EU-UN Cooperation in Peacebuilding

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in International Relations
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Abstract

This thesis contributes to three debates: 1) the debate over whether the UN and regional security actors actually support each other or come into conflict; 2) the debate regarding which conditions are conducive for cooperation between international organisations; and 3) the debate over 'the coordination challenge' in peacebuilding.

The thesis aims to test the liberal assumption that the EU and UN peacebuilding objectives are aligned and that they simply need to link up better to meet them. Its central hypothesis is that even though the EU and UN share values and broad objectives, organisational interests in cooperation are not necessarily aligned because of inter-institutional competition for resources, and intra-institutional competition related to how to address the challenges of peacebuilding.

Qualitative analysis of policy evolution shows that EU and UN development actors share a similar transformative approach to peacebuilding that seeks to address risk factors for conflict, while security actors share a crisis management approach predicated on exerting leverage over national elites in line with short-term priorities.

Quantitative and qualitative empirical analysis of operational cooperation reveals that EU and UN development actors have an increasingly strong operational relationship and that they share material and normative interests in cooperation. In contrast, the relationship between EU and UN security actors is more competitive. Nevertheless, under conditions of UN overstretch and relative weakness, the UN has a material interest in operational cooperation, while the EU interest in cooperation is principally normative. This has led to symbolic forms of institutionalised cooperation, notably the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management and the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Empirical study of these institutions confirms that they satisfy organisational interests in symbolic forms of cooperation, but have little impact on the material dynamics of cooperation and are not appropriately configured to deliver cross-sectoral or inter-institutional coherence.
Acknowledgements

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I am deeply thankful for the patience, advice and unfailing support of Professor Patricia Chilton who accompanied me during the long and often interrupted research process. And last, but not least, I thank my husband, Nick Eckert, for his persistent encouragement and care and our children Helena, Alec and Hannah for the numerous, but worthwhile, distractions.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDCO</td>
<td>EuropeAid Cooperation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALA</td>
<td>Asia and Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Peace-Building Office in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CNMC</td>
<td>Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRIS</td>
<td>Common RELEX Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CSM</td>
<td>Country Specific Meeting</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG DEV</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG RELEX</td>
<td>Directorate-General for External Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHA</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission for Humanitarian Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECPS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission</td>
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<td>EFU</td>
<td>European Union Force at Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUJUSTLEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission for Iraq</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories – EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPT</td>
<td>European Union Planning Team in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>European Union Security Sector Reform Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXPNATDRC</td>
<td>Expert Panel on Illegal Exploitation of Resources in Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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FAFA  Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council
G77   Group of 77
G8    Group of Eight
HSP   United Nations Human Settlements Programme
ICO   International Civilian Office
ICR   International Civilian Representative
IFS   Instrument for Stability
IMF   International Monetary Fund
IMPP  Integrated Mission Planning Process
IO    International Organisation
IPBS  Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy
IPTF  International Police Task Force
IRF   Immediate Response Facility
IRFFI International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
IS    International Staff
MDTF  Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MEDA  Mediterranean region
MINUCI United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCAT United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSRO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MINUTAC Mission des Nations Unies au Tchad et en République Centrafricaine
MONUC United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO   non-governmental organisation
OC    Organisational Committee
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA   Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHQ   Operational Headquarters
OLAS  OnLine Accounting System
ONUB  United Nations Office in Burundi
ONUCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
OSRSG-GLR Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General to the Great Lakes Region
PBC   Peacebuilding Commission
PBF   Peacebuilding Fund
PBSo  Peacebuilding Support Office
PCNA  Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PROXIMA EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
PRSG  Personal Representative for the UN Secretary-General
PSC   Political and Security Committee
SALW  small arms and light weapons
SSR   Security Sector Reform
TRF   Transitional Results Framework
UN    United Nations
Chapter 1. Conceptual and theoretical issues and literature review

1. Introduction

This thesis has been born out of my professional experience and frustrations. For ten years I worked for an independent research organisation in Brussels, providing ‘services’ that aimed to improve the EU’s knowledge and capacity in relation to conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding. Thereafter I worked for five years in a disarmament research agency of the UN. In both contexts, my professional mission was to promote institutional learning based on evaluations of past actions and to suggest ways in which to redeem ‘lessons learned’ through policy adaptation and institutional capacity building. The thesis is not motivated by a similar ambition. Rather, it serves as a cathartic exploration of my impressions of bureaucratic behaviour. In my experience this is driven by everything but evidence-based feedback. While institutions do adapt, and amazingly rapidly at times, this has not appeared to me to be a result of ‘learning’ about what works in practice.

The thesis is therefore motivated by an interest in understanding how International Organisations (IOs) actually do their business. I have chosen to focus on peacebuilding because it is an area in which the EU and UN are increasingly important actors and because it is an area that I know most about. I focus on cooperation between the EU and UN because this relationship is commonly considered operationally significant and mutually beneficial but it has not been subject to much empirical examination. I also hope that an examination of the relationship will shed light on the high-profile policy debate on the ‘peacebuilding coordination challenge’. Because an ever increasing number of external security, humanitarian, political and development actors converge in the post-conflict space, the issue of how they relate to each other and whether or not they collectively deliver a ‘coherent’ response, has dominated discourse within and between International Organisations and states since the mid 1990s. It has also led to the establishment of a new international organisation within the UN family – the UN’s Peacebuilding
Commission. This empirical study of organisational behaviour promises to promote understanding of the treatment of the external coherence issue and to inform assessments of whether institutional innovations to promote coordination and cooperation have been constituted appropriately to deliver it.

Furthermore, a study of the internal and inter-institutional politics of EU and UN engagement in peacebuilding should also help understand the extent to which these bureaucracies can tailor their responses to the local dynamics of conflict. If supply-side politics and bureaucratic norms explain much of IO behaviour, what room is there for the UN or EU local adaptation? In other words, this study should also help promote understanding of how the constitution of international organisations makes them both uniquely qualified and disabled in relation to the difficult business of supporting processes of political and social change in post-conflict environments.

1.1 EU-UN cooperation in peace and security in historical context

The constitutional foundation for the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in relation to maintaining peace and security is the UN Charter. This appears to confirm the primacy of the UN over regional organisations. For instance, Chapter VI (Articles 34 and 35) as well as the general authorisations of Article 39 of Chapter VII affirm the Security Council’s independent authority, organisational autonomy and universal scope to act for peace. Furthermore, the region-focused Chapter VIII conveys that regional organisations are to be subordinate to the UN in the matter of ‘enforcement action’ and grants the Security Council the possibility to ‘utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority’ (Article 53). This has been explained by the ‘Wilsonian tendency to identify regionalism with war-breeding competitive alliances’ (Wilcox, 1965: 789).

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1 Yet, Chapter VI on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes also stresses the role of regional bodies as agencies of the first resort in dealing with disputes among their own members (Articles 33(1) and 52(2)). The UN Charter authors’ rationale behind this was essentially practical – making it less necessary for the UN to deal with local problems (Henrikson 1995: 130).
During the Cold War, however, the constitutional relationship envisaged in the UN Charter was, in practice, inverted. Thus ‘some regional organisations, notably NATO, assumed the main responsibility for maintaining international security’ while the UN was ‘denied its ostensibly central role by the superpower division within it’ (Henrikson 1995: 133). Chapter VIII-based regional organisations were similarly ineffectual in so far as they were subordinated to the broader purposes of the East-West conflict and consequently played a much smaller role than the authors of the UN Charter had planned. The net effect ‘was to reduce the world’s reliance on the UN and to de-emphasise the need for regional organisations to coordinate their actions with the UN (Henrikson 1995: 131)’. Moreover, Wilcox argues that regional international security organisations were ineffectual largely because the UN was. Writing in 1965 he states ‘One can only hazard a guess, but in all likelihood if the Security Council had been able to discharge effectively its responsibility for the maintenance of peace, many more disputes of a local character would have been settled at the regional level.’ (Wilcox 1965: 431). Just as Wilcox saw regional efficacy as dependent on UN efficacy, he also argued that regional security organisations are ‘an indispensable element in [the UN’s] growth and functioning’ (Wilcox 1965: 811). And within the UN at this time, there was support for the argument that regional organisations were better at generating local solutions in some contexts (Nye 1971). Thus, during the Cold War when the UN-regional discourse centred on organisational primacy and competition there was nevertheless recognition of operational regional-global interdependencies and relative comparative advantages. Therefore, despite the unfavourable geopolitical context and limited cooperation between regional organisations and the UN, some concluded that the relationship between regional and global security actors was one of interdependence.

The end of the Cold War heralded a return to regionalism and the rapid growth in UN peacekeeping. As Fawcett notes ‘The end of the Cold War thrust the region to the centre stage of international politics, in a way made possible only by the collapse of the old bipolar system … [and led to] a widespread upgrading of international cooperation and the organisations it spawned’ (Fawcett 1995:17). Similarly, Buzan noted that the removal of ‘overlay’ patterns of great power influence has encouraged multipolarity and contributed to an international system in which ‘regional arrangements can be expected to assume greater importance (Buzan 1991: 208)’.
only did the end of the Cold War herald the age of ‘a new regionalism’ (Fawcett 1995: 17), but it affected how the UN-regional organisation relationship was conceived. With evidence in the 1990s of institutionalisation taking place at regional and global levels, the debate shifted from which level should have primacy to what extent regional-global relationships ‘reinforce each other, or come into conflict’ (Hurrell and Fawcett 1995: 320).

Since the 1990s the vision of productive mutually reinforcing global-regional security partnerships has become increasingly popular and is reflected in current UN and EU policy. This vision sees UN-regional partnerships as the product of ‘the neat interlocking of regional, political, security, or economic cooperation within an overarching global order’ (Hurrell and Fawcett 1995: 320), a vision which some have termed ‘inter-regional globalism’ (Henrikson 1995). The image is one of global subsidiarity, in which different institutions and organisational expertise, and different domains of jurisdiction, are deployed according to the nature of the issue.

The evolution of UN Policy
Although the notion of regional-global interdependencies was not new, it was in the context of a greatly increased burden placed on the UN in the aftermath of the Cold War that the UN embraced regional organisations as a necessary and desirable path to burden sharing. More specifically, the 1992 Report by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali An Agenda for Peace (United Nations 1992) first laid out the rationale for increased decentralisation of the international peace and security architecture (Fawcett 1995: 19; Roberts 1993: 7-8; Henrikson 1995: 160-163). Although the Secretary General noted that the UN Security Council will continue to have ‘primary’ responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, he argued that regional action ‘as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and cooperation with the UN efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs.’ Thus decentralisation was viewed not only as a path to increased burden-sharing but also as a means of buttressing the moral authority of the UN through multi-regional ‘democratisation’ of the international system. Two years later, after a dramatic surge in UN peacekeeping, the Secretary General expanded on the case for increased decentralisation as well as the ‘challenges’ associated with it. In
‘Beleaguered are the Peacemakers’ (Boutros-Ghali 1994), the Secretary General appealed for regional organisations to ‘help ease the financial and material burdens’ placed on the UN, while acknowledging that regional organisations also had comparative advantages such as local knowledge or ‘special insights’ into the conflicts and, in some cases, the capacity for rapid military response. However, Boutros-Ghali also noted that the ‘new regionalism’ presented new practical and political challenges. Specifically, he noted that ‘unity of command is essential’ to avoid UN-authorised actions counter-acting each other and warned that the new regionalism could lead to regional hegemony or ‘spheres of influence’ and therefore had the potential to undermine multilateral approaches. However, he implied that so long as regional actions were authorised by the UN, this danger could be averted.

By the mid 1990s the UN had therefore identified the rationale upon which partnerships between the UN and regional organisations, including the EU, have been built. The logic is as follows: The UN is overburdened. Regional organisations can contribute to burden sharing, provide specialist experience and knowledge and a greater willingness to deploy resources and to bear the cost (Hurrell and Fawcett 1995: 320). In turn, regional organisations simply cannot do without the UN because of its unrivalled political legitimacy.

While Boutros-Ghali’s case for UN-regional partnerships in crisis management identified some potential problems associated with implementation (such as issues of command and control and information exchange), the underlying assumption was that as long as regional actions were authorised by the UN or in conformity with the UN Charter, they would be mutually reinforcing. He did not address the possibility of conflict over assessments of the conflict and how to end it. Nor did he identify states’ choice of alternative institutional venues as a potential source of competition for the UN, although by 1995 it was clear that ‘the tendency of major powers to give priority to whichever institutional level provides the most flexible multilateral cover has by no means wholly disappeared’ (Hurrell and Fawcett 1995: 321). Moreover, although Boutros-Ghali noted that ‘Just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design of co-operative work and its division of labour must adapt to the realities of

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2 All quotes in this paragraph are from this ‘Beleaguered are the Peacemakers’ New York Times article.
each case with flexibility and creativity’ (United Nations 1992), the case for decentralisation laid out in An Agenda for Peace did not highlight the attributes of organisational personality as a key factor in the rationale for decentralisation. As such it either assumed that the UN and regional organisations were sufficiently alike to be able to work together or that differences in institutional personality were not a significant constraint. Thus, this first statement of the UN’s vision of mutually beneficial UN-regional partnerships is based on three assumptions:

1) that increased regional action is not a zero-sum game and will lead to increased capacities in the international system;
2) that the UN and regional objectives are aligned (providing that regional actions have been authorised by the UN); and
3) that regional institutional personality is not a significant constraining factor and that the ‘transaction costs’ or practical challenges of cooperation are not prohibitively high.

Just as the UN Secretary General was developing the case for mutually reinforcing global-regional security institutions in the early 1990s, its underlying assumptions were tested in the experience of UN-NATO cooperation in the Balkans. Despite the fact that the two organisations’ personalities are very different and ‘almost mutually allergic’ (Henrikson 1995: 155), as a matter of defensive necessity the UN asked NATO to prepare for air strikes against the Bosnian Serb gun positions around Sarajevo after the February 1994 attack, and thereafter adopted a ‘dual key’ approach whereby the UN conducted traditional peacekeeping activities with the robust military support of NATO airpower. Although this was seen as evidence by the US Permanent Representative on the Security Council that ‘the UN and the Alliance can co-operate together’ (Henrikson 1995: 156) it also exposed a number of operational challenges associated with the perceived compromised impartiality of the UN operation UNPROFOR. Conversely, the UN’s relationship with the EU in the early 1990s revealed the EU’s operational dependence on the UN, despite initial aspirations to lead the conflict management efforts, including the EU’s 1991 launch of a monitoring mission managed by the European Commission, without prior consultation with the UN. Boutros-Ghali later explained that: ‘According to Article 52 of the UN Charter, regional disputes are supposed to be resolved at the regional level, so we abstained
from intervening because there was already a regional organisation involved’ (Boutros-Ghali 1993: 295). Later, the UN confined its role to maintaining a ceasefire in a division of labour on the basis that the Europeans would take the lead in managing the peace process. However, this early division of labour rapidly gave way to joint efforts to promote the peace process, for instance the International Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 for which the two organisations had ‘equal responsibility’ (Boutros-Ghali 1993: 295). The practical cooperation with NATO and the EU in the 1990s revealed that the UN adopted a politically pragmatic approach to cooperation with regional organisations. Cooperation was born out of operational inter-dependence rather than any constitutional formula for UN-regional cooperation. Just as the UN’s call for NATO air support was based on operational necessity³, the UN’s increasing involvement in the Balkans reflected the EU’s incapacity to manage the conflict on its own. These examples of early post-Cold War cooperation in Europe clearly arose out of the practical (capabilities) and normative (legitimacy) inter-dependencies identified in Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace.

By 1995 therefore not only had the UN formally welcomed increased regional action in crisis management but it was also evident that the UN would remain engaged at the regional level for a mix of pragmatic and normative reasons linked to operational efficacy and legitimacy. This conforms to Henrikson’s review of UN-regional cooperation in peacemaking in which he concludes that:

‘Regardless of the UN organisation’s own peacemaking capabilities or lack thereof, it is now generally recognized, on both sides of the former Cold War divide, that for pragmatic-political reasons as well as for moral-legal ones the involvement of the UN in regional peacekeeping is virtually inescapable.’ (Henrikson 1995: 159).

However, UN peacekeeping failures in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994), and Srebrenica (1995), not only dented UN operational credibility, but they contributed to a decline in international support for UN peacekeeping, which led to the reduction in

³ Even though NATO was not a regional organisation in the sense of Article VIII of the UN Charter and so could not be utilised under Article 53(1).
the number of UN troops deployed from over 60,000 in 1995 to a little over 10,000 in the late 1990s. This trend affected the UN’s authority and its material ‘need’ for burden-sharing. Moreover, the norm in which peacekeeping legitimacy was equated with UN Security Council authorisation was challenged by the humanitarian justification for NATO’s 1999 Kosovo air campaign, launched despite the failure of efforts to obtain Security Council authorisation. While undoubtedly controversial, the NATO campaign enjoyed the support of the majority of EU states and introduced the prospect of further regional actions being justified on ‘humanitarian’ grounds without recourse to the UN Security Council. It thereby threatened the moral-legal foundation of the UN’s continued involvement in regional peacekeeping. Thus, by 2000 the ‘deal’ in which regional actors traded operational capacity for legitimacy arguably looked less attractive for both parties than when Boutros-Ghali had developed the case for greater decentralisation to regional organisations in 1992. In this context, the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was viewed as further evidence of disengagement from UN peacekeeping by the European nations. This accounts for the UN’s perception of the EU as a potential competitor and its initially frosty reception of the development of the ESDP. This competitive tension was acknowledged in one of the first EU documents on ‘Relations between the EU and the UN in crisis management and conflict prevention’ which noted that ‘ESDP may thus be perceived [by the UN] not as a plus but as a diversion of resources’ (European Council 2001a).

The evolution of EU policy

EU policy regarding EU-UN relationships in the area of peace and security was developed after the establishment of ESDP in 1999 had confirmed the EU’s ambition as a global security actor. It is, however, entirely consistent with the Agenda for Peace vision (United Nations 1992). For example, the 2003 European Security Strategy argues for a ‘global order based on effective multilateralism’ as a rational self-interested response to interdependence. The argument is that ‘in a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and our prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system’. This involves ‘the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions, and a rule-based international order’ (European Council 2003a: 9). In this context, EU support for the UN can be seen as a means to achieving this goal. Similarly, the 2003 European Commission Communication The Choice of Multilateralism stated that
conflict prevention and crisis management are areas in which ‘the goals of the EU and UN are united by the premise that the case for multilateralism and international cooperation is unequivocal’ (European Commission 2003a: 13).

As with the UN vision, EU policies also promote cooperation on normative grounds based on what international organisations are rather than what they do. For instance, the European Commission’s Communication *The Choice of Multilateralism* claims that the ‘incontestable advantages’ of EU-UN cooperation are derived from the linkage of the universal legitimacy of the UN with the economic and political weight of the EU (European Commission 2003a). This view suggests that cooperation is the result of normative-material trade or bargaining. This confirms Barnett’s analysis of the dynamics of the relationship between the UN and regional organisations. He notes that the UN is looking for financial assistance and manpower while regional organisations look to the UN for legitimacy and active support (Barnett 1995: 426). This view also remains common amongst EU officials. As one simply put it, ‘This is the deal: we trade capability for legitimacy’ (interview 1). European Commissioners Ferrero-Waldner and Louis Michel have also emphasised the normative foundations for operational cooperation, stating that:

‘Our commitment to the United Nations is based on shared values and strongly convergent objectives in many areas and translates into an active partnership with the UN in operational, normative, and policy work, backed up by strong financial support.’ (United Nations Office in Brussels 2007).

In short, both UN and EU policies suggest that under conditions of interdependence, inter-institutional cooperation is supported for reasons of legitimacy and normative fit (at strategic and operational levels) in addition to operational efficiency. Yet, even though the relationship has consistently been characterised as one of interdependence, the UN has not always welcomed greater engagement of and with regional organisations. During the Cold War the relationship was viewed as competitive, while in the early post-Cold War years the UN embraced the idea of mutually reinforcing UN-regional security partnerships. Drawing on the more recent historical record of EU-UN cooperation in peacebuilding from 2001 to 2008, this thesis aims to contribute to the broader debate over whether and under what conditions global and regional
security institutions reinforce each other or come into conflict. This is the first theoretical debate that it aims to contribute to.

1.2 Theoretical perspectives on cooperation between International Organisations

This section reviews some of the major sets of theories that can be deployed to explain the dynamics of inter-institutional cooperation, and the conditions under which cooperation between IOs is likely. This review of different theoretical perspectives on cooperation between IOs establishes that the second theoretical debate that this thesis contributes to is the debate regarding the conditions under which cooperation between IOs is likely. The review of different theoretical approaches also informs the hypothesis and the methodology used to test it in subsequent chapters.

Neo-realist approaches

Although the discourse between the UN and regional organisations was dominated by regional-global competition during the Cold War, this was not played out in the academic discourse of the realist school of International Relations theory at the time. In the realist view, international organisations had no role independent of their member states and could perform only modest services, including – in the case of the UN – peacekeeping wherever truces and cease-fires could be worked out. International organisations were seen as subordinate to powerful states, with the success of regional groupings contingent on them furthering the geostrategic interests of these states. This approach also rendered the debate over the relative supremacy of regional and global organisations largely irrelevant. Rather, classical structural realists, such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), stressed the constraining role of the anarchical international system on the potential for inter-state cooperation, including through international organisations. More recently, neo-realists have argued that the politics of regional cooperation and integration have much in common with alliance formation. For instance, Walt has argued, in line with balance of power theories, that regional groupings form in response to external challenges (Walt 1987). Similarly, neo-realist accounts of EU integration, such as that of Wallace, stress the importance of the Cold War geostrategic context in which European integration took place. He argues that EU
economic integration was enabled by security dependence on the US and that the US played a key role in promoting greater European cooperation in the context of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union (Wallace 1995)\(^4\). The same neo-realist logic can also be applied to the policies of smaller states outside Europe. For example, as Louise Fawcett has argued, the erosion of the Third World coalition in the 1970s pressed developing countries in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East into 'group solidarity' of a more limited regional character (Fawcett 1995). In short, neo-realism highlights the ways in which geopolitical context or 'outside in' pressures condition strategic state interests in working through regions and/or other multilateral organisations. Indeed neo-realists hold that primacy should be given to the international political system as the most significant level of analysis. This is not to suggest that such structural theory can explain everything. Rather, as Waltz argues, 'it explains a small number of big and important things' (Waltz 1986).

Based on this approach, a key factor in explaining or predicting whether international organisations (IOs) will be mutually reinforcing or conflictive will depend on how the geostrategic context shapes the interests of the most powerful states in working through IOs. It follows that the dynamics of relationships between IOs will always be case specific, and convergent interests cannot be assumed. Rather, inter-institutional cooperation in this view is only likely where their most powerful member states are effectively allies. These conditions were not met during the Cold War, but during the 1990s – a period of US hegemony – neo-realists might argue that global and regional organisations were ‘allowed’ to work together in so far as it helped share the burden of US security provision. By the same token, however, a neo-realist approach might predict that a more multi-polar world order offers less propitious geo-political conditions for global-regional cooperation. Competition between major powers within the UN would presumably limit its role in crisis management, except in a few cases that are not of strategic interest to its most powerful members. Based on neo-realist assumptions then, one might develop a hypothesis that predicts significant constraints on the level and scope of UN-EU cooperation in the security dimension of peacebuilding, while powerful states are more likely to permit UN-EU cooperation to

\(^4\) Drawing on similar Balance of Power theoretical explanations, Barry Posen has argued that in the post-Cold War context the development of European Security and Defence Policy can be explained as a 'balancing' response by European states to US hegemony (Posen 2006).
occur in relation to countries of little geo-strategic interest to them or in relation to the less-politically sensitive development dimension of such cooperation.

Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neo-liberal institutionalists have focused on understanding why states cooperate and why they create IOs. Like neo-realism, this theory is heavily statist but institutionalists argue that the realist account of the international system misses out on how changes in the global economic system (leading to increased interdependence) shape political and economic competition and the definition of state interests. They therefore argue that conditions of interdependence are critical for generating the ‘demand’ for sustained cooperation. According to this view, institutions are purposively generated solutions to problems of collective action. In the words of one of the principal proponents of this view, Robert Keohane:

‘Facing dilemmas of coordination and collaboration under conditions of interdependence, governments demand international institutions to enable them to achieve their interests through limited collective action’ (Keohane 1993: 274).

Where realists view the external political environment and concerns for relative gains as an obstacle to cooperation, institutionalists identify certain conditions as particularly favourable to cooperation. They argue that cooperation can be sustainable when the number of actors is limited, when actors are involved in an on-going process of cooperation (the idea of iteration and the importance of lengthening the ‘shadow of the future’), and when measures are in place to discourage cheating (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Oye 1986).

Although international organisations are, in this view, effectively epiphenomena of state interaction they nevertheless matter because of the benefits they provide and because of their impact on the calculations of the players and the ways in which states define their interests. They achieve this through the provision of information, the promotion of transparency and monitoring, the reduction of transaction costs, the development of convergent expectations and facilitating the productive use of issue-

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linkage strategies. This indicates that liberal institutionalists share an economic approach to organisational theory. Like economists, they see organisations as welfare-improving solutions to problems of incomplete information and high transaction costs (Willett 1991). World politics is therefore analogous to a market with competition, exchange, and consequent pressures for efficiency identified as the dominant environmental characteristics driving the formation and behaviour of international organisations.

Henrikson’s argument for a global-regional peacemaking ‘system’ (Henriksen 1995: 163-168) is consistent with this economic view. He argues that regional ‘decentralisation’ can help ‘bring greater stability to the world’ so long as it does not interfere with the global ‘trunk’ of the world system. His vision is one of multi-organisational networking, where IO pluralism is seen as a strength – providing states with ‘a choice of venue’ based on their specialisation and functional suitability. To return to the market analogy, Henrikson implicitly argues that increased competition between IOs has the potential to produce benefits of greater efficiency and specialisation. However, this view is not backed by his empirical account of inter-organisational cooperation. While he demonstrates that ‘the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of ethnic and other conflicts have made it necessary, as never before, for regional organisations and the UN to work together’ he also notes that ‘organisational personalities are not easily fused’ and that ‘it remains to be seen whether they will become more united in action’ (Henriksen 1995:142). Thus, while the institutionalist logic informs assumptions about the benefits of institutional plurality and subsidiarity, Henrikson’s account does not demonstrate that the self-interested interaction of states does indeed produce cooperative behaviour between institutions that is mutually reinforcing.

While Henrikson imports institutionalist assumptions to the study of UN relationships with regional actors, Tardy (2008) has sought to apply institutionalist methodology to explain cooperation between the UN and EU in relation to civilian crisis management in particular. Tardy argued that the conditions for EU-UN cooperation in the context of civilian crisis management are favourable based on Kenneth Oye’s criteria (Oye 1986). He claims that the shadow of the future is long and that there is a positive payoff structure although material interests in cooperation are asymmetric – the UN
has a greater material interest in attracting EU operational support than vice versa. His judgement regarding the number of actors involved is more ambiguous, however. He fudges the issue by noting that there is a range of relevant institutional and member state actors that make up the relationship. Yet this suggestion that the EU and UN include institutional ‘actors’ with interests of their own breaches the ontological structure of the theory. The statist assumptions underlying liberal-institutionalism (and neo-realism) therefore potentially limit the theoretical utility of this approach for explaining IO behaviour, especially where empirical evidence suggests a causal role for IOs that cannot be explained solely in reference to member state preferences.

**Principal-Agent theoretical approaches**

Partly in response to the theoretical constraint of the statist assumptions that underpin neorealist and institutionalist approaches to the study of IOs, principal-agent analysis has been deployed as an alternative approach to understanding the political economy of institutions. Originally developed in economics, it has been increasingly employed to examine organisational dynamics and provide a more sophisticated approach to understanding IO autonomy and agency (Lake 1996; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney eds. 2006). It builds on theories of rational choice and representation that view IOs as ‘agents’ of states (‘principals’). Unlike institutionalists, therefore, principal-agent analysts emphasise the importance of IOs as actors. They claim that ‘by reinserting agency into institutionalist theory, we shed new light on the sources and difficulties of international cooperation’ (Hawkins et al. 2006:6). While institutionalists focus on the conditions conducive to cooperation, principal-agent analysts also focus on questions of how IOs behave once established. They show how IOs pursue their own preferences and how principals construct mechanisms to ‘bring IOs to heel’ when IO preferences diverge from those of their principals (Hawkins et al. 2006: 6), or to ‘control agent opportunism’ (Lake and McCubbins 2006:341). One of the theoretical limitations of this approach, however, is that it specifies a priori what agents want. They tend to assume that IOs are motivated to protect and expand their resource base and turf, and to maximise their autonomy. While these factors may indeed be common concerns, there is little reason to assume that these matters exhaust or even dominate IO interests. Rather, as ethnographic and sociological studies of IO behaviour have shown, IO interests are often strongly shaped by the norms of the profession and are often in flux. They are subject to internal bureaucratic politics as
well as interactions between IO staff and the world in which they are embedded (Zabusky 1995; Barnett 1997; Barnett and Finnemore 1999). In short, principal-agent analysis is ill-equipped to investigate how IO preferences are shaped or constructed. While offering a useful framework for examining the power relationships between IOs and states, they also make a number of assumptions about IO interests rather than treating IOs as a social fact to be empirically investigated. Moreover, as with neo-liberal institutionalists, the analysis focuses on strategic bargains between member states and specific IO actors. While some principal-agent analysts have explored how some ‘third parties’ have affected the dynamics of principal-agent relationships (Lake and McCubbins 2006)\(^6\), this approach is not well-equipped to examine the dynamics of inter-institutional relationships. Therefore, while both neo-liberal institutionalism and principal-agent approaches provide useful frameworks for understanding why states create IOs and the mechanisms they have for controlling them, they are not good at explaining how IO interests evolve and are affected by the dynamics of inter-institutional cooperation and competition.

**Constructivism**

Constructivism is a major approach to understanding international cooperation which has this analytical potential. Instead of focusing on material incentives, constructivists emphasise the importance of shared knowledge, learning and normative and institutional structures. As Alexander Wendt puts it:

> ‘Constructivists are interested in the construction of identities and interests, and as such take a more sociological than economic approach to systemic theory. On this basis they have argued that states are not structurally or exogenously given but constructed by historically contingent interactions’ (Wendt 1994: 385).

In relation to explaining cooperation between states or organisations, this approach stresses the importance of normative and social foundations. For example, Tonra has argued for the utility of a cognitive approach in understanding the development of the European Security and Defence Policy based on shared identity and normative approaches (Tonra 2003). Similarly, Sjursen has claimed that coordination within the

\(^6\) Lake argues that non-governmental organisations provide information that is essential to the success of international delegations.
EU is ‘a reflex – a habit – and not an act that is based on rational calculations of utility’ (Sjursen 2003: 44). Rather, it is based on norms that have evolved through deliberative communication. In this way, Sjursen argues for ‘a story of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a community of information that later led to a community of views and then a community of action’ (Sjursen 2003: 50). Thus norms are considered key to explaining policies and action. Nevertheless, Sjursen concedes that ‘the hypothesis that the CFSP is held together by a collective set of norms and that this implies that it will in turn, in its external action, be faithful to these norms needs closer examination’ (Sjursen 2003: 49).

A standard constructivist approach to understanding IOs asks ‘How are things put together so that they have the properties they do?’ (Wendt 1998). This approach has more in common with sociology and anthropology than international relations approaches to understanding IOs. While international relations approaches are broadly economistic and rooted in assumptions about instrumental rationality and efficiency concerns, sociological approaches are focused on issues of legitimacy and power (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Barnett and Finnemore have, for example, applied a constructivist approach that draws on sociological institutionalism to explain the power of IOs and their behaviour (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004). This approach explores the social content of an organisation – its legitimacy concerns and dominant norms that shape organisational interests. Building on Weber’s analysis of bureaucracies (Weber 1978), IOs are viewed as a cultural form that embodies certain values and can have its own distinct agenda and behavioural dispositions. Looking at IOs in this way also sheds light on the source of their normative power and how they exercise it. IO power is seen as flowing from the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody as well as their control over technical expertise and information. This provides IOs with the ability to structure knowledge and articulate and diffuse new norms, principles and actors.

This analytical approach provides for the theoretical possibility that IOs produce normative effects independently from powerful states, and that their behaviour does not correspond to efficiency criteria alone. Indeed, Barnett and Finnemore argue that ‘the same normative valuation on impersonal, generalized rules that defines bureaucracies and makes them powerful can also make them unresponsive to their
environments, obsessed with their own rules at the expense of primary missions, and ultimately lead to inefficient self-defeating behaviour" (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 700). This hypothesis is tested through empirical investigations of apparently inefficient or 'pathological' IO behaviour (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004). Similarly, a number of empirical studies cast doubt on the statist approach by providing evidence about the ways in which intergovernmental organisations and nongovernmental organisations successfully promote policies that are not (or not initially) supported by strong states. Examples include disarmament negotiations to ban land mines, cluster munitions and chemical weapons (Price 1997; Hubert 2000; Borrie 2009), as well as cases from other policy areas including human rights and the environment.\(^7\) And, in relation to the EU, a number of studies have shown that membership in the EU affects how member states define their preferences and formulate policies (Hill and Wallace 1996; Nuttall 2000).

In summary, an analytical advantage of the constructivist approach is that it makes no statist assumptions about the principal drivers of IO behaviour, nor assumptions about the dominance of rational-material motivations. It allows for the possibility that there are occasions and environments when strong states do drive IO behaviour (in line with realist assumptions), but also allows for situations in which states’ influence over IOs is more limited. Similarly, under some conditions IO behaviour can be explained by states’ interests in cooperation and delegation (in line with institutionalist and principal-agent assumptions), whereas in others behaviour can be better explained by the normative power and preferences of IOs that derive from how they are socially constituted. Despite being theoretically open to the importance of a broad range of factors, this approach nevertheless offers more than description. In the words of Alexander Wendt, the constructivist approach investigates ‘how the constitution of things helps explain why certain kinds of organisational behaviour are possible, or even probable, and why’ (Wendt 1998).

Compared with international relations approaches to the question of inter-institutional cooperation, constructivists might expect organisational culture and personality to be a more important part of the explanation of IO cooperation. Similarly, this approach

\(^7\) A number of examples are given by Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 715.
might predict that organisations which share similar normative approaches and ways of working are more likely to cooperate, with fewer cultural barriers to such cooperation. By expanding the sources of IO authority and power, this approach also provides a theoretical basis for understanding how inter- organisational cooperation might serve as a mechanism to trade normative for material sources of authority. It therefore offers a potentially rich theoretical framework for investigating EU and UN policy claims that cooperation is based on normative and material inter-dependencies.

Theoretical section conclusions and implications for methodological approach
It is far from clear whether the main lines of the historical example of the EU or UN, much less the story of their cooperation, can be plausibly understood by focusing on one level of analysis. While both neo-realist approaches offer important insights into the geopolitical constraints on IOs, and institutionalists highlight material drivers for inter-state cooperation and support for IOs, neither of these approaches captures the impact of internal bureaucratic politics or inter-institutional competition on IO preferences. Constructivism offers a theoretically promising way of conceptualising the interaction between material and normative incentives while also allowing for IO behaviour and interests to be shaped by internal and external factors. Consequently, even if one shares the realist or institutionalist scepticism about the importance of ideas and normative factors in shaping IO behaviour, one can still argue that a constructivist methodological approach is useful for analysing which causal mechanisms produce which effects under which conditions.

Given the theoretical possibility that institutional interests are shaped by the normative environment in which they are embedded, the following section provides an overview of the evolution of peacebuilding policy. It aims, in particular, to explain how and why the call for improved cooperation between external actors (including the UN and the EU) has come to dominate policy debate. In this way it introduces the third debate – over ‘the cooperation challenge’ in peacebuilding – that this thesis aims to contribute to.
1.3 The peacebuilding record and the coordination challenge

*The mixed peacebuilding record*

Attitudes about what external peacebuilding interventions can and should deliver have changed over time. When the concept of peacebuilding was introduced in 1992 there was a sense that peacebuilding could represent a new era of benevolent international intervention (Rose 2006). This was underpinned by an optimistic assumption about the ability of third parties to deliver peace (Tschirgi 1996, 2004). The post-Cold War empirical record provides some evidence that this was not necessarily misplaced. International interventions have been relatively successful at ending violence (Fortna 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Zürcher 2006). Quantitative analysis also suggests a strong correlation between the risk of a country’s reversion to war, and the presence of peace operations that include a range of peacebuilding components (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). These multidimensional missions are more successful than purely diplomatic efforts or traditional peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, a significant number of wars have recurred. Although the rate of recurrence is subject to some dispute because of difficulties in distinguishing between old wars that recur and new wars, most argue that between one-fifth and one-third of all ended conflicts recur within five years (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Not only does quantitative analysis suggest that at least a quarter of international interventions have failed to ensure stability and prevent recurrence of violence within five years, but qualitative analysis also points to the international community’s limited success in building sustainable peace that involves more than ‘stability’. Relatively few cases are counted as peacebuilding success stories. For instance, the UN Secretary-General has identified only El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia and Tajikistan as successes (United Nations 2004a).

*The contested nature of peacebuilding*

Drawing on evidence from the mixed peacebuilding record, many scholars and practitioners have argued that the liberal peacebuilding model is unrealistically ambitious and/or counterproductive. For instance, a number of scholars point to the constraints on international peacebuilders and the unfavourable conditions in which they operate. They argue that with few resources, and limited political backing, it is
wildly unrealistic to engineer in a few years what it took Western states centuries to achieve, especially under conditions of post-war fragility characterised by profound mistrust and high levels of destruction (Chesterman 2004; Orr 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

Another critique of the liberal peacebuilding model defends the goal of liberal democracy, but contends that a rush to market liberalisation and elections after conflict is destabilising (Zakaria 2003; Paris 2004). For instance, Paris (2004) argued that the effort to transform war-shattered states to liberal democracies as quickly as possible subjects fragile societies to tremendous stress. In the absence of institutional frameworks and civic culture that absorbs the competitive pressures of market and political competition, rivals wage their struggle through markets and ballots and resort to violence when the liberal reform agenda threatens their power base. The potentially destabilising impact of economic liberalisation and democratisation is now received wisdom in policy circles. For instance, a recent report of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) on evaluating peacebuilding began by challenging the notion that progress toward liberalisation, economic growth, prosperity, human rights and democracy all contribute to peace, noting that ‘evidence shows that while some of those efforts do contribute to peace, others have negative or negligible effects on conflict’ (OECD 2007a: 3).

The Paris (2004) critique of the liberal peacebuilding model favoured greater external support for the construction of institutions and a more gradual introduction of liberal political and economic reforms. It has been influential in generating support for the state-building agenda. State-building has also been characterised as ‘standing behind’ peacebuilding (Barnett and Zürcher 2009: 26) in so far as efforts to build peace are increasingly associated with a process of building state capacity and legitimacy. However, as with the concept of peacebuilding, there is no consensus on the scope of state-building. Issues relating to the degree or capacity of the state, the kind of state and what role external actors can and should play in building state capacity remain live. While state-building interventions have tended to focus on creating institutional capacity to provide basic services (the degree of the state), a number of scholars argue that the Western model of the state is inappropriate, especially where it never existed
before. Rather, they argue that state-building should explicitly pursue the objective of establishing ‘mediated’ or ‘hybrid’ states, in which a central government with limited power and capacity relies on a diverse range of local authorities to execute core functions of government and mediate relations between local communities and the state (Menkhaus 2006a; Boege et al. 2009). Others have argued that even when interventions have aimed to create liberal states, they have resulted in reinforcing pre-existing forms of state-hood. For example, Barnett and Zürcher (2009: 24) argued that, given the interests and resources of external peacebuilders, ‘compromised peacebuilding’ is the equilibrium outcome of a process of bargaining between domestic and external actors. This is characterised by symbolic reforms, while previously existing state–society relations are reinforced (Barnett and Zürcher 2009). Similarly, Jeong (2005) observed that external interventions tend to rebuild the state–society status quo and argued that only a more contextualised approach to state-building can address the structural causes of conflict. Hence, although practitioners tend to view state-building as a subset of peacebuilding associated with efforts to build national institutional capacity, how these concepts are related in practice remains subject to ongoing academic and policy debate.

Another critique of the peacebuilding through state-building approach argues that it undermines the political resilience of those countries that receive peacebuilding interventions. For instance, Chandler (2006: 26–27) argued that external interventions have created ‘peace without politics’, depleting politics at the national and local levels and reducing political autonomy and capacity for self-governance. He contended that external efforts to build local institutional capacity are misguided in so far that the institutions they create are hollow and unsustainable. Such fundamental critiques of external peacebuilding interventions have informed policy recognition of the importance of ‘national ownership’ for the sustainability of peacebuilding. However, there is little agreement on how to operationalise this slogan in relation to the peace process, the state-building agenda or specific subsets of that agenda, notably Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), rule of law and transitional justice. For instance, in relation to SSR, the dominant view is that national ownership requires ‘buy-in’ from a critical mass of national elites. However, scholars and practitioners who argue that reform efforts are only sustainable if ‘done by’ local actors have challenged this view (Nathan 2008). Some argue that given the
complexity of conflict dynamics and the limited knowledge that the international actors have on how to promote local autonomy, the best response strategy is for international actors to play a limited role. For instance, Feldman (2004) concluded that the high failure rate of nation-building exercises strongly supports the basic intuition that we do not know what we are doing. He argued in favour of autonomy on the basis that people tend to know themselves, better than others, how they ought to live their lives. Similarly, others pointed to successful cases of peacebuilding and state-building ‘from the bottom up’ with no or limited outside intervention, notably in Somaliland and Bougainville (Boege et al. 2009). Indeed, within the specialist peacebuilding community of practice, there is widespread recognition of the centrality of domestic politics, and the inherently limited role that external actors can play in shifting state–society relations. Nevertheless, most argue that external actions can support domestic peacebuilding processes.

There is broad agreement on bringing local voices into the planning, design and implementation of external interventions intended to provide support for promising processes engaging agents or constituencies for change. However, there is also a broad recognition that the strategy and form of international engagement with local actors will and should vary according to the level of engagement. Some call for a combination of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ approaches. For example, Van Brabant (2008), argued for a differentiated approach with some actors (NGOs and other implementing agencies) dedicated to a ‘soft’ approach designed to nurture socio-political processes of change and build relationships from the bottom up, while other external actors (international organisations and states) apply a ‘hard(er)’ approach to implementing standards and commitments in line with negotiated peacebuilding ‘compacts’. This is consistent with positions adopted by advocates of ‘multi-track diplomacy’ who argue that multiple levels of engagement are complementary (Diamond and McDonald 1996) and is also supported by evidence from some conflict resolution processes. For instance, one ‘cumulative impact’ study of the Northern Ireland peace process argued that peace was an ‘emergent’ phenomenon in which a confluence of local (bottom-up), national, and regional initiatives played a critical part (Fitzduff and Williams 2007).

Within the peace research community there is an emerging consensus that external
support for peace processes requires different types of interventions at different levels. Many international peacebuilding NGOs, for instance, support the conflict transformation approach associated with the work of Lederach (1997). He divided society into three levels arguing that they should be approached with different strategies. Top leadership can be accessed by an outcome-oriented approach and mediation at the level of states. Mid-level leadership can be reached through more resolution-oriented approaches, such as workshops or peace commissions with the help of influential insiders, and the grass-roots level can be reached through a wide range of local peacebuilding activities, including community dialogue and development projects. However, although this framework remains popular and provides the rationale for many peacebuilding strategies at the programming level, its assumptions regarding the link between ‘tracks’ have been brought into question (Paffenholz 2003, 2006). In other words, although there is agreement that external strategies must be tailored to a particular level of intervention, there is no consensus among scholars on the appropriate weighting of approaches and on how top-down crisis management approaches should be combined with long-term, bottom-up efforts to build relationships and address the root causes of conflict.

In summary, while external peacebuilding efforts have fallen short of expectations, there is no consensus around why this is so. Some conclude that ‘we still know remarkably little on a more specific level about which international efforts work and which do not’ (Call and Cousens 2008: 6). Moreover, the practice of peacebuilding, and how best to manage it, is more deeply contested in 2009 than when the concept was first introduced in the early 1990s. There is little agreement on the scope of peacebuilding (and state-building) objectives, and what role the international community can and should play in pursuit of them. Rather, research over the past two decades has highlighted the ‘conflicted’ nature of peacebuilding and state-building, by identifying contradictions or trade-offs between different security, state-building and development mandates and approaches (Paris and Sisk 2009). This has resulted in discourse on the inherent ‘dilemmas’ of peacebuilding relating to the degree of intrusiveness of international support, the duration of the international presence and local participation or ownership (Johnstone 2006; Paris and Sisk 2007; de Coning 2008; Edelstein 2009; Paris and Sisk 2009). There is, in short, no evidence-based guidance for how such trade-offs should best be managed and what coherent and
coordinated peacebuilding should look like in practice.

The quest for coherence and coordination

Despite a lack of evidence-based understanding about what works and whether and how different intervention strategies should be elaborated or combined, efforts to promote external coherence of action have been at the forefront of the international peacebuilding agenda. Just as it is the prevailing wisdom that peace operations are most successful when backed by strong unified external political support, there is a widely held view that the impact of external interventions has been undermined by incoherent external peacebuilding strategies and lack of coordination (Stedman et al. 2002; Dahrendorf 2003; Dobbins 2004; Paris 2004; Dobbins et al. 2005; Cutillo 2006). Persistent challenges associated with coordinating the international effort have strengthened the resolve of agencies, nations and IOs to improve their internal coherence around common strategies. At the national level, this has led to various efforts to promote ‘whole-of-government’ and/or ‘comprehensive’ approaches to planning military engagements. At the global multilateral level, the UN PBC was established in 2005 to tackle, inter alia, the coherence of the collective external peacebuilding effort. In short, the policy focus on coordination assumes that it is nevertheless both possible and desirable to deliver coherent external interventions through improved coordination procedures within and between governments and IOs.

Yet there are reasons to doubt these assumptions. First, as the above analysis of the peacebuilding literature has indicated, incoherence of action is not a technical matter, but rather stems from different and in some cases contradictory policy goals of different agencies and states. As Paris and Sisk have argued this can be explained by the deep uncertainty and real ‘dilemmas’ inherent in peacebuilding (Paris and Sisk 2009). It follows that there is no single obvious ‘solution’ to the challenges of peacebuilding and that procedural mechanisms that promote improved information exchange will not be sufficient for resolving substantive policy differences. This point is reinforced by insights from organisational theory that highlight the limitations of networked forms of organisation. Students of networks have identified the limitations of networks to achieve coordination and cooperation, even where members share high

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8 For examples of this in the case of international interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina see Jones 2001, Cousens 2001 and Woodward 2002.
levels of trust and common goals. Similarly, critics of network theories argue that they place too high an expectation on consensus and that it is sometimes necessary to institute elements of top-down direction, such as a lead organisation to devise strategies and monitor the performance of members (Alexander 1995). This suggests that even under ‘benign’ conditions where external actors share goals and high levels of trust, consensus may be elusive. There are, moreover, concerns that the geostrategic context is becoming less benign or favourable for achieving political agreement on strategic frameworks. In other words, it is not clear that external peacebuilding actors share high levels of trust and common goals that are considered pre-requisites for the effective functioning of networks. For example, some argue that achieving agreement on intrusive peacebuilding strategies will be ever more difficult in an increasingly divided world (de Coning 2008). Within the UN membership there is evidence of growing resistance to what are perceived as Western state-building agendas. The shadow of Iraq has fuelled suspicions in some states in the global South that peacebuilding can lead to ‘neo-imperialist exploitation of vulnerable post-conflict societies’ (Paris and Sisk 2007; de Coning 2008: 12). Similarly, the Non-Aligned Movement and the G–77 have consistently challenged the conflict-prevention, peacebuilding and state-building agendas on the basis of their intrusive, prescriptive nature. Thus, despite policy convergence around the importance of state-building and the coherence of external interventions within the UN, external differences between states regarding the role of external interventions and the kind of state to be built are likely to present serious challenges to its implementation. In other words, even with improved coordination mechanisms, political differences between the G–77 and other Member States may threaten the ability of international actors to reach agreements on a coherent political intervention strategy in line with a crisis management approach to peacebuilding.

Second, a closely coordinated strategic intervention has the potential to stifle innovation and experimentation. As Paris has observed (2006), students of networks have long recognised the benefits of experimentation through decentralised organisational structures. In the context of profound uncertainty that characterises peacebuilding, there is clearly a strong case for experimentation with different strategies and approaches. Indeed, policymakers from the development community, including the OECD DAC Working Group on Conflict and Fragility, have noted
trade-offs between coherence, flexibility in approach and programmatic innovation. While they recognise that close coordination is important for maximising political leverage with national elites, flexibility and programmatic innovation is seen as particularly valuable in dynamic conflict situations characterised by a high degree of uncertainty regarding ‘whom to work with’ and ‘what works’. It follows that closely coordinated interventions are not necessarily in the interests of actors that pursue experimental, transformational approaches to peacebuilding.

Third, some scholars have argued that a lean, coordinated international effort is not a sufficiently ‘robust’ response to non-linear dynamics of conflict. For instance, de Coning (2008) used insights from complexity theory to argue for greater policy tolerance of fragmentation and duplication, noting that, in highly dynamic environments, the systems that do well have a high degree of ‘robustness’, i.e. they have multiple ways of responding to changes in the system, and some degree of overlap and duplication is thus actually healthy in these systems. This view is supported by reviews of the cumulative impact of peacebuilding efforts that have stressed the importance of multi-level and sometimes overlapping initiatives in delivering transformational impacts. For instance, one review process found that the biggest surprise for many, contrary to intuition and conventional wisdom, was that a multiplicity of uncoordinated efforts in Northern Ireland ‘added up’ without any coherent overall strategy. Indeed, there appeared to be ‘a redundancy that was helpful—duplication that facilitated progress rather than waste’ (Collaborative for Development Action 2008: 6).

Fourth, the more that peacebuilding strategies are developed collectively by external actors, the greater the danger that the role of local actors in the development of policies and programmes is undermined. This rationale is central to decentralisation arguments espoused by the ‘public management movement’ that focuses on improving the responsiveness of governments to their citizens (Vigoda 2002). It is also central to the EU’s concept of subsidiarity, as well as the donor community’s promotion of ‘local ownership’ in the development and implementation of development strategies. In other words, the objective of external coherence is potentially incompatible with the practice of generating locally attuned and accountable interventions. This charge is further reinforced by empirical studies of peacebuilding. Indeed, as mentioned above,
some of the most common critiques of past peacebuilding interventions is that they are not customised to local conditions, or accountable to local populations (Jeong 2005; Chandler 2005).

Thus, among peacebuilding scholars and development practitioners, there is mounting support for the suggestion that coordination is not always utility maximising and external coherence should only be a matter of degree. This is also broadly consistent with a transformational approach to peacebuilding, in which the majority of interventions are directed at promoting change indirectly or from the bottom up, rather than by pressuring national elites.

There is, therefore, little evidence that improved coordination guarantees coherent intervention strategies and more effective outcomes. Indeed, as Paris has observed: ‘In light of the deep uncertainties and disagreements that render post-war state-building such a complex (and sometimes controversial) exercise, the emphasis on improving coordination seems strangely anodyne and technocratic’ (Paris 2006: 6). He contends that the institutional focus on the coordination challenge has distracted from deeper strategic and normative questions and has served to obscure the political and contentious core of the peacebuilding enterprise. So why have states and institutions demanded increased coordination and coherence if there is no clear evidence that it will lead to better outcomes?

One possible reason for the dominance of the cooperation issue in policy debates is that member states and institutional actors implicitly agree with the institutionalist assumption that increased interdependence between actors involved in peacebuilding demands greater cooperation in the management of collective action problems. The focus on coordination in this view is a rational strategy for managing interdependence between diverse security, political and development interventions. Indeed, the decision by member states to mandate the UN Peacebuilding Commission to develop integrated strategies, promote coordination, mobilise resources and develop expertise is a classic example of this assumption.

In addition, the focus on coordination is entirely consistent with the tendencies and interests of bureaucracies. It is part of the process of what Weber called the process of
‘rationalisation’ (Weber 1978). Faced with profound complexity and uncertainty it is the default tendency of bureaucracies to move policy discussion into the familiar terrain of rules and procedures (Beetham 1996). This may help explain why much of the official discussion focused on the coordination issue rather than on the strategies and purposes of statebuilding where uncertainties are greatest. It also had the effect of depoliticising official discussions, deflecting attention from controversial questions of substance to procedural questions. This served the interests of political leaders and IOs who share an interest in shaping the management of the collective peacebuilding effort but recognise that framing their engagement as technocratic and neutral is critical to their success and legitimacy. As Barnett and Finnemore have observed, ‘the power of IOs and bureaucracies generally, is that they present themselves as impersonal, technocratic, and neutral—as not exercising power but instead as serving others; the presentation and acceptance of these claims is critical to their legitimacy and authority’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 708). The power of bureaucracies therefore resides at least in part in creating the appearance of depoliticisation. Privileging the issue of coordination and casting the issue in an apolitical, technocratic light, therefore helps shore up the legitimacy of intervening states and international organisations, and the UN in particular, in an area that is characterised by uncertainty and political contest. This suggests that international organisations and states may be complicit in promoting the issue of coordination for symbolic reasons linked to how they are socially constituted rather than, or in addition to, their belief that it is likely to result in better outcomes.

In summary, the above analysis of peacebuilding record and literature confirms that peacebuilding is characterised by uncertainty. It is, moreover, inherently contested, and characterised by dilemmas and trade-offs. Different actors have different logics of intervention that are not necessarily compatible. Policy incoherence is therefore not a technical matter. Rather, it derives from different policy objectives and operational approaches.

Similarly, the analysis of different operational approaches to peacebuilding reveals that an organisation’s interest in cooperating with other external actors depends on their operational approach and objectives. If, for example, an intervention is designed to produce change in the behaviour of political elites over the short term in line with a
crisis-management approach to peacebuilding, actors will be interested in forms of external cooperation characterised by hierarchy since these are most likely to generate the ‘unity of effort’ required to maximise leverage over national elites. Alternatively, for example, interventions designed to support transformative processes of capacity-building from the bottom up have an interest in strong partnerships with a range of local actors, but far less interest in close coordination or even association with other external actors. Rather, they are more likely to argue for coordination through information exchange, especially in relation to needs assessments and conflict analysis. It follows that it is not analytically useful to view organisations as unitary actors where they include institutional actors with different operational approaches, and that operational coherence within organisations cannot be assumed or even expected.

The analysis of the operational case for improved coordination among external peacebuilding actors also suggests that the operational demand for greater coherence is not necessarily evidence-based or utility-maximising. It therefore calls into question the assumption that the coordination challenge is a problem of collective action, which IOs, and the UN in particular, are well equipped to address through procedural mechanisms. Rather, it introduces the possibility that issues of coordination and cooperation have been privileged in official debate because they have symbolic importance: they serve to distract from contested issues of substance, while carving out a legitimate role for international organisations in developing and diffusing peacebuilding norms and managing the collective peacebuilding effort. In short, the above analysis suggests that institutional policies and behaviour are not based on evidence of what works or analysis of comparative advantages but are rather the result of material and normative competition between key operational actors.

1.4 Hypothesis and research questions

So far, this chapter has introduced three theoretical debates with which this thesis will engage. These are:

1) the debate over whether the UN and regional actors actually support each other or come into conflict (in section 1.1);
2) the debate regarding the conditions under which cooperation between IOs is likely (in section 1.2); and
3) the debate over ‘the coordination challenge’ in peacebuilding (in section 1.3)

The previous sections also serve to inform the hypothesis. They introduce the view that the EU and UN share interests in the goals of effective multilateralism and promoting peace and security based on shared values. This has led to the commonly held view that the EU and UN share peacebuilding objectives and that they simply need to link up better to meet these objectives. This thesis tests this liberal assumption.

The hypothesis is that even if the EU and UN share values and objectives, organisational interests in cooperation will not necessarily be aligned because of competition between the EU and UN for resources and intra-institutional competition related to how to address the challenges of peacebuilding.

This hypothesis can be further unpacked into three sub-hypotheses, which also draw on the analysis in this introductory chapter.

First, the hypothesis suggests that EU and UN normative interests in coordination and cooperation are not necessarily aligned with material interests. Where both are aligned, strong operational cooperation is likely (between development actors). Where normative interests are not matched by material incentives (between security actors), cooperation is likely to be symbolic rather than operational.

Second, the above analysis of the characteristics of peacebuilding underscores the importance of professional norms and concerns about legitimacy in shaping institutional interests regarding whom to work with and how cooperation should be structured. This suggests that institutional actors that employ similar normative and operational approaches are more likely to cooperate because they share the same logic of intervention and an interest in promoting their common approach. It also suggests that they will employ different mechanisms to promote coherence and cooperation, which are tailored to their operational approach.

Third, and linked to sub-hypothesis one, the suggestion that material and normative
interests are not aligned provides a potential explanation for why institutions promote procedural cooperation for normative reasons even if their material interest in operational cooperation is limited. On this view, efforts to institutionalise cooperation through bi-lateral and multi-lateral mechanisms, notably the EU-UN steering committee on crisis management and the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), satisfy institutional interests in symbolic forms of cooperation, even if they do not reflect and have little impact on the material dynamics of operational cooperation.

Based on the assumption that interests in operational cooperation are linked to policy compatibility, chapter two asks are EU and UN policies and approaches to peacebuilding coherent? To do so, it traces the policy evolution of peacebuilding within the principal institutional actors that have been operationally engaged in it. This shows that EU and UN peacebuilding policies are partially aligned by sector. Based on this analysis, the subsequent chapters three and four test the extent to which institutional actors that share similar intervention logics and operational approaches have engaged in operational cooperation.

Chapter three focuses on the relationship between EU and UN development actors. It tests for trends in the European Commission (EC)-UN funding relationship since 2001 by asking: Has EC support in fragile situations increased? Has the proportion of EC funding channeled through the UN increased? And is the proportion of EC assistance channeled through the UN particularly significant in fragile ‘peacebuilding’ contexts? This quantitative analysis is designed to identify trends in the operational partnership between the EC and the UN. It is complemented with quantitative analysis of EC funding trends in relation to nine countries – the five that receive the highest volume of aid, and the four countries on the UN Peacebuilding Commission agenda. This is intended to provide insights as to which factors are particularly significant in determining the strength of the EC-UN relationship. The quantitative analysis is augmented by qualitative analysis designed to respond to the questions: What are the key operational challenges for the EC in supporting peacebuilding in fragile contexts? And what are the operational incentives for and challenges associated with working with the UN in peacebuilding contexts? This chapter involves quantitative and qualitative analysis of the EC’s Instrument for Stability (IfS) – the only funding instrument explicitly dedicated to supporting peacebuilding. It asks how far has the IfS
been used to support UN peacebuilding? and which UN institutional actors has the IfS been used to support? This is complemented by qualitative analysis of the management of the IfS. Taken together, this mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis informs the chapter conclusions regarding the extent to which institutional personality and operational norms determine patterns of operational cooperation.

Chapter four investigates the EU-UN peacebuilding relationship in the context of the civilian dimensions of crisis management operations that typically have peacebuilding objectives. The first part of the chapter examines whether the relationship is mutually reinforcing or competitive. It aims to address whether the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)\(^9\) brings added value to the UN through the following questions: Are the EU and UN in competition over civilian human resources? Has ESDP generated additional resources to help share the peace operation burden? And has ESDP increased the pool of civilians that the UN can draw on? Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative analysis of EU recruitment and deployment patterns aims to test whether ESDP has led to increased capacities in the international system in line with the logic of burden-sharing, or whether it has undermined UN capabilities by privileging the deployment of EU civilian resources in EU missions over UN ones.

