Promises and Costs of Gentrification

The Case of Dikmen Valley

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and that any information derived from other sources and publications has been referenced and duly acknowledged in the text.

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Abstract

This thesis explores the class impact of gentrification, contributing to a deeper insight into multiple experiences of gentrification. Centring on an ethnographic study of gentrification in Dikmen Valley in Ankara, it is concerned with the relations among the multiple actors involved in the on-going Dikmen Valley Urban Transformation Project. The project aimed to transform an area that contained many squatter communities into an area of luxury apartments and parkland. Its implementation and the conflicts it prompted were deeply shaped by shifts towards a neoliberal urban development regime and by a revision of earlier policies towards the squatter settlers. The study approaches gentrification as a dynamic process in which urban space is redeveloped in ways that complicate class hierarchies. The thesis argues that it is vital to examine the processes of inclusion to grasp the class impact of gentrification, which is not limited to displacement and stigmatisation. It therefore examines the processes in which inclusion is promoted and negotiated by multiple actors living through gentrification. To address these questions, the study combines historical and ethnographic research. Drawing on documentary research on the changing urban policies and citizenship agendas, the research reveals how the disciplining effects of gentrification operate through citizenship. It details how in Dikmen Valley gentrification was employed to marginalise and punish those who made rights-based claims to homes and land, while the state offered those who obediently participated in gentrification the reward of legal homeownership and recognition as 'good citizens'. The study also draws on participant observation and in-depth interviews with people from a diverse variety of backgrounds living in and around the Dikmen Valley Project Area during January to October 2015. Through this combination of methods, the thesis demonstrates that the ways in which gentrification, promoted by the state actors and negotiated by the multiple actors living through it, complicates existing class hierarchies.

Keywords: Gentrification, class hierarchies, citizenship, inclusion, obedience, right claims, indebtedness, symbolic struggles.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This study explores the class impact of gentrification. In the existing literature that focuses on gentrification from the perspective of its class impact, it is addressed as a class remake of the city. While analyses centred on economic structure explore capitalist processes of appropriation and redistribution of the "rent gap" (Smith, 1979), the studies that focus on 'human agency' emphasise the cultural processes and practices through which class distinction is reproduced. The main goal of reproducing the urban space in a more profitable way is argued to lead to devaluation of neighbourhoods occupied by low-income, socially unwanted/marginalised groups and their successive transformation into middle and upper-class oriented areas. From this perspective, displacement and dispossession of the urban poor and intensification of spatial and socio-economic segregation are addressed as the class impact of gentrification.

This overlooks the fact that even the groups who are directly targeted by gentrification projects are drawn into the gentrification process. It is sourced by the economic rationale of profit maximisation that guides most studies, which in turn results in their failure to fully explore the political interests invested by the state. What are the considerations involved in state-led gentrification other than economic and financial goals? In what ways does politics influence the ways people are included in the process and the ways they negotiate with it? In searching for answers to these questions, this research investigates the political processes of *inclusion* into the state-led gentrification projects, with the purpose of revealing the class impact of gentrification that is beyond displacement and exclusion.

Figure 1: The cover page of the weekly 'Metropolitan Ankara' bulletin dated 14-20 November, 2011, demonstrating two photos of different parts of the Dikmen Valley Gentrification Project Area.

The figure above is the front cover of the weekly 'Metropolitan Ankara' bulletin, which was distributed by the greater municipality in mid-November, 2011. The text in yellow title is 'Here is Dikmen reality' asking in red bubbles whether the valley 'becomes like this' (above) or 'stays like this' (below). On the front cover, there are two contrasting aerial perspective images of different parts of the Dikmen Valley: the first depicts the gentrified valley with luxurious, high-rise and low-rise gated apartments, parks, ornamental pools and cafes, which together form a well-ordered, ostentatious view; the picture below depicts the undeveloped valley, with small-scale squatter houses, poplar trees and the Dikmen stream, a messier, if unpretentious view.

Dikmen Valley used to be one of the largest squatter settlement areas in the capital city Ankara before the implementation of gentrification project. Such squatter neighbourhoods were constructed in the aftermath of the Second World War by rural migrants who were exposed to big cities following the mechanisation of agriculture. In contrast to the practices of squatting through

occupying and settling in abandoned buildings in advanced capitalist countries such as the UK, those migrants in Turkey constructed from scratch one-storey houses which were called '*gecekondu'* (gedʒekondo) (literally 'built overnight').

Despite unaccomplished rehabilitative plans, those informal houses were overlooked by authorities with political and economic motives. The rural migrants offered a submissive group of voters as well as a cheap and unorganised labour force for the national industrialisation process. Over time this political tolerance took the form of enabling some squatter settlers to make profit from the illegally occupied land as governments enacted laws that allowed the construction of multi-storey buildings on squatter land in which the squatter residents became owners of several flats.

After the devastating economic crisis in 2001 in Turkey, however, the populist urban policies, which had prevented the capitalisation of land and housing markets fully, were revised. A policy agenda much more committed to ideas of rent extraction and commercialisation of shelter was put into effect in 2002 onwards by the liberal conservative Justice and Development Party governments. The implementation of a strict neoliberal economy program set the ground for a state-led urban transformation campaign in the cities all over the country.

Scholars in Turkey interpret this process as a shift in governance of urban land and housing markets from a populist to a neoliberal one (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010) due in part to the ways in which political interest in the squatter inhabitants had lost sway (Somali, 2013). The erosion of interest in the political processes and actors is predicated on assumptions which reduce the raison d'état of the state to the rationale of economic profit and analyse the politics and political actors involved in the process as subsidiary to economic ones. Drawing on the same rationale, some scholars attend to the financial inclusion of low-income groups and social aid programmes, which aim to compensate the devastating social impacts of neoliberal agenda (Yildirim, 2009; Akcay, 2015).

However, as the municipal bulletin above reveals, the active involvement of state actors in gentrification projects is concerned with including the squatter dwellers not only financially but also *politically*. The bulletin was distributed shortly after the national elections in which the Justice and Development Party

won the majority of the votes and became the ruling party for the third time (after its victory in the elections in 2002 and 2007). The party had consolidated its legitimacy and power also after the 2010 referendum in which 57% of the voters gave consent to the changes in the constitution towards a more authoritarian regime. Within this context of the political atmosphere that enabled the enactment of a progressively more authoritarian regime, this thesis will investigate the role of state actors in the gentrification process in Turkey.

Throughout the pages of the bulletin, the local state actors embark upon informing the 'good citizens' of Ankara about the successes of the gentrification project in the valley, emphasising the 'good intentions' of the municipality vis-à-vis the struggling squatter residents. While doing that, it condemns those involved in the 'illegitimate' struggles against the implementation of the gentrification project in cooperation with 'terrorist groups'. Criminalisation and stigmatisation as 'terrorists' of those imagined to be resisting gentrification, is a warning to squatter communities to respond appropriately to the 'benevolent' efforts of the municipality: in particular, the offer to squatters is that in return for giving up land and property in the valley this will be given legal ownership of new apartments (located outside the valley). In short, in return for their co-operation, the squatter dwellers are promised both legal homes and inclusion in 'good citizenship' which is defined on the basis of obedience to the state authority. It is this desire to be a 'good citizen' — alongside economic considerations — that, as we shall see, partly explains how local residents come to accept the indebted homeownership offered by participation in the gentrification projects. In this way, the bulletin reveals the complex ways class and citizenship entangle through gentrification.

In the bulletin, the greater municipality promotes the gentrified parts of the valley as a source of pride while the squatter neighbourhood was represented in a binary opposition as a source of shame. Replacing the deteriorated and informal settlements with luxurious and 'orderly' residential areas, gentrification project is promoted with the promise of producing the modern 'ideal' spaces where citizens should seek to live. Thus, investing in symbolic oppositions between modern/non-modern and obedient/disobedient, the state represents participation in the state-led gentrification project as a route to being a good and proper citizen.

This raises questions regarding the explanations of class impact of gentrification solely based on an economic rationale. Thus, drawing on some documentary research and ethnographic fieldwork, this thesis draws on the idea that processes of inclusion and the political considerations behind must be considered when analysing the class impact of gentrification. Addressing also the ways in which inclusion is negotiated by and benefitting some actors, including those most directly stigmatised and expelled by the gentrification process, I intend to demonstrate that the processes of refashioning class hierarchies through gentrification are contested.

This thesis will focus on the Dikmen Valley gentrification project area. There gated apartments occupied by middle class groups and much more prestigious gated communities hosting upper class people were located side by side with high-rise apartments in which the former squatter dwellers were resettled. As the product of neoliberal logic which reproduces the urban space for the progressively more affluent user (Hackworth, 2002), almost all of those gated communities was vertically expanded. They were protected by walls, security cameras and guards, and had privatised infrastructure and services. On the other hand, the squatter neighbourhood that stood in the northern part of the valley was suffering from enduring disinvestment while the squatter dwellers living there have been engaged in political activism since the unilateral announcement of the project in 2006. This framework made the valley appropriate for investigating the class impact of gentrification as it offered simultaneous access to different class groups who were drawn into and negotiated with the state-led project in different ways.

Within this context, the main question of this study is how the project has impacted on class dynamics in the valley. To do that, I will investigate the ways gentrification is promoted by state actors and the processes through which the struggling squatter communities who are stigmatised are also drawn into the project. To connect gentrification to the political processes, I will use citizenship as a critical lens. I will focus on the ways citizenship is officially configured and promoted throughout the process state actors draw people into the gentrification project in the valley, and the different ways it is enacted and mobilised by the different groups living there.

Through exploring the symbolic struggles through which shared understandings regarding who can properly live in places that are officially promoted as 'ideal' homes, this thesis aims to show that the class conflicts that are taking place throughout gentrification are not limited to material struggles over rent extraction and appropriation. To do that, I will explore the process of changing access to material resources such as land and housing throughout the gentrification process in relation to the struggles over access to symbolic resources like 'citizenship'. Thus, the focus on political processes using the lens of citizenship will enable me to move beyond the emphases on material processes of property transfer and displacement as class impact of gentrification.

1.1. Outline of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. In chapter 1, I introduce the research questions of this study after introducing the field, and touching upon briefly what was not fully explored in the relevant research.

In chapter 2, I introduce the key concepts of this study, namely class, citizenship, gentrification and neoliberalism. I offer a critical examination of the key approaches in gentrification research. Then, I explain how I use citizenship to explore changing class dynamics in relation to gentrification and how that helps me shed light upon the under-investigated aspects of inclusion and develop the existing analyses in gentrification research.

In Chapter 3, I present the two types of research that I conducted, namely the documentary and ethnographic research. I first present the relational ethnographic method, discussing how it enables an analysis of the complex ways gentrification deals with the multiplicity of space focusing on the different but interconnected actors involved in the process. I also explain the limitations of 'relationality' in my thesis attending to the reasons for prioritisation of the former and current squatter dwellers. Then, I explain how I combined the data collected through documentary research, and my analysis of these secondary sources, with the ethnographic data. I then elaborate on how this provided temporal depth to the spatial analysis I offer in my study through revealing the interconnectedness between processes of urbanisation and neoliberal urban redevelopment, the ways state citizenship agendas were refashioned and changing class dynamics.

Chapter 4 is about how class inequalities were managed through the processes of formation and evolution of state citizenship agendas and reproduction of urban space in Turkey throughout the 20th century. Drawing on the historical data about the processes of urbanisation and squatting, and the changes in the citizenship agendas in Turkey, this chapter examines the interconnected processes of formation of citizenship regime and urbanisation from the perspective of class hierarchies. The last part of this chapter analyses how the squatter settlements in the Dikmen Valley were formed and how they evolved within the context of the changing citizenship agendas and class dynamics within the context of the neoliberalisation process.

Chapter 5 expands the historical analyses provided in Chapter 4 to the period from 2002 onwards during which neoliberalism took a gradually more authoritarian form in Turkey. I analyse the contemporary gentrification process in relation to the consolidation of duty-based citizenship agenda within the context of authoritarian neoliberalism. The main focus of this chapter is how gentrification was promoted to the squatter communities, that is, how and to what extent they were included in the process. Drawing on the speeches of key political figures about the country-wide urban transformation campaign, I explore how the practices of governing through communities as a result of devolution in the advanced capitalist contexts took the form of promotion of obedient citizenship in Turkey. In the second part of the chapter, I examine how participation in the gentrification project was promoted to the struggling squatter communities in Dikmen Valley through simultaneously associating the rights-based claims and struggle with terror and promoting the promises of 'obedient' participation.

Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 focus on how the remaking of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion was understood by multiple actors involved in the process. Chapter 6 focuses on the interpretations of the changing class hierarchies. I explore how the symbolic boundaries of 'who can properly live in the city' were reformed in relation to the changing physical boundaries on urban space. Drawing on the interviews with the current and former squatter dwellers, the new middle classes and more affluent residents of prestigious gated communities, this chapter explores how middle and upper class residents responded to the state-led gentrification. Drawing on the symbolic power lens developed by Bourdieu, I will explore in what ways the normative

construction of shared understandings regarding who can properly live in the city impacts on the class dynamics.

Chapter 7 is about the 'Right to Shelter Struggle' in the Dikmen Valley. Drawing on interviews with squatter dwellers, who still lived in the valley and those who had moved elsewhere, participants and former participants of the struggle, observation of weekly meetings, and previous scholarly studies of squatter activism in the valley, the chapter examines how the squatter communities enacted an activist citizenship while struggling against forced upheaval and giving away their land to the rich. Based on the differences between the former studies on the struggle and my data from the later stages thereof I explore how the strength derived from collective resistance eroded over time and led to multiple and opposing views.

Finally, in Chapter 8, I sum up the analyses derived from the data presented throughout the study. I argue that an analysis of gentrification from the perspective of class and citizenship in the Dikmen Valley area illustrated that the authoritarian citizenship regime is promoted and established *through* neoliberal urban redevelopment in Turkey and it is actively negotiated in a dynamic process by the different actors involved in the process. I suggest that within the context of the consolidation of authoritarian neoliberalism in the 2000s onwards, the local and national state actors communicated the citizenship agenda based on obedience to the benevolent state through gentrification projects in such a way that criminalises the rights-based claims and struggles. Promoting obedience is done through making promises to different actors, which complicates the class dynamics. As a result, the boundaries of profiting from and being victimised by gentrification are blurred.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Approaches

This research aims at understanding how contemporary gentrification has impacted upon class dynamics in Turkey. Inspired by the limitations of the analyses of the class impact of gentrification in research due to a prioritisation of economic processes and actors, I aim at extending this research through the use of the citizenship lens, which will enable me to focus on the politics involved. In so doing, I bring together economic and symbolic processes and actors in my analysis. Within this context the questions of this study are:

How does the gentrification project impact class dynamics in the valley?

In what ways is gentrification promoted and implemented by state actors in the valley?

How are the different groups living in the valley drawn into the gentrification process?

How do the different actors refashion the boundaries regarding who can properly live in the city?

The key concepts in this research are class, gentrification, and citizenship while neoliberalisation provides the framework of the study. The focus of this chapter is to introduce these concepts and demonstrate how a framework of citizenship is useful for understanding the dynamic ways class operated throughout contemporary processes of gentrification in Turkey.

2.1. Introducing the Framework and Key Themes

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism, which was introduced in response to the crises of the accumulation regime based on Keynesian welfarism in the late 1970s, significantly influenced existing class dynamics through refashioning the responsibilities of the state towards the individuals. Although neoliberalism is 'contextually embedded' (Peck et al., 2009), which resulted in varying levels of

ideological and political adherence to neoliberal economic policies in different places (Jessop, 2010; Hall, 2011), it mainly targeted creating more profit through controlling labour costs. Thus, its key features are privatisation of public assets, flexibilisation of labour markets to reduce 'impediments' to business, liberalisation of trade, monetarism, and the marketisation of society through public–private partnerships and other forms of commodification (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010). To extend market discipline, competition and commodification throughout society, neoliberal doctrines were deployed to justify, *inter alia*, the deregulation of state control over industry, assaults on organised labour, the reduction of corporate taxes, the downsizing and/or privatisation of public services and assets, the dismantling of welfare programs (Peck et al., 2009, p. 50). As the state has largely abandoned its responsibility to make policies of social welfare which are grounded in equality, existing class inequalities intensified. The dissolution of the social welfare understanding and Keynesian institutions generated the concentration of wealth in fewer hands, massive job losses and increased levels of unemployment.

Urban space has received a central place in the neoliberalism research as one of the most strategically important arenas in which neoliberalism has rolled back the Keynesian institutions and policies and rolled out new ones as urban redevelopment has promised profitable forms of capital accumulation. Within this context, Peck et al. (2009) refers to the urbanisation of neoliberalism. They argue that city space was targeted to be mobilised as an arena for market-oriented economic growth and for elite consumption practices while at the same time securing order and control amongst marginalised populations (p. 58). Through adoption of the principle of 'highest and best use' as the basis for major land use planning decisions working class neighbourhoods were destructed and spaces of elite consumption as well as mega-projects were constructed to make way for speculative redevelopment (p. 61).

They explain the role of the state in neoliberal urbanisation with reference to 'dismantling the basic institutional components of the post-war settlement and mobilising a range of policies intended to extend market discipline, competition and commodification throughout society' (p. 50). Transforming members of welfare state into atomistic, competitive individuals was a contested process, which required the state to be more involved. Therefore, even though neoliberal ideology favours self-regulating markets and does not

tolerate state interference in the markets, there emerged 'serious disjunctures between the ideology and everyday political operations of neoliberalism' (Harvey, 2005). Within this framework, Peck et al. (2009) write that:

> While neoliberalism aspires to create a utopia of free markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose versions of market rule and, subsequently, to manage the consequences and contradictions of such marketization initiatives (p. 51).

Similarly in his article titled "New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy", Neil Smith (2002) analyses the historical phases during which gentrification has become a systematised urban policy in North America and Europe. There he argues that the national states are reframing themselves within the context of the globalising network of production as 'purer, territorially rooted economic actors in and of the market', rather than external compliments to it (p. 434). He argues that the dismantling of state responsibilities over production is matched by heightened levels of repression and state activism in terms of social control. Echoing the abovementioned argument of Peck et al. about the role of the state in terms of tackling the crises led by neoliberal policies, Smith writes that these authoritarian policies are justified on the basis of 'quashing opposition and making the streets safe for gentrification' (p. 442).

In line with this, Eric Swyngedouw et al. (2002) examine the emergence of large-scale urban development projects (UDPs) from the late 1980s onwards. Focusing on multiple projects in 13 different cities in Europe they explore the leading role of the local state authorities in the implementation and financing of the large-scale urban transformation projects from the perspective of shifting geometry of power in urban governance in Europe. They argue that with an eclectic planning style, poor integration to the wider urban scale, and less democratic and elite-driven priorities these projects accentuated socio-economic polarisation by leading to price rises and displacement of social and low-income housing and shifts in priorities of public budgets. Indeed, they add, these projects have been used as a vehicle to establish measures of exceptionality in planning and policy procedures whenever there is political opposition (Swyngedouw et al. 2002, pp. 546-547).

The emphasis on the disjuncture between the inherent target of a liberated market and intensified state interventions suggests that in these analyses the

role of the state is reduced to the realisation and maintenance of secure conditions for neoliberal markets. The focus on economic processes and actors, in turn, leads to the neglect of the political considerations involved in the process of neoliberal urbanisation, which are different and beyond the concerns of extending the market discipline through redeveloping the urban space and dealing with the crises generated by these efforts.

There are arguments that the scope of active state intervention is not limited to managing the social and political crises caused by neoliberal policies. William Davies (2014) argues that neoliberalism is an inventive, constructivist force, which aims to produce a new social and political model, and not to recover an old one. Secondly, neoliberal policy targets institutions and activities which lie outside of the market, such as universities, households, public administrations and trade unions so as to bring them inside the market through acts of privatisation, or to reinvent them in a 'market-like' way, or simply to neutralise or disband them. Thirdly, the state must be an active force to achieve this. Neoliberal states produce and reproduce the rules of institutions and individual conduct, in ways that accord with a certain ethical and political vision, which is dominated by an idea of competitive activity. Thus, the state is enrolled as a facilitator in re-regulating markets and fostering new individualistic subjects for market rule (Hall, 2003 cited in Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 7).

Related to Davies' arguments some set of studies focus on the emerging necessity of more actively creating a shift towards the transformation of the people from a common society with shared responsibility, into self-seeking consumers, who would act and think in ways that fit market rationality (Sayer, 2014). There were emphases on the cultural changes this provoked. For example, in his analysis of the development of neoliberal program in the UK, Stuart Hall (2011) emphasises the cultural policies of promotion of 'the taxpayer' and 'the customer', and demonisation of working class as shifty, feckless, and irresponsible (p. 721) at the same time as the shift of power and wealth back to the already rich and powerful and the stagnant or falling incomes of the already less powerful groups. In a similar vein, MacLeavy (2010) also addresses the fact that alongside a free market ideology, an anti-welfare rhetoric warned of the danger of 'welfare' dependency. As a result,

poverty started to be perceived as a personal failure and is removed from the political agenda as wealth and consumption are incentivised in society.

To emphasise the active role of the state, Birch and Mykhnenko (2010) argue that through these processes what they called 'market state' fosters new individualistic subjects for market rule. The same approach guided by an economic rationale is also used by Peck (2001, cited in Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 7) who asserts that the emerging global economy recasts national political economies as problematic and leads to a shift in responsibility to deliver political priorities downwards. Thus, Birch and Mykhnenko (2010) argue that it is too simplistic to assume that neoliberalism leads to the hollowing out of the state. Rather, they emphasise that it involves the shifting of state intervention to new forms of governance underpinned by its logic of competitiveness resulting in a new model of citizenship in which societal rights and responsibilities transform deficiencies into the failure of the individual rather than society (p. 7).

Moving from this point, Christopher Payne (2012) asserts that the difference between classical liberalism and neoliberalism is not related to the question of free markets per se but to the question of how the citizens are expected and incentivised to exercise newly bestowed market freedoms as citizen-consumers. Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko (2010) investigate how neoliberal economic order has managed to maintain its prominence in the face of its failed *raison d'etre* — to ensure wealth for all through market efficiency. They attend to the centralising role of finance, which became the new bedrock of competitive profit making under neoliberalism especially in the 1990s onwards, in terms of promoting 'a new neoliberal common sense' (Hall, 2003, p. 10 cited in Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 3).

Birch and Mykhnenko (2010) focus on financialisation of the global economy arguing that it has gone hand in hand with housing and stock market booms in the 1990s and 2000s in terms of effectively enrolling citizens in the Global North in the expansion of neoliberalism. Through expansion of consumer credits, and in particular residential mortgage loans, hence indebtedness, they argue, that the everyday resources of low- and moderate-income groups were incorporated and that people were remade as 'monetary conservatives' (Watson, 2008) who are more concerned with inflation than welfare spending. As a result, in line with the neoliberal ideology which individualises

responsibility for social justice, wellbeing and health outcomes and promotes the inefficiency of the state intervention in economy, individuals were enacted as rational subjects responsible from their well-being and welfare.

In these analyses of neoliberalism in relation to changing class dynamics, individuals are referred to mainly as potential consumers, in such a way that puts the main emphasis on consumption and economy. These emphases on economic and financial processes — like the analyses of state actors as agents of economy acting mainly with motives of profit-maximisation to promote and extend the free market rule and control and suppress opposition — misses something important: the nature of individuals as political — as well as economic — actors and thus the politics and political struggles involved in neoliberal urbanisation processes. On the other hand, the emphasis on construction of a neoliberal common sense by the state through the promotion of anti-welfare rhetoric and individual responsibility overlooks the ways it is responded by the people, which might be take the form of voluntary participation as well as opposition. As a result, these accounts turn a blind eye to the agency of political actors and the mundane processes of making sense of, negotiating with and also resisting the neoliberal agenda.

In this thesis, I offer an analysis of neoliberal urbanisation in Turkey from a *political* as well as economic perspective addressing the agency of multiple actors involved in the process. I draw on Doreen Massey's emphasis on 'space as the dimension of multiplicity' (2013) in contrast to the 'extended power of economy', which crystallised in conceptualisations such as 'the market state', so as to reveal the multiple ways neoliberal principles were negotiated by different actors.

