Anti-Collusion Enforcements : Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms

Dasgupta, Sudipto and Zaldokas, Alminas (2019) Anti-Collusion Enforcements : Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms. Review of Financial Studies, 32 (7). 2587–2624. ISSN 0893-9454

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We consider the case of changing competition that comes from stronger antitrust enforcement around the world to show that, as the equilibrium switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition, firms step up investment and increase equity issuance. As a result, debt ratios fall. These results imply the importance of financial flexibility in surviving competitive threats. Our identification relies on a difference-in-differences estimation based on the staggered passage of leniency programs in 63 countries around the world from 1990 to 2012.

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Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Review of Financial Studies
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This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Sudipto Dasgupta, Alminas Žaldokas, Anticollusion Enforcement: Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 32, Issue 7, July 2019 is available online at:
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?? financeeconomics and econometricsaccounting ??
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Deposited On:
06 Nov 2018 13:24
Last Modified:
15 Jul 2024 18:25