(Re)Creating the Jewish State:  
Projects of (In)Security  
and the Disjuncture to Price-Tag Violence

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Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing, which is the outcome of the work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. It has not been previously submitted, in part or whole, to any university or institution for any degree, diploma, or other qualification.

Signed: Nicola S. Mathie
This thesis is the outcome of Research Award Grant Number 1225917 from The Economic and Social Research Council. My appreciation will always be with The Economic and Social Research Council for funding this PhD.
Abstract

Jewish-Israeli settlements built over the State of Israel’s internationally-recognised territorial borders are sites of contestation. The focus of this thesis is upon conflicts and contestations which have developed between the State of Israel and some of its own subjects, Jewish settlers, over the evacuation of settlement-communities and structures, and other perceived threats to settlement. From 2008, a new form of violence has been enacted by individuals in the settler community. Self-declared as Price-Tag violence, the attacks take different forms. These include vandalising Palestinian properties and spraying provocative graffiti, and throwing Molotov cocktails at properties. Whilst the attacks are predominantly perpetrated upon Palestinian targets, the attacks are directed at the State of Israel. Price-Tag attacks have also occurred directly on Israeli targets, such as Israeli military vehicles. Since 2011, mosques, churches and monasteries have been defiled with incendiary graffiti and have been torched. Such attacks reflect a heightened radicalism. A number of figures, including high-ranking Israeli security and military individuals, have warned of stark dangers which Price-Tag violence poses and classified it as acts of terror. The aim of this thesis is to trace a genealogy of Price-Tag violence and to critically ask why conflicts between the State and some settlers have developed.

Politically and etiologically, I will analyse the origins of conflicts by identifying tensions in ‘Zionism,’ different meanings within the Jewish State of Israel’s (re)creation, and different projects within settlement. I will then focus on two key historic events which the Jewish State took against settlement: the Gaza Disengagement (2005) and the Amona outpost evacuation (2006). Situating these as significant disjunctive moments, I will assess (re)actions to these acts and their impacts on State-settler relations. With increased disjuncture in some State-settler relations, I will trace a taboo-breaking trajectory of the increased acceptability of violence to safeguard settlement, Land, and perceived security. The thesis will culminate in directly assessing the self-declared ‘new era’ of Price-Tag violence, uncovering its foundations, motivations and significance. The thesis is heavily informed by original data from fieldwork which I conducted in Israel and the West Bank, where unique perspectives from Palestinians and diverse Israelis, particularly Jewish settlers, will be central to analysis. Drawing on key concepts from Critical Security Studies and Political Geography, this thesis will make contributions to these sub-disciplines by showing central interactions between the State, space and (in)security throughout, and different natures of space, impacts of spatial practices, and different meanings of (in)security.
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Introduction

The Growth of a Problematic and Research Importance

In April 2014, a number of incidents occurred in spaces of the West Bank and in Israel. Structures were demolished and attacks were perpetrated on different targets. On the 8th April 2014, an Israel Defence Force (IDF) military-outpost positioned on the outskirts of the Jewish settlement-community of Yitzhar in the north West Bank (Samaria) was demolished. Five settlers from Yitzhar were later arrested for this act. An IDF commander at the scene commented that the IDF and soldiers deployed in the outpost were "working to protect the community and other communities from terrorists" and "were not prepared for such a situation...Jews attacking Israeli soldiers" [quoted Dvorin, 2014c].

The demolition came in the context of another act of demolition earlier that day. Israeli forces arrived in Givat Lehava, a Jewish settlement-outpost located on the space of eastern Yitzhar, and demolished two caravans and a partially-completed home. According to forces, residents resisted the demolition "in all ways possible," including throwing rocks, resulting in injuries to soldiers. "The security sources, for their part, insist that the structures were built illegally and were slated for demolition." The attack on the security forces received strong criticism and was denounced by Israeli officials as "Jewish terror" [Cohen and Dvorin, 2014].

Five days before these incidents, around forty cars in the Palestinian village of Jish, inside the State of Israel’s internationally-recognised territorial borders (‘the Green Line’), had their tires slashed. The attack was labelled as a 'Price-Tag' attack and the perpetrators ‘Jewish extremists.’ Graffiti left in the attack read ‘only non-Jews [should be] removed from our land’ [Times of Israel Staff, 2014a]. Three teenagers, yeshiva students in Yitzhar, were later arrested on suspicion of perpetrating this attack and others [Fiske, 2014]. The Price-Tag attack graffiti made clear that the removal of Jews from ‘our land’ is deemed an unacceptable action and individuals will not stay quiet when such events happen, bringing confrontations/resistances to wider spaces.

On the 6th April, in what was described as another Price-Tag attack, an IDF jeep’s tires belonging to Colonel Yoav Yarom, the commander of Israeli forces in the West Bank, were slashed in Yitzhar. Reaction to the attack on an IDF commander, and a vehicle and symbol of State sovereignty, was critical and determined. Israel’s then-Defence Minister, Moshe Ya’alon, declared that this is terrorism in the full sense of the word. We must root out these phenomena and fight them mercilessly...we will not permit an extremist, marginal, and violent group to raise their hands against the rule of law [quoted Jpost.com Staff, 2014a].
Such events and acts set the scene for fundamental problematics and questions which this thesis is pursuing. This is, conflicts over Israel’s settlements and increased fractures in some State-settler relations. In this “battle over settlements,” the International Crisis Group (ICG) [2009:i] discusses a new action undertaken by some:

- treating every confrontation—however insignificant the apparent stake—as a test of wills,
- religious militants have responded to the demolition of plywood huts with revenge strikes on Palestinians, stoning their cars, burning their crops, cutting their trees and occasionally opening fire.

Confrontations over settlement-communities and structures are not ‘insignificant’ but are at the centre of conflicts and insecurity that have developed. Emerging in 2008, these ‘revenge strikes’ are self-declared as ‘Price-Tag’ (Tag-Mechir) attacks. Since 2008, hundreds have been committed on targets in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel. Other forms of Price-Tag attacks have arisen, including Molotov cocktails thrown at Palestinian properties, IDF properties and personnel attacked, and mosques and churches burnt and defiled with provocative graffiti.¹ The emergence and acts of Price-Tag violence is of research importance for two key significant reasons.

Firstly, Price-Tag attacks pose high insecurity. With the majority of attacks perpetrated on Palestinians and their properties, the violence constitutes a considerable source of insecurity for Palestinian communities. In 2015, a Price-Tag attack was committed in the Palestinian village of Duma in the north West Bank. A Molotov cocktail thrown inside one house resulted in the deaths of members of the Dawabseh family. Hebrew graffiti sprayed on houses read ‘Revenge,’ ‘Long live the king messiah,’ along with the Star of David [Times of Israel Staff, 2015c]. A twenty-one-year-old settler from a nearby settlement-outpost was later charged with the attack [Ben Kimon et al, 2016].² The implications of such attacks are a stark cause of concern.

Secondly, the State of Israel is facing a security problematic from its own Jewish subjects. Price-Tag violence is directed at the State of Israel and is lodged in struggles over space and settlement, and what they represent. Acts perceived to harm settlement-communities, interests and agendas will generate reaction. Figures alert to significant dangers which such attacks, ideologies and motivations pose to Israeli society and the State of Israel. Addressing a rally following the Duma attack, Shimon Peres, Israel’s former President, stated that Israel is facing “a battle for our survival” against “dark and extremist forces,” warning “don’t underestimate the danger...the survival of a Jewish, democratic Israel” is at stake [quoted Times of Israel Staff, 2015d].³ The security of the State itself has become an increased concern.
With the violence emerging in struggles over settlement, this is significant in State-settler relations. Attacks show a move-to-violence, perceived legitimisation of this, and increased radicalisation within segments of the settler community. In 2011, the United States Department of State [2012] classified Price-Tag attacks as ‘terrorist incidents.’ Perpetrators were identified as “extremist Israeli settlers;” signalling that a home-grown terror has emerged and a population has violently turned against its State. Israeli State figures, including former and current chiefs of Israel’s Internal Security Agency, the Shin Bet, have also urged for Price-Tag attacks to be legally classified as ‘terror,’ indicating the significance of such violence [Khoury, 2014; Newman, 2014]. However, the phrase ‘a population has turned against its State’ presupposes that such populations feel belonging to it. This has become problematic, a reality which I will also trace.

This thesis constitutes a journey, building to analyse the emergence and significance of Price-Tag violence. The violence fundamentally reflects a breakdown of an historic close pact between some settler populations and the State of Israel. Price-Tag attacks signify that for some a taboo of deploying violence against the State of Israel has come to be broken and that some in the settler community now see the State as an enemy. The is a dramatic shift which has developed. When the Jewish State of Israel was founded seventy years ago, it was positioned as a State synonymous with security. This was not only with its explicit security mission of serving as the ‘safe haven’ for the Jewish people in the wake of existential insecurity [Ben-Gurion, 1948]. In religious settler communities, particularly after the 1967 War where spaces of the wider ‘historic Jewish homeland’ came under Israel’s control, the State of Israel was also held in a deep metaphysics of messianic security. The State was seen as a sacred being whose (re)creation symbolised a reality of unfolding-redemption. Accordingly, the State and its sovereignty were revered.

How has this pact disintegrated? and, Why has violence against the State come to be legitimised by some? I will reconstruct a genealogy of a progressive disjuncture between some settler populations and the State. I will identify key milestones in this disjuncture which, I will argue, was particularly unleashed from the Gaza Disengagement (2005) where Jewish settlers were forcibly evacuated from settlement-communities in Gaza by the State of Israel. As an unprecedented act which the State took against ‘the Land of Israel’ and settlers, this was an historic moment in State-settler relations. Whilst (re)actions to this event were largely non-violent on the part of settlers/protestors, the act generated critical questioning. Disjunctive impacts were not immediately evident but were recognised after. Something broke in the Disengagement. For some in the settler community, their pact with the State of Israel (further) disintegrated. Dominant taboos were overcome, and pathways to new relations and (re)actions were opened.
The impacts of the Disengagement were seen less than six months later in the evacuation of the Amona outpost in the West Bank (2006). Violence was deployed more readily on the part of State forces and some settlers present. Post-Amona, further confrontations have occurred and a growth of extremism in settler communities is evident. This extremism is also increasing in terms of both acts of violence and ideological radicalism directed at the State of Israel [Fishman, 2017]. I will position Price-Tag attacks as the culmination of a disjuncture and radicalisation which was unleashed post-Disengagement. I will ask what the violence signifies about struggles over settlement, (in)security agendas, State-settler relations, increased radicalisation in segments of settler communities, and what impacts and insecurities the violence poses. With tracing this genealogy of violence and the critical questioning it raises throughout, this thesis will make contributions in particular to the sub-disciplines of Critical Security Studies (CSS) and Political Geography. It will reveal central interactions between the State, space and (in)security, and will expose how concerns and agendas of security are dominant in actions and relations.

The Historic Context of Settlement and State-Settler Relations

This thesis deals with a specific problematic located in a wider historic context. The construction of settlements over the Green Line (Israel’s pre-1967 Lines) is politically and legally contentious. Today, over 400,000 settlers, Jewish-Israeli citizens and subjects of the State of Israel, live in spaces of ‘the West Bank,’ or ‘Judea and Samaria,’ in 131 settlements authorised under Israeli Law and a minority in settlement-outposts unauthorised under Israeli Law [Peace Now]. Under International Law, all settlements are deemed illegal. Nevertheless, settlement units continue to be built. Settlement existence and expansion has provoked confrontations, undermined negotiations, and, condemned by international leaders as “a cause of grave concern” [Jpost.com Staff, 2013a], "counterproductive to the cause of peace" [Benari, 2013b], jeopardises reaching a political peace solution [United Nations, 2016], claims Israel’s current government rejects. For a 'Two-State Solution' to be attained, it is widely believed that this will require Israel’s further ‘disengagement’ from territory, in particular from spaces of the West Bank, and evacuating a number of settlements and settler populations from space. As actions which have been undertaken on smaller scales, these have been impactful on different levels. They have witnessed confrontation and violence, widened divisions in settler communities, struck at belief-systems and projects of security, placed strains on State-settler relations, and generated questioning regarding the Jewish State of Israel. How settler populations react to evacuations, debates such acts generate, and how violent confrontation/resistance against the State has come to be legitimised for some are areas of analysis in this thesis.
The focus of this thesis is upon the internal conflicts which have developed over the evacuation of settlement-communities and structures, and how this has led to divisions, fractures, and conflict for some, with the State of Israel. I seek to critically assess this (in)security problematic, asking why conflicts have emerged and what they signify. Following historic acts of evacuation in the Gaza Disengagement and the Amona outpost, in 2009 the ICG published a report entitled ‘Israel’s Religious Right and the Question of Settlements.’ It warned [i] that

many- in the leadership and among the grassroots - are preparing the ground for the next battle over settlements and territorial withdrawal, animated by a deeply rooted conviction in the rightness of their cause.

Price-Tag violence is a significant new phenomenon and era in such battle. Speaking after the attack on the IDF outpost in Yitzhar, Rabbi Avihai Ronski, former-Chief Rabbi of the IDF, declared that such acts are symbolic of a profound problematic the State is facing with “extremists”: “this is a group with anti-Zionist ideology...they do not believe in the establishment of the State of Israel or in the teachings of Rabbi Kook” [quoted Toker, 2014]. This is not just a confrontation on a direct physical level, i.e. the enactment of violence/violent resistance in space. Such battles surrounding settlement are also confrontations on ideological, political and metaphysical levels.

The teachings of Rabbi Kook⁶ are central to the ideology and movement of National-Religious Zionism [Ravitzky 1993]. This sees the State of Israel as religiously-sacred, intimately tying redemption with the State, which believes that a redemptive process is unfolding within its (re)creation, existence and operationality. Seen as a divine entity, National-Religious Zionism reveres the State’s sovereignty and institutions, including the IDF, and is an active force within settlement, historically working alongside the State of Israel [Newman, 2005; Neidle, 2013]. For Rabbi Ronski, there are Jewish extremists within the settlement community who are ‘anti-State.’

The ‘extremist fringe’ is largely associated with the Hilltop Youth. As a sub-section of the settler community which has grown post-Disengagement, this is a loose group of teenagers/young adults who share similar ideologies and lifestyles, living in unauthorised outposts often on hilltops in the West Bank. They have increasingly been the focus of attention of Israel’s security forces. Confrontations in and around outpost spaces and Price-Tag attacks are largely connected with Hilltop Youth. In the wake of investigations into Price-Tag investigations, a group was exposed within the Hilltop Youth called the Revolt. It holds radical ideologies concerning the State of Israel. In an era of Price-Tag violence, and critical ruptures in some State-settler relations, destructive agendas are aimed at the State of Israel. Understanding how such radical disjunctures and extremism have grown and exacerbated is what this thesis will trace.
Hypothesis

The research purpose is to critically assess the emergence and significance of Price-Tag violence. Its genealogy, I will argue, is based on a series of disjunctive moments from the Gaza Disengagement to now. The origins of such struggles lie in different perceptions of the meaning of the Jewish State’s (re)creation, relations with the Land of Israel, and different projects of security. Actions which the State of Israel has taken against the Land and settlement have witnessed increased fractures in relations. These have not just brought the security of the Jewish State into question, but its very being and legitimacy. For some, such actions are deemed a fundamental affront, posing great insecurity.

With the Gaza Disengagement constituting a significant disjunctive moment, I will trace a taboo-breaking trajectory of disjuncture from there where, for some, violent confrontation/resistance against the State of Israel has come to be (more) legitimised. I will trace a trajectory of how we have arrived from a pact of the settlers with the State, to the point of a radical, violent, anti-State, even verging on the revolutionary, disjuncture with the State of Israel. Some settler populations have no relations with the State and see the State in adversarial terms. For some, radical opposition to the State of Israel has developed. To them, the State has no religious-messianic significance and the Israeli State is synonymous with insecurity. In the growth of critical disjunctures, some subjects are seeking a new revolution to (re)create an authentic Jewish State, where the Land and security are protected. Price-Tag attacks are lodged in such strategy of (in)security, having significant (potential) consequences on the ground.

Key Concept: Disjunctive Moment

If the overriding concern of this thesis is why some settler populations are conflicting with the State of Israel over practices of settlement and settlement evacuation, and why, for some, violent confrontation/resistance has become (more) legitimised, the concept of ‘disjunctive moment,’ I argue, is crucial for such assessments. Developed from David E. Apter (1997), a ‘disjunctive moment’ is concerned with 'an event' which leads to a significant transformation due to its significance. It is ‘a break’ or a turning-point in some regard. The ‘disjunctive moment’ can be political and moral/ethical in nature.

Particular events or incidents create or open-up the possibility to a new path and unlock perspectives and (re)actions that previously would not have thought to be possible or actualised as a possibility. A ‘disjunctive moment’ therefore ‘liberates’ a new perception, agency, or course of (re)action. The significance of 'the event' in attracting/opening a fundamental transformation may not necessarily be apparent at the time of the event; the transformation or 'break' may
become apparent later. This ‘moment’ does not exist in isolation. Crucially, a disjunctive moment may break a taboo or may lead to the breaking of a taboo due to its significance, creating or paving the way to a new era in relations, responses and realities. I will apply this concept to assess how a taboo of deploying violence/violent resistance has come about in State-settler relations over settlement evacuations, and also how ‘disjunctive moments’ have developed into the openness of anti-state ideologies.

The disjunctive moment(s) therefore not merely paves the way for particular perceptions, (re)actions, responses, or changes, and ‘liberate’ these. It serves to give a perceived license for such transformations, indeed a perceived necessity and legitimisation. It both ‘liberates’ and ‘necessitates.’ The event is a confrontation with a reality but it is also a confrontation on an ethical, political, metaphysical, security and ontological level as it poses critical questions back to subjects themselves and their relations and (re)actions moving forward. This concept will be crucial for assessment throughout.

Case-Studies

Case-studies are invaluable components of this thesis where case selection involved careful consideration. ‘The Gaza Disengagement,’ ‘the Amona evacuation,’ and ‘the Ramat Gilad/Mitzpe Yitzhar Price-Tag campaigns’ were selected for important reasons. Each are (in)famous in serving to reveal the breakdown of relations between the State of Israel and some populations over acts of settlement evacuation. The Gaza Disengagement and Amona evacuation have been described as unprecedented in a number of regards. I will argue that both served as two historic and distinctive disjunctive moments in some State-settler relations, and I will assess how different (re)actions in the Amona evacuation can be explained compared with the Disengagement.

Whilst Chapter Six draws on a number of Price-Tag incidents to assess different forms of attacks, motivations and insecurities, larger focus is placed on the 2011 Ramat Gilad/Mitzpe Yitzhar Price-Tag campaign. These are amongst the most severe Price-Tag incidents to date, showing their scope and insecurities in the number and diversity of targets hit. In directly targeting Israeli State forces and architectures, this is important for further recognising important disjunctions. All cases I discuss in the thesis serve to offer valuable insights into developments in the nature and strategies of violence/violent resistance, taboos which have been (further) broken, debates and concerns which such acts stimulate, the significance of space and how it is weaponised, and disjunctions which have grown. The case-studies were a strong focus in my interviews and unique perceptions from a variety of individuals will be central to discussions and assessments.

Primary Research Questions
Aware of an unfolding situation of (in)security on the ground, this thesis began with and was continuously provoked by three primary research questions:

- Why are some settler populations conflicting with the Jewish State of Israel in and over space and settlement?
- Why for some has violence/violent resistance become (more) legitimised?
- What is the significance of Price-Tag violence?

**Interrelated Research Questions**

Four interrelated research questions are of high importance to the assessments and analysis:

- What is the significance of settlement ‘evacuations’ and what questions and problematics do they generate?
- What are the impacts of the Gaza Disengagement, specifically on State-settler relations?
- How can we account for (re)actions in the Amona evacuation?
- How can the concept of ‘disjunctive moment’ help to understand impacts and the legitimisation of violence?

**Methodology**

This thesis has applied qualitative methodology and an interpretivist paradigm. An interpretivist paradigm acknowledges that there are multiple perspectives of reality. Qualitative methodology is concerned with understanding meanings and actions in contexts. It takes into account values and environments, and how perceptions are (re)shaped by worldviews, subject positions and experiences. In qualitative research, ‘understanding’ is central, particularly ‘verstehen’-understanding from the perspective of the interviewee. Mason [2002:1] writes that qualitative research allows an exploration of “the understandings, experiences and imaginings of our research participants…and the significance of meanings they generate” and “celebrate(s) richness, depth, nuance, context, multi-dimensionality and complexity.”

Qualitative methodology is required for the nature and focus of this research. This thesis is concerned with complex and sensitive issues (political, religious, ideological, ethical, and legal), individually and as webs of relations. With these considerations central, I believe that it was indispensable to spend time on the ground, visiting communities and speaking directly with different individuals about issues, problematics and conflicts. In the Summer of 2013 and 2016, I undertook two research visits in Israel-Palestine, eighteen weeks in total, where I undertook
primary fieldwork. The chosen method was qualitative interviews. I conducted thirty-eight indepth interviews with a wide variety of individuals, the majority face-to-face.

The interviews allowed lived-experiences, beliefs, ideologies, viewpoints and concerns to be heard to an extent. Interviews provided primary insights into issues and events which this research is concerned with and constituted valuable opportunities to ask different individuals their experiences and thoughts on particular claims. Such discussions challenged or confirmed hypotheses, spoke back to concepts and frameworks, and stimulated new insights and potential paradigm shifts. Interviewees were carefully considered. Five groups of actors were identified:

- **Security/ think-tank actors** - these encompassed former government advisors, some involved in negotiations, and continue to be influential in advisory capacities.

- **State actors** - included a Member of Knesset (MK) (Israel's parliament), a former IDF commander who held governance positions, and former IDF officers from a variety of backgrounds.

- **National-Religious Rabbis** - encompassed rabbis from different political spectrums.

- **Settlers** - settlers were the largest group of interviewees. The vast majority can be described as 'ideological settlers' (rather than secular, economic settlers for example), but there was diversity within settlers whom I spoke with. Interviewees included settlers evacuated from Gush Katif during the Disengagement, National-Religious settlers from different political spectrums, ultra-nationalist orthodox settlers and supporters of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, outpost settlers, and Hilltop Youth individuals. The variety within this group of interviewees was particularly important for exploring State-settler relations and intra-settler divisions on particular issues.

- **Palestinians** - with Palestinians greatly impacted by Israeli settlement and settler violence, it was important to hear perceptions from Palestinian individuals. Interviewees included a Palestinian Authority official, villagers, and Palestinians who have suffered settler and Price-Tag violence.

Interviews came about through identifying particular individuals who would be valuable to speak with concerning the research aims and questions, identifying organisations and institutions who may facilitate such contact, building networks on the ground, directly visiting communities of interest, and interviewees recommending other individuals to contact for the research. All interviews were semi-structured. The majority began with foundational questions, such as 'what does Zionism mean to you?'; 'what does the State of Israel mean to you?'; 'what does settlement mean to you?'. Such questions allowed an opening into ideologies and positions. Responses later
enabled the undertaking of a thematic discourse analysis of perceptions, comparing and contrasting viewpoints from different interviewees and divergences on issues.

The interview structure flowed with questions divided into particular themes and centred on events or developments in line with my chapters. The semi-structured approach allowed focus in the interview and to ask targeted specific questions, exploring issues and events of significance in the thesis and research questions. Importantly, interviews provided space for interviewees to raise content which mattered to them and for the conversation to develop with particular responses, ideologies or concerns raised. This was important not only for research ethics but essential for the research. It pushed the thesis in new pathways, opened channels of thought and significance, allowing an exploration of unseen or novel aspects within issues/events. This further confirmed the importance of fieldwork where primary data is primacy of place.

Fieldwork was crucial for three further key reasons. Firstly, it enabled me to move-beyond secondary analysis and news-reports. Various interviewees critiqued how media and some academic circles generalise and oversimplify issues, some feeling that issues and communities are misrepresented altogether. Interviewees criticised this both for bias and for complexities within topics ignored or neglected. In particular, settlers discussed that many writers have never visited settlement-communities nor spoken with settlers they were writing about. In this research, fieldwork was placed as a central priority.

Secondly, given the research aims, methodology and paradigm, I sought to gain perspectives from different actors on issues and events. Interviews allowed me to ask carefully-considered questions to gain deeper understandings of topics or developments within my thesis. Gaining such access would have been extremely difficult, and the variety of interviewees largely impossible, if I was not on the ground and able to travel to different communities/institutions and build up networks and relations.

Thirdly, dealing with conflicts in and around particular spaces, it was crucial to gain insight into the nature of these spaces and realities there. Fieldwork enabled aspects of ethnography to be contained in the research. Directly accessing these spaces and communities meant I could gain a level of insight into experiences, ideologies, ways of life, and what space means to individuals.

*Research Ethics and Fieldwork*

Ethics is essential to research and was always at the forefront in designing and conducting my qualitative interviews. Informed consent, representation, sensitivity, confidentiality, anonymity, and interviewees’ rights were all central. Informed consent was primary. I made clear to interviewees what the research purpose was. Interviewees were encouraged to ask any questions
before, during and after the interview. Informed consent was imperative given the various contentions and sensitivities within the research, anddelicate issues of discussion I was asking interviewees their thoughts on. Confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed in all interviews. This provided opportunity for interviewees to discuss thoughts and concerns more openly. With this guarantee, I have not included names of settlement-communities where interviews took place, or exact venues, in case there is any risk that interviewees may be identified from this. In references, no personal details are given, only a brief description of the interviewee’s position, for example ‘National-Religious rabbi.’

Interview questions contained sensitivities which I was always mindful of in phrasing questions and in responses of both myself and interviewees. With the majority of interviews conducted face-to-face, I was able to observe body-language and reactions. I would exclude asking more sensitive questions if I felt that such questions would make interviewees uncomfortable or negatively impact them. In interviews with former Gush Katif settlers, for example, I was mindful that speaking about their former life and the evacuation they experienced may generate painful memories. Similarly, speaking with Palestinians about their concerns and experiences, such as enduring acts of violence, was also sensitive and may generate distress.

In interviews, it was made clear to participants at the beginning and throughout that they did not have to answer any questions which they were uncomfortable with or did not want to, and that the interview could end any time. I avoided asking questions particularly sensitive in nature, such as thoughts on violence and personal experiences, until later in the interview. This allowed, for example, rapport to be built between myself and interviewees and I could gauge how receptive interviewees were responding to different questions. Given the complex and sensitive nature of this research, the aim was to allow space for different actors to speak and allow their perceptions, concerns and experiences to be heard. Importantly, my research enabled individuals to have a sense of representation and empowerment. Interviewees also commented that they enjoyed reflecting on their views and developments, further making the research valuable.

As part of research planning and ethics, reflecting on the research environment was a crucial factor when travelling to and visiting communities. Ongoing conflicts and instabilities on the ground required continual risk assessment, planning and mindfulness when conducting fieldwork, for both myself and in situations where I was speaking with individuals in particular spaces. Language was another important consideration. Language is political and meaningful and this is more so in such contentious and ideologically, religiously and politically significant spaces such as Israel/Palestine. Sensitivity to such contentions and viewpoints was ethically important.

*Clarification on Terms*
Acts of violence are presented as violent confrontation/resistance, or violence/violent resistance. In the eyes of some subjects, such violence constitutes resistance. Acknowledging different perceptions of violence is important for research ethics and respecting viewpoints of different individuals I interviewed and interacted with. Expressions such as ‘violence has become legitimate’ is in no way meant to endorse violence on my part. Again, it signifies what certain individuals feel and attitudes which I was exposed to in fieldwork.

Chapters refer to ‘Judea and Samaria’ and not ‘the West Bank’ because of the audience which this thesis has largely dealt with. This is reflected within interview quotes and secondary literatures. Referring to spaces by one name over another is not designed as a political statement. The naming of space further demonstrates the significance of language and contestations within, and how subjectivity is intimately tied with space and language, which will be a focus of my thesis. Finally, for clarity, ‘Hashem’ is a revered name for God which interviewees sometimes used. Within interview quotes, ‘God’ is displayed as ‘G-d.’ Within belief-systems, displaying God’s name this way is an act of reverence. In line with research ethics, I have respected belief-systems which interviewees (may) hold, and displayed the name this way in interview quotes.

**Empirical Limitations**

This thesis acknowledges a number of limitations. Firstly, the word limit posed a number of restrictions. Whilst it was important to acknowledge and assess complexities within particular areas, I could not provide detailed historical analysis, unpack or trace certain ideologies or movements, or fully expand points. Similarly, whilst the thesis is etiological, there was not scope to include all details, developments or cases. Price-Tag violence, for example, has many occurrences and aspects. Whilst Chapter Six is purposely the longest chapter, further examples could have been assessed. I have explained case-choices, and offered at least foundational points regarding ideologies and movements so the reader is provided base understanding.

Secondly, whilst fieldwork was an integral part of this research, fieldwork had its own limitations. I was very fortunate that a wide variety of individuals spoke with me for this research. However, there were certain actors with which access was not possible but I know whose perspectives would have been important and valuable inclusions for further exploring research questions. This includes members of the Shin Bet and Nationalistic Crime Unit, who are at the forefront of Price-Tag investigations. It would have also been valuable to speak directly with rabbis who have or have come to have anti-State ideologies and ‘extremist’ positions. As an outsider, making such connections and gaining access was unattainable.
Thirdly, as my ability to speak/understand Hebrew is limited, this meant that interviews were in English. Whilst many Israelis speak English, including many settlers, and Anglo-Americans compromise a significant proportion of settlers, nevertheless this did restrict access. Fourthly, with primary fieldwork essential for my research, ideally it would have been valuable to be based on the ground for longer. This would have enabled more time to travel to different communities and speak with more individuals, gaining further comprehensive understanding. However, practical issues, such as visa restrictions, limited the amount of time I was able to. Furthermore, whilst I undertook my first fieldwork visit in 2013, my next fieldwork visit was not until 2016, despite planning fieldworks being closer. Events beyond my control prevented this.

Claims of Originality and Contribution

I contend that this research is original in four main aspects and areas, each and together making contribution to the fields of CSS, Political Geography and Israel Studies.

1) This research has been substantially informed and inspired by primary fieldwork data. The primary qualitative interviews add both originality and contribution by providing first-hand unique insights on important topics and richness to discussion and analysis. The research has moved beyond secondary analysis, allowing original perspectives on specific issues and significant events to be heard. The discussions and assessments have been heavily driven by this data. The thesis has brought into the open a variety of voices and perspectives not as heard before and has critically assessed and contrasted the viewpoints of a wide variety of actors.

From my knowledge, no other academic research on this area has brought together such a variety of viewpoints from diverse actors. As with the centrality of primary fieldwork in the undertaking of this research, interview data is placed in prime place in most chapters, allowing the originality and significance of viewpoints to speak in full force. Again, this approach of placing primary material central in chapters and to the whole thesis discussion and analysis offers an important and original contribution. This topic has often been approached in a partisan way. In placing perspectives from individuals on the ground central, this thesis sought to avoid this.

2) Viewpoints from individuals on the ground led me to develop an argument and approach which I feel adds contribution to understanding why conflicts/confrontations have emerged and what they represent. Situating the analysis within a framework of (in)security provides a new language and way of thinking-through conflicts and confrontations, and what they represent, in a way which may not have been considered before. As I will expand in Chapter One and throughout, my thesis brings important conceptual contributions to the sub-disciplines of CSS and Political Geography. Throughout, I assess interactions between a particular State, a particular space, and
considerations of (in)security. I will bring to focus different meanings and natures of space and (in)security and how these are contained and in contention in settlement practices. I will also examine how unique aspects of the Israeli case interact with and bring new dimensions to concepts, such as the force of belief-systems and where concern with redemption is dominant in relations and actions.

Furthermore, applying a novel concept within this discussion- ‘disjunctive moment’ and ‘disjuncture’- again offers consideration and explanation of why we have seen the development of confrontational and conflictual relations between the State of Israel and some settler populations, the overcoming of taboos by some, perceived legitimisation of violence/violent resistance, and the emergent openness of anti-state ideologies. With such conflicts and disjunctures and the future of settlement-communities uncertain, the State of Israel facing a problematic of (in)security. Gaining understanding and consideration of dynamics is essential.

3) Eiran and Krause [2016] write that although price-tag is a significant phenomenon it has received little scholarly attention and even less systematic explanation backed by original data and fieldwork in the region, despite the fact that it poses a number of key empirical and theoretical puzzles.

Price-Tag violence is not only a significant phenomenon which has emerged in the sense of new realities in State-settler relations in space. It is significant because of the insecurities it brings to different spaces and communities and the (potential) impacts it poses. I argue that my comprehensive analysis of Price-Tag violence, and how this intimately connects with discussion and analysis in all prior chapters, makes a contribution towards this empirical and analytical deficit. Furthermore, my analysis has been underpinned by original data from a variety of interviewees regarding the violence. Again, such data adds primary unique insights and stimulates analysis. My assessments draw on a variety of Price-Tag examples which allows the phenomena and its significance to be assessed systematically.

4) Whilst literatures on Zionism identify tensions within Zionist ideologies and between Zionist movements [Taub, 2010; Seidler, 2012], I also highlight and critically assess tensions on political and metaphysical levels. Recognising these tensions, I argue, contributes to deeper understandings of the conflicts/confrontations which are outplaying in and over settlement.

**Thesis Outline**

Centred upon a problematic of (in)security and disjunctures which have developed within some State-settler relations, this thesis is etiological. A common theme throughout each chapter is how
the State of Israel is interacting with subjects politically, metaphysically, ideologically and practically. Beginning with foundational conceptual discussions and then specifically the (re)creation of the Jewish State, I will next trace interactions and tensions within projects and practices of settlement. I will then focus on two central case-studies concerning historic events of settlement evacuation and how populations responded. I will trace the development of critical State ideologies, culminating in the emergence of Price-Tag violence and the uncovering of the Revolt. The structure is political as well as etiological as it asks fundamental questions of why these conflicts/confrontations have emerged, and the significance of violence. Divided into six chapters, together they trace this journey, each critically assessing the significance of particular issues, events and disjunctures.

Chapter One will situate my thesis in CSS and Political Geography. I will identify key concepts from these sub-disciplines which I will apply to assessments throughout. The chapter will also alert to unique aspects within the Israeli case and how these areas of complexity and uniqueness interact with and bring new dimensions to concepts, bringing conceptual contributions.

Chapter Two will then provide an historical-political foundational discussions on ‘Zionism’ and ‘the (re)creation of the Jewish State of Israel.’ I will assess two dominant Zionist streams- Political Zionism and National-Religious Zionism- and identify different security agendas and natures projected upon the space of Eretz Yisrael and the meaning and operationality of the Jewish State’s (re)creation. I will identify the State’s dominant political nature and its raison d’être. Marked by critical questioning, such discussions are central to analysis throughout the thesis.

From this critical questioning, Chapter Three will explore how the State and subjects are interacting in spaces of ‘the wider homeland’ with Jewish settlement-building. I will identify different strategies and projects invested in acts of settlement- a tool for State-(re)building and spatial (in)securitisation; and settlement as a religious act for hastening-the-redemption. In the act and strategy of settlement, I will draw attention to State-settler relations and how different projects exist side-by-side but tensions between, particularly the politics of settlement-outposts. The next three chapters will focus on key case studies (chronologically and as significant historic and political disjunctures) and how settler populations (re)act to acts of settlement evacuation.

Chapter Four’s focus is the Gaza Disengagement when the State of Israel ‘disengaged’ from Gaza and removed Jewish settlers from space, constituting the closure of the State’s sovereignty and governance-regime. I will discuss the significance of the Disengagement, dominant (re)actions at the time, and assess why violent confrontation/resistance against the State for the majority was a taboo. I will assess different impacts of the event and conceptualise that the Disengagement constituted a key disjunctive moment for the State and for some settlers.
Chapter Five directly follows from discussions in Chapter Four. The Amona outpost evacuation is its leading case-study because of the unprecedented violent confrontation/resistance which the evacuation witnessed. Revealing that a significant shift had occurred following (re)actions which were seen during the Disengagement, I will critically assess how such (re)actions can be explained. I will argue that the Amona evacuation emerged out of the disjunctive moment of the Gaza Disengagement and served as another disjunctive moment in some State-settler relations.

Chapter Six critically assesses a self-declared ‘new era,’ emerging post-Disengagement and post-Amona, the culmination of all disjunctive forces I will trace. I will begin by assessing ideologies and activities of the Hilltop Youth, and relations with the State of Israel. The chapter will assess the significance of Price-Tag violence, motivations, and impacts and insecurities of the attacks. As a new form of violent confrontation/resistance, I will critically assess the significance of this strategy and era of violence on strategic, political-ideological and relational levels, connecting back to discussions within all previous chapters, and how this reflects the culmination of a trajectory of disjuncture.

References

1 Price-Tag attacks are documented by Americans for Peace Now [APN], alerting to the forms of attacks and the different targets, communities and spaces of the attacks.
2 Amiram Ben-Uliel was charged with three counts of murder, two counts of attempted murder, two counts of arson, and one count of conspiring to commit a nationally-motivated crime.
3 These ‘dark and extremist forces’ also concerned extremism within Ultra-Orthodox circles. However, this other extremism is beyond the scope of this thesis.
4 Specifically under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Jewish-Israeli settlements constructed in East Jerusalem, home to approximately 200,000 residents, are also deemed illegal under International Law.
5 As Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently stated: “the reason we haven’t had peace here for a hundred years is not the settlements but the persistent refusal to recognize a nation state for the Jewish people in any boundary.” Quoted Associated Press and Halily, 2017.
6 Avraham Yizhak HaCohen Kook (1865-1935) and his son Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook (1891-1982).
7 With Jewish-Israeli interviewees.
8 Such criticisms were expressed by different settlers, Israeli rabbis, and security analysts.
9 I was invited to present on such dynamics of my research at an ESRC-sponsored event on ‘Risky Research in Conflict Areas,’ Lancaster University, May 2013.
Chapter One: Conceptual Framework- (In)Security and Space

Introduction

This thesis is critically assessing State (re)creation in a particular space, how this contains different agendas of security, and the significance of a self-declared "new era" of violence. In this assessment, I focus indepth on one key architecture and practice which is central to State (re)creation and agendas of security: the building of settlement houses in spaces inside and outside the State of Israel’s internationally-recognised territorial borders. Settlements have potently (re)structured space and their construction continues to be expanded through space. Settlement-building is a practice which is enacted by both the State of Israel and some of its subjects, Jewish settlers. However, confrontations and conflicts have emerged around practices of settlement between the State of Israel and some Jewish settlers. For some, disjunctures with this State have also developed. The concern of this thesis is to critically trace why.

At the centre of the disjunctures and conflicts which this thesis is tracing lies a paradox. The paradox is the following: Why has the State of Israel, which was (re)established on the premise to provide security to the Jewish people, come to be seen as a source of insecurity? and, Why do some of the State’s own Jewish subjects feel it is legitimate and even necessary to confront/resist against this State, even with violence? A key interaction throughout this thesis is between the State, space and (in)security and how subjects interact with these concepts and realities. Understanding these conflicts has been a journey-of-thought where each chapter contributes empirically and analytically to this understanding. A wide range of original empirical material from fieldwork I conducted has been central to analysis. Whilst this thesis is not dominantly theoretical in nature, key concepts have been important for deepening understanding and providing foundations on which assessments rest.

A theoretical framework is an approach for understanding and explaining features, issues and developments of research focus. It provides conceptual tools to think through problematics, to assess why we are seeing these, and what they perhaps signify. Rather than being tied down by frameworks, which close the mind to other considerations, reflexivity has been central. The theoretical framework of this thesis has been a constant discussion with the primary data and developments on the ground which have spoken back to concepts, challenged them and (re)negotiated the framework holistically. The
development of confrontations and conflicts between the State and some Jewish settlers, I argue, also raises important conceptual questions regarding space, and interactions between space and (in)security.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce central concepts and identify their importance in forthcoming discussions. Given the nature of the research issues, I have drawn on literatures and concepts from Critical Security Studies (CSS) and Political Geography. How concepts from Jewish religious thought interact with issues in this thesis will be discussed particularly in Chapters Two and Three. The theoretical contributions which this thesis makes to the sub-disciplines of CSS and Political Geography are threefold: first, assessing interactions between space and security where space has different natures, and assessing why space has become central to conflicts; second, critically examining different meanings and natures of security; third, alerting to how unique aspects and complexities regarding the Israeli case raise important questions of concepts.

Focusing on areas of (in)security and space, the first part of the chapter will identify how my thesis connects with CSS and Political Geography and how my cases bridge both sub-disciplines. I will provide general overviews of these sub-disciplines and identify key concepts, assessing their application to leading questions and concerns of this thesis. Firstly discussing features of CSS, I will focus on three important concepts: (in)security; security and subjectivity; securitisation. I will then explore how Political Geography closely connects with CSS. I will introduce main components of this sub-discipline and identify three concepts of high relevance: spatial (re)structuring; spatial control; the weaponisation of space. Drawing on examples, I will briefly assess how political geography features heavily in practices undertaken by the Israeli State.

Part Two of this chapter will narrow its focus. It will draw attention to the unique aspects and features of the State of Israel as a particular State operating in a particular space. The religious-messianic significance asserted by some of the State of Israel’s (re)creation in a space seen as the historic God-given Jewish homeland is a unique case. This religious-ideological grounding of reality brings unique interactions with the State and space and other significant security visions and concerns. From this, I will alert to tensions between different aspects of security, particularly security which lies with the sovereign State and its actions, and security which lies with a sacred space and truth and where the sovereign God expects that commandments are fulfilled. Achieving redemption is a higher concern and security. In identifying these different foundations of security, such belief-systems and groundings of reality bring responsibility upon subjects.
This opening chapter will not go into specific detail about the cases and developments of this thesis. Rather, its intention is to provide conceptual foundations for assessing central issues and dynamics which I will trace. I will end by alerting to how the conflicts and unique issues within raise important questions of the concepts. Throughout, the chapter will recognise this thesis’ contributions to sub-disciplines where my original empirical material will further interact with these concepts in interesting and important ways.

**Critical Security Studies and the Centrality of (In)Security**

If a central nexus throughout is between the State, space and (in)security, my thesis has strong applications to two key sub-disciplines: CSS and Political Geography. CSS is important in two particular aspects for my areas of focus, making this a pertinent discipline that my thesis is based in. Firstly, CSS underscores the foundational function of security in governance, practices and subjectivity. My analysis encapsulates this. Visions, agendas, and struggles of security are foundational to cases in my thesis and will be discussed across all chapters. Secondly, CSS raises critical questions regarding the impacts of 'security' and how security and insecurity are closely entwined. This thesis is underpinned by a seeming paradox of security. Some of the State’s own subjects, who this State has promised to protect, see this State, rather, in insecurity terms and are resisting against it and its security governance. This generates critical questions regarding 'security' and the State's security practices. Furthermore, in struggles over settlement and realities of violence, the State is facing a problematic of insecurity from some of its own subjects, again provoking important questions regarding security and insecurity.

With concerns of security as central, and struggles over security playing-out, gaining a grounding of what is meant by 'security' is imperative, providing foundation for analysis. As a sub-discipline of Security Studies, CSS explores the centrality of the concept of security. It places security as the foundation of thought and practice around which the modern state, politics and subjects are organised. 'Security' is the principle discourse and device for constituting political order and subjects on the basis of this order [Dillon, 1996; Campbell 1998; Huysmans, 2006; Reid, 2006, 2016; Edkins and Zehfuss, 2008; Jackson, 2012; Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013]. We are subjects of and subject-to security.

The modern state rests on a security contract with its citizens. Citizens expect their state to be their guarantor of security. Subjects are governed around the principle that there is no state without security and no security outside of their state. Their state, subjects are told, is their security racket. An influential relationship therefore exists between 'the state’ and 'security.' This relationship is prominent in the Israeli case and operates on a number
of different levels. As I will assess (Chapters Two and Three), the State of Israel promises security for Jewish subjects but it also seeks security. Concerns with ‘security’ are foundational to the State’s governance and practices (Chapters Three and Four).

Commonly, security and insecurity are conceived on an existential level. Security is thought as safeguarding mortal beings, creating conditions and practices to secure subjects of security. A condition of insecurity can mean existential danger, a life or death situation. Again, this is particularly pronounced in the Israeli case. The State of Israel was born out of a condition of existential security and this concern remains dominant (Chapters Two and Three). Ensuring the existential security of the State and its subjects is primary where the State legitimises its practices in existential terms. This concern with existential security is a particular grounding of ‘security.’

Elevating the dominance of ‘security,’ Security Studies and CSS are underpinned by central questions, taking a closer and critical look at how the principle of ‘security’ works in practice and the impacts of ‘security.’ These central critical questions include: What is security? What counts as a security issue/concern? Whose security? and, How can security be achieved? [Williams, 2008]. Such questions open-up security on a conceptual and analytical level. CSS focuses on three further key concepts that have strong applications to discussions in my thesis.

First, (in)security. Security and insecurity are opposites. If security is seen as the alleviation of threats or dangers, insecurity is the existence of threats or dangers which may cause significant harm in some regard. Whilst opposites, security and insecurity are symbiotic. To be secured, we need to know what we are threatened by. ‘Security’ and ‘insecurity’ are inseparable so we speak of (in)security [Dillon, 1996]. We are, therefore, also subjects of insecurity and subject-to insecurity. The security/insecurity dualism is important in another aspect. When we talk about security, exactly whose security matters? Furthermore, CSS alerts that there is a political economy within security. One person’s security is another’s insecurity. Issues of power and questions of rights are important in (in)security discussions.

Second, security and subjectivity. To be secured, we need to know what ‘security’ is and what practices and conditions secure this. The security foundation of existence and subjectivity is disciplinary, saturating existence and confining imagination as living-out-our-Being as (in)secure subjects of orders of (in)security. People seek security in relation to who they are and also who they are not [Stern, 2006]. Security shapes the self where we live through language of (in)security [Campbell, 1998; Jackson, 2012]. It tells us who
we are, what we value and what we should defend. Together, we see the constitution of
the securable subject. As well as security being a life or death situation, security can also
be thought as the preservation and defence of certain values, those values which matter
most. This security is also existential in the sense that these values shape our existence as
particular subjects. A threat to certain values constitutes a threat to certain subjects.

is technologization par excellence” [Pin-Fat et al., 1999:11]. Securitisation is an active and
productive process. Making something a site or aim of security brings things into being.
Securitisation has to adapt to expanding or shifting (in)security concerns and new threat
perceptions. In identifying threats/dangers, ‘security' requires finding/deploying actions
to alleviate these and therefore (re)gain security. Importantly, CSS alerts to what is
undertaken and legitimised in the name of (in)security and (in)security concerns.
Furthermore, what is necessitated in the name of (in)security. Achieving security and
protecting this security are the highest goal. It is difficult to argue with (in)security.

As well as critically looking at what is legitimised in its name, CSS signals seeming
paradoxes within security and securitisation. Stern [2006:187-8], for example, assesses
that “when people attempt to protect themselves and to create a sense of security, they
also produce danger, fear and harm” and, “as an integral part of promising safety, the logic
of security seems to spin webs of abiding violence and harm.” Insecurity is inseparable
from securitisation. CSS leaves a foreboding alert: the more we seek to secure, the more
insecurity there is. With (in)security central to all aspects of life, importantly ‘security' is
perceived as attainable. As an active process central to the practices and governance-
regimes of states, it is treated as a condition or goal to be attained in its attainability.

Security and securing security are seen as the key role and responsibility of the state.
Crucially, with security centrally tied with and monopolised by the state, the state itself
requires security to ensure its role and legitimacy. The state needs security just as much,
subjects are told, security requires the state. CSS further asks what actions and realities
does a state permit and legitimise to ensure its own security? The State of Israel has
enacted a number of practices in the name of (in)security. As I will critically observe, the
State's agendas and practices of security and security governance constitute insecurity to
others.

All three key concepts will be applied to issues and assessments throughout where my
thesis has strong applications to the field of CSS. As I will expand on later in this chapter,
my thesis brings important contributions to CSS in showing the centrality of security and
generating critical questions of it. However, as a sub-discipline, CSS places large focus upon the State and security and the practices of the State. The Israeli case emphasises that security can also be grounded elsewhere. I will alert to different aspects of security and how subjects have different perspectives of (in)security. I will particularly bring to emphasis the force of belief-systems and how these powerfully embody key concepts from CSS (see below). Subjects can hold visions and agendas of security and seek to actualise these through their own practices for security to be achieved. The force of such belief-systems raises valuable questions regarding (in)security and their impacts on State-subject relations. Furthermore, I will trace how different visions and agendas of security interact but can also be in tension in different practices, providing novel assessments of interactions and struggles of and for security.

**Political Geography and Space and (In)Security**

With the case of Israel importantly emphasising that security can be grounded elsewhere, the securitisation of a particular space is central to my cases and discussions. Whilst I critically assess relationships between security and the State, I also focus on the centrality of another relationship: security and space. In exploring State (re)creation in a particular space, I critically ask what the meaning of this (re)creation is (Chapter Two). As I assess, the nature of this space and State (re)creation are seen by subjects in different lights. Subjects have different relations with space and spatial practices have different purposes. Space is not only central but is of significance in different aspects.

Given the significance of space on different levels in my areas of focus, my thesis extends beyond CSS and also has strong applications to the sub-discipline of Political Geography. Political Geography is of importance in three particular ways. Firstly, the different ways in which Political Geography scholars look at the natures of space. Secondly, how the sub-discipline assesses the impacts of spatial practices. Thirdly, how Political Geography explores how space and subjectivity interact. My analysis applies these considerations and areas of focus to the Israeli case in different areas (discussed below). Providing valuable understandings of space, the sub-discipline includes scholars from backgrounds in Politics, Geography and Security who discuss space from diverse approaches. I will briefly introduce some perspectives.

Henri Lefebvre explores how space is ‘produced’ on three levels: it is a physical environment that can be perceived; it is a semiotic abstraction which informs how people negotiate space; and, it is a medium through which beings live out their life in interaction with others. Social interactions and space closely entwine. Lefebvre [1991] argues that
these aspects constitute a unitary theory of space, tying together the physical, the mental, and the social. Developing this, he applies another tri-approach to space: space is simultaneously a spatial practice (an externalised material environment); it is a representation of space (a conceptual model which is used to shape practices); and, it is a space of representation (a lived social relation of users to the environment).

For Lefebvre, space and everyday lived experiences closely interact. Different societies have different meanings and forms of space. Spatial conceptions precede the spatial practices of humans so every form of social organisation produces a spatial environment that is a consequence of the social relations it possesses. This is a dialectic relationship. A society not only produces a space according to its own nature but reproduces itself with this living space. Approaching space from a Marxist perspective, Lefebvre believes that space can allow for transformation and liberation. Social change cannot occur without the production of a changed space. To change life means to change space.

Other scholars focus on space and social order and how societies seek to organise space, separate spaces, and impose spatial boundaries [Foucault, 1986; Gordon et al., 2000]. Also approaching space from a Critical background, Doreen Massey draws attention to the nature of space. As Massey [1994:5] writes, attempts “to establish boundaries, to secure the identity of places, can...be seen to be attempts to stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time.” However, “such attempts at the stabilization of meaning are constantly the site of social contest, battles over the power to label space-time, to impose the meaning to be attributed to a space.” Despite binaries which we impose on space, for Massey, space and place are not bounded. Rather, they are defined in terms of openness and change, an ongoing production rather than a pre-given. Space is a place for meeting, an intersection of relations. Space is therefore a space of constant movement. Spaces have long histories which are not fixed but are constantly evolving. Therefore, space is not conceptualised as abstract nor as a mere backdrop against which things happen, but is understood to be social, dynamic and productive, with the potential for reproduction and transformation [Knott, 2014:40].

Scholars such as Engin Isin [2012], Charles Tripp [2012; 2013], Derek Gregory [2013] and Judith Butler [2011] also alert to the transformatory potentials of space and subjectivity by focusing on space and performativity. Space is where our socialised everyday routines are performed and where the imprints of disciplined bodies are enacted [Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983]. However, space can also be where new forms of the social and political can be (re)made [Rabat, 2012; Sassen, 2011] and orders and controls (re)negotiated.
There are many examples of state authorities seeking to control, contain or shut-down spaces through different means. These include constructing physical barriers or legally preventing access to and in space. Such practices limit everyday interactions in space and social interactions in the public sphere. However, spaces can remain sites of mobilisation.

Gregory assesses the transformation of the space of Tahrir Square in the ‘Arab Spring.’ Protestors refused the circumscription of this symbolic space and instead (re)appropriated space, allowing for resistance and reinventions. The body itself is central in this (re)claiming. Butler [2011:627] assesses that “the collective actions [of the crowd] collect the space itself, gather the pavement, and animate and organize the architecture.” As Gregory [2013:241] emphasises: “action also takes place.” Actions and performativity which bring things into being cannot be separated from the space through which this occurs. For Butler [2011:0], the presence of bodies in a space which was previously denied to them not only defiantly asserts a right; it is the performance of a new spatiality through which people “seize upon an already established space permeated by existing power, seeking to sever the relation...In wrestling that power, a new space is created.”

The fluid nature of space is therefore elevated. Being at the centre of struggles, space can be emancipated and emancipation can come from space and spatial actions. There is a dualism in performativity and space. Bodies can lay claim to existing spaces through new action and those “bodies are seized and animated by those existing spaces in the very acts by which they reclaim and signify their meanings.” As Gregory [2013:243] assesses, what we see is “the formation of a new, collective subject-in-space-in-process.” Space is a space of transformation and (re)becoming.

Other scholars explore how space and subjectivity closely interact. As Wylie [2002:441] acknowledges, “recognition of the constitutive roles of embodiment, practice and performance in the shaping of subjectivity is increasingly coming to the forefront of theoretical agendas across human geography” [Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000; Harrison, 2000]. Focusing on an Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community in the space of Broughton Park (Manchester), Oliver Vallins [2003] provides important analysis of how identity is closely tied with space. This is not only “the construction of socio-spatial boundaries that are used to define and mark out ‘them’ from ‘us’” but how the organisation of space serves to reflect and reinforce an identity and belief-system. Therefore, whilst the nature of space may be conceptualised by others as dynamic,”...attempts by groupings to stabilize and ‘fix’ (Bhaba, 1994) their identities and spaces are no less important or, for their everyday lives, ‘real’” [Valins, 2003:161].
In Ultra-Orthodox communities, there is a “system of regulation, control and ordering of society...an institutionalization of society and space underpinned by beliefs in the divine authority of sacred texts” [Valins, 2003:161; Valins, 2000]. Through the construction of social and spatial boundaries, such as gender-segregated footpaths or the blocking of streets on Shabbat, these seek to create a regulated and bounded society and keep corrupting influences ‘outside’ [Douglas, 1966; Shaffir, 1987, 1994; Mintz, 1994; Mathie, 2016]. Space can be thought of as a space of defence where spatial boundaries protect an identity and shield members of the community from ‘impurities’ and negative influences [Shilhav, 1984]. However, as Shilhav [1984] also argues, such boundaries can also allow for “cultural dominance” to be imposed on and in space. Assessing how space and subjectivity closely interact and how lived experiences are shaped by space, this reflects how space shapes subjects just as much as subjects shape space.

Finally, scholars such as Eyal Weizman and Stephen Graham take a critical and practical look at spatial practices, architectures and their effects (discussed further below). Violence can be imposed on and enacted through space by deploying spatial practices. With such practices, traditional spatial boundaries can be overcome, creating new spatial realities and new realities of power and violence in space, transforming space itself.

**Key Concepts in Political Geography**

All these aspects of space are applicable to the Israeli case, reflecting the multi-nature of space. For assessing practices and conflicts in this thesis, three particular Political Geography concepts have important applications.

First, **spatial (re)structuring.** Space is a canvass on which imaginaries and designs are enacted. Underlying practices are metaphysical foundations [Graham] where concepts and principles are enacted in building [Weizman, 2006]. Political Geography critically assesses how space is seen as a tool to be possessed and moulded. It looks at how actions in space are used to (re)organise and (re)structure space, (re)designing space according to imaginaries and agendas. Spatial practices have functionality. Practices and architectures are designed as tools to overcome particular problems. With a given state and space shaped according to a particular vision, spatial practices are informative. Planning and building reflect and advance the strategic and security agendas of states. In addition to an instrumental-security role, spatial practices are emancipatory. They liberate visions and desires, enabling new realities to come about.
Second, spatial control. In the innate relationship between security and the state lies territory. The post-Westphalian world is divided into a political order where sovereign states and ethnic self-determination are dominant [Murphy, 1996]. Enshrined in the United Nations Charter is the principle that “every people has the right to self-determination.” Whilst such definitions are open to meaning, the principle commonly rests on the notion of the right of a people to independence in its own homeland state [Summers, 2014]. In this political order, questions of territory and national survival are central. For effective governance and territorial security, the organisation of space is crucial [Crampton et al., 2007; Elden, 2007; Foucault, 2007]. Sovereignty is exercised on territory and on subjects who inhabit it where the defence and control of a given territory and space is crucial for security. This control applies to space inside the state and on the state’s territorial frontiers. Spatial securitisation and state power also extend beyond state frontiers [Graham, 2009; 2010; 2011].

Space can also be positioned as a site of encounter. Home to interactions and circulations, space is productive in allowing things to move, meet and come about. With this nature, space is a site of unpredictability. Filled with contingencies, space contains potential threats [Dillon, 2007a; 2007b]. In seeking to lessen insecurities, space is governed, brought under an order of control where it is organised and managed [Foucault, 2007]. Boundaries and limitations are placed upon space and on subjects in space. As well as advancing political and security aims, Political Geography alerts to how spatial acts reflect dimensions of power and sovereignty. Controlling movements and access are acts of sovereignty with who has the right to make controls and who can access what. Governing and restricting movements and practices can enable domination and subjugation. Using spatial practices to unilaterally shape realities for particular agendas serves power interests. Space and spatial practices have duality. They are used to both empower and disempower, to advance and curtail.

Third, the weaponisation of space. As discussed, space is not merely a theatre on which conflicts occur. Space is an integral part of this theatre and is central in political struggles, contestation and conflict. This is particularly so when the space itself is contested between actors. Throughout this thesis, we are dealing with a contested space with competing claims of ownership, belonging, and rights. Practices in this space are therefore contested. Importantly, Political Geography scholars provide an important conceptual framework for appreciating the nature of spatial practices and struggles. In contested spaces, space is (in)securitised and spatial practices are weaponised. Practices themselves serve as weapons to reinforce claims of sovereignty to this space. Space and spatial practices are
synonymous with both security and insecurity. With space a site of encounter, it is also a site of resistance. Other actors can use space and spatial practices to defend and advance their agendas. My assessment will reveal this in the actions of Jewish settlers, bringing an important contribution to the field (discussed forthcoming).

Political Geography therefore understands space as not static. Rather, it situates space as a theatre, including a theatre of power, will-to-power, performativity and violence. It takes a critical look at how space is organised and what practices and architectures are on the ground. It also alerts to how space and subjectivity closely interact. Furthermore, Political Geography and CSS have important cross-overs. Political Geography works hand-in-hand with state-building, state security and securitisation. Given the significance of space, space is not a neutral background on which political struggles occur. Space itself is focal in struggles and can be at the centre of oppression and violence. It can also allow for reinvention, resistance and liberation.

Political geography is prevalent in the case of the State of Israel where practices are central to both State (re)creation and securing this State. I will briefly discuss such examples. This not only offers a foundational grounding to the Israeli setting but I will begin to assess how key concepts are practically applied. I will then identify in what ways my thesis adds to existing literatures.

Israel and Practices of Political Geography

The State of Israel is a declared Jewish State in the Jewish homeland. This space is contested. Palestinians also claim belonging and rights to this space as the Palestinian homeland. Operating in a contested space, Israeli Political Geographer Oren Yiftachel [1999] classifies the State of Israel as an ethnocracy. An ethnocracy is a regime which attempts to extend or preserve disproportional ethnic control over a contested multi-ethnic territory. Ethnocracy develops chiefly when control over territory is challenged, and when a dominant group is powerful enough to determine unilaterally the nature of the state.

Asserted as the exclusive historic Jewish homeland, this space is underpinned by claims of truth [Hertz, 2008; Schwartz, 2008]. Such claims have guided and provided a perceived legitimisation for actions. After the Declaration of the State of Israel’s Independence in 1948, a concerted effort has been made to ‘Judaicise’ and ‘Hebraicise’ the landscape which involves different practices. Christine Leuenberger and Izhak Schnell [2010] explore the
role of cartography in the State of Israel’s (re)creation. As well as emphasising national borders, maps can also depict patterns of control and preferred national boundaries, emphasize potential threats and political disputes, and stimulate socio-political action. Such political and social concerns shape the maps’ hierarchization of spaces [Leuenberger and Schnell, 2010:805].

Maps present a particular reality of space which serve to reflect claims of ‘ownership.’ “Everything from mountains, valleys, springs, and roads were renamed in order to establish a Hebrew topography. The territory was reconfigured as predominantly Jewish” [Leuenberger and Schnell, 2010:810-12]. Such cartography reflects Lefebvre’s assessment of the representation of space and how this translates into spatial practices, reinforcing a new lived environment.

Political Geography does not just work on drawing boards but operates on the ground. With space contested, creating ‘facts on the ground’ with buildings, architectures and mechanisms of control has been paramount in the State of Israel’s (re)creation. State (re)creation has continued since 1948 where dynamic political geography has been central in Judaising the self-declared ‘Jewish State’ [Ben-Gurion, 1948] and (in)securitising spaces. As Yiftachel [1999] assesses: “the territorial restructuring of the land has centered around a combined and expansionist Judaization and de-Arabization program adopted by the nascent Israeli state” where

the Judaization program was premised on a hegemonic myth cultivated since the rise of Zionism, namely that “the land” (Haaretz) belongs to the Jewish people, and only to the Jewish people [Yiftachel, 1999].

Such assertions are accompanied with physical acts which create new realities in space. New Israeli buildings have been constructed in and upon spaces where Palestinian communities had existed and whose presence has been erased. Acts of erasure and addition have been documented in detail by scholars such as Ilan Pappe, Shlomo Sand, Nur Masalaha, and Walid Khalidi. They have conceived of such practices in existential terms, including ethnic cleansing [Pappe, 2006], apartheid [Masalaha, 2003], and reconquest- ‘the Reconquista of Palestine’ [Khalidi, 2009]. In these practices of political geography, space is reconfigured and re-owned. This reconfiguration is political in reflecting whose rights are respected and whose presence is warranted. Furthermore,
physical practices in space reinforce claims and prevent other claims being realised, simultaneously securing and insecuring.

If space is conceptualised by some militaristically as a battlefield, for Israel this battlefield is extra-territorial. In Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel gained control of East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank. With military victory in spaces ‘outside’ of the State, and Israel maintaining control of these spaces to this day, the State of Israel has ruptured its internationally-recognised borders. Not only does the Israeli State have control over these extra-territorial spaces; it has overwhelming control in these spaces.

The State of Israel has expanded its boundaries of sovereignty over territory where different systems of Israeli Law are enforced for different populations in space. This displays Foucault’s assessment that “territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it is first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power” [Crampton and Elden, 2007:176]. For over six hundred thousand Israeli subjects and citizens who reside in extra-territorial spaces, under violation of International Laws, they are subject to Israeli Civil Law. In contrast, for Palestinians who claim rights to this space as a Palestinian State, they have rights and freedoms suppressed. Palestinians live under Israeli military occupation and are subject to Israeli Military Law, under the State of Israel’s power. Subjects are governed according to different governance-regimes in space. Furthermore, divisions are imposed on and in space and space itself re-imposes divisions, for example segregated roads. The Israeli case vividly reflects that whilst inhabiting the same space, populations can exist in different spaces in their lived experiences.

Political Geography scholars, such as David Newman, Oren Yiftachel, Baruch Kimmerling, Eyal Weizman, Elisha Efrat, Jeff Halper, Stephen Graham and Leopald Lambert have approached the case of the State of Israel from a politics background. They have focused in-depth on Israel’s securitisation of space and the magnitude of the State’s spatial practices. If ‘security’ is a condition or goal to be attained, the State of Israel legitimises its actions according to security goals and concerns. The authors have alerted to how spatial actions, legitimised in the name of security, have been sources of insecurity for Palestinians. As Weizman [2003a] writes: “the human and political rights of Palestinians are violated…as the spatial outcome of a strategic planning” and by “the Israeli project of territorial control.” My focus on the use of spatial practices in the name of (in)security by the Israeli State and the impacts of Israeli actions in space contributes to this field.

As I will assess in Chapter Three, the State has unilaterally restructured space and spatial realities for its own political and security agendas where control in space is a dominant
concern. Through its practices, (in)security and political geography vividly merge. In Israel's extra-territorial spaces, security architectures command the landscape and everyday realities on the ground. Such practices closely connect with the work of Graham [2002, 2004, 2009, 2010] and his focus on the 'new military urbanism' where “everyday spaces, sites and infrastructures of cities- along with their civilian populations- are now rendered as the main targets and threats.” In this political geography there is an urbanization of military and security doctrine as cities and urban sites are problematized as key strategic sites whose density, clutter, unpredictability and vulnerability require new security lock-downs and radically new military paradigms [Graham, 2009:389].

The space of the West Bank is (in)securitised and militarised where the landscape is dominated by a range of security and military architectures. The State of Israel has established mechanisms of control which target the everyday lives of Palestinians. These include the installation of watch-towers, military bases, military patrols, infrastructures, surveillance technologies, walls, and fences. Yet, in Israel’s practices, such militarisation and architectures are not just enacted in urban spaces. All of the State’s extra-territorial spaces are securitised,¹ therefore extending beyond Graham's military urbanism. Being home to 'the other,' space is seen as containing a number of potential threats which need to be monitored, targeted and weakened. The Israeli case shows a prevalence and hybridity in acts of political geography to achieve this, deploying a range of practices and technological developments, such as drones.²

Weizman’s work is especially important for exploring the omnipresence and omnipotence of Israel’s use of architectures on the ground. Calling these ‘architectures of violence,’ architectures are not passively used; they are actively weaponised, playing central roles in the occupation and (in)securitisation of space. The great value of Weizman’s analysis is directing focus upon the environment itself. He alerts that all architectures and spatial (re)structurings must be seen as tactical tools in a strategy of control. In looking at the panorama, you are looking at the battlefield and built-in violence. With architectures and controls enacted in a contested space, Israeli leaders treat spatial practices as “the continuation of war by other means” [Weizman, 2014a; 2014b]. Spatial practices themselves serve as weapons in which the violence of architectures and the environment are deployed against Palestinians and their everyday existence-in-space:

the occupation is an environment that was slowly conceived to strangle Palestinian communities, villages and towns to create an environment where it
would be unlivable for the people there. The crime was done on the drawing-board itself [Weizman, 2014b].

Such practices have many impacts. Palestinian villagers can wake to find roads in/out of villages closed, or new gates or roadblocks installed. For Palestinians travelling through the West Bank, it is highly likely that they must pass through more than one checkpoint. Checkpoints constitute an eruption in space. They curtail movement or can stop movement completely. Their presence reinforces subjugation and a lack of control in space and over life. As well as its installation of architectures, the State of Israel can deny access in space. Spaces can be declared as 'Closed/Restricted Military Zones.' Palestinians can be denied permits to travel across territory. Palestinian Land can be acquisitioned to the State of Israel for a variety of reasons [Bt'Selem, 2010], therefore spaces legally and physically pass to new ownership. Finally, Palestinian homes/structures can be demolished by Israeli forces, physically removing presence in space.

With its practices in extra-territorial spaces, the Israeli State keeps rupturing its borders, continually (re)creating new spatial realities and realities of power and (in)security. This displays how space and spatial practices are used to enforce (in)security and power-relations, a crucial assessment which I will engage in. The dynamism in the Israeli case is the different mechanisms it uses. As authors like Weizman and Lambert critically assess, when we think about borders, walls, we think of a single instrument that separate Israelis and Palestinians, two sides of a map. But in the Israeli-Palestinian frontier, the border is splintered into various border devices. There are fences around settlements, blockades around Palestinian cities, highways that operate as borders, checkpoints and sterile areas, all border devices that shrink and expand the territory at will [Weizman, 2014b].

The State's political geography practices reflect that it acts as the sovereign, despite this space being contested and occupied and the borders undecided. Israel’s political geography is characterised by

the use of apparently temporary security-architecture to create permanent facts on the ground, the rejection of borderlines as the limits of state territory, [and] the preference for ever-flexible internal frontiers [Weizman, 2003a].

Such spatial practices reflect an instrumentalist-approach to space. Space is seen as a tool to be controlled and (re)shaped through power in line with the security and political agenda of the State. Through its enactments of political geography, Israel has restructured,
controlled, and weaponised space, generating matrixes of spatial control. These overt and impactful political geography practices have been sites of important academic analysis.

However, the space of the Land of Israel comprises more than an instrumental-securitisation aspect. As geographers such as Wylie discuss, landscapes can attract certain symbolic, spiritual and mythical associations. As I will examine in detail in Chapters Two and Three, this particular space itself is deeply symbolic. As the space of the ‘the Land of Israel,’ it has its own sacred history, sacred nature and, for some, own sacred destiny. It is a symbolic space. The Land is infused with spiritual significance: “here the patriarchs had walked, the prophets had spoken their message and the Israelite kings had reigned [Schweid, 1985:135]. The work of authors such as Michael Prior [1999] and Eliezer Schweid [1985] is influential in exploring the symbolic significance of the Land of Israel in Jewish religious and national thought. Space therefore has a nature independent from the securitisation and practices which the sovereign State has imposed upon and in this space. For my analysis, this is of ideological, political and practical importance.

As I will bring to emphasis, this space is not only significant symbolically. It is significant ideologically. Infused with its own history and nature, existence in this space interacts with this space in impactful ways. The ‘return-to’ this space generates meaning. This is not only how subjects confront ‘the home of the imagination’ with the encountered physical spatial reality. It also generates a central question of ‘what is the meaning of return-to this space?’ This question impacts on interactions and actions. For some subjects, the landscape evokes history which “feeds the national mythic imagination, giving settlers the sense of foundational authority based on long historical continuity” [Weizman, 2003a]. They are not only residing in this historic and meaningful space; with their return-to and existence-in-space, they are resuming history and a divine covenant with this space.

Return-to this space therefore brings important interactions between space and subjectivity. The symbolism and meaning of this space, by virtue of the innate essence of this space itself, cannot be detached from lived experiences, performativity and practices in this space. There is an embodied context of Being-in-this-space. Lived experiences and subjectivity are shaped by this space and the meanings and relations with it. For some subjects who have meaningful relations with this symbolic aspect, the vision of this space is influential. In encountering the physical Land, the “task [is] to overcome the contrast between the vision and the reality, to discover the true nature of the land and adapt...to it” [Schweid, 2006:134-135]. This will be a key focus in my analysis of Jewish settlement.

Space in the Israeli case therefore has significance and functionality in two aspects. One is a securitisation aspect where the control of space and the utilisation of spatial practices are deemed essential for the State of Israel’s security. Secondly, a symbolic/ideological aspect where this particular space as the space of ‘the Land of Israel’ has its own history and sacred nature, and, for some, its own sacred destiny. In exploring the different natures of space, the impacts of spatial practices, and how space and subjectivity interact in the Israeli case, my thesis has strong applications to the sub-discipline of Political Geography.

My thesis focuses on three features of space: State (re)creation in a particular space and how this connects with agendas of security and ideological meaning; the utilisation of a dominant architecture of political geography (settlement-building-in-space) by both the State of Israel and Jewish settlers and how this connects with State (re)creation and security agendas; and, conflicts which have developed over practices of settlement in space and the significance of acts of violence which have emerged. As I will trace, these three features are interrelated. Applying key concepts from Political Geography and CSS, my analysis bridges both sub-disciplines, bringing contributions to both.

A first contribution is that I will critically assess the relationship between space and the State of Israel’s security. There has been a lot of important academic focus on the militarisation of space and how security architectures transform space [Graham, 2002; Weizman, 2003, 2007, 2014; Efrat, 2006]. I will bring to emphasis how Israeli control in and over extra-territorial spaces, particularly the West Bank, is deemed essential for the existential security of the State of Israel and the existential security of its Jewish subjects. Settlement-construction and Jewish-presence-in-space is key for this. Space and spatial practices are therefore conceived in existential terms, shaping a particular nature of space and privileging a particular security relationship. With space and spatial practices deemed essential for security, governance of this space is crucial. As such, subjects and spatial practices are held under the State’s governance-regime and sovereignty.

With existential security the central concern, the symbolic aspect of this space has been dominated by the State’s existential security discourse. For some, the symbolic aspect of space has also been relegated. For others, it is threatened by the practices of the State. Focusing on this transformation is not only interesting. It is timely and important because of the impacts of this security discourse and the reality it has imposed. Existential security is commonly seen as non-negotiable. However, this is a reality which attracts
condemnation from some of the State’s subjects who respect the primacy of the symbolic meaning of this space. Others argue it is their rights to this space and complying with the sacred nature of this space which are non-negotiable. Respecting the divine covenant with and commandments in this space are primary.

Whilst security architectures may command the landscape, for others space and existence in it are commanded by a Higher power. This ideology can also command subjects-in-space and this space is commanding of subjects, bringing particular expectations and demands (Chapter Three). As I will observe, under the State’s sovereignty, boundaries have been placed upon and in space. However, can this space, with its divine nature, be arbitrarily bounded? On an ideological level, this is a ‘fixed space’ with an inherent sacred history and destiny which supersedes an imposed security discourse and imposed boundaries. In conflicts and confrontations which are outplaying, the different natures of this space and relations with it, I argue, are also in conflict. As such, whilst I focus on conflicts and confrontations in space, the natures of space are also brought into conflict.

A second contribution is critically examining how the securitisation and ideological/symbolic aspects of space are both encapsulated in settlement practices. The work of Newman [1982] and Jones [1999] is important for alerting to how ideological dynamics work with practices of political geography. Furthermore, how subjects themselves are instrumental agents in spatial practices. This can be conceptualised through a critical approach of how the State can use such ideological motivation to benefit its own security and political agenda [Newman, 1989]. Or, as Jones, and Lustick [1988] and Inbari [2012], assess, spatial practices can be motivated by an ideo-theological framework taken-up by subjects themselves. As I will examine, in the practice of settlement, there are important cross-overs between both, revealing how different agendas can use the same practice. However, I will alert to implications. Different natures of space shape practices differently and raise important political and practical questions regarding license and sovereignty. If actions can be justified in the name of ‘security,’ they can also be justified in the name of ideology, also providing a perceived powerful license.