Social Class under Neoliberalism

Within the context provided above, neoliberalism is argued to be a project intent on restoring class power (Harvey, 2005), shifting wealth and power upwards to the already rich and powerful (Hall, 2011; Sayer, 2014). Nevertheless, to the extent that the social and political emphasis on social injustice and inequalities decreased, discussions of the death of class (Bauman, 1992; Pakulski and Waters, 1996) became popular in research especially in the advanced capitalist countries like the UK.

Class started to be seen as an 'image of the past' in examinations of contemporary society as both highly unequal and classlessly individualised (Beck, 1986). It is argued by the defenders of the death of class thesis that widening material inequalities no longer gives rise to class conscious communities, and increasing individualisation has destroyed any relationship that existed between economic position and cultural identity (Bottero, 2004, p. 988). In making these claims, these studies rested on a narrow understanding of class based on individuals' subjective understandings about their objective position within the social structure. This prevented them from critically examining the erosion of association with class identity and solidarity despite sharpening class inequalities and increasing class injuries led by neoliberal policies.

As opposed to arguments about the decreasing explanatory power of class, there were attempts to assert its enduring relevance as an analytical concept for understanding social identities. In contrast to the death of class arguments, the so-called culturalist class theorists (Skeggs, 1997, 2010; Reay, 1998; Savage, 2000; Devine and Savage, 2000) attempted to establish the continuity of class and the importance thereof. To do this they focused on the ways neoliberal individualisation formed particular kinds of class subjects. They analysed cultural practices and identities, as these were conceived as expressions of 'individualised' forms of class struggle as opposed to the former understandings of class based on collective consciousness and solidarity. A prominent advocate, Mike Savage (2000) argues that class processes operate through individualised distinctions rather than in social groupings. Even though people do not explicitly recognise class issues, or identify with discrete class groupings, class processes still operate so long as the specific cultural practices are bound up with the reproduction of hierarchy; therefore, the emphasis is put on the classed nature of particular social and cultural practices rather than formation of political class consciousness.

The 'culturalist class theorists' were successful in demonstrating the continuing importance of class in post-industrial society with a conceptualisation of class inequalities based on culture, rather than economy. In so doing, they were able to shed light on more mundane processes class operates and thus move beyond economic analyses centred on a polarised, abstract conceptualisation of class as a relationship between capital and

labour. However, by putting too much emphasis on culture isolated from the economic processes they disregarded the role of changing material inequalities in terms of fostering inequalities in access to valued goods and ways of life. As Andrew Sayer argues, low income people are not disadvantaged primarily because others fail to value their identity and their cultural goods but because they lack the means to live in ways which they, as well as others, value (2005, pp. 947-948). Moving from this point, these studies which emphasise the continuing importance of class inequalities attempted to analyse the subjective understandings of inequality by the working classes in isolation from the underlying material conditions. By disconnecting the subjective experiences of working class feelings from the material processes of redistribution of valued resources, the new class theory has implicitly taken for granted the devaluation of the working class culture and identity. Moreover, within the context of the neoliberal reconfiguration of poverty as a personal failure, rather than a political issue, this disconnection risks naturalising middle class forms of distinction.

In Turkey, research in gender studies examines the operations of class in more mundane interactions and cultural processes focusing on the relations between middle class and working class women as they encounter each other in the provision of household cleaning services. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu and Helga Rittersberger-Tılıç (2000), Aksu Bora (2005), Gül Özyeğin (2005) analyse the specific form household cleaning services have taken in Turkey within the framework of the complexity of the on-going modernisation process.

Accordingly, they interpret the household cleaning service as a buffer zone between modernity and tradition, which leads to class conflict between the two groups of women, a conflict expressed in cultural terms. The middle-class employer women invest their labour and time in 'clean' areas of domestic work such as cooking and childcare, while the dirty work based on brute force is left to the charwomen. However, cleaner women resist the stigma of this kind of polarization through demanding to be seen as 'family' rather than a traditional servant or proletarianised cleaning worker for example by calling the employer women 'sister', saying that they clean as if cleaning their own house. Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2000, p. 12) argue that by doing so the working-class women insist on establishing a 'pseudo-kinship relationship' with their employers.

These studies provide important insights into the complex nature of class relations within the context of Turkey as a lately modernised country whereby class hierarchies are expressed and experienced in the form of symbolic struggles over cultural values. Unlike the aforementioned accounts that focused on individualised feelings and experiences, these studies draw on interviews with both middle class and working class women and focus on the relational as well as individualised processes of constitution of class distinctions and injuries. On the other hand, their analyses of working-class women are not limited to the ways class injuries are felt. Through addressing mundane ways class inequalities are 'resisted' by them, these studies also avoid taking middle-class value for granted and emphasise the 'power' of the weak to defy the legitimacy of class distinctions through insisting on a pseudo-kinship relationship.

Moving from there, Necmi Erdoğan (2000) links the analysis of class injuries within the context of the neoliberalisation in Turkey, putting the resistance of the cleaner women to neoliberal hegemony into an historical context. He argues that the egalitarian culture embedded in the heterodox forms of Islam in Turkey led to those kinds of pseudo-kinship relationships insisted on by working class women in service roles. Elsewhere, Erdogan (2007) argues that neo-liberal orthodoxy, which has gradually dominated Turkish politics, produced new forms of social exclusion and marginalization processes leading to the dissolution of egalitarian elements of the heterodox forms of Islamic cultural heritage. Nevertheless, he insists that although neoliberal transition has increased the symbolic violence of social hierarchies, the poor subalterns still refer to 'morality' and good manners to protect their self-esteem vis-à-vis the economic and cultural capital of 'the rich' in their narratives. He concludes that the neoliberal hegemony has not yet captured the minds of poor subalterns.

Emphasising the symbolic violence of neoliberalism and hidden injuries of sharpening class inequalities from the perspective of everyday resistance to it, Erdoğan succeeds in addressing the power from below. Although his attempt to bring together the sharpening class inequalities during the neoliberalisation process with changing subjective experiences of class is important, Erdoğan's focus is also limited to the 'tactics' (de Certeau, 1984) employed by subaltern

groups, like the working class cleaner women referred above, in terms of resisting class injuries.

Elsewhere, Erdoğan (2012) examines the youth groups who are stigmatised as 'apaches'. Apaches signify the low-income young adults, who thicken their hair using hair gel, wear fake brand sports clothes, use fake accessories like watches, and dance to techno music next to overpasses in metropolitan cities. He argues that these low-income groups sought to become part of the 'society of the spectacle' and for that they accepted the symbolic power of material possession and consumption as opposed to their moral weapons based on inner beauty. However, this acceptance only increases the symbolic violence of their class injury. Thus, Erdoğan analyses their voluntary participation in the consumption-based culture from the perspective of the injuries it produces and overlooks the promises and pleasures of participation in consumerism. Why young adults want to be part of the consumption culture that stigmatises them and what promises are involved in the process and how these are negotiated remains unexplored.

In *Hidden Injuries of Class* Sennett and Cobb (1993) analyse the everyday lives of working class people and argue that 'class society takes away from all the people within it the feeling of secure dignity in the eyes of others and of themselves' (p. 170). Accordingly, class sets up a contest for dignity. The workers experience social hierarchies as a matter of self-respect since class relations cause symbolic violence in workers' self-perception (pp. 147-148). This is enlightening in terms of moving beyond the emphasis on 'individualised' feelings of disassociation as injury suggests a critical attentiveness to the material inequalities that generate those feelings. Nevertheless, this kind of analysis on hidden injuries overlooks the ways working class individuals are encouraged today to participate and even benefit from the neoliberal policies, and thus their capacity to negotiate with the *promises* of neoliberalisation.

Class is established by the objective inequalities but it functions autonomously from those factors in cultural and political areas. I refuse a reductionist approach which underestimates the 'superstructure' or a culturalist approach, which emphasises the autonomy of culture but overlooks material inequalities, which are still effective in shaping people's evaluations and relations. My aim is

to analyse the normative character of class as a concern over 'value' in relation to changes in the class inequalities in terms of access to the 'valued' resources.

In this thesis, I draw on a Bourdieusian understanding of power to extend these theoretical debates. Bourdieu extends the idea of power so as to include cultural, social and symbolic as well as economic power. By doing so, he enables the analysis of struggle over various sources of wealth-generating resources or assets which involve non-material sources of power. All of these resources can function as a 'social relation of power' through becoming objects of struggle as valued resources that are accumulated and invested by individuals and groups in order to maintain or enhance their positions in the social order (Swartz, 1997, pp. 73-74). Thus, his extension of the definition of power so as to include non-material forms of power provides a useful ground to apprehend the more mundane and immaterial forms in which class operates in social and political processes, for example, in relation to the changes in material inequalities.

More specifically, Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power is useful for the purposes of my study when analysing the struggles over symbolic resources such as 'good citizenship' that are taking place at the same time as valuable urban land is redistributed throughout gentrification. His analysis of symbolic power is centred on the role of symbolic systems and power in terms of maintaining social inequalities. Accordingly, symbolic systems have three interrelated functions: cognitive, communicative and legitimising. While they enable apprehending the world and also communication through shared meanings, he shows how they are also instruments of domination integrating dominant groups and encouraging the dominated to accept existing hierarchies (Swartz, 1997, p. 83). Within this context, Bourdieu defines symbolic power as the 'world-making power' meaning the 'capability to impose the legitimate vision of the social world and of its divisions' (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 13).

I will explore the simultaneous processes of redistribution of valued resources (both material and symbolic), and the struggles over the changing access of valued resources. The symbolic power of different actors involved in gentrification will be important to analyse how the material redevelopment of the urban space for the more affluent users interacts with struggles over 'who

can properly live in and make claims to the city'. Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power enables me to explore the dynamic struggles over class boundaries which are not clear-cut, but depend on the relative symbolic power of particular groups to impose a 'legitimate' vision. Thus, I will analyse how the shared symbolic meanings about state-led gentrification and political activism against it are produced and in what ways these have an impact on class dynamics.

Gentrification

Ruth Glass first used the term in 1964 referring to the accelerating rehabilitation of Victorian lodging houses. The term gentrification indicated tenurial transformation from renting to owning, property price increases, and the displacement of working-class occupiers by middle-class incomers in the UK (Slater, 2011, p. 571). Thus, since the term was invented and came under scholarly attention, class has been central in the analysis. It was explored from the perspective of either class constitutive practices of middle classes or class injuries driven by displacement of the working classes. Within this context, two powerful explanations emerged in the literature; the first one prioritised the economic factors and processes while the other focused on the cultural side of the story and focused on the consumption side. Below, I will first show the contributions both approaches have made in terms of understanding and exploring the class impact of gentrification, and then argue that they have fallen short in terms of exposing how gentrification complicates class relations because they have overlooked the politics involved in the processes of gentrification.

Analysing residential rehabilitation within the context of the broader social, economic and spatial restructuring, economic explanations focus on the question why and how gentrification emerged now and referred to capital movements for explanation (Smith, 1996, 2002; Smith and Williams, 1986). Neil Smith (2002) describes gentrification as a global urban strategy pointing to a new global urbanism, which emerged from the 1970s onwards.

He argues that gentrification commonly occurs in urban areas where uneven investment of capital in certain land uses and its devaluation through use and systematic disinvestment creates opportunities for profitable redevelopment. Gentrification is most probable to emerge when the 'rent gap', i. e. the

difference between the potential and actual ground rent (Smith, 1979), is large enough to create conditions for profitable re-investment.

Jason Hackworth and Neil Smith (2001) explore the evolution of gentrification in North America and Western Europe arguing that during the 1970s and 1980s, gentrification anchored and was articulated to broader economic and cultural processes in national and global contexts. From the 1990s onwards, it has become generalised from the inner city to more distant, mixed, complex places following the involvement of corporate actors and the growth of scale of investment due to higher rates of rent. With the active involvement of the state, the remaining Keynesian institutions with redistributive, demand-led mentality and the community opposition were destroyed and land-use obstacles were overcome (Hackworth and Smith, 2001).

Another set of studies focused on the retrenchment of state welfare and devolution of social provision to local scales in relation to the symbolic processes with which these changes were legitimised. These accounts emphasised that contemporary marginality is symbolically reproduced by the state through *territorial stigmatisation* (Wacquant, 2008; Wacquant et al., 2014).

Wacquant forged the concept of territorial stigmatisation by combining Goffman's view of stigma as 'discrediting differentness' flowing from the ordinary gaze of others in face-to-face interaction and Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power as 'performative nomination' by an authority capable of making its representations stick and come true (Wacquant et al., 2014, p. 1272):

> Bourdieu works from above, following the flow of efficient representations from symbolic authorities such as state, science, church, the law, and journalism, down to their repercussions upon institutional operations, social practices, and the self; Goffman works from below, tracing the effects of procedures of sense making and techniques of 'management of spoiled identity' across encounters and their aggregations into organizations. They can thus be wedded to advance our grasp of the ways in which noxious representations of space are produced, diffused, and harnessed in the field of power, by bureaucratic and commercial agencies, as well as in everyday life in ways that alter social identity, strategy, and structure (pp. 1272-1273).

From this perspective, Wacquant et al. (2014) argue that territorial stigma is a new and distinctive phenomenon that crystallized at century's end, along with the sudden breakdown or gradual dissolution of the districts of relegation

emblematic of the Fordist–Keynesian phase of industrial capitalism. Accordingly, it differs from a traditional topography of disrepute in the industrial city where the state was the provider of social support for lower-income populations. Firstly, territorial stigma has become partially autonomised from the stain of poverty, subaltern ethnicity, degraded housing, imputed immorality, and street crime. Secondly, it prevails not just among social and cultural elites — as with their predecessors of a century ago — but among those who dwell in these districts and those entirely removed from them. Thirdly, the stigmatised neighbourhoods are pictured as fundamentally dissolute and irretrievably disorganised and the residents living there as 'intrinsically deviant and violent'. Thus, last but not least, the stigmatised districts provoke overwhelmingly negative emotions and demand corrective reactions, which in turn foster the growth and glorification of punitive measures against urban marginality (Wacquant et al., 2014, pp. 1273-1275).

Kallin and Slater (2014) explain the ways territorial stigma justifies gentrification:

> When a place becomes tainted by derogatory terms, images and discursive formations, there are not only everyday consequences for people living within it. Symbolic defamation provides the groundwork and ideological justification for a thorough class transformation, usually involving demolition, land clearance, and then the construction of housing and services aimed at a more affluent class of resident (pp. 1353-1354).

They also attend to the fact that the role of the state is multisided as it both constructs the stigma and then proposes to remedy it. Territorial stigmatisation thus plays a critical role both in widening the rent gap and in facilitating its attempted closure (p. 1354). Addressing the correlation between the material processes of displacement/eviction and symbolic devaluation of working class neighbourhoods, arguments of territorial stigmatisation reveal an under-investigated aspect of class impact of gentrification, which is the symbolic politics involved in the state interference.

Nevertheless, theorists shed light on the role of the state in their accounts in such a way that remains limited to the act of initiating and securing the process of rent extraction. Prioritising the economic logic of profit-maximisation, the political motives of the active state involvement in gentrification are overlooked. This echoes the accounts on neoliberal urbanisation referred above and the absence of attention to the political motives of promoting

appropriate citizen behaviour, which are different from economic profit-oriented goals. This has prevented these studies from analysing the ways state involvement might contradict the economic rationale and target the participation of the marginalised, low-income groups in gentrification. For the same reason, these studies also fail to grasp the complex ways the stigmatised and marginalised groups negotiate the processes of inclusion and exclusion.

The economic explanations of the process in Turkey, as a recently industrialised and modernised country have developed on the basis of a stronger emphasis on the increasing centralisation of urban governance in the 2000s onwards (Kuyucu, 2014; Penbecioğlu, 2011; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; Lovering and Turkmen, 2011; Çavuşoğlu and Strutz, 2014). The studies highlight that as opposed to the emphases on devolution to the local scale in advanced capitalist countries, the urban governance is increasingly centralised and state actors at local and national level are actively involved in appropriating and redistributing the incompletely commoditised urban lands (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010; Kuyucu, 2014; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008).

Historically the absence of welfare state in full sense in Turkey was filled by informal provision of welfare by the people. This is best exemplified by the expansion of the squatter housing in especially the big cities all over Turkey in the 1950s onwards due to the incapacity of the state to provide affordable housing to the rural-to-urban migrants. This led to the presence of vast lands with ambiguous tenancy and property ownership structures offering huge potential rent in the process of neoliberal urbanisation from the 1980s onwards. The incomplete commodification of urban land is argued to be the main reason why the squatter neighbourhoods are primarily targeted by the state-led urban transformation projects in the 2000s onwards in Turkey. The non-participatory and urgency-based decision-making and implementation processes of large-scale urban transformation projects, on the other hand, led to an alarming process of 'state-led property transfer' (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010).

Inspired by analyses on neoliberal urbanisation referred to earlier in this chapter, many scholars in Turkey analysed gentrification as a capital accumulation process, during which property of the urban land was transferred from the poor to the more affluent groups by the active role of the

state institutions, thus, as a class-based process. In the absence of social policies enforced by the state and/or other forms of non-state welfare distribution, marketization was forced from above through a relatively more active involvement of the state leading to displacement and dispossession of the urban poor, seizure of public wealth in a few hands, and heightened levels of spatial and socio-economic segregation.

An important focus in these studies is the different examples of resistances to urban transformation projects in different parts of Turkey (Dündar, 2001; Uzun, 2003; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; Erman, 2009; Poyraz, 2011; Tok and Oğuz, 2011; Karaman, 2012). These are examined usually in comparative perspective with respect to the success and failure of collective mobilisation vis-à-vis the implementation of the projects. The focus on 'collective resistance' to gentrification projects, on the other hand, draws selective attention to the agency of these groups limited to 'collective mobilisation' against gentrification. Although it attends to the power of the communities against state-led processes, the analysis of resistance movements in terms of effectiveness of the collective mobilisation is indifferent to the agency of those who are fearful of political action while sometimes even interpreting lack of effective mobilisation as an anomaly from a structuralist viewpoint. This also paves the way for overlooking the inner tensions within the struggling communities who were either regarded as homogenous in class terms or received selective attention to their agency to resist gentrification.

Cultural explanations emerged as a reaction to these structuralist explanations, which were claimed to overemphasise the role of capital accumulation and neglect human agency. The advocates of this approach (Ley, 1996, 2003; Jager, 1986; Hamnett, 1991; Butler, 1997; Podmore, 1998) focus on the interrelation between the dynamic constitution of class and conservation of built environment and explore how the reorganisation of capitalism on urban space has led to the changes in the occupational structure producing a new managerial and professional group of people with different consumption preferences. Gentrification occurs in those societies where a loss of manufacturing employment and an increase in service employment has led to expansion in the amount of middle-class professionals with a disposition towards central city living and an associated rejection of suburbia for the

blandness and monotony it symbolised (Jager, 1986). Thus, gentrification is analysed as a 'back-to-the-city movement' by the middle class.

The cultural analysis successfully shows the interconnectedness between everyday practices of class constitution and the changes in the occupational and housing markets. The changing cultural preferences of the new middle classes with a metropolitan habitus are examined as practices of reconstitution of class distinction. This is in contrast to the conceptualisation of class as an exploitative relationship between capital and labour at the abstract level (Bridge, 1994, p. 31) in the economic analyses, which overlooks the complex ways class operates in everyday experience of gentrification. The cultural analysis is thus powerful in emphasising middle class agency and explaining the relationship between simultaneous changes in labour and housing markets.

However, through analysing the new middle classes as an isolated, distinct group, and emphasis on their changing residential preferences and particularly metropolitan habitus, these analysts avoid from a critical examination of changes in class dynamics throughout gentrification, and thus their analyses risk 'naturalising gentrification' (Slater, 2011). In so doing, they fail to explore how gentrification is negotiated and contested on the ground by different actors including the non-gentrifying groups, despite the theory's efforts to emphasise human agency. The analysis of middle class take-back of the city leaves the dynamism of the process not fully explored as it overlooks the fact that gentrification is an enduring process experienced by different actors simultaneously.

The lack of a critical examination of gentrification and its impacts on the ground, rather than on abstract level as explored by economic approaches, has led to criticisms within the theory, and some studies began to focus on its social costs in order to bring the displaced populations back into the theory (LeGates and Hartman, 1986; Hartman et al., 1982; Marcuse, 1985; Slater, 2009; Atkinson, 2015). Peter Marcuse (1986) argues that gentrification creates a vicious circle in which the poor are continuously under pressure of displacement and the well-to-do continuously seek to wall themselves in gentrified neighbourhoods. He explains this dramatic increase as a spatial polarisation on the basis of economic polarisation of population. The shift from manufacturing to services sector and the increasing professionalisation of

management and technical functions have spatial consequences: blue-collar workers are no longer demanded in the downtown whereas an additional higher-income demand for housing on the side of professional and technical workers is created there.

In his book chapter titled "Gentrification in the City", Tom Slater (2011) critically reflects upon the growing account on gentrification and the ways it has been analysed attending to the lack of sufficient attention to the social costs it has generated. There he made a call in 2011 for a critical analysis of gentrification through which the arguments of the economic and cultural analyses would be linked to the approaches from below. This was a call for focusing on social costs of gentrification while analysing the links between the changing class dynamics and urban space. However, the promises of gentrification are overlooked by this focus on 'social costs' which was regarded as the most important experience of gentrification. Despite the call for an approach from below, the people who were addressed were regarded to be victimised by exclusion and thus, how they are affected by the promise of inclusion in gentrification still needs unpacking.

From the same perspective, some studies centred on spatial segregation and the themes of security and 'gatedness' focusing on the socially polarising impact of gated residential settlements (Pérouse and Danış, 2005; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; Akpınar, 2008; Güzey, 2014; Erdi-Lelandais, 2015; Ataç, 2016). The shared focus on exclusion (by the excluder and the excluded) is important in terms of revealing the social impacts of the global processes of capital accumulation. However, these accounts are reductionist in the sense that they overlook the social costs of inclusion of people in gentrification, which are no less important than those of exclusion.

Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Nielson (2013) propose an approach to exclusion which can capture what is overlooked in those accounts. They argue that 'the image of the border as a wall, or as a device that serves first and foremost to *exclude* is misleading' saying that:

> Isolating a single function of the border does not allow us to grasp the flexibility of this institution… Borders are equally devices of inclusion that select and filter people and different forms of circulation in ways no less violent than those deployed in exclusionary measures. Our argument thus takes a critical approach to inclusion, which in most accounts is treated as an

unalloyed social good... We see *inclusion existing in a continuum with exclusion, rather than in opposition to it* (p. 7) (Emphasis added).

Refusing the emphases of displacement as the only experience of the working class, Kirsteen Paton (2014) develops a more nuanced and richer analysis of the class impact of gentrification. In *Gentrification: A Working Class Perspective*, she focuses on the impacts of luxury residential development in Glasgow Harbour on the adjacent working class neighbourhood, Partick, which used to be one of the key ship production areas in the world. Her study details that the working classes are not merely victims of gentrification, who are subjected to displacement and devaluation. On the contrary, their participation is carefully induced by local authorities and developers, who invite those groups into the gentrification process as potential consumers. Elsewhere, Paton et al. (2012) asserts that the processes of housing renewal, gentrification, sporting events etc., coalesce around the same goal: creating the more active consumer citizen in a moral and economic sense. Contrasted with the popular discussions on the 'death of the class' as well as the *culturalist* emphasis on 'disassociation from class' in the post-industrial society, Paton (2014) demonstrates that the traditional working class identities are not disappearing but realigned. This is through cultivating aspiration so as to make them more congruent with neoliberal forms of flexible accumulation (p. 7).

Demonstrating the simultaneity of exclusion and inclusion, she conceptualises this as the 'hidden rewards' (Paton, 2014, p. 53) alongside the 'hidden injuries' of gentrification, the most apparent expression of which is displacement. She argues that the working class people are invited to take part in the process of gentrification through market incentives, i. e. promoting a more consumer-based form of citizenship. Taking a critical approach to inclusion itself, she emphasises that the process of inclusion is paradoxical, as working class people are simultaneously included in and excluded from gentrification through encouraging them to participate without giving them the means to do so (p. 53). Consumer-citizenship thus reveals the classed aspect of gentrification as it 'paradoxically extends participation to citizens but, because this is based on consumption and ergo people's material propensity to consume, it simultaneously denies participation and disadvantages those who cannot afford to consume' (Paton et al., 2012, p. 1471).