The second part of chapter four examines whether the EU and UN operational engagements have been mutually supportive in practice. It tests the policy assumption that EU-UN operational cooperation is complementary and is predicated on common objectives and policy alignment. It does this by examining the record of operational cooperation in relation to interventions where both the EU and UN were deployed simultaneously, in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo. The case studies address the questions: Can the UN rely on the operational support of the EU? Was EU and UN operational cooperation based on common strategic positions and policies? Did they share the same tactical approach? And do they work well together?

Building on the analysis of operational cooperation, chapters five and six aim to explain why the EU and UN have institutionalised their relationship in peacebuilding

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\(^9\) The period of empirical study of this thesis is from 2001 to 2008. It therefore pre-dates the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in January 2010. For this reason the terminology used in this study is also pre-Lisbon. For example, the term ESDP is used to describe EU crisis management interventions. In 2010, these are called Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) interventions.
through innovations such as the EU-UN Steering Committee for Crisis Management and the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Chapter five traces the evolution of policies and practices regarding cooperation between EU and UN headquarters. It asks *How were EU and UN interests served by institutionalising cooperation through the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management? And what does the record of the Steering Committee reveal about their operational fit?*

Similarly, chapter six examines the record of another institutional innovation designed to promote external cooperation in peacebuilding: the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). It asks *has EU engagement in the PBC promoted EU-UN policy alignment and operational cooperation? And has the PBC successfully addressed the external coordination challenge in peacebuilding?* Chapter six also introduces a more recent policy development, notably the Secretary General’s 2009 report on *Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict.* This implicitly challenges the notion that external coherence should be promoted through multilateral dialogue in New York, instead proposing that it should be addressed in-country with more active engagement of local actors. Although these proposals have yet to be implemented, I ask *is this alternative approach a more promising one?* drawing on my findings of what drives operational decisions and partnerships.

My conclusions in chapter seven point to the mixed incentives for operational cooperation and the mixed record of cooperation in practice. They highlight conditions under which cooperation is mutually reinforcing and argue for the re-orientation of efforts to promote coherence between external peacebuilding actors.

1.5 Methodology

The review in this chapter of some of the major sets of theories that could be deployed to explain the dynamics of inter-institutional cooperation (in section 1.2) argues that a constructivist analytical approach is most suitable for analysing the interplay of material and normative factors in shaping the behaviour of organisations. This calls for intensive empirical study of how organisations actually do their business. It requires research that traces the origins and evolution of IO policies, the means by
which they are implemented, and discrepancies between implementation and policy.  
More specifically, it calls for research into how peacebuilding policies and operational  
approaches have evolved in the principal operational actors within the UN and EU,  
and how policies in favour of greater cooperation have been implemented in practice  
in relation to the distinct security and development dimensions of peacebuilding  
policy. To satisfy this demand for intensive empirical study and to address the  
research questions identified above, I undertook the following:

1) *Reading background literature*

There is very little literature specifically on this topic. There is some on EU-UN  
cooperation in crisis management, particularly in relation to the military dimension of  
cooperation, but very little on cooperation in peacebuilding. There is, however, a vast  
iternational relations theoretical literature on explaining the role that the EU and UN  
play in international security. There is also a body of literature that addresses regional  
organisations and their relationship with the UN. And although the peacebuilding  
literature is far more recent – reflecting that IO engagement in peacebuilding is  
essentially a post-Cold War phenomenon – the body of literature is large. It is,  
however, mostly comprised of case studies of external peace operation interventions.  
Comparatively little attention has been paid to the evolution of peacebuilding policy  
within IOs, or to how IOs have conceptualised and undertaken peacebuilding through  
development assistance. Chapter one, in particular, involved a review of these  
different bodies of literature.

2) *Engaging in theoretical debates*

In my professional capacity I have engaged with a number of relevant theoretical  
debates linked to what role in post-conflict peacebuilding IOs should play, how  
intrusive external capacity-building and reform interventions should be planned and  
managed, and whether and how to reconcile ‘strategic’ interventions with the principle  
of local ownership. I have also observed the rise and fall of fashionable issue areas  
that are relevant to peacebuilding. Since 1995 I have, for example, observed how  
attention within IOs shifted from conflict prevention to crisis management and  
addressing risk factors in the post-conflict space (notably SSR and DDR). Most  
recently, attention has focused on state-building and the quest for a comprehensive  
‘one plan’ approach. This experience, combined with a review of the scholarly
literature, informs which theoretical debates I have chosen to engage in through this thesis.

3) **Identification of problem areas**

Through working, writing and advising in the field I have become familiar with a number of problem areas that the EU and UN grapple with on a day-to-day basis. These include: problems related to IO institutional capacity (recruitment and the staffing of peace operations and permanent country presences, limited capacity and demand for politically-sensitive programming); technocratic procedures and processes linked to problem solving; inter- and intra-institutional turf wars (and the importance of framing issues in line with departmental mandates in this context); and the role of political bias (particularly in the context of crisis management missions, but also in determining aid allocations and priorities). I have, in particular, observed the different dimensions of the security-development cleavage within the EU and UN and how it is reflected in institutional culture, policy and practice. For example, in my professional capacity as a facilitator of training sessions for UN and EU officials in conflict prevention, dialogue and mediation, I have observed how officials from different institutions have dramatically different assumptions about what peacebuilding involves in practice. This professional experience has informed my understanding of the practical challenges that organisations face in this area as well as the importance of institutional culture in shaping individual and organisational behaviour.

4) **Data-collection**

The data collected for chapter 3, which explored the funding relationship between the EU and UN, includes primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include official reports and funding data drawn directly from European Commission and OECD databases. Secondary sources include reviews and reports by Non-Governmental Organisations and think tanks, as well as formal evaluations of EU and UN programming.

The data collected for chapter 4, relating to the deployment of civilians in EU and UN peace operations, was collected from primary sources. This involved extraordinary assistance from the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability in the EU Council
Secretariat and the Department of Field Services in the UN Secretariat since this data is not publicly available.

5) Case studies
The research included case studies. These were chosen to examine how civilian EU missions worked with UN missions with a peacebuilding mandate. Their selection was relatively straightforward since there are only two countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo, where EU and UN peacebuilding missions have worked alongside each other.

6) Interviews
The research relied heavily on over seventy interviews with EU and UN staff, conducted over four years. The interviews and the fifty key interviewees are referenced confidentially in the endnotes. In many cases I was already familiar with and had a trusting relationship with the interviewee through my professional experience. This helped ensure access and a frank exchange. I was mindful of interviewing a broad range of officials, from relatively junior officials who deal with the practical issues of managing procurement and contracts, to Heads of Unit, EU Heads of Mission, and one UN Assistant Secretary-General. The number and range of interviews helped to establish the diversity of views on the EU-UN relationship and to assess how they have been informed by institutional vantage point and culture.

7) Analysis
The type of analysis was dependent on the nature of the data. In chapters three and four, it included quantitative analysis of data on funding and civilian deployments. Elsewhere, where the data was from primary and secondary literature and interviews, it was principally qualitative. In addition, my analysis has been tested and subjected to regular review and commentary in the course of my work, and I have received valuable feedback on work in progress from academic peers, employers, and colleagues engaged in peacebuilding activities in the field.
Chapter 2. Evolution of EU and UN Concepts and Policy

2. Introduction: the contested concept of peacebuilding

In order to test the assumption that operational cooperation is more likely when organisations share the same conceptual frameworks, policies and operational approaches, this chapter first sets out to answer the question are EU and UN policies and approaches to peacebuilding coherent? To do so, it traces the policy evolution of peacebuilding within the principal institutional actors that have been operationally engaged in it. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 survey the conceptual and policy evolution of peacebuilding within the UN and EU in order to identify the main factors that have driven the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of peacebuilding. The final section 2.3 compares institutional approaches and argues that despite differences in the conceptualisation of peacebuilding, both organisations combine a conflict-transformation approach to peacebuilding – working to address risk factors and transform conflict from the bottom up – with a crisis management approach based on strategic deals with national elites. While both approaches can be complementary, they operate at different levels and require different forms of coordination. The chapter concludes with remarks on the implications for practical cooperation.

Rather than begin with a definition of peacebuilding, I begin with a brief analysis of how the term is used. Peacebuilding remains subject to many different interpretations. The European Union and UN do not subscribe to a common definition of the term. In the UN, peacebuilding tends to be associated with the system-wide effort to consolidate peace, whereas in the EU the term tends to be associated with a wide range of long-term development activities designed to promote structural stability, or with short-term actions with direct conflict prevention objectives. The European Council does not use the term to describe its interventions in the framework of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Instead, EU support for international missions is rationalised on the basis that they are in line with EU crisis management ambitions and address the threat posed by fragile states to international peace. Nor is there a common understanding of the term within UN and EU member states. While some states frame their post-conflict activities around the term peacebuilding, others
use alternative, related terms such as stabilisation and reconstruction, state-building or nation-building. Thus, although the use of the term peacebuilding\(^{10}\) has become more common outside the UN since it was first introduced in 1992, it has only partially been adopted by the EU and there is still considerable confusion about its conceptual boundaries and policy implications.

This can be explained by a number of factors. At the most fundamental level, as chapter 1 has shown, conceptual confusion persists because there is no agreement about how to institutionalise peace after war. Peacebuilding has therefore become an umbrella term associated with an aspiration rather than a specific procedure, policy, doctrine or operational programme. It is defined by its signal aim of preventing relapse into war. As one UN official put it, ‘peacebuilding is not a set of activities, but a reason we are choosing to do them’. In the absence of consensus over what works, the evolution of the term has been shaped by how institutions have chosen to conceptualise their engagement in post-conflict contexts as peacebuilding. This, in turn, reflects their normative rationale as well as organisational interests. One review of how twenty-four governmental and inter-governmental bodies that are active in peacebuilding have used the term concludes that: ‘An organisation’s core mandate will heavily influence its reception to, and definition and revision of, the concept of peacebuilding’ (Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell and Sitea 2007: 37). The authors observe that there are even more significant differences in how organisations operationalise peacebuilding. They adopt strategies and programmes that ‘more often than not, reflect unexamined assumptions and deeply rooted organisational mandates rather than ‘best practices’ born from empirical analysis’ (Barnett et al. 2007: 53). If, as their review concludes, bureaucratic interests have been a critical factor in framing the concept of peacebuilding and in determining its practice, then one can expect greater conceptual and policy convergence between organisations with similar mandates and practices. Indeed, Barnett et al. also note ‘organisations do not exist in isolation but instead are nested in structured relationships and exchange of resources and

\(^{10}\) The term ‘peace-building’ was hyphenated in all UN documents until the 2000 Report of the High Level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the so-called Brahimi report (United Nations, 2000). By this stage its use had become so widespread, approaching that of the more established terms peacekeeping and peacemaking, that the hyphenation was no longer considered necessary. Peacebuilding is not typically hyphenated in European Commission documents, but it is in European Council documents.
information; those that are linked have tended to converge on a consensus definition’ (Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell and Sitea 2007: 37).

2.1 Evolution of UN concepts and policy

The term ‘peacebuilding’ entered public usage through the UN and it first entered the UN lexicon in 1992, in Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report, An Agenda for Peace. This served to expand the qualitative scope of peacekeeping operations, paving the way for multi-dimensional operations, and provided for a continued commitment to building peace beyond the time frame of the peacekeeping presence. The report drew on work by the peace researcher Johan Galtung who had earlier distinguished between three approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding (Galtung 1975). It defined peacebuilding as the closing stage in a continuum that passed from pre-conflict prevention, through peacemaking and peacekeeping to peacebuilding. On this model, preventative diplomacy was represented as the opening stage of UN intervention. If it failed, it would be followed by political efforts to negotiate a peace settlement (peacemaking). Should a cease-fire or peace agreement be reached, a mission could be deployed to monitor the cease-fire and the implementation of the agreement (peacekeeping), and to lay the foundations for peacebuilding (United Nations 1992: paras 55-7). Therefore, in An Agenda for Peace peacebuilding was introduced as the phase that followed peacemaking and peacekeeping. It was defined as ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict’ (United Nations 1992: para 21).

As an increasing range of agencies asserted their relevance to peacebuilding in the complex emergencies of the early 1990s, pressure grew for conceptual definition that ‘left no agency behind’ (Call and Cousens 2008:3). Boutros Ghali’s Supplement to the Agenda for Peace introduced two conceptual modifications that accommodated these pressures by expanding the concept of peacebuilding (United Nations 1995). Firstly, it clarified that the scope of peacebuilding goes beyond stabilisation or ‘negative peace’. Rather peacebuilding was to address ‘root causes’ of conflict and establish the conditions for ‘positive peace’ that would eliminate the need for future violence,
rather than only ending the war at hand\textsuperscript{11}. Peacebuilding thereby became synonymous with the concept of conflict prevention. This conceptual expansion increased the range of activities that were described as peacebuilding. As Barnett et al. have observed this was inevitable: ‘Because there are multiple contributing causes of conflict, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any perceived or real grievance can arguably be called ‘peacebuilding’ (Barnett et al. 2007: 44). Similarly, there are a number of variables that can conceivably contribute to a just peace.'\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, a ‘root causes’ definition of peacebuilding enabled conceptual inflation. Indeed, during the 1990’s peacebuilding evolved into an amorphous umbrella concept associated with an array of efforts to address a number of possible root causes rather than a process to identify priority risks or needs in specific contexts. The following 2001 Presidential Statement is commonly cited as evidence of the UN’s expanded root causes agenda:

‘The Security Council recognizes that peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short- and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of society’s sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.’

(UN Security Council 2001)

Moreover, in the 2006 Inventory of UN Peacebuilding Capacity the argument was made that ‘in the absence of a well-articulated [peacebuilding] paradigm, the tendency (including in this inventory) is also to adopt a supply-view of what is needed, thereby overlooking critical areas for effective peacebuilding which to date may be weakly conceptualised or ignored by the international community’. The inventory listed a number of areas in which UN capacity was weak (notably state-building) or

\textsuperscript{11} The concepts of Negative and Positive Peace were conceived by Johan Galtung (Galtung 1985).
\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, some argue that given the ‘complex’ characteristics of social systems there are epistemological barriers to our ability to predict tipping points or phase transitions to violence or peace.
where capacities were dispersed, and identified additional ‘gaps’ such as in-depth knowledge of local context, expertise in land reform, management of state assets and organised crime. In short, a ‘root causes’ conception of peacebuilding continues to support an agenda of institutional capacity building for international organisations.

The second conceptual clarification introduced in the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace was that the term applies not only to post-conflict situations, but to the entire conflict management spectrum, since those technologies that are used to build peace also serve to prevent war. However, the report maintained a distinction between peacebuilding and other UN instruments for peace, notably: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, disarmament, sanctions and peace enforcement. Similarly, subsequent reports by the Secretary General viewed peacebuilding as a ‘complement’ to peacekeeping (United Nations 1998b: para 70) and argued that it involved the ‘re-orientation’ of humanitarian and development activities to reduce the risk of resumption of conflict (United Nations 1998a: para 63). Therefore despite the fact that peacebuilding was no longer conceptually associated with a particular conflict stage, the notion that peacebuilding represented something that followed peacekeeping persisted.

At the same time, however, there was increased appreciation of the need for immediate post-conflict gains to solidify the peace and increase confidence in the peace process. Although this shift in policy had been driven by development actors who found that early recovery needed to begin closer to the space of conflict, in practice early efforts to generate peace dividends and build institutional capacity were associated with greater involvement of UN peacekeepers in a range of civilian tasks rather than efforts to bring forward the development response. The perspectives of the three different UN Departments that were responsible for operationalising peacebuilding concepts and policy reflect this piecemeal evolution.

2.1.1 The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) perspective

The recommendations of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the so-called Brahimi Report of 2000, proved highly influential in shaping the evolution of peacebuilding from the perspective of peacekeeping (United Nations
2000). The Brahimi Report defined peacebuilding as ‘activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war’. It thereby reinforced the notion that peacebuilding related principally to a long-term process that followed peacekeeping. It nevertheless argued that peace operations should lay the foundations for peacebuilding, so as to facilitate the ‘transition’ to peacebuilding carried out by other actors (paras 55-57). As a result, the Brahimi report gave further impetus to the trend towards multi-dimensional peace operations, incorporating dimensions of peacebuilding. This resulted in an acceptance that some aspects of DDR, Rule of Law and SSR should be funded out of the assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations budget. It also consolidated the standard inclusion of funds for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in UN peacekeeping budgets.

Although the Brahimi report led to an increased peacebuilding role for UN peace operations, it nevertheless maintained that peacebuilding was distinct from peacekeeping and associated with other actors in a later post-conflict phase of operations. Barnett et al. have argued that DPKO’s ‘abstinence owes less to principled opposition to peacebuilding and more to the view that peacebuilding is outside its mandate and [to its] vested interest in ensuring that these areas are treated as distinctive, if related and sequential, activities’ (Barnett et al. 2007: 42). This also explains why DPKO has frequently used alternative terms such as ‘Civilian Post-Conflict Capacities’ (UN DPKO, PBPU 2004) to describe its efforts in the areas of DDR, SSR and the rule of law. Indeed, while DPKO-led missions are not described in terms of peacebuilding, DPKO has consistently asserted its leading role in many of the issue areas associated with peacebuilding. For instance, DPKO has argued in the context of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee deliberations, that it should be the lead actor on core dimensions of state-building including security sector reform and rule of law (interviews 2).

While peacekeeping reforms have established that peacekeepers have an important role to play in core dimensions of peacebuilding, the Brahimi report nevertheless proved influential in maintaining that peacebuilding was functionally distinct from peacekeeping. Rather it served to strengthen the association of peacebuilding with
political and development interventions. It noted that ‘peacebuilding is a hybrid of political and developmental activities targeted at the sources of conflict’. Accordingly, it identified the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) within the Secretariat as the focal point for peacebuilding in the UN system and called for the creation of a peacebuilding unit within DPA to act as a focal point within the UN system for coordination, information gathering and best practices. It also identified the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as the lead agency in implementing peacebuilding activities. Therefore, although the need for continuous efforts to consolidate peace was recognised in the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace in 1995, DPKO’s engagement in the debate resulted in the expansion of the peacekeeping remit justified on peacebuilding grounds, while the term peacebuilding remained principally associated with a long-term process, distinct from peacekeeping and led by political and development actors.

2.1.2 The Department for Political Affairs (DPA) perspective

In 1997 DPA was identified as the UN’s focal point for peacebuilding\(^\text{13}\) and it has since embraced its explicit peacebuilding mandate. Although DPA had long conducted political missions and ‘good offices’ designed to support specific political processes, shortly after 1997 it experimented with a new model designed to operationalise peacebuilding through the establishment of ‘Peacebuilding Support Offices’ (PBSOs). This led to the establishment of PBSOs in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic and Tajikistan. These were intended to provide operational support to post-conflict societies to consolidate peace and democracy where the UN Security Council felt that no troop presence was necessary. They were funded from the regular UN budget and authorised by the UN Security Council. However, a review of these missions by UNDP and DPA staff in 2001 found that with the exception of the United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP), none of these missions had been successful (Call 2005: 23). This finding is hardly surprising given events on the ground: Liberia reverted to war and both Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic experienced coup d’états. However, the 2001 review revealed that the PBSOs had failed principally because they were structurally weak

\(^{13}\) DPA was designated the ‘focal point’ in the UN system for post-conflict peacebuilding by virtue of its role as the convenor of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) (Call 2005).
and had little leverage, including over other elements in the UN system. Rather, they were perceived as competing with UN agencies, funds and programmes over donor funds. In all cases except Tajikistan this resulted in tensions between the Resident Coordinator/Resident Representative who headed up the UN Country Team and the Head of the PBSO. The review concluded that the ‘absence of a coherent strategy for peacebuilding and common understanding of objectives and priorities is perhaps the single most significant obstacle to effective collaboration within the United Nations System’ (United Nations 2001). It informed the 2004 UNDP/DPA conclusion that Peacebuilding Support Offices were not a successful model, and prompted the elaboration of a ‘Plan of Action on Peacebuilding’ to improve coordination within the UN system. However, its recommendations were not developed through DPA. Rather, policy issues relating to cooperation were taken up by development and humanitarian actors in the UNDG-ECHA working group on Transitions.

Furthermore, the distinction between primarily political ‘peacebuilding’ missions and primarily security ‘peacekeeping’ missions, combined with the persistent notion that peacebuilding was linked with an end phase in a UN intervention, served to privilege discourse over sequencing and raised questions over how to manage transitions between different kinds of operations (including between DPA-led political and DPKO-led security missions). DPA continued to lose ground to DPKO. Whereas in 1997 DPA had served as the lead agency for peace missions that preceded (such as the UN Advance Mission in 1992 in Cambodia) and followed DPKO missions (including the Misión de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador, and the UN’s Office in Vienna after 1995, and the UN Political Office for Somalia in 1996), turf battles grew as DPKO became more involved in multi-dimensional operations. The issue was resolved in DPKO’s favour in 2002 when the UN Secretary General specified that DPKO would serve as the lead department for the planning and management of all peace and security operations in the field, even when primarily civilian (United Nations 2002). This has led to the current division of roles whereby DPKO leads all larger missions and DPA leads smaller, purely civilian ones often dedicated to assisting the Secretary General in his good offices. Thus, while the role of DPKO in peacebuilding was further institutionalised, albeit under the name of multi-dimensional peacekeeping, the scope of operational peacebuilding operations became associated with far more limited ‘advisory’ interventions.
In addition, DPA’s efforts to strengthen its strategic peacebuilding ‘focal point’ role within UN Headquarters ‘never really got off the ground’ (Call 2005: 15). In a report DPA commissioned in 1997, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General Margaret Anstee recommended that a Peacebuilding Unit be established within DPA for the adequate fulfillment of this role. This recommendation was later supported in the Brahimi report and subsequently received UN system-wide support in a Peacebuilding Plan of Action in 2001. However, the idea never received the support of member states. The proposal was rejected in the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in 2002. While some traditional ‘donor’ states had chosen to build up peacebuilding capacity in UNDP, by supporting the establishment of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery rather than a Peacebuilding Unit in DPA, other member states from the Global South appeared nervous about expanding the UN’s political role in post-conflict situations (interviews 3). Paradoxically, therefore, the department that was identified as the ‘focal point’ for peacebuilding within the UN system has seen a reduction of its role in peacebuilding relative to other UN departments and agencies. This can be partly explained by its small size and limited institutional capacities, which rendered it relatively weak compared with DPKO and UNDP. To illustrate DPA’s relative institutional weakness, Call noted that, in 2004 DPA had fewer staff monitoring country developments – 52 desk officers – than the non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch. It had less than half the staff of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, and its country officers were fewer in number than the number of World Bank staff in one country alone – Indonesia (Call 2005: 22). While DPA’s relatively limited capacity is part of the explanation for why it was relatively unsuccessful in internal inter-institutional turf wars, its increasingly limited role in peacebuilding is also evidence of the operational and political difficulties attendant in associating peacebuilding with principally political interventions. Not only have purely political ‘advisory’ interventions failed in operational terms, for instance when DPAs Peacebuilding Support Officers had limited political backing and resources, but peacebuilding without an explicit link to development resources has proved a hard sell to the wider UN membership. This indicates the political importance of tying external peacebuilding ambitions to development objectives, and helps explain why UNDP’s approach has received greater support from donors and affected member states.
2.1.3 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) perspective

While UNDP has actively pursued its role as a lead agency for implementing peacebuilding, it frames its actions through two distinct concepts. It adopted the definition of peacebuilding used in the Brahimi report but has always stressed that peacebuilding is virtually synonymous with conflict prevention. It used both concepts interchangeably for a few years, but increasingly refers only to prevention to describe actions that are designed specifically to mitigate, reduce or prevent conflict. Nor does UNDP typically use the term peacebuilding to refer to its broader efforts to promote socio-economic development in post-conflict contexts. Rather, it uses the term ‘recovery’. The dual conceptual focus is evident in the name of the ‘Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery’ (BCPR) created in 2001. It attests to the operational alignment of UNDPs work with programmes targeted specifically at reducing conflict, as well as its broader efforts, together with UN humanitarian agencies, to address the relief to development gap. Indeed BCPR was created ‘to provide a bridge between the humanitarian agencies that handle immediate needs and the long-term development phase’ (UNDP 2008: inside front cover). Given that humanitarian agencies have no interest in framing their emergency-response activities in terms of peacebuilding, it is unsurprising that this constellation of actors has adopted the more politically-neutral term ‘recovery’ to describe their ambitions in the post-disaster and post-conflict space. More recently this has been defined as actions designed to ‘restore the capacity of national institutions and communities to recover from a conflict or a natural disaster, enter transition or ‘build back better’, and avoid relapses’ (Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery with UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition 2008: 9). In summary, conceptually and operationally UNDP has made a distinction between its work on conflict that has an explicit preventive objective, and its work that is primarily directed towards the socio-economic aspects of development in fragile and post-conflict contexts. Its preventive work includes support for political dialogue and peace processes as well as efforts targeted at addressing specific threats to peace consolidation such as DDR, rule of law, land mines and small arms. These are treated separately from activities designed to consolidate ‘recovery’ through economic growth and state capacity-building.
Evidence of the success of UNDP’s approach includes its relatively rapid institutional capacity development. While UNDP’s BCPR was created in 2001 with 6 staff, it numbered over 100 personnel three years later. The Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery that was established with voluntary contributions to fund UNDPs operations in this area has also steadily increased in size to over US$100 million in 2007. Although a relatively small proportion of this fund is dedicated to operations with an explicit conflict prevention objective, it has also sought to promote prevention activities as well as conflict-sensitive development through UN Country Teams. Working together with the inter-departmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action (the Framework Team), UNDP has partnered with DPA in introducing Peace and Development Advisors to assist the UN Resident Coordinator in developing conflict prevention strategies and programmes. In contrast to DPA’s Peace Building Support Officers, this initiative serves to strengthen the political component of UN Country Teams without calling into question who is in charge or highlighting the political nature of UN interventions. UNDP aims by this means to improve the political content of its programming without necessarily labeling it as such.

In summary, the above account of the conceptual evolution of peacebuilding within the UN indicates that donor preferences combined with institutional interests have played a large part in explaining how peacebuilding has been conceptualised and operationalised. Despite the UN’s expansive use of the term, relatively few UN actors use it to describe their work. Indeed the UN departments and agencies with the greatest operational engagement in this area have chosen to develop distinctive concepts to describe their engagements in line with their core security and development mandates. This suggests that the dynamics of bureaucratic power and political in-fighting have served to promote conceptual diversity as a means of protecting institutional turf. Moreover, while the term peacebuilding was initially most closely associated with DPA and its political interventions, the link between peacebuilding and DPA has been weakened. Rather, as is explained in chapter 6, peacebuilding has been institutionalised in the UN context in the Peacebuilding Commission and its associated Support Office and Fund which, together, constitute the UN’s ‘peacebuilding architecture’. The UN’s dedicated peacebuilding structures are not, therefore, institutionally associated with any of the main operational actors.
Rather, they occupy an institutional no-mans-land, with the Peacebuilding Commission reporting to the Security Council and General Assembly and its associated Support Office and Fund reporting directly to the Secretary-General.

2.1.4 The UN response to the challenge of coherence

There is broad international and inter-organisational consensus that security, political and development aspects are central to the peacebuilding agenda, while differences in emphasis and categorisation remain common\textsuperscript{14}. Thus, underlying the diversity in the UN’s approach to peacebuilding, there is convergence around the view that peace consolidation is a multi-dimensional undertaking with inter-dependent security, development and political (including support for peace processes and state-capacity-building) objectives. It is also true that the dimension of strengthening political institutions or ‘state-building’ has received increasing attention since 2000. The United Nations Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change argued that peacebuilding should focus on state-building (United Nations, 2004). Scholars talk of a ‘New York Consensus’ which privileges the state-building dimensions of peacebuilding, and they note that ‘the new statebuilding model has found its ideological home at the United Nations’ (Kahler 2009: 288). Yet, despite the elevation of the state-building agenda within the UN, it is not equated with peacebuilding. Rather, state-building is still conceptualised as one of the core dimensions of peacebuilding. Thus, while departments and agencies within the UN define their interventions in distinct terms in line with their core mandates, there is widespread agreement that a range of institutional competencies, from across the UN system, are relevant to these core dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding.

\textsuperscript{14} Reviews of how different nations and international actors approach peace consolidation, all concur that the security, political and economic dimensions are critical (Barnett 2007; de Coning 2008; United States Institute of Peace 2009). However, differences in categorisation and emphasis are still common. For instance, the African Union includes gender as a core dimension of peacebuilding (African Union 2006). In a recent study for the US government, for example, the rule of law is considered a separate category, and activities to promote social well-being are distinguished from economic development (United States Institute for Peace 2009).
### Table 1. Dimensions of Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security &amp; Rule of Law</th>
<th>Providing a Safe and Secure Environment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disarmament and Demobilisation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Police, Corrections and Judicial reform (Rule of Law)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Political &amp; Governance</th>
<th>Support the peace process &amp; Oversee political transition</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Participation, National Dialogue &amp; Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government institutions &amp; civil service capacity building, including public administration at national and local levels</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extend state authority throughout the territory</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support conflict management capacity</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic Recovery</th>
<th>Physical infrastructure: roads, ports, airports, electricity, telecommunications (with particular emphasis on employment generation for youth and former combatants)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social services: health, education, social welfare, population registration (particularly for internally displaced persons and refugees)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stimulating economic growth, through a mix of micro-level efforts to build on existing local capacity and macro-economic policy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening civil society</td>
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*Source: Adapted from de Coning (2008)*

With increased recognition that peacebuilding is a multidimensional undertaking closely correlated with improvements in security, governance and development, the focus of the UN debate has been on how the UN should get its internal act together in support of these objectives. In other words, the UN has privileged a process of reflection on how it should improve the coherence of its action. This was prompted by feedback in the form of evaluations of UN operations and research studies that identified poor coordination as one of the factors that contributed to the UN’s mixed record of success (Cutillo 2006; Dahrendorf 2003; Dobbins *et al.* 2005; Paris 2004; Stedman *et al.* 2002). Evidence of instances of duplication or where different UN actors have worked at cross purposes has underpinned the widely held belief that a
more coherent approach would have a more effective and sustainable impact on peacebuilding. More importantly perhaps were supply-side pressures for institutional streamlining. The 2006 Inventory on UN Capacity in Peacebuilding noted the scattered nature of UN capacities and argued that ‘not only does this result in gaps and overlaps […] but certain sectors lack a clear lead entity or central resource location, resulting in limited accountability for delivery’ (United Nations 2006b: 7). This prompted UN member states to demand reform that would identify sector-wide leads and division of responsibilities. In short, member states demanded greater integration and clearer division of roles in order to improve the accountability of UN post-conflict efforts to the donors/member states and help prevent gaps and overlaps that were viewed as the principal cause of operational inefficiency.

There are clear structural reasons for the UN’s fragmented approach. This is reflected in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report which includes a section on ‘UN systemic challenges’ to efficiency and effectiveness. It notes that:

‘the United Nations has deep capabilities in the fields of peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian action, and successful peacebuilding requires the combined efforts of all of these ‘pillars’. However, the UN entities with capacity in these fields were each designed for a different purpose. Each of them has different mandates, guiding principles, governance structures and financing arrangements – and different cultures and notions of how things should be done. As practice has evolved, each part of the UN system has developed its own set of external partners and stakeholders. This becomes a complicating factor for unity of purpose and action on the ground. Various parts of the United Nations are very rightly linked to distinct international instruments, each with its own pace and accountability. In this context our efforts to ‘deliver as one’ in the field are vital but not sufficient.’ (United Nations 2009: paragraph 24)

In addition, whether a country is considered to be a case for conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping or peacebuilding has implications for how activities are funded and which institutional actor is in the lead. The role of the Security Council in authorising peacekeeping missions and the assessed contribution system for funding
them has ensured that peacekeeping has been a relatively well-resourced and politically well-supported UN instrument. In contrast, peacemaking, conflict prevention and peace-building efforts funded out of the UN core budget (DPA actions) or through member state contributions (UNDP actions) have been relatively less well backed and/or subject to considerable funding lags. This has served to privilege peacekeeping over other UN instruments and has resulted in a fragmented approach to improving coherence.

Efforts to address coherence ‘from the top down’, where there is a UN peacekeeping presence, have led to the so-called ‘Integrated Approach’ to mission planning and deployment. Where there is no peacekeeping presence, the so-called ‘Delivering as One’ reforms have been designed to improve coherence between UN humanitarian, development and environmental actors through partial integration of the UN’s in-country organisation and funding. The Secretary-General has also tried to create a cabinet-style decision making structure in his own office and to this end his Policy Committee has been tasked with clarifying the division of roles within the UN by identifying ‘lead agencies’ at headquarters that should provide system-wide service in their respective area of expertise. Although much organisational energy has been committed to designing and implementing these reforms and they are still actively pursued by UN member states and the Secretary-General, their implementation in the field has proved difficult in light of the structural fragmentation described above. No on-going reform efforts have been comprehensive enough to address the coherence of the collective UN peacebuilding effort, especially during transitions where there is no clear UN lead actor, or in areas where a number of agencies share competence.

For example, while the UN has engaged in a serious attempt to promote integrated planning where it deploys peace missions, the early results demonstrate how difficult this is in practice. Integration was one of the main themes of the Brahimi report (United Nations 2000). As a result the Secretary General called for a plan that can help the different parts of the UN system work together to develop country-specific peacebuilding strategies that are coherent, flexible and field-driven. His call resulted

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15 Since 2005 the majority of UN missions are integrated and have been designed using the Integrated Mission Planning Process. By comparison, while there are ambitions in the EU context to develop a similar comprehensive approach to planning, they have yet to be realised.
in the UN’s Integrated Approach, in which the planning and coordination of complex peace operations is integrated in a single country-level UN system. In this system, mission planning is conducted in accordance with the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which includes a greater degree of consultation with other UN actors (United Nations 2008b). While the UN Secretary-General remains committed to this approach, reviews of its implementation in practice reveal that barriers to integration remain at various levels (policy, strategic, programmatic and administrative). One review of integrated UN missions concludes that:

‘cases of success in integration are largely attributable to the initiative of individual UN staff finding ways of working around the numerous organisational barriers and learning from the fluid post-conflict environment. These successes come with high transaction costs: UN staff may spend as much time navigating systemic dysfunction as they do carrying out their assigned tasks’ (Campbell and Kaspersen 2009: 482).

The persistence of organisational obstacles to integration has led practitioners to question the efficiency of integrated approaches. As reviews of Integrated Missions indicate (Eide et al. 2008), there is an increasing sense that the form of integration should follow function. That is, missions should only be integrated to the extent that there is a critical mass of multiple tasks with a broad mandate. They also note that integration is still perceived by most UN entities as a means by which they are subordinated to the priorities and procedures of DPKO and its Department of Field Services (DFS). This suggests that the ‘Integrated Approach’ has not been fully accepted in the wider UN system. There is, moreover, evidence that there are substantive as well as bureaucratic reasons for resistance. For instance, some argue the integrated mission approach is incompatible with a decentralised approach to peacebuilding which is designed to work with national actors from the bottom up (Hazen 2007). In any case, there is broad agreement that the Integrated Approach only addresses integration at the field level in a sub-set of cases (where there is a peacekeeping mission) and it is therefore not well-suited to managing UN coherence during transitions, including when peacekeepers leave, or coherence of the collective external effort.
Similarly, significant resources and political attention have been given to parallel structural reforms to improve UN system-wide coherence and to ‘Deliver as One’ (United Nations 2006c). For instance, the Delivering-as-One reform effort is supported by the staff of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO). OCHA and DOCO provide support for sector-wide coordination at headquarters level and in the field, through the support of the Special Representative of the Secretary General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. These rationalising reforms have helped establish clearer lines of authority in-country. However, they are designed for situations where there is no UN security presence and are therefore not sufficient to ensure coherence of the broader peace consolidation effort.

The principal UN institutional innovation to address the coherence challenge in peacebuilding has been designed to build on these efforts to improve UN coherence at the field level in peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping contexts. In his report on UN reform In Larger Freedom, the Secretary-General recognised that there was ‘a gaping hole’ in the UN machinery in this area and that ‘no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to peace’ (United Nations 2005a: paragraph 114). The new UN peacebuilding architecture, comprised of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and located in the UN Secretariat in New York, was expressly designed to address this institutional gap. The PBC was to provide a forum for coordination of the ‘many post conflict activities of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes’ as well as the activities of donors, troop contributors and other international organisations and international financial institutions. The UN peacebuilding architecture was therefore designed to bring together the key UN and external actors with a view to sustaining attention, mobilising resources, and addressing the demands of collective coordination, across and beyond the UN system.

Chapter six explores in more detail to what extent the UN Peacebuilding Architecture has been able to fulfill this ambitious mandate. At this stage, it is perhaps sufficient to point to the fact that it has generated limited results in terms of coordination and resource mobilisation and that there is growing scepticism regarding how appropriate
it is for New York-based national ambassadors to develop country-specific peacebuilding strategies. Moreover, given the UN’s interest in how to sustain international attention after a peacekeeping mission leaves, the PBC has, to date, focused on countries in a relatively late peace consolidation phase, typically after a peace operation had left and some three to five years after cessation of hostilities. In doing so, it evidently did not address the early recovery phase, which was also seen as critical in peace consolidation.

Indeed, partly due to the limitations of the integrated approach to mission planning to guide humanitarian and development approaches to early recovery, a range of ‘bottom-up’ coordination initiatives have emerged between development and humanitarian actors to improve their engagement in this phase. For instance, standing and ad hoc committee structures such as the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and UN Development Group explored the challenges of coordinated action with a view to refining and improving the integrated mission approach. In addition, the Inter Agency Standing Committee Cluster Framework also served to bring together UN agencies and programmes to work on policy, organisational and programming guidance in specific issue areas, including ‘early recovery’. These aimed to develop coordination arrangements as well as capacity to ensure that when the humanitarian assistance draws down, development programmes and funds are in place to maintain and expand efforts to develop sustainable solutions. However, these efforts often encountered serious systemic obstacles, with little predictable funding for non-emergency recovery efforts and little capacity in critical areas. Many of these difficulties and gaps were documented in the influential report Recovery from War (Chandran et al. 2008) and have served to stimulate engagement amongst donors and in the UN system about how to bring forward the international development response to improve early recovery efforts.

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16 In addition, thematic interagency working groups such as those on conflict prevention (the UN Framework Team) and the DDR taskforce have developed policy and programming guidance which also aim to improve the coherence of the UN’s effort in relation to particular issues.

17 The UK (which commissioned the ‘recovery from war’ report) has championed efforts to address reforms to early recovery funding, and this issue has also been taken up by a working group of the OECD DAC.
Within the UN, in May 2008, the Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General, the PBC, and member states to consider how the UN and international community could do better at supporting national actors in this early recovery phase. More specifically, it requested the Secretary General to provide advice on how to ‘support national efforts to secure a sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing’. This resulted in the Secretary General’s report *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict* (United Nations 2009). It proposes that UN interventions should be oriented towards the development of national capacity from the earliest stage and should be guided by early peacebuilding strategies developed with and in support of national actors. In marked contrast to the integrated approach to mission planning and the elaboration of integrated peacebuilding strategies in the PBC, it stresses that the early elaboration of a strategic framework should be negotiated directly by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General with national actors. This, it is suggested, should make use of more inclusive planning methodologies such as the Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) methodology already used by the UN, World Bank and European Commission. The impact of the report’s recommendations is to shift the locus of strategic peacebuilding planning from New York to the field, investing the responsibility for external coherence with the in-country UN leadership team.

It is evidently too early to comment on whether these recommendations have been accepted, much less whether they have achieved their intended results. However, it is noteworthy that this latest attempt at addressing the coherence of the external effort is significantly different in approach from previous efforts. It aims to ensure coherence by increasing the authority and capacity of national actors and UN leaders to negotiate common strategies to guide national and external engagements. The report recognises the fragmented nature of governance across the UN system and the coordination challenges this brings, but does not propose new structural solutions. Rather, it seeks to embed the process of setting priorities in the local context – arguing that strategies should build on existing national and international capacities. As such, it places a premium on the ability of local and country-based UN actors to negotiate common priorities, while somewhat insulating this process from the influence of member states in New York.
To summarise, in addition to convergence around the core security, institution-building and development dimensions of peacebuilding, there has also been convergence around the importance of external coherence. At the UN level this has led to a range of efforts to promote an integrated approach. These have included integrated planning for peace operations, and the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission charged with improving the coherence and coordination of the collective external effort in the late consolidation phase. Most recently, the UN has emphasised the importance of engaging national actors in strategic decision-making at an earlier stage, and of shifting the elaboration of strategic guidance from headquarters to the field. However, how this will be implemented and how it will link with the existing models of planning peace operations remains unclear. Similarly, the management of the late peace-consolidation effort is also in question, with the 5-year review of the advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission scheduled for 2010. If the UN adopts the same logic as in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report, there is little reason for a New York-based body to be involved in the negotiation of integrated peacebuilding strategies in a late peace consolidation phase. In any event, although the UN underscores the imperative of national ownership in peacebuilding, the UN debate about peacebuilding remains focused on the still unresolved issue of how best to promote coherence across fundamentally fragmented external interventions.

2.2 Evolution of EU concepts and policy

The term peacebuilding does not feature prominently in EU policy and there is no EU agreed definition of peacebuilding. There have been no European Council Common Strategies or Joint Actions, nor any European Commission Communications on ‘peace-building’ as such. Rather, the EU has developed a mosaic of policies associated with security, development and governance interventions that are relevant to preventing conflict and building peace. While originally framed in terms of conflict prevention, the subsequent development of European Commission (EC) policies has been framed in terms of the objectives of improving aid effectiveness and crisis response and promoting coherence of EU security and development policies in relation to fragile states. Although the EU rarely uses the term state-building, EU
policies on governance and fragility have prioritised state-building as a principal means of preventing conflict. Similarly, while EU security policy has not been framed in terms of peacebuilding, the first 2003 European Security Strategy identified ‘failing states’ as a key threat and noted that the role of civilian crisis management interventions was to ‘restore civil government’. Subsequent EU policy developments have highlighted the importance of security risks linked to the state. Although initially established to substitute for local security with international police deployments, in policy and practice civilian ESDP has been increasingly associated with building state capacity in the area of police and justice, and with reforming the defence sector through SSR and DDR.

**2.2.1 Conceptual origins: the Commission approach to conflict prevention**

Despite the fact that the EU has not tended to frame its activities in terms of a peacebuilding objective, it is nevertheless possible to trace the conceptual origins and evolution of the concept. In contrast to early evolution of peacebuilding within the UN, within the EU peacebuilding has always been associated with the concept of conflict prevention and primarily with the EC. The EC conflict prevention agenda emerged in the mid-1990s and was the first EC policy area to explicitly make the link between development and security. For instance, the 1996 Communication on *Conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond*, argued that development instruments need to take account of:

‘their potential for balancing the interests and opportunities of different identity groups within a state, for encouraging democratic governments that enjoy widespread legitimacy among the population, for fostering consensus on key national issues... and for building mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests.’ (European Commission 1996a: 4)

The 1996 Communication also introduced the concept of ‘structural stability’ as the ultimate EC policy goal. This was defined as ‘a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without the resort to violent conflict’ (European Commission
Promoting structural stability was equated with addressing the structural causes of conflict and the ‘wider sense’ of conflict prevention. Moreover, the Communication argued that ‘activities of conflict prevention in a wider sense should be summarised under the term peace-building’ (European Commission 1996a: 5).

With regard to programming for structural prevention, the Communication argued that programme design should be sensitive to the social impact of development assistance and be prepared to shift the balance of power and opportunities within societies (European Commission 1996a). Furthermore, in its 1996 Communication on *Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development* (European Commission 1996b) the Commission also identified the dangers of not doing so. This Communication describes how politically insensitive development programmes as well as bad governance can exacerbate ethnic or religious differences and contribute to the causes of conflict. The potentially dangerous nature of EC development aid was therefore recognised by the EC well before Andersen’s (1999) influential ‘Do-No-Harm’ initiative drew popular attention to shortfalls in the relief to development continuum. These EC policy documents indicate that the EC was relatively quick to recognise the inter-dependencies between security, humanitarian and development policy. The optimism in the EU’s growing and progressive role in the area of conflict prevention was also echoed in academic and NGO literature (Costy and Gilbert 1998; Cross 1998; Cross and Rasamoelina 1999). It was apparently justified by the production in 2001 of a Commission Communication on *Conflict Prevention* (European Commission 2001a) and the EU Programme of Action on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, commonly referred to as the Göteborg Programme (European Council 2001b). These documents established the EU’s internal strategic logic for improving its engagement in fragile or post-conflict states and formally elevated the status of conflict prevention to ‘one of the main objectives of the EU’s external relations’ (European Council 2001b: 1) 19. As

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18 The OECD DAC 1998 review of EC development assistance (OECD DAC 1998) acknowledged as much in its praise of the above-mentioned reports, in its characterisation of the EC’s pro-active role in formulating the DAC Guidelines on Conflict Peace and Development Cooperation (OECD DAC 1997), and in its conclusion that ‘the international community can look to the EU for strong leadership in this area’ (OECD DAC 1998: 15).

19 The political objectives of EU development policy were formally outlined in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty on the European Union. This identified the objectives of EU development assistance as ‘the promotion of stable conditions for human and economic development and the promotion of human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms’ (CFSP objectives in Article 11 and Development Cooperation objectives in Article 177(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Union). These
such, they served to reframe the European Commission’s mandate in the area of development and governance as promoting (early) structural prevention as well as (late) operational prevention\(^{20}\).

Although the 2001 Communication on *Conflict Prevention* did not employ the term ‘peacebuilding’, it is still considered by many EC practitioners as providing the strategic framework and intervention logic for the EC’s approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The 2001 Communication identified three main objectives: 1) adapt long-term EU instruments to address the root causes of conflict; 2) improve the EU’s capacity to react quickly to address conflict risks or seize opportunities for prevention; and 3) promote cooperation with international partners. The Communication distinguishes between long-term and short-term prevention objectives on the basis of intervention time-frame, (possibly in line with the EC funding instruments). These ultimate objectives could also be defined in terms of their contributions to ‘structural’ or ‘operational’ prevention, or contributions to achieving ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ peace\(^{21}\).

In pursuit of the long-term objective of promoting ‘structural stability’, the 2001 Communication advocates the ‘mainstreaming’ of conflict sensitivity into development cooperation, macro-economic stabilisation, and democratisation programming. In addition, it argues that long-term efforts should address specific ‘cross-cutting’ risk factors associated with conflict such as natural resource management and the illicit trade in drugs and small arms. Another dimension of promoting long-term structural stability is the objective of promoting regional

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\(^{20}\) For a discussion of the distinction between *structural* and *operational* prevention see Menkhaus (2006b).

\(^{21}\) A number of practitioners and analysts have sought to introduce greater conceptual clarity through other conceptual distinctions. For instance, some practitioners make a distinction between programmes designed specifically to prevent violence from re-erupting – ‘peace writ little’ – in the short to medium term, with those that are designed to promote broader institutional and societal transformation – ‘Peace Writ Large’ (Church 2008; Collaborative for Development Action 2008). Others argue that organisations distinguish clearly between preventative peacebuilding at the activity or programme level and *post-conflict* peacebuilding at the systemic level (de Coning 2008). The OECD DAC often makes a distinction between activities with *direct* and *indirect* peacebuilding/Armed Violence Reduction objectives (OECD 2007a, 2009).
cooperation. To this end, the 2001 Communication emphasises the importance of developing the capacity of regional frameworks in Europe’s near-abroad (through the Central and Eastern Europe Accession partnerships, Western Balkans Stabilisation and Association Process, and the Barcelona Process for Mediterranean countries) as well as strengthening other regional organisations with a conflict prevention mandate: the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and supporting intra-regional and inter-regional trade, including through offering developing countries better access to the EC market.

The second principal objective identified in the 2001 Communication relates to the goal of ‘reacting quickly to nascent conflicts’ or short-term prevention. To this end, the Communication recommends building or adapting institutional practices and capacities to enable more rapid and targeted ‘preventative’ interventions using EC funds as well as instruments such as political dialogue, sanctions, and crisis management interventions. In addition to the long-term and short-term conflict prevention objectives, the Communication also identifies cooperation with other actors as a policy objective. Whereas, in the UN, cooperation with other partners is seen as a necessary consequence of increased interdependence of external actors, and therefore as a means to the end of promoting external coherence and efficiency, in the EC Communication it is presented as an operational objective in its own right. This testifies to the importance of ‘multilateralism’ in EC conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy, which was subsequently confirmed in the EC 2003 Communication on *The Choice of Multilateralism* (2003a). This stated that conflict prevention and crisis management are areas in which ‘the goals and activities of the EU and the UN are united by the premise that the case for multilateralism and international cooperation is unequivocal’ (European Commission 2003a: 13). These conceptual distinctions are illustrated in Figure 1, which presents the logical framework of the EC 2001 Communication on *Conflict Prevention* (2001a).
As with the UN ‘root causes’ definition of peacebuilding, the Commission’s approach to promoting structural stability resulted in an intervention logic which encompassed a broad ‘multisectoral’ range of activities distinguished by their (indirect) contribution to peace consolidation as well as activities justified by their (direct) preventative impact. Although the policy logic was evidently intended to improve the real impact of EU engagement on the dynamics of conflict, the focus of the recommendations was related to outputs regarding organisational capacities and approach. The concrete recommendations thereby focused on how the EC should ‘mainstream’ conflict prevention in security, development and trade policies. This required greater attention to conflict in Country Strategy Papers guiding EC development programming and in Trade agreements, and dedicated resources to address cross-cutting risk factors, including those associated with post-conflict contexts. For short-term actions, EC funding was to become more flexible and rapid, while the Commission argued that greater use should be made of Council instruments to promote political dialogue, mediation and the ‘preventative’ use of sanctions and crisis management operations.
The 2001 *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts* (European Council 2001b) drew on the EC Communication and included additional recommendations regarding the Council’s approach to conflict prevention with a view to contributing to ‘a global culture of prevention’. Its objectives included improved political direction and the elaboration of preventive strategies within the intergovernmental decision-making bodies of the Council and Political and Security Committee (PSC), supported by improved early-warning capacities. It also identified thematic policy issues that should receive more institutional attention where these included SSR, DDR, democracy promotion, and efforts to address the spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the illicit trade in high-value commodities, including diamonds. A final explicit objective of the Programme was to build cooperation and partnerships with the UN, other regional and international organisations as well as non-state actors at all levels. Thus, in addition to highlighting a number of ‘cross-cutting’ policy issues that should receive greater attention, the Programme represented a political commitment to changing the processes by which all EU external actions were developed with increased emphasis on addressing root causes of conflict, including those that relate to weak state capacity, in partnership with other actors.

There have been a number of external and internal challenges to pursuing this agenda. While mustering political will for an agenda that is intangible and therefore has no political revenue is intrinsically challenging, the dramatically changed post 9/11 security environment ensured that within the EU political attention focused primarily on developing the EU’s capacity for short-term crisis management response and counter-terrorism. Reflecting on the implementation of the conflict prevention agenda in 2006, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner (2006: 2) conceded that ‘the long-term approach involved in conflict prevention is frequently knocked off course by the imperatives of short-term crisis management’. Certainly, there is little evidence to suggest that the Council and the PSC have developed ‘coherent and comprehensive preventive strategies’. While these bodies have been increasingly active in responding to crisis, their deliberations are not typically strategic with regard to conflict prevention. This is in spite of internal reform efforts in 2001 which sought to

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22 One European Foreign Minister has stated that ‘no politician has ever been re-elected by preventing a conflict in a country that most of the population has never heard of’. This was cited in a presentation by Dan Smith in an Expert Workshop on the German Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building (INEF and SEF, 2006: 12).
encourage the development of pro-active ‘preventive strategies’, drawing on the full range of EU instruments in Council regional working groups, and sought to feed these conclusions into Council and PSC deliberations. In practice, while a few strategies have been proposed, none have been adopted or resulted in pro-active CFSP or ESDP actions. Rather, the discussion of conflict prevention has been reduced to a tour de table of country concerns in the ‘orientation debate’ in the European Council at the beginning of each Presidency.

Similarly, the European Council annual reports of the implementation of the Conflict Prevention Programme are evidence of a shift in focus away from structural prevention or peacebuilding. Rather, they consistently document the EU short-term response to crises over longer-term engagements to project structural stability. For example, while these reports list EU civilian and military crisis management operations, arguing that they constitute ‘important assets in the EU conflict prevention policy’ (European Council 2007a: 3), they do not address long-term efforts to promote structural stability through development assistance (European Council 2006, 2007). These reports also emphasise the Commission’s efforts to address threats (to the security of Europe) of proliferation, terrorism and organised crime, over efforts to promote structural stability or build peace. While this shift in emphasis is certainly in line with political priorities, there are also practical administrative reasons for it. One relates to the difficulty in measuring the institutional commitment to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. A Council report (2006) acknowledges as much in pointing out that whereas crisis management has ‘clearly implementable strategies’ conflict prevention lacks a clear policy framework and dedicated budget lines.

In practice, the role of reviewing the EC’s implementation of its specific commitments to increased conflict sensitivity in its long-term engagements has been taken up by European NGOs from the development and peacebuilding sectors (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2006; International Alert, Saferworld, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2007) or in reviews by peers and independent consultancies (Faria and Ferreira 2007; OECD 2007b). These independent evaluations of the EC’s record acknowledge institutional improvements in the funding architecture for crisis response, including through the ‘Africa Peace Facility’ – a funding mechanism which the African Union can draw on in support of its peace operations –
the ‘Rapid Reaction Mechanism’ and the follow-on Instrument for Stability. They also note progress in relevant policy developments related to security, notably in relation to SSR and DDR, as well as greater EC engagement in policy development related to the management of natural resources and conflict. However, a common critique relates to the limited success of the EC’s efforts to mainstream conflict prevention or conflict sensitivity in and beyond development assistance. For instance, NGO reviews of Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) indicate that only in a few cases, such as Somalia, have CSPs explicitly addressed issues related to conflict (International Alert, Saferworld and European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2007: 8). Similarly, NGO reviews of conflict prevention policies in relation to the Horn of Africa, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrate that conflict assessments have not been systematically used in the design of country strategies and programmes (Saferworld 2006a, 2006b; Vaillant 2006). While the European Council (2007: 7) states that ‘conflict prevention and peacebuilding has been given a high priority in many of the new strategies [for the period 2007-2013]’, there is as yet little evidence of this. Likewise, at the project level the EC has no systematic approach to integrating conflict analysis into project design, monitoring and evaluation. It does, however, now require that implementing partners undertake conflict analysis in their project design, although it is not followed up in EC project monitoring and evaluation.

There are a number of obstacles to implementing the EC’s conflict prevention ‘mainstreaming’ agenda. At the organisational level, EC reforms introduced in the late 1990s have privileged the promotion of the EC as an efficient aid disbursement agency. These reforms reduced institutional incentives and capacity to engage in politically- sensitive and administratively heavy programming. Moreover, the combination of institutional restructuring in Brussels with devolution to the field, has led to the fragmentation of substantive expertise across three Directorates-General in Brussels – Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX), Directorate General for Development, and EuropeAid – and between headquarters and the field. Limited and fragmented expertise has complicated efforts in Brussels to integrate conflict analysis in the development of CSPs and country programming documents and has led to a wide degree of variation in the capacity and approach to implementing conflict-

23 On the contrary, interviews with Council officials suggest that root causes of conflict are only explicitly addressed in the CSP for Sierra Leone (interview 4).
sensitive programming in EC delegations. Moreover, at the strategic level, the partnership approach to developing CSPs in conjunction with recipient governments – a legal obligation for all African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries – militates against the development of politically sensitive activities, particularly in countries where the government may be a party to the conflict. This helps explain why conflict does not feature highly on programming agendas even in countries affected by conflict (e.g. Angola). Thus, despite strong policy commitments made in 2001, efforts to mainstream conflict prevention, including through the work of the Conflict Prevention Unit in DG RELEX and inter-agency Quality Support Group, have met with limited success. In the absence of substantive capacity and buy-in from geographical desks and delegations, the implementation of conflict-sensitive programming remains scattered, ad hoc, projectised and relatively rare.

In summary, while the conflict prevention agenda drew attention to a number of thematic policy areas that are situated within the development-security nexus and has promoted funding flexibility through two new, but limited, budget lines dedicated to short-term crisis response, it failed to provide a policy framework to rally political will and leadership among the EU member states, or to mainstream conflict prevention in EC development assistance.

2.2.2 Changing the framework to state fragility and crisis response

The normative framework of conflict prevention appeared to lose its political appeal after 2001. Thereafter, ‘operational’ preventative actions, including assistance for SSR, DDR and SALW, non-proliferation, and addressing the root causes of terrorism were increasingly couched in terms of security objectives. Meanwhile efforts to tailor development assistance to countries threatened or affected by conflict have been re-framed in terms of the broader international agenda to promote aid effectiveness and policy coherence in fragile states. In line with the Paris High-level forum (2005) on aid effectiveness, the 2006 General Affairs and External Relations Council conclusions on ‘Governance in the European Consensus for Development’ called for an improved EU response to fragile states, to which the Commission responded with a Communication on Fragile States (European Commission 2007). This elevated the importance of state-building as a key dimension of peacebuilding and conflict.
prevention. As with the 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention, the EC Communication on Fragile States also stressed the critical importance of promoting a coherent and comprehensive approach. One evaluation of the EC’s approach to fragile states concluded that ‘the development of an EU approach to fragile states is not about introducing new policies but rather about developing a comprehensive framework under which existing policy commitments relating to aid effectiveness, governance, and conflict prevention can be brought together’ (Faria and Ferreira 2007: 32).

Similarly, the 2007 peer review of EC assistance by OECD (2007a: 66) identified joint EU policy statements on promoting coherence in EU development as ‘the main EU policy frameworks that govern work in the areas of conflict, security and fragile states’. Thus, while EC’s short-term conflict prevention ambitions were increasingly framed in terms of crisis response, its efforts to promote structural prevention through development aid have increasingly focused on improving governance and state-capacities in line with common donor objectives of improving the coherence and effectiveness of assistance in fragile states.

This re-framing of the conflict prevention objective in terms of improving aid efficiency in fragile states was also arguably in line with EC institutional interests.