A third contribution is the centrality of my original fieldwork material and how this reinforces and challenges concepts. I will bring original viewpoints from different Israeli and Palestinian individuals to the fore of what they think about settlement and the impacts of spatial practices. My interviews with a variety of settlers will distinctly signify relations with this space and the influence of ideology. This material will build on the work of authors such as Newman and Jones, where I will highlight the force of ideology in practice,
making an important contribution to this literature. Such original material will also provide direct insights of how space and subjectivity closely interact and the significance of this space from lived experiences, also bringing contributions to literatures on space and performativity. My interviews will provide direct insights into how a particular identity is both tied with and shaped by space, and the different impacts of actions which the State has taken against space and settlement.

A fourth contribution is critically questioning the ‘security’ and ‘ideological’ dichotomy. I will assess how the ideological aspects within this space and in the practice of settlement also embody significant security concepts. Whilst this may be a symbolic space, it is also a space infused with different security visions and concerns (see below). Furthermore, practices in space are enacted within and for a wider agenda of State (re)creation. The ideological dynamics of this, I argue, are also security dynamics. Supported by original interview data, subjects, who have deep ideological relations with space, also use spatial practices to further particular security concerns and agendas. This security can include advancing the ‘true’ meaning of Jewish-return-to-the-homeland, and advancing the Higher goal of redemption. This focus will move beyond a State-centric focus of security and the dominance of an existential security discourse. Instead, my analysis will alert to different aspects of security and space. Again this exposes the intimacy of CSS and Political Geography and how key concepts I have discussed are related.

A fifth contribution is my case studies. Chapters Four and Five focus on two significant events which occurred in spaces seen as the historic Land of Israel - the Gaza Disengagement and the Amona outpost evacuation. Assessing in-depth two historic acts of evacuation, and where my original empirical material heavily features in this analysis, also brings important conceptual contributions to both sub-disciplines. (Re)actions to the evacuations show the significance of space and how space itself is central in confrontations, conflict and resistance. It reflects how space embodies different aspects (ideological, security, symbolic, performativity, weaponisation). The encounters and confrontations in space between State forces and settlers/protestors, and how the evacuations were structured and responded to, served to reflect and differentiate subjectivities. Furthermore, in contrasting the different natures of how the evacuations unfolded, this is also of important theoretical value in showing how the nature of space itself was transformed. New acts of confrontation/resistance embodied the performativity aspect of space and new (re)actions highlighted what acts were deemed legitimate to defend space. In this performativity, new forms of the political were made.
Finally, I will assess how this contested space is not only a space of contestation between Israelis and Palestinians. It is increasingly revealed as a space of contestation between the State and some of its own subjects, Jewish settlers. Furthermore, spatial practices can be used by the State and some subjects against each other. For example, subjects can build homes/structures in space whilst State forces can ‘evacuate’ these, (re)asserting power and governance in and over space and over subjects. My analysis of a new form of violence which has emerged is of valuable conceptual significance in a number of ways (Chapter Six). The performativity of violence displays how violence can be used in and through space in a perceived defence of space and to advance security agendas in space. The nature of this violence transcends spatial boundaries and brings wider spaces into spatial battles.

**The Uniqueness of the State of Israel: Further Dimensions of Security and Space**

With a central nexus throughout this thesis being between the State, space and (in)security, this chapter has provided foundational conceptualisations of ‘security’ and ‘space.’ In consideration of this nexus, we finally need an understanding of ‘the state.’ In my conceptualisation of the state and governance, I have based my understanding upon the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault is renowned for critically assessing the modern state, the nature of power, and interplay of power-relations. This is a valuable conceptual and political mode of thinking to assess the operationality of the State of Israel. "The state,' Foucault [1991b:63-64] discerns, "consists in the codification of a whole number of power-relations which render its functioning possible."

With 'the state' an arrangement of power-relations, these are connected "according to the logic of a great strategy" [Foucault, 1990:97; 1991a:205]. Governance is central to the state’s operationality and concerns of security dominate governance. The state apparatus institutes and disseminates state power and governance [Constable, 1991] and is "a site of strategic action" [Lemke, 2004:52]. "The state' is an effect of political strategy. The state is also a practice where the regimes of governance are integral parts of the governmental objectives which constitute a state [Foucault, 2004:4]. For Foucault, power is productive, enabling things to come about. Power can also be negative in taking and depriving things. Seeing the nature of society and politics as an endless struggle, Foucault [2003] also argues that where there is power there is resistance.

Such interactions and struggles will be discussed throughout where the State enacts its governance-regime and power-relations over space, spatial practices and subjects. Practices by the State are met with confrontation and resistance by some subjects who challenge the State's power, sovereignty and mode of governance. This includes engaging
in independent actions in space (Chapter Three) and directly confronting State forces (Chapters Five and Six). However, if the focus of this thesis is upon conflicts which have developed between some subjects and their State, we need a deeper understanding of this particular State. Recognising unique aspects concerning the State of Israel is also essential to provide a foundational grounding for ongoing analysis.

The State of Israel is a particular State which exists in a particular space (Chapter Two). Though comprised of power-relations and regimes of governance, “the state is not only a material structure and a mode of thinking, but also a lived and embodied experience, a mode of existence” [Lemke, 2007:48; Maihofer, 1995; Sauer, 2001:110-12]. The State of Israel represents much more than an arrangement of power and a strategy of governance. Ideological foundations underpin the State’s (re)creation [Ravitzky, 1993; Seidler, 2012]. How the State of Israel and the Land of Israel are thought and experienced in religious ideology is imperative for conceptual discussions. Powerful belief-systems in the Israeli case are crucial to analysis throughout and importantly add new dimensions to concepts by bringing to focus different meanings and groundings of security.

In conceptualisations of security, ‘security’ can be thought in deeper metaphysical terms. In metaphysics, truth is security [Dillon, 1996]. Truth, as security, is securing the ground of what ‘is,’ providing a foundational grounding for existence and subjectivity. Whilst the State of Israel’s (re)creation is celebrated as the outcome of the aims and efforts of a particular political-nationalist movement (Chapter Two), the reality of State (re)creation in this particular space is underpinned by a different truth: “there is one primary, general thing: the state. It is all holiness and without flaw. It is a supreme heavenly manifestation of ‘he who returns the divine presence to Zion.’” This declaration was pronounced by Rabbi Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook, a leading rabbi within the ideology and movement of National-Religious Zionism. For some subjects, the State of Israel rests upon a belief-system which imbues the State with inherent sacredness.

As CSS literatures discuss, to be secured there needs to be an understanding of what ‘security’ is and what practices secure this. In Jewish belief-systems, the goal of redemption (geulah) is central. Progressing and achieving redemption is messianic security and acts and realities which hasten this therefore constitute practices of security. For religious individuals, the centrality of religious scripture is significant security and adherence to commandments (mitzvot) is paramount for achieving redemption. The Torah and Jewish holy scriptures are a Higher sacred truth, providing foundations of security and subjectivity. They also provide foundations and license for action. The Torah
represents both a divine authority and a divine guide in which God expects that commandments are respected and fulfilled by His subjects for destiny to be realised. The prominence of this was also made clear in numerous conversations I had with religiously orthodox individuals in my fieldwork. The Torah was the prism which individuals spoke through and abiding by this truth, fulfilling God’s will, and hastening-the-redemption were principal concerns. As one rabbi pronounces:

Torah study is fundamental to Israel’s existence. It connects the Jewish nation to God and to Divine values. Torah study is the key to Israel’s progress towards geula (Redemption), because in the Torah we learn about the destiny of Israel and the world, and of the mitzvoth - the paths to achieve this [Melamed, 2014].

“Security narratives offer seemingly cohesive representations of reality with a given past, present and future, with a beginning, middle and end, and a clear, coherent, stable subject” [Stern, 2006:192; Wibben, 2002; Disch, 2003]. Stern writes such narratives can be “seen as attempts to impose order and certainty, to ensure existence.” As I will trace, ‘the Jewish State of Israel’ is held in different visions. Such visions, I argue, are also security narratives where the Jewish State is securitised by subjects. With these security narratives, this State has particular expectations from it. For National-Religious Zionists, and a number of orthodox Jewish individuals, the State of Israel is not only imbued with inherent sacredness; an unfolding-process of messianic redemption is tied with the State itself.

Religious belief-systems intimately interact with the State and such thinking brings a uniqueness to the State of Israel. For some, the State represents a Higher messianic security and its essence, functionality and purpose are given by God. Therefore, whilst the State, in its governance and practices, may be dominated by an existential security discourse (Chapter Two), the State itself is permeated with a different security by virtue of its perceived innate essence. Security visions are projected upon both the State and space where the concern with redemption is dominant in relations. Such thoughts and groundings of security from belief-systems are exceptional to the State of Israel.

Areas of Complexity and Nuance in the Israeli Case: Further Theoretical Contributions

The Israeli case brings a number of unique aspects and complexities. Recognising how they interact with, challenge, and bring new dimensions to concepts, I argue, further brings theoretical contributions to the sub-disciplines of CSS and Political Geography. I will end this opening chapter by identifying these aspects and complexities whose nuances will be critically taken-up in other chapters.
First, I have assessed how security involves metaphysical security in securing the ground of ‘what is.’ With this foundational grounding, security can be existential in seeking to achieve or secure a particular reality. However, in the State of Israel’s (re)creation different realities converge. One reality is the reality of the present where the modern State has an overt political nature and governance-regime. A second reality is the State (re)created in the space of the historic Jewish homeland, a space where the Jewish Kingdom stood. A third reality is a sacred reality which is projected on this space and, for some, upon this State. The State’s true essence is divine and an unfolding-process-of-redemption is underway in reality.

The State of Israel therefore represents something more. This is not only in temporal dynamics within the State’s (re)creation of how history interacts with the present and how expectations from the State guide the future. It is also, importantly, in how the State’s (re)creation, and the reality which it is seen to operate in, bring dominant security and messianic expectations. Such belief-systems provide a security framework where reality is (re)interpreted according to an exalted vision. For some individuals who affirm that the State’s essence is inherently sacred, ‘the State’ and ‘holiness’ converge: “the holy is the political. The state is holiness. Being holy, it is perfect. Being holy and perfect, it is the divine chariot to which the horsemen of the redemption are harnessed.” With this metaphysical grounding, the State, its operationality and reality are securitised.

Despite this securing of reality, the State of Israel has a dominant political nature and operates largely as a secular state (Chapter Two). The nature and actions of the modern State of Israel do not match the vision of a religious Jewish State. How do subjects explain this negation? and, How do subjects negotiate with other realities in place? With a particular vision and security narrative projected upon the State, do individuals maintain commitment to it? For some, upholding this belief is security and security lies in maintaining this pact. However, what happens when this State engages in actions which undermine and even threaten the vision? What security questions and dilemmas do these generate? For others, maintaining commitment to the current State of Israel and respecting its sovereignty are a false security and harmful to attaining true security. To achieve true security, individuals must act to secure this. However, in what ways?

Alerting to such areas of complexity within the Israeli case contributes to the field of CSS particularly. I will draw attention to how different visions and realities interact but can also be in contention. This is not only on an abstract level. I will trace how such complexities are playing-out in practice. Central to interactions, I argue, is a key question:
How is the contemporary State of Israel and current reality interpreted, and how does this connect with considerations of (in)security? In tracing how realities and visions clash, I will assess responses and debates which the State’s acts generate from different subjects. Such responses themselves are of conceptual value in reflecting the force of belief, visions of security, and the will-to-secure. My indepth case-studies of key actions taken by the State against settlement will allow impacts to be assessed. Centred on original fieldwork data, perspectives from different individuals will display different responses, relations, and (re)actions, and show how (in)security is perceived in different ways.

Second, this thesis is exploring an interaction between a particular State and a particular space: the State of Israel and the Land of Israel. I will also focus on a particular cohort of subjects, Jewish settlers, and how their subjectivity and security interact with this particular space. This brings certain values and concerns, and shapes a particular identity and commitment-to this space. Alongside this interaction with and commitment-to space, settlers are also subjects of the State and subject-to its sovereignty. This interaction is therefore triangular between a particular State, a particular space, and a particular population. In the Israeli case, belief-systems are again dominant in interactions.

Literatures in CSS and Political Geography assess that it is commonplace for states to take actions in and against space. However, the actions which the State of Israel takes in and against the space of the Land of Israel cannot be divorced from the significance of this space in its own right. The Jewish faith rests on a central precept: Eretz Yisrael-Am Yisrael-Torah Yisrael: the Land of Israel belongs to the People of Israel according to the Torah of Israel. In belief-systems such unification is God’s will. The Land of Israel has its own inherent divine nature, imbued with sacredness and sovereignty. Not only may such actions by the Israeli State constitute a blow to this unification; they may threaten the sovereignty and security of this space and violate its inherent sacredness.

Faced with such actions, this generates important questions. Firstly, whose sovereignty do subjects respect foremost- the sovereignty of the State, or the sovereignty of the Land? Secondly, with settlers’ subjectivity and security intimately connected with this particular space, how do actions taken against it impact on the subjectivity and security of subjects? Thirdly, how do practices by the Israeli State against this space impact on relations with this State? In focusing on actions which the State of Israel has taken against settlement, my cases will elevate the significance of space itself, contributing to discussions in Political Geography and CSS. Furthermore, my focus on conflicts which have developed over space and settlement strongly signify how space is not just a theatre on which conflicts occur.
but space is integral to such conflicts. Not only do subjects use particular spatial practices to defend/advance agendas. Space makes its own demands of subjects.

Third, in the fields of CSS and Political Geography, 'security' is dominantly seen as lying with the state and its practices. Providing and ensuring security is the chief role and responsibility of the state. As I will discuss, the State of Israel places such concern as central to its actions and governance and affirms that it is the guarantor of security for the Jewish people (Chapters Two and Three). However, what is distinctive in the Israeli case is how some of the State's own subjects see security as also dependent upon their actions. In particular, religious settlers emphasise that they have divine commandments to fulfil, which include engaging in actions in the space of the Land of Israel. This responsibility is due to the Jewish people's own subjectivity as 'God’s Chosen People' and this divine responsibility has bearing. Commandments concern the meaning of State (re)creation, return to the homeland, and spatial practices. Failure to fulfil commandments is believed to impact messianic security and have potential insecurity consequences.

Such belief therefore brings new aspects to the field of CSS. In belief-systems, 'security' lies not merely with the State but with subjects whose actions are also central. Security requires subjects activating their agency and fulfilling commandments given by a Higher sovereign. With this security role and responsibility, this again generates important questions regarding sovereignty, license and (in)security which I will discuss throughout. For example, what happens if the State restricts the actions of subjects which they affirm are their right and responsibility and are crucial for security? and, What happens when different security practices and agendas come into confrontation? Such issues have political and practical implications upon actions and relations. As I will reveal, practices in space cannot be separated from such critical discussions.

Fourth, we often see how states are motivated by concerns of (in)security and justify their actions in the name of security. This brings a certain acceptability and legitimacy to such actions. However, if certain subjects also engage in actions in the name of (in)security and for security agendas, to what extent do such actions attain the same acceptability and legitimacy? What can individuals authorise in the name of security? Such key questions, I argue, must be posed to CSS and Political Geography. These questions challenge how we conceptualise of security and where security lies. Must the state have a full monopoly on security or can subjects themselves acquire a legitimacy to act? My thesis will place significant focus on how subjects use spatial practices to liberate visions and enable new realities to come about for security agendas. As my thesis will trace, acts of violence have...
also been enacted by subjects, including acts of violence against their own State. How do subjects legitimise this? and, What does this signify about the force of (in)security?

Fifth, in conceptualisations and discussions of security, the state is meant to serve as the security racket for its citizens and engages in practices for security. However, what happens when the state is not seen as the source and guarantor of security but is, rather, perceived as a threat to security? What happens when the security practices of the state threaten other visions and practices of security? and, critically, What if the state itself is seen as a key source of insecurity? If the state is seen in increasing insecurity terms, what actions are perceived as permissible to confront this insecurity? Is it legitimate to challenge or overcome this state in the name of security? How individuals confront practices, seen as practices of insecurity, from the Jewish State will be central to analysis throughout this thesis. The concept of disjunctive moment (Introduction), I argue, is crucial for this understanding, adding a key conceptual framework to CSS discussions. I will apply this concept in tracing how relations between the State of Israel and some settler populations have become (more) fractured. Key actions by the State have served to open new paths of thought and (re)action, and have given a perceived license for this, including the legitimacy of violent confrontation/resistance.

Such focus is importance because in most literatures analysts focus on contestations between the State of Israel and Palestinians and how Palestinians react to practices of insecurity from this State. My focus is upon how some of the State of Israel’s own subjects, Jewish settlers, respond to the State’s practices, specifically acts it takes against settlement. This assessment is timely and imperative. Such responses have become an increased concern for the State of Israel where the State's own security is increasingly being challenged. Placing focus on these internal conflicts and (in)security problematics will bring contribution to the sub-disciplines of CSS and Political Geography. I will critically observe how key concepts and questions discussed in this chapter are used by subjects themselves to challenge their own State, its practices, and regime of (in)security.

Conclusion

A central interaction which underpins this thesis is between the State, space and (in)security and how subjects interact with these concepts and realities. The key theoretical concepts which this chapter has discussed- (in)security, security and subjectivity, securitisation, spatial (re)structuring, spatial control, and the weaponisation of space- are of great relevance to assessments throughout. They will serve as valuable conceptual tools to help understand why conflicts have developed between the State of
Israel and some of its subjects over settlement. Concerns with and agendas of (in)security are central to this thesis where spatial practices are principal in this. The focus which this thesis will place upon Jewish-Israeli settlement-building, a practice which attracts large condemnation from Palestinians and internationally, will bring contributions to the fields of Political Geography and CSS. My analysis will show how key concepts from CSS and Political Geography are applied in practice. Furthermore, it will display the impacts of spatial actions and how acts are legitimised in the name of (in)security.

This thesis is dealing with a particular State, a particular space, and a particular population where ideology is dominant in relations and (re)actions, and where visions and expectations are forceful. My areas of focus and cases will encapsulate the concepts in vivid ways. Unique aspects of the Israeli case will also challenge concepts and bring new dimensions to them. The key concepts and critical questions discussed in this chapter underpin analysis. If spatial practices are used to secure realities, we need to critically ask what realities do they seek to secure? Progressing this, I will next look concretely at the (re)creation of the State of Israel and the visions and projects which this (re)creation rests upon. Chapter Three will then focus on the practice of settlement-building. As CSS literatures discuss, (in)security will be central to cases and practices. Thoughts and agendas of (in)security will be the thread which binds this thesis.

As well as reflecting the centrality of (in)security, crucially I will also emphasise how security uses subjects and makes its own demands. The thesis will reflect the impacts of agendas of security and what is legitimised in the name of (in)security. In tracing the developments of disjunctures and conflicts, I will progressively shift emphasis always from the State to the actions of subjects. In contestations which have developed over the Jewish State’s practices and actions against settlement, I will assess a narrative of an undoing of a pact between some subjects and the Jewish State. Tracing an undoing of a pact of security and applying the concept of disjunctive moment which adds to CSS discussions, I will critically reveal how the State and its practices have come to constitute insecurity for some of its own subjects. Responding to this reality of insecurity, some subjects seek to take security into their own hands to bring about a different reality.

References

1 Specifically the West Bank and Gaza.
2 Used for various purposes, such as surveillance or to drop tear gas on Palestinian protestors.
3 Quoted Persico, 2017; emphasis added.
4 Such religious ideologies will be discussed in more detail in preceding chapters.
6 Author Interview, National-Religious Rabbi, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.
Chapter Two: The (Re)Creation of the Jewish State of Israel—Projects of Zionism, Space and (In)Security

Introduction

'The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel' was unilaterally announced on the 14th May 1948. More explicit in this Declaration is "the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz Yisrael, to be known as the State of Israel" [Ben-Gurion, 1948]. The State's (re)establishment is celebrated as an outcome of the efforts of the Zionist Movement, widely regarded as the national liberation movement of and for the Jewish people/nation. The Movement's political agenda was formulated in the First Zionist Congress in 1897 where Theodore Herzl [1897], the father of Political Zionism, stated "we want to lay the foundation stone for the home, that is destined to be a safe haven for the Jewish people."

The State's (re)creation is infused with a framework of rights where "the First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own county" [Ben-Gurion, 1948]. The State of Israel (Medinat Yisrael) is (re)created in the Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael). As "the birthplace of the Jewish people" [Ben-Gurion, 1948] in the Jewish belief-system, this space is loaded with metaphysical significance and historical, religious, messianic, political, and security meaning. "Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland," Israel's Declaration of Independence writes [Ben-Gurion, 1948]. With the (re)creation of the State of Israel, this marks a national return to the Land of Israel and "national rebirth" within. Exploring how the Land of Israel is seen as both 'a national home' and a 'land of destiny,' Eliezer Schweid [1985:9] assesses that the correlation between the traditional image of the land of Israel, with all of its shadings, and its current image of a country in the process of being built up as a modern state, is at the very least, problematic.

Over recent years, this problematic has become increasingly pronounced where a rupture has been expressed in confrontations and acts of violence between the State of Israel and some of its subjects, Jewish settlers who reside in spaces asserted as the historic homeland but not in the State of Israel's formal sovereign territorial borders. It is the contention of this thesis that such conflicts/confrontations we are witnessing over settlement intimately relate to tensions within the foundations and perceptions of the 'return' to the Jewish homeland and the Jewish State's (re)creation. Such tensions, I argue, are firstly in the relationship between the State of Israel and the Land of Israel. In particular, how the
modern-day (re)creation of the Jewish State in Eretz Yisrael impacts upon the meaning of this (re)creation, expectations of the State and Jewish Being in the homeland, and questions and projects of liberation and redemption which constitute different security frameworks in this relationship.

Secondly, within the State’s (re)creation in space lie distinct visions and projects of ‘Zionism.’ Such visions and projects are of very different natures. They have different views, sometimes fundamentally incompatible, regarding the nature and purpose of the State of Israel in its being and operationality. This matters because these impact on attitudes to the State and relations with it where there are significant discrepancies between how ‘the Jewish State’ is seen and how it acts. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed introduction to Zionism, nor to discuss at length different ideological branches. Rather, it seeks to assess central ideological and political tenets of ‘Zionism’ and identify divergences and tensions within. I will take-up key conceptual discussions from Chapter One, looking concretely at the interaction between a particular State and a particular space, identifying different natures of space and different aspects of security.

With ‘Zionism’ a self-declared ‘Jewish Revolution,’ I will begin by critically asking what the meaning of this vision is. I will contrast two dominant ideological and political streams in Zionism: Political Zionism, which is defined by values of liberalism, emancipation and secular Western influences; and, National-Religious Zionism which situates the Jewish State of Israel’s (re)creation in a framework of messianic-redemption, imbuing the State with inherent holiness. I will also briefly observe other religious frameworks which the State of Israel is held in. Assessing these ideologies, this reveals different natures projected upon space, different meanings of the ‘return’ to the homeland, and different natures and meanings regarding the Jewish State’s (re)creation. The visions and projects of Political Zionism and National-Religious, or ‘Redemptive,’ Zionism, I argue, are both agendas and projects of security.

I will then identify the conditions in which the State of Israel emerged as a political entity and how this has shaped the State’s dominant political rationality and governance-regime. The State was born out of existential insecurity in the wake of the Holocaust where the security of space was an existential imperative for the Jewish nation. The State of Israel’s promise to safeguard Jewish life from further existential insecurity means that it is defined by a biopolitical rationality concerned with ‘making life live.’ Spatial practices discussed in Chapter Three intimately relate to this. The chapter will end by raising further critical questions regarding Zionism where perceptions from interviewees further divergences.
The critical assessments regarding the meaning of the 'Jewish Revolution'—identifying different projects of Zionism, space and State (re)creation, and recognising the nature and governmentality of the State as a political entity, will provide important awareness of the foundations and tensions upon which the Jewish State of Israel rests. Such awareness is crucial as I will later assess how some subjects are confronting and resisting against this State. In spatial practices, ‘the Jewish State‘ and ‘the Jewish Revolution’ are brought into question, and there are struggles for the (re)creation of what individuals see as an ‘authentic Jewish State.’ The relationships, tensions and divergences discussed here can be seen as the origins of disjunctive moments which I will trace in subsequent chapters.

'Jewish Revolution'

The starting point of our journey is the State of Israel’s (re)creation, foundations it rests upon, and how these are interpreted. One day following the State’s Declaration of Independence, Zionist leader Menachem Begin [1948] pronounced that there

is no doubt that the revival of Hebrew national independence in our generation has no precedence in human history…a new regime was about to arise; a nation was coming to life; a very old nation which had gone down into the pit of destruction was being re-born.

The (re)coming-to-being of the nation is a dramatic statement, asserting the emergence of a new existence. The basis upon which the State of Israel rests is declared as something greater. The State emerged out of a self-declared revolution, a "Jewish Revolution" [Ben-Gurion, 1944]. "Zionists and their opponents agree that Zionism and the State of Israel constitute a revolution in Jewish history" [Rabkin, 2006:5]. The ‘Jewish Revolution’ itself is revolutionary. Like many authors on Zionism, Shlomo Avineri [1981:13] discusses how “Zionism was the most fundamental revolution in Jewish life,” how it “changed a passive, quietistic, and pious hope of the Return to Zion into an effective social force, moving millions of people to Israel.” ‘Zionism’ is both an ideology, containing ideological branches within, and a political and national movement. Under the direction of the Political Zionist Movement, ‘Zionism’ sought mastery and a new national ‘awakening’ [Pinsker, 1882]. This marked an historic change in Jewish Being and existence. After two thousand years of living a Diasporic existence in the galut, a condition of exile which in the Jewish religious belief-system was a result of God’s will, this was brought to an end.

It is such ‘awakening,’ movement, and liberation which the influential proto-Zionist Leo Pinsker called for.1 Published in 1882, Autoemancipation is an unabated critique of Jewish
Diasporic existence, declared as an existence of insecurity. This insecurity was not only with the "disgrace and persecution" which Jews faced, but was on ontologically and existentially deeper levels. Pinsker [1882] rejected the 'living' of Jewish Being and authenticity of Jewish existence, writing "for centuries we have been revolving perplexedly in a magic circle, allowing a blind fate to rule over us." Entrapped in a rotation of "vacantness," "passivity" and "blindness," such existence, Pinsker argued, betrayed their "ancient national character" and heritage: "what a miserable role for a nation which descends from the Maccabees!" In the problematisation and politicisation of thought, the ground of Jewish Being and existence was questioned and unsettled.

Modern Zionism emerged in the late nineteenth century among European Jewish circles. The ideology and movement of Political Zionism willed Jewish individuals to free the self- and collective nation- from the closures of historical circumstances which "fate had thrown them" [Pinsker, 1882]. Instead, Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion [1944] urged, "we must master our fate, we must take destiny into our own hands!" In the will to "master fate," 'destiny' was central. The Jewish revolution' was "against our historic destiny" and "for changing our national destiny" [Ben-Gurion, 1944]. 'Zionism' is an hermeneutical, ontological, metaphysical and existential revolution of and in Jewish Being, a (re)claiming and (re)assertion of Jewish agency. Herzl [1897] proclaimed at the First Zionist Congress that modern and cultured Jewry have "outgrown the Ghetto." This was replaced by an active movement of change- "the will to make of ourselves a wave of the future" [Ben-Gurion, 1944]. In the State of Israel's (re)creation, Begin [1948] reflected that within a generation there developed within the Jewish people the strength to take up arms, to rise against alien rule, to throw off the yoke of oppression. How long, how endless were the years of exile, of humiliation and destruction. How short, in comparison, were the years of revival, reinvigoration, and armed uprising.

The Zionist movement had a definite political and territorial aim [Herzl, 1897]. "With the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state, Zionism succeeded in achieving the most important goal that it set for itself as a movement of national liberation" [Yehiya, 1998:267]. However, the kind of state which 'the Jewish State' is in its (re)creation attracts different views. The State of Israel is comprised of different visions and agendas. Enacted and operating in a particular historic and spiritual space (see below), the different visions and projects of 'Zionism' bring with them their own requirements and expectations of 'the State' which is 'lit-up in a particular light.' Perceptions of what the State 'is' is not only a question on a political level, i.e. the political or ideological nature of the State. It is a
question which concerns the metaphysical nature of the State, i.e. what the State ‘is’ in its inherent being, and therefore a metaphysical security. This will be significant in how religious communities interpret Zionism and the State of Israel (discussed forthcoming).

If “Israel is an audacious vision that came true,” as Shlomo Ben-Ami [2013] declares, asking what this ‘vision’ is attracts different idealisms and divergences [Hertzberg, 1973; Schweid, 1985]. Since the advent of modern Zionism, Dov Avraham [2014] assesses, there has been “a very deep internal tension...at its root is an identity crisis: What is Zionism? What is its purpose, its raison d’etres?” Rather than discussing ideological streams of Zionism in-depth, I will next identify distinct conceptions of space and projects of State (re)creation in ‘the homeland.’ Such identification is pivotal for grounding understanding of ideological and political divergences within ‘Zionism’ and ‘the State of Israel’ [Taub(a); Taub, 2010; Seidler, 2012] and different security frameworks. This assessment is significant not only ideologically. It has political and practical consequences. Divergences in thought regarding the nature of the State of Israel’s (re)creation and its relationship with the Land of Israel, I argue, are the foundations of ruptures which have developed between the State and some of its subjects, and in the outplaying of conflicts today.

**Political Zionism: Space and Liberation**

The dream of true freedom finally found its full expression in the Zionist idea-to be a free people in your homeland.

*Barak Obama, 2013*

Israel, the Jewish State, is the realization of the Jewish people's right to self-determination.

*Benny Netanyahu, 2014 [quoted Wilner, 2014]*

“The meaning of the Jewish revolution is contained in one word-independence! Independence for the Jewish people in its homeland!” declared Ben-Gurion [1944]. An Israeli political leader also stated that “the essence of Zionism is sovereignty. If there is no sovereignty there is no Zionism.”4 The State of Israel’s Independence Declaration celebrates “the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land” [Ben-Gurion, 1948]. As a movement of and for national liberation, liberation in space is a crucial goal of Political Zionism: "what we need most, a recognition of the absolute necessity of a home of our own...creating a secure and inviolable home" [Pinsker, 1882]. In this national home, the 'living nation' is grounded in national existence where “Jews can flourish as Jews.”5

It is therefore wrong to question whether Zionism is about 'liberty' or 'land' [Taub(b)] as this assumes the two can be separated. 'Liberty' and 'land' are mutually compatible. Land
is needed for liberation where the 'ownership' of land, a national sovereign space- a 'home'- is synonymous with liberation [Pinsker, 1882]. Yet in my interviews, there were differences in the meaning of a 'national home.' In asking what the State of Israel means to them, one left-wing MK replied:

home for Israelis, home for the Jewish people. The State of Israel is the fulfilling of a dream, which must not be on the whole of Eretz Yisrael, it can be on part of Eretz Yisrael, and the dream is that we will have permanent recognised borders.6

Another interviewee replied that the State of Israel means “home,” and ‘Zionism’ is “our right to a homeland.” As we will see, the ‘home’ of ‘permanent borders’ and the ‘home’ of ‘rights to’ and in ‘the homeland’ are sources of tensions. These tensions are contained in practices of settlement in wider spaces asserted as ‘the homeland.’ They are also sources of tension between settler communities and the State of Israel. Whilst this is a focus of preceding chapters, the focus of this chapter is to identify the concrete political nature of the Jewish State of Israel and different perceptions of this State and of Zionism. The political nature and operationality of the modern Jewish State of Israel has been brought into critical question by certain communities. As one individual states: “we established a non-Jewish state in Eretz Israel” [Ben-Yochanan].

Political Zionism is the dominant movement and ideology which brought about the State of Israel’s (re)creation. Recognising Political Zionism’s nature is important for recognising the nature of ‘the Jewish Revolution,’ and foundations upon which the State rests. The explicit aim of Political Zionism was “to secure for the Jewish people a publicly recognised, legally secured home” [Herzl, 1897] where “the end goal of Political Zionism was of course the creation of a Jewish state” [Netanyahu, 2013],7 embodying auto-emancipation [Fisch, 1978:2]. Dov Avraham [2014] assesses that “the establishment of a modern “normal” state for the Jews intended to facilitate the Jewish nation’s integration into the family of nations.”8 In Political Zionism, the right to national self-determination is centred on universal entitlement and justice; they are entitled to this “natural right...like all other nations, in their own sovereign state” [Ben-Gurion, 1948].

Occurring in an age of emancipation, Political Zionism took motivation from the independence which “oppressed and subject nationalities had gained” [Pinsker, 1882]. Declared as a ”Jewish national renaissance” [Ben-Gurion, 1944], historically Zionism was a secular movement of modernity. No Political Zionist leader “would advocate a return to the practice of their ancestral religion” [Rabkin, 2006:8]. As Barnavi assesses,
Zionism was an invention of intellectuals and assimilated Jews...who turned their back on the rabbis and aspired to modernity, seeking desperately for a remedy for their existential anxiety [quoted Rabkin, 2006:7].

As "an essentially secular nationalist movement" [Ben-Ami, 2013], Political Zionist leaders drew on modern sentiments, dominant ideologies, diplomatic tools, movements, and interests to secure the goal of (re)creating a sovereign Jewish State [Avineri, 1981; Taub, 2010; Thomas, 2011; Seidler, 2012; Dov Avraham, 2014]. With language ‘from destruction to rebirth’ engulfing Zionist ideologies, "Zionism should be defined as a territory-based revival of the Jewish people-a revival that includes different aspects"[Zilbersheid, 2004:80]. Yaakov Rabkin [2006:16] writes that “above all, Zionism put forward a new definition of what it means to be Jewish.” The characteristics of the new Israeli identity, ‘the Hebrew man,’ were the antithesis of traditional Jewish characteristics of Jewish Diasporic existence and orthodox Jewry [Rabkin, 2006; Shapiro, 2017]. New values were elevated in ‘the Jewish Revolution,’ such as militarism [Shindler, 2005]. In individual branches of Zionism, the nature of the "Jewish national renaissance" is diverse. For example, Socialist/Labor Zionism’s focus is breaking “the constricting chains of national and class oppression,” the ‘proletarianization’ of Jews and transforming them into “pioneers” [Borochov, 1905; Ben-Gurion, 1944] and creating an egalitarian and self-sufficient society [Syrkin, 1898; Yehiya, 1998]. In Revisionist Zionist ideology, the nature of the State is defined by a ‘Greater Israel’ ideology through territorial expansionism, and values of national pride, sacrifice and militarism [Shelef, 2004; Kaplan, 2005; Peleg, 2005; Rabkin, 2006:111]. Whilst different natures are projected on the State of Israel, in the State’s Declaration of Independence it is declared as “Jewish” and “democratic” and operates with a democratic political ideology, institutions and laws. This identification is important for recognising the concrete nature of the modern State of Israel on a political and legal level, the State, I will trace, which some subjects are resisting.

The State’s declaration of ‘democracy’ has been critiqued and contested. Not only in the treatment of Palestinians [Davis, 1987, 2003; Cook, 2006; Thomas, 2011; Massad, 2011; White, 2011, 2014; Levy, 2014; Adalah; Btselem], and some who critique the anti-democratic practices of the State towards some Jewish subjects [Bam et al., 2005; Honenu]. But, as I will discuss, the very principal that the Jewish State is declared as ‘democratic’ is deemed fundamentally wrong for some. Whilst philosophers such as Sari Nusseibeh [2011] argue that "the idea of a "Jewish State" is logically and morally problematic because of its legal, religious, historical and social implications,” others
welcome these implications. They declare that realising an ‘authentic Jewish State’ is what is demanded and is crucial for security [Kahane, 1974b; Ginsburgh, 2003]. As I will trace, some subjects declare that the State of Israel is a ‘non’- and ‘anti-Jewish’ establishment. Not only are subjects confronting/resisting against the State and its practices of governance and (in)security, they are actively striving for the (re)creation of an ‘authentic’ Jewish State by overcoming the Zionist State of Israel (Chapter Six).

**The Space of Eretz Yisrael**

The Jewish journey begins in the Land of Israel, and it is here that it always strives to return ...the State of Israel was established, in its own right, out of love and longing for an ancient homeland, by virtue of a dream that came true, a dream that became reality. *Reuven Rivlin, 2015*

After assessing the nature of the ‘Jewish Revolution’ and the State of Israel’s political nature, I will assess how ‘Zionism’ and State (re)creation interact with the Land of Israel. The relationship between ‘the State’ and ‘the Land’ has fundamental implications for how State (re)creation and Jewish return-to and existence in the homeland are seen, and upon projects of security.

Liberation in space is the thought of (in)security. In the early years of Political Zionism, the concern was for the Jewish people to be housed in a space, a homeland of their own where they could achieve and enact national existence, liberation and political sovereignty. With this aspiration as primary, Pinsker [1882] declared that “the goal of our present endeavors must be not the “Holy Land,” but a land of our own.” North America, South America, Crimea, Uganda, Madagascar, and Argentina were territories suggested for ‘the Jewish Revolution’ to take effect [Taub, 2010:30-31]. But whilst *Eretz Yisrael* - ‘Zion’- was not the foundation upon which Political Zionism based its aims, "it is rather its (necessary) conclusion" [Taub, 2010:23]: “the will to make ourselves a wave of the future...and of a land of Israel so regenerated” [Ben-Gurion, 1944].

Today the inseparability of ‘Zionism’ with ‘Zion’ is pronounced: “a Zionist is a person who wanted or supported the establishment of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel” [Yehoshua, 2013]. A national liberation movement, it was realised, must take place in the space of the historic national home. Within Political Zionism this was a practical-orientation, reflecting an instrumentalist-approach to space. There was a need for a territorial homeland and, as Herzl [1896:30] declared, “the very name Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvelous potency.” Under Political Zionism, the nature of this space is practically and politically transformed. Historically there has been a “vital relationship between the
[Jewish] people and its land...[and] the people’s right to return to it” [Schweid, 1985:9]. However,

their awakening desire to realize this relationship and act on this right by settling the land and through political activity- testified to changes in the prevalent concept of Jewish nationhood and in the traditional image of the land of Israel. No longer was it seen as the land of destiny, the holy land; rather, it was a land to be possessed, a foundation upon which the national might of the people could stand; no longer an exalted religious symbol, it was a homeland, a “national home” [Schweid, 1985:9].

Political leaders make clear that 'the Jewish Revolution' is a movement-towards-the-future: “not our origin and our past but our mission and our future are what determines our path...the shaping of the tomorrow” [Ben-Gurion, 1944] where

our enemies tried to bury the Jewish future, but it was reborn in the land of our forefathers. Here, we built a foundation for a new beginning of freedom, hope and creation [Netanyahu, 2012].

Yet, as Rabkin [2006:67] assesses, Zionism is simultaneously “opposed to Jewish tradition...and seeking liberation from this tradition itself.” On ideological and political levels, this raises questions regarding the nature of Zionism which I will bring into critical focus in this chapter’s conclusion. If Zionism “is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes,” their interaction is an assessment we need to contemplate.

Assertions of ‘rights’ are also multi-layered. Whilst Political Zionism centres on a discourse of ‘natural right,’ State (re)creation is reinforced through other rights: “the legitimate historical right of the Jews to their national homeland”; “the Jewish people’s inalienable right to re-establish sovereignty in its ancestral homeland”; “preexisting natural, historical and legal rights” [Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016].

One day after ‘the State of Israel has arisen,’ Begin [1948] stated that the Jewish people were “renewing the covenant that was made between [God’s] chosen people and [God’s] chosen land” through Jewish national-return to spaces of Eretz Yisrael. Gershom Scholem “repeatedly posed to his listeners and readers the following question” [Ravitzky, 1993:3]: "can Jewish history manage to re-enter concrete reality without being destroyed by the messianic claim which [that reentry is bound to] bring up from its depths” [quoted Ravitzky, 1993:3]. Scholem furthered:
the Land is a volcano. It provides lodging for the language...people do not realize what they are doing. They think they have made Hebrew into a secular language, that they have removed its apocalyptic sting. But that is not so...every word...is laden with explosives.\textsuperscript{14}

It is how the space of \textit{Eretz Yisrael} is seen by virtue of its own innate nature, history and destiny [Schweid, 1985] which I argue is central to relations. In the Jewish belief-system, the Land of Israel is a land of destiny which God promised in a divine covenant to the Jewish people [M. Kempinski, 2016; Kook, 2016. As Schweid [1985:15] assesses, “this understanding gives form not only to the bond between land and people, but also to the image of the land and its significance to them: it is the Holy Land, the Promised Land.” Ideology closely interacts with space. With the Land of Israel seen as a land of destiny as well as a national home, this fundamentally impacts on ‘Zionism’ and the meaning of the return-to and Jewish national existence in the homeland. As Rabbi Meir Kahane [2011] stated: “Zionism is from Zion.” It also impacts on expectations of the (re)creation of the Jewish State in this space and upon questions of (in)security. Whilst enacting the “Jewish national renaissance” in space, the nature of this space and ‘destiny’ is, for some, already written where messianism is integral and pervasive in the meaning of State (re)creation.

\textbf{Religious Interpretations of Zionism: Space and Redemption}

The modern State of Israel- the foundation of Hashem’s Throne in this world- must be understood not only as His Divine handiwork but also as an early stage in the development of universal redemption- a process that unfolds through a series of historic events. \textit{Hakohen, 2016}

In its founding essence, Zionism is not a religious movement. Under leadership of predominantly secular Jews, the State of Israel was not envisioned as the state of the Jewish religion; rather, the Jewish nation. Herzl wrote: “we shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples” [quoted Batnitzky, 2011:155]. Israeli commentator Anshel Pfeffer [2017] states that “there is no doubt the foundation of Israel was a fundamentally secular enterprise.” The State of Israel is declared as “Jewish” and “democratic.” Democracy is privileged over \textit{halakha}, Jewish religious law.

However, the significance of Zionism and the State's (re)creation on religious, theological and messianic levels is unavoidable. 'The Jewish Revolution' is a confrontation with, and overcoming of, a centuries-old "divine punishment" according to the belief-system of Judaism. Furthermore, the Zionist movement is directed upon the space of \textit{Eretz Yisrael}, the historic God-given homeland and land of redemption [Schweid, 1985; Prior, 1999].
Despite Herzl’s claim [1897] at the First Zionist Congress to represent “the entire Jewish nation,” the nature and legitimacy of ‘Zionism’ and State (re)creation was and continues to be deeply divisive in Jewish circles [Vital, 1982; Ravitzky, 1993; Rabkin, 2006].

Jewish tradition formulates that the Jewish people will return to ‘the Promised Land’ "through the agency of spiritual effort” [Rabkin, 2006:77], total faith in a redemptive process commanded by God and elevating spirituality and religious observance, rather than returning through political agency. National return can only occur through messianic intervention. Only God can bring an end to exile. A secular movement retaining the Jewish nation to the biblical homeland was/is promulgated as anti-Torah, rebellious and sinful and therefore a large majority of the religious establishment was/is against the Zionist movement [Vital, 1982; Ravitzky, 1993; Rabkin, 2006]. Aviezer Ravitzky’s work is important in showing the variations of religious ideology and different non- or anti-Zionist approaches in Jewish orthodoxy. Rabbi Yaacov Reines, for example, declared that

Zionist ideology is devoid of any trace of the idea of redemption...in none of the Zionists’ acts or aspirations is there the slightest allusion to future redemption.

Their sole intention is to improve Israel’s situation [quoted Ravitzky, 1993:33-34].

Reines, and other rabbis, supported the Zionist Movement on a purely practical basis. In ultra-orthodox (haredi) religious circles, spirituality and politics- the sacred and the profane- are strongly separated, either as a means to support or reject the State of Israel’s (re)creation. Many haredim living in Israel inhabit a non-Zionist consciousness, remaining in ‘exile in the Holy Land,’ interact little with the State and secular Israeli society, follow haredi practices of strict halakhic observance, and await the true redemption from God [Ravitzky, 1993:145-181]. Other haredim and Jewish sects, such as Neteuri Karta, Toldot Aaron, and Eda Haredit, inhabit an anti-Zionist consciousness [Mathie, 2016]. They deny the legitimacy of State (re)creation, do not associate with the State, and hold hostility to the State of Israel and ‘Zionism.’ They openly call for the State’s destruction because its existence is deemed both a crime against God and a fundamental danger to Judaism and redemption [Ravitzky, 1993:40-78].

The transformation in Jewish agency and subjectivity within Zionism brought about an historic and revolutionary change in Jewish existence with nationalism, political enfranchisement, and the adoption of secular and liberal values. For some orthodox communities, such change is viewed with disdain. This transformation is seen as a corruption and defilement of Judaism and Jewish Being [Rabkin, 2006]. One statement issued by Neteuri Karta, for example, reads:
worse than the toll of suffering, exploitation, death, and desecration of the Torah, has been the inner rot that Zionism has injected into the Jewish soul. It has dug deep into the essence of being a Jew. It has offered a secular formulation of Jewish identity.16

Whereas Political Zionism’s goal is to ‘normalise’ the Jewish people as ‘a nation amongst nations,’ this is criticised in religious circles for diminishing Jewish ontology and the status of the Jewish nation as God’s ‘Chosen People’ [Kahane, 1974a; Ginsburgh, 2003]. For example, Rabbi Amital declared that “its inner thrust is not the normalization of the Jewish people- to be like all the other nations, but rather to be a holy nation, the people of the living God” [quoted Inbari, 2012:75]. The function of Eretz Yisrael serving as a ‘safe haven’ is further criticised for undermining the religious and sacred significance of the Land. Whilst secular and political visions are projected on the State's nature, many religious Jews see Israel foremost a space of Torah study.

Whilst ‘Zionism’ may seem fundamentally incompatible with traditional Jewish religious belief-systems, Zionism's inherent meaning has been interpreted differently. In religious circles, religious significations of the return to Eretz Yisrael has rethought the meaning of Zionism and the State of Israel’s existence, nature and purpose. Within Zionism, we see not only language of ‘liberation’ but language of ‘redemption.’ Rather than an end in itself, in some Jewish religious circles, the State of Israel's (re)creation marks an 'event,' an unfolding-process where ‘redemption’ is central. In ‘The Tale of Two Zionisms,’ there is another voice, an older, deeper voice of Zionism that resonates...the voice of Redemptive Zionism. Within this paradigm...the State of Israel is but a step in the continually unfolding process of redemption, a redemption that is defined through the unification of the people of Israel with the God of Israel in the Land of Israel [Dov Avraham, 2014].

Under the thought and influence of Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hakohen Kook, and his son Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Hakohen Kook, a "profound messianic political theology" of National-Religious Zionism emerged [Hellinger, 2008], uniting nationalism and messianism. As one interviewee stressed:

the National-Religious Zionist movement is a new invention, a reaction to the secular idea of nationalism...they were religious Jews who said we want to combine the idea of nationalism and religion. They are religious nationalists.17
The interviewee warned that “when we talk about Religious Zionism, there are different ideas, and perspectives.” Different perspectives regarding the State’s actions against settlement will be discussed in later chapters and how ‘religious nationalism’ takes different forms. Rabbi Kook viewed “the heresy of secular Zionism as a grave error” [Inbari, 2012:22-23]. Instead, the Jewish State’s (re)creation is lit in a new metaphysical light. Wagner and Katz [2005] assess that “Kook’s approach is revolutionary in that he saw religious significance in a Jewish state. The state contains inherent holiness and is a tool for the bringing of redemption.”

National-Religious Zionism is characterised by a framework of redemption. A revolutionary approach is contained in the ‘Jewish Revolution’ [Hellinger, 2008] where such approach serves as “the theoretical and ideological foundation for the contemporary emergence of Jewish fundamentalism” [Lustick, 1988:30]. It is total faith that a redemptive-process is unfolding, commanded by God, that imbues the State of Israel’s essence as purely messianic for many orthodox individuals. Rather than against God’s will, all Jews, it is argued, are compelled to support this because its (re)creation is exactly God’s will, a God-given miracle. “Yom HaAtzmaut,” the State of Israel’s annual Independence Day anniversary, “is a day on which a miracle occurred for the entire Jewish people” [Hacohen, 2016]. The State of Israel, therefore, does not just have a different essence. A different security framework is projected upon this State. For “Redemptive Zionists,” or Zionists who situate ‘Zionism’ in a security framework of messianic redemption,

the ingathering of the nation of Israel to the Land of Israel is the fulfilment of an eternal promise by Gd. Redemption Zionists see it as incumbent to remain loyal to that promise and to help enable its complete fulfillment [Dov Avraham, 2014].

Dov Avraham [2014] critically writes that

the goals of Herzlidian Zionism are a false destiny...therefore doomed to fail. The miracle of Israel cannot be truncated by the pragmatism. Any attempt to do so will only set back the entire enterprise.

‘Destiny’ is (re)claimed and asserted. From a movement ‘established’ by secular Jews, Zionism ‘became’ a movement ordained and directed by God. Rabbi Zvi Yehuda, who became a leading figure in National-Religious Zionism after his father’s death, affirmed

it is not for nothing that the Holy One...is gathering the dispersed of Israel to their Land....it is not for nothing that He is breathing the wondrous spirit of heroism into the remainder of His chosen seed;...it is not for nothing that He is taking the
adherents of the Torah, the carriers of its flag, and the soldiers of its army and bringing them here to its place, to magnify and adorn and restore it to its true and eternal state, for the life of the inheritance of choice and sanctity [quoted Inbari, 2012:26].

Crucially, whilst the State’s dominant character is secular, in National-Religious Zionism its essence is inherently holy. Zionism’s inner core is not material but spiritual [Ravitzky, 1993; Schwartz, 2005; Kook, 2016]. The State of Israel’s (re)creation is foundationally claimed to be an outcome of divine providence. Positioned in a belief-system that the State’s existence is a sign and process of unfolding-messianic-redemption, Rabbi Avraham Kook declared that secular Zionists and religious Jews are “two complementary parts of a higher synthesis of which none of them were yet aware,” and “when these two counterparts of the higher truth merged, they would bring about a merging of sovereignty and halacha” [Taub, 2010:39]. Although this may for the time be hidden, secular Zionists are God’s agents, fulfilling a divine plan written and underway. Such ideology and belief-system is a dominant security narrative. God is leading Jews - secular and religious- to the Holy Land, where, ultimately, the nation will return to faith and full redemption will be achieved. In Religious Zionist ideology, Jewish subjectivity and agency are (re)shaped.

Furthermore, State (re)creation itself is a process: the (re)creation of the state is “a stepping-stone on the path to the ideal state” [Taub, 2010:39], a divine entity from which something greater will follow: “[restoration] to its true and eternal state.” 21 For Rabbi Kook and other rabbis, this is ‘the foundation of the throne of God in the world.’ Under this messianic outlook we see the "sacralization of the profane" [Prior, 1999:72] within National-Religious Zionism. The practical and spiritual are interwoven. The Land of Israel, the State of Israel, and the Army of Israel are collectively constituted with holiness [Melamed, 2014]. "Zionism is a heavenly matter" and "the State of Israel is a divine entity, our holy and exalted state!," Rabbi Zvi Yehuda declared [quoted Ravitzky, 1993:82]. It is therefore crucial and incumbent that this sacred State and its laws, sovereignty, institutions, and army are revered because of the security which the State represents.

In speaking with settlers and rabbis who identified as National-Religious Zionist, such views were pronounced. One settler and former IDF officer discussed their upbringing and inculcation with Zionist values:

everyone joined the army, everyone was so proud. It is part of the upbringing, you’re very Zionist, you’re very passionate about serving. In my synagogue, each individual is doing something really, really important in the army.22
In asking one Israeli rabbi how they would describe themselves, they answered: “I am a Religious-Zionist. I have huge amount of respect for, huge belief in the State of Israel.”

One settler who described themselves as “very, very Religious Zionist,” replied that “Zionism is to live in Israel, to serve in the army. To establish a country and to live here and see the miracle of Israel. It’s a miracle.”

I asked one National-Religious rabbi what the State of Israel means to them. They stated:

it is our security, coming-back to our Land and history. Allowing us to fulfil the arising of what our Prophets spoke about. The reestablishment of the Jewish nation to its Land which we have very deep connection with. This is our liberation through the Zionist movement.

Another National-Religious rabbi replied to the same question:

the State of Israel is the tool, which in my eyes is a holy tool, not only a technical tool, in which the Zionist movement is expressing itself. All of our dreams are being expressed, they are being fulfilled by having a sovereign state; by no longer living as guests in other people’s land but in living in our Land as our nation. And this is a fulfilment of our purpose, which is a biblical purpose, but also a nationalistic purpose and a very realistic purpose.

For Jewish religious individuals, Zionism and State (re)creation are situated in a definite metaphysics, a religious and historic framework and reality. This definite grounding is a grounding of security. For National-Religious Zionists in particular, the return to the space of Eretz Yisrael and State (re)creation in this space are foundations for the fulfilling of a sacred vision of a definite end-of-redemption. Ian S. Lustick [1988] discusses how in some orthodox circles, State (re)creation and actions in this space are located in a framework of Jewish fundamentalism. Lustick [1988:6] defines a fundamentalist belief-system as one where adherents “regard its tenets as uncompromisable and direct transcendental imperatives to political action oriented toward the rapid and comprehensive reconstruction of society.” In Jewish fundamentalism there are central principles [Lustick, 1988; Inbari, 2009]: establishing Jewish sovereignty over spaces seen as the entire biblical Land of Israel; implementing an authentic Jewish form of governance and halakah; and rebuilding the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, thereby implementing the divinely-ordained...messianic redemption...the rapid transformation of Israeli society according to uncompromisable, authentically Jewish, cosmically ordained imperatives [9-10].
Such acts are with concern for securing the unfolding-of-the-redemption, implementing actions which adherents believe will hasten this, and therefore giving perceived license [Lustick, 1988; Sprinzak, 1999; Inbari, 2009; Aran and Hassner, 2013; Jones, 2013]. The key discussion is how such ideologies and practices interact with and challenge the modern State of Israel. In Jewish religious-national thought, there are different religious and theosopic frameworks projected on the Jewish State’s (re)creation. Furthermore, different assertions of realities which should be in place according to perceptions of what this (re)creation represents and demands. I will briefly observe the perceptions of Rabbi Meir Kahane and Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh. The values and actions espoused by both, and their criticisms of the modern State of Israel, are important because of their influence in more extremist orthodox settler-communities and where reactions to the State of Israel’s actions against ‘the Land’ and settlement will be the focus of preceding chapters.

Meir Kahane was an ultra-nationalist "religious fundamentalist" [Sprinzak, 1999:145]. For Kahane, the principal reason why the State is (re)created by God is to avenge God’s desecrated honour [Sprinzak, 1999:217-244]. The various persecutions and insecurities which Jews endured in the galut were desecrations on God. Removed from the galut, it was imperative for individual Jews and the Jewish nation to self-transform and elevate in particular Jewish pride, strength and force which would ‘heal’ the nation and bring back Jewish/God’s honour [Sprinzak, 1999:183]. Kahane placed strong emphasis on the ‘Chosen’ ontology and status of the Jewish people who “received the sacred law, the Torah, and an immutable destiny to live and uphold the Torah” [Kahane, 1974a:5]. Declaring exclusive Jewish rights to Eretz Yisrael, he argued that ‘Arabs’ have no place in the Land or the Jewish State and must be expelled.

Kahane was also highly critical of what he called the ‘Hellenisation’ of the State of Israel. ‘Hellenists’ refer to assimilationist Jews influenced by Western culture. For Kahane, this was a significant danger against allowing ‘Jewish destiny’ to be fulfilled. He wrote “it is this foreign body, this malignancy of gentilized foreign culture, concepts and values, that must be dealt with and erased from our midst,” and significantly declared “Jews versus Hellenists: that is the real battle!” [quoted Ravitsky, 1990:34]. Such criticism can be seen as targeting Political Zionism and prevalent cultures and influences in the State of Israel today of secular, Western values. For Kahane this is the antithesis of Jewish nationalism and what is expected of the Jewish State’s (re)creation in the Jewish homeland. Kahane’s views will be discussed further in relation to Price-Tag violence (Chapter Six).
Yitzchak Ginsburgh is a Chabad Rabbi and head of the Od Yosef Chai Yeshiva in the Jewish settlement-community of Yitzhar in the north West Bank/Samaria. Ginsburgh is known for his extremist views on Jewish nationalism and has been questioned for racial incitement [Levinson, 2010b]. Ginsburgh [2014:Preface] wrote that

the ultimate goal of our yearning is the complete redemption, the arrival of Mashiach and the construction of the Temple. There is no doubt that a Jewish state is an essential and central component of the grand picture of the redemption of the Jewish People. Yet, it is clear that the state that was established...[in](1948), as it stands today, is still a far cry from that dreamlike vision that has warmed our hearts for almost two thousand years. It is not difficult to understand why many Torah and mitzvah observant Jews are reluctant to identify themselves with the state and its symbols.

Ginsburgh [2003; 2014] asserts a particular vision of the State, what Jewish existence in Eretz Yisrael means, and actions which must be undertaken to attain an authentic Jewish State and hasten redemption. Ginsburgh advocates two principles particularly significant for this thesis.27 Firstly, he talks about exclusive Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael as a duty and how settlement intimately connects with frameworks of ‘peace’ and ‘redemption’ [Ginsburgh, 2003]. Secondly, he emphasises ontological Jewish superiority.28 For Ginsburgh, the inherent divine ontological separation between Jews and non-Jews needs to be realised practically, and the expulsion of non-Jews from Eretz Yisrael. Such realities, he argues, are essential to allow for ‘divine repair,’29 redemption and peace which centre in particular on the wholeness of the Land of Israel, the Nation of Israel and the Torah. Such actions will allow for “fulfilling the Jewish vision of the true and complete redemption” [10]. Ginsburgh's viewpoints will be further discussed in relation to Jewish settlement (Chapter Three) and Price-Tag violence.

The space of Eretz Yisrael is highly significant on a religious and messianic level. 'Zion,' a revered concept in Judaism as a symbol for Jerusalem and the whole Land of Israel, has profound theological significance [Kook, 1910-1930; Prior, 1999; Sicherman, 2011]. The space of Zion is divine, 'the holy habitation of the Most High. God is in the midst of her' (Psalm 46.4-5). In belief-systems, the Land of Israel is the land of redemption where salvation will be brought. The directing of the Jewish national movement of Zionism upon Eretz Yisrael is therefore reentrance upon sacred space. It was not turned 'From Holy Land to Homeland' [Sand, 2012].30 It is an innately holy homeland. For National-Religious Zionists, and other orthodox groups, the State of Israel’s (re)creation is not only a coming-
upon sacred space, but is a divinely-ordained unfolding-process-of-redemption.31 The unique nature of this space, and how it is synonymous with different significant security, brings important dimensions to the fields of CSS and Political Geography. Space is not merely a site on which actions occur. Space is imbued with its own nature and destiny which not only authorise but require actions. Furthermore, State (re)creation in and return to this space are more than a political cause. As Rabbi Zvi Yehuda declared:

the movement for concrete redemption in our time, including the settlement and conquest of the Land [of Israel] and the abandonment and abolition of exilic existence, did not originate with the religious...it was not that we mortals were forcing the End, but...the Lord of the Universe, was forcing our hand [quoted Ravitzky, 1993:79; emphasis added].

Return and (re)creation are a Higher purpose. The State of Israel’s (re)creation and existence mark a messianic reality and “on the premises of religious Zionism redeeming the land is the overruling imperative” [Taub(a)]. With redemption a process, the priority is upon the ‘to come,’ the aspiration of realising the Higher goal [HaKohen, 2016]. Directed by conviction in a Higher truth, the duty is to hasten ‘the truthing of the truth’ in its fullness. Actions of subjects are central. For National-Religious Zionists, this is revering the State and ‘redeeming’ the whole Eretz Yisrael, the sacred space of redemption.

For National-Religious Zionists, the State of Israel has only one innate purpose and end. The inauguration of a religious and messianic project in Zionism, asserted as the meaning and reality of Zionism, hugely impacts upon how the nature of the State of Israel’s (re)creation and how actions in space are seen. A whole new metaphysical outlook is projected. As Rabbi Zvi Yehuda declared: "our reality is one of teshuvah [return to God, repentance] and it is a messianic one" [quoted Ravitzky, 1993:80]. The sacred State of Israel represents and embodies a Higher messianic security. However, as I will critically trace, there has been increased discrepancy between how the State is seen and how it acts. Actions which it has taken against the Land and settlement-communities particularly challenge belief-systems and relations with the State. With such practices, different natures of space and agendas of (in)security are also brought into confrontation.

Space and Existential (In)Security

The founding of the State of Israel was a thrilling moment of liberation the Jewish people has not felt for thousands of years...even as our legs walked us to freedom "we were dreamers"; Zionism was highjacked by small minded people, and turned merely into another mode of survival.

Ari Soffer, 2013
Whilst ‘Zionism’ and State (re)creation are positioned in different realities, an overt reality has shaped the State of Israel’s political and governmental operationality. The State’s Declaration of Independence [Ben-Gurion, 1948] writes that

the catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people—the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe—was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew.

With the State of Israel’s (re)creation emerging in the context of the Holocaust, the existential security of the Jewish nation became a central concern, impacting upon the nature of space and the State [Aronson, 2011]. The State of Israel’s (re)creation, Shavit [2013] writes, "was meant not only to free a nation, but to save a nation." The State is asserted as the political entity through which Jewish national and existential security depends, an existential necessity in its existence. In asking one Israeli what the State means to them, existential security was placed central:

the purpose of the State of Israel is to be the national home of the Jewish people.
This is essential for the survival of the Jewish people after years in exile and especially after the Holocaust.\(^{32}\)

Visiting the Auschwitz concentration camp on Holocaust Memorial Day, then-IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz affirmed that

the state of Israel is the security that an atrocity like this will not happen again.
The IDF is the shield for the national home— the safe haven for the Jewish people [quoted Winer, 2013].

The State of Israel is positioned in explicit security terms as "the safe haven for the Jewish people," and the guarantee of Jewish security. Speaking at Israel's Memorial Day for fallen soldiers, Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke of "the survival of this nation." He declared that "there is no future for the Jewish nation without the State of Israel...it has a future, if we are wise enough to protect our state" [quoted Times of Israel Staff, 2015b]. If, for Foucault, a regime rests upon a strategy and identifying this strategy is essential for understanding the nature of power-relations and the governance-regime of a state, the State of Israel’s prime concern with securing Jewish life and making this life ‘live’ means it operates through a biopolitical governance-regime. This significantly impacts on the State’s nature and practices. As Soffer [2013] writes, “the first stop for any visiting dignitary is not the Temple Mount...but to Yad Vashem," Israel’s Holocaust Museum. The
practices of the State of Israel epitomise how ‘security’ is the principle of formation around which the State and subjects are governed (Chapter One). With the dominance of its existential security discourse, security agenda, and governance-regime, the Jewish subject, in its biopolitical subjectivity, is positioned as a life-to-be-secured.

Soffer [2013] critiques that “the Israeli political establishment- left- and right-wing alike- are united by a single, debilitating ideological underpinning…survival.” As a National-Religious Zionist, the concern with ‘survival,’ and this being foremost in Israel’s raison d’être, governance-regime and practices, means that “Zionism is ‘highjacked.’ ‘Survival’ is placed before Jewish freedom in the homeland. However, whilst seeking (existential) security in and from space, the reality of this space is synonymous with insecurity [Netanyahu, 2011a]. (In)securing this space through spatial practices and governance is paramount for security and the thought of (in)security [Foucault, 2007]. As Chapter Three will assess, spatial practices are integral within Israel’s (in)security concerns, elevating the centrality and significance of political geography in the Israeli case. Spatial practices in spaces of the wider homeland are deemed crucial for the State’s existential security agenda, and the State’s own security and legitimacy, therefore enacting a particular security relationship between ‘the State’ and ‘the Land.’

Conclusion

This chapter has identified different conceptions of and attitudes to ‘Zionism’ and the State of Israel’s (re)creation in the space of Eretz Yisrael. The State is a political and governmentality entity. The State is also an ideological entity, attracting different perceptions and resting on different projects of security. Recognising how meanings of the return to the homeland and ‘the Jewish State of Israel’ are foundational to actions and problematics today, I began most interviews33 with the question ‘what does Zionism mean to you?’ Using fieldwork to uncover views, this revealed divergences in thought regarding the nature of Zionism, meaning of the return to the homeland, and State (re)creation.

In asking one settler if they would describe themselves as a ‘Zionist,’ their reply was significant: “yes, but there are different ways of what ‘Zionism’ is. The most relevant definition for me is Religious Zionist.”34 One National-Religious rabbi responded “how many hours do I have. I will keep it very brief, but it not a simple question.” Their response accentuated this:

in my ideology there are different levels. To answer the question for me is by starting with the Bible and with G-d and our Forefathers. Or I can answer this in
relation to modern-day Zionism. Each one is an even deeper explanation. In general, Zionism is a movement, a just movement, which is solving - not solving - the Jewish Problem. It is allowing the Jews to fulfil their purpose. It is allowing them to live meaningful lives as a nation, not only as private people. It is a movement of rejuvenation. A movement of reawakening. Of re-becoming of what we always should have been. And for 2000 years we were not capable or allowed to, whatever the reasoning was. It is the fulfilment of 4000 years of dreams coming true.35

Asking what Zionism means, one settler replied that "this is a question without an immediate answer":

clearly when Zionism was founded it was about creating a Jewish State, in the Jewish homeland. And since the State has been created, I think there have been fractures within Zionism as to what Zionism means, still within the Jewish State ideal but within the context of society that means different things.36

It is the growth and openness of such fractures which this thesis will critically trace. In questioning 'the Jewish Revolution' and 'Zionism,' I have assessed two dominant and distinct projects and agendas in Zionism: Political Zionism and National-Religious Zionism. Within these ideologies, the meaning of State (re)creation is situated in different frameworks: a framework of liberation, and a framework of redemption. For Political and secular Zionism, the (re)creation of the Jewish State is foremost a desire for national liberation, sovereignty and mastery, and security imperative to existential threat, a 'refuge' for survival [Taub, 2010; Thomas, 2011; Seidler, 2012]. Yet, there are tensions within these desires, particularly struggles between concepts of 'liberation' and practices of 'security,' and questions of 'sovereignty.'

For National-Religious Zionism, return to Eretz Yisrael and State (re)creation are situated in a messianic framework and reality, a divinely-ordained State operating in an unfolding-process-of-redemption. For some, the development of National-Religious Zionism, and its ensuing actions and influence, constitute a "highjacking of Zionism...a usurpation of the name of what was originally a legitimate national movement" [Illouz, 2014; see also Rubinstein, 1985]. For others, 'Zionism' was and is only a religious/messianic project. Demoting the historic religious significance of the Land, and restricting Jewish freedoms, is the "highjacking of Zionism" [Soffer, 2013; HaCohen, 2016; Kook, 2016]. "In terms of real life both perspectives were and are not entirely separated from each other. However, historically and ideologically they constitute very different tracks" [Seidler, 2012:178].
The two distinct projects - a refuge for securing the existential security of the Jewish people and nation, and a project of and for redemption - are, I argue, both centred upon thoughts, projects and agendas of security, but of different natures. Consequently, the Jewish State of Israel rests upon different expectations and desires. One Israeli declared that "now we have finished with this project called Zionism and it's about time we start building our state." Rather than the 'project called Zionism' ending and 'state-building' to instead start, I argue that the two are entwined. One National-Religious rabbi positioned 'Zionism' as a movement of "re-becoming." Resting on different visions and projects, the State of Israel is an onto-genesis, a project caught-up in a (re)coming-into-being of what its nature 'is' or is seen to be. This onto-genesis is a movement-of-security, seeking to secure 'itself' and how the nature and entailments of this security are seen.

Despite the State of Israel attracting different perceptions regarding what its nature and purpose is or should be, it is defined as 'Jewish' and 'democratic.' Furthermore, whilst declared a 'Jewish Revolution,' Alan R. Taylor (1974:ix) states that "the Zionist Movement is a product of Jewish secularism" and "secular national identity...lies at the heart of the Zionist enterprise." Whilst a modern, secular national-liberation movement enacted in Eretz Yisrael, "Zionism strikes at the heart of messianic redemption" (Rabkin, 2006:15), challenging belief-systems. How the reality of State (re)creation is interpreted and what the nature of the State 'is' and its impact on redemption are deep sources of division amongst orthodox populations. As Ravitzky (1993:1) discusses, 'Zionism' generates fundamental questions:

what is the status of this imperfect reality in Jewish religious consciousness? Does what has been achieved constitute a part of the process of final redemption or an abortion of that process? Is this the beginning of the End, a step toward the fulfilment of the prophetic promises, or is it rather a violent betrayal of those promises in all of their perfection?

Interpretations significantly impact how individuals and communities relate to and interact with 'the Jewish State of Israel.' Whilst President Rivlin stated, in the State's (re)creation, "a dream became reality," do present realities befit the dream? Furthermore, to what extent do the practices of the State as a political entity challenge or undermine other visions of 'the return to the homeland' and projects of security? In exploring the foundations of 'the Jewish Revolution,' further questions need to be critically asked.

Firstly, regarding 'the Jewish State' itself. "Is Israel a state with Jews or a Jewish State?" The commentator states, "don't think that this question is a mere exercise in semantics.

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It’s the key to Israel’s identity and future” [Brody, 2014]. Another Israeli commentator voices that “we need a more comprehensive discussion around what Israel is, and what Israel wants to be” [Sucharov, 2014]. Secondly, if terms are “laden with explosives,” what exactly is the ‘fate’ to be mastered? And, if ‘the Jewish Revolution’ is “against historic destiny” but “for national destiny,” what is this “destiny?” In framing Zionism and State (re)creation as ‘a Jewish Revolution,’ concerned with ‘destiny’ and (re)creating a/the ‘Jewish State,’ this leaves the existence of particular realities open to charges of (in)authenticity and (in)security.39 Such concerns are evident in conflicts and confrontations which I will trace.

For a number of individuals, State (re)creation represents “the liberation of their homeland” [HaCohen, 2016] or, “the realization of the age-old-dream—the redemption of Israel” [Ben-Gurion, 1948]. Yet, such assertions are also problematic. The question of the relationship between ‘the State of Israel’ and ‘the Land of Israel’ poses significant challenges and contestations. Whilst ‘Zionism’ is proclaimed as a ‘return to the homeland,’ asking what this means and constitutes are significant questions [Sand, 2012] and an historic and contemporary ideological and political struggle [Gad and Peleg, 1994; Azaryahum and Golan, 2001; Bar-Gal, 2003; Bar-Gal and Bar-Gal 2008; Leuenberger and Schnell, 2010]. Whilst Begin [1948] advocated “the battle for freedom, for the return of the entire People of Israel to its homeland, for the restoration of the whole Land of Israel to its God-covenanted owners,” as Prime Minister he, and other leaders, have made ‘compromises’ on Israel’s control of spaces seen as the historic homeland (Chapter Three).

It is over the question and practice of Jewish settlement in spaces asserted as the wider Jewish homeland where conflicts have emerged between the State of Israel and some of its subjects. Conflicts and confrontations over settlement, which are the focus of following chapters, reflect dimensions and tensions which this chapter has critically identified. In particular, the relationship between ‘the State’ and ‘the Land,’ the meaning of the Jewish State’s (re)creation and Jewish Being in the homeland, questions of rights and liberation, different projects of security, and concerns with redemption. The ideological and political tensions in this chapter, and how they embody key concepts and complexities discussed in Chapter One, can be thought as the origins of disjunctive moments which I will trace. In actions which the State takes against ‘the Land’ and settlement, these bring the security of the State and ‘the Jewish State’ into question, further showing the significance and interaction of space and (in)security.
References

1 Also named Judah Leib. Pinsker was a Jewish doctor living in Poland.
2 Pinsker’s publication has been acknowledged as foundational to the development of Political Zionism and the Political Zionist Movement. For example, Avineri, 1981.
3 Such a phrase has been deliberately selected for two considerations. Firstly, in philosophical traditions, ‘light’ is representative of ‘truth,’ so ‘lit up in a different light’ reflects how different ‘truths’ ground the State of Israel. Secondly, ‘light’ also has religious connotations so is particularly impactful for capturing the religious and messianic ideologies also imprinted and projected on the State of Israel.
6 Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 11th September 2013.
7 Emphases added.
8 Emphasis added.
9 A variety of authors have alerted to the significance of political, social and intellectual movements and conditions, such as values of Enlightenment, emancipation, and nationalist sentiments, and how these gave impetus to the Zionist enterprise. See, for example, Taylor, 1974; Avineri, 1981.
10 "Such as the renewal of the Jewish national identity, socioeconomic renewal, and a cultural and linguistic re-birth." Zilbersheid, 2004:80.
11 Quoted Dvorin, 2015.
12 Emphasis added.
14 Emphasis added.
15 To different degrees and levels.
16 Quoted Rabkin, 2006:1.
17 Author Interview, Judea, 14th August 2016.
18 Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak HaCohen Kook. His son, Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook adopted the same spiritual/metaphysical/ideological approach; emphasis added.
19 Emphasis added.
20 For some, ‘Zionism’ was always a movement ordained by God, whilst others reject this.
22 Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.
23 Author interview, Judea 24th July 2016.
24 Author interview, Samaria 21st August 2016.
25 Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.
26 Author interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
27 ‘Significant’ generally because of their nature and consequences if enacted, and ‘significant’ in particular for assessing the significances of Price-Tag violence.
29 Satherley discusses how Ginsburgh’s advocacy on the importance of separation is contained within the Lurianic doctrine of shevirat hakelim, the ‘liberation and purification of divine lights’ through the “the separation of the sacred and sinful, of Israel and the nations,” allowing for an eventual ‘harmonious marriage,’ Satherley, 2013:77-78.
30 Emphasis added.
31 Other religious Jews, who may not identify as ‘National-Religious Zionist,’ also take religious significance of Jewish return-to Eretz Yisrael. However, the Jewish State’s (re)creation and where the current State of Israel stands in relation may be different to Religious-Zionist ideologies.
32 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 13th August 2013.
33 With different Jewish-Israeli interviewees.
34 Author Interview, Judea 21st August 2016.
35 Author interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
36 Author Interview, Judea 21st August 2016; emphasis added.
37 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2013.
38 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
39 As we will see, this is different forms of (in)security.
Chapter Three:  
Jewish Settlement in Space and the Activation of Projects of (In)Security

Introduction

1967 was “a watershed in Israeli history” [Sprinzak, 1988:8]. Debates concerning the relationship between the State of Israel and the Land of Israel, and the meaning of the State of Israel's (re)creation, have “arisen anew, and with even greater intensity” following the Six-Day War of 1967 [Schweid, 1985:9]. With Israel's military victory, spaces of the historic Land of Israel- the West Bank (known as Judea and Samaria), Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai- came under Israel's control. In 1982, Israel relinquished control of the Sinai in a peace deal with Egypt yet retains control over the other territories. Their future status is, however, uncertain.

