohl adds that: “In June 1988 in Hanover, there was no talk of an impending German reunification. It was there that Mitterrand and I decided to build an economic and monetary union. That’s why I want to say once more: it is a legend that we relinquished the mark for the German reunification”. Kohl, ‘Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas’, p.7.

<sup>78</sup> Boyes, ‘The euro chancellor’.

<sup>79</sup> Kohl, ‘Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas’, p.4.

<sup>80</sup> For example, euro’s failure to challenge the dollar’s primacy as a reserve currency. Bergsten, ‘The Coming Rise of the Euro’.

able to withstand the consequences of these shocks.”<sup>81</sup> Thus, it is bound to accelerate the economic, political and cultural integration of Europe.<sup>82</sup>

Moves toward further European integration are expected to take place for a host of reasons. Central among them is the existence of a Franco-German axis. Genuine and important disagreements between Paris and Berlin notwithstanding, the Franco-German partnership has not lost its value as the engine of integration.<sup>83</sup> For both Germany and France, European integration remains a *sine qua non* condition of their respective foreign policies. For Berlin “European integration is more than just one foreign policy project among many. It is inseparable from the correct response to the “German Question” and therefore has ultimate priority in the larger Germany of the ‘Berlin Republic.’”<sup>84</sup> Not only is European integration a journey of no return

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<sup>81</sup> Prodi, ‘Euro and enlargement’. “Eurosceptics can be told that the economic and currency crises from Russia to Latin America and the Far East in the last months would have had far greater an impact on the economic and social situation in Germany and the other European countries had the EMU not been in place”. Schäuble, ‘Unsere Verantwortung für Europa’, p.5. In addition, “Every single economy in the Eurozone has a better monetary policy than it did before ... every country in Europe and every citizen within will have a world class currency and all, bar Germany, have lower interest rates than before”. Mundell, ‘First Europe, then the world’.

<sup>82</sup> Hutton, *The World We’re In*, p. 324.

<sup>83</sup> A lot of commentators have not hesitated to call it dead in recent years, while others have recently described it as the “axis of indifference”, Boyes, ‘The euro chancellor’.

<sup>84</sup> Fischer, ‘European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany’s responsibility at the centre of Europe’. According to Fischer, “Solo efforts should never again be an option for us. The completion of European integration in the form of a federation of nation-states is therefore the most important goal of German foreign policy by far. Europe is our most important national interest”. Similarly, Helmut Kohl brushed aside worries over the economic pitfalls of EMU, viewing it as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to bind Germany into an irreversible process of European integration. Barber, ‘The Kohl legacy’. Indeed, support for EMU united Germans of all political hues even before the arrival of the common currency: “Political leadership in Germany is united behind the goal of a federal Europe. The opposition, presenting its election manifesto, has called for a federal Europe to be created on the foundations laid by EMU, arguing that for its own good and that of its neighbours, Germany’s critical size can be managed only through integration. They are in favour of a common foreign and security policy, harmonisation of taxes on turnover, consumption, and capital yields, and also demand an absolute end to national vetoes within the EU.” Traynor, ‘Kohl steps back into ring’. On European issues major German parties hold almost identical positions: “Day by day Gerhard Schröder, is subtly taking on the colourings

for Germany but Germans benefit from it more than any one else.<sup>85</sup> The loss of sovereignty that European integration demands is a price worth paying according to the majority of Germans. When the highly successful Deutsche Mark was replaced by the euro for example, most Germans saw the change as a necessary sacrifice for Europe.<sup>86</sup>

For France, a united Europe is the vehicle for its ambitious goals: “France cannot achieve its principal national objectives alone, outside the EU”.<sup>87</sup> France, in the words of its president, “is not itself, is not great, is not strong, if it is not placed at the very centre of Europe.”<sup>88</sup> French politicians look now ready to see European unification reaching areas that not long ago were thought to be outside the Union’s jurisdiction: “The pursuit of a common security is key to fulfilling the European project. Having common interests and policies calls for providing the means to defend them”.<sup>89</sup> The French welcomed the euro enthusiastically with almost no regret for the disappearance of the French Franc.<sup>90</sup> France, though not too enthusiastically, seems to be slowly abandoning its tough intergovernmentalist approach on issues of integration. Such is indeed the transformation of French positions, that some have even claimed that in its effort to see Europe chart a course

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of his erstwhile rival and European bogeyman, Helmut Kohl. On European issues there is not much to divide Schröder from his challenger Stoiber. Boyes, ‘The euro chancellor’.

<sup>85</sup> Kohl, ‘Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas’, p.4.

<sup>86</sup> ‘Either Europe or another war’, was a common sentiment at the time according to British journalists. Islam, ‘A farewell to marks (again)’.

<sup>87</sup> Lemaitre, ‘Chirac voudra reprendre l’initiative au niveau européen’.

<sup>88</sup> Sarkozy, Discours de M. le Président de la République, Strasbourg.

<sup>89</sup> Bujon de l’Estang, ‘Remarks at the Cleveland “City Club”’.

<sup>90</sup> As a British commentator put it “It is the British who feel nostalgic for the franc, not the French”. Keegan ‘A growing appreciation for the euro’. The same was the conclusion of American journalists: The franc has gone gently into that dark night, provoking not a whimper from the populace. Today’s American in Paris feels more sentiment about the demise of the franc than the French seem to feel”. Hoagland, ‘In France, Time Is Money’.

independently of the United States and not sink into the abject condition of a client, France seems to have realised that Europe sooner or later will have to turn itself into a single state.<sup>91</sup> The Franco-German alliance also acts as a bulwark against disintegration or paralysis. In some cases it is hard for others not to follow the lead of the axis. Britain, Spain and Italy for example could even risk their unity if they decided to resist further integration.<sup>92</sup>

Another factor that contributes to further integration is the indisputable 'spillover effect' of integration in certain fields of activity: "once unification begins in some areas, those matters inevitably affect and draw in other areas, which must be treated in a unified way as well. It is clear now that because of monetary union, you need some additional common rules in economic policy in order to make the system viable. Similarly the field of competition is not completed. It is clear, that it must be extended to the field of taxation, limited, clearly limited, to the case in which taxation is an instrument for competition. If we don't do that, we are completely powerless".<sup>93</sup> Interconnection becomes,

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<sup>91</sup> Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe*, p. 169.

<sup>92</sup> Haseler, 'Superstate', pp. 110-111. The Scots, the Basques, the Catalonians, Italy's northern separatists could, by this logic, decide to move towards the European core and away from London, Madrid and Rome respectively. In their effort to assure the unity of their nation-states, the latter would have to "row with, not against, the European heartland."

<sup>93</sup> Prodi, quoted in Dembart, 'The future of Europe takes place'. Fischer agrees: "The existence of the euro will put considerable pressure on the EU to integrate further". Fischer, 'European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany's responsibility at the centre of Europe'. German finance minister Eichel also made clear that the euro was only the beginning: "The currency union will fall apart if we don't follow through with the consequences of such a union. I am convinced we will need a common tax system", quoted in Conradi and Woodhead, 'Single tax put on EU agenda' Financial experts, like George Soros, also predict that tax harmonisation among EU states is needed in order to support a euro, which is still a work in progress. Spiteri, 'George Soros: impossible to reject euro'. And economists expect that as the euro makes different prices between countries more apparent, pressure will grow to harmonize VAT and other indirect taxes. Conradi and Woodhead, 'Single tax put on EU agenda'. In addition, progressive harmonisation of the taxation systems of the countries participating in EMU is considered to be necessary if the Eurozone wants to become attractive to flows of capital. Bujon de l'Estang, 'Remarks at the Cleveland "City Club"'. An analytical explanation of how 'spillover' (functional, exogenous, political, social

indeed, an unavoidable reality: “Economic and political union cannot be separated. The free movement of capital and labour have to be politically defined and legally regulated. That is a necessity, not a matter of choice. An army and a unified foreign policy may be optional extras. A common competition policy - by definition a political proposition - goes, automatically, with a common external tariff.<sup>94</sup> Crucial in this sense, is the role of the European Court of Justice, which has the potential to ensure that the ‘spillover effect’ will not at some point run out of steam. For those who predict a federal future for the EU this role is going to prove catalytic: “Federalists can also rely upon that great sleeper amongst Europe’s institutions, the European Court of Justice, to push for ‘ever closer union’. For all who want to see, the precedent of the US Supreme Court stands out starkly. Hardly noticeable in the 1787 constitution, the US Supreme Court was to become the greatest single engine propelling the US federal states forward.”<sup>95</sup>

Conducive to more integration, is the phenomenon of American unilateralism: “American contempt for a weak Europe is producing pressure for more unity, more outspoken independence and a clearer understanding

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and cultivated) occurs can be found in Niemann, *Explaining Decisions in the European Union*, pp. 29-47.

<sup>94</sup> Hattersley, ‘A European superstate is inevitable’. For some, however, there are no ‘optional extras’: “...the single market demands a single currency, which in turn demands a single government.” Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 8.

<sup>95</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 89. In what amounts to a euroskeptic’s nightmare, Haseler concludes that “In Europe’s case, the judges of the European Court of Justice can be relied upon, like constitutional jurists everywhere, to make new constitutional law. And when they get their teeth into a European Charter of Rights in a European constitution, then Europeans can expect the erosion of the power not just of national courts but of national governments as well. In the Europe of 2025, the Court may well have its fingerprints on laws ranging from religion to sex, from welfare to employment.” Hutton, agrees: “Indeed, the judgements of the European Court of Justice have quietly built up a body of case law building on the EU’s treaties that does constitute a form of de facto constitution. Enthusiasts and sceptics alike can see evidence for what seems to be an emerging new federal state.” Hutton, *The World We’re In*, p. 287. For a more systematic analysis of the EU’s federal characteristics see Kelemen and Nikolaidis, ‘Bringing Federalism Back In’.

that Europe must spend more money on its military forces if Washington is going to take it seriously".<sup>96</sup> In fact, for some, "whether Washington likes it or not, US unilateralism is driving the process of European integration".<sup>97</sup> US unilateralism and the strong US preference for a unipolar world leave Europeans with virtually no other alternative than the further promotion of integration: "recent political events on the world stage have shown us once again: if the Europeans stay divided and if we do not create a European democracy, then we will not be in a position to shape but only to be shaped."<sup>98</sup> This is particularly evident in the field of CFSP, in general, and ESDP in particular.<sup>99</sup> In the field of trade this has led the EU, since the early 1990s, to establish a trend of initiating international policy changes, rather than simply reacting to them.<sup>100</sup> Integration is also seen as the remedy for America's tendency to follow 'divide and rule' tactics in Europe.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Erlanger, 'US disdain provokes new unity in Europe'. Erlanger finds that renewed American unilateralism is giving weight to the old French idea of the EU as a counterbalance to Washington. "In Europe part of the impetus for European integration derives from a desire to establish a rival centre of power to the US, motivated in some quarters by explicit anti-Americanism", Howard, 'Like all relationships, the one between Europe and the US needs constant attention'.

<sup>97</sup> Peel, 'Europe must now defend itself'.

<sup>98</sup> Fischer, 'European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany's responsibility at the centre of Europe'.

<sup>99</sup> Characteristically, the German Green party, which had firmly opposed ESDP as the militarization of a civilian-based EU, changed radically its position transforming itself to one of the ESDP's strongest supporters, in an attempt to enforce CFSP as a balance to US predominance. Rathbun, 'Continental Divide? The Transience of Transatlantic Troubles', pp. 71-72. The party's position, Rathbun quotes, was that "Without an ESDP and the military means, everything is determined by the Pentagon and the White House."

<sup>100</sup> Henning and Meunier, 'United Against the United States? The EU's Role in Global Trade and Finance', p. 79. Similarly, monetary integration has been pursued in an effort to establish a counterweight to the US and shield member states from the consequences of international monetary instability, often resulting from US policies. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>101</sup> Europeans are increasingly reacting to what they see as hypocritical US attitudes: "The United States will continue to deplore the national divisions between Europeans, and the complexity of their decision-making system, while at the same time taking advantage of it. Kissinger's famous question 'What's Europe's phone number?' never meant that Washington was seeking change, unless of course it would be certain that the European interlocutor at the other end would be understanding and docile." Védrine, 'How others see us: Policy lessons for Europe'.

Integration is also fuelled by the single fact that in the era of globalisation “EU states recognize that individually they are small and ineffectual by world standards. To have influence on the world stage, they must act as one”.<sup>102</sup> Even countries the size of Germany find that globalization poses challenges which can only be addressed at a European level: “The EU alone is in a position to develop effective responses to globalisation, which was long underestimated here in Germany because it emerged parallel to German unification, but which has developed as a challenge for our democracies’ capacity to steer and to act”.<sup>103</sup> France, too, seems to have realised that French identity can only be protected by Europe and that in its long-running battle with Americanised global culture it is only the strength of a wider, united Europe that allows it to properly resist.<sup>104</sup> Indeed, at a time when economic globalisation has reduced the capacity of national governments to act on their own, the rationale of European integration is questioned by a very small number of politicians.<sup>105</sup> Not only

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<sup>102</sup> Dembart, ‘The future of Europe takes place’. Inevitably, they will be ceding “more authority to Brussels, not necessarily because they want to but at least in part because they have no alternative”. That certainly seems to be the case with Britain: “In tomorrow’s world stability and prosperity at home will depend above all on the ability of the international community to act together in pursuit of interests that transcend national frontiers and traditional notions of sovereignty. We all need to ask ‘How can our nation best contribute to the attainment of goals we all share?’ no single government department could on its own deal with climate change, drug abuse and trafficking, AIDS, or intensifying competition for water and fish. The problems are joined up, so government must be joined up”. Blair, ‘Consolidating the European Union’

<sup>103</sup> Fischer, ‘European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany’s responsibility at the centre of Europe’.

<sup>104</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 118.

<sup>105</sup> Buerkle, ‘After 40 Years, EU Arrives at Crossroads’. This seems to apply even to ‘sensitive’ areas like CFSP: “There are now very few, if any, areas of national foreign policy on which member states act strictly alone. For example even the traditionally strong diplomatic powers, Britain and France, can no longer realistically claim to have significant independent national foreign policies in the Middle East. Member states may jockey for political and commercial advantages at the margin, but we have, I believe, recognised that individual European countries no longer have the political weight, nor the economic means, nor indeed any overriding national interest, to pursue wholly competitive, separate foreign

because it allows Europe to better resist unwanted external pressures but also because it gives it the opportunity to better achieve its international goals. When for example the EU's steel tariff conflict with the US had a favourable ending for the EU in late 2003, every European could see for themselves the benefits of Europe 'acting as one' in the world.<sup>106</sup>

Finally, the opponents of further integration have had little success in their efforts to halt the whole process. Within the EU, Britain has always been sceptical of the need for more steps in the direction of European unification. The euroskeptic debate revolves mainly around the issue of sovereignty. Loss of sovereignty is always seen in British politics as something negative, no matter what the circumstances, and the British leaders who took the country into the European Community never found the courage to explain that the erosion of sovereignty after accession would be inevitable.<sup>107</sup> British leaders have therefore the duty to fend off EU attacks on British sovereignty and cannot appear to be making concessions to Brussels at the expense of Britain's sovereign rights.<sup>108</sup> Furthermore, the Thatcherite revolution of the

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policies. The disagreements are at the margin and although they are inevitably highlighted when they occur, they rarely amount to fundamentally different approaches, as was commonplace in the past." Brittan, *A Diet of Brussels*, p. 154.

<sup>106</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 118. Also, Kühnhardt, 'European Integration: Challenge and Response', p. 3.

<sup>107</sup> Hattersley, 'A European superstate is inevitable'. According to Hattersley, "Ted Heath promised no reduction in national sovereignty - instead of emphasising the strength that comes when sovereignty is pooled. But we all knew that the Zollverein was only the beginning. The free trade area begat a community, and the community begat a union. At each step along the way, political and economic integration went hand in hand. It would not have been possible to run the single market, which Margaret Thatcher's government supported with such enthusiasm, without a political and legal framework to enforce its acceptance and application."

<sup>108</sup> Thus, the narrative of British leaders who return home after EU meetings abroad cannot deviate from "the sense of 'winning' a constant series of zero-sum games against partners who were really opponents..." Young, *This Blessed Plot*, p. 511. Characteristically, Young adds: "I have found no trace of any Prime Minister, from Heath to Blair, returning from an

eighties has, by some analysts, affected so much the political system of the country that Britain finds it nearly impossible to converge with Europe's economic and social norms.<sup>109</sup> Jack Straw, for instance, has described the Commission's plans for more cooperation in the field of foreign policy as "not connected with the world we live in now", insisting that foreign policy is the expression of the nation state.<sup>110</sup>

However, Britain may not be in a position to prevent moves toward more European integration. Seen by generations of British politicians as little short of a betrayal of the national birthright", the idea of an EU constitution finally received the support of the British government.<sup>111</sup> In addition, divisions exist within the UK: "Conservatives in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly are less ardently Eurosceptic than Conservative MPs. ...Labour representatives in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly are somewhat more enthusiastic Europeans than their counterparts at Westminster".<sup>112</sup> Polls, for instance, show "consistently higher levels of support for EU membership in Scotland than across much of the UK".<sup>113</sup> Some observers think that the Scots and Welsh look favourably towards the EU as an alternative polity to the UK.<sup>114</sup>

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EU summit to report that he had supported, or else opposed, a decision solely because such a course was best for the future of 'Europe'."

<sup>109</sup> Haseler, 'Superstate', p. 110.

<sup>110</sup> MacAskill, 'Prodi is pushing an outdated vision of Europe, says Straw'.

<sup>111</sup> Castle, 'Trust and accountability remain key in framing of a new Europe'.

<sup>112</sup> Baker *et al.*, 'Celtic Exceptionalism? Scottish and Welsh Parliamentarians' Attitudes to Europe', p.225. Garton Ash makes the same point: "...the Welsh and the Scots seem to have less trouble accepting Europe than the English do. Scots, after all, drive around Britain with the name of their nation written on bumper stickers in French: *Écosse*." Garton Ash, *Free World*, pp. 206-207.

<sup>113</sup> Straw, 'Strength in Europe begins at home'.

<sup>114</sup> Weight, *Patriots*, P. 728. This, remarks Weight, is bringing the Scots and the Welsh further apart from the more euroskeptic English "who regard the EU as a threat to their way of life and co-conspirator in the detachment of Scotland and Wales from the UK." Indeed,

Fears of isolation may well soften UK opposition to integration: “We in Britain can take great pride in our role in 20<sup>th</sup> Century history, often standing alone. Yet I know that in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, as a new Europe arises of peace and prosperity, it would be an utterly backward and self-defeating act for us to isolate ourselves from modern Europe. The outcome would not be a stronger Britain but a weaker one”.<sup>115</sup> And in periods of crisis, at least, British leaders publicly admit that sharing or even losing some degree of sovereignty can be greatly beneficial. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Britain was among the most willing EU members to promote pan-European security measures sending out a loud message that the defence of British sovereignty could not be pursued at any cost: “Acting collectively in the European Union, we have risen to the challenge with plans for a common European arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism, measures to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists, recognise each other's court orders and share intelligence. These are all vital steps for our security which could not have been taken either quickly or effectively without the intergovernmental co-operation which is now a familiar feature of the workings of the EU.”<sup>116</sup> Increasingly, Britain is seen as unable to detach itself from developments in Europe. The position of those who advocate a kind of geopolitical neutrality for Britain

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“Scottish and Welsh nationalists, like the Irish Republic before them, favour much closer involvement in the EU precisely because they believe this will lessen their countries’ dependence on Westminster.” Colley, ‘We fret over Europe, but the real threat to sovereignty has long been the US’.

<sup>115</sup> Blair, ‘Consolidating the European Union’. Blair acknowledges that the price of international solidarity in which Britain believes, is not good words but practical leadership. “We can be a leading power, but if we want to be the decisive leading power it is difficult to see how we could do that if we rule ourselves out of the single currency for ever”, Peter Hain, quoted in Groom, ‘The Euro Arrives Britain: French minister warns over Britain’s EU role’.

<sup>116</sup> Straw, ‘In this New World, All of Us Must Rethink Our Attitudes to Sovereignty’.

(i.e. keeping an equal distance from Europe and America) looks untenable.<sup>117</sup>

And the prospect of a divorce from the EU is unthinkable, as only marginal voices in the UK are supporting such a drastic move. British observers often describe the relationship between Britain and the EU as ‘an unfortunate marriage’. But as they admit, restating Albert Camus’ conclusion on European-British relations, “marriage may sometimes be good but never delightful. As our marriage is not a delightful one, let us at least try to make it a good one, since divorce is out of the question.”<sup>118</sup>

But with Britain looking sometimes half-heartedly dragged into this marriage, it is not a surprise that UK influence within the EU has never been enough to steer the latter’s course. Thus, most British efforts to weaken the Franco-German axis have been unsuccessful. Articles in the British press have often announced the death of the special relationship between France and Germany suggesting that Britain might even try to form its own special relationship with Germany at the expense of France and French dreams of a politically united Europe.<sup>119</sup> Reality, so far, suggests that this is just wishful thinking. British leadership in the EU remains a very remote prospect and the chances that this is going to change any time soon are slim. British leaders, such as Tony Blair and his successors, represent for many Europeans

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<sup>117</sup> Garton Ash wonders over the feasibility of the aim to make Britain “an off-shore Greater Switzerland”: “Would continental Europeans really give us all the benefits of free trade if we were not in the EU? Would Americans and Asians continue to invest so heavily here?” Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 207.

<sup>118</sup> Albert Camus, ‘Britain After the Election: Two French Views’, *Listener*, vol. 36, no. 1186, 22 November 1951, quoted in Weight, *Patriots*, p. 735. Britain takes the argument a step further: “...the real alternative to engaging fully with the rest of Europe is a destiny on the periphery, influenced but not influencing.” Brittan, *A Diet of Brussels*, p. 197.

<sup>119</sup> “Schröder has allowed the anaemic Franco-German partnership to become the axis of indifference. An informal Anglo-German duopoly could come into play over the coming decade if Blair brings Britain into the euro. Schroeder is ...reserving a privileged seat for Blair as soon as he brings Britain into the euro.” Boyes, ‘The euro chancellor’.

‘damaged goods’ as they refuse to bring Britain in the Eurozone and join the Schengen zone, while at the same time they keep boasting of Britain’s economic success and urge the rest of Europe to emulate ‘superior’ British norms.<sup>120</sup> Isolated, Britain seems often condemned to follow reluctantly the lead of France and Germany.<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, Britain cannot seriously be expected to be able to determine EU developments without showing a commitment to the ‘idea of Europe’ in the first place. However, British commitment to Europe cannot even be envisaged if it is not underpinned by strong popular enthusiasm and so far such enthusiasm “has been noticeable in Britain only by its absence.”<sup>122</sup>

### 3. European attitudes towards the US

#### *I. France*

Relations between France and America are setting the tone for transatlantic relations according to some analysts, not least because France is often viewed as a country where anti-Americanism thrives.<sup>123</sup> France is frequently portrayed as a direct antagonist of US interests in Europe. Bent on creating a continent with a separate identity and power base from that of the

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<sup>120</sup> Whiteman, ‘No and after: options for Europe’, p. 684. The number of analysts, who point out that such crowing is groundless, is growing. See for example Brittan, ‘Europe is not so backward after all’ who asserts that “A superficial glance at the indices suggests that the UK has the worst of both worlds. It has roughly the same output per capita as Germany and France but this is achieved, despite lower productivity, with longer hours, longer working lives and less leisure, on American lines.” See also Elliot, ‘Britain has three times the official number of jobless, study finds’.

<sup>121</sup> See Grice, ‘Sarkozy claims victory over Britain as EU strikes deal.’

<sup>122</sup> Bogdanor, ‘Footfalls echoing in the memory. Britain and Europe: the historical perspective’, p. 700.

<sup>123</sup> Biden, ‘Unholy symbiosis: Isolationism and Anti-Americanism, p.10. Poll surveys show that negative images of the US are stronger in France since 2003, reflecting deep seated sentiments. Mireur, ‘Retour sur l’antiaméricanisme’, p. 99.

US, Paris is keen to ensure that plans of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ domination of Europe will always fail.<sup>124</sup> It is also the most fervent proponent of the idea of a multipolar world, in which Europe will inevitably assume the task of acting as a counterbalance to the United States.<sup>125</sup> It is true that France is sometimes the toughest critic of US policies in Europe and French political figures usually do not shy away from publicly criticizing US policies.<sup>126</sup> The French political establishment has never concealed its aspiration to a united Europe as an equal partner of the US. French officials always stress the need for better coordination of European policies, especially in crucial areas such as foreign policy and defence, which will allow Europe to become a truly equal partner of the US.<sup>127</sup>

French leaders have since the mid-1990s abundantly demonstrated their preference for a multipolar world in which American political and military primacy could effectively come into question.<sup>128</sup> For all these reasons, relations between France and America have usually been difficult, fraught with crises and almost always in poor shape. The crisis which

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<sup>124</sup> Siedentop, ‘Democracy in Europe’, pp. 185-186.

<sup>125</sup> Hofmann and Kempin, ‘France and the Transatlantic Relationship’, p. 5.

<sup>126</sup> “I can hear the retort that there can be no such thing as an international society. Maybe. But this is precisely what we have been trying to establish since the Second World War. The WTO is a case in point. The US and France are both supporters of the rule of law in national societies. But you can’t advocate the rule of law in a piecemeal fashion: it must be upheld at the national as well as the international level”. Bujon de l’Estang, ‘Remarks at the Cleveland “City Club”’.

<sup>127</sup> “Common structures for cooperation in defence industries need to be expanded and defended. If you are to be a strategic partner, you cannot afford to be a mere subcontractor for the American defence industry”. Bujon de l’Estang, ‘Remarks at the Cleveland “City Club”’. Sarkozy is even more explicit: “Europe must be independent and Europe will not be independent if she is not capable of defending herself by her own. Do you believe that a group of states incapable of assuring its own security is an independent group capable of saying yes or saying no?” Sarkozy, Discours du Président de la République devant le Parlement hongrois.

<sup>128</sup> Andrews, ‘The United States and its Atlantic partners’, p. 74, Hofmann and Kempin, ‘France and the Transatlantic Relationship’, p. 5.

followed the bitter disagreements over the war in Iraq, however, is seen by many as more severe and deeper than previous ones and therefore likely to last longer or even become permanent.<sup>129</sup> In the wake of this crisis, many in France seem to have been convinced that, despite the existence of commonly shared values and interests, Europe and America must stop pretending that they see the future in the same way and recognize the fact that they are fundamentally different.<sup>130</sup>

## II. Germany

Germany has traditionally been a staunch American ally in Europe after 1945. Its close relations with France on the other hand, have been the foundation of European integration. Special ties with both America and France feature high on the agenda of Germany's political rulers.<sup>131</sup> A strong American presence in Europe is also among the priorities of German foreign

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<sup>129</sup> Soutou, 'Three rifts, two reconciliations: Franco-American relations during the Fifth Republic', p. 102. Following this particular analysis, there are four major obstacles in the way of a real reconciliation between France and America: differing theories of foreign policy (France is not interested in close bilateral cooperation even on terms favourable to it and prefers a true multipolar world order which would reduce the so-called excessive and unbalanced power of the US), diverging geopolitical interests (France sees US foreign policy as a problem in its effort to gain world political, economic and cultural influence by taking the leadership of Europe through a strong Franco-German link), clashing ideologies (the French like to see themselves as the defenders of distinct French and European values which are coming under attack by the forces of American-inspired globalization) and finally, lack of domestic support for strong French-American cooperation (a strong constituency, either on the left or on the right, for good Franco-American relations does not exist in France any more or at best is too widely dispersed to be influential). *Ibid.*, pp. 114-123.

<sup>130</sup> Hofmann and Kempin, 'France and the Transatlantic Relationship', pp. 5-6.

<sup>131</sup> "Close relations with both the US and France are fundamental to Germany's *raison d'état*. Whenever Germany felt pressure to choose between these two partners – just remember the heated debates about the 1963 Elysee Treaty – it successfully resisted the temptation. We have succeeded in maintaining these two vital links and developing them in parallel, and we will continue to do so in the future". Fischer, 'Towards a new transatlantic partnership: The United States, Germany and Europe in an era of global challenges'.

policy.<sup>132</sup> In recent years however, fundamental shifts in the direction of German foreign policy have occurred. In the aftermath of these shifts, analysts find that today's united Germany is becoming politically more distant from the US.<sup>133</sup> Since Germany constitutes Europe's "real pivot"<sup>134</sup>, this development could have serious repercussions for the entirety of EU-US relations. German officials are far more critical of US policies than they used to be in the not so distant past. They are particularly annoyed at US efforts to play down, and try to prevent, advances in European integration.<sup>135</sup> The tension which followed Germany's refusal to back the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq seems to have set the tone for the (short-term at least) future of US-German relations.<sup>136</sup> For some, this is a natural development as

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<sup>132</sup> "An American withdrawal would force Germany into a role in Europe, which it neither can nor wants to perform. Even if the European Union develops ever more into a self-confident, independent political player, its inner stability will still rest to a great degree on continued American commitment. The idea that after the collapse of the Soviet Union Europe is emancipating itself from and bidding farewell to its American partner and 'security lender of last resort' is fundamentally wrong. Those who believed that NATO's very success would lead to its insignificance had to learn a bitter lesson from the bloody wars in the Balkans".  
*Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> Livingston, 'Terms of Endearment: US – German Relations'.

<sup>134</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 73.

<sup>135</sup> While warning Europeans in 2001 to refrain from formulating policies which could duplicate NATO and reduce its effectiveness, Donald Rumsfeld 'forgot' to use the words 'European Union', receiving a rebuke from a German official: "It appeared that the EU was not yet on Mr. Rumsfeld's radar screen. The fact is the development of the Union's defence identity is an accelerating process that it would be a mistake to oppose." Cohen, 'Europe's Shifting Role Poses Challenges to US'. Further integration even on areas the US has made clear they could pose strains on transatlantic relations such as foreign policy and defence, seems to be non-negotiable in German political circles: "European integration must succeed in the fields where Europe can act successfully and where national efforts are not possible any more. To these belong the field of foreign and security policy". Schäuble, 'Unsere Verantwortung für Europa', p.7. "The attacks on New York have made clear to us the threat of international terrorism. Europe's political response to them cannot be that in times of need we resort to the US and at the same time be proud of our self-confidence. We need a common foreign-and security policy." Kohl, 'Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas', p.12.

<sup>136</sup> Chancellor Schröder's reluctance to contribute financially to what he termed "American adventures in Iraq" has come to be regarded a milestone in Germany's relationship with the US. Distancing himself from past practices, Schröder made clear that Germany should not be expected (by the US) to act in the way it did during the Gulf War when it helped finance the US war effort: "Such division of responsibility, which says 'The Germans are not there but they pay', does not exist any more, at least not with me". Helm, 'Schröder stakes poll chances

the EU, with Germany as its strongest member, is slowly becoming a power centre to rival the US, and the US-German relationship must change accordingly.<sup>137</sup> In fact, the shift from a relationship based on acceptance of American leadership toward one of collaboration among equal partners is sometimes deemed as the key change in German-American relations.<sup>138</sup>

Domestically, EU policies play an increasingly important role in the lives of German people making it hard for German politicians not to give Europe greater attention than the US.<sup>139</sup> Out of fear of being branded as anti-Americans, influential figures in Germany usually avoid expressing publicly their reservations about many aspects of American culture and policies.<sup>140</sup> Yet, more and more voices are calling for a Europe that is less dependent on America and German intellectuals are increasingly raising the issue of a choice between Europe and America.<sup>141</sup> Often, this is presented as a choice between Paris and Washington and more often than not analysts think that a serious German break with Paris and toward Washington is unthinkable, since

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on Iraq peace vote'. Furthermore, in an unprecedented step for a German leader, Schröder actively tried to derail American efforts to gain international support and legitimacy for the war in Iraq. Zimmermann, 'Security exporters: Germany, the United States, and transatlantic cooperation', p. 128. For those analysts who did not hesitate to brand the behaviour of Germany in the run-up to the Iraq war anti-American, the genie of anti-Americanism has been let out of the bottle of German domestic politics and it is not clear that it can be locked up once more. Andrews, 'The United States and its Atlantic partners', p. 75.

<sup>137</sup> Livingston, 'Terms of Endearment: US – German Relations'.

<sup>138</sup> Zimmermann, 'Security exporters: Germany, the United States, and transatlantic cooperation', p. 129.

<sup>139</sup> Livingston, 'Terms of Endearment: US – German Relations'. "EU membership has proved extremely beneficial to German interests and thus it should surprise no one that if pushed to choose between the US and Europe, Germany will more readily side with its EU partners."

<sup>140</sup> Nuscheler, 'Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism', pp. 2-3. The accusation of anti-Americanism, notes Nuscheler, is a put-up-or-shut-up argument designed to obstruct open dialogue, and argues that it is not only among free-floating intellectuals that such dialogue must be possible but it is also a *sine qua non* for the political elites on both sides of the Atlantic.

<sup>141</sup> Blaney, 'Friends apart: Europe and America'.

Germany has been even more thoroughly “Europeanised” than it has been “Atlanticised”.<sup>142</sup>

### *III. United Kingdom*

Britain has, for decades now, been proud of its role as America’s closest ally in Europe and its (self-proclaimed) mission to be a bridge between the US and the EU. British prime ministers have consistently refused to acknowledge the possibility of Britain having to make a choice between America and the EU. Such a choice would not be sensible for Britain, is the official mantra.<sup>143</sup> The UK’s special relationship with the United States has a long history and no other relationship, according to its staunchest proponents, can be placed above it. British euroskeptics (some of them self-appointed guardians of American interests in Europe, but most of them concerned with the gradual loss of national sovereignty), never tire of warning American policy-makers of the imminent threats America faces from a more integrated and politically united European Union.<sup>144</sup> Their sometimes vitriolic remarks leave no ‘doubt’ that, left unchecked, European integration will lead to the creation of a single state and will sow the seeds of rivalry between the US and the EU.<sup>145</sup> With no hesitation, they almost call their American friends to take immediate action: “I find, certainly in places in Washington, even amongst those who are very well informed about European affairs, a disbelief about

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<sup>142</sup> Andrews, ‘The United States and its Atlantic partners’, p. 77.

<sup>143</sup> Blair, ‘Only the bad guys will rejoice if we pull apart Europe and America’. Brown’s position is identical: “...Britain does not have to choose between America and Europe but Britain is well placed as the bridge between America and Europe.” Brown, Speech given to the CBI conference in Birmingham

<sup>144</sup> Howard, ‘Like all relationships, the one between Europe and the US needs constant attention’.

<sup>145</sup> Howard, ‘Remember Mr Blair, if America and Europe fall out, the world suffers’.

just how far the project has gone to create a United States of Europe. Be in no doubt. That is the aim. ...Do not believe a word of those who try to reassure you that this is a strange new animal a few stages from friendship, but many stages short of a central government and a super-state in the making. The architecture is the architecture of a superstate. The developments are now quite rapid. My warning to the US is that it is not a good idea for the US to be able to dial one number for Europe".<sup>146</sup> Britain's euroskeptic press rarely fails to present the EU in a negative light when compared to America. Continental Europeans are often portrayed as jealous of the freedom Americans enjoy and they do not, because it has been taken away from them by an illiberal European Union.<sup>147</sup>

Developments in Europe and America however, have led to serious doubts over the UK's ability to play the role of a mediator between the two continents.<sup>148</sup> In its effort to be a successful broker, the UK is following a foreign policy where (on the surface at least) contradictions abound. It has even been suggested that caught between a special relationship with the US and its ancient ties with Europe the UK is torn between loyalties, not sure where its ultimate self-interests might lie.<sup>149</sup> On the one hand London is

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<sup>146</sup> Redwood, 'An Atlantic or a European World: Which Vision Will Prevail in the United Kingdom?'

<sup>147</sup> "Conceived in a popular uprising against autocratic government, the United States has a natural sympathy with self-rule, personal freedom and representative government. To this day, it is guided by the Jeffersonian ideal that decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the people they affect. The EU, of course, is founded on the opposite principle, that of 'ever-closer union'. No wonder its peoples sometimes resent their more successful cousins." The Daily Telegraph, 'To hate America is to hate mankind'.

<sup>148</sup> In the lead-up to the Iraq war, for instance, Blair assured the American president that he could convince the German Chancellor to abandon his objections and join the American led coalition. His spectacular failure to do so was a serious blow to the perception of Britain as a bridge between America and Europe. Wallace and Oliver, 'A bridge too far: the United Kingdom and the transatlantic relationship', p. 172.

<sup>149</sup> Rifkin, 'The European Dream', p. 311.

sharing intelligence with the US and other English-speaking allies, such as Australia and Canada that it does not share with its European allies.<sup>150</sup> On the other hand, trying to boost its European credentials, it is promoting the creation of an autonomous EU defence capability despite the fact that Washington has invariably interpreted such moves as direct threats to NATO.<sup>151</sup> In reality, while Britain rarely passes up an opportunity to prove its loyalty to Washington, the same is not the case with the EU.<sup>152</sup> Even when seen at the forefront of integration efforts, i.e. in the field of defense, Britain is met with distrust from its European allies and is often accused of trying to promote hidden agendas. Tony Blair himself has admitted that much of his enthusiasm for new European projects stemmed from his belief that “if Britain is powerless within Europe, that is not helpful to us with the Americans”.<sup>153</sup> The assumption, both in the US and the UK, is that the more Britain integrates in the EU the more powerful its voice in the US will be.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Rachman, ‘Is the Anglo-American Relationship Still Special?’, pp. 8-9.

<sup>151</sup> Walker, ‘What Europeans think of America’.

<sup>152</sup> Contrary to the French attitude of “No, unless”, the British attitude to Washington has traditionally been “Yes, but”, in the hope that Britain might be able to have an influence on the direction of American foreign policy by expressing support in public and criticism in private. Wallace and Oliver, ‘A bridge too far: the United Kingdom and the transatlantic relationship’, p. 152.

<sup>153</sup> Blair, ‘Only the bad guys will rejoice if we pull apart Europe and America’.

<sup>154</sup> Rachman, ‘Is the Anglo-American Relationship Still Special?’, p.11. The British, says Rachman, worry that Britain will cease to matter to the US if London is a fringe player in Europe, arguing that Britain’s relationship with the US is not an alternative to its relationship with Europe but is in fact dependent on continued close involvement with the EU. Blair’s interest in Europe is thus explained not by his passion for European integration but by its agony that Britain may become irrelevant in the American eyes. Brown seems to confirm this analysis: “It is a total myth that America wants Britain to detach itself from Europe. Far from Americans seeing Britain better off detached from Europe, they themselves take the view that the more influence we have in Berlin and Paris, the more influence we have in Washington.” Brown, Speech given to the CBI conference in Birmingham.

Britain relishes the idea that it plays today a very important role in EU.<sup>155</sup> Nonetheless, it has consistently failed all major tests of a “good European”.<sup>156</sup> The pace of European unification, on the one hand, and Washington’s unilateralist tendencies on the other, have placed London in a very awkward situation. Some are openly doubting that a special relationship between the US and Britain really exists.<sup>157</sup> Many are exasperated at the lack of tangible benefits for Britain.<sup>158</sup> They even wonder whether we are witnessing a return to the days of the special relationship between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan when, according to one of Thatcher’s own advisers, the UK was being reduced to the status of a client state of America.<sup>159</sup> British participation in the war in Iraq, as an unquestioning US ally, has caused widespread criticism, even from unexpected corners: “As for the pretence that Britain was an equal partner in this venture, the only references to Blair are to how much, or how little, he should be told. He was

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<sup>155</sup> “Britain has, I think, a very strong role in Europe now – in defence, in foreign policy, in economic reform, our position is transformed from where it was a few years ago”. Blair, ‘Only the bad guys will rejoice if we pull apart Europe and America’.