While EC reforms had reduced institutional incentives and capacities for engaging in conflict sensitive programming at the operational level, the politics of EU integration and inter-institutional turf wars have reduced incentives to pursue the conflict prevention agenda at a strategic level. The conceptual terrain of conflict prevention was affected by inter-institutional battles over competence. These battles were fought in the court room, with two inter-institutional cases regarding the dividing line between development and security introduced to the European Court of Justice in 2004 and 2005. They also affected the inter-institutional negotiations on the EC financing instruments for the period 2007-2013. During the negotiations in 2005 and

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25 A case brought on 21 February 2005 by the European Commission against the Council of the European Union, Case C-91/05, Official Journal, C 115/10, 14 May 2005. In this case the Commission argued that the annulment of a Council decision to provide assistance (in the framework of CFSP) to ECOAS for work on a small arms and light weapons Convention, on the grounds that the Commission’s previous decision to provide support to ECOAS under similar objectives took legal precedence. In the second case, No. C-403/05, the European Parliament took the European Commission to court arguing that the annulment of a decision to provide support for border management project in the Philippines, on the grounds that it had no competence to fund a project with the explicit objective of combating terrorism.
2006, certain member states challenged the EC’s past support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities as overstepping Community competence, in line with the Council Legal Service’s defence in one of the court cases before the European Court of Justice. Specifically, the Council criticised EC support for conflict prevention programmes implemented by sub-regional organisations (South African Development Community and ECOWAS) as well as EC support for conflict prevention initiatives in Nepal, for mediation efforts in Aceh, Liberia and Sudan, for peacebuilding efforts in Bolivia, and for support to the UN good offices in Columbia. The Council, supported by a number of member states, insisted that the term was removed from the objectives of new development and regional funding instruments and sought instead to narrowly circumscribe EC actions that they deemed legitimate development activities. Consequently, the objective of ‘conflict prevention’ was limited to the relatively small Instrument for Stability (IfS) which is tailored for short-term actions to address the emergence or re-emergence of conflict and global threats to international security. Indeed, the IfS remains the only EC funding instrument that includes the terms ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘peacebuilding’ in its objectives and programme of work. It is also, incidentally, the only funding instrument which is designed to support the peacebuilding capacity of other regional and international organisations, including the UN.

Although the impact of these decisions on EC programming is uncertain\(^\text{26}\), this period of heightened inter-pillar competition arguably contributed to the EC preference for framing its activities within emerging or established multi-donor development agendas rather than through agendas that are common to both development and diplomatic or security actors. Reframing its engagement in fragile states in terms of the OECD DAC priorities of promoting aid effectiveness, coherence and good governance had the advantage of re-enforcing strategic alliances with development actors in member states and in International Organisations, while also providing political shelter from those actors within the EU states and the Council that sought to limit the scope of EC development assistance activities or to tie them to national foreign policy interests.

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\(^{26}\) In any case, this may have been short-lived given the subsequent 2008 court ruling in favour of the Commission’s more expansive interpretation of its competences.
At the policy level, there is ample evidence for EC policy alignment with policy innovations crafted within the framework of the OECD DAC working groups. Although the UN is recognised as leading policy developments in areas such as DDR, EC officials testify to the fact that EC policies tend to follow and be informed by policy discussions developed in the context of the OECD DAC (interviews 5). This is also clear from the coincidence in timing and content of major OECD policy guidelines and EC Communications. It is true, for instance, of EC policies on development coherence, good governance, SSR, and most recently, on funding for early recovery. Similarly, EC policy on conflict prevention has been developed in line with DAC guidelines on peace and development cooperation. This close alignment of EC policies with OECD DAC policy guidance, is evidence of the strength of the donor policy networks linked to the OECD DAC and helps explain the distinct EC conceptualisation of peacebuilding from the perspective of a donor.

2.2.3 The European Council crisis management perspective

Although the EU 2003 Security Strategy identifies that ‘civilian crisis management helps restore civil government’, the deployment of civilian capacities in the framework of ESDP was not initially associated with state-building (European Council 2003). Rather, the purpose and capacities of civilian crisis management have evolved incrementally in response to operational demands, especially in the areas of providing support to state-building processes in the area of police and justice. The creation of civilian ESDP followed in the wake of the 1998 decision taken by France and the UK at St. Malo to create EU military capabilities. But the motivation for and principal drivers behind civilian ESDP were always distinct from those driving military ESDP. For the British and the French, who provided (passive) support, the rationale for creating civilian capacities was linked to the need to fill a gap for international civilian executive policing capabilities.27 For others, including the Swedish, Finnish and Germans, civilian ESDP was also a normative reaction to the

27 This was linked to events in the Balkans, notably the EU’s inability to assist in establishing public order and preventing violent clashes between Kosovar Albanian and Serbian civilians in the divided city of Mitrovica (Dwan 2002, 2004). This was highlighted by the failure of the UN to raise sufficient civilian police authorised to the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Despite appeals from the head of the UN in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, and the newly established HR/SG Javier Solana, less than 2000 of the 4178 police authorised for UNMIK were in place in early 2000. And of these only 22% came from EU member states (Fitchet, 2000).
development of military ESDP, and represented an attempt to ‘round out’ EU military capabilities, building on the EU heritage as a civilian power. Initially, therefore, there was no common vision about what civilian ESDP should do or be.

This is apparent from the broadly worded decision of the 1999 Helsinki European Council to establish ‘a non-military crisis management mechanism to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the member states’ (European Council 1999b). More specifically, the Helsinki European Council agreed an ‘Action Plan on Non-Military Crisis Management of the EU’ (European Council 1999b) that tasked the EU with developing a rapid reaction capability for the deployment of civilian personnel in response to crisis (including for actions led by other organisations). It requested further preparatory work to clarify the scope and purpose of this capability and to define concrete targets with respect to civilian deployments.

The EU role in civilian crisis management was therefore originally conceived as merely one of improved coordination. Consequently, the methodology for the build-up of civilian capabilities was supply-driven. The identification of concrete targets during the Portuguese Presidency drew on a 1999 stock-taking exercise which identified potentially relevant areas of member state civilian expertise. The approach also followed the military model of capacity generation involving the establishment of quantitative targets followed by pledging conferences. Specifically, the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 established four priority areas for capability development. These were police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. In each priority area the EU then established ‘concepts’ clarifying operational procedures for missions designed either to substitute for local capacity or to support capacity building in these distinct areas.

Reservations about the original approach to capability development were raised as early as 2001. For example, during its Presidency in 2001, Sweden had argued that the range of civilian expertise be expanded and that a more comprehensive approach to deploying police and rule of law expertise be considered in line with developments in the UN system, notably the recommendations of the Brahimi report. In practice, however, it was only in response to operational experience and requests for assistance,
that the EU adopted a broader and more flexible approach to the deployment of civilians in the framework of ESDP. This followed criticism of the limited utility of EU ‘concepts’\textsuperscript{28} and feedback from the field which stressed the need for a more integrated approach to police and rule of law deployments. For instance, although the UN had recommended an integrated rule of law mission take over from the IPTF in Bosnia in 2003, this was not perceived as possible given the EU early focus on police-only missions. Practitioners also criticised the military style approach to pre-planning for privileging structures over programming. This has since been partially addressed through the practice of more robust and inclusive pre-planning missions and, in the case of EULEX in Kosovo, the adoption of an explicit ‘programming approach’ to mission planning. Weaknesses in planning were, in any case, arguably inevitable given the limited resources that were dedicated to civilian mission planning. By 2005, there were some 30 staff working on civilian aspects of crisis management in the Council General Secretariat, including capacity building, strategic and operational planning and mission support. The EU Military Staff on the other hand, responsible for strategic planning for military missions (only), numbered over 140.

Paradoxically, despite the early emphasis on the development of military infrastructures and capabilities, the first years of ESDP saw a rapid rise in the number and scope of civilian operations. The first ESDP operation (EU Police Mission in Bosnia) was a police mission launched in 2003, and by 2005 the EU had launched no fewer than 10 civilian missions. These included missions to strengthen police capacity (in Bosnia, Macedonia, Palestine and the Democratic Republic of Congo), to strengthen local justice systems (in Georgia and Iraq), and to monitor disarmament and demobilisation processes (in Aceh) and borders (in Moldova/Ukraine and Gaza). In response to operational demands, the EU expanded the scope of its ambitions for crisis management missions. The 2004 Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP expanded the number of ‘priority areas’ for civilian ESDP up to six (police, rule of

\textsuperscript{28} For instance, the planning for the first two EU police missions launched in 2003, EUPM in Bosnia Herzegovina and Operation Proxima in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) relied principally on the generic EU Crisis Management Concept rather than the police concepts. Moreover, the internal lessons-learned review of planning for EUPM found that the ESDP ‘Concepts’, served as constraints to planning, and argued that they should serve as guidance only. Rather, more emphasis should be placed on needs assessments in the form of fact-finding missions, and where these were restricted in time, consideration should be given to more flexible planning processes which would allow the EU to revisit planning estimates. The review also called for a greater breadth of expertise to be included in planning teams.
law, civilian administration, civil protection, monitoring, and support to EU Special Representatives) and introduced a more agile format for deployment of civilian experts. In 2005 the scope of ESDP tasks was effectively extended again, when the Council agreed a concept guiding how ESDP missions could be deployed in support of Security Sector Reform (European Council 2005c). This was, in turn, followed by the agreement in 2006 of a Joint Council/Commission Concept guiding the provision of EU financial and technical support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes (European Council 2006b), which paved the way for ESDP DDR missions. Moreover, to enable the EU to undertake such a potentially broad range of monitoring and assistance tasks, the 2004 Action Plan (European Council 2004) called for the expansion in the range of expertise that the EU might draw on for ESDP mission design and implementation. Specifically, it called for experts in human rights, political affairs, security sector reform (SSR), mediation, border control, disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and media policy. The Action Plan also introduced the possibility that civilian experts could be deployed in support of Special Representatives, thereby providing a means to boost their supportive role. As a means for the rapid recruitment of such diverse expertise the Action Plan incorporated a proposal introduced by the Swedish for the EU to be able to deploy tailored ‘packages’ of experts with a mix of expertise. These Crisis Response Teams (CRTs) can, in principle, be deployed in support of ESDP missions or in support of EU Special Representatives. Although the CRTs were declared operational in 2006, this instrument for rapid recruitment has in practice only functioned as a roster from which a few individuals have been selected to serve on fact-finding or pre-planning missions.

To summarise, EU civilian crisis management capabilities have developed so that EU missions can now deploy a wider range of experts in a range of formats. While the majority of deployed missions have been relatively small in size and have focused on providing technical assistance for a specific institution or sector (most commonly police and justice), the EU ability to deploy a large mission, including executive and supportive components has also been tested in Kosovo (see chapter 4). Moreover, the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 confirmed the EU capability ambitions to field both executive and supportive missions: ‘The EU aims to have sufficient capability to deploy a small number of executive missions that substitute for local capacity, while
concurrently deploying a larger number of smaller civilian missions which aim to provide technical assistance and political support to state-building and reform processes in fragile or post-conflict contexts.’

This operational evolution has been matched by policy developments which have identified a range of potential roles for civilian ESDP that relate to state-building and peacebuilding objectives. These have, in turn, contributed to the conceptual association of civilian crisis management with promoting stability. This, for instance, reflected in the EU 2008 review of its 2003 security strategy *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* (European Council 2008) Although the section on the objective of ‘building stability in Europe and beyond’ makes no mention of peacebuilding or conflict prevention as such, it identifies ‘post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction’ (including SSR and DDR), ‘state fragility’ and ‘competition over natural resources as a source of conflict’ as priorities under the subheading of ‘the security-development nexus’ (European Council 2008: 8). Thus, the building of ‘stability’ is identified as a core EU security objective that can be pursued by combination of security and development actions and instruments attuned to fragile or post-conflict situations. In contrast, the section on enhancing EU capacities notes that: ‘Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this’ (European Council 2008: 9). In short, the EU’s security strategy conceptually links instruments of crisis management and development with ‘building stability’, while peacebuilding is still conceptually associated with development-led efforts to address structural risk factors in the longer term.

Thus, although the EU (Council and Commission) rarely use the terminology of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the EU appears to maintain the intervention rationale presented in its 2001 conflict prevention programme of action. Specifically, it maintains a distinction between long-term efforts intended to promote structural stability, primarily through development assistance designed to establish conditions that are conducive to peace, and actions and policies that are intended to tackle particular threats to peace or risk factors in the short to medium term. These are pursued through both first pillar and second pillar instruments.
The above account of the conceptual and policy evolution of peacebuilding in the EU also suggests that, as in the UN, the dynamics of bureaucratic in-fighting have served to promote conceptual diversity as a means of protecting institutional turf. Rather than converge on a common objective of preventing conflict, building peace, or even projecting stability, institutional actors have chosen to frame their activities in terms of development or security objectives that are clearly in line with their core mandates and operational approaches. Conceptual proliferation and confusion is therefore also product of institutional diversity and competition in the EU.

2.2.4 The EU response to the challenge of coherence

In line with its 2001 conception of conflict prevention policies, the EU consistently recognises the inter-dependence of its efforts to promote security, development and good governance, and advocates a comprehensive approach, involving the coherent use of a range of policy instruments. The challenge of coherence is also viewed as central to realising EU strategic security objectives in relation to effective crisis management. The European Security Strategy (ESS), agreed by the European Council in December 2003, specifically calls for a ‘more coherent’ approach. It recognises that ‘over the years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale’ and argues that:

‘the challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition of development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command (European Council 2003: 13).’

While the Council and Commission are enjoined by the Treaties to be jointly responsible for ensuring consistency of EU external activities (Nuttall 2000), this has been difficult in practice precisely because there is no ‘unity of command’ and competences overlap. This means that qualitatively similar actions, for example in support of the rule of law, institutional capacity building, and security system reform,
can be supported through either first or second pillar instruments. Moreover, there has been limited tolerance for such shared competences. Rather, the Commission and Council have engaged in disputes over where the dividing line between Community development cooperation and CFSP should lie (see note 25), and, before ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, there had been little appetite for other proposals for structural integration.

As in the UN, efforts to promote coherence through integrating planning have been security-led. But unlike the UN, in the EU the focus has initially been on civil-military integration within the context of ESDP. Within this framework there has been a clear separation between civilian and military missions with parallel intergovernmental decision-making structures and separate chains of command. While the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is responsible for all decisions in the area of crisis management, these are prepared by the EU Military Committee and the EU Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM) respectively with the support of separate planning staff. EU Military Staff conduct strategic planning for military missions, while the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which now includes over 60 staff, conducts mission planning and support for civilian missions. However, in 2009 the decision was taken to merge the strategic planning for civilian missions (DG E IX) with strategic planning for military missions (DGE VIII) in a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). Although some fear that this amounts to a hostile takeover of civilian strategic planning by military planners (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2009), it has been heralded in EU statements as contributing to the goals of coherence by improving the civil-military integration of planning. Thus, the quest for greater coherence has initially been associated with greater institutional integration between civilian and military planning within the crisis management framework.

The challenge of promoting coherence between first and second pillar actions is of a different order, however, and it is unclear whether further integration of crisis management planning will make it easier to address. As I have argued elsewhere, the institutional cleavage between security and development actors presents formidable obstacle to more joined-up approaches (Gourlay 2006a). In contrast to the UN context where member states have pushed for greater integration and streamlining of UN
actions, the politics of EU integration have tended to favour the clear separation of first and second pillar actions, even where this has arguably led to duplication. For instance, in 2004 member states rejected the Commission’s suggestion that civilian mission support functions should be combined in a single agency supporting both ESDP civilian missions and EC deployments in the context of election observation or border monitoring. Similarly, in 2005 in the context of discussions on the establishment of Civilian Response Teams, member states did not agree to EC suggestions to link this initiative with the development of EC rosters and Advanced Planning Teams. As a result, the Commission and Council maintain separate crisis response planning and support infrastructures including separate Situation/Crisis Centres, and rosters of experts that can potentially be deployed at short notice to provide technical assistance.

While implementation of the Lisbon Treaty may lead to some streamlining, it is unlikely that the proposed External Action Service (EAS) will include all of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Development (interviews 6). Thus, the planning and conduct of EU civilian missions will probably remain separated from the practice of delivering EC technical and financial support in fragile contexts, with the EAS potentially holding an analogous role to the role of the UN’s DPA, with little authority to ensure coherence of security and development actions. In short, Lisbon reforms are unlikely to deliver a clear structural solution to the EU’s cross-pillar coordination challenge, although the EAS and the creation of EU delegations should provide a number of new opportunities for inter-linkage.

This suggests that the EU pursuit of coherence will involve efforts to link up rather than integrate separate planning processes. Indeed, this has been the approach advocated by the European Council in its 2007 Conclusions on Security and Development (European Council 2007b: 35-40). These state that:

‘the nexus between security and development should inform EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action, whilst recognising that the responsibilities and roles of development and security actors are complementary but specific’.

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The Council conclusions demonstrate greater tolerance of shared competences, including in the ‘cross-cutting’ areas of governance and rule of law, and call for efforts to improve inter-linkage in relation to strategic planning, SSR, partnerships with regional organisations, and cooperation with humanitarian actors. However, they provide little guidance as to how this should be achieved beyond broad appeals to both security and development actors for greater consultation. Moreover, although the conclusions promote joint Assessment Missions, the emphasis in crisis contexts is on aligning development responses with security planning processes, notably through a joint Crisis Management Concept. In other words, although the Council conclusions have yet to be implemented, the EU approach to improving coherence in crisis contexts appears to be similar to the UN integrated approach to mission planning, in which development actors are included in security-led planning processes.

Finally, the EU maintains an explicit normative preference for cooperation with multilateral partners, notably the UN, in relation to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For instance, it makes cooperation with the UN an explicit objective of its conflict prevention policy and champions operational crisis management cooperation with the UN as a means to improving ‘effective multilateralism’ in its security strategy. It also ‘fully recognises the important role of the UN in strengthening the inter-linkages between security, development and human rights’ in its conclusions on development and security (European Council, 2007b: 35). However, despite a solid foundation of shared values, policy coherence with the UN is assumed rather than explored in EU policy documents and EU policy-making and programming processes are not linked with those developed in the UN framework. The following chapters on EU-UN operational cooperation aim to explore to what extent EU interventions support those of the UN in practice.

2.3 Conclusion: Implications of partial EU-UN conceptual alignment

The above sections 2.1 and 2.2 show how UN and EU policy discourse has been framed in line with institutional mandates and operational approaches, resulting in a diversity of peacebuilding-relevant concepts and practices. This remains the case. Reflecting on the process of consultation that informed the report on Peacebuilding in
the immediate aftermath of conflict (United Nations 2009), one PBSO official noted that ‘we didn’t attempt to resolve definitional issues relating to peacebuilding or state-building because this would have led us into a black hole. We found that humanitarian, development, political and security actors all had distinct visions of what peacebuilding was and all thought that their view was the mainstream one’ (interview 7). Despite or perhaps because of the diverse views of what peacebuilding involves in operational terms, peacebuilding discourse within the UN is closely associated with improving systemic efforts to consolidate peace. This is supported by the fact that the principal innovations associated with peacebuilding in the UN system have evolved in response to perceived weaknesses, gaps and incoherence of the collective international response at the systemic level. The UN principal institutional response to these concerns, notably the Peacebuilding Commission, was designed to bring together the most significant external actors in an effort to secure their sustained support for peace consolidation around a common strategic approach. More recently, the UN has turned its attention to the collective peacebuilding effort in the immediate aftermath of war, arguing for strengthened in-country capacity to promote strategic coordination and for efforts to bring forward the development response.

Like the UN, the EU is a fragmented institutional actor, in which the principal line of cleavage is between the development and security ‘pillars’. Within these pillars different actors are engaged in a variety of activities that can be said to contribute to peacebuilding, using a range of different instruments. Their conceptions of what peacebuilding involves vary accordingly. For example, interviews reveal that for European Commission officials (first pillar) involved in implementing the Instrument for Stability, peacebuilding is often associated with a subset of activities that are designed to address specific risk factors and promote dialogue and mediation. Officials working in DG DEV and EuropeAid (first pillar) associate peacebuilding with efforts to promote conflict-sensitivity in development assistance and address root causes by supporting long-term processes of democratisation, improving governance and promoting development. Within the Council (second pillar), officials do not typically define their work in terms of peacebuilding, but argue that short-term crisis management interventions, including political negotiations and interventions designed for post-conflict state-building, are essential pre-requisites for consolidating peace.
Although it is widely recognised in the EU that ‘post-conflict stabilisation’, recovery and peacebuilding require a comprehensive approach, combining security, development and governance activities, EU member states have not demanded institutional coherence in the same way that member states have in the UN context. Rather, to date, the politics of EU integration have served to entrench the security and development divide, with security actors emphasising decision-making autonomy, and development actors privileging conceptual and policy links with the broader donor community and national development ministries over cross-pillar alliances. This helps explain why, in the EU, the peacebuilding challenge is primarily viewed at the activity level – designing, supporting or implementing specific actions that are considered to have an impact on the root causes of conflict and the consolidation of peace.

Within the EU, even if there is a unified view that peacebuilding aims to prevent relapse into violence by improving security, governance and socio-economic development, there is no shared view on the political and operational questions of who decides on priorities, who implements them and how this should be done at the programming level. This has clearly limited the operational utility of the concept of peacebuilding. On the other hand, while the UN has tentatively begun to address the questions ‘who decides and who implements’ through efforts to bring together key external actors in the Peacebuilding Commission or through efforts to integrate UN interventions at the field level, there is only partial ‘buy-in’ to these efforts and little consensus on ‘how peacebuilding should be done’ at the activity level. Rather, in the UN, operational policy and guidance is decided within discrete communities of practice within specific organisational settings and there is no common view of what peacebuilding involves in operational terms.

Given that the EU tends to view peacebuilding at the programming level, the main focus for the EC has been on strengthening operational partnerships to address specific threats to the peace. In the UN, the principal interest has been on maintaining EU support for the nascent Peacebuilding Architecture in New York and for UN-led coordination efforts and programmes in-country. However, although the EU and UN privilege different levels of the peacebuilding challenge and this contributes to conceptual confusion, in practice both organisations combine similar approaches to peacebuilding, albeit using different conceptual terms. Their organisational approach
to peacebuilding is therefore arguably more similar than it appears from an analysis of terminology.

For instance, the EC approach to peacebuilding is similar to that of UNDP in many ways. Both organisations support a conflict transformation approach to peacebuilding, working to transform violent conflict from the bottom up through various actions designed to promote social and political reconciliation. While their engagement with national elites is a pre-requisite for their operational engagements, their activities are not typically targeted at changing the behaviour of national leaders in the short term. Rather, they are often designed to create enabling conditions for peace in the longer term. The EC and UNDP thus share ambitions to tackle the root causes through long-term programming in areas such as justice, rule of law, democratisation, state-building at national and local levels and poverty reduction. Their engagement in post-conflict recovery is also increasingly guided by common needs assessments and the EC supports UN efforts to speed up the delivery of peace dividends through better humanitarian-development coordination and funding innovations. In these cases, the approach to conflict transformation is necessarily a soft one based on long-term partnerships with national governments and efforts to build local capacity. Although the EC and UN might compete for influence in-country, they tend to share a long-term preventative approach to peace consolidation.

In contrast, the use of political and security instruments for peacebuilding follows a distinct ‘crisis management approach’ in the EU and UN. Although both organisations stress the imperative of national ownership for their operations designed to build state capacity, priority actions are decided from the top down. Actions are implemented by external actors and form part of a package of incentives (positive and negative) designed to maintain the support of political elites for the implementation of peace agreements or mutually agreed reforms.

This difference in approach also has implications for how the different actors perceive the imperative of external coherence and coordination. In line with the logic of crisis management, efforts to promote coherence of the external peacebuilding effort are primarily important for strategic political reasons since ‘unity of effort’ increases the leverage or power of the external actors vis-a-vis key domestic political elites. The
same is not, however, necessarily true for efforts which aim to improve structural stability or change from the bottom up. In these cases, the external actors require consent from national elites but not in return for short-term concessions. Indeed, the development community has long been cognisant of the negative consequences for their work of strict conditionality. From the perspective of many development actors, then, coherence is desirable for reasons of efficiency or administrative accountability. Operational partnerships can enable or strengthen interventions, and aid harmonisation is considered important for achieving ‘critical mass’ without burdening limited state capacity with the administration of external aid. It is not, therefore, principally important for strategic reasons associated with on-going negotiations designed to promote political reform from the top down.

Thus, while both long-term conflict transformation and short-term crisis management approaches to peacebuilding can be complementary, they are organised in fundamentally different ways, with different objectives, theories of change, time-lines, and coordination ‘requirements’. In theory, local EU and UN leadership helps synchronise different approaches and ensure that they are complementary. However, in both cases they often lack the authority and capacity to do so. Similarly, while the EU and UN have created dedicated peacebuilding funding instruments (the Instrument for Stability in the EU, and the Peacebuilding Fund in the UN) to fill strategic gaps or address imminent risks, these are no substitute for agreeing strategic external priorities in line with peace consolidation objectives. And while both the EU and UN support the ambition of the Peacebuilding Commission to guide ‘strategic’ international engagement, in practice it has limited geographical scope and has not guided their operational decisions.

In summary, although the EU an UN employ different conceptual frameworks for peacebuilding, they adopt similar organisational approaches, combining bottom-up support for capacity-building processes with top-down pressure for reform. This creates opportunities for inter-institutional cooperation within sector-specific communities of practice. However, there is no consensus among practitioners or scholars on how to combine these approaches to deliver whole-of-system strategic interventions. This suggests that, in practice, peacebuilding will remain characterised by conceptual and operational competition, both within and between the EU and UN.
Finally, not only is this competition inevitable given the fragmented nature of external engagement, but it is arguably useful. Just as competition in the humanitarian community has led to improvements in service delivery, coordination and funding, it also has the potential to improve the practice of peacebuilding. However, in order to do so, member states and donors need to be better equipped with operational feedback and knowledge in order to judge what works for which purpose and to assess the extent to which they can and should package their assistance to maximise collective leverage. What is needed, therefore, is not greater conceptual clarity or closely integrated approaches, but greater emphasis on building mechanisms for institutional learning and accountability into current practices.
Chapter 3. The relationship between EU and UN development actors

3. Introduction

In this chapter I examine the operational relationship between EU and UN development actors. Because funding is a key indicator of the strength of their operational relationship, this chapter employs quantitative analysis to determine funding trends in relation to the sector and specific countries. This is augmented with qualitative analysis to explain the quantitative findings and identify the material and normative interests that drive or limit operational cooperation. More specifically, in this chapter I tests for trends in the European Commission (EC)-UN funding relationship since 2001 by asking: Has EC support in fragile situations increased? Has the proportion of EC funding channeled through the UN increased in absolute and percentage terms? Is the proportion of EC assistance channeled through the UN particularly significant in fragile ‘peacebuilding’ contexts? And which factors are particularly significant in determining the strength of the EC-UN relationship in peacebuilding contexts?

The quantitative analysis is augmented by qualitative analysis designed to respond to the questions: What are the key operational challenges for the EC in supporting peacebuilding in fragile contexts? And what are the operational incentives for and challenges associated with working with the UN in peacebuilding contexts? The chapter also examines whether and how the Instrument for Stability (IfS) – the only EC funding instrument explicitly dedicated to supporting peacebuilding – has been used to support the UN. It asks how far has the IfS been used to support UN peacebuilding? what activities has the IfS been used to support? and through which UN institutional actors? This is complemented by qualitative analysis of the management of the IfS that aims to explain quantitative findings.

Taken together, this mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis informs the chapter conclusions regarding the extent to which material interests, institutional personality and operational norms determine patterns of operational cooperation.
3.1 Global trends and challenges in funding for fragile states

By way of background, I begin by reviewing the literature and evidence regarding global trends and challenges in funding for fragile states. This serves as a control – helping to later establish to what extent the EC funding patterns are ‘typical’ and can be explained as challenges that are common to all donors. The OECD defines fragile states as countries that ‘lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development, and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’ (OECD 2007c: 2). Using a range of economic and governance indicators the OECD compiles an index of fragile states, which currently includes 38 states\(^{29}\). The figures below are drawn from OECD data, and therefore refer to the states that the OECD currently categorises as fragile\(^{30}\).

Figure 2. Net ODA disbursement from all donors to fragile states 2001-2007

![Net ODA Disbursement from all Donors to Fragile States](image)


As Figure 2 demonstrates, since 2001 there has been a gradual rise in total (multilateral and bilateral) Official Development Assistance (ODA) for fragile states.

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\(^{29}\) In 2009, these were: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Liberia, Mauritania, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

\(^{30}\) When compared with other similar indices, including the World Bank’s index of ‘Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), the Failed States Index, or the ‘Difficult Partnership Countries’, the OECD’s list of fragile countries tends to be longer.
This is due, in part, to significant debt relief programmes as well as to the 2010 aid targets that states committed to at the 2005 Gleneagles summit. However, as Figure 3 demonstrates, over half of ODA to fragile states between 2001 and 2007 was channeled to five countries – Nigeria, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Cameroon.

Figure 3. Shares of Net ODA to fragile states 2001-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shares of Net ODA to Fragile States 2001 - 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Fragile States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to White (2009: 6) regarding ODA for fragile states, ‘the bulk of foreign assistance is channeled to moderately well-off countries, those recently emerging from a conflict or those possessing special geopolitical significance’. The rest are so-called ‘aid orphans’ who receive relatively little support despite high levels of need and probabilities of the (re)-eruption of violence. This confirms that conflict prevention is not the main determinant of global aid priorities. Nor, it appears, is governance or state-capacity-building the main focus of funding in fragile states. Even in those states that receive high levels of ODA, a high proportion of the assistance is in the form of debt relief or humanitarian assistance. It is not therefore clear whether programmable aid for long-term institution-building and development has risen since 2001.

A number of reasons have been given for why many fragile states receive a small proportion of aid despite evident need. The first relates to aid effectiveness. Research in 2000 showed that aid had a positive impact on countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000: 847-68). This proved influential, with
donors increasingly determining aid allocations on the basis of good performance. However, a number of researchers argue that performance-based aid has left fragile states behind and the causes of state fragility unaddressed (White 2009; Fukuda-Parr 2007; Goodhand 2006). Research conducted for the World Bank on the ‘poverty alleviation’ efficiency of aid showed that there was an inefficient allocation of aid, with fragile states receiving less aid than was consistent with what aid could achieve in terms of growth and poverty alleviation (Collier and Dollar 1999). Similarly, research for the OECD showed that most fragile states were under-funded relative to what they should have received according to their poverty, population and World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores. On the other hand, a few ‘aid darlings’ received more aid than their scores justified (Levin and Dollar 2005). Thus fragile states tend to receive less than their need and their performance merits. This suggests that performance-based aid is not necessarily biased against fragile states. To explain the discrepancy, some point to the influence of political and commercial interests to help explain the disproportionately high amount of funding that middle-income countries receive. Moreover, the margins between what states merit based on aid performance criteria and what they receive are larger in bi-lateral aid than in aid from multi-lateral organisations (Levin and Dollar 2005). This is possibly because multi-lateral aid is relatively less influenced by political and commercial interests than bi-lateral aid. A further study shows a preference for donor funding for states where capacity is weak but state legitimacy is strong (Carment, Prest and Samy 2009), pointing to the importance of political stability as a factor in aid allocation decisions, regardless of donor political or commercial interests.

While political influence may be one factor in explaining aid allocation discrepancies, it is certainly not the only one. Organisational incentive structures are clearly weighted against risky and administratively costly aid in fragile states. Donor agencies are accountable to their principals – legislators and member states who stress accountability and concerns over corruption. They also stress aid disbursement efficiency which puts a premium on aid volume. These pressures have, moreover, intensified with the G8 commitments and the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs). They are also translated within organisations into individual appraisal and incentive structures that reward high-volume, risk-averse interventions. By the same token, there are no incentives to encourage staff to take up posts in fragile countries or to
seek out projects linked to state capacity-building. These require high levels of supervision, local expertise and political acumen to maintain relationships with partner governments while tackling political obstacles. In summary, ‘risk-aversion, budget pressures, and a reluctance to make the labour-intensive investments commensurate with the challenge posed by fragile states, all discourage engagement with them’ (White 2009: 9).

Yet, as Collier (2008) has shown, aid as technical assistance can help turn around failing states. There is, for example, statistical evidence that technical assistance in the first years of an incipient reform has a big favourable effect on the chances that the momentum of the reforms will be maintained (Collier 2008: 114). Similarly, there is evidence that programmes and projects in fragile states require higher levels of supervision (Collier 2008: 118). The trick, as Collier argues, is for agencies to create or support funding mechanisms for high-risk interventions, including early recovery funds, and for agencies and donors to accept that they will need to spend relatively more on project administration in fragile contexts.

The following section explores to what extent these broad trends and challenges that discourage engagement in fragile states apply to EC funding for fragile states.

3.2 Trends in EC funding for fragile states

The EC does not routinely publish data on its funding for fragile states. Nevertheless, its EU Donor Atlas platform initiated an on-line tool for tracking aid in situations of fragility. This was based on the World Bank’s list of fragile situations31 and was maintained until 2005. This data is reproduced in Figure 4 below.

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31 The World Bank’s definition of fragile states covers low income countries scoring 3.2 and below in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index. Thirty-three countries are included in this definition of fragile states. They are: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kosovo, Laos PDR, Liberia, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, Vanuatu, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.
Although not up-to-date, Figure 4 reveals an increase in EC ODA assistance to fragile states since 2000. However, much of this additional spending is related to emergency humanitarian aid rather than core development assistance. It is therefore less clear to what extent EC funding for core dimensions of the state-building agenda had increased up to 2005.

3.2.1 Trends in EC funding for state-building in fragile states

Since 2000, there has been a concerted effort within the EU to promote good governance and state-building in EU development policy. This has been reflected in an increasingly elaborate policy framework and dedicated financial commitments. The policy developments can be traced through a number of Commission and joint Commission-Council policy documents. These include the Joint Council and Commission Statement on EC Development Policy (European Commission 2000a),
which identifies institutional strengthening as one of the six priority areas, and the Communication on Governance and Development (European Commission 2003b), which evolved into the Communication on Governance (European Commission 2006a). Governance issues also feature prominently in the European Consensus on Development (European Council 2005a), and the EU Strategy for Africa (European Council 2005b), and in the 2006 EC Communication on Governance (European Commission 2006a). The 2006 Governance Communication draws upon the results of independent evaluation (PARTICIP 2006) with a view to developing a more harmonised approach to governance within the development context.

In line with its elevated policy profile, financial commitments to the good governance agenda have been increasingly significant, although difficult to quantify. The lack of appropriate classification codes has meant that attempts to identify the volume of aid allocated to good governance have been tentative. A 2003 review of country and regional strategy papers conducted by DG DEV nevertheless estimated that €2 billion out of a total programmable envelope of €10 billion for 2002-2007 was allocated to governance-related support (European Commission 2003c). Another estimate of financial volumes (by region) over the period 1995-2004 shows an increase in good governance related commitments, representing 27 percent of total EC commitments. But it also reveals a widening gap between commitments and payments, with only one third of the commitments disbursed over the period (PARTICIP 2006: 38). The EC earmarked €2.7 billion to good governance from the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) for 2008-13 out of a total programmable envelope of €13.5 billion for African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. While 80% of the EDF is allocated through Country Strategy Papers which may also include governance support, the remaining 20% (€2.7 billion) is set aside as an additional ‘incentive tranche’. These funds are allocated on the basis of partner countries’ commitments to governance plans of action. The EC insists that this system does not constitute a form of conditionality since it offers a more collaborative approach to implementation, with joint responsibility for attaining targets. Nevertheless, as the OECD DAC review has observed, democratic governance is increasingly seen as a pre-condition for budget support and it remains unclear how the incentive tranche system will work in fragile states where state capacity is weak (OECD 2007: 64, 68). Thus, although aid allocations for good governance are significant and increasing, the fact that recipients must meet minimum
governance standards to receive budget support, or ‘additional’ governance assistance, suggests that there are significant challenges to aid disbursement on ‘governance’ in fragile states.

As with global ODA trends, it appears that funding for governance is higher in ‘normal’ development contexts and in fragile states is concentrated in relatively few ‘aid darlings’. The EC Communication on Governance acknowledges that the majority of good governance assistance is delivered in stable political contexts (European Commission 2003a, 2006). Likewise the EC report on peacebuilding activities (European Commission 2005a) provides relatively few concrete examples of EC support for state-building in fragile contexts, with some notable post-conflict exceptions: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq and the countries of the Western Balkans. EuropeAid annual reports also show that top recipients of EC aid are often conflict-affected countries. Since 2003, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Sudan, and the West Bank and Gaza\(^\text{32}\) have featured among the top five.

3.2.2 Operational challenges for EC engagement in fragile states

Although there has been little quantitative analysis of the breakdown of EC assistance in fragile states, there have been a number of qualitative studies of EC assistance in this area. The EC commissioned two of these, notably the 2006 thematic evaluation of EC support to good governance (European Commission 2006d) and the 2008 mapping study on situations of fragility (European Commission 2008a). In addition, in 2007 the Portuguese Presidency of the EU commissioned a study intended to inform EU strategy in response to situations of fragility (Faria and Ferreira 2007). These reviews of EC assistance documented the increasing prominence given to the governance dimension in EC development policy, but also identified a gap between policy and practice. As with global reviews of assistance in fragile states, the studies highlighted disbursement pressures combined with an emphasis on financial accountability as factors which served as disincentives for risky and administratively ‘heavy’ governance programming. Similarly, they noted the difficulty of prioritising

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\(^{32}\) In EC funding data categorisation, the West Bank and Gaza are grouped as a country. For the sake of data consistency this chapter uses the same categorisation.
governance issues in Country Strategy Papers where partner governments are not in agreement, and all stressed that the EC in-country capacity was often not sufficient for providing and overseeing governance assistance in many post-conflict contexts.

Building on the analysis provided in these formal reviews of EC assistance, this subsection explores the EC capacities for marrying political and substantive analysis with programming, and argues that the structural reforms introduced in the 1990s have served to exacerbate the challenge by reducing and fragmenting substantive expertise. According to OECD DAC reviews of EC reforms, as well as the analysis of the then Commissioner for Development Aid Nielson (OECD 1998, Jørgensen 2006: 206), member-state criticism of EC aid management efficiency, through the OECD peer review process, was a key driver of the two major organisational reforms of the late 1990s. This was reinforced by internal criticism (European Commission 2000a) and resulted in a comprehensive reform package. The reforms involved the consolidation of project management tasks in a new DG – the EuropeAid Cooperation Office – established in 2001, and the devolution of EC aid management. Grant-making authority was delegated to the EC delegations and some staff were transferred from Brussels to the 140 countries in which the EC is represented (European Commission 2004a).

The centralisation of the operational management of aid disbursement was intended to separate out the policy-making and programming functions retained by DG RELEX and DG DEV from the operational project management tasks. Consequently, EuropeAid is formally responsible for all phases of the project cycle (identification and appraisal of projects and programmes, preparation of financing decisions, implementation and monitoring, evaluation of projects and programmes) that are necessary to ensure the achievement of the objectives of EC programmes. Four of the

33 Evidence for the sluggishness of EC aid management included the amount of undischarged funds: as of December 1996 the committed but undisbursed funds had reached €11.6 billion, including €1.3 billion on commitments made before 1992 (OECD 1998: 55).

34 The proposal to establish a single office responsible for the operational aspects of aid management was initially intended to tackle aid disbursement efficiency by introducing greater flexibility in staff recruitment. This prompted the 1997 suggestion to create an independent aid agency, distinct from the Commission. The idea encountered resistance from all the affected Directorates-General, on the basis that out-sourcing core aspects of the aid disbursement function would undermine the institutional competence and authority of the EC, and in 1997 the compromise decision was reached to set up a common service for all four Relex DGs responsible for operational implementation.
seven EuropeAid directorates are organised by region, two provide operational support and one, Directorate E – Operations Quality Support – is dedicated to ensuring that EuropeAid is a ‘centre of excellence’, where projects are designed with input from substantive experts. In relation to EC assistance to post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building, the relevant units for providing substantive input to project design and implementation are E4 ‘governance, human rights and gender’ and E5 ‘security and migration’. Institutional expertise related to post-conflict state-building and conflict prevention was therefore formally separated from expertise on governance within EuropeAid until mid-2007 when these two units were merged. Thus, organisational re-structuring in order to streamline EC aid disbursement has resulted in the fragmentation of the Brussels-based grant-making infrastructure into three Directorates-General with distinct functional roles and organisational cultures. DG RELEX is designed to promote the EC role as a political and foreign policy actor, DG DEV is aligned with the EC role as an aid agency and EuropeAid is designed to promote the functional imperatives of efficient rule-based aid disbursement. All three Directorates-General have centres of thematic expertise in the area of conflict prevention and post-conflict state-building. This is located in the Conflict Prevention Unit of DG RELEX, the Governance and Security Unit of EuropeAid, and the pan-African unit (dealing with security, governance and migration) in DG DEV, in addition to country and regional desk-officers. The task of ‘mainstreaming’ conflict prevention or promoting a coherent approach to post-conflict state-building has therefore been complicated by the fact that this requires inter-service cooperation between three Directorates-General with distinct organisational agendas, all of whom can claim competence on the basis of their formal roles and expertise.

In addition to the increased fragmentation of the policy and programming infrastructure in Brussels, the process of EC devolution has compounded the scattered nature of EC decision-making and increased the challenge of ensuring substantive expertise and policy coherence in the delivery of EC external assistance. The extensive and rapid devolution of management responsibilities from EC headquarters to the EC delegations abroad was guided by the principle that ‘anything that can be better managed and decided on the spot, close to what is happening on the ground, should not be managed or decided in Brussels’ (European Commission 2000c). It was implemented between 2000 and 2005 and was prompted by severe criticism of EC
efficiency as a donor. In line with this analysis, an independent review of the reform process stated that a ‘profoundly important factor in explaining the current crisis is the ‘existential transition’ in which the Commission finds itself, i.e. from acting as a ‘motor’ for the European integration process to becoming a ‘manager’ of large funds’ (Bossuyt et al. 2000). Devolution was, therefore, designed to quickly yield results that related to the strengthening and expediting of the EC aid disbursement bureaucracy, in addition to delivering qualitative improvements in recipient ownership through the gradual decentralisation of management responsibilities to recipients.

Studies of decentralisation efforts within EU member states reveal that devolution reforms within donor organisations are generally hampered by reliance on centralised procedures, lack of analytical capacity in missions, understaffing and a lack of clear division of responsibilities between different entities in the donor system (OECD 2003). This also appears true of EC efforts, and the specificities of the EC make some of these challenges more acute. For example, while it was broadly acknowledged that understaffing contributed to the slow pace of EC aid disbursement, efforts to address this through devolution still leave the EC relatively short of personnel compared with other donors. They have also focused on increasing human resources for project administration over substantive expertise to promote effective project design and quality control. In total, 1559 staff (375 EC officials and 1184 external staff) were hired to cover the devolution process, of which over half the new official positions are for finance and contract specialists. By the end of 2004, these new positions gave the EC 4.8 staff to manage every €10 million, up from 2.9 in 2000, but still well below the average for EU Member States, which have between 3 (Austria) and 23 (Germany) staff for every US$10 million (European Commission 2004b: 81). Given that devolved systems tend to be more staff intensive than centralised ones, and that few of the new hires have substantive or local expertise, the devolution process did not necessarily increase the human resource capacity in delegations to deliver more locally attuned and politically sensitive funding decisions.

35 By 1999 the EC backlog of outstanding commitments reached more than US$20 billion and the average delay in disbursements had increased from 3 years to 4.5 years in the last five year period.
36 This is, in turn, exacerbated by current incentives in EC career progression. Despite a recent change in the EC statute requiring officials in the Directorate-Generals dealing with external relations to go abroad after a maximum of six years in Brussels, there are no financial or career progression incentives for doing so, and hence many officials find ways to avoid field assignment.
The finding that devolution has not increased the effectiveness of aid delivery has been reinforced by feedback from ACP governments, which stressed that the expertise in the delegations has not matched the expertise required by the focal areas of the country strategy papers or National Indicative Programmes (ACP Secretariat 2004). Moreover, in a number of recipient countries, the devolution of administrative responsibilities and capacity to the national level has led the Commission to roll back joint management with host countries in order to expedite implementation. It has therefore been noted that the process of devolution coupled with the pressure to disburse and a preoccupation with financial accountability has undermined the strategy of building capacity in the recipient country and has confused ‘disbursed money’ with ‘impact’ (Frederiksen and Baser 2004: 9-10). This has prompted calls for increases in operational staff working in the focal areas of EC assistance (particularly governance) and for incentives to reward staff for quality improvements and for active contributions towards strategic reform objectives (Frederiksen and Baser 2004: 10).

In light of persistent staff shortages and the increased responsibilities that EC delegations have acquired, the character and competence of delegations is increasingly shaped by the leadership and recruitment choices of EC heads of delegation. Faced with limited staff allotments, EC managers have to make difficult decisions over whether to prioritise those with experience in supporting sector wide approaches over those with project management skills or broad development experience. NGO reports on EC delegation capacity in countries or regions affected by conflict reveal a wide variation in capacity and expertise, with some delegations (such as for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia/Somaliland, and Uganda) having acquired a high degree of expertise, including through the local recruitment of ALATs (agent local d’assistance technique) (Saferworld 2006a and 2006b; Samson 2007).

In summary, the above account of the reform of EC development assistance highlights how the interaction between member states and the Commission created a reform agenda which focused on developing the institutional competence of the EC as an administratively accountable aid disbursement agency. While neither member states nor the DG RELEX Commissioners who orchestrated the reforms foresaw that privileging aid disbursement efficiency might adversely affect aid effectiveness, it has in practice undermined efforts to build substantive capacity and procedures that
promote politically sensitive and transformative funding strategies in fragile states. Rather, EC reforms have reduced institutional incentives and capacity to engage in politically sensitive project-based programming and to allocate relatively scarce staff resources to developing in-house specialist competence. Moreover, the combination of institutional restructuring in Brussels with devolution to the field, has led to the fragmentation of substantive expertise across three Directorates-General in Brussels (RELEX, DG DEV and EuropeAid) and between headquarters and the field. In doing so, it has complicated efforts in Brussels to integrate conflict analysis in the development of Country Strategy Papers and country programming documents and has led to a wide degree of variation in the capacity and approach to implementing politically-sensitive governance programming in EC delegations. This helps explain why, in the absence of substantive capacity and buy-in from geographical desks and delegations, governance programming remains scattered, ad hoc, projectised and relatively rare in some fragile states.

By the same token, disbursement pressures combined with capacity shortfalls have increased operational imperatives to channel funds through administratively efficient instruments, such as budget support. The European Commission has used budget support for debt relief in fragile states (e.g. Burundi, Central African Republic, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo) and is working, together with other donors, on the development of guidance to increase the use of budget support for state-building and governance development in fragile states. However, given the limited capacity or ‘eligibility’ of national government counterparts and the risk-aversion of member states and the European Parliament, the use of budget support in fragile states is not yet widespread. It would, in any case, likely need to be combined with technical assistance programmes in the area of financial administration.

EC capacity shortfalls and the risk aversion also arguably contribute to an operational interest in partnering with other donors and other international organisations in the implementation of assistance in fragile states. They help explain the increase in the use of Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) in fragile states, administered by the United Nations or World Bank and the use of the UN as an implementing partner for projects and programmes. Distributing aid through the UN is relatively administratively light for the EC, especially since the 2003 Financial and Administrative Framework
Agreement (FAFA), and makes sense in so far as the UN has a comparative capacity advantage and established relationship with the authorities in many fragile states. Where the UN does have this comparative political and capacity advantage in fragile states, one might therefore expect the UN to be the principal implementing partner for the EC. The following section will explore whether this is borne out by recent funding trends and evaluations of EC assistance.

3.3 Global trends in EC funding for the UN

3.3.1 Trends in EC assistance channeled through UN bodies

There have been a number of efforts to track European funding that is channeled through the UN. Within the EC, EuropeAid has produced an annual report of EuropeAid financial contributions to the UN since 2001,\(^{37}\) providing statistics on the external aid that EuropeAid is responsible for disbursing. This includes aid from the European Community Budget and EDF, but does not include humanitarian aid disbursed through the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). Since 2005, the Brussels Office of UNDP has also produced annual reports highlighting the results of the EC-UN operational partnership.\(^{38}\) In addition, the Commission launched an evaluation of the Commission’s external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family. This involved both quantitative and qualitative analysis and was delivered in 2008 (European Commission 2008d). This section draws on the data published in these reports and aims to provide an overview of the main trends in the EC-UN funding relationship.

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\(^{37}\) These annual reports are available on the EuropeAid website at [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/partners/international-organisations/index_en.htm.]

\(^{38}\) These annual reports are available on the website of UNDP’s Brussels office [http://www.undp.org/eu/]

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Figures 5 and 6 show that since 2001 there has been a marked increase in funding channeled from the EC through the UN. From 2002 to 2006, the volume of aid channeled through EuropeAid to the UN quadrupled from some €257 million to over 1 billion in 2006. Although from 2006 to 2007 this declined to around €719 million, this can partly be explained by an accounting change. In 2007 all food aid programmes, with a total budget of €220 million, were transferred to the Commission’s Humanitarian department, ECHO, and therefore most contracts concluded with the World Food Programme do not appear in 2007 figures. However, this alone does not explain the decline in 2007 and 2008. As the figures below indicate, the decline since 2006 can be explained by a decline in aid to some of the countries that received a high proportion of EC assistance, often channeled through UNDP.

39 These EuropeAid statistics are prepared using data from the Common Relex Information System (CRIS) which contains information on projects funded from the general Commission budget (about €4 billion a year). It also includes data from projects in the On Line Accounting System (OLAS) database. These are funded by the European Development Fund that covers countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (about €3 billion a year). Since February 15 2009, however, CRIS also includes data previously included in OLAS. The source of the statistics on EC humanitarian funding from ECHO is also Europe Aid, as represented in the report Improving Lives (UNDP 2008: 20).
Figure 6. Total EC aid and percentage channeled through the UN system (2002-2007)


Figure 7, below, reveals that a large proportion of EC funding for the UN is allocated to situations of fragility (European Commission 2008d). It shows that between 1999 and 2006 more than half (55%) of the total funds contracted by the Commission (DG RELEX, DG DEV, EuropeAid) to the UN bodies over the period 1999-2006 were for interventions in clear situations of political crisis. During this period, three countries received one-third of the total: West Bank and Gaza Strip €548m (14%); Iraq €478m (10%); and Afghanistan €356m (9%). However, as Figure 8 shows, substantial funding for Afghanistan only began in 2001, Iraq in 2002 and the others in 2003-4.
Figure 7. EC aid channeled through the UN (1999-2006)

Source: Evaluation of EC external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family (European Commission 2008d).

Figure 8, below, also demonstrates that high volumes of EC funding for the UN are concentrated in particular crisis-affected states. In addition to the three countries mentioned above, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia were the next three largest recipients of EC funding channeled through the UN, along with regional ACP initiatives. Likewise, the annual reviews of the EC-UN partnership conducted by UNDP consistently reveal that most of the countries in which they receive high levels of funding from the EC (over €15 million per year) have been affected by political crisis. For instance, in 2007 there were 15 countries where the UN received funds for over €15 million from the European Commission. These were, in order of volume, Sudan, West Bank and Gaza, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq, Thailand, Ukraine, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, South Africa, Togo, Indonesia, and Chad (United Nations Office in Brussels 2008: 20).
Figure 8. Evolution of the contracted amounts of EC assistance channelled through UN bodies, 1999-2006 – 7 largest versus other recipient countries

Source: Evaluation of Commission’s external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family (European Commission 2008d).

EC assistance is channelled through a wide range of UN agencies and programmes. EuropeAid’s annual reports routinely report on no fewer than 38 UN bodies that receive EC assistance. However, given that a high proportion of assistance is channelled to countries in situations of crisis, the UN agencies or programmes that are present and have a mandate to deliver recovery assistance receive a relatively large proportion of EC assistance. As shown in Figure 8, which excludes EC humanitarian funding, a large proportion of EC funds were granted to a limited number of UN bodies between 1999 and 2006. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) was the main recipient with €1.5bn, representing 40% of total EC contributions, followed by the World Food Programme with contracts amounting to €0.8bn (21%). Five other large recipients are the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the near East (UNRWA) (15%), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (5%), the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO) (3%), the World Health Organisation (WHO) (3%), and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights UNHCR (2%). Combined, these seven UN bodies received 89% of the EC funding for the UN between 1999 and 2006.
Figure 9. Distribution of the amount contracted from EC by UN bodies (1999-2006)

![Pie chart showing distribution of EC funding to UN bodies]

Source: Evaluation of Commission’s external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family (European Commission 2008d).

Given that EC assistance for the UN is concentrated in a relatively small number of countries and UN agencies, as indicated in Figure 9, it is likely that large fluctuations in country-assistance will be reflected in the volume of funding received by the main UN agencies that operate in those countries. This appears to be borne out by the trend in UNDP funding from the EC, shown in Figure 10. In 2004, 2005 and 2006, when UNDP was conducting large elections and reconstruction projects in Sudan, DRC, and Iraq, UNDP received over €400 million a year from the EC, whereas previous and subsequent levels of funding have been less than half that amount.
3.3.2 Analysis

EuropeAid does not offer any evaluation of the funding trends documented in its annual reports, but it has commissioned studies to evaluate the ‘added value’ of channeling EC funding through international organisations (IOs). For instance, in 2006 it commissioned a study to provide an overview of implementation by IOs. This concluded that the principal reasons for the EC cooperation with IOs were: their ability to mobilise expertise and aid towards emerging global concerns; their potential for aid coordination; and their emphasis on capacity building and on a strong policy agenda. It argued that one of the benefits of collaboration with IOs is that it increases EC policy influence at a broader level and contributes to inter-organisational learning (European Commission 2006c). Similarly, the 2006 UN review of its programmatic portfolio with the EC noted the importance of UN specialist thematic expertise and its coordination role as important reasons for channeling EC assistance through the UN. In addition, it noted that the EC partnered with the UN ‘on sensitive issues that require the legitimacy and impartiality of the UN and in fragile country situations where consistent field presence and combined UN mandates facilitate transition out of crises’ (United Nations Office in Brussels 2006: 12). This suggested that the strong operational EC partnership with the UN in fragile situations flows from the UN capacity and legitimacy in these contexts. The 2008 evaluation of the EC assistance
through the UN reinforced this suggestion, concluding that the added value of channeling EC aid through the UN was simply that it was the only option for intervention in many cases. It concluded that:

‘a number of interventions would not have been possible if they had not been conducted through UN bodies. In various cases the Commission benefited from the unique specific characteristics of the UN system and bodies, which were required for being able to intervene and which no other organisation could offer’ (European Commission 2008d: v).

Of particular note in this context is the use of multilateral response mechanisms for major events, such as MDTFs, which are administered through the UN. The UN thereby ‘made delivery of aid possible in cases where this would otherwise have been difficult, particularly in politically-sensitive situations’. The study found that when the UN has a clear mandate to administer multi-donor interventions in the absence of government capacity, notably in crisis or post-conflict situations, ‘the organisation becomes a natural partner for the Commission’ (European Commission 2008d: 22). This, for example, includes the Iraq Trust Fund (UNDP), the Elections in DRC (UNDP), and the mandate of UNRWA in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In many crisis situations, the evaluation studies found that channeling aid through the UN also ‘had impact in terms of policy dialogue with partner countries’ (European Commission 2008d: vi). This is because the UN had established presence and relationship with national authorities. Channeling aid through the UN offered the EC access to national authorities and a platform for discussion, which was seen to be particularly valuable in fragile states (European Commission 2008d: 25). Also, in cases where the UN administered multi-donor interventions, EC participation enhanced EC influence through the governance structures of MDTFs. This was, for instance, the case in the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the EC actively participated in the technical committee responsible for the elections. There is, therefore, a broad consensus arising out of the evaluations of the EC funding partnership with the UN that in fragile situations the partnership is strong and natural because it is necessary. It enables the EC to disburse aid in these difficult contexts and enhances EC influence with local partner countries.
While none of the evaluations of EC assistance channeled through the UN set out to explain the funding trends, they nevertheless identify a range of factors that help account for the rise in volume and proportion of EC assistance channeled through the UN between 2001 and 2006. According to EC staff interviewed in Brussels and in the EC Delegations, this trend was ‘significantly influenced’ by the clear EC policy preference for supporting effective multilateralism by working with the UN and a crucial administrative agreement that made it easier to disburse funds to the UN in practice. More specifically, the Communication Building an effective partnership with the UN (European Commission 2001) and the Communication The European Union and the United Nations: the Choice of Multilateralism (European Commission 2003a) provided a supportive policy framework, which was further strengthened by the emphasis in the Paris Declaration on donor cooperation and harmonisation of external aid. The Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) agreed in 2003, however, was a critical enabling factor. The 2008 ADE study noted that it ‘allowed UN bodies to work within their own procedures, it specified mutual obligations, and it made possible substantial pre-financing’ (European Commission 2008d: vi). From the EC perspective, it reduced the time needed for partner selection compared with calls for proposals. However, it did not necessarily reduce delivery time given that it effectively transferred the administrative burden to the UN. The UNDP report on EC-UN cooperation in 2006 argues that, in addition to FAFA, which lowered the transaction costs of cooperation for the EC, assistance channeled through the UN has been aided by the devolution process within the Commission, which has increased the country-level entry points for cooperation and helped the EC assess local UN capacities more accurately (United Nations Office in Brussels 2006). Finally, while the ADE study notes that the increase in volume of funding until 2006 is a general phenomenon and does not only apply to countries with high public awareness and donor mobilisation (e.g. Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq), the subsequent decline in funding since 2006 can be largely explained by a reduction in funding for some of the major recipient countries, most of which are in political crisis (see Figure 11 below). Thus, while there has been a general rise in the volume of assistance channeled through the UN, this is likely to fluctuate along with trends in funding high-profile countries or crisis events that precipitate large volumes of aid.

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40 This operationalised the Article 53 of the Financial Regulation agreed in 2002, which provided the legal parameters and procedures for all EC assistance.
Despite the consensus that the EC and UN are natural operational partners in fragile states where the UN has the capacity, legitimacy and mandate to lead international responses, interviews with EC staff and evaluations of the EC-UN partnership reveal persistent frictions that stem from different perceptions of the nature of the partnership and different operational practices. For example, the Commission has unusually high financial accountability standards linked to the financial regulations relating to ODA, which are required of the EC by the European Parliament. They have, however, led to the widespread perception within the UN that the EC is an ‘overly’ demanding donor when compared with other donors. Reporting requirements that require annual interim reports and financial reports in Euros often require distinct management of EC funds within UN interventions, which, in turn, creates problems for the pooling of resources. From the EC perspective, however, the UN is often seen as an unreliable implementing partner precisely because of insufficient and delayed narrative and financial reporting, which create accountability problems for EC officials. For example, the Commission was forced to take abnormal financial risks in contravention of procedures when funding the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo through UNDP, although both sides agree with hindsight that a pro-active attitude to taking risks was required for the sake of the project’s (successful) outcome.

At the operational level, the EC-UN relationship is also strained by different interpretations of what partnership means in practice. From the EC point of view, co-management as defined in the FAFA agreement requires that the UN provide the EC with full information and involve the EC in strategic decision-making relating to project implementation. From the UN perspective, however, the EC is viewed as a demanding donor that wants to interfere in UN project management where it has no responsibility for the implementation for the project and does not deserve a ‘privileged’ status vis-à-vis other donors. While both partners argue that the partnership should be based on mutual respect between ‘equals’, both often feel disrespected. Commission evaluations have concluded that these organisational frictions can be overcome through greater clarification of mutual obligations, including through further guidance on the precise interpretation of FAFA as well as staff training. However, further organisational adaptation may be necessary. There is a strong case for adapting EC financial regulations, making them more risk tolerant in fragile states where the UN
has a leading role in early post-conflict recovery, and for the increased use of MDTFs, which reduce transaction costs for the EC and the recipient country while ensuring that the donors are involved in their governance.