Following 1967, Jewish-Israeli settlements have been built over the State of Israel's internationally-recognised territorial borders ('the Green Line') in spaces asserted as the historic Jewish homeland. Today, over 400,000 settlers, citizens of the State of Israel, live in spaces of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria, the majority in 131 settlements classed as ‘authorised’ under Israeli Law, and a minority in settlement-outposts [Peace Now Settlement Watch]. As a base practice, settlement is the construction of housing into which populations move, enabling residence in spaces. According to the United Nations [UN], Israeli settlements "constitute, enable and support the establishment, expansion, and maintenance of Israeli residential communities beyond the 1949 Green Line in the OPT" (Occupied Palestinian Territories) [UNHRC, 2013].

Built in spaces which under International Law have been occupied by the State of Israel, settlement-construction and existence breach numerous International Laws [UNHRC, 2013; UN, 2016]. Such proclamations have been contested [Shamir, 2014; Stark, 2017]. Settlements are highly divisive in Israeli society. They are a source of tension not only between Israelis and Palestinians but between Israelis. In 2013, a debate was held in London entitled ‘Israel is Destroying Itself With Its Settlement Policy.' The title is provocative. To engage in this debate requires exploring three fundamental points: first, what 'Israel' is or wills-to-be; second, what 'settlement' is and what its purpose and relation with the State is; and third, what kind and degree of insecurity the State's settlement policy is deemed to pose to Israel.

This chapter will assess that settlements are more than physical structures housing subjects in a contested space. Settlement-building and existence in this space contain...
different projects of (in)security. These connect with different (in)securitisations of space, meanings of the return to the homeland and ‘the State,’ and different notions of rights. Expanding on conceptual discussions in Chapter One, I argue that thoughts of (in)security are central to analysis of settlement and political struggles within. I will begin by briefly discussing the practice of settlement and contentions it attracts. I will explore how these interact with questions of ‘Zionism’ and State (re)creation, and where the relationship between ‘the State of Israel’ and ‘the Land of Israel’ plays in this. With settlement and spatial practices held under the State of Israel’s sovereignty and governance-regime, I will identify how these realities also constitute insecurity for other visions and (in)security agendas within settlement. Such debates are the foundations on which settlement rests.

I will then provide an overview of main stages in Israel’s settlement history identifying key developments. From this chronological assessment, I will engage in a political-ideological assessment of the act of settlement. I will identify two dominant security projects and agendas within and critically contrast their natures. Firstly, settlement is a practice of political geography for state (re)building, spatial control and seeking to secure a new spatial reality. I will observe how Israel has legitimised settlement-construction in space because spatial realities have been problematised for the State’s (in)security concerns. Space is brought under ‘the Israeli control system’ [Kimmerling, 1989] and settlers are invested with warranted freedom.

Secondly, settlement is a fundamental religious act. Settlement in the biblical homeland is seen as a Jewish right given by God and a primary mitzvah (religious commandment). Settlement in Eretz Yisrael is also deemed a central practice for hastening-the-redemption and is therefore an act of messianic security. In such framework, the sovereignty of the homeland and Jewish nation precede the license of settlement provided by the sovereign State to Jewish-Israeli subjects. Religious settlers are active agents in settlement. Though holding a perceived different license for settlement, historically settlers and National-Religious Zionists have worked closely with the State of Israel. I will briefly assess the historic close relationship but also tensions between settlement projects in observing the Elon Moreh/Kedumim case-study. Finally, I will observe historic acts of violence from within religious settler communities and the targets of this violence.

I will end by assessing the significance of settlement-outposts. Outposts are unauthorised structures/communities under Israeli Law. Their construction and existence challenge the State’s governance-regime and limitations settlement is held in. Politically and ideologically, outposts bring questions of rights, freedoms and State (re)creation to the
fore. Whilst this chapter will identify how settlement is located in different security frameworks, settlement has become an increasing security problematic. The State's evacuation of structures and communities are at the centre of confrontations which have emerged between the State of Israel and some settler populations. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the significance of settlement and tensions. Such analysis is central for critically assessing political and practical conflicts over settlement which are the focus of preceding chapters, and increased fractures in some State-settler relations.

**The Practice of Settlement**

*Image 3a has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.*

Asking what is ‘settlement’ not only attracts different responses but can be answered from different approaches: legal, political, moral, or religious. Israel's settlements are home to different size populations from a range of backgrounds. They have different characters in their physical appearance and in the nature of communities [Bt'Selem, 2002; Gilbert, 2010; Bt'Selem, 2010; Arieli, 2012; Peace Now Settlement Watch; Yesha Council]. For example, the large settlement Modi’in Ilit near Jerusalem predominantly houses *haredi* populations. The suburban settlements Ofra and Eli are home to National-Religious populations. Settlements in the Jordan Valley are agricultural settlements. The large-settlement Ariel, which has facilities such as a swimming pool and university, is home to a mix of National-Religious and secular individuals.
Settlements receive large economic investment and infrastructures from the State of Israel [Eichner, 2016; Renaudie, 2017] and residents receive incentives and benefits from the State for living in settlements [Bt’Selem, 2010; HRW, 2010; Adalah, 2013]. Conversations I had with Israeli analysts emphasised that many are home to ‘economic-settlers’- individuals who reside in settlement-communities and spaces, despite being located outside the State’s ‘sovereign borders,’ due to economic and lifestyle considerations. One settler from Gush Etzion, for example, told me that they lived there because "it is a nicer environment to raise a family than the overcrowding in Jerusalem." Transport networks enable movement to and from ‘Israel Proper,’ blurring boundaries between the State’s territorial ‘inside’ and ‘outside.’ In not having a particular ideological-attachment to this space, if ordered to relocate inside Israel Proper with compensation, it is believed that economic and secular settlers would largely comply [ICG, 2009].

Settlement-construction and the residence of Jewish-Israeli populations in spaces beyond the Green Line are steeped in legal and political controversy. Settlement has been condemned as "illegitimate" [Reuters, 2013] and "illegal" by international organisations, world leaders, and the Palestinian Authority [UN, 2016]. Settlement-construction is also widely asserted as "an obstacle to peace" [Ravid, 2009; Toameh, 2013]. The multitude and entrenchment of settlements throughout space complicates, if not jeopardises, possibilities of attaining a Two-State Solution, where a sovereign territorially-contiguous State of Palestine exists alongside a sovereign territorially-contiguous State of Israel. In December 2016, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2334 affirming that

Israel’s establishment of settlements in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, had no legal validity, constituting a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the vision of two states living side-by-side in peace and security, within internationally recognized borders [United Nations, 2016].

The Resolution "reiterated its demand that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities." Nevertheless, Israel’s Ambassador criticised the Resolution, pronouncing "we will continue to be a Jewish State proudly reclaiming the land of our forefathers" [quoted UN, 2016]. In 2017, Israel announced plans to build thousands more settlement homes [UN, 2017]. Palestine’s UN Ambassador condemned such acts as Israel “entrenching its colonization and occupation...in grave breach of international [laws]
[Palestine at the UN, 2017]. The insecurities and rights violations settlements pose to Palestinians have been widely documented [UNHRC, 2013]. Organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, B'tselem, Adalah, and APN document different systemic realities in the West Bank. HRW [2010], for example, writes that

Palestinians face systematic discrimination merely because of their race, ethnicity, and national origin, depriving them of electricity, water, schools, and access to roads...while nearby Jewish settlers enjoy all of these state-provided benefits.

Such realities reflect the (in)securitisation of space and life and the State's biopolitical governance which I will argue settlement operates within. In conversations I had with Palestinians in the West Bank, the consequences and insecurities of settlement were emphasised: “they are stealing our land”; “settlements are stealing our resources and pushing Palestinians off their land.”; “Israel forces will not grant us permission to build in our villages. But the settlements are always expanding.” Dispossession and settlement-expansion, Palestinian interviewees discussed, are omnipresent concerns.

Settlements dominate landscapes and realities in space. Many Palestinian villages are surrounded by settlements. All Palestinians I spoke with saw settlements as arms of Israel's occupation. This has also been acknowledged by analysts: “Jewish settlements are the most intransigent manifestation of Israeli occupation over land inhabited by stateless Palestinians” [Weiss, 2010:18; APN, 2016] where a civilian occupation accompanies a military occupation [Newman, 1985, 1989; Efrat, 2006]. Settlement is also situated as a colonisation process [Newman, 1985, 1989; Thomas, 2011; Lambert, 2016]. A UN panel found settlement “was a creeping form of annexation” [UNHRC, 2013] and asked for the “colonization process” to cease [Lazaroff, 2013a].

Settlement and Debates of Zionism, the State and the Land of Israel

Settlement over the Green Line is divisive in Israeli society. The question and practice of settlement are caught-up in political and ideological struggles and thoughts of (in)security. Using fieldwork to uncover different perceptions, viewpoints on settlement connected with meanings of ‘Zionism,’ ‘the State of Israel,’ and ‘security.’ Such perceptions continue ideological and political assessments from Chapter Two. For Israeli security analysts, Israeli military figures and a left-wing MK I interviewed, settlements were unanimously described negatively. Settlement is “a political problem”; “the greatest mistake Israel has done”; “a threat against the State of Israel's most essential interest”; “a high weight pulling us into a swamp”; “a time-bomb”; “a danger.”
These interviewees all largely rejected that settlements over the ‘Green Line’ are important for the State’s security: this is “completely false from the beginning”; “completely nonsense”; “absolutely not, it’s nothing to do with security.” Rather, settlements are “harming Israel’s security”; “not a security barrier but security burden.” One former IDF officer declared that “the West Bank is waiting to explode...it’s a question of when it will.” For these group of actors, ‘Israel is destroying itself with its settlement policy.’ They strove to distinguish between the ‘Land of Israel’ and the ‘State of Israel’ and instead asserted the paramount importance of keeping and securing Israel as a ‘Jewish and democratic State’ within definite sovereign borders. This, they declared, is the meaning of ‘the State,’ ‘security,’ and ‘Zionism.’ As one interviewee pronounced:

the idea of Zionism was not the Land of Israel. It was a state for the Jewish people, a democratic state for the Jewish people because only in democracy, the majority define the state’s character.

Settlement, a number of interviewees argued, poses a threat to ‘Zionism.’ One interviewee stated that “if Zionism means we have to control people by force, I’m not a Zionist. If Zionism means our right to a homeland, yes.” For them, ‘a homeland’ does not involve wider spaces of Eretz Yisrael but ‘a homeland’ in secure, recognised territorial borders. Similarly, another interviewee voiced that “the idea of Zionism is not to create a State of Israel occupying what we call Eretz Yisrael. The idea of Zionism is to have a Jewish State.” For this interviewee, the assertion of rights to wider spaces of Eretz Yisrael is a key insecurity for the State of Israel:

the groups obsessed with keeping hold of the Land of Israel, to grab everything, own everything, possess it, to be in conflict that never ends, occupying another people, they are putting in danger the entire State of Israel.

For one Israeli security analyst who was involved in political peace negotiations, settlers “look at themselves as the ultra- or most-Zionists, but actually they are anti-Zionists because with their actions they are preventing a secure homeland.” Similarly, another security analyst voiced that

the efforts of these National-Religious people to keep the West Bank are anti-Zionists because they are going to kill the Zionist vision of a Jewish and democratic state by changing Israel to be an apartheid, or without a Jewish majority.

The ‘Zionist vision’ is asserted as a particular vision. For one Israeli author, 1967 and ensuing settlement and occupation constitute a betrayal of “the original intent of the
Zionist movement,” putting Israel “on a parallel path” where Israel is “enslaved to the maintenance of the occupation” [Klein, 2017]. Former Israeli Attorney Talia Sason declared that with settlement in the West Bank, “the state of Israel faces the gravest existential threat” in retaining itself as Jewish and democratic [Horowitz, 2012]. For many, ongoing settlement-construction is creating an irreversible reality deeply dangerous for the State of Israel [APN, 2016].

For others, settlement operates in different realities (Chapter Two). Settlers and rabbis spoke not of ‘the West Bank’ but of ‘Judea and Samaria’ (Yehuda and Shomron in Hebrew), the biblical name of this territory. Furthermore, they spoke not of ‘occupation’ but of ‘the liberation of the homeland.’ For different religious settlers and National-Religious rabbis I spoke with, Israel is not ‘destroying itself with its settlement policy.’ Settlement in spaces seen as the wider homeland is foundational to the Jewish State’s (re)creation, reflecting different relations with space. As one National-Religious settler stated:

Judea and Samaria, this is our homeland, this is our heartland. When Jews for thousands of years were saying ‘next year in Jerusalem,’ it was not to go back to Eilat, to Tel Aviv but back to Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, where our Jewish history is and has always been.\textsuperscript{15}

This historic Jewish attachment to space is asserted as foundational to the right of Jewish national return to Eretz Yisrael which underpins Zionism. As another National-Religious settler discussed,

from a moral, historical point of view, from the Being of our people, the right of the Jewish people to be here is because of Judea and Samaria...if we give-up Judea and Samaria, we lose our moral right as the Jewish people to the Land.\textsuperscript{16}

Such declarations challenge the State and Israelis opposed to Jewish-Israeli settlement in spaces of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria. For these group of actors, settlement in all of Eretz Yisrael is central to the meaning of ‘Zionism.’ As one settler declared: “a Zionist is someone who says Zion is ours and we must settle and have Jewish sovereignty over the whole Land of Israel.”\textsuperscript{17} In discussing political contestations in settlement, one National-Religious rabbi pronounced: “my religious belief causes me to believe it doesn’t matter what side of what people call ‘the Green Line’ Jews are on.”\textsuperscript{18} ‘The Green Line’ is deemed artificial to the reality of this space. Asked what settlement means to them, they answered:

it is not only a technical solution to the lack of housing; it is something of deep Jewish meaning because we are re-joining the people and the Land. Even if I have
a house, if there is possibility to build a new settlement in an area which for 2000 years has been barren, when there is a legal opportunity to do so, I am very happy to. It is a Jewish value of rebuilding the people in the Land.¹⁹

For this rabbi, and other religious settlers I spoke with, settlement in spaces of Eretz Yisrael is much more than an act of ‘technical’ construction. The practice of settlement is on religious and ideological levels, a relationship between ‘Jewish Being’ and ‘the Land.’ This central relationship was emphasised by another National-Religious rabbi in answering what settlement means:

we have very deep connections with the Land. It is our Land. Our roots, history, and future. From an emotional perspective we are back, connecting. We are building, planting, restoring ourselves.²⁰

In conversations with settlers, they emphasised historic-religious connections with space and connections in their Jewish Being. One religious settler remarked “if you sit in an office all day, you’re very far from the Land and G-d. But if you're out in the Land, you feel that connection...King David, Jacob and Moses.”²¹ Such insights reinforce how subjectivity and space intimately interact [Lefebvre, 1991; Valins, 2003; Knott, 2005]. This interaction will be of relevance in assessing the impact of the State’s actions against settlement and in struggles over communities and practices (Chapters Four, Five and Six). Importantly, interviews exposed how settlement is located in different security frameworks: securing ‘liberation,’ securing ‘rights,’ and securing the meaning of ‘State (re)creation.’ Such exposure therefore widens concepts of security and contributes to conceptual discussions in Chapter One. In asking one settler what settlement means, they answered:

to establish a state means settlement all over Israel. Jews have the merit to settle anywhere they want. Settlement is freedom, our legitimate right. Yehuda and Shomron are places of Israel, our homeland.²²

Settlement is therefore a security practice for enacting and securing this freedom. Asking one National-Zionist settler why they chose to live in their community, they answered:

we were Jews understanding what Jewish history is. We wanted to be part of Jewish history. One must live where you belong in your homeland...we wanted to be involved in building, expanding, and safeguarding the Land.²³

The politicisation of settlement, and the political significance of language, was highlighted when I asked one settler what settlement means to them:
I don't like the words settlements or settlers. The correct translation is inheritor, people who came and inherited the Land...when you say 'settlement,' people think we settled in something that is not ours, and you get a very negative idea of the settlers. We are inheritors of the Land who live in Jewish communities.24

In asking if 'Zionism' means living in the whole of Eretz Yisrael, they replied:

definitely. Not just in Tel Aviv but in Judea, Samaria, Gaza, Golan, Jerusalem, all that belongs to the Jewish people. Some areas are temporarily, illegally occupied by the Arabs but Jewish history is history of thousands of years.25

Settlement is therefore a security practice for enacting and securing perceived Jewish rights to Eretz Yisrael. This belief presents a different metaphysics and politics within settlement, adding to conceptual discussions in Political Geography. Rather than Israel occupying land, it is 'the Arabs' who are seen as illegal occupiers of Jewish Land. Asserting that Eretz Yisrael is Jewish inheritance and settlers, as inheritors, are enacting this right to settle in space, is significant in numerous ways. First, proclaiming exclusive Jewish rights diminishes rights of the non-Jewish 'other.' As one rabbi stated: "as a minority in the Jewish State, the Arabs should have full personal rights. But they do not have national rights in my Land."26 For others, the presence of non-Jews in 'Eretz Yisrael' is disqualified altogether in religious thought due to the innate meaning of the Land of Israel.

In Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh's political kabbalah, he positions settlement as a mitzvah, and, as Tessa Satherley [2013] discusses, in a messianic dimension of 'divine marriage' and 'act of love.'27 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into such religious discussions. However, recognising different frameworks within which 'settlement' is situated is important for how this impacts on the nature of space and settlement. With Jews God's Chosen People and exclusive Jewish rights and belonging to Eretz Yisrael asserted, this relationship delegitimises the presence of others in this space. As Ginsburgh [2003:77] writes:28 "the taking of possession of any part of the Land of Israel by a foreigner is a betrayal of one's beloved," an "adulterous desecration of a cosmic marriage" [Satherley, 2013:74]. 'Settlement' is placed in a foundational framework of security. For Ginsburgh, full redemption can only arise with full Jewish settlement of the Land, purifying the purity and holiness of the Land. Not abiding by such expectations is declared to have significant insecurity consequences:
if we do not live in our land in accordance with the precepts of the Torah, the land will vomit us out...how much more is this the case with regard to foreign, hostile elements; these are totally “indigestible” to the land [Ginsburgh, 2003:107].

Ginsburgh [2003:105] advocates a duality of Jewish settlement and expulsion of non-Jews: “just as the right leg encourages mass immigration to Israel, the left leg expels undesirable elements from the land.” In belief-systems, not engaging in such practices violates commandments and threatens redemption and frameworks of peace. Settlement and spatial practices are therefore contained in a definite vision of what Jewish Being in the homeland and Jewish State (re)creation mean and demand to attain ‘true’ security [HaCohen, 2016]. Subjects therefore have a key responsibility to play where security is also dependent on the actions of subjects, contributing to conceptual discussions in CSS.

Second, in this relationship between the Jewish people and Eretz Yisrael is where the State of Israel stands. As will be assessed in later sections, relations with the State and respecting the State’s sovereignty are important for the majority of settlers. Another question is how settlers should respond when perceived Jewish rights are curtailed by the State, and if the State is seen to threaten communities, the Land and security agendas. Actions, debates and responses they attract are the focus of preceding chapters.

*Settlement and Political Realities*

Understanding how Jewish-Israeli settlement is enabled and governance realities within which it operates is crucial because this impacts on practices. Settlement requires complex authorisation by different State authorities [Lev, 2013]. Spaces of the West Bank are carved-up by a legal and political order where areas of land are given different statuses [Bt’Selim, 2002; 2010]. Settlements are predominantly built on spaces declared as ‘state land’ [Bt’Selim, 2010:5], or expropriated under ‘military orders’ for ‘essential military needs.’ At the same time, Israeli authorities make it “nearly impossible for Palestinians to register claims of ownership to their own land,” [APN, 2016] and this land is reverted to the Israeli State. Furthermore, “almost one-third of land that is included as part of the settlements in the West Bank is actually located on privately owned Palestinian land” [APN, 2016]. The nature of this space is therefore treated as a juridico-political arena that is shaped by State power. In 2010, settlements, their spatial-holdings and infrastructures controlled over forty-two percent of the West Bank’s land area [Bt’Selim, 2010:5].

Settlement-construction requires planning and approval. This involves building schemes created, permits granted, and the bounds of the settlement and its construction approved
by State authorities, such as the Housing Minister and area Military Commander. The regulatory and ‘legal’ frameworks imposed on space and construction are defined by critics as “lawfare” [Massad, 2011], land dispossession [Etkes, 2006] and “instrumental, cynical, and even criminal...[enabling] the continuous pilfering of land from Palestinians” [Bt'Selem, 2010:5]. The State of Israel wields its architectures and actions on the ground to unilaterally restructure space and facilitate the presence of its subjects and citizens in extra-territorial space. Such measures are enactments of sovereignty in reflecting the sovereign’s right to ‘give and take’ [Foucault, 1977] and the practice of settlement embodies key concepts from Political Geography discussed in Chapter One. Importantly, this reality is also an exercise of sovereignty over space and subjects, i.e. Jewish settlers.

Whilst settlement generates condemnations from Palestinians, international leaders and rights groups, realities which settlement are held within also generate criticisms from settlers who seek other realities. Furthermore, current realities in settlement pose insecurities to visions/agendas. One settler activist declared that “this is a constant battle, for every piece of land. We will struggle over and over till our enemies realize that we won’t raise our hands in surrender.”30 Whilst there may be a ‘battle for every piece of land,’ and despite settlements constructed in what is seen as the historic Jewish homeland, the State of Israel places limitations on space and settlement practices. Held under the State’s sovereignty and governance-regime and enacted in a strategic framework (discussed below), compromise and limitation define settlement politics and realities. Furthermore, with acts of settlement-evacuation, territorial withdrawals and the future status of the West Bank and settlements in spaces uncertain, settlements are in a precarious existence.

The settler Yesha Council [2013] declares "Israel's sole right to sovereignty over Judea and Samaria." Settler populations advocate for formal Israeli sovereignty to be implemented, and this territory to be annexed to the State of Israel. This is asserted as both Israel’s right and what they see as crucial for the State’s security [Women in Green].31 However, this has not happened. Instead, in the past, Israeli governments have been in negotiation discussions which centre on attaining a Two-State Solution. For this to be achieved practically and politically, it will involve ‘giving-away’ parts of Judea and Samaria. For one settler I spoke with, rather than settlements a source of insecurity for the State of Israel, “the plan of a Two-State Solution is a threat to the survival of the State of Israel, not just the communities of Judea and Samaria.”32
More profound criticisms of settlement realities were made by orthodox-nationalist settlers and Hilltop Youth. Acts of settlement-evacuation and the very carving-up of spaces of ‘the Jewish homeland’ are seen as defilements and viewed with disdain. As one Hilltop Youth pronounced: “Eretz Yisrael for us is not a store. We won't give-up any land.” The nature of settlement existence, as held under the State’s governance-regime, impacts on questions and practices of freedom. In discussing the securitisation of communities and spaces with security architectures, one ultra-nationalist settler declared that

we came from the *galut*, from Auschwitz. We came to Israel and are still in a ghetto. In my community we have a fence. We’re inside and there’s a security fence. There's soldiers. You can take a Jew out of the *galut*, but you can’t take the *galut* out of the Jew.

With settlements enclosed spaces, freedoms in the Land are restricted. Such restrictions and (in)securitisations reflect the State’s security agenda which I will assess settlement is situated in. However, these realities impede different visions and beliefs. How spaces/practices are treated, in particular distinguishing ‘authorised’ or ‘unauthorised’ (discussed forthcoming), was critiqued by one Hilltop Youth: “the government and State do not understand what is Israel. Don't understand what is Israel according to Torah, to G-d. When they say ‘this is Israel’ and ‘this is not Israel.’” This not only undermines ‘rights,’ but violates ‘truth,’ God and the sacred nature of this space. Whilst one Hilltop Youth stated that “the main consideration of the State is ‘security,’” in contrast, “people who live in *Eretz Yisrael* don’t see security top. They see the rules of the Torah top. They see their goal is what the Torah says.” This paradigm of settlement as abiding by the Torah contains its own security project, the security of truth (Chapter One) [Dillon, 1996].
Main Stages in Israel's Settlement History

In assessing Israel's settlement history, Elisha Efrat [2006:2] writes that

while the Israelis have engaged in ideological disputes for and against a greater Israel, a civil occupation has been taking shape, under the auspices of the military administration, with the aim of turning the occupied territories into an inseparable part of the State of Israel...beginning in the 1970s, a systematic effort has been made to shape a new reality.40

Settlement-building has occurred under all Israeli governments following 1967 [Benn, 2008], and over recent years has expanded greatly [Weiss, 2008; Ross, 2013; Associated Press, 2013; Miller and Ben Zion, 2013; Peace Now, 2015; Peace Now, 2017]. In 1972, 1,500 settlers lived in the West Bank. Today, the West Bank settler population is over 420,000 [AP and TOI Staff, 2017]. Leopald Lambert [2016] assesses that Israel’s settlement-construction represents "a strategy of fait accompli" and their entrenchment-in-space, Kimmerling [1989] writes, has achieved a “fait accompli." Speaking of settlement in the West Bank, Dany Dayan, then-head of the Yesha Council, declared that “more and more people are internalizing the fact that our presence here as emissaries of Israeli sovereignty is a fait accompli” [quoted Arieli, 2012].

I will provide a brief overview of Israel’s settlement-history, identifying key watersheds and developments. Whilst I will recognise how settlement is an historic and central practice in Israel's State (re)building, I will argue that Israel’s post-1967 settlement beyond the Green Line is caught in different balances for the State. Firstly, a willingness to spatially-expand the State of Israel and its territorial borders has to be balanced against demographic and ethnocratic concerns. Secondly, a willingness to practically exert sovereignty over contested spaces has to be balanced against international
condemnations and pressures. Such considerations, I argue, also reflect tensions in Zionism (Chapter Two). Whilst settlement reflects goals of mastery and sovereignty, settlement generates problematisations regarding the goal of securing ‘a Jewish State.’

Pre-1967 Settlement

Settlement-construction was a key act pre-dating the State’s (re)establishment and an important act in State (re)creation [Sherman, 1982; Troen and Lucas, 1995; Evans, 2006]. “Coming into the land means more than ideological debate and philosophical analysis. It means acts, facts on the ground, practical expressions of great ideas and ideals,” writes one commentator [Apple, 2014]. One Israeli security analyst discussed that “before 1948, the way future Israeli Jews created facts on the ground was to go out and build settlements and outposts” where “these were settlers, they weren’t religious-messianic settlers, they were secular Jews, they tried, with the tools they had, to change realities on the ground.”

Evans [2006:578] assesses how settlement-construction is “one of the longest ongoing attempts to defend territorial sovereignty by directing population settlement to areas of strategic national importance.” Such acts are a means to achieve the (re)creation and security of the State ‘to come’ and future borders [Bt’Selem, 2002].

Inspired by Zionist ideology, Jews moved to Mandate-Ruled Palestine in the 1930s and built ‘tower and stockade settlements.’ Built in desolate regions or constructed between Jewish settlements, they expanded and reinforced presence-in-space [Reichman, 1979; Efrat, 2006:45-46]. This allowed land and resources to be controlled and pursued nationalist interests and strategic objectives (short- and long-term) at times of political uncertainty and insecurity on the ground. Despite basic structures constructed, they were fortified, surrounded by walls, searchlights and watchtowers. Construction and presence-in-space reflected territorial control and served to defend and advance claims and realities of future territorial ‘ownership’ [Evans, 2006:579; Newman, 1985, 1989].

Explicitly designed as a national home, a state of and for "the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land" [Ben-Gurion, 1948], Oren Yiftachel [1999:367-8] defines the State of Israel as an ethnocracy. In an ethnocratic state, “control over state territory and its defense is central to the survival of the group in question” [Yiftachel, 1999:366]. As discussed in Chapter One, the State’s (re)creation has been marked by a dualism of 'Judaisation' and ‘de-Palestinisation’ [Yiftachel, 1999; Davis, 2003; Masahla, 2003; Pappé, 2006; Khalidi, 2009, Massad, 2011; White, 2014]. This is enacted in spatial practices, such as acts of destruction and building [ICAHD], and allowing/disallowing 'life' for inclusion. Israel refuses Palestinian refugees their right of return, but allows Jewish immigration.
Jewish-Israeli settlement has been a central strategic tool. ‘Construction’ and ‘presence’ have consolidated State (re)building where its ethnocratic nature asserts sovereignty in, throughout and over space. Settlement is a prime architecture of political geography. Embodying key concepts from Chapter One, and reinforcing these concepts with their effectiveness, settlements have effectually (re)structured and controlled space, creating new spatial realities and asserting presence and power.

In spaces left by Palestinians who fled or were expelled in the 1948 war, “the authorities were quick to fill the “gaps”...with Jewish settlements inhabited by Jewish migrants and refugees who entered the country en masse during the late 1940s and early 1950s” [Yiftachel, 1999:371]. Zionist leader Yosef Weitz asserted that Palestinians should be prevented from returning, "at the same time the ‘vacuum’ must be filled [with new Jewish settlements]" [quoted Morris, 1986:534]. In 1949, for example, Moshe Dor was established, settled by Jewish immigrants from Greece and Iraq on the site of the destroyed Palestinian village Tantura [Davis, 2003:25].

Settlement-policies and construction were also instrumentalised to overcome “pressing strategic problems” [Evans, 2006:579] following State (re)creation [Shachar, 1971; Ben-Zadok, 1985; Golani, 1992; Troen and Lucas, 1995]. With Israel’s population doubling between 1948-1951, yet Jewish populations concentrated in a small territorial space, ‘frontier settlement communities’ dispersed populations along the State’s borders. Settlement developmental towns in the 1950s populated and stabilised remote rural areas, and housed manpower for agricultural and industrial development [Evans, 2006]. Settlements were a strategic architecture to consolidate spaces of the State, accommodate and disperse Jewish populations and address national and security needs. There were also disciplinary dimensions in directing immigrants to designated areas [Evans, 2006:587].

*Post-1967 Settlement*
Israel's unexpected military victory in the 1967 Six-Day War presented the State of Israel with a complex new reality. Overnight the size of the territory under the State's control increased three-fold. A non-Jewish population of some 600,000 Palestinians in the West Bank came under Israel's occupation, presenting the State with a reality of problematisation. 1967 was a time of uncertainty but opportunity [Evans, 2006:586-8] where settlement in extra-territorial spaces has continued Israel's State (re)building project. As Aluf Benn [2008:49] writes:

it was only, natural...that after the Six Day War settlement would once again be used as a means of establishing facts on the ground that would ultimately lead to changes in the border and expansion of the country's territory.

Historically, the State of Israel and settler leaders/communities have worked closely to further agendas through settlement. The first stage in Israel's post-1967 settlement was under the National Unity and Labor governments (1967-1977). Immediately following the Six-Day War, definite actions were imposed on occupied East Jerusalem. The territory was annexed to the Israeli State and rapid settlement-construction was enacted in East and Greater Jerusalem. In this construction, Bt'Selem [2002:11] assesses that the “goal was to prevent any challenge to Israel’s sovereignty over them and to impede initiatives leading
to an Israeli withdrawal from these areas.” With the West Bank, the initial inclination of most government members was for the territory to be treated as a bargaining-chip for future negotiations [Bt'Selem, 2002].

However, twenty-two settlements were built in the West Bank, predominantly in the Jordan Valley and the Etzion bloc surrounding Jerusalem. Various Nahal military-outposts were also constructed, which would later become civilian settlement-communities. The first settlement built was Kfar Etzion where a group of settlers pressured the government to (re)establish the settlement which was abandoned and destroyed during the 1948 War. The (re)building of Kfar Etzion had ideological dimensions. It reasserted Jewish presence in a space that was destroyed but now under the State of Israel's control. Settlement-construction in this period was underpinned by the Allon Plan. This was concerned with providing the State with new strategic depth and secure borders. The Plan's strategy and how this shapes the nature of settlement will be discussed in the next section.

Post-1967, the influence of religious settlers in settlement was clearly evident. The settlement of Kiryat Arba was founded on the outskirts of Hebron. Located spatially deeper inside the West Bank, Hebron has prominent religious significance, the burial place of the Jewish biblical Matriarchs and Patriarchs. Religious settlers actively pressured the State to allow for Jewish settlement in Hebron. The influence of settlers is further seen in the founding of the Keduemim and Elon Moreh settlements, and in the creation of Gush Emunim (the Bloc of the Faithful), both discussed in more detail.
forthcoming. Two different settlement visions and agendas were evident from the offset in Israel’s post-1967 settlement. Whilst the Labor government favoured settlement-construction in the Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion and the Hebron mountain region- allowing the State strategic depth but avoiding spaces containing large Palestinian populations-, Gush Emunim and religious settlers sought settlement spatially deeper in the West Bank in the central mountain ridge. Furthermore, they would engage in independent acts to achieve desires and agendas [Eldar and Zertal, 2007]. As B’t'Selem [2002:13] discusses:

the principal method adopted by the movement was to settle a given site without government permission- and sometimes contrary to its policy- in an effort to force the government later to recognize the settlement as an accomplished fact.

The second phase in Israel’s settlement history was under the Likud governments (1977-1983). By the time the Likud came to power, thirty-one settlements were built in the West Bank housing 4,400 settlers [B't'Selem, 2002:18].

Most of these settlements were established in areas earmarked for annexation to Israel according to the Alon Plan, while a minority were established by Gush Emunim outside these areas. [B't'Selem, 2002:12].

The Allon Plan was abandoned and settlement expanded considerably. “The Likud sought to perpetuate Israel’s control of the West Bank, and settlement seemed the most auspicious means of doing so” [Benn, 2008:49]. Expansion connected with the Likud’s political ideology of Revisionist-Zionism, centring on Israeli power and strength [Barzali and Peleg 1994, Peleg, 2005; Schindler, 2005]. The government found common ground with religious nationalists of Gush Emunim and National-Religious Zionists, and State-settler relations strengthened [B't'Selem, 2002:14; Zertal and Eldar, 2007]. The building of settlements, like Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev and Beit El, around Palestinian neighborhoods surrounding Jerusalem strove to ‘protect’ Israel’s claim to Jerusalem, asserted Israel’s undivided capital.

In the 1970s, concern for the State’s development and defence needs and population overcrowding saw plans devised for greater expansion. Published in 1978, the Drobless Plan led to dozens of settlements constructed spatially deeper in the West Bank along the central ridge close to large Palestinian areas. Ariel Sharon was widely regarded as ‘the Father of Settlements.’ As Minister of Agriculture (1977-1981), he expanded settlement not only in pace or numbers of settlement-units, but more widely dispersed in and throughout space. In the Sharon Plan, he prepared a map marking areas that he believed
to be vital for the Israeli State’s security, and therefore to be annexed. Only a small number of enclaves densely populated by Palestinians would not [Benvenisti and Khayat, 1987].

Sharon’s concern was with a large Palestinian concentration. Settlement-construction in the West Bank and Gaza strove to divide the concentration of Palestinian populations. Sharon encouraged the ‘Star Settlement Plan.’ Settlements were constructed parallel both sides of the Green Line, demographically separating Palestinians in the West Bank from Palestinians in Israel. More settlements were also established on the western slopes of the central mountain ridge. Whilst populated mainly by religious-ideological settlers, the government made efforts to attract other Israelis with incentives [Aronson, 1987]. From 1977-1983 the number of settlements had increased from thirty-one to seventy-six, and the West Bank settler population from 4,400 to 22,800 [Bt'Selem, 2002:18]. However, in 1982 Jewish settlers were removed from settlements in the Sinai after Prime Minister Begin signed the Camp David Peace Deal with President Sadat of Egypt (1979). In returning the Sinai and evacuating Jewish settlers from this space, a space seen as part of the historic Land of Israel, this drew strong criticism and reaction from settler and Jewish religious communities [Inbari, 2012], a significant event in State-settler history.  

The publication of a Settlement Development Plan (1983) further reflected a spatial-expansionist vision, large settlement growth and infrastructural investment [Bt'Selem, 2002:15]. Twenty-three settlement-communities were built, and twenty Nahal army settlement sites. With a National Unity government formed in 1984, settlements were constructed in both the central mountain ridge and its western slope, and in the Jordan Valley, constituting a compromise between supporters of the Drobless-Sharon approach and the Allon Plan. Barzali and Peleg [1994] assesses that such aggressive and strategic construction sought to change demographic realities in space. Settlement-expansion continued under the newly elected governments (1988-1992). By 1985, West Bank settlements totaled 105, and the settler population 44,200 [Bt'Selem, 2002:18].
In the 1990s Israel's population rose by ten percent with approximately one million Jewish immigrants, mostly from the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{57} Extra-territorial spaces served to provide this spatial home. Between 1988-1992, the settler population increased by sixty percent,\textsuperscript{58} rising from 63,600 to 100,500 [Bt'Selem, 2002:18]. Whilst ten new settlements were built in the West Bank, the government's emphasis was expanding existing settlements [Aronson, 1987:48-9].\textsuperscript{59} Settlement has also expanded to house Israel's growing Haredi populations [Benn, 2008; Rubin, 2015; Peace Now Settlement Watch], such as the Mod'in Illit and Beitar Illit settlement-blocs home to over 60,000 and 49,000 residents respectively.\textsuperscript{60} These socio-demographic features in settlement have biopolitical dimensions in catering for life's needs, as well as natural resources which land and settlement agriculture provide to Jewish settlers and Israelis [Efrat, 2006; HRW, 2010].

The huge scale of construction under the Likud governments attracted international criticism, particularly from the United States, Israel's closest ally. In the late 1980s during the First Palestinian Intifada (uprising), international pressure was exerted on Israel to stop settlement-expansion. In Israel's 1992 election, Labor candidate Yitzhak Rabin fought on a campaign to substantially reduce settlement resource allocations [Bt'Selem, 2002:15]. Furthermore, he distinguished "between "the security settlements," which he justified, and "the political settlements," built adjacent to Palestinian population centers, which he opposed" [Benn, 2008:51]. Rabin favoured the separation of Israelis and Palestinians. In 1993 he signed the Oslo Peace Accords with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. This was a key watershed in Israeli history as Rabin committed Israel to attaining a Two-State Solution. The Accords carved-up the West Bank's territory into three 'areas' where Israeli and Palestinian authorities have different levels of control. In reality, however, Israel exerts authority in all spaces.\textsuperscript{61}

Under the Oslo Accords, settlements were to remain in place until a Two-State Solution agreement was reached. The fate of settlement-communities would then be decided. Whilst Rabin agreed to freeze new settlement-construction, in a deal reached with US President Bush in 1992, construction was allowed in two exceptions. Firstly, to account for the "natural growth" of the settler population. Secondly, construction was permitted in "the Greater Jerusalem" region and the Jordan Valley. Whilst in the signing of the Oslo 2 Accords in September 1995 it stated that "neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the
permanent status negotiations” [quoted Roberts, 2017:249], mass settlement-construction occurred. This was achieved through exploiting these two exceptions.

Settlement in the ‘Greater Jerusalem’ area was not clearly defined and construction occurred in considerable areas beyond the territory of ‘Greater Jerusalem’ which Israel annexed in 1967. Furthermore, during the period of the Rabin government, 9,850 housing units were completed throughout the West Bank [Bt’Selem, 2002:16]. The term ‘natural growth’ also was not precisely defined and allowed for mass construction to occur [Bt’Selem, 2002:16]. Under the banner of ‘natural growth,’ new settlements have been established “under the guise of “new neighborhoods” of existing settlements” [Bt’Selem, 2002:16]. Furthermore, settlers themselves employed a method of settlement-expansion by moving caravans to new spatial areas and residing there. Whilst this was without authorisation from State authorities, State forces refrained from removing them. Some of these new ‘settlement sites’ received retroactive approval as authorised settlement-communities or served to expand the boundaries of settlements which they were built near. Such practices will be further discussed in the section Settlement-Outposts.

Through such methods, “contrary to the expectations raised by the Oslo Process, the Israeli governments have implemented a policy leading to the dramatic growth of the settlements” [Bt’Selem, 2002:16], reflected in statistics. Between September 1993 (the signing of the Oslo Accords Declaration of Principles) and September 2001, the number of housing units in West Bank settlements increased by approximately fifty-four percent. At the end of 1993, the West Bank settler population was 100,500. By the end of 2000, this had increased to 191,600, a growth rate of ninety percent [Bt’Selem, 2002:16-17].

In 1993, Rabin presented his proposal for Oslo 2 talks which included changes in the West Bank’s border. Rabin declared that “the security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term” [quoted Benn, 2008:52], as well as encompassing settlements located close to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Rabin also favoured settlement-blocs located closer to ‘the Green Line,’ than remote settlements.
It is under Ariel Sharon’s leadership as Prime Minister that dramatic political and practical changes in settlement occurred. Sharon faced pressures on different fronts. First, the Second Intifada (2001) where settlers in the West Bank, Gaza, and also Israelis in the Green Line, endured attacks from Palestinians. Second, American and internal pressure to curtail settlement. Such pressures saw Sharon making significant decisions.

Firstly, the construction of ‘the separation fence’ in the West Bank, leaving settlement-blocs west of the barrier. The fence has been criticised by Palestinians and internationally for being viewed as a new de facto border and encompassing large portions of Palestinian territory. Whilst the Sharon government stated that the barrier “is solely for defense purposes and does not represent any kind of political border,” as Benn [2008:55] writes: “the moment it was erected as a physical obstacle on the ground, a clear distinction was created between the two sides.” Secondly, Sharon’s unilateral Disengagement Plan which evacuated all settlements in Gaza and four remote settlements in north Samaria. The significance of this historic act taken against settlement and communities is the focus of Chapter Three. Sharon [2003] also promised to evacuate all settlement-outposts. Falling into a coma, Sharon was unable to fulfill his commitment.
In January 2006, Ehud Olmert replaced Sharon as Prime Minister. In his election campaign, Olmert presented ‘the Convergence Plan.’ Whilst never translated into a detailed program, this plan indicated key priorities regarding settlements and the West Bank. The Plan involved (re)establishing Israel’s border on the basis of the separation fence, evacuating settlements east of the fence, and expanding and developing the settlement-blocs [Benn, 2008:54]. He viewed the division of land and separation from the Palestinians as “the lifeline of Zionism” [quoted Benn, 2008:54]. However, security issues which Israel faced around this time from Gaza and the Second Lebanon War (2006) relegated settlement decisions. In 2007, the Annapolis process was launched under Prime Minister Olmert and Defence Minister Ehud Barak. Olmert and Barak allowed settlement tenders and construction west of the fence, “thereby [strengthening] its status as a de facto border” [Benn, 2008:55]. In negotiations with Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas, Olmert presented the isolated settlements as ‘bargaining chips’:

he suggested drawing up an agreed-upon border, and then evacuating the settlements to the east in two stages: first, a voluntary evacuation in return for compensation and...once the entire arrangement is implemented, a forced evacuation of the remaining settlements [Benn, 2008:56].

In return, the PA was to agree to no limits on Israeli construction west of the border to be determined. Olmert proposed for Israel to annex seven to eight percent of the West Bank. The Palestinians would acquire five percent of alternate territory and passage from Gaza to the West Bank. In 2008, this proposal was refused by Abbas. Since the Annapolis conference, thousands more settlement units have been approved in blocs east of the Green Line and Separation Fence, particularly around Jerusalem. Construction has also occurred in settlements spatially deeper in the West Bank and the State has evacuated only a small number of outposts.
Whilst Prime Minister Netanyahu has at times partially frozen settlement-construction, construction has continued to increase. During political peace talks in 2013 between Israel and the PA, under the auspices of the United States, settlement increased by 123 percent [Miller and Ben Zion, 2014]. Over the years, settlement spaces have been designated as 'development areas' or 'national priority areas,' implicating how settlements and residents are treated [Adalah, 2013] due to the belief that settlement-construction and existence 'protects' areas deemed 'a priority.' Isolated settlements, like Elon Moreh, Yitzhar, and Itamar,65 situated deep in the West Bank near large Palestinian population centres, were included on the List at the end of 2012 [Petersberg, 2012].
2013, ninety-one settlements in the West Bank were on the 'national priority' list [Lewis, Fisher-Ilan, 2013] with fifteen added in 2013 [JTA, 2013].

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Despite the settler population in the West Bank rising considerably since 1967, Palestinians remain the majority population. Whilst settlement-building has occurred under all Israeli governments, over the years, Israeli political leaders have compromised on space in political and diplomatic deals. Significant events have been the Camp David Accords with Egypt, The Oslo Peace Accords, and the Gaza Disengagement. The Gaza Disengagement will be a strong focus of this thesis because, I will argue, it constituted a
key disjunctive moment (Chapter Four) and significant impacts it has had on some State-settler relations (Chapters Four, Five and Six).

In Israel's settlement history, there needs to be question if we can use the phrase 'settlement policy' as a singular. The Yesha Council's chief foreign envoy, Oded Revivi [2016], writes that

since the State of Israel returned to the historical lands of Judea and Samaria in 1967, the settlement process in the area has lacked a clear governmental policy, often shifting with different competing political imperatives.

Such shifts, Revivi states, have impacted the security of settlement-communities, marring their existence with uncertainty. Authors have discussed how settlement changes have been influenced by State leader’s political ideologies, government compositions, security strategisations, national needs, diplomatic deals, international pressures, and the influence of lobby groups on governments [Newman, 1985; Bt'Selem, 2002; Gorenberg, 2006; Eldar and Zertal, 2007; Benn, 2008]. Whilst there may not be one unitary or official policy, we need to question Gorenberg’s assessment [2006] that an "accidental empire" has been created. In asking what underpins settlement-construction, two projects can be identified. These, I argue, connect with different (in)securitisations of space and concern with furthering projects of security within State (re)creation. Firstly, the security strategisation of settlement and recreating new spatial realities in Israel’s State-(re)building. Secondly, the religious act of settlement and the concern for messianic security. Such discussions are important for contrasting different natures in settlement projects and State-settler relations.

**Settlement and the (In)Securitisation of Space**

Given the power that settlement wields in and over space, and how it has been a central historic tool in Israel's State (re)building, Eyal Weizman [2004:221] writes that

the transformation of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 became a parallel conflict, carried out with pencil lines on the drafting tables of military and civilian planners and architects...just like gun or the tank, mundane building matter was used by the Israeli state to apply it strategic and political agenda.

Settlements are significant and effective tools of political geography, encapsulating how concepts discussed in Chapter One- securitisation, spatial (re)structuring, spatial control, and the weaponisation of space- are practically applied. I assess the desire for ‘strategic
depth’ and territorial-expansion post-1967, achieved through settlement-construction, is motivated by an existential security concern with spatial control and presence-in-space. This concern is captured in Israel’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Abba Eban’s, speech at the UN following 1967 in describing the insecurity of Israel’s pre-1967 borders:

we have openly said that the map will never again be the same as on June 4, 1967...this is a matter of security and of principles. The June map is for us equivalent to insecurity and danger. I do not exaggerate when I say that it has for us something of a memory of Auschwitz.66

Eban evoked the trauma of existential insecurity to accentuate the reality of existential danger the State faced now and in future if it returned to a previous spatial reality. This revealed the existential significance of space. Such realities of insecurity significantly threatened the State’s security and therefore threatened existential security, undermining State (re)creation itself. Concerned with this security problematisation, Minister of Labor Yigal Allon proposed territorial adjustments centred on a ‘defensible borders’ doctrine [Allon, 1976]. He wrote that

one does not have to be a military expert to easily identify the critical defects of the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967...the purpose of defensible borders is thus to correct this weakness, to provide Israel with the requisite minimal strategic depth, as well as lines which have topographical strategic significance.67

According to this doctrine, Israel’s 1949 armistice lines presented the State and its citizens with unacceptable vulnerabilities. The Allon Plan served to address “critical defects” by providing the strategic depth and topographical significance needed, (re)designing spatial (in)security out of the new spatial and territorial ‘availability.’ As one Israeli security analyst told me, “the idea of the Allon Plan was to build a security buffer zone in the Jordan Valley and Judean Desert.”68 In the Plan, approximately forty percent of the territory would be brought under Israel’s sovereignty and a large Jewish-Israeli population would live in settlements.69 These "security settlements" were strategised as the State’s security belt. Over the years, the spatiality of 'defensible borders' has substantially expanded.70

If the presence of settlements in space would serve to annex territory in the long-term, Allon recommended settlement-construction should avoid spaces close to or containing large Palestinian populations. The strategic locations where settlements would be constructed would preserve the demographic, ethnocratic and existential security of the 'Jewish State.' From the 1970s settlement-expansion and dispersion are outcomes of a re-
problematisation of the 'defensive borders' strategy. Rather than a security advantage, settlement concentration was seen as a strategic liability following Israel's defeat in the 1973 War. Furthermore, Sharon's settlement-expansion throughout space was motivated by concern of potential threats that a large concentration of Palestinian populations would pose to the Israeli State. Construction and dispersion would divide Palestinian populations, reflecting a security-instrumentalist approach to space. Advocating more aggressive settlement-expansion throughout space, the Droblenss Plan stated "the civilian presence of Jewish communities is vital for the security of the state" and there must not be the slightest doubt regarding our intention to hold the areas of Judea and Samaria forever...the best and most effective way...is a rapid settlement drive [quoted B't'Selem, 2002:14].

Over the years settlement has considerably and consistently expanded and entrenched in the West Bank. State officials and security/military figures [Dayan, 2011] emphasise the strategic necessity of Israel's control of wider spaces for 'Israel's security.' Interior Minister Gideon Sa'ar, for example, stated that Israel needs to know that the (Jordan) Valley settlement will remain and prosper for ages...the security of Israel required a strategic depth, it is unthinkable for the border to not be in the Jordan Valley; the alternative...is unacceptable.

Speaking at the UN in 2011, immediately after Abbas' speech asking for UN-recognition of Palestinian statehood, Netanyahu [2011a] urged the world to recognise "Israel's legitimate security concerns," pronouncing "better a bad press than a good eulogy." He warned of the spatial and existential dangers facing the State, including from its spatiality: without Judea and Samaria, the West Bank, Israel is all of nine miles wide...how do you protect such a tiny country, surrounded by people sworn to its destruction...Israel needs greater strategic depth...to secure and defensible boundaries.

Settler leaders also emphasise that spaces of 'the wider Land of Israel' and settlement presence are pivotal for State security. When it was announced that evacuation centres would be constructed in Samaria as 'safe havens' for Israelis, the then-Yehsa Council Head voiced that these plans emphasize how important the Shomron is for the security of the State and its citizens...without the Shomron, it will not be possible to protect the
residents of central Israel...this is another indication that relinquishing parts of Samaria will be a direct hit on the safety of residents of the State of Israel [quoted Dvorin, 2014a].

In 2014, an Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders was likened by one MK to "suicide." Settlement in space has been explicitly connected with (in)security. In 2014, Minister Sa’ar proclaimed that "when there's no settlement- there's no security and there's terror" [quoted Azulay, 2014]. In 2015, MK Yogev declared “we will continue to build...and the settlement enterprise will continue to strengthen our security” [quoted Soffer, 2015].

After the Second Intifada, we also see a new dynamic asserted within construction where settlement is advocated in response to acts of insecurity. When three Jewish-Israeli teenagers were killed in the West Bank in 2014, one Israeli party leader declared that “building is our answer to murder,” “a display of Zionism.” Another MK stated that "facts on the ground are a symbolic move.” In 2016, after homes in the settlement of Neve Tzuf were burned in an act labelled as “terror,” Israel’s Defence Minister advocated settlement-construction: “I think the best answer is to widen the settlement enterprise” [quoted Ben-Kimon and Somflavi, 2016]. Whilst this can be seen as an act of punishment or retaliation, impacting on the nature and politics of settlement where settlement is a weapon to be weaponised as a counter-response to insecurity, it also embodies existential concerns and Zionist principles. The act and presence of ‘building' politically and practically asserts existence-in-space in the wake of Jewish insecurity.

It is not merely the material structure of settlements in space which are asserted as essential for securing the Jewish State’s security. In 2013, Israel’s Defence Minister stated: "I’m a man [who believes in] settlements...where Jews don't live, there is no security." The presence of Jewish life in space is also deemed a security requisite, further emphasising the biopolitical securitisation of settlement. One former IDF officer stated that "I think today, the government and the army see, not in every aspect but generally, settlers as another arm of control.” In the weaponisation of space [Weizman, 2004; 2006], ‘presence’ itself is weaponised. David Newman [1989:220] assesses that "in order to ensure effective territorial control, the State applies a mixture of military and civilian presence.” With spaces identified as essential for security, home to populations of security who are given a political license to be in space, spaces and communities are 'securitised.' "Around settlements is a shabam, a special security area three-times the size of the settlement," one former IDF officer discussed. The majority of settlements are 'gated-


communities,’ enclosed in fences, security guards at entrances, and Israeli military checkpoints surrounding them, securitising life within.\(^{84}\)

With settlement perceived as a key practice for the State’s security, historically settlers, in their own agency, have been active in settlement. In the founding of the State of Israel, Zionist leaders, such as Ben-Gurion [1944], called for ‘pioneers’ to “build the homeland” and settlers founded agricultural and tower and stockade settlements [Efrat, 2006]. Following the State’s (re)establishment, soldiers were directed from ‘warfare’ to ‘settlement’ to increase and strengthen peripheral settlements\(^ {85}\) [Evans, 2006:582]. The Defence Service Law emphasised the "natural' linkage between security and presence and at the same time urging them to take an active part in the state-building process” [Newman, 1989:221]. The influence and authority of settlers in politics and space is widely documented [Leibovich-Dar, 2002; Sason, 2005; Gorenberg, 2006; Eldar and Zertal, 2007; Pedahzur, 2011; Neidle, 2013; Yesh Din, 2013; Bar’el, 2015; Hass, 2016]. Such influence and authority were discussed with me by a former IDF officer:

when I guarded the settlement, the person who gave me orders was a settler...that's what my commander told me to do, you're supposed to listen to him...you have somebody who's knowledgeable, he's the authority figure.\(^ {86}\)

One Israeli security analyst, who themselves was critical of settlement, reflected that for settlers “what they perceive as security...they see themselves as Israel’s security-belt.”\(^ {87}\) Conversations I had with settlers of different political backgrounds reflected an active subjectivity of being-a-settler. Such subjectivity furthers discussions from Chapter One. Acts of settlement disclose how subjects themselves are active in (in)security practices, seeing security as also being their role and responsibility, not just the States, contributing to CSS. In discussing their involvement in settlement, one settler stated: “I felt I had to leave my little private life and get involved in helping the people of Israel safeguard their homeland.”\(^ {88}\) In asking how they would describe themselves, one National-Zionist settler answered: “I think of myself as a defender and a pioneer of the Land.”\(^ {89}\) They furthered:

you just have to come to Judea and Samaria...just imagine the Jews were not here but the Arabs and the missiles. You can see the houses they will be mowing down, the little mini-Israel that will be left if G-d-forbid we leave Judea and Samaria.

Despite settlement asserted as crucial for security, settlers face insecurities in space. In discussing such realities, I asked one National-Religious settler if they consider leaving space and their community. They answered: “I have resolve, despite it all. We are here
because we want to set up a country...we are holding strong. I believe we should be here.”

It is such commitment to space on an ideological level where ‘settlement’ moves from a framework of existential and territorial (in)security to being intimately connected with the meaning of the ‘return’ to the homeland.

*The Cases of Elon Moreh and Kedeumim*

In this critical analysis of settlement, the founding of the Elon Moreh and Kedeumim settlements is a vital case-study. It offers important insight into the projects and politics the communities emerged from, relations between the State of Israel and settler groups, and revealing another significant agenda within settlement. "For 4000 years the city of Elon Moreh-Shechem has always been a major point of the meeting of the Jewish Nation with the Land of Israel.”

Following Israel’s 1967 military victory, Elon Moreh-Shechem and wider surrounding areas were sites of “a major point of meeting” between the Jewish Nation, the Land of Israel, and the State of Israel where "there developed a desire amongst a large group of Jews to reinhabit these areas.”

*Map 3i has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.*

The community’s website states that “the story of Elon Moreh is the story of the incredible devotion and determination of its founders.”

In late 1974, a group of individuals from the religious and (ultra)nationalist group Garin Elon Moreh attempted to (re)establish a settlement-community on the ruins of Sebastia. In 1975, the Israeli cabinet found the community to be illegal and the group was removed from space on seven occasions. Eventually, the communities of Kedumim and Elon Moreh were established where Jewish presence in space was authorised by the State approving their construction and existence. "The Elon Moreh settlement nucleus was conceived as a practical expression of the notion of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel.” This was not merely ‘a practical expression’ but a religious and ideological expression: “It was here that G-d first promised Abraham our father, "To your descendents will I give this Land.”}
It was upon this ‘promise’ and right that Jewish individuals acted where "pioneers...like the Maccabees of old, the founders of Elon Moreh were determined to preserve their heritage while strengthening Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel." Despite their belief and determination to strengthen "Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel," the group was hindered by the State of Israel’s sovereignty and concern of directing settlement. The government eventually accepted the determination of and wider public support for Jewish settlement in these spaces of religious-national significance. The State facilitated the presence of Jewish civilians by authorising the establishment of a temporary community in the Kadum army camp. The settlers were therefore positioned in a space under the State's direct sovereignty, limiting settlement practices, and giving settlers a restricted political license. Eventually, the settlement-communities of Elon Moreh, Kedeumim, and many more settlements in Samaria, were founded by the State.

This famous case is important in a number of regards. Firstly, it reflects the governance realities within Israeli settlement. Secondly, it shows the commitment of Jewish settlers to (re)establish settlement-communities and enact Jewish sovereignty in and over space. Thirdly, the case embodies struggles between two sovereignties. The Garin Elon Moreh group was willing to confront the State's sovereignty to pursue their project. In inhabiting a particular world-of-meaning, settlement was seen as a ‘right’ and ‘duty’ to be enacted in the Land of the Forefathers, the space which the sovereign God had promised ownership. The sovereign State was ultimately unable to control the desire of ideological groups to engage in settlement-practices but a compromise could be reached with the State directing populations in space. Ultimately, the (re)establishment of settlement in that particular space was made possible by the State exercising its sovereignty, ordering the land be "seized for military purposes." It embodies how space is a theatre of power.

The case is of further importance in the settlers’ justification of settlement-construction and existence in space. The notion that settlements in the West Bank are vital for the State’s strategic security was brought under the spotlight. Settlers openly declared that they are not in space out of a concern with (in)security, or at least the State’s (in)security concerns. Rabbi Menachem Felix proclaimed that their main concern and motivation was the commandment to settle Eretz Yisrael which is "in the deepest meaning of the word...the place where this land was first promised to our first patriarch" and they regard their settlement as "a permanent Jewish settlement no less than Degania or Netanya." Through this declaration, the settlers brought into the open a different project and prioritisation, challenging the foundations upon which the State's settlement-enterprise rests. Through their victory, they had asserted their own agency, seeking to secure and
advance a different project and reality. It is this other security project and reality in settlement which I will now assess.

**Settlement and National-Religious Zionism: Redemption and the Mitzvah of Settlement**

One Israeli analyst captured different groundings within Israel's settlement 'enterprise':

Israel conquers the West Bank and suddenly you have groups of people promoting the idea that Israel should establish Jewish communities in this occupied area. The reason to do this is still a question today. Some people will say this is for security... yet some groups say we are in the West Bank because this is the Land of Abraham and it is our Land, our document is the Bible, so-called ideological settlements.103

'Ideological settlements' are located deep in the West Bank, such as Yitzhar, Itamar, Elon Moreh, Kfar Tapuach and Hebron. They are home to religiously-orthodox settlers who have strong religious-ideological attachment to this space. If such settlers were ordered to leave their communities, it is believed that this would generate significant opposition and resistance.104 In the (in)securitisation of spaces outside the State's internationally-recognised territorial borders, Jewish settlers have a political license to be in space from the State of Israel. Yet, we need to recognise the religious-ideological significance asserted upon this space as the space of 'Eretz Yisrael.' This not only presents a different explanation and project of settlement but fundamentally impacts the nature of space and settlement. This reality is reflected in a publication by the settler Yesha Council [2013:6]:

Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the forefathers of the Jewish nation, dwelt in the mountains of Judea and Samaria, residing in Shechem, Elon Moreh, Beit El (Bethel) and Hebron. It was in Judea and Samaria that G-d promised to give Abraham the land for his descendants as an everlasting covenant, and so it was forever named “The Promised Land.”

As ‘the God-given Promised Land’ in belief-systems, settlement-building and existence in spaces of *Eretz Yisrael* operate in a different framework of sovereignty and rights. One National-Religious rabbi declared “the Land of Israel is not like any other land- it is Hashem’s special Holy Land” [Brody, 2014]. *Eretz Yisrael* is innately sacred space, space of divine sanctity and redemption. The right of Jewish settlement in this space is due to the “everlasting covenant” given by the sovereign God to His people [Kook, 1865-1935; Fisch, 1978; Sicherman, 2011; HaKohen, 2016]. In belief-systems, acts of settlement therefore contain a sovereignty and license predating the sovereignty and license given to
Jewish-Israeli subjects by the sovereign State of Israel. Rather than ‘destroying itself,’ for religious settlers, settlement in space is central to what Jewish ‘return’ to the homeland and the Jewish State’s (re)creation mean.

“Sacred texts have a living impact on people’s everyday worlds,” Frosh [2009:210] writes. Given the significance of this Land, it makes its own demands: “King David says that Hashem gave us the land...so that we would “guard His laws and observe His commandments”...as the Torah instructs” [Brody, 2014]. For Nachmanides, “living in Eretz Yisrael is equal in importance to all the commandments” and the mitzvah yishuv ha’aretz (settling the Land) is “a commandment equivalent to all the other mitzvot combined” [Melamed, 2016a]. The nature of this space brings important contributions to Political Geography in showing how space itself makes demands on subjects. Living in space comes with its own obligations. Settlement is deemed a fundamental religious act for hastening-the-redemption. The nature of settlement and the religious-messianic framework it operates within impact subjectivity [Frosh, 2009]. In this belief-system, settlers are God’s faithful subjects, obeying a supreme mitzvah. As National-Religious Rabbi Eliezer Melamed [2016b], head of the Yeshiva in Har Bracha, pronounces: “we settled here to fulfill the vision of the prophets and fulfill the mitzvoth of settling the Land.”

For Religious-Zionists in particular, Israel’s 1967 victory further marks the ‘liberation’ of the homeland. Seen as a miracle of divine providence [Kempinski, 2016], victory is imbued with messianic significance. Weeks before this during Israel’s Independence Day, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook lamented that he “could not take part in the joy.” Instead, in an impassioned speech, he asked "where is our Hebron- are we forgetting that?!...”and other spaces of ‘the homeland’ [quoted Inbari, 2012:28]. Weeks later, these spaces came under Israel’s control. This, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda declared, was the "visualization of the divine politics" and testament to the sacredness of the State itself to be blessed with such victory. It demonstrated conclusively to Kook and his followers that the unfolding-of-the-redemption was underway [Aran, 1988], the 'light of holiness' was shining through in the reality of the present [Taub, 2010:45-46]. ‘Zionism’ was not only hastening the End of Days, but, Kook pronounced, "the End...was forcing us!."105 This, Taub [2010:42] assesses, was "the spark that ignited the messianic fire" and “the immediate catalyst for the contemporary emergence of Jewish fundamentalism” [Lustick, 1988:19].

In this reality, Jews are obligated to fulfil the mitzvah yishuv ha’aretz. Within this messianic and fundamentalist framework, settlement in the whole Eretz Yisrael is a decisive step for hastening a divinely-ordained process of redemption believed to be underway. A reality
of security critically makes its own demands on subjects, an important aspect which the Israeli case brings to emphasis in CSS discussions. Many authors [Lustick, 1987; Aran, 1988; Newman, 2005; Gorenberg, 2006; Eldar and Zertal, 2007] document how religious settlers are dominant actors in settlement. Gush Emunim was, Gideon Aran terms, an ‘activist movement’ of ‘Jewish Zionist fundamentalism.’ “A band of skull-capped and bearded young men, assault rifles on their shoulders and rabbinic texts in their hands” [1988:265] began a determined campaign of settlement of religious-messianic motivation and Greater Israel ideology. Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva graduates, a prominent National-Religious institution [Hellinger, 2008], and disciples of Rabbi Kook, such as Moshe Levinger, Haim Druckman, Hanan Porat, Shlomo Aviner, Eliezer Waldman and Ya'akov Ariel, were active figures, driven by fundamentalist religious ideology, conviction, “ultranationalism and active messianism” [Lustick, 1988:9].

"Initially," Aran [1988:265] writes, "the phenomenon was described as lunatic, esoteric, episodic, and marginal...in time, however, it became clear that the phenomenon...possessed depth of content and influence" where “the movement is largely responsible for fundamental changes in the Territories” [267]. Israel’s defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War was further viewed as religiously and messianically significant, punishment from God for not heading the directive of settlement more actively following the ‘liberation of the homeland’ in 1967. This defeat, and subsequent negotiations by the Begin government for the return of the Sinai for a political peace agreement, led to a more vigorous ‘messianic activism’ [Prior, 1999:87]. Operating in a framework of Jewish fundamentalism [Lustick, 1988:8] and seeking to implement "transcendental imperatives" for redemptive security, such messianic-religious settlers engage in actions to ensure Jewish rule over the "whole Land of Israel," substitute [a] radical and apocalyptic vision of Jewish destiny for the pragmatic Zionism that Israel's founders had made [Lustick, 1988:3].

The settlement project of National-Religious Zionism operates within a different framework than the State's strategisation of settlement. Crucially, however, National-Religious leaderships and communities have worked- and continue to work- closely with the State of Israel [Lustick, 1988; Jones, 1999; Newman, 2005; Niedle, 2012]. The National-Religious leadership is a powerful lobby in Israeli politics, government and society, seeking to advance settler interests and National-Religious ideologies. In accounting for this historic relationship and cooperation, the interests of Israeli governments and National-Religious leaderships/communities have merged.
These close relations are also importantly due to the metaphysical and messianic significance projected on the State of Israel's (re)creation and operationality [Kook, 2016]. For National-Religious Zionists, the State is a sacred being and vehicle of and for redemption (Chapter Two). Held in such religious-messianic-political framework and security narrative, the sacralisation and securitisation of the State places it on a pedestal. Whilst decisions by Israeli governments and the State's treatment of settlement may attract criticism from communities, crucially reverence to the State and its sovereignty continues to be largely paramount in State-settler relations and interactions. However, in actions which have been taken by the State of Israel against settlement, this relationship has become increasingly strained. Since the 1980s, Motti Inbari [2007:699] writes,

the Gush Emunim settlement movement has seen an increasing conscience of crisis due to the discrepancy between their underlying religious belief, which considers the State of Israel to be the first step toward full redemption...and the actually reality of concessions and withdrawals.

Particularly since the early 1990s, the National-Religious Zionist community has undergone a “crisis of conscience” [2007:702]. The State’s actions have provoked profound theological crises due to the discrepancies in how the State is seen in its religious-metaphysical being, and in actual realities with the State’s actions against Eretz Yisrael [Inbari, 2007; 2012; Jones, 2013]. Not only has the Jewish State ‘given-away’ parts of the historic Jewish homeland, it has ‘evacuated’ settlement-communities in this Land and forcibly removed settlers from spaces. Such acts, and how these impact upon State-settler relations, are the focus of preceding chapters.

Historic Acts of Violence in Religious Settler Communities

In this overview of settlement history and the realities which settlement operates in, there needs to be a recognition of realities of violence. Historically, a number of acts of violence and “political terrorism” [Aran and Hassner, 2013] have been perpetrated by individuals from religious settler communities. Authors such as Ian S. Lustick [1988], Ehud Sprinzak [1999], Ami Pedazhur and Arie Perliger [2003], Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar [2007], Motti Inbari [2009], Gideon Aran and Ron E. Hassner [2013] have documented these in-depth. High-profile attacks have been enacted over the years through different means.

In the 1980s, Palestinian individuals and institutions were targets of a series of attacks. “The first action by the Jewish terror group was carried out to avenge the murder of six yeshiva students” in the city of Hebron [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:78]. Booby-traps were
placed in cars belonging to several mayors of Palestinian cities, leaving the mayors seriously wounded. A hand grenade was also thrown at an Islamic College in the West Bank city of Hebron killing three students. In 1984, Israeli security forces arrested a group of over twenty Israelis for these acts of violence. Named 'the Jewish Underground in the Territories' by Israeli media, all members were observant Yeshiva graduates and most were settlers. The attacks were seen as acts of vigilantism, retribution, and deterrence against Palestinian attacks [Weisburd, 1988, 1999; Pedazhur and Perliger, 2003] (Chapter Six). However, the arrests uncovered more planned high-profile acts of violence whose implementation would have been of great impact. First, the bombing of five buses from East Jerusalem which were filled with passengers. Second, destroying the holy Muslim shrine of the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem.

Three main leaders of the Jewish Underground were Menachem Livni, Yehuda Etzion, and Yeshua Ben-Shushan. Livni told his interrogators that the Jewish Underground had support from extremist rabbis from Kiryat Arba who

stressed that it was necessary to discourage the Arab population by means of mass attack actions. "In light of the government’s weakness and the feeling of those present that the government had 'abandoned them,' it was proposed that deterrent actions be carried out by settlers" [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:77-78].

Furthermore, the Jewish Undergrounds' actions "relied on the rabbis' opinion based in traditional Jewish law (halakha), [which] was to attack “various targets with the aim of deterring Arabs from acting against Jews”" [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:78]. Such halakhic opinions came from the head of the Hebron yeshiva, Rabbi Zvi Liebman, and head of the Kiryat Arba yeshiva, Rabbi Dov Lior [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:78]. This historic case shows how rabbinical authority was important in acts of violence. Furthermore, the social standing of the perpetrators is noteworthy. As Zertal and Eldar [2007:76] assess:

the people of the Jewish terror group did not arise from the murky margins of their settler community but in fact came from the best families of settler society and the heart of the believing establishment. They emerged from the preferred and well-funded settlements, from elite yeshivas, and from select units in the army.

The social background of the Jewish Underground and their relations with the settler mainstream, rabbinical authorities and IDF will be of importance in comparisons with perpetrators of future acts of settler violence, the Hilltop Youth, in Chapter Six. Menachem Livni was an IDF sapper and officer and the operational commander. He lived in Kiryat
Arba and was a student of Rabbi Levinger. Yehuda Etzion was “determined and zealous in his faith” and was “among the "professional settlers" during the first years of Gush Emunim, spending long periods on the hilltops, moving constantly from one to another.” Etzion helped in the founding of Jewish settlements and at the time of Camp David negotiations participated in demonstrations. Etzion also undertook his military service as a paramilitary yeshiva soldier in combat engineering. Following the signing of the Camp David Agreements, he sought a different course for accelerating the unfolding-of-the-redemption and for allowing ‘Jewish destiny’ be fulfilled.

A greater vision guided Yehuda Etzion and his friends. Alongside the violent revenge against Palestinian terror, the most important aim of the Jewish terror organization was the elimination of the “defilement” from the site of the Temple, i.e. blowing up the Dome of the Rock [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:79].

Yeshua Ben-Shushan was the group’s ideologue and spokesperson. He had insisted on serving in an elite army unit and he completed an officers’ training course. Ben-Shushan went on to study in the Mercaz HaRav yeshiva, a prominent National-Religious institution and ideological stronghold of Gush Emunim. With the establishment of Gush Emunim, he led soldiers and supporters to sites of settlements and demonstrations, and helped to establish settlement-communities. He continued his influence in the IDF, appointed to the position of Regional Defence Officer in Samaria and helped to establish new infantry units composed exclusively of settlement residents [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:80].

Ben-Shushan was “an ardent Messianist...immersed in medieval Jewish mysticism” where “under his influence, several members had plotted the destruction of “the abomination,” the Dome of the Rock” [Aran and Hassner, 2013:359]. Such act occurred for a messianic agenda. The Dome of the Rock was believed to radiate 'high energy vibrations’ which bequeathed strength on Muslims everywhere. The strength of these rays was from the Foundation Stone on which the shrine was built and from the remains of the Jewish Temple. When Arabs, “‘the emissaries of the devil’” [Aran and Hassner, 2013:359], had conquered the holy city and had installed ‘the abomination,’ they had deprived the Jewish people of their superiority. For Ben-Shushan and his supporters this could not continue. As Aran and Hassner [2013:359] assess, the individuals knew that destroying the Muslim shrine would provoke millions of Muslims around the world against Israel. This terrifying scenario, described as heralding a "World War III," did not deter them. They perceived it as the ultimate confrontation, an Armageddon that would usher the full redemption.
Removing the Dome of the Rock would have major violent and political implications. For the perpetrators and supporters, these would be positive and necessary. Violence would be justified in the name of messianic (in)security and would serve as an act to trigger full security. This incendiary attack was not fulfilled. A variety of explanations are put forward for this, including Livni’s ill-health, dithering over planning, fear that the attack would lead to attacks against Jews, the withdrawal from the Sinai completed, and doubts that the plan could be implemented [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:85].

Historically, other individual acts of violence have occurred from settler communities. Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai and the evacuation of settlers from Yamit in the context of a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, attracted high condemnation in the settler community. Whilst settlers in the Sinai were not ideological-messianic settlers and were willing to accept compensation for the evacuation, settlers in Judea and Samaria engaged in a campaign to stop the withdrawal. There was great concern that the Sinai withdrawal would set a precedent for future spatial withdrawal and settlement evacuation, particularly in Judea and Samaria. As Yoel Bin-Nun, a leading National-Religious rabbi, later said: “in the struggle for Yamit I saw a struggle for Judea and Samaria,” and Gush Emunim’s political secretary voiced: “we were there so that no Jewish settlement would ever be uprooted again” [quoted Zertal and Eldar, 2007:71]. Action against the withdrawal was therefore part of a larger security agenda.

The Movement to Stop the Withdrawal engaged in lobbying, propaganda, and individuals took up residence in hundreds of empty homes in Yamit. The evacuations, however, preceded without violence from settlers/supporters. Following its implementation, “the Gush embarked on a renewed campaign to establish more firmly the settlements in the West Bank” and the Yesha Council was founded as the umbrella organisation for the settlements [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:75]. However, in this context of evacuation and spatial withdrawal, individuals did engage in acts of violence. Yehuda Richter is an American-born orthodox settler from Elon Moreh and a strong supporter of Meir Kahane. In February 1982, Richter ambushed a Palestinian bus in the West Bank and wounded many of its passengers. His act of violence was an attempt to stop the withdrawal. In April 1982, Richter also locked himself in a bunker in Yamit with several companions and heating-gas containers where he threatened to commit suicide as the settlement evacuations were to be implemented. Such acts reflect the significance of this space and commitment to it.