Thus, her study extended the boundaries of the analysis of class impact of gentrification through critically exploring the ways working class people are included as well as excluded. By doing so, Paton moved beyond the abstract analyses of state-led realignment of existing class inequalities, beyond a focus on inclusion of working classes purely in financial terms, and beyond analyses of middle class cultural practices taken in isolation. Drawing on the argument about the simultaneity of inclusion and exclusion and the flexibility of the border between the two, this study attempts to analyse how inclusion and exclusion is promoted, negotiated and contested through gentrification in Dikmen Valley. Taking the argument that gentrification realigns traditional class identities and behaviours (Paton, 2014) as the point of departure; I explore the impact of gentrification on class dynamics in Dikmen Valley.

I aim to develop this argument by focusing on the context of Turkey where authoritarian forms of neoliberalism have created different forms and trajectories of inclusion and exclusion. To explore the politics involved in gentrification, my study will explore how the authoritarian state actors in Turkey reconfigure and promote appropriate citizen behaviour (as was done in the municipal bulletin referred in the Introduction) as they draw different actors on the gentrification projects and how these are negotiated and contested by those actors.

Citizenship

In order to bring the symbolic processes into the analysis of the impacts of processes of inclusion throughout gentrification on class dynamics, I will consider the role of citizenship as the state is actively involved in both promoting and implementing gentrification projects in Turkey. I will draw on Engin Isin's conceptualisation of citizenship. Isin (2009) takes a relational approach to citizenship arguing that:

> Citizenship governs who citizens (insiders), subjects (strangers, outsiders) and abjects (aliens) are and how these actors are to govern themselves and each other in a given body politic. Differing from mere membership, it is a *relation* that governs the conduct of (subject) positions that constitute it... Being a citizen almost always means being more than an insider – it also means to be one who has mastered modes and forms of conduct that are appropriate to being an insider (pp. 371-372).

Thus, Isin conceptualises citizenship as a struggle zone in which the normative framings of being an insider are constantly remade. Citizenship is centred on normative notions of inclusion of a political community through defining the 'other', that can be within as well as outside of the political community. Thus inclusion in citizenship is always premised upon clear definition and exclusion of non-citizens.

While analysing citizenship as a struggle zone, I will focus on the symbolic struggles over normative constructions of 'shared understandings regarding what sorts of individuals and groupings can properly live in the city' (Painter and Philo, 1995, p. 108). This will enable me to connect gentrification to political processes and critically examine the class conflict and struggles taking place in Dikmen Valley. It will also allow emphasising the agency of different actors living through gentrification through examining how they negotiate and contest those shared understandings regarding who can be included, while they are materially displaced and resettled in the city space. Relating the focus on symbolic struggles over citizenship to class conflict, I will analyse how citizenship is configured by multiple actors involved in gentrification and attend to the political functions thereof. By doing so, I aim to examine different class groups in relation to each other rather than in isolation.

In exploring the struggles over normative construction of citizenship, I will focus on the efforts of the nation-state to promote an official definition of citizenship. Engin Işın (2009) analyses changes in the 'modern figure of the citizen with singular loyalty, identity and belonging' in relation to the contemporary challenges nation-states have faced. He argues that 'the question is not so much "what is citizenship?", but rather that we need to explore "what is *called* citizenship?"' to develop a dynamic conceptualisation thereof as this would reveal all the interests that are invested in its normative construction (2009, p. 369). In line with that, I will draw on the concept of 'citizenship agenda' introduced by de Koning et al. (2015) to explore the governmental aspect inherent in the normative construction of citizenship:

> We define citizenship agendas as normative framings of citizenship that prescribe what norms, values, and behaviour are appropriate for those claiming membership of a political community. These agendas are concerned with defining the meaning of membership *in explicitly normative ways that go beyond conventional, legal– formal citizenship status*… Such citizenship agendas invariably imply models of *virtuous and deviant citizens*, favouring

particular subject-citizens over others, and suggesting ways to transform the latter into the former (de Koning et al., 2015, p. 121, emphasis added).

Thus, in addition to the symbolic exclusion from 'virtuous' citizenry, citizenship agendas involve concrete interventions into the 'deviant' subjects' behaviour to transform them. This reveals that citizenship has a direct impact on mundane operations and struggles of class, influencing class dynamics. Within this context, connecting gentrification to the changes in state citizenship agendas will enable me to critically examine how changes in citizenship regimes and urban policies together transform class dynamics.

I will refer to the notion of 'spaces of citizenship' (Painter and Philo, 1995; Desforges et al., 2005) which sheds light on 'the ways the material spaces are related to the varying constructions of citizenship present in the shared understandings of who can properly live and work in those spaces' (p. 108). The concept explores the spatially differentiated nature of de facto citizenship as experienced by 'othered' groups who are subjected to social and spatial marginalisation (Desforges et al., 2005, p. 439). This will enable me to uncover the 'differentiated rights that citizens enjoy in these spaces and the obligations that they have towards the other occupants and possessions of these spaces' (Painter and Philo, 1995, p. 108), thus examine the struggles among different configurations and practices of citizenship.

This will also help me uncover the dynamic ways the single logic of rent extraction and economic motives involved in the process of gentrification interact with the political and social processes on the ground. This is not fully explored in the economic and cultural analyses of gentrification due to the lack of attention to the political actors and motives in gentrification research. I will draw on the notion of 'citizenship as critique' proposed by Susan Smith (1989, p. 148). It uncovers the spatially uneven relationship between state and civil society through exploring the interface between political arrangements and social structures (Painter and Philo, 1995). This will enable me to reveal the ways the state citizenship agenda impacts the promotion and implementation of gentrification projects and thus to move beyond reducing of the role of the state to the expansion of neoliberal ideology.

In so doing, I aim to shed light on the ways the nation-state deals with the challenges of rescaling driven by the neoliberal globalisation process. Purcell

emphasises that globalisation in the post-1980 period led the traditional ties between citizenship and the national scale to be destabilised, so the scale of citizenship was rescaled both upwards and downwards (Purcell, 2003, p. 564). Within this context, it is argued that neoliberalism has brought the new mode of 'governing through communities' which refers to a shift towards an emphasis on the practice of responsibilities by 'active citizens' in sub-national communities (Rose, 1996; Dean, 1999 cited in Desforges et al., 2005, p. 440). This contrasted to the prioritisation of 'national citizen' in most post-war advanced liberal democracies through emphasis on the security of social, political and economic rights at the national scale. As noted above, the promotion of active, consumer citizens targeting the working class participation to gentrification (Paton, 2014; Paton et al., 2012) reflects this new mode of governing through communities.

Within the same context, I will focus on the groups who are drawn into the projects not only as potential consumers and investors to be incorporated into the neoliberal market but also as citizens whose loyalty was targeted by the state. I will explore collective resistances against state-led gentrification projects as struggles over changing access to valued resources and recognition as 'valued' actors. In line with my attempt to analyse material and symbolic processes together, I will approach the struggles led by the socially and spatially marginalised groups from the perspective of resistance to eviction from the decision-making processes as well as the inner-city land. I will pay attention to their claim to participate in the process of redistribution of urban land, which involves also the claim to be equally valued citizens.

In so doing, I will draw on Engin Isin's argument that domination and empowerment aspects are simultaneously integral to citizenship as it involves 'ruling class strategies via the state and it is an expression of social movements' (2009, p. 369). Emphasising the latter aspect, he constitutes acts of citizenship as the object of analysis, as he focuses on rupture that focuses on the actor (or the act she creates) rather than the persistence of order. Analysing on a group of irregular migrants (the *Sans Papiers*) who occupied a church in Paris in the 1990s to demand the right to stay in France and thus the right to regularised status, he explains the importance of the act of those migrants:

> ...Without papers and thus without ascribed identities, and their defenders, is not that they simply pointed to the injustice of their situation and sought

their 'human rights'. Rather, they enacted themselves as citizens by usurping the *right to claim rights* (p. 381). (Emphasis added)

From this perspective, I will analyse *the right to shelter struggle* as a process through which the stigmatised and marginalised citizens exercise and nurture their 'right to claim rights' and enact themselves as claim makers. This will enable me to explore these claims in relation to the context of the state citizenship agenda and the symbolic power of the more affluent groups in making more 'legitimate' claims to the city. In so doing, it will also help me emphasise the agency of those marginalised groups in terms of negotiating with and contesting the dominant configurations of citizenship.

In the light of the discussion provided above, integrating citizenship to analysis of class impact of gentrification will be very useful in terms of my attempt to explore how class inequalities are transformed, managed and contested. I will examine;

- the specific form of neoliberalisation in Turkey and how the current restructuring of the 'welfare state' differs from the experiences in advanced countries like the UK
- the social costs of inclusion as well as exclusion from gentrification
- the negotiations and struggles over inclusion into the inner-city and the urban decision-making processes

Thus I aim at bringing together the material and normative processes of boundary drawing. Within this context, this study attempts to analyse gentrification as part of a broader process whereby the material and symbolic borders of inclusion and exclusion from city space as well as citizenship are redrawn and negotiated among the multiple actors involved in it. I aim at revealing the class impact of gentrification through focusing on the social impacts of inclusion as well as exclusion.

I draw on Paton's definition of gentrification as a process in which people as well as urban space are targeted so as to make them more congruent with neoliberalism through promoting individualism and entrepreneurialism. Unlike advanced capitalist contexts like the UK, Turkey, as a lately industrialised and modernised country, imposed modernisation as a political project from above and the citizenship regime was state-centric and duty-based. Citizenship was gradually configured on the basis of passivity and

obedience vis-à-vis the strong and benevolent state. Because of this, in the political agenda of mainstream politicians, the attempts to maintain and nurture the citizens' desire to be obedient to state authority (and the fear of not being) had been central. From this perspective, I explore how these concerns regarding the promotion of state citizenship agenda were effective in the neoliberal urbanisation process, which was carried out state-led gentrification projects in Turkey particularly in the 2000s onwards.

I focus on the gradually more centralised and authoritarian urban governance, wherein both local and national state actors were actively involved in the redistribution of urban land with profit-seeking motives in Turkey. From this perspective, I explore the processes of redistribution of urban land and rental gains, the changing citizenship regime and the subsequent changes in the normative boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. While doing that, I analyse the ways inclusion to gentrification is promoted in Turkey in order to reveal the differences in a context wherein neoliberalism has taken an authoritarian form. Through taking a historical perspective to urban processes in Turkey and in Dikmen Valley, I detail the political and social processes that have led the way for authoritarian gentrification.

I explore the complex and contradictory ways people negotiated with these entangled processes of inclusion and exclusion. I unfold the different ways squatter communities respond to forced eviction and displacement as well as inner tensions and contradictions within these groups as opposed to the homogenising attitudes towards collective mobilisation against gentrification. Drawing on Engin Isin's concept of the 'right to claim rights', I examine the *Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter Struggle* in relation to the state citizenship agenda promoted through gentrification and explore the transformative and unique features of the struggle from this perspective.

Last but not least, I explore how affluent groups who wanted to live in the inner city negotiated the promises and costs of gentrification. I examine the negotiations about the symbolic boundaries regarding 'who can properly live in the city' in relation to the changing physical boundaries through property transfer. I also show how the transfer of squatter communities to the peripheries of the city and the criminalisation of their rights-based struggles affected the way in which the affluent groups reconstituted their class worth.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the research questions and the key concepts in this study. I aim at examining the class impact of gentrification, which was not fully explored in research because of the under-investigation of the processes of inclusion. I first offered a critical examination of the research on neoliberalism with a focus on neoliberal urbanism, class and gentrification attending to the limitations in terms of attending to the politics involved in the process and explaining the role of the state and the political actors. . Then, I explained how I intend to overcome these limitations using the lens of citizenship. I demonstrated how the analysis of spaces, agendas and acts of citizenship in relation to one another allows the politics and political actors into the analysis of the class impact of gentrification.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the methods and approach used in this study. I combine two sets of data collected through ethnographic research and use of secondary sources and some historical material. I first detail the relational ethnography by Matthew Desmond (2014) and then explain how I bring it together with the secondary sources about the processes of urbanisation in Turkey and Ankara and the formation of the official understanding of citizenship in Turkey. Then, I discuss how combining a spatial relational perspective with temporal analysis has enabled me to critically examine the complex ways gentrification operates in multiple yet interconnected places.

I am taking a broad definition of methodology to include not only research methods but approaches to my subject matter, particularly ways of conceptualising and framing it. As regards the latter I shall defend my approach through a brief review of past research in Turkey on the Dikmen Valley and other cases of gentrification. Since methods should be appropriate to the specificities of the subject matter I will explain the former by reference to the latter.

3.1. Bringing Multiplicity of Space into the Research

As Doreen Massey explained in an interview dated 2013, space is the dimension of multiplicity, in which many things — some of them interconnected — are going on at the same time in different places. Thus space presents us with the existence of the other. Gentrification, as the current policy of neoliberal urban agenda, is a process led by the single logic of profit-maximisation. It reduces urban space to a commodity that is a story-less, flat surface and the citizens into consumers. Although profit-seeking is the dominant force, the way profit is pursued and realised has always to deal with the multiplicity of processes going on in interconnected spaces if it is to be successful. Thus, it needs to detect which kind of housing and resident for which kind of location will maximise profits. As a result, it generates new kinds

of differentiation that fit with the profit logic as well as reproducing the existing ones.

To examine the multiple ways the single logic of profit operates, I attempt to bring into view the stories of different actors who have been living through gentrification, giving different meanings to it and expecting different things from it. To do that this study focuses on the Dikmen Valley gentrification project area in Ankara where different actors have lived through an on-going process of urban change.

As the next chapter reveals, the history of the valley is one of competitions and struggles between several different groups, of different classes and ethnicities, and various corporate and state agents. The valley used to be one of the largest squatter neighbourhoods in the capital Ankara. The urban transformation project started to be implemented by the greater municipality in 1989 in a way that progressed phase by phase. This led to a complex demographic structure as the middle class and more affluent groups moved to the newly constructed gated apartments and prestigious gated communities in the northern phases while the rural-based migrant groups continued to live in the northern parts of the valley. In the latter in particular, from the 1980s onwards, the amnesty laws legalised the squatter houses and led to their transformation into 4/5-storey apartment buildings. On the other hand, some squatter dwellers, who could not afford and/or did not want to pay for the title deed certificates, continued to stay in their squatter houses without holding legal documents, while new squatter houses were also being constructed by newcomers. The squatter neighbourhood was occupied predominantly by religious and ethnic minority groups, but after the 1980 migrants from more diverse backgrounds also moved in the area.

It is this heterogeneity that makes the Dikmen Valley a good study site for observing the processes of inclusion and exclusion. Due to this demographic heterogeneity, Dikmen Valley promised to be a useful field to explore the dynamic negotiations about the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. As the implementation of the project extended over the process of neoliberalisation, it also reflected the changes and continuities in the on-going process of urban redevelopment regime, including important changes in terms of the initial

rehabilitative purposes, environmental concerns, and participatory methods of the project.

I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the Dikmen Valley Urban Transformation Project area during January to mid-October 2015. It involved room-based interviews and walks with individuals and groups, participant observation of the struggling squatter communities, and photo elicitation. I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with a total of 56 participants who lived in and/or close to the Dikmen Valley project area. These include:

- ✓ 25 squatter dwellers lacking legal title-deeds (6 of them were former residents in the valley),
- ✓ 16 people (6 tenants, 9 owner-occupiers, 1 young adult living with parents) living in non-gated high-rise apartments and gated communities,
- ✓ 13 people (3 tenants, 9 owner-occupiers, 1 young adult living with parents) living in prestigious gated communities,
- ✓ 1 former squatter dweller, who was resettled in high-rise apartment blocks in Dikmen Valley as part of the redevelopment project
- ✓ 1 doorkeeper living in one of the apartment blocks in which the former squatter dwellers were resettled (See Appendix).

I preferred to conduct one-to-one interviews to get in-depth data, although I did interviews with couples living in gated apartments or neighbours living in the squatter neighbourhood when it was the preference of the participants as my main priority was to provide a comfortable place to the participants. In total, 8 of the participants were joined by their neighbours, spouse, child or cousin. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 82 years old. All of the interviews were conducted in person and 54 of them were recorded whereas in 2 of them I did not use voice recorder. The transcriptions of 12 interviews were done by the author and those of the remaining 44 interviews were done by a professional after I had deleted the participants' names and any other information like birthplace that could reveal their identity, from the voice recording. The interviews were translated into English (when necessary) by the author.

All of the middle and upper class participants were residents in gated apartments or prestigious gated communities within and/or close to Dikmen Valley Urban transformation Project area. Only 2 middle class participants,

Bora and Oktay, had moved from the high-rise apartments in the valley to apartments elsewhere by the time I interviewed them. On the other hand, 19 of the participants were living in the squatter neighbourhood when I interviewed them for the study while 7 of them were former squatter dwellers, who were living in apartment buildings at the time of the study. Seher was a university student, who lived in a shared house in a different city during term time. Ibo was working in an industrial company and staying in the place provided by his employer.

To recruit participants, I directly contacted individuals in my social networks who knew people living in the project area, and then through snowball sampling, I included more respondents. To start with a diverse set of participants, I chose individuals from different age groups, gender and class in my social network. While I was conducting the fieldwork, I also contacted a director, who made a documentary about urban transformation in Turkey based on the case of Dikmen Valley. Although she lost contact with the upper class resident involved in her documentary, I was able to interview four of the director's own friends, who resided in gated communities that were adjacent to the project area.

Aiming to reveal the negotiations over who can properly live in the city, in the interviews, I asked middle and upper class participants questions about themselves, their story of education and employment, the story of the places they lived and how they felt about living in those places, their reflections on the on-going gentrification project in the valley and Turkey and the promises of the country-wide urban transformation campaign, the active role of the state in the process, the demolition of squatter houses, the newly constructed peripheral social housing estates, and struggles over the right to dwelling and land, To the former and current squatter dwellers, I asked more detailed questions about the process of the right to shelter struggle, how they mobilised, what they achieved and lost throughout the process, what things have changed, and the challenges they faced over time.

In addition to the interviews, I attended the weekly meetings organised in the *Right to Shelter Bureau* in the squatter neighbourhood where there had been a collective struggle against the gentrification-led displacement, and did some participant observation there. The right to shelter bureau included a squatter

house, which is used as the place for meeting and other collective activities in winter times, and a container, which is used as the office where activists spend time, give consultation or information about the process, and also the documents about the project were kept. It was opened in 2006 when the people refused to leave their houses and looked for a place to inform people about the process and discuss together what they could do against the implementation of the project. Alongside the squatter people living in the neighbourhood, members of the radical leftist organisation People's Houses were also actively involved in the process of the struggle when I did my fieldwork.

In addition to interviews and chats in the bureau, I took a walk in the neighbourhood with 5 participants taking photos. In two of them, I asked my participants to take me to the places that had a meaning for them in whatever order they wanted. As we walked we also talked about the stories of the places they took me, about which I took notes. I took photos of the places they took me such as their houses, their gardens, and the streets they used to play as children. In one of them, I walked with a participant and her 9-year old daughter, and as we walked and chatted, the daughter took her own photos with my phone. I also took more spontaneous and shorter walks with 7 other participants, I walked together to their houses for the interview after the weekly meeting; and with a group of participants I went to two different houses in the neighbourhood to celebrate a wedding and a circumcision ceremony which were taking place. As we walked, I listened to their stories about the places we passed by such as their memories about clashing with the police forces in particular streets and corners, or the demolished shop that used to sell bread. These walks enabled me to get a deeper insight about the participants' sense of belonging to their neighbourhood, which helped me better contextualise their claims to their land and house.

To gain access to the squatter neighbourhood, I used two gatekeepers who were members of that organisation. Although the organisation helped me gain entrée, over time I realised that it was also preventing me from getting access to those people who were fearful of becoming part of, or who were against the political activism, as they thought I was affiliated with the People's Houses organisation. Nevertheless, attending the weekly meetings I tried to observe how different groups of people approached each other, reacted to the

discussion and comments, discussed the issues on the agenda and approached each other helped me detect the inner tensions as well as gave clues about what the non-activists thought. I also used a group of my friends from university who had lived in the neighbourhood for some time in the past, to help me get access to a family, who used to be active members of the struggle but at later stages withdrew their support because of conflicting views on the changing content of the struggle due to increasing power of the People's Houses organisation. This will be explained in more detail in Chapter 7.

In order to deepen my insights of inner tensions and to bring the voice of the people who were hesitant about political activism, I stayed in the neighbourhood after the meetings also, and spent time with the people; had lunch and played rummy king with them; listened to their conversations and comments about the meetings; and had random chats with many of them. Group interviews and unstructured chats with former and current squatter dwellers while they were waiting for the weekly meeting and/or reflecting on the discussions after the meeting were enlightening in terms of revealing different and opposing views about the on-going process of struggle in the valley. In those chats and interviews, some people expressed opposing views about staying in or leaving the neighbourhood. Especially those who had left their houses but came to the neighbourhood to attend some meetings were witnessing sentiments of resentment from the people who had stayed in their houses and 'been paying the price of political activism'. Within that context, these interviews and chats gave the former an opportunity to explain the reasons of their abandonment and express their maintaining support for the struggle. Listening to those conversations between the former and the current squatter dwellers whose support for the struggle differed and attending to the silence of some people as well as expressions of opposing views, I was able to develop insights about the internal contradictions, which are usually overlooked and underrepresented in research and leftist-oriented news media. I will address these in more detail when I analyse the right to shelter struggle in Chapter 7.

I initially used the bureau to get access to the people, but because I became involved in random chats before and after the weekly meetings, after a while I managed to build independent relations with the people who participated in the meetings. I started my fieldwork in January and after a few months, the

residents in the valley seemed to get used to my presence in the weekly meetings. Internal tensions encouraged some former squatter dwellers, on the other hand, in cases where they were no longer actively supporting the struggle but attending the meetings to be informed about the negotiations with the municipality. They tried to get in with me as they expected me to give them information without any intention to blame them for their decision to leave the neighbourhood.

Throughout the process when the valley had become one of the leading examples of activism against state-led gentrification in Turkey, there had been many researchers and journalists who visited the area and talked to the people. However, the time I spent in the field was longer than what the people living in the squatter neighbourhood were used to. Some of them expressed their disturbance at me seeing 'their many faces', as I will explain in detail in Chapter 7. Owing to the absence of time pressure, I met some locals in the earlier stages of my fieldwork but waited until they had the time to interview with them. More importantly, I had a chance to keep observing the people after I interviewed with them. I sometimes realised that they were saying different things when the voice recorder was on and off, or when they were alone with me and there were others around us. Being attentive to these also enabled me to include different and conflicting opinions (including those of the same person) regarding the project and the struggle. Participants gave me their consent about using any material they shared with me, but I exclude any material that they requested be kept confidential, whether during or after the recording.

Yet, one of the hardest parts of conducting a relational ethnographic fieldwork in Dikmen Valley was to 'gain access to and get in with an interconnected web of people, many of whom are bound in relationships of antagonism' (Desmond, 2014, p. 569). In the eyes of most of the squatter dwellers, I was a researcher who was interested in their struggle and wanted to make their voice heard. The women especially were very enthusiastic to talk to me about their experiences and feelings regarding the struggling process. Men, on the other hand, were much more distant to me as the patriarchal and traditional social codes in the neighbourhood prevented them from approaching women outside their family. Thus, initially I kept interviewing women and young male adults, while I observed men during the weekly meetings. To provide a more

comfortable place for the men to approach me, I tried to chat to the participants I already knew in the bureau when there were other men sitting and chatting there. I allowed and encouraged them to make comments and interrupt as we spoke. Over time, men started to feel less worried about talking to me. The activist figures, who were affiliated with the People's Houses, on the other hand remained more suspicious about my intentions as I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 7. I remained attentive to these differences between the activists affiliated with the People's Houses and the others in order to uncover the inner tensions within the struggling group.

The people living in gated apartments and the prestigious gated communities, on the other hand, did not accept doing walking interviews saying that they did not have the time. For the same reason, they usually invited me to their workplaces in their lunch breaks for the interviews. That was the greatest difficulty as sometimes I had to finish the interview in half an hour, which was not appropriate for an in-depth interview. I used a photo elicitation method during the interviews with the middle and upper class participants to initiate more lively conversations about their evaluations about the gentrification process in the valley and Turkey. These photos were usually useful in terms of motivating the participants to speak and enabling me to use the limited time I was provided by some participants more efficiently. I showed them photos of the apartment buildings in which the former squatter dwellers were resettled and the view of the squatter neighbourhood from the edge of the gentrified part of the Dikmen Valley, and asked them how they felt about living closer to the former and current squatter dwellers, and the delay in the implementation of the project. This triggered a discussion about their feelings and opinions about the inclusion of the squatter residents in gentrification projects as well as the processes that led to the delay in the implementation of the gentrification project in the valley and in Turkey such as the squatter dwellers' resistance, as I will discuss in Chapter 6.