<sup>156</sup> Early membership of the euro was widely seen as the litmus test of being a “good European”. Elliot, ‘Britain between the superpowers’.

<sup>157</sup> “The phrase is certainly used far more in Great Britain than in the US. If prominent Americans hear the term, they might be forgiven for looking slightly blank.” Rachman, ‘Is the Anglo-American Relationship Still Special?’, pp.7-8. Just before the Bush administration came into power it was made clear to the British government that the new government would have no sentimental attachment to Britain, and warm relations between the two would depend on the degree of loyalty of London to Washington. Wallace and Oliver, ‘A bridge too far: the United Kingdom and the transatlantic relationship’, p. 168. Furthermore, one is reminded that Anglo-American relations only became “special” after 1945 when it was obvious that the United Kingdom had become much inferior to the US and not before 1940, when Britain was in a much stronger position. Lundestad, ‘Toward transatlantic drift?’, p. 28.

<sup>158</sup> As an official in the British ministry of defence put it in the run up to the Iraq war: “In order to help the US war effort, we are spending large amounts of money, for example by providing air tankers for US aircraft, and we are putting the lives of our special forces at risk. And yet, in return, the Americans do not listen to a word we say and frequently create difficulties, whether on the organisation of the peacekeeping force in Kabul or any other military matter. I have to ask whether it is in the national interest that we should go on offering such unstinting support”. Grant, ‘Powerless Europe’.

<sup>159</sup> Denman, ‘Blair’s Tune Isn’t What the Continent Wants to Hear’.

not just Bush's poodle, but one with neither bite nor bark."<sup>160</sup> A few commentators have even dared to raise the issue of the challenges which excessive American influence poses for UK sovereignty.<sup>161</sup> Moreover, London's European allies firmly reject the idea that their links with Washington "should be built through London."<sup>162</sup> To increasing numbers of Britons, therefore, the idea that their country does not have to make a choice between closer integration with Europe and a special relationship with the US is an illusion.<sup>163</sup>

#### *IV. America's worsening image*

It is gradually becoming clear that it is not mainly through common actions but through common reactions that a certain degree of uniformity in

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<sup>160</sup> Jenkins, Lies, damn lies. Before the war Blair had tried to make the Bush administration commit on three important issues, namely the effective, efficient and responsible reconstruction of Iraq, the UN involvement in it and the US intervention in the Israel-Palestine conflict. On all these fronts Blair had little, if any, success. Wallace and Oliver, 'A bridge too far: the United Kingdom and the transatlantic relationship', pp. 172-173.

<sup>161</sup> Colley, 'We fret over Europe, but the real threat to sovereignty has long been the US'.

<sup>162</sup> Wallace, 'The collapse of British foreign policy', p. 55. Such attitudes on the British side might even be seen as insulting: "It has always been an illusion that France, or Germany, or other major European states would accept this claim for a privileged British position-in which, to extend Harold Macmillan's wartime analogy, the British act as Greeks to the imperial/American Romans, while the continental Europeans are the other subject peoples on whose behalf they speak." *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56. Even prominent British figures, such as former foreign secretary Malcolm Rifkind, have admitted that "any bridge will be very unstable if it leans too much in one direction", while Gerhard Schröder has famously remarked that traffic across the bridge nearly always seemed to be in one direction. Wallace and Oliver, 'A bridge too far: the United Kingdom and the transatlantic relationship', p. 176. Besides, this *leitmotif* of the bridge appears in the eyes of many as intrinsically hubristic. Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 45.

<sup>163</sup> Rachman, 'Is the Anglo-American Relationship Still Special?', p.11. Some in Britain share the French position that the EU must develop into a superpower capable of 'standing up' to the US. They argue that Britain is much more likely to play a leading role within Europe where it will be one of several big powers than in a transatlantic relationship, in which Britain would inevitably be the junior partner. They talk derisively of the pro-US camp wanting to turn Britain into 'the fifty-first state'. *Ibid.*, p.13. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Iraqi war when Britain tried to rebuild relations with France and Germany, voices were heard in Washington calling Britain to choose between its transatlantic and European links rather than to balance between them. Wallace and Oliver, 'A bridge too far: the United Kingdom and the transatlantic relationship', p. 153.

European attitudes towards the US is starting to emerge; reactions to America's unilateralism, triumphalism and its obsession to perpetuate a unipolar world order. Even some of its most loyal European allies feel now the need to warn the US that no state in the long run can go on alone and friendless.<sup>164</sup> Europe wants to form a true partnership of equals with America based on consultation, dialogue, and mutual respect and not be treated as just a member of an *ad hoc* coalition shaped by the needs of the US and involved in missions decided only by the US (as is currently the case with America's 'war on terror').<sup>165</sup> The idea that the EU-US partnership cannot be anything else but a relationship between equal parties has become deeply entrenched in the European psyche and seems to be non-negotiable anymore: "Partnership implies mutual respect, fair burden-sharing, common analysis and definition of measures."<sup>166</sup> The Iraq crisis was revealing in this sense as even staunch US allies like the German Conservatives felt the need to send a clear message to American policymakers. "The US has to learn that the European Union is a partner and not a protectorate,"<sup>167</sup> was the angry reply of Edmund Stoiber to Donald Rumsfeld's comments on the division of Europe between 'new' and 'old'. Furthermore, many Europeans are irritated by America's ambivalent stance toward European integration: "You want to have your cake and eat it.

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<sup>164</sup> Stig Møller, 'United We Stand, Divided We Fall'.

<sup>165</sup> Cloos, 'Les Relations Transatlantiques: Divorce ou Renouveau?', p.437.

<sup>166</sup> Solana, Speech at the Annual Conference of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union.

<sup>167</sup> Hooper, 'Anger at Rumsfeld attack on 'old Europe''. Rumsfeld is quoted by the same source as saying: "You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't," he said. "I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire Nato Europe today, the centre of gravity is shifting to the east and there are a lot of new members."

You complain when we have no common policy but you often resent it when we do get our act together, as we are increasingly beginning to do.”<sup>168</sup>

Nowhere is Europe’s frustration and indignation at US foreign policy more evident than on the issue of NATO and its role after the end of the Cold War. Growing numbers of Europeans are viewing NATO as merely the instrument by which American hegemony over Europe is expressed.<sup>169</sup> American commentators begin to realize that “the accusation that the US behaves like a hegemonic power in relations with its allies, once heard mainly from French quarters, now echoes elsewhere in Europe”.<sup>170</sup> Many Europeans are now becoming convinced that the US does not want NATO to have a military function but just use it to keep Europe from detaching itself from US control.<sup>171</sup> Not surprisingly, they are extremely hostile to American plans to transform NATO into a new organization with political functions too.<sup>172</sup> And French ambitions to establish alternative European security structures through ESDP do not seem as ‘fanciful’ as they did just a few years ago.<sup>173</sup>

Friction also arises from ever-widening hostility among European electorates to globalisation and its ‘ugly’ consequences, as globalisation is often perceived as synonymous with Americanisation.<sup>174</sup> The results of the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands were to a substantial extent a reaction to fears that the EU is moving too much along American lines and is

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<sup>168</sup> Patten, ‘America and Europe: an essential partnership’.

<sup>169</sup> Blaney, ‘Friends Apart: Europe and America’.

<sup>170</sup> Sloan, ‘Transatlantic relations: Stormy weather on the way to enlargement?’, p.557.

<sup>171</sup> Wallerstein, ‘Why NATO?’. By this account, NATO is seen by the US as a military drag and that is the reason why the European offer of help after 11 September was quietly refused.

<sup>172</sup> Czempiel, ‘Hat die euro-atlantische Gemeinschaft eine Zukunft?’, 557.

<sup>173</sup> French leaders are confident that slowly, but steadily, developments will lead to this outcome. Hofmann and Kempin, ‘France and the Transatlantic Relationship’, p. 7.

<sup>174</sup> Lundestad, ‘Toward transatlantic drift?’, p. 24.

threatened by the American-led globalisation with its demands for unfettered capitalism. EU politicians have already started to respond to such fears. French president Sarkozy has stated that one of the main themes of his presidency will be the necessity to reorientate EU priorities and create a “Europe of protections”.<sup>175</sup> Far more serious is the divergence of opinions between the EU and the US on the issue of how to best deal with international terrorism. Many in Europe see no basis for common action and judge US foreign policy potentially more dangerous than the actual threat of international terrorism.<sup>176</sup> This stems basically from the fact that the war on terrorism is often seen in Europe as a cynical excuse for America to settle scores with whoever defies its hegemony and a plot to return the world back to the days of the Cold.<sup>177</sup>

The perceived impact of Evangelical Christian fundamentalism on US politics constitutes for most Europeans a source of worry. It is a fact, that most people in Europe do not realize the extent to which religion is a factor on the US political landscape. Some politicians have suggested that this is a problem which must be addressed decisively.<sup>178</sup> However, it seems that there is little respect in Europe for such US sensibilities. Javier Solana spoke for

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<sup>175</sup> Sauger *et al.*, *Les Français contre l'Europe?*, p. 12.

<sup>176</sup> Daalder, ‘The End of Atlanticism’, p. 40. Some Europeans do not hesitate to brand the United States the world’s “leading outlaw” and the major threat to their safety. Curtis, *Web of Deceit*, p. 436.

<sup>177</sup> Curtis, *Web of Deceit*, pp. 76-79. “Almost anyone can be labelled a sponsor of terrorism and subject to US attack or other forms of US involvement in the country’s internal affairs. As in the Cold War, the US has divided the world into those who are with it, and those against, offering rewards and punishments as appropriate.”

<sup>178</sup> Bruton, ‘Transatlantic Relations: the EU Stance’, p. 144. Focusing on the Israel/Palestine conflict, Burton, has said that “it is important for Europeans to recognize the influence of evangelical Christianity on United States public opinion and particularly on the Republican party. Evangelicals believe that the second coming of Jesus Christ can only occur once the Jewish people have been converted to Christianity. Therefore evangelicals have special religious interest in the preservation of the state of Israel. This is a reality which must be understood by European policymakers”.

the majority of Europeans when he said that for the Old Continent it is hard to come to terms with the religious undertones of the Bush administration's language: "For us Europeans, it is difficult to deal with because we are secular. We do not see the world in such black and white terms".<sup>179</sup> So, it comes as no surprise that most Europeans feel worried when they hear US officials, and especially the US president, claim that God is on America's side supporting its foreign policies.<sup>180</sup> Many analysts have come to believe that such an important difference between America and Europe on this potentially very crucial issue is actually irreconcilable.<sup>181</sup>

Many in Europe also feel increasingly irritated by the loud voices of American triumphalists who scorn the Old Continent for its 'pitiful' economic performance and its 'utopian' ideals. Most Europeans are steadfastly refusing to heed American warnings that Europe needs to copy 'tested' American recipes of lower taxation, less social protection, less state intervention, less unionized workforces, more entrepreneurial freedom, greater share-holder value, if it wants to see one day its economies take off.<sup>182</sup> They are also

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<sup>179</sup> Quoted in Dempsey, 'Europe's foreign policy chief sees widening gulf with US'.

<sup>180</sup> Sloan, 'How Does Religion Affect Relations between America and Europe?', p. 5.

François Heisbourg speaks for many in Europe, when he says that "The biblical references in politics, the division of the world between good and evil, these are things that we simply don't get. In a number of areas, it seems to me that we are no longer a part of the same civilization." *Ibid.* To press this point further Sloan provides some interesting statistics: while 59% of Americans think religion is a very important part of their lives, only 11% of French and 21% of Germans think the same. Even supposedly ultra-religious Poland does not come anywhere near the American figure: only 35% see religion as very important. And when asked if it is necessary to believe in God in order to be a moral person, only 13% of French and 25% of Britons agree, while on the other side of the Atlantic an impressive 50% seem to take a different view. In addition, Europeans rarely go to church and seem to believe that God is irrelevant to their lives.

<sup>181</sup> Mireur, 'Retour sur l'antiaméricanisme', p. 105.

<sup>182</sup> Monks, Key to the future of Europe. It is not difficult to see why Europe could never adopt such practices, according to Monks: "We are convinced there is indeed a common European Social Model, anchored in shared values and aspirations; and yes, it is different from the US, where the number of people living in poverty is currently rising by 1 million a year."

surprised by the amount and the tone of criticism they receive from Americans over the treatment of their Muslim populations and their failure to successfully integrate them into European societies. This criticism is all the more incomprehensible as the US itself does not seem to perform better on this front: a fully 57 per cent of Muslim immigrants in the US and 32 per cent of American-born Muslims would prefer to leave the country for an Islamic country if they could and 74 per cent of them would like to replace public schools with Islamic ones and only 10 per cent of them express unequivocal loyalty to the US.<sup>183</sup>

They retort that it is the American economy and the American society, which are in a terrible state and that Americans should rather concentrate on trying to come up with remedies for the numerous ills of their society and their way of living. A number of American ‘myths’, on which the superiority of the American ways is based, are passionately ‘debunked’ by European analysts: the miracle of America’s economic growth in terms of GDP, the significantly higher rates of productivity in the US which create more jobs whereas Europe is losing them, the necessity for high job insecurity, low wage-growth, and extreme inequalities in order to achieve high employment levels, and finally, the phenomenal performance of American businesses due to their commitment to shareholder value.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> Huntington, *Who Are We?*, quoted in Schuker, ‘One Nation Divisible’, p.197.

<sup>184</sup> Mark Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, pp. 72-74, explains why Europeans should not be impressed with such American claims. He writes that figures given for the growth of US GDP hide the fact that the US economy has been growing mainly because of a growing population and not thanks to better economic performance. The much praised miracle of American productivity has also a very simple explanation which does not justify any kind of US crowing: the US produces more because the Americans work longer hours. The average American worker takes only ten days’ holiday every year, while his or her European counterpart enjoys average holidays of thirty or more days (In 2004 Americans

More and more Europeans believe that the ‘American Dream’ is a fantasy or merely a propaganda tool. ‘Armed’ with arguments that have often been advanced by American economists, sociologists, political scientists and other experts, (to a great extent in order to avoid the ‘dreaded’ accusation of anti-Americanism) they increasingly focus on America’s ‘dark side’. And on many occasions, they seem to conclude that the much vaunted superiority of ‘the American way of life’ is nothing more than the product of endless and excessive ‘hype’. How can America be the land of opportunity, they wonder, when, for instance, its people have to work for so many hours, they take almost no holiday and have an increasingly limited social life? Gradually, Europeans are becoming convinced that their values and their way of life are not only extremely different from American values and practices, but they are also superior. America is seen as beset with huge, daunting problems which render it less and less attractive and desirable as a partner.

One of these problems is inequality. America is no longer the land of opportunity: “The American Dream offers the promise that if you work hard, you – or at least your children – will be rewarded with a better life. Today,

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were working fifty per cent more than people in France, Italy and Germany, Prescott, ‘Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?’, p.2. “Over his or her lifetime, the typical American works 40 percent more than the typical European. Pozzen, ‘Mind the Gap.’). When it comes to the issue of the link between higher productivity and creation of jobs, he argues that figures for the rise in US employment levels conceal the fact that almost 1 per cent of the population of the US is in prison. Countries like Sweden, Denmark, and Ireland in Europe prove that high levels of total employment do not necessarily derive from a highly deregulated job market in which high levels of inequality are an unavoidable and indeed necessary condition. Finally, the success of numerous European companies which are world leaders in their respective fields, helps dispel the myth that European businesses do not perform according to their true abilities because their commitment to shareholder value is mitigated by their responsibilities to their staff and the wider community within which they operate. Furthermore, as some economic analysts point out (see for example Brittan, ‘Europe is not so backward after all’), America and Europe may have now reached a stage of development where growth is no longer the most sensible policy objective and thus GDP growth rates should not be seen as the most reliable indicators of economic performance.

more and more Americans are working longer hours than ever, but they are not necessarily getting ahead. The American middle class is shrinking, both in absolute size and in purchasing power, while the top and bottom classes are expanding. Increasingly, the United States is dividing between a small, fabulously wealthy elite and a growing, struggling majority who must work hard simply not to fall behind.”<sup>185</sup> It is characteristic that while the US economy has been expanding, creating new wealth from 2001 to 2007 most American workers “have not shared in the growth and prosperity they have been helping to create. ...In fact, many workers’ wages have been stagnant for a number of years, after adjusting for inflation, particularly those at the middle and lower end of the pay scale.”<sup>186</sup> Not only displays the American society huge income inequalities for a developed country, but risks, if current trends persist, becoming even more unequal in coming years.<sup>187</sup> America is more economically unequal today than at any time since the Great Depression of 1929, but amazingly, there is little recognition of this fact among Americans and no alarm in US administrations over its negative consequences.<sup>188</sup> Inequality has, indeed, serious repercussions: “It reduces social mobility, ossifying the US into a class society as the rich gain a stranglehold on the elite educational qualifications that pave the way to the top while those at the bottom are trapped on low skills and low incomes. US social and income mobility is no higher than in Europe and on some measures it is actually

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<sup>185</sup> Hertsgaard, *The Eagle’s Shadow*, p. 133.

<sup>186</sup> Berstein and Mishel, ‘Economy’s Gains Fail to Reach Most Workers’ Paychecks’, p. 1. “The real wage of the typical male worker, for example, is up only 1% since 2000 and not at all since 2003. As of 2006, the median income of working-age families was down -4.2% in real terms over the cycle, a loss of -\$2,375 (2006 dollars). Poverty, at 12.3% remains 1,0 percentage point above its 2000 trough.”

<sup>187</sup> Gnesotto and Grevi, *Le Monde en 2025*, p. 155.

<sup>188</sup> Hertsgaard, *The Eagle’s Shadow*, p. 142.

worse.”<sup>189</sup> Blinded by their ideology of ‘market fundamentalism’, US policymakers pay no attention to the most ominous aspect of America’s growing inequality: the shrinking of the middle class.<sup>190</sup>

America is not only producing more poor. It turns its back on them too. Alone among industrialized countries the US puts military spending above the social and material well-being of its population: “According to the 2003 discretionary budget, total military spending amounted to 56 percent of the federal budget, compared with 6 percent for health care and education alike, 5 percent for community development, and 3 percent for miscellaneous social services.”<sup>191</sup> “The US is ruled by a military plutocracy”,<sup>192</sup> is therefore the conclusion of some foreigners. Furthermore, the US is pitilessly attacked as a ‘war-mongering’ nation, a land where the idea of war has become a national obsession and an inescapable feature of everyday life: “Even before 9/11 it (US) had waged war on over half the nations of the globe. Its economy is a war economy. Its science and technology is deeply entrenched in the military machine. It sustains and runs the most formidable war machine in history. The images and metaphors of war permeate every aspect of American society and culture – in films, television programmes, video games, fashion, children’s toys, social programmes and political rhetoric. An alliance of neo-

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<sup>189</sup> Hutton, *The World We’re In*, p. 25.

<sup>190</sup> Hertsgaard, *The Eagle’s Shadow*, pp. 142-143. Thus, they are playing with fire, argues Hertsgaard, as “throughout modern world history, it has been a secure middle class – and the belief by lower classes that they could rise to enter that class – that has kept nations politically stable and socially peaceful.” How has America reached this point? There is no mystery behind this sad situation: according to Hertsgaard: “American governments have been dominated in the last decades by people and policies that favour the well-to-do over everyone else.” *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>191</sup> Boggs, *Imperial Delusions*, pp. 32-33. Since 1945 severe cuts in Pentagon spending have been unthinkable as those who support such moves are quickly marginalized by the media and the government establishment. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>192</sup> Pilger, *The New Rulers Of The World*, p.15.

conservative ideologues, free-market right-wingers and evangelical Christians is now waging war against the social contract, the inner-city poor, pro-choice women, gays, big government and the constitutional separation between religion and the state, secular reason and religious beliefs. And to top it all we have the notion of preventive, pre-emptive war, the translation of the early-19<sup>th</sup> century Monroe Doctrine of America's right to unchallenged secure dominance in its hemisphere into a neo-conservative policy for global domination. For America war is a necessity, for war has become its reason to be."<sup>193</sup>

What many Europeans find particularly appalling about America, is the state of its democracy. America is not a democracy any more, cry many in Europe: it has become a plutocracy. It is practically impossible to win any election in America without high levels of financial backing. This is proved by the undeniable fact that the candidate with the most cash wins with depressing regularity.<sup>194</sup> A foreign observer of the 2000 presidential campaigns of the two final candidates remarked characteristically: "They called it an election but it looked like an auction."<sup>195</sup> Others call it a wealth race. Whatever the term, the essence of the matter, some argue, remains the same: "The ability to raise money is now the single most important qualification for running high office in the United States."<sup>196</sup> In addition,

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<sup>193</sup> Sardar, and Wyn Davies, *American Dream Global Nightmare*, p. 25.

<sup>194</sup> Hutton, *The World We're In*, p. 30. In 1998, for instance, 98 per cent of House incumbents and 90 per cent of Senate incumbents were re-elected as they managed, thanks to their position, to raise the most money."

<sup>195</sup> Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy*, p. 83. That is how Palast described in his bestseller the 2000 presidential election in America.

<sup>196</sup> Hertsgaard, *The Eagle's Shadow*, p. 159. And this is why and how this is happening, according to Hertsgaard: "Long before actual voters get a chance to choose among the candidates in primary elections, those candidates must succeed in what has been called the

corporation executives are increasingly and routinely receiving government posts, leading many skeptics to the conclusion that “The corporations don’t have to lobby the government anymore. They *are* the government”.<sup>197</sup> The ‘revolving-door’ exchange of personnel between military, business and government is also seen as an essential feature of the American political landscape, Democrat and Republican.<sup>198</sup> In sum, some Europeans think, “US democracy, where votes and office are increasingly bought, is an offence to democratic ideals.”<sup>199</sup>

It is becoming quite common to watch Americans being blamed by Europeans not just for what they do, but also for who they are.<sup>200</sup> The traditional assumption that “even when they are critical of the United States, Europeans retain a favourable view of Americans as people,”<sup>201</sup> does not look so firm any more.<sup>202</sup> America is being castigated as morally, socially and

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‘wealth primary’ – the race to prove one’s fund-raising clout. Without it, the media do not take a candidate’s chances seriously and so withhold the coverage needed to make him or her known to voters. Of course, to raise a war chest, a candidate must convince potential donors that he or she deserves their support. This fact gives an enormous amount of political power to the nation’s richest individuals. The richest 4 percent of the population provide nearly 100 percent of all individual campaign contributions. These people are not monolithic in their views, but they tend to support policies that will preserve their privileges, such as high-end tax breaks and a corporate-friendly approach to government regulation. Non-individual contributions come from labour unions and corporations. Since corporations’ contributions outnumber labor’s by seven to one, the well-off maintain an overwhelming advantage.”

<sup>197</sup> Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy*, p. 86.

<sup>198</sup> Sardar, and Wyn Davies, *American Dream Global Nightmare*, p. 17.

<sup>199</sup> Hutton, *The World We’re In*, p. 2.

<sup>200</sup> Lundestad, ‘Toward transatlantic drift?’, p. 25.

<sup>201</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 91.

<sup>202</sup> George Walden, a former British diplomat, clearly states, for example, in the first pages of his book that, “my own book contains criticism of America’s religious traditions, its current government and its people.” Walden, *God Won’t Save America*, p. 11. The reasons he gives for this choice, seem to be in agreement with what many Europeans think in private but do not admit in public: “Confining responsibility for the state of a society and its conduct abroad to governments is another way of avoiding the truth about national temperaments, but it won’t do. If it were true The People would be absolved from all culpability (and denied all praise) for their country’s behaviour. It makes no sense to treat grown-up people like children, playing down their faults and talking up their successes, to make them feel good about themselves. A character in a Martin Amis novel remarked that he couldn’t understand how

culturally reactionary and retrograde for practicing the death penalty on its soil, for its gun culture, for its neglect of the poor, its poor public infrastructure, its addiction to fatty fast food and tawdry mass entertainment.<sup>203</sup> Having reached their conclusions about the (un)attractiveness of ‘America’s ways’, Europeans can freely start marvelling at the greatness of their own systems and values. They should feel really privileged, they are told, because they have the better of two worlds: “If America represents the freedom of the individual to consume, and Asia the importance of social stability, Europe allows its people the best of both. It combines the energy and freedom of liberalism with the stability and welfare of social democracy.”<sup>204</sup> Thus, it is hardly surprising that people in Europe think that in terms of quality of life the Old Continent is certainly better than the United States.<sup>205</sup> Europe’s arguably biggest success, however, lies in attaining something that American experts still believe that cannot be achieved, certainly cannot last and ultimately cannot but fail: the ability to combine the high growth rates and freedoms of capitalism with the civilized values of security and welfare.<sup>206</sup> Europe is increasingly portrayed as the exact

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Mrs Thatcher became Prime Minister because no one he had ever met had voted for her. There can be a similar reluctance to face the fact that, like it or not, Americans indisputably voted (in 2004 at least) for George W. Bush to be their President. However you hedge it about this tells us something about the United States. The peculiarities of nations, good and bad, tend to reflect the temperaments and qualities of their peoples. As Plato remarked, where else would they have come from?” *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>203</sup> Lundestad, ‘Toward transatlantic drift?’, p. 25, Hodgson, ‘Anti-Americanism and American Exceptionalism’, p. 32.

<sup>204</sup> Leonard, ‘Europe’s transformative power’.

<sup>205</sup> Eurobarometer 64, p. 143.

<sup>206</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 71.

opposite of America: a land of tolerance, with a sense of community, taste and manners.<sup>207</sup>

#### 4. A post-realist Europe

The principles that determine EU's involvement in world affairs are mainly dictated by Europe's awful experiment with power politics and the belief that globalisation poses new challenges that cannot be met by traditional thinking. Few today question the assertion that the "EU has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance which transcends Westphalian norms".<sup>208</sup> In fact, the core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was, and still is, a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and hegemonic ambitions of individual states; a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions.<sup>209</sup> Not only has Europe rejected the idea of balance-of-power politics, but it has even succeeded in reversing it, as some analysts suggest. Indeed, neighbouring countries seem to be keener on joining the EU than balancing it and while EU member states might try to balance each other, no state would try to check the Union's rise.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Lundestad, 'Toward transatlantic drift?', p. 25. Although Lundestad concedes that much of this is pure caricature, he nevertheless points out that Americans and Europeans do appear to be moving apart culturally and he fears that in the long run public opinion on such issues can carry a particularly decisive weight.

<sup>208</sup> Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', p.240.

<sup>209</sup> Fischer, 'European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany's responsibility at the centre of Europe'. And since Europe rejects power politics for itself it rejects it for the world too.

<sup>210</sup> Leonard, , *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p. 27.

The view that nationalism fed Europe's destruction throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century is widely held in Europe.<sup>211</sup> European leaders and electorates seem to have come to terms with the idea that the days of the traditional nation-state have long been numbered and integration is the only way forward for a peaceful and prosperous Europe: "The time of the nation state of the old type is over for good. We have learnt from the experiences of two world wars that a return in that past would have terrible consequences."<sup>212</sup> This does not mean that European states will be erased from the map. Despite potent external symbols such as a flag, an anthem and passport, the EU constitutes, at the moment at least, more of a decentralized network, (a skeletal organization which leaves real power to its members), than a traditional nation-state in the making.<sup>213</sup>

Gradually, European states have ceased to perceive the world as an incurably anarchic environment where nation states, as major actors, struggle to maximize their power and promote their narrowly defined interests using

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<sup>211</sup> Hoagland, 'In France, Time Is Money'. Leading European philosophers, like Habermas, hold that the dangerous logic of nationalism lies at the heart of today's euroskepticism, making the need for more integration even more imperative. McCormick, *Weber, Habermas, and Transformations of the European State*, p. 213.

<sup>212</sup> Kohl, 'Der Euro und die Zukunft Europa's', pp. 16-17. This does not mean that notions such as national sovereignty and patriotism are incompatible with the new line of thinking; they do, however, take a whole new meaning: National sovereignty can retain some substance only through the exercise of pooled sovereignty given the international balance of power and the almost mathematical need to combine national ambitions to cope with the scale of the challenges. Patriotism, one of our shared values, is bound to blossom as our nations enrich each other. Our nations are not being asked to sacrifice their history or their traditions. What they are being asked to do is to build on their synergies for purposes accepted by all. This is the political pact that must unite us. Delors, 'European integration and security', p. 106.

<sup>213</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p. 25. Leonard clearly follows here in the footsteps of Alan Milward's *The European rescue of the nation-state*. Even ardent supporters of European integration, such as Habermas, claim that European laws do not pose a serious threat to the sovereignty of individual European states; on the contrary, they argue, the dynamics of contemporary capitalism have a far more erosive impact on state sovereignty than European law, and they go as far as to suggest that it is the European Union that is going to save the state from itself. McCormick, *Weber, Habermas, and Transformations of the European State*, p. 212.

whatever means they think necessary. Instead, they have developed a method of cooperation and integration that favours the law and compromise rather than relations of power and have ceased to view the international environment as a Hobbesian world where the powerful dominate the weak and where conflicts are resolved with recourse to arms.<sup>214</sup>

The notion of national interests has not become obsolete in a post-realist Europe. Naturally, the members of the EU have not given up the pursuit of national interests but have radically altered the definition of the national interest in order to reflect their new understanding of international realities: “Nations will always pursue what they believe to be their national interests. But what is that interest in the modern world? And what should be the primary purpose of foreign policy? Is it defensive: to keep bad guys down and to defend the homeland? Or is it positive: to build a system of co-operative global governance and international community legitimised by representative institutions and by the rule of law?”<sup>215</sup> The need for a broader definition of the ‘national interest’ is therefore imperative: “11 September stands as a symbol of the fact that we now well and truly live in one world, that no country, either in America or Europe, is invulnerable any longer, and that we can no longer afford to close our eyes to “failing states” and “black

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<sup>214</sup> Cloos, ‘Les Relations Transatlantiques: Divorce ou Renouveau?’, p.435. Indeed, a civilian power aims at transforming international relations from their supposedly natural state of anarchy to civility. Maull, ‘Europe and the new balance of global order’, p. 780.

<sup>215</sup> Patten, ‘America and Europe: an essential partnership’. That was, writes Patten, the logic behind the thinking of Europe’s founding fathers who sought not just reconciliation on the European continent, but partnership at a deeper level: a union that would endure because it was rooted in fundamental structures rather than in alliance or deterrence. A community. The question that Europe and America now face is whether this insight has wider application.

holes” within the political and social systems of our planet”.<sup>216</sup> Issues which had previously not featured high on the agenda of political leaders are now being viewed in a new light and addressing them has become a matter of urgency: “Defend sustainability, because no-one benefits in the end if we unravel the ecological fabric our livelihoods depend on; and global responsibility, because those with access to the benefits of globalisation will not reap more than short term rewards unless they also make sure that access is shared more widely. The trade system will only be politically and economically sustainable if it is also environmentally and socially sustainable.”<sup>217</sup>

Multilateralism constitutes one of the core elements of European thinking on international affairs and multipolarity is favoured as a much more stable foundation for world peace. Nurtured by national sensibilities and the day-to-day operation of the European Union, a process of negotiation, influence and compromise leading to a consensus as a precondition for action has become deeply rooted in European diplomatic culture.<sup>218</sup> Therefore, it seems that the contrast between Europe’s and America’s worldviews could not be greater. At the moment when Americans relish the advantages of *realpolitik* and make little or no use of multilateral instruments, Europeans try to prove to the rest of the world that this kind of approach to international affairs is not only doomed but also dangerous.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Fischer, ‘European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany’s responsibility at the centre of Europe’.

<sup>217</sup> Hain, ‘The End of Foreign Policy?’.

<sup>218</sup> Andréani, ‘Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship after the Iraq Crisis’, p. 51.

<sup>219</sup> Cloos, ‘Les Relations Transatlantiques: Divorce ou Renouveau?’, p.435.

Europe is in effect turning its back on realism. Its goal on world stage is to facilitate the emergence of a multipolar world based on the principles that helped to create a successful EU: “Not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. The most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is. The EU can be conceptualised as a changer of norms in the international system and the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system. The EU seeks to redefine international norms in its own image”.<sup>220</sup> In this sense, the ultimate goal of the EU must be to secure its existence. Europeans are urged to take their share of the responsibility for peace and development in the world.<sup>221</sup> As a first task, they should encourage regional cooperation.<sup>222</sup> Then, see the instruments of international governance made more effective.<sup>223</sup>

The assertion that American predominance is a prerequisite for global peace and stability is not widely shared in Europe. European leaders claim that the world is gradually acknowledging the contribution Europe’s intervention in world affairs can make to global stability and prosperity: “None more than the EU and the European nations have invested in financial support, help with reconstruction, dialogue or mediations in conflict regions in the world. My diplomatic travels during the European presidency have taught me that countries all over the world expect precisely this approach from our

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<sup>220</sup> Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, p.252. This is clearly displayed in the text of the EU’s rejected constitution, whose language is “one of universalism, making it clear that its focus is not a people, or a territory, or a nation, but rather the human race and the planet we inhabit”. Rifkin, ‘The European Dream’, p. 213.

<sup>221</sup> Prodi, Speech at the Opening session of the Convention on the future of Europe.

<sup>222</sup> Patten, ‘America and Europe: an essential partnership’. “Nations states will survive but international relations cannot be managed by 189 nations”.

<sup>223</sup> Blair, ‘Consolidating the European Union’.

continent. Europeans are asked more and more to deliver peace.<sup>224</sup> Peace, in this context, cannot always be delivered through the display and use of ‘hard power’.

While a number of American analysts insist that Europeans negotiate because they are weak with no military power and therefore they have no alternative, many in Europe just wonder: “How much use is ‘full spectrum dominance’ when dealing with failed states in the greater Middle East and Central Asia, or anchoring Russia in a westward direction, or managing China’s integration into the global system? Has America’s military dominance secured a peace deal between Israelis and Palestinians? What use has US hard power been in evoking trust and respect instead of resentment?”<sup>225</sup> This point is also made by the most ardent supporters of the idea of the EU as a superpower. For them the fate of the post-1960s Soviet Union offers the stark lesson that “military power itself, even a massive and feared military machine, does not a superpower make.”<sup>226</sup> Indeed, a wide range of problems in today’s world seem to defy conventional methods of dealing with them: “Modern problems do not respond to traditional diplomatic solutions. How effective can a domestic Government campaign against HIV/AIDS be when last year three quarters of British victims were infected whilst travelling in Africa? How can we mobilise against global warming or illegal drug use, when the cause is not some hostile power’s ambition or greed

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<sup>224</sup> Verhofstadt, ‘Europe’s Response After September the 11<sup>th</sup>’.

<sup>225</sup> Everts, ‘Some strategies work better than force’. What really matters, therefore, is not the number of planes or precision-guided weapons the US has but how good it is at solving problems.. Hain, ‘The End of Foreign Policy?’

<sup>226</sup> Haseler, ‘Super-State’, p.177. The Iraq quagmire, Haseler, continues, where US military power has proved inadequate to deal with ‘asymmetric warfare’, further stresses this argument. And since, ultimately, it is social strength at home that counts, it is a mistake to judge Europe’s future power and security by military spending.

but all our individual consumer decisions?”<sup>227</sup> However, few in Europe would argue that it is wrong to believe that peace sometimes has to be secured or won through armed conflict. Indeed, Europeans are not pacifists; they just believe that military power on its own cannot solve all problems and that a clear political and diplomatic strategy is a prerequisite for the use of military force.<sup>228</sup> European military capabilities are therefore a necessity. Moreover, it would be self-defeating for Europe to ignore international reality when it comes to new threats or the limits of multilateral institutions or international law and categorically deny the use of force.<sup>229</sup> Thus Europe is not expected to refrain from using force in times of need and when certain conditions are met. This is something that is clearly recognised and stipulated in the text of the ESS: if we want international organisations and treaties to play their role against the threats to peace and international security we must be ready to react when their rules are not respected.<sup>230</sup> Even with such capabilities developed, however, Europe would still be less keen to use force to intervene in the world, as an array of other means would certainly be deployed first.<sup>231</sup>

## 5. Conclusion

The end of the Cold War was greeted in Europe as the harbinger of a transition to a new multipolar order within which Europe would stand next to America as an equal partner. For many this is just wishful thinking as Europe

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<sup>227</sup> Hain, ‘The End of Foreign Policy?’

<sup>228</sup> Ischinger, ‘Pax Americana and Pax Europea’, p. 88.

<sup>229</sup> Chopin, *L’Amérique et l’Europe : La Dérive des Continents?*, pp. 122-123.

<sup>230</sup> European Council, ‘A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy’.

<sup>231</sup> Europe’s interventions are unique since they can mobilize simultaneously aid, trade and development assistance along with Europe’s armies of diplomats, police, aid-workers, magistrates and election monitors. Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p.68.

is beset with internal problems such as an underperforming economy, aging populations, lack of direction, the disaffection of its own citizens. Such criticism however, is only marginally justified. The European Union is today a powerful actor with a global presence. The impression exists among many circles that in recent years the project of European integration has stalled or, even worse, is about to start to unravel. A number of developments, it is argued, seem to justify such views: Europe's Constitutional Treaty was rejected in 2005 by French and Dutch voters, the war in Iraq brought to the open the deep divisions of Europeans, the EU's democratic deficit keeps growing, the special relationship between France and Germany seems to have run its course and the opponents of further integration are presented with new opportunities to put an end to it. Nevertheless, further integration is not only feasible but appears to be inevitable too. European publics are in favour of it and it should not be forgotten that history shows that integration usually follows periods of crises. The introduction of the common currency stands as proof of this. Furthermore, the close Franco-German partnership still remains the linchpin of European integration, the spillover effect of integration is still at work and those who oppose integration have so far had little success in prevent it. External factors, such as American unilateralism and the process of globalisation, also offer incentives to Europeans to pull more resources together.

In the absence of a common 'US policy', EU-US relations are determined to a great degree by the relationship between the US and the EU's three biggest member-states. Relations between Paris and Washington are

often tense, reflecting general EU-US disagreements. Berlin is also showing signs of becoming more distant from Washington, reversing a long tradition of strong US-German ties. London, always eager to play the role of bridge between Europe and America, is coming under pressure to show a stronger commitment to the European project at the expense of its special relationship with Washington. America's soft power is fading dramatically in Europe and even staunch Atlanticists have started to feel uneasy about American policies which consistently fail to treat Europe as an equal partner. Europeans often blame America for the negative effects of globalisation, which many perceive as Americanisation. They are also worried about a number of domestic trends in the US which have, in their opinion, a negative impact on America's foreign policies, such as American triumphalism and Christian fundamentalism. At the same time they turn even more critical of the American society and its various ills, such as high levels of inequality and crime.