3.4 EC funding for UN peacebuilding

3.4.1 Global trends in EC funding for UN peacebuilding

The EC does not routinely provide statistics relating to its aid for peacebuilding. However, in EuropeAid 2006 and 2007 reports on its contributions to UN funds, programmes and agencies it identified the total amounts that the EC contracted with direct links to peacebuilding.\(^{41}\) In 2006, the total figure was €806 million, of which 36% was focused on elections and institution-building, 11% was for support to refugees, 11% was for economic recovery, 7% was on management of natural resources. Other identified categories were Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) (3%), demining (3%), justice and human rights (5%), and children/gender in post-conflict assistance (2%) (European Commission 2007b). In 2007 EuropeAid identified that the total amount contracted to the UN with direct links to peacebuilding was €318 million, of which 41% was dedicated to elections and institution building, 29% was for rule of law, justice reform and human rights, 14% was for SSR, 6% was for management of natural resources, 5% was for DDR, 3% was for demining, and 2% was for support to refugees (European Commission 2008b). These categories were identified on the basis of unexplained ‘peacebuilding’ criteria. The 2006 report also stated that 20% of aid had ‘no links with peacebuilding’ while the 2007 breakdown only included peacebuilding categories. This discrepancy raises the issue of the scope of peacebuilding. From EuropeAid 2007 and 2006 reports, it appears that peacebuilding has been defined as support for governance and security measures, but not for socio-economic activities.

The issue of how EuropeAid defined the scope of peacebuilding was tackled again in 2008, when EuropeAid commissioned a two-phase thematic evaluation of EC support to conflict prevention and peace building. The preliminary phase resulted in a scoping

\(^{41}\) This practice has since been discontinued in EuropeAid reporting.
and mapping study that sought to address issues of scope and build an inventory of EC support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding from 2001 to 2008 (European Commission 2009b). It produced an inventory of 3080 interventions which were classified in eleven thematic categories derived from priority themes in the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention (European Commission 2001a)\(^\text{42}\). More specifically, the inventory included all EC funding decisions that were ‘easily’ linked to conflict prevention and peacebuilding by their OECD DAC sector codes (e.g. UN post-conflict peacebuilding ‘15230’) or domain codes (e.g. Instrument for Stability ‘IFS’). This produced a list of some 546 interventions. A second phase identified additional projects from an additional 64 search keys that related to the 30 ‘key concepts’ identified from the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention. After cross-checking, this produced the ‘inventory’ of 3080 interventions. This section which addresses the EC-UN funding partnership in peacebuilding draws on data provided in this inventory since it is the most comprehensive source of publicly available data on EC support for peacebuilding. However, it should be noted that this data set is based on a more limited understanding of peacebuilding than is typical in the UN context, which includes most governance, socio-economic and security support in a fragile situation as well as much humanitarian relief. In contrast, the EC peacebuilding inventory explicitly excludes humanitarian support dispersed through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) as well as direct budget support, although many might argue that both play a role in peace consolidation and state-building in fragile contexts.

\(^{42}\) These were: economic support and trade cooperation; democracy, rule of law and civil society; security sector; peace consolidation and conflict prevention; reconstruction and infrastructure; anti-drug actions; environment and natural resources; health and communicable diseases; population flows and human trafficking; rapid intervention; and multi-sector interventions in other thematic categories.
Figure 11. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in top five recipient countries

![Graph showing EC spending on peacebuilding in top five major recipient countries.](image)

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b).

Figure 11 reveals that total spending for peacebuilding increased dramatically from €86 million Euro in 2001 to over €1 billion in 2007, totaling some €5.9 billion from 2001 to 2008. Of this €2.2 billion (37%) went through the UN. As with ODA trends for assistance to fragile states, for most of this time the bulk of EC assistance went to a few countries. In the case of the EC, the top four recipients of peacebuilding assistance were West Bank and Gaza (26%), Afghanistan (12%), Iraq (11%) and Sudan (8%). Together, they received 57% of EC assistance from 2001 to 2008. The Democratic Republic of Congo received a further 5% and eleven other countries received between 1-2%.

However, in 2008 funding levels for the top four recipients declined. This was largely because no new funds were contracted to the Iraq and Afghanistan Trust Funds or the AMIS peace operation in Sudan and the funding for the Temporary International Mechanism to support the Palestinian Authority (TIM) declined. Given that in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, much of the EC’s funding was channeled through the UN-managed Trust Funds, this largely explains the drop in the EC funding for the UN in 2007 and 2008 as shown in Figure 12 below and in the level of funding for UNDP shown in Figure 10 above.

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43 These include: Angola, Columbia, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Somalia, Bangladesh, Liberia, Ukraine, Central African Republic, Timor Leste and Indonesia.
Figure 12. Proportion of EC peacebuilding spending channeled through the UN

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b)

3.4.2 EC-UN funding trends in selected countries

In order to illustrate the variety of the EC-UN operational partnerships in different peacebuilding contexts and to produce insights into which factors are particularly significant in determining the strength of the EC-UN operational relationship, this section explores the funding relationship in nine countries. These include the top five recipients of EC peacebuilding assistance (West Bank and Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and DRC) as well as the four countries on the agenda of the UN PBC (Sierra Leone, Burundi, Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau). The selection of countries was made in order to explore EU-UN funding relationships in fragile states that receive high volumes of aid (‘aid darlings’) as well as the countries on the PBC agenda (which aims to draw attention to ‘forgotten crises’). The inclusion of countries on the PBC agenda was also justified on the basis that it would test whether the PBC had an influence on EC operational partnerships with the UN in-country.
The West Bank and Gaza

Figure 13. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in West Bank and Gaza

![Graph showing total EC spending on peacebuilding in West Bank & Gaza]

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b)

In the West Bank and Gaza much of the spending was in the form of direct budgetary assistance to the Palestinian Authority. For example this included €98m in 2002, €80m in 2003, and €70m in 2005. In 2006 the Commission provided around €100m to the Temporary International Mechanism to support the Palestinian Authority, which increased to €342m in 2007, but dropped significantly in 2008. By contrast, EC spending channeled through the UNRWA remained fairly level at under €100m a year. This corresponded to 14% of EC peacebuilding funding to the UN from 2001-2008 (European Commission 2008d: 13), which was used to support relief and reconstruction programmes. In general terms, the EC-UN partnership in the West Bank and Gaza is strong, where the EC is the principal donor and the UN is the principal implementing agency, with a specific 1949 Security Council mandate to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestinian refugees.
In Afghanistan, the majority of EC assistance was dispersed to MDTFs. These included the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which inter alia pays the salaries of the Afghan National Police. Since its inception the EC has been the largest donor to LOTFA but currently the US is the largest. The EC has also contributed to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund. Both of these are managed by UNDP and implemented together with national partners. The EC also contributed to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which is one of the most important delivery means for channeling aid into the government’s core budget. It does not, however, fund security-related activities. It is administered by the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and UNDP. The EC also plays a leading role in support of the Afghan health sector, where service delivery is largely contracted to NGOs. In general terms the EC’s partnership with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is constructive, with, for instance, active EC engagement in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. However, this partnership is rendered less significant, given that there is little strategic coherence between EU institutional actors and member states in Afghanistan, and that UNAMA does not, in practice, exercise a coordinating role in relation to US and International Security Assistance Force state-building efforts (HTSPE 2008: 27-37).
Iraq

Figure 15. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Iraq

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b)

In Iraq, a large proportion of EC funding was channeled to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). This consists of the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund and the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund. Between 2003 and 2007 the EC was the largest donor to IRFFI, contributing 42% of the Fund. In addition to funding channeled through the IRFFI, the EC has supported UNDP projects in the field of human rights and civil society as well as rule of law and justice. Given the improved security situation in Iraq in 2008, the decision was taken to wind down IRFFI and EC assistance is now shifting to more bi-lateral cooperation. Nevertheless, a significant number of EC programmes will continue to be implemented by UN agencies, including through UNDP, UNHCR, WHO and UNICEF. Since 2003 almost half of EC aid has been dedicated to the development of basic services (education, health, infrastructure, water and sanitation), one quarter to human development (agriculture, poverty reduction, land mine action, refugees), and the rest to electoral support and capacity building (including justice and rule of law, civil society, and human rights). The EC and UN share objectives that are aligned with the International Compact with Iraq and the Iraqi National Development Strategy. Their significant operational cooperation forms the basis of a strong EC-UN partnership in Iraq.
The Sudan

Figure 16. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Sudan

The majority of the funding for peacebuilding in Sudan was from the African Peace Facility and was used to support the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This, for instance, totaled €74m in 2004 and €70m in 2005 and indicates that in material terms the EU-AU partnership is more significant than the EU-UN partnership. Nevertheless, the EC also channeled assistance through UN implementing agencies. Notable examples include its support for the Sudan post-conflict community-based recovery and rehabilitation programme. This is administered through UNDP, which serves as National Authorising Officer for the EC, but is implemented by a consortium of local NGOs and non-state actors. The EC has also provided €12m in support for an interim DDR programme, implemented with the assistance of UNDP, over €6m for an education management programme implemented by UNICEF, and €4m for a population census project implemented by the UN Population Fund.
The Democratic Republic of Congo

Figure 17. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in the DRC

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</table>

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding inventory (European Commission 2009b)

In contrast to the Sudan, much of EC funding was channeled through the UN in the DRC after the EC resumed its engagement in 2002 (see Figure 17). The largest proportion of assistance was dedicated to preparing and supporting the 2006 elections (€165 million between 2004 and 2006), which was implemented by UNDP with additional technical support provided by the EC. Although, at an operational level, the ‘co-management’ of this assistance was strained given the inherent challenges in managing such a difficult project with limited UNDP staff, EuropeAid evaluations attest to the unique technical and logistical advantages that the UN provided, making it the only organisation capable of implementing this programme (European Commission 2008a). While the elections received the majority of EC funding, the EC also supported transport and infrastructure projects, and projects designed to support security and the rule of law. For instance, it provided €20m to the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) managed by the World Bank, provided more than €40m for support of the justice sector and €10m for the police, complementing the EU’s ESDP EUPOL police mission to establish an Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa. Although the majority of EC assistance in the DRC was channeled through UNDP, the EU-UN in-country relationship was broader and more complex. This reflected the range of EU and UN actors on the ground. In the case of the EU, this involved the EU Special Representative, the EC Head of Delegation and
the Heads of Mission for the various EU ESDP missions. The relatively large EU and EU member state engagement served both to increase EU ambitions and, at times, to undermine EU cohesion. On occasion, this led to competition between the EU and UN, for example in 2006 over the issue of who should coordinate international SSR efforts (see chapter 4).

**Burundi**

Figure 18. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Burundi

![Total EC Spending on Peacebuilding in Burundi](image)

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b)

Figure 18 shows that a relatively small proportion of EC Peacebuilding programming assistance has been channeled through the UN in Burundi. The EC channeled €5m through UNDP in support of the electoral process in 2005/6, €1.5m for mine action capacity development, and smaller amounts relating to food security, demobilisation and human rights to the FAO, WFP and UNHCR respectively. Moreover, the EC’s 2008-2013 strategic programming documents were agreed with the government before the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) agreed the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi in 2007. EC officials testify that their programming decisions were not, therefore, influenced by the work of the PBC (interviews 8). In summary, the EC’s operational partnership with the UN is not strong in Burundi. While the EC has actively supported UN-led efforts to support the peace process and to agree integrated peacebuilding strategies in the framework of the PBC, this has not
affected EC strategic decision-making processes based on bi-lateral dialogue with the Government of Burundi.

However, Figure 18, which draws on the data set from the EC’s scoping study on peacebuilding (European Commission 2009b), is arguably not an accurate reflection of the EC’s broader peacebuilding engagement. For instance, the data does not include EC macro-economic assistance, budget support, humanitarian assistance, or much of the rural programming. Moreover, the swings in funding indicated in the graph are misleading in so far as they represent multi-year contracts. In practice, the EC is the largest single donor in Burundi and EC funding has steadily increased since 2001, with a shift towards funding for governance and direct budget support. Programmed EC assistance under the 9th European Development Fund (2003-2007) totalled €115m, of which about half the amount was for rural development, 27% for macro-economic support, and 15% (€17.25m) for good governance. The governance interventions provided support for decentralisation with support for rule of law programmes at national and local levels. In addition, the EC disbursed over €100m in unforeseen funding and humanitarian aid. The EC Burundi Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for 2008-2013 confirms an increase in funding for state-building with €90m for direct budgetary support (European Commission 2007c). Support for rural development remained constant at over €50m, while support for health increased to €25m. While the EC has maintained or increased its support for socio-economic recovery, it has also increased the level and proportion of funding for state-building. This has contributed to the overall increase in ODA in Burundi. While conflict had turned Burundi into an ‘aid orphan’ in the 1990s with a total of less than $100m ODA in 1997, ODA has increased steadily since 2000, to $415m in 2006 according to the OECD.

45 These funding decisions are in line with the EC’s stated priorities of 1) reinforcing the legitimacy and capacities of the state, ii) supporting justice reform, iii) supporting decentralisation, and iv) preparing for the 2010 elections.
Sierra Leone

Figure 19. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

![Graph showing total EC spending on peacebuilding in Sierra Leone]

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (EC, 2009b)

As in Burundi, the vast majority of EC spending on peacebuilding in Sierra Leone has not been channeled through the UN. The little which was channeled through the UN included support for the truth and reconciliation commission implemented by the UNHCR in 2002/2003 and electoral assistance though UNDP in 2008/2009. Nor is the majority of EC aid represented in Figure 18, because it does not include macro-economic support, humanitarian support, or support for infrastructure. Yet this formed the bulk of EC assistance. For instance, from 2003-2009, the EC provided €220m, and the programmed proportion of this included €70m for reconstruction, €50m for direct budget, and €5m for support to civil society. Similarly, the CSP for 2008-2013 provides for €242m, of which €95m is for infrastructure, €90m is for direct budget support, €37m is for good governance and institutional support, and €20m supports efforts in relation to trade and agriculture. The EC CSP was elaborated jointly with Sierra Leone and the UK Department for International Development. This process was not linked to the PBC discussions regarding a Peacebuilding Strategy or Compact. Although the PBC engagement was intended to provide a common framework for donor assistance, it was perceived as being linked with the ‘vertical’ Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and disconnected from benchmarks and procedures already negotiated by donors and the government (Mollet et al. 2007; interview 9). In summary, the
operational partnership between the EC and UN was not strong in Sierra Leone. Moreover, the work of the Peacebuilding Commission was seen to provide little added value, while adding another complicating layer to donor coordination.

*The Central African Republic*

Figure 20. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in CAR

![Total EC Spending on Peacebuilding in CAR](image)

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b)

The only EC support for UN programmes represented in Figure 20 was for a UNDP programme for election assistance and for unforeseen food security support implemented by the UN’s FAO. The EC funding relationship with the UN programmes and agencies was therefore relatively insignificant. Between 2003-2007, the EC programmed aid to the Central African Republic amounted to €55 million, of which the three priority areas were economic integration, transport and infrastructure, and management of natural resources. Support for conflict prevention and political dialogue received some €5 million. The level of EC support has increased in the 2008-13 programming cycle to €137 million with a greater emphasis on governance and socio-economic rehabilitation (€72.5 million), plus €34 million in budget support, with infrastructure receiving relatively less (€19.5 million). The EC relationship with the UN is therefore not strong in terms of funding. Moreover, since 2008 when the EU launched an ESDP mission, EUFOR Tchad, to protect civilians and UN staff in the north-eastern Central African Republic, it has been overshadowed by Council-led cooperation with the UN (humanitarian actors and DPKO) in relation to the ESDP.
mission and the UN Mission in Chad/Central Africa follow-up. Nevertheless, the EC and UN maintain a strong policy-level relationship in-country (interview 10).

Guinea-Bissau

Figure 21. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau

![Graph showing Total EC Spending on Peacebuilding in Guinea Bissau from 2001 to 2008](image)

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b)

Figure 21 captures EC support for parliamentary and presidential elections that was channeled through UNDP in 2005 and 2008. The data for EC support to peacebuilding does not, however, cover the majority of EC assistance in the country. From 2003-2008 this totalled some €92 million, with a focus on infrastructure (€51 million) and governance, including support for elections and SSR (€17 million). In the 2008-2013 programme, it totalled some €100 million, with two priority areas identified as conflict prevention, and water and energy. Under conflict prevention, the strategy paper identifies security sector reform, administrative capacity-building and reform, and support for the rule of law as a priority. In line with an increasing emphasis on SSR, the EC had sent a team of ‘experts’ to work within relevant ministries in 2008, preceding the launch of an EU SSR mission in the framework of ESDP. In 2009, the UN cited the need to improve the coordination of various SSR efforts as one of the reasons why its field presence should be strengthened to an integrated peacebuilding
office. Although the EC and UN view their engagement as complementary and both view SSR as critical to promoting political stability, the UN’s focus on addressing the risk factors of drug trafficking and youth unemployment differs from the EC’s emphasis on supporting regional hydro-energy infrastructure projects that are seen as a pre-requisite for economic development.

Conclusions on EC-UN country partnerships

The above country cases illustrate that trying to identify the scope of peacebuilding on the basis of project or programme objectives inevitably introduces inconsistencies in how peacebuilding is defined. For instance, in the top recipient countries, where use of MDTFs was common, the inventory included a range of activities related to reconstruction, security, political and social development. In the case of Sudan, the majority of the EC’s assistance was for an AU peacekeeping presence, an activity not included in ODA. In other cases, including the countries on the PBC agenda, the identification of peacebuilding programmes appears to have been more selective, including short-term emergency response and governance programmes but not direct budget support or action primarily geared towards socio-economic development. In these cases, peacebuilding appears to have been associated with a subset or ‘cluster’ of activities with peace consolidation as their primary objective, rather than the collective recovery effort. In other words, where the EC uses funding mechanisms designed specifically for post-conflict recovery, including MDTFs or the African Peace Facility, the entire effort is categorised in terms of peacebuilding. Where there is more limited donor engagement, peacebuilding tends to be counted as only those activities that have direct peace consolidation objectives. Therefore, if one were to compare like with like, the proportion of assistance for Iraq and Afghanistan would appear relatively lower.

Although such quantitative overviews appear to import inconsistencies in how donors categorise funding, they are nevertheless revealing in so far as they point to the central coordinating role that the UN plays through MDTFs in cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan, or where the UN has been asked to play a key role in relation to critical

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events, as with the 2006 elections in the DRC. However, in a number of less high-profile fragile states, the UN is not necessarily a ‘natural’ implementing partner for the EC, nor does it inevitably have greater capacity than other actors or a privileged relationship with the government of the state. Although the EC and UNDP appear to routinely collaborate in support of elections, the EC’s support for state-building, including DDR and SSR, is not typically implemented through the UN in these cases. Conversely, there are other cases, such as in Aceh, Indonesia (not covered above), where the EU has played a key role in reaching and implementing (the demobilisation and disarmament aspects of) a peace agreement, but where an agency of the UN has taken the lead in implementing the follow-up reintegration programme. This suggests that the form and strength of EC-UN in-country partnerships depends on specific in-country capacities and relationships between the UN, the EC and the government of the country. Although a desk-based quantitative analysis evidently does not capture the quality of in-country political or policy partnerships, it does suggest that even in fragile or peacebuilding contexts, operational partnerships and approaches to donor coordination are context-specific, with leadership functions assumed by the actors with the most capacity and the strongest relationships with the government concerned.

3.5 EC support for UN peacebuilding through the Instrument for Stability

3.5.1 Overview of the Instrument for Stability

Objectives
The Instrument for Stability (IfS) is the only EC financial instrument with an explicit mandate for crisis prevention and recovery and the largest proportion of the Instrument (approximately €1.3 billion over seven years) is dedicated to crisis response. It was introduced in 2007, replacing the Rapid Reaction (funding) Mechanism (RRM) introduced in 2001. It is intended to deliver an immediate and integrated response to situations of crisis in third countries within a single legal instrument until normal cooperation under one of the other instruments for cooperation and assistance can resume. Previously, a crisis response could trigger as
many as seven separate EC financing instruments\textsuperscript{47}, each with its own decision-making procedures and budgetary constraints. The IfS therefore improves upon past instruments for short-term EC financing in so far as it has led to important streamlining of decision-making in the crisis response phase. Like the RRM, the IfS enables the Commission to make rapid funding decisions (without comitology\textsuperscript{48}). It integrates the RRM budget line and improves upon it by allowing more time (two years) to secure follow-on funding from the geographic budget lines. It has therefore also been designed to improve the linkages between the initial response and follow-up assistance delivered under the main long-term geographic instrument, and to strengthen the coherence between EC assistance and the EU’s foreign policy response using inter-governmental CFSP instruments.

In addition to the crisis response component (Article 3 of the IfS regulation), the IfS includes a longer-term component that provides for ‘assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation’. This is divided into three parts. Article 4.1 provides for efforts designed to support international efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats to critical infrastructure, and critical maritime routes. Article 4.2 provides for efforts to address threats posed by trafficking, terrorism and organised crime (including support for efforts to address the illicit trade in small arms). Article 4.3 is referred to both as the ‘crisis preparedness’ component and, more commonly as the Peacebuilding Partnership. It aims to build capacity for crisis response, including the capacity of non-state actors and international organisations. It is the only part of the IfS that explicitly mentions peacebuilding, in the context of the Peacebuilding Partnership that aims to mobilise and build civilian expertise for peacebuilding.

\textit{Size}

In the budgetary planning for the IfS, it was allocated €2.062 billion over the period 2007-2013. Of this the crisis response component (Article 3, budget heading 19.06.01)

\textsuperscript{47} In Iraq, for instance, the response previously included the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, the Human Rights Regulation, the Mine Action Regulation, and Humanitarian aid. Other options include the regulations on ‘Aid to uprooted people’ and ‘Rehabilitation’.

\textsuperscript{48} Comitology refers to the process in which the Commission consults advisory committees made up of EU member state representatives when implementing EU law and making significant funding decisions.
was to receive no less than 73%, or €1.49 billion\textsuperscript{49}. However, in 2008 this was revised down to between 1.27-1.29 billion, representing a loss of at least €20 million a year\textsuperscript{50}. In 2007 the crisis response component was allocated €93 million and in 2008 this figure rose to €129 million. This corresponds to the reported commitment of €220 million for some 59 ‘actions’ in 2007 and 2008. The geographical distribution of these actions is represented in Figure 22.

Figure 22. IfS crisis response funding in 2007-2008

![Pie chart showing the geographical distribution of IfS crisis response funding in 2007-2008:]
- Georgia: 18%
- Africa: 29%
- Kosovo: 26%
- Middle East: 12%
- Asia: 19%


The crisis response component also includes three thematic ‘facilities’ to enable the financing of smaller actions at the sub-delegated level without the need for an individual financial decision. These include the Policy Advice and Mediation Facility (€10 million). This has the enabled the EC to draw on short-term advice and expertise (including in Guinea-Bissau, Armenia, Georgia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Myanmar) and to provide funding for post conflict/disaster needs assessments with the World Bank and UN in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Haiti and Ukraine. Although small in size, it

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\textsuperscript{49} The Stability Instrument is by far the smallest of the EC external relations instruments. Budgetary allocations in billion Euro for the other principal financial instruments over 2007-2013 are as follows: Humanitarian Aid 5.6, Development Cooperation 15.1, European Neighbourhood Policy 10.6, and Pre-Accession instrument 10.2. All figures are based on a working document of the Commission services Multiannual Financial Framework, Indicative breakdown of expenditure within individual headings, April 2006.

\textsuperscript{50} The budget was revised down after €240m was re-allocated to the Food Facility. This funding was pledged to assist developing countries cope with the effects of increased food prices. It was originally intended to be drawn from budget lines for (internal) agriculture, but in line with rules for budgetary re-allocation it had to come from a source within the external relations budget heading 4. This explains why the IfS was ‘raided’ for Food.
therefore represents an important new mechanism that can be used to strengthen EC substantive and analytical capacity, and to provide mediation support on an ad hoc basis. A second facility is the Conflict Resources Facility (CRF). This is also small (€2 million) and has been used to strengthen processes designed to address the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The third facility, the Transitional Justice Facility (€12 million), can be used to provide timely assistance to international tribunals and transitional justice initiatives.

In addition, the IfS includes a long-term Crisis Preparedness Component (Article 4.3), commonly referred to as the Peacebuilding Partnership. It is not included in the crisis response component, but is of a similar size to the ‘Facilities’ of the crisis response component mentioned above (€15 million over 2007-2008). It has been principally used to support non-state actors, although it has also been used to support capacity building in the UN and regional organisations. For instance, it provided support for the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System and for OECD-DAC-supported international dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding, and for monitoring of the implementation of principles of good international engagement in fragile states. Its support for UN capacity building is described in the next section. In addition, the Peacebuilding Partnership has been used to fund the development of EU crisis management capacities, including through support for training for civilians interested in deployment in ESDP missions.

Scope
The scope of the activities that it can support was subject to intense negotiation between member states, the Council and the European Parliament in 2005 and 2006. The final compromise details the activities that the IfS can be used to support in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis, as well as other security-related activities to promote cooperation in tackling organised crime, terrorism, non-proliferation and the protection of critical infrastructure. In relation to peacebuilding, the IfS provides for ‘support for the development of democratic, pluralistic state institutions […] an independent judiciary, good governance and law and order, including non-military technical cooperation to strengthen overall civilian control and oversight over the security system and measures to strengthen the capacity of law
enforcement and judicial authorities...\textsuperscript{51} In addition, it identifies a number of priority preventive objectives. These include strengthening the role of civil society and its participation in the political process and strengthening the capacity of non-state actors in the fields of mediation, ‘track-two’ diplomacy and reconciliation, and building effective bridges between non-state actors and formal diplomatic initiatives. It also provides for measures aimed at strengthening the conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery efforts of international regional and sub-regional organisations, with specific mention of support to African Regional Organisations as well as the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In short, the IfS was intended to support the full range of civilian activities designed for conflict prevention, state-building and post-conflict recovery, with the exception of activities associated with ‘defence’ reform. It explicitly cites both prevention and recovery as potential objectives and has therefore been used to address specific threats to peace or to fill gaps in broader recovery efforts. However, the priority areas identified in the regulation have been interpreted as indicative rather than prescriptive, and in practice the interpretation of the objectives of the instrument has been even wider.

The IfS annual reports do not provide a detailed quantitative breakdown of the allocation of funding by theme or activity type. Nevertheless, they provide eight thematic categories under which actions have been funded. These are summarised below in Table 2.

Table 2. Thematic priorities of the crisis response component of the IIS (2007-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Area</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advice for post-conflict SSR</td>
<td>DRC, CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Palestine, Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Flanking’ measures for ESDP missions</td>
<td>Georgia, Kosovo, DRC, Afghanistan, Chad, Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening regional peacebuilding capacity</td>
<td>AU – Amisom Somalia, AU-UN mediation in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law and Transitional Justice</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Columbia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to interim administrations</td>
<td>International Civilian Office, Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution and reconciliation</td>
<td>Sri Lanka, Thailand, Colombia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Peru, Palestine, Burma, Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict/disaster programmes and needs assessments</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Lebanon, Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to displaced populations</td>
<td>Lebanon, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resources</td>
<td>Dedicated Facility (see below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Because ESDP missions have no independent source of project funding, so-called ‘flanking measures’ that have been designed to complement ESDP missions appear to have been particularly significant. These include €15 million for internally displaced people and clearance of unexploded ordnance in parallel with the deployment of EUMM in Georgia. In Chad and the Central African Republic – alongside and in support of the EUFOR mission – €15 million was used to support the UN Mission in Chad/Central African Republic police programme and the election census in Chad, while €6.5 million was used to kick-start security sector reform in the Central African Republic. In Kosovo, €14.2 million was allocated to the International Civilian Office during the difficult transition between Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the launch of the EULEX mission. And in the Democratic Republic of Congo €10 million was allocated for support to stabilisation in the eastern Congo.
In situations where there have been no ESDP missions, large actions have included €13 million for a recovery programme in Bangladesh and €6 million to support the transition process in Nepal. Although EC delegations are encouraged to and on some occasions do provide project proposals, they are in most cases responsible for monitoring project implementation. In total, 40 actions representing €180 million have been sub-delegated to the delegations.

In summary, the IfS is used for actions which complement ESDP interventions or seek to fill perceived funding gaps in post-conflict recovery. These actions are by definition not programmed in advance since they are developed in response to situations of crisis. Although they are intended to address ‘gaps’ in recovery, funding decisions do not appear to be based on post-conflict needs assessments. Rather, priorities are dictated by the needs (or opportunities) as perceived by ESDP missions or staff in DG RELEX A/2 or by EC delegations. Only in the case of the post-disaster recovery of Bangladesh has the crisis response component been mobilised after a joint UNDP-World Bank-EC needs assessment. This suggests that, for the most part, the EC IfS has addressed gaps in post-conflict recovery as identified by EU officials on an ad hoc basis. Although the crisis response component has an EU bias in so far as it is intended, inter alia, to complement ESDP actions and can be triggered by proposals submitted by EC delegations, it can also be used to strengthen UN peacebuilding. The following section seeks to address to what extent this has been done.

2.5.2 IfS funding for UN peacebuilding

In 2007, 41.5% of the IfS crisis response actions were channeled through the UN. This represents some €38 million. Similarly, in 2008, 42% of all actions supported by the IfS were channeled through the UN, with a value of some €54 million. Thus, over a third of the EC’s dedicated short-term crisis response funding has been channeled through the UN. Figures 23 and 24 indicate the distribution of this funding within the UN.
Figure 23. IfS funds channeled through the UN system in 2007

![Pie chart](image)


Figure 24. IfS funds channeled through the UN system in 2008

![Pie chart](image)


Figures 23 and 24 show that the EC short-term crisis response actions have been implemented by: (i) actors associated with security response and rule of law (DPKO); (ii) the humanitarian response (UNHCR, IOM and others); (iii) good governance and socio-economic recovery and reconstruction (UNDP and UN Office for Project Services). In 2007 DPKO/DPA was the largest UN recipient of IfS funding, while in
2008 UNDP received the most. While a range of UN actors are important operational partners in crisis response, the EC’s funding relationship with DPKO/DPA is more significant in relation to the IfS, which is administered by DG RELEX, than is the case with long-term funding instruments administered through DG DEV, EC delegations and EuropeAid.

Although the IfS peacebuilding partnership was intended to build capacity in other international organisations, regional organisations and NGOs in relation to peacebuilding, it has not been used to contribute to the UN Peacebuilding Fund. According to some EC officials, this is because the IfS serves a similar purpose to the Fund. The IfS has, indeed, been used to support actions in three of the four PBC focus countries – Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone – and in Burundi the EC remains the largest single donor. Some EC officials contend that direct contributions would not necessarily add value but rather simply transfer administrative burden from the EC to the UN. Moreover, they argue that the IfS is better suited to mobilising additional EC resources, in so far as it is designed to identify and kick-start funding from long-term EC funding instruments. However, there is no evidence that IfS decisions are guided by priorities established within the context of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, and therefore no reason to believe that the IfS will necessarily complement the work of the Peacebuilding Commission or be consistent with the priority areas addressed by the Peacebuilding Fund.

In practice, rather than provide direct support to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the Peacebuilding Partnership has been used to strengthen the objectives of donor coordination and national capacity building through other UN-led initiatives. These include two grants for UNDP post-crisis and conflict needs assessments, as described in Box 1, and a grant for a UNDP work to develop guidance on natural resources and conflict.
Box 1 Post Conflict Needs Assessments

The EC has been a strong advocate for the agreement of common frameworks for recovery planning in situations of conflict and fragility. In particular, the crisis preparedness component of the IfS has been used to support the development and use of a common platform for post conflict recovery planning, notably the Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) methodology. This was initially developed by the UN Development Group and the World Bank. It involves the conduct, by cluster teams comprised of national and international experts, of field and desk assessments that seek to map the terrain of key needs in the country. Using this information, the Transitional Results Framework (TRF) is developed with key milestones relating to the needs mapped by the PCNA. Actions included in the TRF reflect strategic dimensions of peacebuilding and conflict mitigation by referring to gender-, ethnic-, age-, or region-specific actions. Thus, the TRF lays out a selective group of priority actions and outcomes with their financial implications, and allows national and international stakeholders to align efforts to support a successful transition.

Source: Adapted from the Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning, signed by the EC, the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank, on 25 September 2008.

In 2009, the Peacebuilding partnership also provided support for a project initiated by the UN’s Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) to provide a software tool designed to help countries track donor assistance. It has also provided financial support to the UN Mediation Support Unit, linked to DPA, in order to improve its capacity to deploy experts with expertise in natural resources and mediation.

While the IfS has been used to support some capacity building in the UN, EC staff recognise that cooperation has, to date, been ad hoc and limited. According to a 2009 evaluation of the Peacebuilding Partnership this is partly due to the annual budgeting cycle, which made it difficult to develop more strategic engagement in capacity building processes, and partly due to limited EC staff resources that restrict the EC ability to engage in more strategic policy dialogue (Bayne and Trolliet 2009: 36). Yet, given that the objectives of the IfS peacebuilding partnership are so closely aligned
with the mandate of the PBSO to ‘develop best practice’, there may well be greater opportunities for exploiting institutional synergies. For instance, the PBSO has focused on developing ‘best-practice’ networks for reflection across the UN agencies and is collaborating with non-state and academic actors to develop the evidence base, including through the web-based Initiative for Peacebuilding (www.peacebuildinginitiative.org). Yet there is no link with similar EC–supported initiatives, including the EC-supported Initiative for Peacebuilding (www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu), which also seeks to build the evidence base drawing on the operational experience of specialist peacebuilding NGOs. There is therefore clearly scope for linking up separate EU and UN ‘best practices’ initiatives in line with the important but relatively neglected objective of building the evidence base and promoting institutional learning on peacebuilding.

2.5.3 Conclusions and outlook for the IfS

On present evidence, EC-UN funding cooperation drawing on the IfS is significant but not systematic. In some cases of crisis response it has been triggered by dialogue within established EU-UN dialogue channels. This is, for instance, the case with the UN-EU Steering Committee where IfS support for DPKO/DPA activities has been raised. In the case of the crisis preparedness component of the IfS, support for joint conflict analysis or for the PBSO database project has been negotiated outside formal dialogue processes between DG RELEX and UNDP or PBSO.

In 2010, the IfS will be subject to a mid-term review. This will be an opportunity to take stock of whether the Instrument is structured to fulfill its strategic objectives. The above quantitative analysis suggests that it has been deployed to support a range of actions and actors, in many cases the UN, and that the majority of assistance has been for actions designed to complement ESDP or UN missions in post-conflict settings. A relatively small proportion of the IfS is dedicated to improving the peacebuilding knowledge and/or capacity of actors, be they non-governmental, regional or international (through the Peacebuilding Partnership). Nor has it provided for individual capacity-building (training) for non-EU national or international actors. It was, moreover, long disputed whether the IfS should be used to build EU capacity by
supporting the training of EU nationals for civilian crisis management, although this was agreed for 2009.

Despite the recognised need and high demand for building institutional peacebuilding capacities within and outside the EU, the Peacebuilding Partnership, with an annual budget of around 7 million, is clearly not sufficiently resourced to have a large capacity-building impact as well as promote learning and provide policy guidance. The 2010 reform will need to make strategic decisions about its core objectives. There may be pressure from member states to increasingly use this funding instrument to train EU nationals for ESDP missions. However – unless the size of the instrument was increased – this might undermine the objective of strengthening EC peacebuilding influence and capacity by supporting the development of strategic partnerships with key operational actors, through programmes designed to build capacity and promote inter-institutional learning.

3.6 Conclusions

In response to the question *has EC support in fragile situations increased?* the analysis of global and EC trends in funding for fragile states (in sections 3.1. and 3.2) shows that EC commitments largely reflect global trends, in which there has been a gradual rise in overall funding for fragile states, with a small number of fragile countries receiving a large proportion of the funding. However, the EC data on ODA in fragile states is incomplete and not sufficiently detailed to conclude, definitively, that the total volume of programmable EC aid for state-building in fragile states has increased since 2001. In response to the question *what are the key operational challenges for the EC in supporting peacebuilding in fragile contexts?* qualitative analysis reveals that despite a strong policy preference for support to strengthening governance in fragile states, the EC faces common organisational challenges to disbursing aid in this area. Organisational disincentives for aid delivery in fragile states are linked to disbursement pressures, risk aversion and substantive capacity shortfalls. Moreover, reforms to improve EC aid disbursement efficiency and the process of EC devolution have further reduced institutional incentives and capacity to engage in politically-sensitive governance programming and have increased EC
incentives for the use of budget support and multi-donor funding instruments in fragile situations.

Section 3.3 addresses the question has EC funding channeled through the UN increased in absolute terms and proportionately since 2001? It provides evidence that the volume of EC assistance channeled through the UN increased sharply from 2001 to 2006 and then declined slightly in 2007 and 2008, (with the decline after 2006 largely attributed to a reduction in assistance in the four countries that had previously received the most). The countries in which the largest volume of EC funding has been channeled through the UN are Iraq, West Bank and Gaza, Afghanistan, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. EC funding for the UN has therefore increased especially in fragile or post-conflict situations. This suggests that, yes, the proportion of EC assistance channeled through the UN is particularly significant in fragile ‘peacebuilding’ contexts.

This finding is reinforced in section 3.4 which tests has the EC funding for the UN has grown stronger in the area of peacebuilding since 2001? EuropeAid data for EC funding for peacebuilding shows (in section 3.4.1.) that EC spending for peacebuilding increased from less than €100 million in 2001 to over €1 billion in 2007, declining to €745 million in 2008. Of the total EC funding on peacebuilding, 37% (€2.2 billion) was contracted to the UN. These findings confirm that EC assistance for peacebuilding channeled through the UN has increased since 2001 and that the UN is a key operational partner for the EC in peacebuilding.

In response to the question what are the operational incentives for and challenges associated with working with the UN in peacebuilding contexts? the analysis suggests that the EC and UN are strong operational partners in fragile states because the UN is often the only actor with the capacity, legitimacy and mandate to deliver international assistance in these contexts. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the agreement in 2003 of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) effectively lowered the administrative costs of cooperation for the EC and is an important factor in explaining the general rise in EC funding through the UN. Nevertheless, interviews reveal persistent operational frictions between EC and UN partners that stem from different perceptions of the nature of the partnership and different organisational
cultures and administrative practices. These have formed stereotypes of the EC as an overly demanding and interfering donor and of the UN as an unreliable implementing partner that is not interested in involving the EC in strategic decision-making in line with the FAFA agreement co-management provisions.

To address the question which factors are particularly significant in determining the strength of the EC-UN relationship in peacebuilding contexts? section 3.4.2 examines the EC-UN funding partnership in relation to nine countries: the top five recipients of peacebuilding assistance (West Bank and Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and DRC), and the four countries on the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) agenda (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, and Guinea-Bissau). It finds that in the West Bank, Afghanistan, Iraq and DRC where the use of MDTFs is common or where the UN has been asked by the host country to play a central role, the UN has been a natural implementing partner for the EC. But in the relatively ‘forgotten crises’ of the countries on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda, the EC-UN partnership is context and sector specific. The strength of the operational partnership in these cases depends on relative operational capacity of the UN compared with other implementing partners, and on the political standing of the UN in the country. This suggests that the EC and UN are less likely to be strong operational partners in a later peace consolidation phase or where the UN does not play a central aid coordination role.

Section 3.5 focuses on the EC Instrument for Stability (IfS) – the principal EC funding instrument for short-term crisis prevention and response. In response to the question how far has the IfS been used to support UN peacebuilding? it finds that over 40% of IfS has been channeled through the UN in 2007 and 2008. In response to the questions what activities has the IfS been used to support? and through which UN institutional actors? the data have shown that the crisis response component of the IfS is often used to complement EU and UN missions with assistance aimed at helping establish rule of law and SSR in post-conflict situations. It also reveals that a relatively large proportion of EC funding through the instrument is channeled to DPKO, DPA and UNDP. This confirms the strong EC-UN operational partnership in early peacebuilding and shows that the IfS is used to build operational partnerships with both UN security and development actors. However, of the small Peacebuilding Partnership component (€7 million a year) of the IfS that is explicitly intended to build
peacebuilding capacity in and strengthen policy dialogue with other international, regional and non-governmental organisations, very little has been channeled through the UN. Despite its potential to do so, the IfS has not, therefore, been used to develop the policy dialogue or promote inter-institutional learning between the EU and the UN.

The quantitative review of EC funding relationship with the UN has a number of limitations. It evidently reveals little about the quality of the EC policy partnership with the UN (at headquarters or in-country) or its impact. But even within the limitations of a broad quantitative approach, the analysis of EC support for peacebuilding reveals additional difficulties associated with quantifying the EC work on peacebuilding. While it is clear that the EC provides support for socio-economic development, governance and security in fragile contexts, the categorisation of funding, and whether or not it is considered to fall within the scope of peacebuilding, depends on the country context and funding mechanism. For example, while all funding through conflict-specific funding instruments such as the IfS and MDTFs is included, in other cases (including the countries on the PBC agenda) funding for peacebuilding is associated with a smaller sub-set of activities designed to (re-)build states, provide security and tackle specific risk factors. This makes it difficult to establish funding trends for peacebuilding. This finding further reinforces one of the conclusions of the previous chapter, that the amorphous concept of peacebuilding is not operationally useful. The analysis of EC funding for peacebuilding (in section 3.4) shows that even when the scope of peacebuilding is carefully linked to EC peacebuilding policies and concepts, it cannot be applied consistently because of inconsistencies in aid categorisation.

Despite these limitations, the mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis sheds light on the principal drivers of the EC-UN operational relationship. It shows that EU and UN development actors – the EC and UNDP – have a clear material interest in operational cooperation. This stems from the status of UNDP as a voluntary funded organisation and the identity of the EC as an aid disbursement agency. While EC capacity for programming in fragile contexts is limited and aid disbursement pressures and institutional risk aversion also militate against stronger programming engagement, the capacity and legitimacy of the UN as an ‘implementing partner’ is unrivalled in these contexts. The empirical evidence is, however, less conclusive on the role of
norms in influencing these partnerships. Although there are no counter-examples or counter-trends to the hypothesis that operational cooperation is predicated on normative alignment and a shared conflict transformation approach to peacebuilding, the analysis of EC funding decisions is not specific enough to determine whether or not operational cooperation consistently occurred in the context of normative and policy alignment. This suggests that further empirical research is needed to show how normative and material factors shaped individual funding decisions.
Chapter 4. The relationship between EU and UN crisis management actors

4. Introduction

‘The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything that the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives.’


In this chapter, I investigate the EU claim that its crisis management interventions support UN interventions and objectives. I do so by examining whether the rise of EU (civilian) crisis management capacities and the deployment of EU civilian missions with peacebuilding objectives have, in practice, reinforced the UN. I first test whether ESDP has enhanced or depleted UN capacities by exploring the extent to which the EU and UN are in competition for civilian human resources and whether ESDP has generated new civilian resources that the UN can potentially draw upon. Secondly, I test whether EU and UN operational cooperation has, in practice, been mutually supportive or conflictive. In other words, this chapter aims to assess the structural dynamics of EU-UN relationship by exploring to what extent the organisations compete with each other over resources. It also addresses the dynamics of operational cooperation, by exploring whether the EU and UN share common objectives and policies and whether they support each other in practice.

More specifically, section 4.1 tests whether civilian ESDP contributes to burden sharing through the quantitative analysis of international civilian deployments. It examines whether civilian ESDP missions have led to increased capacities in the international system in line with the logic of burden-sharing, or whether they have undermined UN capabilities by privileging the deployment of EU civilian resources in EU missions over UN missions. In short, I address whether ESDP brings ‘added value’ to the UN through the following research questions: *Are the EU and UN in competition over civilian human resources? Has ESDP generated additional resources to help share the peace operation burden? And, has ESDP increased the pool of civilians that international operations can draw on?*
Section 4.2 explores the policy assumptions that operational cooperation is complementary and is predicated on common objectives and policy alignment through case studies of EU-UN operational cooperation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Kosovo. These are the two countries in which civilian ESDP missions have been deployed alongside UN missions. The case studies address the questions: Can the UN rely on the operational support of the EU? Was EU and UN operational cooperation based on common strategic positions and policies? Did they share the same tactical approach? And do they work well together?

4.1 Trends in European civilian deployments

4.1.1 Quantitative trends in European civilian deployments to UN missions

In a 2004 study on the emerging civilian ESDP capacity, Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues that the rise of ESDP will result in a reduction in the number of civilians from EU countries that are deployed to UN missions. He concludes that:

‘the EU civilian rapid reaction capacity is not a ‘real added value’ for the UN yet.[...] On the contrary, the number of personnel provided by EU member states to UN commanded operations is likely to decline further should the EU decide to launch new civilian operations in the years ahead. The first casualty of such operations would be the EU-UN relationship’ (Jakobsen, 2004: 1).

This section tests whether the empirical record supports Jakobsen’s claim that the EU and UN compete over the same civilian resources. To do so, I first examine trends in the deployment of civilians from EU countries to UN operations either as ‘international staff’ or as ‘police’ since ESDP first became operational in 2003\(^{52}\). The results are shown in Figure 25. This shows that the number of EU civilians deployed as international staff in UN missions has increased slightly in absolute terms since 2003. In contrast, the number of EU police deployed in UN missions declined

\(^{52}\) The UN data on civilian deployments is only disaggregated into these two categories. The data dates back to 2003 since this was the year in which ESDP first became operational.
dramatically in 2008. The following analysis seeks to provide explanations for these trends.

Figure 25. Civilians from EU countries deployed in UN peace operations

Source: DPKO, Peacekeeping Public Affairs Unit, 28 August 2008 (international staff) and DPKO website (police).

Trends in the deployment of EU civilians as International Staff in UN missions

Table 3, below, shows that the number of civilian staff from EU countries employed as international staff (IS) in UN peace operations increased from 1021 in 2003 to 1398 in 2005 after which they have remained fairly constant at over 1400 per year.
Table 3. Number of EU nationals having served in UN peace operations as international staff*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>2003</th>
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<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008**</th>
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<td>263</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1021</strong></td>
<td><strong>1175</strong></td>
<td><strong>1398</strong></td>
<td><strong>1465</strong></td>
<td><strong>1461</strong></td>
<td><strong>1440</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: DPKO, Peacekeeping Public Affairs Unit, 28 August 2008.
* International staff includes professionals (at the professional ‘P’ level, the director ‘D’ level, Assistant Secretary General and Under Secretary General levels) as well as Field Service staff categories (FS/GS/S). These figures do not include UN Volunteers (UNVs), locally recruited staff or individual contractors.

** The 2008 data are based on staff employed up to August 2008 rather than the full year. Actual figures for the full year may be somewhat higher.

The breakdown of civilian international staff deployed in UN missions by nationality in Table 4, below, also shows that EU country contributions to UN operations remained constant or increased in all cases except Sweden (whose IS deployments decreased from 80 in 2003 to 68 in 2008\(^3\)). It also indicates that overall numbers have remained fairly constant despite the drawdown of UNMIK, the mission with the largest number of European nationals. Whereas the number of EU international staff deployed in UNMIK has fallen from 349 in 2003 to 151 in mid 2008, this was compensated by significant rises in deployments of European nationals in other operations, notably in MINUSTAH in Haiti (from 1 in 2003 to 130 in 2008), UNIFIL in Lebanon (from 54 in 2003 to 104 in 2008) and UNAMID, the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (from 1 in 2007 to 70 in 2008).

Table 4. Numbers of international staff from EU countries deployed in UN peace operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
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<td>MINUCI</td>
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</table>

\(^3\) Sweden has a strong track-record of direct support to UN operations and has also served as a champion for the development of civilian ESDP within the EU. One possible explanation for the relative decline in deployments of Swedish personnel to UN missions is that the Swedish state actively encourages applications to ESDP missions.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>MINUGUA</th>
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</table>

141
There is therefore little evidence of a correlation between EU deployments of civilian experts in ESDP operations and deployments as IS in UN operations. Nevertheless, while the number of EU nationals serving as IS in UN missions has remained steady since 2005, the total number of IS has continued to rise in line with the increase in total deployments and the increasingly multifaceted nature of UN peace operations.

For instance, international staff in missions totaled 5083 in 2005, rising to 6810 in 2008. Thus there has been a decline in the proportion of IS staff in UN missions from EU countries from 27.5% (1398/5083) in 2005 to 21.2% (1440/6810) in 2008.

Similarly, although the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy have long been ranked in the top 20 nations in terms of the number of international staff in UN missions, they have all slid a couple of places down the ranking tables since 2005 (Center on International Cooperation, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). In short, there is some evidence of a relative decline in the number of international staff serving in UN missions from EU countries since ESDP became operational in 2003.

However, it remains unclear whether the relative decline in IS deployments from EU countries is related to the impact of ESDP and the presence of the EU as a competitive employer. There are at least two reasons to doubt the extent to which the EU and UN
compete for international civilian staff. The first is that the UN has, in practice, developed a cadre of civilian peacekeeping professionals who are committed to developing their careers in UN peace operations54. A second reason relates to the distinct recruitment practices of the EU and UN. While ESDP recruitment is decentralised, with member states responsible for identifying and suggesting candidates in response to Calls for Contributions from the Council General Secretariat, the UN is committed to direct recruitment for international staff positions, through the UN on-line Galaxy software tool. In the UN there is no role for member states in fielding candidates. It follows that in the majority of EU countries the state has little if any role in identifying or encouraging personnel to apply for international staff positions in the UN’s DPKO. Few states keep track of the number of their civilians deployed in UN missions, much less play an active role in identifying and encouraging applications. Indeed, even states such as Germany, with a centralised capacity to mobilise and train civilians for international deployments, testify that they have no way of tracking applications for UN jobs (Gourlay 2006b; interview 11). Thus, the UN’s commitment to a centralised recruitment process for contracted staff serves to shield the UN from the effects of EU member states’ preferences, including those that might support deployments for EU missions over UN ones. In short, while there is some evidence of a relative decline in the proportion of IS staff in UN missions that come from EU member states, it is not possible to draw conclusions from this quantitative evidence that this is as a result of EU member states privileging deployments to EU missions over UN ones.

Trends in the deployment of EU civilians as Police in UN missions
The correlation between the rise of ESDP and the decline of EU police deployments to UN missions is stronger. Table 5, below, shows that the number of EU police deployed to UN missions declined from 1320 in 2007 to 650 in 2008.

---

54. This is despite the fact that DPKO efforts to formally establish a cadre of 1500 civilian peacekeeping professionals, with concomitant long-term contracts and benefits, have yet to be accepted by UN member states (Gourlay 2006b: 18).
Table 5. Number of police from EU countries that served in UN peace operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>171</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>1261</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>1312</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>650</td>
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</table>

Source: December monthly summaries of contributions, UN DPKO website.
Table 6, below, further shows that the decline in EU police deployed to UN missions can be largely accounted for by the drawdown of UNMIK mission. It shows that the number of police from EU countries deployed in UNMIK decreased by 681 from 810 in 2007 to 129 in 2008, and that the total number of EU police contributions to UN operations declined by 670 from 1320 in 2007 to 650 in 2008. This confirms Jakobsen’s prediction that the ratio of EU civilians deployed in UN missions will be much smaller after the EULEX mission takes over from UNMIK in Kosovo (Jakobsen 2006). While in December 2007 EU police made up 11.92% (1320/11077) of UN deployed police, in December 2008 the proportion had dropped to 5.65% (650/11511). As of 2008 EU police make up a smaller proportion of UN police (5.65%) than do EU military contributions to UN missions (13.4%).

Table 6. Numbers of police from EU countries deployed in UN operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>940</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55 As of October 2008, European military personnel made up 13.4% UN military deployments (10,433 personnel), and the majority of those deployed were deployed in UNIFIL in Lebanon (7315 personnel). Europeans made up less than 2% of UN deployments in Africa (1014). Source: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2008 (Center on International Cooperation 2008).
In summary, although there has been a decline in the proportion of EU civilians employed as international staff in UN missions since the rise of ESDP missions, (from 27.5% in 2005 to 21.2% in 2008), it remains unclear whether there is a causal link. Given that both organisations deploy fundamentally different recruitment mechanisms, there is no evidence that ESDP missions deployed civilians who would otherwise have been deployed as international staff in UN missions. However, ESDP and the transition from UNMIK to EULEX Kosovo in particular has led to a sharp drop in the number of European police deployed in UN missions. The proportion fell from 11.92% in December 2007 to 5.65% in December 2008. This can be directly attributed to the re-deployment of a number of UNMIK staff to the EULEX mission, suggesting that the EU and UN do compete over the same civilian police resources.

4.1.2 Trends in European deployments of civilians to ESDP missions

This section examines whether ESDP has, in line with the rationale of burden-sharing, reinforced the UN by generating new international civilian capabilities. In other words it addresses the question has ESDP generated additional resources to help share the peace operation burden?

As Table 7 (below) shows, the EU civilian deployments to EU LEX Kosovo totaled 1347 in 2008 (including but not limited to police). This is higher than the European historical commitment to UNMIK. Therefore, the rise in total numbers of EU police deployed in EULEX is evidence that ESDP has generated additional civilian resources for the follow-on mission to UNMIK.
Table 7. Total of EU civilian staff deployed, by ESDP mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPM</strong></td>
<td>176</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proxima II</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EULEX Kosovo</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EULEX RTF</strong></td>
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<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUMM Georgia</strong></td>
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<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUJUST LEX</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUBAM Rafah</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPOL COPPS</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUSR reinforced support Georgia</strong></td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUPOL Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPOL Kinshasa/RD Congo</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUSEC Congo</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMIS II Police Team</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guinea-Bissau</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>301</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Seconded + Contracted</strong></td>
<td><strong>341</strong></td>
<td><strong>386</strong></td>
<td><strong>469</strong></td>
<td><strong>2225</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, General Secretariat of the European Union.
Legend: S = Seconded staff, C = Contracted staff

Beyond the UNMIK case, Table 8 below reveals that the EU has also mobilised civilian deployments from smaller EU countries including, Belgium, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Malta, and the Baltic states. In contrast, Tables 3 and 5 (above) on international staff and police deployments to UN missions reveal that these smaller states had no tradition of deploying civilians to UN missions. This suggests that the EU’s decentralised recruitment practices, with direct involvement of member states in identifying candidates, were able to mobilise additional resources. In addition, the fact that civilians are seconded to EU missions – an option for which there is no equivalent
in the UN system\textsuperscript{56} – may affect their perception of how easy it will be to reintegrate into national police duty and thereby increase their readiness for ‘once-off’ or occasional deployments to EU missions. In short, ESDP appears to have mobilised new and additional human resources, particularly from national police forces, to those already deployed in UN missions. This indicates that the deployment of civilians to EU or UN missions is not a zero-sum game. Rather, in so far as ESDP has mobilised greater European engagement in peace operations, it has helped address UN over-stretch through burden-sharing.

Table 8. EU civilians including police deployed in ESDP missions

<table>
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<th>2008</th>
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<tr>
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</table>

\textsuperscript{56} Secondments are not an option for the UN which, since the 1999 ‘no-gratis personnel’ ruling, restricts the use of seconded personnel in DPKO missions.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>370(40)</strong></td>
<td><strong>415(49)</strong></td>
<td><strong>469(99)</strong></td>
<td><strong>2220(292)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third states</td>
<td>47(6)</td>
<td>54(4)</td>
<td>30(3)</td>
<td>168(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, General Secretariat of the European Union.

*2005 was the first year in which the CPCC collected data on deployments.

Numbers show seconded and contracted staff, of which numbers of contracted staff are included in brackets ()

There is, however, still a gap between ambition and reality in relation to EU civilian deployments. The EU’s approach to generating civilian capabilities was to establish quantitative targets based on assessments of existing capabilities, and to solicit pledges of potentially available contributions on the basis of these targets. These are reproduced in Table 9 below. When compared with actual civilian deployments from EU countries they are clearly ambitious. For instance, even the historically high number of over 4300 EU civilians deployed in both EU and UN operations in 2008 falls short of the ESDP target for 5000 deployable police, although if EU civilians deployed in OSCE missions were also included, the total figure would be closer to the mark. In short, it appears that EU targets are currently set based on a maximalist vision of the size of the human resource pool that EU member states can deploy for any peace operation although they are expressed only in terms of EU capability ambitions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority area</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Numbers pledged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Substitution policing, monitoring mentoring and advising tasks</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>Judges, lawyers, public prosecutors and penitentiary experts</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil administration</td>
<td>Set up or ensure functional administrative frameworks</td>
<td></td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire agreements, borders, human rights, political</td>
<td></td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and security developments, confidence building measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to EUSRs</td>
<td>Provide advice on SSR, DDR, mediation, border control, human rights</td>
<td>444</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and media policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, ESDP appears to have led to an increase in the total number of European civilians deployed to peace operations\(^57\). Figure 26 shows that despite the relative decline in EU civilian (police) deployments in UN missions, the development of ESDP operations has led to an increase in the total number of EU civilians deployed in EU and UN operations.

\(^57\) However this account does not track civilian deployments to the OSCE. Although these are typically small in number and the number of OSCE operations is at a historical low, this omission means that it is not possible to claim definitively that ESDP has increased the total number of European civilians deployed in any international peace operation.
Figure 26. Total civilian deployments (police and international staff) from EU countries to UN and EU missions

Sources: UN DPKO website and peacekeeping public affairs unit, EU Council General Secretariat (CPCC) and website (figures for ESDP civilian deployments for 2003 and 2004 are based on figures of deployments to EUPM, Proxima and EUJust Themis provided on the Council website).

4.1.3 Qualitative analysis of EU recruitment

Although the quantitative analysis suggests that ESDP has been able to harness additional civilian (police) resources, it evidently offers few insights into the quality of civilians deployed. This qualitative analysis asks has ESDP increased the pool of civilians that the UN can draw on for its peace operations?

The fact that civilians deployed in EU missions are ‘seconded’ by member states means that the vast majority of those deployed in ESDP missions are civil servants normally active in European domestic contexts. Only a few EU countries have recruitment and financial provisions in place to harness expertise from the private or non-profit sectors. Given the intrinsically challenging task of convincing national Police Chiefs or Ministers of the Interior that it is in their interest to release their talented staff for international deployments, Foreign Ministries responsible for ESDP recruitment typically stress that international deployments are essentially temporary, once-off engagements for limited durations. Thus the EU’s approach to mobilising
civilian resources is predicated on the assumption that skills acquired in national policing duties are transferable to international operational settings and that civilians will return to their national careers after a short tour of duty\textsuperscript{58}.

There is also a widely held perception that EU operational effectiveness is undermined by not having the right people. As one veteran EU police commander noted, ‘I used to think that quality mattered, but now I am convinced that numbers [of police] matter more. When you know that for any 10 police in a mission only 2 will be useful, you need to make sure that you have a lot of them’ (interview 12). Both UN and EU police missions have been criticised for placing too much emphasis on the structure and size of the force before decisions on its specific operational objectives and programme of activities have been made (Merlingen and Ostraušikaitė 2006; Kroeker 2007). This has meant that job descriptions included in Calls for Contributions have not reflected key mission needs. Similarly, others have argued that the dominant military culture of (civilian) ESDP missions, combined with the fact that the majority of staff are trained for executive or ‘substitution’ tasks, has reduced the efficacy of missions with a state capacity-building mandate. This was, for example, one of the findings of a case study of the EU engagement in Afghanistan commissioned by the EC (HTSPE 2008) as well as a case study of the UN mission in Sierra Leone (Hazen 2007).