One of the most notorious acts of settler violence against Palestinians occurred in 1994. On the 25th February, the day of the Jewish holiday of Purim, Baruch Goldstein arrived at
the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and entered into the adjacent Ibrahimi Mosque. He opened fire and shot dead twenty-nine Palestinian worshippers whilst they were praying. Goldstein was a doctor, a reserve army officer, and a very pious individual. He was a recent immigrant from the United States who had moved to Kiryat Arba. Following this high-profile attack, Hebron's Jewish settlers described Goldstein’s deed as an act of revenge against Palestinian attacks. His attack, they said, was Kiddush Hashem (Sanctification of God’s Name) and Goldstein died as a martyr. This act was infused with religious justification and motive [Schwartz, 2005; Seeman, 2009]. With his death, there was a desire for God to avenge his noble death and kill many more Palestinians. Goldstein’s grave in Kiryat Arba is a revered site for some right-wing Israelis and settlers.

On the 4th November 1995, Israel’s Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated. This was an act that shocked Israeli society. Rabin was shot three times after addressing a mass rally in Tel Aviv in support of his government’s peace policy. The perpetrator was Yigal Amir, a Yeshiva high school graduate and law student at Bar Ilan, a National-Religious university. At his trial, Amir justified his action. He stated that he “acted according to din rodef...In other words, I did this not as a punishment but as a prevention” [quoted Aran and Hassner, 2013:360]. “The Halakha defines a rodef (pursuer) as one who is about to murder a Jew.” For Amir, Rabin was not only a traitor in his support to hand over parts of Judea and Samaria to the Palestinian Authority. With this act, he was deemed as ‘one who was about to murder a Jew’ and therefore Amir was obliged to stop this murder. “Such a violent bystander would be free of guilt since he acted in good faith to save a Jewish soul” [Aran and Hassner, 2013:360]. This killing was deemed a just act of security. Operating with this obligation, violence was enacted for a noble purpose of saving Jewish life. Violence was also enacted in a Higher name for the sake of the Land and God.

In May 2003, a group of four men were arrested while they were caught trying to booby-trap a Palestinian girls school in East Jerusalem. The individuals were strongly orthodox Jews from the settlement of Bat Ayin who practiced a mix of Hassidic Judaism and the teachings of Rabbi Meir Kahane. The group would be known as the Bat Ayin Underground. Israeli security services later connected the group to a number of terrorist acts between 2001-2002 in which eight Palestinians were killed. In August 2005, Eden Natan-Zada boarded a bus armed with an assault rifle in Shefar’am, an Israeli-Palestinian city. Shooting into the bus, he killed four and wounded other passengers. Natan-Zada was an AWOL soldier from the settlement of Tapuach. At the time of this attack, he was undergoing a process of becoming an observant Jew.
Finally, in October 2009, Yaakov Teitel was arrested and convicted of a number of terrorist acts which were committed over twelve years. These included the murder of two Palestinians in 1997, placing a booby-trap at the home of Professor Zeev Sternhel, an Israeli liberal intellectual, and seriously wounding an individual from the Christian ‘Messianic Judaism’ movement with an explosive package. Teitel was American-born who had immigrated to Israel and lived in the settlement of Shvut Rachel.

Such historic acts reflect that a climate of extremism and violence exists in sectors of the settler community. In all such attacks, individuals resided in or had connections with settlement-communities in the West Bank. Perpetrators were very orthodox at the time of the acts, or would later become very pious. They possessed a strong religious conviction and held an extreme right-wing ideology, many being supporters of Meir Kahane and “the radical right” [Aran and Hassner, 2013]. The attacks showed how violence was enacted and legitimised in the name of (in)security and religion. Violence was used to defend nationalist and security agendas, was activated as a response to Jewish insecurity from Palestinians, or was used specifically to advance a religious-messianic agenda, as was the case with Ben-Shushan. Aran and Hassner [2013:363] also assess that while

> clearly motivated by religion and executed by religious actors, these Jewish violent acts have a clear political and national dimension that is right-wing and hawkish. As a rule, this violence appears in connection with Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank and with efforts to promote a Greater Land of Israel agenda.

Importantly, the attacks by Richter and Amir show how violence was deployed when there were threats to spaces of ‘the Land of Israel’ and there was a desire to prevent these threats. Such acts serve to reflect the significance of this space. The case of Yigal Amir is particularly important for demonstrating the significance of actions taken against the Land to warrant such acts of violence, even providing perceived legitimacy and necessity to shoot a leader of the State of Israel. The violence shows how individuals held a perceived license to act based on religious understanding and for safeguarding the Land and Nation. It therefore not only reflects the strength of faith but, I argue, the strength of (in)security in what is enacted in the name of (in)security.

In historic acts of settler violence, Palestinians were the dominant victims. Individuals were selectively and deliberately targeted, such as Palestinian institutions. The planned attack on the Dome of the Rock also revealed how there was vision of targeting religious sites and communities to generate a significant reaction which would serve a messianic-security agenda. The targeting of religious sites and non-Jewish communities will be of
importance in assessing the motivations and impacts of Price-Tag violence where the targeting of holy sites has become more common place. (Chapter Six). Finally, acts of historic settler violence have also signified a perceived legitimacy for targeting certain Israeli-Jews, such as liberal academics, and leaders who threaten space.

These acts of violence, as well as other historic incidents, are all of importance in reflecting extremism and violence and perceived legitimacy of violent acts in the name of the Land of Israel, (in)security, religion and messianism. Each act of violence is also important for further opening-up violent paths, which is of high significance to my central concept of Disjunctive Moment [Apter, 1997] (Introduction). As discussed, disjunctive moments do not exist in isolation. Individuals reflect on significant acts which serve to confirm or exacerbate beliefs and provide (further) perceived necessity or legitimacy for (re)actions or relations. Such historic cases and climates of violence and extremism in the settler community are important for my narrative of progressive radical disjuncture where I will trace the continued use of violence, the breaking of taboos, and increased extremism which have specifically occurred over settlement actions.

My cases are therefore situated in this history and have not occurred in isolation. What is disjunctive in my cases, however, are three critical aspects. First, with the Gaza Disengagement (Chapter Four), actions by the State of Israel against settlement were on a new scale with the IDF evacuating a large number of Jewish settlers from a space seen as integral to the Land of Israel and what this represents. This was a key turning-point in relations and (re)actions moving forward. Second, in the Amona evacuation (Chapter Five), the disjunctive impact of the Disengagement was clearly evident in violent confrontation/resistance being deployed against Israeli State forces. Levels of violence would be described as unprecedented and the symbolism of the evacuation and signs carried by some represented a deeper disjuncture. Third, the assassination of an Israeli State leader was a momentous act. However, crucially, Price-Tag violence (Chapter Six) is directed not at State leaders or officials. It is directed at the State of Israel itself. This is a feature which I clarified with interviewees who expressed difference between targeting leaders and targeting the State. Furthermore, as I will discuss, Price-Tag violence has become reflective of radical agendas directed at the State, which some individuals have turned against, rather than directed at particular individuals or leaders.

As I will assess, from these historic acts, violence has continued to be deployed by individuals from religious settler communities. Violence is legitimised in the name of (in)security, the Land, and faith. Violence is also deemed to have strategic value in
defending and advancing agendas, including a religious-messianic agenda. However, post-
Gaza I will conceptualise that acts of Price-Tag violence have come to occur within a
narrative of radical disjuncture with the State of Israel where radicalism is heightened.

**Settlement-Outposts**

[Image 3f has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.]

In discussing acts and politics of settlement, we finally need to recognise the significance
of another form. Settlement-outposts are deemed ‘unauthorised’ under Israeli Law. Outposts take forms of structures such as shacks, prefabricated trailers and caravans. Today, there are over ninety outposts throughout the West Bank, often located on hilltops or close to authorised settlements [Peace Now Settlement Watch]. They are largely constructed by ideological settlers. For many settlers, such construction is not ‘unauthorised.’ Rather, they are enacting a Jewish right of building in spaces of ‘the historic Jewish homeland.’ Outpost-construction is significant because it brings questions of rights, State (re)creation, and the relationship between the Land of Israel and the State of Israel to the fore. Contained in acts of construction are struggles of sovereignty. Outposts reflect tensions within projects of settlement and State-settler relations. As well as embodying political-ideological struggles, they have become sites of direct confrontation between the Israeli State and some settler populations, a focus of later chapters.

In 2004/2005, Attorney Talia Sason investigated the illegality of outposts and the climate which has enabled their existence. Under Israeli Law, an outpost is a settlement which does not fulfil at least one of the four basic conditions which provide a license of authorisation: 1) "the decision to establish a settlement must be made by the authoritative political echelon." 2) "Israeli settlements shall be established only on State land." Therefore, the status of a particular settlement space is paramount in defining the structure as '(un)authorised.' 3) "a settlement shall be established only according to a lawful designed building scheme...which has the power to produce a building permit."106
4) "the bounds of jurisdiction of such a settlement was determined in an order by the Commander of the area." Sason writes that "the lack of fulfilment of one of them makes the settlement illegitimate," and "missing an authorization of the kinds mentioned above makes it illegal." Such conditioning reiterates the sovereignty and governance-framework within which settlement-practices are contained.

Although deemed illegal under Israeli Law, outposts exist in a climate which enables their existence. Whilst largely constructed by 'ideological settlers,' analysts point to the systemic involvement of State and State-affiliated authorities and the crucial role they play in facilitating the existence of many [Leibovich-Dar, 2002; Sason, 2005; Efrat, 2006; Weiss, 2006; UNESCO Chair, 2012; Melamed, 2016b; Peace Now]. Israeli security analysts and military figures I spoke with were critical of this complicity. This support comes in two forms: overt support from authorities, such as providing infrastructural services to support existence; or covert support, by not enforcing law and therefore providing a 'wink' to existence. In asking why many have received support, outposts have perceived strategic and political value.

Outpost-expansion began in the mid-1990s when, under the Oslo Accords, the Rabin government froze settlement-expansion. With limitations placed on settlement, outpost-construction was a strategic means to continue settlement-expansion [Efrat, 2006; Horowitz, 2012; Melamed, 2016b]. This bypassed pressures to continue agendas, and practically enacted sovereignty in a contested space.

just like the official settlements at the time, these outposts were established with the goal of attaining two different objectives, which, basically, are both ides of the same coin...to create a continuity of Israeli presence by taking over as much land as possible; on the other, creating a barrier between the various Palestinian population centers [Peace Now 2005].

Under further diplomatic pressures, in 1998 Minister Ariel Sharon instructed settlers to move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements, because everything we take now will stay ours...everything we don't grab will go them (i.e. Palestinians) [quoted Gilbert, 2010].

In the (in)securitisation of space, outpost-construction and inhabitation have received de-facto political license. Outposts have been likened to the 1930s 'tower and stockade' settlements [Efrat, 2006]. As discussed, the construction of structures, however basic their materiality, laid practical claims to and gained control over (contested) spaces for
future State (re)building. Outpost-construction also connects with political interests and relations [Eldar and Zertal, 2007]. Powerful settler organisations, such as Amana which is an arm of the Yesha Council, are behind the founding of more 'established' outposts. These outposts are constructed on spaces where it is believed that authorised settlements will eventually be expanded with the State’s legal/political approval [Melamed, 2016b]. Outpost-construction on such spaces pre-emptively enacts this expansion. Amana is a powerful and influential lobby in governments. Politicians and parties are also closely connected with and dependent to an extent on receiving the backing of settler lobbies, organisations and communities [Lis, 2010; Ezra, Blank, 2015; Levi, 2015].

Such relations influence existence. One Israeli military individual discussed that “if Amana is supporting the outpost, it will receive more budget. If it is created by Amana, I can assure you it will be stronger, more supported.” Furthermore, this also influences outpost evacuations. As the interviewee furthered: “sometimes it’s youth groups who decide to build. Sometimes, it’s one family...for sure they will be evacuated because it’s very easy to.” As an ‘unauthorised’ practice enacted by individuals, each outpost is significant to politics in space and State-settler relations.

Outposts and Questions of Rights and ‘Zionism’

As well as a strategic practice, outposts interact with the State politically-ideologically with questions of State (re)creation and (in)security projects. Construction connects with ideological tenets underpinning 'Zionism' and cuts across Zionist branches I assessed in Chapter Two, namely the return of the Jewish nation to its 'ancient homeland,' (re)gaining sovereignty, and notions of rights. For assessing ideological politics and relations, I will briefly observe two examples.

Situated on a hilltop in the Judean desert, the communal outpost Neve Erez is home to a community living off the land in caravans, shacks and tents. "People ask why we live here," says Tehila Cohen, one of the residents, "we reply, why shouldn't we live here? This is our homeland" [quoted The Telegraph, Chapter Five]. Neve Erez was established in 1999 and partially built on private Palestinian land. In 2001, on orders of Prime Minister Barak, the outpost was evacuated. In 2001, Neve Erez was re-established a short distance away from the original outpost location. Another resident, Noam Cohen, states that "we moved from this non-authorised hill over here to another non-authorised hill over there. When everybody forgot about is, we came back" [quoted The Telegraph, Chapter Five]. The notion of the Jewish right to live in spaces of 'the homeland' was emphasised: "I am a
Jewish person and I base my claim on 2,000 or 3,000 years of history” [quoted The Telegraph, Chapter Five], therefore not feeling confined by present realities in space.

In 2002, the outposts Ramat Gilad and Havat Gilad were built in Samaria after Gilad Zar, who worked in the settlement of Itamar, was killed in a Palestinian attack. Following Gilad Zar's death, his father, Moshe Zar, vowed to establish settlements in his sons memory. Moshe Zar is an influential figure within the settlement movement. A statement discussing Havat Gilad reveals ideologies within construction, and realities of insecurities:

our presence here is meant to underscore our right to live in Erez Yisra'el, to let the people of Israel and the whole world know that all attempts to weaken and discourage us will fail. We pray that the Almighty will help us and strengthen the spirit of the people of Israel to overcome our enemies both within and without and by the merit of the Holy Torah we shall succeed [Chavat Gilad].

Image 3g has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Speaking in 2006, Gilad Zar's sister, Michal Shoham, who lives in Ramat Gilad with her family, stated that she and other residents would defend their homes

the way a mother defends her child from a tiger's claws. For us, this place is Gilad's tombstone, a tombstone that speaks to me a lot more than the one in the cemetery. It's impossible to flip a switch and say, 'now we'll get rid of them' [quoted Shragai, 2006].

The personalisation of outposts, and using construction and existence to commemorate Jewish individuals as well as to further a religious or political agenda, politicises, moralises and sacralises space and outposts. This further reveals ideological and existential attachments to space. Political and ideological motivations for construction were further disclosed in an interview which I had with an Israeli military individual who held a
governance position in the West Bank. They also discussed sensitivities which State forces had regarding evacuations:

most were built during the Second Intifada...people needed to express themselves against the violence. The settlements and the settlers were attacked. They lost a big amount, they had casualties and I have to react in a very sensitive way; between the needs of the people, between the needs of the security of Israel, between the needs of the Palestinians.114

The interviewee discussed two dominant ideologies within outpost-construction:

some of the settlements were raised from the idea that this is revenge for events on the ground: you will kill us, we will build. This is the Zionist response. The second idea is we want to establish here a state which we will belong in the future and stay in place, and the more we take more land and expand more settlements, it will be more difficult for the Israeli government to give-away this land. They will have to fight us. We will enlarge to show that we are here for the generation who wants to evacuate us. I think these are the two main ideas. Eretz Yisrael to Am Yisrael: The Land of Israel belongs to the People of Israel. One is revenge and the Zionist response, and the second, we will enlarge our communities and show we are on the ground and this belongs to us.115

For some, outpost-construction is located foremost in a religious-ideological framework. Outpost-construction was inspired by both Sharon’s command and for ‘religious nationalists’ "by the religious vision of a Greater Israel based on biblically defined borders” [Gilbert, 2010]. One orthodox settler voiced to me that “this is Jacob’s area.”116 Construction in spaces asserted as the ‘God-given homeland’ is further seen as a religious act, fulfilling the mitzvah yishuv ha’aretz and therefore advancing a religious-messianic security project. Within such political-ideological frameworks, subjects, in their spatial practices, also challenge the State of Israel and its political and ideological tenets. In tracing the metaphysical and political foundations of 'Zionism,' the goal of attaining and securing 'freedom' is central. Israel’s national anthem reads: “as long as the Jewish soul yearns...our hope is not yet lost, the hope that is two-thousand years old, to be a free nation in our land, the land of Zion, Jerusalem” [The Knesset].

The question and practice of outpost-construction serve to question what Jewish existence in ‘the homeland’ means and the reality of freedom. As one outpost settler remarked: “we are here to show that we can build freely. The Land of Israel belongs to the
Jewish people. We are settling here and in other places because it's our right.”¹¹⁷ That outpost-construction/existence closely connects with such questions was made clear by an ultra-nationalist orthodox settler. Outposts also challenge dominant realities and restrictions placed upon settlement:

the fence defines you, I'm up to this point...the hilltop is a way to get out of the fence. When we conquered the Land in 67, that's nice, but how do you maintain it? You have to live it, use it, not live in a ghetto where you travel, open the gate, then come home.¹¹⁸

Outposts are therefore a political and existential statement, enacting a vision of what Jewish Being in the homeland means. The different metaphysics and ideologies within outpost-construction is also seen in the small orthodox settlement-community of Bat Ayin which also does not have a fence. Bat Ayin was described by one Israeli military individual as “a very, very radical, extremist place.”¹¹⁹ In asking the significance of not having a fence around settlement-communities, the interviewee presented a particular mind-set: “of course not. We will not have a fence, no way. We are free. G-d can protect us. They - the Arabs- should put up a fence, not us.” Outpost-construction not only challenges the State politically and ideologically. It can be a means to pursue a nationalist (in)security agenda. The same ultra-nationalist orthodox settler discussed that

the idea of the hilltop is that you spread-out and therefore clean up the area because if you just live where the fence is, it's like you're saying 'I live up to here'... so the idea of the hilltop, let's say someone has a barn, then we plant more things, and then we have the shul, more houses, the Arabs will never come here because it's yours. We're walking on it...if we weren't using it, like ten years ago, they can walk around and infiltrate the settlements...we kept building more and more, now the area is clean of Arabs.¹²⁰

Deemed an ‘unauthorised’ practice constructed in ‘unauthorised spaces’ according to the State of Israel, outposts bring questions and struggles of sovereignty to the fore. Whilst outpost-construction may exist in ideological, political, religious and nationalist frameworks, the act is inescapable from relations with the State. Engaging in such acts therefore has to be weighed alongside governance realities and State relations. The question of outposts attracts intra-settler divisions. Outpost-construction and inhabitation are practices which many settlers do not engage in and are critical of. As one National-Religious settler declared to me: “I do not associate with these. Settlements need to be law-abiding, signed off as legal to be built,” adding, “I am a law-abiding citizen.”¹²¹

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Rabbi Melamed [2016b] differentiates between acts of outpost-building. He is critical of the ‘unauthorised practices’ of “activists and youths” who build on “unauthorised lands” without the support of State-officials and mainstream settler leadership, and those who engage in confrontations with State forces. This will be a focus of Chapter Six.

Perceptions on outposts also reflected considerations with the status of land within current realities. In asking one National-Religious rabbi about construction, they responded: “if it is built on private land, this belongs to someone, so I am against that.” With some settlers asserting exclusive Jewish rights to space and where this means rights to build anywhere, I asked the rabbi their thoughts on this: “I agree, but even in Jewish scriptures, when a gentile buys a piece of land, it’s his.” One settler discussed circumstances where they will support outpost-construction:

if someone has built an outpost on land which already has been recognised as land which belongs to the State, it has already been recognised that here in future we will build a Jewish town and for some political reason a politician has put the page he needs to sign to the bottom of the pile, I support outposts where they will have to decide.

However, they added, “if people are doing this on private land, if they are doing that violently, I oppose it completely.” There are therefore boundaries placed within acts of construction. One settler classified outpost-construction as “non-violent opposition” against both “the Arabs” and “the State.” However, they stated that they would not engage in such acts because of their respect for the State of Israel’s laws and because they did not wish to be put in a position of engaging in confrontation with State forces. As ‘unauthorised’ existence, outposts are subject to evacuation/destruction by State forces, placing structures and inhabitants in a precarious existence [Marcus, 2009; Dvorin, 2014b; Porat, 2014; Silverman, Tazpit 2014; Tucker, 2017]. Such evacuations may seem paradoxical. Whilst Israeli governments announce new settlement-constructions, State forces demolish small outposts. Such realities, however, reflect the sovereignty and governance-regime within settlement, and limitations construction and existence are held under. For example, in 2015 the State’s Civil Administration stated that security forces destroyed four illegal structures built without permission on state land at the Geulat Tzion outpost. The buildings were destroyed after completion of enforcement and demolition orders...the two buildings were rebuilt on the ruins of illegal buildings that were destroyed previously [quoted Ezter and Dvorin, 2015].
Some outposts, like Maoz Esther, have been demolished multiple times [Somfalvi, 2009; IsraelNN staff, 2009; Ya’ar, 2010; Miskin, 2012]. Regarding one demolition, occurring after “a building was recently demolished in the area, leading to violent acts on the part of local residents,” then-Defence Minister Barak declared “a law abiding society cannot tolerate attempts by citizens to reject the state’s sovereignty over them” [quoted Somfalvi, 2009]. Yet, “each time, residents return and rebuild, undeterred” [Ya’ar, 2010], challenging the State’s sovereignty.

Such encounters critically raise questions regarding the State’s (in)security practices, showing how spatial practices and (in)security are interrelated and how my thesis is situated in both CSS and Political Geography. After her home in the Maale Rehavam outpost was razed, one settler, Moriya Kaniel, voiced that “the leadership and those responsible for our safety and protection, do the very opposite and force us from our homes” [quoted Silverman, Tazpit, 2014]. Responding to another demolition of Maoz Esther, residents declared that “we protest this crime...destroying Jewish homes in the land of Israel instead of focusing on fighting our enemies” [quoted Miskin, 2012]. Struggles around settlement, realities of evacuation, and impacts on State-settler relations are the focus of preceding chapters.

**Conclusion**

“Settlement reflects a dispute over the Land,” one settler stated to me. Settlement itself is a disputed practice on many levels. For some, ‘Israel is destroying itself’ in constructing and expanding settlements outside the State’s internationally-recognised territorial borders. For others, settlement in these spaces is integral for the State of Israel’s (re)creation and security, and a security practice on different levels. This chapter has examined how perceptions of settlement connect with meanings of Jewish national return to the homeland and State (re)creation. As a practice, settlement brings the relationship between the State of Israel and the Land of Israel to the fore (Chapter Two).

The act of settlement encapsulates key concepts discussed in Chapter One- (in)security, security and subjectivity, securitisation, spatial (re)structuring, spatial control, and the weaponisation of space. The focus which I have placed upon this significant architecture of political geography and (in)security reveals how these concepts are applied in practice, bringing contribution to the fields of CSS and Political Geography. Settlement not only reflects the centrality of (in)security but reveals different aspects of security. I have also illustrated how subjects have been central in spatial actions, taking a prominent role in ‘safeguarding’ the Land and safeguarding and progressing security agendas. Settlers have
elevated their own agency in spatial practices, activating their perceived license and rights, and have engaged in spatial actions with and without the State’s authorisation.

In the (in)securitisation of space, I have highlighted how settlement operates in different realities and assessed how different natures of space and agendas of security are contained in settlement. This is important because they shape the practice and nature of settlement, and subjectivities of settlers, differently. Firstly, settlement is an historic and contemporary practice within Israel’s State (re)building. Settlement accommodates populations and has provided the State with strategic depth which is deemed essential for the State’s security. The control of space and Jewish presence in space connect with the State’s existential security concerns and agenda. Secondly, settlement is a fundamental religious practice. Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael is not only deemed a religious commandment but a central act for messianic security in hastening-the-redemption. Historically, religious settlers have been active agents in settlement.

Despite settlement positioned in different projects of security and frameworks of rights, space and settlement are held under the State of Israel’s sovereignty and governance-regime. Settlement is marked by compromise and limitation. This impacts on other settlement agendas and on questions of rights and freedoms in ‘the homeland.’ Outpost-construction is particularly significant in provoking such questions and relations. As an unauthorised practice, construction brings questions and struggles of sovereignty, Being in the homeland, rights, freedoms, and projects of (in)security to the fore.

Historically, acts of violence have been perpetrated by individuals from religious settler-communities where violence has been enacted for nationalist, security and messianic agendas. The majority of such violence has been perpetrated upon Palestinians. However, the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin showed how targeting a State leader was also deemed appropriate by some for safeguarding Land, settlement, and perceived security, therefore reflecting the force of these. Whilst the State and settler populations have historically worked closely, the relationship between the State and the Land and the State and settler communities has become increasingly challenged. Actions taken by the State against settlement and spaces have brought communities and projects into confrontation with the State’s sovereignty and ‘the State’ itself, revealing the fragility of relations. Yehudit Tayar [2014], “a veteran spokesperson for the Jewish pioneers in Yesha,” writes:

> we know that governments rise and governments fall- but the Land stays…our faith is in the eternal promise given to our people by G-d HIMSELF and we know that it is up to us to ensure the fulfillment of this promise. No matter how many
times we are threatened, beaten, arrested...one-sided agreements made by the destructive governments of Israel, we must continue to fight on, and in the end we shall continue to live the miracle of our return to our homeland and heritage. We...will do all we can to protect this gift forever.

The next two chapters will assess two milestone events in State-settler relations when the State of Israel evacuated Jewish settlement-communities in spaces seen as the historic Land of Israel. Chapter Four is a case-study of the Gaza Disengagement and Chapter Five is a case-study of the Amona evacuation. The tensions within settlement which this chapter has critically assessed will be further revealed. The analysis will centre on key questions, including: What questions do such acts generate? How do settler populations (re)act to acts of evacuation? What is the nature of this ‘fight’? and, What are the impacts on State-settler relations?

References

1 Organised by the debate group and forum Intelligence Squared.
2 Author conversation, Judea 8th August 2016.
3 Architectures such as military checkpoints located throughout spaces of the West Bank symbolise subjects are within a different space, but they have free movement.
4 Israeli security analysts interviewees also affirmed this belief.
5 Declared as such by the United States.
6 Expressed by the Palestinian leadership.
7 Expressed especially from European leaders.
8 Author Interview 25th August 2013.
9 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 10th September 2013.
10 Author Interview, Ashkelon 5th August 2013.
11 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th September 2013.
12 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th September 2013.
13 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 13th August 2013.
14 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 10th September 2013.
15 Author Interview, Judea 9th September 2013. Eilat and Tel Aviv are places in Israel’s Green Line.
16 Author Interview Judea 20th August 2013.
17 Author Interview, Judea 20th August 2013.
18 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
19 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
20 Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.
21 Author Interview, Samaria 22nd August 2013.
22 Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2016.
23 Author Interview, Judea 20th August 2013.
24 Author Interview, Judea 20th August 2013.
25 Author Interview, Judea 20th August 2013.
26 Author Interview, Jerusalem 26th August 2016.
27 Satherley [2013: 73] assesses that for Ginsburgh “every point of Jewish settlement on the Land is a point of such conjugal love, in which the Jewish People are the groom and the Land of Israel is the bride.”
28 See also Ginsburgh, 2003:83; 178-9 ff
Ginsburgh is also deeply against the mixing of Gentile cultures with Jewish culture. Satherley, 2013:74. Therefore the State of Israel, and *Eretz Yisrael*, as they are today, are not in their ‘rightful’ state.

The Jewish Home party has proposed to annex ‘Area C’ 60 percent of the territory.

Satherley, 2013:74. Therefore the State of Israel, and *Eretz Yisrael*, as they are today, are not in their ‘rightful’ state.

Nadia Matar. Quoted Hasten, 2011.

The Jewish Home party has proposed to annex ‘Area C’ 60 percent of the territory.

Author Interview, Judea 20 th August 2013.


Author Interview, Samaria 21 st July 2016.

Such as fences around settlements, gates which residents have to enter into at settlement entrances which are often manned by security guards, and military watch-towers around or inside the communities.

Author Interview, Samaria 30 th July 2013.

One former IDF officer who worked in the West Bank discussed that “the army’s job is to protect the Jews from the Arabs and then you start having buffer zones around the settlement, patrols between the settlements, you have lock down- no one can drive on this road except Israelis.” Author Interview

Author Interview, Samaria 21 st July 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 21 st July 2016.

Emphasis added.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 14 th August 2013.

Such as the Bet She’an Valley, the Negev, and in Upper and Lower Galilee.

These were also constructed along strategic settlement lines that had to be ‘fortified.’ Approximately fifty such settlements were established during the 1930s.

In particular uncertainty that gripped Palestine in 1939-39 with a wave of riots

For a discussion of the problems this brought, see Troen and Lucas (eds.), 1995; Evans, 2006.

In 1948, the majority of the Jewish population lived along the coastal strip between Tel Aviv and Haifa, and approximately three-quarters in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa—but these spaces constituted only ten percent of the country’s land. Evans, 2006:580-582.

For the (re)building and consolidation of the State, the 1949 Hofein Committee emphasised the need for population-dispersal across space and territory.

Such as in the Galilee and Negev.

Israel also annexed to its State territory land parallel to the ‘Green Line’ and over the years constructed four settlements on this space: Shilat, Lapid, Kefar Ruth, and Maccabim.

The Cave of the Patriarchs inside Hebron (Hevron) is the burial site of Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, Rebecca, Jacob and Leah. The Ibrahimi Mosque, which is attached to the Cave of the Patriarchs, is a revered holy city for Muslims.

Especially in the Jerusalem and Greater Jerusalem area.

Settlements were located both on hilltops and close to large Palestinian population centres.

It is beyond this thesis’ scope to focus on this event.

This was known as The Hundred Thousand Plan.

According to the Plan, 300-450 kilometres of new roads were to be paved for settlers to use.

Particularly in areas such as the Western slopes of Samaria and North of Jerusalem.

Approximately 200,000 Jewish immigrants made Aliyah in 1990, many from the former Soviet Union, preceded by approximately 176,000 more immigrants in 1991, the highest two-year total since 1949-59.


As well as accommodating Jewish immigrants, settlements such as Modiin, Katzir, Harish and Rosh HaAin “had strategic value in preserving Israeli sovereignty in important border areas,” Evans, 2006:591.

Figures accessed from Peace Now’s Settlement Lists.

Author Interview, Palestinian Authority member, 14 th August 2016. Media reports, for example, regularly report that Israeli forces arrest Palestinians who reside in ‘Area A.’

20,400 housing units to 31,400.


Negotiations over the ‘shelf agreement’ was to determine principles for a permanent arrangement.

These settlements are located outside of the Palestinian city of Nablus in the North West Bank.
which land was 'seized' to build the Elon Moreh settlement) petitioned Israel's High Court and thousands of supporters who arrived in the space of Sebastia to celebrate the holiday of Hanukah.  

The Plan proposed that a large Jewish-Israeli population would live in settlements in particular spaces: the Jordan Valley; the slopes of the Samarian Hills; and agricultural settlements clustered around regional centres.  

The 1979 'Allon Plan' draft proposed to annex areas such as wider 'Great Jerusalem,' the Etzion Bloc, most of the Judean desert and a strip in the south of the Hebron Mountains where, together, these areas comprise approximately half of the area of the West Bank. Bt’Seflem, 2010:12.

Israel’s military defeat revealed the inadequate defensive function of agricultural settlements. Israel was forced to depart from settlements in the Golan Heights.

In many cases, these settlements were then inhabited by the same soldiers.  

Founding of new settlements in peripheral border areas deemed essential for the State’s security.

In 2014, Minister Gilad Erdan stated that "in light of increased threats to the security of the State of Israel...Samaria’s proximity and accessibility to large population centers...its topographical and geographical advantages, and the high motivation shown by area residents [to protect Israel] makes it the best location to house tens of thousands of Israeli citizens in an emergency situation." Dvorin, 2014a.

Shomron is the Hebrew name for Samaria; emphasis added.

Deputy-Minister Ofir Akunis stated that "an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borders is like a suicidal person jumping off the roof of the Azrieli Towers in Tel Aviv," a 49-floor skyscraper. Quoted Benari, 2014.

Naftali Bennett, quoted Jpost.com Staff, 2014.

Tzipi Hotovely, quoted Jpost.com Staff, 2014.

Naftali Bennett.

Moshe Ya’alon, quoted Jpost.com staff, 2013d; emphasis added.

Author interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2013.

Author interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2013.

Author’s ethnographic analysis alerted to the militarisation and securitisation of communities.

This was headed by the IDF’s Culture and Welfare Department and was an integral part of the Defense Service Law. As an IDF programme, soldiers opted to undertake their army service in the founding of new settlements in peripheral border areas deemed essential for the State’s security. In many cases, these settlements were then inhabited by the same soldiers.

Author interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2013.

Author interview, Tel Aviv 13th August 2013.

Author interview, Judea 20th August 2013.

Author interview, Judea 20th August 2013.

Author interview, Judea 24th July 2016.

Pinchas Fuchs 'Elon Moreh- at a glance,' http://www.shechem.org/elon-moreh/engkmtxt.html

Shechem is also known as Nablus which today is a large Palestinian city in the North West Bank. Shechem is the biblical name for this place.

Pinchas Fuchs, 'Elon Moreh- at a glance,' http://www.shechem.org/elon-moreh/engkmtxt.html

http://www.shechem.org/elon-moreh/enggar.html

Prime Minister’s Office Israel State Archives.


http://www.shechem.org/elon-moreh/enggar.html. Between late 1973 and 1975, there were eight separate campaigns to settle near Nablus/Shechem.

This was as Jewish groups advanced on Sebastia for an eighth time, this time joined by thousands of supporters who arrived in the space of Sebastia to celebrate the holiday of Hanukah.

http://www.archives.gov.il/ArchiveGov_Eng/Publications/ElectronicPirsum/ElonMoreh/

Speaking before Israel's High Court after the Palestinian landowners of Rujeib village (from which land was 'seized' to build the Elon Moreh settlement) petitioned Israel's High Court

The settler group's representative.

Degania and Netanya are Israeli towns inside the Green Line.

http://www.archives.gov.il/ArchiveGov_Eng/Publications/ElectronicPirsum/ElonMoreh/

Author Interview, Jerusalem 23rd August 2013.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 10th September 2013.

And again that the approval of the political echelon is granted.

This determination can only be made after receiving the approval of the political echelon. This was one of the conditions within the diplomatic/political process.

Influential settler figures include Zeev Hambish and Daniella Weiss. Settler support is particularly important for Israel’s right-wing parties, such as the Likud and Bayit HaYehudi. In government election campaigns, politicians can be seen visiting settlement-communities seeking to win support.

Emphasis added.

Moshe Zar was one of the founders of the settlement of Itamar in Samaria.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016.

Moshe Zar was one of the founders of the settlement of Itamar in Samaria.

Emphasis added.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 27th August 2013.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 27th August 2013.

Author Interview, Samaria 30th July 2013.


Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2013.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2013.

Author Interview, Judea 8th August 2016.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.

Author Interview, Judea 5th August 2013.

Author Interview, Judea 5th August 2013.

Author Interview, Judea 8th August 2016.
Chapter Four: The Gaza Disengagement

Introduction: Symbolism and Provocation of Torn Flags

In the Gush Katif Museum in Jerusalem a story is told. A story of heritage-abandonment, security-insecurity, return-removal, construction- destruction, where Jewish presence and un-presence in Gaza is chronologised. Thirty-eight years after gaining control over Gaza, and thirty-five years after Jewish Israeli settlement-communities were constructed in spaces by the Jewish State of Israel, settlement-communities were removed by this State. In August 2005, the State of Israel unilaterally ‘disengaged’ from Gaza. This translated to a full Israeli withdrawal from inside the territory of Gaza. The event is known as ‘the Disengagement,’ or Hitnatkut in Hebrew. The initiative was devised by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a leader who had been instrumental in settlement-expansion since the 1970s. Sharon [2003] presented the Plan for unilateral Disengagement at the Fourth Herzliya Conference in December 2003 where he announced Israel

will initiate the unilateral security step of disengagement from the Palestinians...the purpose of the Disengagement Plan is to...grant Israeli citizens the maximum level of security. The process of disengagement will lead to an improvement in the quality of life, and will strengthen the Israeli economy...these steps will increase security for the residents of Israel and relieve the pressure of the IDF and security forces...the Disengagement is meant to grant maximum security and minimize friction between Israelis and Palestinians.¹

Politically, the Disengagement

[w]as] intended to benefit the state of Israel by finally defining its southern border, helping to secure a Jewish majority within its newly consolidated borders, and allowing Israel to take the lead in a moment of stalemate in the peace process [Eiran, 2009:101].

The event constituted more than a political-strategic initiative and act. Sharon called the operation "historic" and "fateful." As well as Israel's withdrawal from inside the territory of Gaza, the Disengagement required and entailed the evacuation of approximately 9000 settlers from twenty-one settlement-communities in Gush Katif and other spaces of Gaza, and a smaller number from four small communities in North Samaria. In this evacuation, settlers were forcibly removed from their homes and space by Israeli State security forces.
The Disengagement marked a new reality of territorial and spatial withdrawal and has been the largest evacuation of settlement-communities and Jewish settlers to date. The Disengagement required exceptional measures from the State, which I argue constituted a disjunctive moment for the State of Israel.

At the end of the Gush Katif Museum is a vivid image. The image is of four torn flags, flags of the State of Israel hanging together on a piece of string in Gush Katif. According to the Museum’s Director, the image is symbolic because “it shows that there is something torn that happened here as a result of the Disengagement.” Throughout this thesis, the image of the torn flags is central. As my interviews exposed, there are key divisions in viewpoints on different issues amongst Israelis. However, in what ways are 'the flags of Israel' torn? What is the significance of the Disengagement in relation to this tearing? and, In impacts and divisions, can the flags be 'un-torn' or is the string fissured beyond repair? The image and symbol of torn flags is not only metaphoric. In the reality of (violent) conflict/confrontations between the State and some settler populations, this has become reflective of reality, a reality this thesis seeks to gain understanding of.

As an historic event, “the Disengagement produced images that shocked the nation and reverberate to this day” [Ferber, 2015]. Whilst the Plan attracted support from over half of the Israeli public, it generated strong objections from settler and religious communities. For the questions which this thesis is concerned with, the Disengagement is important in two aspects. Firstly, as a significant event in State-settler relations, the event brought into the open conflicts I have observed within the meaning of the State of Israel’s (re)creation (Chapter Two) and in the projects and politics of settlement (Chapter Three). With the Disengagement, not only did the State turn against spaces of ‘the Land of Israel;’ it struck at National-Religious Zionism and the historic close relationship between settler populations and the State of Israel. In revoking their political license to be-in-space, the Disengagement impacted on settler and religious communities, having significant impacts on a variety of levels.

Secondly, if the purpose of this thesis is to critically assess conflicts/confrontations which have developed between the State of Israel and some settler populations, the Disengagement is a key watershed in relations. Many authors have discussed its significance, not only in relation to the growth of divisions in settler communities, but in State-settler conflicts which have developed [ICG, 2009; Byman and Sachs, 2012]. I will assess the significance of the Gaza Disengagement and how it constituted a disjunctive
moment for the State. The Disengagement, I argue, is a key disjunctive moment in a narrative of disjuncture which I am tracing.

In briefly exploring settlement in Gaza and the language of the Disengagement, I will begin by assessing how the Disengagement Plan and event encapsulates the State’s security and governance-regime. The Disengagement was enacted in the name of ‘(in)security’ and ensuring the State’s existence and its future as ‘Jewish and democratic.’ The act of Disengagement is key for exploring interactions between space and (in)security which I am tracing and different meanings and tensions between these. I will next identify three dominant reactions in settler communities leading-up to the Disengagement: religious belief and spiritual resistance; cognitive dissonance; and protest. Based largely on my fieldwork which provides unique insights and perceptions, I will assess the dominant nature of (re)actions to acts of evacuation by State security forces. I will explore debates and concerns generated, the large taboo of violence, and strength of Mamluchtí ideology.

‘Mamluchtí’ is a term meaning ‘pro-state.’ This ideology is central to National-Religious Zionism and was the main ideology held by Gush Katif settlers. The ideology served to boundarise (re)actions deemed to be legitimate against evacuations. I will then critically assess the Disengagement’s significance and unprecedented actions and why this constituted a disjunctive moment for the State. I will end by beginning to identify significant impacts and debates post-Disengagement which are the focus of Chapters Five and Six in continuing this narrative of disjuncture.

**Settlement in Gaza and The Disengagement**

Settlement in Gaza began in 1970 following Israel’s military victory in the 1967 War. Until 2005, twenty-one Jewish settlement-communities existed in spaces of Gaza, home to approximately 9000 inhabitants, many of whom had lived there for decades [Eiran, 2009].
In 1968, Israel's Minister of Labor, Yigal Allon, proposed the establishment of two Nahal military outposts in Gaza. These became the civilian settlement-communities of Kfar Darom (1970) and Netzarim (1972) [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:281]. Settlement-construction in Gaza encapsulated strategic objectives, in particular the biopolitical (in)securitisation of space which Chapter Three assessed. Israel's Minister of Labor Yigal Allon declared that "there is great security importance in a Jewish presence in the heart of Gaza" [quoted Eldar and Zertal, 2007:281]. Speaking after the settlement of Netzer Hazani was formally established in 1977 “when a military outpost was transformed into a civilian community” [Freund, 2014], future Prime Minister Rabin stated that this is a great day for the State of Israel and Jewish settlement...it is a day that symbolizes the fortification of our presence in this area, which since the Six Day War has become an integral part of the state and its security [quoted Freund, 2014].

The rationale of ‘security' and ‘presence’ in space was practically pursued in Sharon’s settlement policies, most notably in 1978 when he implemented the 'Five-Finger Plan' in Gaza.⁵ Asking a former Gush Katif settler about this Plan, they discussed that "the government put between Arab cities five fingers, five areas of Jewish settlement. The idea was to split the area up...the more we split up, it will be easier to control." This was a strategic carving of space achieved through construction. The interviewee discussed that
(in)security considerations were central: "one from the border, and one from the population...so there would not be so many Arabs together." Spaces of Gaza were brought under a will-to-control and secure where the presence of Jewish populations would serve as a means of dividing and weakening the asserted threat posed by the ‘dangerous other.’ Settlement-expansion in the early 1980s was asserted as vital for territorial security in securing border frontiers:

the settlements were perceived as creating important strategic barriers. Namely, they separated the local Palestinian population from the Egyptian Sinai and created a buffer between territorial Israel and Gaza.

Sharon stated that "Gaza is our southern security belt" [quoted Zertal and Eldar, 2007:282]. Settlement-construction was a central (in)security practice, seeking to (re)shape reality through spatial control where Jewish presence in space was securitised. This reflects an instrumentalist approach to space and encapsulates key concepts discussed in Chapter One- spatial (re)structuring, spatial control, and the weaponisation of space where ‘presence’ is central. However, one settler critiqued a reality which settlement does not exist in: “in the Six-Day War...they didn’t say Yehuda, Shomron, Gaza, it’s our country and that’s it.” For this interviewee, State leaders should express unequivocally that spaces of ‘the wider historic Jewish homeland’ belong to the State of Israel and this ‘unification' in 1967 is final. Not doing so undermines security and rights.

Again, the relationship between the State of Israel and the Land of Israel attracts divergences. Despite the State’s strategisation of settlement in Gaza, and Jewish settlers given a political to reside there by the State, this space is also seen as the God-given Jewish homeland [Fitleberg, 2005]. This is a space infused with ideological meaning and relations. As Chapter Three discussed, Jewish settlement in Gaza and spaces of ‘Eretz Yisrael’ is imbued with a perceived license which predates (and potentially overrides) the political-license given by the State: a God-given right.

Furthermore, ‘settlement’ is not merely a strategy. It is an existential act where individuals choose to live in a space and adopt a way of life. It is a lived space where settlers, in their existence and worlds-of-meaning, interact with space. Speaking with former Gush Katif settlers offered insights into realities and subjectivities, what life was like in this space from their lived-experience, and later impacts which the Disengagement would have, bringing contributions to the field of Political Geography. One interviewee described their community as “a religious community.” Asked whether people moved to Gaza for ‘Zionist’ or ‘religious’ purposes, they answered "it was both. People were very, very messianic."
When I asked another former Gush Katif settler to describe life in Gush Katif, they reflected that "it was a very, very warm community. Every settlement has its own character...all of us knew each other." The sense of ‘community’ was emphasised strongly. Despite Gush Katif being a lived community and where subjectivity closely interacted with space, spaces increasingly became spaces of insecurity, especially during the Second Intifada. "By spring 2005, 5,500 mortars and Qassam rockets bombarded Gush Katif," one former resident discussed. Asked about the attacks and the impact, they responded that it was a very hard time. I don’t think we were afraid but we did worry. In the last five years of Gush Katif, we had two big problems: one was the road to Gush Katif, lots of shooting, bombs. Sometimes we cannot go on the road. The second was the rockets. We had lots of worries for the families. When the Second Intifada started, I didn't go to school...it's not like we lived with fear. This was the situation.

Former Gush Katif settlers discussed that this reality was accepted by communities and that continuing existence in this space was deemed primary: "the situation was our life, we lived a normal life. But we knew we had to defend something, we knew it was important we stayed." The individual further stated that "I don't know any family who left Gush Katif because of the security problems. The opposite, communities were growing." Other individuals emphasised how the reality strengthened communities: "we're brother together against the problems, the dangers. It made us one unit" and, "this is what our life made us be. Strong and wanting to stay." Another settler stated that "religious people are usually stronger." Discourses from religious settlers reveal commitment to space, underpinned by commitment to faith, further signifying how space and subjectivity closely interact. Furthermore, insecurity is responded to differently where the strength of belief-systems brings important conceptual contributions to Critical Security Studies (CSS). Despite reconciling themselves to a reality of insecurity, this reality increasingly became problematic for the State of Israel and its security concerns. The Disengagement was a practical outcome of the political rationality of the Jewish State of Israel.

The Language of the Disengagement

Regarded as ‘the Father of Settlements’ and eulogised by one settler leader as “a hero who built our land,” Ariel Sharon had been revered in much of the settler community (Chapter Three). For settlers I spoke with, the Disengagement Plan was a huge shock and betrayal to the settler community. How Sharon’s momentous decision can be explained has different interpretations. Zertal and Eldar frame the initiative as motivated by diplomatic pressure and unilateral strategic manoeuvring. The Disengagement from
Gaza also allowed for "deepening the occupation in the West Bank and perpetuating the
domination of the Palestinians" [Zertal and Eldar, 2007:446]. Sharon's former Chief of
Staff, Dov Weisglass, stated that Sharon believed it would improve Israel's security and
2014] discusses how "Sharon's weak commitment to any one ideology was crucial to
understanding his shifts in position" where "more general the ideological goals, the more
flexible they are to support differing strategies to respond to changed circumstances." For
others, Sharon's unilateral decision was "Sabra Zionism" where "Israel boldly determined
its own destiny" [Troy, 2014]. This was a pragmatic decision by a strong leader.

If 'ideological goals' could be negotiated [Shelef, 2004; Rynhold and Waxman, 2008],
'security' could not. As Sharon [2005a] stated: "when it comes to security, we are not going
to make any compromises whatsoever. Not now, and not in the future." The language of
the Disengagement is the language of (in)security, dominating discourse in key Addresses
of the Disengagement Plan. If Jewish-Israeli settlement in Gaza was authorised according
to the (in)secutrisation of space, it was unauthorised according to considerations of
(in)security. The Disengagement, Sharon [2003] asserted, was meant to "grant Israeli
citizens the maximum level of security." The Plan epitomises security's foundational
function around which political order is constituted and the State and subjects are
governed (Chapter One). Such a principle of formation confines political imagination,
resulting in particular power-effects arising out of regimes of (in)security and governance.

In his first public address presenting the Disengagement Plan, Sharon [2003] stated that
"the Disengagement Plan is a security measure and not a political one." However, the
Disengagement was also situated in a political language of progressing 'fate,' 'common
destiny,' and securing the State's 'character' and 'future.' Whilst such considerations are
also groundings of 'security,' the measure is political in asserting what the State's 'destiny,'
'character,' and 'future' are. Sharon [2003] asserted this: "we are all entrusted with the
duty of shaping the face of the Jewish and democratic State of Israel as a state." In
approving the presented Disengagement Plan, Sharon [2004b] declared that "Israel is
taking its future into its own hands." As assessed (Chapters Two and Three), the 'Jewish
State of Israel' is projected with different natures and projects. The Disengagement Plan
affirmed a particular vision of the State-'Jewish and democratic' and was a course of action
undertaken to enable and advance a particular 'future.'¹⁶ For this 'future' and 'security,'
settlement-in-space was (re)problematised where Sharon [2005b] warned that "the fate
of the entire state is at stake. We must withdraw from Gaza in order to build Israel."¹⁷
Through this ‘fateful’ decision, this entailed the ‘evacuation’ of Jewish settlement-communities. As Rynhold and Waxman [2008:12] assess, given practical realities and advancing a particular vision of ‘the State’ and securing ‘security,’ ‘peace,’ and ‘existence,’

the value of Eretz Yisrael was effectively demoted in order to preserve a more fundamental value- Israel’s continued existence as a democratic Jewish state with a clear Jewish majority.

More than demoting the value of Eretz Yisrael, settlement in spaces of ‘the wider homeland’ came to be problematised. This was perceived not only harmful to security and peace, and harmful for securing the State’s Jewish and democratic character. It was also perceived as a threat to the State’s very existence. The Disengagement underlines how (in)security and acts of political geography are interdependent. As Sharon [2004b] stated, "I am firmly convinced…that this disengagement will strengthen Israel’s hold over territory which is essential to our existence," but, in order to achieve peace, Israel will not be able to hold all the Jewish communities…no doubt [there] would be some relocation of Jewish communities…all that in order to provide more security to the State of Israel [Sharon, 2004a].

Sharon declared that the Disengagement constituted “a fateful hour” where “we must remember that we are making this decision in order to advance the future of the State of Israel.” Yet he was aware that the security of this future was dependent on the following appeal which he made in addressing the Knesset on the Disengagement Plan Vote [2004c]:

I call on the people of Israel to unite at this decisive hour. We must find a common denominator for some form of "necessary unity" which will enable us to cope with these fateful days with understanding, and through our common destiny...allow us to construct a dam against brotherly hatred which pushes many over the edge. We have already paid an unbearably high price for murderous fanaticism. We must find the root which brings us all together.

If, Sharon [2004c] professed, “the Disengagement Plan presents the possibility of opening a gate to a different reality," I will assess how the Disengagement’s reality was reacted to.

Reactions to the Disengagement in Settler and Religious Communities

Despite Sharon's appeal for unity and support, the Disengagement was highly divisive in settler and religious communities. Taken in the name of (in)security, this entailed a loss of 'rights' and existences. The Disengagement also overrode other projects of security in
space and settlement (Chapter Three). With settlement in spaces not fitting with the desire to secure a particular future and the State’s character and existence, settlers had to face the reality of evacuation. That security has not been achieved post-Disengagement has been one of its criticisms. As one settler reflected: “the day we left, a rocket was launched into Ashkelon. The day after. I remember thinking, 'we told you so.'” One settler from Judea who was present in Gush Katif to protest the Disengagement, also discussed: from a security point of view, we on the Right warned if we leave Gaza, it will put the entire South in danger. We were accused of being war-mongers, hysterical. No one apologised when the rockets started falling.

In my interviews, there were other significant criticisms raised concerning very acts of evacuation. As one National-Religious settler stated:

the Land of Israel belongs to the people of Israel, and we cannot give it away. Nobody has the right to give it away because it’s ours, past, present and future. It belongs to our Forefathers, to us, and to future generations.

For this and other settlers I spoke with, the State did not and does not have a right to ‘give the Land away’ due to the sovereignty of this space as the God-given Promised Land which belongs inherently to the Jewish People. Acts taken against this space are infringements of the “eternal covenant.” If one settler answered that “settlement means freedom. Freedom to live anywhere in the Land of Israel,” the Disengagement represented the loss of freedom. Furthermore, whilst Sharon [2005b] declared that “we must withdraw from Gaza in order to build Israel,” for one settler I spoke with “Gush Katif was part of all Israel,” and in the Disengagement, “we lost part of our body.” Such sentiments were expressed to me by numerous settlers.

A particularly pertinent interview I had was with a ‘settler-soldier,’ a settler who was a soldier at the time of the Disengagement and was present in Gaza but did not partake in the evacuations. For them, the whole concept of the Disengagement was antithetical to Zionism and Judaism: “taking people out of their homes...it has nothing to do with Zionism. Nothing to do with Judaism. It’s not a character of ours.” Whilst I assessed that the Disengagement was a political decision and act taken in the name of ‘the State,’ ‘peace,’ and ‘(in)security,’ we have to be critical of these notions. As one interviewee discussed, Judaic theosophical notions of peace are different from secular concepts which centre on ‘compromise’ between different sides. In Hebrew, the word peace- shalom- refers to ‘wholeness.’ Within this conception and framework, the Disengagement was adversarial
to peace and security because the Disengagement was ‘giving-away' parts of ‘the historic Jewish homeland' and therefore infringing on 'wholeness.'

As an historic initiative and event, how did populations (re)act to the act and reality of the Disengagement? The work of Lilly Weissbrod and Israel Savyon [2008] details a variety of responses: denial; belief the prophecy was merely delayed or territorially restricted; self-accusation; maintenance or strengthening of trust in God; adoption of ultra-orthodoxy; loss of faith in the prophecy; despair; search for an alternative religious message. I will now assess three dominant responses at the time: religious belief and spiritual resistance; cognitive dissonance; and, protest. The nature of these reactions reflect the significance of the Disengagement itself and the debates and divisions it generated.

Reactions at the Time of the Disengagement

The first dominant reaction was religious belief and spiritual resistance. Prayer was advocated and enacted on a national-scale. In March 2005, Rabbis Mordechai Eliyahu and Avraham Shapira instituted a nation-wide fast
to reverse the evil decree of the withdrawal from Gaza. In doing so, Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu imitated the biblical Mordecai's public fast on behalf of Esther, which was shortly followed by the salvation of Persian Jewry [Stadlan, 2014:5].

In the impending evacuation, salvation was sought. On the 10th August 2005, a mass prayer was held at the Western Wall attended by 70,000 individuals from different religious sectors [Marciano, 2005]. This was the largest gathering in Jerusalem's Old City since Israeli forces (re)gained control in 1967, and the largest since the destruction of the Second Temple [HaLevi, 2005]. In his open letter to "the settlers in Yesha," Eliyahu wrote:

I repeat that we believe in good faith that the prayers of all of us and certainly all of us together will eliminate the evil decree of the government. So do not pack or to do any act that which weakens the settlement or the residents...standing bravely in front of people who are trying to weaken them and thank God no success [Amiel, 2005].

Prayer was an act of faith and spiritual resistance. Rather than “the evil decree” happening, Eliyahu affirmed that

the Seer of the Generations in advance...will answer us and bring our justice into the light, and no one shall stop the Divine process of the national revival of the People of Israel that is returning to its Land [Amiel, 2005].
Through religious faith, God will “eliminate the evil decree.” The Disengagement will not happen but “justice” and “the Divine process of the national revival” will prevail. Similarly, his appeal to Gush Katif residents to continue their lives there can be seen as a religious act and act of spiritual resistance. As one settler reflected to me:

there was a kind of mystical position that if we act like it won’t happen, it won’t happen. Our actions will shape reality. Many planned their weddings to take place in Gush Katif after the time of the supposed Disengagement. Farmers in Gush Katif applied for bank loans for their next crop cycle which was to be harvested after the Disengagement.25

This position attracted different perceptions. As the same interviewee discussed:

I remember at the time thinking I wasn’t sure how I felt about this. On the one hand, I could identify with this feeling that we want to go on and the Disengagement is not going to happen. On the other hand, I felt this is just shutting our eyes to reality.

For others, such actions were important. "There is great value in these actions [as they] express faith in the Creator." The refusal of residents to vacate, Eliyahu argued, "strengthened faith in God and in the promise of the Land made by God to Abraham" [Amiel, 2005]. In asking one former resident how they reacted when State forces arrived in their community, they answered: “I cried and went to the synagogue and prayed to Hashem they stop.” Such actions are reflected in news reports from the time. As evacuations progressed, individuals barricaded into synagogues in Gush Katif [Ynet Reporters, 2005b]. On the night of the deadline for the evacuation of Neve Dekalim,

hundreds of residents packed into the structure to celebrate the dedication of a new Torah scroll. Men of all ages swayed through the synagogue, singing "Am Yisrael Chai"- "the Nation of Israel lives on"...some congregants clapped and laughed; others broke down into tears, sobbing violently in each other’s arms [Klein, 2009:44].26

Religious explanations offered for the reality of the Disengagement, and the 'signals' or 'lessons' rabbis and religious populations would take following this event, will be assessed forthcoming. The second significant reaction is cognitive dissonance. Leading to the Disengagement, settlers reflected that “there was a spectrum but there was a strong atmosphere of saying somehow it will be averted” and, “there was a certain belief that somehow it might be cancelled at the last minute. As the days got closer, the realisation
that it was going to happen, people were rattled." 27 One settler’s recollection of the atmosphere in Gush Katif at the time also displayed this: “most people did not believe it would happen. People repressed the truth that they really will be expelled.” Asked why they felt most people believed 'it would not happen,' they answered: “it was a combination of faith and also a political view that the army will refuse to make this crime.” 28

Commentators have discussed how Gaza's settlers continued their lives as normal 29 [Stadlan, 2014]. Klein [2009:42] writes:

reporting from Gaza in the final countdown to the withdrawal, I found most residents...had not resigned themselves to the reality of their expulsion, believing something or someone would stop the government from carrying out its plan.

Whilst such actions can be explained as acts of spiritual resistance, there is also a different 'level' to this denial and non-belief that the Disengagement would take place. Writing to settlers one month prior to when the Disengagement was to be implemented, Eliyahu declared: "I intend to strengthen your hand against the terrible moral injustice of the intention to evacuate settlements and expel Jews from their homes- it will not be"! As Stadlan [2014] discusses, "the impending Disengagement constituted a crisis so severe that Rabbi Eliyahu explicitly denied that the redemption-damning event was occurring." 30 A number of academics have classified such reaction as 'cognitive dissonance' [Inbari, 2007; Weissbrod and Savyon, 2008; Stadlan, 2014]. This classification is interpreted from the work of Festinger et al. who suggested that

an occult or messianic group may heighten its ideological activities after confronting an event that disproves its convictions in order to reduce the cognitive dissonance caused by the falsifying event [Stadlan, 2014:1].

For Stadlan [2014:2], "the main idea remains relevant and helpful in understanding the Messianic Religious Zionist response to the Disengagement." Inbari applies the 'cognitive dissonance' theory to Eliyahu’s response. Rather than an erosion or weakening of faith, the failure of a prophecy can attract "a strengthening of religious belief and practice, in an effort to set the messianic process back on course." Furthermore when someone who believes wholeheartedly in something

is committed to this belief, and has taken irreversible actions on the basis of this belief, is confronted with ostensibly irrefutable evidence contradicting the erroneous belief, the individual may strengthen faith, and invest renewed efforts in convincing others of the accuracy of their worldview [Inbari, 2007:708].
Again this position was divisive within settler and religious communities. One National-
Religious rabbi stated that they were critical of such approach: “it was an abuse of
rabbinical position, to deny that G-d will allow this to happen.” Whilst spiritual
resistance was a central (re)action, another National-Religious rabbi discussed prominent
debates and dilemmas at the time:

from the religious point of view, what should the believer do in the weeks and
months before the Disengagement? Should it be strengthening in belief, trust in G-
d, to say what will happen after is a distraction, and it’s part of making people
fear? Other rabbis came from other religious points of view saying you don’t
have a promise from G-d that things will not happen. Therefore you should
prepare and get ready for any option you have.

The third dominant reaction to the Disengagement was protest. The primary response by
the Yesha Council was to organise widespread protests. The fate of Gush Katif was
brought into the consciousness of Israelis in Israel Proper with protests held throughout
the State. On the 11th August 2005, some 150,000 Disengagement opponents gathered
in Tel Aviv. Protest was also encouraged by leading National-Religious Zionist rabbis. As
Inbari [2007:706-7] writes, the

dominant response to the Disengagement plan among militant religious Zionist
rabbis sought to encourage opposition to the act of eviction...[they] argued that,
since the State of Israel was acting in a manner contrary to the divine promises in
the Torah regarding the Land of Israel to the People of Israel, it was permissible
to oppose the actions of the state. However, the opposition they advocated was
limited to passive civil disobedience.

Writing a public letter to "our brothers, the settlers in Yesha...powerful heroes and
performers of His will," Eliyahu affirmed that "we are obliged to protest against this
terrible moral wrong" [Amiel, 2005]. Protest was deemed a religious and moral/ethical as
well as a political act. Spaces of Gaza were focal points of organised anti-Disengagement
protests, with thousands of people camping out [Klein, 2009:41]. However, Israeli
security forces made strong efforts to limit protest. In July 2005, Gaza was declared a
'Closed Military Zone,' where space was in 'lock-down.' Security forces estimated that
"perhaps more than 3,000 right-wing activists had already entered the Strip and
infiltrated settlements to link up with more hardline settlers" [Pratt, 2006:246]. In using
mechanisms of State sovereignty, settlers/protestors were physically and legally
prevented from 'reinforcing' protests inside space and communities. Gush Katif became a
space of isolation brought under an order of control as evacuation preparations advanced. Gush Katif went from a ‘community’ to a ‘closed-military-zone,’ a practice predominantly employed against Palestinians, showing how spatial acts can be used against own subjects.

Organised protests continued to the last days of the Disengagement’s implementation. The focus of the settler Yesha Council was to prevent the practical possibility of the ‘evacuations’ from taking place by preventing State security forces accessing Gaza. Under the ‘Orange Dawn’ Plan, one of the key directives is for long convoys to arrive at the Kissufim crossing, the entrance to Gush Katif, and prevent any access to it by evacuating forces [Singer-Heruti, 2005]. Jewish life served as a ‘human shield’ around and for Gaza, serving to close the ‘closed military zone.’ Such an act further highlights the significance of this space. On the day the Disengagement was scheduled to begin, Yuval Porat “the main strategist for the Yesha Council, said the next stage would be "to send hundreds of groups" of protestors on Monday to break through army roadblocks” [Singer-Heruti, 2005]. However, the Yesha Council would make deals with the government, an act which would have consequences in the settler community post-Disengagement (Chapters Five and Six).

In spaces of Gaza, resistance efforts continued. Holding sit-down protests, settlers strove to block military vehicles and evacuation buses reaching communities. Despite residents and protestors issued final ultimatums that they had forty-eight hours to depart after the evacuations began on the 14th August, "the majority of Gush Katif residents stayed." This is important as it signified attachments to space and communities. It was also a protest against the Disengagement and against the State’s sovereignty itself in refusing to obey.

**Debates and the Nature of (Re)actions at the Time of the Disengagement in Settler and Religious Communities**

Despite the Disengagement initiative attracting different reactions and resistances, State forces preceded with the evacuations on the 14th August. Settlers therefore had to confront the Disengagement as a physical reality. This section will assess the nature of (re)actions towards the physical act of evacuation and debates over responses. In the Disengagement there was a dominant taboo of violence in place. Understanding why is a crucial assessment. It reveals concerns and fears in place at the time and will allow a recognition of the ideological and political framework within State-settler relations and fears which the Disengagement posed to this relationship. Assessing the nature of (re)actions will also allow the significance of later developments in relations and responses to evacuation to be realised.
For evacuations to be implemented, this was dependent upon the service of Israeli State forces, in particular the IDF which was tasked with the evacuations. Engagement in these acts brought the agency of the IDF, as an institution and individual soldiers, under the spotlight. The question of whether forces should be encouraged to refuse State-orders of evacuating settlers attracted strong division in religious circles, particularly amongst National-Religious rabbis. As one National-Rabbi discussed with me, "the dominant debate at the time was over the question of refusal. This was the main gap between rabbis. A lot of it is still not bridged because it was the question." Another rabbi stated that "the issue of refusal was very, very wide open. It was a strong debate with lots of power." On the one side, some rabbis felt that it was legitimate for rabbis to urge soldiers to refuse such orders. Furthermore, soldiers had responsibility to disobey. Issuing the following appeal to "the heroes of our army," Rabbi Eliyahu wrote that

soldiers who are required to commit the crime will reply, "I cannot." If they are coerced, they will sit on the floor and cry with the family they wish to expel from its home. Surely and certainly there is no permit to volunteer to participate in this criminal act which is also forbidden by the Bible [Amiel, 2005].

For Eliyahu, active participation in evacuations was not just deemed a criminal act against ‘brothers,’ but an act in violation of the Torah, and therefore against God. Rabbi Avraham Shapira declared participation a sin [Ginsburg, 2005; Inbari, 2007]. Rabbi Ginsburgh [2003:53] also asserted that disobedience in 'uprooting' Jewish communities in Eretz Yisrael is imperative:

the Torah itself that demands, in cases of conflict, that one disobey the law of the land in order to obey the law of God. If soldiers in the Israel Defence Forces are commanded to uproot Jewish settlements in the Land of Israel, the order must be disobeyed.

Significantly, Ginsburgh placed the Torah’s authority ahead of the State’s authority and this should be respected in action. In contrast, other rabbis believed that it was wrong to encourage soldiers to disobey orders. Rabbi Shlomo Aviner called for soldiers to obey stating that “we cannot fly a flag of insubordination. It would be the demise of the army” [quoted Wagner, Katz, 2005]. Rabbi Zvi Tau also rejected calls for order disobedience because of the harmful division this would cause in Israeli society. One settler discussed rabbinical fears regarding disobedience:
I learnt at a yeshiva at the time of the Disengagement, in a settlement, after I finished in the army. Our rabbis were against disobeying orders. The way they phrased it was: ‘Disengagement is terrible but it is not so terrible that it’s worth dismantling the country in order to stop it.’ That’s what they felt would happen if there was mass disobeying.”

Reflecting on debates of disobedience at the time, one National-Religious rabbi emphasised to me the importance of rabbinical position and leadership in communities. ‘Organised refusing,’ and rabbis instructing soldiers that they must refuse participation, is unacceptable due to harmful impacts. The divisions this would exacerbate would threaten the IDF, where cohesion and obedience to orders is primary to this institution. Furthermore, refusing orders would bring further internal divisions and pose a threat to the State by potentially triggering a civil war. In the Disengagement, the vast majority of forces obeyed orders where 130 soldiers reportedly refused orders [ICG, 2009:18].

*The Taboo of Violence/Violent Resistance*

Speaking about the Disengagement on the 21st October 2004, Justice Minister Lapid warned that "Israel may deteriorate to a civil war" [quoted Eiran, 2009:113]. Such stark warning indicates the significance of the event with the fear that it may generate a civil war. A news article published on the 17th August 2005, however, revealed a different reality in the Disengagement:

> the actual removals-which have seen troops dragging some settlers out kicking and screaming-have taken place amid high emotion but little physical confrontation...there were skirmishes with security forces but no serious fighting as the settlements were evacuated [Oliver et al., 2013].

In looking at what happened in the ‘moment’ of evacuation, actual and intimate encounters when settlers were evacuated from homes and communities by Israeli State forces, such assessments are crucial for signifying the dominant nature of (re)actions. This awareness is gained from evidence from the ground at the time of evacuations, and from my interviews which provide primary unique insights. One National-Religious rabbi interviewee reminisced that “before they left the house, some residents danced. A song of belief, spiritual Hasidic dancing.” When forces entered houses, they were met with singing families, each of whom started to sing in their private dining rooms. Loud songs flooded the streets of Neve Dekalim. Exuberant celebrations broke out
inside and outside the Jewish homes. Not a single resident of Neve Dekalim departed [Klein, 2009:44].

Many settlers chose to be carried-out of homes by forces, not to leave of their own accord. One news article reported that when confronted by State forces, Eran Hendel "prized off the mezuzzah at the door of his house...cut his shirt, to indicate mourning, then fell to the ground, sobbing" [Erlanger, 2005]. There was also what I call a protest-of and protest-to morality. Gush Katif residents/protestors confronted forces with statements like: "don't take my home away from me," "don't do this," "Jews don't expel Jews," and "cry, at least, where are your tears?" Such emotive statements/pleas may have been issued out of emotion, but can also be interpreted as efforts to 'connect' consciousness or appeal to conscience in evacuation realities.

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As the 'evacuations' were underway, Rabbi Shmuel Tau, head of the Torah Haim Yeshiva in Neve Dekalim "considered to be Gush Katif's ideological stronghold," instructed students to leave voluntarily: "those who cannot leave should sit...and wait for soldiers to evacuate him, without any violent resistance" [quoted Ynet Reporters, 2005a] where "the rabbi's students responded by breaking into tears, lying on the ground and kissing it." Whilst there were confrontations, "civilian resistance to the evacuation was almost entirely passive" [Klein, 2009:44]. Speaking on the 10th August 2005, Colonel Erez Katz insightfully told reporters:

> even though we simulated some extreme scenarios, we believe most settlers would not resort to violence...some of them are even waiting for the soldiers with cakes and candy [quoted Somfalvi, 2005].
A variety of interviewees wished to emphasise the reality of non-violence and passive resistance on the part of settlers in the Disengagement. I asked one settler when it came to be realised that the reality of the Disengagement was happening, did they recall if there were any debates within communities regarding (re)actions when the soldiers arrived. They answered that

there was a sack of potatoes and a sack of fish. Meaning, you can sit there and have soldiers carry you onto the bus and be completely passive. Or you could squirm, like fish. It is very, very important for me to stress there was very, very little talk of actual physical opposition. Pretty much the most common extreme measure of opposing was squirming. Nobody was talking about hitting or fighting. Maybe on the fringes. But I don’t remember anybody talking about physically fighting soldiers, or anything like that. There were some people who went on roofs. People sat in their homes. The most common choice was sack of potatoes, completely passive. And a little bit sack of fish. There were a lot of people who were not even sack of potatoes.49

Another settler reiterated that "it was mainly passive, very passive, with different degrees." In advocating protest, one settlement council leader, Tzvika Bar-Hai, stated that "we will not raise a hand against police and army personnel...we will not confront anyone" [quoted Singer-Heruti, 2005]. Asking why we did not see violence or 'civil war,' "the rabbis would not let this happen," one interviewee told me. Acts of protest/resistance were contained in strict boundaries of acceptability. Non-violence against State forces was strongly emphasised. In asking one Hilltop Youth individual why there was little violent confrontation, the role and influence of rabbis, particularly National-Religious rabbis, was discussed in critical terms: "the State tricked them."50 Rabbi Eliyahu stated that "we will
creating an atmosphere of rift and hatred among the people, or God forbid, even considering the idea that someone would raise a hand against his brother; referring to sections of the people as "rabble"; or expressing absolute despair with the State of Israel-all of these are a terrible affront to the most important values in the name of saving the Land of Israel [quoted Inbari, 2007:710-11].

Whilst the Disengagement may be deemed "a terrible moral injustice,"51 for Rabbi Aviner it did not provide a license to engage in certain actions:

although I think the disengagement is a terrible thing it does not give the right to wage civil war or to disobey an order...we must forswear violence, ridicule and hatred. There can be no name-calling, no pulling, no tugging. The soldiers must obey orders, and the civilians need to get up and go peacefully [quoted Ginsburg, 2005].

For Aviner, peaceful cooperation was the utmost importance. Similarly, for Tau emotions and (re)actions must be controlled. Protest operated in strict boundaries so not to 'affront' 'the most important values.' Importantly, Tau expressed that 'saving the Land of Israel' was not a license to engage in actions in such 'affronts' which he explicitly lists. It was not just forbidden to create divisions within the Jewish people, creating an atmosphere of 'rift' and 'hatred,' and resorting to violence against 'brothers'- an idea which was unthinkable; but 'expressing absolute despair with the State' itself was forbidden, signaling the State must maintain its standing on a pedestal. Yet the word 'despair' contains different meanings. As Chapter Five assesses, how populations responded to the State post-Disengagement reflected and furthered division. That the Disengagement stimulated such division is testament to its significance.

On reactions at the time, one National-Religious rabbi reflected to me that "people were asking me, what should I do? What’s going to happen?...we decided that if they came, there will be no violence. A Jew does not raise up his hands."52 Another settler also stated that "the leadership decided we cannot do anything which may endanger even one person."53 The same rabbi furthered:

what happened in Gush Katif, the adults were so deeply ideologically committed to not having a civil war. Not only not having a civil war but not doing bad things. We were so deeply connected to the fact that the soldiers are our brothers...they
told the soldiers ‘you are also victims of ideological thinking. We have nothing against you.’

As one soldier reflected, settlers “weren’t beating anybody, they were singing. Songs of belief.” In speaking with former Gush Katif settlers, I asked why they thought people did not fight with the soldiers? Such questioning within interviews was an important opportunity to understand further why there was a taboo of violence. One former Gush Katif settler answered that

it was very difficult. We are both Israelis. They kept proprietorship and protected us all these years and the people of Israel. Also, if we fight with them, it could lead to civil war.

In asking this interviewee if civil war was their greatest fear, they replied “yes.” Another former Gush Katif settler stated that “we believed in the soldiers. We did not want a civil war.” One settler further reiterated: “as Zionists, we do not want a civil war. One person turning against another. So they thought if we cooperate and don’t curse, it will be better.” The settler-soldier also discussed conversations which they had with settlers outside Gush Katif who advocated more confrontational actions to be undertaken:

I would make phone calls to them all day and say ‘don’t do this. You’re desecrating G-d’s name, that’s not what He wants, for us to have a civil war.’ That’s what I felt, there is a civil uprising going on. We’re going to be fighting each other.

There was also another layer in this taboo of violence which was disclosed by one National-Religious rabbi. In asking if they thought it was fear of civil war which prevented people from taking a tougher stand in Gush Katif, they replied:

no. Even if I caused one soldier to be hospitalised then I’m not going to do it. Even if there would not be a civil war. My religious belief and ideology tell me first of all you do not hit anybody else. Anybody. Obviously if he is a Jew, period.

The great efforts to avoid any violence or harm against State forces was seen with actions on the ground. At Kfar Maimon, a site where anti-Disengagement protesters gathered, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow helped prevent clashes between demonstrators and security forces. In some cases he physically grabbed and shoved people to move them away from the security forces, so God forbid, he said, violence would not erupt [Wagner, Katz, 2005].
The Dominance of Mamluchti Ideology

Given the significance of the Disengagement, assessing the primary (re)action of settlers to acts of evacuation, and the nature of this (re)action, is politically significant. For interviewees, the dominant taboo of violence in place was largely explained by three reasons. First, relations which settlers had with the IDF. Second, pronounced fears that a civil war would be caused. Third, violent confrontation/resistance and causing any harm was perceived to be prohibited and engaging in such acts off-limits. National-Religious rabbis made clear that settlers/protestors had no license to do so and if they did, it would be deemed an affront. Rabbinical authority on this matter was predominantly respected.