Whereas realists feel confident that their analysis can offer valuable insights in the making and execution of American policies, in the case of the EU they feel they have very little to say. European integration is indeed a puzzle for realists as it contradicts nearly all their basic tenets. As they often admit, "the interest displayed by the European countries in the EU creates a problem for realist theory."<sup>232</sup> Their predictions about the collapse of order in Europe and the return to a state of relative anarchy in the aftermath of the Cold War have displayed, according to many analysts, the limits of their

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<sup>232</sup> Andreatta, 'Theory and the European Union's International Relations', p. 25. Waltz, for instance, has termed European integration an exceptional event.

analysis: “Indeed, the depth and breadth of inter-state integration, the central role played by the institutions of the EU in promoting and sustaining cooperation, the asymmetric payoffs of cooperation, the bandwagoning behaviour of states within the EU and Eastern Europe, and the pacifying effects of functional interdependence all question neorealist predictions about state behaviour.”<sup>233</sup> The impact of realism on the analysis of the EU and its policies has, therefore, been very limited: “For much of the last two decades, neorealism has been the single most influential paradigm in International Relations. It is therefore something of an anomaly that it has had so little impact on the study of EU foreign and security policy co-operation.”<sup>234</sup>

Constructivist approaches, on the other hand, seem to have much more to offer. The ideational factors which lie at the heart of constructivist analysis are often in a position to explain certain processes and outcomes in European politics: “The lessons of history and memory are important in shaping the conscience of nations and in influencing national and supranational preferences in many political spheres – in particular, those linked to the identity and international status of the political subject in question.”<sup>235</sup> Indeed, constructivists can offer particularly plausible arguments on issues such as the identity of the EU and its international role: “According to constructivist theories of international relations, ideas, ideational factors, ‘social purposes’ and the self-images of actors both influence political action and are issues of power conflicts. ...scholars and a part of public opinion support the idea of ‘Europe as the world’s Scandinavia’ – emphasizing both the socio-economic

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<sup>233</sup> Collard-Wexler, ‘Integration Under Anarchy’, p. 427.

<sup>234</sup> Hyde-Price, ‘‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique’, p. 218.

<sup>235</sup> Telò, *Europe: a Civilian Power?*, p. 224.

content of the external influence of the European model of society which can balance freedom, justice and solidarity, and the commitment to the UN. The foundation of the concept of the EU's special mission, of its 'international political responsibility' or 'historical memory' of past tragedies is underpinning an idea of Europe as a normative power."<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> Ibid, p. 222.

## Chapter Four

### *Enlargement and European Integration*

#### 1. Disintegration *ante portas*?

The Union's expansion to the East has raised the spectre of political paralysis. It has been predicted that "under the existing system of decision making, the move toward including twenty-five or more members of the Union would reduce dramatically the likelihood that a qualified majority in coalitions needed for important decisions could be achieved."<sup>1</sup> With an increased level of diversity after enlargement, diversity of interests is bound to follow; member states will be pursuing different and often irreconcilable goals complicating even further the decision-making process, especially in areas where unanimity is required.<sup>2</sup> The new members will be rather unwilling to show much appetite for compromise in decision-making, having made already big sacrifices in their efforts to conform to western European standards in the lead-up to accession.<sup>3</sup>

We are also warned that the big-versus-small-states debate will become sharper after enlargement when the number of countries with populations under 20 million will more than double to 19.<sup>4</sup> Large states will have greater difficulty in introducing and materializing the reforms that promote their interests and as a result, they would be inclined to toy with the

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<sup>1</sup> Quaisser and Hall, 'Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement', p. 46.

<sup>2</sup> Mayhew, 'A certain idea of Europe: Can European integration survive eastern enlargement?', p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Sauer et al, *Les Français contre l'Europe?*, p. 135.

<sup>4</sup> Fuller, 'The next Europe: As EU grows, some fear it will burst'.

idea of a multi-speed Europe, forming groups within which their primacy could be restored.<sup>5</sup> Such a development, however, would have very negative consequences. It would destroy the idea of European solidarity and would make impossible, by some analyses, the emergence on the global scene of the EU as a global power.<sup>6</sup> Besides, many doubt its feasibility. The requirement, they state, that non-participating members must acquiesce for such a move to take place, has little chances of being met.<sup>7</sup> The EU's alleged democratic deficit is also likely to deteriorate.<sup>8</sup>

The Franco-German alliance, which has served as the locomotive of European political integration in the last decades, is expected to be dealt a severe blow as well: "The enlargement of the European Union will also upset traditional alliances, including the already shaky German-French axis that steered the EU during the past few decades."<sup>9</sup> In post-enlargement EU a common Franco-German front will not even be necessary for the promotion of new initiatives and new members will be able to form alliances with other old members in order to further their own interests.<sup>10</sup> Others find such predictions rather sanguine warning about even more dramatic consequences: "The Franco-German condominium was already showing strains when Europe had

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<sup>5</sup> Baun, 'Intergovernmental Politics', p. 137.

<sup>6</sup> Toulémon, 'La tentation de l'Europe à la carte', p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Grabbe and Guérot, 'Could a hard core run the enlarged EU?', p. 4. The adherents of this position also add that the idea of a core Europe should not be associated with federalist structures and ambitions anymore but with a form of reinforced intergovernmentalism.

<sup>8</sup> Fukuyama, 'Does "the West" still exist?', p. 158. Fukuyama uses a unique argument to explain his prediction: "There is a significant democracy deficit at the European level, one that exacerbates existing democracy deficits at the member-state level. This is the source of much of the backlash against further European integration, which is seen as weakening local powers in favor of unmovable bureaucrats in Brussels. The problem will become even more severe with enlargement, as states from Eastern Europe enter the Union with very different expectations and experiences".

<sup>9</sup> Fuller, 'The next Europe: As EU grows, some fear it will burst'.

<sup>10</sup> Grabbe, 'What the New Member States Bring Into the European Union', p. 80.

only twelve members, but with enlargement to include the states of Eastern Europe, the ability of France and Germany to control the EU would slip fast".<sup>11</sup> Such a move will take place, they contend, because other members do not back their policy preferences and they do not trust them to act in the general interest of the Union on sensitive issues like EU-US relations.<sup>12</sup> Even some French commentators seem to be resigned to an inevitable weakening of the influence of the Franco-German duo, mainly because of a much more isolated France in a Union of nearly 30 members.<sup>13</sup> Germany is depicted as the big winner of enlargement, both thanks to its geographical position and the substantial economic benefits which is expected to gain.<sup>14</sup>

A new opportunity will be created, according to some British analysts, for Britain to take the lead in the new EU as signs emerge that "the British view of Europe as a loosely organized grouping of nations, rather than a Community –and a grouping, moreover, with close ties to the United States– may be attracting support, especially among the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe."<sup>15</sup> Thus, Britain's goal of slowing down European integration could probably be seen as more attainable after enlargement.<sup>16</sup>

Consequently, any thought of an EU being built along federalist lines after enlargement will be rendered utopian. Political unity will remain elusive.

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<sup>11</sup> Fukuyama, 'Does "the West" still exist?', p. 148.

<sup>12</sup> Grabbe and Guérot, 'Could a hard core run the enlarged EU?', p. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Sauger *et al.*, *Les Français contre l'Europe?*, pp. 131-135.

<sup>14</sup> Nugent, 'The EU and the 10 + 2 Enlargement Round', p. 6.

<sup>15</sup> Bogdanor, 'Footfalls echoing in the memory. Britain and Europe: the historical perspective', p. 700. Bogdanor, like many other British scholars, contends that the accession of these countries in the EU should not be interpreted as an embrace of European supranationalism but as the declaration of their independence from Russia.

<sup>16</sup> Nugent, 'The EU and the 10 + 2 Enlargement Round', p. 6.

The already overly complex and highly bureaucratized structures of European integration will be further complicated by the EU's expansion.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, enlargement could provoke a legitimacy crisis for the EU if the benefits which have been predicted and promised to the populations of the new members will not be sufficiently apparent soon enough after accession.<sup>18</sup> A long and demanding transition period that offers few tangible benefits, could thus have a very negative impact on peoples' perceptions of European integration in general and the positive role of the EU in particular.

Public skepticism over the costs of enlargement in both Eastern and Western Europe poses as one of the most serious threats to a successful enlargement of the EU and integration of the new members into the Union. Other unpleasant developments are also predicted. For example, analysts warn that increased levels of crime should be expected as an unavoidable result of enlargement.<sup>19</sup> While acknowledging that the road to Eastern enlargement is paved with good intentions, some analysts are concerned over the high levels of anxiety among the public, regretting the fact that "the public's level of sophistication tends to be underappreciated by Europe's leaders," who fail to understand public skepticism as a well-founded uncertainty regarding people's personal finances as well as their collective future as Europeans.<sup>20</sup> People in EU-15 are anxious over the impact of competition from low-wage

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<sup>17</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 95. These structures will be reminiscent of a giant economic conglomerate, predicts Brzezinski, and will not be able to evoke the popular sentiment necessary for a political vocation. Therefore, at least for some time to come, the EU as such will be much more a reality economically than politically. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>18</sup> Mather, 'The Citizenry: Legitimacy and Democracy', p. 113.

<sup>19</sup> Quaisser and Hall, 'Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement', p.9.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

economies and the possible influx of cheap migrant labour.<sup>21</sup> Large numbers of Germans and Austrians, for instance, were dominated before 2004 by fear of an oncoming “Übersiedlungstrom”, a ‘flood’ of migrants, from neighbouring Central and Eastern European countries.<sup>22</sup> Such fears became even more accentuated in the few countries, such as Britain, who placed no restriction on the free movement of the newcomers’ citizens. On the eve of enlargement, most of the British media – and certainly the ones with the greatest circulation – were preparing the public for an unprecedented ‘invasion’ by eastern Europeans: “Readers of best-selling British newspapers must have the strong impression that the EU’s eastward enlargement is primarily about migration. Britain has ‘an open door to welfare tourists’, according to the Daily Mail, which claimed that ‘...as many as 100,000 gypsies were reported to be ready to come here once they became EU citizens’. Then came the health warnings: ‘Sick migrants will swamp our wards’, warned the Sun. ...The broadcast media – even the BBC – followed the tabloid agenda to a large extent.”<sup>23</sup> While initial estimations were not at all alarming, two years after enlargement the British government had to admit with a certain degree of embarrassment - and under the pressure of an angry press which was drawing public attention to the potential pressure of such an influx of people on jobs, wages, housing and social services - that 600,000

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<sup>21</sup> Amatto and Batt, ‘Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border’, pp.6-7. For an overview of EU-15 public fears over the economic impact of enlargement, see Barysch, ‘East versus West? The EU economy after enlargement’.

<sup>22</sup> Quaisser and Hall, ‘Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement’, p.9. Every second Austrian was worried in 2003 about EU enlargement; only 20 per cent thought that enlargement would be a positive development and 70 per cent feared that cheap labour from accession countries would take over their jobs. Akule, ‘Austrians fear for jobs after EU enlargement’.

<sup>23</sup> Grabbe, ‘Where are the Eastern Hordes?’, p. 1.

people from eastern Europe had moved to the UK since 2004, many more than it had been predicted prior to enlargement.<sup>24</sup> EU officials are trying to downplay such fears reproducing the official line of the British government: “In this context I have been greatly encouraged by the official messages that have been given: this has not been an uncontrolled rush; most people have come in response to a real prospect of finding a job; they are helping to fill gaps in the labour market in areas such as administration, hospitality and catering, manufacturing and food; average wages have continued to rise across the economy and are not being depressed by follows of cheap labour.”<sup>25</sup> It is feared that such a development could not only lead to higher unemployment in these areas of Western Europe, but also put a downward pressure on wages.<sup>26</sup> Commission officials are relieved to observe after enlargement that on this issue at least “the economies of the 15 Member States are not being destroyed by unfair practices of the newcomers. It is a win-win situation for all involved.”<sup>27</sup> Serious tensions in Western Europe could break out if businesses decided to move to low-wage areas in Eastern Europe causing increased unemployment levels.<sup>28</sup> Again, Commissioners are reassuring: “On the tricky issue of delocalization-that is the relocation of activities and of jobs to the new Member States, there is no bad news as many

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<sup>24</sup> Hübner, ‘Enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and Globalisation. The need for an open Europe’. The number of people from the new accession countries applying for work in the UK would not be higher than 5,000 to 13,000 per year, had previously estimated the British government. Johnston, ‘Record immigration from eastern Europe’.

<sup>25</sup> Hübner, ‘Enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and Globalisation. The need for an open Europe’.

<sup>26</sup> Quaisser and Hall, ‘Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement’, p.27.

<sup>27</sup> Hübner, ‘Enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and Globalisation. The need for an open Europe’.

<sup>28</sup> Smith and Timmins, ‘Building a Bigger Europe’, p.3.

said there would be.”<sup>29</sup> A lot of citizens of the EU-15 are concerned about the degree of readiness of their own countries and the new countries for enlargement, worrying that all has happened too fast and adjustment problems after the accession of the new states will provoke additional costs which have not been foreseen.<sup>30</sup> The rejection by France in 2005 of the EU’s constitutional treaty was also triggered by opposition to enlargement, it is widely estimated.<sup>31</sup> In addition, many people feel that their well-being could be on the line, as they will have to forego domestic investments after enlargement in order to deliver higher levels of transfers to the new poorer member states.<sup>32</sup>

If the prospect of further political integration is viewed pessimistically in Western Europe in the light of enlargement, then the grievances and worries of the peoples of the new members could deal it, according to some commentators, the final blow. People in Central and Eastern Europe, have their own sources of concern: rising prices, waves of foreign goods, loss of national identity and an erosion of national sovereignty so soon after the end of Soviet domination.<sup>33</sup> Several new members face the risk of an accumulation of company closures and a very high unemployment rate due to the exposure of their private sector to the extreme competition of the EU

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<sup>29</sup> Hübner, ‘Enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and Globalisation. The need for an open Europe’.

<sup>30</sup> Quaisser and Hall, ‘Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement’, p.27.

<sup>31</sup> Barysch, ‘East versus West? The EU economy after enlargement’, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup> Quaisser and Hall, ‘Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement’, p.27. Thus, net receivers of transfer payments (mainly of cohesion and structural funds) in the EU-15, namely Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, will remain net receivers after enlargement to 25 members, but they will witness a fall in transfers from the current rate of 1-4 percent of their GDPs to a meager/paltry 0.3-0.8 percent. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>33</sup> Richburg, ‘The EU and the Power of the People’.

internal market.<sup>34</sup> Farmers in traditional agricultural economies, such as Poland, fear they will not be treated fairly and that their country will be swamped with imports from Western Europe's vast and heavily subsidised agri-businesses.<sup>35</sup>

Leaders of the new EU members clearly stress the importance they place on the topic of identity preservation, in view of the fact that many of these countries "were able to fully realize national identity only after the collapse of the bipolar ideological system at the beginning of the 1990s" and explain that "smaller candidate countries fear that by entering the EU they will be exposed to uncontrollable processes and lose their national identities."<sup>36</sup> In Poland, for example, political parties argue that membership will dilute Poland's national identity and prominent religious figures worry that it will erode the country's strong Roman Catholic faith.<sup>37</sup> The refusal by the EU constitutional convention to include references to Christianity in its draft has reportedly angered Poland's fiercely devout villagers, who have now opened a front with the secularists in Brussels.<sup>38</sup> Fearful of losing their unique national identities once they are admitted to the EU, Estonians and Latvians, still reminiscent of their forced incorporation into the Soviet Union and the

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<sup>34</sup> Derycke, 'Relations EU-CEECs and the Intergovernmental Conference', p.299, Quaisser and Hall, 'Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement', p.16.

<sup>35</sup> *The Times*, 'A Polish Europe'. Due to such fears, *The Times* report, the governments of the EU's prospective members had to resort to some truly unorthodox methods to convince their peoples to approve, through referenda, their countries' accession to the EU. In Poland, even the former communist leader Jaruzelski, urged his countrymen to go the polls and vote "yes," as did the Pope, who said Europe needed Poland and Poland needed Europe, and thousands of Polish priests in their churches on referendum day, while the authorities of the Polish capital offered free tickets to galleries and museums in a bid to make sure people stayed in the city to vote.

<sup>36</sup> Drnovsek, 'National identities need to adapt and survive'.

<sup>37</sup> Smith, 'On Washington's Side: Poles Cherish U.S. as Friend, Fondly Recalling Its Support'.

<sup>38</sup> *The Times*, 'A Polish Europe'.

disadvantages of living within a “union”, want to retain the option of leaving.<sup>39</sup>

Intergovernmentalism could also be seen as gaining ground after enlargement. The new states are highly sovereignty conscious, have only recently gained back their political independence and do not want to see the latter dilute in a wider supranational framework that is dominated by larger countries.<sup>40</sup> Thus, they should not be expected to hand over many of their competences to Brussels: “One can postulate ...that having emerged from the yoke of Soviet dominance, these countries will guard their independence jealously and will be unwilling to cede too much power to Brussels”<sup>41</sup> Fear of losing a great part of sovereignty is compounded in certain cases by worries that, decades after the defeat of Nazi Germany, EU membership will open the doors to Germans to dominate new member states economically.<sup>42</sup> People in Poland often tend to link the opening of central European markets to the free flow of capital with the undesirable spectre of foreigners, especially Germans, being able to purchase land cheaply.<sup>43</sup>

There is concern that when they join the Union they will be treated as second-class members.<sup>44</sup> Even before accession, there was evidence of the CEECs lamenting their “second-class membership”, regarding the

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<sup>39</sup> Mite, ‘Candidate Countries Want To Be In, But Some Want To Ensure They Can Get Out’.

<sup>40</sup> Baun, ‘Intergovernmental Politics’, p. 138.

<sup>41</sup> Gower and Redmond, ‘Conclusion’, p. 186.

<sup>42</sup> Richburg, ‘The EU and the Power of the People’.

<sup>43</sup> Echoing these concerns, Poland has initially demanded, unsuccessfully, an eighteen-year transition period in which to allow for price equalization before the freedom to purchase land is implemented in full. Blazyca, ‘EU Accession: The Polish Case’, p.211.

<sup>44</sup> The fact that the EU is offering new members just one-quarter of the agricultural support that current members get, is often being used as proof that the EU is not ready to confer equal rights to the people of Central and Eastern Europe. Richburg, ‘The EU and the Power of the People’.

Commission's position of a ten-year transition period for integrating their farmers into the direct-payment system.<sup>45</sup> And as history provides numerous examples of how the people of Central and Eastern Europe have experienced bitter domination by major powers in the East such as Russia, and France, Germany and Austria in the West, a lot of people wonder whether EU accession means that it is now time for them to be dominated yet again by the West, bullied by French and German leaders.<sup>46</sup>

Old disputes between new members and the EU-15 could be revived threatening harmonious relations among the EU-25. The issue of the Sudeten Germans is a case in point. Influential associations of the Sudeten German deportees in Germany see the accession of the Czech Republic into the EU as the right moment for the Czech government to issue a formal apology, repeal the Benes decrees (a position also supported by Austria), and compensate the ethnic Germans whose properties were confiscated after their expulsion from Czechoslovakia.<sup>47</sup> Czech officials counter-argue that most Czech victims of Nazism never received compensation from Germany and political leaders are adamant that there can be no formal apology or repeal of the Benes decrees, which were ratified by the Parliament of Czechoslovakia, warning at the same time that any outside pressure on the Czech Republic could create a

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<sup>45</sup> Quaisser and Hall, 'Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement', pp.33-34.

<sup>46</sup> Applebaum, "'Old Europe" versus "New Europe"', p. 32, Quaisser and Hall, 'Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement', p.26.

<sup>47</sup> Richburg, 'The EU and the Power of the People'. Following the end of world war two, around three million of ethnic Germans were forced to leave their homes in Sudetenland, a part of northern Czechoslovakia bordering Germany. Their expulsion, legalized by decrees issued by the then Czech leader Eduard Benes (Benes decrees), has always been seen by Czechs as fair retribution for the Sudeten Germans' role in supporting Hitler's aggression and compensation for the years of Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia

backlash.<sup>48</sup> The fact that in March 2002, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany felt he had to cancel his visit to Prague following remarks by Prime Minister Milos Zemen of the Czech Republic that the Sudeten Germans were “Hitler’s fifth column”, has been seen as a worrying sign that the issue can still cause friction between the two countries and is far from solved and forgotten.

### *I. The end of CFSP?*

Many of the old EU members worry that the new countries, above all the Baltic States, will derail EU efforts to build a closer relationship with Russia because of their Russophobic views.<sup>49</sup> The leaders of the Baltic States have never denied that at the centre of their interests will always be their ever-restrained relations with Russia, which for at least ten years now have been stagnant.<sup>50</sup> Baltic-Russian relations are still mired in mutual suspicion and mistrust, reflecting century-old antagonisms and disputes and seemingly conflicting future hopes and expectations; EU and NATO enlargements and the *rapprochement* between Russia and the US in the wake of the 9/11 events notwithstanding, the Baltic states have not ceased to suspect the Kremlin of nurturing hopes of regaining its lost geopolitical presence in the area.<sup>51</sup> The

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> “We are not Russophobic. We just have a very realistic view,” is usually the mantra of the Baltic States whose foreign policies, however, are still driven by the fear of losing their hard-fought independence. Peel, ‘Estonia looks west for peace’.

<sup>50</sup> Paulauskas, ‘The Baltics: from nation states to member states’, p. 6.

<sup>51</sup> Shortly after Russian president Vladimir Putin had characterized the fall of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century, Latvian president Vaira Vyke Freiberga retorted that for her that day was “the happiest day of a long and gloomy century”, and when the leaders of the three states were invited to Moscow in May 2005 to attend the celebrations of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, the presidents of Lithuania and Estonia declined, wanting to avoid honouring “another

leaders of these new members expect their voices to be heard and respected within the enlarged EU when it comes to EU-Russian relations, since they consider themselves 'experts' in this field.<sup>52</sup>

It is taken for granted by many analyses that EU enlargement will make the likelihood of EU member states bringing their foreign and defence policies closer together even more remote, as the new member states are very US-minded and profoundly hostile to integration.<sup>53</sup> Some are categorical that the EU will be split between the pro-American countries in the East and Western countries with more skeptical attitudes toward the United States.<sup>54</sup> The new members will, according to political analysts (especially from the United States), not only bring greater diversity, but "an innate bias" toward Washington because these countries "still feel grateful to the United States for their freedom and also see Washington as a hedge against the re-emergence of a hostile Russia."<sup>55</sup> Since their main concern is maintaining their national

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manifestation of unflinching imperial nostalgia." Paulauskas, 'The Baltics: from nation states to member states', pp. 9-10. The Baltic states claim that the Kremlin pursues an active (albeit little publicized) campaign to influence Baltic politics and policies; tries to tarnish the image of the three Baltic states as credible partners; uses Russian mass media to 'inform' the Russian public about the misfortunes of their Russian brotherhood in Latvia and Estonia, the attempts of the Baltic states to 'rewrite' history, the neofascist demonstrations that are allowed to take place in these countries, and the support of the Baltic states for the Chechen terrorists. Russia, in its turn, accuses Latvia and Estonia for systematic and severe violations of the human rights of their Russian minorities: in 2005 10% of the Estonian population (i.e. members of the Russian minority) still had no citizenship and in Latvia the figure was even higher, at 19%. Paulauskas, 'The Baltics: from nation states to member states', pp. 11-13.

<sup>52</sup> "It generates great resentment when people who don't know Russia try to tell people who have experienced Russia at first hand what Russia and the Russians are like." Ilves, interview with *Der Spiegel*.

<sup>53</sup> Schmitt, 'Disunity holds the EU back from a major global role'.

<sup>54</sup> Fuller, 'The next Europe: As EU grows, some fear it will burst'.

<sup>55</sup> Tyler, 'US inaction on rift puzzles allies'. Statistics show that as early as 1994 central and eastern European countries surpassed the EU average in voting coincidence with the US at the United Nations coming close – in terms of the percentages- to the ratios of the UK-US special relationship. Dunay, Kende, and Szücs, 'The Integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Fifteen', p.329. Many of the new members are expected (mainly in the US) to be reflexively pro-American for another reason too: they have a distrust of the French-style statism which reminds them of their totalitarian

independence and identity, they are bound to see the United States, rather than any European neighbour or the EU itself, as the principal guarantor of their young democracies, and the essential political reference point in creating a future that is secure and prosperous.<sup>56</sup> In addition, it is argued, Eastern Europeans are far more relaxed about America's 'hyperpower' status than their western neighbours.<sup>57</sup> This state of affairs is expected, in many circles, to create new fissures in Europe which American administrations could exploit to promote their interests by playing off the new members against old members not so keen to follow America's lead, as the Iraqi conflict has shown. In this crisis, East European leaders displayed a remarkable unity in adopting American positions and ignoring the stance of EU members like France and Germany.<sup>58</sup> Poland<sup>59</sup>, in particular, is clearly seen as a strong ally

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past. Fukuyama, 'Does "the West" still exist?', p. 148. Furthermore, in the case of the Baltic three, strong Baltic emigration to the US has created affinities on both sides of the Atlantic and powerful networks of influence on the American political scene. Chillaud, 'Les pays Baltes, l'Otan et la PESD', p. 96.

<sup>56</sup> Vinocur, 'The big winner in the EU expansion: Washington'. In the same token, they are expected to deliver a decisive blow to the Brussels bureaucracy bringing to a halt efforts towards a common European army and common foreign policy, or at least ensuring that such moves do not take an anti-American direction. Applebaum, ' "Old Europe" versus "New Europe"', p. 37.

<sup>57</sup> "Better a single hyperpower, after all, than the bipolar system that left them under Soviet occupation. Whereas many west Europeans remember the Cold War era as a time of economic growth and political strength, east Europeans remember it as a time of national catastrophe. There is little nostalgia for the days when American power was checked by the Soviet Union". Applebaum, ' "Old Europe" versus "New Europe"', p. 32.

<sup>58</sup> Based on this, some have labelled the new EU members as 'Atlanticists' first and 'Europeans' only for economic and social questions. Hoffmann, 'On EU/US Relations', p. 107. On February 5, 2003, a group of ten former communist countries (known as the "Vilnius Ten") issued a statement of support for the United States. Their leaders said that: "Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values." "The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction." Fuller, 'East Europeans line up behind Bush'. Such support is all too natural. Latvia's ambassador to NATO said characteristically: "There's this feeling that if ever there were any problems in our neck of the woods, perhaps it wouldn't be the French who would be first there on the front lines. It would be more likely to be the Americans." He also added that Latvians still remember with gratitude that during the days of the Soviet Union the US allowed Baltic countries to maintain embassies in Washington – in defiance of Moscow. Fuller, 'American lobbyist swayed Eastern Europe's Iraq response'. In

of America ready to clash with other EU members to defend its special American ties.

The states of Central and Eastern Europe entered the EU bearing the label of the 'loyal Atlanticist'. For some of them, mainly the Baltic States, this was seen as a matter of survival. NATO, and more specifically Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, has always symbolized the best chance they have to retain their newly found freedom in case old rivalries reignite in the region. In addition, the US, its signing of the Yalta agreements notwithstanding, had always been seen by the Baltic States with more sympathy since it never recognized formally their occupation by the Soviet Union and its muscular foreign policy during the Cold War was perceived by the occupied states as more promising in terms of ending the occupation one day than Europe's *Ostpolitik* with its emphasis on engaging Moscow.<sup>60</sup> As long as the EU looks unable or willing to build a strong defense dimension and adopt tougher attitudes towards Russia, its policy toward Moscow will continue to be seen by most new members of the Union as 'myopic', strengthening their ties with

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sharp contrast to the majority of EU members, the "Vilnius ten" (formed in 2000, when Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia decided to work together in seeking NATO membership) said at the time that Iraq was already in "material breach" of UN Resolution 1441 and that "the clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein regime requires a united response from the community of democracies." Following Washington's lead, they did not call for the UN to adopt a second resolution before military action. Donovan, 'Vilnius Group Supports U.S. On Iraq'. Echoing the US position a spokesman for the Hungarian Foreign Ministry added that "...a military solution without the Security Council mandate is still better than to wait and see what Saddam Hussein is going to do with his weapons of mass destruction." Baker, 'U.S.: Rumsfeld's 'Old' And 'New' Europe Touches On Uneasy Divide'.

<sup>59</sup> Many American analysts share the view that Poland constitutes the most pro-American country in the world. Applebaum, ' "Old Europe" versus "New Europe"', p. 33. Poland's strong ties to the US are, arguably, best explained by the presence of a 10 million-strong immigrant community of Polish origin in the United States, which, unlike Americans of German origin for example, keep lively connections with the motherland. Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 84.

<sup>60</sup> Paulauskas, 'The Baltics: from nation states to member states', p. 30. Also, after 1989, the US was not displaying the same degree of hesitancy as its European allies vis-à-vis the issue of opening the doors of NATO to the former Soviet Baltic republics.

Washington.<sup>61</sup> For Poland, often viewed as America's 'protégé' in Central and Eastern Europe, Washington seems to have become "the security guarantor that the Poles had craved since the late eighteenth century."<sup>62</sup> In the run up to the Iraq war the justification of Poland's decision to support the decision of the United States to go to war was not seriously contested within the country, while Polish leaders did not have to worry about the existence or not of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, since the home debate was dominated by the need for Poland to prove firstly its loyalty to America and secondly its ability to be 'America's model ally'.<sup>63</sup> The fact that the leaders of these countries sided with America despite widespread opposition from their electorates is not seen as a sign that contradicts such assumptions.<sup>64</sup>

The war in Iraq has been presented as the most convincing evidence for the validity of the claims of those who predicted that the new enlargement could only lead to splits and bitter disputes within the enlarged EU.<sup>65</sup> Right

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p.31. US leaders, in contrast to Europe's traditional powers, are carefully nurturing this developing relationship with gestures of the utmost symbolism: "Anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America", declared President Bush on his 2002 visit to the country. *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> Zaborowski, 'From America's protégé to constructive European', p. 5.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 11-12. Promoting democracy and universal human rights was another argument used by Polish leaders. Apart from these moral arguments, expectations of material benefits also played a role in Poland's decision to join the 'Coalition of the willing' in Iraq: privileged access for Polish companies in the reconstruction of Iraq and rearmament of the new Iraqi army and a change in America's immigration rules towards Polish citizens allowing them to travel to the US without a visa. *Ibid.*, p.13.

<sup>64</sup> Reluctance to embrace enthusiastically the war is thus explained by "the left-wing tilt of the media in most European countries, a half-century-long tradition of pacifism on the European continent, a series of American diplomatic mistakes, the peculiarities of the war on Iraq, and the appalling, and continuing, American failure to communicate with the outside world". Applebaum, ' "Old Europe" versus "New Europe"', p. 35. Applebaum comes to the conclusion that the choice of these leaders to ignore their publics demonstrates that their will to ensure the continued American presence in Europe is more important public support. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>65</sup> Even before Iraq, however, there were clear signs of tension. Following, Poland's decision, in January 2003, to buy American instead of European-made fighter jets, an EU commissioner accused some future members of the Union of lacking a "European reflex," warning them that "by joining the Union, they are not simply entering a supermarket but a

after a special EU summit in Athens in February 2003 on the issue of Iraq, French President Chirac aired his annoyance at the “Vilnius Ten” Eastern European leaders, who had earlier publicly supported the US on Iraq, by calling them “infantile” and “irresponsible” for the stance they decided to adopt.<sup>66</sup> In another outburst, a spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry added in February 2003 that, “If Bulgaria or other Eastern European countries give the impression that it is more important for them to cooperate with the US than with Europe, namely with France or Germany, it is possible that – not governments, but public opinion, which has not had its say on joining Europe – people will ask whether the Eastern Europeans’ place is in Europe. That they’d better join the US instead of Europe. At that point, there will be a choice. Everyone must realize that.”<sup>67</sup> Outrage was caused in many European capitals by Chirac’s remarks in February 2003 that by publicly siding with the US many candidate countries could hardly have found a better way of diminishing their chances of entering Europe and had missed a good opportunity to “remain silent”.<sup>68</sup> In the wake of the war in Iraq, many in the

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political Union too.” Fuller, ‘East Europeans line up behind Bush’. The \$3.6 billion deal was the biggest arms deal by a former communist country and was greeted by the American ambassador in Poland as “the deal of the century.” Poland’s defense minister labeled it “the contract of the century,” expressing at the same time the wish that it would strengthen the links between Poland and the US. Predictably, Europeans, most notably the French, felt deeply dissatisfied with Warsaw’s decision to ignore the European arms industry. Tagliabue, ‘Poland, in ‘Deal of Century,’ Signs to Buy 48 U.S. Fighter Jets’.

<sup>66</sup> Fuller, ‘Chirac-Blair struggle for influence over new Union members is seen’.

<sup>67</sup> Geshakova, ‘East Europeans Tread Fine Line Amid NATO Frictions Over Iraq’.

<sup>68</sup> Jacoby, ‘Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations’, pp. 249-250. The Latvian president retorted at the time: “We have not heard of any accession criterion that we can be seen but not heard”, leading the British prime minister and the EU commissioner for enlargement to stress the right of candidate EU members to speak their mind within the EU.

EU were so irritated by Poland's policies that started referring to it as 'America's Trojan donkey'.<sup>69</sup>

Shortly after the commencement of the Polish mission in Iraq Polish officials rushed to accuse and condemn France for selling Roland-type rockets to Iraq as late as 2003.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, British leaders tried to present Britain as a natural ally of the new members, in an attempt to strengthen Atlanticism within the new, enlarged Union.<sup>71</sup> Anti-integration forces in the Union's eurosceptic champion, Britain, sensed an opportunity for the British government to form a strong alliance with the firmly pro-American, anti-integration Poland, a country big enough to ensure that it cannot be "slighted by Brussels or patronized by Paris."<sup>72</sup> Atlanticism would thus be strengthened, while Britain would acquire an even higher status in the expanded Union, being able to exert more influence.

The ability of France and Germany to steer the course of the EU's foreign policy is also expected to be compromised. Britain holds firmly that in an enlarged EU a leadership group comprising just France and Germany will no longer be sufficient to decide the strategic direction of the Union.<sup>73</sup> They

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<sup>69</sup> *The Economist*, 'Is Poland America's donkey or could it become NATO's horse?'. The phrase first appeared in the German press. Poland has also been labeled America's 'lap dog' or 'vassal'. Jacoby, 'Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations', p. 253.

<sup>70</sup> A bit later, however, the same officials had to admit, embarrassingly, that these rockets were more than 15 years old and the date "2003" engraved on them was just the year to which they were guaranteed. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7 October 2003, quoted in Jacoby, 'Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations', pp. 253-254.

<sup>71</sup> Stressing the importance of a common US-EU stance on the Iraq question, Tony Blair wrote to East European leaders: "How we in Europe handle this crisis will have profound implications for EU-US relations for generations to come. We must resolve it in a way that strengthens our partnership." Fuller, 'Chirac-Blair struggle for influence over new Union members is seen'.

<sup>72</sup> *The Times*, 'A Polish Europe'.

<sup>73</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 214. This is because, as Garton Ash argues, "Unless they (France and Germany) extend the couple to make a three-some, Britain will form alternative

will no longer be able to “command a continent where newer states from the Soviet bloc are rapidly filling out the ranks of NATO and the European Union.”<sup>74</sup> In fact, they dread the possibility of “being pushed from a position of pre-dominance inside Europe’s institutions by new, pro-American alliances building from the Continent’s south and east,” and run the danger of becoming “just additional members of an American-oriented provincial sideshow.”<sup>75</sup> Publicly chastising the new members for their pro-American positions, the way the French President did, could only have the perverse effect of uniting East European countries against France.<sup>76</sup> In the wake of enlargement, Germany should abandon any hopes of leading the continent from Berlin and resign to an increased American overall influence in Europe and within the EU.<sup>77</sup>

## *II. One continent, many cultures?*

Whereas previous enlargements did not endanger the cultural cohesion and further integration of the Union, cultural diversity tends to be seen as a threat in the case of enlargement to the East.<sup>78</sup> The prospect of enlargement to the East has evoked unprecedented fears of unmanageable conflicts of values and interests which could paralyse the Union and jeopardise its ability not

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ad hoc alliances, together with states such as Spain, Poland or Italy. Europe will then be torn between two magnetic poles, rather than gathering around one magnetic core. If France and Germany were to go ahead unilaterally in a ‘pioneer group’ as some, especially in France, like to envisage, they would look behind them and find half their fellow Europeans marching in a different direction.”

<sup>74</sup> Tyler, ‘US inaction on rift puzzles allies’.

<sup>75</sup> Vinocur, ‘For Paris and Berlin, a drive to stay important in Europe’.

<sup>76</sup> Fuller, ‘Chirac-Blair struggle for influence over new Union members is seen’.

<sup>77</sup> Vinocur, ‘The big winner in the EU expansion: Washington’.

<sup>78</sup> Amatto and Batt, ‘Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border’, p.5.

only to move forward but even to sustain its existing achievements.<sup>79</sup> The fact that “the attitudes and behavioural reflexes of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe continue to show the imprint of decades of communist dictatorship”, coupled with old-standing prejudices in Western Europe about the East as “backward” and less “civilised” than the West, not fully “part of Europe”, have added to fears that eastward enlargement has a serious destabilizing potential.<sup>80</sup>

Former communist states are sometimes routinely portrayed as intolerant, and indifferent to the fate of minority groups which live within their borders. The plight of the Roma in most parts of Eastern Europe is often brought up as a case in point. Official attitudes towards Slovakia’s Hungarian minority are also characteristic: “In Slovakia, the anti-liberal reaction applies also to the treatment of national minorities. Although in practice there is no significant shift (yet?), the discourse has changed: Jan Slota, the leader of the Slovak National Party, was reported as saying that he envies the Czechs for having expelled the Germans and that he would not mind sending Bugár, the leader of the Hungarian minority, to Mars ‘without a return ticket’. The legitimization of xenophobia is a major feature of the onslaught on political liberalism.”<sup>81</sup>

Many of these fears seemed to be vindicated almost simultaneously with the arrival of the new members. Alarming doubts over the commitment of the new populations to democratic ideals and norms began to appear more

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<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p.11.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Rupnik, ‘Populism in Eastern Central Europe’.

frequently.<sup>82</sup> Many analysts started to fear that the reform process in the new member states could be undermined.<sup>83</sup> Soon, though, it became clear that the populist movements that mushroomed in Eastern and Central Europe after the admission of the new members into the EU are not anti-democratic but anti-liberal.<sup>84</sup> Western commentators have been predicting that the enlarged Union can only become more Roman Catholic and more socially conservative, and ultimately, less tolerant.<sup>85</sup> This has been evidently clear in the case of Poland: “The Polish style ‘politics of values’ is, of course, based on the assumption that ‘moral order’ based on religion should prevail over the freedoms guaranteed by permissive liberalism on issues such as abortion, gay rights, or the death penalty. Asked about his intention to remove Darwinism from school curricula, the Polish minister of education answered, ‘We’ve managed without tolerance for long enough. And we also shall manage without it now.’”<sup>86</sup>

The struggle for the preservation of national identities in a Europe of half a billion people has led to fears that many political leaders in the new member states might view the EU and the process of integration in general, as the main obstacle in their efforts to defend their distinctive national characteristics. Developments in some of these states seem often to prove this point. Indeed, another feature of recent populism in the area is opposition to European integration: “The pro-European coalitions have been exhausted and

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> Larrabee, ‘Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe’.

<sup>84</sup> Rupnik, ‘Populism in Eastern Central Europe’.

<sup>85</sup> Fuller, ‘The next Europe: As EU grows, some fear it will burst’. Fuller quotes a UN survey, which shows that less than one quarter of people living in former East-bloc countries believe divorce is acceptable and only 16 percent said they approved of homosexuality.