Such critical reflections suggest that the current EU ESDP recruitment strategy was designed and is most suitable for rapidly identifying candidates with relevant executive professional experience. This is clearly an advantage in missions with a substitution mandate and in monitoring missions that often require rapid mobilisation of significant numbers of observers, sometimes with specialist (disarmament/border monitoring/human rights) expertise. However, it is less well adapted to missions with intrusive and invariably politically sensitive institutional reform and capacity building mandates. This suggests that the ‘new’ civilian capabilities that ESDP has harnessed

\textsuperscript{58} Given the difficulty that many EU member states experience in selling this internally, the current EU strategy for generating civilian capabilities emphasizes the need for Council General Secretariat to work more closely with Ministries of Interior to generate greater buy-in. To this end, civilian international deployments are increasingly justified in terms of their contributions to national security, notably through the linkage of international and domestic crime. However, persistent difficulties with this national recruitment strategy have also prompted calls for establishment of national standing ‘civilian reserves’ for international deployments as well as efforts to promote a cadre of civilian peace operation professionals at EU level, drawing on member state, Council Secretariat and Commission officials (Korski, 2008a, 2008b).
are not necessarily suitable for recurrent deployments, especially in the context of operations with peacebuilding mandates. In short, even if the EU has been able to harness ‘new’ civilian resources, these are not necessarily of the right kind and there are strong reasons to doubt that they could be re-deployed in the context of a UN-led mission. This suggests that ESDP has not necessarily increased the pool of civilian resources that the UN can potentially draw upon.

4.1.4. Implications for the EU-UN relationship

In summary, the quantitative overview suggests that the rise of ESDP has not directly contributed to strengthening the civilian dimensions of UN peace operations. Rather, it shows that the EU and UN compete over civilian resources, especially in relation to civilian police. Moreover, this competition looks set to intensify. As the EU struggles to meet its civilian capability targets (Civilian Headline Goals 2010), it plans to squeeze additional capacity from those states that are traditionally strong contributors to UN operations including non-EU ‘third states’ (interview 13). These already make up around 10% of ESDP civilian mission deployments (see Table 8). If, as this plan suggests, the composition of future ESDP missions will be increasingly ‘global’, the EU is increasingly likely to be in direct competition with the UN, including for non-EU civilian resources. This suggests that the UN does not have a material interest in promoting ESDP in so far as the organisations compete over the same human resources. This tension is also reflected in public discourse. For instance, during a conference on the EU-UN partnership in peace operations in 2008, the UN DPKO representative then responsible for institutional partnerships, Renata Dwan, argued that the EU-UN partnership ‘had to be worked at’ and noted that ESDP risked undermining UN capabilities if it led to further European disengagement from UN peace operations. She concluded that ‘the development of ESDP is in the interest of the UN in so far as it contributes to both ESDP and UN civilian capacities. It is not a question of either/or’\textsuperscript{59}. Paradoxically, however, the finding that EU-UN competition over human resources is a zero-sum game at least in relation to police, suggests that the rise in ESDP has produced conditions that are more conducive to operational cooperation; in so far as ESDP increases UN dependence on the capabilities of the EU,

it is likely to result in greater operational cooperation. This, in turn, confirms that in
the context of peace operations, the UN interest in operational cooperation is
conditional on its relative institutional weakness – its institutional overstretch and
capability short-falls. In short, it supports institutionalist assumptions that
organisations have an interest in cooperation under conditions of interdependence.

The quantitative overview of civilian deployments nevertheless also suggests that
ESDP indirectly benefits the UN in so far as it has captured new European capacities
for international civilian deployments. This is despite the fact that ESDP has not
increased the pool of civilian resources that the UN can draw on. Indeed, the analysis
of ESDP recruitment finds that it is unlikely that the UN will be able to harness
civilian resources initially mobilised for the EU. Nevertheless, to the extent that ESDP
has been able to harness human resources through member state secondments to EU
missions that would not otherwise have been available to the UN, ESDP clearly
contributes to burden-sharing. Quantitative findings confirm that ESDP has brought
(some) new capacities into the system that can be mobilised – through ESDP
interventions – in support of a UN mission or to relieve the UN of some of its burden,
including, for example, by taking over from the UN missions in Kosovo. This appears
to be consistent with the rationale for greater regional engagement in peace operations
presented in the UN Agenda for Peace (United Nations 1992) as described in chapter
one. It suggests that in the context of UN over-stretch, the UN does have a material
interest in promoting an efficient division of labour with the ESDP missions,
providing that their mandate complements that of UN operations. I turn next to
examining whether such operational complementarity has been achieved in practice.

4.2 Civilian ESDP-UN operational cooperation

4.2.1 Introduction

Whether EU-UN cooperation is mutually reinforcing or not will depend on how EU
and UN capabilities are utilised. In this section, I test the assumptions that underpin
UN and EU claims that UN-EU operational cooperation is mutually beneficial. More
specifically, I test whether the empirical record confirms that EU-UN cooperation is
mutually reinforcing provided that the UN and regional objectives are aligned through
UN authorisation, and that the practical challenges of cooperation (linked to institutional personality and operational approach) are not prohibitively high.

The UN has been present and active in all the countries to which the EU has sent a civilian ESDP mission, and UN political missions, country teams and implementing agencies often serve as an important partner to the ESDP missions in a range of roles. For instance, in Guinea-Bissau, the UN country office, which had an established relationship with key national actors, played a critical role in providing entry points for the ESDP mission. The mission had been met with distrust and scepticism by the military elite and it was only six months after it arrived and after the UN country team arranged for an SSR seminar involving the EU mission, that the ESDP mission made headway in building working relationships with the host government. Similarly, as has been demonstrated in chapter 3, the UN is often an ally of the EC in developing and implementing country-specific recovery and development programmes. In the case of Aceh, for instance, the EU Aceh Monitoring Mission was followed by a range of EC-supported actions to promote DDR and economic recovery. These were jointly designed with and implemented by UN agencies (International Labour Organisation, the International Organisation for Migration, and the United Nations Development Programme). While recognising that the operational relationship between civilian ESDP and the broader UN family is significant, this chapter is designed to investigate the operational relationship between civilian ESDP and UN peace missions on the basis that they are both 'security actors’ that employ a similar approach. This section, therefore, focuses on the two country cases where civilian ESDP missions have taken place in support of or alongside UN peace operations. The first country is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which, in addition to two military missions (Artemis in 2003 and EUFOR in 2006), the EU has deployed a police and security sector reform mission (EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RDC). The second case is Kosovo, where, as of early 2009, the EULEX mission had reached full operational capability after a long and complicated ‘transition’ from UNMIK. Drawing on these case studies of EU-UN operational cooperation, I ask: Can the UN rely on the operational support of the EU? Was EU-UN operational cooperation based on common strategic positions and policies? And did they work well together?
4.2.2 Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Congo

The DRC is often cited as a good example of the EU’s Security Strategy commitment to ‘reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflict, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations’ (European Council 2003a). On this view, both military Operation Artemis, which provided bridging protection force in Bunia in 2003, and EUFOR, which provided additional support to the UN mission, MONUC, to help ensure stability in Kinshasa during the 2006 elections, are seen as evidence of enhanced military support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations. Similarly, the EU police and security sector reform missions and EC financial support for UN-implemented DDR, rule of law and the election support programmes are evidence of reinforced cooperation with the UN in post-conflict peacebuilding in the DRC. One such favourable appraisal argues that EU engagement in the DRC, both in terms of ESDP missions and EC support for the rule of law represents a good example of a comprehensive approach to post-conflict stabilisation in alignment with the objectives of MONUC (Martinelli 2006). For instance, Martinelli writes that ‘the EU’s presence in the DRC is testimony to the tangible cooperation the Union is pursuing with the UN, consistent with the EU-UN joint declaration on cooperation in crisis management’ (Martinelli 2006: 394) and, moreover, that:

‘Perhaps nowhere more than in the DRC can we see the EU’s determined efforts to use the inter-institutional framework devised at Maastricht and the inter-pillar coordination required to made full use of the toolbox available to help transition in the DRC through civilian and military crisis management instruments coupled with humanitarian assistance and longer-term development policies (Martinelli 2006: 380).

This chapter questions Martinelli’s interpretation, arguing that the EU has been a constructive niche player in the DRC, but that the roles of its missions were inherently limited and some were less than effective. The DRC case also highlights the severe challenges that the EU faced in addressing internal coherence, between EU institutions and member states and within EU institutions, as well as external coherence with the UN. This contributed to the failure of the EU to play a leading role in coordinating
external support for Security Sector Reform in the DRC, despite its explicit ambition to do so.

_Military ESDP missions Artemis and EUFOR DRC_

A 2008 review of Europe’s role in nation-building (Dobbins _et al._ 2008) concedes that EU military engagement in the DRC represents ‘a definite advance in the EU’s institutional development’ and recognises that Europe’s nation-states may not have been willing to make a military commitment to the DRC under any other arrangement. It nevertheless questions the efficacy of the EU’s ‘episodic’ or ‘punctuated’ military participation and insistence on maintaining a separate chain of command, arguing that less intermittent commitment of European troops, with direct contributions to MONUC, would have been more helpful for the UN. Feedback from officers within MONUC also highlights the practical difficulties of coordinating with EUFOR – a parallel operation to MONUC active in the same theatre, when compared with the relatively easier task of transitioning to and from the bridging operation _Artemis_. From the perspective of DPKO and MONUC, at the working level cooperation was, at the very least, complicated and the transaction costs involved were seen as burdensome. The EUFOR experience has not, therefore, endere UN officials to the model of over-the-horizon EU support for UN operations. One senior DPKO official stated that this was not a model that the UN would look to repeat (interview 14).

Similarly, while there is a broad consensus on the need for and important impact of the _Artemis_ mission in 2003, there is less agreement over the value-added of EUFOR. While the mission succeeded in fulfilling its mandate to contribute to providing security in the capital Kinshasa, its military deterrence effect remains difficult to assess. A 2007 annual review of peace operations notes the rapid deployment of 400 troops on 19–21 August 2006 to suppress fighting that had erupted after attacks initiated by Joseph Kabila’s presidential guard on Jean-Pierre Bemba’s militia, and the increased deployment of troops in advance of polling on 29 October, and argues that this had ‘significant political value, although its military impact should not be exaggerated’ (Center on International Cooperation 2007: 60). Similarly, experts on the Congo such as Nzonga-Ntalaja have argued that EUFOR was of limited value. He notes that ‘it was based on the assumption that making the elections peaceful would contribute to restoring stability in the DRC.[…] But peace is still elusive, especially in
the part of the country where President Kabila is supposed to have brought it.’
Moreover, he notes that EUFOR did not address the root causes of instability, notably
the role of political militias, and was widely perceived locally as having been sent to
ensure that Kabila remained in power. As such, it only strengthened anti-European
sentiment, particularly in Kinshasa (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007: 33).

The fact that the EU has not intervened military in the DRC since EUFOR DRC is
also significant, particularly since the UN Secretary-General requested EU military
assistance to protect civilians during the escalation of violence in the East in 2008. As
on previous occasions, both France and Belgium publicly supported the idea of EU
assistance in the form of a military ESDP operation. However, they did not receive
support from other EU member states. A number of member states, including the UK,
argued that they were already overstretched, and Germany appeared to have principled
reservations about European troops fighting in Africa. In addition, Gowan has
highlighted the tactical difficulties, including the likelihood that the rebels would have
had time to take UN peacekeepers as hostages in Goma. The deepening financial crisis
arguably also compounded the sense of European overstretch. Taken together, this
contributed to a sense of ‘intervention fatigue’, possibly suggesting that the age of
‘EU humanitarian interventionism’ is over 2008 (Gowan 2009: 57-59).

In any case, the 2008 Congo case appears to underscore that the UN cannot rely on the
EU support, even in cases where it has a track-record of supplementing UN
capabilities. However, EU officials argue that this case does not undermine the EU-
UN relationship because it was not, in fact, clear that the UN wanted the EU to
intervene in this case (interviews 15). The EU received mixed signals from the UN
regarding a possible EU intervention. The UN Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in DRC did not call for or support the idea of a separate EU
intervention, and the letter requesting assistance from the UN Secretary-General
bizarrely quoted European Commissioner Michel’s case for EU intervention rather
than directly requesting it. This provoked debate over whether the UN really required
EU assistance, and suspicions, as with the 2006 EUFOR DRC mission, that the UN
had somehow been manipulated by some EU member states into requesting an EU
mission. Even if this was not the case, it appears that both EU member states and the
UN DPKO were divided over the utility and political desirability of an EU military
intervention to protect civilians in the DRC in 2008. This not only illustrates the inherent unpredictability of the punctuated EU support for UN missions, but suggests that member states within the EU and UN have come to question the utility of the role of the EU as a provider of emergency ‘humanitarian’ military response.

**Strengthening the police and the role of EUPOL Kinshasa**

The EU police mission in the DRC was the first civilian ESDP mission in Africa. It was designed to establish, equip and train an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) tasked with protecting the transition institutions, in accordance with the Sun City peace agreement of 2002 and the Memorandum on Security and the Army of 2003. Although the establishment of IPUs was originally conceived of as an integrated alternative to military guards, it soon became apparent that the leaders of the transition authorities wanted to maintain their separate, loyal militia or ‘military guards’. The role of the IPU therefore shifted to providing security for the nascent institutions of the DRC. This meant that the establishment of the IPU did not directly affect existing armed bodies. This had the benefit of ensuring that the establishment of the IPU was relatively uncontroversial, but it also did little to address rebel groups in Kinshasa. EUPOL was established in April 2005 after EC assistance had provided material assistance in preparation of the deployment.

The genesis of the EUPOL mission resulted from a ‘model’ process of EU-UN cooperation. The EU and UN shared the strategic priority of securing the transition to democracy and the mission was conceived of in cooperation with the UN and the transitional government. This involved a pragmatic, joint assessment of how the EU could best help address some of the most strategic gaps in security. More precisely, in 2003, the objectives of the international community in the DRC were aligned with the goal of successfully implementing the ‘Sun City’ power-sharing peace deal – the Global and Inclusive Agreement signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, and the March 2003 Memorandum on Security and the Army. In relation to Police, MONUC was indirectly engaged at the operational level of the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) and took the lead in efforts to build its capacity, including through a number of ‘train the trainers’ and specialised training programmes.  

60 From January 2005, the focus of the MONUC police training effort was on securing the 2006 election. To this end it provided basic training to 50,000 territorial officers, in conjunction with efforts
however, in a position to provide the training, equipment and monitoring required for the specialist Integrated Police Units foreseen in the Sun City Agreement. Training and equipment of specialised, ‘elite’ police units clearly required support from other actors. Hence, the UN had previously welcomed the bi-lateral interventions of Angola and France in training Rapid Reaction Police in Kinshasa and encouraged the EU to play a complementary role in training the Integrated Police Unit that was to be dedicated to securing state-institutions. The idea for this EU mission was first raised in 2003 in a meeting of the Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT). This was a mechanism agreed at Sun City that comprised the transition government and international actors and effectively enabled the key international donors ‘to steer the domestic political process in the DRC’ (Keane 2007: 220). The proposal resulted from discussions between the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General William Swing, the EC Head of Delegation, and the representative of the EU Presidency. Therefore, as with Artemis, the EU’s first civilian ESDP mission in Africa was generated in response to a request from the UN, although in this case the request was informal and first discussed at field level rather than between capitals. Formally, the EU mission was launched in response to an invitation from the Congolese authorities, and this also served as its legal base.

In Brussels, the mission’s mandate to build police capacity to secure the nascent democratic institutions of the DRC was also relatively clear, limited and uncontroversial with member states. The French served as champions of the idea within the Political and Security Committee (PSC), while the Secretary General/High Representative Solana ‘sold’ the idea as evidence of the continued EU commitment, following Artemis, to providing security in the DRC and supporting the political transition process. The PSC agreed to support the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit in December 2003. However, pre-planning of the mission was not entirely smooth. The Commission argued in favour of a small ‘Commission mission’, using contracted agents managed by the Commission with long-term involvement, while the Council preferred a more robust but shorter intervention in line with the ‘crisis management approach’ (Hoebekе, Carette and Vlassenroot 2007). The compromise was a sequenced multi-phase operation rather than an integrated effort. It was divided

supported by a UNDP-managed $48 million fund to provide the equipment and training to secure the election process.
into three stages, the first two of which were the Commission’s responsibility. These related to the rehabilitation of the training centre, the provision of equipment and technical assistance, and an initial training phase for the IPU. This was principally financed with €6 million from the European Development Fund but support for weapons had to be generated from other sources not constrained by development funding rules. Member states contributed a further €2.3 million in cash and in kind for the provision of weapons and law enforcement equipment, and €585,000 of the CFSP budget was used to buy missing equipment such as arms, grenades and ammunition. The establishment of the IPU was delayed because the Congolese authorities took longer than planned in identifying the police that were to form the IPU and in identifying an operational base (barracks) for the police officers. Once identified, it became clear that it needed refurbishment. The EC mobilised an additional €1.05 million through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism for this task, arguing that without a place to live the IPU could become a threat to public order.

The third phase of the project was for the deployment of the EUPOL mission. This was to accompany the deployment of the IPU and to monitor its work. The mission was formally approved on 9 December 2004 and began to deploy in February 2005. Those pre-deployed participated in the specialist training. When the mission had reached full capacity of 29 international staff, headed by Police Commissioner Adilho Custódio from Portugal, it was formally launched on 12 April 2005. The launching ceremony served as the official transition from Community action to an ESDP action and was attended by both the HRSG Solana and Commissioner Louis Michel. In Solana’s speech at the ceremony, he noted that the mission ‘underlines the EU’s capacity to blend different institutional instruments in a coherent manner’ and noted that ‘right from the start, the support provided by the EU to the IPU falls within the framework of close cooperation with MONUC’ (European Council 2005d). Interviews with EC and UN DPKO staff suggest that the internal and EU-UN coordination in the planning phases was effective and relatively straight-forward (interviews 16).

During the second Community phase and the early stages of the deployment of EUPOL (until June 2005), 1050 police officers and 40 Congolese trainers received training. Thereafter, the mission was responsible in monitoring the work of the IPU. From June 2005 the IPU provided eight mobile patrols a day and was responsible for
protecting key government buildings including the buildings of the National Assembly, the Senate, and the Supreme Court, as well as the Independent Electoral Commission. It was first ‘tested’ during protests against the postponement of the elections in June and July 2005. While some criticised its handling of the protests as rough, the conduct of the IPU was nevertheless perceived as relatively professional (Martinelli 2006: 398). In November 2005, the mission’s mandate was extended and expanded to contribute to the security of the electoral process61. The new mandate emphasised training in crowd control and the coordination of other intervention police units. In April 2006 the mission was reinforced with 29 policemen (including officers from Angola and Mali) for the duration of the elections and sought to improve the coordination of the crowd control units in Kinshasa by providing assistance to the relevant operational decision-making centres of the PNC. These, in turn, were tasked with co-ordinating the IPU, Police d’Intervention Rapide and the Groupe d’Intervention Mobile.

Although there were a number of international actors engaged in police training in 2005, with the goal of implementing the peace agreement and securing the 2006 election, there was no commonly agreed plan for police restructuring. Recognising the need for a more coordinated approach, in February 2006 the DRC Ministry of the Interior invited the organisations and states already active in the area, in cooperation with the PNC, to form a Groupe de Réflexion pour la reforme de la police. Those invited included MONUC, the EU (European Commission and EUPOL), South Africa, Angola, France and the UK. This led to the creation of an implementation body, Comité de suivi, chaired by the DRC with the financial and technical support of donors, including the EC62. In this way EUPOL became gradually more engaged in matters of police reform, but unlike the EUSEC mission described below, this was never the mission’s principal mandate. Rather, while EUPOL has been involved in stock-taking initiatives, for instance assisting in the census of the PNC (an operation led by South Africa), its actions, in line with its mandate, have focused on building capacity rather than promoting reform. Not only was the EUPOL mandate less

61 The EUPOL mission initially had a budget of €4.37 million. An additional €3.5 million was provided for the extension and expansion of the mission in 2006. Furthermore, the Head of Mission secured additional equipment for crowd control from member states during 2006.

62 The EC provided €10 million for the support of the national police census and human resource management in 2007-2008.
politically contentious, it was also relatively clear that the EU did not play a leading role in the area of police reform. Thus, despite the fact that the EU and UN (MONUC) were vying to lead international engagement in SSR during the run up to the elections in 2006 (see below), EUPOL was not directly engaged in political turf battles and relations with MONUC remained constructive.

In conclusion, the EUPOL is a positive example of how an ESDP mission can provide a significant, specialised role in police capacity building, complementary to that of MONUC and other international actors. It is consistently described by UN officials as a targeted and effective operation. It was not, however, designed to contribute to the reform of the PNC and unsurprisingly has had little impact on efforts to promote broader police reform in the PNC beyond Kinshasa.

Defence reform and the role of EUSEC RD Congo

Unlike EUPOL, the mandate of the EU mission to provide advice and assistance to security sector reform in the DRC (EUSEC RD Congo) mission was broader and more politically intrusive. Its objective was to assist in the reform of the defence sector by providing assistance for the creation of the new integrated Congolese army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Also, unlike EUPOL, the idea for the mission did not originate in-theatre and in close cooperation with the UN, but rather was the product of a French-Belgium initiative, in the form of a joint non-paper transmitted to the PSC in late 2004. More precisely, the initiative was led by the Belgian Foreign Ministry who felt that an EU mission would not only have more legitimacy than on-going Belgian bi-lateral efforts, but might also help mobilise additional European assistance for Security Sector Reform (SSR). Although the idea was not supported by the Ministry of Defence in Belgium, which preferred the bi-lateral approach, the Foreign Ministry ‘won the day’ after securing the support of the French (interview 17).

Within the DRC, reform of the security sector in line with the ambition agreed in 2003 to create 18 integrated professional brigades, had been contested and fraught with delays (Keane 2007; Hoebeke et al. 2007; Onana and Taylor 2008; Dahrendorf 2008). There were a number of difficulties in implementing the brassage (or mixing) process that involved the mixing and integration of various former warring parties from across
the DRC territory into new integrated brigades. For instance, although the DDR process was conceived as an entirely voluntary process, this was compromised by Congolese transition leaders’ insistence on imposing an inflated quota system for army integration in order to maintain their leverage within a partisan national army. This spurred, continued and often forced recruitment of new combatants (Onana and Taylor 2008: 505). While this Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) effort was problematic, it was relatively well financed through the World Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). In contrast, support for efforts to build army capacity was limited. One of the few efforts that existed in 2004 was the Belgian initiative to train the first integrated brigade in Kisangani, ‘operation Avenir’, with the support of France and Luxembourg. Frustrated by the slow progress, the Belgians persuaded the French to support the EU SEC RDC idea on the assumption that it would generate greater EU assistance and enhance EU political leverage on issues related to SSR. The mission, as it was originally conceived, was small in terms of human resources – an advisory mission with a team of eight experts, but its scope and political ambition were large. The EU Joint Action of 2 May 2005 mentioned that the mission provide ‘technical expertise’ on command and control, budgetary and financial management, training, accountancy and dealing with contracts and tenders (European Council 2005e). The eight experts were to be seconded to the private office of the Minister of Defence, the general military staff, including the Integrated Military Structure, the staff of the land forces, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-assignment (CONADER), and the Joint Operation Committee.

Although EUSEC RD Congo was established following an official request by the DRC government, and, indeed the letter of invitation forms the legal basis for the mission, the letter arrived ‘at the last possible moment’ after ‘difficult’ discussions (interview 18). From its inception therefore, the sensitivity of the mission’s mandate has meant that cooperation with the host-government could not be assumed. Similarly, internal fragmentation even within the Belgian government – the sponsor of the mission – suggested that the buy-in of some of the key European states was uncertain.

One of the tasks that EUSEC RDC undertook early in its operation was an audit of the army’s chain of payment system. This found evidence of corruption and the
embezzlement of funds allocated for ‘ghost’ soldiers’ salaries. Based on this audit, EUSEC RDC developed the so-called ‘chain of payments’ project. The project separated the chain of payment from the chain of command. It ensured that soldiers based in the new integrated brigades were paid regularly and thereby helped generate confidence for donors willing to support the army reform. This project began in December 2005 under the code-name EUSEC FIN and the mandate for EUSEC RDC was revised accordingly. It involved the deployment of a number of international advisors at each level of the chain of payments down to the brigade level. It was authorised for 18 months with a budget of €1.84 million.

Although neither EUSEC RDC’s first mandate, nor its second EUSEC FIN mandate, was developed in close association with the UN or MONUC in the field. MONUC welcomed the chain of payments initiative and a number of UN officers saw this as the main purpose of the mission (interview 19). However, the EUSEC RDC also had ambitions to assist with broader reforms in the area of SSR, and, in practice, during the run up to the 2006 elections the EU and UN competed over who should lead or coordinate the SSR process. From MONUC’s point of view, MONUC should act as the principal coordinator since it was the largest international actor with 17,000 troops and enjoyed greater legitimacy. MONUC also had a track-record in efforts to coordinate SSR. In 2004 it had established an SSR planning and coordination structure consisting of a steering committee of donors, a technical advisory group and a Secretariat. However this first coordination architecture failed in early 2005 because of lack of acceptance by either the government or the donors. Indeed, the EU had warned that the structure was too driven by MONUC and not consultative enough (Onana and Taylor 2008: 507). In the context of MONUC’s mixed track-record in coordinating issues of SSR, and given that the EU had two missions dedicated to security sector capacity building, the EU argued that it was in a better position and more capable of taking on the external SSR coordination role. In the spring of 2006, EUSEC developed a framework document for SSR in which it proposed an EU-led cooperation strategy at the multinational level to improve donor coordination. This was not, however, taken up by MONUC or the DRC authorities. On 15 September 2006, the GAERC re-affirmed the EU ambition to lead international efforts in SSR. It stated that ‘in view of the need for a comprehensive approach combining the different initiatives underway, the EU would be ready to assume a coordinating role in
international efforts in the security sector, in close association with the United Nations, to support the Congolese authorities in this field’ (European Council 2006c). The EU ambition to lead SSR efforts, was subsequently welcomed in the UN Security Council resolution 1756 (2007). It:

‘calls on the donor community to continue to be firmly committed to the provision of the urgent assistance needed for the integration, training and equipping of the Armed Forces and of the National Police of the DRC as well as for the reform of the administration of justice and urges the Government and its partners, in particular the European Union, to agree promptly on ways to coordinate their efforts and to carry out security sector reform by building on the results already achieved’ (United Nations 2007).

However, although the EU cited this resolution extensively as evidence of its leading role, in practice its role had been contested during the transition and, even with UNSC support, it was unable to execute a co-ordinating role in the post-election context where neither the government nor the donors had an interest in a concerted approach to SSR.

One review of the EU SEC RDC mission concludes that ‘a major success for EUSEC has been to occupy a strategic position within the different actors involved in the reform of the Congolese security sector’ and ‘in maintaining the confidence of the Congolese authorities in this very sensitive domain’ (Hoebeke, Carette, Vlassenroot 2007). However, this finding is questionable, particularly considering events in the post-election period. During 2005 and early 2006 EUSEC RDC participated in a range of meetings on SSR, hosted by the transitional government and attended by the main stakeholders. This enabled the EUSEC mission to gain oversight over various bilateral initiatives. However, it did not confer on the EU a position of coordinator nor did it lead to greater convergence on central questions related to the future of army reform. Although MONUC was primarily dedicated to the DDR process and to securing the election in 2005, when it did engage in SSR during 2006 its work on army reform followed a separate process and took a different form. In June 2006 a DDR/SSR unit was created in MONUC and a military Deputy Chief of Staff was appointed to it. This was subsequently divided and the SSR section began work on a
consultation process, which resulted in the ‘Strategy to Support the Government of the DRC in SSR 2007-2010’ (agreed on 7 February 2007). As with the EU ambitions, the strategy aimed to support the new government in drafting a National Security Strategy or White Paper on SSR, and developing plans for the army, police and justice sector, while providing continued operational support to the Brassage process. Thus, before the 2006 elections both the EU and the UN had positioned themselves as the ‘key’ international counterparts for the new government, ready and able to provide policy and operational advice. Unsurprisingly, therefore, both EU and UN officials have characterised the EU-UN relationship on SSR in the run-up to the 2006 elections as competitive (interviews 20)\textsuperscript{63}. Dahrendorf’s review of SSR in the DRC similarly identifies competition within MONUC and between MONUC and the EU as obstacles to the pursuit of a coordinated approach to SSR. She writes that: ‘The establishment of a more coherent viable SSR coordination mechanism for the DRC was often debated, but fell foul of internal politics and other priorities, such as security and elections’ (Dahrendorf 2007: 94). The review concludes that ‘there was no real locus for conceiving and coordination of SSR activities. A certain degree of infighting, within the [MONUC] mission itself and between the UN and the EU, posed obstacles’ (Dahrendorf 2007: 96).

While the EU and UN were competing over which international organisation should take the lead on issues of SSR, the EU SEC mission’s claim to providing a leading role were, in practice, undermined by divisions between the mission and key EU member states, notably Belgium. Whereas the EU SEC Head of Mission, General Joana, was working with the Army’s Chief of Staff, General Kisempia, on the assumption that the DRC required and could financially sustain a professional dedicated army of some 70,000 to 80,000 soldiers, the Belgian Minister of Defence was simultaneously encouraging an alternative plan, supported by the Minister of Defence, Chikez, for a larger, more ‘productive’ army in line with the Chinese system\textsuperscript{64}. Indeed, after the elections Kabila adopted the Chikez plan for a large and

\textsuperscript{63} EU-UN competition over roles was exacerbated by the different visions for DDR. The EUSEC Head of Mission, General Joana of France was highly critical of the UN-led DDR process, which he viewed as ill-conceived and destabilising. In particular, he argued that a DDR process should have been based on a high-level process of power-sharing and integration rather than being based on incentives given to individual soldiers to demobilise (Joana 2008; and interview 21).

\textsuperscript{64} Although the Chinese were extremely important actors and had a strong military representation in Kinshasa, it is not clear from interviews how active they were in the SSR debate.
functionally diverse army of some 130,000 soldiers. According to this plan the army would be divided into four parts: a determined army with a ‘traditional’ defence role; a construction army with a role in conducting enabling infrastructure projects, a production army with a role in farming, and an army d’excellence with a broader educational role (interviews 22)\textsuperscript{65}. It was clear to the DRC authorities that EU member states had no common position and were not necessarily interested in developing one. This undermined the credibility of the EUSEC RDC mission. It also strengthened the UN case for increasing its role in SSR. Indeed, UN officials cited divisions within the EU as one of the reasons for the creation of an SSR unit in MONUC (interview 23). Lamenting the fragmentation of the international community in 2008, General Joana argued that one of the external factors that explains the limited success of SSR efforts in the DRC is that there was not even a minimum level of coherence or concerted action on the part of the international community – notably between the EU, UN, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the UK, South Africa, the US, Russia and China. He also noted that this enabled the DRC authorities to ‘divide and rule’, playing off one actor against another (Joana 2008).

While the international community was relatively divided during the transition phase, it at least had a mechanism for promoting coherence and exerting influence through the CIAT. One of the first acts of President Kabila was to dissolve the CIAT and without it the international community had no formal mechanism for coordination or for influencing the government of a sovereign state. Not only were the EU and UN’s structural political ties to the DRC government weaker after the election, but both actors were relatively less important when compared, in particular, with China. In 2007 China agreed a deal with the DRC government, of a $US 9 billion investment in return for copper mining concessions, in which part of the investment deal included a pledge to build a factory for ammunition and provide army training and equipment.

\textsuperscript{65} In the absence of effective donor-supported reintegration, the army is an important source of employment and security for the government (but not necessarily its citizens). This was, according to interviews, one reason why Kabila’s government is actively considering this model for army reform, even if was unlikely to receive financial support from Western development actors. This proved to be the case, and after a new Congolese Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff took office in 2008, they worked with the international community on a Revised Plan for Army Reform based on the Kisempia plan. This was endorsed by the President in May 2009 (Clément 2009).
In practice, no external actor has played a leading role in coordinating SSR efforts since the 2006 elections. Rather, President Kabila has favoured a bi-lateral approach to securing assistance. Arguably South Africa has maintained the best relationship with the DRC authorities in relation to the issue for SSR. It has, for instance, continued to engage the government in a dialogue process through a series of seminars in relation to army reform. Strikingly, the EUSEC was not even initially invited to one such event in 2007. This reflected the extent to which the relationship between the EUSEC mission and the government had deteriorated. While some argue that the break-down in EUSEC-DRC government relations was possibly a consequence of the EUSEC’s role in clamping down on corruption within the army through the chain of payments projects (interviews 24), others argue that it was an unforeseeable consequence of getting caught up in the Congolese political struggle between Chikez and Kisempia (Clément 2009). In any case, in a context in which EU Ambassadors had publicly condemned Kabila’s government after the violent clashes of March 2007, and in which relations between the EUSEC RDC Head of Mission and the Minister of Defence, Chikez had ‘reached a point of no return’ there was no option but for the PSC to wind down the EUSEC mission (interviews 25). By mid 2007 the EU had lost all leverage and influence with the government of the DRC in relation to SSR (interviews 26).66 One perverse consequence of the relative decline in the EU’s role and ambitions in SSR in the DRC since 2007 is that, out of necessity, EU and UN informal cooperation has much improved. For a while neither the EU (EUSR, EC Head of Delegation and Head of Police Mission) nor the UN (SRSG and MONUC) played a co-ordinating role in relation to SSR. As a consequence their relationship became less competitive (interviews 28). Later, in 2008, UN Resolution 1856 tasked MONUC with coordinating SSR activities with the EU operations and after a new Defence Minister and Chief of Staff was appointed in 2008, MONUC and the EU have worked well together in support of revising the plan for army reform based on the vision of a smaller professional army (interviews 29).

Not only did the EU fail to rally the international community around a common SSR agenda in the DRC 2006, but its efforts to create an integrated ESDP mission in

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66 The deterioration of relations between the EUSEC RDC Head of Mission and the DRC authorities resulted in the PSC discussing whether the mission should be discontinued before the end of its mandate in June 2007, but the Dutch and Belgians argued in favour of its continuation (interview 27).
support of SSR were also thwarted. Following a joint Commission-Council review of EU action in the DRC (Examen Global et Unifié de l’action extérieure de l’UE en RDC doc 7138/1/06), the PSC tasked the Council Secretariat and the Commission ‘to continue work on a comprehensive EU approach to security sector reform in the DRC and to present options in this field as appropriate’. This resulted in a joint Commission-Council evaluation mission in October 2006, which was followed by a paper: ‘A comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the DRC’. This argued that member states consider establishing an integrated ESDP mission in agreement with the new DRC government which would contribute to ‘enhanced coherence with major activities carried out by other actors, most notably the European Commission, EU member states, MONUC, South Africa, Angola, the US and Canada’. To this end, it proposed a number of ways in which internal EU coordination could be improved, in addition to improving EU support for the DRC-led Committee structures responsible for defence, police and justice.

More specifically, the paper argued that a future integrated mission might comprise army, police and justice reform components, which in all cases would be complemented by EC support. For instance, in relation to army reform it argued that an integrated mission could contribute to the development of a broad strategic planning process, through the preparation of a white book on defence, and could actively support reform projects identified by the mixed committee for the reconstruction and reform of the army. In relation to justice, it foresaw that the EC would provide substantial support to the development of the civilian justice sector, while the EU mission might include a component intended to improve military justice. Similarly, the EC was to provide substantial support to the development of the PNC, with a potential ESDP component dedicated to providing assistance to the EC police team, to monitoring Kinshasa police work, and to assisting with the re-organisation of crowd-control units across the territory. In short, the paper proposed reconfiguring and extending the roles of EUSEC RDC and EUPOL into a new integrated ESDP mission, that would commence after June 2007, in line with established plans for EC assistance for reintegration, police and justice capacity-building.

By mid 2007 it had become clear that this plan was over ambitious. As mentioned above, the DRC government had little interest in formalising a privileged role for the
EU in relation to SSR, and rather preferred to further discussions with external actors on a purely bilateral basis. But even if this had not been the case, discussions within the EU in the spring of 2007 revealed tensions between the Commission and Council over the respective importance of Community to ESDP approaches to institutional capacity building as well as tensions between the Council and member states over the role and scope of a potential integrated ESDP mission. Thus, by mid 2007, the option of an integrated ESDP mission was effectively off the PSC table in Brussels (interviews 30).

Case conclusions
The DRC case reveals that while the EU and UN shared the priority objective of securing the transition process, they did not share a common approach to the second-order priority of SSR. Where actions were designed with a view to securing the election, EU-UN cooperation was relatively unproblematic at the strategic level (EUPOL and EUFOR DRC). In the case of the military operation EUFOR DRC, however, the practice of working together with MONUC in the same theatre involved significant transaction costs and this has led DPKO officials to publicly discount the joint operations model. In contrast, when the EU and UN did not share a common strategy with regard to the second-order priority of army reform, the relationship was more competitive. Moreover, divisions within the EU were a key factor in explaining why the EU did not live up to its ambitions to coordinate external SSR interventions. At the time MONUC officials cited internal EU fragmentation as evidence of its limited credibility and capacity to coordinate SSR efforts, while the Head of EUSEC RDC also identified internal competition between EU member states and EU institutions as operational obstacles. As such, the DRC case highlights the debilitating impact of internal fragmentation on the credibility of the EU and on its ability to provide leadership for the broader international community. Indeed, it is broadly recognised by EU officials that the EU is at its most divided when it comes to the DRC (interviews 31).

67 Following the EU Council conclusions on Security and Development in December 2007, the EC was tasked with commissioning studies on operational cooperation between EU actors and member states in a number fragile states or states recovering from war. Internal discussions quickly concluded that the DRC would not be chosen as a case study, because all agreed that internal coordination had been ‘deeply problematic’ (interview 31).
The case of EUSEC RDC also demonstrates the inherent challenges of maintaining a working relationship with the host government while advocating a strong normative vision for defence reform. Neither the EU vision for army reform, nor its coordinating role, was welcomed by the new DRC government. Nor did other external actors share an interest in the EU or the UN playing a coordinating role. This case therefore highlights the relative impotence of both the EU and the UN in co-ordinating external action after the 2007 elections, in a context in which other external actors (notably South Africa, Angola and China) and the government had little interest in improved donor coordination. Therefore, in addition to underlining that EU and UN visions for post-conflict SSR are not necessarily aligned, this case also highlights the fundamental challenge to the objective of improving donor coherence, namely that in some cases this is neither in the interest of the host government nor the external stakeholders. Thus, just as EU and UN interests in cooperation cannot be assumed, nor is the Paris/Accra agenda of promoting donor coherence one that is universally shared in practice. Rather, the DRC case illustrates that in the absence of a commonly agreed strategy, it is rational for the government and key external actors to pursue their interests through bi-lateral relationships.

4.2.3 Case study: Kosovo

The Western Balkans is a strategic priority for the EU and it is therefore not surprising that it is also the region with the highest number of ESDP interventions. As of 2009, the EU Police Mission is still operational in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as is the ESDP military operation Althea that took over from NATO in 2005. In Macedonia, support to the police has included the Proxima police mission, and has, since 2006, been continued in the form of a European Community assistance programme.

However, it is in Kosovo that ESDP faced its biggest challenge with the largest and most ambitious civilian ESDP operation, EU LEX Kosovo, which conducts a mix of executive and supportive tasks in the area of police, justice and customs. It is also the mission with the longest lead-time and biggest planning team. Although pre-planning for this mission dates back to 2005, and a robust planning team, the EU Planning Team (EUPT), was deployed to Pristina in April 2006 to help design the EU mission
that was intended to follow on from the UN, the EU only took over the majority of UNMIK’s mandate in late 2008. Moreover, while EULEX is operational there has been no formal transition in that EULEX still operates under the legal ‘umbrella’ of UNMIK. The Kosovo case therefore also represents the lengthiest, most complicated and most incomplete ‘transition’ from a UN to an EU mission.

Planning for the transition (2006)

The origins of the EULEX mission and of international efforts to address the status question are linked. Until 2004 the ‘standards before status’ policy effectively made any discussion of status conditional on the ability of the Kosovo administration to meet an array of governance standards, including in the rule of law area. This policy was reviewed in 2004. An initial report by the Norwegian Ambassador to NATO, Kai Eide, argued that the ‘standards before status’ policy was incredible and unwieldy. He recommended that UNMIK’s standards policy should be simplified and made more realistic and that efforts to transfer powers from UNMIK to local authorities should be stepped up. He also noted that UNMIK’s executive control was unpopular and this was only set to get worse. To this end, he argued for status talks to start soon, after a comprehensive standards review in 2005. Therefore the political status process was essentially justified as a means of protecting UNMIK and the standards process. Implicit in the Kai Eide review is the notion of the ‘obsolesing welcome’68, and the sense that UNMIK could neither substitute for a political process nor foster conditions that were favourable to it. Indeed, without status talks, there was a danger that local frustrations would mount and UNMIK’s mission would be jeopardised.

Although Eide’s status recommendations were not immediately taken up by the UN Secretary General, they raised expectations within Kosovo that the 2005 review of implementation of the simplified standards would pave the way for talks on status. The UN Security Council authorised commencement of the status talks in October 2005, after receiving a further report by Kai Eide on the review of standards implementation. The UN Secretary General appointed Maarthi Artisaari, the former President of Finland, to serve as his Special Envoy soon thereafter and the talks began

68 This term has been used in a presentation by Roland Paris, to describe the phenomenon that the local popularity and credibility of international peace operations declines over time. Presentation on ‘the dilemmas of peacebuilding’ given at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2007.
in 2006. In Weller’s detailed account of these negotiations, he clearly demonstrates that the parties held fundamentally incompatible conceptions about the purpose of the negotiations in relation to the status question from the outset, and that the negotiation process did not lead to a revision of these positions (Weller 2008). Serbia held the view that UNSC Resolution 1244 confirmed and preserved its territorial integrity, enabling UNMIK to prepare the Kosovo territory for self-governance during an interim period after which it would return to the territorial jurisdiction of Serbia enjoying wide-ranging autonomy. According to this view, the talks were ‘status determined’ and limited to discussing the form of autonomy. In contrast, the view of many western governments and the Kosovar delegation was that the autonomy referred to in Resolution 1244 related to the interim period when Kosovo was under UN jurisdiction, and that the talks were therefore ‘status open’, with no limitations on the potential options for status. In order to get both parties to engage in the negotiations, Ahtisaari proposed a process that had a dual purpose. While he agreed with Belgrade that the talks would be ‘status neutral’, focusing on practical, technical issues in the first instance, he also maintained that if there was to be no agreement on status, he would make his own, separate recommendation to the Security Council on the issue. In line with this approach, it was argued that even if the Security Council did not approve the Special Envoy’s status recommendation, it could nevertheless approve the settlement package that emerged from the negotiations. This would guide future efforts at promoting self-governance and provide a legal basis for the international presence in the territory. This was the basis upon which the EU based its planning assumption that the status talks would be followed by a new UN Security Council resolution formalising the transfer of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovo authorities.

Ambassadors to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels had discussed Kosovo on a number of occasions in 2005, and there was broad consensus that the EU should play a leading role in efforts to build Kosovo’s self-governance capacity post settlement. It was, however, already evident that there was a wide range of views within EU member states on the status issue (interviews 33) and public pronouncements on a possible future civilian presence stressed that contingency planning would not prejudge the outcome of the talks. After the Ahtisaari talks began, it was agreed that the EU should deploy a sizable planning team (EUPUT) to explore
the design of a potential ESDP mission covering the rule of law and possible other areas based on the assumption that the Ahtisaari talks would conclude in December 2006. A Joint Action authorising the EUPT was agreed in April 2006. The EUPT initially consisted of 30 staff, including member state experts in police and justice.

Conceptual planning for an ESDP mission initially proceeded smoothly. By mid 2006 the EUPT was operational and by September it had developed proposals for the structure and role of the mission. These designs for the role and structure have remained largely unchanged. The proposals were for an integrated mission designed to assist the Kosovo authorities in the area of police, justice and customs. In the area of police, the mission was designed to monitor, mentor and advise counterparts in the Kosovo Police Service with dedicated units assigned to monitoring crime, administration, operations, border police and the Ministry of Interior. In addition, the police component was to also have some executive powers. These included the assignment of 500 officers for riot control and crime investigations relating to organised crime, inter-ethnic crime, and war crimes. In the area of Justice, the EUPT identified tentative structures for the Justice component of the mission, with monitoring units assigned to the key institutions of justice, namely prosecutors, the Kosovo Judicial Council, the Supreme Court, and the correctional services within the Ministry of Justice. Similarly, a customs monitoring unit and a customs compliance unit would provide support to operational counterparts in Customs Directorate General in the Kosovo Ministry of Finance and Economy.

During this stage when the EU and UN were operating on the assumption of political settlement in late 2006, working-level discussions between UNMIK and the EU Planning Team were constructive. The EUPT and UNMIK held extensive consultations on the design of the EU’s mission, in which UNMIK also informally shared its lessons learned. For instance, UNMIK strongly advised the EU to operate on a regional basis, rather than from Pristina as the second phase in UNMIK’s operation had done (interviews 34). Similarly, both UNMIK and EUPT agreed that it was important that UNMIK conclude the vetting process before the transition to EULEX, since experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina had demonstrated the operational difficulty of forming working relationships based on trust with counterparts when the mission also has executive powers that could remove them from their jobs. More
broadly, UNMIK concurred with the EUPT view that the follow-on EU mission should adopt a different approach to UNMIK in line with its capacity-building mandate and that this should be well communicated to the population, both through a communication strategy but also through visible symbols of difference. For instance, UNMIK initially agreed that rather than take over UNMIK’s Headquarters in one of the largest buildings in downtown Pristina, the EU should set up its headquarters in UNMIK’s more modest, but technically well equipped building near the airport. This was considered to be symbolically more in keeping with the supportive role that the EU planned for the mission. At the same time, the EUPT and UNMIK agreed that for pragmatic reasons the EU and UN should also work to ensure an efficient transition, with maximum use of UNMIK material assets as well human resources. At this stage the main point of contention was that the UN insisted on a rapid drawdown of UNMIK, with a transition phase of 120 days after a status agreement, while the EU favoured a more gradual transition, granting the EU more time for mission build-up (interviews 35). In short, the conceptual pre-planning for the EU rule of law mission proceeded relatively quickly in 2006 and with close, largely unproblematic cooperation with UNMIK.

The EUPT was not, however, the only EU planning team in Pristina town. Planning for the International Civilian Office (ICO) proceeded a few months later. The ICO-EUSR Preparatory Team was approved by the European Council in September 2006 and deployed in October. It consisting of some 70 people but was not initially led by Peter Feith, the intended EUSR, who was not authorised to deploy before a status deal. It had two principal tasks. The first was to prepare for the International Civilian Office that was to be headed by an International Civilian Representative, double-hatted as the EU Special Representative. The ICR was to oversee implementation of the Settlement, and was intended to have some executive powers including the ability to annul political decisions contravening the status settlement. The second task of the team was to prepare together with the Kosovo authorities and UNMIK for the transfer of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovo authorities, and to a limited extent the future international presence. Although their mandates were distinct, UNMIK initially perceived this double planning presence of the EUPT and the ICO-EUSR Preparatory Team as ‘heavy’ if not confusing. From UNMIK’s perspective, this was another example of unhelpful fragmentation within the EU (interviews 36).
Transition Delayed (2007)

Although the EU assumed that 2007 was to be the year of transition from UNMIK to EULEX, this ambition was frustrated in the absence of a political agreement. From March 2007 when Ahtisaari’s Plan was first presented to the Security Council with UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s ‘approval’, to July 2007, the US and the EU continued to push for a UNSC resolution that would endorse the Ahtisaari package. Angela Merkel was, for instance, given the mission to ‘deliver Russia’ at the G8 summit in June 2007, a mission which was, however, undermined by President Sarkozy’s suggestion for another round of negotiations (Weller 2008; and interviews 37). In any case, having failed to secure UNSC resolution on the Ahtisaari package, the EU and the Contact Group initiated a further round of negotiations with a UN deadline of 10 December. These talks were initially characterised by ‘new approaches’. For instance, there initially appeared a greater willingness by Belgrade to explore more substantive autonomy short of de jure independence, while the European negotiators put ideas on the table, such as territorial exchanges, that had been previously been excluded as a matter of principle from the Ahtisaari talks (Weller 2008). However, having engaged in the Ahtisaari talks in good faith, the Albanians were unwilling to re-open negotiations that deviated substantially from this settlement plan. No progress was made and the talks were concluded in November 2007.

These delays caused significant problems for UNMIK, which, in political terms, ‘had been left adrift by the intergovernmental failure to agree on Kosovo’s future’ (Center on International Cooperation 2008: 54). Operationally, UNMIK had managed to avoid haemorrhaging civilian staff in 2007, which it feared might jeopardise its operations, by offering a retention package with generous exit payments and relocation options to other missions. This was effective. However, UNMIK’s credibility and ability to exert political leverage was severely eroded by the perception that it was on its way out. Nevertheless, UNMIK’s engagement in the transition planning and implementation process at least helped it maintain relations with the Albanian politicians. This transition planning involved multiple committees,

69 In September 2007, UNMIK had a 20% vacancy rate which was far lower than other missions likely to stay in place for longer such as UNMIS in Sudan and UNMIT in Timor Leste. However, specialised posts, such as international prosecutors were increasingly hard to fill (Center on International Cooperation 2008: 53)
convening representatives of UNMIK, KFOR, the EU (EUPIT and EU ICO-EUSR PT) and domestic politicians. These planning and implementation discussions covered a wide range of issues including security and justice (as well as constitutional issues that were linked to the political settlement) and their work-programme was adjusted in April 2007 to match the Ahtisaari Plan.

In addition to mitigating some of the ‘lame duck’ effects for UNMIK, the transition planning process helped the EU to establish constructive working relationships with domestic politicians and to refine its plans. For instance, while the EUPIT had foreseen a mission size of less than 1000 in 2006, this was revised upwards to 1825 during 2007, and the majority of staff would be in the area of police. This revision was in large part in response to concerns over maintaining public order. The higher figure is closer to the some 2000 police officers that UNMIK had deployed in 2007. While both UNMIK and the EU insisted that the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) should take primary responsibility for public order, its capacity to do so was limited, particularly in the area of planning. In any case, while the EU mission was designed to support the rule of law in the whole Kosovo territory, the KPS was only present in part of it. It would certainly not be able to respond to flare-ups where they were most likely, notably in the divided city of Mitrovica and in Serb areas of the North where Serb security services had run parallel structures since 1999. There were also concerns that it could not effectively police the Serb enclaves in the South, in the face of widespread unrest.

The most significant innovation in EU planning methodology – the adoption of a ‘programmatic approach’ to planning – arguably also benefited from the extended planning period. Not only did the EUPIT already engage in monitoring and advising functions through its participation in transition working groups in 2007, but the long lead-time enabled it to elaborate, together with domestic counterparts, relatively detailed planning matrices in the course of 2007 and 2008. Although the EULEX mission was not the first to formally acknowledge the importance of ‘local ownership’, it was the first to incorporate local counterparts into mission planning through a development-style approach to programming. This involved the joint identification of specific objectives and benchmarks, with monitoring tasks designed as an accountability and learning tool – able to feed into programming adaptation. Moreover,
EULEX has broken new ground for ESDP in a number of other ways. During the planning phases EULEX consulted relatively widely with various non-state actors, particularly in the North. While this fell short of some NGO expectations for greater ‘social accountability’ to the people of Kosovo (EULEX 2008), it nevertheless demonstrated that EULEX planners operated a relatively (for ESDP) broad interpretation of local ownership. Similarly, the mission was the first to have a training and ‘best practices’ unit, although, given its limited resources, the most it can hope to achieve is training about best practice. Similarly, the EULEX planners drew on experience and lessons learned from other ESDP and UN missions in providing for human rights and gender advisors, and elevating the operational importance of its communications and community liaison strategy. Early signs (in 2009) of ‘unexpected’ engagement between the mission and local actors, especially in the North, appear to suggest that this approach has been effective (interviews 38).

*Transition Interrupted and then Reconfigured (2008)*

Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008 and incorporated the bulk of the Ahtisaari plan provisions into its constitution, which entered into force on 15 June 2008. During the four month intervening period all transition was on hold, and the UN did not transfer any authority in the absence of Security Council support for the Ahtisaari Plan. Thereafter, the fundamental challenge for the transition was how to navigate between what has been described as the ‘two legal universes’ of Resolution 1244 and the new constitution (Center on International Cooperation 2009: 75).

This legal challenge became an operational challenge. While the mandate of UNMIK was evidently aligned with Resolution 1244, that of the EU’s International Civilian Office and the EU’s rule of law mission, were clearly designed on the basis of the Ahtisaari Plan. Although this had been accommodated in the Kosovo constitution, the fact that Kosovo’s status remained contested meant that the constitution did not confer a clear mandate for international action. In the absence of a clear legal basis for the transition, in practice each aspect of it had to be negotiated in the field without common EU-UN legal and political guidelines at the strategic level.

In some cases, such as in the area of economic reconstruction, this transition was not so much negotiated as determined by the EC’s abrupt withdrawal of support for
UNMIK economic reconstruction pillar (IV). UNMIK’s powers in this area, exercised through the Kosovo Trust Agency were in practice transferred to the Privatisation Agency of Kosovo after the EU’s decision to withdraw funding for UNMIK’s pillar IV after the Kosovo constitution entered into force in June 2008. Although the EC argued that its work in this area had been completed in 2007, the abrupt EC disengagement met with criticism from the UN. The Secretary-General complained that there had been no previous consultation with UN headquarters and that the EC withdrawal left UNMIK without the means to replace European Commission-funded experts\(^70\) (International Crisis Group 2008: 7-8; United Nations 2008c: 2). While the legal basis (Resolution 1244) for UNMIK’s work in the economic area remained intact, its powers were de facto transferred, albeit it ‘messily’, to Kosovo control after June 2008\(^71\).

In contrast to the EC’s rapid exit from UNMIK, the legal limbo reduced the ability of the International Civilian Office’s ability to perform its Ahtisaari Plan-aligned mandate. In the absence of Security Council authorisation, the mandate of the ICR derives only from those states that have recognised Kosovo and their International Steering Group (ISG) over which the International Civilian Representative, Peter Feith, presides. The 100-strong ICO was operational before the Kosovo constitution came into effect and it played an important role in assisting the Kosovo authorities in enacting their legislative programme. However, its functional alignment with the Ahtisaari Plan has meant that the Office was not fundamentally ‘status neutral’. This was problematic for the UN and until the Kosovo constitution was approved UNMIK effectively disengaged from the political transition negotiations. Specifically, UNMIK stopped participating in the Strategic Group on Transition and it suppressed draft regulations it had prepared as its contribution to the 41 laws associated with the Ahtisaari plan (International Crisis Group 2008: 7).

The contested nature of the ICO also meant that the ICR, Peter Feith, could not play the international coordination role that was envisaged in the Ahtisaari Plan. While

\(^{70}\) This was later remedied by the appointment by the ICO of three international members of the Privatisation Agency of Kosovo board.

\(^{71}\) The transfer of public and socially owned property from KTA to the Privatisation Agency of Kosovo was beset by delays and allegations of impropriety. For instance, it was reported that KTA archives had been destroyed by UNMIK and KTA officials prior to the handover (International Crisis Group 2008: 7-8).
Peter Feith initially adopted an assertive stance, this placed a strain on his relationship with the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Joaquim Rücker – the ultimate authority in Kosovo according to Resolution 1244. Tensions eased, however, as Feith adopted a more ‘measured approach’ as the year progressed and after the change of the UN SRSG to Lamberto Zannieri (Center on International Cooperation 2009: 75). Moreover, given the divisions within EU member states, with 22 pro-recognition and 5 anti-recognition states (Greece, Spain, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus), Peter Feith’s task, as EU Special Representative, of promoting coherence in EU action faced significant challenges. While some anti-recognition member states and EU officials questioned the legal basis of the office (International Crisis Group 2008: 8), even pro-recognition states differed in their opinions of how pro-active the ICR should be. Internal tensions were further highlighted by public disagreements between Peter Feith and Pierre Mirel of the European Commission over the ICR’s steering function of EULEX (Deimel and Garcia Schmidt 2009: 5). While EULEX formally takes political guidance from Feith, its orders come from the PSC in Brussels and it is broadly viewed as political equal rather than subordinate to the EU Special Representative (interviews 39; and International Crisis Group 2008: 9).

The fact that the ICO was perceived as a political ally of Pristina meant that it met with far stronger and more dangerous Serbian opposition. Belgrade insisted that Peter Feith lacked legitimacy and its opposition has limited its contacts in Serb majority areas. More ominously, an attack on the ICO office on 24 February 2008 caused the ICO to evacuate the office and it has not been able to resume contacts in the Serb areas in the north of Kosovo since then. A bomb attack on an ICO building on 14 November 2008 further underscored the continued political vulnerability of the ICO.

*Transition to EULEX*

The transition to EULEX was also complicated by the fact that the EU mission was not considered ‘status neutral’ in so far as it had been planned to help the Kosovo authorities implement the police, justice and customs elements of Ahtisaari’s proposal. While the mission began to deploy in February 2008 with the intention of being

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72 Although the Kosovo government demanded that the transition produced a single international counterpart, as of 2009 it was faced with four Pristina-based international mission chiefs of equivalent political weight (Special Representative of the Secretary-General Lamberto Zannier, ICR/EUSR Pieter Feith, EULEX chief Yves de Kermabon, and KFOR commander Giuseppe Emilio Gay).
operational by the time the constitution came into force, its lack of clear legal basis was reflected in the reluctance of UNMIK to proceed with the transition. This posed significant operational challenges and resulted in further delays.

Until June 2008, from the UN perspective transition was effectively on hold. By mid-June only 300 of the 2000 planned personnel had joined EULEX. These included 80 percent of the judiciary contingent, all the customs officers and all the police middle-management. The majority of the 550 riot police were already active in Kosovo, deployed as a Polish and Romanian police unit in UNMIK and a French and Italian unit in KFOR. It was agreed that these were to be transferred once EULEX became operational. Similarly, this was the case for another 200 UNMIK officials in the area of justice and police.

Transition planning had assumed that EULEX would take over UN material assets, including buildings, vehicles and computers and that UNMIK would provide information to EULEX that was relevant to its executive tasks notably in the area of justice. However, questions over EULEX’s legal base meant that UNMIK did not have clear instructions to proceed with the transition in line with earlier planning discussions. In practice, this made cooperation ‘almost impossible’ before an overarching agreement on technical arrangements was reached in August 2008 (interview 40). Nevertheless cooperation over the transfer of assets remained patchy. For example, on the issue of which building the EULEX would use UNMIK changed its position, providing EULEX with the option of slowly taking over the UNMIK Headquarter building in downtown Pristina rather than the building near the airport. This was not in line with previous plans or EU preferences, but the EU had little choice but to agree (interviews 41). There were also ‘teething problems’ associated with co-habiting in the UNMIK HQ building during transition. For instance, although there was agreement at HQ level that EULEX and UNMIK security passes should allow reciprocal access, this was not implemented in practice, thereby unnecessarily complicating informal ‘in-house’ cooperation. Similarly, the organisations’ different procedures and procurement rules led to some problematic misunderstandings. For example, although it had been agreed that UNMIK would make 200 vehicles available to EULEX ‘for inspection’, when the EULEX mission inspected the vehicles it found that only half of these met with EU standards as defined in the EU’s procurement
procedures. Similarly, despite an informal agreement that EULEX would take over UNMIK’s armoured cars, both field missions were surprised to discover that these were not UNMIK’s to offer; according to UN rules, these should first be offered to other UN missions. In addition, despite agreement that the EULEX would take over the medical clinic used by UNMIK, at the time of writing it was unclear if this would happen because of concerns over whether it met with EU standards. Some EU officials acknowledge that there was a feeling of resentment over some of these technical transition delays. For example, one official noted that EULEX was placed in a catch 22 situation, whereby ‘UNMIK would not agree to the transfer of assets until the EU had more people on the ground, but we couldn’t put people on the ground until we had the assets’. Another stated simply ‘we were more eager to get in than they were to get out’ (interviews 42). Others, however, reported constructive cooperation. For instance, in the area of communications and press, EULEX and UNMIK staff ensured ‘joint-messaging’ and reported close working relationships with counterparts (interviews 43).