Yet, for one former Gush Katif settler, to understand the (re)actions “you need to know the communities. You need to understand the spiritual way of looking at things to understand the entire picture,” adding, “people usually take it from the opposite, the outer, technical position.” In assessing the main responses to and within the Disengagement, what we have been observing is the dominance of the Mamluchti position. Mamluchti is a Hebrew term meaning ‘pro-State,’ or a statist ideology. Mamluchti ideology is central to National-Religious Zionism. The ideology sees the State of Israel as an inherently sacred being in which an unfolding-process-of-redemption is occurring. The State and all of its institutions are revered and there is commitment to the State.

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Speaking with National-Religious rabbis, responses reflected this position/ideology. For example, regarding the Disengagement decision: “in my view, the government was qualified to do it. It was not illegal. The government decides where the State’s borders are. This is the government’s sovereignty.” On a religious level, the State’s sovereignty is sacralised. The overwhelming Mamluchti position was discussed in relation to the ideology which the majority of Gush Katif settlers held and how this conditioned the nature of (re)actions. As one settler stated:
in Atzmona no way would there be clashes, absolutely no way. It completely
contradicts their ideology to clash with the army...they didn't leave when the
order to leave was given; but when the soldiers came and said 'if you don't go we
will kick you out by force,' they did not resist.63

The former Gush Katif settler who discussed the importance of understanding the
spiritual position of the communities, provided this insight: "I was part of the community
of Netzarim, which was the last settlement expelled. Our ideology was very pro-national,
pro-State. In Hebrew, Mamluchi."64 One Israeli analyst discussed that

in Gush Katif resistance did not take off. There was an overwhelming feeling of 'we
don't want to betray our State, our soldiers.' I am not saying it was soft because it
was not, the campaign was quite surprising in how strong it was.65

Yet, when it came to responding to acts of 'evacuation,' a direct encounter which
constituted a political and moral-ethical moment, ideology was overwhelming. As
interviewees discussed, the Mamluchi ideology served to condition and boundarise
responses. One settler from Samaria who participated in protests around Gush Katif felt
that the occurrence of civil war was not even a fear or concern due to the atmosphere and
the approach which settlers and protestors took:

I didn’t feel the people will react aggressively against the soldiers because all the
people were singing. They were stupid but people sang to the soldiers, even Zvi
Tau. I still remember the stupid song, 'we love you, we love you, we love the army.'
So nobody thought to really harm the soldiers. Not even to harm the army cars.
The most brutal thing was to sit down in the houses.66

For this settler, "the only fear was to lose the country." Whilst this was a significant fear
within the Disengagement, this did not provide a license to engage in violent
confrontation/resistance against it. Another settler from Judea who spent time in Gush
Katif discussed the dominance of the Mamluchi position comprehensively:

you need to understand that all the residents in Gush Katif, as a whole, were
extremely upstanding citizens. They all went into the army. They all sent their
children to the army. They were very, very Mamluchi. They all believed in the
State of Israel which of course made the pullout that much harder...and why send
the army to do such an aggressive action? But once it was clear it was the army
doing it, I think you need to understand the society and the belief of the residents
of Gush Katif that it was unthinkable to use violence against a soldier of the State
of Israel. Really unthinkable. It was a thought which was travelling around but boldly the answer was no. Because it was clear that as much as the Disengagement was a bad idea, and as much as they were thinking it is causing a huge scar to the society and to the State of Israel, the residents themselves did not want to be a part in making that wound deeper. And they knew that if there was violence against soldiers it would be very, very bad. For everybody. It would be bad for the army, bad for the residents, they would lose any support they still had. So it was highly taboo.67

This insight is crucial for understanding the “taboo” of violence against the State and the IDF and the force of the Mamluchti ideology. As a National-Religious settler also discussed:

you had people who said ‘let’s not create a bad image to the settlers. The government sent us, now the government tells us to leave.’ They were upset about it but it helps the fact that it’s National-Religious Zionist. That whole movement is like ‘that’s what G-d wants and G-d wants us to support the country. We were sent here in the name of G-d, and we will leave in the name of G-d.’68

The importance of ‘oneness’ was emphasised by numerous interviewees. One National-Religious rabbi stated that

we are so deeply committed to the fact that the soldiers are us. They are our brothers, friends, cousins...we’re part of the country, we’re part of the State. Which means my right-hand can’t start beating my left-hand. It’s one person, one unity.69

Such ideology reflects how settlers and soldiers are seen as the same ‘body.’ Whilst a momentous action was taken by soldiers against settlers on orders of the State, and generated deep internal debate and anguish, crucially, for the vast majority of settlers they remained part of the same ‘body.’ Again, the framework in which the Disengagement was situated is significant. One National-Religious rabbi illuminated this in discussing further debates at the time:

as a parent, it is against my ideology but my son thinks we should barricade the house. At least express we are not participating, ‘How can you sing with them?’, he asked. A very difficult moving example which people brought was if someone is a rape victim, do they sing with the person attacking? And they said, ‘it is not a rape victim. It is a very difficult political disagreement, with people who are our brothers, so that it is a wrong example.’70
The emphasis on preserving ‘oneness’ is reflected in actions which occurred during evacuations. One former Gush Katif settler discussed that before they left their homes, some settlers “danced. A song of belief...holding hands.” Significantly “they let the soldiers participate.”71 A former Gush Katif settler also disclosed a significant debate in their community on the eve of its evacuation:

there was discussion of whether to make issue of taking the lamp off the roof and walking around with it. They said this would make connection with the expulsion of the Israelis in the Roman Era. ‘No,’ they said, ‘the main thing is to lift the flag of the State of Israel.’72

The choice which settlers made is meaningful. The waving of the flag of the State of Israel was a political-ideological and spiritual act. Symbolically it affirmed Mamluchtishi ideology. It showed commitment to the State and that the priority was to preserve and strengthen ‘oneness.’ However, whilst these were the prominent ideologies and (re)actions at the time, the Disengagement would perpetuate significant impacts in the relationship between the State of Israel and some settler communities.

Furthermore, whilst the taboo of violence/violent resistance dominated (re)actions, there was debate. The significance of actions in Kfar Maimon where there was “a standoff for a few days” between anti-Disengagement protestors and the IDF who had assembled blockades to prevent protestors marching further to Gush Katif, was emphasised to me by one settler from Judea:

there was a big question of should they- peacefully- start crossing the army blockade? When there are tens of thousands of people, you don’t need to hit a soldier, you just need to start walking towards them. The decision by the leaders of the Orange Movement was no. They would not go through the army barriers. Already then there was an outcry by more extreme elements saying we should continue the march.73

One settler also discussed debates in Gush Katif communities as the reality of the Disengagement approached:

we were sitting and some people were like ‘no it’s not going to happen.’ Others were like ‘we don’t want it to happen, but if it does what do we do?’ Others said ‘we will battle against it and fight it.’ Others said ‘no, we will leave in pride. In sadness but pride.’74
Whilst stronger approaches were advocated than total passive resistance, ‘battling’ and ‘fighting’ did not mean against the State itself. Yet it is important to recognise that on the fringes, acts of violence/violent resistance did occur in part. As one former soldier discussed, in Netzer Haetzani for example, they left “not willingly but they didn’t violently oppose it. Whereas there were communities like Shirat Hayam and Kfar Darom those were violent. They threw acid on police officers.”

On the fringes there was another perspective. As the interviewee discussed, “there are people who say the opposite—‘let’s show we’re not going to go down without a fight because what is the point of this whole thing, and they’ll feel like they won.’” In asking a former resident about some of the violence/violent resistance seen on the margins, their explanation was important:

in Kfar Darom, the people were not from Gush Katif. They came from all of Eretz Yisrael and they fought for Eretz Yisraël. Their concern was not to prevent a civil war but to defend the Land.

The seeds of subsequent extremism and disjuncture, and how this is expressed through violent confrontation/resistance, is evident here. With concern for the defence of the Land positioned primary, this concern will be central to the growth of extremism and the diffusion of a perceived license to act against the State which is seen as threatening the Land. This growth and disjuncture is what I will map over the course of these three evidence-based chapters.

To recognise why these impacts were perpetuated and disjunctures with the State of Israel have (further) emerged, I will next critically assess the significance of the Disengagement as constituting a disjunctive moment. The final section will then begin to identify key impacts in the aftermath of the Disengagement, particularly on State-settler and intra-settler relations, and in religious communities and National-Religious Zionism.

Significance of the Disengagement: A Disjunctive Moment

The Gaza Disengagement was a key watershed in the State of Israel’s history and in State-settler relations. Giving-up of spaces/territory under the State’s control, seen as spaces of the God-given Jewish homeland, was not new. The State had shown its capacity to withdraw from territory in diplomatic and political peace deals and evacuated the Jewish settlement of Yamit in the Sinai (Chapter Three). Whilst these acts generated strong condemnations in settler and National-Religious communities [Inbari, 2007; 2012], the Disengagement was unique in a number of regards. As Eiskovitch et al. [2008:1] write:
the expulsion of Jews from twenty-one settlements in the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the northern Shomron and the transformation of these settlements into piles of destruction was a calamity for those who were expelled, a blow for those faithful to the return to Zion, and a national trauma for Israel and the entire Jewish nation. This was true in the past, it is true now, and it will be true in the future.

One settler characterised the Disengagement to me as “a collective trauma.” I argue that the Disengagement constituted a significant disjunctive moment for the State of Israel. Sharon stated that the Disengagement was “historic” and “fateful.” Exceptional actions were also taken to achieve the ‘evacuations’ (discussed below). Not only did the State of Israel take unprecedented actions against spaces of ‘Eretz Yisrael’ and settler communities, striking at the historic pact which National-Religious Zionists in particular had with the State. The Disengagement was also a key disjunctive moment because of its impacts on some State-settler relations which became apparent after, opening new pathways to relations and (re)actions (Chapters Five and Six). I will identify the Disengagement’s significance, recognising why it constituted a disjunctive moment.

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Firstly, the significance on a practical-political level. Whilst the importance of the Disengagement witnessing little physical confrontation will continually be discussed, we should not think that the Disengagement itself was not a violent act. In reflecting on what ‘Disengagement’ entailed, the Jewish legal rights organisation Honenu writes:

in a move that set Jew against Jew, the IDF was used to engineer the expulsion of more than 8,600 people from their homes. Gush Katif residents watched in horror as the living were dragged from their homes and the burial places of the dead were desecrated [Kutnicki and Pollack, 2011].
News reports also document how “the actual removals...have seen troops dragging some settlers out kicking and screaming” [Oliver et al, 2013]. One settler present in Gush Katif recounted that “it was an atmosphere of fear. People were very shocked. Most did not believe, until the end, it would happen.” Inside the synagogue in Neve Dekalim, "protestors locked arms and legs, lay on the ground, tied themselves to furniture and chanted "a Jew does not expel a Jew” [Macintyre, 2005]. The act of 'Disengagement' was politicised and moralised. As Macintyre [2005] furthers:

although the decision...to barricade themselves into the synagogues left the army little choice, supporters of the settlers said they were outraged. They claimed this was an unprecedented operation by Israeli troops to evict Jews from their places of worship. 

The unprecedented nature of the Disengagement was emphasised by numerous interviewees in my fieldwork. Publications further reflect this in exceptional actions taken to achieve and secure the historic event. Eiskovitch et al. [2008] explore the systematic 'Mental Preparation for the Disengagement,' where the IDF was “transformed into an army of expulsion” [i]. "The mental preparation for the Disengagement Mission was prepared in a comprehensive way that has no parallel in the history of the IDF" [iii]. Eiskovitch et al. discuss how new kits were produced for all levels in the IDF and Police which "established a new ideology" [iii] and agency for this event. The Disengagement symbolised, operated in, and enacted a new reality. Eiskovitch et al. argue that this reality was in a context where the values of Judaism and love of the Land had been lost. Instead, "the objective of the brainwashing was to emphasize the need for obedience" [iii], even resorting to forcing and threatening State forces to ensure this. Obedience to the State was the highest value despite the ideological/ethical significance of evacuating settlers.

The IDF was not just politicised, as some interviewees argued. The subjectivity and agency of IDF personnel underwent "spiritual and ideological conversion" [ii]. To ensure that evacuations were implemented, and an (in)security order achieved, soldiers were 'released' "from their conscience by carrying out exercises in "'emotional disconnect" so that they would be transformed into obedient robots" [iii]. "Such a transformation was needed," Eiskovitch et al. write because of

the irresolvable conflict between the objectives of the IDF, which include defense of Israel and its citizens, and the "Disengagement mission," which consisted solely of expelling Jews from their land in order to hand it over to the enemy [ii-iii].
Furthermore, they declare, the mission was "in conflict with natural ethical instincts" [v]. Orders and acts of evacuation were so exceptional that a 'mental operation' preceded the physical operation. In footage, we see soldiers obediently implementing orders with seeming little reaction to comments and appeals from settlers such as "go back and say, I wanted to but I couldn't take a child out of his home. You will be heroes," and "my father tells me about what he did in the army- he fought in wars. What will you tell your children- I expelled Jews."\[81\] One settler present recalled this vividly: "I saw them. They were totally mentally blocked. They didn't express any sign of mercy or emotion."\[82\] In the Disengagement, the State had not just 'turned against' settlement and settler populations in Gaza; it had practically turned 'brother against brother.'

Bam et al. [2005] document a simultaneous systematic-process dealing with Disengagement opponents. Again, such measures by the State were unprecedented. In passing 'the Disengagement Law' in February 2005, "the civil rights of opponents...have been subject to extensive violations." Bam et al. [i] write that these violations "are not the exception. They are the inevitable outcome of the policies [of] Israel's legal system." Rather than viewing acts such as blocking roads as nonviolent civil disobedience, a democratic right of protest, "Justices of the Supreme Court conflated nonviolent civil disobedience with insurrection and sedition" [i]. The involvement of the Shin Bet to investigate such 'crimes' testifies to the perceived danger that individuals posed. Authorities treated civil disobedience as "a threat to the existence of the state, the equivalent of armed insurrection" [1].

Concerns regarding the potentially explosive atmosphere at this time again testifies to the significance of the Disengagement. But where did the perceived danger come from? The answer to this is important in the context of State-subject relations: "what made them allegedly so dangerous to the state...was not what they did but what they thought," where "the phrase "ideological crime" ("avaryanut ideologit") pops up again and again in court decisions regarding opponents of disengagement" [3]. Broadcasting a different ideology or perspective was not only perceived to have potentially dangerous consequences, but was construed as insurrection against the State. Ideology and insecurity were entwined. Furthermore, subjects rendered themselves insecure before the State in holding counter-ideologies. Judge Henig, for example, stated that

when we are dealing with respondents who act out of ideological fervor, the relevant court decisions set a different standard for assessing the danger to the public and the conditions for release.\[83\]
Similarly, Judge Diskin declared that “in my opinion one cannot detach the suspicions against the defendant from the reality we live in as well as his ideological motives” [quoted Bam et al., 2005:4]. Statements make clear that cases involving ‘ideology’ requires “a different standard.” Such treatments by the State and concern with ideology will be important for future State-settler relations with the growth of the Hilltop Youth (Chapter Six). Actions perceived as arising from “ideological motives” or “ideological fervor” provided a necessitation and authorisation of differentiation and treatment due to the perceived levels of danger this posed to ‘security’ and ‘the State.’ Of further importance is focus placed on the background/lifestyle of individuals where “the conflation of the parents’ presumed ideology with their evident religious lifestyle is hard to miss” [4]. Some 1,500 protestors were arrested during the Disengagement [ICG, 2009:4].

Secondly, the Disengagement was significant on a political-metaphysical level. The language of Disengagement is not merely the language of (in)security but simultaneously the language of loss: loss of communities, existence, rights, and spaces of ‘the homeland.’ Whilst the Disengagement was historic and significant by itself, the Disengagement was part of a wider battle over Israel’s settlement project(s), projects of State (re)creation, ‘Zionism,’ and Jewish Being in the homeland. As Eisikovitch et al. [2008:i] write, “this was destruction of Zionism, Israeli security, personal rights, and the rebuilding of the nation and the land, not only Netzarim.” Politically, the Disengagement was significant. After years of the State of Israel and settler and National-Religious communities working closely together, this was an historic moment in this relationship.

The sovereign State asserted its sovereignty, revoking the political license for existence in space and actualising the forcible evacuation of Jewish settlers, therefore revealing the precariousness of settlement which could be undercut by the State. The State privileged the strategic/(in)security calculation of settlement, rather than the religious vision and agenda within settlement-construction and existence in Eretz Yisrael, a central practice in belief-systems for hastening-the-redemption (Chapter Three). The Disengagement constituted an historic political and practical blow upon other security projects and also marked a new reality for the Jewish State whose subjects had to confront. As the evacuation deadline edged nearer, a meeting was held where Rabbi Menachem Porush burst into tears, telling those present that over the past 80 years of his life, he cannot remember a time where thousands of Jewish families were being expelled from their homes in such a manner, when 25 Jewish towns were set to be utterly destroyed, when the destruction of dozens of synagogues and houses of Torah
study was to take place, as well as the desecration of Jewish graves. "Even in Russia it was not like this" [HaLevi, 2005].

For some, the Disengagement constituted "uncompromising treachery towards the best people, those who had rebuilt the land...it would be reminiscent of Nero and the burning of Rome" [Eisikovitch et al., 2008:1]. This was the magnitude. Gush Katif settlers may have endured rockets unleashed on communities, a situation which many had accepted and had strengthened their belief and existence; they could not, however, withstand evacuations ordered and undertaken by their own State. Such reality was reiterated to me by one Hilltop Youth:

we came back home after 2,000 years and who took us out?...Israelis, Israelis. When we talk about who is worse, Israelis or the Arabs, the Israelis did in six days what the Arabs tried to do in thirty-eight years.

In asking about the Gaza Disengagement, another interviewee stated "what a terrible moment in our history. Jews sent to expel other Jews." Taken in the name of (in)security, the event and reality of the Disengagement and its practical-political and political-metaphysical significance, constituted a disjunctive moment for the State. Such acts were unprecedented and historically broke taboos. As one settler emphasised, “in the Disengagement, lots of red lines were crossed.” A vision and measure of 'security' had made its own demands on the State where the State, without compromise, exerted its sovereignty and governance-regime over space and subjects on a new scale. A new order of (in)security was in place where Jewish settlers were forcibly evacuated from communities and spaces by State security forces.

As an historic chapter in State-settler relations, this was also a lesson for Jewish-Israeli subjects of what State sovereignty and being-subject meant. The Disengagement struck at relations, a key impact which I will trace. The settler-soldier described entering into Gush Katif after the evacuations were completed and how this was meaningful for them.

I still remember the smell. After the uprooting happened, there was a smell of toilet everywhere. Rubbish everywhere. The communities were disgusting...it was such a contrast. It was so beautiful and now it’s disgusting, because it’s a disgusting move by our government. Everything was so comparable in your head.

**Impacts of the Disengagement in Settler and Religious Communities**
Such indepth analysis of the Disengagement brings contribution to the sub-disciplines of CSS and Political Geography in showing the impacts of implementing a security agenda and how this impacts on space, security and relations. The Disengagement was impactful on different levels. Given the significance of impacts, I argue that the Gaza Disengagement would also constitute a disjunctive moment for some settlers, where evidence of this is seen in the Amona evacuation (Chapter Five), the widening of divisions in settler communities and on leadership levels, and the emergence of critical ruptures with the State (Chapters Five and Six). The seeds of this disjunctive impact is what I will now critically assess in identifying significant impacts in the aftermath of the Disengagement.

Firstly, there were impacts on the personal level for settlers who were evacuated from space and communities. As one former Gush Katif settler expressed, “it was very difficult, a difficult trauma.” Another stated that “my childhood was destroyed.”91 In speaking with former residents, I asked where are you from? On all occasions, individuals responded: “I am from Gush Katif,”92 highlighting attachment remains with this space. Furthermore, a number of former residents continue to face social, financial and psychological struggles even today.93

Secondly, there were considerable impacts on leadership levels. The Disengagement generated various questions and disputes. Former residents and the ‘settler-soldier’ critiqued that there was no unified response from rabbis, testifying to the divisiveness of the Disengagement in Jewish religious-thought and circles.94 In asking one National-Religious rabbi the significance and impact of this, they answered: “that is something important. There was not only not one answer but big disagreements between rabbis. One of the consequences was no confidence in rabbis.”95 The perceived failure of the (re)actions to the Disengagement also impacted on the leadership and authority of rabbis and mainstream-settler leadership. Settler youth were especially effected by the Disengagement, an impact I will discuss in Chapters Five and Six. What is significant is criticism of the nature of the positions which rabbis took, i.e. the dominant taboo of engaging in any violent confrontation/resistance. As one rabbi voiced, “many rabbis lost their position. It doesn't matter what they said. The fact that from the youth's point of view, it's a fight.”96

Thirdly, betrayal. If in Gush Katif “there was an overwhelming feeling of we don't want to betray our State, our soldiers,” feelings of ‘betrayal’ were a key impact of the Disengagement. This was discussed by numerous interviewees.97 In asking one National-
Religious Zionist rabbi what the Gaza Disengagement represented to them, they answered:

so many questions, consequences, where to start?...there was extreme damage, and without benefit. The pain of such a high price in the personal life effected the National-Zionist movement very, very highly. We feel that ourselves, as supporters of the State, and pioneers. This is a contradiction we didn't get over.98

One settler emphasised different aspects of betrayal:

there was a lot of betrayal that took place...in my opinion many democratic lines were crossed. A prime minister who went against election promises. The media was completely drafted against the settlers of Gush Katif and against Disengagement opponents. The justice was not doing its job...many different betrayals. That was very painful.99

The sense of betrayal was also internal to National-Religious communities, again in different aspects. Reflecting on the evacuation from their home, one former Gush Katif settler stated:

I couldn't believe that we could be so badly humiliated...I believed in the leadership around me and today I understand we were taken for a ride. I understand that their intention was good. They did not purposely betray us. They thought it was the right thing, to avoid a civil war, G-d forbid and their intentions were good, no doubt. But in the end they sold us down the river.100

The Disengagement was also significant because of divisions it caused in 'the body' and overwhelming feelings of betrayal within. One settler, who served in the IDF before the Disengagement, recalled a conversation which they had with a former Gush Katif settler:

at some point he asked me: 'what did the rabbis at your yeshiva say about disobeying orders? I swallowed a lump in my throat and said, 'well they were against disobeying orders.' And he said, 'why is that'? I gave him the answer: 'better to have people doing it more sensitively and more emphatically.' And he said, 'they don’t understand anything. Because the most prominent feeling I felt was betrayal. I felt betrayed by the government, by the court system, by the media, and by the army. I was betrayed by everybody.' He told me: 'I would prefer to have a non-religious soldier drag me by the hair and throw me into a bus than to have a religious soldier speak to me nicely and hold my hand and be empathetic...the
minute I saw religious soldiers taking part, I knew I had been betrayed by everybody.’ And this is a sentiment I have heard echoed a number of times.

The same interviewee recalled another conversation they had with a former Gush Katif settler:

she and her family were dragged from their home and thrown onto a bus. Yet she said the hardest thing in the Disengagement for her was when a group of religious soldiers gathered for a prayer on her front lawn.101

The settler-soldier stated that "years later it still hurts me to speak to anyone who wanted to be there. Who wanted to take people out of their homes...what is that?” For them, the Disengagement also provoked thought upon their belief-system and the different subjectivities and identities of being ‘a soldier’ and ‘a settler,’ within a subjectivity and ideology of a 'National-Religious Zionist.' These were brought into tension. As the interviewee discussed, they "experienced the Disengagement as a settler in uniform," the same uniform they revered but was used to remove other settlers from communities. They recounted how many settlers arrived in the vicinity of Gush Katif and formed a human chain for solidarity. The interviewee recalled: "I thought, I want to be on that side. When you're in uniform you can't." For someone who revered the State and was proud of their IDF service, "in the Disengagement it felt like a splitting, a betrayal...I felt like this is not what I joined the army for. Why was I doing this? Why was everyone so against me?"102

Fourthly, impacts on National-Religious Zionism. The Disengagement and the manner in which the evacuations were undertaken struck at the heart of National-Religious Zionist ideology. After the Six-Day War, where Israel’s victory was seen in National-Religious and other religious circles to represent a Higher stage in the unfolding-of-redemption, Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook stated that

we must remember for once and all: that which is sacred is sacred![...The State of Israel and the arrangement of government in Israel are sacred. And everything that belongs to observing this commandment, all the tanks and other weapons[...].]-all belong to this sanctity [quoted Inbari, 2007:699].

In 2005, communities confronted a reality that these ‘sacred’ tanks and weapons were deployed to destroy Jewish communities and remove Jewish populations from spaces of Eretz Yisrael, an order issued by the 'sacred' government and undertaken by the 'sacred' State of Israel, despite widespread appeals/protests. As discussed, some National-Religious rabbis pronounced that the Disengagement “will not happen...this heinous act of
expulsion of Jews from the holy land." I interpreted this as both a faith-based approach and cognitive-dissonance, a sign of the disjunctive significance of the Disengagement Plan and reality itself i.e. it was too unbelievable to believe. But the reality of the Disengagement did happen. In so doing, this brought about a new reality. Such acts posed fundamental questions back to National-Religious Zionists and other religious settlers.

This not only connected with feelings of betrayal. As the settler-soldier stated, “the situation put me in a very tough dilemma to which to this day I am still part of. The thought I always had throughout was ‘how could they do this to us?’” It also generated questioning on a deeper metaphysical and religious level, a (re)questioning, for some, of how the State- in its metaphysical being- could and would do such an action. The question of the reality of the State’s practices would have to be posed against the reality projected on the reality of the State, i.e. its metaphysical being. The Disengagement was a provocation of thought, a compulsion to ask what is its fundamental meaning? What did this represent?, and, What are the lessons to be learnt? Critically, such questioning occurred in a reality where actions taken by the State against the Land and settler communities (Chapter Three) had provoked “a profound theological crisis intensified by the demolition of Jewish settlements during the Disengagement” [Inbari, 2007:699]. These acts tested “the very foundations of the beliefs regarding the political and religious behavior for the population” and generated soul-searching [Inbari, 2007:697]. This, I argue, also represents the thought of security and security’s foundational function where belief and security are one and addresses key conceptual questions from Chapter One.

In such questioning, there were varying responses and interpretations of the reality of Disengagement and how religious Jews should respond post-Disengagement [Inbari, 2007; 2009; 2012; Weissbrod and Savyon, 2012]. National-Religious Rabbis Tau, Lior, and Tamon interpreted the Disengagement’s reality as a test from God, directed at the faithful. Everything is of divine intent, even if believers struggle to comprehend God’s will and struggle to see how acts of evacuation and destruction by the Jewish State are in line with the process-of-redeemption. As ‘a test of faith,’ commitment-to-faith should be upheld. "According to Rabbi Ramon, it was a sin of heresy to challenge God by expecting a miracle" [Weissbrod and Savyon, 2012:10]. Others interpreted the reality of the Disengagement as signifying a need for critical self-reflection, on an individual and community level. The Disengagement was a lesson that more actions were required to hasten the process-of-redeemption. For Rabbis Aviner and Zvi Tau, the Disengagement was seen to take place in a context of the failure to widen and deepen spirituality in Israel. The struggle against territorial withdrawal therefore needed to be achieved through a "spiritual transition" of
deeper spiritual renewal. It was imperative to strengthen the spiritual message of redemption within the wider Israeli public [Inbari, 2007:710]. For one former Gush Katif settler, bridging divisions between settlers and other Israelis is a key priority:

after Disengagement we wanted to send a message to the people of Israel that what happened was because the entire nation was not with us. If the entire nation was, it wouldn't have happened. We felt we need to connect with other parts of our brothers in Israel. This was the lesson we learnt from the expulsion. 

Post-Disengagement, national unity and gaining greater support for settlement-communities and the settler cause was a key goal. As one former Gush Katif settler emphasised:

as our rabbi termed it, 8000 people were expelled from Gush Katif. When we return, we want to return with eight million people, meaning the entire nation, not just a specific sector of the population.

However, the Disengagement exacerbated tensions in National-Religious Zionism and settler-communities, further testifying to its significance and impact. "Religious Zionism," Wagner and Katz [2005] write, "has always been an ideologically divided movement. Currently, however, interfactional struggles are amplified in light of one of the most divisive events ever in Israeli society." Shortly after, an article was published entitled 'The war of the camps: Factional infighting after disengagement is tearing Religious Zionism apart' [Wagner, Katz, 2005]. Critical issues and debates at the time of Disengagement, such as order-refusal, became further causes of division. As discussed, Rabbi Aviner was influential in ruling that soldiers should obey orders. In the Disengagement’s aftermath, "he has been labeled a traitor by a group of right-wing Religious Zionist rabbis who consider Aviner’s call to soldiers and police to obey orders to evacuate...an unforgivable crime." One yeshiva student at Yeshivat Beit El reportedly declared that

Aviner caused the biggest desecration of God by creating a situation in which soldiers with kippot took part in the expulsion of Jews from Gaza. Religious soldiers, relying on Aviner, took part in this horrible crime. So how can you expect anything more from secular soldiers? [quoted Wagner, Katz, 2005].

Such criticisms, Wagner and Katz [2005] critically assess, reflect a much deeper rift between opposing camps within Religious Zionism. The dissent is not just over insubordination or disengagement or even territorial compromise:
it is about the religious camp’s continued cooperation with secular Zionists, the relationship with the secular state of Israel, and the role of Religious Zionism in the 21st century.

Such assessments are central to issues and concerns of this thesis where I also argue that ‘evacuations’ and other acts against settler communities are always greater than the acts of evacuation or particular issues. The key question is how are acts and realities interpreted in religious-thought? and, How are relations with the State effected? The settler-soldier attached important symbolism to what they witnessed in spaces after the evacuations were completed. They vividly recalled that "left behind was an orange kippah that someone started knitting but was undone. It was like ‘whoa’ that is what they are saying."111 Fundamental questioning that the Disengagement provoked was discussed by interviewees. As one settler stated:

the question is, is this relationship between the secular State and the secular Zionist movement and the Religious-Zionist movement conditional or unconditional? That was the question brought to the fore by the Disengagement. It was the question.112

One interviewee powerfully phrased the problematic and reality I am tracing: “when you say things like ‘Jews expelling Jews,’ what does this mean? What do you do? Is this the withdrawal of unconditional support?”113 One National-Religious rabbi interviewee had a very definite position where the relationship between National-Religious populations and the State of Israel is primary:

the bottom line is the settler movement is not a fundamentalistic movement. It is a movement which believes in obtaining the people. We take the long route. We still believe we should be sitting in Gaza, but are not going to do anything which may cause a civil war on whatever level. Even if it’s going to take twenty years, and meanwhile people are going to be expelled, and it will take another 100 years, however long it will take, we will only do something where there is mutual agreement with democracy and the State of Israel.114

Despite challenges in this relationship, for this rabbi and many more National-Religious Zionists, Mamluchti ideology remains central. For others, this is not the case. Post-Disengagement, more critical perceptions have emerged in the open in sectors of the settler community. As Chapters Five and Six assess, more confrontational approaches against evacuations have occurred and association with ‘the democratic State of Israel,’
for some, is also rejected. The settler-soldier provided important insights into problematics and questioning post-Disengagement where they recalled a conversation that they had with a former Gush Katif settler\textsuperscript{115} and their own emotions:

I asked him, ‘are you thinking of going into the army now’, because he was eighteen. He hesitated and said he was contemplating, debating. And I asked, ‘why?’ He said, ‘because the country betrayed us, so I don’t know.’ On the one hand it took me a while to be ok with myself. To go back in the uniform that pulled people from their houses. On the other hand, I believe in the State of Israel, I believe in the importance of the army, in solidarity, of the importance of giving back…but for him, it was just still so real.\textsuperscript{116}

With IDF-service a central and cherished value within National-Religious ideology, that a former Gush Katif settler who belonged to a National-Religious community was contemplating not serving is significant. As another settler discussed, that the IDF was sent to undertake evacuations meant that the IDF became increasingly politicised: “before, the people would never have questioned the army and the values. Before, nobody would dare refuse command. Now people are more critical about the way of doing things.”\textsuperscript{117} The settler-soldier recalled an incident that happened at the Western Wall, shortly after the Disengagement’s completion, where IDF recruits were confronted by settler youth. This was significant and reinforces the significance of actions taken against space and settlement. With some settlers publicly confronting Israeli soldiers and at Judaism’s holiest site revealed levels of anger. As I will discuss, how some settlers react to State forces post-Disengagement reveals significant fractures with the State itself.

It is the image of the torn flag of Israel hanging in Gush Katif which reflects the significant impact of the Disengagement on different levels. One former Gush Katif settler discussed how the image is symbolic of a reality of division but a reality which the Disengagement made apparent: “I always said it. Our biggest mistake, biggest weakness is that our flag is broken. When the flag is united we will be strong and say ‘this is our country.’”\textsuperscript{118} I argue that the image of the torn flag also serves to capture how the Disengagement constituted a critical disjunctive moment in perpetrating and exacerbating divisions. In asking what the symbolism of this image means to them, another former Gush Katif settler stated that “this is exactly what we felt the days of the Disengagement, we are broken between us. It was like this before but the Disengagement made it worse.”\textsuperscript{119} One Hilltop Youth individual discussed how the image is symbolic of reality and the critical role the Disengagement
played in this reality: “the flag is ripped, that is us, we are more ripped between us because of what happened.” Asked if the Disengagement symbolised a division they answered:

yes. There were people who understood this before the expulsion. There were people who knew where the State is going, what is going to happen. But after Gush Katif, it was realistic, more real.120

Post-Disengagement further splits have emerged in communities and relations which I will discuss forthcoming. Recognising how the Disengagement constituted a key disjunctive moment, and with the image of the torn flag of Israel central in thought, the concern of the next two evidenced-based chapters is to assess how the taboo of violence in the Disengagement was broken and a critical rupture with the State has emerged or come to be heightened in the open.

Conclusion

The Gaza Disengagement is a key watershed in the State of Israel’s history and an historic chapter in State-settler relations. The Disengagement was a political outcome of the State of Israel’s political rationality, governance-regime and (in)security concerns. The act was framed and legitimised according to agendas of ‘(in)security’ and for securing the existence and the future of the State of Israel as ‘Jewish and democratic’ [Sharon, 2003]. For this security, Jewish settlers lost their political license to be in this space, a space seen as part of the historic God-given Jewish homeland, and were removed from communities by State forces. The Disengagement encapsulates the centrality of (in)security and key concepts of securitisation, security and subjectivity, spatial (re)structuring and spatial control, bringing conceptual contributions to CSS and Political Geography. In the act of Disengagement and spectacles of evacuation, the different natures of this space and relations with it came into tension. Whilst acts of evacuation were part of some higher purpose, or "transcending goal" [Apter, 1997:3], the giving-up of spaces of Eretz Yisrael and the forcible evacuation of settlers struck at National-Religious Zionist ideology particularly and brought State-settler relations to the fore. Eldar and Zertal [2007:445] write that

from the moment Sharon made public his disengagement plan, the settlers and the prime minister headed toward a crucial, emblematic battle over their future. For what was on the agenda seemed so momentous.

In this 'emblematic battle,' Bam et al. [2005:36] claim that the state "won hands down" but add that "it was a pyrrhic victory." Framed in terms of ‘(in)security,’ this was a
measure the State had to achieve, a security and existential necessity. In order to work- towards and secure this security, a new reality came into being. This chapter has critically assessed the significance of the Disengagement. With analysis informed by original fieldwork, I explored (re)actions and debates which the Disengagement generated at the time, dominant concerns and taboos in place, the dominance of Mamluchti ideology, and significant impacts post-Disengagement. Recognising the significance of the event and actions, I argue that the Disengagement constituted a key disjunctive moment for the State of Israel. In the evacuation of Jewish communities by the State, the largest such evacuation to have taken place, Klein [2010] states that “few events in Israel’s recent history sear the Jewish soul as did the destruction of 25 thriving Jewish communities.” As an historic event, the Disengagement was disjunctive in breaking taboos. The State took unprecedented and exceptional actions against spaces of ‘Eretz Yisrael’ and against settler communities, many of whom had an historic close relationship with the State. Such realities generated questioning and debate, and had impacts on a variety of levels. After the evacuations had been completed, one settler recalled thinking, “Disengagement is done and we are back to normal. I don’t know what’s worse.” But ‘normality’ is not something we see post-Disengagement. Indeed, one former soldier described seeing in Gush Katif’s classrooms signs declaring “we will never forgive, we will never forget,” testifying to the significance and trauma of the event. All interviewees I asked stated that the Disengagement constituted “a turning-point.” In the Disengagement, the State turned- against the Land in ‘disengaging’ from Gaza. As I assessed, this entailed the loss of ‘rights’ and posed different insecurities. Within State-settler relations, not only did this generate feelings of betrayal but had deeper impacts on relations.

With the symbolic image of the torn flag of Israel at the centre of thought and constantly provoking in its provocation, as we saw, for one individual “it shows that there is something torn that happened here as a result of disengagement.” After the disjunctive moment of the Disengagement, the key questions are: What impacts did this have on State-settler relations? and, How would settlers respond to further evacuations and actions by the State perceived to be acts of insecurity? Despite the Disengagement attracting strong condemnation and resistance in settler and religious communities, protest/resistance remained on the whole non-violent. Resorting to violent confrontation/resistance against State forces was a dominant taboo, a line which most individuals did not cross, and the Mamluchti position remained dominant.
However, the Disengagement exposed divisions and critical questioning within the Religious-Zionist movement and teased the taboos. It articulated the possibility of breaking them, of turning against the State, violently. Very little violent protest/resistance happened but the limits had been teased as a response to the significance of the State’s actions. As I will next assess, further evaucations and confrontations would witness more readily the deployment of violence/violent resistance by some settlers and State forces. How has violent confrontation/resistance against the Jewish State come to be deployed and legitimised by some, moving-beyond dominant taboos? I will argue that the Disengagement also constituted a disjunctive moment for some settlers where I will trace this narrative of disjuncture post-Disengagement.

From this disjunctive moment, significant impacts have emerged, opening new pathways and exacerbating relations and (re)actions. I will assess how fundamental meanings and impacts are carried-forward in how some settlers (re)act to the State’s actions against settlement. Chapter Five will centre on the Amona evacuation. Chapter Six will continue to trace the widening of divisions in settler communities and the deepening of disjunctures in some State-settler relations, focusing on the ideologies and activities of the Hilltop Youth and Price-Tag violence. The Gaza Disengagement is a central event in explaining the growth of extremism [ICG, 2009; Byman and Sachs, 2012]. Whilst a hugely significant event itself, it is integral to this narrative of disjuncture.

References

1 Emphasis added.
2 Yankale Klein, SOS Israel, 2008.
3 Author Interview, Israeli security analyst Tel Aviv 10th September 2013.
4 The communities were Bedolah, Bnei Atzmon, Dugit, Elei Sinai, Gadid, Gan Or, Ganei Tal, Kfar Darom, Kfar Yam, Kerem Atzmona, Morag, Neve Dekalim, Netzarim, Netzer Hazani, Nisanit, Pe’at Sadem Katif, Rafiah Yam, Shirat Hayam, Slav, Tel Katifa.
5 Then Israel’s Minister of Agriculture.
6 Author interview 18th August 2013.
8 Author Interview, Samaria 14th August 2013.
10 Forty-two Israeli civilians were killed in Gaza from rockets, bombings, and settlement infiltrations.
11 Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2013.
12 Author Interviews, 4th August 2016; 25th July 2016; 18th August 2013. One of the paintings which hangs in the Gush Katif Museum is of religious women from Netzarim painted as angels.
13 Such discourses were observed by speaking with such individuals, or from secondary sources.
15 "In the framework of the disengagement plan’ Israel would strengthen its control of those parts of the land that will constitute an inalienable part of the state of Israel in any future
agreement” and "the disengagement plan releases Israel from adopting a diplomatic plan that is dangerous." Sharon, 2003.

16 The Addresses also proclaim the Disengagement was enacted for progress to be made on resolving the conflict with Palestinians. For skepticism, see for example, Zertal and Eldar, 2007:446.

17 This was one of the last Addresses which Sharon made before the evacuation of the settlement communities got underway. The central Zionist philosophy and ideology of Israel and the Jewish people facing an existential (in)security problematic, the need to ‘build’ Israel and ‘master fate’ is epitomised in the philosophy, ideology and politics within and behind the Disengagement Plan.

18 Author Interview, Judea 22nd August 2016. Ashkelon is a coastal city in southern Israel.

19 Author Interview, Judea 20th August 2013.

20 Author Interview, Judea 20th August 2013.

21 To my question ‘What does settlement mean to you?’. Author Interview, Samaria, 21st August 2016.

22 Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2016. The individual stated that they do not favour Samaria any less than Jerusalem or Gush Katif. Giving-away any part of ‘Israel’ raises concerns about other spaces.

23 Author Interview, Judea 22nd August 2016; emphasis of interviewee.

24 These were rabbis from Haredi, Sephardic, and National-Religious sectors.

25 Author Interview, Judea 21st August 2016.

26 The value of rejoicing is an esteemed tenet of Judaism.

27 Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2016; Judea 24th July 2016.

28 Author Interview Samaria 18th August 2016. The interviewee felt that soldiers should have refused orders and not partaken in “this crime.”

29 Such as scheduling community events for the following year, buying new furniture for their synagogue, and planting crops just a few months before the evacuation was scheduled to occur.

30 Emphasis added.

31 Author Interview, Judea 24th July 2016.

32 For example, the offer of compensation for Gush Katif residents before the evacuations had conditions. Residents and families therefore needed to assess how actions would impact on their future post-Disengagement, causing a number of anxieties. See for example Eiran, 2009.

33 Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.

34 The Yesha Council is the "umbrella governing organization of the Jewish communities of Judea and Samaria,” and at the time represented the Jewish communities of Gaza. The Yesha Council.

35 A large proportion of Israelis had never been to Gush Katif and as different interviewees informed me, have never been to the West Bank. For those who have, it is likely this was in the context of IDF service.

36 These included along highways, outside the Knesset, and in major cities. The anti-withdrawal camp encouraged a ‘visual resistance’ throughout Israel in other ways, such as encouraging Israelis to wear the colour orange as an act of support and solidarity with residents of Gush Katif. Klein, 2009:40.

37 An estimated 1,000 buses transported people from across Israel to the protest.

38 Emphasis added.

39 Yesha is the collective name for Judea, Samaria and Gaza

40 Protestors included from communities in Israel and settlements from Judea and Samaria

41 Tzvika Bar-Hai “told protestors that on the day the ‘disengagement’ was scheduled to begin...they should make their way to those Israeli towns closest to the Gaza Strip, by car, by bus and by foot, before then leaving en masse, to head for the numerous entrances into Gush Katif. Pratt, 2006:245.

42 Klein, 2009:43 records how, despite the evacuation date twenty-four hours away, about two-thirds of the 467-family town of Neve Dekalim remained and whilst approximately seventy families had left in the preceding weeks, more than one thousand ‘protestors’ had ‘infiltrated’ into the community.

43 Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016; emphasis of interviewee.

44 Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.

45 Rabbi Shlomo Aviner is an influential National-Religious Zionist Rabbi.

46 Author Interview, Judea 24th July 2016.
An invaluable resource for gaining an insight into the events of the evacuations and how this was responded to at the time in these spaces is through watching footage/documentaries of these events which powerfully visualise the actions and emotions on the ground.

Emphasis added.

To reinforce obedience, threats were employed against soldiers against order refusing, such as expulsion from prestigious courses, career officers fired, and objectors were threatened with jail [Eisikovitch et al., 2009:iv]. Such measures were discussed with me by settlers and former soldiers. As one Religious-Zionist settler stated: “the soldiers were forced to do this task. The mental preparation was so massive that anyone who was participating was influenced. Psychologically they prepared them that it’s a very important measure for the State of Israel. The soldier was also afraid to lose their position.” Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2016.

Emphasis added.

Arutz Sheva TV, 2011. Such interactions were forms of resistance employed by settlers and anti-Disengagement protestors against State security-forces, what I called protests-of and protests-to morality. However, we can also think of these as a resistance against the consciousness which State security forces had entered into the spaces of Gush Katif with and within. Such interactions can be thought of as efforts to ‘crack’ the shell of the mental preparation, seeking to open the forces’ eyes to another reality in the moment of the reality of the Disengagement and their engagement in this mission.

Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2016.

Quoted Bam et al., 2005:4; emphasis added.

This provided legitimacy and necessity for suspects to be held in pre-trial detention. Bam et al., 2005.

Emphasis added.

Discussed by former Gush Katif settlers in author interviews.

Author Interview, Samaria 19th August 2013.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 16th August 2016.
The individual was a teenager when the Disengagement happened.

Some also answered "I am from..." a specific settlement-community in Gush Katif, such as Ganei Tal or Neve Dekalim, rather than saying 'I am from this community in Israel/Judea or Samaria. One settler, focused on the personal impact on former residents: "there were many, many impacts. One was upon the psychology. The mental feeling was awful. They lost their work positions. It was very hard to rehabilitate their work. Many people worked in agricultures/farmers so they lost this." Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2016.

With rabbinical guidance central, having fragmented/mixed-messages compounded the event. Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.

The sense of 'betrayal' was a prominent feeling expressed to me by different interviewees. Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.

Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, Amiel, 2005.

Space does not permit a detailed examination of all of interpretations and responses but it is worth briefly exploring some which will be of particular analytical value to this thesis' analysis.

Rabbi Zvi Tau discerned that the Disengagement and the failure to stop it "was intended as a message from heaven, in order to educate and inform the religious public. Moreover, only an assertive informational campaign could nullify the edict." Inbari, 2007:710.

Such rabbis included Avraham Shapira and Dov Lior.

Beit El is a settlement-community in the central West Bank. A kippah is a religious symbol and dress worn by Jewish men. The colour orange was the symbol of anti-Disengagement protest.

The former Gush Katif settler was approximately eight years-old when the Disengagement happened. Author Interview, Judea 22nd August 2016; emphasis of interviewee.

Chapter Five: The Amona Evacuation

Introduction

In assessing the significance of the Gaza Disengagement, Chapter Four argued that it constituted a disjunctive moment for the State of Israel and was a key watershed in State-settler relations. At the time of the Disengagement, the disjunctive impact was not fully obvious. Settlers/anti-Disengagement protestors largely respected close State-settler relations and did not engage in violent confrontation/resistance against the evacuation and State forces. The focus now is to assess impacts post-Disengagement on relations and how future settlement evacuations would be responded to by some settlers. The ICG [2009:i] elucidates this landscape:

In the run-up to the 2005 Gaza withdrawal, some analysts and even a few decision-makers predicted violent clashes and hard-fought evacuations. They were mistaken. Disengagement proceeded remarkably peacefully and smoothly. But it would be wrong to veer to the other extreme and assume that what happened in Gaza will be replicated in the West Bank. There are differences in numbers, background and militancy of the respective settler populations. Plus, Gaza taught lessons to all sides, the government but also the militants. Since then, the latter have been preparing for the next round.

'The next round' came in Amona. Amona was a settlement outpost in Samaria, the north West Bank, which had been built illegally under Israeli Law. In February 2006, Israeli State security forces arrived into the space of Amona to forcibly evacuate the homes of Jewish settlers. This took place six months after the Gaza Disengagement where settlers had to confront another reality of evacuation. Yet, in the course of these six months, a dramatic shift became apparent. In this new reality of evacuation, a new reality emerged. The predominant guiding-principle which marked the nature and response to the evacuations in Gush Katif and overall Disengagement was 'with love we will win.' In Amona, this was not the case. In the Amona evacuation, violent confrontation was deployed by State forces and a number of settlers/protestors, the majority of whom were settler youth. Amona is the most (in)famous evacuation to have occurred where the levels of violence in the evacuation were unprecedented.

This chapter focuses on the Amona evacuation. Again this event and the critical questions it raises were heavily explored through fieldwork I conducted. This original data and unique insights will structure discussion and analysis. I will argue that Amona both...
emerged out of and constituted a disjunctive moment for the State of Israel and settler populations. As one interviewee pronounced, “Amona crossed a red line.” The key concern of this chapter is to critically assess how and why a dominant taboo of violence came to be broken and what this signals about some State-settler relations. The case of Amona is important for two reasons. Firstly, the dramatically different manner in which some settlers responded to the evacuation, compared to evacuations in Gush Katif, further reveals the significant impacts of the Disengagement, particularly on some State-settler relations. In Amona, the critical questions which the Disengagement generated were carried forward in further actions which the State took against spaces of Eretz Yisrael and settler communities. In the responses of some settlers to the evacuation, it was evident that something had broken in Gaza and seeds of extremism post-Gaza were germinating.

Secondly, Amona itself constituted a disjunctive moment and was another key watershed in State-settler relations. If the Disengagement had been followed by peaceful relations between the State of Israel and settler communities, we would not be talking about a narrative of disjuncture. The Disengagement would be seen as a blip in an unbreakable, sacred relationship of security. Amona signified that for some in the settler community this was not the case. Rather, this pact was disintegrating and colliding in and over settlement evacuations, and for some violently collided in Amona. The nature of the evacuation and (re)actions by some settlers revealed that pathways to new or exacerbated relations had been opened, and there was a perceived license for engaging in violent confrontation/resistance against State forces. Embodying key concepts from Chapter One, this case-study is of conceptual value to the sub-disciplines of Critical Security Studies (CSS) and Political Geography in further reflecting interactions between space and (in)security and the impacts of spatial actions. The symbolism of the evacuation also reflected new realities of confrontation/resistance in and over space and how space itself was transformed with new performativities in space.

The taboos which were broken in Amona on both sides have significant implications post-Amona, all the way to the violent episodes of Price-Tag attacks that are the focus of Chapter Six. These implications would be in new realities of violence, upon questions of (in)security, and deepening disjunctures in some State-settler relations. The image, question, and provocation of the 'torn flag of Israel,' a key symbol and provocation in Chapter Four, took on a new violent meaning in Amona. The move-to-violence is a significant break in realities and relations. I will argue this new reality operated within a provocation of thought with regards to how ‘the Jewish State of Israel’ itself is seen and related to by some settler populations.
This chapter will begin by providing an account of the ‘battle of and for Amona.’ I will assess how the evacuation again embodied the State’s governance-regime and realities that settlement exists in. Given the nature of the evacuation and (re)actions on the ground, I will position the evacuation as a ‘spectacle.’ In this spectacle, not only were two sides in confrontation- State forces and settlers/protestors-, but Amona represented struggles between ‘the State of Israel’ and ‘the Land of Israel’ and between differing agendas in space which this thesis has traced. The struggle and spectacle of violence therefore had deeper ideological and political dimensions and again brought relations to the fore. Observing the nature of the ‘evacuation,’ I will then assess why Amona constituted a disjunctive moment for the State of Israel and some settlers. With evacuation a site of confrontation, I will next assess perceptions of ‘evacuation’ itself. Perceptions of different interviewees concerning the language of evacuation offer an original contribution in literature.

Moving from these perceptions, I will return to the Amona evacuation. In asking why we saw such different (re)actions on the part of some of those present compared with the Disengagement, four explanations will be discussed: a psychological reaction; a practical-strategic response; a political-ethical response; and, a religious-ideological response. The chapter will end by assessing the significance of the open emergence of more critical and anti-State perceptions of the Jewish State of Israel. Such perceptions not only take issue with the (in)security of this State but reveal how the State is (re)interpreted metaphysically, ideologically, and politically. Such perceptions and relations are central to the narrative of disjuncture and violent confrontations I am tracing.

The Battle of and for Amona

Amona was an unauthorised settlement-outpost, constructed illegally under Israeli Law (see Chapter Three for discussion of outposts). The outpost was built in 1995 on a hill overlooking the settlement of Ofra, 15.1 kilometers east of the State of Israel's
internationally-recognised sovereign territorial borders. Amona was founded by a group of religious settlers from Ofra. The name of a community provides an insight into its nature and imaginaries invested in the space of construction. 'Amona' derives from the Book of Joshua 18:24 where Kfar HaAmmonai- 'Village of the Ammonites' - is. The Ammonites were an ancient nation in the Old Testament. In 2006, the outpost was home to approximately fourteen families. On the 1st February 2006, State forces arrived in the space of Amona to implement evacuation-orders on nine of the outpost's permanent-constructed homes. The case of Amona is the story of a battle on different levels.

The 2006 Amona evacuation was an outcome of a long-fought legal battle between Amona's residents, and their representatives, and the Israeli High Court (petitioned by an Israeli peace organisation supporting Palestinian claimants). Ruled to be built on private Palestinian land by the High Court, a ruling which Amona's residents contested, in October 2004 Israel's Civil Administration issued demolition-orders for nine of the outpost's homes. In July 2005, the Israeli rights group Peace Now petitioned the High Court charging authorities with failing to implement 'stop-work-orders' at the site and implementing the issued demolition-orders [Peace Now, 2006]. On the 4th August 2005, the State affirmed that these would be implemented following the Gaza Disengagement's completion. At the beginning of January 2006, settlers "began a series of stalling tactics in court" seeking to repeal the ruling [Peace Now, 2006].

In an act of assertion, the High Court of Justice (HCJ) declared that the evacuation decision stood as the Civil Administration, an institution of the State of Israel, had proclaimed its intent to demolish the structures. Critics may charge that in cases of evacuation, such as Amona, it may not be the will of governments for evacuations to occur. Furthermore, as Chapter Three discussed, many outposts exist in a climate which enables their existence in space, through overt or covert support, despite their illegal status under Israeli Law.

Map 5a has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
However, the case of Amona reflected the legal and political reality settlements exist in under the State's governance-regime and sovereignty. This reality is key to our analysis as it impacts on questions of rights, sovereignty and existence in space. Such cases also reveal tensions in the relationship between the Land of Israel and the State of Israel, and demonstrates the operationality of ‘the Jewish State of Israel.’ Then-Police Commissioner Moshe Karadi positioned the Amona evacuation as a test-case for Israel’s democracy and rule of law, expressing that it is unthinkable that the systems in charge of implementing a judicial ruling will not succeed in executing it. That would be a black stain on the rule of law and on Israel as a democratic state [quoted Shalom, 2016].

In rejecting a final petition submitted by settlers on the 29th January 2006 against the evacuation, the Court openly rebuked the behaviour of certain settlers and how settlers/supporters planned to (re)act if the Court's decision was not in their favour. Justice Michael Cheshin voiced: "I visited the Amona website, and it turns out that people are calling for violent resistance if the petition is rejected." He criticised the contempt shown against the Court:

the court is not a grocery store and the petitioners must bow their heads and accept the verdict. To say that they will engage in a violent battle if the verdict goes against them constitutes contempt of court [quoted APN, 2006].

Cheshin also criticised the contempt shown to the State of Israel itself, stating that "these calls are not against the British occupier, but against the elected authorities of the State of Israel" [quoted Peace Now, 2006]. In the legal battle played-out inside the Court over the fate of the nine outpost homes, inside an institution and theatre of State sovereignty and symbol of the Jewish State’s democracy, Amona’s residents had lost their legal license to reside in this space. As subjects of the State, settlers were reminded that they were subject-to the State's sovereignty and law. It would be in the evacuation of the structures where the force of the State's sovereignty and governance-regime would again be exerted over space, subjects and practices.

With the fate of Amona sealed legalistically, the key question is how would settlers respond to the ruling? In the battle of and for Amona, we move from a battle inside the courts to a battle on the ground, a physical encounter and confrontation. On the 1st February 2006, approximately 10,000 security forces, comprised of Israeli Police, Border Police, and IDF soldiers, ascended upon the small space of Amona to facilitate the State-
ordered evacuation. Upon ascending into this space, they were met with approximately 4,000 settlers and supporters, the majority settler youth, who had pre-emptively arrived in Amona and made preparations for the evacuation event. One settler also discussed that other settlers tried to enter Amona but were prevented by State forces. In the act of evacuation, Jewish settlers again would be physically removed from space by State forces, and settlement homes reduced to rubble. While this spectacle of violence and power had been enacted in the evacuations in Gush Katif a few months earlier, in “the great drama that took place in the [Amona] outpost” [Shalom, 2016], this evacuation was a spectacle of a different order.

**Image 5b has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.** Image is of the Amona evacuation at the time of the evacuation.

**Image 5c has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.** Image is of the Amona evacuation at the time of the evacuation.

These images are not the exception but characterise the Amona evacuation.³ The (re)actions and the nature of the evacuation reveal that Amona was dramatically different compared to the scenes which characterised the evacuations in Gaza and how the Disengagement unfolded. The contested space of Amona became the theatre of a new
violent confrontation between settlers and State forces. David E. Apter's work on violence is of value. He notes [1997:4] that when

people do try to take control, and by means of interpretive action, then the iconography of violence, the choreography of confrontational events, the planning of actions based on interpretation and interpretations deriving from actions become a purpose.

The more concerted choreography and clear iconography of violence marked the Amona evacuation as a confrontational event of a different kind. What, then, was the ‘purpose’ of the confrontation? The evacuation was an encounter when two sets of actors clashed with and resisted against the other in a battle in and for space. Emerging out of a disjunctive moment, the Disengagement’s reality, and unfolding reality of another evacuation, had to be interpreted. The evacuation constituted a new struggle where actors were acting on different mandates. State forces were obeying orders from the State. Settlers and protestors were defending perceived rights to this space and security agendas, and resisting against the eviction of a settlement-community in space seen as the historic Land of Israel and what this represents. As a physical confrontation, actors sought to control actions in space and the way the evacuation unfolded.4 Understanding the evacuation as a spectacle is of conceptual value to Political Geography. It shows how space itself is weaponised by different actors who seek to control space and spatial actions.

It is also of conceptual value to Political Geography in signifying space and performativity. The (re)actions and evacuation’s nature reveal a dramatic shift had occurred from the Disengagement. Amona also constituted a spectacle in signifying taboos had been broken on both sides. As Chapter Four discussed, the Gush Katif evacuations were met with overwhelming non-violent resistance. State forces were largely confronted with songs and appeals by settlers/protestors. Some residents refused to leave their homes and barricaded themselves inside. They were brought/carried-out of their homes by forces as acts of passive resistance and as a religious, political-ideological, and ethical standpoint. There were also efforts to block forces entering.5 Yet, protest/resistance by settlers was overwhelmingly passive. The large taboo of violence, consciousness of seeking to avoid a civil war, and the dominance of the Mamlucht position, a pro-State ideology which sees the State of Israel as sacred and an unfolding-process-of-redemption is occurring within the State, were all overriding concerns, serving to boundarise responses.

Whilst non-violence resistance largely defined (re)actions to the event of Disengagement and violence/violent confrontation/resistance remained a large taboo, some did take a
more confrontational position against State forces. The spaces of Gaza were declared a 'Closed Military Zone' with concern that 'right-wing extremists,' predominantly from Judea and Samaria settlements, would enter to reinforce resistance [Pratt, 2006:246]. There was presence of more 'extremist' actors on the fringes, such as in the community of Kfar Darom, and criticisms were voiced of leaders who made decisions of non-violence/confrontation. On the part of State forces, whilst they implemented the evacuations with resoluteness, some describing as "robotic obedience" [Eisikovitch et al., 2008], there were signs of sensitive interactions with settlers. The Amona evacuation was markedly different for both sides. I will briefly assess key details of how the evacuation practically unfolded to recognise differences. One news-report disclosed that the day prior to the evacuation,

security forces will form three circles around the site designated for evacuation following the disengagement model. The evacuating forces are equipped with clubs, water hoses and other crowd-dispersing equipment such as tear gas [Weiss, 2006a].

Leading-up to the evacuation, protest/resistance was externalised around Amona and internalised in spaces of the outpost. Protestors blocked the main road running past Ofra/Amona, causing traffic disruption. Inside the outpost, settlers/protestors positioned themselves on rooftops where "barbwire fences have been prepared in advance" [Weiss, 2006a], therefore fortifying spaces. The evacuation was undertaken in stages. State forces headed towards Amona at 3:00am. At the outpost's entrance, they "were greeted with a barrage of rocks, oil, paint, and water" [Weiss, 2006b]. Meir Bokovza, who was tasked with commanding the evacuation operation, stated "it was a planned ambush" [quoted Shalom, 2016]. Bokovza further recounts the violence which security forces were greeted with.

One police horse was stabbed and there were policemen whose helmets' protective glasses were smashed by stones. Commander Gideon Mor...was hit by a stone that infiltrated his helmet and broke his nose...it was the preview of the violence we encountered at the outpost five hours later [quoted Shalom, 2016].

After the last-minute legal appeal was rejected, and the temporary injunction issued by the HCJ against the evacuation was lifted, forces proceeded with the evacuation at 10am. Immediately following the court decision, thousands of youths in Amona were instructed to barricade themselves inside houses and on the roofs. Thousands of
settlers formed human-chains around the structures, as sirens continued blaring. Meanwhile, forces started heading into Amona [Weiss, 2006b].

Club-wielding police and many on horseback are symbolic of the evacuation.

**Image 5d has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.**

By noon, a bulldozer had razed the first structure. "The evacuation degenerated into a violent confrontation between thousands of settlers and thousands of soldiers and police officers" [Weiss, 2006b]. The sense that Amona's evacuation was of a different nature, and the symbolism that a battle was taking place, was marked by the burning of tires, covering Amona in smoke. Space was therefore transformed physically and symbolically. The level of violence was captured in one news-report from the time [Greenberg, 2006]:

police in riot gear, some of them on horseback, came under a hail of rocks as they drove back crowds gathered around the nine houses and then broke through shutters and windows to remove people inside. When officers climbed ladders to reach protesters on roofs ringed with barbed wire, they were hit with paint, eggs, sand and mud. Settlers used long poles to drive the police back and burned tires, sending up thick plumes of black smoke. Dousing the protesters with water cannon and riding a bulldozer shovel to the roofs, club-swinging officers forced holdouts into the shovel to bring them down.

By early afternoon, as the evacuation was drawing to an end, 200 people reportedly sustained injuries [Weiss, 2006b]. Acting Prime-Minister Olmert praised security forces "who are carrying out the most difficult mission using admirable restraint and determination, in the face of this unprecedented offensive" [quoted Weiss, 2006b].

*An 'Unprecedented' Event: Amona as a Disjunctive Moment*
Capturing the significance of the Amona evacuation, Oded Shalom [2016] writes that “everyone who was present at Amona that day *spoke about a war*, and all because of nine homes which the HCJ had ordered the demolition of.” Such assessment is meaningful. Amona is characterised not as an ‘evacuation’ but a ‘war.’ It testifies to the significance of the confrontation between settlers and State forces and alludes to the nature of this confrontation as a violent spectacle. Writing that this war was ‘all because of nine homes’ indicates the importance of these homes to generate such a ‘war.’ Responses to the evacuation further emphasise the significance and force of this space, bringing contribution to the field of Political Geography. The spectacle encapsulates how space is not merely a theatre on which conflict occurs but space is integral in struggles and conflict (Chapter One). The struggle also suggests that the ‘orders of demolition’ represented and embodied greater dynamics and these greater dynamics were in contention within this ‘war.’ This will be discussed further in accounting for the violent confrontation/resistance.

When asked about the Amona evacuation, all interviewees stated that the evacuation constituted a critical and “symbolic” event. The evacuation was also deemed to constitute a “turning-point” in State-settler relations. Furthermore, a number of interviewees initiated an emphasis on the difference between the scenes/responses in Gaza with Amona, further attesting to Amona’s significance. For example, regarding the nature of the evacuation and violence, “this is one of the big differences between Amona and Gush Katif.” When I asked a former Gush Katif settler that some people say that those present in Gush Katif should have taken a more confrontational stance, even violence against evacuating soldiers, their immediate response was “here we speak of Amona.” Another former Gush Katif settler stated that “unlike Gush Katif, in Amona they fought. It was not a gentle expulsion.” After recognising the nature of the Amona evacuation as a spectacle of violence, I argue that the evacuation constituted a disjunctive moment for the State of Israel, assessed first, and a disjunctive moment for settlers, assessed second.

One Israeli security analyst professed to me that the Amona evacuation “was a necessary step. The Israeli government had to choose between law and anarchy. In this case the government chose law.” Despite the evacuation being an outcome of a legal ruling and not a diplomatic or political initiative, this action taken by the State was again meaningful and impactful for settler communities. Taking place in a space of the biblical heartland of Samaria, the Jewish democratic State again revoked the license of settlers to live in a space seen as the historic Jewish homeland, and therefore violated these perceived rights. The evacuation again involved the destruction of Jewish homes by State security forces and further revealed the precariousness of settlement existence. Crucially,
such act again struck at National-Religious communities, and other settler communities, and the historic close relationship with the State of Israel.

One Yesha Council member significantly positioned the evacuation as a “battle” greater than the homes: “this is not just a battle for our home; It is a battle for religious Zionism as a whole” [quoted Weiss, 2006a]. Again space and settlement homes embody ideological and security dimensions. With its practices, the State again infringed on this relationship on different levels, generating further feelings of betrayal. Amotz Eyal, an IDF soldier whose brother from the Psagot settlement was seriously injured in the Amona evacuation, declared that “I give my all to this country, and then it comes and spits in my face” [quoted Fendel, 2006]. The day after the evacuation, the following headline appeared on the settler-affiliated Israeli news-site Arutz Sheva:

‘Hundreds Injured in Brutal Demolition of Nine Jewish Homes: Hundreds of activists were injured- some seriously- as police forces violently stormed the hilltop community of Amona and demolished nine homes.’

Post-evacuation, a number of teenagers present testified about their treatment. Such testimonies document strong levels of violence by State forces, accounts of experiences and how individuals saw the event. "The police came with the purpose of killing," Amotz Eyal stated after his brother Yechiam Eyal purportedly lost consciousness in the violence in the evacuation [quoted Fendel, 2006]. As well as personal injuries settlers/protestors endured, the overall approach with which State forces implemented the evacuation was markedly different to evacuations in Gush Katif. The Disengagement’s dictum was ‘with sensitivity and determination.’ In Amona this was replaced with much more forceful and violent actions by State forces. It is this reality of violence, and its significance, which numerous settlers spoke about and emphasised in interviews. Interviewees not only reiterated that such actions by State forces against settlers were unprecedented. They significantly pronounced that in Amona a line was crossed by State forces.

One settler stated that “for whatever reason, the police came in there more violently. There was a lot of violence. That is unacceptable.” One settler who was present in the Gush Katif evacuations and Amona reflected that Amona “was much more brutal than Gush Katif. It was a real battle there. The forces behaved in a much more brutalistic way.” One settler characterised Amona as “very, very over-violent,” adding “the violence there was disproportionate” and “Amona was very, very ugly.” Another settler present in Amona declared that “I think they crossed red lines. They were very brutal. They beat people with the horses. I saw the brutality, it was not nice.” Asked why they thought there was this
'brutality,' they answered that “they got commands to fulfil the mission at any price. Completely to do it as fast as possible...not to be mentally planned.”16 This perception reflects that State forces had overcome taboos which may have been in place pre-Disengagement. Again this signifies how the Disengagement was a disjunctive moment for the State and new realities were in place post-Disengagement.

One Gush Katif settler, a Religious Zionist, had moved to a Samaria settlement following the Gaza Disengagement. For them strengthening national unity and maintaining commitment to the State and Mamlucht ideology were greatly important. For them, what happened in Amona is very difficult and painful. They declared that "Amona was a red line." Recounting “the brutality of State forces,” they stated that “Amona is such an open-wound for the Religious-Zionist community.”17 Such statement demonstrates how the evacuation was deemed an assault on the National-Religious sector and left painful injury on this community. Another National-Religious settler also critiqued the evacuation and State forces’ conduct pronouncing that “there are unwritten rules in expulsions. You don’t knock people to the ground. We’re Zionist. It was unethical.”18

The individual not only characterised the ‘expulsion’ as unethical but highlighted who the violent and 'unethical' actions were against- “we're Zionist.” This signals another significance of Amona. Such actions and conduct were against an historic pact between National-Religious Zionists and the State of Israel. Furthermore, the dramatic shift in how State forces undertook an order of evacuation, overcoming ‘unwritten rules’ where a number of interviewees emphasised the ‘over-violent’ nature, signifies that the Amona evacuation constituted another disjunctive moment. With Amona ‘crossing red lines’ and ‘such an open-wound,’ this would be impactful in future State-settler relations and in the widening of disjunctures (Chapter Six). Such acts by the State are also important in accounting for future acts of confrontation/resistance against evacuations, and the perceived license for this on the part of some settlers, which I will discuss forthcoming.

The Amona evacuation also constituted a disjunctive moment for some settlers. It is important to make clear that a large proportion of settlers/protestors in Amona did not engage in violence. Right-wing MKs were also present protesting the evacuation.19 One settler stressed to me that "for the leaders of the National-Religious Zionist Movement, there was a huge attempt to keep peace. Keep it as clean as possible.”20 Settler representative Hanan Porat stated that "we're saying no to violence, no to hurling stones at any price" [quoted Weiss, 2006b]. Amona’s leaders and rabbis present also continued to advocate non-violence. As one settler present reflected:
the community’s secretary tried to calm the young people. All the time they shouted in the speaker not to harm the soldiers and to just passively resist. I think most sat down...some threw objects.\textsuperscript{21}

However, violence did erupt on the part of some settlers. “Asked about the police’s early evaluation of the expected level of violence,” Police Commissioner Moshe Karadi stated:

the general atmosphere was filled with determination to oppose the expected evacuation. We estimated that there would be resistance, even violent resistance, but I must admit...\textit{we did not anticipate the intensity of the violence} [quoted Shalom, 2016].\textsuperscript{22}

The early evaluation or anticipation of how the evacuation would be responded to by settlers did not match the reality. The reality and “intensity” of violence on the part of some settlers/protestors present in the Amona evacuation, warrants further investigation. It was clear that, for some, the taboo of engaging in any violent-confrontation/resistance against State forces, which was dominant in the Disengagement, had been broken. There was not only a move-to-violence but, as Bokovza states, “violence at a very high level” [quoted Shalom, 2016]. In the battle of and for Amona, approximately eighty State forces were also injured in a “violent confrontation following three and a half hours of \textit{unprecedented clashes with settlers}” [Weiss, 2006b].\textsuperscript{23} This remark on the ‘high level’ of violence can be interpreted as not just the high numbers of injuries sustained but how the evacuation itself is characterised as a violent confrontation.

The violent confrontation/resistance on the part of some meant that Amona constituted a disjunctive moment for settlers. If State forces had moved beyond the dictum which characterised the Disengagement, some settlers had moved beyond the dictum which characterised the leading ideology of the Disengagement - ‘with love we will win.’ They also had moved beyond the moral and political lines dominantly in place in the Disengagement regarding the acceptability and legitimacy of action i.e. deploying violent confrontation/resistance against State forces was illegitimate, dangerous, and taboo. With a number of settlers/protestors in Amona, predominantly settler youth, not abiding by the calls of the mainstream settler leadership and rabbis of engaging only in non-violent protest/resistance, this also signified a weakening of such authority and generational divisions. The overcoming of these taboos and traditional authorities which Amona signified will be of further importance in Chapter Six. The violence which forces faced in Amona is further reflected by Bokovza:
I had been in many riots during my service in the police...this was the most difficult event I had ever experienced. Taking stones, actual rocks, and throwing them at the police at point-blank range is violence at a very high level. I saw Perspex riot shields being shattered...a Perspex riot shield is extremely durable. It doesn’t break by just being hit [quoted Shalom, 2016].

The levels of violence deployed by settlers was also deemed unprecedented. The unprecedented acts of violence and injuries which State forces sustained within the evacuation prompted then-Prime-Minister Olmert to publicly condemn the conduct and violence from settlers:

this is a phenomenon that cannot continue or be accepted. When bricks are thrown at the heads of soldiers and police officers a line has clearly been crossed...this is reaching a scope we haven’t seen before. This was an organized activity in the part of the settlers for political ends...the State of Israel will not tolerate it [quoted Weiss, 2006b].

Understanding this new reality of violence, and how some individuals justified this, in response to the State’s evacuation of Jewish settlement homes is crucial. Before I discuss explanations for how such violence in Amona can be accounted for, it is important that I assess perceptions of ‘evacuation’ more generally. In centring this discussion upon the viewpoints of different actors I spoke with, such assessments provide a novel contribution to literature on settlement and State-settler relations. Acts of evacuation by the State of Israel are at the centre of conflicts and confrontations which have emerged and deepened between the State and some settler populations. Perceptions on the act reveal important ideological and political divergences. This continues critical discussions from Chapters Two, Three and Four regarding the meaning of State (re)creation, relations between ‘the State of Israel’ and ‘the Land of Israel,’ and questions of rights and (in)security. These perceptions also provide the grounding for accounting for different (re)actions to settlement evacuations and disjunctures in some relations.

**Perceptions on ‘Evacuation’**

The language deployed to name the act of removing individuals out of a particular building in a particular space, and removing structures from space is political, articulating a political position. When reports of such acts are written in most mainstream media or spoken about by officials or analysts, the most dominant word employed is ‘evacuation.’ Headlines such as ‘violent confrontations erupt as outpost evacuated,’ or ‘Amona
evacuated; hundreds hurt,' stimulated a political intrigue. Namely, if settlers are being 'evacuated,' why is this met with resistance? Why do 'evacuations' witness and entail 'violent confrontations' and injuries? Why is an act, commonly associated as an act of security, accompanied with violence and insecurity? In speaking with diverse actors, I asked did they think if 'evacuation' or 'disengagement' are accurate words. Responses uncovered divergent perceptions on such acts and the language they are held within. The response of one Israeli rabbi vindicated the importance of this questioning:

I always start with that. If I want to demonstrate the importance of names, titles, I always start with that. Giving a name is giving a political opinion. Every word you choose actually demonstrates exactly what that person thinks and feels.26

Another settler also asserted the importance of such language: "people are very fixed. In Israeli society, it is important what term you are using. What they feel. What their views are."27 In interviews, some security analysts and State actors, such as military individuals, thought that this question was not an important issue, which is significant in itself. As one interviewee remarked, "the removal of people is evacuation." Or, whilst they answered that 'evacuation' "is an appropriate word for the act," a more 'positive' word should be used. Such words interviewees voiced included "resettlement"; "absorbing"; "relocation." As one interviewee answered: "I think it is a correct word for the activity, but I prefer to call it resettlement, or absorbing the settlers inside the State of Israel, inside the Green Line."28 For all security analysts and State actors, 'evacuation' is a positive and 'necessary' action, both for settlers and especially for the security of the State of Israel. As one security analyst voiced: "this is the necessary step to take if you want to maintain Israel as a Jewish State and a democracy."29 An insightful perspective concerning this question came from a former military figure who held governance-positions:

no, it's not a good work to use evacuation. It's something which we have to deal with to respect them, to love them, to adopt them, not to treat them as an enemy; to build the infrastructures for their move, relocation, something's that more calm...to bring them in a very respectful and proper way like our brothers.30

Importantly, this individual acknowledged that the perspective and act of 'evacuation' is seen very differently by many settlers. As they stated, "they call it very strong words like 'throwing,' 'kicking,' 'demolishing,' 'destroying'...we have to find a word for evacuation. Words have power. Words have meaning and power." Also insightfully, some interviewees themselves initiated a correction of my use of the word 'evacuation.' One
settler stated “you mean, the uprooting.” One former Gush Katif settler declared: “I don’t call it ‘the Disengagement’ but the expulsion.” One settler also meaningfully responded:

I do not use this word (evacuation). This is not a natural phrase for me. When I hear the word ‘evacuated,’ it is that someone wants of needs to be evacuated. You evacuate someone from a flood. You don’t evacuate someone from a house that he wants to continue living in. The words I use in Hebrew translate to banishment and uprooting. ‘Evacuation’ is inaccurate.  