<sup>86</sup> Rupnik, ‘Populism in Eastern Central Europe’.

have disintegrated in the immediate aftermath of EU accession. Significantly, the Polish, Czech and Hungarian prime ministers resigned within days or weeks of fulfilling the ‘historic’ task of ‘retuning to Europe’. The populist nationalists present themselves as the only defenders of national identity and national sovereignty against ‘external threats’. They also never miss a chance to stress that Poland is in the EU only to defend its legitimate interests. The EU is the perfect target since as a liberal, elitist, supranational project it represents a combination of most of the aforementioned grievances.”<sup>87</sup>

This in turn revives the extensively expressed fears over the viability of democracy in the new states. “The assumption that joining the EU would stabilize the political system of the new democracies” was a powerful perception in the pre-accession phase.<sup>88</sup> Some political forces, however, have been prepared to see the EU only as a threat and a competitor.<sup>89</sup> Many Europeans were therefore utterly disappointed, and felt deeply betrayed, when they saw right after the admission of the new members that a new, completely different reality was emerging in some places: “After joining the EU, the ‘now we can show them who we really are’ posture seems to prevail. In some cases, one senses a satisfaction in joining Europe in order to oppose those who for half a century ‘built it without us’. Tired of being the European pupils, the populist nationalists have been longing to reveal at last the kind of Europe they have in mind; a ‘Europe of sovereign nation-states’, a ‘Christian Europe’

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.* Populist parties in Poland started even before the day of accession attacking the Polish government for ‘selling off’ the country to the EU: “I saw that when Prime Minister came back from Copenhagen, he handed President Kwasniewski 50 euro. Is that how much he had told the Prime Minister to sell Poland for?”, A. Lepper, quoted in Szostak, ‘The Europeanization of Polish National Identity 1989-2004’, p. 245.

<sup>88</sup> Rupnik, ‘Populism in Eastern Central Europe’.

<sup>89</sup> Szostak, ‘The Europeanization of Polish National Identity 1989-2004’, p. 247.

opposed to the materialist, decadent, permissive, supra-national one.”<sup>90</sup> This particular enlargement, therefore, presents the EU with a grave threat with regard to its identity, warn many analysts. As they often point out, this wave of new members could put an end or, at least, seriously hinder any attempts to build a genuine EU identity.<sup>91</sup>

## 2. Enlargement as a catalyst for more integration

### *I. Why pessimists are wrong*

Previous enlargements have demonstrated that expansion should not be viewed as incompatible with a further deepening of the Union. On the contrary, it has been argued that enlargement can actually speed up both the process of integration and the process of convergence in new member states, even in the case of lack of enthusiasm for further integration on behalf of some of the new members.<sup>92</sup> Many predict that the 2004 round will not turn out to be different. Not only will it not slow the pace of integration, they

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<sup>90</sup> Rupnik, ‘Populism in Eastern Central Europe’.

<sup>91</sup> Nugent, ‘The EU and the 10 + 2 Enlargement Round’, p. 10. As Nugent explains, the issue of a common identity is viewed as particularly important by those (federalists in their majority) who usually argue that a firm common identity is a precondition for a fully effective political system.

<sup>92</sup> Krenzler, ‘The Geostrategic and International Political Implications of EU Enlargement’, p.5, Kok, ‘Enlarging the European Union’, p.22, and Cameron, ‘The European Union and the challenge of enlargement’, p.243. Cameron offers solid evidence to support this point: “Following the first enlargement involving the UK, Ireland and Denmark, the Community agreed common policies in new areas (e.g. regional, environmental, technology) as well as closer cooperation in foreign affairs (EPC). Institutional arrangements were also strengthened with the introduction of the European Council and direct elections to the European Parliament. Following the accession of Greece, and then Spain and Portugal, the Community further developed the Structural Funds as a mechanism for transfer of resources to the less-favoured regions of member states. This second enlargement wave was also accompanied by the Single European Act, increased involvement of the European Parliament and a new financial resources package for the Community. The Single European Act significantly extended the use of majority voting, without which it would have been impossible to complete the internal market. The latest enlargement involving Austria, Sweden and Finland followed the Treaty on European Union which again involved considerable deepening such as the commitment to Economic and Monetary Union, the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and yet further powers for the European Parliament.”

argue, but it will provide EU members with new incentives for further cooperation, “on issues ranging from economic policy coordination to internal security to environmental degradation.”<sup>93</sup>

EU institutions have not witnessed any dysfunctions that could be attributed to the arrival of new Commissioners or MEPs or more political leaders around the tables of Council meetings.<sup>94</sup> In fact, the first comprehensive analyses which examine how the EU institutions have adapted to the eastward enlargement of the EU conclude that not paralysis (or gridlock) but ‘business as usual’ is the term that best describes the way they currently function.<sup>95</sup> Traditional decision-making patterns do not seem to have been affected: “The long-established norm of reaching most decisions by consensus-building has persisted since enlargement on decisions taken under QMV as well as by definition on those requiring unanimity.”<sup>96</sup>

Moreover, the argument that the formation of a core Europe after enlargement is not a real possibility is not accurate. This is an option that still remains popular with key players like France and Germany<sup>97</sup> and, as the examples of both ESDP and EMU demonstrate, feasible. In addition, it should not be taken for granted that newcomers would fiercely oppose such a move. Poland, according to a former Polish foreign minister, is not against a ‘core Europe’. On the contrary, he says, Poland hopes that the Franco-German

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<sup>93</sup> Grabbe, ‘What the New Member States Bring Into the European Union’, p. 83.

<sup>94</sup> Hübner, ‘Enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and Globalisation. The need for an open Europe’.

<sup>95</sup> Wallace, ‘Adapting to Enlargement of the European Union: Institutional Practice since May 2004’, pp. 1,4.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*, p. 11.

<sup>97</sup> Grabbe and Guérot, ‘Could a hard core run the enlarged EU?’, p. 9.

motor of integration will be stronger after enlargement with Warsaw's help.<sup>98</sup> His concern is that states which are left out of this avant-garde, will feel like second-class members. To remedy this, he states, it is crucial that the avant-garde remains a group open to new members.<sup>99</sup>

Enlargement has always been used by pro-integration forces within the EU as a reason to act preemptively on a possible deadlock regarding the Union's decision-making process. Romano Prodi clearly stated, referring to the 2004 enlargement, that "everybody understands that you need a new decision-making process. This means that we need rules, new rules, new rules, new rules, new rules. Everybody understands that unanimity is ridiculous at this stage."<sup>100</sup> Deepening is therefore seen as a *conditio sine qua non* for enlargement.<sup>101</sup> Indeed, preparations for the admission of a considerable number of former communist countries into the Union began as early as in 1993, at the Copenhagen Summit.<sup>102</sup> In practice, deepening unequivocally means that the Commission will have to consolidate and further extend its role as an initiator and protector of Community interests, and that more qualified majority voting should be introduced in the Council.<sup>103</sup> French positions on

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<sup>98</sup> Bartoszewski, 'Europas Identität nach der Osterweiterung der EU', p. 13.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>100</sup> Dembart, 'The future of Europe takes place'.

<sup>101</sup> Derycke, 'Relations EU-CEECs and the Intergovernmental Conference', pp.298-299.

<sup>102</sup> "At the EU summit in Amsterdam in 1997, an attempt was made to alter selected EU institutions, but with little success. The next step came with Agenda 2000, which grew out of the Berlin Summit in 1999. Agenda 2000 proposed reforms to agricultural and structural policy. However, shortly after the Berlin Summit it became clear that these changes only could be considered as first steps toward a more comprehensive set of reforms. The Nice Summit, held in December of 2000, was expected to prepare the EU institutionally for Eastern enlargement by providing at least some preliminary solutions to pressing problems. A certain amount of progress was made. For example, a new set of voting procedures for EU members was established that extended the possibility of majority voting. Additionally, the Nice Summit provided the legal basis for integrating a group of core EU member countries." Quaisser and Hall, 'Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement', p.43.

<sup>103</sup> Derycke, 'Relations EU-CEECs and the Intergovernmental Conference', p.303.

this matter are indicative of the importance pro-integration forces attach to this issue: “Unanimity is the system which allows to some to impose their law on all the others. Unanimity is the certainty that we will never do something great, that we will never take any risks, because with unanimity we align ourselves with those who want the minimum Europe. Unanimity is powerlessness. It is incapability to act...”<sup>104</sup> The aim has been to show that intergovernmental rules and practices will not work in an enlarged Union, as the implementation of the unanimity rule could lead to an increased risk of immobility.<sup>105</sup> The dilemma for EU members is thus clear; integration or erosion: “Europe has no other alternative. The current confederation of states will be unable to function with 25 or even 30 members. Europe will have to choose between integration and erosion. I am confident that it will opt for full integration. All member states have already invested too much in this great project European Union to let it fail or even stagnate for a longer period of time.”<sup>106</sup>

What is going to be the answer of the new eastern members to this dilemma? It is difficult to see how a paralyzed Union could serve the interests of its new members. Not only are the new members appalled at such a possibility, but they are determined to make the Union work, because this represents their best chance to put behind “their unhappy histories of marginalization and oppression by dominant Great Powers, socio-economic

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<sup>104</sup> Sarkozy, Discours du Président de la République Française devant le Parlement européen.

<sup>105</sup> Derycke, ‘Relations EU-CEECS and the Intergovernmental Conference’, p.302. To illustrate the strong paralyzing effects of the unanimity rule, especially in the field of foreign and security policy, Derycke refers to the Union’s inability to play a vital role when the crisis in former Yugoslavia started to unfold.

<sup>106</sup> Fischer, ‘Towards a new transatlantic partnership: The United States, Germany and Europe in an era of global challenges’.

stagnation, recurrent national tensions and political instability.”<sup>107</sup> A diluted EU would almost certainly render the principle of solidarity a dead letter, and with no solidarity the integration of former Soviet satellites in a democratic Europe would be impossible.<sup>108</sup> Indeed, the new members attach great significance to this parameter. They explicitly recognize that one of the basic values which were the basis for the building of Europe was solidarity.<sup>109</sup> In characteristic manner, Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves reminded Poland’s leaders in summer 2007 that there is a limit to their tendency to try to promote national interests ignoring the concerns of other EU members.<sup>110</sup>

With the exception of Poland, all eastern European countries are classified as small countries, likely supporters of the strengthening of the Commission and the Parliament’s role and mistrustful of existing intergovernmental arrangements in the Union. Even Poland, however, should not be considered as a natural intergovernmentalist and a supporter of the stronger Council of Ministers in some areas, where it finds the Commission its natural ally.<sup>111</sup> Contradicting the view that as newly founded democracies they will be extremely reluctant to cede any sovereignty to Brussels, they could prove to become the cheerleaders of further integration: “We are interested in a stronger role for the Commission and the Parliament and less in intergovernmental, more obscure consultations and decision-making, which is

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<sup>107</sup> Amatto and Batt, ‘Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border’, p.5.

<sup>108</sup> Derycke, ‘Relations EU-CEECS and the Intergovernmental Conference’, p.305.

<sup>109</sup> Bartoszewski, ‘Europas Identität nach der Osterweiterung der EU’, p. 15.

<sup>110</sup> “I always tell my Polish friends, you can’t be against the constitution and then expect solidarity from the EU when you have problems with Russia.” Ilves, interview to *Der Spiegel*.

<sup>111</sup> Zaborowski, ‘From America’s protégé to constructive European’, p. 22.

now much more present.”<sup>112</sup> Such a stance is expected to prevail due to the fear that in a European Union of almost 30 members the big powers like France, Great Britain and Germany will rule and smaller states will have no say.<sup>113</sup> EU officials are confident that the political leadership of the new members will favour such an approach for an extra reason too: “The newcomers further expect that the EU, which they perceive as the oncoming structure of interstate multilateral cooperation, will help them to solve problems that most countries in the world today cannot solve alone.”<sup>114</sup>

Consequently, they are more probably going to find themselves on the side of pro-integrationists who have long argued that “If the decision-making mechanism remains unchanged after enlargement, there will be a higher risk that the real decisions are taken in the corridors by the large countries via some contact group and outside the grip of the European Union structures.”<sup>115</sup> This is indeed what worries them the most. It is not the loss of national sovereignty *per se* but “the loss of control in a supranational system that is dominated by larger countries.”<sup>116</sup> The Baltic States seem to confirm such assessments. Lithuania was the first EU member to ratify the EU Constitution and Latvia did so immediately after the rejection of the constitution by the French and Dutch voters.<sup>117</sup> Fears that the new members want to turn the EU into nothing more than a free trade area also seem to be unfounded. As it is

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<sup>112</sup> Janez Drnovsek, quoted in Fuller, ‘The next Europe: As EU grows, some fear it will burst’.

<sup>113</sup> Akule, ‘Austrians fear for jobs after EU enlargement’.

<sup>114</sup> Bartoszewski, ‘Europas Identität nach der Osterweiterung der EU’, p. 7.

<sup>115</sup> Derycke, ‘Relations EU-CEECs and the Intergovernmental Conference’, p.302. Some analysts even argue that the new members will even encourage the Union to develop new areas of integration. Grabbe, ‘What the New Member States Bring Into the European Union’, p. 70.

<sup>116</sup> Baun, ‘Intergovernmental Politics’, p. 138.

<sup>117</sup> Paulauskas, ‘The Baltics: from nation states to member states’, p 32.

repeatedly stressed, these states did not have to enter the EU in order to enjoy the benefits of free trade in industrial products, foreign direct investment and financial aid, as they could enjoy all these advantages even prior to accession.<sup>118</sup> Instead of teaming up with existing members, such as Britain, to halt integration the new members are expected to follow more pragmatic patterns of behaviour. They are less likely to act in unison, as a single block, and more likely to join forces with each other and older EU members according to the issues at hand.<sup>119</sup> Patterns of compliance by the new member states with EU rules are indicative of their relaxed attitude to the loss of sovereignty through transfer of powers to Brussels and their determination fully endorse integration: “The data on transposition of EU directives into national law show that after an early period of difficulty the new member states are among the best performers (they hold four out of the top five places) in putting EU directives on to their national statute books, with only the Czech Republic lagging a little behind, and still better performing than the laggards among the EU15.”<sup>120</sup>

The possibility of a serious EU legitimacy crisis looks remote too. In the new member states the majority of people had little trust in their own public institutions before enlargement and a relatively low basis of personal affluence.<sup>121</sup> Even slow progress, therefore, with regard to the twin goals of reinforcing democracy and improving the economic situation of the new EU citizens would not lead automatically to widespread unraveling of the Union’s

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<sup>118</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 66.

<sup>119</sup> Grabbe, ‘What the New Member States Bring Into the European Union’, p. 80.

<sup>120</sup> Wallace, ‘Adapting to Enlargement of the European Union: Institutional Practice since May 2004’, p. 20.

<sup>121</sup> Mather, ‘The Citizenry: Legitimacy and Democracy’, pp. 111, 113.

legitimacy. Besides, the latter will also be strengthened as a result of the Union's enhanced international standing: by being part of a supranational community which enjoys the status of an international player, people in the new member states achieve a prominence that could never be reached independently by their respective nation-states.<sup>122</sup>

## ***II. Towards a stronger CFSP***

Fears of policy splits due to the new members' 'anti-Russian' bias are proving rather excessive. As the case of the Baltic States demonstrates, "their initial stance of 'we know better' how to deal with Russia, Ukraine or Belarus" was not met with great enthusiasm by the old members of the EU and in the end, the only thing the Baltic three manage to gain was "a lesson in humility".<sup>123</sup> Moreover, many political figures in these countries are beginning to realize that they stand to benefit substantially, both economically and politically, from a more developed relationship between the EU and Russia, the southern Caucasus and other parts of the former Soviet Union.<sup>124</sup> By trying to make the EU adopt more confrontational a stance towards Russia, the Baltic States risk ending up much worse off: reinforcing their anti-Russian image, alienating some of their own friends within the EU and becoming pariahs outside the official EU-Russia dialogue.<sup>125</sup>

Grappling with the side-effects of an allegedly pro-US bias, however, is a much more complicated issue. When the question of joining the 'Coalition

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<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.

<sup>123</sup> Paulauskas, 'The Baltics: from nation states to member states', p 26.

<sup>124</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 64.

<sup>125</sup> Paulauskas, 'The Baltics: from nation states to member states', p 40.

of the willing' against Iraq arose in 2002-2003, the Baltic States had no hesitations: if they wanted to continue to rely on the US and NATO for future help in case of an immediate threat to their security, they had to actively prove their solidarity.<sup>126</sup> This rationale applied for the rest of the new members as well. A short analysis of the events which led to some of the most dramatic tensions between old and new members of the EU shows that there is more than meets the eye when it comes to explaining the final attitudes of the then EU candidates over the issue of Iraq. For instance, the 5 Feb 2003 statement by 10 East European governments (Vilnius ten), offering support to the US on the issue of Iraq, should not be seen as just an example of former communist countries aligning themselves with the United States because of their gratitude for Washington's hard stance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It also was a calculated move aiming at promoting the goal of winning admission into NATO, shortly before US Congress was going to decide on the matter. Referring to the stance of some of the signatories, the man who helped draft the statement has said that "they clearly wanted to do stuff to impress upon the U.S. Senate the freedom-fighting credentials of these new democracies."<sup>127</sup> Soon afterwards, however, diplomats from the states which signed the statement were expressing fear that the role the former US official

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<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p 31. Besides, since the issue of Iraq found the EU unprepared to adopt a common stance, none of these countries saw their participation in the war as anti-European.

<sup>127</sup> Fuller, 'American lobbyist swayed Eastern Europe's Iraq response'. A former Defense Department official, Bruce Jackson, has been an adviser to the East European countries for several years and is believed to have contributed significantly to increased American political influence in the region. The Vilnius Ten statement was distributed to the press by an organization chaired by Jackson, the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. And by all accounts, the process that led to the making of this statement was not even initiated by the states that signed the final text.

had played “could be misconstrued in Europe as undue American influence on their foreign policy.”<sup>128</sup>

Poland’s eager participation in the Iraq conflict on the American side, despite fierce French and German opposition, has often been interpreted as a proof of Poland’s loyalties lying with the US and not the Union’s traditional powers. However, even the Poles themselves did not fail to notice the peculiarity of Poland’s fervent support for the US during, and immediately after the Iraq war: support came from a Polish government which at the time had a domestic approval rating of around twelve per cent; public opinion was against the war; the impression was projected that the Polish government was embarking on an adventure abroad when it could not do things well at home.<sup>129</sup> The political class was divided in many of the new members. Regarding the Vilnius Ten statement, the President of the Czech Republic, who holds no real power, signed the text of support to the US, but the Czech Prime Minister did not.<sup>130</sup> Moreover, even after the last-minute personal intervention and pressure of President Bush the Czech Republic’s coalition government refused to become part of the “coalition of the willing”.<sup>131</sup>

In time, the initial instinctive pro-Americanism of the new members is expected to recede. The new members are trying hard to balance their EU-US

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<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>129</sup> Berstein, ‘Poland Upstages, and Irks, European Powerhouses’.

<sup>130</sup> Tomiuc, ‘Do Citizens Of Vilnius 10 Support Action Against Iraq, Or Only Their Governments?’. In Bulgaria too, the country’s foreign minister signed the statement but the President of the country refused to give his support to unilateral US action.

<sup>131</sup> Jacoby, ‘Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations’, p. 251. Just a few days later the new President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, not only spoke against any American invasion in the absence of a UN resolution but commented that building democracy in Iraq was an idea “from another planet”, prompting the furious reaction of the American ambassador to the Czech Republic who walked out of a meeting with Klaus declaring that the comments of “a single Czech politician” could not jeopardise US-Czech relations. *Ibid.*

relations. For them it is an article of faith that they should have the best of relations both with other EU members and the US, and that they do not have to choose “between allegiance to the United States or the European Union.”<sup>132</sup> They do not want to see America and Europe become fierce rivals and they warn that Europe’s awareness of its identity must derive from positive and affirmative discourse and not from the negation of America.<sup>133</sup> They do not want to be labeled as ‘pro-European’, ‘anti-European’, ‘pro-American’, or ‘anti-American’. “To say that we’re a Trojan horse of the United States -in the EU- is unjust,” Alexander Kwasniewski has declared.<sup>134</sup> The same message comes from the Baltic States as well. Perceived for too long as leaders of inexplicably pro-American and inherently ‘CFSP-skeptic’ states the political elites of the Baltic States are today increasingly faced with the dilemma of throwing their political weight behind the support for a strong Europe or the support of the old Atlanticist idea of Europe as a pillar of NATO.<sup>135</sup> Soon, however, they could be faced with the unenviable duty of making a clear choice between competing foreign policy priorities. They are caught in a tug of war, and their position in the long term is rather untenable. When Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania signed the Vilnius Ten statement on 5 February 2003, they declared their agreement with the US that Iraq was already in “material breach” of UN Resolution 1441. Almost two weeks later, however, they also endorsed the European Union’s common position on Iraq, which took the view that it was exclusively up to

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<sup>132</sup> Fuller, ‘East Europeans line up behind Bush’.

<sup>133</sup> Geremek, ‘Note on the Transatlantic Bonds of the EU’, p. 45.

<sup>134</sup> Vinocur, ‘The big winner in the EU expansion: Washington’.

<sup>135</sup> Paulauskas, ‘The Baltics: from nation states to member states’, pp. 5-6.

the United Nations to decide whether Iraq has actually been in breach of any UN resolution.<sup>136</sup> Staggeringly, Poland's representative at the meeting added that the Union's position "fully expressed" the Polish position, in spite of Poland's decision to send troops to Iraq on the US-supported basis that Iraq had violated UN resolutions.<sup>137</sup> Such 'muddling through' approaches might turn out to be counter-productive. In many cases a choice seems to have been made: UN reforms agenda, Kyoto protocol, the ABM treaty, the International Criminal Court.<sup>138</sup> In all of these cases the new members have rarely deviated from the general EU consensus. And this has often happened against concerted and frantic US efforts to prevent the alignment of the new members with traditional EU positions.<sup>139</sup> Undoubtedly, new members, such as the Baltic three, still view the ESDP project as a rival to NATO and they do not seem to be particularly keen on the idea of an autonomous defense role (they do not even take it for granted) fearing it would finally replace NATO in the European defense architecture. However, they are strongly advised to "shed the illusion that the ESDP could represent a sort of an extension of NATO. It is a solely European project, one in an array of measures the EU possesses to pursue its own strategic goals."<sup>140</sup> The citizens of the Baltic States, nevertheless, seem to have their own, separate opinion on this issue. Polls consistently show that their support for ESDP and CFSP not only is strong,

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<sup>136</sup> Lobjakas and Knox, 'Candidates Sign Up To Bloc's Position On Iraq, Although Chirac Jibes Steal Limelight'.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 66, Paulauskas, 'The Baltics: from nation states to member states', p 33.

<sup>139</sup> On the issue of the International Criminal Court for instance, despite long and persistent efforts Washington did not manage to sign bilateral agreements with the new members in order to exempt its troops from the Court's jurisdiction.

<sup>140</sup> Paulauskas, 'The Baltics: from nation states to member states', p. 34.

but it also surpasses the EU average. Even in decision-making on European defense policy, they are willing to give priority to the EU institutions than to the national governments or even NATO.<sup>141</sup> Their gradual transformation from ‘hardened’ Atlanticists to ‘ordinary’ Europeans could be underpinned by a combination of several factors.

a. The special weight of the new members in the enlarged Union has, by all accounts, been overestimated. The new members are not, and probably never will be, in a position to join forces and defy ‘heavyweights’ France and Germany while they are themselves so weak. Poland is routinely presented by a certain circle of policy analysts and media as a future EU heavyweight, willing to change the balance of power within the Union in favour of America, in defiance of France and Germany’s drive to a more independent continent. When Polish troops were dispatched to Iraq to fight along the Americans and then try to help with the reconstruction and the administration of the country, Poland found itself suddenly elevated to the status of an important international player, a firm ally of the world’s most powerful nation with the ability to influence important international developments. Characteristically, the US ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, spoke of “a new power in Europe”.<sup>142</sup> The idea may have made a lot of Poles proud, but for some of the country’s more skeptical analysts was more than an oxymoron. Faced with unemployment of around twenty per cent, a general feeling of corruption, with a resentment of the political class, uncertain of its own institutions Poland at the time of war in Iraq, was far from a world

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<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>142</sup> Jacoby, ‘Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations’, p. 253.

powerhouse.<sup>143</sup> The conclusion could among cynics be that Washington was so eager to have allies in Iraq that it was raising Poland to a level of importance well beyond the country's size or abilities.<sup>144</sup> Thus, it is far from certain that new members could go to extreme lengths in order to please Washington when transatlantic tensions arise, jeopardizing their relations with EU leaders like France and Germany.<sup>145</sup> So, the assertion (almost treated as an axiom in many US circles) that "as long as a handful of countries are willing to ally themselves with the United States, Europe cannot become a powerful American opponent"<sup>146</sup>, is highly questionable.

b. It is also becoming clear that the 'blind' pro-Americanism of most of the new members can rarely go further than security issues and relations with Russia. This is certainly the case with the Baltic States. The US is in no position to offer significant assistance to them when the focus shifts to economic and social developments or the dependence of the Baltic States on Russia for their energy needs.<sup>147</sup> The EU's importance on the other hand can only grow. EU membership has been instrumental in helping the Baltic States limit their dependence on the Russian economy, a strategic goal for them.<sup>148</sup>

Concerning their eastern neighbourhood, the Baltic States realize that "due to

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<sup>143</sup> Berstein, 'Poland Upstages, and Irks, European Powerhouses'. Bluntly put at the time by a Polish commentator: "Poland doesn't have the capacity to get its own home into shape – much less run another country like Iraq."

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.* Skeptics think that Poland rose to prominence as an American ally, not because of its inherent strength, but by a kind of default: "It's because the others, France and Germany, were absent that Poland became a major player, but when you look at the means of this country, it is a little ironic."

<sup>145</sup> Baker, 'U.S.: Rumsfeld's 'Old' And 'New' Europe Touches On Uneasy Divide'.

<sup>146</sup> Applebaum, ' "Old Europe" versus "New Europe"', p. 37.

<sup>147</sup> Paulauskas, 'The Baltics: from nation states to member states', p 31.

<sup>148</sup> In 1996, 45% of Lithuania's imports came from the EU and 32.2% from the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) while 38.5 of its exports went to the EU and 39.3 to the CIS. By 2004, imports from the EU had jumped to 63% and exports to it to 66.4% while the respective figures for the CIS stood at 16.1 and 26.9. Similar trends prevailed in Latvia and Estonia too. Paulauskas, 'The Baltics: from nation states to member states', p 32.

objective historical, economic and geographic reasons the EU has stronger vested interests and, therefore, is a more active player than the US.”<sup>149</sup> Poland too, finds that the EU is far better suited than the US to have a constructive engagement with Poland’s eastern neighbours.<sup>150</sup> Just a few months after the beginning of Polish involvement in Iraq as part of the US-led invasion political observers were pointing out that the failure of Poland’s leaders to display concrete gains from their participation in the war was leading to a “noticeable cooling of talk about the transatlantic relationship serving as a substitute for closer ties to Europe”.<sup>151</sup> This is something that even some of the most ‘euroskeptic’ eastern leaders seem to have realized: “besides our very close relations with the United States that we regard as a great value, nothing is going to change the fact that Poland is in Europe and that Europe is our fundamental plane of reference.”<sup>152</sup>

c. The Iraq war and its aftermath have caused a palpable ‘change of hearts’. For Poland, the turnaround is fuelled by two events: “the continuous lack of stability and meager prospects for implanting democracy in Iraq, as well as the evident failure of Warsaw to secure some clear benefits from its loyalty towards the United States...”.<sup>153</sup> Polish leaders had to endure embarrassment at home and felt politically exposed. President Kwasniewski

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<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p 31.

<sup>150</sup> Zaborowski, ‘From America’s protégé to constructive European’, 23. This is because Poland knows first hand what difference conditionality can make both on domestic reforms and international relations and simply for reasons of proximity expects the EU to be an active player in the region.

<sup>151</sup> Jacoby, ‘Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations’, p. 253.

<sup>152</sup> Kaczynski, Speech at the Euro-American Press Club.

<sup>153</sup> Zaborowski, ‘From America’s protégé to constructive European’, p. 5. “Only a handful of Polish companies have been involved in the reconstruction programmes ...Poles still need visas when traveling to the United States- it is actually harder to get one now.” *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14. See also Larrabee, ‘Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe’.

had to admit, at the time, that he was ‘hurt’ by the refusal of the US to change policy on the issue of visas for Poles who would like to visit America, and shocked by the Abu-Ghraib scandal; finally he felt compelled to declare that “Poland was misled” over the WMD issue, and criticize American unilateral instincts.<sup>154</sup> The material benefits for these countries were also meager. Hopes that eastern European firms would win lucrative contracts in Iraq, once the reconstruction of the country began, were quickly dashed.<sup>155</sup> The hastiness with which the troops that were sent to fight in Iraq have been withdrawn or are being withdrawn, indicates that in future, the new EU states might not be so fervent supporters of Washington’s ‘coalitions of the willing’.

d. Another issue that figures prominently in the new members’ political calculations is the uncertain future of NATO, which could usher in a return to ‘power politics’. America’s refusal to accept the help of its NATO allies during the Afghanistan war and its clear preference for ‘Coalitions of the willing’ in its ‘war on terror’, made many in Poland wonder whether the Polish reliance on NATO could be sustainable in the long run.<sup>156</sup> In addition, meetings of British, French and German leaders to discuss the EU’s response to the 9/11 events generated fears of a return to a ‘Europe of great powers’

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<sup>154</sup> Zaborowski, ‘From America’s protégé to constructive European’, pp. 13-15. “However, the Iraq crisis was the first case when Poland experienced the perils of American leadership and hegemony...” Although all these events do not seem capable on their own to force Polish leaders into spectacular reversals of policies towards the US in the short term, the truth is that the ‘Iraqi lesson’ of the Polish political elite has marked the end of the honeymoon period for the US-Polish relationship and the beginning of the transformation of Polish attitudes to CFSP and ESDP. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>155</sup> Jacoby, ‘Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations’, p. 253. Polish firms were expecting for example to win or be awarded contracts of a total value of \$2 billion dollars and Czech firms \$100 million dollars but these never materialized.

<sup>156</sup> Zaborowski, ‘From America’s protégé to constructive European’, p. 19.

through the creation of a European *directoire*, from which Poland would be excluded.<sup>157</sup>

e. The war in Iraq has made political elites in Eastern Europe aware of the dangers of ignoring their publics in the way many leaders of the new member states did during the Iraq crisis. Support for US was firm in official circles and weak or non-existent among the publics. In early 2003, only one third of the Polish population thought that their country should participate in the oncoming war, in the Czech Republic this percentage was further reduced to 24 per cent (under the premise of a UN mandate, and only 13 per cent without it) and in Hungary to 17 per cent.<sup>158</sup> Political leaders cannot repeatedly ignore public opinion.<sup>159</sup> The Latvian Prime Minister saw his popularity drop from around 70 percent to some 40 percent after he signed the Vilnius Ten statement, expressing support for the US position in Iraq.<sup>160</sup> In Iraq, many of the new members joined the US-led coalition but abandoned it later when public support and, in some cases, governments fell.<sup>161</sup> Surveys show that support for ESDP in the ten new members stands at 85 per cent, 10 per cent higher than in the EU15.<sup>162</sup> As for CFSP, support for it in the new

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<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>158</sup> Jacoby, 'Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations', p. 250. Thus, it is gradually being realized, even in the US, that eastern European support for the war in Iraq has mainly been an elite rather than a popular matter. Fukuyama, 'Does "the West" still exist?', p. 148.

<sup>159</sup> The new member states were not cheerleaders of NATO's Kosovo war either. On the contrary, public support for the Kosovo War was at its lowest among the new members. Officials in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland "found themselves on the defensive, explaining to their respective publics why an alliance that was meant to bring peace to them was now bombing Belgrade in their name – a devilishly difficult concept to defend even if the logic of bringing peace to Europe's periphery made long-term sense to most in Central and Eastern Europe." Valasek, 'Reality check'.

<sup>160</sup> Tomiuc, 'Do Citizens Of Vilnius 10 Support Action Against Iraq, Or Only Their Governments?'

<sup>161</sup> Valasek, 'Reality check'.

<sup>162</sup> Eurobarometer 64, p. 103.

members stands at 74%, 7% stronger than in the EU15.<sup>163</sup> Support for NATO, on the other hand is waning.<sup>164</sup>

f. Eastern European leaders come gradually to realize that there is little room for sentimentalities in the way Washington treats its allies. US policies are almost always dictated by cold, interest-based calculations and notions such as solidarity between allies have sometimes only a token value. When eastern Europeans chose to follow the EU and not the US line on the ICC, the Bush administration responded by cutting military aid to them.<sup>165</sup> Few US politicians are watching closely developments in Eastern Europe and issues of primacy in the new EU members sometimes do not even generate much, if any at all, interest in the US. The bitterness, for instance, that was felt throughout Eastern Europe, after the failure of the US administration to award post-war contracts in Iraq to Eastern European firms, or revise its visa policies for Eastern Europeans, was hardly noticed within the US administration.<sup>166</sup> Even some American analysts are warning the new members, especially Poland, that sooner or later they will be left with only one viable option when, inevitably, they are faced with the volatility of US foreign policy: “Poland and its neighbors have yet to give up hope of a strong NATO, but they can ignore reality for only so long; Warsaw and other like-minded capitals will soon

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<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>164</sup> See *Transatlantic Trends*, 2006, 2005.

<sup>165</sup> Jacoby, ‘Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations’, p. 255.

<sup>166</sup> Applebaum, ‘“Old Europe” versus “New Europe”’, p. 36.

realize they have no choice but to settle for a strong EU.”<sup>167</sup> Besides, this is also what their geographical position dictates.<sup>168</sup>

g. The permanent ‘pulling power’ of Europe is a factor that can hardly be overstated. It is becoming more and more obvious, even to those in the US who do hope and expect that the new members will act as staunch US allies within the EU, that<sup>169</sup> EU money and threats to halt it will prove very powerful; elites can be individually seduced with the stipends, scholarships, and jobs, that the EU has to offer; huge numbers of eastern Europeans study on the western half of the continent. It is very likely, then, that “as these countries become more closely integrated into the European Union, so their peoples will identify more with Europe than with America.”<sup>170</sup> This is already happening, as some analysts point out, and it is particularly obvious among the young, even in the most pro-American countries like Poland.<sup>171</sup>

For all these reasons the EU’s CFSP and ESDP have come to be seen in a more positive light by the new EU members. Poland offers a clear example of how perceptions and actions can change. Since 2003, it has supported in the field of CFSP and ESDP the creation of the post of EU foreign minister, of a European Armaments Agency, of a European diplomatic service, of an EU Armaments and Research Agency, as well as the inclusion of the mutual defence (solidarity) clause and the formation of the European

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<sup>167</sup> Kupchan, ‘The Rise of Europe, America’s Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy’, p. 226.

<sup>168</sup> Zielonka, *Europe as Empire*, p. 159.

<sup>169</sup> Applebaum, ‘“Old Europe” versus “New Europe”’, pp. 35-36. At the same time the new, stricter post-9/11 US rules on the admission of prospective foreign students and visitors to the US force a great number of people to choose alternative destinations.

<sup>170</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 88.

<sup>171</sup> Larrabee, ‘Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe’.

Security Strategy.<sup>172</sup> In 2003, Romania was the only of the EU candidates to sign a non-extradition treaty with the US offering exemption from prosecution to US military staff before the EU-backed ICC.<sup>173</sup>

In sum, it is safe to claim that the EU's eastern newcomers are not hostile towards ESDP as such; their ultimate interest is effective defense. Preferably through NATO, because they believe that if the US quits Europe there is a real risk of returning to the *realpolitik* of the 20<sup>th</sup> century with Russia becoming again a threat. But in case this strategy fails then a truly European defense is viewed as the second best choice. Thus, many think that in case NATO's future becomes even more uncertain the countries of Eastern Europe will be forced to "choose ever more often between their distant patrons in the United States and their local patrons within Europe".<sup>174</sup>

### ***III. 'Unity through diversity'***

Culturally, the EU-15 and the new Central and Eastern European states do not represent two different worlds. With regard to religious values and practices, a marked degree of convergence between West and East already exists, as secularisation of society has taken hold on both sides of Europe with people increasingly in favour of the distinction between church and state.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Zaborowski, 'From America's protégé to constructive European', pp. 19-20.

<sup>173</sup> Jacoby, 'Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations', p. 255.

<sup>174</sup> Jacoby, 'Military competence versus policy loyalty: central Europe and transatlantic relations', p. 255. "To be sure, warm bilateral relations with the United States would be of immeasurable help in a true crisis. But betting on the long memory of an embattled, distracted, and increasingly isolated superpower carries with it some real risks".

<sup>175</sup> Amatto and Batt, 'Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border', p.14. Amatto and Batt go as far as to suggest that in fact secularisation in Central and Eastern Europe and the West was driven by the same factors: "The massive shift of employment from rural areas to the towns and cities in

Poland is frequently used as living proof of a firmly religious, barely secularized Eastern Europe. Even in Poland, however, it is becoming clear that modernization is leading to secularization.<sup>176</sup> Besides, Poland should rather be seen as the exception among Central and East European countries just as the Republic of Ireland constitutes the exception in Western Europe.<sup>177</sup>

Severe restrictions on individual freedoms reflected on the curtailed rights of women, gays, ethnic minorities (namely the Roma) in Central and Eastern Europe have helped portray it almost as a heaven of intolerance and racism.<sup>178</sup>

However, we should not forget that Western societies have not always had a better record of success in integrating Roma.<sup>179</sup> Thus it should not come as a surprise that comparative research on the issue of tolerance has revealed that

the 1950s-1970s uprooted large numbers of former peasants from their traditional community life, centred on the church. The attractions of a materialistic, consumption-oriented lifestyle proved a potent challenge to traditional spiritual values. The spread of the notion of the "weekend" as a time for private family leisure - frequently spent away from the city in small cottages with attached allotment gardens - displaced church attendance on Sundays."

<sup>176</sup> Casanova, 'Religion, European secular identities, and European integration', p. 69. The Polish Church, argues Casanova, has squandered much of its authority with its heavy-handed interventions in Polish politics and its reactionary positions on issues like modern individual freedoms. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>177</sup> Amatto and Batt, 'Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border', p.15.

<sup>178</sup> "The issue of gay rights has only arrived on the public agenda in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of communism and remains acutely contentious in most societies, even where membership of the Council of Europe obliges governments to amend repressive and discriminatory legislation. Attitudes on this topic are more comparable to those found in the West before the 1960s, and open displays of homosexual behaviour are often met with ridicule, if not undisguised disgust and hostility. Racism is another area where communist rhetoric and practice have been either ineffective or counter-productive. Communist regimes simply swept the issue of Roma rights under the carpet. Roma constitute the largest ethnic minority in many Central and East European states. Efforts at integration consisted in no more than outlawing the nomadic way of life and prosecuting so-called "social parasitism," accompanied by policies of enforced settlement and bureaucratically-imposed assimilation. ...The education system for the most part ignored the special needs of Roma children. The result has been the creation of urban ghettos, and employment, if at all, in the most menial occupations. Social marginalisation meant that prejudices against the Roma were simply further reinforced, and were as evident in communist officialdom as in the wider society." Amatto and Batt, 'Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border', pp.16-17.