The transition also required close cooperation between parts of UNMIK and EULEX operation involved in executive tasks. This was largely unproblematic in the area of police, although one senior UNMIK police official had clear principled reservations over the legitimacy of the EULEX presence. Cooperation was more problematic in relation to the executive tasks in the area of Justice, however, where tensions arose over the transfer of case files from UN to EU supervision. Some UNMIK judges and prosecutors, who had played an executive role in the Kosovo legal system since 1999, argued that it would be in breach of client confidentiality to hand-over case file information to the EULEX which was to play a more limited advisory role. From the EU’s perspective, this un-transparent approach was unjustified given that the mission maintained executive tasks, and that, in any case it is difficult to draw a line between executive and monitoring tasks. For instance, when an EULEX judge sits on a panel, s/he clearly has an executive role in addition to an advisory one. Moreover, some argued that UNMIK’s executive approach had been fundamentally opaque and unaccountable, for instance, lamenting that UNMIK had only begun to keep statistical records in 2003 (interviews 44). More broadly, it has been reported that during 2008, ‘personal relations were frequently poor. There was a feeling that EU staff saw their
predecessors as jaded while UNMIK saw their successors as naïve’ (Center on International Cooperation 2009: 79).

Reflecting on the transition in 2009, one official noted that ‘the transition was only difficult when there were no clear instructions’ (interview 45). After the UN Secretary-General’s ‘reconfiguration’ plan had been transmitted to UNMIK on 25 July and a comprehensive EU-UN agreement on the transfer of assets was agreed on 18 August, the framework and timelines for transition were, in effect, clarified. Although this was not the first UNMIK ‘reconfiguration’, it was by far the most fundamental.  

In June 2008 the Secretary-General declared that he no longer believed the UN mission to be viable in its current form. In his role as Chief Administrative Officer he introduced a plan, on 12 June, for the reconfiguration of UNMIK from an executive to a political mission, with limited roles in reporting, liaison, and facilitating dialogue. In accordance with this plan, UNMIK would drawdown as EULEX deploys, with the transition planned to take 120 days. Although this plan was not approved by the Security Council, and there were objections to reconfiguration, not least from Russia and Serbia, the Secretary General transmitted instructions to UNMIK on the basis of this plan on 25 June. Despite concerns about a political back-lash (International Crisis Group 2008), reconfiguration and transition to EULEX under a ‘UN umbrella’ was relatively smooth. The UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General managed to secure Serb acceptance to the EULEX operation after a series of negotiations with Belgrade on the six areas in which UNMIK would prolong its role.

On 9 December 2008, the integrated rule of law mission began operations across Kosovo. This too went more smoothly than many had feared. Deployment of some 75 EULEX officials in the North met with no opposition and in the following months conducted a number of court hearings in Mitrovica – the first for over a year. Similarly, the EU’s operation under the ‘umbrella’ of UN has not been problematic in practice. EULEX reports to the PSC, which in turn links to New York. Given that the UN ‘umbrella’ is extended to such a high level, as of early 2009, it had had little impact on EULEX operations.

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73 After the failure to reach a UNSC status resolution in July 2007, the UN Secretary-General had introduced a minor reconfiguration. This involved the withdrawal of some of its civil affairs officers at the municipal level, and the handing over of civil registration responsibilities to local officials.
Case Conclusions

The Kosovo case reveals the adverse operational consequences of EU and UN planning assumptions predicated on EU and UN policy alignment. Specifically, the EU LEX mission was planned on the assumption that the transition from UNMIK to EULEX would be authorised by a new Security Council resolution, providing a clear legal framework for an EU operation which was designed to support state-building rather than execute the functions of a state, as UNMIK had been authorised to by the UNSC resolution 1244 of 1999. Not only did these negotiations take longer than initially envisaged but they were inconclusive in so far that they did not result in an agreement, but rather a UN Special Envoy ‘recommendation’ for conditional independence for Kosovo and a ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settelement’ (the Ahtisaari Plan). Since neither of these options was acceptable to Serbia and its ally Russia, they did not form the basis for a new Security Council resolution that would have paved the way for the transition to EULEX. Neither did Kosovo’s subsequent unilateral Declaration of Independence in February 2008 clarify the situation. Rather, it divided the international community, including the EU, and increased tensions over whether and on what basis the EU could take over the operational functions of UNMIK. Since the EU role in Kosovo had been planned on the basis of the Ahtisaari Plan for conditional independence, it was not considered ‘status neutral’. Indeed, in his 15 July 2008 report to the Security Council, Ban Ki Moon acknowledged that there is no ‘status neutral’ option if Pristina wants UNMIK to go and Belgrade wants UNMIK to stay. Likewise, where Belgrade wants EULEX out and Pristina wants EULEX in, no matter how the mission defines itself, it is not perceived as status neutral. Therefore the EULEX mission was jeopardised in so far as it was seen as a party to the conflict over Kosovo’s status. This not only delayed operationalisation, while the UN negotiated a plan to ‘reconfigure’ UNMIK’s role and provide a new legal framework for EULEX, but fuelled fears that EULEX would not be able to deploy in the Serbian North of Kosovo. With hindsight, therefore, the EU and UN planning assumptions appear naïve and the case reveals that the EU and UN do not always share common purpose and strategy upon which effective operational partnerships depend.

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4.3 Conclusions

In response to the question are the EU and UN in competition over civilian human resources? section 4.1.1 shows that there is a strong correlation between the increase in EU police deployments in ESDP missions, notably in Kosovo, and a decline in deployments of police from EU countries in UN missions. With respect to international staff from EU countries deployed in UN operations, there has only been a slight decline in the proportion of international staff from EU countries deployed in UN operations. However, there is no evidence to suggest that this is the result of competition with the EU and different recruitment practices further suggest that this is unlikely. In short, this chapter confirms that the EU and UN compete over civilian human resources, particularly in the area of police. Consequently, ESDP has not directly contributed to strengthening the civilian dimension of UN operations.

In response to the question has ESDP generated additional resources to help share the peace operation burden? section 4.1.2 demonstrates that ESDP indirectly benefits the UN in so far as it has captured new European capacities for international civilian deployments. In so far as ESDP has mobilised greater European engagement in peace operations it has helped address UN over-stretch through burden-sharing. The qualitative analysis of ESDP recruitment in section 4.1.3 addresses the question has ESDP increased the pool of civilians that the UN can draw on for its peace operations?

It shows that it does not. It finds that the ‘new’ civilian resources harnessed through ESDP are not necessarily of the right kind for missions with capacity-building mandates and argues that the form of ESDP recruitment militates against their redeployed in the context of a UN-led mission. In short, the analysis of the material foundations of the relationship between EU-UN security actors in relation to peacebuilding confirms that their relationship is competitive. But it also shows that it has the potential to be mutually reinforcing as long as it contributes to burden-sharing by generating new capabilities and by the deployment of ESDP missions in line with UN objectives.

In response to the question do the EU and UN share common objectives and policies in the context of crisis management? evidence in section 4.2 shows that in the DRC and Kosovo EU and UN policies were not always aligned. Moreover, in Kosovo,
where the EU and UN planners assumed EU and UN agreement over the status question, the lack of an agreement had a debilitating effect on the transition from UNMIK to EULEX. In response to the question can the UN rely on the operational support of the EU? operational experience in the DRC underlines that EU military support for the UN is inherently unpredictable, especially where the EU is internally divided. In response to the question do they share the same tactical approach? evidence shows that even where EU and UN missions agree on strategic objectives, such as the importance of security sector reform in the DRC, they have differed over tactical approach and competed over who should lead international efforts. Similarly, in response to the question do they work well together? evidence from the empirical record is mixed. In some cases, such as EUPOL DRC where there was a clear division of labour, cooperation was smooth. In others, such as the EUFOR military mission, the ‘transaction costs’ involved in working in the same theatre were considerable and have led UN officials to argue against repeating this model of operational cooperation. And in Kosovo, cooperation in relation to the transition was smooth only after the legal framework of the EULEX mission had been clarified.

These cases therefore challenge the liberal assumption that multilateral security cooperation is essentially about burden-sharing. As Gowan has put it in a blog posting:

‘[There is] a growing conceptual problem for fans of multilateral security cooperation. This is a naïve belief that all international security institutions have, or could have, shared goals and that we simply need to link them up better to meet those goals. This is a hangover from the happy days of the 1990s, when the West still had a grip on pretty much every organisation from the UN to Boy Scouts, but it’s not sustainable in a more competitive world.’


Similarly, this chapter argues that the liberal concept that underpins EU and UN policies of effective multilateralism and UN cooperation with regional organisations is naïve on a number of levels. At the political-strategic level it is naïve to assume that international security institutions will share common objectives and policies, just as it is more often than not the case that there is no common vision or policy within multilateral international security institutions. Even where policies are aligned, the
logic of inter-institutional burden-sharing is often trumped by inter-institutional competition, driven by member state and organisational interests in maximising autonomy. And, at the technical level, the fact that organisations work differently creates a number of practical challenges to linking up. This was, for example, the case in the cooperation between EUFOR and MONUC in the DRC and in the transition from UNMIK to EULEX in Kosovo. This is not to say that the EU and UN cannot be effective partners in the context of crisis management operations, but rather that policy and operational compatibility cannot be assumed, especially, as Gowan observes, in a world in which the influence of the West is in relative decline.
Chapter 5. Institutionalising EU-UN Crisis Management Cooperation

5. Introduction

As shown in chapter 1, during the 1990s the Cold War controversy over the relative merits of regionalism and globalism was replaced by a liberal consensus on the compatibility and practicability of new global-regional partnerships in peacemaking and peacebuilding. This liberal consensus underpins current UN and EU policies that favour greater cooperation between the EU and UN in crisis management and peacebuilding. This chapter explores whether, how and why these policies have been institutionalised in EU and UN headquarters. More specifically, it asks *how were EU and UN interests served by institutionalising cooperation through the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management? And what does the record of the Steering Committee tell us about the EU and UN operational fit?*

Section 5.1 examines the extent to which policy preferences for greater inter-institutional cooperation reflect institutional and member state interests and how these, in turn, have shaped the scope and form of its institutionalisation, including through the 2003 Joint Declaration on Crisis Management. This Joint Declaration established new modalities for cooperation between headquarters (the EU-UN Steering Committee) and an agenda for improving practical EU-UN cooperation in the areas of planning, communication, ‘best practices’ and training. Section 5.2 examines its implementation in practice, highlighting what it reveals about the operational fit between the two organisations.

5.1 ESDP and the development the EU-UN dialogue in crisis management

5.1.1 Early dialogue about models and modalities of cooperation (2000-2002)

The 1998 French-British decision at St. Malo that led to the development of ESDP was not driven by concerns related to improving the capacity of UN peacekeeping. One of the main interests for both the French and British was to develop an ‘autonomous’ military capacity which, while potentially benefiting other security
organisations including the OSCE, UN, and NATO, was not essentially about generating capacities which could be used in support operations led by others. Moreover, the foundations of ESDP were established at a time in which UN peacekeeping was in crisis and when painful memories of UN peacekeeping failures, notably that of Srebenica, were keenly felt by a number of EU member states. Within the EU, this contributed to what Tardy observed as ‘a strong sentiment that the ESDP should be developed without excessive linking to the UN’ (Tardy 2005:54). Indeed, the EU was initially reluctant to intensify contacts with the UN in relation to crisis management. For instance, in his meeting with the Presidency in Paris and with the HR/SG in Brussels in October 2000 the UN Secretary General suggested the creation of working groups on particular themes, including peacekeeping cooperation, but the Political and Security Committee ‘found this to be premature’ (Novosseloff 2004: 3).

Nevertheless, the EU was eager to stress that ESDP could provide added value to the UN. The Nice Presidency Conclusions noted that the efforts to build EU crisis management capabilities ‘will enable Europeans in particular to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organisations such as the UN or the OSCE’ and mandated the Swedish Presidency to ‘identify possible areas and modalities for cooperation with the UN in crisis management’ (European Council 2000). Following the mandate set in Nice, the Swedish Presidency (January to June 2001) developed a ‘Non Paper’ which served as the basis of discussion between the General Affairs Council and the UN Secretary General in May 2001 (European Council 2001a). It included a number of concrete suggestions for areas in which the EU could enhance their cooperation with the UN in relation to conflict prevention, crisis management, field coordination and cooperation in Africa. In the area of military crisis management, for example, the Presidency suggested that cooperation could focus on ‘harmonisation of standards and requirements for planning and implementation of operations, with a view to facilitating a joint rapid deployment capability’. It also recommended that that the ‘issue of stand-by arrangements’ be addressed. In relation to civilian crisis management, the Presidency proposed that the EU and UN ‘develop a common frame of reference for missions involving civilian police, civil protection and civilian administration’ drawing on UN experiences in relation to standard operating procedures, rules of engagement and legal frameworks’ (European Council 2001a). Moreover, the Presidency suggested the possibility of joint
fact-finding missions and the elaboration of models for field-level cooperation based on the experience the structured EU-UN cooperation with UNMIK in Kosovo. These suggestions were, for the large part, too ambitious for EU member states however. The resulting document *EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management* (European Council 2001c) which was finally agreed in June 2001 bore little resemblance to the Presidency’s Non Paper. In the area of crisis management, for instance, while member states agreed that cooperation was intended to ‘ensure that the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities provide real added value for the UN’ suggestions for how this might be achieved were limited to ‘cooperation on compatibility of civilian training standards... planning methodologies... and field-level coordination’. In the early days of EU-UN dialogue therefore the EU member states clearly resisted the idea that ESDP capabilities were to developed using UN standards and methodology in order to serve as ‘an asset for the UN’ (European Council 2001a).

Reflecting both the limited political interest on the part of EU member states in greater predictable cooperation with the UN in the area of military crisis management as well as the Swedish Presidency’s interest in developing civilian capacities for the EU, the Presidency focused its energies on identifying principles and options for cooperation in the less sensitive area of civilian crisis management. This resulted in the agreement of the document *EU cooperation with international organisations in civilian aspects of crisis management* (European Council 2001d). In addition to identifying the principles of ‘added value’, ‘interoperability’, ‘visibility’ and ‘decision-making autonomy’ that should guide EU cooperation with relevant international organisations, it identified a number of options or models for operational cooperation. These included: 1) no EU coordination, and states respond individually to an operation led by another organisation; 2) national contributions following EU consultations; 3) a coordinated EU contribution to an operation led by another organisation; 4) a component such as police in an operation under the overall lead of another organisation (based on the Kosovo ‘pillar’ model); 5) the EU could lead an operation, but with some components provided by other organisations; or 6) the EU could lead an autonomous operation. While the document stated that evidently the choice of option remains a political decision taken on a case by case basis, it is significant that – unlike EU military capabilities – from the outset of the development of EU civilian
capabilities, member states were open to a number of models for the deployment of EU civilian operations, including options where EU operations could effectively be deployed in direct support of and as part of an operation led by another international organisation.

In addition to discussing models of operational cooperation, in 2001 the Swedish Presidency also identified modalities for ‘intensified cooperation’ between the EU and the UN headquarters (European Council 2001c). These included meetings of EU member states’ representatives with high-level UN officials, notably EU Ministerial meetings with the UN Secretary General, and meetings of the Political and Security Committee with the UN Deputy Secretary General and Under Secretaries General. They also included meetings between the Secretariats at high level (between the EU HR/SG, the External Relations Commissioner and the UN SG and UN Deputy SG) and between contacts in the Council Secretariat and the Commission and the UN Secretariat ‘at appropriate levels’. Thus from the outset, the management of EU-UN cooperation was designed to emphasise direct UN engagement with CFSP and ESDP inter-governmental decision-making bodies while also creating opportunities for Secretariat to Secretariat contacts, including with the European Commission. Initially, the form of dialogue reflected the multi-faceted nature of the relationship. For instance, the spring 2002 ‘mission’ of the UN to the EU was a joint one comprised of the UN Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping representing DPKO, as well as colleagues from the Department for Political Affairs (DPA), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Consequently, the delegation met a range of EU actors and the substance of discussion ranged beyond potential future cooperation in the context of UN peace operations. Thereafter, however, new mechanisms were established to coordinate a narrower range of actors, notably UN DPKO engagement with the EU Council Secretariat General. To this end ‘task forces’ were established in late 2002 to take stock of on-going cooperation and identify areas for future cooperation. On the EU side, the task force comprised DG E VIII (military aspects), DG E IX (civilian aspects), the EU Military Staff, DG E IV dealing with UN matters and the legal department. On the UN side, an ad hoc coordination group on DPKO-EU relations was convened as UN military advisor General Patrick Cammaert commented ‘for the exchange of information and...as an ideal vehicle for the crafting of DPKO’s overall strategy vis-
à-vis the EU’ (quoted in Novosseloff 2004: 4). Therefore, in practice, EU-UN
dialogue privileged the Council General Secretariat-DPKO relationship. It was only
after 2003, however, that institutionalised dialogue took on operational significance.

5.1.2 Early operational cooperation and the Joint Declaration of 2003

The test of ESDP-UN operational cooperation came in 2003, with the launch of the
first civilian and military missions. These were the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (EUPM) which took over from the UN’s International Police Task Force
(IPTF) and the military operation Artemis which served as a ‘bridging operation’
protecting civilians in the town of Bunia in Ituri, North Eastern Congo until the
deployment of the UN MONUC Ituri Task Force three months later. Although these
experiences of operational cooperation were not jointly evaluated by the EU and UN,
respective internal and independent assessments were relatively positive on balance.

In the case of EUPM the EU mission was designed to ensure a ‘seamless transition’
from a UN to an EU mission. This led to the decision for the EU to adopt the UN’s
operational programme, to employ a large proportion of the IPTF staff, to co-locate
EU and UN teams in Sarajevo, and to appoint the IPTF Commissioner, Sven Christian
Frederiksen, to head the EU planning team and then the EUPM mission itself.
Subsequent evaluations of the implementation of EUPM (Tardy 2005; Hansen 2005;
Merlingen and Ostrauskaitè 2006; Ashdown 2007) have pointed to some negative
reactions to this whole-scale take-over, which meant that some members of the
mission felt constrained by the programme they inherited. Nevertheless, the transition
was widely viewed as a success as reflected in the first progress report of the High
Representative/Secretary General of CFSP submitted to the UN Security Council in
July 2003 in which he wrote that ‘a smooth and efficient transition of the
responsibility from the UN to the EU in a crisis management operation is no longer an
aspiration but a concrete component of our cooperation’74.

While EUPM was seen as a positive operational development, the military operation
Artemis was viewed as ‘a major breakthrough in relations between the two

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74 Annex to the letter dated 17 July 2003 from the Secretary-General of the UN to the President of the
organisations’ (Tardy 2005). The operation occurred in a context where the UN was aware that there was a risk of massive violence in the East which the MONUC was not capable of addressing. Keenly motivated to ‘avoid another Rwanda’ and to protect MONUC troops in Bunia, the Secretariat worked on generating support for a Security Council resolution to increase MONUC capabilities while also exploring which nations might be able to provide resources. Informal talks with the French revealed that they would be willing and able on the condition that the operation would be strictly limited to three months duration and to Bunia town, rather than the larger Ituri area that the MONUC force commander had identified as requiring urgent protection. The UN had no option but to accept these terms and these were duly reflected in UNSC Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003, following an official request from the UN to the EU for assistance. Although authorised by a UNSC Resolution, the Artemis mission was implemented ‘autonomously’, directed by the EU Political and Security Committee, and with France serving as a Framework Nation.

It is widely recognised that the context of the Iraq war had a powerful motivating effect for the French engagement (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 512; Dobbins et al. 2008; Gowan 2009). In the wake of the deep divisions within the EU that had been exposed over the invasion of Iraq, the Artemis operation served as a demonstration of ‘common’ ESDP purpose and action. The political value of the operation for the EU was made explicit by the French in discussions in the Political and Security Committee, in which the French noted that internal discord over Iraq threatened to jeopardise the development of ESDP (interview 46).

In terms of formal operational cooperation requirements, the Security Council requested (only) that the head of the mission report regularly to it. In practice, the HR/SG reported to the Security Council once, in a public meeting in July 2003. A UN DPKO Lessons Learned Study nevertheless reflected that communication between EU and UN headquarters and the EU and UN missions on the ground was generally satisfactory although the EU/France was initially slow to provide information about the mission’s deployment (United Nations 2004c). Operational cooperation on the ground remained constructive during the mission’s implementation in particular when

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75 This has been documented in the documentary film The Peacekeepers (Cowan 2005).
elements of the follow-on MONUC Ituri Task Force began to arrive in August 2003. Similarly, cooperation between headquarters and between the French operational command and Bangladesh – the principal troop contributor to the Ituri task force – was relatively smooth in relation to the deployment of the MONUC follow-on mission. More specifically, the transition included a mission from the French operational command to Bangladesh and the Operation Commanders visit to New York. The phased handover plan involved the co-location of military staffs, joint Artemis/MONUC patrols, and a progressive hand-over of points of control.\textsuperscript{76}

However, as Tardy has shown, although the EU was willing and ready to engage in a visible autonomous operation in response to a UN request, this willingness to provide support to the UN did not extend to the less-visible context of national contributions to the follow-on UN-led mission (Tardy 2005). When EU member states (specifically France) involved in Artemis were asked by the UN Secretariat to re-hat some of their assets, making them available for the UN, they declined.\textsuperscript{77} While the EU offered MONUC access to their institutional assets, notably the EU’s Satellite Centre capabilities, direct support for MONUC was less forthcoming from European nations. Unlike the ‘seamless transition’ which the EU achieved when it took over from the UN’s IPTF in Bosnia — by double-hatting the head of mission and re-hatting a third of the mission staff — after the EU’s first military operation in Africa, none of the states that contributed to Artemis participated in the force that took over from it.\textsuperscript{78} At the operational level, this was criticised for jeopardising the credibility of MONUC (United Nations 2004), while at the strategic level it was seen as evidence that ESDP would not narrow the commitment gap between the developing and the developed world to UN peacekeeping (interviews 47). In short, from the UN perspective, operation Artemis was welcome evidence that the UN could harness support from Europeans through complementary ‘bridging’ ESDP actions, but it also confirmed fears that ESDP would do little to address European disengagement from UN peacekeeping.

\textsuperscript{76} I have provided a more detailed account of the planning and operational conduct of operation Artemis in Ulriksen et al. (2004).

\textsuperscript{77} While Artemis provided some logistics support to MONUC this was limited to the transition period.

\textsuperscript{78} The fact that the MONUC representative in the Ituri sector was a French national did, however, assist with the transition.
From the EU perspective, early military cooperation in operation Artemis was judged to be successful (Ulriksen et al. 2004) and it was immediately followed by consideration of an EU civilian police mission to complement the police training activities of MONUC (see chapter 4). At the strategic level, the EU also sought to build on the momentum of the positive operational cooperation through new commitments to further institutionalise the relationship. Consequently, the EU proposed the idea of a ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management (henceforth referred to as ‘Joint Declaration’). Reaction to the idea in DPKO was mixed, with some suggesting that the Declaration was an unnecessary ‘photo opportunity’ or premature (interviews 48). Nevertheless, DPKO also recognised that improving dialogue between the two organisations had the potential to identify new opportunities for operational cooperation (interviews 49).

The Joint Declaration, initially drafted by the EU Council Secretariat, was agreed by the Political and Security Committee on 19 September and signed by the EU President, Silvio Berlusconi and the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan on 24 September in New York (European Council 2003b). The Joint Declaration contained the commitment to ‘establish a joint consultative mechanism at the working level’. This provided a new framework and mandate for Secretariat-to-Secretariat contacts and was intended to complement the various modalities for EU-UN cooperation at the political-strategic level identified in 2001 (European Council 2001c, 2001d). This has since come to be known as the UN-EU ‘Steering Committee’. Its mandate was not essentially a strategic or political one. No mention was made of a role in relation to particular operational contexts or decisions. Rather, it was to ‘examine ways and means to enhance mutual coordination and compatibility’ in the areas of planning, training, communication and best practices.

Specifically, in the area of planning, the Joint Declaration noted the potential for assistance in assessment missions and greater cooperation between planning units in relation to resource allocation and interoperability of equipment. No mention was made for cooperation in relation to doctrine or procedures for cooperation in the event of joint or subsequent missions.
The Joint Declaration was more ambitious in the area of **training**. It called for ‘the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel; the synchronisation of pre-deployment training for civilian police, military liaison officers and military observers; and the institutionalisation of training seminars, conferences and exercises.’

In regard to **communication**, the Joint Declaration called for greater cooperation between situation centres and exchange of liaison officers as well as the establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue between headquarters. Similarly, the Declaration called for ‘regularised and systematic exchange of lessons learned and **best practices** information, including sharing of information on mission hand-over and procurement.’

Much of this agenda was not new in so far as it built on the previously agreed ‘themes of cooperation’ outlined in the Gothenberg Presidency Conclusions of 2001. In short, the principal innovation of the Joint Declaration was to create a new modality for Secretariat-to-Secretariat contacts to monitor and drive inter-institutional cooperation on previously identified issues related to inter-operability and inter-institutional learning.

In substance, then, the 2003 Joint Declaration offered little that was new over and above the identification of a limited agenda and new format for working-level discussions. In line with sceptical remarks by UN staff on the EU’s push for the Joint Declaration being about the ‘photo opportunity’ (interview 50), Tardy has highlighted the symbolic importance of the initiative in relation to the EU’s inter-institutional competition with NATO. He argues that the EU had a clear interest in highlighting its cooperation with the UN in so far as it served to help establish its operational and political credibility, in particular vis-à-vis NATO with which it was engaged in a ‘beauty contest’ (Tardy 2007: 59). NATO’s subsequent efforts to match the EU’s formal partnership with the UN, suggest that NATO also believed that formalising UN-NATO cooperation would provide NATO with additional political legitimacy, and redress an imbalance in its partnership status with the UN vis-à-vis that of the EU (interviews). Just as the Western European Union and NATO had competed to serve European peacekeeping needs in accordance with OSCE and UN mandates in the early 1990s (Chilton et al. 1994; Chilton 1995), ten years later inter-institutional
competition remained an important factor in motivating EU and NATO efforts to formalise their operational partnerships with the UN.

As envisaged in the 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, the UN was interested in developing tailored and non-exclusive partnerships with all regional organisations (see chapter 1). Indeed, after the UN-EU Joint Declaration of 2003, Kofi Annan made it clear that this partnership was not an exclusive one. In March 2004 he stated before a sub-Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly that ‘NATO might be employed in a ‘peace enforcement’ role, much as the EU deployed Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo as a bridging force before the deployment of a UN operation’ (quoted in Tardy 2007: 59). However, in practice, efforts to formalise the UN-NATO relationship met with resistance from UN member states\(^{79}\). Similarly, UN member states from the developing world have been sensitive to irregular support for UN peacekeeping from European countries. An example of this is the ‘No gratis personnel’ ruling of the General Assembly that was implemented in 1999 and prevents member states from seconding (paid national) staff to UN DPKO operations. The ruling was motivated by the perception that secondments of national civilian staff (predominantly from Europe) to UN missions had the effect of increasing the West’s dominance over UN peacekeeping (Gourlay 2006b: 42). These examples support the more general observation that whereas DPKO has an interest in encouraging support for UN peacekeeping from regional organisations, this is not shared by all UN member states, some of whom fear that deeper cooperation might limit their influence and result in institutional bias.

This snapshot of institutional incentives to formalise the UN-EU relationship in 2003 reveals that a number of different motivations were at play at different levels. At the level of the organisational Secretariats or ‘agents’ the EU clearly had a greater interest

\(^{79}\) The proposal for a UN-NATO Joint Declaration was first introduced by NATO in September 2005. The substance of the proposed Declaration was similar to that of the UN-EU declaration but also contained additional elements on cooperation in relation to the threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction and terrorism. This first initiative was declined, however, on the grounds that DPKO did not have time to consult and prepare a response in time for the General Assembly (interviews 51). A year later, acting on advice of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, the UN once again declined to sign the Joint Declaration in 2006, citing that it was politically problematic. Although a number of UN member states including non-NATO Security Council members remained averse to the idea, a Joint UN-NATO Declaration was eventually signed in October 2008, but not without subsequent diplomatic protest from Russia (interviews 52).
in institutionalising its relationship with the UN in so far as it boosted EU credibility directly and vis-à-vis a potential organisational competitor, NATO. For the UN Secretariat, the Joint Declaration was potentially a means to secure greater operational support. At the level of both organisations’ member states – their Principals – there was no resistance to the proposal to improve inter-institutional learning and interoperability through stronger working level contacts between Secretariats. However, as the next section will show, member state sensitivities to strengthening Secretariat-to-Secretariat cooperation and autonomy proved to be far greater in the EU.

5.1.3 The role of the UN-EU Steering Committee

Although the Steering Committee was tasked with promoting working level cooperation in four thematic ‘baskets’ of cross-cutting issues, namely planning, training, communication and best practices, the discussions at the bi-annual meetings always focused on operations. In most cases the bulk of the agenda (usually a full day) was dedicated to an overview of on-going or planned operations. Discussion of the four ‘basket’ areas was typically limited to a single session or second half-day. From the outset the UN encouraged this meeting format in order to promote operationally relevant discussions with the potential for identifying opportunities for further cooperation (interviews 53). Meetings routinely assessed specific operations as well as broader questions of institutional capacity development. For instance, in 2005 following the UN Summit that established the UN Peacebuilding Commission and addressed a range of issues linked to UN-regional organisation cooperation, discussions also extended to how the EU could support the UN’s nascent peacebuilding architecture as well as UN commitments to build African peace capacities. The UN also used the Steering Committee meetings to explore the extent to which EU capacity could be ‘relied upon’ for UN peacekeeping. This involved a number of discussions of how EU battlegroups might be deployed, and whether they might function as a strategic reserve for the UN albeit with different chains of command (interviews 54). More controversially, the Steering Committee also served as a testing ground for concrete ideas concerning operational cooperation. This included, most notably, discussion of the idea at the November 2005 meeting, that the EU might send a force to help secure the 2006 elections in the DRC (interviews 55). This contributed to a perception within some EU member states – notably Germany –
that the Steering Committee had over-stepped its mandate and pre-empted the
decision-making role of member states. It is, however, unlikely that this was the case.
Rather, the idea that the UN should formally request assistance from the EU was
introduced in informal bi-lateral discussions between the French Ambassador and the
Under Secretary General in New York, and ‘tested’ in a number of further informal
bi-lateral conversations, including with the EU delegation (interviews 56). The UN
Secretary-General’s official request for assistance that was sent to the EU on 27
December 2005, was therefore preceded by a range of informal bilateral discussions.

Even if the Steering Committee did not play a critical role in preparing the formal UN
request for EU assistance, the early strategic discussions of the EUFOR mission had a
back-lash effect on its role. Within a month of the UN request for EU assistance,
Germany drafted a new Joint Declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis
management in which it sought to protect the decision-making role of the member
states vis-à-vis the Steering Committee through increasing opportunities for strategic-
level dialogue between EU member states (through the Troika) and the UN. Although
the UN and many EU member states, including France and the UK, thought this
unnecessary (interviews 57), a new 2-page ‘Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in
Crisis Management’ was duly adopted during the German Presidency on 7 June 2007
(European Council 2007c). In addition to calling for regular political dialogue
between the UN Secretariat and the EU Troika, it encouraged regular exchanges
between the UN Secretariat and the EU Political and Security Committee as well as
continued meetings of the UN-EU Steering Committee. It also sought to ‘build on the
achievements of the 2003 Joint UN-EU Declaration’ with further cooperation in the
areas of: support to African peacekeeping capacity-building; cooperation in police,
rule of law and security sector reform; exchanges between UN and EU Situation
Centres; and cooperation with the EU Satellite Centre.

The Council Secretariat was subsequently tasked by the PSC to develop suggestions
for the implementation of the six points identified in the Joint Declaration of June
2007. These aimed to ensure that the PSC was better informed of the political
dialogue that took place between the EU Troika an the UN Secretariat or in the
context of the Steering Committee, while also encouraging more regular participation
of senior UN Secretariat representatives in the PSC with a more pro-active agenda.
Addressing concerns about appropriate forms of up-stream political dialogue, the Secretariat argued for a flexible case-by-case approach, while recommending the use of Tele-Video conferences between the UN Secretariat and the Troika or PSC. Where the UN is considering a request for EU support, it recommended that, as was the case with operation Artemis, the first point of informal contact should be the High Representative of CFSP/Secretary-General.

In line with the 2007 recommendations for future implementation of the Joint Declaration, the role of the Steering Committee would be specifically linked to generating and overseeing common cooperative projects. These would include after-action reviews of planning in operations where both the EU and UN have worked together, as well as efforts to align doctrine or guidelines on particular aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping and to develop civilian capabilities. Staff in both the EU and the UN argue that implementing these recommendations would require a revision of the role of the Steering Committee in practice as well as new working methods, such as joint issue-specific task forces which would work on specific common projects (interviews 58). This it is argued would enable the Steering Committee to live up to its name and provide guidance to a common programme of work in addition to providing a venue and occasion for a regular overview of the extended network of operational relationships.

In short, the history of the UN-EU Steering Committee since 2003 is an example of institutional adaptation to the structural constraints of the UN-EU crisis management relationship. While initially conceived by EU member states as a means to institutionalise the UN-EU crisis management partnership, it served principally as a forum for information exchange and a means by which both sides could better assess the potential and limitations of operational partnership, particularly in relation to ESDP and DPKO operations. Although the UN had initially hoped that the Committee might serve as a pro-active forum in which to prepare operational decisions, the reaction to the early informal discussions of a potential EUFOR mission in the DRC in 2006 made it clear that EU Member States were not willing for the Committee to take on a strategic-political role. While both Secretariats have been eager to pursue cooperation – the task of ‘steering’ operational cooperation across the EU and UN systems remains a challenge. Some in the EU observe that ‘it is a victim of its own
success’ (interview 59), arguing that the establishment of a relatively rich network of operational relationships across both organisations means that the Committee’s steering role is redundant. Others, including UN officials and independent observers (interviews 60; and Tardy 2008: 15), argue that the form of the Committee’s role must be adapted to suit its role – requiring a more decentralised and flexible approach to identifying opportunities, and agendas for common action where these involve clusters of actors working on particular problems or issues. For example, although the Steering Committee has addressed issues relating to the UN peacebuilding architecture, it is unclear whether its current format is appropriate to steering EU-UN working-level cooperation in relation to thematic or geographical areas of peacebuilding. These involve different constellations of actors from across the EU and UN system, many of whom are already working together in-country or in thematic policy networks or clusters. In future, therefore, the Steering Committee will need to address how it can best add value to existing inter-institutional relationships.

The history of the Steering Committee is also an illustration of the practical challenges associated with efforts to connect institutions at the working level where the institutions are not structurally aligned and have different working practices. The next section provides further evidence for this by reviewing progress made in implementing the Joint Declarations and ‘institutionalising’ EU-UN crisis management.

5.2 Institutionalising EU-UN crisis management cooperation

Although discussions of operational issues have dominated the agenda of the Steering Committee, some progress has been made in institutionalising the EU-UN relationship through improved cooperation in the ‘basket’ areas of planning, training, communication and best practices, identified in the Joint Declaration of 2003. Progress is briefly documented below, with a view to assessing the organisational ‘fit’ between the EU and UN.
5.2.1 Planning

In relation to planning, the Joint Declaration was followed with discussions within the EU Council with the objective of identifying the modalities under which the EU could provide capabilities in support of the UN. Discussions of military assistance were distinct from those relating to civilian support and they resulted in two separate documents, agreed by the European Council in June 2004 (European Council 2004b) and December 2004 (European Council 2004c) respectively.

In relation to the military, the EU identified two principal options for providing assistance to the UN: ‘provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation, or an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN’ (European Council 2004b: 2). The first case of national contributions to a UN mission, the EU foresaw that it might provide a complementary ‘clearing house’ function, to assist with the coordination of national contributions from EU member states to the UN mission. This was viewed as being of particular relevance for so-called ‘enabling capabilities’ and was intended to complement regular UN force generation procedures. This model of cooperation was subsequently implemented in 2006, when the EU served as a clearing house for EU member state contributions to UNIFIL after the war in Lebanon. In this instance, there was consensus within the PSC that the EU was not interested in launching an autonomous operation and the Council Secretariat coordinated the contributions of EU member states. The Council Secretariat did not, however, play a direct role in negotiating modifications to UN planning procedures, in which the French sought to exert greater control over operational planning through the establishment of a European-dominated Strategic Military Cell within DPKO in New York and a European Force Commander on the ground. This had the effect of disintegrating the UN military and civilian operations on the ground since it kept UNIFIL II separate from UN agencies working on development and capacity building (Youngs 2007: 12). In this case, therefore, greater European direct engagement in UNIFIL II served to separate UN military planning from civilian planning and prevented the UN from implementing its Integrated Approach to mission design.

In the June 2004 Presidency conclusions the EU identified four options by which an EU operation could be deployed in support of the UN (European Council 2004b). The
first is a ‘stand alone’ operation in which the EU would conduct an operation under a
UN mandate but with no simultaneous UN deployment. An example of this model
was the deployment of the military operation Althea which took over from the
NATO’s SFOR deployment in Bosnia Herzegovina in December 2004, with recourse
to NATO assets under the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements.

A second option was identified as the ‘modular approach’ in which the EU could
take responsibility for a specific component within the structure of a UN mission. This
has yet to be put into practice in the context of an ESDP military mission, however.
The third and fourth options were identified as responding to the UN need for rapid
response. They included the scenario of a ‘bridging operation’ in which the EU
would lead a UN-mandated operation until the UN could take over, as in the case of
operation Artemis in the DRC. This is also the model of the EUFOR Chad/CAR
mission launched in 2008. The fourth model is the ‘Stand by’ model. This was
described as an ‘over the horizon reserve’ or ‘an extraction force’ and was seen to
have particular relevance in the African context. This ‘Stand by’ model was
introduced by the UN Secretariat. There was initially some confusion between this
model and the UN ‘strategic reserve concept’. The EU was at pains to clarify that EU
Battlegroups could not serve as a strategic reserve for the UN. In January 2005, it
clarified that an EU Battlegroup could not serve under UN command, but could
potentially, ‘be deployed at short notice and on a short term basis in support of a UN
mission in answer to a request from the UN’ (European Council 2005f). The EUFOR
DRC mission in 2006 was an example of the Standby model, although it was not an
EU Battlegroup mission. The coordination of EUFOR and MONUC was, however,
complicated in practice and, according to one senior UN DPKO official, ‘this is not a
model we are looking to repeat’ (interviews 61).

The EU subsequently identified two additional options in relation to civilian
operations. In the paper that CIVCOM prepared to complement the June 2004 options
for military support, the EU included the option of ‘an EU component of a larger UN
operation’ and ‘simultaneous EU-UN operations’. In the first case, the EU civilian
component would operate under its own chain of command while ‘also reporting to
the UN chain of command […] as part of an integrated and inclusive framework’.
This would require ‘appropriate command arrangements […] and compatibility of
concepts and procedures’ (European Council 2004c: 6). The further option of ‘simultaneous EU-UN operations’ called for ‘secure and interoperable systems for information exchange and communication between the EU and the UN’ but did not imply that the EU would consider hybrid missions with new modalities for joint command. As in the early dialogue between the UN and the EU, when modalities of EU support for UN operations were discussed in 2004, the EU maintained its insistence on decision-making autonomy and privileged autonomous military missions, while maintaining the option of an EU civilian component in a broader UN mission. Although the EU EULEX Kosovo mission was intended to take over from UNMIK in Kosovo, in practice EULEX which operates under the umbrella of UNMIK is the first test case of this model (see chapter 4).

The EU has also provided focused material and practical support to the AU AMIS mission in Darfur in response to a request for assistance. While this form of support was not identified as a model for EU support to the UN in EU policy documents, it is nevertheless a model that could be applied to the UN. It is therefore included in Table 10 summarising different models of EU support to the UN below.

Table 10. Modalities of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management

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<tr>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Example</th>
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<tr>
<td>National contributions (with use of the EU ‘clearing house mechanism’)</td>
<td>UNIFIL, Lebanon, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stand alone</td>
<td>Althea, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bridging</td>
<td>Artemis, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stand-by</td>
<td>EUFOR DRC, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modular approach (EU component of UN operation – civilian only)</td>
<td>EULEX, Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical support</td>
<td>EU Assistance mission to AMIS in Darfur, 2006</td>
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Source: adapted from Tardy 2008b.
Over and above the identification of scenarios in which EU capabilities might be deployed in support of the UN, some progress has been made in relation to the Joint Declaration’s call for ‘reciprocal assistance in assessment missions’. Assessment missions in the DRC in advance of EUFOR DRC included UN staff, and the Assessment Mission in advance of the EUFOR CHAD/CAR mission was conducted jointly. Similarly ‘greater contact between mission planning units’ has been established, in particular between UN DPKO and a number of contact points within the Council Secretariat in relation to the conduct of exercises as well as in cases of real operational cooperation. For instance, in 2005 the UN actively contributed to the EU exercise study EST 05 which was intended to help develop modalities for bridging and hand-over of operations between the EU and UN. Representatives from DPKO and OCHA have been systematically invited to participate in EU exercises (one per year) since then.

While these initiatives have undoubtedly contributed to the institutionalisation of EU cooperation in planning, the most significant impetus for developing and testing planning cooperation has been in actual operational cooperation and its evaluation through joint After-Action Reviews. This has revealed good practices as well as problems and has triggered the elaboration of a number of documents designed to improve inter-institutional knowledge, document good practice, and serve as a practical guide for planning cooperation.

A constant challenge has been how to link up planning structures and processes that are not ‘naturally’ aligned. There are a number of significant differences in EU and UN chains of command and planning processes that complicate cooperation. The fact that EU decision-making and planning involves member states to a higher degree than UN planning has been well documented (Derblom et al. 2008; Wiharta 2008; Tardy 2008b). Tardy contrasts EU decision-making as ‘heavy and time-consuming’, compared with the UN process which is ‘lighter and less state-controlled’ (Tardy 2008b: 11). Similarly, the joint review of the EU Chad/CAR mission contrasted the relative degree of autonomy that the UN planners in the Secretariat of DPKO had vis-a-vis UN member states, with the closely supervised and multi-step decision-making process in the EU. Whereas EU member states are effectively integrated into EU pre-mission planning processes through the involvement of member states in the various
committees responsible for the preparation of crisis management decisions, the UN planning process has been designed to encourage the integration of relevant ‘stakeholders’ within the UN system in the pre-planning and early operational planning phases through the relatively informal Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP).

Thus, in addition to being more flexible or ‘lighter’, UN planning procedures are also more horizontally integrated across the UN system. This is because the IMPP is implemented at Headquarters by an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) comprised of a range of UN stakeholders (mostly from DPA and DPKO). In contrast, foreign policy bodies within the EU (such as the bodies responsible for CFSP within the Council Secretariat or the European Commission), are disengaged from mission planning. Rather, planning for military missions is strictly a matter for military planners and EU diplomats or military officials who sit in the various decision-making bodies.

In addition, as Tardy has observed, there are significant differences in the responsibilities of planners at different stages in the planning process (Tardy 2008b). In the UN, most of mission planning, including elements of operational planning and force generation, are conducted by IMTF before the authorising Security Council decision. Thereafter DPKO continues operational planning and hands over to the mission leadership in-theatre at a relatively late stage in the planning process. By contrast, within the EU there is a strict distinction between pre-mission strategic planning conducted by the EUMS in the Council Secretariat and operational planning which takes place after the Joint Action decision authorising the mission, in one of the EU’s five national Operational Headquarters (OHQs), within NATO’s SHAPE or within the EU’s Operations Centre in Brussels. Thus, in practice, within the UN a team of a few military planners and civilians are responsible for strategic and operational planning, whereas within the EU planning decisions are the product of a multi-step process of inter-governmental negotiation informed by military planners in Brussels, and later in OHQs.

Unsurprisingly, this mis-match of planning architecture has complicated the task of planning cooperation. Adapting to a separate layers of planning in OHQ for which
there is no equivalent in the UN system and which changes with each mission is a challenge for UN DPKO planners in HQ and has prompted calls that planners from OHQ be included in EU-UN ‘education days’\textsuperscript{60}.

In the case of Chad, where the EU and UN were planning for a synchronised mission start-up, differences in planning and decision-making sequencing proved particularly problematic. Whereas operational planning within the UN occurs before the Security Council decision to launch the operation, in the EU operational planning starts after the ‘Joint Action’ decision to launch an operation. Given that the Joint Action had to follow the Security Council resolution, this evidently hampered efforts to plan in parallel and prompted the Joint After Action Review to suggest the idea of two Security Council Resolutions, or a UNSC Presidential statement, to allow for an EU Joint Action to be adopted earlier.

Given these structural and procedural differences, one of the priorities for improving cooperation has been to improve inter-institutional knowledge. Drawing on experience of operational cooperation to date and, specifically the Joint After-Action Reviews of the EUFOR RD Congo and the EUFOR Chad/CAR missions, a number of documents have been created to help planners understand and adapt to the different planning processes. For instance, in June 2008, DPKO produced \textit{Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions}. These include: a \textit{Comparative roadmap of UN and EU planning processes}; \textit{Terms of reference for a UN-EU joint coordination group to support cooperation in planning}; \textit{a checklist of elements usually included in UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the deployment of an EU operation}; and \textit{a checklist of elements included in follow-up technical arrangements between the UN and the EU} (listed in Tardy 2008b: 6). The EUFOR Chad/CAR After-Action Review also recommended the drafting of ‘framework agreements for UN-EU cooperation on financing and logistics aspects for EU operations undertaken under the EU Athena mechanism using as a model the Technical Attachment established for EUFOR Chad/CAR’ (European Council 2008). Taken together, these documents provide evidence of significant improvements in the

\textsuperscript{60} Similarly, during mission implementation, the additional layer of operational command reduces the autonomy of the Force Commander, which has been shown to have complicated MONUC-EUFOR cooperation on the ground (Major 2008).
technical aspects of cooperation in planning. They also serve to highlight the importance inter-institutional knowledge and communication as a pre-requisite for smooth cooperation and of the Joint After Action Reviews as a means for promoting inter-institutional learning in relation to operational planning. Indeed, while the Steering Committee was charged with encouraging cooperation on the technical aspects of planning, communication and best-practices, it is clear that real progress in these areas has been made as a result of operational cooperation and the joint After Action Reviews that followed it (interview 62).

5.2.2 Best Practices

Although the 2003 Joint Action identified ‘best practices’ as one of the four basket areas for cooperation, progress in this area was initially slow because of different approaches to institutional learning. For instance, in 2004 in the context of Steering Committee discussions, DPKO raised the possibility of developing cooperation in this area along the lines of DPKO’s (then) approach to learning lessons – principally through independent evaluations which were subsequently made public on the website of the Best Practices Section of DPKO. This proposal was rejected by the EU, however, on the grounds that an independent and external approach was not compatible with the EU’s formal internal lessons learned process and was not acceptable to EU member states (interviews 63). Thus, after operation Artemis in 2003, for instance, the EU and UN conducted separate lessons learned exercises. The UN-EU Steering Committee called for the first joint After Action Review for the EUFOR RD Congo mission in 2006. It was based on DPKO After Action Review practice and led by representatives from DPKO Best Practices section. This involved a day of discussions between a team of 14 members of EU and UN planners, and resulted in the identification of good practices and actionable lessons learned in relation to triggering mechanisms, planning process, formal enabling mechanisms and planning for logistical support. As indicated above, many of the recommendations of the AAR were subsequently taken up under the auspices of the UN-EU Steering Committee and incorporated into formal EU internal lessons learned processes as well as the 2007 UN-EU Joint Declaration. This also further institutionalised the After Action Review approach to best practices in its call for ‘systematic UN-EU joint lesson learned exercises following cases of joint operational cooperation’. A joint
workshop involving EU and UN planners was also held in 2009 to identify lessons from transition processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IPTF to EUPM) and Kosovo (UNMIK to EU LEX).

5.2.3 Communication

The value of identifying improved communication as a key cross-cutting theme in the 2003 Joint Declaration has been borne out by subsequent operational experience that highlighted the need for improved communication and inter-institutional knowledge as a pre-requisite for effective cooperation.

Although the 2003 Joint Declaration does not address communication at the political-strategic level, much of the 2007 Declaration is dedicated to elaborating ways in which communication between the UN and the Troika and PSC might be improved. While it is recognised that more frequent cross-participation in high-level meetings is unrealistic, the challenge given the constraints of formal multi-lateral settings is to create space for open, informed and pro-active strategic-level discussions.

At the working level, despite a number of informal contacts between European Council and DPKO staff, the EU’s security rules prevented the EU from sharing key planning documents. This made planning cooperation more difficult, including in relation to the EUFOR DR Congo mission. To address this, an agreement was reached enabling the EU to share information classified up to ‘restricted’ (one level up from public). The exchange of more sensitive information has occurred on a regular basis through briefings by the EU military liaison officer in New York or through European UN staff with appropriate EU security clearances. However, the fact that DPKO has no liaison officer in Brussels is seen as an obstacle to coordinated planning (interviews 64). This will, however, be addressed in 2010 when DPKO is due to locate a liaison officer in Brussels.

More broadly but no less significantly, the experience of cooperation in planning has revealed that in order to work together effectively both EU and UN planners need to understand each other’s working practices better. This was first made explicit in the EUFOR RD Congo After Action Review which recommended that the EU and UN
arrange regular ‘education days’ to improve mutual knowledge of EU and UN concepts, definitions, decision-making and planning procedures. The elaboration of a ‘Comparative roadmap of UN and EU planning processes’ in 2007 was also seen as necessary and useful to this end. Although it is widely recognised that mutual knowledge and understanding have improved through the role of the Steering Committee and operational experience ‘particularly in the categories of staff that interact’ (Tardy 2008b: 13), it is also widely held that this remains insufficient (interviews 65). Staff rotations coupled with the fact in EU military missions planning is conducted in different operational headquarters, means that planning cooperation requires a constant commitment to improving knowledge across institutions.

The Joint Declaration also made specific mention of greater cooperation between Situation Centres. This has been an area of exemplary virtual inter-institutional cooperation. The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre established a web-based secure portal through which a number of international Situation Centres, including that of the EU, UN and NATO exchange information about areas of particular concern on a voluntary basis. Similarly, the European Commission’s Crisis Room has developed a software platform ‘Tariqa’, collating open source intelligence from over 60,000 sources and has offered the UN access to it (interview 66). Cooperation between the UN and the EU Satellite Centre and the EU Joint Research Centre has been mutually beneficial. The EU Satellite Centre has often provided DPKO and UN missions with satellite imagery and the UN has provided the Satellite Centre with collateral information, for instance in relation to the DRC, to improve its imagery analysis.

5.2.4 Training

Concerns with maintaining EU decision-making autonomy and developing internal capacities have meant that the EU has, in practice, favoured autonomous operations over more integrated models of cooperation with other international organisations. This has evidently limited the opportunities for joint efforts in the field of training, in particular the 2003 Declaration’s call for ‘the synchronisation of pre-deployment

81 The UN and EU have also undertaken joint needs assessments with a view to enhancing the capability of the African Union Situation Room.
training for civilian police’ (European Council 2003b). Pre-deployment training has not been synchronised for the practical reason that EU and UN operations have not been either.

The Joint Declaration also called for broader inter-institutional standardisation, specifically ‘the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel’. Although the Council Secretariat has actively supported the goal of standardisation in training, the fragmented approach to the training of civilians within the EU – where this remains the responsibility of the member states – coupled with diverse national approaches to policing and justice, has meant that standardisation remains an unrealised ambition within the EU. Some progress has been made, notably through the European Commission’s support for ‘the European Group on Training’. This is a network of training institutes, specialised in civilian training, which has developed a standardised ‘core course’, designed to provide the minimum basic training for ESDP missions, as well as a set of specialised courses. The curriculum of the core course is intended to provide basic instruction on EU institutions and basic skills training relevant to a deployment by any international organisation i.e. mine awareness, gender sensitivity, understanding different institutional actors and working with the military, police, NGO community etc. However, these courses are only offered in some member states, and despite a PSC decision that all personnel seconded on ESDP missions be provided with such minimum training before attending mission-specific induction training, this has not been implemented in practice.\(^2\)

In relation to UN-EU cooperation in training, following the 2003 Joint Declaration, the European Commission financed two joint training courses (one on human rights protection and child protection, the other on Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration) and a seminar in 2006 designed to explore opportunities for further cooperation in training. The seminar served to highlight the structural differences in the EU and UN approaches to training. In the UN training is largely centralised within the Integrated Training Service financed from the peacekeeping budget, but in the EU

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\(^2\) A questionnaire conducted by the Council Secretariat revealed that a small proportion of all mission staff had attended such a core course. Trainers within the EULEX mission in Kosovo also testify to the low percentage of staff that had received basic training (interviews 67).
core and specialist courses remain the responsibility of EU member states, with some additional financial support from the European Commission. This means that the EU and UN approach to training is not easily linked, although the substance of the training is broadly compatible. As a result, rather than focus on developing joint training, the EU and UN have limited their cooperation to providing reciprocal access to their training courses, including for Secretariat staff, although the up-take of these offers has been limited. In short, despite the relatively early identification of ‘training’ as an area in which the UN and EU had a stated interest in cooperation, in practice this has not taken place to any significant degree. Rather cooperation has been ad hoc, and typically involved cross participation in specialist courses for Secretariat staff rather than mission personnel. This is principally due to a disconnect between EU and UN approaches to training. So long as the EU has no standardised approach to basic or specialist training and EU missions are not integrated with UN ones there are few entry points for efforts to develop a joint approach to training of civilian personnel.

In 2008, however, the Steering Committee was able to identify additional entry points for cooperation in the area of police. Although there is little consensus within the EU on doctrine in relation to police capacity building mandates, the EU and UN agreed to work together on the elaboration of a doctrine for international executive policing (for which only the UN has direct operational experience), and to jointly develop training modules based upon it. To this end both EU and UN trainers took part in the police training for the nascent European Gendarmerie Force funded by the Commission’s Instrument for Stability. Furthermore, the EU and UN identified a the goal of improving national capacities for police training in countries that regularly contribute police to international missions as a common goal for further cooperation in the area of training.

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83 For example, the EU has invited UN Secretariat officials to participate in the strategic-level ESDP Orientation Courses provide, principally for EU member state officials working on ESDP by the European Security and Defence College, and the UN has invited EU Secretariat officials to participate in DPKO trainings on lessons learned and best practice as well as specialist trainings (including on DDR) provided to UN staff at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi.
5.3 Conclusions

In response to the question *how were EU and UN interests served by institutionalising cooperation through the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management?* this chapter argues that EU interests in the institutionalisation of the relationship were largely symbolic – driven by interests in promoting the credibility and legitimacy of ESDP through association with the UN. These were driven more by the dynamics of inter-institutional competition, notably with NATO, than by material interests in closer cooperation. Conversely, the UN was principally interested in the mechanism in so far as it promised greater material support for UN operations.

More specifically, the chapter shows that EU member states were cautious of close association with the UN in so far as it threatened the decision-making ‘autonomy’ of ESDP. Many EU member states, including France and the UK, supported the development of ESDP precisely because it promised a greater level of member state control of operations when compared with NATO (notably the Kosovo 1999 air campaign) or UN operations (notably the ‘failures’ of Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda). Nevertheless, within the EU, the political momentum for greater EU-UN operational cooperation was linked to the drive to establish ESDP as a credible crisis management actor, and as a credible alternative to NATO. The EU needed formal UN support for ESDP missions for purposes of legitimacy and operational cooperation helped establish ESDP operational credibility. The French took the lead in efforts to establish the ESDP operational credibility through early operational action in 2003 to take over a UN police mission, (EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and to provide a ‘bridging’ military support to a UN mission (*Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo).

Similarly, efforts to institutionalise the EU-UN operational partnership through the 2003 Joint Declaration were also driven by EU member states eager to consolidate the EU’s new role as a security actor through the increased legitimacy that a ‘visible’ partnership with the UN promised. However, the early history of the Steering Committee also demonstrates the limited interest of EU member states in the committee pro-actively exploring options for operational cooperation. The Steering Committee was perceived by Germany, in particular, to have exceeded its mandate by discussing opportunities for operational cooperation in the DRC in 2005. EU member states responded by re-asserting the primacy of member states as the UN counterparts.
in relation to strategic-level dialogue and decision-making. Not only does this highlight the limited interest in EU member states in promoting operational cooperation, but it also supports one of the conclusions of the chapter five, notably that EU cooperation with the UN in the area of crisis management is fundamentally case-specific and unpredictable.

In response to the question *what does it tell us about the EU and UN operational fit?* this chapter reveals that there are significant differences in how the EU and UN work. Indeed, the work programme of the Steering Committee has been informed by the identification of practical obstacles to cooperation that are linked to structural and procedural differences in working practices. For example, structural differences between layers of command complicated cooperation between EU and UN missions in the DRC (Major 2008; Tardy 2008b) while differences in planning procedures hampered efforts to plan for parallel mission start-up, notably in Chad. Such operational experience led commentators to conclude that ‘cooperation is difficult because we work differently’ (Tardy 2008b: 11). Similarly, UN DPKO officials note the high transaction costs of operational cooperation in the same theatre (in the case of EUFOR DRC and MONUC). More alarmingly, some concluded that ‘The EU is poor at working with the UN both strategically and operationally, and it is getting worse at it – EU-UN cooperation on the ground in Chad has been worse than in Congo’ (Keohane 2009: 52).

However, there is evidence that both institutions have learnt from their experience of operational cooperation. While different institutional approaches to institutional learning initially delayed cooperation in the area of ‘best practices’, when the EU and UN did engage in joint After Action Reviews they proved to be particularly productive in driving the cooperation agenda at the working-level and shaping the UN-EU Steering Committee work programme. For example, joint operational planning experience (mostly in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Chad/the Central African Republic) triggered a number of innovations. These included Joint Assessment Missions, strengthened modalities for communication in the operational planning phases (including additional EU military liaison resources in New York and increased use of Video Tele Conferences), as well as Joint After Action Reviews.
designed to promote inter-institutional learning with regard to planning cooperation. Therefore, in the thematic basket areas of communications, planning and best practices, efforts to improve cooperation have typically been triggered by operational experience and, more recently, by efforts to redeem lessons learned through joint After Action Reviews. A notable exception is the area of training. While there is no political or policy objection to aligning EU and UN training standards, the fact that training within the EU is not yet standardised and that EU pre-mission and in-mission training remains relatively undeveloped, has meant that improved EU-UN cooperation in relation to standardisation has been a second rank priority. Operationally, the EU and UN have also tended to divide functional responsibilities even where they are present in the same theatre (DRC, Kosovo), which has, in turn, limited the opportunities for joint in-mission training.