To get a better sense and deeper insight of the practices of drawing symbolic boundaries, I also asked the participants, who live in gated apartments and prestigious gated communities, to take photos of the things and places that they liked and did not like about where they lived, and to send them to me on Whatsapp. Many did not send me their photos, even though they told me that they would do and I reminded them a few times. Nevertheless, 11 participants

texted me some photos, and the similarities in the photos still gave me a sense of their relations to the space. I analysed the photos my participants sent me in relation to the whole context of their narratives in the interviews, as I will show in Chapter 6.

3.2. Relational Ethnography

In this study, I use relational ethnography as recommended by Matthew Desmond (2014) to emphasise the negotiations and struggles over the reproduction of space through gentrification. This broadens and expands the horizons of ethnographic study beyond understanding delimited groups or boundaries (Desmond, 2014, p. 548).

For a relational approach, he attributes a higher importance to the choice of the object of analysis. Despite the fact that the field of ethnographic research covers all corners of the world, the object of analysis remains limited to particular bounded groups or places analysed individually or comparatively (p. 550). He argues that studying people and places in relative isolation interferes with our ability to understand their mutual encounter and confrontation (p. 551).

The object of analysis of relational ethnography is not a particular group or a delimited location but *processes* involving configurations of relations among different actors or institutions (Desmond, 2014, p. 547). Desmond asserts that relational ethnography involves studying various actors. More specifically, it includes at least two types of actors or agencies occupying different positions within the social space and bound together in a relationship of mutual dependence or struggle (p. 554).

Desmond proposes four objects of analysis that can be drawn upon in a relational ethnographic research: processes rather than processed people, fields rather than places, boundaries rather than bounded groups, and cultural conflict rather than group culture (p. 562). He gives the example from his ethnographic study about the process of eviction in Milwaukee's low-income housing market. He wrote that taking this *process* as his scientific object enabled him to explore the interactions and transactions between various actors involved in the process including the tenants experiencing eviction and the landlords conducting eviction as well as many other people in their

network. By focusing on the process of eviction itself rather than evicted tenants or evicting landlords, he argues that he could explore the social relations and interactions which extended the confines of a single neighbourhood (p. 563).

Inspired by his approach, my object of analysis is not as a particular neighbourhood or a particular culture within a particular boundary. Although I did the research *in* a particular place, the locus of my research is not the same as the object of analysis. My object of analysis is not the displaced and excluded squatter dwellers or the displacing gentrifier groups in isolation from each other. Taking excluded groups as my object of analysis contradicts with my purposes to explore the complex ways gentrification impacts on class dynamics. As I attempt to explore the conflicting processes of inclusion and exclusion at the same time, the focus of this study is not the squatter neighbourhood nor the gated residential areas but the *processes* of inclusion and exclusion through gentrification.

Thus this study involves a focus on 'boundaries' rather than bounded groups. I draw upon a critical approach to inclusion and its inseparability from exclusion within the context of gentrification, as discussed in Chapter 2. Desmond argues that thinking critically about boundaries and revealing the processes that cause and constitute boundary change requires thinking relationally (2014, p. 565). He proposes to study the boundaries such as classification process of dividing slum from non-slum, the defining bounds of 'slumness' rather than studying the slum itself. Therefore, studying boundaries from a relational perspective suits my purposes to explore how people are included as well as excluded. Also it enables me to explore how these boundaries are negotiated, and thus, emphasise the human agency of various actors.

My relational approach does not involve group interviews or focus groups that bring together middle and upper class residents with former and current squatter dwellers. Despite the lack of real interaction among these different actors, however, all the one-to-one interviews, walking and visual methods enabled me to reveal that middle and upper class residents and the former and current squatter dwellers actively participate in the symbolic struggles regarding 'who can properly live in the city' and enacted and mobilised

citizenship in different ways. Equally important, with this focus on boundaries, I was able to become much more attentive to the inner boundaries within the struggling squatter communities. As a result, I managed to move beyond the 'romanticising' analyses of collective action based on shared class interests that overlook the complexity and dynamism of mobilisation, as I will point out in Chapter 7.

Last but not least, Desmond proposes studying cultural conflict rather than group culture as the latter attributes stable and shared beliefs and practices to a bounded, homogenous group. Rather than harmony, he focuses on competition between people structurally dissimilar to one another (2014, p. 568). He writes that studying eviction allowed him to explore the dynamics of meaning making through relations between landlords and tenants. From this perspective, I will focus on the process of redrawing the symbolic boundaries of inclusion and exclusion through exploring the differing claims to the city and citizenship in relation to the broader processes of gentrification.

Despite including different groups in my research, my relational ethnography has limitations. I spent much more time with the former and current squatter settlers than the middle and upper class residents. Hence, while my study involves different actors at the same time, the perspectives and experiences of the former and current squatter dwellers are central in my study. This is related to my intention to focus on the politics behind the processes of inclusion in gentrification. In prioritising their experiences, I was able to reveal the ways even the socially and spatially marginalised groups who are targeted by gentrification might benefit from participating in it and secondly the disciplining effects driven by the state's political considerations. Thirdly, the focus on the squatter communities enabled me to critically examine how the disciplining efforts of gentrification simultaneously paved the way for transforming the squatter settlers' individualised troubles of housing into public issues mobilised around the right to claim rights, in contrast to the official citizenship agenda, as will be explained in detail in Chapter 7.

The prioritised status of the squatter settlers in my study was also related to my wish to use ethnography to bring the voice of the people who have fewer channels to speak. Nevertheless, despite my attempts to focus on the voices from below, the squatter dwellers, who were not active parts of the struggling

process, are underrepresented as they were more difficult to gain access to and much more reluctant to speak, even if I tried. What is more, there were other actors in the field of whom I became aware only during the fieldwork, namely the Syrians and waste recyclers, who recently moved in the project area. Although I thought about talking to the Syrians in the later stages of my research, of central impediment in terms of talking to them was the language barrier. On the other hand, I could not use my participants as gate keepers as I was informed by (and also observed) that the two groups did not interact very much with one another. I heard from the leading activist figures that the Syrians sometimes visited *the right to shelter bureau* to be informed about the implementation of the project. Their ambiguous legal status put them in a more fragile position vis-à-vis the state-led processes of urban redevelopment and because of this I thought they would be extremely suspicious of speaking to strangers. Due to my primary interest in moving beyond the emphases on displacement and territorial stigmatisation as well as class reproduction in the analyses of the class impact of gentrification, I limited my analyses by focusing on the groups benefitting as well as targeted by these agendas. Thus, these groups are seen through the eyes of the squatter dwellers in the thesis. Nevertheless, in future research, I aim to explore to what extent an understanding of citizenship as claims and acts can be empowering for Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey.

3.2.1. Absence of Relational Approach in Previous Research

Within the context of the arguments made above, this study departs from ethnographic studies which favour an economic approach to gentrification and aim to analyse the macro processes through focusing on micro settings (Mühürdaroğlu, 2005; Karaman, 2012; Somalı, 2013). Although they reveal the connections between micro settings and macro processes and policies, they tend to view groups and places as receptacles of large-scale processes and aim to 'see the big through the small' (Stolte et al., 2001, p. 387 cited in Desmond, 2014, p. 553).

The multi-sited ethnographic studies that explore processes of urban redevelopment and impacts thereof in multiple places by comparing two or more case studies affected by the broader process of gentrification (Uzun, 2003; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; İslam and Sakızlıoğlu, 2015), also

tend to assume clear boundaries between those places that are investigated. The contradictions within the assumed homogenous groups are mostly overlooked.

Drawing upon the flexibility of boundaries, I focus on the interactions between the different groups living in the gated places and address differences as well as shared social attributes and practices among them. I also aim to question the territorial boundedness of the squatter dwellers. Thus, I focus on the conflicting practices and tensions among different groups of people living (or who used to live) in the squatter neighbourhood.

My study therefore differs from the studies focusing on collective resistance against gentrification from the perspective of their achievements and failures in terms of stopping the steady wave of forced displacement, and reflecting upon more effective forms of mobilisation. Dikmen Valley constitutes a popular example of collective mobilisation for the right to shelter in academia and the radical leftist printed media. It is emphasised that the struggle of the squatter residents in Dikmen Valley has succeeded in delaying the implementation of the gentrification project since 2006. However, existing studies examining Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter movement (Karagüney, 2009; Aykan, 2011; Aksoy, 2012; Deniz, 2016) mostly overlook the dynamic relations between the broader urban change and contested claims to participate in the gentrification processes.

Fuat Karagüney (2009), for instance, approaches the title deed owners as the true right holders on the land and argues that the demands of the collective struggle are not legitimate as it was led predominantly by those people without title deeds. He argues that the latter group victimises the legal rights of the former through refusing to leave the neighbourhood and delaying the implementation of the project. By approaching urban transformation as an issue of formalisation of informal settlements, Karagüney overlooks the historical processes that generated the 'illegal' presence of the squatter dwellers without title deeds on public land.

In 1972, Laura Nader called for reinventing anthropology through a renewed emphasis on studying 'up' and 'down' together to demonstrate the *connections* between the powerful actors and institutions and relatively less powerful

individuals and groups. She explains the promises of this approach in terms of developing adequate theory giving the example of slums:

> The ghetto may be viewed as being without law, lawless. The courts are not geared to the complaints of the poor; furthermore, they are not geared for cheap and quick resolution of conflict — crucial features for the poor. From this perspective, ghetto communities may be said to be shut out of the legal system except as defendants, and indeed they are often shut off from other municipal services ranging from garbage-collection to police protection (Nader, 1972, p. 290).

Thus, Karagüney's analysis lacks studying 'up' and overlooks the fact that the difference between squatter dwellers with and without title deeds resulted from the inefficient housing policies followed by populist attempts of inclusion of the squatter dwellers. By focusing on the 'illegal' status of the squatter communities, his approach criminalises the rights-based struggle of the squatter communities lacking legal title deeds and thus approves, if not legitimises, the punitive measures against it.

The studies focusing on the achievements of the struggle in the valley focus on the process of organising collective mobilisation. Begum Aykan (2011) explores the right to shelter struggle from the perspective of framing of individual claims to the city and politicisation of the squatter communities. She emphasises how the right to shelter movement was successful in framing diverse claims - due to important ethnic and (religious) sectarian differences - on the basis of a claim to 'the right to the city' and encouraging the squatter dwellers to become involved in political activism. She argued that an important reason for this effective mobilisation was its non-hierarchical form without leadership. Evin Deniz (2016) agrees with Aykan in terms of the success of the movement and highlights the importance of encounters with the police and other politically active groups as well as the rights discourse in terms of generating effective mobilisation.

These arguments were shared also by the leftist-oriented news media and the members of the radical leftist People's Houses[1] organisation, who have been actively involved in the struggle in the valley. The organisation's activism concentrates mainly on struggling for the right to housing as well as education and health. The right to shelter struggles in Dikmen Valley as well as elsewhere

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[1] Hereafter – PH

in Turkey was represented in the narratives of the PH members living in the valley as well as in the radical leftist-oriented newspapers as a struggle of the poor proletariat against oppression and capitalist exploitation. Thus, the struggle was imagined as a successful mobilisation of a heterogeneous group on the basis of class interest, thus devoid of contradictions and inner conflicts.

Because of such 'romanticising' approaches to the collective mobilisation in the Dikmen Valley in the leftist-oriented news media, I was very surprised when I first went into the field. What I saw was a highly deteriorated neighbourhood in a physical sense; the houses, the gardens, the roads, the signboards, and even the trees were left without maintenance. Most of the squatter dwellers, who were said to be brought together by an admirable struggle to defend their homes against forced eviction in such a way that overcame internal divisions, had already moved out from the neighbourhood. There were less than 500 households, living in the neighbourhood when I started my fieldwork in February 2015. Of these households, approximately 200 had refused to become part of the political activism against the state.

The dominant mood of the people in the valley was anxious, a suspense which also impacted on their activism. During the long process of waiting in anxiety, even the most prominent figures in the struggle with a few exceptions had purchased 'formal' apartment houses elsewhere thanks to cheap housing credits as precaution against forced eviction. The poor, landless people struggling for their right to shelter had, in the process, transformed into property owners and to some extent partners in urban regeneration. Thus, the academic and popular representations of the struggle in Dikmen Valley no longer represented the truth of the situation when I did my fieldwork.

3.3. Bringing Time and Space Together

The differences between the written material and the field revealed the need to focus on the complex ways people are included in the process of gentrification as well as analysing the 'richly heterogeneous complexities of the lived experience of marginality' (Auyero and Jensen, 2015, p. 360). To do that, I integrate the aspect of 'temporality' into the analysis of the right to shelter struggle in the valley. Bahar Sakızlıoğlu (2013) mentions this need through an ethnographic analysis of displacement led by the urban transformation project in Tarlabaşı, Istanbul. She argues that the local state expanded the process of

implementation of the project after declaring it, and this impeded effective mobilisation against displacement as people's expectations from the project were constantly lowered and stirred. Indeed, one of the problems of previous explorations of the housing activism in the valley was the limits of approaching the struggle as static, and the people living there as immobilised.

The struggle had lasted since 2006 and was still continuing when I left the field in October, 2015. Throughout these years, the dynamics in the neighbourhood had changed radically. The collective action started with almost 3000 people whereas there were approximately 600 people left in the neighbourhood when I started my fieldwork in January, 2015. The houses in the fourth phase of the project area were almost completely demolished and started to be occupied by newcomer migrants, namely the Syrians and waste collectors. Many luxurious high-rise residential and commercial buildings had been constructed around the remaining squatter neighbourhood in the fifth phase of the project area. Moreover, the resistance in the valley seemed to lose its popularity in the news media and academia.

Within this context, rather than trying to find heroes and emphasise class solidarity in such a way that overlooks the complexities and contradictions within struggling communities, I intended to explore the inner tensions generated over the course of its 9-year history alongside the already existing differences. With an analysis of the struggle as a process, I was able to attend to the limitations of those claims while emphasising the ways rights claims have empowered oppressed groups.

I focus on the 'interactions in a changing field' (Desmond, 2014, p. 555) 'from multiple and even opposing perspectives' (p. 559) to reveal the struggles over boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, in order to avoid freezing my participants in an 'ethnographic present' (Burton, 1988 cited in Desmond, 2014, p. 552), I use the past tense throughout the thesis, as the field has continued to change since I left in mid-October 2015. Taking a temporal perspective, I focus on struggle and tension as well as cooperation and coherence in the asymmetrical interactions within the squatter communities.

Alongside ethnographic study, I undertook documentary research about the historical progression of urbanisation in Ankara with regard to the relationship between the formation and reworking of the citizenship agenda

and the construction of the built environment. I researched secondary materials such as books, journal articles in the National Library and the library of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara and also online reports of chambers about urbanisation processes, the development of squatting, and the popular representation of the squatter communities in the mainstream printed media and scholarly works.

I also scanned online archives of mainstream newspapers to investigate the newspapers articles about the squatter settlers. I analysed some weekly municipal bulletins in Ankara to uncover the popular representation of the squatter settlers in the Dikmen Valley. To get access to the former volumes of the bulletins, I contacted the Head Office of the Chamber of Environmental Engineers in Ankara and consulted their archive. In addition to these, I analysed the speeches of key actors of the urban transformation campaign that I accessed through scanning websites of some online and printed newspapers to uncover the ways in which gentrification was promoted and the people were drawn into it. Last, I collected photographs showing how the squatter dwellers were represented in the local and national mainstream newspapers based on these sources and other types of visual data including maps, graphics, and statistics from scholarly works about the urbanisation and urban transformation processes in the valley and in Ankara.

By bringing time and space together through an analysis of the ethnographic data together with the historical research on the urbanisation and formation of spaces of citizenship and the official definition of (good) citizens, I aim to examine the dynamic relationship between conflict among the multiple meanings and practices that are simultaneously at play and the specific 'mode of integration' (Mills, 1959, p. 47) (at that particular time) of the urban regime.

Conclusion

This chapter explained how using relational ethnography and historical analysis is enabling in terms of moving beyond the cultural and economic analyses of class impact of gentrification and attending to the complexities and dynamism thereof. It outlined how taking *boundaries*, rather than bounded groups/places, and *processes* as the objects of inquiry equipped me with better tools to uncover the dynamic ways the disciplining efforts of gentrification operates are contested in multiple yet interconnected spaces. Alongside

bringing different experiences and perspectives into view, I also critically reflected upon the limitations of my 'relational' ethnographic approach in prioritising the perspectives of former and current squatter dwellers.

Chapter 4: Formations of Citizenship Regime and Class Inequalities throughout Urbanisation in Ankara (1923-2015)

In the contemporary studies on nation-state rescaling within the context of the increasingly global economy, the subsequent 'unsettling of national citizenship' (Holston and Appadurai, 1996) is frequently emphasised (Purcell, 2003; Fenster, 2005; Işın, 2008; 2009). Işın (2009, p. 369) mentions contemporary debates in citizenship studies which focus on the emergence of new scales, sites and actors of citizenship that complicate the ways in which citizenship is imagined and performed, not only as membership but also as claims (Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1997; Scholtz, 2006). He continues that new actors articulate claims for justice through new sites that involve multiple and overlapping scales of rights and obligations (Huysmans, 2006; Huysmans et al., 2006). Among them are the squatter dwellers in the peripheries of the cities in the Global South, who conduct protests for their 'rights to the city'.

To understand how class inequalities and relations have been affected by the contemporary processes of gentrification in Turkey – which is the main object of this dissertation, this chapter analyses the processes of urbanisation and official configuration of citizenship in Turkey in relation to one another. Drawing on the conceptual framework provided by 'the citizenship agenda' (de Koning et. al., 2015) and 'the spaces of citizenship' (Painter and Philo, 1995; Desforges, 2005) and the historical data provided by the secondary sources on these processes in Turkey, I will explore the changes in the normative boundaries regarding who has been configured as proper to live in the city in relation to the material changes in the city space. In doing so, I aim to shed light on the political as well as economic processes through which the ground for contemporary gentrification and rights-based activism against it was paved in Turkey.

In the first part of this chapter, I explore how the state citizenship agenda was formed in Turkey focusing on how 'good' citizenship was officially configured and promoted. In the second part, I analyse the formation of squatter neighbourhoods by rural migrants from the 1940s onwards as a manifest challenge to the state authority. I examine how they evolved over time in relation to the changing state citizenship agenda as well as the changing dynamics of class conflict. With this historical analysis drawing on secondary resources and visual material such as maps and photos collected through documentary research, I aim to shed light upon how the ground for the contemporary urban transformation campaign based on zero tolerance to informal housing was prepared in Turkey. The last part of the chapter explores how the local state's approach to the gentrification project in Dikmen Valley has evolved through demonstrating the changes as well as continuities in the process in line with the broader context provided in the first part.

4.1. Constitution of State Citizenship Agenda and Its Landscapes (1850s-1930s)

As referred earlier in Chapter 2, citizenship is a normative concept as well as a legal one to the extent that it refers to the 'ideal' norms of conduct and the forms state-citizen relations should take. In principle, formal-legal membership of a political community attributes each subject living within that territory certain rights and duties aiming at counterweighting the existing class, ethnic, religious and gender inequalities. Through the normative definition of (ideal) citizenship, however, particular individuals and groups are valued over others, while at the same time existing material inequalities limit the access of the subordinate groups to valued practices and goods. These two interrelated processes lead to the formation of differentiated rights, responsibilities and senses of citizenship (Desforges et al., 2005, pp. 439-440).

The process of urbanisation in Turkey throughout the modernisation process bore witness to the continuous struggles over normative construction of citizenship. The formation of citizenship agenda by the state in Turkey dates back to the early 19th century when the modernisation attempts in the Ottoman Empire started. The rise of nationalism and demands of independence threatened the territoriality of the empire. The Ottoman elites sought to save the empire from collapse through granting constitutional rights

to the ethnically and religiously heterogeneous subjects living in the empire. In her book, *In Search of the Ideal Citizen*, the most detailed source in Turkish on the changing citizenship agendas in Turkey, Füsun Üstel (2014) explores the historical process of how modern citizenship was normatively constructed and promoted by the state authorities since the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire. She analyses the changes in the *civics curricula* to understand how the national citizenship education in primary and secondary schools evolved in relation to the changing configuration of ideal citizenship in Turkey. The process of formation of modern citizenship in Turkey has taken place on a fragile ground, as she argues, since the Ottoman intellectuals intended it to save the empire and transform its population from passive subjects of the Sultan into modern citizens simultaneously (p. 30).

The first steps in establishing a modern constitutional order which involved reforming the sharia law, were the declarations of edicts of *Tanzimat* (Reorganisation) in 1836 and *Islahat* (Reformation) in 1856. In these edicts, the contradictory goals of the modernisation project were immediately apparent. In the former, the right to security of life and property, equitable tax, and right to a fair trial of the Muslim people and other religious groups living under the imperial territory was recognised. The motive behind recognition of such civil rights, however, was the promise of allegiance of the subject-citizens. It was specified that a man would willingly serve his state and nation if he was assured about the security of his life, his honour, and property.

The scope of the latter edict was broader as the threat of nationalist ideas strengthened at the time. The edict proclaimed 'Ottoman citizenship' — in contrast to the superior status of Muslim population before then — stating that 'every individual, who is a subject of the Ottoman State, is called Ottoman without exception regardless of which religion or sect he is a member' (Üstel, 2014, p. 27).

In 1876, the first Ottoman constitution was promulgated. The authorities of the Sultan were restricted with the establishment of the executive assembly of the notables, whose members were elected by the Sultan, and the legislative Assembly of the Deputy, whose members were elected by the people. Yet, the final decision was to be made by the Sultan, and in February 1878 Sultan Abdulhamid closed the Assembly. After thirty years of despotic rule,

constitutionalism was declared again in 1908 because of the increasing pressure of the Turkish nationalist groups. To the former constitution new clauses were added that promoted civil and political participation of the citizens, such as restricting the authorities of the Sultan's powers to set up and close the assembly and recognising the right to association.

New political associations and parties were formed, and those, which had continued their activities secretly, manifested themselves publicly. However, the rapid process of civilisation of politics stimulated citizen participation in politics, which contradicted with the primary goal of preserving social unity for the sake of state security. As a result, restrictions regarding the purpose and qualities of the associations followed. With the Law on Associations and The Strike Law enacted in 1909, the associations 'aiming to change the form of government and/or dissociate the Ottoman society' were claimed to violate the security and integrity of the country. Furthermore, the Ottoman counter coup against the declaration of Constitutional monarchy, known as the 31 March Incident[2], led to the demonization of alternative political opinions and approaches (Üstel, 2014, p. 28).

Within this framework, the pedagogues of the Ottoman modernisation configured the public sphere in terms of order as the source of security. They emphasised the perfection of the existing order established by the constitution as well as the moral qualities of the public servants as opposed to the arbitrary rule of the Sultan. The public sphere was not a place where ideas, decisions and demands were circulated and negotiated like the bourgeois public sphere in Western Europe. On the contrary, it was an *ordered* space providing the citizens with an atmosphere of trust by the order of law. What is of importance was to ensure political stability and social integrity. Accordingly, the citizen, who would become the main actor in the public space, was expected to fulfil her duties and comply with the desired codes of conduct to contribute to the persistence of order and stability. This imposed an understanding of citizenship as a granted privilege more than a right that is to be exercised and claimed.

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2 The parliament and the 1876 Constitution had been suspended by the Sultan AbdulHamid in 1878. The revolutionary Young Turks forced the Sultan to declare constitutional monarchy and restore the constitution in 1908 reopening the General Assembly of the Ottoman Empire. The conservative reactions and discontent about constitutionalism were materialised in a counter-coup attempt in 31 March 1909 demanding Sharia rule. It was put down after 9 days and then the constitution was restored and the Sultan Abdulhamid was deposed from the country.