<sup>179</sup> Zielonka, *Europe as Empire*, p. 79, Amatto and Batt, 'Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border', p.17.

there is “considerable overlap between west and east in the middle range of tolerance.”<sup>180</sup>

The populist threat, posed by some political movements in the new member states, should not be exaggerated. There are, say some observers, important reasons to think that the situation may be “desperate”, but not “serious”, meaning that the EU could learn to live with the populists.<sup>181</sup> Moreover, populism is not a phenomenon which made its appearance in Europe in 2004. The EU had a fair number of encounters with populist movements well before the states of eastern and central Europe appeared on its map. In dealing with populists, the EU has proved to be a great constraint.<sup>182</sup> This has been sufficiently demonstrated in the recent change of government in Poland. The will of the Polish people to appear again as ‘normal’ Europeans played a catalytic role in the ousting of the populist government. And this seems to confirm the conclusions of analysts who have long argued that the new members on the periphery of the EU’s traditional centre (i.e. the six original members) have often “more motivation to assimilate into the norms of the centre than is the case for populations closer to the centre.”<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, p.19.

<sup>181</sup> Rupnik, ‘Populism in Eastern Central Europe’. As Rupnik argues, “...there are cycles of populism. They come to power on an anti-corruption drive ‘to clean the house’, but once you become the house you may yourself become identified with the practices you have denounced. They then tend to fall back on clientelism and instrumentalization of the state by the ruling parties (as we see in Poland) rather than remaining true to their radical slogans.”

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.* Like most other analysts, Rupnik focuses on Austria: “Austria has been the main test case since 2000: ostracism showed its limits, absorption proved more effective. After all, populist nationalists joined (and have since left) government coalitions in Italy, Holland and Denmark. The lesson for the newcomers could be that populism can erode or dissolve thanks to EU constraint.”

<sup>183</sup> Zielonka, *Europe as Empire*, p. 82.

In contrast to what a lot of analysts believe, leaders from the new EU members acknowledge that it is almost inevitable that individual and global identities will overshadow increasingly unimportant territorial identities, arguing that a common European identity can be built as a surplus or addition to existing national identities.<sup>184</sup> Echoing their western counterparts,<sup>185</sup> they argue that social cohesion and protection of the environment can constitute the foundations of a common European identity, further suggesting that “in pursuing the goals of protecting the global environment and bridging the gap between rich and poor, Europe should contribute actively to eradicating the negative effects of globalization while enhancing its unprecedented opportunities.”<sup>186</sup> Empirical evidence shows for example that in the new members’ support for social welfare spending is even greater than that in Western Europe.<sup>187</sup> The initial enthusiasm for markets and economic liberalism of the 1990s has receded under the weight of high unemployment and serious structural problems, and former communist and socialist parties have regained some of their power by advocating higher levels of economic and social security.<sup>188</sup> Indeed, rather than relying on a neoliberal blueprint, the new members of the EU have proved that they try hard to combine economic growth with social protection.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Drnovsek, ‘National identities need to adapt and survive’.

<sup>185</sup> “This challenge (the economic challenge of globalisation) brings in its wake the social challenge, i.e. that of maintaining our European social model, the guarantee of our cohesion.” Chirac, Treaty of Rome 50th anniversary celebrations press conference.

<sup>186</sup> Drnovsek, ‘National identities need to adapt and survive’. See also, Barysch, ‘East versus West? The EU economy after enlargement’.

<sup>187</sup> Buananno and Deakin, ‘European Identity’, p. 93.

<sup>188</sup> Baun, ‘Intergovernmental Politics’, p. 141.

<sup>189</sup> Zielonka, *Europe as Empire*, p. 85. As Zielonka finds, “none of the Eastern European democracies resemble the American model.”

Those who fear that further cultural differentiation, due to enlargement, could eliminate the prospects of more integration, have to be reminded that cultural pluralism has always been a permanent feature of Western Europe politics. In the EU-15 a north-south divide in cultural values and political and administrative traditions continues to exist and influence perceptions among member countries highlighting the persistence of cultural differences as a lively factor in politics within and between states.<sup>190</sup> Thus, at this stage at least, predictions that increased cultural diversity in the enlarged Union could have a devastating effect on existing and future political structures must be treated very cautiously.

### 3. Conclusion

Its eastward enlargement, could throw the EU into a state of paralysis, many analysts have warned. The diversity of interests and goals in a Union of almost thirty members threatens to render the decision-making process of the EU unworkable. Conflicts between big and small states could be exacerbated, France and Germany may not be in a position to push for more political integration, euroskeptic Britain could have the chance to find fresh and willing allies to help it freeze further integration, huge numbers of immigrants from the new member states may cause a rise in levels of unemployment and crime in the old EU member states. Citizens of the new members may have to deal with loss of national identity and sovereignty, while worrying about a

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<sup>190</sup> Amatto and Batt, 'Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border', p.32.

possible economic domination by their new neighbours, namely Germany. They also risk being treated as second-class citizens within the new EU.

The 'Russophobia' of the new members puts into question the possibility of a closer relation between the EU and Russia and their strong pro-American feelings risk splitting the new Union into two warring camps. The 'new Europeans' are too anxious to please Washington and prove their loyalty to it, many analysts say. The Iraq War was just the beginning, complement others. Europe also risks a new split, along cultural lines this time. Eastern Europeans carry with them their own distinct values and identities and are less 'civilised' than their Western counterparts, showing intolerance for minority groups for example. Their commitment to democratic ideals should not be taken for granted either, many warn, and the rapid transformation of the former communist states into modern, liberal democracies may not last long.

As previous enlargements show, the process of widening the EU is not incompatible with the process of deepening. On the contrary, further integration is what usually follows enlargement rounds. This round does not seem to be different. The new members of the Union are not sworn enemies of integration, as some fear and others hope. They have nothing to gain from a diluted EU in which the spirit of solidarity, in which they have invested so much, will be considerably weakened. The new members are small states, in their majority, and that makes them natural allies of the EU's supranational institutions. Their anti-Russian and pro-American feelings are already receding and their stance on critical foreign policy issues does not differ from

the stance of older EU members. The same is the case with issues of values and identity.

Many analysts have quickly reached the conclusion that the new enlargement of the EU can only strengthen intergovernmental tendencies within it. Intergovernmentalists have traditionally insisted that “enlargement always makes the EU more conflictual because it diversifies the range of national preferences that must be accommodated.”<sup>191</sup>

Federalist visions of European integration, they claim, will be the big victims of expansion: “Acceptance of the federalist agenda that underpins much of the debate and writing on the EU will come increasingly under question as the EU enlarges further.”<sup>192</sup> Negative political spillover ‘from the outside in’, is also a realistic possibility it is claimed: “...new members and their respective political elites bring with them their own preferences for moulding the character of the EU. This may not necessarily all be in the direction of further deepening, as areas of integration may be limited, resisted or even reversed by the presence of new political elites who do not share the premise that further integration is advantageous in itself.”<sup>193</sup>

Such accounts, however, fail to recognise the importance of all those factors which have made further integration possible even when it was least expected. They underestimate the role of supranational actors like the

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<sup>191</sup> Peterson and Bomberg, ‘Northern Enlargement and EU Decisionmaking’, p. 45.

<sup>192</sup> Croft et al., *The Enlargement of Europe*, p. 85. For a similar conclusion, see also Miles and Redmond, ‘Enlarging the European Union: the Erosion of Federalism?’.

<sup>193</sup> Miles, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, p. 256. See also, Croft et al., *The Enlargement of Europe*, p. 79: “In an increasingly diverse EU, it becomes more and more difficult to be certain of the commitment of new members to deepening. At the very least, some prospective members may press for British/Danish-style opt-outs once they have become full EU members. More fundamentally, they may seek to redirect, inhibit or even reverse the present course of European integration.”

European Commission who acts as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ and tries “to push forward a supranational or transnational agenda, even where member states are reluctant to accept further integration.”<sup>194</sup> Indeed, the Commission and ECJ are often judged to be irrelevant or at least relatively unimportant by intergovernmentalists.<sup>195</sup> The latter tend to downplay the fact, for example, that the European Court of Justice interprets the Treaty expansively within its rulings, ushering in the building of a supranational community as it plays an active role in the creation of Community authority in legal matters (confirming, in this way, the neofunctionalist idea about the autonomy of the EU’s supranational institutions).<sup>196</sup> Neofunctionalist arguments about the role of elites in the new member states, pointing in the direction of further integration, are supported by strong evidence: “Elites are fully committed, and this commitment has gone beyond the communist/anti-communist divide within the political class, present at the beginning of transition. ...the pro-EU political discourse is the only legitimate one, with all alternate discourses being so far delegitimized.”<sup>197</sup> Finally, the argument that further integration cannot be ruled out after the last round of EU enlargement is strengthened by contradicting intergovernmentalist assumptions: on the one hand, it is stressed that the political elites of the new member states will never consent to further integration in the fields of CFSP and ESDP,<sup>198</sup> but on the other hand it is accepted that economic interests remain primary and overshadow security

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<sup>194</sup> Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, p. 85.

<sup>195</sup> Cini, Michelle, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, p. 106. Intergovernmentalists also ignore non-state ‘transnational’ actors such as European firms and interest groups.

<sup>196</sup> Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, pp. 90-91.

<sup>197</sup> Mungiou-Pippidi, ‘Facing the ‘desert of Tartars’, p. 70.

<sup>198</sup> Miles and Redmond, ‘Enlarging the European Union: the Erosion of Federalism?’.

concerns,<sup>199</sup> and therefore member states which are reluctant to follow a federal agenda can be ‘bought off’<sup>200</sup> and end up supporting federal projects.

Constructivist analysis is also useful in explaining why the diversity-factor has been overstated in discussions about the future of European integration after enlargement. There is no doubt that “both rationalist and constructivist factors play a role in enlargement decision-making and ...material cost/benefit calculations would lead us to expect a strong CEEC interest in EU membership.”<sup>201</sup> Of even greater significance, however, is the constructivist argument that “EU membership as part of the CEECs’ foreign policy objective to ‘return to Europe’ is motivated by their desire to cast off an ‘eastern’ identity and to be recognized as ‘one of us’ by the European international community.”<sup>202</sup> It is exactly this desire of the new members that can safely lead to the conclusion that their intention is not to dilute a specific European identity which has been gradually built over the last decades, but to share it with pride and promote it even further.

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<sup>199</sup> Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>200</sup> Miles and Redmond, ‘Enlarging the European Union: the Erosion of Federalism?’, p. 303. Miles and Redmond argue that despite their objection to a federal EU, countries like Britain and Denmark (bought off with opt-outs) and Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal (bought-off with receipts from the EU budget) have been convinced, at certain moments, to follow the path towards a federal Europe. One can therefore only wonder how it will be possible for states like Estonia, Slovakia, Lithuania etc. to stave off further integration (provided that they are against it in the first place) when states like Britain and Spain, with infinitely greater economic resources and, hence, less susceptible to pressure, have failed to do so in the past.

<sup>201</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU enlargement’, pp. 520, 524.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 520.

## Chapter Five

### *The impact of enlargement on the European Union's external relations*

#### **1. The EU between introspection and a global role**

The creation of a large zone of prosperity, stability and security in the European continent is seen as the main advantage of the new expansion. This is the main goal of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), through which the new EU seeks to create good neighbours who conform not only to 'EU values' generally speaking, but also to EU standards and laws in specific economic and social areas.<sup>1</sup> A territorially enlarged EU is expected to cease being a disinterested actor in relation to the countries on its periphery since "it is just too powerful and has too many interests of its own to continue to accept an uncritical devolution of its responsibilities to other external actors, such as Russia and the USA."<sup>2</sup> In the long term, the effects of enlargement could be felt on a much wider scale: "...enlargement may also lead to a long-term change in the EU's geopolitical aims due to the increased prominence of its global role. First, enlargement would put a seal on the Cold War legacy of division and confrontation, allowing it to concentrate on wider issues. Second, the Union's larger economic base will complement the process of globalisation through greater contact with global markets."<sup>3</sup> Eastward enlargement, signals for many Europe's opportunity to become a global player

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<sup>1</sup> Smith, *The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy*, p. 763.

<sup>2</sup> Dannreuther, 'Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy', p. 184.

<sup>3</sup> Krenzler, 'The Geostrategic and International Political Implications of EU Enlargement', p.7.

and a responsible partner, mainly due to the fresh mind, fresh visions and new interests that are brought into the EU.<sup>4</sup>

EU political interests are therefore going to be pursued more vigorously. The Action Plans (through which the ENP is implemented) between the EU and its new neighbours are proof of this, since within them political objectives such as respect for specific human rights and democratic principles, cooperation in the fight against terrorism and on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and support for the International Criminal Court feature prominently.<sup>5</sup> Even those who predict that in the wake of enlargement the EU will find it harder to be an effective actor on world stage, admit that its presence will be weightier, purely because its size and its borders have expanded.<sup>6</sup> Enlargement is seen as a powerful tool of ‘Europeanizing’ the EU’s new neighbourhood. This is particularly true for those states which already have membership aspirations, such as Ukraine.<sup>7</sup> Enlargement is also giving greater credibility to the EU’s ambitions to be treated as a global actor in international politics by strengthening its claim that it has developed a unique capacity to promote the internal transformation of states, which is driven less by a realist calculus of military power than by the civilian tools of economic integration and moral persuasion.<sup>8</sup>

However, the expansion of the EU’s borders also ushers in the creation of a new neighbourhood, which is mainly characterized by its political,

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<sup>4</sup> Mathiopoulos, ‘Recommendations for a New Transatlantic Charta’, p. 179.

<sup>5</sup> Smith, *The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy*, p. 765.

<sup>6</sup> Archer, *The European Union as an International Political Actor*, p.233.

<sup>7</sup> Emerson *et al.*, ‘The Reluctant Debutante: The EU as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood’, p. 177.

<sup>8</sup> Dannreuther, ‘Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 183.

economic and cultural diversity. The problems the EU might come against in this new geographical environment have long been identified by EU policy-planners: "...the new opportunities brought by enlargement will be accompanied by new challenges: existing differences in living standards across the Union's borders with its neighbours may be accentuated as a result of faster growth in the new Member States than in their external neighbours; common challenges such as the environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight against organised crime will have to be addressed; efficient and secure border management will be essential both to protect our shared borders and to facilitate legitimate trade and passage. No less importantly, the long-standing cultural links across these borders should be enhanced rather than hindered."<sup>9</sup>

Surrounded, after enlargement, by countries economically dependent on access to its markets, concerned about cross-border travel and trade and anxious for their voices to be heard in EU negotiations, the EU risks, without an acceptable alternative to membership, facing a lengthening queue of new applicants, resentful of their exclusion and envious of the privileges others have won.<sup>10</sup> The issue of the new borders generates, indeed, a very heated debate: "Borders are not about to melt away, but they are shifting. While they are becoming less significant between member states of the EU, the external border between members and non-members is taking on many of their functions and so threatens to become a new dividing line in post-communist Europe. Borders, to those outside them, readily appear as at best an

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<sup>9</sup> European Commission, 'Paving the way for a new neighbourhood instrument', p.4.

<sup>10</sup> Wallace, 'Looking After the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25', pp.1, 4.

inconvenience, and at worst as a massive injustice. To those on the inside, however, they lay the foundations of political order, defining right and opportunities to participate in power and material benefits. The potency of the idea of ‘returning to Europe,’ moreover, lay not only in its implicit demand to share in the political and economic goods enjoyed by citizens of the European Union, but also in its deep appeal to a common identity. Being ‘European’, means for many people in Central and Eastern Europe being part of the ‘civilized world,’ escaping from “Eastern barbarism” and backwardness. Exclusion represents therefore an affront to notions of the dignity and worth of national cultures, which are constituent elements of the identity of individuals and therefore deeply affect their feelings and psychological reactions.”<sup>11</sup> The Union risks finding itself between a rock and a hard place: “Inclusion means bridging the old Cold War divide and uniting a continent, but could end up shredding the carefully woven fabric of the Union itself. Exclusion means isolating countries that can ill afford isolation, and making a mockery of the very term ‘European union’”.<sup>12</sup> Pressure for new enlargements will grow, at a time when EU member states are displaying signs of ‘enlargement-fatigue’, as the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands have showed.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Amatto and Batt, ‘Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border’, pp.9-10.

<sup>12</sup> Smith, *The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy*, p. 757. Offering EU accession to countries such as Ukraine and Belarus may potentially “overstretch” the capacity of the EU, and in any case, meeting the Copenhagen criteria seems to be an impossible goal in these ex-Soviet republics. Krenzler, ‘The Geostrategic and International Political Implications of EU Enlargement’, p.8.

<sup>13</sup> Emerson *et al.*, ‘The Reluctant Debutante: The EU as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood’, p. 226. Such pressure will also be exerted by the new members of the EU, (with Poland and the Baltic States leading the way) which have not and will not cease reminding other EU members of the dangers of ‘losing’ Ukraine and other states to an

The designers of the ENP and those responsible for its implementation not only acknowledge these concerns but admit that they have been a crucial factor in its conception and formulation. Indeed, the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched to address most of these challenges.<sup>14</sup>

Combining elements of the EU's foreign, security, development, enlargement and trade policy,<sup>15</sup> the ENP is presented as an effective way of responding to "(EU) citizens' concerns for prosperity, security and stability, not with an abstract concept but with concrete, measurable results. And it is about helping our neighbours towards their own prosperity, security and stability, not by imposing reforms, but by supporting and encouraging reformers."<sup>16</sup> The best way to reach these targets is, according to EU leaders and publics, to bring the new neighbouring countries closer to EU practices and traditions: "The ENP is primarily an attempt to create good neighbours: namely, the kind who conform not only to 'EU values' generally speaking, but also to EU standards and laws in specific economic and social areas. The process of growing closer to the EU by 'approximating' its values and standards is expected to help increase prosperity and security in the

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increasingly authoritarian Russia. Dannreuther, 'The European Security Strategy's regional objective', p. 77. Poland is particularly keen to promote Ukraine's candidacy as it expects that Ukraine's European integration will provide a buffer between itself and Russia. Kuzio, 'Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future?', p. 100. Polish leaders keep stating that "Europe does not end at the EU's Eastern borders, nor will it end there after enlargement." Cimoszewicz, 'The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish View'. And many analysts warn that in the case of Ukraine "if the enlargement of the EU results in a lack of prospects equating to a form of exclusion, authoritarianism and a tightening of the links with Moscow are likely to become more marked." Gomart, 'Enlargement Tests the Partnership Between The EU & Russia', p. 6.

<sup>14</sup> Smith, *The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy*, p. 758.

<sup>15</sup> Lippert, 'The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions', p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU's Newest Foreign Policy Instrument', p. 140.

neighbourhood.”<sup>17</sup> Thus, the EU is seeking to “harness the attraction and influence of Europe, with strong emphasis on institution building and reform.”<sup>18</sup>

## 2. Russia and the EU: Friends or ‘foes’?

The EU has always had a special relationship with Russia but after the EU’s eastward enlargement this relationship is expected to undergo fundamental changes. Enlargement presents the two sides with increased opportunities for cooperation and closer relations but at the same time creates the potential for significant frictions or even open rivalry.

There are significant factors which bring the two parties closer together. By far the most important one is considered to be their interdependence in the field of trade (energy more specifically).<sup>19</sup> In addition, Russia is a potential source of instability, which, if not contained, could create serious problems for all of Russia’s neighbours. Russia may pose no military threat to European security, but it poses problems of a different nature, such as breakdown of civil society, declining life expectancy, health crises, large scale

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<sup>17</sup> Smith, *The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy*, p. 763.

<sup>18</sup> European Commission, ‘Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility’.

<sup>19</sup> “The EU is the largest consumer of Russian energy products with 63% of Russia’s oil exports and 65% of its gas exports being exported to the EU. Russia is the largest single external supplier of oil, accounting for 30% of EU total imports or some 27% of total EU consumption of oil. Russia also accounts for some 44% of EU gas imports or around 24% of total gas consumption.” European Commission, *The European Union and Russia*, p. 13. This interdependence, estimate some, can guarantee a degree of stability in the relationship of the two parties: “The energy interdependence will keep the EU-Russian relationship relatively stable in the medium to long term. In 2010 the North European gas pipeline, traveling under the Baltic Sea, will further link Russia and Germany.” Trenin, ‘Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West’, p. 99.

environmental pollution, widespread crime and corruption.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, it is not in the interests of EU states to have a weak and unstable Russia as their largest neighbour. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians live in the Baltic States, which are now part of the Union.

This status of interdependence, nevertheless, is often seen as inadequate, on its own, to guarantee harmonious European-Russian relations. On the contrary, it is frequently argued, a number of negative developments cast a dark shadow over the feasibility of close and fruitful ties between the EU and Russia. Indeed, the current state of EU-Russian relations seems to confirm such pessimistic assessments. There exists a strong consensus among political commentators that the EU-Russia dialogue, after years of deterioration, has reached a stalemate. Heated debates both within the EU and Russia are currently taking place concerning the direction of the future EU-Russian partnership.

Strategic cooperation is a rather unattainable goal, many are convinced, because, first and foremost, Russia and the EU do not really share the same objectives. On the contrary, there is marked divergence: “Russia wants to consolidate the European CIS space, and then have a neat Europe in which the enlarged EU and the Russian led space would be mutually exclusive, and the EU and Russia would manage the big Europe as an ordered

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<sup>20</sup> Noe, ‘The impact of EU Enlargement on External Relations, notably with the US and Russia’, pp. 13-14. This instability emanates from Russia’s acute internal problems: Russia’s population is shrinking; Russia could have a total population of 130 million in the next twenty years from today’s 143,2 million; AIDS is spreading at an alarming rate; according to the most pessimistic scenarios the country will see 11 million cases of HIV infection which may result in 8,7 million deaths; Russia faces huge social problems like poverty, alcoholism, high criminality, while the disparities between different social groups and regions and the poor quality of life are fuelling nationalism and xenophobia. Furthermore, in certain regions of Russia Islamic fundamentalism could become in the near future an important and destabilizing threat. Gnesotto and Grevi, *Le Monde en 2025*, pp. 25-26.

duopoly. The EU ...wants to see all of Europe converge on its conception of European political values and economic norms...”<sup>21</sup>

The ENP is paving the way for a more dynamic EU presence in a geographical area which up to now has been viewed by the Russian Federation as a quasi exclusive sphere of influence and responsibility. The logic of clash could, theoretically at least, prevail leading to a spectacular deterioration of Brussels-Moscow relations: “In this perspective, the two ‘near abroad’ policies - of Russia and the EU - may clash. In the eastern part of the EU’s arc of neighbouring countries, the Russian Federation is heavily involved in most crises, from Transdnierstra to the northern Caucasus; by the same token, Russian relations with Belarus and Ukraine may not always be in tune with EU interests and goals. In other words, the EU’s initiative of implementing a neighbourhood policy involves the Union in a number of crises that involve Russia as well. This makes EU-Russia cleavages more likely.”<sup>22</sup> A major source of friction stems from the fact that Russia tends to view the EU’s engagement in geopolitical terms and as zero-sum competition for regional influence.<sup>23</sup>

Increasingly, Russia is seen by many in the EU in a negative way. It is often described as an international bully who uses its vast energy resources to blackmail its neighbours and therefore an unreliable trading partner for the

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<sup>21</sup> Emerson, ‘The EU-Russia-US Triangle’, p. 7. Gomart says something similar: “The EU sees the partnership as a means of stabilizing Europe as a continent, as well as a vehicle for converting Russia to its way of thinking. Russia uses it to avoid isolation by institutionalizing trade in order to influence the EU’s international personality in a dialogue ‘of equals’.” Gomart, ‘Enlargement Tests the Partnership Between The EU & Russia’, p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> Aliboni, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, pp. 13-14.

<sup>23</sup> Dannreuther, ‘Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 200.

EU.<sup>24</sup> It is also frequently criticized for authoritarian practices and serious violations of human rights. Indeed, the list of such violations is alarmingly long: “Issues that the EU raises with Russia in the human rights consultations include: the human rights situation in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, including torture and ill-treatment; freedom of expression and assembly, including freedom of the media; the situation of civil society in Russia, notably in light of the laws on NGOs and extremist activities; the functioning of the judiciary, including independence issues; the observation of human rights standards by law enforcement officials; racism and xenophobia; legislation relating to elections.”<sup>25</sup> EU leaders are increasingly voicing their concerns: “Russia’s attitude towards non-governmental organisations gives ground for concern. The reports we are receiving tell us that NGO legislation, while not problematic in itself, creates in its application a lot of red tape and insecurity for NGOs.”<sup>26</sup> Even its status as a democratic country comes into question: “We must abandon the myth that Russia is a large democracy. It simply isn’t.”<sup>27</sup> There seems to be a wide consensus among EU circles that the

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<sup>24</sup> Even an EU commissioner has warned that “The events at the beginning of 2006 between Russia, Moldova and Ukraine were a wake-up call, reminding us that energy security needs to be even higher on our political agenda.” Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU’s Newest Foreign Policy Instrument’, p. 141. Russia is also cast as unreliable because, as some predict, it will not be able to guarantee a constant supply of energy to the EU due to lack of investment in its infrastructure: “Gazprom’s output has been flat for years, while domestic demand is rising swiftly. Energy experts say that Russian underinvestment could open up a ‘gas gap’ in Europe as early as 2010.” Barysch, ‘Reciprocity will not secure Europe’s energy’, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> European Commission, *The European Union and Russia*, p. 15. Russian leaders are often attacked in an unusually harsh manner: “Mr Putin’s use of energy as a weapon is only one instance of a Russian assertiveness that nowadays seems to border on gangsterism. Perhaps the most spectacular recent example is the murder in London of a former Russian agent, Alexander Litvinenko. Though it is not clear whether the Kremlin ordered the killing, that this even seems possible says something about the internal state of Russia.” *The Economist*, ‘Don’t mess with Russia: From Russia with polonium’

<sup>26</sup> Merkel, interview with the *Financial Times*.

<sup>27</sup> Ilves, interview to *Der Spiegel*.

Putin years have seen a retreat of democracy, pluralism of media and individual liberties.<sup>28</sup> Russia is not a democracy, claim many, because it is not really governed by elected politicians but private interests: “Private and corporate interests are behind most of Moscow’s major policy decisions, as Russia is ruled by people who largely own it.”<sup>29</sup>

In Russia, as well, many seem to harbour negative feelings toward Europe. There is a variety of reasons for which ordinary Russians and their political leadership often see the European Union critically: “The mood in Russian society is increasingly anti-Western, with many Russians feeling the West humiliated them in the past. Plans to expand NATO further into the post-Soviet space only reinforce Russia’s anti-Western sentiment. Overwhelmingly, the view of the Russian elites is that the West wants to prevent the resurrection of a strong Russian state.”<sup>30</sup> Russians are also angry at the criticism they receive from many European corners. Not only do they reject it but reward with higher popularity rates their political leaders when the latter seem to stand up to this criticism.<sup>31</sup> Finally, many believe that the EU enlargement will be unfavourable for Russia as it will result in the marginalization and isolation of the country.<sup>32</sup>

With all these unpromising parameters clouding relations between Moscow and the EU it has been rather easy for many commentators to decide that all this talk about a strategic partnership amounts to little more than rhetoric. The actual state of affairs, they conclude, indicates there is no major

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<sup>28</sup> Pozzo di Borgo, ‘Union européenne-Russie: quelles relations?’, p. 88.

<sup>29</sup> Trenin, ‘Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West’, p. 95.

<sup>30</sup> Rahr, ‘Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship’, p. 143.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.

<sup>32</sup> Borko, ‘The new intra-European relations and Russia’, p.379.

underpinning of the relationship: “Russia will inevitably be confronted with its internal problems for many years. It has come to recognize the growing influence of the EU in certain areas but it does not see any need to make major concessions to achieve a rather nebulous ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU. The same holds true for Brussels. It knows that it is heavily dependent on Russian energy but it also recognises that the energy card is not a strong one – after all, Russia has to sell its oil and gas to live. Overall, therefore, there is no major underpinning of the relationship.”<sup>33</sup> For Russia in particular, the relationship is perceived as one sided: “This Europeanism of Putin has a unique character: it departs from the point that Russia takes part in developments within Europe in order to exert a great influence but the internal affairs of Russia remain its own affair.”<sup>34</sup>

### 3. The EU’s moment of truth

#### *1. An inadequate ENP?*

A great number of analyses clearly argue that the EU has not grasped the enormity of the eastward enlargement project, has not formulated adequate policies to deal with the issues involved and, above all, lacks a clear vision of what it wants to achieve. The damage the EU risks inflicting upon itself, is consequently, incalculable: introspection, marginalisation, irrelevance on the world scene.

The main EU attempt to manage the effects of enlargement, the ENP, has been already dismissed, by some analysts, as neither conceptually

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<sup>33</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 121.

<sup>34</sup> Arbatova, ‘Russie-UE après 2007 : le débat russe’, p. 18.

complete nor operationally stable, ambivalent (due to its complex nature as a “composite policy”), condemned to become the object of lengthy and acrimonious disputes.<sup>35</sup> It is a peculiar ‘hybrid’: “In a way, the ENP still suffers from being neither enlargement nor foreign policy: it cannot exercise conditionality as effectively as the former, nor can it bring to bear all the tools and levers of the latter. It lacks a clear *finalité*, while being too sectoral and overloaded with policy goals that go well beyond the remit of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations. It is also seriously under-funded – despite the 30% increase in the budget for 2007-13.”<sup>36</sup> The ENP is, in addition, seen as antithetical to the values and traditions of the Union. It focuses on developing bilateral relations between the EU and individual countries, in an attempt to influence their internal and external politics, and change in the direction desired by the EU is seen to be more likely to come about by the use of EU leverage on its neighbours separately rather than in multilateral discussions.<sup>37</sup> The reluctance of the EU to contemplate further enlargement is also seen as a factor in the weak (non-existent for some) support of the EU for the burgeoning democracy movements in the area, with many analysts predicting that “enlarging fatigue

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<sup>35</sup> Lippert, ‘The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions’, pp. 2-3. It is also impossible for EU members to agree on the direction the ENP should take, as they perceive its various aspects differently. *Ibid*, p. 18.

<sup>36</sup> Balfour and Missiroli, ‘Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 6.

<sup>37</sup> Smith, *The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy*, pp. 762-763. “The ENP is a policy based on strengthening the bilateral links between the EU and each neighbour, a policy for neighbours rather than a neighbourhood policy. ... Yet the EU is clearly the world’s foremost example of regional integration, has prided itself on boosting regionalism elsewhere in the world, and now claims to be supporting effective multilateralism everywhere. Not doing so in its own backyard seems a rather curious paradox.” *Ibid*, pp. 771-772.

risks trumping democracy.”<sup>38</sup> Characteristically, France has added a new clause to the French Constitution, which stipulates that French voters will decide in a national referendum if they want future enlargements to take place.<sup>39</sup>

Critics find it hard to agree with the description of the ENP by EU officials as “a win-win policy, based on mutual interest and shared values.”<sup>40</sup> It is not clear, they contend, to what degree the EU is prepared to push for these ‘values’.<sup>41</sup> Instead, they maintain that the ENP Action Plans reflect a rather ample dose of EU self-interest.<sup>42</sup> With its negative and positive mechanisms of conditionality and inclusion, the ENP is, by this thinking, a framework in which the EU works not only as a hub but also as a political hegemon.<sup>43</sup> Thus, inescapably, the ENP is seen as exploitative in nature: “The ENP requires much of the neighbours, and offers only vague incentives in return. ...The member states will need to be more serious about setting clear benchmarks (and standing by them consistently) and offering concrete incentives (even when they perceive these to be costly to themselves) if the ENP is to meet its core objectives.”<sup>44</sup> Many also see the ENP as nearly defunct because of the attitudes the Union is displaying towards Moscow. The EU has been accused of adopting a quite submissive stance towards Russia, failing to

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<sup>38</sup> Emerson *et al.*, ‘The Reluctant Debutante: The EU as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood’, p. 215.

<sup>39</sup> Marchetti, ‘Consolidation in Times of Crisis: The European Neighbourhood Policy as Chance for Neighbours?’, p. 11.

<sup>40</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU’s Newest Foreign Policy Instrument’, p.142.

<sup>41</sup> Balfour and Missiroli, ‘Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> Smith, *The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy*, p. 765.

<sup>43</sup> Aliboni, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 13.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 772.

defend its own values through the intensification of the ENP, in order to avoid antagonizing its great neighbour.<sup>45</sup>

These criticisms are compounded by the fact that even the European Commission itself finds the ENP wanting in a number of areas. It admits that there is a worrying asymmetry between costs and benefits for the participating countries: “The EU seeks to encourage a very ambitious reform programme in partner countries, with many of the political and economic costs being up-front. Yet, an important part of the incentives of the ENP – for instance in terms of market access and integration and other economic benefits – will only bear fruit later. This creates a real difficulty for partner countries in building the necessary domestic support for reform.”<sup>46</sup> It is not surprising then, that for many commentators the ENP risks failure at the moment: “it has so far fallen short of managing the neighbouring countries’ expectations and also lacks political momentum on the part of the EU.”<sup>47</sup>

Despite the strong criticism, however, the planners of the ENP remain confident that the latter can and will respond to the challenges it is confronted with. Denying any charges of bullying, members of the Commission maintain that “the Action Plans cover areas where the country wants to make progress, and where the EU will offer help to achieve that progress. But our role is to

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<sup>45</sup> Lippert, ‘The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions’, p. 20. The Union’s external human rights policy often falls victim to other concerns, especially when these relate to ‘strategic partners’ (such as Russia or China) or key interests (such as energy supplies). Balfour and Missiroli, ‘Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 10.

<sup>46</sup> European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 3.

<sup>47</sup> Lippert, ‘Beefing up the ENP: Towards a Modernisation and Stability Partnership’, p. 87.

support changes, not impose them.”<sup>48</sup> They also dismiss calls to change their approach vis-à-vis the incentives towards ENP partners: “Questions have been raised as to whether the incentives on offer are sufficient to encourage reform, and whether this is not simply a repackaging of old policies in new clothes. My response is two-fold. First, the impetus for meaningful reform must always come from within. If that desire is not there, no amount of external assistance or pressure will build sustainable reform. That is why the EU believes in encouraging not imposing reform. Second, the EU’s offer through ENP is not a second-best option to enlargement, but rather a highly-desirable step-change in our relations offering substantive benefits to all involved.”<sup>49</sup> Besides, as it is argued, the proximity and attractiveness of the EU model of democracy, governance and the rule of law, ensure that the EU has no need to pursue a forceful policy but instead simply engage its neighbours with multiple personal and institutional contacts and joint activities in order to promote the ultimate goal of Europeanisation.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, many analysts claim that the tools of the ENP are not so different than those used before the 2004 enlargement. Therefore, they maintain, the goal of ‘Europeanizing’ the EU’s neighbourhood through the ENP is not as hard to attain as some critics think.<sup>51</sup>

The political will to maintain the ENP as a serious policy instrument is also strongly declared. With its December 2006 Communication the Commission made clear that the ENP is indispensable and could and should

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<sup>48</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: bringing our neighbours closer’, p.2.

<sup>49</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU’s Newest Foreign Policy Instrument’, p. 140.

<sup>50</sup> Emerson *et al.*, ‘The Reluctant Debutante: The EU as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood’, p. 175.

<sup>51</sup> Grazulis, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: Enlargement Prevention or Preparation for the Next Wave?’, pp. 308-311, 320-323..

be strengthened “particularly when one considers the prohibitive potential cost of failing to support our neighbours in their reform efforts. The EU must present an attractive offer to ENP partner countries – offering them improved trade and investment prospects, making people-to-people contacts and legitimate short-term travel easier, being more active in addressing frozen conflicts, and opening more possibilities to mobilize funding. The EU must help those neighbouring countries who are willing to reform to do this faster, better and at a lower cost to their citizens. It must also provide more incentives and convince those who are still hesitant.”<sup>52</sup> Thus, new emphasis is placed on the political dimension of the ENP by the introduction of new initiatives.<sup>53</sup> The creation of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the new lending mandate of the European Investment Bank constitute the two ways in which the ENP is going to enjoy better funding from 2007 onwards. Better flexibility and a 30 per cent increase on available funds for the period 2007-2013 are expected to render the ENPI much more effective than previous instruments.<sup>54</sup>

The fact that EU membership is not an option (at least in the short or medium term) does not necessarily diminish the chances of the ENP to

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<sup>52</sup> European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 2. The Commission acknowledges that poverty and unemployment, mixed economic performance, corruption and weak governance, bleak personal prospects for the young and ‘frozen conflicts’ are not simply problems of the EU’s new neighbours in the East. These phenomena also threaten directly the EU itself as they “risk producing major spillovers for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation and terrorism.” And the Security Strategy of December 2003, lists security in the neighbourhood among the three strategic objectives for the EU. European Council, ‘A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy’, p. 8.

<sup>53</sup> European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’, pp. 9-10.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

achieve its ambitious targets. On the contrary, it could be viewed as an advantage as this weakening of enlargement prospects could induce the EU to invest more heavily in its neighbourhood policy, precisely because the EU's function as an automatic gravity model may otherwise run out of steam.<sup>55</sup>

Conflict resolution is recognised as a top priority, following the admission that “if the ENP cannot contribute to addressing conflicts in the region, it will have failed in one of its key purposes.”<sup>56</sup> Here too, as in the case of internal reforms, the onus falls on the shoulders of the new neighbours. The EU has made it clear that it does not want to be seen to impose solutions.<sup>57</sup>

Critics who claim that the EU ends up betraying its values in the way it applies the ENP, ignore sometimes some crucial parameters: “... a flexible approach does not necessarily mean that the EU is being hypocritical about the principles it preaches, but rather that it depends on strategic arguments (how human rights objectives interact with other interests), pragmatic considerations (such as the possible impact of positive or negative conditionality), and the specific characteristics of the country concerned (whether, for example, certain ways of promoting democracy could be considered culturally insensitive or irrelevant.)”<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Emerson *et al.*, ‘The Reluctant Debutante: The EU as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood’, p. 226.

<sup>56</sup> European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 9.

<sup>57</sup> “Dear friends, my message today is really simple. When it comes to the future of the new democracies; the need to address ‘frozen conflicts’, or the efforts of building a meaningful partnership with the EU, the mantra is always the same: success starts at home. The lead must come from the new democracies. We in the EU will give all the help and support we can. This is the bargain.” Solana, ‘The Role of the EU in Promoting and Consolidating Democracy in Europe’s East’.

<sup>58</sup> Balfour and Missiroli, ‘Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 14.

Crucially, the ENP has been greeted with enthusiasm by EU publics. High majorities in EU member-states think that both the EU and its neighbours have to gain from increased cooperation. And though many among them express concerns about potential financial costs, they want the EU to continue supporting its new neighbours for as long as they keep making progress on reforms.<sup>59</sup>

## ***II. EU and Russia: The unavoidable partnership?***

The prospects for an EU-Russian partnership are much better than many predict. The so heatedly discussed and disputed concept of interdependence between the EU and Russia in the energy field is a real fact.<sup>60</sup> It remains strong and is unlikely to diminish in the coming years. Even Moscow's fiercest critics in the EU concede that "We will need a pragmatic relationship with Russia, because it supplies most of Europe's natural gas."<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> European Commission, 'The European Union and its neighbours'.