In summary, while the framework and structures for EU-UN cooperation in crisis management was established from the top down by EU member states, and designed to promote the visibility of the relationship, the content of working-level cooperation was limited to a technical agenda generated from the ‘bottom up’ through working-level processes of reflection within headquarters. Much of this work has been dedicated to addressing the organisational differences that presented practical obstacles to smooth operational cooperation. In some cases, however, the benefits of EU and UN cooperation have not outweighed the transaction costs associated with organisational alignment. For instance, the benefits of joint training have not outweighed the costs associated with aligning decentralised and centralised approaches to financing and organising training activities. In other words, where EU and UN operational experience have revealed that the practical costs of organisational and procedural mis-matches, the institutions have invested (small amounts) in processes and efforts to address these differences, including through improved inter-institutional learning. Where practice differs and the costs of doing nothing are small, as in the area of training, there has been little progress in institutionalising cooperation. In conclusion, the history of the Steering Committee reveals that there are significant differences in how the EU and UN crisis management actors work, and serious transaction costs associated with cooperation. In most cases related to operational cooperation in civilian crisis management, however, these costs have not proved
prohibitive and the EU and UN have invested in processes of inter-institutional communication and learning to address many of the practical challenges. While this appears to have confirmed the utility of a technical approach to improving cooperation, it is, however, clearly contingent on policy being broadly aligned. Since the Steering Committee has been explicitly prohibited from addressing matters of strategy and policy, it follows that this institutional mechanism is not configured to address problems of collective action linked to policy divergence.
Chapter 6. EU engagement with the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

6. Introduction

It is only relatively recently, in 2006, that the UN established a dedicated institutional ‘architecture’ for peacebuilding, comprising PBC, PBSO and PBF. These structures are often considered the centrepiece of UN peacebuilding, particularly in New York. However, as chapters three and four demonstrate, they are relatively marginal to the bulk of EU and UN peacebuilding interventions and to their operational cooperation. For instance, as described in chapter 3, the elaboration of EC country programming has not been influenced by integrated strategies developed within PBC in countries on the PBC agenda. And in the context of peace operations, as described in chapter 4, operational cooperation has not typically taken place in countries on the PBC agenda. Rather, as the preceding chapters demonstrate, the business of developing peacebuilding-relevant policy and operational partnerships is scattered across EU and UN institutions and involves a range of operational actors, the majority of whom are not represented within PBC.

Nevertheless, the UN’s peacebuilding architecture was specifically intended to address the multi-level and multi-actor challenges of resource mobilisation, coherence and institutional learning. Indeed, as is shown in chapter 2, despite or perhaps because of the diverse views of what peacebuilding involves in operational terms, peacebuilding discourse within the UN is associated with the challenge of improving systemic efforts to consolidate peace. It did not evolve in response to challenges at the activity or programming level, but rather to address incoherence or weaknesses of the collective international response. Thus, although the peace-consolidation objective leaves no agency behind, peacebuilding in the UN is not institutionally linked with any of the main UN operational actors. This helps explain why it occupies an institutional no-man’s-land, with PBC reporting to the Security Council and General

84 The EU SSR mission to Guinea-Bissau is a potential exception. It was launched in June 2006, six months after the Security Council recommended that Guinea-Bissau be placed on the agenda of the PBC. There is, however, no evidence of discussion of the mission within the PBC or of informal consultations between EU planners and the PBSO.
85 While the EC and EU Presidency are represented, the UN operational departments, programmes and agencies do not have a seat at the table.
Assembly and its associated Support Office and Fund reporting directly to the Secretary-General.

This chapter addresses the question: *Has EU engagement in the UN’s peacebuilding architecture promoted EU-UN policy alignment and operational cooperation? And has the PBC successfully addressed the external coordination challenge in peacebuilding?* It aims, in section 6.1, to trace the EU’s involvement in the establishment of the PBC in order to assess to what extent the PBC has served as a venue for improving inter-institutional cooperation. Section 6.2 provides an overview of the institutional structures that have been developed within the UN in order to identify the opportunities that they afford for EU-UN cooperation at the strategic and policy level. The chapter also assesses, in section 6.3, how far the PBC has delivered on its mandate to promote integrated strategies, improve learning, mobilise resources, and enhance coherence. This includes analysis of recent proposals for UN peacebuilding reform, notably those outlined in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on *Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*. It assesses their implications for EU-UN cooperation in peacebuilding and asks *is this alternative in-country approach a more promising one?*

### 6.1 An overview of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the EU role in it

#### 6.1.1 The establishment of the UN PBC

The EU was a strong supporter of the idea of a PBC in the run-up to and during the September 2005 Summit where the idea was finally agreed by UN Member States. Although, as described chapter 2, the UN had identified the concept of peacebuilding in 1992 and the Brahimi Report identified DPA as the UN institutional focal point, there was a widely held perception that the UN institutional machinery was not well suited to the management of multifaceted interventions across ‘transitions’ from war to peace. The idea for a new UN-based body to address these challenges arose out of the High-level Panel on Security Threats and Reform that convened in 2003. In its report *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, the panel argued that there was no body within the UN system designed to arrest a state’s slide into war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace and identified the need for:
a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace (United Nations 2004b).

More specifically, it proposed the idea of a PBC and argued that it be a subsidiary of the Security Council, supported by a PBSO and a PBF. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was a vigorous proponent of the idea, which was duly reflected in his 2005 report In Larger Freedom and included a range of reform proposals to be addressed at the 2005 Summit (United Nations 2005a). An addendum to the report elaborated that PBC should: ensure that the international community supports national authorities; proposes priorities based on realities in the receiving country; mobilises necessary resources for early recovery and medium- to long-term investment; and creates a forum in which representatives of the UN, major bilateral donors, troop contributors, regional actors and financial institutions can share information and achieve coherence.

The support for this proposal was uncontroversial and clear within the EU. The EU shared the ambition of generating sustained and well-coordinated support for states at risk of conflict or emerging from war. In the EC 2005 Communication on the UN Summit, the EC stressed that:

consensus on establishing a Peace Building Commission is essential. Such a body would fill a gap in the UN system. The EU should support a broad mandate entailing a holistic approach to peacebuilding, i.e. covering the whole continuum from peacekeeping to longer-term development issues (European Commission 2005b).

During the negotiations on the PBC proposal, the EU duly supported the most expansive mandate and argued that the final Outcome Document include agreements on the composition, mandate and the date for which it should become operational. This was achieved and PBC was one of the few reform proposals to emerge from the 2005 Summit, with a commitment to establish PBC by 31 December 2005. This is not to say that the idea was uncontested. Indeed, the final document includes a number of
compromises. For instance, the mandate of PBC was limited to post-conflict peacebuilding and did not include the preventative function initially envisaged in the high-level report of 2004. Powerful countries, including permanent Security Council members that have consistently been reluctant to equip the UN Secretariat with early warning or intelligence-gathering capabilities, favoured the more limited mandate. A range of countries from the Global South were also reluctant to grant an open mandate for the Security Council to comment on domestic political conflict that ‘risked’ becoming violent. This argument was, however, for the most part not made explicit. Rather, a number of countries argued that conflict prevention was already covered by DPA and UN agencies. A second compromise generated during the 2005 Summit was that the PBC report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, thereby, increasing the Global South’s influence over its functioning and role. It followed that PBC was formally established by concurrent acts of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Its inaugural session took place on 23 June 2006.

6.1.2 A complicated start for EU engagement: Issues of representation

The EC Communication in preparation for the World Summit stated that ‘the EU will certainly contribute actively to the work of PBC, using EC and Common Foreign and Security Policy instruments, in line with the European Security Strategy’. It also argued that ‘given these experiences and its contributions to peacebuilding around the globe, the European Community should fully participate in all meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission’ (European Commission 2005b: 3). In practice, however, formal issues around EU involvement contributed to the PBC’s slow start and showcased the contentious nature of the EU relationship with the UN as well as its internal inter-institutional struggles.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document provided that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) should be invited to participate in all meetings of PBC. It also provided that ‘other institutional donors’ should be invited, but it was not clear who the ‘other’ referred to. The EC made its case that it should be included as ‘another institutional donor’ in communications to agreed PBC members and in a letter from the president of the EC to the UN Secretary-General in June 2006. This was not in itself contested, however the subsequent request that the EU be granted not
only the status of institutional donor but also a seat at the table as a political actor was perceived by the G–77 as a move to add even more OECD seats to PBC. Conversely, when the Organisation of the Islamic Conference requested that it be granted the same status as the EU on the basis of formal organisational equivalence, many western members of PBC thought it inappropriate. This issue contributed to the climate of suspicion during 2006 when procedural and organisational issues dominated the agenda. It was only eventually resolved in May 2007 when the four observers to PBC—IMF, World Bank, EC and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference—were all invited to become full members of PBC and all in relation to their ‘institutional donor status’.

In parallel to discussions in New York about EU formal participation in PBC, in Brussels the ‘nameplate’ issue of how the EU–EC should be represented in PBC was subject to intense negotiation. While the EC noted that EC participation was relevant given that the invitation was for ‘institutional donors’, the European Council countered that the EU should be represented in view of the importance of second pillar foreign and security policy competences in peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery. The nameplate issue was eventually resolved with the UN insistence that PBC status arrangements only provided for the ‘European Community’. The PBC chair, PBSO and the UN Office of Legal Affairs also agreed on a ‘two chairs—one delegation’ formation, where both the EU Presidency and the EC were invited. This was agreed in May 2007 and, in practice, it has worked smoothly (interviews 68). The Presidency keeps all 27 member states informed of PBC developments and prepares EU coordination meetings. It normally intervenes on the basis of pre-agreed statements or positions prepared on the basis of coordination meetings or in the European Council Working Group on the United Nations, with assistance from the European Council General Secretariat. The EC intervenes on matters that relate to its role in-country, through close coordination with its country delegations or as a donor on thematic issues such as monitoring and evaluation. The Working Group on the United Nations, the EC UN Unit and the EC and EU delegations in New York evidently have greater knowledge of the politics of the UN than the local politics of peacebuilding in specific countries. This presents whole-of-government challenges to all PBC members, including the EU.
The acrimonious process of resolving issues of EU representation in PBC in the first year of its operation attests to the highly politicised nature of doing business in New York. It also attests to the sensitivities relating to EU institutional competences and the dividing line between foreign and development policy that were particularly acute in 2006. However, on both counts the subsequent experience of actually working together in the context of PBC has been a relatively harmonious one and has, if anything, provided a venue for constructive debate on issues of relevance to peacebuilding, which has bridged OECD/G-77 divisions. EU officials testify that working groups and country meetings have highlighted shared interests across regions and rich–poor country divides, and have helped foster greater understanding of the challenges faced by donors and national governments in the peacebuilding context. More specifically, some have pointed to the opportunity that PBC provides for the EU to bring its expertise to the table and to present a combined position from a donor and political perspective. In other words, despite its fractious set-up phase, PBC has provided a rare, relatively neutral UN venue for addressing issues at the intersection of development, governance and security. This is politically useful for the EU (and the UN) even if PBC may not yet be optimally configured to address its mandate (see below).

6.2 An overview of mandate and structures

6.2.1 The Peacebuilding Commission

The formal mandate of PBC, the first element in the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, is detailed in paragraph 2 of its founding resolutions (United Nations 2005c, 2005d):

(a) to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

(b) to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; and
(c) to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery … .

Its mandate is, therefore, an ambitious one: it aims to provide strategic guidance in relation to specific countries, develop broader policy guidance, improve early and long-term resource mobilisation, and enhance the coordination of all relevant actors. Moreover, since it has no formal authority and functions as an advisory body, it must achieve these results through its informal influence based on the quality of process and the perceived value of its outcome.

Given the PBC objectives, the founding resolutions of 2005 provided that PBC meet in various configurations, with their composition reflecting their purpose. These included an Organisational Committee (OC), Country Specific Meetings (CSMs) and a Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL). An overview of these working configurations as well as the other elements of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBF and PBSO) follows.

*The Organisational Committee*

The OC is responsible for establishing the agenda of PBC, taking into consideration the requests of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and, in exceptional circumstances, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the General Assembly and a Member State in danger of lapsing into conflict. In June 2006, it adopted the rules of procedure that govern PBC (United Nations 2006a) and it has provided the framework for the country-specific and thematic work. It has 31 members, designed to represent key peacebuilding actors with broad regional representation. These include: (i) seven members of the UN Security Council, including all its permanent members; (ii) seven members of ECOSOC, elected from regional groups; (iii) the five top providers of assessed contributions to UN budgets and of voluntary contributions to UN funds; (iv) the five top providers of military and police personnel to UN missions; and (v) seven members elected by the General Assembly in order to take into account appropriate representation from all regional groups.
This OC is the cornerstone of the Peacebuilding Architecture in so far as it sets the broad agenda and approach of the other meeting configurations. For example, it was the OC that agreed how to interpret the PBC mandate to develop integrated approaches to peacebuilding when it adopted the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy (IPBS) concept in February 2007. This idea enjoyed the support of the EU. Ambassador Thomas Matussek, on behalf of the EU, argued that ‘promoting the development of a viable peacebuilding strategy which has broad ownership is where the PBC can really add value’ (quoted in Ponzio 2007).

In its first year of operation, with Angola as chair, the OC served mainly to define the role and operating methods of PBC. In the second year, after many of the procedural issues had been resolved the new chair, Japan, sought a more proactive role for the OC. This involved, for instance, PBC retreats in January 2008 and February 2009, which included senior UN representatives from the Secretariat and Permanent-5 Member State ambassadors who are often absent from PBC meetings. These retreats served to review the function of PBC and tackle issues of strategic relevance such as how PBC could do better in relation to resource mobilisation and coordination. It is likely that the OC will continue to take a proactive role in shaping and adapting the role of PBC in the future.

Country Specific Meetings

Country-specific configurations of PBC were provided for in the founding resolutions of PBC. In early 2006, the Security Council suggested that Burundi and Sierra Leone be the first two countries on the PBC agenda, following requests from these countries. This was agreed by the OC and the first CSMs took place in September 2006. The initial CSMs got off to a false start. They appeared to be perceived by the two countries concerned as a pledging conference and some donors (including EU officials) were dismayed that they were used to present a ‘shopping list’ of requests for assistance. To dispel this misperception, PBSO sent missions to Burundi and Sierra Leone in November 2007 and redoubled its arguments to PBC members that CSMs should not serve as another donor forum, but instead seek to develop written, negotiated strategies that could serve as a standard against which to measure progress. This has, indeed, been the principal focus of CSMs. The first IPBS was agreed for
Burundi in June 2007. Although the process was a difficult one, the resulting umbrella document ‘addresses political risks and priorities that were absent from other existing strategies’ and ‘represents the closest thing to a consensus vision on the priorities for peace consolidation in Burundi’ according to one review (Centre on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute 2008). In the Burundi case, the Norwegian CSM chair led the process, while the Burundi government, with the support of the UN integrated mission (UN Integrated Office in Burundi) and PBSO, crafted the IPBS. Although also difficult, the development of a strategy for Sierra Leone followed a different process. Given the government’s parallel focus on upcoming elections and ‘strategy fatigue’, it sought to build on existing strategic documents to develop a Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework to serve as a ‘compact’ in which the government and international community articulated their respective commitments. This strategy was adopted after the national elections in November 2007, also with intense support from the United Nations Integrated Office and PBSO. In both cases, CSMs subsequently adopted monitoring and evaluation frameworks against which progress on the IPBS was to be measured. While it remains unclear to what extent these strategies have served to guide national and international engagement (see next section), it is broadly recognised that that the CSM chairs have at times played an important political role, backed by PBC and the Security Council.

In both Burundi and Sierra Leone, the chairs have influenced national decision-making on governance issues and, in the case of Burundi, the Norwegian CSM chair was able to broker a solution that arose when IMF threatened to delay completion of its Sixth Review (Centre on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute 2008). Thus, on occasion, PBC has been able to influence both national decision makers and donors in line with peace consolidation objectives.

In late 2007, the Security Council requested that PBC also consider Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic was placed on its agenda in mid-2008. While both countries requested that they be put on the PBC agenda, the decision to do so was not automatic. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, it took the Security Council five months to transmit the request because it was not clear on what grounds countries should be placed on the agenda. This reflects confusion within the Security Council over what criteria should guide selection, and over the role of PBC. including whether it should deal mainly with countries in the late peace consolidation phase.
The Working Group on Lessons Learned

This working group was established in January 2007 to address the PBC mandate ‘to develop best practices’. WGLL meets on an ad hoc basis to discuss thematic issues of relevance to the work of PBC and CSMs in particular. One meeting addressed the issue of how to improve coordination between the PBC and regional and sub-regional organisations. It served to highlight limitations in the PBC’s country-specific approach and in the PBF’s ability to build capacity in regional organisations.

Although there has been criticism that these meetings have not always been directly linked to the country work of PBC and it is unclear to what extent these meetings have served to inform policy and/or operational developments in the broader UN system, they have provided a platform for reflection on key peacebuilding issues and have been used to introduce a number of constructive suggestions on how the work of PBC could be strengthened.

6.2.2 The Peacebuilding Fund

PBF is the second element in the UN Peacebuilding Architecture established after the 2005 World Summit. It is separate from PBC and under the authority of the Secretary-General. It can, therefore, operate in any country deemed eligible by the Secretary-General, in addition to the countries on the PBC agenda. In October 2006, PBF was launched and achieved its funding target of US$ 250 million within the first year. It is a multi-donor fund intended to provide short-term support to countries in the early stages of a peace process or to address gaps in a process. Its original Terms of Reference specified that it should support:

- activities in support of the implementation of peace agreements;
- activities in support of efforts by the country to build and strengthen capacities that promote coexistence and the peaceful resolution of conflict;
- establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities; and
- critical interventions designed to respond to imminent threats to the peacebuilding process (United Nations 2006d).
PBF interventions were divided into three ‘windows’. Window I was dedicated to those countries that are on the PBC agenda, where PBC provides guidance on the priorities for PBF. Although PBF is not formally accountable to PBC, a number of PBC members argued that PBC should play a hands-on role in deciding how this money should be allocated. Window II was used to support preventative actions in other countries at risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict. Countries and projects were selected based on analysis by PBSO and the decision of the Secretary-General. Window III was considered a rapid response facility and has been used to support dialogue, reconciliation and security measures in a range of fragile countries. However, the window structure was revised in 2009 so that there is no window specifically dedicated to countries on the PBC agenda. Rather, both countries on the PBC agenda (Window I) and those declared eligible for PBF by the Secretary-General (Window II) will be eligible for PBF funding. An Immediate Response Facility (IRF) replaces Window III and provides emergency funding for immediate peacebuilding and recovery needs. This includes ‘efforts to revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends to the population at large’ while the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility provides longer-term support for activities that are directly aimed at building national capacities to prevent the (re)lapse of conflict (and that cannot be funded under other humanitarian or development instruments).

While the PBF and the EC IfS were designed to serve similar purposes, the PBF does not have an equivalent to the IfS ‘Partnership for Peace’ component, which is designed to build peacebuilding capacity in regional and non-state actors. This has been identified as a limitation of PBF, with CSMs recognising the importance of regional actors, but unable to recommend that UN funds, including PBF, be used to support their interventions. For this reason, CSMs and WGLL meetings have advocated that other donors actively support the build-up of regional peacebuilding capacity. This is one area for strengthened EU–UN cooperation, and tri-partite EU–UN–AU and EU–UN–ECOWAS partnerships have been proposed to this end.

6.2.3 The Peacebuilding Support Office

The third element of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture provided for in the 2005
founding resolutions is PBSO. The founding resolutions provided that it be ‘small’, established ‘within existing resources’, ‘staffed by qualified experts’ and serve ‘to assist and support the Commission’ (United Nations 2005c; 2005d: paragraph 23). For many Member States, the role of PBSO was clearly to provide support to PBC and PBF. However, from the outset the former Secretary-General insisted that it should also serve to improve internal UN coordination around peacebuilding. In addition to its secretariat function, PBSO was, therefore, expected to bring UN operational actors together to contribute to the development of strategies in the countries on the PBC agenda and to their implementation.

Given these expectations and its limited resources, PBSO has been overstretched. PBSO has been principally occupied with the labour-intensive process of establishing and supporting PBC and PBF. It prepares substantive inputs for all the meetings of PBC, including analysis and mapping exercises for the preparation of IPBS and background briefings for the thematic and WGLL meetings. The number and frequency of these meetings has dramatically exceeded expectations. It meets in one form or another (OC, CSMs or WGLL) every second working day. This is arguably unsustainable (for PBSO and the members of PBC), especially if PBC is to cover additional countries. Furthermore, PBSO manages PBF with projects in some 15 countries, and provides policy research and guidance for strategic assessments and inputs into IMPP. In 2008, PBSO was also tasked with preparing the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (see next section).

PBSO also supports a fourth ‘virtual’ element of the Peacebuilding Architecture. This is designed to capture and disseminate best practices and improve institutional learning through electronic ‘discussions’ of the peacebuilding Community of Practice and through a web-based portal, the Peacebuilding Initiative. The community of practice draws together policy experts and practitioners from across the UN operational agencies and invites them to participate in moderated electronic debates on particular peacebuilding challenges. These are compiled into consolidated replies and

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86 For the first five months, PBSO included only three professionals and the Assistant Secretary-General as the process of seconding staff, re-allocating posts and hiring staff through the Galaxy system proved slow. Staff numbers have since increased with seven permanent, eight temporary and four seconded posts agreed for 2008–2009.
recommendations that are then made available to the UN as a whole. This means of consultation also assists PBSO in its work. For instance, it was used to consult UN practitioners on some of the key issues to be addressed in the Secretary-General’s report *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*. The web portal (www.peacebuildinginitiative.org)\(^{87}\) provides news, reviews and analyses of thematic issues of peacebuilding that are considered to be of relevance to policymakers and practitioners as well country-specific analysis of the countries on the PBC agenda.

The internal interagency coordination function rests with the office of the Assistant Secretary-General within PBSO. While this function has not been of interest to Member States and has not been a priority of the work of PBSO, in May 2007 the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee agreed on certain convening functions of PBSO after consulting with UN operational actors including DPA, DPKO, UNDP, UNDG, OCHA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. And, in 2008, PBSO set up a Senior Peacebuilding Group with representation from all the main UN operational actors and the World Bank with a view to improving the coordination of the UN peacebuilding responses. However, implementation and development of such interagency coordination has been slow for a number of reasons. First, PBSO did not proactively pursue it, given its limited resources and competing priorities. Second, it was not evident that all operational actors shared an interest in developing this role for PBSO. Although UNDP and UNDG have been encouraging, others have not (interview 69). Third, soon after PBSO had ‘staffed up’ and the first Assistant Secretary-General Carolyn McAskie had been replaced by Jane Holle Lute in 2008, Lute was recruited to work in the new US Administration, thus leaving a leadership vacuum. It remains unclear how PBSO will pursue its internal convening role.

### 6.3 A review of reviews

There have been a number of reviews of PBC by scholars and practitioners. This section aims to highlight some of their findings with a view to assessing to what extent

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87 The web portal is a project of the International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research with PBSO and the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research as partners.
the PBC has lived up to its mandate to sustain and improve the collective peacebuilding response.

6.3.1 Integrated strategies

The mandate of PBC provided in the 2005 resolutions appears unclear in relation to PBC role in promoting integrated strategies. The first point suggests that PBC plays a role in proposing integrated strategies for peacebuilding, and the second point states that PBC should play a supportive role in focusing attention on reconstruction and institution-building efforts and in the development of integrated strategies. Although these recommendations arguably point to different roles for PBC, in 2007 the PBC OC agreed that the focus of PBC country-specific work was to elaborate and agree to IPBS through its CSMs. This role has been and remains widely contested.

Although the EU was initially in support of the idea, a number of actors, including EU donors, are concerned that PBC, thereby, duplicates other processes without adding value. For example, while stressing that Germany strongly supports PBC, Dr Rudolf Fetzer from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development called for PBC to leave the preparation of country strategies to other organisations to avoid duplication (SEF News 2008). Similarly, one researcher (who later went on to work for PBSO) asked:

How could yet another strategic peacebuilding framework benefit a country such as Sierra Leone, which, with the support of the international community, already maintains a Poverty Reduction Strategy, a Medium Term Expenditure Framework and a Peace Consolidation Strategy? It would be difficult to name a candidate country for the PBC that does not already have similar home-grown, carefully developed plans in place. Local strategic planning exercises are a far better means of empowering local counterparts than efforts in New York, and such local exercises are likely to better analyse and reflect the core peacebuilding priorities of the country (Ponzio 2007: 10).

Several researchers, practitioners and, most significantly, representatives of recipient
states have echoed this concern. Reflecting on IPBS, a member of the High-level Panel that originally proposed the idea of PBC (United Nations 2004) noted that the panel had envisaged that the strategies would be developed in the field with additional support from New York. Yet, representatives of the Burundi and Sierra Leone governments have argued that the process has been New York centric and has not empowered local governments even if it intended to. Some also argued that ‘there is nothing in them that is not already in the Poverty Reduction Strategy’. This concern is shared by a number of researchers and practitioners (Picciotto 2005; McCandless 2008). More significantly, members of PBC and key UN actors, including PBSO, increasingly share the concern. For instance, the 2009 PBC retreat noted the need for immediate improvements (which do not require new legislative mandates), including ‘modified approaches to the purpose and scope of integrated strategies’ (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2009). Key recommendations also included the need to: (i) revisit the PBCs advisory role to become relevant to a larger number of countries; (ii) support the development of nationally owned and developed peacebuilding strategies based on in-country assessment and planning processes; and (iii) to develop instruments of engagement with countries on its agenda, drawing on existing in-country strategies and identifying areas of immediate priority action. In short, a number of recommendations that emerged from the PBC retreat stressed the need for PBC to engage with a greater number of countries in a variety of ‘lighter’ ways designed to support peacebuilding priorities identified by the countries. The case for supporting national efforts to develop peacebuilding strategies with the support of in-country UN leadership if necessary was also emphasised in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict that was prepared by PBSO. It stated that ‘in all cases the Commission should build on and enhance existing country level strategy setting processes where they exist, and ensure that its work is closely linked to and driven by the specific needs and priorities of the country on its agenda’ (United Nations 2009: paragraph 85). The thrust of the report’s argument is, therefore, at odds with a role for PBC in which it proposes and decides on country strategies in New York.

In conclusion, although all actors agree on the importance of fostering integrated and strategic approaches to peacebuilding, the role of PBC in developing integrated strategies is contested on the grounds that it does not empower national leadership.
adds little value to other strategic exercises and is too labour-intensive—with this approach PBC would be limited to addressing very few countries. This is also reflected in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report which argued that PBC should rather enhance its advisory role in ‘monitoring progress in the implementation of national peacebuilding strategies and recovery frameworks developed through common assessment and planning processes among national and international actors, and providing political support as necessary’ (United Nations 2009: paragraph 83). EU officials also suggest that they would welcome such a change. Some agree that strategies developed by PBC have added little to other pre-existing strategies, including World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategies and have questioned whether and when PBC should engage in a process of defining strategies (interviews 70).

6.3.2 Policy guidance and best practices

In its founding resolutions, PBC is simply mandated to ‘develop best practices’. As described above, this ambition has been pursued through WGLL meetings and thematic CSMs. PBSO staff have also provided policy input into the development of other UN strategic documents, including the civilian aspects of peacekeeping mission planning, and have stimulated reflection on key peacebuilding topics across the UN system through e-discussions of the peacebuilding community of practice. To date, therefore, the PBC architecture has served mainly to identify and explore key peacebuilding issues. This has no doubt had an educational role, particularly for members of PBC, but many argue that it is not sufficiently tailored to providing advice in relation to specific countries (for the Security Council or the countries on PBC agenda) or for developing policy guidance for UN operational actors. To improve the mainstreaming of peacebuilding at an operational level, some have recommended that PBSO work more closely with other best practices centres within the UN system, including the best practices section of DPKO, the policy section of UNDP–BCPR and the DPA Mediation Support Unit (Centre on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute 2008: 25).

Recommendations proposed at the 2009 PBC retreat on how to improve the PBC role in mainstreaming peacebuilding ranged from serving as a ‘knowledge depository’ to the development of policy guidance and recommendations on key peacebuilding
issues. The majority of recommendations, however, related to how PBC could make better use of this knowledge through a strengthened advisory role. This was also a key message in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report, which emphasised that PBC could provide the Security Council with ‘integrated peacebuilding perspective and specific suggestions for the Council’s own engagement with the country on its agenda’ (United Nations 2009: paragraph 24). This is intended to ensure that peacekeeping mandates include a peacebuilding perspective.

A number of officials have also argued that the agenda of WGLL should be geared toward addressing requests for advice from countries or to exploring strategic issues identified by the OC. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report also suggested that the PBC provide advice in relation to specific, more limited requests for assistance from countries, while local UN leadership should play a leading role in supporting national actors in identifying strategic priorities.

6.3.3 Resource mobilisation and sustained attention

The 2005 founding resolutions mandate PBC to ‘help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery’. Reviews of its work all agree that PBC has increased the attention of the international community, in general, and the Security Council, in particular, to the otherwise ‘forgotten countries’ on the PBC agenda. It has also sustained attention in the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone beyond the timeframe of the peacekeeping presence. However, as pressure for PBC to take on a wider range of countries increases, the issue of how and when to wind down, disengage or ‘graduate’ a country from the PBC agenda, while sustaining international attention, have come to the fore. These considerations have contributed to the widely shared view that the level of PBC attention must be scalable and compatible with existing monitoring and tracking mechanisms.

Independent reviews share the view that PBC has not delivered on its resource mobilisation mandate. There is some evidence that PBC engagement with countries on its agenda has led to increased resources from some of its members, notably Japan and Norway. PBC also played a role in ensuring that IMF funding was not delayed in
Burundi, as mentioned above. However, PBC has not resulted in revisions to existing donor aid programming practices or priorities. This, as chapter 3 shows, is also true of European Community assistance to the countries on the PBC agenda.

Although the PBC mandate specifically mentions resource mobilisation for early recovery, PBC has not addressed this issue, mainly because the first countries on its agenda were in the late recovery stage. Also, PBF was not initially mandated to fund early recovery efforts, although after the 2009 revision to its terms of reference, it will be able to in future. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report recommended that:

in the immediate aftermath of conflict a first quick release of [PBF] funds could be requested by the senior UN official in the country, working closely with national authorities, to catalyze concrete activities in an early integrated strategic framework, or its equivalent. A second allotment could be made available once a national peace consolidation and recovery framework has been established … to help bridge delays in donor disbursements (United Nations 2009: paragraph 75).

Thus, although PBF has only partially been used for early peacebuilding funding in countries that are not on the PBC agenda to date, there is agreement that it will be used for early recovery funding in the future. There is also broad support for the idea that the identification of priority action plans be conducted in-country, with PBF also used to support the build-up of government secretariat capacities and accountability mechanisms (steering committees) for this purpose.

Although the PBC has been associated with providing guidance for PBF, its role is now clearly separated from the management of PBF. Instead, the Secretary-General’s 2009 report recommended that PBC work with the General Assembly and ECOSOC to address the funding challenges that arise when conflict ends and calls for PBC to:

i) promote innovative approaches to mobilising resources in countries that receive inadequate attention;

ii) advance aid effectiveness and mutual accountability between donors and programme countries around national peacebuilding compacts and priorities;
and

iii) encourage donors to provide faster, more flexible and more risk tolerant funding to address the specific funding challenges and gaps that arise when conflict ends (United Nations 2009: paragraph 84).

These recommendations are consistent with other initiatives to address aid effectiveness in situations of fragility and conflict, including those developed within the framework of OECD DAC Working Group on Conflict and Fragility. They build on findings regarding the challenges in transitional financing that are widely acknowledged by donors and non-donors. The challenge for PBC will be in how it can generate additional political support for this reform agenda and mobilise non-traditional donors to provide assistance for early recovery efforts.

As indicated by the EC experience in chapter 3, the UN MDTF arrangements have proved useful for this purpose since they provide donors with an administratively light and relatively risk-averse means by which to provide assistance to fragile states. Their increased use will likely form part of the solution to the recognised challenges of early recovery funding and strategic coherence. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report argued for the establishment of in-country MDTFs, emphasising that:

evidence has shown that when resources are channelled through such funds, they can contribute significantly to predictability and coherence and facilitate alignment by directing funds toward a focused set of agreed priorities. If well supported, MDTFs and other pooled funds can be the muscle behind a common strategic approach (United Nations 2009: paragraph 78).

This is not to suggest that the record of MDTFs is entirely positive. In the past, MDTFs managed by the World Bank and UNDP have often been slow to release funds because of administrative and legal obstacles. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report recognised this, but argued that many of these obstacles have been addressed in the World Bank–UN Framework Agreement so that disbursement should be ‘fast’ and ‘smooth’ in the future. If PBC is to deliver on its early resource mobilisation, it will need to consider how it can engage with the broader aid effectiveness reform agenda and generate support for the establishment of country-specific MDTFs.
6.3.4 Coherence and coordination

The 2005 founding resolutions charge PBC with providing ‘recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN’. As identified in chapter 2, the challenge of coordinating all relevant actors within the UN when PBC is not formally linked to any of them is a formidable one. The first Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Carolyn McAskie, confirmed this. She noted in her review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture that when establishing the internal coordination mandate of PBSO ‘account was not fully taken of the extent to which bringing all the actors together around new approaches would take more than hiring a new conductor, especially when some of the players did not want roles in the orchestra’ (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office 2008b: 23). Reviews further suggested that there is still ‘no established pattern of working with DPKO, UNDP, the World Bank and other critical actors in helping to shape strategy or in monitoring implementation’ (Centre on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute 2008: 7).

PBC’s mandate is, in any case, unrealistically ambitious in relation to its internal coordination role. Given PBC’s institutional location and composition, it is clearly not designed to bring UN operational actors together, nor does it have the authority to direct them. Moreover, so long as the nature of the PBC advisory role is evolving and likely subject to change, it is difficult to identify the practical objectives of the PBSO’s internal convening function. As reviews of integrated approaches to peace operations have found, the form of cooperation should follow its function (Eide et al. 2008). Once the PBC advisory role becomes clearer, it will be easier to identify the added value to all actors of convening under the umbrella of PBC, the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee or the Inter-Agency Peacebuilding Contact Group. Recent reviews on the role of PBC are tellingly silent or unspecific on this issue. For

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88 Representation of UN operational actors in the PBC CSMS was unusually limited to two officials: the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support and the most senior UN representative in the field. Unlike in other UN intergovernmental bodies there was no official seat for every UN fund, programme or agency. This made it more difficult to engage relevant operational actors in New York (who could attend as observers) and helps explain why many agencies do not share a sense of responsibility for implementing the integrated strategies developed in CSMS.
instance, the 2009 PBC retreat recommended vaguely that PBC should ‘provide advice on how to improve in-country UN coordination’. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report reiterates the intention that PBC ‘promote greater coherence and synergies between the different parts of the UN system and other relevant actors outside the UN system’, but provides no guidance as to how this should be achieved. This indicates that PBC is not the right forum for country-specific, interagency coordination.

However, the objective of improving interagency coordination is being achieved in relation to another element of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture—that is, PBF, where the Inter-Agency Peacebuilding Contact Group has a clear role in reviewing priority plans for the use of PBF, in particular in countries where there is an effort to avoid duplication with ongoing or planned interventions. Should the role of PBF evolve as indicated above, this interagency role will likely evolve with it.

There are a number of other dimensions to the peacebuilding coherence challenge (Picciotto 2005: 13–14). Picciotto has broken down the coherence challenge into four dimensions: (i) internal coherence; (ii) whole-of-government coherence; (iii) donor coherence; and (iv) country-level coherence. In addition to addressing internal UN coherence as explored above, PBC has been mandated to improve horizontal coherence between external actors (donor coherence). Indeed, PBC was designed to bring together key external actors including institutional donors and its working level meetings typically include a number of other ‘relevant’ actors. Which additional external actors are invited to join its deliberations, evidently has and will depend on the case and purpose of the consultation. For example, if PBC identifies aid reform for peacebuilding as a strategic objective, coordination with OECD DAC will be required. Alternatively, if PBC identifies building peacebuilding capacity in regional actors as a priority, it should work with the relevant regional actors and donors, including the EC, that have funding mechanisms and policies in place to support capacity-building for peacebuilding at a regional level. If PBC takes on the role of developing policy guidance specifically in relation to institution- or state-building, for instance, it will need to work with a broad network of actors, both within and outside the UN, who are willing and able to support the initiative and to translate lessons learned into institutionally sanctioned practice. In short, the form of external coordination will also depend on its purpose and, given that PBC is an advisory body that brings together
sovereign actors, it will only work so long as all relevant actors perceive that the benefits of such cooperation outweigh the inevitable transaction costs involved.

The EU has been willing to invest significant resources, including the internal transaction costs of agreeing common positions and harnessing external expertise, in support of the work of PBC. This has had indirect benefits for the EU in New York, for instance, helping it forge constructive working relationships with non-donors. In addition, as described in chapter 2, EU engagement with the UN in the area of peacebuilding is backed by its development and foreign policies under the respective frameworks of aid effectiveness and effective multilateralism. This, coupled with the pragmatic realisation that the establishment of any new institutional arrangement takes time, explains the strong EU engagement in and support for PBC in New York. However, EC delegation staff in-county are less convinced of the benefits of EC engagement. One questioned ‘Tout ça pour ça?’ (All that for only that?) and argued that the added value of EC work in relation to improving the coherence of external interventions (in Burundi) did not justify the internal transaction costs associated with participating in it.

Another level of the peacebuilding coherence challenge, which PBC is confronted with but has little influence over, is the issue of national-level ‘whole-of-government’ coherence. One review of PBC noted that:

one of the persistent criticisms of PBC deliberations is that the major donors have at times been inconsistent in the policies promoted by New York and field representatives or that their political and development representatives in the field send contradictory messages regarding the PBC (Centre on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute 2008: 18).

The ability of PBC to achieve its coordination mandate is predicated on the ability of national actors to act coherently. Most member states recognise the importance of whole-of-government approaches to fragile states, but many have not yet made the necessary institutional investments to ensure consultation across development and foreign and defence ministries. This is true of many members of the EU and the EU itself. But PBC can do little about this; even when members can agree on broad
priorities within PBC, this does not in itself ensure coherence of action. For example, in the case of Guinea-Bissau it was widely recognised that one of the key peacebuilding priorities was SSR and EU positions were entirely consistent with PBC priorities on this. However, agreement on priority areas alone did not prevent what many perceived as duplication between the EC SSR intervention and the launch of the ESDP SSR mission shortly thereafter. Indeed, unless the strategic prioritisation within PSC is accompanied by internal whole-of-government and country-level efforts to promote coherence, they may, in fact, increase the likelihood of duplication in certain areas.

In summary, PBC is not institutionally well placed to fulfil its coordination mandate because it does not have the authority that centralised, hierarchical coordination would require. Nor does it necessarily have the legitimacy to pursue this role through persuasion in the eyes of the main UN operational actors or other donors who base their operational decisions on processes of consultation (with national actors), whom they view as equally if not more legitimate. The main institutional weaknesses of PBC in this respect are its location in New York and the fact that its membership does not necessarily reflect the principal ‘stakeholders’. In short, PBC arguably exacerbates the coherence challenge rather than reducing it, by adding yet another set of external actors to the ‘stakeholders’ that have a direct interest in a country’s political, social and economic development. At an operational level, it has also increased the coherence challenge for participating Member States (and institutional actors) by requiring a complex chain of consultations in-country, in capitals and in New York in order to agree on broad priorities that are not in themselves controversial and do not provide much guidance in relation to the critical questions of how best to address the broad priorities identified.

In conclusion, the reason why PBC struggles to achieve its coordination mandate is linked to the fact that it fails to meet the (EU) principle of subsidiarity. PBC does not meet at the appropriate level (or place) to make decisions regarding country priorities and how they should best be implemented. This is, in turn, an important argument for addressing the issue of prioritisation and coherence at the country-level through inclusive dialogue and negotiations. It is also a key reason for supporting the Secretary-General’s 2009 report, in which he argued precisely for this reorientation
and for additional support for national and UN in-country actors to drive sustainable peacebuilding processes. Given the importance of this report for the continuing evolution of the UN approach to peacebuilding, the next section provides a brief overview of the analysis and recommendations presented in it.

6.3.5 The Secretary-General’s report *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*

In 2009, the importance of addressing the coherence challenge at the country-level was recognised in the Secretary-General’s report on *Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*. The report stressed the operational imperative of national ownership, the fluidity of post-conflict contexts and the fragmented nature of UN and external operational capabilities. Indeed, it acknowledged that:

> the United Nations will always be one among many actors involved in efforts to support countries emerging from war and therefore relies on strong partnerships based on a clear comparative advantage. The World Bank is a critical strategic partner in the initial post-conflict period …. Regional and sub-regional organisations also have vital political, security and economic roles to play in the immediate aftermath of conflict. We must build on our nascent partnerships in the peacemaking, peacekeeping and development spheres to promote engagement of regional and sub-regional organisations in peacebuilding (United Nations 2009: paragraph 91).

However, unlike previous efforts to improve external coherence, including the establishment of the PBC, the report argues that these challenges are best tackled in-country. Consequently it proposed ‘an agenda for action’ around the central message that the UN needs to strengthen its *in-country* capacity to define priorities, together with national counterparts, and to align UN and international resources behind that strategy.

One of the core elements of this agenda is the need for ‘stronger and better-supported UN leadership teams on the ground’ (United Nations 2009: paragraph 30). These are seen as a prerequisite for generating UN coherence and also coherence beyond the UN.
They would seek ‘to bring together the senior leadership of the political, peacekeeping and development elements of the UN country presence, where relevant’ and would ‘be supported by analytical, planning and coordination capacities in the form of small unified teams of experts’. In order to empower in-country UN leadership with the authority to agree priorities and division of responsibilities, the report recognised that it must build up improved mechanisms for holding senior leadership to account. It recommended strengthened accountability to the Secretary-General along the lines of the ‘senior managers compacts’ that have been used for Under Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General at Headquarters. It also recommended that the UN integrated strategic framework be used as a mechanism for mutual accountability in which ‘the senior representative is held accountable for his or her performance by the system and at the same time he or she can hold each part of the system accountable for implementing agreed roles and activities’ (United Nations 2009: paragraph 38).

A core element of the agenda to promote more coherent action beyond the UN is the promotion of common assessment methodologies that provide a framework for a more rationalised approach to aid coordination, while also ‘situating local actors at the centre of the assessment process’. The PCNA methodology developed by the UN and World Bank and also used by the EC is cited as a positive example of such a methodology. It can be successively expanded and detailed over time, with ever greater national involvement, so that it provides the basis for a ‘compact’ or ‘framework’ that can be used by national and international actors in monitoring progress against commitments. This is an approach that the EC actively supports, a point that was made clear to the Secretary-General’s report drafting team.

Although the Secretary-General’s report argued that the UN should support the development of a national peace consolidation and recovery framework derived through the PCNA methodology, it also accepted that the UN IMPP would take place in parallel since both planning processes ‘follow different timelines and serve different purposes’. It argued that the UN leadership team should ‘ensure the strategic coherence and appropriate links between PCNA and the UN internal planning processes by maintaining an ongoing dialogue around a common vision with the key national, regional and international stakeholders’ (United Nations 2009: paragraph 43).
Nevertheless, this proved a hard sell to DPKO which is institutionally committed to achieving coherence through the IMPP (interviews 71).

This places the responsibility of ensuring external and internal coherence firmly with the UN in-country leadership. This is a tall order given their limited authority over mission planning. However, its chance of success is greater if IMPP builds on established, if provisional, operational programming priorities. The Secretary-General’s report also argued that local UN leadership, together with the World Bank, should work to identify immediate national priorities, using an early iteration of an integrated strategic framework where a UN mission is being planned.

The Secretary-General’s 2009 report argued that PBC has a critical role in championing the agenda outlined above. It will, for instance, be involved in developing an implementation plan for the report, including possible financial aspects. In addition, the report pointed to a number of ways PBC can serve as a champion for a peacebuilding agenda with key actors. It argued that it develop its advisory role in relation to the Security Council, support ongoing efforts to promote coherence within and beyond the UN, and promote aid reform among key donors. In relation to its engagement with specific countries, its main function would be to monitor progress in implementing national peacebuilding strategies or frameworks. Although it would no longer have a role in developing strategies, it would play an important role in helping to hold all parties (within and outside the UN) to account for the commitments they have made.

Although evidence suggests that the PBC is not configured to ensure operational coherence, the experience of the PBC to date nevertheless suggests that it has the potential to play an important political role in monitoring and providing political support for peace consolidation processes. There are instances where a PBC chair has brokered the release of IMF funds and influenced national leaders. Indeed, in this respect the PBC may prove to be a victim of its own success as a significant political actor. Although a number of countries had expressed an interest in being on the PBC agenda (e.g. Haiti, Liberia, Nepal), none have introduced a formal request and UN officials speculate that this is in part because of concerns about the additional political pressures that this will place on them (interviews 72).
6.4 Conclusions

The establishment of the PBC is evidence of the widely-held assumption that procedural mechanisms for coordination present a rational strategy for managing interdependence between diverse security, political and development interventions. Moreover, the decision by member states to mandate the PBC to develop integrated strategies, promote coordination, mobilise resources and develop expertise is entirely consistent with principal-agent analysis of why states delegate to international organisations. Principal-agent scholars argue that states delegate to international organisations to bolster their credibility in the international community and with domestic publics, to develop expert knowledge, and to cope with disputes and problems of collective decision-making (Pollack 2006; Lake and McCubbins 2006). This chapter provides empirical support for this rationalist account of why states establish new institutions.

However, it also reveals that the PBC has not, in practice, lived up to these expectations. In response to the question has the PBC successfully addressed the external coordination challenge in peacebuilding? this chapter demonstrates that the PBC does not have the authority or proximity to operational UN actors to ensure coherence of the UN system. Nor does the evidence suggest that peacebuilding strategies developed by PBC have served to guide the actions of other external actors, including the EU. Rather, PBC has introduced another complicating layer in efforts to promote coherence through integrated strategies, and one which is more easily embroiled in the politics of global governance played out in New York than in the domestic politics of peacebuilding. Moreover, it finds that PBC is not the most appropriate forum to tackle the governance challenge associated with the coordination of ‘sovereign’ external peacebuilding actors in relation to country-specific interventions. Rather, the analysis of the coherence challenge in this chapter is consistent with the recommendations made in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report that peacebuilding strategies should be anchored ‘in-country’ where their development forms part of the peace consolidation process.
This, in turn, informs the negative response to the question *has EU engagement in the UN’s peacebuilding architecture promoted EU-UN policy alignment and operational cooperation?* The empirical record shows that the EU engagement in the PBC has not promoted operational coherence or even policy alignment, given different planning time-lines and procedures. Nevertheless, although the PBC has not delivered operational coordination, the EU experience of participating in the PBC has provided a number of important opportunities to strengthen policy-level cooperation with other PBC members. Officials testify that after a fractious start, working level discussions have enhanced EU visibility in policy debates and provided opportunities for constructive dialogue across the OECD-G77 divide. EU engagement in the PBC is therefore politically useful for the EU even if it does not deliver operational coherence or cooperation.

Moreover, the PBC offers a relatively (for the UN) institutionally neutral forum in which to review past practice and forge common understanding of key challenges. PBC and PBSO legitimacy and institutional incentives are linked to providing impartial advice and they have the potential to play a critical role in bringing evidence into peacebuilding discourse and policy development within and beyond the UN. Strengthening EU engagement with the UN on peacebuilding practice, including through active engagement in PBC, therefore, also offers an important opportunity for learning for the EU. Within the EU learning tends to take place informally, through networks of practice and cooperation, especially in the context of the development of OECD DAC policy guidance (for development actors) or NATO doctrine (for security actors). Yet, despite the fact that the UN is a leading operational actor in peacebuilding, opportunities and resources for EU engagement with UN networks for policy development have been limited. EU engagement in PBC deliberations therefore serves as an important complement to policy making within security alliances or donor groupings.

In response to the question *is the alternative in-country approach to improving external coherence a more promising one?* I suggest that it is. I argue that the value of the Secretary-General’s proposal to move assessments, planning, priority setting and resource allocation to the country concerned, and to negotiate strategies for peacebuilding upon them, is not based on evidence that this produces the ‘best’ results.
Rather, the argument is that strategies based on common needs assessments and dialogue, with mechanisms for national and international actors to hold each other to account, are likely to be more politically workable and sustainable than strategies developed externally. In other words, in the absence of clear evidence about what works, it is better that the process of identifying priorities be informed by local perceptions of need and local politics than driven by supply-side interests and unexamined assumptions. Given that the EU is also a fragmented institutional actor, this analysis is also applicable to the EU’s approach to addressing the internal and external coherence challenge. I have argued elsewhere (Gourlay 2009, 2010) that the mixed UN experience in attempting to address the coherence challenge from the top down, and recent UN support for a bottom-up approach, is relevant to the EU. The post-Lisbon Treaty reform agenda, including the establishment of the European External Action Service, also provides a clear window of opportunity to strengthen EU in-country capacity to engage in collective priority setting processes for national capacity building.
Chapter 7. Conclusions

7. Introduction

The EU and UN both share a mandate to promote peace and development and both have stated an interest in promoting ‘effective multilateralism’. Since the end of the Cold War both organisations have also promoted improved coordination and cooperation, claiming that their relationship is mutually reinforcing. Both have also invested in new institutional mechanisms for this purpose, notably the UN-EU Steering Committee on Crisis Management and the UN Peacebuilding Commission. These policies and institutional innovations have been predicated on the assumptions that institutional objectives are aligned, and that improved mechanisms for information sharing will lead to improved operational cooperation and better outcomes. Implicitly, EU and UN policies also assume that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs and that the practical challenges of cooperation are not prohibitively high.

The empirical research carried out for this thesis has been designed to test these policy assumptions. In doing so it aims, firstly, to contribute to the broader debate over whether the UN and regional actors actually support each other or come into conflict. Secondly, it aims to contribute to theoretical debates regarding the conditions under which cooperation between International Organisations (IOs) is likely. And thirdly, it aims to contribute to the debate over ‘the coordination challenge’ in peacebuilding, by demonstrating how IOs have contributed to framing the issue and structuring the international response in ways that are potentially unhelpful or even self-defeating.

The empirical research examines the evolution of policy and the record of operational cooperation. This is informed by a constructivist methodological approach that attempts to unpack organisational interests in cooperation and explain differences between policy and practice. Rather than assume that IO interests are in line with the material interests of their most powerful states, or that they are only interested in providing services that states find useful, IOs are treated as a social fact to be investigated. Theoretically, this allows for IO interests to be shaped by the normative environment beyond their member states. It also allows for institutional interests to be
shaped by internal factors, such as intra-organisational bureaucratic politics or professional norms. In other words, it also explores the role of institutional personality in explaining IO behaviour. This does not pre-judge the importance of material or normative factors. Rather, it allows that both might be significant, depending on the context. The case made in the introductory chapter for deploying a constructivist approach therefore rests on its analytical potential. In short, through intensive empirical study a constructivist approach should be able to shed light on which factors cause which effects under which conditions.

By way of introduction, in chapter one I examine the evolution of the peacebuilding policy environment. This aims to establish the extent to which policy has been shaped by institutional learning based on empirical operational feedback and why such prominence has been given to the ‘peacebuilding coordination challenge’ within official debate. I establish that peacebuilding is increasingly characterised by uncertainty, operational dilemmas and contest over operational goals and approach. While there is broad consensus on the aspirational goals of promoting security, good governance and development, there is little understanding of what actually works and why. Given the mixed record of peacebuilding, some argue that international engagement has not been robust enough to build the capacity of the state and promote reform through pressure on national elites in line with a crisis management approach to peacebuilding. Others question the sustainability of this approach and stress the inherently limited role that external actors can play in transforming state–society relations. In this view, peacebuilding is a transformative process in which external actors can only play a modest role in addressing structural risk factors, and supporting processes of change. Although some policy makers and scholars argue for an approach that combines a top-down crisis management approach, which aims to maximise external leverage for reform with a long-term, bottom-up approach that aims to support transformative processes and address root causes, there is no consensus on how short-term and long-term strategies should be combined. In short, peacebuilding is characterised by uncertainty and substantial differences in approach, and there is no evidence-based guidance for what coherent or coordinated peacebuilding should look like in practice.

Not only is there no clear evidence regarding which approaches work best and how
different approaches should be combined, the peacebuilding literature review confirms that peacebuilding is subject to political contest within organisations and member states. This, in turn, suggests that the chances of achieving agreement over substantive policy goals and strategies through procedural mechanisms of coordination are slim. The fact that external actors have different objectives and employ different strategies to achieve them also suggests that not all actors will be interested in achieving a lean, coordinated approach. Rather they will have interests in different forms of coordination and cooperation. For example, security and political actors typically favour hierarchical or ‘integrated’ responses to the coordination challenge in so far as it serves to promote ‘unity of effort’ and maximise leverage over national elites. In contrast, development actors tend to favour a more experimental approach to peacebuilding that values relationships with a range of local actors over close association with other external actors. In line with this operational approach external coordination is not essential for operational effectiveness, although information-sharing offers potential efficiency gains and can contribute to organisational learning. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that a significant number of UN member states from the Global South are increasingly sceptical of prescriptive peacebuilding and state-building agendas. This further highlights the politically contested nature of peacebuilding and casts doubt about whether external coherence can be achieved through procedural mechanisms of coordination.

The peacebuilding literature review also casts doubt over the policy assumption that coherent, coordinated external action will produce better results. Not only does it show that this will depend on the operational approach to peacebuilding, but it also highlights the trade-offs between the goal of external coordination and other policy goals. Most notably there is a potential trade-off between external coordination and local ownership. This is an important concern given that one of the most common criticisms of external interventions is that they are ineffective because they are not sufficiently attuned to local political context and are not sustainable because they have been imposed rather than developed together with local actors. Similarly, close external coordination has the potential to stifle innovation, experimentation and flexibility. I argue that these concerns are pertinent given that peacebuilding contexts are highly dynamic and are characterised by profound uncertainty over what works and whom to work with. In these situations, experimental, adaptable approaches are
equally if not more appropriate than lean coordinated strategies. Moreover, where the
dynamics of conflict are typically non-linear (OECD DAC 2009), it appears
incongruous to promote closely coordinated linear intervention strategies. This is
further supported by assessments of the ‘cumulative impact’ of external interventions
that found ‘a redundancy that was helpful—duplication that facilitated progress rather
than waste’ (Collaborative for Development Action 2008: 6). There is, therefore, some
evidence to support the suggestion that in highly dynamic environments, the
interventions that do well have multiple ways of responding to changes in the system,
and some degree of overlap and duplication is thus actually healthy in these systems.

So why do governments and IOs strive for external coherence when there is no
evidence that political differences can be overcome through procedural coordination
or that it will produce better results? I posit that an important part of the explanation
lies in the assumptions and norms that provide rational-legal bureaucracies, including
international bureaucracies, with the power to shape issues and structure international
responses to them. Drawing on sociological institutionalism, I suggest that it can in
part be explained by a habitual bureaucratic response to complexity and uncertainty. I
also suggest that it is in the interests of IOs to highlight the issue coordination as an
apolitical problem of collective action, given that their power and authority rests on
assumptions that they are uniquely qualified to address such problems. Indeed, I
suggest that whether or not institutionalist assumptions about the ability of IOs to
solve problems of collective action are based on empirical evidence, they nevertheless
shape state and IO behaviour. In other words they serve as norms. The focus on
coordination, on this view, is a ‘normal’ and rational strategy for managing
interdependence between diverse actors and their interventions. In short, I suggest that
IOs have a normative bias towards coordination and cooperation. This does not,
however, necessarily reflect their material interests, nor is it based on empirical
evidence that cooperation is actually rational and utility-maximising in peacebuilding
contexts.

This analysis of the coordination challenge in peacebuilding informs the hypothesis
that IO normative interests in coordination and cooperation are not necessarily aligned
with material interests. Where both are aligned, strong operational cooperation is
likely. Where normative interests are not matched by material incentives, cooperation
is likely to be symbolic rather than operational. Moreover, the analysis of the peacebuilding literature suggests that those whom institutions are interested in cooperating with and the form of that cooperation will depend on agency-specific norms and operational approach. This in turn informs the hypothesis that inter-institutional cooperation is more likely between development and security actors that use similar intervention logics. In short, even if the EU and UN share a normative interest in coordination and cooperation, organisational interests in cooperation will not necessarily be aligned because of competition between the EU and UN for resources and intra-organisational competition related to how to address the challenges of peacebuilding.

7.1 Conclusions from empirical studies and answers to research questions

Chapter 2: Policy trends and the EU–UN Peacebuilding Partnership

The research agenda developed to test the hypothesis begins by identifying the principal institutional actors in the EU and UN that are active in the area of peacebuilding and explaining how their concepts, policies and practices of peacebuilding have evolved. This tests for normative alignment between EU and UN actors and informs the analysis of their material and normative interests in cooperation. Chapter two therefore addresses the question Are EU and UN peacebuilding policies coherent? by tracing the evolution of EU and UN policies and explaining why different organisational actors within the EU and UN have different conceptions of what peacebuilding involves.

Although the term ‘peacebuilding’ entered the public usage through the UN, I show that the UN departments and agencies with the greatest operational engagement in this area—notably the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA)—have chosen to develop distinct concepts to describe their operational engagements in line with their core security, development and political mandates. I argue that internal intra-institutional competition has contributed to conceptual proliferation and diversity of approach, which, in turn, explains why DPKO, UNDP and DPA do not agree on what peacebuilding involves at the operational level, nor on how to ensure coherence
of the UN peacebuilding effort. The history of intra-institutional competition also attests to the material basis of institutional power. For example, while DPA was designated the focal point for peacebuilding within the UN in 1997, in practice it lost out to both DPKO and UNDP who successfully mobilised member state resources to practice peacebuilding, albeit under different names. In the case of DPKO, this led to multi-dimensional peace operations, the expanded scope of mission mandates and the inclusion of ‘civilian post-conflict capacities’ within mission personnel. This transformation was called for in the 2000 Brahimi report (United Nations 2000) with the argument that peacekeeping missions had to spend money to save money. In other words they had to lay the foundations for peacebuilding as part of their exit strategy. This worked: member states have agreed to expanded mission mandates and budgets since 2000. On the basis of its increased operational capability, in 2002 DPKO won the subsequent turf battle with DPA on who should lead missions with a political peacebuilding dimension. Although DPA argued that it had both mandate and capacity (since it had been operating a number of Peacebuilding Support Offices PBSOs) it was decided that that DPA would only lead purely civilian/political missions. Moreover, DPA also lost ground to UNDP. In affected countries, PBSOs effectively competed with UNDP country offices for donor programme funding, and while the Secretary-General had requested that DPA capacity for peacebuilding be reinforced, member states did not agree, choosing instead to rapidly increase the funding for a dedicated ‘Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery’ within UNDP. This explains why peacebuilding and state-building activities now take place either within a security or development conceptual framework. And while DPA continues to play a role, notably in mediation support, its operational role has shrunk with a reduced number of purely political missions. Rather, working together with UNDP, DPA places Peace and Development Advisors to support the political content of the leadership of UN country teams. In short, the interplay of internal bureaucratic politics with the local politics of peace interventions account for why ‘security-first’ and ‘development-first’ approaches to peacebuilding have been privileged over overtly political interventions.