The emphasis on order and the tension between civil and political participation and the security of the state continued also after the Republican state was established. After the devastating world war and the *War of Liberation*[3], the military cadres declared the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and immediately embarked on the formation of a modern and secular citizenry. The contradictions led by simultaneous attempts to transform the passive subjects of the Sultan into modern, enlightened citizens and secure their allegiance to the new regime continued also after 1923.

In studies on citizenship in Turkey a shared emphasis is the explicit state-centrism involved in the citizenship agenda. In her article titled "The Anatomy of Citizenship in Turkey" Ayşe Kadıoğlu analyses the formation of citizenship in relation to the development of nationalism and argues that in the French experience formation of the nation and the state was simultaneous, and in Germany nationalism preceded the formation of the state. She continues that in Turkey the establishment of the state preceded the formation of the nation without a preceding Enlightenment thought (2012, p. 179). She argues that the concept of citizenship was drawn upon the assumption of an unenlightened, inexperienced, and passive society rather than claim-making, free and active individuals; citizens were expected to internalise the modernisation project of the Republican cadres and follow the routes that are already shown to them instead of self-reasoning (2012, p. 178).

Because of the absence of an Enlightenment movement during which the individual becomes autonomous from divine rule through the capacity to reason, the main mechanism to show the citizens those routes was the education system (Caymaz, 2007, p. 5; Üstel, 2014, p. 155). Various studies on citizenship agendas examine how states use citizenship agendas in order to manage populations (Bhandar, 2010) through for instance inculcating responsible and virtuous behaviour in citizens through citizenship education (Brooks and Holford, 2009; Kennelly and Llewellyn, 2011 cited in Koning et al.,

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3 After the defeat of the Central Powers during the WWI, the territory of the Ottoman Empire was occupied by the Allied Powers. As opposed to the quisling Sultan and the Ottoman government in Istanbul, a war of liberation (1919-1922) was started under the leadership of a group of soldiers led by Mustafa Kemal. The soldiers refused to recognize the authority of the Ottoman government and established another government in Ankara. In April, 1920 they declared the Republic of Turkey and established the Grand National Assembly. Following the victories in all the fronts of the war, the assembly declared that it abolished Sultanate in 1922, which meant the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. With the Lausanne peace treaty (April, 1923), the sovereignty of the new state was internationally recognised. In October, the assembly declared Turkey to be a republic.

2015. p. 122). The main aim of state-controlled citizenship education in Turkey was to inculcate patriotism and civility (Üstel, 2014, p. 175) to secure the allegiance of the citizens to the new regime and instil modern and secular values and behaviours in the 'unenlightened' citizens. Within this framework, in 1928, a national campaign of literacy was introduced with the establishment of the *Schools of the Nation* for men and women aged between 16 and 45. *Information on Country* lessons in these schools aimed at equipping the illiterate citizens with Republican values, which they were expected to internalise and transmit.

In his contribution to the book on societal peace and citizenship in Turkey, R. Özgür Dönmez (2011) defines what he calls the formation of citizenship regime in Turkey as 'traumatic' in agreement with Kadıoğlu. He argues that, on the one hand, it aimed at transforming the subjects of the Sultan into modern citizens in the name of bringing about radical modernity; but on the other, it borrowed monist and social engineering features of the empire, which prevented the civil society from engaging in politics (Dönmez, 2011, p. 5). The Republican elites tried to overcome the contradiction between creating modern, right-holder citizens and securing their allegiance through a duty-based configuration of citizenship. This is revealed in a school textbook published in 1926 that stated that 'Citizens have rights in order to fulfil the duties that they are responsible for' (Üstel, 2014, p. 181, my translation). As Caymaz (2007) argues while analysing the evolution of citizenship education in Turkey, citizens were expected to fulfil their duties defined by the state within the space delineated and bestowed by the state. Accordingly, if they were doing their duty completely, they would not need to claim anything from the state (p. 46).

In this duty-based configuration, the class aspect of citizenship was hidden. The working class mobilisation was already weak compared to the Western European countries where citizenship developed as a class compromise given to the working classes by the liberal welfare state. Moreover, throughout 1930s, the new regime was consolidated under the single Republican People's Party rule, gradually replacing the emphases on constitutional citizenship and Republican values of equality with an increased emphasis on patriotism as an antidote to the enduring tension between civil and political participation and the integrity of the state. The citizenry was configured as an 'integrated and

unprivileged mass' (Şenol-Cantek, 2016, p. 172) without class conflicts, and ethnic and religious differences (Bali, 2000 cited in Özyurek, 2002, p. 18). This way the newly established nation-state attempted to form national integrity and cohesion among a diverse population.

The differences between the painting "In the Wake of the Revolution" (1933), by Zeki Faik İzer, and the "Liberty Leading the People" (1830) by Eugène Delacroix, that İzer was inspired by, reflect this understanding (See Figures 2 and 3). Delacroix painted a half-naked woman holding the French flag leading the people composed of bourgeoisie, workers, and students with the ideal of liberty. Similarly, the woman in white dress in İzer's painting represents the Republican ideal yet she is exempt from leading the people as she follows the directive of the leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who points at the future. People followed then not an ideal of liberty but the Republican ideology (Poyraz, 2013).

Unlike Delacroix, İzer does not represent class differences in line with the Republican idea, as the main contradiction was between the modern-looking young men and women in the crowd, and the reactionary represented by the bearded, old men on their knees. Abandoning class inequalities and suppressing the acting and claim-making capacity of citizens with a passive, duty-based configuration of citizenship manifested that the newly found republic was owned by the state not by the citizens.

Figure 2: "In the Wake of the Revolution" by Zeki Faik Izer, 1933 (Source: Poyraz, 2013)

Figure 3: "Liberty Leading the People" by Eugène Delacroix, 1830 (Source: Poyraz: 2013).

The Republican elites created their 'formal, fixed landscapes of citizenship that communicated their understanding of citizenship through the built environment' (Desforges et al., 2005, p. 441). They constructed homogenous and ordered spaces such as squares and boulevards, as well as ballrooms and leisure parks, which would reflect the alleged social unity and the power of the

state. The first civic urban space of Ankara was Ulus Square (See Figure 4) where public announcements, ceremonies and celebrations such as the opening ceremony of first National Assembly or the abolition of monarchy, were held and carefully policed by the state with mass participation of jubilant crowds (Sargın, 2004, pp. 664-665). With its sterility, Ulus Square is argued to represent the ideal of a non-antagonistic public as rallying of the masses was not allowed except for the official ceremonies (Toker and Tekin, 2002, p. 102 cited in Şenol-Cantek, 2016, p. 46).

Figure 4: The official ceremony of the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Republic (Source: Hür, 2015).

The presence of 'ideal' citizens on public space, on the other hand, was reduced to the duty of representing the secular ideology of the new regime and thus reproducing state power. Ankara was declared the capital city in 1923, and the municipality of Ankara was formed in 1924. In 1925, the municipality was given the authority to expropriate, and according to the first city plan of Ankara, 4.000.000 m^2 of land between the administrative centre Ulus in the Old Town and the emerging residential and administrative centre that is the New Town (See Figure 5) was expropriated to construct the capital (Kaynar, 2016, p. 67). In the 1930s, the New Town, which included the new Kızılay Square (See Figure 6), became the residency for the military bureaucrats and politicians, who migrated from big cities such as Istanbul and Izmir, as well as the notables of the Old Town, who were compliant with the new regime (Şenol-Cantek, 2016, p. 47).

Figure 5: Ankara Master Plan, Hermann Jansen, 1932 (Source: Güngör, 2012).

Figure 6: Kızılay Square in the 1930s comprising Güvenpark, the houses of the bureaucratic elites, Güven Monument (two soldiers), and the ministries on the right in the distance.

Despite the emphases on citizenry as a united, homogenous mass the normative construction of citizenship favoured educated and modern-looking citizens, who are devoted to the ideal of modernisation and thus representing the ideal Republic. The middle and high-income bureaucrats, most of whom

migrated from big cities such as Istanbul and Izmir, constituted role models not only for the poor but also the notables in Ankara.

On the other hand, the native, rural-based populations of Ankara, who subsisted on agriculture and stockbreeding and living according to religious codes, were expected to modernise through the inculcation of the Republican values before becoming visible on the public spaces in Ankara. In line with this, the entrance of the pedestrians wearing rural/traditional clothes to the Kizilay-Cankaya line of the boulevard was blocked by government officials as the New Town was protected from the visual and noise pollution (Senol-Cantek, 2016, pp. 110-111). Senol-Cantek also mentions that with the Hat Law (1925), those whose appearance was not neat were not allowed to enter the boulevard of the New City (p. 147). The Mayor Nevzat Tandogan, who was in charge between 1929 and 1946, is famous for his authoritarian measures to promote the desired codes of conduct through declaring very detailed instructions about how to and not to behave in public places (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990 cited in Kaynar, 2016, p. 52).

The apparent absence of antagonism was, thus, based on the exclusion of class, ethnic and religious subjectivities from the normative construction of citizenship and its landscapes. The state citizenship agenda and the subsequent construction of a segregated capital city thus contrasted with the emancipation offered by the equality promised by formal citizenship.

4.2. Formation of Spaces of Citizenship (1930s-2000s)

Squatter houses were developed in Ankara in the 1920s by low-income groups, who were excluded from wider urban development plans. These rural migrants to the city came to work in the constructions and in the absence of housing supply constructed the first shanty houses on lands excluded from the city plans due to topographical disadvantages such as valleys and hills, yet close to the developed areas of the city (Senyapili, 1985, pp. 42-46 cited in Kaynar, 2016, p. 81). These were called *gecekondu* (literally meaning landed in one night/overnight), which fittingly describes the speed and stealth of the construction process (Tas and Lightfood, 2005, p. 4).

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the founders immediately started to construct a modern capital city from scratch on the

lands of Ankara that had been neglected under the Ottoman rule. The primary concern of the urban plans was the needs of the middle- and high-income groups who migrated from big cities in the Western part of the country. The first squatter houses were made of old cheese and oil tins and where largely all demolished by the Government in 1933. The Ministry of Interior, on the other hand, called them 'the third Ankara' in a speech he made in 1934 about the implementation of their demolition (Senyapili, 1985, p. 57 cited in Kaynar, 2016: 81).

The decision to invade a vacant lot was often made after it had been surveyed in advance. Then, thousands of people moved onto the lot overnight, divided and named it. Then they began to build dwellings with the assistance of friends and relatives using paperboard, sheets of tin, planks of wood, and other useful makeshift materials. They erected the houses in a matter of hours. By morning, previously empty land appeared dotted with one room shacks. Later, if successfully defended against the police, the shacks may gradually have been expanded to become permanent houses by replacing the original construction materials with brick and cement (Karpat, 1976 cited in Tas and Lightfood, 2005, p. 7). If, after many years, the owner of a shack received the legal title to the land, they often built a better house with a small garden and a variety of flowers, offering an appearance that is quite different than the slums in western cities (Tas and Lightfood, 2005, p. 7).

In the post-WWII period, the mass introduction of machinery in agricultural sector due to the Marshall Aid[4] from the US 'pushed off' the extra labour force, and as a consequence 1950-60 was the decade when migration to urban areas reached a peak (Şenyapılı, 2004, p. 3). An estimated three million people migrated to cities from rural areas in this period (İçduygu and Ünalan, 1998). The rural migrants, who were mostly young men, first built shanties in and around the city at geographically undesirable sites, preferably close to their jobs available to them.

The presence of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods on urban space was tolerated as the duty-based citizenship agenda was becoming more flexible under the

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4 The Marshall Plan was targeted to prevent the south-eastern Balkan countries such as Turkey and Greece from joining the communist bloc through a strategy of development. It was welcome by the Turkish authorities because with the limited sources taken over from the Ottoman Empire, the new Republic could not provide the support necessary to initiate changes in the cultivation and ownership patterns to rural areas.

populist urban policies of the right-wing Democratic Party. The rural migrants preferred pre-election times for constructing their *gecekondu* houses. The Democratic Party officials did not want to be embroiled in the controversy of confronting migrants, who would constitute an important source of votes as well as cheap and unorganised labour force during the import-substituting industrialisation period in the post-war era. de Albuquerque (2010, para. 23 cited in Davy and Pellissery, 2013, p. 76) argues that people in slums know that they cannot assert their rights, since they live in an 'illegal settlement', and that this makes them reliant on the charity of the local authorities to tolerate their continued presence. In this regard, improvements to infrastructure in informal settlements frequently coincide with pre-election periods. Similarly, the occupation of vacant land and construction of *gecekondu* house in the cities in Turkey usually took place before the election times. As a result, the population living in the *gecekondu* houses — working in marginal jobs as porter, cleaner, shoe black and peddler in Ankara — was estimated to be close to 60,000 in 1948 (Senyapili, 1985, pp. 81-83 cited in Kaynar, 2016, p. 83).

The volume of rural migrants was so high and continuous that the native urbanites had to integrate with the newcomers, rather than the reverse. *Gecekondu* areas transferred 'their rural ambiance to the cities by building structures resembling their previous dwellings in the villages' (Özüekren, 1997, p. 34 cited in Erisen, 2003, p. 87). On the other hand, the urbanised face of Ankara also transformed significantly during the 1950s. Akcura (1971) explains the shift of the city core from the old centre Ulus to the New Town:

> In 1952, Kızılay, the central hub of New Town, was formally accepted as the Central Business District. Landowners were permitted to build apartment blocks along the boulevard, with shopping arcades on the ground and basement floors. Consistent with the conventional 'international' image of the CBD, the first sky-scraper of Turkey was also built in Kızılay. Bank branches, upper-class hotels and restaurants, advertising, real estate, foreign and domestic travel agencies and insurance offices were opened. On the upper floors of apartment buildings, luxury services such as fashion houses, photographers, and hairdressers replaced residences (Akçura, 1971, p. 123 cited in Batuman, 2013).

The outcome was the consolidation of class-based segregation in Ankara from the 1950s onwards: The upper- and middle-income groups lived in the centrally built-up residential districts of multi-storey apartment buildings with better and legal infrastructure facilities, whereas the rural-based working

classes mostly lived in the single-storey *gecekondu* houses on the peripheries with inadequate infrastructure facilities and on the land they did not legally possess. In 1950, the population living in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods was about 100,000 whereas the number of the higher income groups living in the multi-storey apartment houses[5] in the New Town was 45,395 (Yavuz, 1952, pp. 72-73 cited in Kaynar, 2016, p. 84).

Thus, in the 1950s the inadequate housing supply for the low-income citizens as well as the ambiguity of the citizenship status of the rural migrants due to the informality of their work and housing still persisted. To win their votes in election times, the state tried to outline its relationship with these rural migrant citizens through tolerance of informality and maintenance of rural culture in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, the state tolerance of informality and maintenance of rural culture implicitly led the *gecekondu* dwellers to continue forming informal ways of social solidarity based on ethnic or religious identities, kinship and fellow citizenship while blocking their membership to modern citizenship (Dönmez, 2011, p. 7).

On the other hand, simultaneity of tolerance of membership to local, identity-based communities and promotion of formal, constitutional citizenship revealed the modernisation process in Turkey to be contradictory rather than linear. The contradictions between the promotion of formal membership to the nation-state and the localness of actually existing forms of membership persisted. Despite being formal members of the nation-state, the *gecekondu* communities were mobilised on the basis of locality or identity and maintained a strong sense of belonging to the village and to their ethnic and religious identity.

I argue that by tolerating the maintenance of these informal and local networks instead of providing welfare services the potential of mobilisation of reflections and deliberations of the *gecekondu* settlers regarding the resolution of their access to the right to housing and infrastructure was mainstreamed. Within the same context, Karpat (1975) argues that the provision of informal housing and employment opportunities generated attribution of a positive meaning to clientelist relations and perception of the state by *gecekondu*

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5 During the second period, the traditional fabric, which consisted of one-to-three-storey houses, was replaced by multi-storey apartment buildings that were owned jointly. Apartment living, praised as a prestigious type of accommodation, was preferred by prosperous dwellers and aspired by the lower-income groups (Erisen, 2003, p. 101).

dwellers as a 'father', who will protect them (pp. 93-94 cited in Muhurdaroglu, 2005, p. 70).

Within this context, although these communities struggled on a daily basis for the right to reside with dignity and security in the absence of welfare services, the gap between the fact that they are formal members of the state and that their right to dwelling was denied was not challenged. The state officials implicitly encouraged the rural migrants to resolve their housing problem in their own ways disregarding the societal disturbance led by the illegal presence of *gecekondu* settlers in the cities. Within this context, knowing that they *owed* their 'illegal' presence in the city to the state's tolerance, the *gecekondu* dwellers responded to their acceptance in the labour market, to services received and to achievement of legality in space over time, by political support of the authorities. This, in turn, further mainstreamed their potential to 'disturb the established practices and configurations of citizenship', which James Holston (1998) called insurgent citizenship, up until 1970s during which the *gecekondu* settlements became a strategic centre for leftist political activism.

The contradiction between formal and substantive citizenship consolidated after the commencement of multi-party regime in 1946. The slow transition to a multi-party regime from the 1930s onwards provoked insecurity about the presence of oppositional political thought within the context of the enduring suspicion towards citizen participation. As a solution, the emphasis on citizenship was replaced with that on the nation state. Üstel (2014, p. 247) explores the 1948 *Primary School Syllabus*, which was used until 1968, arguing that this school program defined the nation, not the citizen, as the holder of the rights, and this prevented the individual from emerging as the main actor of democracy.

However, this did not prevent citizens from engaging in politics. Polarisation between the opposition Republican People's Party and the Democratic Party increased political censorship. The intensification of economic problems in the late 1950s led to mass demonstrations, which turned into violent confrontations between the government, the army and the public. In May 1960, the bureaucrats and army leaders, representing the industrial capitalists and secular, Republican values, who felt threatened by the petty bourgeoisie

gaining power due to Democratic Party's economic policies, conducted a military coup.

The subsequent 1961 Constitution prepared by the junta differed from its predecessor 1924 Constitution in the sense of granting extensive rights to civil society, and made possible political association around ideologies (Erman, 2001, pp. 985-986). It attempted to bring the citizen back into the state citizenship agenda. 'Each person who is tied to the Turkish state with the bond of citizenship' was defined as citizen and the references to language, ethnicity, and religion — which were suppressed by the Republican promotion of the citizenry as a homogenous mass — were omitted. The *1968 Primary School Syllabus,* within this framework, reflected an attempt to develop a rights-based understanding of citizenship with its universal dimensions (Üstel, 2014, p. 254). The *1969 Secondary School Syllabus* also promoted political awareness of national and universal problems, and thus, turned towards creating 'enlightened citizens' (p. 262), with the capability to live and work together, respect the concept of rights, and at the same time apprehend their duties as citizen, and comply with the laws (p. 263). Özyürek (2002, p. 20) argues that the coup also ensured the already existing idea that only the state was responsible for bringing progress and modernisation to the country. This implicitly reproduced the long-lasting suspicion towards the political participation of citizens.

In the mid-1960s onwards, the spontaneous processes of housing production that is the construction of apartments by small contractors and informal *gecekondu*s, were regulated by the state (Tekeli, 1993, pp. 6-7 cited in Batuman, 2013, p. 586). The 1965 Flat Ownership Act enabled multiple households to own apartment flats in a multi-storey building. This law enabled the urban middle classes to become home owners in the inner city areas where the land prices were very high. The following year, the *Gecekondu* Law (Law No. 775) was enacted with the purpose of spatially organising the *gecekondu* houses in contrast to the vote-seeking approach of the preceding governments.

The solution it brought was threefold: to improve those *gecekondu* settlements which were considered to be in relatively good condition (that is to bring infrastructure and services to these settlements), to demolish those which were not, and to prevent further *gecekondu* formation. Displaced residents

were to be relocated in social housing, which was to be constructed through expropriation of public land by the municipalities. However, in practice, demolition and prevention of further construction was limited. While the number of *gecekondu* houses in Ankara was estimated at 70,000 in 1960, the number reached 240,000 in 1980, and the *gecekondu* population rose from 250,000 to 5,750,000 between 1955 and 1980. These numbers corresponded respectively to 4.7 % and 26.1 % of the urban population nationally (Batuman, 2013, p. 586).

Senyapili (2004) explains the legal recognition of the presence of *gecekondu* with the transformation to import substituting industrialisation model with a planned economy and an internal market protected by the government in the 1960s. She argues that this brought a new economic function to the *gecekondu* population as consumers in the domestic market at a moment when the national private sector (producing especially white goods) needed consumers in order to survive. The *gecekondu* population now obtained permanency both in economic and physical urban spaces (p. 7). What is more, by bargaining with local authorities for infrastructure and services and contributing with their collective labour, *gecekondu* residents were able to obtain roads, electricity and running water in their homes, albeit at a much lower quality than in the formal apartment buildings in the city (Erman, 2012, p. 296). As a result, many better-off *gecekondu* settlements turned into established low-density residential neighbourhoods while new g*ecekondu* houses were constructed with expectations of amnesty laws in the future.

On the other hand, g*ecekondu* people and neighbourhoods were culturally stigmatised by the urban elites living in the higher-rise, formal apartment buildings. The presence of the rural masses in the cities was initially tolerated with the expectation that they would become modernised and urbanised over time as they became accustomed to city culture. With the impact of the dominance of the modernist ideal of a single and linear progress, the *gecekondu* people were looked down upon as the 'rural/uncivilised other' and portrayed as 'ignorant, culturally backward, and lacking manners' by the urban elites throughout the 1950s (Erman, 2001, p. 991). Analysing the changing representations of the *gecekondu* people in mainstream newspapers and academic works, Erman (2001) argues that:

> In their imagination, the peasants were not only ruralising the city and undermining the urban and modern way of life, but, by means of the *gecekondu*s mushrooming on the city's outskirts, they were also disturbing the dream of planned cities as beacons of modernity (p. 299).

As they were violating private property rights — defined as a cornerstone of Western democracies — they were seen as enemies of law and order (Erman, 2012, p. 299).

In the 1960s and 1970s, the negative reaction and arrogance of the urban elites to the *gecekondu* phenomenon persisted although in some cases softened under the influence of Marxism as well as within the context of the promotion of 'enlightened' citizens. Throughout these two decades, the society became more inclined to participate in the political decision-making processes in Turkey due to the comparatively liberating characteristic of the 1961 Constitution. As a result, the rural migrants started to be seen as humble people from Anatolia exploited by the system that is the 'disadvantaged other' (Erman, 2001, p. 987) which acknowledged the underlying socio-economic processes behind the rural-to-urban migration rather than the migrants themselves.

In the 1970s, however, *gecekondu* houses grew in number and changed character. The existing *gecekondu* settlements turned into established low-density residential neighbourhoods with municipal services and the number of *gecekondu* settlements continued to increase due to the ineffectiveness of rehabilitation attempts. People started to construct additional floors to their *gecekondu*s, and as it started to be sold and bought in the housing market, *gecekondu* houses started to be a source of rent. The public land stock had already shrunk since the 1950s, and it became impossible for newcomer migrants to invade public land and build their own *gecekondu*. Therefore, some of them became tenants of the existing *gecekondu* owners, who had constructed second/third *gecekondu* in order to get rental income. The tolerance of the political authorities towards this subletting further encouraged the commercialisation of *gecekondu* housing. On the other hand, the legal status of the *gecekondu* house remained ambiguous, which continued to make the *gecekondu* people vulnerable to government action (Erman, 2001, p. 986).

In contrast to commercialisation, the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods also became part of the political polarisation in the country in the 1970s. They became the 'rescued regions' of radical leftist activists, who were organised mainly among the workers in the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods and students in the universities (Erman, 2001, p. 986) using their strong social networks in labour unions. Due to the loose control of public land by the state at the time, socialist groups became important actors in appropriation of the land, planning process, construction and distribution of the *gecekondu*s, as well as prevention of development of private property culture (Şen, 2013, pp. 5-6).

These activists also constituted a counter-force against land brokers and speculators, with whom they clashed, took the land by force and distributed it to the rural migrants. The speculators were informal yet organised interest groups in the *gecekondu* market who enclosed peripheral land and parcelled it into plots to sell even placing ads in newspapers to reach prospective *gecekondu* owners (Payne, 1982 cited in Erman, 2001). Şen (2013, p. 6) argues that the *gecekondu* houses were the only economic gain these groups could attain in the absence of social housing. The activists resided in those same neighbourhoods protecting them against the police (demolition) as well as fighting against right-wing extremists in street battles.