Most settlers stated that the term ‘evacuation’ is not at all appropriate. More ‘appropriate’ words they provided included “uprooting”; "expulsion"; "crime"; "banishment"; "destruction." One National-Zionist ‘Land of Israel activist’ and settler pronounced:

I use the word expulsion. What other word would you use to describe a government that uproots its own citizens from areas that always belonged to us and expel them? One has to use very strong language to express the crime behind it and the terrible thing.

A number of settlers discussed that the use of the term ‘evacuation’ has been carefully and strategically chosen by the State for political means. As one settler voiced: “‘evacuation’ is used to make it seem nicer, look nicer. The word evacuation is like to save them. In my own life, I use expel.”  

In asking one former Gush Katif settler why they call it ‘expulsion’ and not ‘the Disengagement,’ important perceptions were revealed:

‘Disengagement’ is a very politically-correct word. It is like covering the truth. They are throwing people out of their homes. The name Disengagement wasn’t named by the settlers but by the government. They tried to make it as clean as possible. Also, how can you disengage from something that belongs to you?

In asking the individual, now a settler in Samaria, if ‘the evacuation of Amona’ is an accurate term, they stated: “no, this word is inaccurate as well. In Hebrew I use the word ‘tearing from place’ (achira), like removing from an amputee.” The politicisation and deployment of language to ‘make the act look clean’ was expressed a variety of times by different settlers. With such a politically- and religiously-sensitive topic, and seeking to gain deeper understanding of why some settler populations are conflicting with the State, interviews offered important insights into State-settler relations and spatial practices and politics. Whilst ‘evacuation’ connects with the State’s governance-regime, perceptions from settlers on the act of ‘evacuation’ closely connect with relationships with the Land of Israel, and perceived rights they have to this Land. Acts of ‘demolition’ and ‘expulsion’
violate this relationship and rights. It is not the will of 'settlers' to be 'evacuated.' Rather, acts of 'evacuation' are acts of insecurity on different levels.

Assessing divergent perceptions regarding the act and language of 'evacuation,' the first such analysis of its kind to my knowledge, brings novel conceptual contribution to Political Geography and CSS. 'Evacuation' is the language of both security and insecurity. My analysis demonstrates the importance of language and how different subjects locate (in)security differently. Furthermore, it shows the political economy within acts where actions taken in the name of security and governance constitute insecurity for others. It reflects how spatial acts mean (in)security to different subjects who have different relations with space. It also displays how spatial practices can be used by the State against subjects and how acts of political geography threaten space and security agendas, as well as undermining perceived rights. Bringing viewpoints from different actors to the fore brings originality in exposing the impacts of key concepts discussed in Chapter One.

On perceptions of 'evacuation,' the strongest language deployed came from Hilltop Youth individuals I spoke with, whose significance in State-settler relations will be discussed in Chapter Six. As one Hilltop Youth individual declared: "it's expulsion. In the galut they called it 'pogrom.'"36 This was not the first time such language has been expressed in the State's evacuation of Jewish settlers. In being carried out of their home by State forces in the Disengagement, one settler declared: "I feel that today was a pogrom" [quoted Erlanger, 2005]. The use of the word 'pogrom' to describe the State's acts of evacuation is loaded on a number of levels. Pogroms were a symbol and action of insecurity which Jews suffered in the galut.37 For the Proto-Zionist Leo Pinsker [1887], the galut was an "unnatural state and existence." As highlighted in Chapter Two, Political Zionist ideology is centred upon securing Jewish security and liberty by (re)establishing a sovereign Jewish State in the 'ancient homeland.' The use of the word 'pogrom' to describe actions which Jewish settlers face from their own Jewish State, in their 'ancient homeland' after they have 'overcome' the galut, is politically and metaphysically significant. It reflects how spatial practices are associated with insecurity. Furthermore, this perception of 'pogrom' raises critical questions of (in)security regarding the State itself.

Such perceptions themselves are viewed with disdain for many. In asking one National-Religious rabbi about some individual's use of the word 'expulsion,' they declared: "I do not like the word expulsion. I will not use the word expulsion. It is an offensive word. It takes us back to our past. It alienates."38 For others, such words are deemed appropriate, reflecting significant divisions in perspectives and acceptability. Uncovering viewpoints,
it is clear that 'evacuation' is a deep source of division. If there is conflict happening in and over space, there is conflict in and over the language which different subjects hold. All individuals stated that words have power. The act and politics of 'evacuation' is different than the act and politics of 'demolition' or 'expulsion.' Such acts by the State also bring the practices of the Jewish State into question. All settlers I interviewed were critical of the State's actions taken against settlement-communities and settler populations, with different degrees of criticism. However, perceptions and actions are very different things.

In responding to acts of evacuation, the majority of settlers do not advocate nor partake in violent confrontation/resistance against the State. Furthermore, not all Gush Katif 'evacuees' nor Amona residents legitimised violent confrontation/resistance against State forces, nor actively engaged in such acts. As my interviews uncovered, the large rejection of violence in the Disengagement, in Amona, and in future evacuations is for a number of reasons. In asking one former Gush Katif settler what they thought about those who did fight in Amona, they answered that "the evacuation was happening and no one could stop it. And a war will not stop it." Another Gush Katif settler was also critical of individuals who engage in more confrontational approaches to resist evacuation: "this might be a way for people to take out their frustration but technically it has no effect. We have a strong army. If they want to expel, they will expel at the end of the day."39 Such responses reflect a practical look at realities and how this effects (re)actions. One former Gush Katif settler advocated a different approach to resist 'expulsion' and to stop future 'expulsions':

firstly, we need to get closer to the people of Israel, talk to them and convince them why the Land of Israel is so important. Gush Katif was too far from the people. They did not hear what the people wanted them to hear. Now we need to go out and tell them why we are fighting expulsion (gerush).40

This approach was and continues to be advocated by the National-Religious settler-mainstream where national unity is a central tenet within National-Religious Zionism. However, deeper concerns and criticisms were also voiced regarding engagement in violent confrontation/resistance against the State and State forces. In asking one religious settler if they think that the violent (re)action in Amona undertaken by some settlers is appropriate, they answered: "I think it is wrong to turn against each other."41 One former Gush Katif settler expressed a significant concern regarding what happened in Amona: "a war creates hatred."42 Crucially, when it comes to responding to acts of evacuation and the perceived appropriateness and license for actions, the taboo of deploying/engaging in
any violent confrontation/resistance remains in place for many. As one settler declared: "I will not fight moving from my home. Violence against the State is wrong."43

The key concern now is to assess why some settlers in Amona did ‘cross a line’ and engage in unprecedented violence. This is a crucial analysis for two reasons. Firstly, engagement in violence, and perceived legitimisation for this, signifies how Amona constituted a disjunctive moment in overcoming taboos and acting on new pathways. Secondly, the violent confrontation/resistance in Amona would have significant implications in some State-settler relations post-Amona.

**Accounting for Violent Confrontation/Resistance in Amona**

In my interviews I posed the following question: ‘Why do you think we saw different scenes in Amona compared with Gush Katif?’ Based on the data I collected through my interviews, I will provide four explanations to account for the violent confrontation/resistance by some settlers: a psychological reaction; a practical-political response; a political-ethical response; a religious-ideological response. Whilst assessments are divided into four explanations, there are overlaps.

Firstly, violent confrontation/resistance was a psychological reaction. For some, the psychological impact of the Disengagement was pronounced and this psychological impact was enacted in the Amona confrontation. Settler representative Hanan Porat captured this when he stated that “the wounds of Gush Katif are still bleeding” [quoted Weiss, 2006b]. Furthermore, the Amona evacuation constituted another ‘trauma’ that settlers endured. As one settler present in the evacuation stated, “it was in a different context but the [temporal] proximity to Gush Katif served to enhance the impacts, enhance the trauma.”44 Another individual discussed how what settlers had experienced in the Disengagement ‘overflowed’ in Amona:

in Amona, there was an overflowing of anger, of frustration, of pain that was directed at Gush Katif, and the failure of Gush Katif, directed at the Israeli government, Israeli army, and the people of Israel...the feeling they just don’t get it. Don’t see what’s going on.45

This psychological impact from the Gush Katif evacuations and Gaza Disengagement as a whole is important. In this impact, there is recognition that a disjunctive moment had occurred in the Disengagement which may not have been made obvious at the time of the Disengagement. In the aftermath of the evacuations in Gush Katif, the disjunctive impact was felt and the dots where joined, and overflowed in a new evacuation. The psychological
(re)action in Amona of the move-to violent confrontation/resistance by some can also be perceived as avenging Gush Katif. One settler declared that "Amona showed the bitterness of Gaza." One former Gush Katif settler stated that “in Amona they took out their anger and what they thought about the soldiers.” Furthermore, “the fury, the frustration, the resent and even the hatred poured out in Amona, and it poured out on a number of other occasions.” Violent confrontation/resistance was therefore enacted out of cumulative resentment and a means to express feelings and emotions in the context of another evacuation and what this entailed. Given the force of such emotions, this further revealed how the Disengagement constituted a disjunctive moment to have such impact.

As well as this psychological landscape in which the Amona evacuation operated, the ideological landscape of settlement-communities in Judea and Samaria was also explained as important for accounting for responses. As one interviewee discussed, “it is the ideological differences which you need to understand to understand the different reactions.” Whilst settlement-communities in Gush Katif and Judea and Samaria were/are home to Religious-Zionist communities, they are “different sociologically and ideologically.” Explaining this, they expanded:

the hilltops of Route 60...are the ideological elite. Gush Katif was non-elitists. The atmosphere was very different. It was a place of agriculture not Jewish learning. Furthermore, Judea and Samaria is home much more to the religious Right.

With a settlement ‘evacuation’ occurring in the biblical heartland of Samaria, for many this was unacceptable and expressed through more confrontational (re)actions in Amona.

Secondly, violent confrontation/resistance can be explained as a political-practical response. Olmert declared that the violence of settlers was not a sporadic phenomenon which emerged ‘organically’ or unexpectedly on the ground. Rather, he claimed that “this was an organized activity in the part of the settlers for political ends” [quoted Weiss, 2006]. Settlers and rabbis I spoke with explained that, for some settlers, the battle in and for Amona was intentionally more confrontational i.e. ready for a fight and ready to fight. Deploying violence/violent-resistance was a strategic or practical-political shift. After having faced the reality of evacuation from communities and space six months previously, settlers had to face the reality of another evacuation. Furthermore, in 2003 Prime-Minister Ariel Sharon [2003] had publicly announced that all outposts would face the same fate in the future: “the unauthorized outposts will be dismantled. Period.” Confronting such realities, lessons had been learnt from the Disengagement. For some, they were willing to act upon lessons in the Amona evacuation.
Speaking days after the Amona evacuation, then-Shin Bet Chief Yuval Diskin assessed the motivations of violent confrontation/resistance by some settlers in Amona. He stated that “the main motivation of the people was to repair the shame of Gush Katif and to instill a message: ‘we will not win with love, but with struggle and war’” [quoted Sofer, 2006]. Diskin also importantly noted that the mainstream settler leadership had no influence on such “extremists” [Sofer, 2006]. As well as Amona being used as an opportunity for ‘redemption,’ i.e. “to repair the shame of Gush Katif,” Amona was symbolically important. The confrontation was a political opportunity to send a message to the Israeli State that a political-practical, or strategic, shift had occurred in responding to ‘evacuations.’ As one settler similarly discussed with me:

one slogan in Gush Katif was ‘we will achieve victory with love.’ I mean without violence. This slogan was wrong. We loved and didn’t achieve victory. So, what are the conclusions? Some, or many, of our children said ‘ok if not with love, with hatred, and with violence because love appeared as a failure, the wrong thing to do. So let’s use violence and this time we will show the government first, we are not kids anymore, and second, the price of destroying settlements is so high that it’s not worth it.’ And then the explosion appeared.

The move-to-violence/violent resistance by some settlers can therefore be seen as a responsive (re)action to the perceived failure of the response predominantly adopted in the Disengagement. Following the ‘success’ of the Gush Katif evacuations, a number in the settler movement came to a realisation that engagement in non-violence does not ‘pay.’ The respect for and commitment to passive-resistance and non-violence apparently came to nothing when homes and communities were reduced to rubble by State forces, and the existence of more homes/communities were being threatened. Some settlers felt they had been ‘pushed’ into the path of violence due to the State’s actions. As Boaz Haetzni stated: “we don’t like extremism, but when the situation is extreme, a moderate response is madness.” ‘Reality’ therefore has to match ‘reality,’ practically (re)shaping (re)action. Yet this move-to violent confrontation/resistance was inescapably political and disjunctive because it broke a dominant taboo, and opened new pathways to other, even more radical and violent actions, the focus of Chapter Six.

The Amona evacuation also represented a generational division in the settler community. As interviewees discussed, the majority of those settlers present in Amona were settler youth/young adults, and it was they who engaged in violent confrontation/resistance. After the Disengagement, we see disenchantment with the approach taken and instructed
by mainstream community leaders, particularly the Yesha Council, and also a number of National-Religious rabbis. "After Gaza, the non-violent approach of their traditional leadership...for the settler cause was rejected by many settlers, especially the younger generation" [UNESCO Chair, 2012]. As one settler voiced: "in Gaza our leaders favored non-violent, symbolic acts in a futile attempt to win support. Had we resisted, the army could not have stopped us" [quoted ICG, 2009:30].

The disjunctive moment of the Disengagement propagated a disjunctive moment for some settlers in their acceptability of the necessity of violent confrontation/resistance. The 'lessons' learnt from the Disengagement signifies that Amona emerged out of, and reflected, a turning-point for some. As one settler remarked, "this attitude led to a schism within the settler community and a spate of violent confrontations." For some, violence acquired license in terms of practical legitimacy to resist against the State and defend space and communities. The violent struggle and spectacle of battle in Amona also sent a political message to the Israeli State, and arguably served to secure other outposts against decisions of evacuations. As Byman and Sachs [2012] write, "the violence surrounding [the evacuation] strengthened the perception that any withdrawal, no matter how small, risks opening up deep fissures within Israeli society" and, they assess, "left leaders wary of future evacuations." The head of a military Torah college significantly warned that "after Amona, he who tries to evict us will tear Israeli society apart."

Thirdly, violent confrontation/resistance can be explained as a political-ethical response. Given this significant shift of the move-to-violence, and the significance of violence itself, I argue that this means accounting for violent confrontation/resistance as a practical-political response is not enough. Let us return to how one interviewee phrased the problematic and reality we are tracing: "when you say things like 'Jews expelling Jews,' what does this mean? What do you do? Is this the withdrawal of unconditional support?" Whilst acts of ‘evacuation’ may be outcomes of legal and political decisions by the sovereign State, connected with the State’s political nature and governance-regime, settlers have to decide how they (re)act to such acts. This, then, is an ethical confrontation. For former Gush Katif settlers, we see self-reflection and critical questioning of "the way Land of Israel loyalists dealt with the expulsion":

we shut the house and locked it on all sides... in the end they broke in through one of the windows. On the one hand, we knew that we wouldn't use force, it was clear to each one of us. Maybe logically we should have done other stuff but it was clear to us that we can't. We did what we could without hitting anyone. Maybe it was a
mistake. Sometimes I think we should have done more than we did. I ask myself 'why did you give up your house so easily?'

The statement "we knew that we wouldn't use force" as "it was clear to each one of us" is a clear insight into the taboo of deploying violence against State forces at the time of the Disengagement. It is the critical (re)questioning which emerged after regarding practical actions taken against evacuation, and the perceived failure of these actions, which would be disjunctive for some. The reflection or lesson of "should have done more," and the need to do "more," provided a perceived license for some for other pathways of action. As another former Gush Katif settler reflected:

we didn't do enough. As individuals, we did what we could, but as a public we didn't do enough. As a public, we can say that the tikkun- to make up for it- is in our future. The ones who showed the way were our children. Amona's the way...there's no other way but that of overflowing courage like there was in Amona and our youth have it.

In the battle of and for Amona, some settlers/protestors were willing to move-beyond the taboo of deploying violence/violent resistance against 'their' State where a new era of the necessity, acceptability and legitimacy of violence/violent resistance was in being. The feeling of the 'need' to resist is political and ethical. As one Hilltop Youth individual told me, "a lot of people from Gush Katif that didn't fight, you could see them in Amona because they felt they had to fight." The feeling of 'having to fight' places the event and spectacle of Amona as an ethical encounter, a feeling of compulsion to fight/forcefully resist this new evacuation.

For some, Amona was construed as a symbolic and practical battlefield. The spectacle of violent confrontation/resistance against the evacuation and for the Jewish community and space of Eretz Yisrael was redemptive for past injustices, like Gush Katif. The struggle can also be perceived as redemptive for future perceived violations from the State against communities and the Land. For Hilltop Youth I spoke with, judgement from God is an omnipresent and omnipotent concern and motivation. Defending the Land comes first. This is seen as acts of Jewish pride, responsibility, and love. The significance of the Hilltop Youth and their ideologies is discussed in Chapter Six. Again, the generational nature of this response in Amona was emphasised. As one National-Religious rabbi discussed, the passive response taken by Gush Katif settlers (particularly adults), even to the point of embracing soldiers, singing together, giving them food, was scorned by youth:
some teenagers, who see things in a black and white situation, could not understand. People are expelling you from your house and you are giving them supper! Throw dishes at them! Many of the youth couldn't contain. It was ideological. They thought their parents were going crazy- 'what are you doing'!

'Seeing things in black and white' is also a meaningful and ethical framework, i.e. when this is the situation, this is the license for response. When 'the next round came,' the rabbi furthered:

what happened in Amona was a reaction. Now we are the youth, we will show what it means to protect our Land, to protect ideology, and there were little if no adults there. Many of the parents said the youth are so furious about what happened in Gush Katif, let them go, nothing violent is going to happen here. But there was violence. Both sides were violent.

The discursive framing of the Amona evacuation is also crucial within this political-ethical framework and (re)action. A statement issued by 'Yesha Rabbis' declared that "we must stop the persecution of Jews and the selling of our sacred land by all possible means" [quoted Weiss, 2006a]. The discursive framing of the evacuation as 'persecution of Jews' and 'the selling of our sacred land' morally-structured the event. Such a framing of the act may have provided a powerful political, religious and moral-ethical license for the defenders of the 'sacred land.' Amona therefore was a struggle of something deeper. Such hierarchies were visualised on the ground, reflecting the performativity aspect of space.

Image 5e has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. Image is of the evacuation at the time of the evacuation.

Whilst State forces were perched on horseback or in demolition machinery, settlers/protestors stood guard on top of the Amona hilltop or on top of Jewish homes
slated for destruction, for some constituting the 'sacred ground' and the 'moral ground.' State forces were encased in 'riot-gear' or defensive/offensive armourments. Settlers/protestors wore their own 'uniforms' - religious attire, constituting their own defensive/offensive armourments where faith and commitment-to-faith was their 'weapon.' Such assessments of space and performativity bring conceptual value to Political Geography literatures in showing how space and subjectivity closely interact and also how spatial practices can frame subject positions. This was particularly pronounced in conversations with Hilltop Youth individuals (Chapter Six). Whilst the Yesha Council clarified that their call to 'stop the persecution' "by all possible means" meant non-violent means, this was not the case for everyone. The question of the 'appropriateness' of response combined political, ideological and moral-ethical questions. A conversation I had with an orthodox ultra-nationalist settler was invaluable in gaining a perspective into why violence, for some, was not only perceived to be justified but welcomed:

the fact is, if you want to prevent it you have to fight them like everyone else, at least threaten it. If they know you're going to go down easy, what's going to happen? They're going to do it more. Like Sharon did Gush Katif so quickly, so easy, in a week, and they realised they could do more. What happened then, they went into Amona, they had a big battle, and all of a sudden, 'hey, it's not so easy.' It was ugly. It was Jew against Jew. It was violent. But who says great things don't come through self-sacrifice and violence?...any great thing, any revolution was done through violence and self-sacrifice. And people fell and people got hurt. It's not through being nice. Unfortunately the slogan for Gush Katif was 'with love we will win.' What the hell is that! You're not going to win a battle like that. They laugh at you. So it might be Jew against Jew, it might be ugly, but you have to be ready for it. You certainly can't say I'm going to give up my house and then not fight. It's a sham. We have to be ready to fight.64

This is a deeply significant insight. Whilst touring Kerem Atzmona, one of the Gush Katif settlement-communities to be evacuated, as the evacuations were underway, Police Chief Moshe Karadi stated that "based on the current pace, which at this point is faster than estimated, we'll finish the evacuation sooner than planned" [quoted Ynet Reporters, 2005a]. In another such statement, Prime-Minister Sharon had pronounced that

despite the terrible difficulties and the images that tear my heart as well, I must say the settlers are conducting themselves in a dignified, restrained manner and
are making a very big effort to ensure the evacuation passes quietly [quoted Ynet Reporters, 2005a].

For some, the speed and ‘dignified restrained manner’ which largely characterised (re)actions in Gush Katif and was praised by State leaders, was unwelcomed and denounced. Speaking with the orthodox ultra-nationalist settler, the Disengagement was not merely a practical failure i.e. its speed and the passivity of settlers/protestors. The approach taken and the Disengagement’s result was deemed a moral/ethical and ideological failure. For this interviewee, individuals have to ‘go all the way’ with their commitment, resistance, self-sacrifice, and love of the Land, even if this necessitates violence. Such perception reveals what individuals are willing to do and legitimise in the name of (in)security, situating this analysis in the sub-disciplines of CSS and Political Geography. Amona encapsulates both ideological and behavioural radicalisation, from thinking to doing the undoable.

Fourthly, the move-to violent confrontation/resistance in Amona was explained as a religious-ideological response. In conceptualising that the Amona evacuation constituted a disjunctive ideological moment for some settlers, I have attributed the “unprecedented” violence to three responses. Firstly, a psychological reaction. Secondly, a political-practical response. Thirdly, a political-ethical response. Yet, despite these rationalisations and legitimisations, violence against the Jewish State of Israel as the Jewish State of Israel is religiously and ideologically significant. It is in the spectacle of Amona where conflicts I have been tracing- namely conflicting visions and projects contained within State (re)creation, visions and projects of (in)security, and projects and rights of Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael- collided in an “unprecedented” violent encounter in space. The battle of and for Amona contained and represented deeper ideological conflicts. As one Israeli analyst discerned:

Amona is a symbol of the clash between the State as the State, and between the settlers as the settlers...Amona was the highlight when two ideologies were in conflict: the settlements, the settlers on one side, and the State on the other side.65

One National-Religious settler, a former Gush Katif resident, discussed the significant “inner conflict” which the evacuation generated and challenges it posed for National-Religious Zionists in particular:

on the one hand, people wanted to express that they don’t agree with the uprooting. However, they want to stay loyal to the State and the country. They love
the country. They are part of the country. This was a huge conflict, particularly for
the National-Zionist movement. A huge conflict. On the one hand, you love the
State and the country and you are very, very national. On the other hand, you can’t
agree to such an act. So you have a huge inner conflict. Sometimes, some people
choose this side, and other people choose the other side.66

Not only was this “inner conflict” ethical and political in nature, it was religious-
ideological. If Amona was a confrontation, this confrontation raised profound questions
regarding the Jewish State of Israel itself. Speaking with an outpost settler provided a
crucial perspective for how they framed the battle: “Amona is a test case of an historical
question of certain interactions between the State and the settlers, which at the same time
is a question which is a burning issue now.”67 One individual also discussed that “the
failure to resist the Disengagement sparked off all sorts of ideological and theological
questions about Israel.”68 Chapter Four assessed that a key impact of the Disengagement
was the questioning it generated. This questioning was not only on significant issues, such
as what levels of resistance were deemed legitimate, or whether IDF soldiers should obey
evacuation orders. It was also questioning of how the Disengagement itself should be
interpreted and how this concerned the being of the State of Israel and relations with it.
Again Inbari’s work [2007; 2009; 2012] is important for valuing significant discussions in
religious-thought. As he discusses [2009:10], such acts

provoked a profound theological crisis...the fundamental religious dilemma is
profound: how can a state that uproots settlements and hands over parts of the
biblical Land of Israel...be considered "absolutely sacred?"; what sublime religious
meaning can be attributed to the actions of a secular state unaware of its purpose
of serving as "the foundation for God's throne in the world," which threatens to
destroy by its own hands the chance of realizing the messianic hope?69

Such questioning was the theological/religious/ideological context in which the Amona
evacuation occurred and further tested foundations of beliefs regarding political and
religious behaviour, (re)actions, and commitment to the Israeli State. If Ravitzky [1993]
discussed how religious communities reacted divisively to the “imperfect reality” of State
(re)creation and this (re)creation provoked religious and messianic questioning (Chapter
Two), the practices of the declared Jewish State provoke further (re)questioning. Such
questioning, I argue, must be seen as reflecting the thought of (in)security. Individuals
sought to secure a grounding of reality of what the actions of the State mean and its
relation with messianic security. Yet, in the reality of another settlement evacuation,
Amona forced communities to revisit Gaza. For some, another reality of evacuation—what this represented—served to further confirm and heighten critical perceptions and disjunctures. For some, such realities produced a narrative that seemed to justify violent rupture in a post-Disengagement disjunctive reality.

It is the open emergence of critical perceptions of 'the Jewish State of Israel,' on both an (in)security and metaphysical level post-Disengagement, which I contend is crucial for accounting for violent confrontation/resistance against the State of Israel as the State of Israel. The critical (re)interpretations regarding the Jewish State of Israel, or how critical perspectives were (further) confirmed in the Disengagement and post-Disengagement, is the grounding of significant disjunctures in State-settler relations. These disjunctures were paramount in Amona for opening new pathways to relations and (re)actions, and for accounting for the taboo-breaking unprecedented violence on the part of some settlers. Furthermore, these critical disjunctures would impact on relations and responses post-Amona (Chapter Six).

**Relations with the State of Israel Post-Disengagement in Settler and Religious Communities**

In the Post-Disengagement era there are varying responses to and relations with the Jewish State of Israel which I will now assess. I will begin by recognising commitment to the Mamluchi, or pro-State ideology, which a majority of settlers continue to hold. I will then observe and critically assess that in the post-Disengagement reality, more critical and anti-State perceptions have emerged in the open. These perspectives reflect how the historic pact in State-settler relations has become (further) strained for some, and that critical disjunctures with the State have grown.

Whilst actions which the State of Israel has taken against settlement-communities generates criticisms and objections, the majority of settlers continue to hold a Statist/pro-State approach. This approach maintains commitment to and relations with the Jewish State of Israel. For many, a Mamluchi ideology underpins this commitment. Mamluchi ideology, which is central to National-Religious Zionism (Chapter Two), believes in the sanctity of the State of Israel and that the State is an inherently holy vehicle-of-redemption. This ideology and approach is eloquently reflected in the attitude of one former Gush Katif settler, Tami Zilbershein:70

> I think there has to be a distinction between the Medinah and the Memshalah, between the State of Israel and the Government of Israel. I believe that the State
of Israel is part of fulfilment of the prophecies, fulfilment of the fact that we're in the beginning of the salvation, we're in the beginning of the Redemption and that's like a birth, Yom HaAtzmaut, is like a rebirth of the nation of Israel, we have come back to ourselves.

Zilbershein discussed how maintaining commitment to the State is central:

if I have a child that does not continue the way I believe in, I'm still going to be happy he was born and I'm still going to believe in him, that I believe he's going to come back to the good life...if I have a child that strays...doing very negative things, yes I'll be very upset, I'll cry, I'll do everything I can in my power to stop it, but I'll also still be very happy that my child was born and I believe in him, I believe that in him he has to really fulfil his true inner self and I'm going to continue believing in him, and with that belief that's the only way I'm going to bring him back to himself. So too with the State of Israel. I believe in the State of Israel. I believe the State of Israel has the ability to be...the vehicle-of-the-Redemption, and right now they've done a lot of wrong things, they've done a lot of mistakes, there's been a lot of negative things that they've done but I still believe in the State of Israel and I still celebrate Yom HaAtzmaut, and I believe that we're going to come back to ourselves...2000 years we lived in a very unnatural existence, we were not connected to our Land, we're now coming back to be a nation and it takes a lot of time to bring the Jews back from the galut and all the things that we're suffering from are remnants of the galut mentality of a lack of comprehension of what we're all about, what the nation of Israel is all about...even though we have mistakes, I believe we can correct these mistakes.

This mirrors a perspective shared with me by a National-Religious rabbi:

I feel I have a paradox. I love my State but she is not doing what she should be doing...so we are walking on a tight wire, because I don't want to weaken the State. I believe in the State. I believe in law and order. I also believe in democracy.

Furthermore, the interviewee pronounced, "in my expectation the day will come, it should have come long ago, but the day will come when the Jewish State will fulfil what we expect it to fulfil." Retaining its metaphysical and religious grounding, subjects maintain belief in the State in its being as the vehicle-of-the-Redemption. Seen in this light, the State of Israel continues to be a sacred being and a sacred being of security. Maintaining this belief is security where recognising the force of belief brings contribution to the field of CSS.
Importantly, this *Mamlucht* position conditions the responses of many to the practices of the State of Israel. The State and its sovereignty continue to be revered, even in acts the State takes against the Land. With this reverence, the taboo of engaging in any violent confrontation/resistance against settlement evacuations remains in place for the majority of National-Religious Zionists. As one settler declared:

I will not fight. I will demonstrate but not partake in illegal action. I am a law-abiding citizen. I respect the State even though I fully believe in my rights to the Land. As a Religious-Zionist, I will not be that person who raises a hand against my brothers and my State.\(^73\)

One National-Religious rabbi told me that rather than confronting against the State of Israel, “I religiously believe that I should be strengthening the State of Israel, meaning building and strengthening other things; not doing anything which will create anarchy.”\(^74\) One former Gush Katif settler reflected on the importance of maintaining belief:

when I was expelled I felt weakened. There was a picture of our rabbi coming out of the synagogue waving the flag of Israel and the flag had an orange strip on it. For me, and for a lot of people, that picture gave a lot of power. Because it said we can overcome everything if we are together. We believe in Israel. *We love Israel no matter what. We are still Israelis, we are still Zionists.*\(^75\)

For this interviewee, maintaining this commitment and identification is greatly important. They expressed that their belief in the State and relations with it are unconditional. Yet, in reflecting on (re)actions to evacuations in Gush Katif, the interviewee importantly reflected: “if we had the same situation again, I am not sure if people will react differently. It is how you look at the State and your nation and if that changes in this time.”\(^76\)

**Critical State Perceptions**

Changes in perceptions regarding the State of Israel and relations with it are evident in a different interview. This was a joint interview with Efrat and Yitzchak Zimmerman, former Gush Katif settlers who were evacuated in the Disengagement. In discussing their perspectives post-Disengagement, critical perceptions regarding the State and leadership are voiced. However, these positions have different levels:

the State cut itself off from its citizens. ‘The Disengagement’...it's a stupid country that takes its essence from external roots. We need to return to our inner self, to our roots and from this take the strength to make our salvation come true because
salvation exists, it continues, it hasn’t stopped but the expulsion shattered the external layer that people thought was enough for the process of salvation. That’s an external shell that is meant for other nations to see. But the nation of Israel needs something else, more powerful from within, that will show the way for the people of Israel. I’m more optimistic than my wife because I believe that from this will emerge the real leaders who will be tested by Hashem...we don’t despair. The Leftists thought that through the expulsion they would cause us to despair but it only made us stronger. We shall return to Gush Katif [Yitzchak Zimmerman].

The Disengagement therefore served as a lesson to return to ‘our inner self,’ or Jewish ‘roots,’ and from this reform the State of Israel within. The lesson of the Disengagement was the recognition of the need for and emergence of ‘true’ Jewish leadership, serving to bring-about salvation within the State. This contrasts with a less optimistic perception of the State. For Efrat Zimmerman, the orange flag, a symbol of anti-Disengagement protest, has replaced the State of Israel’s flag. They do not partake in national actions that celebrate the State, such as Independence Day celebrations, nor show reverence to the State, such as singing the national anthem. They discussed their perception post-Disengagement:

for me, the Torah has become much more meaningful than it was before. For me, the true leader, in a much more tangible sense, is Hashem. I feel things much more tangibly today and this is from the expulsion. Redemption? Of course I also see this as another step on the road to salvation. But the flag won’t take me there and Hatikva won’t take me there. To this day, I refuse to sing Hatikva. I don’t raise the flag on Independence Day, just the orange flag [Efrat Zimmerman].

Mrs Zilbershein and Mr and Mrs Zimmerman lived in Gush Katif, are religious individuals, underwent the same physical experience of evacuation, and were joined in the same fate i.e. ‘evacuated’ from their homes in Gush Katif and came to live in a Samaria settlement-community. However, following the Disengagement they voiced significantly different conclusions regarding the State of Israel and their relations with it. Such perspectives and divergences reflect crucial insights provided to me by a former IDF officer who grew up in a National-Religious community:

there’s two ideas: you’re religious, religious Zionist, BUT you’re part of the State and you put your nationalism in this idea of the wholeness of the State and the people before the Land; or, you say the most important thing is the Land and I’m putting what I think is G-d’s word over the State. And that was a split that I think grew and grew...the Religious-Zionist community is split, but they’re hiding it,
they're covering up this split. They all agree with the holiness of the Land but
people will use different methods. You have people who split off and they're
becoming more and more split off. It's been a very difficult ten years for the
Religious-Zionist community and I think it's going to be a much more difficult
reality in the future. It's a community that's growing up with separate values. In
the comments made by Efrat Zimmerman we gain insight into a more critical, hostile,
or even rejectionist perspective regarding how the State has come to be (further) seen and
related to. Again, my interview with the former IDF officer offered a crucial internal
insight. Whereas they stated that Amona constituted "a break, a split," what I
characterised as a 'disjunctive moment,'

before that the Disengagement was another break, split. That's where you begin
seeing more rabbis telling people 'don't go to the army,' and it became derogatory
to call someone Mamluchti- to call someone part of the State is calling someone
part of the system which used to mean being national. For example going to a
National-Religious school. Being national is something seen as important and
central in the Religious-Zionist community and these incidents split...slowly but
surely growing apart.

**Increased State-Settler Disjuncture**

The historic and unprecedented events of the Gaza Disengagement and Amona
evacuation, which were particularly impactful on State-settler relations, must be
recognised as disjunctive moments in a narrative of disjuncture. The willingness by some
to deploy violence/violent resistance, and the legitimisation of such course of action, came
in the context of fractures in National-Religious Zionism, and other religious communities,
where, for some, association and relations with the State underwent critical shift. These
shifts may be on different levels but that shifts did occur reveals the disjunctive
significance of the State’s actions against spaces of Eretz Yisrael and settler communities.
In the Disengagement, a large proportion of National-Religious rabbis, mainstream
settler-leadership, and settlers were anxious to avoid a 'split' in the Jewish nation. This
served to establish political and moral-ethical boundaries for what resistance was deemed
appropriate or legitimate. For some present in Amona, this was not the overriding
concern. In describing the Disengagement as “a turning point,” I asked one settler about
the Disengagement’s impact on relations with the State of Israel. They replied:
I would say that the vast majority of Gush Katif residents who were banished from their homes still wave the flag on Independence Day, say the prayer on Independence Day, and maintain relations with the State.

I then posed the following question: ‘so the Disengagement is seen as more a temporary setback and there is faith that there will be a return to Gush Katif. But did the State itself lose its fundamental religious grounding and function?.’ The answer I got:

no, although I will say that even those who believe that the State of Israel has a religious function, I think they might believe it less. There’s the phrase Atchalta De’Geulah- the Beginning of the Redemption- and that was fundamental to the founding father of Religious Zionism. Whilst for Shmuel Tal that completely disappeared, I would say that for others it carries less weight...there was a little bit of a shift in how much people viewed the State through spiritual eyes. Even within the religious majority who say the prayer for the State on Independence Day.81

Whilst this is a perspective of one settler, their reflection of the impact of the Disengagement on the (National-Religious) settler community as a whole is significant. In the belief-system of National-Religious Zionism, the very fact this individual believed that a shift in perception had occurred regarding the religiously sacred State of Israel is ideologically, religiously, metaphysically and politically significant. As Byman and Sachs [2012] write, and has been the focus of other authors such as Inbari [2012],:

although Gush Emunim strongly opposed any government policy that curtailed the settlement project, it respected the primacy of the state...for religious-nationalist settlers, the state remained an instrument of providence, carrying out God’s mission...adherents of Gush Emunim believed that salvation itself would emerge from the state and thus did not challenge its political authority.

Post-Disengagement, the primacy of the State of Israel has come to be (further) critically questioned and challenges made to is political authority. Shifts and disjunctures with the State were further alerted to in my interviews. One settler discussed that in the post-Disengagement era, and in realities of outpost-evacuations which were epitomised in the Amona evacuation:

in some cases has undermined basic confidence in fundamental thinking regarding the State of Israel. It is clear there has been a change and it is clear there has been a challenge. And now there is a fundamental split. There is no longer a
fundamental commitment for all. Rather there is deep animosity and a deep animosity split.\textsuperscript{82}

The reality of there being ‘a fundamental split’ and ‘no longer a fundamental commitment for all’ but ‘deep animosity and a deep animosity split’ with the State of Israel testifies to the impacts of the Disengagement and Amona and their broader significance. With basic confidence in fundamental thinking regarding the State (further) undermined for some, this signifies the growth of disjunctures in some State-settler relations. Then-Shin Bet Chief, Yuval Diskin, warned that what was witnessed in Amona was a “process of rift” between some settlers and the State. Diskin significantly noted that some settlers/protestors in Amona carried signs reading “in war we will prevail,” and “it is Jews who build and Israelis who destroy” [Nir, 2011]. The unprecedented (re)actions in Amona reflected a deeper disjuncture in relations, and an unfolding process of rupture. One settler discussed that in settler communities post-Disengagement "people became more extreme. There is now a whole group of people. They won’t believe in the Jewish State. Whereas before they were very much pro-State."\textsuperscript{83}

Critically, for some, the sacredness of the State itself has been inverted. Post-Disengagement, the (in)security of the Jewish State of Israel, in its different aspects, has been (further) brought into question. This (in)security also concerns the religious and metaphysical relationship between the State and Jewish security, messianism, and redemption/salvation. It is such a religious and metaphysical (re)evaluation of the status and (in)security of the State of Israel, a State which in National-Religious circles was viewed as “absolutely sacred” in all its essence and operations and positioned as a vehicle-for-redemption, and therefore an absolute source of security, which serves as a critical disjuncture. In discussing the Disengagement’s impact upon thought and relations with the State on a religious-ideological level, one settler spoke of the significant change in perception of Rabbi Shmuel Tal:

there is a certain prayer all National-Religious Jews say on Independence Day. Ultra-Orthodox Jews don’t. He said the pray on Independence Day pre- Disengagement. Post-Disengagement he said to stop to his community. \textit{There is a very tangible example of someone saying ‘I no longer believe the State of Israel is holy} and that the foundation of the State of Israel on Independence Day in 1948 was an historic, spiritual event. The State of Israel is just another country. It is not a vessel for G-d’s will or whatever comes out is from His will.\textsuperscript{84}
The settler added "he’s at the tip of the spectrum. But that doesn't make him irrelevant." We now need to recognise the significance of not only the development of critical State perceptions but the emergence or strengthening of anti-State positions. This is a critical reality where the religious-messianic position and sanctity of the State has been rejected by some. In 2007, the following headline appeared in Israeli media: 'Disengagement from secular state: Prominent Zionist-religious rabbi Shmuel Tal talks of how he became alienated from the State of Israel following pullout." Before the Disengagement "he was considered to be a rising star in religious-Zionist circles" [Nashoni, 2007]. The article details an interview which Tal held and offers insights into "his new worldview."

The Israeli government is described as a "kingdom that has transformed into apostasy." The State of Israel is one "who screams against God" where, he insists, "it's no longer possible to combine holiness and impurity." Crucially, there is no possibility of trying to influence the State "from within" and Tal rebukes National-Religious rabbis and populations for "accepting the yoke of the secular sovereign." Tal criticises the cooperation and obedience of large segments of the National-Religious community with the State post-Disengagement:

we declare out loud that we'll continue enlisting in the army without any preconditions...we take leave of Netzarim with a prayer for the well-being of those doing the expelling. We embrace the soldiers who are banishing us, and we even pray for their health. We turn the other cheek. Have we gone crazy? [quoted Nashoni, 2007].

For Tal, the Disengagement was an event so disjunctive that it brought about a fundamental and critical change in perception of the 'Jewish State of Israel' and relations with it. Furthermore, it established particular revelations: 'no longer possible to transform the state from within'; particular relations: 'should not accept the yoke of the secular sovereign'; particular separations: 'no longer possible to combine holiness and impurity'; and the significance of calls for 'disengagement from the secular state.' This was an assertive and complete disjuncture. Post-Disengagement, and for some actualised in the battle of and for Amona, the State is held in new metaphysical groundings of (in)security. For others, the State’s practices have served to confirm critical beliefs of the State. Post-Disengagement, we significantly see the openness of language of 'disengagement,' a language of (in)security, and actions which reflect this radical disjunctive grounding. Such disjunctures on an (in)security and political-ideological level, I argue, are instrumental in breaking taboos of violence/violent resistance against the State as the State.
The occurrence of such profound shifts were further discussed by my interviewees. In returning to the conversation which I had with the outpost settler, the Amona evacuation was significant because it was a "a test case of certain interactions between the State and the settlers." These interactions concern fundamental relations with the State and how the State's practices, such as evacuations, challenge these relations. The interviewee discussed how such relations are reflected in orthodox practices and signify divergences:

every Shabbat, religious Jews go to the synagogue. After the Torah reading, the National Jews say a specific prayer for the State of Israel and its success. After the expulsion of Jews from the Gaza Strip in 2005, and later the Amona destruction in 2006, there were many changes in the attitude of observant Jews to the question of to say or not to say this specific prayer in favour of the State of Israel. This is a very interesting change...what exactly was the meaning of this prayer in the eyes of those who prayed and what happened later? The fact that the State of Israel destroyed and expelled Jews from Gaza, and destroyed part of the settlement of Amona, in what way did it affect the spiritual connection and perceptions of observant National Jews to the idea of the State of Israel and maybe in its spiritual meaning, spiritual aspect?...there are certain religious Jews who were so offended by the actions of the State, they did not say this prayer. This is a very dramatic issue.87

The expansion which the interviewee provided regarding how different members of their community reacted to this prayer in the post-Amona evacuation era offers a powerful and unique insight into perspectives and divisions:

there were different approaches. Why exactly did Observant Jews stop saying the prayer for the State anymore? Say it but revise its contents, change the text of the prayer? There's a certain sentence which says 'save the State, and G-d please guide the Prime-Minister and the Ministers', this is a free-style translation. Some people changed it to 'G-d save the State from the Prime-Minister and Ministers'...in Israel we live these issues everyday. There are some friends who started going out of the synagogue when this prayer began. In Israel in the social code, going out of the synagogue is something you do when it's an act of protesting in a way, and in another way it happens in the High Holidays when there is a prayer when you remember the dead, and remember your dead parents if you have. Those people who have living parents, they go out of the synagogue when this prayer is said. In a way, going out of the synagogue when saying a prayer for the State is like saying, 'for me the State is dead, I have a living parents somewhere else.' These are very,
very delicate, social, religious, cultural questions...you can see it's something a religious Jew does to convey his opinion about national, political questions, opinions about the government, the State, certain actions, by a religious act.\textsuperscript{88}

Whilst there is much wealth in this discussion, the insight that the prayer was modified to ask God "to save the State" is of great significance. The question of asking God to save what- therefore identifying where the insecurity/danger lies- is important. Whilst this outpost settler stated that some individuals were asking the State to be "saved" from the government, a conversation which I had with an Orthodox Hilltop Youth individual provided another concern and reality: "we ask that Hashem saves us from the State."\textsuperscript{89}

For this individual, it was not a matter of asking God to save the State from dangers/insecurity; it was asking God to save the people from the Jewish State itself. Such an insight is fundamental for this analysis. In asking God to save the Jewish people from the State of Israel, the State is placed in a new metaphysical, religious, political, and (in)security light, serving to reframe State-settler relations, conflicts and confrontations, and represents a radical disjuncture with the Jewish State of Israel. This analysis and radical disjuncture will be continued in Chapter Six. For the orthodox ultra-nationalist settler who not only legitimised but welcomed the violent confrontation/resistance in the Amona evacuation, their framing of the reality within which such confrontations operate is meaningful. In asking if they see the struggle for the Land as a battle, the individual answered "it's a total battle, it's a war, it really is." I then asked is it also a battle/war against the State which is stopping building and removing people from their homes? Their response was crucial for opening-up critical perceptions and relations:

> it might have to be because what's the difference if a gentile throws me out of my house or a Jew? They're both bad. I have to fight either one. Unfortunately, many of the settlers are very, very in to the government, the soldiers because there was Rav Kook, he saw the State as something very holy, as a holy thing, so a lot of his students look at it and say 'you can't go against the government, against the army, against the State. You can't, no matter what. Even if they do bad things.' So it's hard to get that mentality of 'yes.' Some people have it. The younger generation have more promise with it.\textsuperscript{90}

Such perception is of important conceptual value. It reveals how acts taken against space are impactful. They force relations to be revised and necessitate actions to be taken in the name of (in)security. Spatial practices and (in)security are closely interrelated. Settler youth were at the forefront of deploying violent confrontation/resistance in the Amona
evacuation. Post-Amona, actions by segments of the younger settler generation continue to reflect critical perceptions of and relations with the State and resistance against it.

Conclusion

The Amona evacuation is a spectacle where we can assess impacts in some State-settler relations in a post-Disengagement reality. It signifies shifts and widening disjunctures within (re)actions to evacuation. The Amona evacuation again constituted a disjunctive moment for the State of Israel and a disjunctive moment for some settlers. The evacuation witnessed "unprecedented" actions where lines were crossed on both sides. I sought to assess the significance of some individuals deploying violence in and for space against the State, breaking dominant taboos in place during the Disengagement. With the majority of analysis centred on original viewpoints of individuals on the ground, four explanations were discussed of why we saw such (re)actions: a psychological reaction; a practical-strategic response; a political-ethical response; and, a religious-ideological response.

In the State of Israel's evacuation of Jewish settlement-communities, different settlers I interviewed were critical of such actions. They spoke not of 'evacuation' but of 'destruction' and 'expulsion.' Such acts by the State against the Land and Jewish communities undermine rights and securities and reflect different relations with space and meanings of (in)security. However, in confronting realities of evacuation, the responses I captured in interviews pointed to different directions. Amona signified and further widened intra-settler divisions. The majority of settlers continued and continue to reject engagement in violent confrontation/resistance against the State, and the legitimacy of this, for a number of reasons. Commitment to Mamluchi ideology remains strong and there remains a strong taboo of violence. However, for a smaller number, there was/is perceived legitimacy. Moreover, more extremist segments of the settler community welcome such responses, deeming this necessary and appropriate.

Such actions by the State against Eretz Yisrael and settler communities are deemed an affront. The Amona evacuation reflected and enacted ideological and behavioral radicalisation. Responses to the evacuation again showed the significance of space and the force of (in)security, bringing contributions to the fields of CSS and Political Geography. This case study is also of conceptual contribution to Political Geography in reflecting how space was transformed physically, symbolically and violently and the performativity aspect of space. Furthermore, whilst confrontation occurred in space, the battle was also for space. It also signified how this space symbolises something more. The unprecedented violent confrontation/resistance on the part of some settlers/protestors, and how the
evacuation as a whole was a spectacle of confrontation, was a significant lesson for the State. In Amona, ‘the gloves were off,’ reflecting a significant shift in approach and radicalisation from the Disengagement. As an unprecedented confrontational event, Amona also reflected something greater. Days after the evacuation, Yair Naveh, then-Head of the IDF’s Central Command, spoke of the violence by “extremist youth,” stating

the sense of subjective betrayal of the extremist youth is enormous...there is a process of rupture with the settlers, and...the surprise was with the intensity of the violence and the hatred we saw [quoted Sofer, 2006].

This “process of rupture” with the State is hugely significant in affirming deeper and radical disjunctures on political-ideological and relational levels with the State of Israel itself. Post-Disengagement, not only have critical perceptions of the State of Israel emerged in the open on an (in)security and religious-ideological level. We also see the emergence/vocalism of anti-State ideologies, disjunctures and disassociations with the State and radical opposition to it. As I critically observed, Amona has been discussed in terms of a ‘battle’ or ‘war’ in a number of aspects. Shalom [2016] writes that “everyone who was present at Amona that day spoke about a war,” testifying to the nature and significance of the evacuation and the nature and significance of this space. The spectacle of the Amona evacuation powerfully embodies the concept the weaponisation of space, and how different actors sought spatial control in this spatial confrontation and battle. New performativities and relations were enacted in space.

One settler interviewee celebrated how Amona was “a battle, a war.” Observing scenes of the evacuation, the spectacle of Amona was a battle when two sides violently confronted the other in a battle in and for space. Furthermore, signs of ‘war’ were carried by some settlers/protestors in Amona where it was communicated that “through war we will prevail.” This was a significant disjuncture from the motto of the Disengagement—“through love we will win.” A differentiation was also voiced between “Jews who build” and “Israelis who destroy” [Nir, 2011], therefore dividing and framing subjectivities.

Occurring out of a disjunctive moment, Amona symbolised that new pathways had been opened. I will next critically observe how this narrative of disjunction continues and is further exacerbated. In discussing the post-Disengagement era, one settler reflected that

there's the issue of political extremism and religious extremism and how they interact. There are those who want the Jewish State to be Halakhic. That is something that existed before Disengagement but was magnified after the
Disengagement because we see what we get with a secular state, these terrible things happening. That can lead to someone strengthening their belief.\textsuperscript{92}

If, as one interviewee discussed, there is no longer fundamental commitment to the State in some settler communities, this releases new pathways of (re)action against the State. Post-Disengagement and post-Amona, I assess that questions of (in)security are placed central. In the State's actions against Land and communities, the State is increasingly seen in insecurity and adversarial terms. Chapter Six will assess this growth of extremism and disjuncture in two areas.

Firstly, the ideologies and activities of the Hilltop Youth who continue disassociation with the State of Israel and radical opposition to it. Secondly, the emergence of Price-Tag violence. Not only is the Price-Tag strategy a new form of violence/violent resistance post-Amona, furthering the ‘militant-activist’ approach unleashed in the battle of and for Amona. Price-Tag attacks have emerged and operate in a self-declared ‘new era.’ The Hilltop Youth’s ideologies and Price-Tag violence continue to place ‘war’ as central in relations, actions and struggles. Both reflect the widening of critical and radical disjunctures, struggles between the State and the Land, and where the ‘the Jewish State of Israel’ is placed at the centre of struggles. I will argue that Price-Tag violence represents the culmination of a trajectory of disjuncture activated in Gaza and Amona.

References

1 In November 2005, Israel’s then-Defence Minister, Shal Mofaz, decided the demolitions would be implemented by the end of January 2006, apparently after pressure from Israel’s High Court.
2 In particular, settlers petitioned the High Court to dismiss the Peace Now petition because it had omitted details and representations. In an act of assertion, the High Court of Justice (HCJ) vacated the Peace Now petition but declared that the decision of demolition still stood.
3 Revealed through news-reports, testimonies, and footage from the scene, as well as reflections.
4 In order to discern the atmosphere and actions on the ground, this assessment has relied on the consultation of various news-reports and witness-accounts from the time, as well as viewing footage from the scene of the evacuation, and speaking directly with individuals on the ground about the event.
5 This was attempted through building road-blocs and forming human-chains (see Chapter Four).
6 Such as at Kfar Maimon. Particular criticism was against The Yesha Council.
7 Such as soldiers comforting residents. Arutz Sheva TV, 2011.
8 \textit{Emphasis added.}
9 \textit{Emphasis added.}
10 \textit{Emphasis added.}
11 Author Interview, Samaria 4\textsuperscript{th} August 2016.
12 Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 10\textsuperscript{th} September 2013.
13 As one settler discussed, “what happened to Amona was not like Gush Katif. It was a legal question because the State says the houses were not purchased and they were established on Palestinian land.” Author Interview, Samaria, 21\textsuperscript{st} August 2016.
14 \textit{Emphasis added.}

Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 25th July 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 24th August 2016.

These included Aryeh Eldad and Effie Eitam.

Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2016.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 25th July 2016.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 10th September 2013.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 27th August 2013.

Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2016.

Self-described as such.

Author Interview, Judea 20th August 2013.

Author Interview, Samaria 18th July 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 24th August 2013.

The condition and state of exile.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 24th July 2016.

Author Interviews, Samaria 4th August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 25th July 2016. Gerush is the term the interviewee used to define the act.

Author Interview, Samaria 25th July 2016.

Author Interviews, Samaria 4th August 2016.

Author Interview, Judea 2nd August 2016.

Author Interview, Judea 5th August 2013.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 4th August 2016.

Author Interview, Judea 2nd August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 4th August 2016.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 4th August 2016

Author Interview, Jerusalem 4th August 2016. Route 60 is the main road through the West Bank. Hilltop-communities the individual referred to include Bet El, Ofra, Eli, Ma’ale Levona, Shiloh, Elon Moreh.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Boaz Haetzni, quoted The Telegraph, Chapter Five.

Emphasis added.

Boaz Haetzni, quoted The Telegraph, Chapter Five.

This statement was made by Nati Harel. International Crisis Group, 2009:11.

This is how the narrator of the interview set-up the discussion. Arutz Sheva TV, 2008b.

Efrat Zimmerman, Arutz Sheva TV, 2008b; emphasis added.

Yitzchak Zimmerman, Arutz Sheva TV, 2008b.

Author Interview, Samaria, 24th August 2016.

Boaz Haetzni, quoted The Telegraph, Chapter Five.

Emphasis added.

Boaz Haetzni, quoted The Telegraph, Chapter Five.

This is how the narrator of the interview set-up the discussion. Arutz Sheva TV, 2008b.

Efrat Zimmerman, Arutz Sheva TV, 2008b; emphasis added.

Yitzchak Zimmerman, Arutz Sheva TV, 2008b.

Author Interview, Samaria, 24th August 2013; emphasis added.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016. I have added exclamation marks after these phrases because of the manner in which the interviewee expressed these points.

Pictures from the scene show many men wearing yarmulkes, whilst females there can be seen wearing modest and traditionally religious-conservative clothing, such as flowing skirts.

Author Conversation, Samaria 21st August 2013; emphasis added.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 4th August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 25th July 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 11th September 2013.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 4th August 2016.
Emphasis added.

Tami Zilbershein, Arutz Sheva TV, 2008a.

Author Interview, Jerusalem, 25th August 2016.

Author Interview, Jerusalem, 25th August 2016.

Author Interview, Judea 2nd August 2016.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria, 18th August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria, 18th August 2016; emphasis added.

Arutz Sheva TV, 2008b; emphasis added.

Arutz Sheva TV, 2008b. Hatikva is the State of Israel’s national anthem.

This statement has been made because of the descriptions which these individuals made about their lives and the visible religious language and dress contained in the interview.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2013; emphasis added.

Author Interview, Judea 21st August 2016; emphasis added.

Author Interview, Samaria 7th August 2016; emphasis added.

Author Interview, Samaria 25th July 2016; emphasis added.

Author Interview, Samaria 7th August 2016; emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Netzarim was a Jewish settlement-community evacuated in the 2005 Gaza Disengagement.

Author Interview, Samaria 11th September 2013; emphasis added.

Author Interview, Samaria 11th September 2013.

Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2013; emphasis added.

Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2013; emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Author Interview, Samaria 22nd August 2013; emphasis added.
Chapter Six: ‘A New Era’- Price-Tag Attacks and the Hilltop Youth

Introduction

On the 19th June 2012, residents of Jab’a, a Palestinian village in the West Bank, awoke to find their mosque on fire and graffiti sprayed on its walls. The messages were in Hebrew and read 'Ulpana war,' 'The war has started,' ‘Pay the price’ [Fleishman, 2012a]. Such attack is a Price-Tag [Tag-Mechir] attack. The attack referenced Ulpana, a Jewish settlement-outpost in the West Bank. On the 6th June 2012, Israel's High Court affirmed that Ulpana must be evacuated by Israeli State forces by the 1st July 2012. Armed with a spray-can, 'war' has been declared and a 'price' enacted. Price-Tag violence began in 2008 and has grown numerically. In 2012, 623 cases related to Price-Tag attacks were opened by Israeli police [Ynet, 2013]. Rabbi Gilad Kariv declared that Israel and Palestinian communities are facing "a Price-Tag epidemic" [quoted Rosenberg and Hasson, 2012]. Damaging properties and vehicles and defiling these with graffiti, which is often religious, nationalist, threatening and inflammatory in nature, are archetypical Price-Tag actions.

Attacks have also seen Molotov cocktails thrown at Palestinian homes, Israeli military checkpoints and vehicles vandalised, an IDF base broken into and Israeli military personnel injured. Since 2010, Price-Tags have also grown in gravity. Religious buildings have been targeted with incendiary graffiti, and mosques, churches and monasteries burned in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel. In 2015, a Price-Tag attack caused the deaths of three Palestinians when a firebomb was thrown inside a Palestinian home in the village of Duma. Most Price-Tag attacks occur in contexts of outpost-evacuations, or threats of evacuations, and actions by the State of Israel which are deemed to threaten settler interests. High-ranking State officials have declared that such violence is “Jewish terrorism” and have urged for attacks to be legally classed as such. The purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the emergence and significance of Price-Tag attacks.

Before I engage in this direct assessment, I first need to assess the growth of the Hilltop Youth (No’ar Ha-Gva’ot) and their ideologies. The Hilltop Youth is an extremist sub-section of the settler community which has come to prominence in the post-Disengagement era. The Hilltop Youth is widely linked to Price-Tag attacks, and a number of Hilltop Youth have been arrested for suspected involvement in such attacks or faced restrictions from State security forces on suspicion of involvement and other violent activities. Identifying
ideologies which characterise the Hilltop Youth, and their relations with the State of Israel, are crucial for recognising disjunctures and how Price-Tag violence connects with these.

Emerging in a self-declared "new era," for this thesis Price-Tag violence is highly significant for three reasons. Firstly, Price-Tag attacks represent ‘a new era’ in violence/violent resistance by some subjects. Attacks represent a new strategy in battles over settlement and what practices of building and evacuation represent. With the violence emerging post-Gaza and post-Amona, it reveals how taboos of engaging in violence have come to be (further) broken for some and reflects increased extremism. Secondly, Price-Tag attacks and ideologies of the Hilltop Youth embody heightened ideological, political and relational disjunctures with the State of Israel. Framing realities as ‘war,’ I will assess how Price-Tags are offensive and defensive weapons in battles between ‘the State’ and ‘the Land’ and where questions of (in)security are central.

Thirdly, more radical aims within acts of Price-Tag violence have been identified, directed at the State of Israel itself. In 2015, a group called the Revolt was uncovered in the Hilltop Youth which was involved in Price-Tag attacks. The Revolt’s agenda of destroying the State of Israel has alerted to more fundamental dangers which the violence poses. Enacted for some with the goal of Jewish Revolution where the (re)creation of the Jewish State is central, Price-Tags serve as ‘sparks’ to potentially enable this by generating instabilities.

This chapter is again centred on primary fieldwork, providing original perspectives for analysis. I will also draw on examples to assess the nature and significance of violence. The chapter will assess how the violence embodies key concepts in Chapter One from the fields of Critical Security Studies (CSS) and Political Geography: (in)security, security and subjectivity, securitisation, spatial (re)structuring, spatial control and the weaponisation of space. Price-Tag violence powerfully and uniquely shows how some subjects apply these concepts to challenge their own State through spatial practices and acts of violence. Such assessment brings novel and important contributions to these sub-disciplines.

Part One will recognise extremism post-Amona and will focus on the growth of the Hilltop Youth. I will identify key characteristics and ideologies within the Hilltop Youth and what these signify regarding relations with the State of Israel. Part Two will then assess the emergence of Price-Tag violence. Whilst I will identify discernible ideological influences within the violence, I will argue that its emergence is foremost explained by the different disjunctive impacts of the Gaza Disengagement and Amona evacuation. Not only does this violence reflect how taboos have been [further] broken, but reflects deepening disjunctures within some State-settler relations.
Part Three will assess three dominant motivations and strategies within Price-Tags: revenge, deterrence, and coercive deterrence. The focus is on what the deployment of violence and such strategies indicate about State-settler relations and questions of power. Part Four will identify key impacts and (potential) insecurities of Price-Tag attacks. I will also assess reactions in settler and religious communities to the violence which again reflect intra-settler divisions. To assess different insecurities of Price-Tags and the diverse forms of attacks, I will focus on the Ramat Gilad/Mitzpe Yitzhar Price-Tag campaign and Ephraim military base attack. This attracted strong condemnation from State authorities and settler-mainstream because State forces were directly targeted. The attack further reflects disjunctures with the State and perceived legitimacy for such attack.

Part Five will end with a major disjunctive disjuncture. I will begin by assessing the viewpoints of one prominent Hilltop Youth individual, Meir Ettinger, and how he frames realities and relations with the State. Ettinger has been held in administrative detention for his suspected involvement in Price-Tag violence and activities deemed to pose insecurity to the State. Following this assessment, I will observe further hostile State perceptions before focusing on the uncovering of the Revolt and its agenda which reveals an intensity of radicalisation and radical disjuncture. Given the significance of Price-Tag attacks emerging post-Disengagement and post-Amona, I will argue that these historic and unprecedented events must be seen as disjunctive moments in a narrative of radical disjuncture with the State of Israel which is being expressed through violence. I argue that Price-Tag violence represents the culmination of a trajectory of disjuncture which I have traced in some State-settler relations.

**Part One: Post-Disengagement Disjunctures and Extremism- The Hilltop Youth**

As assessed (Chapters Four and Five), the Gaza Disengagement was impactful on settler communities in a variety of ways. The State removed Jewish settlers on an unprecedented scale from space seen as the historic Jewish homeland, and settlement-communities were demolished by State forces. The Disengagement struck at historic State-settler relations, ideologies, and projects of security. As well as generating feelings of betrayal on different levels, many point to an increase in extremism and violence within settler communities in the post-Disengagement era. In 2008, IDF Central Commander Gadi Shamni stated that

> there has been a rise in Jewish violence in Judea and Samaria. In the past, only a few dozen individuals took part in such activity, but today that number has grown into the hundreds. That's a very significant change [quoted Harel, 2008a].

1
Shamni noted attacks on both Palestinians and State security forces, including IDF, declaring “it’s a very grave phenomenon” [quoted Harel, 2008a]. This section will critically assess the growth of violence and extremism post-Disengagement and post-Amona. I will then identify key ideologies and characteristics of the Hilltop Youth which reflect such extremism, and embody significant critical disjunctures which I have been tracing. In assessing reasons for the growth of violence, Byman and Sachs [2012] assess that “the rise in violence among extremist settlers stems from deep changes in the settler population, particularly its dramatic growth and shifting ideological composition.” They, and other authors [ICG, 2009; Eiran and Krause, 2016], also note a weakening of rabbinical authority and of the mainstream-settler leadership in settler communities.

A number of my interviewees discussed that settler youth were particularly affected by the Disengagement, precipitating further splits in the settler community. As one National-Religious rabbi stated, “historically the Disengagement was a turning-point. One of the main consequences was upon children.” Many youth are critical of the older settler generation and mainstream leadership. In the eyes of some, traditional principles in the religious-nationalist settler movement have been negated, particularly the ‘pioneering spirit’ of settling all of Eretz Yisrael. Instead, the older generation and mainstream-leadership have become comfortable with middle-class lifestyles and directed their focus on maintaining relations with the State and Israeli governments.

Many youth and other extremist settlers are also critical of how the mainstream-settler leadership and National-Religious-mainstream practically and politically (re)acted against the Disengagement with peaceful resistance and cooperation with the State. As Chapter Five discussed, a large majority of those present in the Amona evacuation and confrontation were settler youth. Unlike settlement evacuations in Gaza, violent confrontation/resistance was deployed more readily in Amona by some settlers against State forces. Speaking in 2008, Akiva HaCohen, “an Orthodox hilltop youth pioneer” [Kershner, 2008], spoke of Amona’s impact in settler communities: “Amona pretty much divided this public into two parts, the more militant activist part and the more passive part” where people “have to decide whether they are on the side of the Torah or the state” [quoted Kershner, 2008].

As well as signifying divisions regarding the nature of approaches, ‘more militant activist’ and ‘more passive,’ HaCohen presented a significant disjunction. ‘The Torah’ and ‘the State’ are placed as a binary choice, and critically do not belong together. The existence of such divisions has been vocalised. In May 2008, when the IDF was negotiating with the
Yesha Council for the voluntary evacuation of the Migron outpost, settler youth interrupted State Independence Day celebrations which the Council was holding there, a revered day in National-Religious Zionism. Settler youth distributed leaflets accusing Yesha’s leaders of “collaborating” with “the enemy,” and slashed leaders car tires [ICG, 2009:9]. This is an insight into how the State of Israel and IDF have come to be (further) seen in hostile and adversarial terms and has come to be asserted in the open.

Incidents of violence against State forces have also occurred in settlement-communities. In March 2015, a violent confrontation occurred between settlers and Israeli soldiers. Israeli media reported that soldiers

were attacked...in the West Bank settlement of Bat Ayin and responded by firing several warning shots in the air. They had been deployed to the area to secure the area for police officers, who were conducting a number of arrests of far right activists [Zitun, 2015].

In detailing the incident, IDF soldiers stated that

those who attacked us in Bat Ayin had blood in their eyes and were close to physically hurting us. We were fighting in Sajaiyeh just a few months ago...and now we've become a target to the very people we defended [quoted Zitun, 2015].

Another soldier said he felt as if "radical settlers has spit in his face," declaring “there seems as if there is no difference between them and the terrorists in Hebron who throw stones or firebombs at us” [quoted Zitun, 2015]. The comments reveal what State forces perceive as a paradoxical reality of insecurity, i.e. Israeli security forces being attacked by Jewish settlers- “become a target to the very people we defended.” Such confrontations in space reflect critical disjunctures within some State-settler relations post-Disengagement. Another crucial statement is contained in the report: "[the] Head of the unit's intelligence said the fear is now settlers will attempt to take revenge against the forces” [Zitun, 2015] where, they voiced, "we are only here for a couple of days, but we're afraid they will target our base or equipment in a 'price tag' attack like they did in Yitzhar" [quoted Zitun, 2015].

The attack on the IDF base was how the thesis Introduction began. Referencing Price-Tag violence indicates that attacks have become a significant feature in contexts of some State-settler relations, and the fear that such attacks generate (discussed forthcoming).

Such incidents signal that fundamental shifts in attitudes and State-settler relations have occurred or amplified. One settler stated that one of the impacts caused/exacerbated by the Disengagement was that "people became more extreme. They lost faith in the
system.” Inbari assesses that “Gaza has not broken the back of messianic Zionism; it has strengthened its radical strain” [quoted ICG, 2009:10]. This ‘radical strain’ is particularly embodied in the Hilltop Youth’s ideologies and activities. Post-Disengagement and in the context of such impacts and divisions,

some Jewish youth opted to remove themselves to armed hilltop redoubts or outposts deep in the West Bank and beyond the state's culture or secular laws. Followers form loosely organised networks...generically are referred to as no’ar ha-gva’ot (hilltop youth) [ICG, 2009:8]

The Hilltop Youth (No’ar Ha-Gva’ot) is not an organisation. It is a sub-section of the settler movement, “loosely organised networks” [ICG, 2009:8] where individuals have shared characteristics and ideologies, seeing themselves as a community of people. Inbari [2009:132] writes that the term refers “to a group of people...[which] form the fringe of the settler movement, and are perceived as a radical ideological faction...willing to accept a hard and ascetic lifestyle.” The Hilltop Youth are teenagers and young adults who build and inhabit settlement-outposts throughout Judea and Samaria, often on hilltops. Many are located around the Shiloh Bloc, around the city of Nablus/biblical Shechem, and also in the South Hebron Hills [Boudreau, 2014].

Hilltop Youth individuals have connections with more extreme ideological orthodox settlement-communities, such as Yitzhar. Most are third-generation [ICG, 2009:8] or second-generation settlers. Their numbers are estimated to be a few hundred. Many interviewees sought to emphasise the size and position of the Hilltop Youth as “a very small group,” “marginal,” and “on the fringe” which lacks support in the settler-mainstream. Yet, as one rabbi acknowledged, “I don’t know the numbers. It’s an underground movement.” In contrast, one high-ranking Israeli military individual I spoke with stated that “they are not a small group. They became, not a very large group, but not
a small group against the State of Israel.” The significance of the statement being ‘against the State of Israel’ will be discussed forthcoming.

Boudreau [2014:78] characterises them as “the new national religious fundamentalists.” The Hilltop Youth are described as “a group of extremist settlers” by a number of commentators [Shalom, Novik, 2015] or “the most radical of the settlers” [Associated Press, 2014]. The Hilltop Youth have been discussed in relation to significant issues, such as ideological and sociological shifts in the settler movement [Weiss, 2005; Kaniel, 2005; Feige, 2009; Weissbrod and Savyon, 2012; Inbari, 2009; 2012; Jones, 2013; Neidle, 2013], Violence in Judaism [Aran and Hassner, 2013], Settler Violence and ‘Settler Terrorism’ [ICG, 2009; Byman and Sachs, 2012; Boudreau, 2014], and Price-Tag Violence [Satherley, 2012; Eiran and Krause, 2016].

In asking one Israeli Rabbi what do you think their primary ideologies and goals are, they answered that “you cannot say all of the youth are motivated by a, b, or c.” However, in media/publications, ‘the Hilltop Youth’ is discussed as a singular and the Hilltop Youth as a whole is subject to almost unanimous criticism. Whilst it is important to acknowledge that this is more a loose rather than coherent group, we can observe common characteristics, ideologies and activities. Each of these are ideologically and politically important for discussions which this thesis has engaged in and reflect increased extremism within segments of the settler community.

**Ideologies and Perceptions of the Hilltop Youth**

As a significant stream in the settler community over recent years, at the forefront of settlement activities and confrontations/resistances in space, I used fieldwork to uncover ideologies and perceptions of the Hilltop Youth. These are important for revealing further shifts and divisions in the settler community, and the open-emergence of ideological, relational and political disjunctures with the State of Israel which is enacted in acts, including violence. I will identify key characteristics of the Hilltop Youth: separation/disengagement; anti-establishment; outpost-building and the primacy of *Eretz Yisrael*; religious orthodoxy and concern of Jewish authenticity.

These are not ordered in importance but to clearly identify ideologies/characteristics which continue previous discussions. Furthermore, these intimately connect with discussions on Price-Tag violence. Ideologies all point to themes of disengagement, disjuncture, and the pre-eminence of *Eretz Yisrael* and belief. I will then discuss different perceptions of the Hilltop Youth in my interviews, providing primary insights from
different actors. Explanations/perceptions further signify the importance of the Disengagement in accounting for the growth of the Hilltop Youth and ideologies/activities.

The first characteristic is separation and 'disengagement.' This disengagement is from the secular State of Israel, mainstream-settler leadership and community, and mainstream-Israeli society. As one Hilltop Youth individual stated to me: “we have nothing to do with them.” The ideological and political disengagement of the Hilltop Youth has translated into a particular existence-of-disengagement. One National-Religious rabbi discussed how Hilltop Youth wear particular clothing, not only to show ‘belonging’ but ‘separateness’:

because I have a small knitted kippah, they have it with thick wool just to show that they are different. Their clothing is different to express they are not part of the Religious-Zionist movement: ‘we are an offspring. We think you are wrong and we are true.’

The second characteristic is anti-establishment and anti-authority. There is large rejection of the mainstream-settler leadership and other authority figures in communities. Feige [2009:237] assesses their approaches are rooted in a “radical drive against all forms of establishment.” Hilltop Youth have dropped out of schools. As one rabbi stated, “they'd rather set up a settlement than go to college.” Another settler discerned that “they are disaffected. They can't trust the government.” The Hilltop Youth were described as “anarchist” by a number of interviewees. Not only ‘anarchist’ but “they are in an open rebellion,” one settler declared.

Interviewees also alerted that Hilltop Youth largely reject rabbinical authority and “they don’t feel particularly led by the religious leadership.” One rabbi voiced, “they lost their confidence in the State. In rabbis. In any authority. The only thing they believe is pure ideology.” Significantly the interviewee placed emphasis on ‘pure,’ which connects with the characteristic of religious orthodoxy (assessed forthcoming). Whilst “they don’t feel particularly led by the religious leadership,” some rabbis in the extreme Right have been associated with the Hilltop Youth, such as Yitzhak Ginsburgh and rabbis from the Od Yosef Chai Yeshiva in Yitzhar [Satherley, 2012].