<sup>60</sup> Nobody doubts the increased future needs of the EU in gas and oil from Russia. Less attention is paid though to the fact that not only is Russia exporting tiny quantities of its gas and oil outside of the wider European region but its options in case it wanted to change this situation, would be very limited. For an extended analysis of Russia's inability to become a truly global supplier of energy resources see Milov, 'Neo-Con Plans and the Sober Reality'. As Milov explains: about 95 percent of Russia's crude oil and 100 percent of its natural gas is exported to Greater Europe (including Turkey).; Russia's potential strategy to move away from the West and diversify energy exports to BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as a geopolitical alternative is doomed; China gives priority to the development of its own energy capacity and thus buys only oil from Russia and not gas or electricity; further economic growth in China and other Asian countries will not be accompanied by a huge surge in oil demand; the surge in energy demand is going to take place in Chinese regions where Russian deliveries of oil are hindered by long distances and high costs; India cannot import easily Russian oil because it is separated from Russia by impassable mountain ranges, and oil would have to pass from areas known for their political instability (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia); like china India has vast reserves of coal, enough to keep the country going for another 220 years; so the old saying 'old friends are best' is relevant: Europe is for Russia the closest and more lucrative energy market.; price wise it is the most lucrative and the volume of Russian oil exported is growing continuously.

<sup>61</sup> Ilves, interview with *Der Spiegel*.

Most EU leaders seem reluctant to equate Russian energy policies to bullying tactics, through which Russia is trying to expand its influence: “We need reliable energy supplies from Russia and Russia needs us as reliable consumers. I think it’s perfectly legitimate for Russia to seek greater access to western European markets.”<sup>62</sup> Already, the tone of political discourse is softening; pledging to refrain from lecturing Russia, Portuguese Premier, Jose Socrates, stated while discussing the agenda of the Portuguese EU Presidency in July 2007: “Any relations based on moral judgments lead to confrontations”.<sup>63</sup> The evolution of EU policies toward Russia has clearly been influenced by democratic political criteria, and often divisions among EU members over the issue of EU-Russian relations, are disagreements over means and not aims.<sup>64</sup>

Increasingly, many Europeans realize that certain criticisms against Russia are often excessive, or even totally unjustified, reflecting Cold War mentalities and syndromes rather than reality, and reinforcing at the same time negative Russian stereotypes about the West in general, and Western Europe in particular: “many of these western criticisms are either off the mark or downright illogical. Why, for example, is it undemocratic for Russia to appoint rather than elect provincial governors, but not for Ukraine, Poland or France? And is Russia’s new NGO law so terrible?; the Council of Europe has established that it is technically more liberal than similar laws in Finland and

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<sup>62</sup> Merkel, interview with the *Financial Times*.

<sup>63</sup> Prokhorova, ‘“The War and Peace” of EU-Russian Relations’.

<sup>64</sup> Emerson *et al.*, ‘The Reluctant Debutante: The EU as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood’, pp. 198, 200.

France.”<sup>65</sup> And if Russia is a bully, as it is often claimed in the media, then surely it would not be so hard for some of Russia’s most vociferous critics to provide some evidence that would refute the claims of Russian officials that, “...no one has ever proved that the accusations of ‘energy blackmail’ have any grounds, or that we have violated even one of our commitments or contracts.”<sup>66</sup>

Instead of instinctively castigating Russia for its ‘appalling’ norms and practices, many in the EU are slowly starting to try to fathom the realities of Russia’s socio-economic and political life. Thus, they are gradually starting to grasp, for example, the grave impact of the 1990s on the Russian psyche: “That experience has had a profound effect. It colours the memories of many Russians and fuels skepticism about the benefits of western-style democracy and the market economy, perceptions which will take years to change.”<sup>67</sup> More and more EU leaders can at least understand (and sometimes justify) the rationale behind particular aspects of Russia’s home and foreign policies.<sup>68</sup> Increasingly they realize that they can have only a minimum (if any at all) influence over Russia’s internal affairs. Hence, the need to lecture Russia on a wide range of issues and situations is becoming less imperative. It seems that many Western Europeans are beginning to heed the advice of those commentators who for years have been stating that: “...the West needs to

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<sup>65</sup> Maynes, ‘A soft power tool-kit for dealing with Russia’.

<sup>66</sup> Lavrov, ‘The Present and the Future of Global Politics’.

<sup>67</sup> Mandelson, ‘The EU and Russia: our joint political challenge’. “Indeed”, Mandelson continues, many in Russia actually believe that when we say ‘values’ we only mean ‘interests’, by which we are somehow seeking to undermine Russia at home and put her down abroad.”

<sup>68</sup> “Steinmeier shares Schröder’s sympathies for an EU-Russian strategic alliance and understands that the Kremlin had to recentralize decisionmaking in the energy sector to dismantle the Russian oligarchs’ systematic plundering of Russian resources.” Rahr, ‘Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship’, p. 141.

calm down and take Russia for what it is: a major outside player that is neither an eternal foe nor an automatic friend. Western leaders must disabuse themselves of the notion that by preaching values one can actually plant them. Russia will continue to change, but at its own pace.”<sup>69</sup>

Such a stance, of course, does not have to be marked by an eagerness to please Russia by avoiding or softening criticism: “We should try to understand Russia better, and weigh the consequences of our actions. This does not mean appeasing; or suppressing criticism; or abandoning our principles. ... But it does mean understanding Russia’s viewpoint and sensitivities; avoiding needless provocation; and above all not taking steps which play into the hands of the most backward and hard-line forces in Russia.”<sup>70</sup>

The assertion, that the people and the political and military leadership of Russia view the EU as a threat, is not supported with enough and conclusive evidence. Russia never raised any serious objections to the EU’s expansion: “Whereas Russia used to object to NATO expansion, it welcomed EU enlargement and did not object when even former soviet republics like the Baltic States were included. Although the EU’s positive image depended partly on its civilian character, its emerging and increasing security role also received more positive than negative judgments in Moscow.”<sup>71</sup> It has even indicated that its opposition (wherever this has been expressed) to the Union’s

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<sup>69</sup> Trenin, ‘Russia Leaves the West’.

<sup>70</sup> Lyne, ‘The best way to handle Putin’. “This does not mean that the EU should close its eyes to autocratic tendencies in Russia or atrocities in Chechnya. But rather that pretending that Russia shares its values and aspirations, the EU should openly acknowledge that there are profound differences.” Barysch, ‘Whither EU-Russian Relations?’.

<sup>71</sup> Forsberg, ‘The EU-Russian Security Partnership: Why the Opportunity was Missed’, pp. 251-252.

ENP is not an inevitable constant.<sup>72</sup> And now that the Union has become a neighbour, it is viewed more as a competitor than as an enemy: “We no longer have the feeling of being surrounded by enemies, but rather by competitors.”<sup>73</sup> Public opinion polls convey a similar message: only 8 per cent of Russians see European countries as potential aggressors united by NATO and 7 per cent as implementers of US policy on the Eurasian continent.<sup>74</sup>

No matter how strong Russia looks, or tries to look, today, it is widely accepted that “the Russian leaders realize that in the longer term, Russia – in its desire for more influence in the world – will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union).”<sup>75</sup> Indeed, Russian leaders have been indicating that should the time come for Russia to choose a partner, there could only be one option: “...Russian society and the Russian leadership are in complete agreement that our policies should be oriented towards Europe. And I am simply confident that by joining our forces we will be able to accomplish a great deal both for our peoples and for the world at large.”<sup>76</sup> The geopolitical challenges which Russia will likely face in the near future, such as China or Islamic fundamentalism, are of such importance that cannot be met by Russia alone.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Dannreuther, ‘Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 200.

<sup>73</sup> Surkov, interview with *Der Spiegel*. Vladislav Surkov, (Putin’s chief strategist) is the architect of Russia’s “controlled democracy” (also termed guided democracy and sovereign democracy).

<sup>74</sup> Levada Centre, ‘Voices from Russia: Society, Democracy, Europe’.

<sup>75</sup> Menkiszak, ‘The “Pro-Western Turn” in Russia’s Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects’.

<sup>76</sup> Putin, Conversation with Journalists Following the Meeting with Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber.

<sup>77</sup> Karaganov, ‘Time to back off: Russian-European relations’.

Furthermore, it is simply not true that Russia is strongly inclined towards isolationism and wants to avoid interaction with the rest of the world. Even some of the Kremlin's most ardent nationalists recognize that Russia needs close cooperation with the EU: "We have achieved too little when it comes to modernizing our society, and we must look to the West for the technological and intellectual solutions necessary to do so. The idea that we should suddenly be able to produce something, now that we're on our own, is erroneous. We must learn from others."<sup>78</sup>

In this respect, the 'pulling power' of the EU is, by all accounts, unparalleled: "Russians flock to Western Europe for business, holidays and enlightenment. Russian businesses and the fast-growing middle classes want to build up the economy, not divert resources into armaments. They are proud to be Russian and want their country to be respected; but their benchmark is to achieve a European standard of living and to be accepted as Europeans. They tend to ignore politics. Over half of Russia's exports go to the EU. Most of the foreign investment in Russia comes from the EU, and the Russians want more."<sup>79</sup> It is an undisputed fact that the role of the EU as civilisational model and reference for Russian elites and civil society has considerable resonance.<sup>80</sup> The number of Russians visiting the EU is growing at 20 per cent a year.<sup>81</sup> An estimated 300,000 Russians live in London alone, while Russia's big companies are listing on the London stock exchange and they are

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<sup>78</sup> Surkov, interview with *Der Spiegel*.

<sup>79</sup> Lyne, 'The best way to handle Putin'

<sup>80</sup> Emerson *et al.*, 'The Reluctant Debutante: The EU as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood', pp. 216-217.

<sup>81</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 126.

increasingly investing in EU countries.<sup>82</sup> Russians have easy access to the EU where they can make their comparisons between their level of quality of life and that of the citizens of the EU states, creating pressures within Russia for greater convergence with EU practices.

Thus, in time, increased contacts and interaction between Russians and EU citizens are expected to strengthen significantly the ties between Russia and the EU. Even on the thorny issue of values and norms, it is not hard to find common ground. Here too, insist analysts, there is great scope for convergence: "...it is important to bear in mind that the values gap between the EU and Russia is most visible only in human rights issues. In many questions of international politics, the EU member states are actually closer to Russia than the USA, as can be demonstrated by looking at UN voting behavior."<sup>83</sup>

Above all, however, what brings the two parties closer is the unambiguous need to address common threats: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, Islamic extremism."<sup>84</sup> Since they share common borders, the two sides are compelled to work together on issues of such prominence. This factor is expected to have a catalytic effect on the future of EU-Russian relations. With respect to the EU, it is therefore claimed that "in the longer run, it will be both impossible and sub-optimal to continue developing the ESDP without a closer relationship with Moscow."<sup>85</sup> Practical steps that seem to confirm such estimates are already visible. In its December

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<sup>82</sup> Barysch, 'Russia, realism and EU unity', p. 8.

<sup>83</sup> Forsberg, 'The EU-Russia Security Partnership: Why the Opportunity was Missed', p. 263.

<sup>84</sup> Karaganov, 'Time to back off: Russian-European relations'.

<sup>85</sup> Forsberg, 'The EU-Russia Security Partnership: Why the Opportunity was Missed', p. 248.

2006 communication to the Council and the European Parliament, for instance, the Commission stressed the need to “engage Russia in closer cooperation in preventing conflicts and enhancing stability across Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus.”<sup>86</sup> For some, this constitutes a precondition for a global EU role. If Europe, they argue, wants to play an enforced role in the world it has to reinforce its links with Russia.<sup>87</sup> Many are of the opinion that this is all the more reinforced by Russia’s unique strategic advantages. The latter, render Russia the EU’s indispensable partner: “For the EU, Russia is the immediate neighborhood and the ultimate frontier. In principle, Russia alone, not Africa or the Middle East, could give Europe strategic depth. Culturally, geographically and historically European, Russia would project the EU all the way to the Pacific, strengthen the European’s global outlook, and provide the EU with a range of resources and materially add to its power.”<sup>88</sup>

Hence, the omens for the future of the EU-Russian relationship look auspicious. Notwithstanding the current problems which sour EU-Russian relations, time seems to work in favour of closer and better cooperation between the two powerful neighbours. Indeed, as experienced commentators argue, “Relations must be allowed to take their course. One should not put the cart before the horse...”<sup>89</sup> Disagreements are openly acknowledged; however, it is becoming evident that, given the strong centripetal forces which bring Russia and the EU closer together, they will be gradually ironed out.

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<sup>86</sup> European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 9.

<sup>87</sup> Pozzo di Borgo, ‘Union européenne-Russie: quelles relations?’, p. 92.

<sup>88</sup> Trenin, ‘Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West’, pp. 104-105.

<sup>89</sup> Delors, “‘Many Countries Are Sliding into Nationalism’”.

### III. Strengthening the EU's global role

The move towards a closer relationship with Russia is a development that contradicts, to a great extent, the assessments of those who view the possibility of a more inward-looking EU after enlargement as quite probable. It has long been contended that “The danger of EU’s greater heterogeneity is compounded by the expectations that the EU will take a leading role in global politics. In fact, it does not necessarily follow that a larger EU will automatically become more internationally assertive, since increasing complexity may actually result in an EU focused on internal, rather than external, issues. Only when these problems are addressed and when the political views of the Member States are more homogeneous, will the Union be able to take full advantage of the enlargement process.”<sup>90</sup> Strong heterogeneity in the area of CFSP, many think, is seriously diminishing the chances for a successful ENP and could even pose serious dangers for the unity of the Union: “Here again, EU cohesion in the CFSP does not seem sufficient. But running a globalizing neighbourhood could be very difficult and the EU could get hurt.”<sup>91</sup> For many political commentators, especially American ones, this is not just a possibility but a *fait accompli*. Europe’s focus has shifted ever more inward, is their conclusion, and they confidently predict that the Union will remain concentrated on completing the ambitious project of enlargement for years to come.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Krenzler, ‘The Geostrategic and International Political Implications of EU Enlargement’, p.5.

<sup>91</sup> Aliboni, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, pp. 2-4. For Aliboni application of the EU’s neighbourhood policy could embrace, under certain conditions, even countries such as Iran and Iraq.

<sup>92</sup> Daalder, ‘The End of Atlanticism’, p. 43.

Such self-absorption, however, is, given the challenges of enlargement, a luxury that the EU cannot afford. The ENP will have not only regional but also global geopolitical implications such as more direct EU involvement in regional and local crises and possible extensions of EU involvement: “The ENP’s most obvious geopolitical effect will be expanded political involvement by the EU, which will face an alternative between acting effectively to defuse crises and solve conflicts in the political co-sphere it wishes to control and stabilize for the sake of its own security, or being witness to the weakening of that co-sphere and the enfeebling of its own security. Consequently, in order to succeed, the EU will seriously have to reinforce its CFSP as well as ESDP.”<sup>93</sup> Proof that this is the case is provided by the creation of the ESS in late 2003. It is widely recognized that the *European Security Strategy* was to a significant degree drafted as a response to the 2004 enlargement of the Union, and aimed at demonstrating that the EU could no longer be a disinterested actor *vis-à-vis* its new neighbours.<sup>94</sup>

Moreover, as a ‘civilian power’ with a mission to transform the global system<sup>95</sup> the EU seems destined to take up this challenge. Thus, “the EU’s intention to play a bigger role in the world and its desire to shape the global governance system”<sup>96</sup> renders the ENP and its implementation a crucial test that the EU cannot afford to fail. Indeed, the new neighbourhood is “the principal testing ground for validating the EU’s distinctive claim to be a

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<sup>93</sup> Aliboni, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 16.

<sup>94</sup> Dannreuther, ‘The European Security Strategy’s regional objective’, p. 63.

<sup>95</sup> “The EU is seen, and indeed projects itself, as a qualitatively different (ie. normative) power in world politics and on this basis stakes its claim to being a legitimate and thus a more effective international player.” Farrell, ‘EU External Relations: Exporting the EU Model of Governance?’, p. 453.

<sup>96</sup> Farrell, ‘EU External Relations: Exporting the EU Model of Governance?’, p. 453.

transformative post-Westphalian power, gaining influence through encouraging the internal transformation of societies rather than through physical or military coercion.”<sup>97</sup>

In view of its weighty consequences, it would be extremely short-sighted to treat the ENP as a mere result of the Union’s need to address short-term challenges. And it would certainly be a mistake to dismiss it purely as an exercise in empty rhetoric.<sup>98</sup> Rather, it should be seen as the result of a strategy of greater involvement in world affairs and the manifestation of Europe’s will to claim a much greater responsibility in shaping global developments. Indeed, it is a policy which, judging by its aims and ways of implementation, seems to validate the prediction that “enlargement will eventually produce a larger and stronger Union capable of mobilising resources for a global policy...”<sup>99</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

The enlarged European Union will by all accounts develop a greater interest for its new periphery. This presents it with a unique opportunity to ‘Europeanise’ its neighbourhood, creating a secure and prosperous

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<sup>97</sup> Dannreuther, ‘Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 184.

<sup>98</sup> Dannreuther, ‘The European Security Strategy’s regional objective’, p. 79. For Dannreuther, the ENP can even turn out to be a radically innovative policy: “There are potential analogies with other EU policies which initially faced considerable scepticism and even outward rejection, such as eastward enlargement, but which then developed an internal dynamic and momentum, transforming the very nature and self-identity of the Union in the process.” *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

<sup>99</sup> Krenzler, ‘The Geostrategic and International Political Implications of EU Enlargement’, p.3. What is critical, according to Krenzler, is the period of ‘digestion’: “The long-term effects of enlargement on the international political and economic role of the EU are considered to be positive. Once enlargement is digested, the EU will become a stronger member of the international community, capable of mobilising greater resources for a global policy, offering a stable relationship to its neighbours and contributing effectively to the maintenance of the open world economy.” *Ibid.*, p. 9.

environment in a region which has often been characterised by instability. The EU's new neighbourhood, however, also presents it with new challenges. New neighbours will most certainly ask to join the Union soon, feeling already excluded from a club to which they think they have every right to belong. However, the Union is not in a position to offer the prospect of membership to any of these states, so soon after its last enlargement. Partly to compensate for this, it has designed a new plan: the European Neighbourhood Policy, a combination of its various policies, from security to trade to development. The new enlargement round also brings the Union closer to Russia with which it wants to form a strategic partnership. This, nevertheless, does not seem to be an easy task. It is widely argued that the EU and Russia do not share the same objectives. Russia is expected by many to feel threatened by the EU's close presence at its borders. In addition, there does not seem to be much sympathy for Russia in the EU at the moment. In Russia itself, there is much distrust of the West and some even think there are hidden motives behind the EU's latest expansion. Many have doubts about the prospects of the EU's ENP as well. They find it inadequate, ill-designed, underfunded and therefore not capable of addressing the challenges for which it has been designed. European publics support the ENP, however, and the EU looks willing to make it work. The prospects for a successful EU-Russia partnership are quite positive too. Interdependence in the field of energy is not the only thing that brings them together. They also face common threats and challenges and can gain significantly from close cooperation.

Realists predict that as the EU expands into a region where antagonism for influence has traditionally been strong and relentless, it will inevitably be drawn back to ‘power politics’. A clash with Russia is, under certain circumstances, inevitable, they claim: “If the contrast becomes too marked between a large, inclusive and increasingly prosperous EU and a stagnant Russia, then the scenario of revived nationalism leading to disputes with the Baltic States and possibly other Western neighbours will not seem so remote. In these circumstances it will not take much for the EU and Russia to start looking like security threats to each other, and the old realist game will have recommenced.”<sup>100</sup> The structure of the ENP and the means to promote it, however, render this scenario highly unlikely. Furthermore, both liberal and constructivist analyses suggest that a constructive rather than conflictual relationship between the EU and Russia is the most likely outcome in the near future.

The prospect of further expansion, as a result of pressures from the new neighbours of the EU and the inability of ENP to deal with the challenges the new neighbourhood poses, also generates fears that the dilution of the Union will become at some point inevitable. If constructivist analysis is right, however, this does not need to be the case. “Enlargement” argue constructivists, “will continue until the (cultural) borders of the international organization match.”<sup>101</sup> Therefore, the Union will welcome as new members only those states which will not jeopardise its homogeneity. This is powerfully demonstrated in the case of Turkey’s application for EU

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<sup>100</sup> Hill, ‘The geopolitical implications of enlargement’.

<sup>101</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU enlargement’, p. 515.

membership. The arguments made in favour of Turkey's admission into the EU are of a strategic character and it is rarely argued that Turkey should become an EU member because it belongs to the European family: "the reasons provided for such an inclusion are strategic. They have nothing to do with notions of duty or solidarity, which is most often the case when references are made to central and eastern Europe. This might contribute to our understanding of why Turkey has not been prioritised in the EU's enlargement policy."<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Sjursen, 'Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy', p. 505.

## Chapter Six

### *Europe and America after the enlargement*

Given that the EU's eastward enlargement is not going to bring European integration to a standstill, but on the contrary it has the potential to further enhance it, a shift in the current course of EU-US relations seems rather unlikely. Furthermore, enlargement is bound to render the EU a much more active global actor with a *de facto* elevated status and a broadened agenda. Europe and America do not see eye to eye on many issues which have the potential to shape the future of global politics and the EU's ambition to have a greater say on the way these issues should be tackled is not a development that Washington welcomes with enthusiasm. Hence, enlargement is probably not only going to help maintain existing sources of friction between the two sides but also create some new ones. It is natural, therefore to expect that transatlantic relations will remain in a phase of protracted turbulence.

What follows, is an analysis of some of the developments which are currently shaping the future of transatlantic relations and the impact which the eastward enlargement of the European Union is expected to have on them. The analysis shows that this enlargement will most probably reinforce the impact these developments have on the transatlantic relationship, exacerbating thus the negative trends which characterise today relations between Europe and America. So, examined here are the following issues: US ambivalence toward European integration, US-Russian relations, the EU's increased

presence in Asia and the Middle East in particular, European efforts to promote globally certain aspects of the so-called EU model of governance, Europe's efforts to become a viable and recognisable pole in a global multipolar system and Europe's alleged attempt to create an identity against America.

### 1. Washington's 'European integration dilemma'

Thinking along realist lines, most US analysts and policy-planners expect in the wake of the eastward enlargement a politically weakened and less cohesive European Union, of a strong and irreversible intergovernmental structure. Such expectations are also based on analyses by European integration theorists, who often conclude that the enlargement of the EU has ushered in the incorporation of a majority of 'dissident' members, who are resistant to the vision of an 'ever closer union' and intergovernmentalist tendencies within the Union have, therefore, been reinforced.<sup>1</sup> The latest enlargement, in other words, will seriously question the compatibility of widening and deepening, and in this way will be radically different from all previous enlargement rounds which have all conformed to the 'classical Community method' and led to further integration.<sup>2</sup> The new members of the EU are expected to be characterised by a strong anti-integration (anti-federal, as is often claimed) stance: "...the inclusion of the CEECs is likely to hold

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<sup>1</sup> Miles and Redmond, 'Enlarging the European Union: the Erosion of Federalism?', p. 285.

<sup>2</sup> Redmond, 'Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Prospects for a Wider Europe', pp. 451-452. Redmond analyses the 'classical Community method' with its emphasis on the acceptance by the new members of the *acquis communautaire*, (pp. 452-456), and concludes that the 2004 enlargement is unlikely to conform to it.

back the pace of European integration and make the realization of any federal plans more difficult. These countries do not share federal objectives for the EU or for the development of their countries.”<sup>3</sup> The implications for EU-US relations are clear and have been sufficiently demonstrated in the run-up to the Iraq War: the United States could try to exploit the differences between EU member states, strengthening bilateral relations and, thus, minimizing the likelihood of concerted European action on issues of great importance to Washington. Indeed, such a scenario would be in line with standard realist predictions: “The divisions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe that emerged during the Iraq crisis of 2002-03 are suggestive of the patterns of relations that could emerge, with some states allying with the USA and others pursuing a *Kleineuropa* (‘small Europe’) option of integration between a select group of ‘core’ states. European integrational politics in the early twenty-first century are thus likely to be characterised by shifting coalitions of great and middle powers.”<sup>4</sup> This has already prompted some staunch Atlanticists to proclaim Washington ‘the big winner’ of the EU’s eastward enlargement.<sup>5</sup>

As it has been showed in previous pages, however, European integration is unlikely to be halted as a result of the Union’s expansion to the east. On the contrary, more and deeper integration is likely to follow, especially in the long run: “In the short run the import of additional diversity from Eastern Europe may indeed result in a more intergovernmental rather

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<sup>3</sup> Miles and Redmond, ‘Enlarging the European Union: the Erosion of Federalism?’, p. 300. Inevitably, this will lead to differentiated integration: “...in a European Union of twenty-plus, the federalists will be in the minority; this is why a multi-speed EU, with a hard core at the centre essentially based on the six founding members, is looking an increasingly likely scenario.”Ibid, p. 304.

<sup>4</sup> Hyde-Price, ‘‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique’, p. 232.

<sup>5</sup> Vinocur, ‘The big winner in the EU expansion: Washington’.

than a federative mode of European cooperation. This need not be the case in the long run, however. Although each previous wave of enlargement implied a certain increase of diversity, communitarian solutions nevertheless gradually became the norm in many new fields.”<sup>6</sup> The US, therefore, will have to deal after enlargement with a more integrated Europe, whose external policies will have a larger scope. It will, thus, come under more pressure to formulate a more coherent stance vis-à-vis European integration and the transformation of Europe into a stronger, global actor. So far, Washington’s attitude has been characterised as ambivalent: “while the USA would welcome a more cohesive and effective ally with which to ‘burden-share’, there is concern that a more integrated Europe would be less willing to acquiesce to US leadership.”<sup>7</sup> This ambivalence has been a persistent feature of US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: “...the end of the Cold War division in Europe was greeted with a mixture of sentiments in Washington. On one hand there was a tendency to assume that the job was done, and that the time had come to reap the ‘peace dividend’ and to retire from direct involvement in Europe. But this was countered by an equally if not more powerful desire to retain political leverage in Europe and to prevent the development of a ‘European foreign policy’ that would deviate from that of the US – not only in Europe but also in the wider world.”<sup>8</sup> What is beyond doubt, however, is that in the current era,

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<sup>6</sup> Zielonka and Mair, ‘Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union’, p. 6. Diversity, according to this analysis, teaches adaptation, bargaining and accommodation and, hence, can facilitate cooperation and foster further integration. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>7</sup> Hyde-Price, ‘‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique’, p. 228.

<sup>8</sup> McGuire and Smith, *The European Union and the United States*, p. 209. The EU was to become ‘America’s European pacifier’, stabilizing the new Europe, pp. 209-210.

the US does not look as approvingly as before on the developing political role of the EU.<sup>9</sup>

This situation, however, may not last for long. The voices of those Americans who call for an official and open anti-integration policy grow increasingly stronger. Some of America's most influential think-tanks do not hesitate to call Washington to embark on a policy of dividing Europeans as they think that steps towards more integration in Europe, such as a European Constitution, will result in an EU that is likely to counterbalance rather than cooperate with the US.<sup>10</sup> These steps are already threatening the survival of NATO, warn some analysts, who stress that under the circumstances the US is left with only one option: "The United States should end its uncritical support of European integration. US policymakers should issue an official statement making clear that, if NATO is to survive, the (EU) constitution cannot go into effect in its current form."<sup>11</sup> Yet, such action might prove counterproductive. The United States, claim many analysts, could risk too much if it adopted such a strategy: "The worst response the United States could take would be to start opposing European integration. British Tories have traditionally underestimated the determination of the Continent to press ahead with integration, and the United States would be unwise to repeat their error. If the United States opted for 'disaggregating' Europe into its component nation-states and made countries choose between their European vocation and transatlantic links, most EU countries, including all new members, would opt for the European Union. If the gambit was tried and failed, the United States

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<sup>9</sup> Telò, *Europe: a Civilian Power?*, p. 238.

<sup>10</sup> Zaborowski, 'How the US views the European crisis'.

<sup>11</sup> Cimbalo, 'Saving NATO From Europe'.

would lose remaining influence in Europe and unite the Continent against itself.”<sup>12</sup> Such a step, on the other hand, would be more than welcomed by many proponents of further European integration.<sup>13</sup>

## 2. The EU-Russia-US triangle

The nature of Europe’s relationship with Russia is becoming another contentious issue in EU-US relations. US leaders, still mired in Cold-War thinking, want Europe to play an active role in US efforts to isolate Russia and minimize the effects of its resurgence on the global stage. Europe, however, is finding it hard to follow such a course. Not only because it seems, at the moment at least, incapable of doing so, but because it is not sure that this is what its ultimate interests dictate.

For a long period of time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was seen by US leaders as weak and vulnerable, saddled with problems which could not be tackled without external help. Rivalry with America would be senseless for this Russia and an alliance with China would have meant subordination, was the predominant US view.<sup>14</sup> Russian leaders had realised that they needed to cooperate with the US if they wanted Russia’s power to be restored and this was amply demonstrated by their behaviour before and

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<sup>12</sup> Sikorski, ‘Europe (Almost) Whole and Free: EU Enlargement and Its Implications’. See also, Hyde-Price, ‘‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique’, p. 231: “Deteriorating transatlantic relations might act as a catalyst for a more cohesive EU with a sharper and more effective international role.”

<sup>13</sup> Leonard, ‘One year later: Europe’s debt to Rumsfeld’. Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe, argues Leonard, has brought Europeans closer together stressing their common identity and for this reason Rumsfeld’s name may have to be added to the pantheon of Europe’s founding fathers.

<sup>14</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 101.

immediately after 9/11.<sup>15</sup> Many were hoping that Russia could even become a NATO member helping thus end, once and for all, the struggle for primacy in Europe, and securing the predominance of NATO: “Yet in the longer run, Russia may come to realize that NATO membership will give it greater territorial security, especially in its depopulating far east. That consideration may eventually prove to be the most persuasive. ... At stake is the future global security role of the Euroatlantic community. The eventual inclusion or Russia as a normal, middle-ranking European state (though no longer an imperial Third Rome) in the Euroatlantic system would create a much more solid and comprehensive basis for coping with the rising conflicts in the Global Balkans of west and central Asia. The consequent worldwide primacy of the Euroatlantic institutions would finally end the bitter struggles for supremacy waged for so long and with such destructive intensity among the European nations.”<sup>16</sup> Cold War mentalities, however, persist in the US when it comes to US-Russian relations. US leaders remain ambivalent about the prospect of a closer relationship with Russia and even when they seem to be ready to take steps in that direction they find little or no support in Congress or the media.<sup>17</sup> Thus, emphasis is still given on how America and the EU can work together to check Russian ambitions for a greater role in the region: “The EU-US alliance to constrain Russia is now only a pale shadow of the Cold War of the Soviet period. However the semantics and mind-set of the Cold War keep on surfacing still in a mild way, notably over the post-Soviet space,

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<sup>15</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, pp. 312-313.

<sup>16</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, pp. 101, 104-105.

<sup>17</sup> Gvosdev and Simes, ‘Rejecting Russia?’.

called its near abroad by Russia.”<sup>18</sup> European states are therefore reminded that they have to be especially careful lest their ‘energy partnership’ with Russia give the Kremlin new sources of political leverage against its neighbours and that “cooperation with Russia must be matched by simultaneous efforts to consolidate geopolitical pluralism in the former Russian imperial space, thereby creating enduring obstacles to any attempts at imperial restoration. NATO and the EU must therefore make certain to include the newly independent post-Soviet states, especially Ukraine, in the Euroatlantic community’s expanding orbit.”<sup>19</sup> Americans fear that Europe’s increased dependency on Russian energy sources also poses a risk to Atlantic solidarity.<sup>20</sup>

It is feared that “an institutional relationship between Russia and Europe that is closer than that of Europe with the United States, or even comparable to it, would spark a revolution in Atlantic relations.”<sup>21</sup> Americans are alarmed by the intentions of some European circles to do exactly that: “By co-opting Russia into its orbit, the EU would do much more than marginalise the USA in Eurasia. It could radically redraw the map of world politics. If the USA were to lose its western ‘perch’ on the Eurasian continent, her position as a global superpower would be seriously weakened, as she became one superpower in a world of several. And the centre of gravity in world politics would move away from a globally dominant Washington and back towards

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<sup>18</sup> Emerson, ‘The EU-Russia-US Triangle’, p. 1.

<sup>19</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 103.

<sup>20</sup> Brzezinski, *Second Choice*, p. 171.

<sup>21</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 79. “Russian membership in the European Union would split the two sides of the Atlantic. Such a move would inevitably drive Europe further toward seeking to define itself by its distinction from the United States and would oblige Washington to conduct a comparable policy in the rest of the world.”

Eurasia and its strongest power, the EU.”<sup>22</sup> Washington fears that, German leaders, for instance, could be faced with “temptations for a special Russo-German rapprochement based on the Bismarckian tradition that the two countries prospered when they were close and suffered when they were in conflict.”<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, many see the EU and the US already competing with each other to secure favourable trade relations with Russia.<sup>24</sup> The US is likely to attempt to frustrate any serious effort for a strong strategic relationship between the EU and Russia since it wants to avoid at any cost the possibility of two Eurasian powers getting together to marginalize America or even oust it from Eurasia.<sup>25</sup> US efforts to create a system of anti-missile defence in Eastern Europe are often seen as associated with such plans. Russia’s leadership has been particularly suspicious of America’s motives: “Why are our American partners trying so obstinately to deploy a missile defence system in Europe when it is not needed to defend against Iranian or North Korean missiles? ... Is it perhaps to ensure that we carry out these retaliatory measures? And to prevent a further rapprochement between Russia and Europe?”<sup>26</sup> Such US efforts however, could backfire as reactions in Europe are not always in the direction the US expects. Some find that such tactics can never bear fruits since the US “can never have the relationship with Russia which the EU can have because of both the geographic proximity of Russia and the Union and the symbiotic relationship of Russian energy and

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<sup>22</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 159. The EU-Russia alliance could even, by the middle of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, replace NATO as Europe’s primary security system, according to Haseler.

<sup>23</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 40.

<sup>24</sup> Henning and Meunier, ‘United Against the United States? The EU’s Role in Global Trade and Finance’, p. 83.

<sup>25</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 159.

<sup>26</sup> Putin, Interview with Newspaper Journalists from G8 Member Countries.

EU markets.<sup>27</sup> In Germany, for instance, a number of politicians have criticized Washington rather than Moscow for the escalating row over missile defences.<sup>28</sup>

In Russia pro-American sentiment is hard to detect. Hopes for a new era in US-Russian relations after the Cold War were soon dashed. Initial pro-American attitudes soon changed in the wake of “Wall Street’s triumphalism and the imposition on the defeated Russians of a swift road to capitalism (creating the ‘Wild West capitalism’ of Mafiosi economics)”<sup>29</sup> The IMF’s policies of rapid privatization and deregulation in Russia had catastrophic results, leading to social chaos and anarchy. Many in Russia have since believed that these failed policies were not accidental but deliberate and part of a plot to eviscerate Russia and remove it as a threat for the indefinite future.<sup>30</sup> Russians are also annoyed by the constant American criticism of Russia’s authoritarian tendencies and imperial foreign policy. Russian leaders not only reject such criticism but accuse Washington of being a much worse offender: “Putin himself has asserted that there are fewer black pages in the history of the USSR than in the past of the United States, citing racism, the atomic attacks on the civilian populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam.”<sup>31</sup> They also condemn US foreign policy as irresponsible and dangerous: “Russia is against attempts to divide the world into the so-called ‘civilized mankind’ and all the others. This is a way to

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<sup>27</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 159.

<sup>28</sup> Barysch, ‘Russia, realism and EU unity’, p. 7.

<sup>29</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 157.

<sup>30</sup> Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, pp. 171-172.

<sup>31</sup> Pfaff, ‘The Russia we have’.

global catastrophe.”<sup>32</sup> Officially, Moscow denies any efforts to create a split between the EU and the United States: “Russia does not intend to drive a wedge into transatlantic relations. Nothing can do more damage than the disagreements over Iraq. However, we do not want to see consolidation of the transatlantic link at our expense.”<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, many hope that the rapprochement with the EU can create a cleavage in its relations with the US beneficial to Russia and dream of building a strategic Eurasian block which could associate some EU states, namely France and Germany, with eastern political regimes opposed to Atlanticism.<sup>34</sup> And many increasingly see Europe as an independent entity, declaring that the world of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which was comprised of ‘two Europes and one West’, has become history and it has been replaced by the world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century with ‘one Europe and two Wests’.<sup>35</sup>

### 3. EU involvement in Asia

Some American analysts have predicted in recent years that “as the EU enlarges eastward, it will come to dominate the geopolitics of Eurasia, gradually replacing America as the arbiter of the globe’s strategic heartland.”<sup>36</sup> NATO could be the victim of such a development: “enlargement could strengthen EU confidence and military resources, while also precipitating a great leap forward in integration – in this case NATO would be at risk, and the

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<sup>32</sup> Lavrov, ‘The Present and the Future of Global Politics’.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Arbatova, ‘Russie-UE après 2007 : le débat russe’, p. 16.

<sup>35</sup> Inozemtsev, ‘Europe as the “Center”, and Its Outskirts’.

<sup>36</sup> Kupchan, ‘The End of the West’.

EU would become the major player in Eurasia.”<sup>37</sup> Many think that already Washington and Europe are joined in a subtle and usually unspoken political battle not just for influence, but for primacy in Eurasia where the EU is slowly establishing a separate ‘western’ relationship with the eastern side of Eurasia through the now annual EU-Asian summit.”<sup>38</sup> The Union is indeed trying to become a political player in this area, creating strategic partnerships with India, Japan and China. Its special relationship with China is growing particularly fast, as China considers the EU to be a valuable ally in its dealings with the US, and it is characteristic that in 2006 more EU Commissioners visited China than went to any other country.<sup>39</sup> The region of Central Asia is also attracting Europe’s attention. What makes Europe particularly interested in this area is the fact that the latter is one of the world’s richest producers of oil and gas. The EU is becoming more and more dependent on imported energy, at the very moment when the International Energy Agency warns that the risk of supply failure is growing as major producers are either unable or unwilling to step up investment to meet rising demand.<sup>40</sup> At the same time US policymakers state in all directions that “energy is the albatross of US national

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<sup>37</sup> Hill, ‘The geopolitical implications of enlargement’, p. 107.

<sup>38</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, pp. 143, 160.

<sup>39</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, pp. 144, 156. American policies bring the two sides closer: both China and the EU, estimates Cameron, have to live with an American hyperpower that pursues its own and often different agenda from that of Asia and Europe. Some Europeans seem to have extremely high expectations with regard to EU-China cooperation: “If all goes well, China could be one of the most important agents of transformative power, adapting Europe’s recipe for success to its own region and helping build a global environment that embodies multilateralism and regional integration. Ironically, the lasting legacy of China’s rise might be a ‘New European Century’”. Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p. 120.