Within the same context, following the 1973 local elections, 5 mayors of big cities including Istanbul and Ankara, who were members of the mainstream Republican People's Party, initiated 'municipal socialism'. Vedat Dalokay, the Ankara mayor, started to discuss the *gecekondu* phenomenon with references to class problems at the time, challenging the long-standing exclusion of class-based political struggle, which had been considered harmful to national integrity. A leftist municipal program was developed, which advocated working class participation in decision-making processes and introduced measures reducing the cost of reproduction of urban labour power (Batuman, 2013, p. 584). Principles of productive, autonomous and active municipality were adopted. As part of this, the municipalities initiated the establishment of housing cooperatives among labour unions and professional associations, and expropriated urban lands to transfer to the cooperatives for the construction of houses (Karasu, 2009, p. 251).

This alarmed the central state and at the same times as leftist agendas developed in particular places, the allegiant citizenship agenda regained prominence at national level. The military intervention in 1971 tried to suppress the accelerating political activism and widening legitimacy of constitutional citizenship through abolishing labour unions, imprisoning intellectuals such as writers and journalists as well as radical activists from revolutionary organisations.

In line with this, the 1973 Law on National Education reversed the preceding goal of the state to train enlightened, politically conscious, and active citizens, and re-emphasised the national unity vis-à-vis emphases on universal humanitarian values and the ideal of solidarity (Ustel, 2014, pp. 264-265). The consolidation of the polarisation of the society between radical right- and left-wing activism, weak coalition governments and political instability in addition to the economic deterioration following the oil crises came to an end with a military coup in 1980. The 1982 Constitution was prepared and put into practice by the junta. The Junta then dissolved in 1983.

During this period, Üstel (2014) argues that 'state-of-emergency patriotism' (p. 308) was introduced against the radical alien ideologies like socialism. The 1982 Constitution restricted the rights of individual-citizens and put more emphasis on the duties toward the state. The books of Information on Citizenship in post-1985 involve increased emphases on national unity, defined with respect to common language, religion (Sunni Islam) and ethnic identity (Turkish), and lesser emphasis on constitutional citizenship. With this, individuals and groups from multiple identities and class backgrounds were subjected to the homogenous community' and expected to conform to the state authority rather than becoming subjects (p. 293). The earlier emphases on multi-party system as a necessity of democracy were withdrawn as representations of alternative political thoughts became associated with the idea of internal and external threats to state security (pp. 298-299).

It was within the context of the martial law in the 1980s, which secured a social and political atmosphere free from opposition, a neoliberal economic programme was introduced and it was sustained by the succeeding civil authorities. A consumerist, individualistic culture was being promoted by the printed and visual media as a virtue, while the demands for political activism

were strictly controlled by suppressing particularly leftist activists through imprisonment, torture, and exile (Gürbilek, 2011, p. 13). According to the report of Human Rights Association in Turkey, 650,000 people were taken under custody and tortured for as long as 90-day periods; 171 people were documented to have died because of torture; 49 people were executed; police opened a file on 1,683,000 people for being communist, Alevi, Kurdish, religionist or follower of sharia; 98,404 people were judged because of 'being a member of political organisations', and 14,000 people were deprived of citizenship. 39 tons of newspapers were destroyed, 300 journalists were attacked; and 3,854 teachers, 120 academicians and 47 court judges were dismissed (HRA 12 September Criminal Complaint, pp. 1-2).

In the absence of social and political opposition, development programs targeting infrastructure of telecommunications, motorway and airports in order to attract foreign capital into the domestic market and by this way be attached to the global economy were initiated. Importantly, then, neoliberalism from the outset emerged in the context of authoritarian rule – which as we shall see marks a significant difference from the emergence of, for example, Reaganite or Thatcherite forms of neoliberal reform in the same period in the US and Europe.

The attempts to develop a fully liberal market economy shook society deeply, increasing migration to large cities, unemployment rates and hence social discontent. While 54.7% of Ankara's population still lived in *gecekondu* settlements in 1985 (Uzun, 2005, p. 186), industry gradually left the urban core throughout the 1980s and large-scale factories around the *gecekondu* districts moved to peripheral areas (Keyder and Öncü, 1993; Erkip, 2000; Keyder, 2005 cited in Batuman, 2013, p. 582), and employment opportunities of the previous period decreased. Increasing layoffs in the private sector and the shrinking of the public sector led to high unemployment rates and acute poverty among the low-income population (Erman, 2001, p. 987).

In the 1980s, the local governments and the modes of the production of urban space were also reorganised, which led to what Batuman calls the 'neoliberalisation of the urban realm' (2013, p. 584). With the 1984 Metropolitan Act, a two-tier metropolitan system was developed by formation of the Greater City Municipality and district municipalities (Dündar, 1997;

Leitmann and Baharoglu, 1999 cited in Türker-Devecigil, 2005, p. 214). Greater Municipalities were granted extended revenues as well as planning powers within metropolitan areas that included a number of district municipalities.

Contrary to the legacy of 'productive municipality' of the social democrat experiments of the 1970s, the municipalities now emphasised 'distribution' of municipal services to the 'consumers' who would have to pay for that service rather than 'citizens' who demand municipal services (Karasu, 2009, p. 253). Accordingly, municipal services such as garbage removal, street cleaning, maintenance of parks and public spaces, and so on were privatised; municipal funds were allocated to private investors via outsourcing while unprecedented amounts of loans from national and foreign institutions were used (Dogan, 2008, pp. 72–73 cited in Batuman, 2013, p. 584).

Gecekondu neighbourhoods became one of the focal points in terms of neoliberalisation of the urban regime. The right-wing Motherland Party government enacted a series of amnesty laws between the years 1983 and 1987, which allowed the construction of apartment buildings of up to four-storeys on *gecekondu* land. The *gecekondu* dwellers were made rights-holders of the area that would be redeveloped by improvement plans (Türker-Devecigil, 2005, p. 215). This legalised the commercialisation of *gecekondu* house as the *gecekondu* residents in advantageous locations that were profitable for the developers, had an opportunity to make economic gains. Erman (2001) interprets the promotion of making of easy money out of *gecekondu* houses as the government bribing the most suffering people to keep them from political activism against the state — by giving them the hope of becoming rich (pp. 986-987). The goal was to diminish the potential of radical activism due to increasing impoverishment by making the *gecekondu* people part of the rent-sharing process and cultivating the habit of treating their homes as investments.

Reduced mobility in the labour market, increase in family incomes through more family members entering the labour market and through benefits acquired by the family during the time spent in the city coupled with the rent-acquisition opportunity provided with amnesty laws (Senyapili, 2004, p. 11). As a result, in 1984 around 1.5 - 2 million people applied to benefit from the amnesty laws. Once owner-occupied and/or owner-built *gecekondu* houses

were transformed into 4/5-storey apartment buildings in which the owner of the *gecekondu* land owned several apartment flats. This led to the rapid erosion of the notion of 'innocent *gecekondu* people' within the context of the 'state-of-emergency-patriotism'. The popular image shifted to the 'undeserving rich other' (Erman, 2012, p. 300), which refers to the 'illegal' wealth obtained when the illegal *gecekondu*s were transformed into multi-layered apartment buildings.

Only the *gecekondu* houses that had location advantages and were attractive to private developers were transformed into apartment buildings yet people continued to construct new *gecekondu* houses with an expectation of upcoming amnesty laws (Köktürk, 2003 in Uzun, Cete and Palancioglu, 2010, pp. 205-206). Thus, individual expectation of rental gains impeded the formation of collective rights-based claims for both affordable housing and wider public infrastructure and services. The potential of developing class-consciousness, social solidarity and/or organising collective claims to equal citizenship was thus fatally undermined.

While some *gecekondu* dwellers became better-off, a new factor was added to the impoverishment conditions of the newcomer migrants in the mid-1980s onwards when the Kurdish[6] population in the south eastern region was forced to leave their villages and migrate due to rising terrorism within the context of the civil war between the army and the Kurdish guerrilla forces, which fought for independence. Some of these migrant groups, who now had no support from the rural area and who have had no chance for making material and psychological preparations prior to migration, settled in abandoned buildings in or around commercial centres, creating transition areas in desolate condition, or entered peripheral, untransformed *gecekondu* housing areas, mostly as tenants (Şenyapılı, 2004, pp. 11-12).

In addition, the rise of Islamism as a political force in Turkey from the 1990s onwards further stigmatised the Alevi[7] migrants living in the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. This rise was not only tolerated by the state as an antidote to inheritance of the leftist activism but also supported by the state's increasing emphasis on its Turkish–Sunni character. Batuman (2013) argues that the

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6 Kurdish people are the biggest ethnic minority group in Turkey.
7 Alevi people are the main minority group in Islam in Turkey.

development of political Islam had important consequences in terms of the welfare system in Turkey saying that:

> In the early 1990s, the neoliberal restructuring characterised by privatisations, the precarisation of labour, as well as the chronically high level of inflation all resulted in increasing impoverishment, especially in the big cities. While mainstream political parties remained impervious to urban poverty, the Islamist cadres actively worked within the squatter areas and established a network of aid and solidarity in the early 1990s (Tugal, 2006; White, 2003). While this strategy allowed them to gain control of local administrations in the major cities, they utilised this power to further improve their aid network as an original ''welfare system'' in the second phase (1994–2002). Municipalities under the Welfare Party began to systematically distribute coal, food, bread and clothing to low-income households during the 1990s. Especially in the early years, the economy created by these aids was disorganised and shady. The control of aid distribution was handled together with Islamist associations and through the municipalities' charity funds, which blurred the flow of municipal funds and obscured their monitoring (Batuman, 2013, p. 585).

The social aids were meaningful within the context of the progress of neoliberal urbanisation, as throughout the 1990s industrial production was transferred to the new industrial zones on the periphery.[8] Simultaneously, a process of 'suburban sprawl along the Western axis' (Batuman, 2013, p. 582) was taking place. According to the plan proposed in 1965 by the Ankara Master Plan Bureau, the city started to develop to the west, which was the only direction where the city fringe was not surrounded with *gecekondu* areas (Batuman, 2013, p. 581) (See figure 7). Based on the Bureau's proposal, the authorities initiated the suburban sprawl along the Western axis and the moving of industry out of the city centre during the 1970s. Low-income housing was targeted to be built through public investments in the northwest, while private sector middle-class housing projects were encouraged in the southwest throughout the 1980s (Batuman, 2013, p. 582).

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8 While 86 % of industrial businesses were within a 10 km. radius in 1988, by 2007 only 17 % were within the 6 km. radius in Ankara. Between 1988 and 2007, 58 % of the industrial workforce moved out of the centre to peripheral residential areas (Bostan, Erdoganaras and Tamer, 2010, pp. 88–89 cited in Batuman, 2013, p. 582).

Figure 7: The expansion of Ankara and the growth of *gecekondu* areas. The red boundaries show the limits of the Jansen plan, which was approved in 1932. The dark areas display the *gecekondu* areas in 1965 and the light shaded ones show their extent in 1990 (Source: Batuman, 2013: 582).

From the 1980s onwards, the middle and high-income groups, who were now in the process of integrating into the global economy, left the core and started to move to the gated residential places in the suburbs that were promoted as the 'ideal home' now (Erman, 2001). The tendency of spatial segregation also resulted from the fact that the rural migrants were able to make themselves visible in cultural production (*arabesk* music[9]) and became better-off as a result of amnesty laws, which made them right holder on urban land. The *gecekondu* residents, who had experienced rapid upward mobility, came to be seen by the urban elites as a 'cultural problem', polluting the city with their 'tasteless over-consumption' (Oncu, 1999 cited in Erman, 2012, p. 300).

These reveal that while the material boundaries between the places resided by more affluent groups and the squatter communities were changing, the former actively invested in cultural binaries between modern/'varosh' which, in turn, became 'instruments of domination' (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 79) that 'legitimised' their 'propriety' to live in the city and the 'impropriety' of the *gecekondu* settlers who lacked urban values. Moreover, the increasing emphasis on

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9 *Arabesk* is the name of the specific music type born out of *gecekondu* settlements that expressed the pain of disappointment and pessimism in view of harsh and cruel aspects of urban life (Senyapili, 2004, p. 10).

deservingness through fulfilling citizen duties set the ground for more exclusionary images that would follow.

From the mid-1990s onwards, the *gecekondu* people started to be represented as 'varosh' (the dangerous other) in the mainstream newspapers. Following the 1 May (May Day) demonstrations in 1996, the term 'varosh' was first used in the mainstream newspapers and TV news. In the demonstrations, two young adults were killed even before the march started, and radical leftist groups engaged in vandalism, destroying buildings and cars. The mainstream newspapers focused not on the bloody violence or very high level of participation to the demonstrations but on two 'varosh' girls who were inappropriately plucking 'municipal' flowers in the square – revealing their incivility, as well as on the protestors' attacks on ATMs. The following day, one of the headlines in a mainstream newspaper was 'Varoshes came down to the city'.

The term 'varosh' is Hungarian in origin and denotes the neighbourhoods outside the city walls (Erman, 2001, p. 996). It represented the low-income people living in the outskirts of the cities as unruly masses threatening the city with their radically different political views, conflicting social values and 'inferior' culture (or 'lack of culture') and confronting it with vandalism and violence. Unlike its predecessor, the *gecekondu* people, 'varosh' implies an inability to modernise or indeed urbanise (Akçay, 2005 cited in Yonucu, 2008, p. 57). A particular culture productive of 'degeneracy' and 'criminality' became associated with the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods (Yonucu and Gonen, 2011, p. 87).

In line with such criminalisation the state citizenship agenda also gained a stronger emphasis on internal threats referring particularly to leftist activism. In the late 1990s, Turkey was pulled in two contradictory directions by the attempts to develop human rights education due to the criteria of EU membership on the one hand and the embedded state-centrism, which viewed the former with scepticism, on the other. The emphasis on state security and national unity consolidated what Üstel (2014) calls 'national security patriotism' (p. 309). In the 1990s, *Education on National Security* chapter was added to outline of the *Information on Citizenship and Human Rights* course at secondary schools. There, the state authorities introduced a de-politicised

conceptualisation of the problem of protection of human rights emphasising the malpractice and intolerance of the individuals holding a public office like policemen rather than the state's responsibility to protect the rights of minority groups, and promote equality (pp. 310-314).

The state also denied its responsibility in terms of provision of the housing right and maintained the social-aid based 'municipal welfare system' in the 1990s (Batuman, 2013, p. 585). This consolidated the contract between the state authorities and the *gecekondu* people based on the latter's political support in return for the former's tolerance, and further marginalised the rights-based claims. On the other hand, middle- and high-income groups also released themselves from any responsibility for the deteriorating situation of the *gecekondu* population as 'varosh' legitimised and supported politically the objective of *gecekondu* demolition (Etöz, 1999 cited in Erman, 2001, p. 997).

These symbolic struggles, thus, prepared the ground for the country-wide neoliberal urban transformation campaign based on *zero gecekondu* policy (Erman, 2012). From 2004 onwards, it has been implemented without much effective resistance — except for those led by the groups directly targeted. One of the most effective resistance movements was mobilised in Dikmen Valley, which will be analysed in the next part.

4.3. The Story of Dikmen Valley (1960s-2000s)

Figure 8: The location of Dikmen District in Ankara (Source: Turker-Devecigil, 2006, p. 169).

This study focuses on the gentrification project in Dikmen Valley area. The Dikmen district is one of the oldest rural migrant settlements in Ankara (See Figure 8). Dikmen Valley is located between two densely populated housing quarters, Cankaya and Dikmen, which are in Ankara's southern urban development zones. Cankaya has been the most prestigious district of Ankara (See Figure 9), with the foreign embassies, universities, cultural centres and shopping malls, and an upper middle- and upper-income urban population and the Presidential House[10], the residence and office of the Prime Minister, the Supreme Court. The National Assembly Palace is also situated at 800 m distance from the *gecekondu* houses. The area stretches south along bottom of the valley for approximately 6 km and has a width of 300 m. It starts almost from the city centre, Kızılay, and reaches the forested areas in the south (See Figure 10).

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10 It has not been occupied by the President since the construction of the new White Palace for R. T. Erdogan in 2014. Yet, Cankaya as a whole is the oldest among the recently emerging prestigious districts of Ankara.

Figure 9: The Cankaya District.

Figure 10: The location of Dikmen Valley within Cankaya District.

The valley has been designated as a natural conservation area in all urban development plans because it is one of the most important air circulation corridors and the water basins of Ankara. The *gecekondu* development process in the valley started after the 1960s with the rural to urban migration. The migrants came from smaller towns close to Ankara such as Tokat, Yozgat, Corum, and Sivas. Once the first comer migrants settled in they brought their families and sometimes relatives and neighbours. By the 1980s, the number of *gecekondu* houses had risen to about 4,000 in the project area (Gunay, 1994 cited in Uzun, 2005, p. 187) (See Figure 11). Before the gentrification process, approximately 10,000 people lived in 2,000 *gecekondu* dwellings (Egercioglu and Özdemir, 2006, p. 8).

Figure 11: The one-storey *gecekondu* houses surrounded by higher-rise traditional apartment buildings in both sides of the Dikmen Valley before the implementation of the first phase of the project (Source: Turker-Devecigil, 2006).

The process of transformation of the *gecekondu* houses in Dikmen Valley started in the early 1980s. Most of the *gecekondu* owners in Turkey had been given temporary title-deeds, and then provided with right-holder status by the Redevelopment Law, which was enacted in 1984. Because of the central location of Dikmen Valley in Ankara, land speculation was also leading to opportunities for higher rent. Thus, some of the *gecekondu* owners sold their *gecekondu* houses and lands to developers, and were given flats from the newly built four/five-storey apartments in exchange.

The increase in the rent gap alarmed also the municipality and in 1984, the Greater Municipality of Ankara introduced the Dikmen Valley Green Area Project. The project aimed to relocate the *gecekondu* owners to another part of the city and transform the valley into an urban park to preserve it as a green

area. The expropriation decision was taken but it could not be implemented because of high expropriation costs and oppositions of the *gecekondu* inhabitants, who individually took the project to court (Turker-Devecigil, 2006, p. 169).

In 1986, Cankaya District Municipality together with the greater municipality revised the project, and the new version known as the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project was approved in 1989 (Ciftci and Karakayaci, 2002 cited in Uzun, 2003, pp. 187-188). It was one of the largest-scale *gecekondu* transformation projects in Turkey, designed to be implemented in five phases (See figure 12).

Figure 12: The implementation phases of Dikmen Valley Project (Source: Turker-Devecigil, 2005).

In contrast to the decentralisation attempts in advanced capitalist countries, in Turkey public actors at local and national level started to become actively involved in the neoliberal urbanisation processes from the late 1980s onwards to control redistribution of the urban rents created. Thus, local governments maintained their role as 'administrative tools to execute the duties of the central government' (Heper, 1988 cited in Göymen, 2007, p. 246). So, one of their primary roles within the context of the changing urban governance in the 1980s onwards was to control the redistribution of rental gains.

Nevertheless, the profit-seeking motives of the local state were not manifest, initially. A major objective of the project was to transform the valley into a recreation area serving the whole city while helping preserve the nature it enclosed as well as to create a commercial, cultural, and social urban node that would integrate with and serve the whole city. The project also addressed the housing problem of the *gecekondu* dwellers in the area with a relocation model based on self-financing and participation (Uzun, 2005, p. 188).

Along with the apartment buildings constructed for the *gecekondu* residents, luxury housing for high-income groups and cultural and commercial facilities were also constructed in the area, to provide the necessary financial resources for the project (see figure 13). A significant proportion of the total project cost was financed by the marketing of the apartments located in luxurious residential towers in the project area (Turker-Devecigil, 2005, p. 218).

Figure 13: The apartment houses constructed for the former *gecekondu* dwellers (above) and higher income groups (below) in the first phase of Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Project. (Source: Uzun, 2003).

As the project started, the representatives of the project management company (Metropol Imar) and the municipality organised face-to-face meetings with the right-holder *gecekondu* dwellers in order to 'inform' them about the project. They tried to reach a consensus about their rights and expropriation costs.

Apart from representatives from the local state and ministries, academics, members of chambers, and housing cooperatives, in which *gecekondu* dwellers were represented, were present in the meetings. The target of the greater municipality, which was the main decision-maker, was to *convince* the *gecekondu* dwellers to support the project as their opposition had stopped the implementation of the earlier version of the project.

Turker-Devecigil (2006) explores the Dikmen Valley Project focusing on the participation mechanism it engaged. She writes that:

> As stated by the project designers, the media for communication and participation was provided, but the participants were not interested in project details since they were concerned with increasing their economic gains. The negotiations took place around who would get what, revolving around the floor space of the flat, the number of rooms. As stated by the participants, they were always informed about the project, but they did not take part in decision-making. According to their perception, their demands were not taken into account. Some of the interviewees stated that they were afraid of voicing their needs (pp. 176-177).

How the participation principle was implemented represents the 'top-down, hierarchical, and expert-driven structure of the urban decision-making process in Turkey in which citizen participation is allowed after the plans are prepared' (Gunay, 1992 cited in Turker-Devecigil, 2006, p. 172). The lack of collective organisation among *gecekondu* dwellers independent of the state-led cooperatives, alongside their hesitance to voice their demands reveals the absence of a sense of citizenship that includes making rights-based claims.

The earlier project aimed to provide integration between the upper-income groups in the west (in Hosdere district) and lower-income groups in the east (Dikmen district), which were physically separated by geography of the Dikmen Valley. A 'Culture Bridge' (see figure 14) was proposed as a structure that would enable cultural and shopping activities, and designed as a public space where people could meet and mingle. This bridge was planned as a two-story bridge, which would connect the sides of the valley for pedestrians; lower floor was planned to have social and commercial facilities such as a cinema, retailers, cafes etc., while the upper floor would be a pedestrian walk that connects two sides of the Valley (Eren, 2016, p . 67). Similarly, 'Culture Park' (See Figure 15), located at the valley bottom, was composed of open

green areas integrated with some social, cultural, recreational and sports facilities (Türker-Devecigil, 2005, p. 219).

Figure 14: The Culture Bridge and the twin towers (Source: Malusardi and Occhipinti, 2003).

Figure 15: A photo of the Dikmen Valley in 2003: the culture park surrounded by the social apartment blocks constructed for the former *gecekondu* owners and higher rise blocks for higher-income groups (Source: Turker-Devecigil, 2006).

However, in 1994, the social democrat mayor Murat Karayalcin was replaced by the right-wing Islamist Melih Gokcek in the local elections. The initial goal of integrating the *gecekondu* people into the urban community transformed following the elections. Instead of a 'Culture Bridge', a new bridge between the different blocks of the Park Valley Gated Houses was constructed (See Figure 16). It connected the affluent residents living in the prestigious Park Valley Terrace Houses to the rest of the valley. Far from connecting people from

different socio-economic groups, this new bridge highlighted the privilege of the affluent groups in the prestigious houses.

The second phase was approved in 1992 and completed in 2003 and the model for the transformation of *gecekondu* houses to modern apartments in that phase was the same. However, the project had lost its economic feasibility during the implementation of the first phase because the *gecekondu* settlers individually took the municipality to the court, and as they won the case, the expropriation values were increased. In order to increase the revenues of the project, land earmarked for municipal services such as parks was re-designated as residential land and construction density increased. As a result, while the total population in the project area was 9,809 in 1996, it increased by 183.5% after the completion of the project's first and second implementation zones (Dundar, 2003 cited in Kahraman, 2008, p. 115).

Figure 16: The Bridge connecting the Park Valley Terrace Houses (on the right) and Park Valley Apartments (higher blocks on the left behind the leafage). (Photo: Author, 18.06.2014).

As a result of construction of more luxurious residential buildings, real estate values in the area increased considerably. This led to the displacement of the *gecekondu* dwellers. In 2002, the title holder *gecekondu* dwellers constituted only 38% of the apartment residents in the DVP area as most of them sold or rented their house, and moved to other neighbourhoods where land prices were lower and low-income groups lived (Turker-Devecigil, 2003 cited in Uzun, 2005, pp. 189-190).

At the same time as the phases in the northern part of the project area were redeveloped, construction of *gecekondu* houses continued in the southern parts of the valley. The total numbers of *gecekondu* houses in the fourth and fifth phases increased from 515 in 1993 to 1,119 in 2001 (Muhurdaroglu, 2005, p. 109). The redevelopment project in fourth and fifth phases of Dikmen Valley was announced unilaterally in 2006 by the greater municipality. The *gecekondu* dwellers holding title deeds were offered to be relocated in the valley whereas those lacking title deeds were offered to be relocated to Doğukent, which was an empty zone located at 4.5 km away from the valley, and asked to pay 16,000 TL (approximately 7,000 sterling pounds) in advance.