The third characteristic is outpost-building. One settler discussed that outpost-building began before the Hilltop Youth (see Chapter Three), where “I wouldn’t say it is particularly a strategy of the Hilltop Youth but also goes beyond that.” However, “today, the Hilltop Youth are the ones who are most enacting that action. And that’s something that happened post-Disengagement, outposts.” As Hilltop Youth are at the forefront of outpost-
construction, I asked one settler if they think that one of their goals is for those outposts to eventually become legalised settlement-communities. Their reply was significant:

they definitely don’t want them to be removed. As they embody anti-establishment feelings both with the State and the established settler movement, they are less looking for formal recognition than the established settlement movement which is in a constant dialogue and tactical struggle, but also cooperation, with the State of Israel and government, and are always looking for as much official recognition as they can get.\(^\text{15}\)

Another settler stated that “there is a big difference between Hilltop Youth outposts and the settlements.” Rabbi Eliezer Melamed [2016b] writes that “all the hilltop communities regularly destroyed by the army and the police are hilltops that were started by the private initiative of activists and youths on unauthorized lands.” Many are built by or associated with Hilltop Youth. Building connects with struggles for the Land where “there is an attempt to extend Israel by building significant outposts.” Settlers discerned that such struggles and construction are centred on activating and asserting Jewish rights in and to space. As one settler discussed, “they feel they are fulfilling their right to settle anywhere in Eretz Yisrael, and gaining control over the Land.”\(^\text{16}\) The ideological and political struggles within ‘building’ were emphasised to me by one Hilltop Youth individual. Outpost-construction is especially important with State forces evacuating outposts, such as Givat Ha’Ulpana and Havat Gilad, and in struggles of (re)creation:

what happened in Givat Ha’Ulpana and Havat Gilad, it’s more and more important to assert our statement that ‘we can live wherever we want and this is Israel,’ and that’s how we will be able to reproduce Eretz Yisrael.\(^\text{17}\)

Within practices of outpost-construction, practices of disengagement and ideological existence are also encapsulated. Hilltop Youth are seeking to enact and secure different visions of Jewish existence in the homeland. As one settler reflected,

they want to have their own community. Many live by an ideology of living off the Land...as much as they are seen to be very hardliner, nationalists, there’s more to them. A naturalist ideology, reconnecting with nature. A barren hilltop is a great place to do that...and there’s also a provocative element. A certain ‘look at me, I’m going to do what I want, and no one’s going to tell me otherwise’, going up on some hilltop to confront the army, or the State, or the settler establishment. But they’re also there to fulfil their ideals.\(^\text{18}\)
The fifth characteristic is religious orthodoxy and seeking to return to and enact what is perceived to be Jewish authenticity. The Hilltop Youth are not only characterised by religious orthodoxy but have literal interpretation of Jewish holy texts and strive for Jewish existence as it was in the biblical age. This, they see, is Jewish authenticity and what modern Jewish existence in ‘the homeland’ must be mirrored on. This religious orthodoxy connects with the centrality of Eretz Yisrael and deep connections with the Land, and where the Torah is primary in all aspects of life and the primary authority. One settler described the group as “a religious core.” One National-Religious rabbi described them as “literal and extreme.” Another National-Religious rabbi, who was critical of their ideologies and activities, described the Hilltop Youth as

a spiritual movement. Which means, ‘we want to be true, true to G-d...get up at five in the morning and pray at the first light of dawn.’ Something which only a very small amount of people do...their main motivation is to live truth.19

In conversations with Hilltop Youth individuals, everything was discussed through the prism of the Torah, where it’s centrality, authority, and truth were continually emphasised. As one Hilltop Youth individual stated, "every word in the Torah is meaningful." In asking how they would describe themselves, they answered:

I am a Jew seeking to fulfil Hashem’s will. The Torah is central and I want to understand from all the Books He gave to understand what is our way...always live by the truth.20

Crucially, abiding by ‘truth’ itself is security, a foundational security in Being [Dillon, 1996]. Recognising the strength of such belief in the ideologies and practices of the Hilltop Youth brings conceptual contribution to CSS where the Torah represents both a foundational and Higher security. Another settler emphasised Hilltop Youth’s deep spirituality and returning to Jewish authenticity. Connections with the Land are central, shaping existence/activities:

it is a spiritual movement. It is all going back to being a true Jew...working the land, as a farmer, maybe a shepherd...‘we are going back to biblical times.’ That ideology is central.21

Conversations with Hilltop Youth signified this love of the Land and reverence of Davida Malik (King David) who was also a shepherd. As one Hilltop Youth individual voiced,
in *Yehuda and Shomron*, the air is holy...something happens in their hearts. Suddenly they realise what it means to be a Jew, what it means to be in *Eretz Yisrael*...there is truth inside them and you can’t take that from them, you just can't, it's deep in their heart.22

The practices of the Hilltop Youth bring important conceptual contributions to Political Geography. Acts of outpost-building embody the concepts of spatial control and spatial (re)structuring. In engaging in independent acts of construction, subjects seek to overcome boundaries which have been imposed on space. Spatial practices are therefore used as a mode of resistance. They (re)affirm rights against authorities and governance-regimes where space is (re)transformed into a theatre of power and resistance.

The practices of the Hilltop Youth also reflect how subjectivity and space closely interact and the ideological dimensions of space. Spatial practices assert a subjectivity. In enacting a particular lifestyle and practices in space, this not only allows for differentiation. Space allows for liberation. With such spatial existences and practices, this enacts a vision of what Jewish existence in the homeland means and allows this vision to be physically (re)created. Importantly, it shows how liberation and empowerment can come from space and spatial practices where the Hilltop Youth embody the performativity aspect of space. Significantly, such practices also seek to liberate space itself and the perceived meaning and nature of this space. Practices not only (re)create a different vision of this space but, in such ideological relations, rescue the meaning and nature of this space itself. Practices are therefore both acts of ideology and acts of security. Again, my analysis is of value in capturing the different natures of space. Such analysis also further displays the intimacy of (in)security and space and the different securitisations of space in the Israeli case.

After identifying central characteristics and ideologies of ‘the Hilltop Youth,’ I will further discuss perceptions. One Israeli military individual presented ideologies in the Hilltop Youth as such:

they believe in the Messiah. They strongly believe in a large Israel. They strongly believe the State of Israel made all the mistakes against Jews. They strongly believe Arabs have no place here. They strongly believe the only law they can respect is the law of the Torah, not the law of the State of Israel, because this is the real law. Their sources are Meir Kahane. They believe in rabbis who say we are the selected nation by G-d, the Bible protects us for over 4000 years. And they are the real force and the real people of Israel...there is a strong belief they are the real Jewish.23
The interviewee stated that “I think it’s the most racist, fascist group you can imagine.” How such ideologies connect with Price-Tag violence and relations with the State of Israel will be a central focus. The Hilltop Youth also generate condemnation from rabbis and settlers, in particular National-Religious circles. Rabbi Melamed [2016a], a prominent National-Religious rabbi, wrote a critical article on their ideologies/activities. Whilst acknowledging that there are “various” levels in the hilltop communities and “the numbers are difficult to estimate...it is widely assumed that tens of them are carrying out violent and heinous acts”:

clearly, there are youth among the residents of the hilltop communities who publicly bring shame to the Torah and the nation. They claim to love the Land of Israel, but in reality, abhor all the people engaged in its settlement and the soldiers who protect the Jewish residents there thanks to the State of Israel. Theoretically they love the Jewish nation, but in practice, they seem to hate Jews. They think that the only way to redeem the Land of Israel is by means of unauthorized building. By doing that, they are in conflict with all the righteous settlers. They despise their peers who study Torah in yeshivas and serve in the army, protecting the nation and the land.

In contrast, one prominent Hilltop Youth individual, Meir Ettinger [2017a], presents key beliefs and driving-forces within the Hilltop Youth’s ideologies/activities:

the hilltop youth preserves the pioneering and the belief that all settlers had until a decade ago...our right to the entire Land of Israel, and the integrity of the Holy Torah...and longing for the Temple and the Kingdom of Israel.

Ettinger positions the Hilltop Youth as the preservers of the settler movement. Ettinger argues that, unlike other sectors of the settler community, the Hilltop Youth are uncompromising with their belief, rights, and mission. In discussing the Hilltop Youth, settlers and rabbis I spoke with were critical. One ‘moderate’ settler described them as “extreme and hate-ridden.” Despite being at different ends of the political spectrum, and many critical of the State’s ‘evacuations’ of Jewish settlements, all National-Religious settlers and rabbis I spoke with disapproved of the Hilltop Youth’s ideologies and practices. One rabbi declared that “they are frowned upon by mainstream-society.” Another rabbi stated that “they are a fringe group. They do not have legitimacy.” One rabbi described them as “wild ruffians” and “extremists.” 24 Asked if there is any way they can sympathise with their ideology, they answered “with these extremist people, no.” 25
Another settler declared that “this is not our way. Their illegal and violent acts are something we do not do. They are not part of the mainstream-settler community.” The Hilltop Youth do not associate with Mamluchi ideology. This ideology is a pro-State ideology which reveres the State of Israel as a sacred being of redemption. The ideology is central to National-Religious Zionism (Chapter Two). Such ideology has been used to denounce the Hilltop Youth. One National Religious settler, for example, stated that

Rabbi Zvi Tau says the State is sacred. We do not fight. We do not lift a hand against soldiers. Even the Right are law-abiding. 99.9% of people. Independence Day is seen as something sacred.

For this interviewee, the Mamluchi position is greater than the violence and ‘extremism’ on the margins. Of particular significance for interactions and disjunctures which I am tracing is how interviewees explain the growth of the Hilltop Youth. All interviewees discussed the centrality of the Gaza Disengagement, and for also impacting behaviour:

before the Disengagement, they were more peaceful. They go to some hilltop, herd sheep. Maybe have some minor skirmishes with Arabs. After the Disengagement, they became first of all more nuanced, and second more aggressive.

As well as embodying disjunctures and extremism on ideological and political levels, accounting for how and why the Hilltop Youth have developed further reflects significant disjunctures. One settler stated that:

it’s a response to the Disengagement. The movement says ‘we no longer trust the State of Israel, no longer see the IDF as holy, it carries out evil. We look out for ourselves.’ It was a very extreme response to the Disengagement. It definitely created that movement.

A number of youth have become (further) critical of the Mamluchi position, instead expressing different beliefs of and relations with the State of Israel. A 2008 interview captured this shift:

for the original Gush Emunim and Yesha founders, there was no question that the state was positive, that they were loyal to it and that they should act from within the state regardless of which government was in power. Nowadays, many of their children see the state as a problem not a solution and as an obstacle that should be removed.
As an "extreme fringe" and embodying radical disjunctures with the State of Israel, their activities have brought individuals into confrontation with State forces. The Hilltop Youth have attracted particular attention for their suspected involvement in acts of violence. Increasingly Hilltop Youth individuals, and other ‘extremist settlers,’ have received exceptional measures from Israel’s Civil Administration and Israeli defence/security agencies. Measures include being issued with ‘administrative-orders’ (or ‘restraining-orders’). They are referred to as ‘distancing-orders’ or ‘expulsion-orders’ by certain settlers. Individuals are prevented from entering Judea and Samaria, or particular spaces within, for certain amounts of time. Other restrictions are also placed on movements, such as individuals not allowed to leave home at night, and forbidden to contact certain individuals. The orders can be extended. A smaller number of Hilltop Youth have been held in administrative detention, which is detention without trial for an indefinite time. This is a practice reserved for ‘exceptional circumstances’ and a practice traditionally only imposed on Palestinians. Such measures reflect a new era in some State-settler relations. The measures are also conceptually significant to CSS and Political Geography. They show how spatial practices can be deployed by the State against its own subjects. Furthermore, how ‘space’ itself can be used as a mode of punishment or security procedure, for example preventing entry to space. In such utilisation, the nature of space itself is transformed.

For Hilltop Youth I spoke with, such treatments are seen as punitive measures and symbolic of the persecution which they feel they face from the State of Israel. Discussing such treatment of the Hilltop Youth, Ettinger [2017a] wrote “the establishment persecutes so brutally and brutally...terrified that there were boys with an ideology who were willing to give their souls for a purpose.” Ettinger [2017a] further argues that “the clear (and declared) purpose of the actions of the Jewish gang in the Shin Bet is to destroy the hilltop youth.” In discussing the State’s treatment of the Hilltop Youth, one Hilltop Youth individual stated that “they want to break the spirit, they want to scare me.” But, they declared, “I have fear only from G-d.”

Such restrictive and exceptional measures reflect how concerned security forces are with activities and relations. As one Hilltop Youth remarked to me, “they fear our power and coordination.” In the wake of violent incidents against Palestinians and State forces, seventeen restraining-orders were issued against Hilltop Youth in one month. They were issued in response to acts of violence and “aiming to reduce terrorist attacks carried out by Jews there” [Ben Kimon, 2017b]. The measures, Israel’s Deputy Attorney General stated, are “a preventive tool designed to save lives” and “simply saves lives.”
forces heightened their activities against Hilltop Youth after the 2015 Duma Price-Tag attack. Its significance will be discussed in Part Five.

In speaking with one Hilltop Youth member, I stated that people say it is the Hilltop Youth who are leading events. The interviewee replied, “yes, we are taking control and defending.” But, they added, “there’s an argument going on in the Hilltop Youth between whether we should go build another house on a hilltop or make Price-Tag.” It is the Hilltop Youth’s association with and suspected involvement in Price-Tag attacks which has made them a particular focus of the State of Israel. The significance of Price-Tag violence will now be the focus of assessment, continuing analysis of the Hilltop Youth and discussions from previous chapters, where Price-Tag violence reveals new strategies of confrontation/resistance and critical ruptures.

**Part Two: The Emergence of Price-Tag Violence**

In 2008, the following statement was published:

>a new era has come to Judea and Samaria. For every evacuation, for every demolition and destruction, for every stone moved, [the Israeli government] will get war. We call this 'mutual responsibility,'[...]for every act of destruction in the southern Hebron hills we will set fire to Samaria, and for a container destroyed near Har Bracha we will exact a price in the southern Hebron hills [quoted UNOCHA, 2008].

This ‘new era’ was enacted. On the 19th June 2008, "violent riots broke out...between residents of the Yitzhar settlement in [the] West Bank and police forces, during the tearing down of an illegal structure in Havat Shaked,” a settlement-outpost located near Yitzhar. The confrontation caused injuries on both sides [Weiss, 2008] but resulted in much more. Later that day, violence occurred in spaces around Yitzhar- burning olive orchards, assaulting Palestinians, and vandalising their property [UNOCHA, 2008:9]. This was the first known enactment of the 'Price-Tag' strategy where attacks were "in response to the executed demolition of one settler caravan in Givat Shaked” [UNESCO Chair, 2012:31].
'Price-Tag' attacks have been connected with Hilltop Youth [Kershner, 2008; Eiran and Krause, 2016], and individuals from Yitzhar [Satherley, 2012; Miskin, 2014a]. Price-Tag perpetrators are categorised differently by analysts/individuals. For example, 'Price-Tags' are "hate crimes...committed by self-styled pro-settler revenge terrorists who evidently stop at nothing and respect no laws" [Horowitz, 2015]; "a hooligan and fringe element that exists within the mainstream Israeli and settler communities" [Asali, 2013]; “young militant Israeli settlers” [Nir, 2011]; “allegedly perpetrated primarily by religious nationalist radicals in isolated settlements or outposts” [Leibler, 2014]; “nationalist attacks by Jewish extremists” [Hartman, Gravé-Lazi, 2014], or, as one former Shin Bet official positioned, “a group of fundamentalist ideological criminals...[who] don’t recognize the law of the land.”

Then-Justice Minister Livni declared that Price-Tag perpetrators are “an extremist ideological group based in certain settlements...that doesn’t adhere to any authority” [quoted Haaretz, 2014b]. Then-Public Security Minister Aharonovitch stated perpetrators “are part of the extreme right” and “not a few bad apples but a large number of people” [quoted Khoury, 2014]. With security forces warning in 2008 of increased settler extremism [Benn and Haartez Correspondent, 2008], then-Infrastructure Minister Ben-Eliezer declared that “[the settlers] don’t think like us. Their thought is messianic, mystic, satanic and irrational” [quoted Benn and Haaretz Correspondent, 2008]. With hundreds of Price-Tags committed, we cannot say all were motivated by the same influences.

However, the nature of attacks, sites targeted, and graffiti serve as windows into who perpetrators deem it is legitimate to attack and motivations. Rather than “irrational” thought, certain ideological, political and nationalist influences can be discerned.

In accounting for Price-Tag attacks, authors characterise its nature in different ways and point to certain (ideological) influences. I argue that Price-Tag violence is also a means to pursue visions and agendas. Importantly, these connect with central questions which this thesis has traced, namely the meaning of ‘the (re)creation of the Jewish State’ and ‘the return to the homeland.’ I will briefly assess two ideological and political influences evident in the nature of Price-Tag violence: Meir Kahane, and Yitzchak Ginsburgh. I will then critically question whether Price-Tag attacks can be seen as the continuation of historic acts of settler vigilantism before assessing the emergence of Price-Tag violence in a self-declared “new era” and what this signifies.
The first discernible ideological influence is the late Rabbi Kahane. As discussed (Chapter Two), Kahane was a right-wing rabbi who espoused an extreme version of Jewish nationalism. The influence of Kahane on Price-Tag violence was declared by a number of interviewees. One Israeli security analyst stated that “Price-Taggers are Kahanists” and one Israeli military figure stated that “their roots are Kahane.” Boudreau [2014] found he remains a strong influence in particular settler-communities and amongst Hilltop Youth. For one Hilltop Youth individual and Price-Tag proponent, the ‘truth’ and guidance of Kahane are a central influence in their everyday action: "he’s great, he talks a lot of true things. Rabbi Kahane said the Arabs are like cancer."\(^40\) ‘Kahane was Right’ has been written at various attacks, signifying ideological/political influence.\(^41\)

Declaring exclusive Jewish rights over the whole of ‘Eretz Yisrael’ and asserting coexistence is not an option [Kahane, 1974b], Kahane "was consistent in his demand to evict all Arabs from Eretz Israel" [Sprinzak, 1999:190]. Price-Tag messages have vocalised this, with graffiti ‘Arabs out’ written in a number of Price-Tags [APN]. Attacks have also targeted mixed and largely non-Jewish communities in Jerusalem and in Israel. Vehicles and properties have been vandalised, and mosques, churches and monasteries burnt. Accompanying graffiti vocalises nationalist messages and hostility to the non-Jewish ‘other’: ‘Stop assimilation’; ‘Only goyim should be evacuated from our land’\(^42\)/‘Only goyim are turned out of our country’;\(^43\) ‘Goyim in the country=enemies’;\(^44\) ‘Close Mosques, not Yeshivas’; ‘death to Christians, the heretical enemies of Israel.’\(^45\) The indiscriminate targeting of Palestinians and non-Jewish communities reflect that they are situated as the ‘other’ and ‘enemy.’ One Hilltop Youth discussed how Price-Tag attacks are used to express and pursue an ideological/nationalist (in)security agenda through violence:

> first of all, we need to take the Arabs out of Israel...when a Jew goes and burns an Arab car, he makes a statement that ‘you are not supposed to be here, you’re my enemy.’ Someone who wants to kill you, you kill him first. A teaching says ‘take out all the goyim that sits in Israel because if you don’t do that to them, they will do that to you.’\(^46\)

Price-Tag attacks also connect with Kahane’s teachings of ‘mutual responsibility’ and ‘revenge’ [Sprinzak, 1999:209]. Kahane promoted this on a practical level. From 1974 he publicly advocated *Terror Neged Terror*: Jewish terrorism against Palestinian/Arab terrorism and emphasised the principle of ‘mutual responsibility,’ coming to the aid of all Jews who face insecurity and a Jewish value of caring for others in the community. A small number of Price-Tag attacks have been enacted in the aftermath of Palestinian attacks.
against Jewish individuals. In May 2013, attacks occurred in the aftermath of the killing of settler Evyatar Borovsky. Bearing the Eviatar/Evyatar ‘tag,’ violence was enacted upon a variety of targets in the West Bank, Jerusalem and in the village of Umm al-Qutuf, home to mainly Palestinians inside Israel. Graffiti left at attacks read: ‘price-tag,’ ‘Eviatar,’ and the Star of David graphited on a mosque’s wall; ‘30 days since Eviatar- may God avenge his death,’ and ‘Jewish blood is not cheap’; ‘revenge,’ ‘regards from Baruch Tzuri to Eviatar’ [APN]. Bearing Eviatar’s name, the individual was ‘avenged’ through acts of violence where it was publicly communicated that ‘Jewish blood is not cheap.’

Yet whilst Price-Tags are based on the ‘Mutual Responsibility’ (Arvut Hadadit) concept, significantly this emerged in response to the State’s practices. Furthermore, the majority of attacks are enacted in contexts of outpost ‘evacuations,’ and are acts aimed at the State. How this impacts on the nature and significance of Price-Tag violence will be discussed forthcoming. Finally, Kahane advocated Jewish violence and strength on religious and existential levels as Kiddush Hashem (Chapter Two). The performativity of Price-Tag attacks assert Jewish force and pride, activating Jewish agency against insecurity and for projects of perceived security. The ontological and existential dynamics within violence are largely overlooked in analyses but were disclosed in conversations which I had with more extremist settlers and Hilltop Youth. One Hilltop Youth interviewee stated that a goal in Price-Tags is “revenge” where such ‘revenge’ is “to bring back Jewish respect, honour, national pride.” This mirrors Kahane’s teachings. For this interviewee, violence is not only on a political level, but is ideological and existential- fighting for what they believe the Jewish nation should be, and asserting this through acts of violence. Such violence illuminates different aspects and meanings of perceived security.

Whilst Israeli security analysts and military individuals I spoke with criticised that rabbis were not doing enough to stop Price-Tag attacks, they also stated that there is rabbinal influence behind them. Foxman [2014] writes that perpetrators are driven by a philosophy of vengeance directed at those who do not share their extreme political or religious beliefs, and are often inspired by religious and other communal leaders espousing messages of hate. Infamous among these is Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburg.

The second discernible ideological influence within Price-Tag violence is Rabbi Ginsburgh. As discussed (Chapter Two), Ginsburgh is a Chabad rabbi and head of the Od Yosef Chai Yeshiva in the settlement of Yitzhar. A number of connections have made between Price-Tag perpetrators, and other acts of settler violence, and Yitzhar and the Od Yosef Chai
Yeshiva. The ‘Price-Tag manifesto’ has been credited with Rabbi Elitzur from this yeshiva and yeshiva graduates (see below). Yitzhar residents,\(^{51}\) and individuals connected, have been arrested on suspicion of Price-Tag violence \([\text{Rosenberg, 2014}]\). In 2014 then-Justice Minister Livni called Price-Tags “hate crimes that have come over from Yitzhar into the State of Israel” \([\text{quoted Ezra, 2014}]\).

In April 2014, Israeli security forces seized control of the Od Yosef Chai Yeshiva and closed it for a number of weeks “in response to the settler violence targeting the security forces” and, “the army said...because it was used in the past by settlers as a base from which they attacked Palestinian villages in the area as well as Israeli security forces” \([\text{Jpost.com staff, 2014b}]\). Two publications authored by rabbis at the Yeshiva led to their arrests on charges of ‘inciting racist violence.’\(^{54}\) Whilst Ginsburgh has not publicly endorsed Price-Tag attacks nor been arrested for involvement,\(^{55}\) Satherley \([\text{2013}]\) assesses that there are aspects of Ginsburgh’s ‘theosopy’ which must be assessed in relation to the attacks, and motivations which may influence violence.

Ginsburgh emphasises significant principles.\(^{56}\) As discussed (Chapters Two and Three), exclusive Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael is asserted as a ‘duty’ and central for peace and redemption \([\text{Ginsburgh, 2003}]\). These frameworks bring concerns upon territorial compromises and evacuations by the Israeli State. Satherley \([\text{2013:78}]\) assesses that these are not merely “gross affronts to Jewish law, but...represents a deplorable set-back in the process of earthly and heavenly tikkun.” Secondly, the inherent divine ontological separation between Jews and non-Jews needs to be realised practically. Furthermore, the blood of Jews and non-Jews is inherently unequal\(^{57}\) and Ginsburgh situates ‘the Arabs’\(^{58}\) as ‘Ishmael,’ the Biblical enemy of the Jewish people. In 1996 Rabbi Yoel Bin-Nun warned of significant dangers Yitzhar's yeshiva and “Rabbi Ginzburg and his doctrine posed.”\(^{59}\)

Within a Kabbalistic framework, “Ginsburgh has an alternative conception of how ‘true’ peace can be achieved,” where Jewish violence plays a positive and important role.\(^{60}\) Jewish “affirmativeness and boldness” indicates “continuously...ready to fight, physically, for our right to inherit our land” \([\text{Ginsburgh, 2003:66-7}]\). Vengeance is an assertion of Jewish identity and ‘uprightness,’ a virtue to raise morale and restore honour \([\text{Satherley, 2013:78-83}]\). Furthermore, ‘vengeance’ is seen as a positive Jewish act where, Ginsburgh writes \([\text{2003:92}]\), all Jews have a “duty to sanctify His Name by taking vengeance” where “Israel's honour is God's honour, and Israel's vengeance takes on a deeper meaning as God's vengeance.”\(^{61}\) For Ginsburgh, acting on divine impulses, ‘impulsive revenge attacks’ and personal sacrifice are Kiddush Hashem (sanctification of G-d's Name) \([\text{Seeman, 2003}])
2005] and acts of vengeance are “associated with the beginning of the ‘world to come.’” Recognition of such frameworks brings contributions to CSS in showing different meanings of security and how violence is perceived to play a positive and necessary role.

With Ginsburgh’s theosophy defined as “anarchic” [Seeman, 2005:1015], Satherley assesses how individuals engaging in Price-Tags and other violence may be influenced by Ginsburgh’s teachings. In particular, the privileging of impulsive physical acts, notions of revenge, how ‘the Simple Jew’ has connections with ideologies of the Hilltop Youth, celebration of the assertion of individual Jewish agency as “privileging of personal experience and subjective authenticity” [Seeman, 2005:1019], and other principles I have discussed. In 2014, security officials estimated that close to one hundred “far-right activists from the Yitzhar settlement and hilltop outposts north of Ramallah and the south Hebron Hills” were involved in ‘hate crimes’ where “the activists base their acts on ideas of the extremist rabbi Yitzchak Ginzburg” [Harel et al., 2014]. Finally, Tessa Satherley [2013] argues that Price-Tags are the continuation of historic settler vigilantism, fitting previous vigilante models where “the mantle has passed to the Hilltop Youth...and acts in this classic vigilante mould have adopted the ‘price tag’ signature” [60]. Settler vigilante violence against Palestinians in the West Bank was prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s. David Weisbrud [1982] researched that historic settler vigilantism was enacted in contexts of violence perpetrated by Palestinians, largely against settlers, and the perceived inability or ineffectiveness of the IDF to protect settlers. Wesibrud assessed that vigilante violence centred on seeking to ensure security and deterrence, and cementing control over Eretz Yisrael. Vigilante acts in the 1970s/80s enjoyed broad support among Gush Emunim settlers and a sizeable number participated in the acts. Therefore, as Chapter Three documented, settler violence against Palestinians has history where the majority of historic settler attacks have been against Palestinians. Furthermore, acts of settler violence against Palestinians continues to be widely documented [Bt’Selem; DCI, 2010; UNOCHA, 2008; UNOCHA, 2017; Yesh Din].

Whilst a few Price-Tags have been enacted in the aftermath of Palestinian attacks against Jewish individuals, and seeking control over the Land is a key goal, there are, however, significant differences between Price-Tag attacks and historic settler violence. I argue that Price-Tag violence must be assessed not within a vigilante framework for a number of key reasons. Firstly, whilst historic settler vigilantism enjoyed broad support within the settler community, Price-Tags have been widely denounced by the settler-mainstream (discussed forthcoming) and conducted by, as one settler described, “the fringe of the
fringe.” Secondly, whilst ‘deterrence’ is a key goal, unlike historic settler violence, revenge and deterrence are not predominantly “against Arabs,” even though the majority of attacks are perpetrated upon Palestinians. The attacks are usually enacted in contexts of evacuations by Israeli State forces and, as I will discuss forthcoming, the main target of the violence is the State of Israel. Thirdly, on ideological and political levels, Price-Tags do not fit the ‘vigilante model.’ Ehud Sprinzak [1987:211n9] assesses that what characterizes the vigilante state of mind is the profound conviction that the government or some of its agencies have failed to enforce their own order...vigilantes, in effect, enforce the law and execute justice.

Whilst backed by the norm of self-defence and acting in the name of what they believe to be the valid law of the land, vigilantes operate within the system [Sprinzak, 1987; Weisbrud, 1989; Pedahzur and Perliger 2003]. Weisbrud [1989] discovered supporters viewed it as extra- but not anti-legal action. In Price-Tag attacks, it is exactly that State forces are enforcing their laws and order i.e. outpost/structure evacuations, which stimulates responses. Rather than working within the system, Price-Tag perpetrators are actualising their objection to this law and order and resisting against it, instead seeking to enforce their ‘own system’ and justice through violence/violent resistance.

Fourthly, Satherley [2013:59] states that within this vigilante framework “the price tag slogan and targeting of the IDF are novel features.” Rather than “novel features,” I argue that Price-Tag violence as a whole must be thought of as a new form of violence and reflects critical disjunctures, which I will expand on next. As a phenomena of violence that is directed primarily at the State of Israel, Price-Tags mark a new strategy and era of violent confrontation/resistance by a sector of the settler community. This is lodged in struggles against settlement evacuations, and other practices deemed as insecurity from the State, and struggles for securing projects and existences. With violence deemed a crucial act of and for security this is of important conceptual value to CSS. It displays the different aspects and focuses of this security which I will alert to in my analysis. The use of such violence also poses important questions to CSS: Can engaging in such violence, in the name of (in)security, be deemed legitimate, or is it only the State who can authroise and legitimise the use of violence for security concerns?

**Price-Tag Violence: Disjuncture in the Post-Disengagement Era**

Identifying ideologies/motivations is important for recognising influences within the violence. However, we need to assess why Price-Tag violence itself has emerged. And, why
violence is deemed legitimate for some. Accounting for the emergence of Price-Tags and the performativity of attacks is a crucial assessment. In literature, the Gaza Disengagement is a key event discussed. As Nir [2011] writes, “it is impossible to comprehend the roots of this [Price-tag] campaign without examining the traumatic impact that Israel's August 2005 withdrawal...had on the settlers.” Price-Tag violence reflects significant shifts within the settler movement and State-settler relations. The violence denotes disjuncture.

As observed, some settlers openly declared that attacks are contained within and represent a “new era.” The emergence of this violence reveals different disjunctive impacts of the Disengagement and Amona evacuation (Chapters Four and Five). The significance of the violence in its nature, strategies and impacts (discussed later), reflects a heightening of disjuncture and extremism. I argue that Price-Tag violence, as disjuncture, reflects disjuncture on three levels which will underpin analysis. Firstly, a tactical-strategic level. Secondly, a political-ideological-ethical level. Thirdly, an ideological-relational level, a radical disjuncture with the State of Israel.

Firstly, Price-Tag violence reflects a tactical-strategic disjuncture. Eiran and Krause [2016] assess that “Price-tag is the latest iteration in a decades-old debate within the national-religious settler community over how best to expand settlements and safeguard them against removal.” Historically the mainstream- and National-Religious- settler movement have worked closely with the Israeli State to advance interests. However, with realities of evacuation, and other communities/structures under such threat, this again generated critical reflection regarding approaches. The emergence of Price-Tag violence signifies a tactical-strategic disjuncture. As Nisan assesses, “this is action based on what are seen as the lessons of the failure to 'save' Gush Katif, which are giving rise to a more militant activist approach” [quoted Jeffay, 2008]. The violent confrontation/resistance in Amona was perceived to have practical and political impact. With the shock perpetrated by this historic confrontation, "the Amona clashes verified that the strategic use of violence worked as a means to resist the State" [UNESCO Chair, 2012:31].

Whilst settlers did not stop the outpost houses being evacuated, for more than one year after Israel’s government did not evacuate further outposts. This freeze was, according to MK Uri Ariel, because the response by settlers in Amona "deterred the military and police establishment":

> the fact that since Amona not even one outpost has been uprooted...stems directly from the fact that the form of the battle in Amona has presented the military and police with an intolerable price tag [quoted Nir, 2011].
An interview I had with a Hilltop Youth individual captured strategic concern and (re)thinking post-Disengagement. As the interviewee discussed, what preoccupies efforts in the Hilltop Youth is a question. "The question is, what did we learn from Gush Katif? They succeeded in doing that. What do we need to do to stop this happening again?" Rather than waiting for insecurities to come into spaces, for this interviewee, individuals need to assert active agency in space and engage in direct confrontation/resistance if required: "I think it's a problem because we are waiting for them in our houses. We need to go out, do something, not wait for it to happen." A new performativity is therefore activated in space for the defence of space, a valuable discussion for Political Geography.

In 2008, the evacuation of outposts, and illegal structures in settlements, resumed on a small-scale. State forces had learnt lessons. In order to avoid large-scale confrontations or 'showdowns' between 'settlers' and 'the State,' like the 2006 Amona battle, time was a strategic weapon employed. Outposts were largely evacuated rapidly, without prior warning, usually at night/early hours. This reduced mobilisation possibilities for settlers to arrive in spaces of evacuation to confront/resist. However, lessons were learnt on both sides. As one Hilltop Youth informed me, "after Amona, the government got smart. But we got smarter." Any destruction is deemed unacceptable and a violation. The question was not should confrontation/resistance continue, but how in a new context? In 2009, Rabbi Elitzur released a statement advocating "acts of mutual guarantee":

> we have power too and we will use it at the time and place of our choice...we do not discriminate: *if the Jews don't have quiet, the Arabs won't have quiet*...all that leads to *graceful activities with lots of joy*...we can carry out quiet and deep operations simultaneously with *widespread acts of disorder* [quoted UNESCO Chair, 2012:35].

Speaking anonymously in 2011, one Hilltop Youth leader explained the founding of the 'Price-Tag' or 'Mutual Responsibility' idea, providing an insight into motivations:

> one evening, about three years ago, a few people sat in a small settlement in Samaria and looked for a solution. The IDF would demolish settlement outposts without a response, because people simply weren't able to reach the [sites]...for these people, who did not have the privilege to oppose the demolition, the concept of 'mutual responsibility' was born that evening...the media decided to call it the 'Price Tag' [quoted Nir, 2011].
Price-Tag violence is a means to ensure that resistance against State actions can continue and individuals continue the "privilege" of opposition through other means. If time is the State's weapon, space and instability are settlers where "radical settlers" and "militants" have "spawned a broader, more defined strategy of resistance designed to intimidate the state" [Kershner, 2008]. The strategies within Price-Tag violence and impacts of the attacks will be identified forthcoming.

Secondly, Price-Tag violence reflects a political-ideological-ethical disjuncture which I have traced regarding critical questioning of 'evacuation' and responses to this. One Israeli military individual presented what they said was "a new mind-set" which they hear post-Amona in more extreme elements of the settler community: "we will not be surrounded like we were in Gaza. We will not let them grab us like sheep as they did in Gaza. Instead, there will be violent activities. Much more, much more."73 This notion of resistance mirrors how one settler, Revital Sorek, from the Givat Assaf outpost reacted in 2011 to threats of evacuation:

> this is our home and we will not give in easily...in the event that things reach an evacuation, then yes, there will be use of force. We will not go like lambs to the slaughter [quoted Sanders, 2011].74

Sorek took issue with the very concepts and acts of evacuation and relocation which she said were "out of the question," declaring "you don't move a Jewish community in the Land of Israel."75 This reflects how such reality is deemed an affront. Yitzhak Shadmi, then-director of the Samaria Settlers' Council, pronounced that “dismantling is for us a crime. And if it is a crime it must be prevented” [quoted Nir, 2011]. Whilst settlers are critical of what they see is violent conduct by State forces in settlement 'expulsions,' one extremist settler critically focused on the 'essence of expulsion and destruction' itself:

> the very essence of expulsion and destruction of Jewish homes is violent. Whilst we critique the violent approaches of forces, what we take issue with is the acts and realities themselves.76

In asking one Hilltop Youth individual how they would (re)act against future evacuations, they stated "I will go and fight for Eretz Yisrael, to try to stop the big Chilul Hashem (desecration of G-d’s name) they want to do here, because it’s a Chilul Hashem no matter who takes Jews out from their homes."77 Again, this exposes how such actions by the State are deemed an affront and desecration where individuals feel it is legitimate to resist.
against. I argue that Price-Tag violence is a heightening of radicalisation from the shift witnessed in the 2006 Amona evacuation.

The Amona evacuation was a significant turning-point within some State-settler relations. (Re)actions were markedly different from the Disengagement (Chapter Four). I conceptualised that Amona emerged out of and constituted a disjunctive moment. The battle of and for Amona, and the spectacle of violence there, revealed that some individuals were willing to more violently confront/resist against the State in defence of communities, space, and what these represent. Not only did Amona symbolise that pathways to new (re)actions had been opened, but these broke taboos. In 2008, then-Shin Bet Chief Yuval Diskin discussed a significant shift in approach in settler communities. Diskin warned that if there was a decision to ‘evacuate more territory,’

the scope of the conflict will be much larger than it is today [than]...during the disengagement. Our investigation found a very high willingness among this public to use violence- not just stones, but live ammunition- and not only in the West Bank, in order to prevent or halt a diplomatic process...their approach began with the slogan ‘through love, we will win’ during the [Gaza] disengagement, but has now reached ‘through war, we will win’ [quoted Benn and Haaretz Correspondent, 2008].

Price-Tag attacks not only represent a tactical-strategic shift but increased radicalisation and extremism in a narrative of disjuncture. In discussing this extremism and willingness to use violence post-Disengagement, Diskin situated this as reflective of fractures within settler and religious communities, and in some State-settler relations, declaring ”what we are seeing today is the result of a deep rift” [quoted Benn and Haaretz Correspondent, 2008]. In 2008, the Shin Bet believed there to be “a few hundred extremists of this type.” Diskin stated “there is no clear leadership...they are motivated by a unity of purpose- not to allow the security forces to evacuate people” [quoted Benn and Haaretz Correspondent, 2008]. Reaffirming the significance of the disjunctive moments of the Disengagement and Amona, one high-ranking Israeli military individual also assessed changes in perceptions and approaches:

to the settler community, both were very dramatic events, both of them. Because at the time they believed nothing would happen. In the end they would succeed in the struggle against Gaza. The event of Gaza brought them to the violent event in Amona. And now what I hear is ‘don’t make the same mistake we did in the past.
Now we have to fight, immediately, not wait. *We have to be more extremist. We have to be more radical in our fighting...we have lost trust.*

One Israeli military individual further discussed significant changes in perceptions. Again, this reflects a narrative of disjuncture and, I argue, where Price-Tag attacks constitute such ‘fight’:

the Gaza evacuation and the Amona evacuation brought the settlers to the point that *if we will not fight for ourselves, nobody will fight for us.* This is the atmosphere. This is the way they will react. So we will find strong activities on the ground.

Thirdly, Price-Tag violence reflects an ideological-relational disjuncture. Historically, settlers have worked closely with the State of Israel to advance settler interests. However, “the main price-tag perpetrators- the "hilltop youth"...have decided to confront the state” [Eiran and Krause, 2016]. Again, the use of violence is a political-strategic shift. “Price-tag is a *new form of political violence* perpetrated by the hilltop youth in order to maintain Israeli territorial control in the West Bank” and “to secure settlement expansion” [Eiran and Krause, 2016]. This ‘new form of political violence’ has “strategic logic.” Eiran and Krause [2016] assesses this in three areas: ‘triadic deterrence,’ ‘chain-ganging,’ and pre-emptive spoiling’ where “Price-Tags have potential to shift the political landscape within and between Israelis and Palestinians.” The fears of such shifts on the part of the State of Israel serve to protect settler interests.

However, as Eiran and Krause [2016] also assess, “price-tag represents a *new form of violence...most specifically in its relationship with the Israeli state.*” Price-Tags are a phenomena and acts of violence directed primarily at the State of Israel. Post-Disengagement and Post-Amona, for some, the State of Israel is (further) positioned in critical (in)security terms where Price-Tag violence reflects the degeneration of an historic pact in some State-settler relations. Eiran and Krause [2016] write that “the main price-tag perpetrators- the hilltop youth...see the state as a significant threat after its withdrawal from Gaza” and, “the hilltop youth perceive the government as the biggest threat to their enterprise.”

The State’s practices, particularly acts of evacuation, have brought into question the (in)security of the Jewish State of Israel and relations with it. Critical (in)security perceptions of the State, and radical disjunctive relations with it, were expressed by Hilltop Youth individuals. As one Hilltop Youth expressed, "we ask Hashem to save us from
the State." A Hilltop Youth interviewee alerted to how the State of Israel is held in a deep metaphysics of insecurity:

Rabbi Ginsburgh says the State is like a shell crushing the nut. A nut first needs his shell around him because it protects him. But comes the time when the shell starts to squeeze the nut and it can die, it can die. *We got to the time when we need to break the shell so we can live, so we can live here...it comes the time when you need to break the shell because it threats to kill you.*

The interviewee clarified that ‘the shell’ is the State of Israel, and ‘the nut’ being crushed is the Jewish soul and Jewish existence. The State is deemed a significant security threat on different levels. In ‘evacuating’ Jewish communities and placing limits upon Jewish freedoms, rights and existence, therefore limiting and oppressing projects and practices of security, the State is ‘crushing’ what this individual sees as the Jewish soul and Jewish existence in the homeland. The need to ’break the shell’ becomes an existential necessity for ‘living,’ serving to legitimise and necessitate confrontation/resistance against the State which, in eyes of some, is synonymous with insecurity.

This transformation is of crucial conceptual value to the sub-disciplines of CSS and Political Geography. Not only does this reflect a paradox of security- a State which promises existential security is now itself seen as a security threat and a threat to existential security. This also negates the dominant concept in modern politics and Security Studies that the state serves as the security racket for its citizens. With this perceived security threat amplified due to the State's acts against space and settlement, it further shows the significance of these and the intimacy of space and (in)security. Such extremism and radical ideological-relational disjuncture will be further discussed in Part Five where I will also assess how Price-Tag violence connects with these relations and (in)security concerns and agendas with the uncovering of the Revolt Network which has called for the State of Israel's destruction.

**Part Three: Price-Tag Attacks**

As well as disjuncture, Price-Tag violence is also a strategy. As a strategy of violence/violent resistance, what do Price-Tags seek to achieve? Drawing on attacks and assessments, I will identify three discernible strategies/motivations. Firstly revenge. Secondly, deterrence. Thirdly, coercive deterrence. Given the nature and impacts of the violence (discussed forthcoming), I argue that all three motivations underpin Price-tag attacks. Again, this ordering is not to indicate that one is more important than the other.
but is for analytical purposes. The focus of this assessment is what these motivations signify about the nature of such attacks, how space is used, and how Price-Tag violence is significant in State-settler relations.

The first motivation of Price-Tag violence is revenge.

Across the West Bank, there’s a war of attrition going on between the Hilltop Youth and their own security forces. The Israeli police are trying to stop them establishing outposts on this land. Price Tags are the Hilltop Youth’s revenge [Panorama, 2013].

The enactment of a Price-Tag indicates the immediate context/event which stimulated the act. Attacks predominantly occur following the evacuation of an outpost, or structure(s) within [Nir, 2011; APN]. Price-Tags constitute a direct ‘price’ for the evacuation. With attacks also known as ‘Mutual Guarantee,’ the guarantee is that an act by the State against settlement will be met with a near-immediate counter-response, and a ‘price’ should be expected. As one settler leader declared: "whenever an evacuation is carried out—whether it is a bus, a trailer or a small outpost— we will respond." With graffiti left at the majority of attacks, perpetrators wish to communicate their attack and message. The word Tag-Mechir or Arvut Hadadit are often accompanied with other graffiti. This is important as it makes clear the attack is a 'Price-Tag' attack, rather than another incident of settler violence endured by Palestinians.

Price-Tag attacks are designed and enacted strategically, ideologically and politically distinct. Although Price-Tags are usually enacted on Palestinian targets, graffiti reveals they are directed principally to an Israeli audience, specifically the Israeli State. As the UNESCO Chair [2012:34] discusses, graffiti is written in Hebrew, a language most Palestinians cannot read, and references people/places they have no knowledge of. Furthermore, the actual Price-Tag strategy is aimed predominantly at the State of Israel. Military individuals I spoke with stated that whilst the attacks “are on the easy target which is the Palestinians, the main target is actually the State.”

With Tag-Mechir/Arvut Hadadit a political categorisation, an additional word(s) politically signifies how perpetrators frame relations, and motivations enacted within the attack. 'Revenge' is a common message. For example: 'Price Tag Bat Ayin' 'Revenge for Arabs'; 'Eye for an Eye—We Won't forget' and 'We Will Not Forget Alei Ayin'; 'Revenge' 'Settlement 18'; 'Revenge' 'Regards from Ulpana' and 'Regards from Gilad Farm' [APN].

Enacting a Price-Tag attack is a means of and for retaliation, to ‘punish’ the State for its
actions. Furthermore, in connecting the attack directly to an outpost which has been the 'victim' of evacuation, the outpost is 'avenged': 'Price Tag,' Vengeance for Yitzhar.' In deploying such attack, the State is held to account for its actions.

Secondly, Price-Tag violence is a deterrence strategy. The ability to retaliate in such manner creates a balance of power between two sets of actors in space, each with an ability to hold the other in check and inflict harm on the other. On the 1st June 2009, Israeli media reported that "soldiers and police removed three caravans from the Nahalat Yosef outpost...settlers did not learn of that operation in advance, so it encountered no opposition" [Shragai and Pfeffer, 2009]. Settlers not only rebuilt the outpost immediately after but responded that day by torching Palestinian fields through the West Bank. In a statement sent to reporters, perpetrators declared that this was "the price for harming our sacred land" [quoted Shragai and Pfeffer, 2009]. Where its "roots lie in Gaza and Amona," since then, Amos Harel [2008b] writes, "the extreme right has sought to establish a 'balance of terror', where every action aimed at them...generates an immediate, violent reaction." The Price-Tag strategy has answered this call in enacting of a violent act(s).

Assessing the Price-Tag strategy, Shin Bet Chief Yoram Cohen stated that perpetrators "want to make the government think twice about the removal of even one shack" and, to do this, they adopted a strategy of "terror and fear." Ori Nir [2011] describes the Price-Tag strategy as

A major success and a rather unique form of terrorism in Western experience: politically-motivated violence, directed against innocent civilian members of an adversarial society (Palestinians), with a primary purpose of deterring the terrorists’ own government (Israel's) from taking actions against their community.

On the 7th June 2011, individuals rolled burning tires into a mosque in the Palestinian village of Al-Mughayyir and sprayed on the mosque's walls 'Ali Alyin,' 'Price Tag' and 'This
is only the beginning' [Altman, 2011b]. Less than a week earlier, a violent confrontation occurred in the Ali Alyin outpost between settlers and State forces who came to evacuate structures. Settlers and Border Guard officers sustained injuries in the evacuation [Altman, 2011a]. In an era of Price-Tags, one Hilltop Youth individual made clear that "if there is no quiet for the Jews- there shall be no quiet for the Arabs" [quoted Nir, 2011].

This aim of 'making the government think twice,' where if an 'evacuation' is implemented or 'quiet' is disturbed, a Price-Tag will be implemented and 'quiet' will be disturbed, therefore also means Price-Tag violence is a deterrence strategy. This is acknowledged by a range of authors [UNOCHA, 2009; Nir, 2011; Eiran and Krause, 2016]. "Foremost, ‘price tag’ violence functions as a political and military deterrent to stop or prevent outpost demolitions and serve settler interests" [UNESCO Chair, 2012:32].

An Israeli military individual I spoke with stated that Price-Tag attacks combine “revenge, for sure, and deterrence where sometimes they say ‘we will act before any activities to create some deterrence.’”

Given that a central aim of the strategy is to prevent outpost evacuations, attacks “can also be triggered by an announcement, or even a rumor, about an imminent evacuation" [UNOCHA, 2009]. If the State is determined in enacting law and governance against construction on minimal occasions, some settlers have shown active determination to resist.

Price-Tag attacks heighten ‘the militant activist approach’ which has grown post-Disengagement. Revenge and deterrence have power dimensions and the deployment of violence creates a new era in State-settler relations in space. Shortly after the activation of the Price-Tag ‘weapon’ in 2008, an announcement was published in the settler newspaper Samaria Settlers Committee. It claimed that through ‘mutual responsibility’ this was "a true example showing that the settlers set the boundaries of the battle" [quoted UNESCO Chair, 2012:31], reflecting a belief/reality that individuals wield- or have the capacity to wield- a strategic weapon in spatial struggles. This potently embodies the concept the weaponisation of space (Chapter One). Space is conceived as a battlefield and spatial practices serve as weapons of (in)security and sovereignty in spatial battles.

Thirdly, the violence is a coercive deterrence strategy. Declaring that the main target is “the Israeli State,” one Israeli military individual described the strategy to me as such:

it is to give a sign to the Israeli government, the Civil Administration, that 'if you do anything to harm any kind of house, building, the activities of settlements, or the settlers, you will hear from us by our activity against it. We will create the instability on the ground.' This is the idea behind Price-Tags.103
Creating “instability on the ground” will be crucial to later assessments. On the 9th November 2011, three cars in the Palestinian village of Beit Ummar were set on fire. Graffiti sprayed on a house read ‘Price-Tag,’ ‘there will be war over Givat Assaf’ [The Daily Star, 2011]. This was presumably in response to an order by Israel’s High Court for the State to implement the ‘evacuation’ order for the Givat Assaf outpost by the end of that year. Today, Givat Assaf remains. Whilst there is no direct connection between this Price-Tag and the non-evacuation, despite the High Court ruling that it should be over many years [Levinson, 2013; Lazaroff, 2014], the non-evacuation sends a powerful signal, that such attacks/threats have impact.

Assessing the Price-Tag strategy, Yoram Cohen argued that as well as aiming "to make the government think twice about the removal of even one shack," the thinking is that "the worse it becomes the more the government would prefer to avoid the removal of outposts" [quoted Ravid, 2012]. One Israeli military individual stated to me that "this is the phenomenon. People are not allowing the State to evacuate even one caravan, or one family." Violent response and the creation of instability against acts of evacuation, or perceived threat to settler interests, have short- and long-term goals of cumulative deterrence. As one Israeli security analyst assesses:

the strategic goal is to frighten Israeli society to such a degree that it will withdraw from any possibility of a major removal of settlements in the future…the only way to prevent it from becoming a slippery slope toward wholesale evacuation is to put up a fight for every house or even a chicken coop…their tactic is to react to even the smallest of such moves with violence so that eventually the army tells the government they can’t do it.

In devising and activating a strategy which guarantees (re)action, enacts violence throughout space, unsettles stability and poses (potential) dangers, means that Price-Tags are weapons of (in)security. The use of threats, intimidation and violence are aimed to secure a particular result:

in the long term, the Price Tag campaign serves the settlers in building cumulative deterrence…if removing a handful of buildings from an illegal outpost sets the settlers off on an uncontrollable rampage, just imagine how bad it’ll be if the government…commits to removing tens of thousands of settlers from scores of settlements [Nir [2011].
Such attacks, Nir [2011] writes, sow “fears of escalation.” Perpetrators and settlers have reminded the State that a ‘new era’ is in place; an era where actions by the State which are seen as damaged/ threat to damage settlement and interests will now be publicly reacted to. Following the first Price-Tag after the evacuation of Havat Shaked, one settler declared that such incidents will only escalate: "should they [Israeli security forces] attempt to remove even a single container, beam, thorn or rock- the whole country will go up in flames." In 2008, following the evacuation of the Adei Ed outpost, settler Itay Zar stated that the Price-Tag response constitutes a 'legitimate struggle.' Zar made clear that settlers aim to turn every evacuation into "a day of chaos" so that security forces "can't come, do the evacuation and then go" [quoted Jeffay, 2008].

Regarding the decision to 'evacuate' the large outpost of Migron, a senior IDF officer warned that this could lead to a "change in the security stability" in the area. If the 'evacuation' was implemented, "obviously it will trigger reactions on the ground" [quoted Bar-Zohar and Levinson, 2012]. The "obviousness" of a reaction is a guarantee, a 'price' to be expected, the 'cost' which the State, security forces, and direct victim(s) of the attack(s) will pay. This "obviousness" was vindicated when the outpost was evacuated, resulting in multiple Price-Tag attacks, bearing the 'Migron' tag, avenging its destruction in a series of violent incidents throughout space [APN].

Individuals have voiced concern about how the threat and reality of violence impacts the State’s legal and governance-regime and democracy. In 2009, Israeli Attorney Michael Sfard argued that courts were more reluctant to approve evacuation petitions because of settler attacks:

> the court tell me time and again, 'you know that it's not that simple to do what you are asking.' And I'm always saying, 'well, it means that being violent turns out to be a very clever thing to do [quoted Garcia-Navarro, 2009].

**Part Four: Insecurities and Perceptions of Price-Tag Violence**

Price-Tags generate strong condemnations in Israeli society. I will identify impacts/insecurities attacks pose. I will discuss perceptions of the violence and responses in settler and religious communities. I will then critically assess the Ramat Gilad/Mitzpe Yitzhar Price-Tag campaign where the insecurities of violence were seen. With the IDF directly targeted, I will explore reactions and its significance in State-settler relations.

Price-Tag violence contains numerous significant impacts and insecurities. Firstly to direct attack victims, predominantly Palestinian individuals-communities. UNOCHA
[2008] writes that "after paying the price of Israel's settlement policy for decades, Palestinians...are now paying the price for the limited efforts undertaken to remove settlement outposts." Attacks on properties have financial and personal impact. Price-Tags also involve more serious acts of violence. In addition to threats of 'war,' death threats have been issued on multiple occasions. 'Death to Arabs' is common Price-Tag graffiti. One attack particularly emphasised this. As well as 'Vengeance for Yitzhar' and 'Price tag' the messages 'The only good Arab is a dead Arab' and 'This time on buildings, next time on humans' was sprayed on a wall in Beit Ummar [Israel Hayom, 2013].

Threats to life are exacerbated by direct, physical violence in attacks. In July 2010, Israeli forces demolished two caravans and a goat pen in the Givat Ronen outpost. Subsequently, approximately one hundred settlers engaged in a widespread Price-Tag campaign. Entering the Palestinian village of Burin, settlers committed arson, threw Molotov cocktails and assaulted villagers [UNESCO Chair, 2012:34]. Settlers later claimed the attacks were part of 'mutual responsibility' [Magnezi, 2010a; 2010b]. In December 2015, tear-gas canisters were thrown inside a Palestinian home in Beitillu with a family inside. Graffiti left at the attack read 'Revenge' and 'Regards from the detainees of Zion,' an apparent reference to settler youth detained by State forces in connection with the fatal Duma Price-Tag attack (Part Five) [Lazaroff, Toamah, 2015].

Palestinians live with intimidation and fear of settlers entering villages and deciding what the target and method of the 'price' will be. In 2009, UNOCHA warned that Price-Tag violence further undermines the physical security and livelihoods of Palestinians in the West Bank. Communities particularly vulnerable to settler attacks are vulnerable to Price-Tag attacks [UNOCHA, 2008, 2009]. In January 2014 there had been 2,100 settler attacks since 2006 [Associated Press, 2014]. Price-Tag violence exacerbates realities of insecurity and power inequalities. Space is now synonymous with different insecurities. As one Price-Tag victim remarked, "the settlers can do whatever they want. I am helpless." This was a sentiment echoed to me by numerous Palestinians I spoke with. The insecurity has seen some villagers establishing night patrols to safeguard against attacks and constructing defences on and around properties.

Price-Tags are also recognised to pose dangers to the State of Israel. Attacks impact IDF missions. In October 2008, West Bank Commander Major General Shamni stated that

we're talking about a hard core of a few hundred activists...what this bunch does is causing tremendous damage...harming our ability to carry out security missions in the territories. We have to divert our efforts to there [quoted Harel, 2008a].
A 2011 report revealed that the IDF Central Command allocated one-third of its forces in the West Bank for Price-Tag-related missions. One senior official told reporters that when a battalion commander needs to come to a road and disperse Jews...throwing stones at Palestinian cars, it means he is not able to carry out his main mission, which is to defend Israel [quoted Katz, 2011].

If the Price-Tag strategy is centred on ‘a guarantee,’ the danger is the unpredictability of the attacks. The violence has brought insecurities to different communities and spaces. As attack documentations show [APN], Price-Tags take diverse forms, attack diverse targets, enter diverse spaces, and leave different defamatory and inflammatory messages. Spaces are unsettled. In the hundreds of Price-Tags, communities in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel have been hit. Whilst attacks may be in response to evacuations in spaces of the West Bank, violence is instigated in wider spaces, therefore showing the reach of settler violence and wider insecurities enacted in space. Transcending spatial boundaries, Price-Tags violence embodies the concepts spatial (re)structuring and spatial control where its nature and impacts are of conceptual value to Political Geography. Declaring them “terror acts,” then-Public Security Minister Aharonovitch warned that “this phenomenon might bring about a serious deterioration in Jerusalem and the West Bank” [quoted Ynet, 2013].

With violence enacted on diverse communities, this strikes at fragile relations, impacting stability and areas of coexistence. Mixed communities in Israel, such as Abu Ghosh, have been targeted with ‘Arabs Out’ sprayed in one Price-Tag [Hasson et al., 2013]. A young Yitzhar settler was later charged for this attack [Hasson, 2014]. Such attacks have attracted condemnations from State officials. Minister Bennett warned that perpetrators “want to destroy any chance of good neighborly relations between Arabs and Jews in our country” [quoted Ynet, 2013]. Perpetrators have used attacks to pronounce objections to such coexistence in space [Dvir, 2014a] and to vocalise nationalist agendas and visions of how ‘the Jewish State’ should be. Yet, this is recognised to threaten the State of Israel’s security where attacks “could threaten the foundations of Israeli society” [Foxman, 2014].

Since 2011, other significant sites have been targeted. The burning of mosques, churches and monasteries and/or defiling with graffiti, have further raised insecurities of this violence. Defamations on sacred buildings are highly inflammatory. Examples of graffiti include ‘Muhammad is dead’; ‘Muhammad is a pig’; ‘Jesus Son of Mary the Whore’; ‘We Will Crucify You’; ‘Death to Christians’ [APN]. After a firebomb was thrown inside Jerusalem’s Beit Jamal Monastery on the 19th August 2013 and graffiti sprayed on the
walls read 'Price Tag,' 'Death to the Gentiles' and 'Revenge,' Chairman of the Tag-Meir organisation,\textsuperscript{112} Gadi Gvaryahu, warned that

the violation of the monastery is directly linked to attacks against over twenty Christian and Muslim places of worship in the last three years. The attackers seek to cause unrest between the various religions in Israel and bring about bloodshed [quoted Hasson et al., 2013].\textsuperscript{113}

Speaking at a security briefing on the 20\textsuperscript{th} March 2012, Yoram Cohen declared that "the burning of mosques by Jewish youngsters wrecks significant damage on Israel both in the political context, as well as in the security context" [quoted Lis, 2012]. Attacking holy buildings, defaming religions, and issuing death threats to non-Jews have attracted great concern of how the political, cultural, religious and direct violence employed within 'Price-Tag' attacks can serve as 'triggers' of insecurity. One commentator warned that such attacks "are leading to a war of religions that could quickly spread" [Landau, 2014]. In 2011, after settlers burnt a mosque in the village of Burqa, Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for Palestinian Authority President Abbas, proclaimed "an attack on (Muslim) holy places is a declaration of war on the Palestinians by settlers" [quoted Levy, 2011].\textsuperscript{114}

Religions and sacred spaces have been situated as platforms and weapons of war. This has considerable security implications. A high-ranking Israeli military figure declared to me

that on the day we will face casualties on the ground, it might be a very critical event, it might blow the area. More than this, imagine that they will start harming, or blowing something in Jerusalem. It will cover the whole Muslim world.\textsuperscript{115}

If senior figures have acknowledged that Price-Tag violence has the capacity to "ignite the territories,"\textsuperscript{116} and settler leaders have warned "the whole country will go up in flames," the power and (in)security of Price-Tag attacks lie in the different 'fuels' perpetrators can employ to spark the 'ignition.' This is not only an (in)security acknowledged in Price-Tag violence. It is also critically a strategy of such violence itself. The significance of this will be discussed in Part Five.

Legally, Price-Tags are considered 'nationalistic crimes' and culprits 'illegal associations,' equipping security forces with significant powers to act [Ynet, 2013]. However, attacks have been declared as "terrorism" by high-ranking Israeli security and State officials, and urged Price-Tags to be legally defined as such. Israel's previous-Public Security Minister Aharonovitch urged the government to define Price-Tag perpetrators "as a terror organization" [quoted Khoury, 2014]. In 2011, Nitzan Alon, then-Commander of the IDF'S
West Bank Division, warned that "today, an extremist minority, small in number but not in influence, could bring about a major escalation via acts that are dubbed 'price-tag,' but amount to terrorism" [quoted Haaretz Editorial, 2011]. Byman and Sachs [2012] argue that Price-Taggs should be seen as "terrorism" because:

"terrorism" is defined not only by the act itself but also by its purpose: to produce a psychological effect...a means of advancing a political agenda. This definition fits the aim of extremist settlers...seeking to frighten a rival population and intimidate a government, the extremists mimic the typical methods of terrorist groups across the globe.

Major-General Mizrahi\textsuperscript{117} described Price-Taggs as "political terror" [quoted Jpost, 2011; Levy, 2011]. One high-ranking Israeli military individual defined the attacks as "Jewish terror...Jewish national terror."\textsuperscript{118} Calling Price-Taggs "terrorism," Israel's right-wing Justice Minister, Shaked, significantly warned that "Jewish terror against the State is even more harmful to security than Arab terrorism" [quoted Pitrikovsky, 2015]. Within Price-Taggs, there is debate on levels of organisation. Levinson [2014b] writes that perpetrators don’t belong to a hierarchical organization...they have no headquarters...all you need is a racist ideology, a spirit of adventure and a few dozen shekels for spray paint, gasoline or other flammable material and a lighter. The rules of the game are simple: Every attack on settler interests should draw a response.

Shragai [2011] states that "the "price tag" campaign is not orchestrated by any formal, organizational structure" but "independent cells" operate, connected with extremist settlements/outposts.\textsuperscript{119} Yet others have noted warnings by security officials that groups "were becoming more organized and sophisticated, using databases to track potential targets, carrying out surveillance and communicating through social networks" [Sanders, 2011]. According to "new analysis" by the Shin Bet in 2011, extreme right-wing Jewish activists in the West Bank have moved from spontaneous acts against Arabs- following the demolition of Jewish homes by Israeli authorities, or terror attacks against Jews- to organized planning that includes use of a database of potential targets...[and] access points and escape routes in the villages [Levinson and Rosenberg, 2011].

High-ranking security officials have discussed difficulties in securing evidence for prosecutions. The vast majority of cases are dropped and perpetrators not charged [Shragai, 2011; Zohari, 2014; Yesh Din, 2015]. Whilst numerous individuals criticise
security forces for perceived weakness in investigations [Nir, 2011; Gurvitz, 2013; Hussein, 2014], one high-ranking Israeli military individual declared to me that “there is much professionalism in Price-Tags.” Indeed Gadi Zohari [2014], former head of Israel’s Civil Administration, claims that

“price tag” operations are carried out by a meticulously organized network of cells...the network closely resembles terrorist organizations [in] structure and mode of operation and it succeeds in veiling its headquarters and any internal communications.

’Price-Tags’ are lodged in spatial struggles, settlement projects/interests, and projects of (in)security. However, attacks generate criticisms within settler and National-Religious communities. Dany Dayan, then-Head of the Yesha Council, proclaimed that "Price tag policy is a moral and tactical disaster...it damages the settlement enterprise" and the “gravest danger to our camp” [quoted Levinson, 2012c]. Similarly, Naftali Bennett, leader of the National-Religious Jewish Home Party, declared that Price-Tags are “the biggest threat to the future of settlements in Judea and Samaria” [quoted Harkov, 2013]. National-Religious rabbi Yuval Sherlo also stated that

[Price Tag] endangers the settlement movement...cuts off the branch that we are sitting on. It's hard to see anything that inflicts more damage to the settlement enterprise itself than this [quoted Shragai, 2011].

Rather than an act to 'protect' communities, projects and interests, attacks are seen as detrimental and threatening, the source of insecurity. This reflects the concept of (in)security where (in)security is perceived differently. Perceptions also reflect intra-settler divisions and furthers divisions. This was seen, for example, with different reactions to the 'evacuation' of the large Givat Ha'Ulpana (Ulpana) outpost in 2012. In a statement issued by Ulpana’s residents in June 2012, they agreed to 'voluntary evacuation,' voicing concerns of the harmful consequences of settler violence/confrontation and the impacts this would cause. They stated that “this battle between brothers is tearing apart the Israeli public in general, and our population in specific,” and declared “we are peaceful people” [quoted Lazaroff, 2012]. As assessed (Chapter Four), concerns of national unity and avoiding a civil war were dominant during the Disengagement and served to boundarise (re)actions. Deploying violent confrontation/resistance was and remains a dominant taboo for the settler majority. Nevertheless, as the evacuation order was issued, a string of Price-Tags were initiated bearing the 'Ulpana' tag, [APN]. Whilst some individuals strove to deter or avenge the
'evacuation,' Ulpana residents were willing to 'pay the price' for the State's decision, rejecting violence deployed in their name, leading to further intra-settler divisions.

Price-Tag violence also generates condemnations regarding immorality. Bennett declared that "every 'price tag' act is immoral and un-Jewish" [quoted Harkov, 2013]. One rabbi declared that "I oppose Price-Tags completely. It's against our religion to express violence against Arabs and against Jews."121 In 2014, more than one hundred National-Religious rabbis across the political spectrum signed a petition declaring that “'Price-tag' [activities] are actions that are forbidden according to the Torah and ethics, contravene the law and cause a desecration of God's name” [quoted Sharon, 2014]. On other occasions National-Religious rabbis have condemned Price-Tags on religious grounds [Nahshoni, 2011; Miskin, 2014b]. However, Leibler [2014] critically assesses religious-ideological landscapes where rabbis who accuse "leaders of breaching Halacha by opposing settlement growth or dismantling unauthorized outposts" have impact:

such attitudes encourage impressionable youngsters to believe that the Torah approved their right to fight for what they consider to be the will of the Almighty and grants them license to suspend the law of the land and engage in violence.

For others, the Torah is the only law of the Land. One ultra-nationalist settler supportive of Price-Tags and the Hilltop Youth placed emphasis upon religious teachings:

they call us extreme but the Torah says Joshua came here to throw-out the inhabitants of the Land, the Seven Nations, the Canaanites. It's wrote down as Jewish Law that when you came to the Land, it's a mitzvah to expel the inhabitants.122

The authority of what they see as the truth of the Bible is not only seen to provide an authoritative license for action but a 'commandment.' They added, “unfortunately not many people, even rabbis who know the Torah, do not have the guts to say that.” A belief that subjects have a mandate to enact violence from a Higher sacred authority brings important conceptual contribution to CSS with questions of license. Furthermore, this incorporates discussions of security and subjectivity. One Hilltop Youth asserted that ‘revenge’ is a Jewish act and positive value. When Jews face insecurity, "they keep their head up and feel the pride of being a Jew and seek to take revenge like our heroes in the Tanakah." Furthermore, Davida Malik would “take revenge, war...not put-up a fence.” Whilst they acknowledged that in Price-Tag attacks “there are all kinds of goals,” a key goal is “revenge. If you learn the Tanakh, you see lots of big price-tag actions... that's how
we bring back Jewish pride. That's how we make His name good and holy.”

For this individual, violence is enacted in the name of God and affirming a Jewish value. In highlighting the strength of ideology, Rabbi Shlomo Riskin [2011] states that

it’s hard, impossible actually, to preach to people who believe that they are the holy defenders of the Land of Israel; that they wave the banner of the pure and genuine Torah.

It is acts of violence by settlers against State forces which draws particular criticisms from settlers and rabbis. Riskin [2011] issued the following warning to Price-Tag perpetrators:

you consider yourselves the new Hasmoneans, the Maccabees who do not bow their heads before the Hellenizing priestly establishment, which today, you believe, wears the uniform of the Israel Defense Forces. Because you are convinced that all your deeds are for the sake of heaven...I am telling you that you are making a fundamental mistake.

Violence against Israeli forces was a particular denunciation by interviewees. One settler stated that “I am against actions which harm the army, it is immoral.” Another settler declared that “harming soldiers is unacceptable.”

Case-Study of the Ramat Gilad/Mizpe Yitzhar Price-Tag Attack Campaign

To further explore the insecurities and significance of Price-Tag violence, I will focus predominantly on one case-study. Not only is it impossible to analyse each Price-Tag attack due to space limitations, but this case has been carefully selected for a number reasons. On the 11th December 2011, Israel’s then-Defence Minister ordered the evacuation of two outposts in Samaria: Mitzpe Yitzhar, connected to the settlement-community of Yitzhar, and Ramat Gilad, near the settlement-community of Karnei Shomron. Between the 12th and the 19th December, a series of Price Tags were perpetrated throughout spaces upon different targets. Although Price-Tag 'campaigns' had occurred prior, this campaign is significant because of the multiple spaces/sites targeted. The attacks signified the different insecurities within Price-Tag violence and developments in violent confrontation/resistance against settlement evacuations which this thesis has traced. Reactions also signal this as one of the most infamous attacks. In directly targeting State forces, the violence signified political fractures in some State-settler relations, which will be further discussed in Part Five. I will begin by providing a chronological overview of the Price-Tag campaign and its spatial significance and then assess reactions.
12th December: having heard of the issued evacuation-order, approximately 150 ‘Hilltop Youth’ arrived in the space of Mitzpe Yitzhar to resist incoming security forces. Tires were collected to be burnt and roadblocks were built [Harel et al., 2011]. As we saw in the Amona evacuation (Chapter Five), there were efforts to ‘fortify’ spaces around the outpost and prevent State forces entering. Violence was also enacted in wider spaces around the Mitzpe Yitzhar outpost. Rabbis for Human Rights reported that dozens of settlers from Yitzhar entered the nearby Palestinian village Bruchin and threw rocks at houses.

13th December: one Israeli news-article reported that "tensions were high among West Bank settlers Monday night, ahead of the possible eviction of several illegal outposts" and hundreds of settlers and right-wing activists have gathered on the premises, as well as at the nearby outpost of Ramat Gilad...some 150 members of the 'Hilltop Youth' arrived at the [Mitzpe Yitzhar] outpost on Monday, saying they will fight any attempt to evacuate the premises [Altman, 2011c].

Settlers also enacted confrontation/resistance beyond the outpost spaces. Around 300 settlers threw stones at Palestinian vehicles on the main road near Ramat Gilad. This mirrored a "new approach" described by settler leader Daniella Weiss in 2008 that had been taken-up by settlers: "the first instruction is to come to the outpost as quickly as people can," but if they look unlikely to arrive in time "people should block the traffic and prevent any kind of transportation along the road" [quoted Jeffay, 2008]. Rendering the roads around Yitzhar spaces of insecurity, a group of settlers significantly escalated events by directly attacking State forces and a military vehicle.

Settlers opened the jeep of the Brigade Commander of the Ephraim military-base, Colonel Ron Kahana, threw a concrete block and "pelted the vehicle with stones causing the officer and his deputy light wounds." According to an incident account, a young settler approached the Deputy Brigade Commander "hit him in the head and said: "You're a Nazi"" [Levinson, et al., 2011]. Attacks by settlers on State forces and properties continued. At approximately 1am, some settlers boarded a bus to the IDF’s Ephraim Military Base in the West Bank "in protest of the possible eviction of several illegal outposts on Tuesday." Upon arrival, fifty settlers attacked the base, slashed tires and smashed the windshields of military vehicles, torched tires and hurled Molotov cocktails, stones and paint at Israeli soldiers and vehicles [Alman, 2011].

14th December: further attacks occurred in and across space where "unusual movements by an Israeli Defence Forces convoy [triggered] fears of an upcoming dismantlement of
the Mitzpe Yitzhar outpost” [Levinson, 2011d]. Settlers stoned Palestinian vehicles on main junctions in the north West Bank in anticipation of the evacuation and in a violent effort to deter this. Settlers attacked spaces in Jerusalem. A mosque was set on fire and graffiti sprayed on the mosque- "Price Tag," "Mohammed is a Pig," and "Mohammed is Dead" [Rosenberg and Hasson, 2011]. Attacks were also enacted in the West Bank. Four Palestinian vehicles were torched in villages and graffiti reading "Camaraderie Mitzpe Yitzhar," "Pay the Price," "Friends of Yitzhar," and "Price Tag" were inscribed. In referencing Mitzpe Yitzhar, this directly connected the attack with this outpost.

15th December: in early hours, hundreds of Israeli police, IDF soldiers and Civil Administration officers arrived and "razed two structures in the illegal West Bank outpost of Mitzpe Yitzhar" [Efraim, Omri, 2011] despite settlers planting stones, nails and spikes on the road leading to the outpost [APN]. If settlers strove to limit and prevent State forces entering the outpost space, State forces successfully limited and prevented the movements of settlers/activists:

hundreds of right-wing were headed to the outpost overnight with the intent of stopping the buildings' demolition, but the IDF declared the areas between Tapuach Junction and Yitzhar a restricted military zone [Omri, 2011].

In describing the event of evacuation, Avraham Benyamin, a Yitzhar spokesman, stated that "the soldiers came like thieves in the night, like cowards...the residents here were asleep and security forces stopped other settlers from arriving here" [quoted Efraim, Omri, 2011]. Consequently, the actual act of evacuation did not encounter confrontation/resistance.

However, post-evacuation, confrontation/resistance continued with settlers perpetrating insecurity in and throughout space. The evacuation of structures in Mitzpe Yitzhar stimulated two approaches which my interview with a Hilltop Youth individual alerted to. Moshe Shimon, a resident of Mitzpe Yitzhar, stated that "we're getting ready to rebuild everything here. Two homes for every one that is raised. We're not afraid" [quoted Efraim, Omri, 2011]. Price-Tag actions also continued and gained what can be described as a more 'militant' tone. Settlers torched a mosque in the Palestinian village of Burqa, located close to Yitzhar, and sprayed graffiti on the mosque wall "Mitzpe Yitzhar," "War" [Levy, 2011]. On the same day, another attack was enacted on a space and architecture of State sovereignty in the West Bank. An Israeli military checkpoint was vandalised with the words "Nazi" and "price tag" [Altman, 2011e].
19th December: days after the evacuation, Price-Tag attacks continued. Settlers burnt cars in the Palestinian village of Beitin and vandalised a mosque in the Palestinian village of Bani Na’im, east of Hebron in the South West Bank/Judea, with graffiti “Price Tag,” "Yitzhar" and insults to the Prophet Mohammad [Lappin et al., 2011].