<sup>40</sup> European Commission, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, p. 3. The Commission predicts that “with ‘business as usual’ the EU’s energy import dependence will jump from 50% of total EU energy consumption today to 65% in 2030. Reliance on imports of gas is expected to increase from 57% to 84% by 2030, of oil from 82% to 93%.”

security” and that American priorities should be set accordingly.<sup>41</sup> The energy-rich Eurasia is becoming a battleground between the EU and the US as their interests keep diverging and their relationship is equally characterised by competition and cooperation.<sup>42</sup>

The enlarged and, consequently, even more energy-hungry Union is, by the same token, compelled to become more involved in the politics of the Middle East. However, the region’s vast oil reserves are not the only reason why Europe seeks a more active role in it. As a neighbour, Europe is directly affected by instability in this region and both European interests and security could be considerably enhanced by a peaceful and prosperous Middle East.<sup>43</sup> Europeans strongly believe that no permanent peace can be achieved in the wider Middle East if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not resolved first. To them, this conflict is at the root of the instability and terrorism which have plagued the region for decades now. American policies in the region, however, are seen in Europe as part of the problem and not part of the solution to the conflict. Many Europeans accuse Washington of behaving irresponsibly by offering unconditional support to Israel and think that US policies in the region could constitute for many EU states a security risk.<sup>44</sup> European

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<sup>41</sup> Lugar, ‘The New Energy Realists’.

<sup>42</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. ix.

<sup>43</sup> Schwenninger, ‘Note to the EU Presidency and EU Foreign Ministers’, p. 85. “The population of the Arab countries is expected to rise from 280 million to somewhere between 410 and 460 million in 2020. ... The majority of this population will be under thirty years of age. Roughly half the teenage Arabs interviewed in a recent survey conducted by Arab scholars say they wish to emigrate from their own countries. Of those who wish to emigrate, somewhere between a third and a half say they would like to come to Europe. ...If nothing changes in their Arab homelands, tens of millions of young people will want to leave the near East for the near West. If Europe does not bring more prosperity and freedom to these young Arabs, these young Arabs will come to Europe. So the peaceful economic and political transformation of the near East is an even more vital interest for Europe than it is for America.” Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 153.

<sup>44</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 151.

governments and publics treat US Middle East policy as horribly one-sided in favour of Israel and nobody even thinks that the US will ever change its policies in the region in order to accommodate European concerns and interests.<sup>45</sup> Many Europeans seem to be convinced that US Middle East policies have been hijacked by a powerful Israel lobby in the US and by fundamentalist Christians.<sup>46</sup> In fact, it has been widely believed in Europe that President Bush has been using the whole crisis surrounding 9/11 “either for electoral purposes or to advance American power and interests in the world by reordering the Middle East in the interests of oil supplies and Israel. Or both.”<sup>47</sup> The ‘war on terror’ has been for many sceptical Europeans a pretext for America to declare war on its enemies: “So we are not really being asked to fight ‘world terror’. We are being asked to fight America’s enemies.”<sup>48</sup> America’s declared goal of bringing democracy to the Middle East by military force was seen in Europe either as naïve or hypocritical and many viewed it as an expression of old-fashioned imperialism.<sup>49</sup>

Americans on the other hand, have been ascribing strong pro-Palestinian feelings in Europe to European anti-Semitism in countries like France and Germany and to the desperate efforts of European politicians to gain Muslim votes or oil contracts.<sup>50</sup> In contrast to the majority of Europeans, many Americans see terrorism as an evil largely unrelated to Israeli

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<sup>45</sup> Galen Carpenter, ‘After Iraq: Permanent Transatlantic Tensions’, p. 150.

<sup>46</sup> Fukuyama, ‘Does “the West” still exist?’, p. 154.

<sup>47</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 148.

<sup>48</sup> Fisk, ‘This Is Not A War On Terror. It’s A Fight Against America’s Enemies’.

<sup>49</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 48.

<sup>50</sup> Fukuyama, ‘Does “the West” still exist?’, p. 154.

occupation of the Palestinian lands.<sup>51</sup> Europeans are accused of jumping to conclusions about US Middle East foreign policy, ignoring key facts about how American policies for this region are formulated. They ignore, more specifically, the convergence of American and Israeli strategic views over the past several decades, not because of some “nefarious Jewish influence” but because of the Cold War.<sup>52</sup> Thus European interference in Middle Eastern politics is usually viewed with suspicion in the US and Israel. Americans who think that “given the Middle East’s proximity to Europe and Europe’s historic political and economic interests in the Middle East, the European Union will have to assume a more active role in pacifying the region”, insist that this should be done under American terms, meaning that, in practice, the Europeans could at best participate in a joint American-European deployment in the Middle East, coordinated and commanded through NATO.<sup>53</sup> Many in Europe gradually realize they are expected by American administrations to be junior partners in America’s current and future interventionist ventures throughout the Middle East and it is for this purpose that Washington has been so keen to create a rapid response force within NATO.<sup>54</sup> This is a role, however, which is not deemed adequate for securing European interests in the region. Therefore, Europe gradually realises that it has to act more actively as a balance and complement to the US in the region even if this could lead to a more permanent rift in US-European relations.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, this is exactly what

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<sup>51</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 105.

<sup>52</sup> Fukuyama, ‘Does “the West” still exist?’, pp. 154-155.

<sup>53</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 106.

<sup>54</sup> Galen Carpenter, ‘After Iraq: Permanent Transatlantic Tensions’, p. 147.

<sup>55</sup> Schwenninger, ‘Note to the EU Presidency and EU Foreign Ministers’, p. 86.

the EU has been doing in recent years.<sup>56</sup> Inevitably, many analysts predict, “the Middle East is a source and a catalyst of what threatens to become a downward spiral of burgeoning European anti-Americanism and nascent American anti-Europeanism, each reinforcing the other.”<sup>57</sup> In fact, by challenging America’s monopoly in regional arbitration, some Americans claim, the European foreign policy, for the first time since the Suez debacle of 1956, could explicitly define itself *against* America.<sup>58</sup>

#### 4. Offering an alternative to *Pax Americana*?

The Cold War bipolarity, argue some analysts, has today been replaced by a new form of bipolarity: “...a post-modern bipolarity where Americans and Europeans compete in the international market not just for commodities and services but also for ideas.”<sup>59</sup> Social and cultural values are becoming the characteristic features of a new dimension of the transatlantic relationship as “Europeans and Americans – loosened from the restrictive military ties of the cold war era, witnessing unprecedented levels of economic competition, and more openly and regularly reminded of how they differ on political priorities – have had more time and opportunity to explore those values, and along the way have become more conscious of their differences. While the EU pursues a liberal social agenda, the United States has a more conservative hue. While Europe leans towards the secular, religion sits at the heart of American public and political life. While Europeans build their welfarist social model,

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<sup>56</sup> See Steinmeier, ‘Europe’s role in the Middle East’.

<sup>57</sup> Garton Ash, ‘The new anti-Europeanism in America’, p. 131.

<sup>58</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, pp. 69-70.

<sup>59</sup> McCormick, *The European Superpower*, p. 138.

Americans argue the merits of individual responsibility and opportunity. While most Europeans believe that government is responsible for the provision of core public services, most Americans have a preference for the private sector. While post-material Europeans are conscious of the environmental impact of consumption, Americans are conspicuous and unapologetic consumers. While the EU pursues a post-modern agenda of globalization, science, peace, internationalism, social spending, and sustainable development, the American agenda is more nationalist, more insular, more independent, and more focused on what is best for America.”<sup>60</sup>

The EU’s eastward enlargement is seen as adding validity to official European claims that “the EU model of cooperation and integration is a pole of attraction for countries in our neighbourhood and beyond.”<sup>61</sup> With a hint of triumphalism Europeans declare that the EU is the only power in history “whose geographical enlargement has caused neither fears among nations nor the formation of counteralliances” and the process of EU enlargement has been “the biggest and most ambitious regional security and stability program in history.”<sup>62</sup> More and more are tempted into thinking that the EU model could and in fact should be applied in the rest of the world too: “The European Union is the entity in the world that has the longest and deepest experience in aggregating collective preferences among nations. It is a grand-scale experiment engaging nation-states who seek on a continuous basis to accommodate each other’s interests and reach consensus in two dozen policy areas at once. And somehow, in spite of the haggling, it works. Therefore,

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid, pp. 136-137.

<sup>61</sup> European Commission, ‘Europe in the World’.

<sup>62</sup> Ischinger, ‘Pax Americana and Pax Europea’, pp. 87, 90.

shouldn't European habits of cooperation and institutional frameworks be built on, not only in other regional contexts but also in tackling global issues? Why not see the European Union as a microcosmos, an explorer of new kinds of political deals between and beyond states? And isn't EU enlargement, with the concurrent dramatic increase in the differences of size, wealth, and political system within the Union, added evidence for the expansionary potential of the EU model?"<sup>63</sup>

Europe is gradually discovering that it has a new *mission civilisatrice*, namely a "EU-topia" of transnational, law-based integration which stands in direct clash with America's mission.<sup>64</sup> European integration is seen as a successful experiment which could provide "an example to other continents of how nation-states can be fused into supra-national powers."<sup>65</sup> Having learned the painful lessons of uncontrolled and unmitigated nationalism during the twentieth century, Europe is now willing to show others how they, too, can move beyond the disastrous competition between nation-states to a new era of security, prosperity and peace. Most Europeans feel that "Europe has learned from its terrible history of competing nation-states, each aspiring to mastery. After giving the world the curse of the nation-state, Europe should now offer the global antidote. The European Union is a model of how nation-states can overcome their differences, in a law-based transnational community of peaceful cooperation."<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Nikolaidis, 'The power of the superpowerless', p. 100.

<sup>64</sup> Garton Ash, 'The new anti-Europeanism in America', p. 129.

<sup>65</sup> Habermas, 'Opening up Fortress Europe'.

<sup>66</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, pp. 92-93.

The eastward enlargement of the Union is hailed as the catalytic event which has helped Europe to grasp the actual significance of this achievement: “The process that led in May 2004 to the largest ever influx of new members showed us the value of what we in the EU now enjoy. It held up a mirror to the European models and to the community method that we have adopted for safeguarding them. Enlargement made us appreciate the attraction that this holds to others and the potential for our soft power to promote reform and help shape the global forces, rather than simply react to them.”<sup>67</sup> Europe feels that its model has now proved its value and is ready for export. It is the model of the future and it is on its way to replace the American model which is the model of a bygone era: “Old Europe, honourably represented by France and Germany, is the advanced faction of the West, which, learning the lessons of the twentieth century, has turned to a post-heroic cultural style, and a corresponding policy; the United States, by contrast, is stuck in the conventions of heroism.”<sup>68</sup>

What is to be exported, however, is not just Europe’s different way of seeing the world and Europe’s different way of acting in it. It is the whole set of values and ways of life which characterize Europe: its emphasis on quality of life, its embrace of the principle of social solidarity, its unique strain of capitalism. It is this mix of values and attitudes which makes the ‘European way’ relevant and appealing in today’s world, many think, distinguishing it from the ‘American Dream’, which “is locked into a specific period of time

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<sup>67</sup> Landaburu, ‘Hard facts about Europe’s soft power’. “

<sup>68</sup> Quoted in Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 56.

long since passed by in European history.”<sup>69</sup> The European model is mainly characterised by its emphasis on a number of processes which have become almost a permanent point of friction between the EU and the US and are expected to ‘haunt’ transatlantic relations to an even greater degree after the eastward enlargement of the EU:

### ***I. Global governance – Multilateralism - Interregionalism***

Europe sees a globalist foreign policy that puts a premium on international cooperation as the only way to address the multiple challenges and opportunities which a globalised world creates.<sup>70</sup> Europeans take great pride in the fact that their track record in the promotion of human rights, peace building, and conflict prevention, as well as in the protection of the global environment is second to none in the world.<sup>71</sup> EU leaders further believe that they deliver what the world needs and what the world wants: “Whether we are dealing with poverty, inequality, human rights violations, terrorism, pollution or weapons of mass destruction, people expect a new type of global governance which will transform today’s insecurity into tomorrow’s opportunities. Global public opinion increasingly demands the strengthening of international institutions such as the United Nations”.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, a growing number of analysts highlight the similarities in the way the European Union and the United Nations design their comprehensive long-term approaches to

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<sup>69</sup> Rifkin, *The European Dream*, p. 85. People from all over the world prove this point, maintain some scholars, by flocking to Europe. McCormick, *The European Superpower*, p. 132.

<sup>70</sup> Daalder, ‘The End of Atlanticism’, p. 46.

<sup>71</sup> Ischinger, ‘Pax Americana and Pax Europea’, p. 87.

<sup>72</sup> Papandreou, ‘The Importance of Transatlantic Relations and Dialogue’, p. xv.

peace and security, claiming that the EU-UN relationship is of long-term strategic importance.<sup>73</sup> This is no coincidence, EU officials argue: “Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The UN lies at the heart of this system. As a matter of fact, cooperation with the UN has been at the heart of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy from the outset.”<sup>74</sup> Whereas, however, the *European Security Strategy* makes clear references to the legal status of the UN charter, the political primacy of the Security Council and the operational significance of the UN in post-conflict and conflict-prevention scenarios, the *National Security Strategy of the United States* simply states that multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom loving nations and places the role of the UN next to NGOs that could help “in providing the humanitarian, political, economic and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan”.<sup>75</sup>

Moreover, there are signs that the EU may simply be the first of a series of new unions, from Asia to Africa and Latin America, which will be forged by economic forces and not by force of arms.<sup>76</sup> And not only serves the EU as a pioneer but it is seen as a model to be imitated: “The EU is also increasingly respected as a model for regional integration elsewhere in the world and has made an impact in terms of developing alternative concepts of

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<sup>73</sup> Gowan, ‘The European Security Strategy’s global objective’, p. 43.

<sup>74</sup> Solana, Speech at the Annual Conference of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, Paris.

<sup>75</sup> Gowan, ‘The European Security Strategy’s global objective’, p. 47.

<sup>76</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 75.

security.”<sup>77</sup> European plans and intentions, however, have more far-reaching consequences: “According to the EU a ‘strengthened regionalism’ and multidimensional interregionalism could provide contributions to global multilateral governance, combining the legacy of previous multilateral values with the prospect of a less asymmetric world order.”<sup>78</sup>

On the contrary, the US is turning its back on the advantages of regional integration, weakening its international position: “Its ideology of unilateralism has stopped it from replicating the success of European enlargement in NAFTA, in spite of persistent demands from Mexico.”<sup>79</sup> Moreover, positive references by American policymakers to empire and the imperial revival that goes along with it can only further alienate America from the rest of the world, especially Europe, where the imperial idea has been discredited long ago.<sup>80</sup> The differences between European and American approaches are therefore fundamental and difficult to reconcile: “The EU and US visions of multilateralism have distinct background and features. The EU urges multilateralism to be effective enough to shape regional and global governance, to entangle national powers and deal with emergencies. Regionalism is not simply an instrument by which old multilateralism can be

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<sup>77</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 215. Europe, as Cameron explains, is particularly interested in watching such tentative steps develop to structures that are as close to the EU model as possible: “The EU supports these efforts through a mix of political, financial, economic and technical measures. In Africa there is the increasingly important African Union, as well as a number of regional and sub-regional organisations. In Latin America there is the Andean Pact and Mercosur as well as the Central American Free Trade Association (CAFTA). In the Middle East there is the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). In Asia there is the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asian Regional Forum (ARF). There is also much talk of an East Asian community involving China, Japan and South Korea.”

<sup>78</sup> Telò, *Europe: a Civilian Power?*, p. 240.

<sup>79</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, pp. 130-131. While popular revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine seek integration into Europe, continues Leonard, the same movements in Latin America seek greater autonomy from American hegemony.

<sup>80</sup> Andréani, ‘Imperial Loose Talk’, p. 79.

restored. Rather, it is the driving force for a reformed world governance which goes beyond a mere update of the old article XXIV of GATT.”<sup>81</sup>

## *II. The primacy of international law*

With increasing vehemence Europeans refuse to accept as valid the assumption that we live in a Hobbesian world where the struggle between good and evil will never end, an assumption which in America is taken as an axiom. What they claim instead, is that “the number of countries in the world where relationships cannot be managed through the rule of law has been shrinking since the end of the Cold War. Our world is not a Hobbesian landscape beyond the Kantian European island, full of rogue states bent on destroying the civilized West. Instead, democratization, even if imperfect, even if too often illiberal (as if mass elections alone could mean democracy), has been the trademark of the past decade.”<sup>82</sup> An increasing number of Europeans do not rank America’s ‘war on terror’ the biggest threat to world peace and security. Climate change, competition over resources, marginalisation of the majority world and global militarization are seen as more imminent threats since they are most likely to “lead to large-scale loss of life – of a magnitude unmatched by other potential threats – and have the greatest potential to spark violent conflict, civil unrest or destabilisation that threatens the international system as we know it.”<sup>83</sup> Europeans resist US

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<sup>81</sup> Telò, *Europe: a Civilian Power?*, p. 240.

<sup>82</sup> Nikolaidis, ‘The power of the superpowerless’, p.108.

<sup>83</sup> Abbott et al., *Beyond Terror*, p. 4. Even US government agencies have proffered the thesis that there are other greater threats to US security than terrorism. In 2003 a report commissioned by the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment reached the conclusion that

efforts to broaden the definition of the terrorist threat, since they seem to believe that US policymakers nurture the hope that “the terrorist threat can play the role of alliance unifier that the Soviet threat did during the Cold War.”<sup>84</sup> Once associated with internet rumours and conspiracy theories, such doubts over America’s rationale for the war against terrorism, are now expressed by authoritative scholars: “Do Americans (or at least some in the US) need to overemphasize the new terrorist threat and the Hobbesian quality of the world because with the end of the Cold War they lost that ‘other’ that was necessary to their own unity? Do they need to undervalue the effectiveness of international institutions because classical external sovereignty is the only collective cause they can agree on? How is it that the pursuit of moral certainties happens to never contradict American economic and Geostrategic interests?”<sup>85</sup>

The strategy behind the ‘war on terror’ is increasingly seen as flawed, counterproductive and therefore, destined to prove short-lived. Interestingly, even some realists can see that, admitting that “the primary focus on terrorism is politically captivating in the short run. It has the advantage of simplicity. By demonizing an unknown enemy and exploiting vague fears, it can rally popular support. But as a longer-range strategy, it lacks staying power, can be internationally divisive, can breed intolerance of others (‘he who is not with us is against us’) and unleash jingoist emotions, and can serve as the point of departure for America’s arbitrary designation of other states as ‘outlaws’.

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climate change over the next twenty years could result in a global catastrophe costing millions of lives in wars and natural disasters. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>84</sup> Galen Carpenter, ‘After Iraq: Permanent Transatlantic Tensions’, p. 149.

<sup>85</sup> Nikolaidis, ‘The power of the superpowerless’, pp. 109-110.

Consequently, it poses the risk that America will be perceived abroad as self-absorbed and that anti-American ideologues will gain international credence by labelling the United States a self-appointed vigilante.”<sup>86</sup> There is widespread suspicion in Europe that America is not just acting as if the world is anarchic but it is acting with the purpose to make the world look anarchic: “Acting as if the world is Hobbesian can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, increasing the likelihood that it would be so.”<sup>87</sup> A 1997 report by the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board reveals that there is a strong correlation between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.<sup>88</sup> Those who are convinced of America’s imperial tendencies, have no doubt that US policymakers act the way they do in their attempt to create the anarchic environment which is needed as a pretext for America’s hegemonic role in world affairs even though this reduces American legitimacy: “Invoking the rhetoric of democracy and human rights, US leaders have made a mockery of international order, helping reinforce an anarchic state of nature that would seem to be fully at odds with all their stated intentions. The longer such conditions persist, the more the US relies on military force to ensure its global domination, the more precarious becomes its legitimacy within the world system.”<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 215.

<sup>87</sup> Nikolaidis, ‘The power of the superpowerless’, p. 109.

<sup>88</sup> Hertsgaard, *The Eagle’s Shadow*, p. 77.

<sup>89</sup> Boggs, *Imperial Delusions*, p. 205.

### III. The value of soft power

More and more analysts come to the conclusion that instead of making America safer the use of force has, ironically, demonstrated the limits of American power and has weakened America's strategic position.<sup>90</sup> Contrary to what is sometimes presented as a quintessential European stance, Europe has not declared military power obsolete. The usefulness of military force is duly recognised by the EU. Its use, however, is sanctioned only when its purpose is to help increase the international community's capacity to pursue civilian ends and only when all other means have been tried and proved inadequate.<sup>91</sup> Europe thus appears to have redefined old notions of power and influence.<sup>92</sup> Indeed, many seem today to agree with the assumption that "it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons."<sup>93</sup> The idea of Europe as a civilian power has proved its value, it is often claimed, since Europe has been able to "lead by example" and project its relevance worldwide both during the Cold War and in the era of globalisation.<sup>94</sup>

After its eastward enlargement the EU accounts for nearly half of the world's outward foreign direct investment, provides ten times more peacekeepers to UN operations than the US and exerts greater leverage than

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<sup>90</sup> Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, p. 338. See also, Black, *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony*, p. 237. Black contends that for the United States "the use of force has been a wasting asset, not simply in Iraq but also as an instrument of foreign policy, both in securing goals and in sustaining alliances. Ironically, the same was true of the Soviet Union. ...its international reputation was also compromised by the use of force, in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1980-8."

<sup>91</sup> Nikolaidis, 'The power of the superpowerless', p. 113.

<sup>92</sup> Khanna, *The Metrosexual Superpower*, p. 68.

<sup>93</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>94</sup> Nikolaidis, 'The power of the superpowerless', p. 99.

the US over pivotal countries such as Brazil and Russia.<sup>95</sup> Perhaps the greatest success of Europe has been the successful promotion of democracy with peaceful means. In contradistinction to America the EU strives to promote tolerance between states and mutual empowerment by all actors in the system, avoiding for example exporting democracy in ready-made packs and seeking instead ways “to empower local actors to determine their destiny, even if and when they mess it up.”<sup>96</sup> America, on the other hand, “has had very little successful experience in helping create stable democracies in any part of the world over the last two decades, including in its own neighbourhood.”<sup>97</sup>

#### *IV. Managing globalization*

One of the core ideas of the model which Europe tries to promote is that prosperity and creativity can and should be pursued by limiting market forces rather than unleashing them.<sup>98</sup> Despite the dire predictions of American analysts this model has stood the test of time proving that contrary to the predictions of Wall Street analysts there may be nothing inevitable about market globalization and new rules of engagement between global markets and actors such as the EU may already have come into effect.<sup>99</sup> This is a fact

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<sup>95</sup> Khanna, *The Metrosexual Superpower*, pp. 67-68. Even in the fight against terrorism, Khanna claims, Europe displays the right ensemble of strengths: “Europeans excel at human intelligence, which requires expert linguists and cultural awareness. French espionage agencies have reportedly infiltrated al Qaeda cells, and German and Spanish law enforcement efforts have led to the capture of numerous al Qaeda operatives.”

<sup>96</sup> Nikolaidis, ‘The power of the superpowerless’, p. 103. Thus, Nikolaidis concludes, although the EU cannot even think of rivaling the US in effectiveness and decisiveness, it certainly surpasses it in legitimacy: “Americans believe that their example is so powerful that the use of soldiers and guns to implement it is legitimate. Europeans believe that their example is so powerful that its promotion requires neither soldiers nor guns.”

<sup>97</sup> Schwenninger, ‘Note to the EU Presidency and EU Foreign Ministers’, p. 84.

<sup>98</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 131.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

that has served for many in Europe as an incentive to develop a very different vision of global development that other states and areas will find considerably more attractive than US policy.<sup>100</sup> Europeans often imagine Europe as a bridge between the excessively capitalist US and the developing world since their social and economic models are thought to be more compatible with the values of much of the developing world than are those of the US.<sup>101</sup> It is not the European model that has seen its days they argue, but the specific model of globalization which Washington has fully embraced and tried to establish as both panacea and inescapable destiny all over the world. Now, Europeans claim, even influential US scholars admit that “unless some aspects of globalization can be effectively governed, it may not be sustainable in its current form.”<sup>102</sup> To many parts of the world, the globalization which the US has so aggressively tried to promote, has meant nothing else than “the spread of poverty to every country except the United States” and an American campaign to “force the rest of the world to adopt its (America’s) form of capitalism.”<sup>103</sup> This globalization has also had a powerful cultural motif rendering it synonymous with Americanization: “the imposition on other nations of the American way of life, leading to the progressive cultural homogenization of the world on the American mode.”<sup>104</sup> American policymakers, however, remain convinced that it is futile to try to limit market forces and warn the world to brace itself for the arrival of the market-state: “In our own era we are witnessing the emergence of the *market-state* and the shift

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<sup>100</sup> Glenny, ‘Pursuing Common Security Goals’, p. 119.

<sup>101</sup> Russell Mead, ‘American Endurance’, p. 173.

<sup>102</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, p. 87.

<sup>103</sup> Johnson, *Blowback*, pp. 194,214.

<sup>104</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, p. 154.

to that form from the constitutional order of the nation-state that has dominated the twentieth century.”<sup>105</sup> Europe’s big idea, however, is to place capitalism at the service of humans, not the other way round and to show the world (and a sceptical America) that this kind of ‘social capitalism’ can actually work – can produce the goods.<sup>106</sup> Thus, EU leaders feel the need to clearly state that “Europe has chosen the market economy and capitalism. But this choice does not imply the absolute laissez-faire and a financial capitalism that favours speculators and rentiers rather than entrepreneurs and workers.”<sup>107</sup>

And confronting those to whom the idea that markets can be opposed or tamed is anathema, they add that “Europe does not accept de-industrialisation, does not stay with crossed arms before the delocalisations, does not submit to the pseudo-dictatorship of the markets.”<sup>108</sup> Even Europe’s most fervent supporters of globalization disagree with their American counterparts who claim that “globalisation isn’t a choice. It’s reality”, arguing

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<sup>105</sup> Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, p. 228. “Such a state depends on the international capital markets and, to a lesser degree, on the modern multinational business network to create stability in the world economy, in preference to management by national or transnational political bodies. ... Whereas the nation-state justified itself as an instrument to serve the welfare of the people (the nation), the market-state exists to maximize the opportunities enjoyed by all members of society. ... If it is more efficient to have large bodies of persons unemployed, because it would cost more to the society to train them and put them to work at tasks for which the market has little demand, then the society will simply have to accept large unemployment figures. ... If the nation-state was characterized by the rule of law, the market-state is largely indifferent to the norms of justice, or for that matter to any particular set of moral values so long as law does not act as an impediment to economic competition. ... Now it is up to the individual to avoid problems, not up to the state to fix them. If there are unsafe areas of town, the citizen is best advised not to go there, rather than expect the police to ensure a safe environment.” *Ibid.*, pp. 229-230, 785.

<sup>106</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 127.

<sup>107</sup> Sarkozy, Discours du Président de la République Française devant le Parlement européen.

<sup>108</sup> Sarkozy, Discours de M. le Président de la République, Strasbourg. Trying to counter some of globalization’s negative aspects the EU has created a ‘globalization fund’, which provides money to national governments with the aim of retraining and reintegrating into the labour market workers who lose their jobs when EU companies move to countries with lower production costs. Vucheva, ‘Brussels grants cash to Germans and Finns hit by globalisation’.

that governments have the power to put globalization into reverse again and that a better globalization can be built.<sup>109</sup>

### 5. A strong Europe ushering in a new, multipolar world

EU leaders often state that one of the challenges for Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the challenge of the multipolar world in which Europe, a powerful Europe which “unashamedly” takes on its natural political role, must now take its full place.<sup>110</sup> A global role for Europe, they add, is what Europe owes to its citizens and the world in general and therefore it is a responsibility from which the Union cannot shy away: “The European Union is already a global actor. It has to be. In the era of globalization Europe bears great international responsibility. The safety of our citizens and international cooperation and solidarity are inextricably intertwined. It is therefore in our enlightened self-interest to act globally. And this is exactly what Europe does: We export stability in order not to import instability.”<sup>111</sup> What this has come to mean in practice is that Europe is both trying to build security in the European region and create a viable new international order.<sup>112</sup> By incorporating into the ESS’s text the provision that the Union’s first line of defence lies abroad, Europe’s leaders send the message that they are now willing to use the continent’s power beyond its borders. This, however, means that in order to promote its interests in a world which is not always prepared to accommodate these interests “... the European Union should not hesitate to take stands as an

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<sup>109</sup> Legrain, *Open World*, pp. 7, 24.

<sup>110</sup> Chirac, Treaty of Rome 50th anniversary celebrations press conference.

<sup>111</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Europa als globaler Akteur – Aktuelle Schwerpunkte Europäischer Außen- und Nachbarschaftspolitik.

<sup>112</sup> Howorth, ‘A European Union with Teeth?’, p. 42.

alternative to the United States, with its different methods, policy concerns, and priorities and its own ways of making friends and indeed enemies.”<sup>113</sup>

Most Europeans are in favour of a strong EU role in world affairs, arguing at times that the Union should become a superpower.<sup>114</sup> Foreign leaders also see Europe’s greater involvement in global affairs as not only inescapable but necessary as well: “With two permanent members of the Security Council and 23 more votes in the UN an enlarged EU will have an obligation to play a significant role on the world stage.”<sup>115</sup> Indeed, policymakers around the world expect the EU to emerge as one of the several pillars in the new multipolar world ready to balance the United States “for the world good”.<sup>116</sup> It is widely accepted that contrary to American beliefs, the EU possesses enough clout to respond to that task. Europe’s ability to influence US foreign policy outcomes should not be seen as negligible, analysts say, even in cases such as the war in Iraq, where Europe did not manage to prevent America from going to war but did manage to make this decision more costly.<sup>117</sup> And when it comes to trade, the ability of the EU to effectively constrain American power is not even questioned.<sup>118</sup> Successful European initiatives in the face of fierce American opposition, such as the Kyoto Protocol, have already given the EU real leadership status in the eyes of the

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<sup>113</sup> Nikolaidis, ‘The power of the superpowerless’, p. 117.

<sup>114</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 91.

<sup>115</sup> Downer, ‘EU Enlargement: Meeting the Challenges of the Global Security and Trade Environment’. A view from Australia.

<sup>116</sup> Chaban *et al.*, ‘The European Union As Others See It’, p. 256. European attitudes toward the Iraq war were often mentioned in this survey as an illustration that the EU is not going to “just be content to sit on the sidelines and be dictated to by the US”.

<sup>117</sup> Lindberg, ‘The Atlanticist Community’, p. 231.

<sup>118</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, p. 30.

world.<sup>119</sup> The Kyoto protocol, the establishment of the UN Human Rights Council, the euro, the Airbus 380, are all symbols on a global scale of the Union's power.<sup>120</sup> Influential figures often see the EU as already exceeding the American role in international business and describe the EU, politically, as the second most important contemporary geopolitical force.<sup>121</sup> Public opinion reflects such assessments both in Europe and the US: 69 per cent of the French estimate that in two decades the EU will be as powerful, if not more, than the US in international relations and in economy but only one in 3 says the same will be the case in military terms while in the US more than 50 per cent believe that the EU will be as strong as the US economically and politically but 64 per cent say it will be inferior militarily.<sup>122</sup>

Many also think that Europe's ascendancy on the world scene is both facilitated and dictated by the respective decline of US power. As it is often pointed out, what an enlarged EU can do with its greater presence internationally is partly dependent on the opportunities set for it by the international environment.<sup>123</sup> The perceived decline of the US role in the world is providing the EU with a big opportunity. It is a commonplace conclusion among many in Europe that Washington has failed in its global agenda and it has lost its capacity and its credibility to play its traditional role

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<sup>119</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 14. "In the 1980s and 1990s environmental issues became increasingly European and then global. ... The environment has become a major area for EU legislation, with over 200 laws on the statute book. ... The sixth environment action programme (2002-12), the budget for this programme amounts to 7.1 billion euros per year." Ibid, p. 13.

<sup>120</sup> Landaburu, 'Hard facts about Europe's soft power' and Khanna, *The Metrosexual Superpower*, p. 68

<sup>121</sup> Chaban *et al.*, 'The European Union As Others See It', p. 256.

<sup>122</sup> French-American Foundation – France, 'Regards croisés France/États Unis', p. 164.

<sup>123</sup> Archer, 'The European Union as an International Political Actor', p. 233.

of honest broker and pacifier on the world stage.<sup>124</sup> This, they argue, can only mean that Europe has now to do what America cannot. The US role in the world is diminishing and for many this is an irreversible process: “The US today may not look like Rome or the Soviet Union just before their demises, but it may certainly resemble the British empire of around 1900, just before the onset of its rapid decline.”<sup>125</sup> With its relentless pursuit of an unproductive and extremely expensive ‘war on terror’, it is jeopardising its economic and moral power.<sup>126</sup> Indeed, many are adamant that, because of America’s unbalanced economy which is riddled with debts and deficits and its overstretched empire, the twenty-first century will not be another ‘American century’.<sup>127</sup> As early as in 2004, for example, many Americans started to feel that the American economy could not sustain operations like the one in Iraq and started to ask for US troops to be withdrawn from there.<sup>128</sup> In addition, for the first time in decades, the dollar has a true competitor, the euro, that is restricting America’s room for maneuver.<sup>129</sup> America’s diplomatic clout is disappearing fast too: Despite all the powerful levers at its disposal, America

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<sup>124</sup> Haine, ‘The European Security Strategy coping with threats; Is Europe secure?’, p. 38. Following this reading, the EU is in reality left with no other choice but to undertake such a role since US actions in the world have serious consequences inside Europe (as the Iraq war, the occupation of the country or the existence of Guantanamo demonstrate).

<sup>125</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 32.

<sup>126</sup> Abbott *et al.*, *Beyond Terror*, p. 77. Thus, it is argued that with China’s power growing and America’s ability to guarantee other countries’ security diminishing, more governments are expected to turn to China or other powerful but undemocratic states for both security and trade.

<sup>127</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 4.

<sup>128</sup> Layne, ‘The Best of Bad Choices’.

<sup>129</sup> Heuser, ‘The euro is on the upswing’.

did not manage to get the UN resolution it wanted in the UN prior to the war in Iraq.<sup>130</sup>

America's greatest problem, however, is the fact that increasingly its actions lack legitimacy in the eyes of the world. America's soft power seems to evaporate rapidly. This is perhaps, argue some in Europe, "the most dramatic sign of the end of the American century."<sup>131</sup> Many see the US as nothing more than an exploitative empire: "Though it rejects imperial pretensions and has no imperial structure, it is, for all its protestations of goodwill, perceived in many parts of the world as peremptory and domineering – imperial, in fact."<sup>132</sup> In addition, the image of a unique and benevolent American empire charged with maintaining order in the world, which often shapes Americans' perceptions of their country, irritates allies and adversaries alike.<sup>133</sup> American policies are seen as utterly hypocritical: "Washington excuses its backing of dictators as geopolitical realism, but it sings a different tune when anti-democratic behaviour comes from governments that threaten the interests of American corporations. The United States was the only nation in the western hemisphere that did not condemn but welcomed the April 2002 coup that briefly removed Hugo Chavez, the elected president of Venezuela. In fact, Washington funded some of the groups behind Chavez's ouster – incredibly enough, through its National Endowment for

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<sup>130</sup> A detailed analysis of these levers and the way they were used by the American government is provided by Anderson *et al.*, *Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced? : How the Bush Administration Influences Allies in its War on Iraq*

<sup>131</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p. 124.

<sup>132</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 287.

<sup>133</sup> Hoffmann, 'America Alone in the World'. See also, Browne, 'Victims of the peace decide Americans are worse than Saddam'.

Democracy.”<sup>134</sup> Its insistence that America’s model is superior to all other models and should be copied by others is offending and infuriating the world: “Kofi Annan, for example, in accepting the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize for his work as secretary-general of the United Nations, quietly observed: ‘The idea that there is one people in possession of the truth, one answer to the world’s ills, or one solution to humanity’s heeds, has done untold harm throughout history – especially in the last century.’”<sup>135</sup> America’s excessive reliance on military power is seen as highly dangerous: “People the world over dread the image of today’s highly militarized America. The American military is becoming an autonomous system, it is an entirely mercenary force increasingly separated from civilian interests and devoted to military ones. ... The corporate interests of the armed forces are given priority over the idea that the military is just one of several means that a democratic government might employ to implement its policies and in the long run the armed forces displace other instruments of foreign policy implementation.”<sup>136</sup> Furthermore, the US is refusing to address the ‘ugly’ consequences of its foreign policy and accommodate the legitimate interests of others, resorting to public relations tricks in order to ‘sell’ its policies abroad: “With an escalating mood of anti-Americanism across the globe, the State Department and a number of federal agencies have enlisted Madison Avenue public-relations firms to help refurbish the national image abroad, guessing that international public opinion would go along with the tired mythology of freedom, democracy, abundance, and peace that serves to cloak US interests and obscures the actual legacy of

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<sup>134</sup> Hertsgaard, *The Eagle’s Shadow*, pp. 200-201.

<sup>135</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, p. 144.

<sup>136</sup> Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 222-223.

authoritarian rule, exploitation, and violence known well by most of the globe. ...One instrument of this ideological crusade is the Office of Public Diplomacy, an arm of the State Department. ...the public-relations apparatus works to cosmetically remake the US image in the absence of real changes in policies or actions. ...The Office of Public Diplomacy produces TV, radio, and print advertisements showing idealized images of American life that, along with ambitious educational, technical, and cultural exchange programs, are meant to create an atmosphere of goodwill toward the US government. ..Propaganda methods are bound to fail in a context where too much history is left to be explained away.”<sup>137</sup> America’s unilateralist tendencies are frequently used both as proof and corollary of the decline of US power: “America has also gravitated toward unilateralism out of frustration with its inability to get its way as often as in the past. Accustomed to calling the shots, the United States is likely to go off on its own when others refuse to follow Washington’s lead, which the Europeans have been doing with greater frequency as their strength and self-confidence grow.”<sup>138</sup>

It is self-evident, many Europeans claim, that the EU should not be associated with an America whose image is so negative around the world. This could only damage Europe’s interests. The greater EU role that comes with enlargement must therefore be easily distinguishable from America’s role in the world. Otherwise the EU exposes itself to charges of hypocrisy (i.e. not living up to the norms and standards it preaches to other countries and being indistinguishable from the US whose practices it condemns). Indeed, it is

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<sup>137</sup> Boggs, *Imperial Delusions*, pp. 205-206.

<sup>138</sup> Kupchan, ‘The Rise of Europe, America’s Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy’, p. 216.

inevitable that when the EU acts *in tandem* with the US it receives part of the blame for US actions which provoke angry reactions in other parts of the world: “The shock wave from the Iraq crisis is strong and probably lasting; as regards the balances in the Middle East and other regions; as regards the image of the United States and the West in general everywhere in the world; as regards our capacity to tackle crises together legitimately and effectively.”<sup>139</sup> Predicting dire consequences of such an alignment with the US, European media, just a few weeks after 9/11, were asking European leaders to reconsider their policies towards Washington, arguing that Bush’s war against terror without any consideration of the roots of terrorism would only lead to more terrorism.<sup>140</sup> It is often difficult for Washington’s European allies to cooperate with America without jeopardising some of their interests and it is increasingly argued that it would be better for European leaders to avoid dealing with Washington sometimes rather than appear to be close to it: “To a new leadership class it sometimes seems that America is ... the nut you walk away from.”<sup>141</sup> This is certainly a development that seems to vindicate the fears of those analysts who some years ago advanced the argument that “world politics in the twenty-first century will in all likelihood be driven primarily by blowback from the second half of the twentieth century – that is, from the unintended consequences of the Cold War and the crucial American decision

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<sup>139</sup> Kouchner, Speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

<sup>140</sup> Augstein, ‘Abenteurer und Strategen’.