The analysis of the internal cooperation challenge in the UN context highlights the important role of member states and UN leadership in promoting coherence through an integration agenda. I argue that this was based on assumptions – in line with the crisis management approach to peacebuilding – that an integrated approach would be
more effective and efficient. Efforts to promote coherence include the Integrated Approach to planning and managing peace missions, pooled funding mechanisms in the ‘Delivering as One’ reforms, and the identification of ‘lead agencies’ in specific sectors relevant to peacebuilding.89 Yet the difficulties in implementing these integration reforms attest to the fundamental differences in objectives and approach that operational actors employ. Thus while member states and successive Secretary-Generals have shared the ambition to promote a hierarchical organisational response to the challenge of coherence within the UN, these have been resisted not only in order in order to protect institutional turf, but also because of operational incompatibilities linked to different intervention logics. This provides evidence that organisational fragmentation, personality and norms are a significant constraining factor in efforts to promote top-down coordination within the UN. Significantly, the Secretary-General’s 2009 reform agenda Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict broke with the tradition of promoting coherence through top-down integration. Rather, it argued for the coherence challenge to be tackled from the bottom up, in the affected countries, through joint needs analysis involving local actors. The (implicit) argument in this report is that addressing the external coherence in-country is more consistent with objective of promoting effective partnerships with other external actors as well as (progressively) building local capacity and promoting local ownership. In other words, while UN member states and the UN leadership drove institutional reforms to promote coherence through internal integration, recent reflections have implicitly recognised the trade-offs with operational demands for flexibility and local capacity building. They have therefore generated calls for forms of cooperation that are more consistent with the interests and normative approach of development actors.

The analysis of the evolution of EU approaches to peacebuilding show that, as in the UN, there is no common interpretation of what peacebuilding involves. For instance, the EU European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) engagements are not typically defined in terms of peacebuilding although crisis management interventions, including

89 Moreover, although the UN institutional Peacebuilding Architecture created after 2005 was also intended to address the internal coherence challenge, it was not configured to do so; UN operational actors were not involved in the deliberations of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office had no authority over them.
civilian missions designed to strengthen state police and justice capacities, are considered prerequisites for consolidating peace. Within the European Commission (EC), peacebuilding has been conceptually associated with conflict prevention and the objective of promoting ‘structural stability’ by addressing the root causes of conflict. It involves long- and short-term assistance to address key risk factors related to governance, state capacity, natural resource management, and includes support for dialogue and mediation processes. EC conflict prevention policy frameworks have, however, been reframed in terms of the development objectives of promoting aid effectiveness in fragile states. I argue that this can be explained by external and intra-institutional factors. The external normative environment in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US played a role in shifting priorities within the EC – resulting in a reduction of human resources for conflict prevention – while intra-organisational turf wars between the Council and Commission problematised the issue area, increasing Commission incentives to re-frame its activities. More specifically, I show that the conceptual terrain of conflict prevention became subject to competition and contest after the Commission took the Council to court over an issue of institutional competence in the area of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2005. Following this, the Council took a hard line, limiting the scope of Commission competence during debates on new financial instruments. This resulted in all mention of conflict prevention being dropped from the development financial instruments, with the result that only the relatively small Instrument for Stability had an explicit mandate to address conflict prevention and peacebuilding. I therefore argue that the Commission’s re-framing of the conflict prevention debate in terms of aid effectiveness was not driven by member states. Rather, it was a tactical move by the Commission (albeit supported by some member states) to shield this agenda from internal turf wars by embedding it in an established development framework.

I conclude that for both the EU and UN institutional fragmentation and competition has led to conceptual diversity and confusion. In the absence of clear evidence-based policy guidance, organisational approaches to peacebuilding have been based on unexamined assumptions and organisational mandates rather than ‘best practices’ supported by empirical analysis. This helps explain why the use of the umbrella term ‘peacebuilding’ in the UN context is not associated with any operational practice or actor. Rather, it is associated with the challenge of improving system-wide efforts to
consolidate peace. The history of UN efforts to promote coherent peacebuilding interventions demonstrates the importance of normative assumptions that problems of collective international action should be dealt with through delegation to IOs and that internal coordination and cooperation is best promoted through hierarchical forms of organisation. Yet the peacebuilding record highlights that these assumptions can come into conflict with operational demands for flexible, locally-responsive leadership and the integration of external efforts in local peace processes.

In contrast with the UN, within the EU there has been no effort to reconcile the security-led and development-led approaches to peacebuilding through institutional integration. Indeed, the term peacebuilding is problematic in the EU context, precisely because it spans the development-security divide. Rather, in the pre-Lisbon Treaty context, the politics of EU integration served to reinforce the cleavage between development and security approaches to peacebuilding. Moreover, while the EC played an important normative leadership role in recognising the inter-dependence between security and development in the late 1990s and in promoting a development-led conflict prevention agenda, this has been marginalised as a result of member state focus on the build-up of EU crisis management capacities (including for civilian missions) since 2001. Inter-institutional competition has also contributed to the EC re-framing its conflict prevention work in terms of good governance or aid effectiveness in situations of fragility. This helps explain the limited use of the term peacebuilding in the EU context – even as both the Council and the Commission became increasingly active in fragile contexts.

In so far as peacebuilding is interpreted differently by EU and UN actors, it follows that EU and UN conceptual and policy frameworks are not obviously coherent. Nevertheless, I argue that, in practice, the EU and UN employ similar approaches to peacebuilding. They both seek to marry a top-down crisis management approach led by security and political actors with a bottom-up approach that uses aid to transform state–society relationships and promote structural stability. More specifically, DPKO and the Council Secretariat share a crisis management approach to peacebuilding, while UNDP and the Commission share an approach that is synonymous with conflict prevention, and seek to build peace by addressing structural risk factors. The finding that there is operational alignment between UN and EU security and development
actors, in turn, suggests that practical and normative barriers to cooperation should be less significant between these actors.

Conversely, the significant differences in operational approach between development and security actors highlights the difficulties in reaching agreement, both within organisations and between them on how these distinct approaches should be combined. While crisis management actors favour strategic coherence through integration of the external effort, development actors hold that the key to promoting a sufficient level of external coherence is the conduct of common needs assessments and the agreement – with national actors – of common matrices or ‘compacts’. These serve as a strategic framework and are designed to enable mutual accountability of the collective (national and international) peacebuilding effort. Thus, in line with their distinct intervention logics, decisions regarding operational cooperation take place in different places between different constellations of actors. While decisions regarding cooperation between security actors take place at headquarters and capitals and involve direct negotiation between the political leadership of the intervening actors, the entry point for cooperation between development actors is the country level, where needs assessments and poverty reduction strategies are elaborated and negotiated with national governments.

The empirical analysis of the evolution of peacebuilding concepts and operational approaches within the UN and EU, therefore confirms that development-led and security-led approaches to peacebuilding are organised in fundamentally different ways, with different objectives, theories of change, time-lines and external coordination ‘requirements’. This suggests that, in practice, peacebuilding will remain characterised by operational and conceptual competition between development and security actors both within and between the EU and UN. In addition it suggests that efforts to address the coherence challenge are also likely to be contested, with different types of actors preferring different forms of coordination. It follows that forms of institutional coordination and cooperation between the EU an UN are likely to be more developed between actors that share the same approach.

*Chapter 3: The EC–UN Peacebuilding Partnership*

In line with this hypothesis, I test for material and normative interests in cooperation
between EU and UN development and security actors in chapters three and four respectively. The focus on the EC’s funding relationship with the UN in chapter three is also justified on the basis that it is the principal indicator of the strength of the EU-UN operational partnership in the area of development assistance. It also highlights the material interests that the UN and EU have in operational cooperation. In relation to the EC-UN partnership it is obvious that the material relationship is not symmetrical. Rather, for the UN operational agencies that are funded by states on a voluntary basis, the EC is officially considered is an ‘institutional donor’ while UN agencies, funds and programmes are seen by the EC as potential ‘implementing partners’ that compete with other IOs, NGOs (and each other) for valuable EC contracts.

I first test whether EC support in fragile situations has increased in absolute terms, whether the proportion of channeled through the UN has increased, and whether the proportion of EC assistance channeled through the UN is particularly significant in fragile ‘peacebuilding’ contexts. This aims to identify trends in the operational partnership between the EC and UN development actors in peacebuilding contexts. Second, I track funding trends in relation to specific fragile states – including the five that receive the highest volume of EC aid and the four countries on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This quantitative analysis aims to provide insights into which factors are particularly significant in determining the strength of the EC-UN funding relationship. The quantitative analysis is augmented with qualitative analysis of key operational challenges for the EC in supporting peacebuilding in fragile contexts in general and in working with the UN in particular.

By way of introduction, I review the literature regarding global trends and challenges in funding for fragile states. I note that there has been a gradual rise in Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding for fragile states, excluding debt relief, but that this is not distributed on the basis of the greatest need or likely poverty-reduction impact. A relatively small number of states receive a disproportionately large amount of the funding, while others remain ‘aid orphans’. This, I contend, can be explained by the influence of political bias as well as the inherent organisational difficulties associated with efficient aid disbursement in situations of fragility. Donor agencies, and their member state – ‘principals’, value aid disbursement efficiency. This translates into organisational incentive structures that reward high-volume, risk-averse
interventions. These are, however, not easily achieved in fragile situations that typically require high levels of supervision, local expertise, and political acumen to maintain relationships with partner governments while tackling political obstacles.

The review of the available data on EC funding for fragile states confirms that the EC funding commitments broadly reflect global trends, with a small number of fragile states receiving a large proportion of EC funding. It also confirms increased policy and financial commitments to good governance and state-building. Nevertheless, EC funding for governance is higher in ‘normal’ development contexts and concentrated in relatively few fragile states. Based on qualitative empirical analysis, I argue that organisational incentives related to the evolving EC identity as an aid disbursement agency explain why the EC capacity to support governance programming remains limited. More specifically, reforms to improve aid disbursement efficiency and the process of EC devolution have reduced institutional incentives and capacity to engage in politically sensitive programming and have increased the fragmentation of substantive expertise in Brussels between the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX), Directorate-General for Development (DG DEV) and EuropeAid. Disbursement pressures, risk aversion and substantive capacity shortfalls have, by the same token, increased EC incentives to use budget support and multi-donor funding instruments in fragile situations. I argue that these pressures translate into positive incentives to channel funding through the UN in fragile situations so as to minimise reputational risk while maintaining institutional credibility as an administratively efficient donor. Thus the qualitative analysis of material incentives for EC funding decisions suggest that the EC has an interest in ‘outsourcing’ aid disbursement or in channeling aid through the UN because of internal factors linked to its organisational identity as an efficient aid-disbursement organisation, its limited capacity for politically sensitive programming, and its concerns over reputational risk.

An important empirical test of whether the EC-UN operational relationship has grown stronger since 2001 is whether the EC has increased its support for UN peacebuilding efforts in absolute terms and proportionately, relative to its funding channeled through other actors.

I provide evidence, in section 3.3, that the volume and proportion of EC assistance
channeled through the UN increased from 2001 to 2006. From 2002 to 2006 the volume of aid channeled through the UN quadrupled from some €257 million in 2002 to over €1 billion in 2006. Moreover, the proportion of assistance channeled through the UN increased from 4.3% to 12.6% during this period. This suggests that the UN has become an increasingly significant operational partner for the EC. Moreover, the countries in which the largest volume of EC funding has been channeled through the UN are Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and the West Bank and Gaza. EC funding for the UN has, therefore, increased especially in fragile or post-conflict situations. From 2001 to 2006, over 55% of funds contracted by the EC to UN bodies were in fragile states, with Afghanistan, Iraq and the West Bank and Gaza collectively receiving a third of the total. These trends are further confirmed, in section 3.4.1, in a review of data on EC funding for peacebuilding. It finds that EC spending for peacebuilding increased from less than €100 million in 2001 to over €1 billion in 2007, declining to €745 million in 2008. As with global ODA trends for assistance in fragile states, the bulk of peacebuilding assistance went to a few fragile countries. Of the total EC funding on peacebuilding, 37% (€2.2 billion) was contracted to the UN, confirming that the UN is a key operational partner for the EC in peacebuilding.

To further identify which factors are important in determining EC operational cooperation with the UN in fragile situations, I examine, in section 3.4.2, the EC–UN funding partnership in relation to nine countries: the top five recipients of peacebuilding assistance (West Bank and Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and the four countries on the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) agenda (Burundi, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau). I find that in Afghanistan and Iraq, most EC assistance was channeled through the UN due to the UN management of Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, too, most EC assistance (for the 2006 election) was administered by UNDP. In the West Bank and Gaza, EC funding for United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) remained constant, while increases in assistance after 2006 were largely channeled directly to the Palestinian Authority or the Temporary International Mechanism. In Sudan, very little EC assistance was channeled through the UN, and the vast majority was used to support the African Union Mission in the Sudan directly. In contrast, in the
four countries on the PBC agenda, the volume of EC aid identified as peacebuilding assistance was far lower and a relatively small proportion of it was channeled through the UN. This was mostly linked to election support implemented by UNDP. In short, in early recovery phases where the use of MDTFs is common or where the UN has been asked by the host country to play a central role, the choice of the UN as an implementing partner for the EC has been automatic. But in other cases, the EC–UN partnership is context and sector specific. Operational cooperation is consistently strong in relation to elections, for example, but in other thematic areas the strength of the operational partnership depends on relative operational capacity of the UN compared with other implementing partners, and on the political standing of the UN in the country.

The analysis of these findings suggests that in addition to internal EC interests linked to risk aversion and limited internal capacity, EC interests in channeling funding through the UN in fragile situations is also linked to the fact that the UN is often the only actor with the capacity, legitimacy and mandate to deliver international assistance. This suggests that the institutional personality and credibility matters a great deal in decisions regarding whom to work with in fragile contexts. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the agreement in 2003 of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) effectively lowered the administrative costs of cooperation for the EC and is an important factor in explaining the general rise in EC funding through the UN. This confirms that administrative ‘fit’ is also a significant factor in operational cooperation. Furthermore, the role of the UN in administering MDTFs means that the EC effectively outsources its aid disbursement function to the UN in situations where MDTFs are in place.

In short, the analysis of EC development funding trends confirms that EC interests in partnering with the UN in fragile situations are underpinned by internal organisational pressures for risk-averse and efficient aid disbursement coupled with UN’s unrivalled organisational credibility and capacity in many fragile contexts. Nevertheless, interviews reveal persistent operational frictions between EC and UN partners that stem from different perceptions of the nature of the partnership and different organisational cultures and administrative practices. These have formed stereotypes of the EC as an overly demanding and interfering donor and of the UN as an unreliable
implementing partner that is not interested in involving the EC in strategic decision-mak ing in line with FAFA co-management provisions. This, in turn, confirms that the partnership is primarily viewed, especially by the UN, in terms of funding, and suggests that it is not necessarily based on policy alignment. In other words, the empirical evidence supports the suggestion that both the EC and UN development actors share a material interest in operational cooperation and that adjustment of administrative practices have further reduced the costs of cooperation for the EC, but it provides little evidence to suggest that in-country operational cooperation is predicated on shared norms or the alignment of institutional policy objectives.

While the above analysis focused on funding trends from the long-term EC development financial instruments, in section 3.5, I analysed how the EC Instrument for Stability (IFS)—the principal EC funding instrument for short-term crisis prevention and recovery actions—has been used to support UN peacebuilding. This is a relatively new instrument (established in 2007) and by EC standards is relatively small with a budget of around €120 million per year. But over 40% of it has been channeled through the UN in 2007 and 2008 for a range of post-conflict actions. Unlike the long-term EC financial instruments for development that are administered by DG Development and EuropeAid, the IFS is administered by the External Relations DG (RELEX A2). It and has been extensively used to complement EU and UN crisis management missions with assistance aimed at helping establish the rule of law and promote Security Sector Reform (SSR) in post-conflict situations. Indeed, although DPKO/DPA missions are normally wholly funded from UN assessed contributions, a significant proportion of IFS funding for the UN was channeled to DPKO or DPA (36% in 2007 and 19% in 2008). This deviation from the norm of supporting only UN development actors appears to run counter to the hypothesis that institutional personality and norms determine whom institutional actors will cooperate with. However, the fact that funding decisions are made within DG RELEX and are, de facto, subject to approval by the inter-governmental crisis management decision-making body, the Political and Security Committee, suggests that funding decisions are in line with the hybrid mandate and nature of the instrument – designed to provide short-term support to a variety of responses to crisis, including those designed and implemented by EU and UN security actors. On closer reflection, therefore, funding patterns do not contradict the hypothesis that normative operational alignment is a
necessary pre-requisite for operational cooperation.

To conclude, the empirical analysis of EC funding channeled through the UN in peacebuilding contexts confirms that both institutional actors have a material interest in cooperation. The interests of the UN agencies clearly stem from their status as voluntarily funded organisations, while EC interests are linked to its identity as an aid disbursement agency, its limited capacity for programming in difficult or fragile peacebuilding contexts, its risk aversion and the UN’s unrivalled capacity and legitimacy as an ‘implementing partner’ in these contexts. The empirical evidence is, however, less conclusive on the role of norms in influencing EC funding decisions. There are no obvious counter examples or trends to the hypothesis that operational cooperation is predicated on normative alignment. Indeed, the relatively high proportion of funding for UN security actors from the EC Instrument for Stability suggests that normative and operational orientation is significant in determining who to work with. Nevertheless, the analysis of EC funding trends is not detailed enough to comment on whether operational cooperation occurred in the context of close normative or policy alignment. While anecdotal evidence based on interviews suggests that this was not always the case, it is not sufficient to draw conclusions about the relative (un)importance of operational normative alignment in determining operational partnerships. This suggests that further empirical research is needed to explain how normative and material factors shaped specific funding decisions.

Chapter 4: EU-UN Cooperation between security actors
In chapter four I investigate whether the EU-UN peacebuilding relationship in the context of the civilian dimensions of crisis management operations – which have state-building objectives – is mutually reinforcing or conflictive. Although both organisations have made policy declarations underlining their strategic interest in greater cooperation based on a rationale of burden sharing, I test their underlying assumption that increased regional action leads to increased capacities in the international system (see section 1.1). More specifically, in section 4.1, I test whether civilian ESDP does indeed contribute to burden sharing through the quantitative analysis of international civilian deployments. This aims to address whether ESDP brings ‘added value’ to the UN through the following research questions: Are the EU and UN in competition over civilian human resources? Has ESDP generated
additional resources to help share the peace operation burden? And, has ESDP increased the pool of civilians that international operations can draw on?

The empirical record provides a mixed picture in relation to the impact of ESDP on deployments of civilians from EU countries to UN missions. There is little correlation between the rise of ESDP missions and the number of EU civilians deployed as international staff in UN missions. This has slowly increased since 2003 but has declined as a percentage of total international staff. In contrast, the number of EU police deployed in UN missions declined dramatically in 2008 in absolute and proportionate terms, principally as a result of the drawdown of the UN mission in Kosovo and the transition to the ESDP rule of law operation (EULEX) in Kosovo. The rise of ESDP has not, therefore, directly contributed to strengthening the civilian dimensions of UN peace operations. This suggests that the EU and UN are in competition for civilian resources. Moreover, this competition looks set to intensify. As the EU struggles to meet its civilian capability targets, it plans to squeeze additional capacity from those states that are traditionally strong contributors to UN operations, including non-EU ‘third states’. These already make up around 10% of ESDP civilian mission deployments. If, as this plan suggests, the composition of future ESDP missions will be increasingly ‘global’, the EU is increasingly likely to be in direct competition with the UN, including for non-EU civilian resources. This suggests that the UN does not have a material interest in promoting ESDP in so far as the organisations compete over the same human resources. Conversely, however, if EU-UN competition over resources is a zero-sum game, the rise in ESDP may produce conditions conducive to operational cooperation in so far as it will increase UN dependence on capabilities of other actors.

Despite the relative decline in EU civilian (police) deployments in UN missions, the quantitative overview of civilian deployments nevertheless suggests that ESDP indirectly benefits the UN in so far as it has captured some new European capacities for international civilian deployments. This supports the burden-sharing rationale that underpins EU and UN policies. It suggests that ESDP has brought (some) new capacities into the system that can be mobilised in support of UN missions or to relieve the UN of some of its burden e.g. in Kosovo. This in turn, suggests that in the context of UN over-stretch, the UN does have a material interest in promoting an
efficient division of labour with the ESDP missions, providing that that their mandate complements that of UN operations. However, the qualitative analysis of EU recruitment reveals that the ‘new’ civilian capabilities that ESDP has harnessed are not necessarily suitable for recurrent deployments, especially in the context of operations with peacebuilding mandates. This suggests that ESDP has not necessarily increased the pool of civilian resources that the UN can potentially draw upon.

In conclusion, the study of the material foundations of the relationship between EU-UN security actors in relation to peacebuilding, confirms that the relationship is competitive but that it also has the potential to mutually reinforcing as long as it contributes to burden-sharing by generating new capabilities and by the deployment of ESDP missions in line with UN objectives. It also confirms that in the context of peace operations, the UN interest in operational cooperation is linked to institutional overstretch and capability short-falls. In short, it supports institutionalist assumptions that organisations have an interest in cooperation under conditions of interdependence. But it also suggests that these conditions require multipolarity within the international security system and relative UN weakness.

Even under these propitious geo-strategic conditions, whether EU-UN cooperation is mutually reinforcing or not will depend on how EU and UN capabilities are utilised. In section 4.2 I test the policy assumption that the UN-EU operational cooperation is mutually beneficial because it is predicated on common objectives and because the organisations are sufficiently alike to work well together. In other words, I test whether the empirical record confirms that EU-UN cooperation is mutually reinforcing provided that: the UN and regional objectives are aligned through UN authorisation and that the practical challenges of cooperation (linked to institutional personality and operational approach) are not prohibitively high. Drawing on case studies of EU-UN operational cooperation in the two countries in which civilian ESDP missions have been deployed alongside UN missions, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Kosovo, I ask: *Can the UN rely on the operational support of the EU? Was EU-UN operational cooperation based on common strategic positions and policies? Did they share the same tactical approach? And did they work well together?*
I find that the record of operational cooperation is mixed. Operational cooperation was mutually beneficial in the EU police mission and MONUC in the DRC, but the relationship between the EU SSR mission and MONUC was characterised by competition. And in Kosovo, the EU-UN relationship was embroiled in controversy over the Kosovo status question. This proved debilitating for the transition from UNMIK to EULEX. More specifically, the EU Police mission in the DRC, which was jointly conceived of by EU and UN representatives, is an example of how an EU mission can provide a specialised niche role in police capacity building, complementary to that of the UN (MONUC) and other international actors.

Operational cooperation was based on common objectives and a clear division of labour: the EU provided equipment and intensive training to an integrated police unit in Kinshasa considered key to securing the political transition, while MONUC was responsible for broader police reform and training efforts. Cooperation was smooth in part because this clear division of labour required relatively little day-to-day operational cooperation. It is, however, far from clear that this form of EU support is predictable. It was forthcoming in the historical context of the early establishment of ESDP when there was a strong interest by EU member states in demonstrating the operational credibility of ESDP and in demonstrating that the EU remained engaged in the DRC after the short ESDP military bridging operation – Artemis. Furthermore, the internal controversy that resulted from the 2008 UN request for EU military support to protect civilians in the eastern DRC, confirms the unpredictability of EU military support for UN missions.

Although the EU and UN shared the priority objective of securing the transition process in the DRC, they did not share a common approach to the second-order priority of SSR. The EU SSR mission resulted from a Belgian-French initiative and was not requested by the UN. It resulted, in the lead up to the 2006 elections, in competition between the UN and EU over which actor should coordinate external SSR interventions. This shows that even where the EU and UN shared objectives in the area of SSR, operational cooperation was undermined by competition and differences over operational approach. In other words, the DRC case shows that the alignment of EU and UN policy objectives is not sufficient to ensure mutually beneficial cooperation. In addition, the fact that neither the EU nor the UN were able to coordinate external SSR interventions between 2006 and 2008 also highlights a fundamental political challenge
to the objective of improving external coherence, namely that in some cases this is
neither in the interest of the host government nor in that of the principal external actors.
The DRC case therefore also underlines that the agenda of promoting donor coherence
and aid effectiveness, including through IO coordination, is not universally shared in
practice. Rather, even where actors have broadly complementary objectives, it is
rational for the government and key external actors to pursue their interests through
bilateral relationships rather than through the EU or the UN. This challenges the
dominant view that external coherence can be achieved given common objectives and
that member states share an interest in delegating coordination to IOs.

The Kosovo case further challenges the assumption that EU and UN share common
objectives and policies. In Kosovo, where the EU and UN planners assumed EU and
UN agreement over the status question, the lack of an agreement had a debilitating
effect on the transition from UNMIK to EULEX. This indicates that EU and UN
planning assumptions were naïve; given their distinct memberships, the EU and UN
do not necessarily share a common purpose and strategy upon which effective
operational partnerships depend. It provides clear counter-evidence to the assumption
that the EU-UN relationship is mutually supportive because it is predicated on shared
objectives and policies. Evidence from the Kosovo case nevertheless supports the
assumption that the EU and UN can work well together in practice. Although both the
EU and UN preferred and planned for a clean transition, the case shows that the model
in which an ESDP mission is deployed in the framework of an UN one can be made to
work. Although a number of practical challenges were encountered due to different
organisational working practices, these were resolved once the legal framework for
the EU mission was settled and there were clear operational instructions. This shows
that UN and EU organisational personality and operational practice is not a significant
constraint for operational cooperation in the context of security-led civilian operations.

In summary, the record of EU-UN operational cooperation in relation to (civilian)
crisis management suggests that the concept of mutually reinforcing multilateral
security organisations that underpins EU and UN policies is naïve on a number of
levels. At the political-strategic level, it is naïve to assume that international security
institutions will share common objectives and policies, just as it is more often than not
the case that there is no common vision or policy within multilateral international
security institutions. Moreover, the logic of inter-institutional burden sharing can be
trumped by inter-institutional competition, especially where organisations compete for
resources from member states and for influence with the ‘host’ country. And at the
technical level, the fact that organisations work differently creates a number of
practical challenges to linking up. This means that cooperation has practical
‘transaction’ costs. This is not to say that the EU and UN cannot be effective partners
in the context of crisis management, but rather that operational cooperation is
contingent on specific conditions. While the rising importance and capability of
regional organisations such as the EU is conducive to operational cooperation based
on material/operational interdependencies, the coincidence of operational objectives
and policies between the UN and EU cannot be assumed, especially in a world in
which the influence of the West is in relative decline.

To recap, in chapters three and four I focused on testing the assumptions about the
conditions under which operational cooperation is likely, and is likely to be mutually
supportive. The research revealed the importance of material interests and
interdependence in promoting cooperation. I also showed that material interests in
cooperation are strong in relation to the relationship between development actors,
while operational interests in cooperation in the context of crisis management are not
always aligned. Rather, UN interests in cooperation are conditional on relative
institutional weakness and/or overstretch. The empirical evidence further shows that
the UN cannot rely on the EU for predictable operational support, and challenges
assumptions about EU-UN normative and policy alignment by showing that policies
can and, at times, do differ and come into conflict.

Chapter 5: Institutionalising EU-UN Crisis Management Cooperation
Building on the analysis of operational cooperation, in chapters five and six I explain
why the EU and UN have institutionalised their relationship in peacebuilding through
innovations such as the EU-UN Steering Committee for crisis management and the
UN Peacebuilding Commission, and assess whether these mechanisms are effective in
addressing the political challenges to coordination and operational cooperation that I
identified in the preceding chapters.

In chapter five I address the question *how were EU and UN interests served by*
institutionalising cooperation through the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management? I argue that ESDP was established precisely because it offered member states a multilateral platform in which they enjoyed a greater level of control than in the context of NATO or UN operations. This explains why EU member states were initially cautious of close association with the UN because it threatened their decision-making autonomy. However, they also shared an interest in establishing ESDP and the EU as a credible crisis management actor. I argue that efforts to institutionalise the EU-UN operational partnership through a highly visible 'Joint Declaration' and the establishment of the UN-EU Steering Committee were driven by member state interests in promoting the legitimacy and credibility of ESDP through association with the UN. It was, moreover, driven by strategic inter-institutional competition with NATO. In other words, EU member states were interested in establishing a forum to promote EU-UN cooperation in crisis management primarily for symbolic reasons. This suggestion is further supported by the narrow 'technical' mandate of the Committee and by the reaction of EU member states to the suggestion that the Steering Committee had overstepped its mandate by exploring the possibility of an EU military mission to the DRC to help secure the 2006 elections. Rather than welcome exploratory dialogue to identify windows of opportunity for operational cooperation, EU member states led by Germany, insisted on a new Joint Declaration in 2006 which clearly established that the Steering Committee was not to engage in political-strategic dialogue but rather to 'steer' a technical agenda of work designed to improve interoperability between organisations. The history of the UN-EU Steering Committee on crisis management thereby confirms that EU member states were interested in the symbolic association of ESDP with the UN but not in delegating decision-making authority to the Council or in promoting operational cooperation.

In contrast, UN DPKO and the Council Secretariat had a clear interest in using this institutional framework to promote EU operational support for UN missions. This helps explain why Steering Committee meetings initially focused on identifying areas for potential operational cooperation rather than the technical agenda of how to promote operational improvements in the 'basket' areas of planning, communications, best practices and training identified in the 2003 Joint Declaration. It was only after concrete experience of operational cooperation highlighted how operational differences complicated cooperation, that Council and DPKO secretariats developed a
joint work programme to address how cooperation could be improved at a working level. For example, joint operational planning experience (mostly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Chad/the Central African Republic) triggered a number of innovations. These included Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs), strengthened modalities for communication in the operational planning phases (including additional EU military liaison resources in New York and increased use of Video Tele Conferences), as well as Joint After Action Reviews designed to promote inter-institutional learning with regard to planning cooperation. Therefore, in the thematic basket areas of communications, planning and best-practices, efforts to improve cooperation have typically been triggered by operational experience and, more recently, by efforts to redeem lessons learned through Joint After Action Reviews. A notable exception is the area of training. While there is no political or policy objection to aligning EU and UN training standards, the fact that training within the EU is not yet standardised and that EU pre-mission and in-mission training remains relatively undeveloped, has meant that improved EU-UN cooperation in relation to standardisation has been a second rank priority. Operationally, the EU and UN have also tended to divide functional responsibilities even where they are present in the same theatre (DRC, Kosovo), which has, in turn, limited the opportunities for joint in-mission training.

In response to the question what does the record of the Steering Committee tell us about the EU and UN operational fit? it shows that although the EU and UN work differently, procedural and structural obstacles to cooperation can be overcome. The UN-EU Steering Committee has had some success in identifying and addressing some of the organisational differences that presented practical obstacles to operational cooperation. In relation to planning and communications, this has prompted emphasis on inter-institutional learning to help staff understand and accommodate different organisational procedures and practices. In some cases, however, the benefits of EU and UN cooperation have not outweighed the costs associated with organisational alignment. For instance, the benefits of joint training have not outweighed the costs of aligning decentralised and centralised approaches to financing and organising training activities. In short, where EU and UN operational experiences have revealed that the practical costs of organisational and procedural mis-matches are small, the institutions have invested in processes and information products to work around the differences.
But where practice differs and the costs of doing nothing are small, as in the area of training, there has been little progress in institutionalising cooperation.

To summarise, for EU member states the utility of a formal UN-EU relationship is largely symbolic, linked to the credibility and legitimacy that association with the UN brings. For the UN, however, institutional interest in engaging in the Steering Committee is sustained by the promise of operational or financial aid. Indeed, DPKO and DPA have increasingly used the Steering Committee to pitch for ‘flanking’ assistance for their operations (most recently in Chad) and to support UN DPA mediation capacity from the EC Instrument for Stability. It has therefore served DPKO and DPA material interests by linking them up with EC funding. EU member states have not, however, allowed the UN-EU Steering Committee to address more fundamental strategic questions relating to operational objectives or approach. It has not therefore served as a forum in which conflicts over policy alignment or operational roles have been addressed even where these have been the principal sources of operational discord. In short, the history of the UN-EU Steering Committee shows that member states and IOs have material and normative interests in establishing and maintaining institutional mechanisms for information sharing and coordination, even when they have no authority to resolve issues of collective action by tackling substantive differences over operational objectives and approach.

Chapter 6: EU engagement with the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

In chapter five I assessed why the EU and UN have privileged the institutionalisation of cooperation through the creation of a Steering Committee and showed how it has been used in practice: It has helped address some of the practical challenges of operational cooperation that result from different organisational procedures and working practices but has not been configured to address political and substantive differences over operational objectives or approach. In chapter six, I undertake a similar exercise in relation to the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). I examine why member states, the EU and the UN have chosen to respond to the challenge of promoting coordination between external peacebuilding actors through the establishment of the PBC and assess its record in tackling the external coordination challenge. I also assess whether EU engagement in the PBC has promoted policy alignment and operational cooperation with the UN.
The rationale for the establishment of the UN PBC was that there was an institutional ‘gap’ in the UN system, since there was no inter-governmental body that brought together member states that supported UN security interventions with IOs and member states that were critical to supporting post-conflict recovery and development. Kofi Annan assumed in his report In Larger Freedom, that by bringing these actors together in the PBC ‘they can share information and achieve coherence’ (United Nations, 2005a). States from the Global South were sceptical of the prescriptive peacebuilding agenda and ensured that the PBC mandate was limited to post-conflict peacebuilding rather than conflict prevention. Nevertheless they supported the initiative, in large part because of the PBC mandate to mobilise additional resources for peacebuilding.

Yet the practice of the PBC has fallen short of these high expectations. I show (in section 6.3) that its role in developing integrated strategies for peacebuilding for the countries on its agenda is increasingly contested, including by development actors within EU member states, on the grounds that it does not empower national leadership, adds little value to other strategic exercises and is too labour intensive. A review of the PBC mandate to develop best practices argues that while the Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL) and Country Specific Meetings (CSMs) have explored key issues and provided an important educational role for the members of the PBC, they have not guided operational practice nor provided advice to member states or the Security Council. Similarly, I note that the PBC has not delivered on its mandate to mobilise resources and sustain international attention. Rather, in its early years, the PBC focused on the management of the Peacebuilding Fund. There is little evidence that it delivered new resources for the countries on its agenda, especially from non-traditional donors.

Most importantly (for my research agenda) is the finding that the PBC has had little impact in relation to its mandate to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN. I establish that the PBC does not have the authority or proximity to UN operational actors to ensure coherence within the UN system. Moreover, UN operational actors and donors who base their operational decisions on processes of consultation (with national actors) tend to view these processes as equally if not more legitimate than guidance developed in the PBC. There is no evidence to
suggest that peacebuilding strategies developed by PBC have guided the actions of other external actors, including the EU. I therefore argue that the PBC has introduced another complicating layer in efforts to promote coherence through integrated strategies, and one that is more easily embroiled in the politics of global governance played out in New York than in the domestic politics of peacebuilding. In this way it fails to meet the (EU) principle of subsidiarity; PBC does not meet at the appropriate level (or place) to make decisions regarding country priorities and how they should best be implemented. This confirms the possibility, introduced in chapter one, that the more that peacebuilding strategies are developed collectively by external actors, the greater the danger that the role of local actors in the development of policies and programmes is undermined. In other words, it provides evidence that the objective of generating external coherence through dialogue between external actors is difficult to reconcile the objectives of generating locally owned and accountable interventions.

The findings regarding EU engagement in the PBC further confirm these conclusions by demonstrating that PBC deliberations are not linked to internal planning processes. The institutional divide between the Council and the Commission made early engagement in the PBC difficult to manage and delayed the PBC start-up. And while the EU has consistently supported the initiative of establishing the inter-governmental body and contributed actively to its deliberations, there is no evidence that EC programming or planning for ESDP missions have been influenced by the integrated peacebuilding strategies developed by the PBC. Similarly, the EC has not chosen to integrate its funding for peacebuilding through EC support for the PBF. Rather, the EC privileged the establishment of the parallel peacebuilding funding mechanism – the Instrument for Stability. Nevertheless, EU engagement in the PBC continues to be supported by the EU because it has other political benefits. It provides opportunities for constructive debate, helps strengthen relationships across the OECD-G77 divide and enhances EU visibility and profile in New York.

In short, the analysis of the role of the PBC in addressing the external coherence challenge shows that it has not been effective in influencing operational decisions, even among its members and most staunch supporters. It highlights inefficiencies in addressing the coherence challenge through dialogue between diplomats in UN headquarters and suggests that this obstructs the objective of generating locally owned
and accountable interventions. The analysis therefore supports the view that it is more
efficient and legitimate to address the coherence challenge at the country level\textsuperscript{90}.
Significantly, the Secretary-General’s 2009 report \textit{Peacebuilding in the Immediate
Aftermath of Conflict} argues for this reorientation of the UN peacebuilding effort
around strategies developed in-country (United Nations 2009). In section 6.3.5, I
summarise its main findings and recommendations and analyse their implications for
how the UN intends to tackle the coordination challenge in future. The Secretary-
General’s report implicitly argues that the key to strengthening operational
partnerships between external actors is to move the needs assessments, planning,
priority setting and resource allocation to the country level, and to ensure that
assistance is controlled by a partnership of national and international actors. To this
end, it calls for stronger and better-supported UN leadership teams on the ground and
the expanded use of common assessments methodologies that can be successively
developed over time into ‘compacts’ that can be used by international and national
actors to monitor progress against commitments.

The Secretary-General’s recommendation that efforts to identify peacebuilding
priorities and strengthen partnerships should be focused at the country level, was
based on evidence that this is where operational decisions by humanitarian and
development actors are made and on the operational imperative of prioritising national
capacity building and ownership. It is therefore little surprise that the Secretary-
General’s recommendation is broadly supported by UN development and
humanitarian actors. By the same token, as indicated in chapters one and two,
addressing the coherence challenge in-country in a relatively inclusive process is not
in the interest of security actors who favour the security-led Integrated Approach to
mission planning. Interviews reveal that DPKO contested this re-orientation during
the drafting of the Secretary-General’s report. This, in turn, confirms that different
intervention logics are likely to lead to conflicts over how the external coherence
challenge should be managed. Indeed, this is implicitly recognised in the Secretary-
General’s report. Its emphasis on strengthening local UN leadership is intended to
help prepare leadership to manage inevitably competing demands from within and
outside the UN system. It therefore recognises that in the context of political

\textsuperscript{90} This, nevertheless, leaves the PBC with the potentially important role of holding actors to account for
delivering on their agreed commitments.
environments characterised by operational uncertainty or dilemmas, widespread mistrust, and overwhelming material need, deciding operational priorities requires a broad set of skills, knowledge and political acumen rather than a specific procedural approach or rules to guide operational practice. In other words, implicit in the Secretary-General’s report is the recognition that a bureaucratic approach to addressing problems of collective action is not sufficient or appropriate in the context of peacebuilding.

7.2 Results from testing the hypothesis

In chapter one I introduced the liberal view that the EU and UN share the goals of effective multilateralism and promoting peace and security based on shared values. This, in turn, informs the common view that the EU and UN share peacebuilding objectives and that they simply need to link up better to meet these objectives. This thesis challenges these liberal assumptions. The hypothesis I proposed in chapter one is that even if the EU and UN share a normative interest in coordination and cooperation, organisational interests in cooperation will not necessarily be aligned because of competition between the EU and UN for resources and intra-organisational competition related to how to address the challenges of peacebuilding.

I then elaborated on this with the following sub-hypotheses:

1) EU and UN normative interests in coordination and cooperation are not necessarily aligned with material interests. Where both are aligned, strong operational cooperation is likely. Where normative interests are not matched by material incentives, cooperation is likely to be symbolic rather than operational.

2) EU-UN operational cooperation is more likely to occur separately between development actors and security actors that use similar intervention logics. They will employ different mechanisms to promote coherence and cooperation which are tailored to their operational approach.

3) Efforts to institutionalise cooperation through bi-lateral and multi-lateral
mechanisms to promote dialogue between Headquarters, notably the UN-EU Steering Committee on Crisis Management and the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), satisfy institutional interests in symbolic forms of cooperation, but they have little impact on the dynamics of operational cooperation.

In relation to sub-hypothesis 1) the empirical record suggests that normative interests in cooperation between security actors are not necessarily aligned with material interests. I have shown that the EU interest in self-sufficiency and institutional autonomy militated against providing direct and predictable forms of support for UN operations. Nevertheless, the EU had a clear normative interest in promoting multilateral responses to security challenges and a normative interest in associating the EU with the UN in crisis management based on what the UN is – its normative authority – rather than what it does or can offer the EU in material terms. This resulted in a symbolic Joint Declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management and an institutional mechanism with no autonomy and a limited mandate – the UN-EU Steering Committee – to promote operational cooperation.

Similarly, the UN had no a priori material interest in cooperation with the EU in the context of crisis management. However, in the context of institutional over-stretch and relative institutional weakness this changed. The history of the UN response to the development of ESDP shows that the UN (DPKO) showed little enthusiasm for the development of ESDP because both organisations competed over resources. Nevertheless, in the context of organisational over-stretch the UN had a clear material interest in cooperation with the EU in so far as it could harness EU capabilities, albeit indirectly, to share the operational burden. The UN also had a stated normative interest in promoting cooperation with regional bodies. This was based on the rationale that it would lead to further democratisation of the international security system. In short, in the historical context of UN overstretch UN material and normative interests aligned in support of operational cooperation with the EU. This in turn helps explain why the UN used the opportunities for dialogue in the Steering Committee to push for more predictable forms of operational support, even though these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful.

Regarding the operational relationship between EU and UN development actors, the
research results confirm that both the EU and UN had material interests in cooperation. The European Commission was interested in channeling funding through the UN in fragile contexts in so far as this helped maintain its reputation as an efficient aid disbursement agency with minimal administrative burden and reputational risk. UN development actors, including UNDP, which are funded from voluntary contributions by governments, also had a clear material interest in operational cooperation. The research results were, however, less conclusive in regard to whether operational cooperation was predicated on normative policy alignment. Although the European Commission had policies in place that explicitly supported funding the UN as a means to promote effective multilateralism and both actors adopted a similar long-term, transformative approach to peacebuilding, more research is required to determine whether and what role normative/policy alignment played in relation to specific funding and programming decisions.

The research also supports sub-hypothesis 2) that operational cooperation is more likely to occur separately between development and security actors that use similar intervention logics and will employ different mechanisms to promote coordination and coherence. Empirical results show that bi-lateral cooperation occurs between institutional counterparts. Cooperation between EU and UN security actors – the Council and DPKO – has resulted in regular formal Steering Committee meetings as well as a joint programme of work designed to address practical difficulties in cooperation related to procedural or organisational differences. Conversely, although development and humanitarian actors have been invited to engage in these bi-lateral mechanisms between headquarters, they have not found them operationally useful. Rather EC-UN cooperation is supported by a web of relationships linked to their funding relationship in country and to particular thematic areas, including elections and natural resource management, where they work jointly to develop programmes and programming guidance. Moreover, both UNDP and the EC (together with the World Bank) hold that key to promoting operational coherence and cooperation is to work together ‘up-stream’ in joint needs assessments. As a result, efforts to round out the predominantly funding relationship have focused on developing joint assessment and early recovery planning processes.

One potential counter-example is that funds from the EC Instrument for Stability have
also been used to directly support DPA and DPKO peace operations. However, the management of this financial instrument by DG RELEX (rather than DG Development or EuropeAid) and the fact that funding decisions require de facto support by the intergovernmental crisis management body – the Political and Security Committee – confirms that it is a hybrid instrument, linked to crisis management actors. It is therefore constituted and deployed differently from other development aid, and this is reflected in its support for both crisis management and transformative approaches to peacebuilding.

Finally, in relation to sub-hypothesis 3) the empirical findings suggest that member states and international organisations create new institutional mechanisms, including the UN-EU Steering Committee and the UN Peacebuilding Committee in the belief that information sharing will promote coordination and resolve problems of collective action. However, the results show that information sharing and dialogue in these forums has had little impact on the (material) drivers of operational decisions. Even so, these structures further member state and institutional normative interests in symbolic forms of cooperation. In addition, dialogue processes may deliver other unforeseen benefits. For example, while the UN-EU Steering Committee was never intended by EU member states to promote strategic operational cooperation, DPKO was able to use this forum to explore and ultimately succeed in receiving EC funding for UN peace operations. Conversely, even while the EC recognised that the PBC had not delivered on its coordination or resource mobilisation mandate, it nevertheless served EC political interests in forging more constructive working relationships with states from the Global South. In other words, although the forums that have been created to resolve the coordination challenge do not have the authority to resolve (or even address) substantive differences over policy objectives and operational approach, they have demonstrated some utility to the member states and the institutions in whose interests they were established.

7.3 Theoretical Implications

As mentioned in the introduction, this research agenda has the potential to contribute to three distinct, if related, theoretical debates:
1) the debate over whether the UN and regional actors actually support each other or come into conflict;

2) the debate regarding the conditions under which cooperation between International Organisations (IOs) is likely; and

3) the debate over ‘the coordination challenge’ in peacebuilding.

On the first debate, the research results suggest that the UN and EU clearly support each other in relation to the development-led dimensions of peacebuilding. In practice, the UN is a preferred implementing partner of the EU, for normative and material reasons, and their relationship is one of mutual interdependence. In relation to the relationship between the UN and EU as security actors, and in the context of purely civilian dimensions of peace operations, the evidence is less clear cut. The EU has helped share the global peacebuilding burden by taking over from some UN missions (in Bosnia and Kosovo) and has launched civilian missions intended to complement the UN mission in the DRC. However, EU operational support is unpredictable and EU member states privilege the deployment of their civilians to ESDP operations over UN ones. To the extent that the EU and UN compete for resources, they are structurally in conflict. Yet whether this translates into conflict in operational terms depends on the alignment of operational objectives and approach. The results from the case studies challenge policy assumptions that the EU and UN share operational and policy objectives. Disagreement over the status of Kosovo had a debilitating impact on the transition from UNMIK to EULEX. And the history of the EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC showed that even where the EU and UN shared common policy objectives, EU and UN missions competed over who should coordinate the external aid effort and how to approach SSR. In short, the research results indicate that although the EU and UN share values and long-term objectives they can and do sometimes come into conflict over respective roles and operational approach in the context of civilian crisis management. This, in turn, challenges the liberal assumption that the EU and UN relationship is mutually beneficial since it is based on shared objectives and supports the conclusion that that ‘the complexities of the international political system militate against developing a predictable and reliable interlocking system’ (Bah and Jones 2008).
In relation to the second debate on the conditions under which cooperation between International Organisations (IOs) is likely, the research results are broadly consistent with a neo-realist interpretation of policy alignment being contingent on the alignment of IO objectives and policies of their most powerful states. On this view, the fact that the EU and UN were mostly mutually supportive during the 1990s and early 2000s is linked to the importance of the West in determining UN operational objectives. By the same token, divergence between EU and UN positions over Kosovo might be explained by the West’s relative decline in influence in the UN. In other words, it suggests that an increasingly multi-polar world offers less propitious geo-strategic conditions for mutually beneficial EU-UN relationships.

The evidence of EU institutional autonomy in the area of development compared with ESDP is also consistent with neo-realist expectations over when member states are likely to delegate decision-making autonomy to IOs. On this view, the European Commission’s extensive cooperation with the UN in relation to the development dimensions of peacebuilding can be explained because it was in the material interests of member states and the IOs they delegated authority to. Conversely, member states interest in maximising their control over crisis management operations was not necessarily served by close institutional cooperation between the EU and the UN. Member states limited the institutional autonomy of the Council and the UN-EU Steering Committee accordingly, and privileged autonomous EU missions over missions conducted in the framework of UN missions. This confirms that member state ‘compliance’ is a necessary if not sufficient pre-requisite for inter-IO cooperation.

The research results also underscore the importance of material interests in explaining IO behaviour and the construction of institutional norms. For instance, the investigation into the evolution of EU and UN concepts and policies shows that intra-institutional fragmentation and competition led to conceptual proliferation. Indeed, ‘peacebuilding’ is rarely used by institutional actors, precisely because it is an umbrella term that spans institutional divides. It is therefore not helpful in differentiating actors on the basis of their mandate and approach. Similarly, research results provide evidence of conceptual adaptation and re-framing in response to intra-institutional turf wars over competence. For example, the European Commission’s re-framing of the conflict prevention agenda in terms of crisis response and aid.
effectiveness in fragile situations can be seen as a response to the fact that the conceptual terrain of conflict prevention became subject to battles over Council and Commission competence.

The finding that material interests drive state and IO behaviour nevertheless leaves room for normative and administrative fit to shape the pattern of IO cooperation. Normative factors shape how IOs choose to intervene based on (implicit) theories of change. This, in turn, determines which operational partnerships are most important and how they should be structured. Operational approach is also linked to administrative fit, which in turn determines the transaction costs and payoff structure of cooperation. Although the research results confirm the importance of material interests in shaping policies and interests in cooperation, they also provide evidence that the normative rationale for IO interventions shapes how material interests are perceived. The results confirm that operational cooperation occurs between institutional actors that adopt the same normative and operational approach to peacebuilding. Similarly, the EU material interest in supporting the UN, is informed by shared normative interest in ‘effective multilateralism’ and belief that multilateral responses to security challenges are utility maximising and result in better outcomes. The research findings therefore suggest that alignment of normative interests and operational approach is also important in determining operational partners. In other words, ‘institutional personality’ matters too.

The third debate to which this research contributes relates to how best to address the ‘external coordination challenge’ in peacebuilding. The research findings confirm that IOs have an interest in framing conflicts over the ends and means of peacebuilding in apolitical terms of coordination, in line with the source of their organisational authority. It also suggests that member states share assumptions about the ability of IOs to resolve political conflicts of collective action since, for example, they explicitly mandated the Peacebuilding Commission to do so.

However, the research results also confirm that institutional mechanisms to promote information exchange and collective decision-making have not been successful in resolving substantive and normative questions about peacebuilding priorities and how to intervene. They have, rather, introduced another complicating layer in resolving the
coordination challenge and have therefore worked at cross-purposes with other stated organisational goals, including the goal of fostering local ownership and capacity through an inclusive approach to analysis and programming. Similarly, they have not promoted internal coherence since they do not directly engage operational institutional actors in the design of operational strategies. This, in turn, suggests that in the context of uncertainty and multiple actors – many of whom do not share objectives or normative approach – the potential of institutional mechanism to agree a common plan of action are slim. Nevertheless institutional mechanisms to promote coordination fulfill normative interests in promoting the perception of cooperation: they are useful to member states and IOs for symbolic reasons.

Finally, the research findings confirm the limitations of assumptions that states are unitary rational actors. States are fragmented and development and foreign ministries can work at cross purposes. For instance, while the UK Department for International Development was actively promoting the European Commission to engage more proactively in conflict prevention programming in the framework of OECD DAC working groups during 2005 and 2006, the UK Ambassador in Brussels supported the deletion of any mention of conflict prevention in the Commission’s financial instrument for development. This lends support to the view that, as with IOs, states should not be considered as unitary rational actors, but rather as collective entities composed of rational actors with different preferences (Milner 1997). It also confirms Duffield’s analysis that:

‘In order to emerge, policies have to have the support of strong groups and interests within institutions: leadership figures and entrepreneurs who can initiate policy and forge the wider coalitions necessary for their chosen line to gain acceptance. Policy formation involves political rivalry and alliance not only within institutions but between them as well.’ (Duffield 2001: 264)

Empirical evidence that undermines statist theoretical assumptions also supports the choice of a constructivist methodological approach to the study of IO behaviour and inter-institutional cooperation. The findings reveal that the principal line of operational tension in relation to peacebuilding policy objectives and operational approach is between alliances of development and security actors that include IO
officials, member state officials and external experts. This suggests the importance of policy networks suggesting, for instance, that the EC approach to delivering assistance in fragile states is aligned with those of the development actors within and beyond member states because it is constituted through common inclusive processes. This view supports a networked model of policy formation, which corresponds with Peter Haas’ analysis of the importance of ‘epistemic communities’\(^1\) (Haas 1992). Yet even if a focus on epistemic communities may have produced additional insights into the normative evolution of development and security led approaches to peacebuilding, this methodological approach would not have been theoretically better equipped to understand the material dynamics of conceptual competition.

7.4 Potential directions for future research

This research exercise was designed to shed light on whether the UN and EU actually cooperate in mutually supporting ways and which conditions are most conducive to operational cooperation. It also asks why the EU and UN have invested in institutional mechanisms to promote information exchange and cooperation and whether these mechanisms have achieved their stated purpose. The findings suggest that EU and UN cooperation is not ‘self-organising’ even where the EU and UN share common objectives, and that this is, at least in part, because of interinstitutional competition and incompatible interests in how to manage the coordination challenge.

These conclusions are not particularly helpful in offering policy guidance as to how to organise external interventions. In chapter one I raise the possibility that under conditions of profound uncertainty an experimental approach to peacebuilding is more appropriate than a closely coordinated ‘one plan’ approach. Yet this thesis does not test whether such alternative approaches produce better outcomes in practice. One possible line of future research would be to do so. In order to test the feasibility of the experimentation model one might, for example, test how organisations learn or adapt in the context of peacebuilding and the consequences of such adaptation. In other words, this would test how to improve the ability of organisations to learn from

\(^1\) Haas defined an epistemic community as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas 1992: 3).
empirical feedback, and the results of evidence-based learning. Similarly, in chapter one I also introduce the possibility that uncoordinated external actions can ‘add up’ with impacts greater than the sum of their parts even in the absence of strategic guidance. Yet further empirical research is needed to test whether greater policy tolerance of fragmentation and even duplication is warranted. This might be attempted through further long-term studies of the cumulative impact of external interventions.

Similarly, in chapter six, I (implicitly) support the reorientation of the UN efforts to promote coherence in-country on the basis that it recognises the overtly political nature of peacebuilding and offers a more promising approach to reconciling the goals of building national capacities and leadership with the goals of promoting external coherence. It is, however, too early to test the empirical results of this approach where it has yet to be broadly implemented. However, development practitioners have a wealth of positive and negative experience with efforts to build local capacity and ownership through inclusive in-country assessment and programming processes in ‘normal’ development contexts. Indeed, the aid effectiveness agenda that the OECD DAC and some affected states are promoting seeks to draw lessons from these experiences in the context of fragile states. In other words there is ample empirical evidence to test the results of locally-led efforts to develop institutional capacity. Comparative analysis of these experiences might provide evidence that is useful in informing the design of negotiation processes to agree priorities in peacebuilding contexts. Similarly, comparative analysis of how joint needs assessments and planning processes have been conducted in practice, can test for whether they have informed subsequent planning decisions by national and international actors and whether these have, in turn produced more coherent and better results. They may also be useful in promoting learning regarding process design. Similarly, empowering local UN leadership to address the coherence challenge in country suggests that the UN will serve as both a mediator and an interested actor in the peacebuilding process. It follows that empirical study of the UN’s roles as a mediator may be instructive in informing its role as a guarantor of the subsequent peacebuilding process. Indeed, among peacemaking practitioners there is increasing recognition that the process of deciding peacebuilding priorities is in practice an extension of the negotiations which led to cease fire or peace agreements. Therefore a comparative analysis of the different roles that the international community can play as a neutral mediator, a
power-based mediator or as a party to the conflict is potentially relevant for guiding the choice of leadership style and process design in peacebuilding contexts.

7.5 Final thoughts

As I mentioned in the introduction, this research exercise was born out of my professional encounters with the EU and UN, and my impressions that they are relatively bad at organisational learning. My personal experience suggested that this was not because of individual incompetence or lack of intellectual curiosity but rather because of internal institutional politics. Although the bureaucrats I worked with emphasised the technical nature of their work, they were acutely aware of the limited scope for influencing the political dynamics of organisational change through feedback relating to the impact of their practices. It is as a result of this experience that I chose, through this thesis, to explore the intra- and inter-institutional politics of the ‘supply side’ of peacebuilding.

What I found is on one level both familiar and unremarkable: material institutional interests go a long way to explaining the dynamics of intra- and inter-institutional politics. In line with institutionalist and realist theoretical assumptions I also found that institutions were fairly responsive to their member states and did develop concepts and practices in line with their given mandates. Their elaborate decision making mechanisms also effectively structured the politics between key institutional and member state actors with the result that policies and decisions reflected the views of the strongest alliances within discrete development and security policy sectors. And where institutional politics were not structured, as in the policy area of peacebuilding which spans the security, development and political sector, member states have responded by creating new procedures or mechanisms to rationalise the external politics of peacebuilding through efforts to promote cross-sectoral integration within states and institutions or, in the case of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, to create a new institutional mechanism. However, the statist assumptions upon which the PBC was founded meant that it has not in practice serve to ‘rationalise’ or structure the external politics of peacebuilding since it does not include the majority of relevant
external institutional actors – much less the relevant actors in the affected country – in its deliberative processes. In practice, therefore, the external inter-institutional politics of peacebuilding takes place informally, outside established institutional frameworks.

At another level my research has led me to reflect on the ‘evolutionary’ character of institutional politics and the structuring force of this evolution. This has in part been prompted by my findings about how intra- and inter-institutional competition (for resources from member states) has led to conceptual and operational diversity. The analogy with biological evolution and diversity could be extended further. Competitive dynamics also potentially help explain the proliferation of IO actors and functions based on pressure to identify niche competencies, as well as patterns of institutional adaptation in response to changes in the environment and perceptions about the fitness of organisational responses. While such evolutionary analogies have been employed to help explain this history of economic life (Seabright 2004), the difference with institutional life is that the dynamics of competition are more inward-looking. International organisations do not operate in an open market, rather they compete for the favour of a relatively small group of powerful and/or wealthy states and institutional donors. Therefore it is in a sense obvious that their competition takes place within the conceptual and normative parameters of how states and bureaucracies see the world and their role in it. My analysis of ‘the peacebuilding cooperation challenge’ confirms the ‘faith’ that these actors have in rational-legal procedural approaches to solving problems of collective action, even where it is clear that the objectives of member states and institutional actors are not always aligned and that the operational record has been characterised by operational dilemmas and inter-institutional contest. In other words, this research has also demonstrated the importance of cultural bias in explaining institutional behaviour. This finding also resonates with my professional experience in which I often criticised EU and UN interventions for formalised technocratic approaches to peacebuilding and state-building which were loaded with (unfounded) assumptions about how to build institutional capacity and what such capacity should look like. I am therefore gratified to discover at the end of this research exercise that some important external peacebuilding actors are becoming increasingly (self-) aware of how their normative projections can be or have been unhelpful. For example, the Concept Note for the World Bank 2011 World Development Report begins with the acknowledgement that:
‘Underlying some of the less satisfactory aspects of international performance is a cultural issue... The international institutions of today were born of a pact between the larger and wealthier nations at the waning of the colonial era. While the pact has broadened, the process of institutional deepening is not yet complete, particularly insofar as countries with weak bargaining power vis-à-vis the international community are concerned. The world of international donors and institutions is still quite inward-looking; the problems of fragile and conflict-affected states tend to be seen through the prism of external organisations own norms, standards, expectations and structures. There is a tendency to push favored solutions; there is also a lack of acknowledgement of how long it has taken to confront violent challenges to development and to create resilient institutions in the North, or of the parallels between current violence in the North and the South.’ (World Bank 2010: v)

Finally, it seems that I too cannot escape my professional conditioning (and interests) and will end, coming full-circle, with a predictable appeal for more critical research on the impact of external peacebuilding interventions and for greater institutional investment in organisational adaptation through evidence-based learning.
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