The *gecekondu* dwellers from the latter group were not willing to be resettled away from the valley. On the other hand, the dwellers lacking title deeds were suspicious about political activism against the state within the context of the historical context referred above. Nevertheless, differing from the earlier phases of the project, a leftist organisation, the People's Houses[11] (hereafter PH) was politically active and organised in the adjacent Ilker neighbourhood.[12] A few household came forward and contacted with the PH to be informed about gentrification. Gradually, the *gecekondu* people started to come together to discuss what the project brought for their neighbourhood and what they could do about it. Under the active role of the PH, activist *gecekondu* people also undertook home visits, to explain to people why they should not sign the contracts, and encouraging them to support the resistance so that they could more effectively demand fairer conditions of replacement.

As will be examined in detail in Chapter 7, it was not a smooth process of mobilisation. Local communities within the *gecekondu* neighbourhood were divided according to ethnicity, religion, hometown origins and political views. Nevertheless, the threat posed by state-led gentrification was so severe that the *gecekondu* people — most of whom did not hold legal title deeds — were mobilised on the basis of the right to shelter. This movement has become a leading example of effective mobilisation of legally vulnerable *gecekondu*

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11 It is a radical leftist civil society organisation, whose activism particularly concentrates on struggles for the right to housing, education, and health.
12 It used to be a *gecekondu* area as well, and the *gecekondu* houses were transformed into two- or four-storey apartment buildings with partial first-floor commercial uses by market-led rehabilitation plans prepared by the Cankaya district municipality and implemented by small-scale constructors before the Dikmen Valley Project.

dwellers as they succeeded in altering the terms of their inclusion in the process.

Conclusion

This chapter made a reading of the formation of the spaces of citizenship in Turkey in relation to the changes in the state citizenship agendas. The discussions in this chapter demonstrated that the normative construction of citizenship had been central in terms of refashioning class inequalities throughout the urbanisation process in Turkey. In connecting the political processes and agendas to urbanisation processes in Turkey, this chapter demonstrated that class cannot be analysed as an abstract relationship between capital and labour, in agreement with the cultural analyses of gentrification. Nevertheless, through attending to the symbolic struggles over 'who can properly live in the city' alongside the material processes of appropriation of urban lands, the chapter also revealed that class conflict operates in symbolic — as well as economic – terms and that these are not limited to individualised practices of reconstituting middle class distinction, as they 'legitimised' material inequalities and thus created political effects.

Drawing on secondary sources on the formation of the state citizenship agenda, I explored the dynamic processes through which citizenship was officially configured in Turkey as a status bestowed by the state and how these impacted on the urbanisation processes. I argued that with a duty-based, passive configuration of citizenship and emphasis on preservation of the bestowed citizen rights rather than *nurturing or actually using* them, political participation was rendered unnecessary and the potential to transform the insurgent practices of avoiding the state authority in the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods into collective rights-based claims and struggle has become captivated.

Within this context, the fact that socially and spatially marginalised *gecekondu* communities were given share from the rental gains provided by neoliberal urban redevelopment revealed that political concerns regarding prevention of political activism against the state have been strategically important in terms of shaping the cities in Turkey. This contrasts with the emphasis on the economic and financial motives of profit maximisation in the discussions on neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanisation (as referred in Chapter 2) and

proves the necessity to analyse the politics and political actors involved in the urbanisation processes. The next chapter examines the state-led gentrification process in Turkey in the 2000s onwards from this perspective and attends to complicated ways the *gecekondu* communities are drawn into and excluded from state-led gentrification projects.

Chapter 5: Promoting the State Citizenship Agenda through Space (2004-2015)

> *Haydar (59): If we defend our rights here, struggle for our own lands, and you proclaim us terrorist, then we are terrorists!*
>
> *Ibo (34): As you grow up, you see that the city is expanding, the buildings around are rising, your friends and many others are moving from the neighbourhood to those buildings. So, you think of yourself, 'this place does not belong to me'; 'they are going to take it from me one day'. If it were for me, I would not undertake something like that (the struggle for right to shelter), I would think that 'this land is not mine' and leave.* (My translation[13])

Haydar and Ibo were a father and a son living in the *gecekondu* neighbourhood in Dikmen Valley. Haydar was a retired municipality worker, who had been active in the unionist struggles, and Ibo worked as electrician in a private company with no trade union membership. There was a noticeable difference in the narratives of these two men from succeeding generations in terms of staking a claim on the land. While Haydar, who was one of the leading figures of the right to shelter struggle which was organised against gentrification in Dikmen Valley, is ready to pay the price of claiming his right, his son confessed that he would have rather left the neighbourhood in the beginning. The father was confident when making rights-based claims to the neighbourhood despite criminalisation, whereas the son felt uncomfortable about making claims to where he lived. This discontinuity in the narratives and feeling structures of Haydar and Ibo correspond with the profoundly changing approach of the state towards informal settlements in Turkey from populist tolerance to zero tolerance. This was manifested from 2004 onwards following the introduction of the neoliberal urban transformation campaign across the country, particularly stigmatising and demolishing the *gecekondu* settlements all over Turkey.

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[13] Translations of all the quotations taken from the interviews, political speeches and newspapers news throughout the thesis are done by the author.

Within the context of the authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey, the active involvement of the state in the process of urban redevelopment has led many scholars to focus on the processes of state-led property transfer from the poor to the rich and marginalisation of the *gecekondu* settlers. In this chapter, I analyse the on-going processes of gentrification in Turkey and in Dikmen Valley. Moving from the argument that gentrification involves hidden rewards as well as hidden injuries (Paton, 2014), I focus on the ways the *gecekondu* dwellers are encouraged to participate in and benefit from the process at the same time as they are stigmatised.

I attend to the authoritarian form neoliberalism has taken in Turkey, and reveal the centralised urban redevelopment regime. Under the light of the historical context provided in the former chapter, I analyse the implementation of neoliberal urban policies in relation to the political concerns particularly over the refashioning of the normative definition of 'good' citizens. Drawing on the argument that neoliberalism is contextually embedded (cf. Chapter 2), I will demonstrate that the processes of inclusion differ in Turkey from advanced capitalist countries like the UK, where working class people are encouraged to participate in gentrification through market incentives and without being provided with the material sources to do so. Moving beyond the economic and financial considerations in gentrification research that centred on emphasis on neoliberalism, I will link the promises of inclusion in Turkey to the political considerations. In doing so, I will reveal how gentrification was used as a tool to discipline rights-based claims and struggles while rewarding obedient participation through symbolic inclusion into the 'good citizenry' as well as financial inclusion.

In the first part of this chapter, I analyse public speeches of key public figures and the way gentrification in Turkey was promoted in the printed mainstream media in comparison to the previous urban policies and approaches to the *gecekondu* communities. I demonstrate that the informal settlements are specifically targeted by this process not only in order to include them into the formal urban land stock but also to discipline rights-based claims and struggles through simultaneous promises of inclusion and threats of violence, which is overlooked in the existing studies due to overemphasis on economic profits. In the second part of the chapter, I explore how the simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion took place in Dikmen Valley *gecekondu* neighbourhood

drawing on some visual material in the mainstream newspapers about the gentrification process in the valley, some secondary sources and some interviews with the *gecekondu* settlers living in the valley. I analyse how the local state promoted gentrification project in the valley to the *gecekondu* communities who mobilised their rights-based claims to where they lived. Using printed materials produced by the local state and speeches of local state actors, I demonstrate how territorial stigmatisation and inclusion constitute the opposite sides of the same coin in the promotion of the state citizenship agenda based on benevolence of the state and obedience of the subject-citizens.

5.1. Centralisation of Urban Governance

> ***R. Tayyip Erdogan****: If my house is unauthorised, seventy per cent of the citizens in Istanbul live in unauthorised houses. I am one of them.* (Tezkan, 2011)

A month before the local elections in March 1994, a news item about R. Tayyip Erdogan, who was one of the candidates for the Mayoralty of Istanbul, created a shocking effect. It came out that he had been living in an illegal building. He joined the main news bulletin on a private TV channel together with the other two candidates for the Mayoralty of Istanbul. The anchor person tried to drive him into a corner asking him questions about the latest news. Without hesitation, he accepted the truth of the news. Furthermore, he was talking about being among the majority living in illegal houses as if he was proud of it. This is interpreted by many as one of the reasons Erdogan garnered such popular support. Thus, the fact that Erdogan was elected in the local elections in 1994 as the Mayor of Istanbul came as no surprise.

12 years later, this time as the Prime Minister of Turkey, he made a speech in the First Housing Congress organised by the Mass Housing Administration, where he said:

> Before, it was being said "how is it possible to demolish these (houses), to remove these all?" Now, they have all been demolished! Thus, if you are determined, if you insist and believe, then you will demolish… It was our greatest dream to *annihilate the gecekondu order*, which has *surrounded our cities like* a *tumour*. Now we are accomplishing it, and we have to accomplish it country-wide. (Övür, 2008) (Emphasis added).

The fact that the *gecekondu* people were illegal occupiers of public land had been 'the elephant in the room' in Turkish politics until the 2000s. Although the unplanned expansion of illegal settlements of rural migrants had disturbed the urban community from the beginning, none of the mainstream politicians had publicly named the *gecekondu* settlements as tumours or commenced comprehensive projects to demolish them, because of what Muhurdaroglu (2005) calls 'embedded clientelism'. With this, he refers to the coalitions that are formed between the *gecekondu* leaders and the political party officials with electoral concerns on the basis of ethnicity and/or hometown (p. 109). Therefore, this speech by the then Prime Minister Erdoğan has symbolised a turning point in terms of urban policy in Turkey.

As detailed in Chapter 4, in the absence of effective housing policies, the '*gecekondu* order' had been formed as a housing solution by rural migrants, who moved to the cities following the mechanisation in agriculture and correlative loss in rural jobs. The construction of *gecekondu* houses was initially tolerated by mainstream political authorities that failed to produce effective solutions to the housing shortage in cities with limited resources for urbanisation.[14] Over time these settlements were officially recognised for political and economic motives. As part of neoliberalisation after the military coup in 1980, the *gecekondu* dwellers were made right-holders of the 'illegally occupied' land that would be redeveloped by improvement plans (Türker-Devecigil, 2010, p. 215).

During the 1980s, Turkey was being transformed into a consumer society, and the desire for wealth and appetite for consumption was enthusiastically stirred up through promoting material wealth and ideas of 'striking it rich'. This *propaganda for consumerism* aimed at breaking the accumulated power of the labour unions and leftist movement, which had organised long-term strikes and occupation of factories throughout the 1970s (Bali, 2001). Within the context of the deteriorating economic conditions, individualist consumerism started to be seen as a target to achieve by the broader society, who now demanded their share from the developing prosperity in the country. Making

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14 Turkish Republic was established in 1923 following two destructive wars namely the World War I (1914-1918), and the National Liberation War (1919-1923) against the imperialist powers, who wanted to colonise the country. The military elites, who established the republic aimed at creating a modern, secular nation state, however, with the limited resources of the young republic and the emergency target of industrialisation, urbanisation was left to the spontaneous solutions of the people.

easy money out of *gecekondu* housing was tolerated by the populist policies of the governing parties as these aimed at giving the *gecekondu* people the hope of becoming rich and prevented them from engaging with radical activism against the state (Erman, 2001, pp. 986-987).

The Redevelopment Law of 1984 is argued to differ from the *Gecekondu* Law of 1966. The latter aimed at improving the existing *gecekondu* houses while clearing out the uninhabitable ones and developing low-cost housing to prevent further *gecekondu* settlements. The Redevelopment Law on the other hand sought to clarify the land ownership structure in *gecekondu* areas and create a base for transforming *gecekondu* land into formal urban land stock by changing the current structure completely (Şenyapılı, 1996; Leitmann and Baharoglu, 1999 cited in Türker-Devecigil, 2010, pp. 215-216). With the Redevelopment Law, the already existing commercialisation of *gecekondu* housing was legalised, and *gecekondu* construction was implicitly encouraged as the people started to expect forthcoming amnesties. These individual expectations of rental gains absorbed the potential of social mobilisation against the worsening socio-economic conditions due to neoliberal policies.

After the election of the neoliberal Justice and Development Party in the national elections in 2002, the populist urban regime was revised and replaced by a 'zero tolerance approach to the legal ambiguities and the incompletely commoditised market structure that characterised the *gecekondu* areas' (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p. 2). Urban transformation was adopted as a new local policy instrument in 2004, leading to a country-wide campaign carried out through state-led and/or state-financed large-scale projects. The government enacted a series of legal regulations to overcome the lack of a legal framework and limitations in financial resources. 78 laws and 10 by-laws, totally or partially concerning the production of the built environment were enacted from 2002 to late 2007.

As opposed to the attempts at decentralisation of urban governance in the advanced capitalist countries which led to increasing emphases on values such as autonomy and subsidiarity[15] for more democratic and participatory urban regimes, the neoliberal regime of urbanisation in Turkey involved

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15 This meant the provision of public services by the units closest to the public. After the acceptance of The European Charter on Local Self-Government in 1985, this principle was adopted in the international documents and newly formed institutions (Parlak et al., 2008, p. 30).

progressively centralising and non-participatory processes of rent appropriation (Kuyucu, 2014). The 2005 Municipalities Act was renewed granting finances to the greater and district municipalities to redevelop *gecekondu* areas. There were no specifications or requirements for participatory mechanisms permitting the inhabitants to take part in the preparation of the projects in the municipality law or in the official 'implementing principles' of the projects, thus decisions were taken without any citizen participation or democratic procedure (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010 cited in Kuyucu, 2014, p. 615).

TOKI (the Mass Housing Administration), which was originally established in 1984 in order to construct affordable houses for low-income people, also increased its political and financial power. This was an incremental process as the following time-frame revealed. TOKI was given legal powers

- ✓ (2004) to determine right holders and the values of their houses,
- ✓ (2005) to determine the *gecekondu* prevention areas and take-over of the land owned by the Treasury for free,
- ✓ (2006) to be exempted from almost all expenses,
- ✓ (2007) to approve and reject all plans developed for the boundaries of *gecekondu* rehabilitation zones, *gecekondu* refinement areas and *gecekondu* prevention areas within the limits of the local administrations
- ✓ (2008) to carry out projects in any field without indicating any health and safety criteria about the transformation projects in relation to an earthquake (Source: Yılmaz, 2013).

With these regulations, TOKI gradually transformed from a credit dispensing mechanism, which provides cheap housing credit to cooperatives, into an extremely powerful land broker and housing developer. With these regulations, as Batuman (2013) emphasises, the administration became exempt from almost all of the bureaucratic mechanisms. Kuyucu (2014, p. 616) also underlines that TOKI has become a prime example of a technocratic institution enabling the neoliberalisation of land and housing markets as it takes orders directly from the Department of the Prime Minister and is exempt from parliamentary oversight and auditing. The numbers of the houses produced by TOKI also reveals the centralised mode of urban redevelopment regime. TOKI had built 43,000 houses in the period 1984–2003; 500,000

houses between 2002 and 2011, and plans to have constructed 700,000 more by the year 2023 (TOKI, 2017).

Simultaneously, a consumption-led recovery (Duman, 2013, p. 2) started to be implemented and the consumer credit markets were restructured to sell the houses produced at profitable prices for private investors. Through providing cheap consumer credits, the ability of low-income groups to consume was increased without a corresponding increase in people's income (Akçay, 2017). The Law No. 5582, which was known as the Mortgage Law, was passed in 2007 aimed at restructuring the housing finance sector, which had traditionally been weak and insufficiently institutionalised in Turkey (Gürlesel, 2006; Öncü, 1988 cited in Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010):

> The primary mechanism of homeownership in Turkey has been traditionally using one's own funds, borrowing from friends/relatives or *gecekondu* construction. Use of housing credits has been extraordinarily low (0.75 per cent of GNP in 2001) despite very high rates of homeownership (59 per cent in 2000). Such an underdeveloped financing mechanism is a serious impediment to a capitalist urban regime. The new law institutionalised the 'mortgage system', which is expected to provide a major impetus to the housing finance sector. Although this is a big step towards neo-liberalisation, high inflation and interest rates exclude most lower-income citizens from participating in mortgage markets. Those unable to enter the private credit market can, however, obtain housing through TOKI (Mass Housing Administration), which provides state-subsidised credit to lower-income consumers (p. 1485).

Following from that, a nation-wide campaign of homeownership through long-term instalments 'as if paying rent' was introduced in order to realise the long-lasting dream of the low-income people of owning a legal house.[16] As a result of the credit boom in the 2000s, the aggregate consumer credit volume, covering consumer, mortgage and credit cards, increased from 111 billion TL (approximately 46.250 billion GBP) to 250 billion TL (approximately 89.285 billion GBP) from June 2008 to June 2012 (Duman, 2013, p. 7). Alongside this financial inclusion, however, appropriate citizen behaviour, which is obedience to the state authority, was also promoted. In the following part, I will attend to how this process took place in Turkey and in Dikmen Valley from 2004 onwards.

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16 In 2008, more than 6,000 houses constructed by TOKI in different cities in Turkey were put up for sale with instalments as long as 180 months and without any prior condition to be given credits.

5.2. Promoting the Citizenship Agenda: Benevolent State and 'Innocent Victims of Criminals'

The threat of displacement by gentrification projects was targeted to be compensated by the provision of cheap housing credits. At the same time, a committed campaign about the intolerability of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods and the inevitability of their transformation to create civilised cities and citizens was also conducted. The first radical act was the enactment of the Criminal Act in 2004, which made the construction of illegal settlements punishable by imprisonment (from 1 to 5 years), for the first time in the history of Turkey. The previous punishment was either demolition or a civil penalty. The law also denied the responsibilities of public officials in tolerating *gecekondu* construction, as there was no punishment for them.

In Turkey, the process whereby the *gecekondu* people lost their innocence dated back to the 1980s when the *gecekondu* houses started to be transformed into apartment buildings. As discussed in Chapter 4, the *gecekondu* dwellers have been considered as the 'people', the rural-based and uneducated but allegiant masses whereas citizenship was associated with the urbanite middle and upper income groups living in formal apartment buildings, which were considered to represent modern way of life. In the 1980s, the popular image of *gecekondu* people shifted from 'the rural/innocent other' to 'the undeserving rich other'. This referred to the wealth obtained from the legalisation of illegal *gecekondu* houses and transformation thereof into multi-storey apartment buildings (Erman, 2012, p. 300).

The 1990s witnessed the criminalisation of the *gecekondu* people as 'varosh' and stigmatisation of their neighbourhoods as hotbeds of criminality. Yonucu and Gonen (2011) argue that the traditional division between 'citizens' versus 'people' turned into 'citizens' versus 'criminal' in the 1990s onwards as the urban poor started to be represented as 'dangerous others' in the media as well as by the criminologists and urban planners. They assert that:

> The urban poor are increasingly seen as a 'race apart' and their particular culture as productive of 'degeneracy' and 'criminality' concentrated in their neighbourhoods in which they reside... The discourses they (criminologists and urban planners as well as the media) produce are aligned with the aim of reconstructing the metropoles of Turkey as "non-antagonistic", financial, business and cultural centres attractive to foreign capital and global

investment, 'secured' and 'freed' from crime and/or urban poor (Yonucu and Gonen, 2011, p. 77).

Within the context of the representation of the *gecekondu* areas as hotbeds of crime in the 2000s onwards, they evaluate the gentrification projects as projects of marginalisation, which push from the cities those who have been deemed redundant by neoliberal economy (p. 96). Thus, they interpret the main social costs of gentrification as the exclusion of the 'surplus populations'.

Elsewhere, Yonucu (2008) explores the impacts of the neoliberal shift in Turkey on a working class neighbourhood through focusing on the alteration of Zeytinburnu, which is one of the oldest *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in İstanbul. She details the transformation thereof into a dangerous 'no go area' from the 1980s onwards, in a way that created double exclusion for the people living there. She suggests that 1980s generated a new corporatist form of governance, which aimed at homogeneous social unity through assimilation of 'marginal' identities into a secular, modern, middle class Turkish identity. More recently this has transformed again into a neoliberal type of governance that is more concerned with exclusion. She adds that what is more challenging in terms of marginalisation is that exclusion goes hand in hand with the production of desire to be included into the 'normal Turkey' that is to be respectable, which is defined on the basis of urban middle class norms and particularly the consumerism.

Within the context of centralised process of appropriating urban lands, gentrification was mostly analysed in Turkey from a structuralist perspective of appropriating rent and emphasis was made on the exclusion of the *gecekondu* people. It is argued that under the Justice and Development Party government, populist urban policies, which had left the urban land incompletely commoditised, were replaced with a 'neoliberal urban regime' (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu, 2008; Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010; Penbecioglu, 2011). As a country with incomplete commodification of urban land and ambiguous forms of property structure, it is argued that the prime target of gentrification is to appropriate the high levels of urban rent (Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010; Muhurdaroglu, 2005; Balaban, 2008) as revealed by the active involvement of large-scale public actors like the TOKI. Within this context, it is argued that the political interest in the *gecekondu* inhabitants lost power as the focus shifted to opening up channels to certain capitalist fractions (Somalı,

2013, p. 63). Nevertheless, I will argue that this interest was not lost but rather changed its form.

To begin with, it is the formal land use pattern that became surplus, rather than the *gecekondu* people. While explaining the contest over the ground rent indicated by the forced evictions, Davy and Pellissery (2013) wrote that a change in the land use pattern is expected, as soon as informal uses are no longer the 'best', that is, most profitable, uses of the land (p. 72). Thus, in contrast to the abovementioned arguments of 'pushing the redundant from the city' and double exclusion, the *gecekondu* people's participation in the state-led gentrification projects was targeted. Moreover, the state actively set the conditions for their inclusion in such a way that would be enabling for the promotion of its citizenship agenda. Within this framework, the accounts on marginalisation and double exclusion overlook the complex ways the urban space was produced for the more *obedient* as well as the more affluent user in Turkey.

As noted above, in *Gentrification: A Working-Class Perspective* (2014), Paton offers an analysis of gentrification through restating the connection between contemporary urban restructuring and working class communities with a focus on active, consumer-citizenship. She unfolds the material underpinnings of the working class disassociation with class focusing on the devaluation which occurs as part of regeneration which aims at realisation of potential value and profit (p. 3). From this perspective, she argues that gentrification targets *people* as well as places defined by their 'lack'.

Paton addresses the processes of dismantling of the social contract and previous notions of citizenship alongside the attempts to foster flexible accumulation regime. Accordingly, citizens are encouraged now to act responsibly by making decisions that support entrepreneurialism which is both morally correct and rational choice. Thus, she demonstrates that alongside attempts to redevelop urban space for the more affluent user, gentrification policies seek to cultivate aspiration and realign the traditional working class identities and behaviours to make them more congruent with post-industrial neoliberalism (p. 7). In doing so, she concludes, the process offers 'hidden rewards' as well as hidden injuries to the working class communities (pp. 53-54).

Her attentiveness to hidden rewards proves to be more useful than emphases on marginalisation and double exclusion when exploring the ways neoliberal urban regime was communicated with the *gecekondu* people in Turkey. Participation in gentrification projects not only meant displacement as it offered the *gecekondu* dwellers legal homeownership in modern apartment flats constructed by TOKI contrasted with the legally ambiguous and culturally inferior status of the *gecekondu* houses. As a result of the expansion of consumer credits and promotion of 'becoming homeowner as if paying rents', legal homeownership became probable for the low-income groups.

Deniz Yıldırım (2009) refers to this financial inclusion within the context of Justice and Development Party's populism. From a structuralist perspective, he argues that the financial inclusion of the groups marginalised by neoliberal policies of precarisation and de-unionisation of labour and oppression of social rights is part of 'neoliberal populism'. It aims to compensate the injuries of these policies. The incomes attained from the transformation of *gecekondu* areas for instance are redistributed among the capitalist groups while the former residents in those areas are provided with cheap housing credits.