<sup>141</sup> Gopnik, ‘The Human Bomb: The Sarkozy regime begins’. “When Sarkozy met Condoleezza Rice, she said, ‘What can I do for you?’ And he said, bluntly, ‘Improve your image in the world. It’s difficult when the country that is the most powerful ... is one of the most unpopular countries in the world. It presents overwhelming problems for you and overwhelming problems for your allies.’”

to maintain a Cold War posture in a post – Cold War world.”<sup>142</sup> It is more than clear that “...America infuriates lots of people around the world and the fact that most of them cannot or do not want to strike back the way Bin Laden did, does not mean that they welcome or accept America’s domination.<sup>143</sup> Moreover, America often gives the impression that it lacks the ability to reward even its most loyal allies.<sup>144</sup>

For some, however, simply to disassociate itself from America will not be enough for Europe. For them, the US constitutes a threat to world stability and peace and therefore it has to be actively constrained. The US, many insist, has become a paragon of instability and insecurity: “What the strongest do eventually defines what everybody should do, and when that practice becomes common, it tends to take on an aura of obligation. ... If other states act on the same rationale that the US has proposed and accept preventive military action as a legitimate response to potential threats, a messy world would become a lot messier.”<sup>145</sup> In its decline, it is feared in many parts of the world, the US will probably try to establish an exploitative hegemony as this is what declining powers often do.<sup>146</sup> Indeed, the US is often portrayed in the worst possible manner. It is a dangerous and ruthless bully who will stop at nothing in order to get what it wants: “Even while seeking congressional and U.N. approval for war in late 2002 and early 2003, Bush, in a confidential discussion with Prime Minister Tony Blair recorded by Blair’s foreign policy adviser, actually toyed

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<sup>142</sup> Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 229. The term ‘blowback’, which was invented by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency for their own internal use, refers to the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people. *Ibid*, p. 8.

<sup>143</sup> Hertzgaard, *The Eagle’s Shadow*, p. 201.

<sup>144</sup> Margolis, ‘Coalition of the Coerced’.

<sup>145</sup> Kegley and Raymond, ‘Global Terrorism and Military Preemption’, p. 45.

<sup>146</sup> Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 224. History, Johnson claims, offers few examples of declining hegemonies reversing their decline or giving up power peacefully.

with the idea of staging deliberate military provocation in order to precipitate a *casus belli*.”<sup>147</sup> It does not even hesitate to ‘produce’ threats in order to advance its interests, endangering thus global order: “The concept of threat is highly malleable, and statesmen, rather than acknowledge their desires for influence and even hegemony, understandably often manufacture, consciously or unconsciously, ‘threats’ and ‘dangers to security’ to justify expansion.”<sup>148</sup> Thus, some Europeans think that an effort to render the EU a credible counterweight to America has become imperative for European leaders. For the proponents of ‘superpower Europe’ this would be a natural step: “A new European superpower will be built in the crucible of global rivalry and conflict, in global economic crises, in future conflicts along Europe’s long borders and, above all, in Europe’s response to American economic and military power.”<sup>149</sup> In this endeavour Europe, many think, could count on the support of other important players as well. The forces that pull Europe apart from America have the same effect on other actors too, with the latter becoming increasingly committed to multilateralism and showing a strong interest in limiting American power.<sup>150</sup> Indeed, as many Europeans estimate, many other states “are drawn towards the EU by the French stance on a ‘powerful Europe’ in a multipolar world. They see this powerful Europe acting as a counterbalance to an overly powerful United States, as an alternative to the UN Security Council that is very often paralysed and as a stabilising influence in the Near East and elsewhere. They recognise that a strong and

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<sup>147</sup> Brzezinski, *Second Choice*, p. 143.

<sup>148</sup> Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power*, p. 10.

<sup>149</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 3.

<sup>150</sup> Stiglitz, ‘Improving Transatlantic Relations in the Aftermath of the Iraq War’, p. 56.

independent Europe offers new options in a unipolar world that has been globalized since 1989 by American influences.”<sup>151</sup>

## 6. Building a European identity against America?

Some analysts have advanced the thesis that in the wake of enlargement a greatly heterogeneous EU might be in need of an ‘emotional glue’ to hold it together and since history shows that such emotional glue has traditionally been manufactured by identifying an ‘Other’ against which a common identity can be built, Europeans could be tempted to find this ‘Other’ in the United States.<sup>152</sup> Thus, Europe could find itself listing the ways in which it differs from America in an attempt to construct a clear self-image.<sup>153</sup> The idea has been gaining ground in the US, where it is widely held that “...the sheer pleasure that Europeans take in denigrating America has become another bond unifying the continent.”<sup>154</sup> Alarmed Atlanticists in Europe find that some of Europe’s leading intellectuals “fail to construct Europe’s political identity without actively ‘othering’ and even orientalisng its counterpart, which today is the United States.”<sup>155</sup> Of course, many European leaders warn that Europe’s common identity cannot be built on anti-Americanism.<sup>156</sup> Scholars also counter that “the US does not qualify as the EU’s ‘other’ – if the EU needed one at all it has its own past.”<sup>157</sup> Even those Europeans who would

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<sup>151</sup> Védérine, ‘How others see us: Policy lessons for Europe’.

<sup>152</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>153</sup> Garton Ash, ‘The new anti-Europeanism in America’, p. 129. See also, Zaborowski, ‘How the US views the European crisis’.

<sup>154</sup> Reid, *The United States of Europe*, p. 10.

<sup>155</sup> Heins, ‘Orientalising America? Continental Intellectuals and the Search for Europe’s Identity’, p. 435.

<sup>156</sup> Cimoszewicz, ‘The Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’.

<sup>157</sup> Nikolaidis, ‘Living with our Differences’, p. 92.

consider the US a candidate for the role of Europe's 'Other', confess that America "would never be the primary 'other', for Europeans may well revert to its (Europe's) oldest 'other' of all – Islam. A continuing 'war on terrorism', tensions between the West and Islam and the West and the Arab world, and trouble on Europe's borders with Islam, could all conspire to create in European minds a clear and present 'other' – as could future non-integrated Islamic populations in European cities, in Bradford or Berlin or Marseilles."<sup>158</sup> Such reassurances, however, do not seem strong enough to allay American suspicions. Thus, careful warnings are sometimes conveyed to European policymakers: "Those who seek identity via confrontation with America must not delude themselves into believing that the United States will remain forever passive when its policies are being challenged as a matter of principle. Sooner or later, it will be back on the course that nearly destroyed them twice in a generation – this time not by war but by an exhausting national rivalry. Ironically, the upshot of such an evolution could well be a weakening of European integration, because, in the end, some key members of the European Union are bound to reject the risks of growing estrangement from the United States."<sup>159</sup> Though the view that America could serve as Europe's 'Other' has found a receptive audience within American and British circles, it has not gained much credibility in most of Europe, where the idea that EU-US differences are somehow deliberately overemphasized or even 'fabricated' in a plot to unite a fragmented EU, does not sound particularly plausible. In the US, however, it is taken quite seriously and tends to reinforce the idea that

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<sup>158</sup> Haseler, *Super-State*, p. 122.

<sup>159</sup> Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?*, p. 54.

Europe is intrinsically anti-American and therefore what America does or does not has little impact on how Europeans see it. Subsequently, European complaints about US foreign policy are most often associated with Europe's anti-Americanism and are routinely dismissed as groundless or capricious. And enlargement will not manage to reverse this tendency: "The accession of Central Europe to the European Union will soak up anti-American sentiment emanating from the core, but not forever. Brussels is already pressing Central Europe to its ample bosom. European think-tanks spend millions shaping public opinion all over the region. Thousands of journalists and scientists receive stipends in Western Europe. ...it cannot be long before attitudes change."<sup>160</sup>

## 7. Conclusion

The Union's expansion to the east is not going to bring integration to a standstill. Instead, it will lead to a more integrated Union with a more ambitious role within the world arena. That means that Washington will soon have to decide about the stance it wants to hold on this fundamental, for the future of transatlantic relations, matter: will it accept as unavoidable the gradual political integration of Europe or will it openly oppose it in an effort to derail it before it reaches, arguably, the point of no return? Whatever the choice, it will have a catalytic effect on EU-US relations. Further friction is expected as a result of Washington's insistence that the EU offer full assistance to it in its effort to isolate a resurgent Russia. The US thinks that a

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<sup>160</sup> Sikorski, 'Europe (Almost) Whole and Free: EU Enlargement and Its Implications'.

common front with Europe is needed if Russia is not to stage a comeback as a big power on the world scene. Europe does not seem to share such plans and Washington's perseverance risks backfiring. The eastward enlargement has also raised fears among US policy-planners that an expanding EU might one day become a powerful rival for influence in Eurasia, an energy-rich area which is of strategic importance to both the US and the EU. But this is not the only area in which they risk becoming competitors over energy. The Middle East too, could become a new front. The EU and the US have divergent views on the critical issue of how to bring stability in the region and the prospects for a common approach look remote at the moment. Furthermore, the eastward expansion of the EU has considerably enhanced its image as a civilian power. The EU is increasingly viewed as an actor who can offer stability and security around the world thanks to its unique model of cooperation and integration. What is of particular importance though, is the fact that this model is totally different from the model Washington applies in order to achieve the same ends. European efforts to 'export' this model to the rest of the world are bringing the EU to direct confrontation with America as this competition over models is considered to be a zero-sum game. Thus, issues like multilateralism, interregionalism, the role of international law in the organisation of the international system, the role of soft power in international relations and the course of globalisation are gradually becoming areas of conflict between Europe and America with potentially far-reaching consequences for their future relations. Following enlargement, the EU also appears, and in many cases is expected and asked to be, eager to accept more

responsibilities on the global stage, projecting its power beyond its borders. This should not be viewed as just a reflection of the Union's increasing power however. It is also the result of a growing demand by Europeans for independent action from Washington, either because the US seems to be unable to tackle serious global problems alone or because its methods are deemed as inappropriate and therefore unacceptable. Thus the idea of the EU acting globally as a counterweight to the US in areas where the intervention of the latter is not desired or cannot be expected, is constantly gaining ground. Finally, it has been feared that in the aftermath of the eastward enlargement a far from homogeneous EU will inevitably search for a suitable 'other' against which it will try to build a common identity. Americans have long suspected that this 'other' can only be the world's only superpower, and no matter how hard Europeans try to convince them that this could never be the case, they are alarmed and often warn Europe over the consequences of such a plot.

Most realists would expect the EU to rise to balance against the US, as this is what big powers, acting within an anarchic system, do against the powers which dominate the world.<sup>161</sup> The EU, however, has chosen to follow a different path. As a civilian power, it has opted for a 'structural foreign policy', one that aims to change the structure of the world system by eliminating the logic of power politics: "...a 'structural foreign policy' limits international anarchy by supporting international regimes and their legitimization processes, and consolidating regional organizations elsewhere. Moreover, it expresses a changed perception of threats and power criteria,

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<sup>161</sup> Collard-Wexler, 'Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union', pp. 425-426.

strengthening a type of structural power linked to civilian relations and the knowledge society as opposed to classic military power.”<sup>162</sup> Anarchy is for realists a given, a permanent feature of the international system that dictates to a great degree the behaviour of states. By openly opposing the logic of anarchy the EU seems to endorse the famous constructivist tenet that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. Indeed, the example of the EU shows that approaches such as multilateralism and interregionalism, two key components of the concept of global governance, can beyond any doubt mitigate anarchy. Inevitably, Europe is finding itself entangled in a tug-of-war with the hegemonic superpower, which is determined to preserve the current *status quo*.

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<sup>162</sup> Telò, *Europe: a Civilian Power?*, p. 231.

## Chapter 7

### *Conclusion*

#### **A. Europe and America beyond the eastward enlargement**

It is more than evident that political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic need to think seriously about the future of the transatlantic relationship. The starting point of their reflection is obvious: “We must ask ourselves whether the differences between the US and many Europeans are fundamental or strategic. Are these differences likely to be permanent, or is there a way to overcome them?”<sup>1</sup> Transatlantic disagreements are without doubt serious and overcoming them could turn out to be a Herculean task. At the moment, it seems that there are few reasons to be optimistic about the prospects for a renewed transatlantic relationship: “The project of building and maintaining an Atlantic community is at risk as never before. The Alliance’s strategic purpose is unclear; its domestic support in key countries is, if not altogether unravelling, at least greatly weakened by historical standards...”<sup>2</sup> Key disagreements between the two allies, on the question of the place of power in international affairs for instance, look unbridgeable and divergences look set to persist in the future.<sup>3</sup> Political culture and domestic pressures on both sides of the Atlantic are also seen as more

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<sup>1</sup> Papandreou, ‘The Importance of Transatlantic Relations and Dialogue’, p. xi.

<sup>2</sup> Andrews, *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress*, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Lindberg, ‘The Atlanticist Community’, p. 215.

divergent today than at any other point in the history of transatlantic relations.<sup>4</sup> Deeper differences in historical self-perceptions between Europeans and Americans can only be patched over in the short run, argue many scholars, but will continue to constitute sources of friction in the longer run.<sup>5</sup> For some, these developments seem to vindicate all those analysts who assumed in the early 1990s that the end of the Cold War should naturally lead to the end of the Atlantic partnership.<sup>6</sup>

While Europe seems to have come to terms with one of the key elements of multilateralism, namely the willingness to accept decisions that differ from those one would have wanted, the US continues to think that its immense power should by no means be constrained.<sup>7</sup> Global primacy seems to be the top priority for every American administration: “No American leader of any political persuasion will accept the proposition that the basis for a US-European partnership should be containment of US ability to act.”<sup>8</sup> Even America’s closest allies cannot persuade it that modifying its foreign policy in order to show consideration for European interests and concerns can be worthwhile.<sup>9</sup> Disagreements among US policy-makers are by and large about style and not substance: “tactics can often be adjusted without giving up basic interests. Style

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<sup>4</sup> Smith, ‘Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and World Order’, p. 102.

<sup>5</sup> Fukuyama, ‘Does “the West” still exist?’, p. 138.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Owen, ‘The Collapse of the West’.

<sup>7</sup> Stiglitz, ‘Improving Transatlantic Relations in the Aftermath of the Iraq War’, p. 54.

<sup>8</sup> Asmus, ‘Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance’, p. 29.

<sup>9</sup> Wallace and Oliver, ‘A bridge too far: the United Kingdom and the transatlantic relationship’, p. 176.

may be the easiest part.”<sup>10</sup> Such an attitude, however, can be no basis for a successful transatlantic partnership in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as “only a rearticulation of the partnership’s central meaning, in terms that correspond more closely to the desires of citizens and of organized interests on both sides of the Atlantic, will suffice if the Alliance is to thrive in the new century”.<sup>11</sup> Europe’s nations are too ancient and too powerful culturally and materially, to accept anything less than that, it is often remarked.<sup>12</sup> But what kind of transatlantic partnership could they hope to build when many of them view America’s foreign policy as a source of global instability?<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, negative American perceptions of the EU, its nature and its capabilities, make it extremely unlikely for US policy-makers to contemplate the idea of a partnership of equals. The euphoria which overwhelmed many parts of Europe in the wake of the eastward enlargement has not had any considerable impact on American perceptions of Europe and the state of world affairs in general. Most Americans continue to see Europe as weak, lacking both the capacity and the resolve to become a decisive global player, let alone a reliable partner for the US. True, say many Americans, Europe’s agenda is broadened after its eastward enlargement. However, this does not mean that Europe’s power has increased: “Today’s Europe may be more extensive in scope

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<sup>10</sup> Nye, ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, p. 268.

<sup>11</sup> Andrews, ‘Is Atlanticism dead?’, p. 256.

<sup>12</sup> Pfaff, ‘Present and Future of the Tensed EU-US Relations’, p. 39.

<sup>13</sup> Heisbourg, ‘US-European relations: from lapsed alliance to new partnership?’, p. 124.

but still remains impotent globally.”<sup>14</sup> The EU is often portrayed as a mere coalition of weak states suffering from “a self-induced blindness to the political realities and military necessities of international affairs.”<sup>15</sup> It is often argued by some of America’s most influential scholars that Europe’s achievements and virtues have been grossly exaggerated: “For all their talk of wanting to establish a rule-based international order, the Europeans have not done that well within the European Union itself. The Europeans have developed a decision-making system of Byzantine complexity, with overlapping and inconsistent rules and weak enforcement powers. The European Commission often does not have the power to even monitor compliance of member states with its own directives, much less the ability to make them conform. This fits with an attitude toward law in certain parts of Europe that often sees declarative intent as greater in importance than actual implementation and that Americans tend to see instead as undermining the very rule of law.”<sup>16</sup> Indeed, American critics say, the EU has not much to celebrate: “The ‘non’s’ and ‘nee’s’ on the Constitutional Treaty, two decades of economic stagnation in ‘core Europe’, welfare state retrenchment, the increased propensity of Europeans to vote for populist mavericks, the inability of political elites to respond credibly to these phenomena, and the failure of the common

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<sup>14</sup> Brzezinski, *Second Choice*, p. 24. This estimate, coming from Barack Obama’s chief foreign-policy advisor during the 2008 presidential campaign, is indicative of the way both Democrats and Republicans think most of the time about Europe and its international status.

<sup>15</sup> Berkowitz, ‘Liberalism and Power’, p. 213.

<sup>16</sup> Fukuyama, ‘Does “the West” still exist?’, p. 142.

foreign and security policy as exemplified by the Iraq War contradict euphoric academic assessments.”<sup>17</sup>

Americans find they cannot take seriously European criticisms: “Europeans spend much of their time trying to come up with new ways to complain about America while at the same time they become more American every day.”<sup>18</sup> Besides, continuous criticism of America reveals the real extent of European impotence: “Unwilling to address their genuine problems, Europeans become more reflexively critical of America. This gives the impression that they're active on the world stage, even as they're quietly acquiescing in their own decline.”<sup>19</sup> Europe should not be deluding itself that it is currently staging a comeback into global politics, for its future continues to be bleak: “Europeans should not think that the fact that despite the constant prophecies of doom by Anglo-Saxon sceptics the EU continues to progress can be interpreted as the beginning of the end of Europe’s decline and maybe the beginning of a great recovery.”<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Cafruny and Ryner, ‘Monetary Union and the Transatlantic and Social Dimensions of Europe’s Crisis’, p. 141.

<sup>18</sup> Serfaty, ‘Cooperation or Failure’, p. 192.

<sup>19</sup> Samuelson, ‘The End of Europe’.

<sup>20</sup> Russell Mead, ‘American Endurance’, p. 172. Economic, political and military reasons justify such a pessimistic prediction according to Russell Mead. Economically, Europe will suffer heavily from both the aging and shrinking of its population; politically, the EU is condemned to remain an awkward player on the international scene because (among other reasons) its internal divisions are too deep and its constitutional processes too cumbersome; militarily, the EU has neither the will nor the financial means to be among the world’s greatest powers. Russell Mead, ‘American Endurance’, pp. 175-177.

The world is as anarchic as ever and everybody realizes that in this kind of environment states have to choose between strong US leadership and chaos.<sup>21</sup> Europe is unable to survive in this Hobbesian world: “Like posthistorical France and Britain confronting the still very historical Germany of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s, Europe as a whole today is a little too pure to cut an effective figure in the sad and sorry world we actually have.”<sup>22</sup> The reality is, US analysts contend, that the EU depends on America’s military might not only for its own defense but also for the policing of hot spots around the globe.<sup>23</sup> Even after the Iraq war many foreign policy experts continue to think that contrary to what is occasionally assumed, Europe still acknowledges the primacy of American power and the need for a global hegemon.<sup>24</sup> Global governance and multilateralism are usually hailed as noble ideas but are deemed suitable only for weak states which cannot face alone the problems and challenges of the modern world. European leaders are scorned for their attempts to promote internationally some of Europe’s supranational ideals: “One critically important factor has to be the experience of European integration over the past generation. The loss of sovereignty is not an abstract, theoretical matter ... Having lived through this masochistic experience repeatedly, one imagines that they are like former smokers who want to put everyone else through the same withdrawal pains that they have endured.”<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Brzezinski, *Second Choice*, pp. 191-192. Despite its failures, America will inevitably be given a second chance to lead the world, argues Brzezinski, because no other power is capable of playing the role of an effective stabilizer.

<sup>22</sup> Russell Mead, ‘American Endurance’, p. 170.

<sup>23</sup> Berkowitz, Peter, ‘Liberalism and Power’, p. 212.

<sup>24</sup> Serfaty, ‘Cooperation or Failure’, p. 190.

<sup>25</sup> Fukuyama, ‘Does “the West” still exist?’, p. 151.

Europeans, too, seem to come to terms with the fact that different US administrations do not mean radically different approaches to the EU and the disagreements between Europe and America are here to stay.<sup>26</sup> This, after all, is what realist thinking dictates. Realism, as it is often admitted by its adherents, cannot comprehend change and realism is expected, despite its shortcomings and challengers, to continue to guide the actions of American policymakers in the foreseeable future.<sup>27</sup>

Under these circumstances many believe that a ‘divorce’ looks a more likely outcome. Some have even analyzed the various forms it could take.<sup>28</sup> Yet, such a development is far from inevitable, argue many scholars. Disagreements between the two allies are not over ends, they maintain, but over how to arrive at them.<sup>29</sup> Europe and America have more to gain as allies than as neutrals or adversaries and they will continue to strongly depend on one another for the foreseeable time.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, some conclude, “we should expect more convergence rather divergence in transatlantic relations.”<sup>31</sup>

Those who strongly believe that a common future still remains a possibility, see ‘stabilizers’ in transatlantic relations which can guarantee the continuation of strong ties between the two parties. The first of those ‘stabilizers’

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<sup>26</sup> See Kettle, ‘A post-Bush America is not about to fall at Europe’s feet’.

<sup>27</sup> Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 31.

<sup>28</sup> A ‘hard’ divorce would mean that Europe and America simply continue to drift further and further apart with the former adopting a ‘continental fortress mentality’ and the latter reverting even more to unilateralist tendencies. The ‘soft’ divorce scenario predicts that Europe will not detach itself from the US but will be critically involved with it, retaining the ability and will to say ‘no’ in certain circumstances. Reichard, *The EU-NATO Relationship*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>29</sup> Lindberg, ‘The Atlanticist Community’, p. 229.

<sup>30</sup> Reichard, *The EU-NATO Relationship*, pp. 36-38.

<sup>31</sup> Lindberg, ‘Les relations euro-américaines ou le « désaccord théorique imparfait », p. 82.

is (common) culture. Europe and America belong to the same historical civilization, share the same values and their differences are differences within the family.<sup>32</sup> Despite the frictions, no two parts of the world are more similar in their commitment to democracy and human rights than Europe and America.<sup>33</sup> There are also signs that, even on traditionally dividing issues, such as the death penalty, convergence is gradually gaining ground.<sup>34</sup> These, however, are assessments that many find difficult to share. Some of Europe's most influential thinkers claim that not only European and American political values differ, but they differ because they are incompatible.<sup>35</sup> And many openly declare that the importance of the cultural link has been overly exaggerated: "The alliance of values is overblown and oversold. To paraphrase Dean Acheson, the Atlantic has lost a community and not yet found a role. An Atlantic Alliance on the Cold War model has dissipated. It is not possible for a second time. Europeans and Americans are friends; they are no longer blood brothers."<sup>36</sup>

The second 'stabilizer' is public opinion. Differences between Europe and the United States exist but should not be exaggerated, argue many commentators. Public attitudes on many issues are broadly similar in both continents and thus a solid basis exists for enhancing cooperation in many

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<sup>32</sup> Garton Ash, 'Europe and the US: Five Frank Thoughts and One Proposal for the Foreign Ministers of Europe', p. 73.

<sup>33</sup> Nye, 'Repairing the Transatlantic Rift', p. 79.

<sup>34</sup> Lindberg, 'The Atlanticist Community', p. 233.

<sup>35</sup> Heins, 'Orientalising America? Continental Intellectuals and the Search for Europe's Identity', p. 445.

<sup>36</sup> Danchev, 'How Strong Are Shared Values?', p. 19.

areas.<sup>37</sup> American public opinion, more specifically, could offer continuity to US-European relations as Americans support international organisations, multilateralism international engagement and alliances.<sup>38</sup> Yet, the events surrounding the war in Iraq have proved that American leaders can command support at home for their foreign policies even if the latter are at odds with mainstream public opinion.<sup>39</sup> Poll surveys, for instance, were showing at the time that only a minority of Americans was ready to go to war with Iraq without UN Security Council approval, but when the American government decided to go to war anyway, the public rallied around it.<sup>40</sup> Not surprisingly, European observers have serious reservations about the capacity of US public opinion to have a positive impact on transatlantic relations.<sup>41</sup>

The most important ‘stabilizer’ is by far economic interdependence between the two continents: “The economic relationship has typically been undisturbed by conflict in other arenas; reciprocal investments tend to dampen

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<sup>37</sup> Larrabee, ‘Reshaping US-EU Relations: Toward a Broader Strategic Agenda’, p. 66.

<sup>38</sup> Kahler, ‘US politics and transatlantic relations: we are all Europeans now’, p. 85. But as Kahler concedes, this is purely theoretical support as Americans seldom do anything about it in practice. Thus committed interest groups often turn out to be more influential. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>39</sup> Though Americans favoured close cooperation with Europe even after 9/11, the Bush administration was able to “preside over, and indeed to a substantial degree even to provoke, the greatest transatlantic crisis in half a century without suffering an immediate loss of popular support.” Andrews, ‘Is Atlanticism dead?’, pp. 258-259. The role of the media has of course been catalytic in this development. See Fritz *et al.*, *All The President’s Spin*, pp. 143-185.

<sup>40</sup> Kull, *et al.*, ‘Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War’, pp. 569-570. Kull *et al.* suggest that this happened because the public came to have certain false beliefs or misperceptions that would make going to war appear more legitimate, consistent with pre-existing beliefs. The authors show that even after the end of the war Americans continued to believe that Iraq played an important role in the 9/11 attacks, that WMD had been found in Iraq and that the rest of the world was in agreement with US decision to go to Iraq without UN backing.

<sup>41</sup> See for example Habermas, *the divided west*, p. 51.

the conflict that has often surrounded trade disputes.”<sup>42</sup> In fact, interdependence is so strong in this field that “it is difficult to tell whether transatlantic companies are more ‘American’ or ‘European’.”<sup>43</sup> The statistics, which are usually used as proof of the strong transatlantic economic ties, are truly impressive.<sup>44</sup> For some, this ‘stabilizer’ is in fact the only factor that can help the two sides bridge their differences.<sup>45</sup> On the contrary, a great number of scholars do not think that commercial ties, however strong, will be able to offset the forces of separation in the geopolitical arena, adding that “a more assertive Europe and a less competitive American economy do increase the likelihood that trade disputes will become more politicized.”<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, even these links seem to become looser: “Europe’s strengthening trade relationships with countries other than America give it more balance. European goods exports to America last year

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<sup>42</sup> Kahler, ‘US politics and transatlantic relations: we are all Europeans now’, p. 89. However, Kahler admits that even the combined weight of this economic ‘stabilizer’ and internationalist public opinion may not serve to offset other, more disruptive trends in domestic politics such as the polarization of political conflict in the US and the shifting balance of ethnicities in the US and Europe.

<sup>43</sup> Henrikson, ‘Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently’, p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, pp. 98-99. As Cameron mentions: The US and the EU account together for around 60 per cent of the world’s total GDP; European exports to the US totaled € 260 billion in 2005, while imports from the US amounted to € 195 billion; more than 60 per cent of foreign investments in the US come from the EU and over 50 per cent of US foreign investments go to the EU (in 2004 the EU invested \$ 871 billion in the US and the latter \$ 628 billion in the EU); France is the largest single investor in Texas and the US invests more in the Netherlands than it does in Japan; the EU-US relationship directly supports 12 million jobs; even at the time of the Iraq crisis when many Europeans and Americans orchestrated boycotts of American and European (mainly French) products respectively, US investment in France and Germany – and vice versa – actually increased.

<sup>45</sup> Brok, ‘Agenda for a New Transatlantic Relationship: the EU’s To-Do List’, pp. 137-138.

<sup>46</sup> Kupchan, ‘The Rise of Europe, America’s Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy’, pp. 212, 226. See also Wanlin, ‘Transatlantic Trade: Walk Before You Run’.

[2005] totalled € 185 billion – up just € 5 billion since 2001. But its sales to Asia totalled € 244 billion – up € 44 billion over the same period.”<sup>47</sup>

Finally, common threats are also seen as strengthening transatlantic ties. The common fight against international terrorism, it is argued, could generate greater cooperation between Europe and America, especially in the event of big terrorist attacks in Europe.<sup>48</sup> “Whatever our differences, we also share some common threats, in terms of the fanatical enemies of the West for whom the differences between European and American capitalism or culture are a matter of mere pedantry”, is the mantra of many scholars.<sup>49</sup> However, many warn that it is wishful thinking to believe that Americans and Europeans do not disagree on the nature of the threats but only on the means to address them.<sup>50</sup> Even when Europe and America recognize the same threats they do not always put them in the same context.<sup>51</sup> In any case, the existence of common threats has failed so far to play the role of ‘stabilizer’ in EU-US relations.<sup>52</sup>

The renewal of the transatlantic relationship, however, is also dependent upon the political will of the two sides. And that, it is often claimed, should not be taken for granted: “... the benefits that might result are in dispute, leading some observers to wonder if Atlanticism is a lost cause.”<sup>53</sup> This, increasingly, is

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<sup>47</sup> Flynn Vencat, ‘Revenge of the Euro’.

<sup>48</sup> Soutou, ‘Three rifts, two reconciliations: Franco-American relations during the Fifth Republic’, p. 126, Zimmermann, ‘Security exporters: Germany, the United States, and transatlantic cooperation’, p. 146.

<sup>49</sup> Hill, ‘The Choices in Euro-American Relations’, p. 69.

<sup>50</sup> Nikolaidis, ‘The power of the superpowerless’, p. 108.

<sup>51</sup> Brimmer, ‘Que reste-t-il de la communauté transatlantique ?’, p. 75.

<sup>52</sup> Andrews, ‘The United States and its Atlantic partners’, p.73.

<sup>53</sup> Andrews, *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress*, p. 6.

the case in Europe: “There is a growing anxiety among many Europeans that their inability to affect American foreign-policy behavior renders the costs of alignment with the United States increasingly great - perhaps even greater than the benefits. As a result, it is becoming quite possible-perhaps even likely-that major European countries will conclude that an overt distancing from U.S. policy is not only desirable but also necessary.”<sup>54</sup> The fact that in the run-up to the war in Iraq transatlantic debate “quickly degenerated into a degree of invective unprecedented in the history of the Atlantic,”<sup>55</sup> is perhaps an indication that the will to save the Alliance is not very strong. Indeed, current efforts by EU and US leaders to forge a strong transatlantic partnership are often seen as lacking in conviction.”<sup>56</sup> In addition, there is growing concern in other states over the prospect of the US and the EU overwhelming the world with their economic and political power and establishing NATO as the world’s policeman.<sup>57</sup> New rising powers like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have already a stronger representation at international fora and both EU and US leaders realize that “it is no longer possible for 90 per cent of the world’s population to be governed by a system designed to suit the interests of Europe and America.”<sup>58</sup>

Open and direct confrontation between the two continents would not be in any party’s. Most analysts hold that it is simply impossible for Europe to embark

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<sup>54</sup> Daalder, ‘The End of Atlanticism’, pp. 56-57.

<sup>55</sup> Andrews, ‘Is Atlanticism dead?’, p. 264.

<sup>56</sup> Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, p. 105.

<sup>57</sup> Nikolaidis, ‘The power of the superpowerless’, pp. 116-117.

<sup>58</sup> Leonard, *Why Europe will run the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, p. 123. “That is why the solipsistic obsession – on both sides of the Atlantic – with the relationship between Europe and America is unhelpful.” *Ibid.*, p. 125.

on a collision course with the US as too many countries in Europe have relations of dependency with Washington and still too much residual respect for the American people.<sup>59</sup> Besides, Europe would not want to make an enemy of the hyperpower.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, if the EU decided to act as a counterforce it would commit the same error for which it rebukes the US: unilateralism.<sup>61</sup> So, unable to move forward and apprehensive of the consequences of a breakdown of their relationship Europe and America appear to be condemned to continue to drift slowly apart. And this is an assumption with which many American and European observers seem to agree.<sup>62</sup>

## B. Conclusion

This study has argued that Europe and America have been drifting inexorably apart since the end of the Cold War. America's declared objective to maintain its predominance in the post-bipolar world is leading US policy-makers to view with suspicion European efforts to give the European Union a stronger voice in international affairs. US support for European integration is in decline and the EU is increasingly seen as a rival in the making as it does not hide anymore its willingness to act independently from Washington. The Iraq crisis has convinced many Americans that Europe cannot be a trustworthy US ally anymore. Domestic developments in the US are strengthening such trends.

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<sup>59</sup> Lundestad, 'Toward transatlantic drift?', p. 29.

<sup>60</sup> Hill, 'The Choices in Euro-American Relations', p. 69.

<sup>61</sup> Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, p. 218.

<sup>62</sup> Lundestad, 'Toward transatlantic drift?', p. 26, Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, p. 35.

Domestic politics takes frequently precedence over foreign policy goals and Europe is inevitably seen as a strong economic competitor and not a partner. America's cultural links with Europe are also weakening.

In Europe, attitudes toward America are hardening as well. European integration enhances the power of Europe and strengthens the voices of those who ask America to treat Europe as an equal partner. Europe wants to have a bigger say in world affairs and, most importantly, wants to do things differently than America. The war in Iraq has convinced many Europeans too that a strong transatlantic relationship cannot exist anymore. Moreover, many Europeans feel that Europe and America no longer share the same culture as they have divergent, if not different, values.

The eastward enlargement of the European Union is expected to strengthen these trends in transatlantic relations. The process of European integration is not threatened by the eastward enlargement. Predicted catastrophes, such as high unemployment, massive migration, higher crime rates, paralysis of the EU's institutions, weakening of the Union's voice abroad have not materialized and are unlikely to do so in the future. On the contrary, this enlargement, like all the previous ones, seems to be reinforcing integrational trends. The new member states have showed and continue to show their commitment to a more united continent as it is in their interests to do so. Their pro-American instincts in the field of foreign policy and security, seen by many analysts as an insurmountable obstacle to a political Union, are receding under the increasing awareness that the future of the new members lies with their

European neighbours rather than their American friends who live thousands of miles away. Culturally, too, their willingness to prove to the rest of the world that they are 'normal' Europeans more than compensates for those unique characteristics in their culture and national characters which have caused many observers to believe that Europe after 2004 will be divided along cultural lines. Thus, economically, politically and culturally a more united Europe appears to be emerging.

The European Neighbourhood Policy, with which the Union is trying to respond to the post-enlargement challenges of its new geographic neighbourhood, cannot be dismissed as a weak and ineffective 'wish list', and is expected to play a catalytic role in stabilising and 'civilising' the EU's new 'near abroad'. Notwithstanding current disagreements, the relationship between the EU and Russia looks set to grow in significance. The two neighbours share common interests and face common threats and this constitutes a strong basis for a fruitful partnership. As the contacts between them multiply and they get to know each other better, they start to acknowledge their differences and put aside dogmatic approaches. Their relationship can only grow stronger and convergence on political priorities could well be the outcome of increasingly closer ties. A working ENP and stable relations with Russia not only help dissipate fears of an inward-looking and powerless European Union after the eastward enlargement, but steadily lead to the estimate that a more active EU is about to appear on the world stage.

A more integrated Europe, with greater influence in the world, will inevitably alter the dynamics of the transatlantic relationship. A number of developments influenced, to varying degrees, by the eastward enlargement point in the direction of a more fragmented relationship. Enlargement has the potential both to crystallize existing negative trends and create new sources of friction. An enlarged and more integrated EU will bring US policy-planners under increasing pressure to respond in a decisive manner to Europe's further integration and their options seem to spell more trouble for EU-US relations. European and American attitudes towards Russia are far from identical and American pressures on Europe to join it in a common crusade to marginalise Russia risk a European backlash. The enlarged Union is now seeking a political role in areas in which until recently the US seemed to have a monopoly of action. Central Asia and the Middle East are already seen by many analysts as 'battlegrounds' between an energy-hungry EU and a hegemonic America which does not want to see its influence diminish. Civilian power Europe tries to export its tested model of integration by promoting global governance, multilateralism, interregionalism, international law, and tries to limit the use of force. Despite strong US opposition, it looks determined to work in the direction of establishing a global multipolar order within which it could have a much bigger say on global developments and could shoulder more responsibilities. Finally, in its search for cohesion, the enlarged EU is suspected by its transatlantic ally, of resorting to the old recipe of manufacturing a new 'enemy', namely America, against whom a common European identity could be forged.

Both realists and constructivists predict a bleak future for the transatlantic relationship. Realists, however, seem to base their predictions on a highly-contested premise: that the EU will intentionally start to counterbalance the US. Constructivists base their argument on more stable ground, arguing that confrontation between Europe and America will be the result of their different values and beliefs. The EU does not follow a policy of open confrontation towards America. It is however a civilian power, and as such it has revisionist plans. By its structural foreign policy it is trying to alter the structure of the international system, ‘civilising’ international relations.

As the example of the European Union demonstrates, anarchy is not the reason why the US behaves unilaterally and pursues by every means the perpetuation of unipolarity. Anarchy seems indeed to be ‘what states make of it’, as constructivists have always maintained. The constructivist argument that America acts ‘exceptionally’ on the world scene because, primarily, it feels it is an ‘exceptional nation’, sounds much more convincing than realist explanations which point out that America is actually ‘obliged’ to act so. The limitations of realist thinking become even more obvious when realists are called to explain the creation and evolution of the EU. It is, therefore, no big surprise that realists admit that their impact on EU studies has been minimal.

Constructivism on the other hand, has no problem in explaining the phenomenon of ‘civilian power Europe’. Identities, lessons of history, memory, are all factors that help explain why Europe has turned its back on *realpolitik*. Constructivist arguments also sound plausible when it comes to explaining why

further integration is very likely after the eastward enlargement of the EU. Eastern Europeans are eager to prove their 'Europeanness' and the pooling of national sovereignties has come to define modern Europe. Realist predictions have more chances to turn true in the case of the EU's involvement in its new post-2004 neighbourhood. The EU's new neighbours are much less 'civilised' and the EU might have to resort to power politics if it wants to 'survive' in that region. Nevertheless, a successful ENP would most definitely render this possibility extremely unlikely.

On the contrary, more transatlantic friction in the wake of enlargement is quite probable. As the power of the EU grows, a 'realist' America might at some point decide that the time has come for an open anti-integration 'EU policy'. It could also feel obliged to check the expansion of EU's influence in strategically sensitive areas, such as the Middle East, where Washington seems to want to have exclusive influence. A 'realist' US will almost certainly try to sabotage EU efforts to 'civilise' relations between states on a global level. In fact, many claim that this is exactly what Washington has already embarked upon. Instead of trying to tame anarchy, America is often seen as a 'creator' of anarchy (through its War on Terror for instance), in a sinister plot to preserve its hegemonic position as the 'guarantor of world peace'.

The rift, therefore, between 'civilian power Europe' and 'realist' America will, most probably, keep growing. Though a 'divorce' may, for the time being at least, not look imminent, further estrangement of the two parties looks the most plausible scenario.

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