Speaking with one Hilltop Youth, they perceived the Price-Tag campaign as a victory for settlers, an affirmation of the (coercive)deterrent power which such violence wields. Whilst the outpost structures were eventually evacuated, the attack was deemed to have impact: “what they did in Ephraim, it made the army stop. There were army on their way to destroy Jewish homes and when they went to the Ephraim base, they stopped.” The interviewee also welcomed the approach within the attacks: “we need to fight for the Land, with G-d and the Torah to help us, and do our best to keep it. Now you understand what I told you. The best defence is attack. They stopped it."

For another Hilltop Youth, the Price-Tags were successful because of what they demonstrated: "it scared them." This indepth analysis of the Ramat Gilad/Mitzpe Yitzhar campaign is of conceptual contribution to Political Geography and CSS. The widespread campaign is symbolically significant. If I conceptualised of the Amona evacuation as a spectacle, Price-Tag attacks/campaigns are also spectacles. They embody key concepts discussed in Chapter One: spatial (re)structuring, spatial control, and the weaponisation of space. Such violence can be approached from a spatial perspective, contributing conceptual insights and discussions. In the campaign, we saw the activation and assertion of sovereignty and agency by subjects in space. Furthermore, space itself was weaponised where spatial actions served as weapons to weaken or attack adversaries. For example, State forces declared the space of and around the Mitzpe Yitzhar outpost a 'restricted military zone,' a demarcation and declaration which not only excludes subjects from-space but projects and enacts sovereignty in and over space and over subjects. It is boundary of power. Counter to this, settlers strove to physically prevent or divert forces from entering the outpost space by using weapons such as stones and tires. Violence was also enacted in wider spaces and wider spaces were brought into this battle, ‘expanding’ the spatial battle.

Furthermore, in entering spaces which are 'off-limits' to Israeli citizens/settlers-Palestinian villages and Israeli military bases- attacks are a political statement and act. They show the State that in the space of Eretz Yisrael, a theatre of contestation and sovereignty, space has no 'bounds.' Whilst individuals are not bounded by space in the sense of current realities, governance-regimes and power-relations, they are bounded to their meanings of this space, i.e. the meanings of Eretz Yisrael and notions of rights and
what actions/realities should be in this space. Spatial acts and violence are therefore ideological and political in communicating this, seeking to (re)structure and secure this.

The Ephraim Military Base Attack: A Turning Point?

The Ephraim base attack attracted widespread condemnation from State actors. Defence Minister Barak declared that "these activities have the characteristics of home-grown terror and will not be tolerated." Home Front Minister Vilnai added that "these are criminals, Jewish terrorists who are attacking the security of Israel...they are fighting the IDF which is protecting them" [quoted Agence France-Presse, 2011]. Barak stated that "there is no doubt that we're talking about terrorists." Following the attack, Prime Minister Netanyahu called an emergency meeting with ministers and officials. He described the situation as "intolerable" where the "incident deserves full condemnation" [quoted Ravid and Levinson, 2011]. Speaking later at a public event, Netanyahu declared that the attack "crossed all lines" [quoted Zippori, 2011].

This notion of 'crossing a line' or marking a 'red line' is a common discourse expressed by various leaders when State security forces are attacked. This signifies that perpetrators have engaged in exceptional actions and broke widely-acknowledged taboos. An IDF spokesperson declared that "violence that targets the IDF and its soldiers is...seen as extremely severe" [quoted Agence France-Presse, 2011]. The IDF Chief-of-Staff, Benny Gantz, highlighted the apparent paradox: "the IDF, which protects its people, found itself defending itself from them. It's absurd and unbelievable" [quoted Benari, 2011].

For Rabbi Avichai Ronsky, former Chief Rabbi of the IDF, the attack on the base "is not just the crossing of a red-line, this is something far more serious" [quoted Levinson, 2011c]. All interviewees, when asked, viewed the attack as symbolic in some capacity. However, there was some division on whether it was a 'turning point' or an 'exceptional' event. For one Israeli security analyst, direct attacks by settlers on State forces/architectures are "an exception, which exists on the margins." However, for one Israeli military individual, the Ephraim base attack was perceived as "a turning point." The seriousness of this attack and that it was unprecedented makes it a disjunctive moment. For this interviewee, attacks on military properties and personnel constitute "terror": "it is against the Israeli soldiers. They damaged military cars, a military base, military property. They even harmed Israeli soldiers. It is terror." One National-Religious rabbi emphasised that the attack was also seen as 'crossing a red line' by many in the settler community:
that is an example of crossing the lines of where some of the leaders of what I call
the first generation understood that we see the line. They said ‘when I saw a rock
was thrown at an IDF jeep, I understood a line had been crossed.’\textsuperscript{136}

One settler argued that the Hilltop Youth and extremist elements in the settler community
“want to express their frustration.” However, they stated, “when they attack the army, it
is a very serious thing.” For this interviewee, the Ephraim attack was “the most extreme
and serious incident,” adding, “I don’t identify with their extremism.” They also stated that
with such actions, “it created a backlash against the extremists”\textsuperscript{137} in the ‘settler-
mainstream.’ For the majority of settlers, attacks on soldiers and State forces remain a
dominant taboo. However, whilst declaring that “the attack is wrong,” one rabbi presented
a mind-set or ideology which “a small group of people” hold:

‘the army has been stopping us. We want to blockade them. We want to tell them
that what the army is doing is not a Jewish army. It is the opposite. And the fact
that we broke in there is to show the army that what they are doing is wrong’ I
think they were planning on teaching them a lesson.\textsuperscript{138}

The interviewee then added, “what they are doing is the opposite of defending Israel.” In
presenting this mind-set, the rabbi illuminated a significant ideological disjuncture. This
was also discussed by another interviewee. When I asked a former IDF soldier if the attack
was a ‘turning point,’ important points were made:

I don’t think so. I understand why it was seen as a turning point because
dramatically an army base was attacked; but in this community it has been part of
the discourse for some time. Having forty of fifty people going into a base is a red
line, but with a lot of preparation before...it is a turning point, but it’s a tactical
turning point: stopping harming the Palestinians but harming the State directly.
But seeing the State or the government as an enemy in that sense isn’t
new....however, the army continues to work with the settlers. It’s seen as a glitch,
a flip, and the majority of settlers don’t attack police or soldiers.\textsuperscript{139}

Price-tag attacks denote disjunction. My interviewees, however, disagreed whether it is
the act or underpinning ideology that is the key element of the disjunction. It is this
ideological disjunction which I will now assess. Whilst Price-Tag violence is significant on
a strategic level, its deeper significance, I argue, is on an ideological, political and relational
level. In the Ephraim base attack, GOC Central Commander Avi Mizrahi declared that “in
my 30 years in the IDF I never saw such hatred by Jews towards soldiers” [quoted Harel
et al., 2011]. One high-ranking military individual emphasised that "Price-Tag is not a minor thing. It's a very significant thing. It's significant because people are against the State. People are taking to harm the State." Where 'the State' itself stands vis-à-vis Price-Tag violence demands critical assessment. The direct targeting of State forces and architectures in this "new era" has brought into the open the reality that for some settlers 'the State of Israel' is deemed a threat which they are actively resisting against.

**Part Five: Price-Tag Violence and Ideological-Relational Disjuncture with the State**

Accounting for Price-Tag Violence and its deeper significance cannot be attained without recognising ideological and political landscapes within relations and confrontations. Publications and statements by Hilltop Youth individuals are crucial for such assessments. This section will critically discuss the culmination of a trajectory of disjuncture which I have traced. I will begin by assessing how one prominent Hilltop Youth individual, Meir Ettinger, frames relations and confrontations. I will then assess perceptions of the State of Israel from interview data. The final subsection will discuss the uncovering of the Revolt, whose perceptions and agendas reveal a radical agenda within acts of Price-Tag violence and radical disjuncture with the State.

Meir Ettinger is described as "a Jewish activist" and "the unofficial leader of the Hilltop Youth" [Ettinger, 2015]. He is the grandson of the late Rabbi Kahane and is connected with Rabbi Ginsburgh. Ettinger has received the most known exceptional treatments from State security forces for his suspected connections with violence, and insecurity which State forces believe Ettinger poses. In the aftermath of the 2015 Duma Price-Tag attack (discussed below), he was held in administrative detention for nine months on suspicion of 'terrorist activities.' He is currently banned from re-entering Judea and Samaria. In 2015, Ettinger wrote an article entitled 'The Credo of the Hilltop Youth.' The publication provides important perceptions of the State, concerns and motivations, and conflicts on ideological, metaphysical, political and security levels.

Price-Tag graffiti not only reveals a political-framing of the action but a framing of how reality is seen. If the enactment of 'Price-Tag' attacks has been declared as 'war' by perpetrators, 'war' is a framework which Ettinger claims the State of Israel is operating within. Ettinger argues that the Israeli State, which he calls 'the establishment,' itself has declared 'war' where the Hilltop Youth and Jewish settlers are facing 'a war against survival.' Such claims significantly reframe realities and relations, and position acts of violence/violent resistance as defence in confronting 'a war':

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140 Where 'the State' itself stands vis-à-vis Price-Tag violence demands critical assessment. The direct targeting of State forces and architectures in this "new era" has brought into the open the reality that for some settlers 'the State of Israel' is deemed a threat which they are actively resisting against.

141 The publication provides important perceptions of the State, concerns and motivations, and conflicts on ideological, metaphysical, political and security levels.
unfortunately, most Jewish residents have not yet noticed that the rules of the game have changed. The establishment has made the hilltop youth and Jewish ‘settlers’ their major focus, escalating their actions to the point where it is a war against our very survival.\textsuperscript{142}

Ettinger emphasises different violations and insecurities from the State. With the Hilltop Youth and Jewish settlers ‘their major focus,’ “this is why officials found it proper to destroy the “Chazon David” synagogue near Hevron on the same night Arabs perpetuated two terror attacks.” Ettinger discusses how settlers endure “expulsions, harassments and arrests” by ‘the establishment’ and State forces, and are “provoked.” He also highlights the case of Elad Sela, a settler from Bat Ayin who served in the IDF. In 2014-2015, Sela faced indictment of serious espionage for passing classified information to help Price-Tag suspects and other “radical right-wing activists” [Shalom, Novik, 2015]. Ettinger emphasises the significance of Sela’s treatment by State authorities:

\begin{quote}
while this has not been the first time a Jew has been accused of ‘spying’ on behalf of the ‘settlements,’ it is the first time the security services have explicitly defined Jewish hilltop settlers as the ‘enemy,’\textsuperscript{143}
\end{quote}

where, he states,

\begin{quote}
this was done matter of factly...as if declaring part of the Jewish population in Israel as an enemy is a light matter!...the security services have been acting a long time now as if the main enemy of the State of Israel is Jewish children who move to the hills of Judea and Samaria (‘Hilltop Youth’) and that helping these youngsters is akin to treason.\textsuperscript{144}
\end{quote}

Ettinger brings to focus current realities in some State-settler relations, critiquing realities of (in)security:

\begin{quote}
it seems as though their raison d’etre is to fight against us, Jews who dare aspire for a true Jewish state. The situation has become so dire that the security services leave no stone unturned to seek out such people...they meticulously plan how to prevent Jews from settling unauthorized hilltops. They go from hilltop to hilltop threatening...they will destroy their homes unless they receive the proper paperwork.\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

Ettinger states that the State’s target are ‘Jews who dare aspire for a true Jewish state’ and the case of Sela symbolises another reality in place: “a pure and righteous Jew is sitting in
jail for helping his fellow righteous Jews. *Has the Israeli establishment declared war on all idealists who dream and strive for the Jewish Redemption?*, adding “those who condemn Elad Sela and those who condemn the ‘radical’ Jews he helped are explicitly helping in *this war against holy Jews*.” 146 Ettinger also declares that it is those who ‘dream and strive for the Jewish Redemption’ who are the target of this ‘war.’ These realities, he argues, demand critical questioning and reflecting:

what is the answer? The Unit147 has declared us the enemy, preventing us from settling new hilltops, and is arresting us for defending ourselves. Must we give up on our dreams, give up on settling the land?

On various occasions, Ettinger contrasts how Jews are treated by the Israeli State compared with ‘Arabs.’ Such realities are deemed not only as improper but symbolic, fundamental signals concerning ‘the State’ itself. Ettinger writes:

we must ponder carefully these recent events and understand why the State is so frightened, of what they term ‘nationalistic crime.’ How is it that despite the fact that we want the best for our fellow Jews, we are somehow considered ‘the enemy?’

Such perspective brings significant conceptual contribution to CSS. It shows the force of the key concepts (in)security, security and subjectivity, and securitisation. Again it reflects the dominance of the concern of existential (in)security. However, what is of conceptual significance is where this existential (in)security is perceived to be from. Ettinger exposes his own belief of a paradoxical reality in existence. Presenting a reality of ‘war,’ and predominantly the Hilltop Youth facing a “war against our very survival,” the State of Israel is not just seen as an ‘obstacle’; the State is deemed a fundamental source of insecurity on a number of levels. This is a State which itself has declared war against its own subjects, Jewish settlers, and is posing existential insecurity to them. The State is now positioned in a new metaphysics of insecurity. The State also poses insecurity to other key aspects of security which Ettinger brings to light, including the space of the Land of Israel, settlement, Jewish righteousness, and securing the redemption.

Rather than just losing confidence in the State, as one interviewee voiced, I argue that the Hilltop Youth embody the most radical disjuncture with the State of Israel in the post-Disengagement era. How individuals relate to such realities and insecurities, and struggle in aspirations to “realise a true Jewish State” and “the Jewish Redemption,” are important questions. These relations and concerns are of great significance in the “new era” of Price-
Tags. Ettinger ends vocalising disjuncture and aspiration: “when we behave like ‘spies’-hiding our true intentions and that our loyalties lie with G-d, the Jews of Judea and Samaria and the Torah, then the authorities will view us an enemy from within.”  

Therefore: “our goal must be to act “like truthful people”…openly state our beliefs. We must declare unequivocally that we demand a Jewish State, and our foremost obedience is to G-d.”

*Hostile Perceptions of the State of Israel*

In the concerns and activities of the Hilltop Youth, Meir Ettinger places the goal of attaining a Jewish State as primary. In Chapter Two I assessed how this goal was central to Zionism, where Zionism was pronounced as “a Jewish Revolution” [Ben-Gurion, 1936]. The question of where ‘Zionism’ stands in a self-declared “new era” is politically and ideologically significant. ‘Zionism’ has been used to denounce Price-Taggers and perpetrators. Tzipi Livni declared that “Price tag’ goes against Israel and Zionism” and are an “anti-Zionist crime” [quoted Ezra, 2014]. However, can the ideologies and activities of the Hilltop Youth be thought of as ‘Zionist?’ In discussing the Hilltop Youth, one National-Religious rabbi had this perception:

> they are a very small group who have despair of the Zionist Movement and the way it is today, meaning the country. They say ‘we are the true Zionists. The country has betrayed the Zionist ideology and we are true to the Zionist ideology.’ Some of them have adopted, in my eyes, extremist views. Obviously in their eyes they are normal, and I am the one despairing at the ideology.”

Asked if they despair at the Zionist movement, the rabbi answered, "no they despair of the State. They claim that they are the only ones who are still true to the Zionist movement.”

Concerns of authenticity and being ‘true’ were proclaimed by Ettinger and Hilltop Youth. However, that they see themselves as “true to the Zionist Movement” must be critically approached. For Hilltop Youth and other extreme orthodox settlers I spoke with, they do not associate with ‘the Zionist Movement’ for two key reasons. Firstly, ‘Zionism’ is intimately associated with the State of Israel, a State which they do not associate with and are actively resisting against, or, for some, even seeking to bring down (discussed forthcoming). Secondly, ‘Zionism’ is deemed an inauthentic Jewish Revolution, permeated with secular values, impacting how the State is related to. As one Hilltop Youth declared, “Zionism has nothing to do with Judaism” and, “I worship Torah, not the State.”

If State actors have served to differentiate Price-Taggers and the Hilltop Youth with ‘Zionism,’ individuals have voiced their hostility to ‘Zionism.’ Graffiti found by police near
the Givat HaBaladim outpost made headlines: ‘Hilltop Youth call for death to ‘Zionazis’’ (Ben Kimon, 2017a). This is a powerful and provoking statement. An ideology which underpins the State of Israel is written in conjunction with a substantial insecurity in Jewish history, and who, the article stated, Hilltop Youth have called for death to. Furthermore, an image of the Star of David was drawn combined with a swastika, again placing an image synonymous with the State of Israel with a symbol synonymous with Jewish insecurity. “Givat HaBaladim is considered one of the more extreme strongholds of the so-called "Hilltop Youth" and, Ben Kimon [2017a] writes, “dozens of young people from the area have been evacuated and/or arrested on suspicion of conducting "Price Tag" attacks.” In the outpost, graffiti also called for death to Arabs, Israeli police, and the Israeli left. Such statements further reveal radical disjunctures with the State of Israel on ideological, political, relational and security levels.

The ideologies and activities of the Hilltop Youth and Price-Tag violence both reflect radical disjunctures. In discussing such activities, one security analyst stated that “they are not obeying the rules. They have their own system.” For Hilltop Youth, these ‘rules’ and ‘system' centre on what they see as ‘truth,’ what one rabbi described as “their belief in pure ideology,” and central goals of hastening-the-redemption and (re)creating a ‘true’ Jewish State. Current realities of the State of Israel are viewed with hostility. One Hilltop Youth individual declared that

we came to Israel but we didn’t do what G-d told us to do...the Torah says Jews are above everyone and Eretz Yisrael is above everything else and only the Torah is the right way and G-d is only our authority.152

Another Hilltop Youth discussed inauthentic and insecure realities in place, proclaiming “it’s only getting worse. The desecration the State does to Am Yisrael. When we have this desecration, it desecrates His name...my heart is crying for that.”153 Current realities, and what current realities prevent, are synonymous with insecurity. For this interviewee, “the main enemy is the State.” Another Hilltop Youth pronounced that “the State works against us. They put people like me in jail but they are also doing these actions against G-d.”154 For the Hilltop Youth, and other extreme orthodox ultra-nationalist settlers I spoke with, the State is a dangerous “Hellenistic establishment” which “doesn’t go the way of the Torah.”155 In contrast:

there are Jews, religious mitzvoth-observing Jews, where their Jewish heart and soul tells them what is true. They’ve seen truth, they feel the pride of being a Jew because they have their head up and their faith is with Hashem.156
They furthered, "we have the spirit of Hashem in us. We learnt. We are on our way to build Eretz Yisrael." In an age of Price-Tag attacks, disjuncture and violence have merged, underpinned by ‘truth’ and struggle. With settlers such as Meir Ettinger presenting realities of insecurity and war, seeing the State in hostile and insecurity terms, this has brought a new era within some State-settler relations, and a perceived license and necessitation for violent confrontation/resistance.

*The Revolt and Disjunctive Disjuncture: Price-Tag Attacks and Destructive (Re)Creation*

The question of how individuals relate to realities of perceived insecurity, and struggle to realise projects of security, is a critical focus in the Price-Tag era. Aspirations to (re)create ‘a true Jewish State’ have translated into action. It is through the Price-Tag strategy and violence, I argue, where we can see this aspiration pursued with an agenda of destructive (re)creation. Such agenda is the culmination of a radical trajectory I have traced.

The July 2015 Duma Price-Tag attack was a significant moment in the era of Price-Tag violence. This was the first fatal Price-Tag. Three members of the Dawabsheh family were killed after a firebomb was thrown inside their family home. Graffiti sprayed on the home read ‘Long live Messiah the king,’ ‘Revenge,’ and the Star of David. The attack spurned Israeli security forces to act. A twenty-one year old settler from a nearby settlement-outpost was charged. The attack was also a significant moment because of what was exposed in its aftermath. In investigations into the attack and arrests of suspected Price-Tag perpetrators and Hilltop Youth, a group was uncovered in the Hilltop Youth, known as ‘the Revolt.’ Since 2013 members were suspected of perpetrating a number of significant Price-Tag attacks (Image 6d).

According to the Shin Bet, the “Revolt” group’s ideology started taking shape in October 2013. Since that time and until the Duma attack, its members committed 11 arson attacks against Palestinians or churches [Zitun, 2016].

From information released by the Shin Bet, ‘the Revolt’ is “a radical fringe” of the Hilltop Youth [Kershner, 2016] where “the ideology was formulated by veteran hilltop youth, including Rabbi Meir Kahane's grandson, Meir Ettinger” [Zitun, 2016]. The group's "hardcore element" is estimated to number 30-40 people. Most of the group's members are believed to reside in the Shiloh bloc and other areas in the Samaria region. In 2015, Meir Ettinger, who was accused by security services of heading the cell [Blumenthal, 2015], and a number of other settlers were arrested for their suspected involvement in and committing Price-Tags. A timeline of the activities of the Revolt group displays the
different kinds of actions and violence undertaken from October 2013-December 2015 [Zitun, 2016].
In 2016, Israeli media published segments from “manifestoes” of the Revolt, uncovered by the Shin Bet in investigations. The “manifestoes” detail a radical ideology, principles, and foundations for action, displayed as such in Israeli media:

- “The State of Israel has no right to exist, and we are therefore not bound by the rules of the game;
- Destroy everything first, then rebuild;
- A king must be crowned after the overthrow of the government;
- Under the current foreign rule, we must set up cells in every settlement, hill, city, and yeshiva, made up of 3-5 members who decide to act;
- The cell can begin with small acts. There must be no contact between the cells; Don’t tell, don’t investigate, and don’t make inquiries;
- There is no room for gentiles, particularly Arabs, to live inside the borders of the state, and if they do not leave here it is permissible to kill them indiscriminately—women, men and children;
- the blood of those who are not Jews will always be cheaper than the blood of Jews.”

In asking what is the driving motivation of the Revolt, we are confronted with a radical disjuncture in place in some State-settler relations. ‘The Jewish State of Israel’ is placed at the centre of thought and operation. If this thesis began with identifying tensions and conflicts within the meanings and projects of ‘Zionism’ and ‘the Jewish State of Israel,’ and I assessed throughout how ‘the State’ is interacting with subjects, Ettinger brings such tensions into the open:

the state of Israel has many weak points, topics, which you walk on the edge of a tight rope in order not to cause a disturbance. *What we will do is simply ignite all those barrels of explosives*, all the questions and the contradictions between Judaism and democracy, between Judaism and secularism, and *not be afraid of the results* [quoted Liebermann, 2015].

The question of the purpose of ‘igniting all those barrels of explosives’ is central to analysis in revealing a radical disjunction with the State of Israel. Ettinger reveals the intention:
the meaning of bringing down the State is toppling the structure of the state, and to build a new institution...to this end, we must work outside of the rules of the institution we want to bring down [quoted Blumenthal, 2015].159

To ensure that the goal of the Revolt is fully understood, Ettinger warns that

you have to pay attention to the difference between 'breaking' the state, which is an action that doesn't pay enough attention to what is left of the fragments, and 'dismantling', which is the same action, only gentler and particularly careful. That is, ultimately the goal is disturbing the foundations of the state...in practice the revolt will not permit the state's existence in the same way [quoted Blumenthal, 2015].160

The primary ideological goal of the Revolt, I discern, is 'destructive (re)creation,' engaging in acts to destroy the State in order to (re)create the Jewish State as 'the Jewish State.' This is an existential revolution, existential and structural “toppling” and existential (re)creation in line with a vision of authenticity and ‘security,’ a revolutionary vision and agenda. Ettinger writes:

if the 'contractor' sees there is a regime and keeps him from carrying out the mission, and the mission must be carried out, he must think now how to topple the regime that's stopping him from building the temple, which is preventing us from attaining full and true salvation [quoted Blumenthal, 2015].161

'Toppling' the regime is posited as a religious and moral/ethical act and responsibility, a 'mission' which 'must be carried out' to advance a fundamentalist agenda for messianic security- “attaining full and true salvation.” This is in a reality where the perceived 'non-' and 'anti-Jewish' State of Israel is deemed a fundamental threat to this attainment. Such acts can be perceived as fundamentalist revolutionary violence, violence enacted in the name of and for a Higher purpose. Violence is therefore securitised where the force, significance and implications of this agenda of security and violence bring significant conceptual contribution to CSS. It raises imperative questions of what is legitimised in the name of (in)security and how subjects seek to achieve this. Acts which have the potential to create conditions for insecurity on the ground, “ignite” the explosives and eventually “topple” demand that we recognise another significance of Price-Tag violence, its nature, and agenda. Eiran and Krause [2016:18] write that “perpetrators of price-tag are playing with the fire of potential conflict with three adversaries simultaneously- the settler movement, the Israeli state, and the Palestinians.” They assess that the
burning and vandalizing of Palestinian mosques on 40 separate occasions is an escalatory tactic designed to provoke conflict that chain-gangs the Israeli state and deters subsequent actions against the perpetrators.¹⁶²

Image 6e has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Burning and vandalising mosques and sacred buildings is “an escalatory tactic” given the significance of this targeting. For Palestinian I spoke with, attacks on mosques are deemed the worst attacks and generated strong emotions. In historic acts of settler violence, there are similarities with the individuals from the Jewish Underground who sought to target religious sites to advance redemption and therefore messianic security (Chapter Three). Concern with redemption remains central and influential. Furthermore, such targeting will generate similar significant reactions which Jewish Underground members hoped for- generating instability before a messianic process is put back on track and therefore security restored. However, there are key differences.

Whilst Eiran and Krause assess that such attacks are designed to “provoke conflict,” they situate this in a framework of deterrence for safeguarding settlement. However, a different goal of such attacks has been revealed which reflects radicalism and radical disjuncture. This is a key difference which distinguishes the targeting of religious sites in Price-Tag violence compared with the Jewish Underground. The targeting of religious sites in Price-Tag violence is in a self-declared “new era.” Furthermore, The Revolt manifesto exposed a radical agenda directed at the State of Israel itself by means of such violence and goals of instability and destruction.

In the wake of criticism of the Shin Bet in their treatment of suspects connected with the Duma attack and other Price-Tag attacks, Minister Bennett publicly supported the security services. Bennett significantly proclaimed that there are deeper motivations contained in such violence: “there are a few dozen people whose goal is not murder;
murder is just their means to *undermine the foundations of the state*... the goal was to bring down Israel” [quoted Winer, 2015b].

“He further said they have been trying to wage a biblical war *to bring down the state*” [Winer, 2015b].

Fishman [2017] writes that the Shin Bet has alerted to a significant growth of extremism and destructive agendas within violence. They have warned that attacks perpetrated by some settlers on Palestinians and State forces are “anarchistic-messianic Jewish terrorism, which *aims to destroy the Zionist state* for holding up the arrival of redemption.”

In the concrete revelation of such motivations, I explored this further during my fieldwork in 2016. I asked one military individual if they thought what has developed is a revolution, to cause a rebellion to overthrow the State of Israel, and Price-Tag attacks are a strategy to further this. The interviewee replied:

> of course. It's a kind of rebellion and revolution. It's not only punishing the Palestinians. They have a plan and the plan is 'let's try to be the match. Our match will light the fire.'

I asked one Israeli rabbi what they think the strategy behind Price-Tag attacks is. They answered:

> they have a different policy. I spoke with a lot of Shabak to understand. From their point of view, 'we are very small. We don't have weapons. So what should be our strategy? Our strategy should be try to disturb. The Christians, the Palestinians, and the Arab-Israeli in order that *they* will raise up against the State of Israel and it will be a big mess.' Therefore, for Christians, they burned five churches. I want to emphasise all five were inside the Green Line. Other things they did. They are burning mosques and with all kinds of nasty slogans in order to boil the pot. The third thing they did was attack Palestinians so they will not be silent. And therefore Israel will have to decide. They will use lots of power, violence and order to win. Or suffer. This is a completely bad but different vision.

The rabbi presented Price-Tags as "a policy," "a strategy" and "a vision" in a different light. For this interviewee, individuals are doing so because they are seeking “to force the State of Israel to make the right decisions,” i.e. how they believe the Jewish State of Israel should be. For other individuals I spoke with, and reflected in writings of Hilltop Youth individuals and information uncovered by security forces, where the State of Israel stands in relation to this ‘revolution’ needs to be critically addressed. One Hilltop Youth individual stated that “we make revolution through Price-Tag.” However, they do not
associate with the State in any manner and do not see any possibility for the State to reform and be synonymous with security. They declared that "my goal is to bring about the gehulah (the redemption) and the Messiah (the Messiah) and I don’t think it will come from the State." They furthered, “I see myself very, very separate from the State. All what it’s doing is against G-d, against Torah. I have nothing to do with it.”

Rather than seeking to ‘reform’ the current State of Israel, other interviewees discussed a goal of destructive (re)creation within ideological and political agendas of Hilltop Youth and Price-Taggers. One rabbi declared that “they seek to destroy and their goal is to re-establish the Throne of David.” One Israeli military individual also stated that “they became a very large group against the State of Israel. Some of them say they want to create a kingdom, the Judea Kingdom,” adding “it is a kind of underground against the Israeli State, they are seeking to destroy the State and its legitimacy.” They also presented the goal of destructive (re)creation:

I think in the end, I don't know their time period, they want to see an independent Kingdom of Judea. They will do this by bringing down the State of Israel and creating a new state. Crazy, but this is their goal.

In categorising the ideology and motivation as destructive (re)creation, the emergence of the Revolt represents a full and radical disjuncture with the State of Israel. This embodies the full undoing of a pact with the State and the breaking of a major taboo: calling for revolution against ‘the Jewish State of Israel,’ a State that was synonymous with different fundamental securities (Chapter Two), and engaging in acts of violence which may serve these aims. In an age of Price-Tags, not only are some in the settler community seeking to destroy the current ‘non’- and ‘anti-Jewish’ State of Israel, as they see it, through violence and instability. They are seeking a new project of (re)creation in the name of ‘security’ a Higher purpose. In asking one Hilltop Youth individual how they would respond to criticism which Hilltop Youth and Price-Tag perpetrators have generated from the State, they insightfully answered

if this government which is against Jewish people and Jewish land, are talking about me like that, it means I’m on the right way. When they consider these people extreme or these are extreme places, you give me hope, you give me pride to be a Jew. The light will come and the truth will stay forever. But the State is rotten, you can't bring a change from there...we know what the laws of the Torah are and the laws of the Israeli State are very against them. The two cannot go together. Jews are above.
Emphasising total commitment to God and the Land, individuals are actively seeking to (re)create an ‘authentic Jewish State’ where Halakah is primary, authentic Jewish existence in ‘the homeland’ is secured, obedience is foremost to God, and redemption is put back on course. What they see as an authentic Jewish Revolution driven by truth and a desire to secure truth. Price-Tag and Hilltop Youth practices, such as outpost-building, are therefore perceived as speaking truth to power, and asserting Jewish truth and power. Whilst *Gush Emunim* and the wider National-Religious settler movement have been willing to accept compromises where *Mamluchti* ideology remains strong and violence remains a dominant taboo, radical shifts have occurred in the post-Disengagement era. Not holding *Mamluchti* ideology, the Hilltop Youth have made a radical break with the State and chosen confrontation. Confronting what they see are realities of insecurity, epitomised in the State’s evacuation of settlement-communities, some settler groups are seeking to take ‘security’ into their own hands, leading to a new era of revenge, resistance and Jewish revolution against the State of Israel.

**Conclusion**

Declared “a new era” post-Disengagement and post-Amona, this chapter has critically assessed the nature and significance of Price-Tag violence and strategies within. Emerging in relation to evacuations of outposts/structures, perceived threats to settlement-communities and projects, as well as to visions of what Jewish existence in ‘the homeland’ means and demands, engaging in violent confrontation/resistance, and even revolution, against the State for some has become legitimised.

Operating within frameworks of ‘revenge,’ ‘resistance,’ ‘(coercive) deterrence,’ and ‘war,’ and legitimised according to commitment to God, *Eretz Yisrael* and (in)security concerns, Price-Tag attacks represent ‘a new era’ of violent confrontation/resistance. As a strategy and attacks principally directed at the Israeli State, and where some settlers have deployed direct violence against State forces, this has overcome dominant taboos in place during the Gaza Disengagement. Price-Tag attacks and ideologies of the Hilltop Youth are both a culmination of an alienation that goes back to the Disengagement and a major paradigm shift. The attacks pose a variety of (potential) insecurities to Palestinians and other communities, and insecurity to the State of Israel.

Price-Tag violence is of high conceptual significance to CSS and Political Geography and embodies key concepts discussed in Chapter One. If a key motivation is to establish a balance of power or “balance of terror” [Harel, 2008b] in struggles for space and settlement, this again reflects the significance of this space and spatial practice and central
interactions between space and (in)security. Price-Tags serve as strategic weapons for defending and advancing projects of perceived security. In so doing, space itself is weaponised. Attacks overcome spatial boundaries, generate insecurities throughout space and brings wider spaces into battles. In seeking spatial control and security, space is (re)structured and new realities of power, resistance, and (in)security are in place. Through deploying acts of confrontation/resistance, this enacts new performativities in space and reinforces subject positions and relations between subjectivity and space.

The nature of this violence indicates deeper significance. Emerging out of disjunctive moments, both the growth of the Hilltop Youth and the advent of Price-Tag attacks reflect “a new era” and paradigm in some State-settler relations and embody radical disjunctures with the State. Attacks display new relations of (in)security and deepening (in)security concerns. Disjuncture from the State and the move-to-violence is perceived by some as necessary and legitimate. This is in a reality where the State is seen as an increasing threat, and realities and relations are one of ‘war,’ existential struggle, and there is concern with securing the redemption. ‘Disjuncture’ has come to take on a new level of disjuncture. Turning against the State of Israel in such a radical way through violence is deeply significant. This is because of the historic pact which existed in State-settler relations. In tracing a trajectory of disjuncture, for some settler communities the State of Israel has not only lost its religious-metaphysical grounding; the State is seen in fundamental insecurity terms, opening new pathways to relations, (re)actions and radicalism.

Price-Tag attacks, I argue, are the culmination of a trajectory of disjuncture which I have traced in some State-settler relations. In the ideological and political paradigm shifts, these radical disjunctures are being expressed and furthered through acts of violence, having significant (potential) impacts. The betrayals and feelings of affront have not only significantly impacted on relations with the State. There is now radical opposition to and against the State. The construct of ‘the Jewish State of Israel’ and its (in)security have been brought into critical questioning and Price-Tag violence poses a significant challenge to this. What is more radical is that revolutionary agendas have been exposed in Price-Tag violence. Radical opposition to and against the State has translated into action. Attacks have potential for causing great insecurities. These insecurities arguably enable for destructive (re)creation in desires for attaining ‘a true Jewish State,’ for perceived projects of (in)security, and defending the Land in a self-declared “new era.”

References

1 Emphasis added.
2 Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.
3 Author Interview, National Religious rabbi, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.
4 Sajaiyeh is a district in the Gaza Strip and saw some of the heaviest fighting, casualties and destruction during ‘Operation Protective Edge’ - the Summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict.
5 Author Interview Samaria, 25th July 2016.
6 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
7 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016.
8 Specifically in the latter sections of Chapter Six.
9 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
10 See, for example, Fisher, 2012.
11 Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2013.
12 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
13 Author Interviews, Jerusalem 22nd August, 2016; Judea 24th July 2016.
14 Author Interview, Judea 24th July 2016.
15 Author Interview, Judea 24th July 2016.
16 Author Interviews Judea 21st August 2016; Samaria 18th August 2016.
17 Author Interview, Samaria 19th August 2013; emphasis added.
18 Author Interviews Judea 21st August 2016.
19 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
20 Author Interview, Samaria 19th August 2013.
21 Author Interviews Samaria 10th August 2016.
22 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
23 Author Interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016.
24 Author Interviews, Jerusalem 22nd August, 2016; Judea 24th July 2016.
25 Author Interview, Judea 24th July 2016.
26 Author Interview, Judea 24th July 2016.
27 Author Interview, Judea 24th July 2016.
28 Author Interview, Judea 21st August 2016.
29 Author Interview, Judea 18th August 2016.
31 Actions are documented on the news-site Hakol HaYehudi and by the Association Honenu.
32 Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2016.
33 Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2016.
34 Raz Nazri, quoted Arutz Sheva Staff, 2016.
35 Author’s Interview, Samaria 19th August 2013.
36 Emphasis added. ‘Har Bracha’ is a Jewish-Israeli settlement in the north West Bank (Samaria). The ‘southern Hebron hills’ are in the south West Bank (Judea). The Hilltop Youth member is therefore emphasising that what happens in one particular space/geographical location will gain a reaction in a different space/geographical location as the two spaces are interconnected.
37 Whilst some analysts refer to the outpost as ‘Givat Shaked’ - ‘Shaked Hill,’ others refer to the outpost as ’Havat Shaked’ - ‘Shaked Farm.’ As the outpost is referred by settlers as Havat Shaked, I will use this name.
39 Understanding motivations would require speaking with perpetrators, understanding their world-view, influences, ideologies, motivations and justifications. This would only be a partial understanding.
40 Author Interview Samaria, 19th August 2013.
41 For example, Price-Tag attacks on 7th October 2011; 31st October 2011; and 8th February 2012 [APN].
42 Price-Tag attack in the village of Jish in the Upper Galilee. Jish has a predominantly Maronite-Catholic population. on Buchnik, 2014.
43 Jpost Staff, 2014.
44 Dvir, 2014b.
45 Price-Tag attack 17-01-2016, Dormition Abbey Jerusalem. 10 different messages, a number which were anti-Christian, were sprayed on the Abbey. Yanovsky, 2016.
46 Author Interview, Samaria 18th August 2013.
47 13th May 2013.
48 29th May 2013.
49 30th May 2013.
Therefore assuming that rabbis have influence over Price-Tag perpetrators or supporters. The Od Yosef Chai Yeshiva is not formally affiliated with the Hasidic movement and is also not mainstream Religious-Zionist.

These publications were Barukh HaGever [Barukh the Man/Blessed the Man], authored by Rabbi Ginsburgh following Barukh Goldsein’s [an orthodox settler from the settlement of Kiryat Araba on the outskirts of the city of Hebron] murder of 29 Palestinian worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron on the 29th February 1994; and, Torat HaMelekh [The King’s Torah], authored by Rabbis Yosef Elitzur and Yitzchak Shapiro who were students of Ginsburgh and senior teachers at Od Yosef Chai Yeshiva. Torat HaMelekh is infamous for saying it is permissible to kill non-Jews due to their innate nature. However, as stated above, Ginsburgh has previously been questioned by Israeli authorities on suspicion of inciting racist violence with his publications.

'Significant' generally because of their nature and consequences if enacted and 'significant' in particular for the nature of this thesis and in assessing the significances of Price-Tag violence.

As Ginsburgh writes "it should be recognized that Jewish blood and a goy's blood are not the same...Any trial that assumed that Jews and goyim are equal is a travesty of justice." Quoted Satherley 2013:65.

I.e. Palestinians but he does not recognise this identity.

Yoel Bin-Nun warned in 1996 of “‘the potential for murder in the yeshiva in Shechem” (at the time the Od Yosef Chai Yeshiva was located on the outskirts of the city of Shechem/Nablus). He also stated to the Yesha Council that “I have no doubt that Rabbi Ginzburg and his doctrine are a threat to our entire enterprise: to settlement activity, yeshivas, society, the state as a whole.” Quoted Satherley, 2013:65.

This complex model and conception again is discussed very clearly and informatively by Satherley. Of particular note “He argues that peace among the nations depends on Jewish rulership and Gentiles' fear of Jewish strength,” which itself serves to bring about a revelation of God's name and the achieving of ‘true peace.’ See Satherley, 2013:76-77 and ensuing references.

Seeman discusses how this was emphasised in Ginsburgh’s publication of Barukh Ha-Gever. Satherley, 2013: footnote 171, p. 79.

Whilst at the time, Seeman writes within an ‘Orthodox’ framework. Seeman, 2005:1019.

I.e. seeking to ensure deterrence and security against acts of Palestinian violence and the inability of the IDF and Israeli Police to protect settlers from such attacks; and, using vigilante violence to assert Jewish presence and strength in space.


Statement made by Itay Zar, a settler from the Havat Gilad outpost in 2008.

Such as neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem.
likely to ignite the territories.” quoted Stewart, 2011.

Palestinian vehicles by settlers and forces stationed on the outskirts of Palestinian villages which tress.

illegal outpost, settlers responded by burning Mr Ghanem’s and his neighbo West Bank, between the settlements of Kedumin and Yitzhar. Following the evacuation of an

treme, more routine acts of settler violence are deep sources of insecurity, harm and trauma. As my interviews with Palestinians brought into

militant Israeli settlers in the West Bank to deter Israeli law enforcement authorities from

projects, has been discussed throughout this thesis and can also be recognised from assessments which this thesis has engaged in regarding the frameworks and securitisations of ‘settlement.’ The ‘harm’ which Price-Tag attacks have been acknowledged to cause upon security forces and the State of Israel will be discussed forthcoming in this chapter.

The harm of settlement-evacuations, and also other actions deemed harmful to settlement projects, has been discussed throughout this thesis and can also be recognised from assessments which this thesis has engaged in regarding the frameworks and securitisations of ‘settlement.’ The ‘harm’ which Price-Tag attacks have been acknowledged to cause upon security forces and the State of Israel will be discussed forthcoming in this chapter.

87 Usually settlement outposts which have Hebrew names and which are named after particular Biblical figures/sites, or particular names in commemoration of Jewish individuals.

88 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016.

89 Attack on the Palestinian village of Urif on 26th January 2011 after the Israeli Civil Administration ordered demolition orders for several structures in the Alei Avin outpost. As well as the Price-Tag graffiti, settlers also set fire to a tractor in Urif.

90 Attack on the Palestinian village of Ein Abus on 27th January 2011, again in reaction to the Israeli Civilian Administration ordering several buildings in the outpost of Alei Avin to be demolished. As well as the Price-Tag graffiti, settlers also set fire to a Palestinian car in Ein Abus.

91 Attack on the Palestinian village of Beit Illu, 28th June 2011. This is believed to be a reference to the outpost of Mitzpe Avichai, also known as ‘Hill 18.’

92 Attack on the Jewish-Arab village of Neve Shalom. The tires of fourteen cars were slashed.

93 Authorised settlement communities which may have also encountered confrontations with State forces may also be names in Price-Tag attacks or reasons why a Price-Tag attack has been enacted. Such communities named in Price-Tag attacks have included Yitzhar and Bat Ayin.

94 Attack on the Palestinian village of Beit Umar. As well as these words, threatening statements were graffitised directed at ‘Arabs’ and a Palestinian car was torched in Beit Umar. Israel Hayom, 2013.

95 The harm of settlement-evacuations, and also other actions deemed harmful to settlement projects, has been discussed throughout this thesis and can also be recognised from assessments which this thesis has engaged in regarding the frameworks and securitisations of ‘settlement.’ The ‘harm’ which Price-Tag attacks have been acknowledged to cause upon security forces and the State of Israel will be discussed forthcoming in this chapter.

96 Emphasis added.

97 Emphasis added.

98 Quoted Ravid, 2012; emphasis added.

99 Similarly, Ori Nir [2011] writes, “‘Price Tag...started out as a violent tactic employed by young militant Israeli settlers in the West Bank to deter Israeli law enforcement authorities from removing illegally-built structures from West Bank settlements and illegal outposts. The tactic includes attacks on Palestinians and their property, as well as attacks on Israeli military and police officers to obstruct and deter law enforcement inside settlements.”

100 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016.

101 As Chapter Two discussed, such acts of ‘evacuation’ are enacted on a minimal level.

102 Emphasis added.

103 Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016; emphasis added.

104 Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 27th August 2013.

105 Yehuda Ben Meir, quoted Sanders, 2011; emphasis added.

106 Emphasis added.

107 Daniella Weiss, quoted Weiss, 2008; Emphasis added.

108 The focus which this thesis is placing upon ‘Price-Tag’ violence does not intend to belittle other acts of settler violence which have not been declared as Price-Tag attacks by the perpetrators but which Palestinians also endure. As my interviews with Palestinians brought into the open, more routine acts of settler violence are deep sources of insecurity, harm and trauma.

109 Ahmed Ghanem, quoted in Garcia-Navarro, 2009. Mr Ghanem lives in a village in the North West Bank, between the settlements of Kedumin and Yitzhar. Following the evacuation of an illegal outpost, settlers responded by burning Mr Ghanem’s and his neighbour’s land and burning 150 tress.

110 This included forces being stationed along roads in the West Bank to prevent thestoning of Palestinian vehicles by settlers and forces stationed on the outskirts of Palestinian villages which have been vulnerable to Price-Tag attacks, such as those near the Yitzhar settlement. Katz, 2011.


112 Chairman of the anti-Price-Tag ’Tag Meir’ organisation.

113 Emphasis added.

114 Emphasis added.

115 Author interview Tel Aviv, 27th August 2013.

116 Avi Mizrahi warned Price-Tag- violence is terrorism and "terrorism against Palestinians is likely to ignite the territories." quoted Stewart, 2011.

117 At the time Maj.-Gen Mizrahi made this statement he was OC Central Commander.
Shragai lists Yitzhar, Kiryat Arba, Maon, Adi Ed, Esh Kodesh, and Alei Ayin.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016

Ehud Barak

Some of these acts carry on to the following day as they occur late at night and the early hours.

Palestinian vehicles are distinguished by the colour of their license plates which is white.

Left in the village of Duma.

Left in the village of Yasuf.

Left in the village of Haris.

Video footage of the military operation in Mitzpe Yitzhar can also be accessed from this article.

Author interview, Samaria, 19th August 2013.

Included the Defence Minister, Public Security Minister, IDF Chief of Staff, Police Commissioner.

Author Interview Tel Aviv, 10th September 2013.

Author Interview Jerusalem, 22nd August 2016; emphasis added.

Author Interview Judea, 15th August 2016.

Author Interview Jerusalem, 25th August 2016.

Author interview Jerusalem, 25th August 2013; emphasis added.

Author Interview Tel Aviv, 27th August 2013; emphasis added.

The article was an Op-Ed published on the Israeli news site Arutz Sheva.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

The Nationalistic Crime Unit.

Emphasis added.

Author interview, Jerusalem 25th August 2016; emphasis of interviewee.

Emphasis was placed on 'true' by the interviewee.

Author Interview Samaria 8th August 2016.

Author interview Jerusalem, Samaria 19th August 2013.

Author Interview Samaria 8th August 2016.

Author Interviews, Samaria 19th August 2013.

Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2013.

These points- comprising 'the group's ideology'- are presented as bullet points in Zitun, 2016.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Eiran and Krause, 2016:2; emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016. The Shabak is the Shin Bet, Israel's Internal Security Service. Emphasis placed on 'they' by the interviewee.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.

Author Interview, Samaria 19th August 2013.

Author Interview, Jerusalem 22nd August 2016.

Author Interview, Tel Aviv 11th August 2016; emphasis added.

Author Interview, Samaria 21st August 2013.
Conclusion

Israeli settlement-construction over the State of Israel's internationally-recognised territorial borders is deeply contentious. Settlement existence and expansion is deemed a critical obstacle to reaching a political peace solution with Palestinians, undermining and jeopardising the Israeli government's declared intent of attaining a Two-State Solution. Dominating realities on the ground, settlements will continue to be deeply contentious, impacting on futures. As a practice enacted in contested spaces, the focus of this thesis, however, has been on internal contests and conflicts which have grown between the State of Israel and some settler populations. This is an exigent (in)security problematic with new realities of violence and confrontation on the ground. In 2017, Israeli media reported "a stark rise in the number of skirmishes between Jewish teenagers and Israel's security forces and Palestinians" where, Zitun [2017] writes,

attacks launched by the ideologically-driven youths have included rock throwing, vandalism to military vehicles, price tag attacks, shock grenades and even violence directly committed against an IDF officer.

Enacted by 'ideologically-driven youths,' how have we reached a point where attacks against Israeli State security forces have become more frequent and there is perceived legitimacy for this? Where some in the settler community feel it is acceptable to throw rocks at IDF personnel? Where IDF soldiers who "came to defend the country" are called "Nazis and stinking Zionists" by some settler youth [quoted Zitun, 2017]? Whilst this extremism may be confined to small radical segments in the settler community, this is highly significant in State-settler relations, insecurities on the ground, and in uncertainties this poses. This is particularly significant for a state like the State of Israel, 'the Jewish State,' which is (re)created in a meaningful space and a State which was associated with fundamental security on different levels.

This thesis has centred on a problematic of (in)security with a paradox of security at its core: Why has the State of Israel, which was (re)established on the premise to provide security to the Jewish people, come to be seen as a source of insecurity? and, Why do some of the State's own Jewish subjects feel it is legitimate and even necessary to confront/resist against this State, even with violence? Tracing this, I have assessed that this is not a paradox. Rather, the shifts in perceptions and the emergence of confrontations
and violence reflect critical disjunctures which have developed between the State of Israel and some of its subjects in which concerns and agendas of security are central.

Concepts from Critical Security Studies (CSS) and Political Geography have underpinned analysis. My cases and areas of focus have displayed how key concepts discussed in Chapter One—(in)security, security and subjectivity, securitisation, spatial (re)structuring, spatial control, and the weaponisation of space—are applied in practice and have vividly shown their impacts. Throughout, I have focused on a particular State, a particular space, and a particular population. The unique aspects of the Israeli case have also brought new dimensions to these concepts. I have assessed how State (re)creation and spatial practices in this space contain different aspects and agendas of security, generating different expectations from the State of Israel. I have observed how religious belief-systems interact with the State and space where different realities are projected on them and where messianic security is dominant in relations. Furthermore, I have illuminated how space is not just a theatre on which conflicts occur; space is integral to these conflicts. Subjects have particular relations with this space and space makes its own demands.

My thesis has critically examined different features of space in the Israeli case:

- the meaning of State (re)creation in the historic space of ‘the Land of Israel’;
- a particular spatial practice which is central to State (re)building and securitisation—settlement-building;
- detailed case-studies of historic settlement evacuations;
- tracing confrontations which have emerged in and over space;
- and, a detailed analysis of a new form of violence which is enacted throughout space in a self-declared ‘new era’ in space and relations—Price-Tag attacks.

As I have traced, these features and cases are interrelated. With these indepth focuses, I have illuminated different aspects of space, bringing conceptual value to Political Geography particularly. Whilst the State of Israel and Jewish settlers both engage in settlement, a key architecture in political geography, this practice is for different agendas. The State of Israel’s dominant concern is with existential security and ensuring the existential security of the State and Jewish subjects. For religious settlers, settlement is a fundamental religious commandment and a central act for hastening-the-redemption, a practice of messianic security. Whilst both agendas can co-exist, there are underlying political and ideological tensions between these agendas. The instrumental-security and ideological-symbolic natures of this space are also in tension.
The act of settlement embodies the concept of spatial (re)structuring. Both the Israeli State and Jewish settlers have sought to (re)structure space to (re)create new realities. Settlement liberates visions and has dramatically restructured spatial realities in a contested space to progress agendas. Through my analysis, I have shown the impacts of this practice. However, I have critically asked 'what reality are settlement practices seeking to create and secure?' Alerting to different realities projected upon space and State (re)creation is conceptually valuable. It illuminates complexities in the Israeli case where the State and space have different natures, groundings of security and expectations. Importantly, this leaves the existence of particular realities open to charges of inauthenticity and insecurity to which subjects respond differently.

The act of settlement also embodies the concept of spatial control. In Political Geography literatures, there is much focus on the militarisation of space where security and military architectures command landscapes and space is dominated by mechanisms of control [Efrat, 2006; Weizman, 2014a; 2014b]. The focus in such literatures has been on how the State of Israel seeks to assert its power and control over space and Palestinians and how this constitutes insecurities and rights violations to Palestinians. Of far less focus is how the Israeli State imposes its sovereignty and governance-regime over space and its own subjects, Jewish settlers, and the impacts of this.

As I have brought to emphasis, this spatial control is epitomised in actions taken against settlement, such as restricting construction and evacuating communities, structures and settlers from space. This spatial control is also important and is being confronted and resisted against by some of the State's subjects who refuse to be bounded by such controls and seek to defend space against practices of perceived insecurity. I have importantly observed how Jewish settlers also seek spatial control. The practices of the Hilltop Youth particularly epitomise this with acts of construction, enacting a different lifestyle in space, and, for some, engaging in Price-Tag violence (Chapter Six). This is of conceptual value. Such acts and struggles demonstrate how space is a theatre of relations and power. State forces and Jewish settlers both seek to assert authority in space through different spatial practices, including against each other.

Given the nature of such struggles, my assessments embody the concept the weaponisation of space. In discussions of Israel and space, space is commonly viewed as a space of contestation between Israelis and Palestinians. I have traced how space is increasingly a space of contestation and conflict between the State of Israel and some Jewish settler populations. The nature of Price-Tag violence reflects how some subjects frame their
struggles as a ‘battle’ or ‘war’ (Chapter Six). Indeed, Price-Tag graffiti has vocalised this. Enacting acts of violence throughout space generates insecurities in different spaces and to different communities. The violence overcomes spatial boundaries and brings wider spaces into this ‘battle’ and ‘war.’ This is an important site of analysis for Political Geography in how violence and space interact. With acts of violence enacted in a perceived defence of space and settlement, this is also of conceptual significance for elevating the value of space and settlement and signifying how they also symbolise something more.

Throughout, I have examined how space and subjectivity and security and subjectivity interact. My interviews with a variety of settlers bring original contributions in signifying how subjectivity is closely attached with space. This original data brings to force the ideological dimensions of this space, expanding on literatures that focus on the ideological dimensions of settlement [Newman, 2005; Jones, 2009; 2012]. The interviews also reinforce how subjectivity is shaped by (in)security. Importantly, personal insights from settlers reveal different impacts which acts taken against space and settlement by the State have caused. With such insights, I assessed how acts have impacted on relations, belief-systems, and securities, and key questions they have generated. These assessments are of conceptual contribution in highlighting how space and (in)security are interrelated.

In assessing indepth historic acts of evacuation, my analysis also elevated the performativity aspects of space. Conceptualising of the Gaza Disengagement (Chapter Four) and the Amona evacuation (Chapter Five) as ‘spectacles,’ the different significances of evacuation were brought to the fore. In acts of evacuation, space was transformed politically, practically and symbolically and had new associations of (in)security. For some, it also (re)affirmed different subject positions. My unique exploration of the language of ‘evacuation’ through original fieldwork data is also of important conceptual contribution. It demonstrates how spatial practices and ‘security’ are seen differently and held in different languages of (in)security, also reflecting different relations with space.

Critically contrasting the natures of the Gush Katif evacuations with the Amona evacuation, I examined how actions taken against space can motivate and generate new performativities and resistances. Symbolically and ideologically, ‘the Land of Israel’ is a fixed space with its own innate sacred nature and history in belief-systems. However, this space is continually being transformed through different practices. Conceptually, this reflects that space is a space of (re)becoming and how new subjectivities, associations of (in)security, and forms of the political can come from space and different spatial practices.
With security concerns and agendas central in actions and relations, my thesis also makes important conceptual contributions to CSS. The concepts of (in)security and securitisation have been applied throughout. Practices rest on agendas of security. However, I have drawn attention to different meanings of ‘security’ in the Israeli case, including existential security and messianic security. I have bridged the ‘security’ ‘ideological’ dichotomy in assessing how ideological relations with space embody key security concepts, such as securing the ‘true’ meaning of State (re)creation and adhering to commandments in this space for messianic security to be progressed. I have observed how acts are enacted and legitimised in the name of security. However, such acts constitute insecurity to others. With security agendas central, and new threat perceptions developing, my thesis has shown how subjects have sought to take ‘security’ into their own hands. This has provided a perceived license for action, including acts of violence, and has brought some subjects into confrontation and conflict with the State, revealing the force of (in)security.

In discussing such interactions and tensions between the State, space and (in)security throughout, underpinned by the unique complexities and nuances in the Israeli case, I have traced the undoing of a pact of security. For some settlers, their security is increasingly seen as separate from the State of Israel. Instead it lies in their relations with the space of Eretz Yisrael, defending this space, adhering to commandments given by the sovereign God, and placing concern with redemption and Jewish ‘authentic’ existence as central. My analysis has therefore highlighted different aspects and sites of ‘security.’

What has developed is not only a security breakdown between some subjects and their State. It is a security problematic. If the State is facing insecurity from some of its own subjects, they have come to view this State as a source of insecurity in different aspects. Such disjuncture therefore challenges the dominant perception that the state serves as the security racket for its subjects. Rather, for some, disassociating with this State and confronting it is needed to safeguard security and advance security agendas, even if this means violence. Actions which the State of Israel has taken against space have been particularly impactful. Disjunctures with the State reveal the power of belief-systems and the significances of this space. Throughout, I have brought to emphasis how security uses subjects. Different security agendas and concerns have their own demands for action.

These concepts and nuances underpin settlement and confrontations which have developed. Applying key concepts and identifying unique dimensions have brought contributions to both sub-disciplines. My thesis has expanded on important literatures which focus on ideological dynamics within the Israeli State and Israeli settlement. This
includes the work of Aviezer Ravitzky, David Newman, Clive Jones, Sara Yael Hirschhorn, and Motti Inbari. Inbari’s work has been of particular value in provoking key questions which this thesis has taken up in case-studies, analysis and fieldwork where I have contributed depth of analysis and originality. I have assessed critical questions which acts of ‘Israeli territorial compromise’ have generated, and how settler communities have responded to these acts. I have observed divergences in settler communities over issues, such as what (re)actions are deemed as legitimate, and have critically identified shifts.

My thesis has also made a contribution to minimal literatures on Price-Tag violence, such as the work of Byman and Sachs [2012] and Eiran and Krause [2016]. Tracing the genealogy of Price-Tag violence, both etiologically and politically, has contributed to addressing an analytical deficient on such a significant form and reality of violence. This is of importance. Such violence is not only of analytical and academic significance because of important questions which it raises in interactions between the State, space, subjectivity and (in)security. It has political value because of the (potential) impacts of this violence on the ground. Tracing its genealogy, and bringing in different perspectives from significant individuals in original fieldwork I conducted, has provided a comprehensive analysis to deepen understanding. I have importantly assessed the foundations, strategies and impacts of Price-Tag violence. All are key areas which individuals need to consider when approaching this violence and its perpetrators.

**A Journey of Understanding**

Provoked by the question ‘why are some Jewish settlers conflicting with the State of Israel?’ this thesis has etiologically and politically traced confrontations and conflicts which have emerged over questions and practices of settlement and the State’s evacuation of settlement-communities. Acts of evacuation, and other acts by the State deemed to threaten settler interests, have generated political and (in)security problematics and impacted relations. I have traced the growth of disjuncture from the Disengagement and the Amona evacuation, to a culmination of a trajectory of disjuncture in the emergence of Price-Tag violence and radical ideologies and agendas exposed in the Revolt.

Centred on frameworks of ‘(in)security,’ ‘disjunctive moment’ and ‘disjuncture,’ the contribution which this thesis strove to make was to provide political and ideological assessment of conflicts and confrontations which are playing-out in and over settlement and space and the significance of the new era of Price-Tag violence. Each chapter constitutes an invaluable part of this journey of understanding and disjuncture, bringing depth of discussion and analysis. Assessments have been substantially informed and
provoked by perceptions and experiences of diverse actors on the ground. These perceptions have given this thesis not only originality but the capacity to engage in deeper recognition of significant issues and events.

Ideologically and politically, the origins of this disjunction, I argue, are in different perceptions which Jewish subjects hold regarding the meaning of the Jewish State’s (re)creation, different expectations from the State, and different security projects within the space of *Eretz Yisrael* and the Jewish State (Chapter Two). There are significant discrepancies between how the Jewish State is seen and how the modern Jewish State of Israel acts. Furthermore, actions by the State undermine and threaten different securities and beliefs. Settlement practices and contestations reflect different relations with the Land. Concerned with conflicts over settlement-practices and evacuations, I assessed how tensions are contained in settlement projects and in questions of what license Jewish settlers hold to reside in spaces outside the State’s internationally-recognised territorial borders but seen as ‘the historic Jewish homeland’ (Chapter Three).

With settlement positioned as a key act for State (re)creation and the securitisation of space, I contrasted different natures of settlement: a practice of political geography for State and territorial security; and a religious commandment for hastening the-process-of-redemption. Settlement is a security practice in different aspects. It is also a practice of insecurity for others, in perpetuating the occupation, and threatening the State of Israel’s future as ‘Jewish and democratic.’ Klein [2017] writes that the settlement enterprise has become a divisive factor in Israeli society, sowing bitter rivalries among Jews not seen since the end of the Second Temple period...what do we want for our future? What will be the continuing story of Israel?

With a commitment by some subjects to reside in spaces of ‘the homeland’ and expand settlement, underpinned by different agendas and notions of rights, settlement practices nevertheless are held under the State’s sovereignty and governance-regime. Settlement is marked by constraints and uncertainties, restricting building, perceived rights, and freedoms. A particular focus has been upon how settler populations (re)act to events of ‘evacuation’ and fractures which have grown in State-settler relations.

As an historic event in State-settler relations taken in the name of (in)security, I discussed the significance of the Gaza Disengagement (2005). Assessing dominant responses at the time and concerns and taboos in place, these reflected the strength of the *Mamluchti* position. As a pro-State ideology which underpins National-Religious Zionism, seeing the
State as a sacred being of divine providence where an unfolding-process-of-redemption is occurring in the State’s (re)creation and operationality, this served to boundarise (re)actions. As one National-Religious rabbi stated to me, although the Disengagement was deemed a terrible thing for settler communities, this did not provide a license to violently confront/resist State forces and turn against the State of Israel. Yet, in assessing impacts of this unprecedented event on different levels, these were significant and potentially incendiary. The Disengagement is seen by many in the settler community as a collective trauma where the State turned against settlement and settlers on a new scale.

The hugely significant disjunctive impact was not immediately clear but for some in the settler community, particularly youth, was evident in its aftermath. It is the critical (re)thinking which this prompted, I argue, which is a key impact. The Amona evacuation (2006) is described as ‘unprecedented’ due to levels of violence it witnessed on the part of State forces and some settlers/protestors. Occurring less than six months after the Disengagement, Amona symbolised that significant shifts had occurred for some. In seeking to understand why we saw the move-to-violence, and the perceived necessitation and legitimisation of this for some settlers, the violent scenes were explained as being outcomes of different responses. Recognising the significance and impacts of evacuations, the concept of disjunctive moment, I argue, is central.

Individuals engaging in violent protest moved beyond and broke dominant concerns and taboos largely in place in the Disengagement, opening and actualising new pathways of thought, relations, and (re)actions. In Amona, impacts of the Disengagement were seen and a growth of extremism was evident. This was not only in signs carried there- ‘through war we will win’-, but in the deployment of violent confrontation/resistance, overcoming taboos. Security officials noted that what was witnessed in Amona was a "process of rupture," and they were shocked by levels and intensity of hatred and violence directed at State forces. Crucially, I observed the significance of the growth/emergent openness of anti-State ideologies where the security of the State, in different aspects, was critically brought into question, impacting on relations.

This radical violent rupture of the pact between some settlers and the State of Israel culminates, I argue, in the ideologies and activities of ‘the Hilltop Youth,’ described as a ‘fringe’ and ‘extreme’ group in the settler community. Their activities have increasingly been the focus of concern and action by State security forces and have been involved in confrontations in space. The activities and ideologies of the Hilltop Youth reflect the most radical disjuncture with the State of Israel which has been exacerbated in the post-
Disengagement era. It is the Hilltop Youth’s association with Price-Tag violence which has been a particular focus of concern for State forces.

Chapter Six centred on critically assessing the emergence of a self-declared ‘new era’ which this thesis built to assess etiologically and politically. Price-Tag violence is the cumulative disjunction caused by the Disengagement and unleashed in the Amona evacuation. I explored different disjunctures and strategies within Price-Tag attacks, and the insecurities which attacks pose. Assessing how violence is largely deployed in response to the State’s evacuation of settlement-outposts/structures, and perceived threats to settlement projects and interests, violence is used to defend and advance agendas. Emerging post-Amona, Price-Tag violence heightens a ‘militant activist’ position undertaken by some settlers, bringing new realities in realities of contestation.

An Incendiary Future

In 2017, Israel’s right-wing government passed the Regulation Law which retroactively legalised thousands of settler homes, many in outposts built before a certain time. Such regulation was divisive in Israeli society and attracted international condemnation. Whilst this regulation may safeguard the existence of such structures/communities from evacuation by changing their status from ‘unauthorised’ to ‘authorised,’ other settlement structures and outposts continue to face prospects and acts of evacuation. Furthermore, the future final status of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria and all settlements remains uncertain. For a Two-State Solution to be achieved, it is widely believed that this will require Israel’s further ‘disengagement’ from territory, and the evacuation of a number of settlement-communities. In 2005 Susskind et al. wrote

whether or not it will be possible to relocate settlers from the “territories” depends not just on the willingness of the relevant Israeli officials to authorize evacuation...given the violence it may cause, but especially on the thinking and the changing attitudes of the settlers themselves.

They continued by stating that “only by understanding the views of the current settlers-their motivations, their beliefs, and the differences among them- will it be possible to formulate a sensible relocation strategy.” My research sought to gain insights into such perceptions and divergences. In struggles around the questions, practices and evacuations of settlements, we have seen how questions, concerns and projects of (in)security interact and collide and the challenges which settlement evacuations pose to communities, belief-
systems and State-settler relations. Despite evacuations and territorial compromises, the majority of the settler community maintains close relations with the State of Israel.

In spite of challenges which State actions have posed to settler communities and agendas, belief-systems continue to be largely upheld in National-Religious Zionist communities. The State of Israel continues to be placed on a pedestal, attracting reverence and commitment. Furthermore, engaging in violent confrontation/resistance against the State/State forces continues to be a dominant taboo for the vast majority of settlers. Acts that are deemed to undermine the State and violate Israeli Law are also highly rejected. Ensuring the ‘wholeness’ of *Am Yisrael* is placed ahead of the ‘wholeness’ of *Eretz Yisrael* and not causing divisions, resorting to violence, or running the risk of civil war. Concerns are placed in religious, ideological, moral-ethical, political, and security frameworks.

However, one Israeli security analyst professed to me that “there will be settlers who will not leave, no matter what. Settlements like Yitzhar, Itamar, Kfar Tapuach, Elon Moreh.”¹ These settlements, located deep inside the West Bank, are home to orthodox settlers who have strong religious-ideological attachment to this space. Whilst violent confrontation/resistance continues to be rejected and remains a dominant taboo for the majority, for some subjects this is deemed [more] legitimate for confronting practices and realities which are deemed practices and realities of insecurity. It is also deemed [more] legitimate to secure settlement, ‘the Land of Israel’ and notions of ‘security’ and ‘rights.’

Post-Amona, security agencies warn of increased extremism, violence, and a willingness to engage in violence in sectors of the settlement community. This is a notable reality which the State of Israel has to face. Israeli State leaders repeatedly warn of insecurities facing the State of Israel from external actors. However, this thesis has traced how the State is facing insecurity from some of its own subjects, and that some settlers hold extremist positions towards this State. Given the problematics and dangers such positions are believed to pose, understanding why these positions have emerged/emerged in the open, ideologies they rest upon, support they attract, and goals and impacts they seek to achieve, needs to be a focus of attention. This is a demanding area for future further research where, I argue, only spending time in communities and engaging a range of individuals can there be depth of understanding. Understanding perspectives, ideologies and concerns of actors considered extreme is particularly imperative for engagement.

Price-Tag attacks embody such radicalism. With the nature of this violence, and the insecurities it contains, Israeli officials have declared that Price-Tag attacks are “acts of terror,” and have urged for them to be legally classified as such. Viewed by a number of
State officials as constituting terror, the State of Israel must face a reality where a home-
grown terror has emerged. If throughout I have observed how realities and practices are seen, and how the State is related to, we need to recognise how some subjects relate to the State in this ‘new era.’ The violence represents a significant shift in some State-settler relations. As an act predominantly directed against the State of Israel, even though the majority of attacks are physically activated on Palestinian targets, Price-Tags embody and exacerbate fundamental disjunctures in place. The violence is the culmination of a trajectory of disjuncture which I have traced. Attacks and strategies reflect a new era of confrontation and resistance where the battle is taken to the State. Significantly enacted in frameworks of ‘revenge’ and ‘war,’ in battles for settlement spaces, some settlers have turned against and confronted the State of Israel. This is a new performativity in space.

Seeking to gain understanding of this new era of confrontation/resistance, all fieldwork conversations were meaningful in uncovering perspectives and divergences. Three moments were particularly provocative: first, the symbolic image of the ripped flags of Israel hanging in the Gush Katif Museum; second, one Israeli security analyst’s declaration that “if you insist on rights, the result is war;”\(^2\) third, one Hilltop Youth pronouncing that “we need to go all the way with our truth.”\(^3\) The historic events of the Gaza Disengagement and Amona evacuation, I argue, must be seen as disjunctive moments in a narrative of an undoing of a pact between the State of Israel and some settlers who have disengaged from the State, and commitment to it, and have come to (further) see the State of Israel as a significant source of insecurity. Such disjunctures are being expressed through confrontations on the ground where, in this disjuncture, taboos of turning against the State of Israel and deploying violence against it have come to be (more) broken for some.

Reflected in ideologies and activities of the Hilltop Youth, and exposed in the Revolt manifesto (Chapter Six), some settlers have not only disengaged from ‘the Jewish State’; they hold radical opposition to it. With fundamental radical disjunctures in place, some subjects are seeking to overcome the State and bring about a new reality. This thesis has come full-circle. My discussion began with assessing ‘the Jewish Revolution’ which succeeded in (re)creating the ‘Jewish State of Israel,’ a declared ‘Jewish’ and ‘democratic’ state. What we are now witnessing is the desire by some subjects to enact a new Jewish Revolution centred on (re)creating what they see is an ‘authentic Jewish State.’ With the security and legitimacy of the State of Israel brought into critical question, confrontations on the ground and a revolutionary agenda held by some, this imbues Price-Tag strategies and attacks with further significance. This is a significant (in)security problematic which has emerged for the State of Israel and in settlement politics, evacuations and relations.
With such (in)security problematics in place, the future is therefore uncertain. It is recognised that the status quo is untenable. This is recognised not only by Palestinians, rights organisations, and some international bodies and political leaders. Israeli security analysts, military individuals, and also some settlers I spoke with also stated that it is untenable. In reality, the status quo itself is far from static. For Palestinians it means deepening occupation, rights violations, and settlement expansion. For settlers, outposts face prospects of evacuation and current limitations on settlement constitute insecurities.

With political peace talks with Palestinians stalled, any discussion of larger-scale settlement evacuation is not in the open. However, settler populations have declared that acts of evacuation are deemed an affront, infringing on relations with the Land and security. The key questions, therefore, are: How will any future acts of evacuation impact on relations between settler communities and the State of Israel? Are relations with the State conditional or unconditional? and, If an Israeli leadership activates a programme of disengaging from spaces of the West Bank and evacuating settlements, will violent confrontation/resistance be seen as necessary and legitimate for more settlers? Again, these are key questions to be explored in future research.

In direct confrontations in settlement spaces and in acts of Price-Tag violence, extreme elements in the settler community have shown a willingness to (re)act against any action deemed to threaten communities or interests. The fatal 2015 Duma Price-Tag attack spurred Israeli forces to act. Exceptional acts have been taken against Hilltop Youth and other settlers suspected of involvement in violent acts, such as temporarily banning individuals from the West Bank. Whilst such actions may limit potential acts of insecurity short-term, the State is dealing with a deeper problematic of disjuncture. Acts taken against settlers may serve to further radicalise individuals, deepen disjunctures, and give further perceived legitimacy and impetus to radical agendas held. How this impacts on the security of Palestinians and the security of the State of Israel are key questions to behold.

In the international community, attaining a ‘Two-State Solution’ is asserted as essential for peace and security. For a number of settlers, it means the opposite. Furthermore, the internal confrontation/resistance this may generate may threaten peace and security, bringing uncertain consequences, which is a critical concern to be recognised.

Settlers are more than spoilers in settlement politics and conflicts. They are central actors who wield influence. In an era of Price-Tag violence, this is on a new level. Indeed, as was written in a settler newsletter, Price-Tag attacks show that “settlers set the boundaries of the battle” [quoted UNESCO Chair, 2012:31], wielding a weapon in space in defence of
space and agendas, and to further agendas. Each Price-Tag attack is a price paid and an act of insecurity. State-settler struggles and struggles over settlement have been externalised beyond settlement spaces, bringing wider spaces and communities into this ‘battle.’ The power and danger of such attacks, I argue, is their uncertainty. What forms will future Price-Tags take? What will their targets be? and, What impacts and insecurities will attacks pose and potentially trigger? The sparks which Price-Tag attacks may ignite may not just have implications for Palestinian communities, Israeli society, and the State of Israel. They may have significant insecurities beyond.

References

1 Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 7th September 2013.
2 Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 13th August 2013.
3 Author Interview, Samaria, 21st August 2013.
Glossary

Am Yisrael- The People/ Nation of Israel
Am Yisrael Chai- The People/ Nation of Israel Lives On
Arvut Hadadit- Mutual Responsibility
Atchalta De’Geulah- The Beginning of the Redemption
Avaryanut ideologit- Ideological Crime
Chilul Hashem- Desecration of God’s name
Davida Malik- King David
Eretz Yisrael- The Land of Israel
Galut- Condition of Jewish Exile
Geulah- Redemption
Gerush- Expulsion
Gush Emunim- Bloc of the Faithful
Halakah- Jewish Religious Law
Haredi/ Haredim- Ultra-Orthodox Jews
Hashem- God
Hatikva- The National Anthem of the State of Israel
Hitnachlut- Settlement
Hitnatkut- The Disengagement
Kidush Hashem- Sanctification of God’s name
Malchut Yisrael- The Kingdom of Israel
Mamlucht- Statist/ Pro-State
Medinah- State
Medinat Yisrael- The State of Israel
Memshalah- Government
Mitnachalim- Settlers
Mitzvah- Positive religious commandment
Mitzvot- Religious commandments
No’ar Ha-Gva’ot- The Hilltop Youth
Shabak- The Shin Bet, the State of Israel’s Internal Security Agency
Shabam- A special security area
Shalom- Peace
Shekhinah- Divine presence
Shul- Synagogue
Shomron- Samaria, or the North West Bank
Tag-Mechir- Price-Tag
Teshuvah- Return to God, repentance
Tikkun- Rectification/ Fixing
Yehuda - Judea, or the South West Bank
Yehuda and Shomron- Judea and Samaria, or the West Bank
Yesha- Collective name for Judea and Samaria
Yishuv ha’aretz- Settling the Land
Yom HaAtzmaut- The State of Israel’s annual Independence Day anniversary
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