What was still overlooked in his emphasis on financial inclusion, however, is the symbolic inclusion promoted through the process of gentrification. In his speech in 2006 — that was cited above — Erdoğan talked about the 'promises' of gentrification:

> We prepared the ground for the people (*gecekondu* residents) who were in fact *undeserving, illegal occupiers* of those places to be *relocated in modern houses in a different place*, and also by way of persuasion through paying them compensation for demolition *despite the mistakes they have made*. (Sabah, 2006; emphasis added)

While he criminalised the *gecekondu* residents as the illegal occupier of the urban land, he simultaneously promoted participation to gentrification as a chance to be forgiven and be accepted as 'good citizens'. Far from having lost his attention in *gecekondu* communities, he still spoke as the head of the benevolent state, which takes care of its citizens. Thus, he promised the *gecekondu* people inclusion into good citizenry in return for their obedient participation in the process. Gentrification projects were presented as a chance to correct their 'enforced' involvement in illegal occupation of land in the past and prove their 'deservingness' to become part of the 'good citizenry'.

This exposed the ways gentrification, as an economic project, was integrated into the political process of promoting the citizenship agenda. The underlying logic of territorial stigmatisation and demolition of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods was not limited to the speculative gains offered by transforming incompletely capitalised urban lands into middle- or upper-class oriented ones and integration of the low-income groups into the housing market and neoliberal transaction markets. It also involved political goals of transforming the rural-based, low-income groups into obedient citizens. In line with that, the state also criminalised any form of opposition as a terror act. Those who opposed the terms offered by the urban transformation projects were criminalised and subjected to punitive measures.

A further justification for top-down implementation of large-scale projects without effective opposition came in 2011 with the Van earthquake which struck the South-eastern cities in Turkey with a moment magnitude of 7.2 and killed around 650 people. As Klein (2007) explores the policies followed after the Katrina hurricane in the USA and argues that disasters act as opportunities for capital accumulation, which she conceptualises as 'disaster capitalism'. Congruently, the Van earthquake has led to the promotion of gentrification projects as solutions to disasters, weakening social reactions against the social costs of those projects. Thus, after the Van Earthquake, which also reminded the devastating Marmara Earthquake in 1999[17], the 'natural' disasters and particularly earthquakes started to be discussed in relation to the other 'naturalised disasters' such as crime and 'created a sense of urgency' (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 17) in implementing the gentrification projects.

Within this context, Tayyip Erdoğan, then Prime Minister, mentioned his ambition to solve the problem of illegal housing permanently even though this would lead them to election defeat:

> From now on, we are going to give our Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning full authority, if necessary, in terms of solving the problem of illegal housing and *gecekondu* in our cities. We are going to expropriate this type of buildings *without taking the consent of the locals who do not demolish them*, and demolish these buildings by ourselves. We are not going to take any

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17 The Marmara Earthquake with a moment magnitude of 7.4 that struck North Western Turkey, killing around 17,000 people and leaving approximately half a million people homeless. This earthquake played a particularly important role in the production of the social consent for the large-scale urban transformation projects.

notice of whether we lose their political support or not. (Hurriyet, 2011; Emphasis added)

This speech revealed the function of disasters in terms of legitimising the transforming urban governance in a more centralised and non-participatory way. Shortly after this speech, the Law on the Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk (Law no. 6303), known as the Disaster Law, was enacted in 2012. Within the context of the sense of emergency, the only authority to determine 'risky areas' to be renewed was appointed to be the Ministry of Urban Development and Environment. With this law, the already authoritarian form of urban governance and decision-making processes was consolidated. According to the public report prepared by the Chamber of City Planners (TMMOB):

> The Disaster Law introduces highly problematic provisions as it penalises any locals who object to the local administration's transformation plans. Another major problem is a provision of the law which states that individuals who refuse to leave their dwellings marked for demolition will be denied utility services, which is a major violation of right to property. The law also disregards the financial state of the poor, stating that infrastructure costs in a disaster-risk area should be paid for by those whose houses were demolished under the law. By leaving the last say to the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning it cripples local participation. The law also runs the risk of causing the last remaining Treasury land plots in cities to be sold to private owners. It allows the transfer of all immobile public property including schools or hospitals in disaster-risk areas to the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning. The Disaster Law is indeed a disaster for protected historic sites and grasslands, as it overrides all laws protecting "natural and cultural heritage". (mimarist.org, 2012)

Within the context of urgent implementation of large-scale projects without negotiation, gentrification started to be represented as 'the' solution to the all of the city's ills from disasters like earthquakes to terrorism (Islam, 2010, p. 60). Erdogan Bayraktar, the former head of TOKI, talked about gentrification as 'the only solution to more than one problem the cities face' in a speech he made in 2013:

> Urban transformation decreases poverty; protects natural resources and creates healthy environments; prevents illegal organisations in the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods just as it leads to a drastic decrease in ghettoisation; economic recovery by increasing the potential of business and decreasing unemployment; and provides opportunities to live in more secure

and modern places with high quality conditions in peace and happiness. (ntv.com.tr, 2012)

As he thought that criminality is embedded in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, he promoted gentrification to erase crime from city space through demolishing those spaces that generate crime.

Nevertheless, criminalisation is done carefully alongside the promise of inclusion. In the later parts of his aforementioned speech in 2006, Erdogan revealed the inclusionary aspect of gentrification:

> I cannot say this is Ankara just showing Cankaya.[18] What is there behind Cankaya? We have to see this... Come let us expand this to the whole country. Let our whole nation enjoy these pleasures. But the nation should help us too; *our citizens* should have this consciousness. To say that 'this land is mine' after being settled there right away with the bricks carried in a horse carriage! No way! *This is not a citizenship right! This is the abuse of the citizenship right!* You must know this. (Baştakar, 2006; Emphasis added)

Here, he referred to the claims of *gecekondu* residents to the land as an illegal act lacking the sense of citizenship to conform to the state's policies, which are in the citizens' interest. The aspiration to possess modern houses and enjoy higher standards was conceptualised as a path to become included in the 'deserving citizenry'.

He also promoted the provision of cheap housing credits as part of the urban transformation projects:

> For all those years, our cities were bribed for political interest. We need to do what needs to be done all together... There are those who are trying to arouse pity: 'The poor thing had only a house, and look, they demolished it!'... How come they are the poor thing! There is an *illegal occupation* there. The one you call the poor thing shall go, buy a house, which is sold in return for monthly 200 TL instalments! (Bastakar, 2006; Emphasis added)

Thus, the 'benevolent state' was ready to forgive the *gecekondu* settlers' past 'mistake' and offer them better conditions, as opposed to the opposition parties, which Erdogan accused of benefiting from people's poverty. In contrast to the UK context where the working class people are 'invited to become part of the gentrification process without giving them the means to do so' (Paton, 2014, p. 53), the *gecekondu* settlers, including the ones who are directly

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18 Cankaya is the most prestigious district in Ankara mostly populated by the urban middle and upper income groups.

targeted by the state-led gentrification projects, were provided with the means to participate and also benefit from the process. Through the simultaneity of provision of means to become included in the process and criminalisation, gentrification projects were used in the political attempt to discipline the rights-based claims and struggles against the state, which were associated with terror.

Thus, taking a more nuanced approach to criminalisation, I argue that it was targeted *selectively* at the insurgent groups while the obedient ones were promised rewards. This revealed the fact that gentrification in Turkey involved disciplining measures towards social and political opposition. It has become a tool with which the government communicated its state citizenship agenda which was based on a configuration of obedience to the benevolent state.

Indeed, in another speech made in 2013, Erdogan talked about the promises of gentrification as opposed to the criminality of opposition to it:

> *My citizen*, *my Istanbulite brother* has the right to reside and live in the best, healthiest, solidest houses without having any fear and worry. We cannot give consent anyone to live in jerry built houses like poultry sheds or shacks. However, they (the political parties supporting the insurgent *gecekondu* residents) are trying to impede this highly important transformation process with slogans of 'don't touch my house', spreading lies and slanders, and provoking some neighbourhoods… The main opposition party and *marginal leftist organisations and terrorist organisations that the party cooperates* do not want this transformation for obvious reasons. Why? It is because they seize opportunity through people's victimisation. They are exploiting poverty. First, they condemn *my brother* to poverty and then they try to abuse his feelings. They want to keep inhumane conditions of living in which *they can raise militants, exploit people and do any kind of illegality*… With the demolition of these buildings, a *degenerated system is being terminated*. (haberler.com, 2013; Emphasis added)

These words revealed that gentrification was not only about the redevelopment of urban space. It was part of a broader process of disciplining the 'criminal' practices that were attached to what he called 'the *gecekondu* order'. On the other hand, despite criminalising the *gecekondu* settlements, he did it in a careful way through separating the 'militants' supported by opposition groups and parties and the poor citizens who were 'exploited' by the former. Thus, he represented the *gecekondu* people as innocent victims of criminal groups. Calling the *gecekondu* people 'his brother', Erdogan promoted

the correspondence between what his benevolence is capable of providing and what his citizens (should) expect, thus invited the *gecekondu* people to participate in the process.

5.3. Separating 'Innocent Valley People' from 'Terrorist Groups'

The people living in the *gecekondu* neighbourhood in the fifth phase of Dikmen Valley experienced the complex processes explored above. As noted above in Chapter 4, from the mid-1990s onwards, there were significant changes in the ways the project was implemented as a result of the changes in the local government. This was argued to have generated a shift in terms of the state's approach to *gecekondu* communities and urban space. Muhurdaroglu (2005) evaluates this shift as the transformation from the rehabilitation project to a gentrification project referring to the increasing displacement of the *gecekondu* communities from the area (p. 108). Turker-Devecigil (2005) also argues that after the local elections, the approach of the local state to the Dikmen Valley shifted from 'an urban area to be rehabilitated' to 'a value to be shared'.

Her emphasis on such a radical change, however, disregards the continuity in the process that is the presence of profit-making purposes in the earlier stages of the project. Yet, it was apparent in the active involvement of the local state in the process. In line with the centralisation of urban governance, the greater municipality of Ankara prepared the Dikmen Valley Project and together with district municipalities established a joint stock company (Metropol Imar Co. Inc.) to carry out the redevelopment in the valley. Thus, it is more appropriate to argue that the profit-seeking motives became more manifest after the mid-1990s.

After the municipal change in 1994, large-scale private construction companies were also included in the process; however, Metropol Imar A.S. remained active in terms of planning, consulting and undertaking the processes of urban redevelopment in the municipally designated areas not only in the valley but in the whole city. In contrast to the involvement of the state when it was too risky or expensive for the private sector so as to provide financial resources and gradually leave the process to the market forces in advanced countries; in Turkey, the local and national state actors involved in the process have acted like private agents with profit-seeking motives. The reason for preparing a special project and using a public-private partnership model rather than

leaving the transformation process to the market forces through an improvement plan in Dikmen Valley was argued to aim 'guaranteeing the gains of the municipality and that of the private firms who would take part in the redevelopment process' (Muhurdaroglu, 2005, p. 131).

The motive of appropriation of urban rents led to legal disputes between greater and district municipalities in the process of establishing the legal framework for urban transformation in Turkey. After the 1990s, the two local government units – Ankara Greater Municipality and Cankaya District Municipality (which has been under control of the main opposition party) – were contradicting each other on the basis of appropriating the rental gains. As a result of the subsequent delays in the implementation process of the project in Dikmen Valley, only three-fifths of the project was completed by the time I started my fieldwork in 2015. After the enactment of the new law of Metropolitan Municipalities (Law no. 5216) in 2004, by which, metropolitan municipalities gained planning authority at all scales, Dikmen Valley was immediately labelled as a municipal project area. Today, there is no single unit in the Cankaya District Municipality that takes part in the transformation process of the valley.

Since then, the greater municipality had been actively involved not only in the implementation of the project but also in the promotion of gentrification, which was the national urban policy, and criminalisation of resistance to it. It is argued that local governments in Turkey have been regarded as extension and agents of the central government (Heper, 1988 cited in Goymen, 2006, p. 246) to promulgate the ruling ideas, norms and the ideology (Ersoy, 1999, p. 77). Through ambitiously promoting the 'necessity' of the project in the municipal weekly bulletins and the criminalisation of the groups struggling in the valley, the greater municipality of Ankara was mimicking the broader promotion of obedience.

In 2006, the greater municipality unilaterally announced the 4th and 5th Phases of Dikmen Valley Urban Transformation Project, sending legal notice to the *gecekondu* people living in the neighbourhood to evacuate their houses and sign the agreement. When the project was announced there were 1,084 households holding title deed and 1,200 households without it (Deniz, 2010, p. 104 cited in Aykan, 2011, p. 29). For the title-deed holders, the contract offered

two options: they could either sell their land for a unit price which was well below the market value or get housing from the valley, provided by the municipality under certain financial terms. Title-holders with 400 m² of land would be provided with a house of 100 m². If the land of the household was less than 400 m² — which was the case for most — then it would pay a certain amount to be determined according to the cost of the houses of 100 m² to be built in the valley for each missing unit. They would also get a rent allowance of 250 TL for two years. For that, they had to relinquish their houses and leave the valley as soon as they sign the contract (Aykan, 2011, p. 30).

The explanations that focus on the single logic of rent appropriation overlook the complex ways gentrification deals with multiplicity when reproducing the urban space for profit. The people without title deeds were not excluded unlike in the earlier phases, during which they were not accepted as right-holders in order to keep the construction density low in the valley, as it was to be transformed into a green area. As noted above, the people lacking title deeds were offered land from Dogukent project area (4.5 km away from Cankaya district, 11 km away from the city centre).

However, there was no infrastructure or built environment in Dogukent, yet. Not even the parcellation of the land was completed, and nobody could get information about where the exact area to be settled was. Moreover, they had to pay the price of the parcel of land without the housing on it, 16,000 TL, which was a very high level for low-income people, over 120 months in equal instalments (Aykan, 2011, p. 30).

Due to the uncertainties about the duration of the project and date of delivery of the promised houses, the low level of rent allowance and demolition costs, and high level of debts, the people were reluctant to sign the agreement with the local state. As noted above, politically active households came forward and initiated meetings to discuss what could be done against the project together. Progressively more people started to attend those meetings to be informed about the process.

On the other hand, almost all of the title-deed holders signed the contract and left the valley by the end of 2006. Against the other people's refusal to evacuate the valley, the greater municipality cooperated with the local leaders such as the elected heads of the neighbourhoods to convince the remaining people to

sign the contract. The pressure to demolish was very high; the municipality cars were touring the valley streets all day in a threatening manner.

Moreover, the municipality sent demolition teams and 5,300 policemen to the neighbourhood on 1st February in 2007 early in the morning. Although there was no demolition that day, the clashes with the police lasted all day. In the period following, people in increasing numbers left the valley either with great hopes of becoming a legal homeowner in the prestigious valley area or because they were scared of the idea of disobeying the state and advised by the local leaders to leave.

While realising the powers vested in itself the greater municipality effectively used its 'power over time' increasing anxiety in the community through continual delays in the project; hopes were raised and then lowered (Sakızlıoğlu, 2013). It cut off municipal services of transportation and stopped maintaining roads in Dikmen Valley, brought stray dogs to the neighbourhood, poured garbage and rubble onto the roads in the neighbourhood (See figure 17), threatened the prominent figures in the struggle, and eventually sent socially unpopular groups such as Syrian asylum seekers and waste collectors to the neighbourhood in order to discourage people from living in the neighbourhood.

Figure 17: Rubbish thrown on the roads of the *gecekondu* neighbourhood (Photo: Author, 08.02.2015)

Along the lines of the shift in the state's approach to the informal settlements, the greater municipality gave the people in the valley the message that with or without their support, the urban transformation project was going to be implemented. This indicated that gentrification-induced displacement was not only about being evicted from the neighbourhood and the succeeding loss of economic and social network, but also about the erosion of the claims to the right to use and appropriate the urban space, as reflected to the fragile claims of Ibo to his neighbourhood, referred to at the beginning of the chapter.

Nevertheless, the process was more complex as gentrification also came with promises of inclusion to the deserving citizenry alongside with the punitive measures for noncompliance. As referred in the beginning of Introduction Chapter, in one of the weekly bulletins of the greater municipality of Ankara dated November, 2011, the local state explained the gentrification and struggle process in the valley. The collective right to shelter struggle in Dikmen Valley was represented in it as 'an illegal struggle led by particular marginal groups waiting for an opportunity for their ideological protests and to create tension'. The *gecekondu* people living in the valley were separated from these struggling groups and portrayed as 'poor people in Dikmen Valley', 'the citizens who were cheated with disinformation', and 'the people who are unfortunately used as puppets of conflicting ideological groups'. The leftist figures who were actively involved in the process were seen as 'provocateurs', who had been spreading terror in the valley with the support of other organisations and some political party members for years, despite not being right holders.

Thus, the municipality refused to recognise people's right to participate in the urban decision-making processes and associated their rights-based claims to the urban space with illegality and even terrorism. The *gecekondu* people in the valley were also 'warned' at the end of the article to use their last chance and follow the other *gecekondu* residents in different urban transformation project areas in Ankara, who had accepted the terms of the municipality. The bulletin reminded the valley people of the heavy legal penalties for preventing demolition. By using the threat of punishment and promises of obedience at the same time, the municipality tried to discipline the political activists in the valley.

In the same bulletin, a second article with a more stigmatising and disciplining tone came in 2013. It was titled 'Terror is once again active in Dikmen Valley', and represented the opposition groups as militants, whose purpose was to provoke conflict, whereas the greater municipality had constantly come up with offers which represented its 'good intentions'. It contained telephoto photographs of the clash between the valley people, who have sticks and stones in their hands and wear masks, and the subcontracted company workers, who were sent by the developer company to start demolishing the *gecekondu* houses in the valley. The titles in the different pages of the bulletin were 'Terror is active once again in Dikmen Valley' (see Figure 18), 'Is this a place *out in the sticks*?', and 'Terrorist protest *in the heart of the capital* with stones, sticks and weapons' (Emphasis added).

According to the research participants, what happened was that a group of subcontracted workers of the construction company came to the neighbourhood with weapons attacking residents in their attempt to empty the valley so that the implementation of the project would start. People I spoke to in the valley told me that the workers were brought in by police buses, and were armed and fired shots towards them. The valley people responded with sticks, stones and weapons 'to defend their houses' (with the participants' own words). In the municipal bulletin, those people were represented as terrorists who injured the policemen and the journalists whereas there was no mention of the subcontracted workers carrying weapons. This absence was to represent the struggling groups in the valley as innately unruly, and thus, legitimise the punitive measures for the sake of creating ideal that is 'orderly' city centres — as opposed to the disordered 'places out in the sticks' — through gentrification.

Figure 18: A picture from the municipality's weekly bulletin with a title of 'Terror of *Gecekondu* People DIKMEN WAR' (Buyuksehir Ankara Bulletin, 19-26 March 2013)

Besides, it was once again emphasised in the bulletin that although the *gecekondu* settlers had no rights on the land/house according to the law, the greater municipality of Ankara still offered them 200 m² urban lands from Dogukent Boulevard. They were asked to pay 16.000 Turkish Liras but in instalments over 10 years. Alternatively, they were offered apartments from TOKI houses to be paid for in 15 years in two other parts of Ankara, both of which were tens of kilometres away from Dikmen Valley. Alongside increasingly punitive approaches to the right to shelter struggle, the municipality highlighted the generosity of the benevolent state, which was ready to reward obedient participation despite the absence of legal right.

Moreover, in the bulletin, the Dogukent location was represented as one of the 'rising attraction centres in Ankara'. The *gecekondu* populations were targeted to be removed from the valuable inner-city lands, but the promotion of the peripheral lands as attraction centres highlighted their 'deservingness' to live in valuable lands. This 'inducement' echoes Paton's emphasis on the promotion of participation through promoting entrepreneurialism. The people lacking title deeds and struggling for their right to affordable housing were encouraged to see the residential place as a source of investment rather than shelter, and think in ways that promote profit. By doing so, the rights-based language used by the struggling communities in the valley was trivialised.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the promotion of gentrification in contemporary Turkey and the Dikmen Valley, focusing on the simultaneous presence of

criminalisation and promotion of participation in the process. As a lately industrialised country, the local and national state was actively involved in the process of urban redevelopment especially in 2004 onwards. This was commonly argued (by economic explanations of gentrification) to be related with the goal of appropriating the high levels of rent offered due to incomplete commodification of urban land. However, these accounts overlook the ways the *gecekondu* people were encouraged to participate in gentrification.

Drawing on Paton's approach to gentrification as a policy that targets *people* as well as places (2014), I argue that the gentrification process did not lead to exclusion of the *gecekondu* people from the inner-city and 'normal Turkey'. On the contrary, these socially and spatially marginalised groups were made promises of inclusion and also given the means to participate and benefit in return for their voluntary participation in the state-led gentrification projects in line with the attempts to promote obedience to the benevolent state as part of the government's gradually more authoritarian citizenship agenda.

This chapter also demonstrated that the ways the *gecekondu* people were included in the process differed in Turkey due to the authoritarian form neoliberalism has taken. In addition to the promotion of consumerism and entrepreneurialism, gentrification acted as a disciplining tool in Turkey with which the state citizenship agenda was promoted. Focusing on the selectivity of criminalisation, I argued that it was used to separate the 'innocent' from the 'criminal' and state's benevolent face was shown to the former while the latter was subjected to punitive measures. As the promotion of benevolent state-passive citizenship model trivialised and criminalised the rights-based struggles and claims, it can be said that social costs of inclusion in gentrification are no less than those of exclusion.

Chapter 6: The Present Picture of Dikmen Valley: Heaven and Hell Separated by a Bridge

Gülsen (*gecekondu* dweller): Our land is valuable but we are valueless, somehow!

Hazal (owner-occupant in a prestigious gated house): Replacement in the same place is not right. Once you resettle them [the *gecekondu* dwellers] within the valley, they will not easily leave here… Instead, [the state should] give them a *nice* place with facilities and everything inside. If you throw them out, of course they will resist.

Deniz (tenant in a gated community): Because it is a gated community, we don't have much connection with the neighbourhood, the valley, the street, to be honest. You know shopping is now done in big supermarkets and so on. We have a more sheltered thing as it is gated... and it is very central. And, of course, the people in the apartment are highly educated.

These quotations from three different participants living close to each other allude to the gap between the value of the land and that of the people occupying that land. Gülsen (40) was a *gecekondu* dweller lacking title deed and she had been struggling against displacement led by the gentrification project in the fifth phase of Dikmen Valley. Hazal (40) was an owner-occupant in the gentrified part of the valley in the luxurious terrace houses, which are close to the high-rise apartment blocks in which the former *gecekondu* dwellers were resettled. Deniz (34) was a white-collar worker, who lived as a tenant in a recently constructed gated community on Dikmen Street.

Gülsen's demand to be included as deserving to be resettled in the valley, Hazal's confidence about her value and explicit intolerance about proximity with the 'inferior' other, and Deniz's contentment about living in isolation

from the outer world and non-educated others revealed the fact that at the same time as material boundaries of inclusion and exclusion were redrawn through gentrification, normative boundaries regarding 'who can properly live in the city' were also negotiated by different actors involved in the process.

First, I explain how gentrification was promoted as a social policy of transforming non-modern places and practices (like *gecekondu* buildings) into modern ones and creating modern cities based on analysis of the speeches of key political actors. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 16 middle class, 13 upper class participants and elicitation of the photos sent by some of them, and also 19 current, 7 former *gecekondu* dwellers, I will explore how the dominant classes including the new middle classes and the affluent groups invested in cultural binaries to legitimise their claims to the inner-city, and de-legitimise the claims made by 'non-modern' groups namely the *gecekondu* people. Drawing on Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power, I will analyse dynamic processes whereby middle and upper class actors struggle to maintain and enhance their position in the social order and link these to the contestations over normative construction of citizenship. In doing so I will address the political function of these symbolic struggles in disempowering the *gecekondu* dwellers through de-politicisation of their rights-based claims, and legitimising the state-centric, non-participatory ways gentrification was implemented.

6.1. Promises of Modernised Cities

Within the context of state-led implementation of gentrification, the power of the changing cultural preferences of the so-called new middle classes in reshaping the city space is relatively limited in Turkey compared to the advanced capitalist countries in the Global North. Rather, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and 5, the centralised authorities were actively involved in reproducing the urban space in a non-participatory way to create more profit for themselves as well as the private investors. To disguise this and produce the consent of the affluent citizens, however, gentrification was promoted as re-urbanisation and modernisation. R. Tayyip Erdogan made a speech in 2013, when he was the prime minister, explaining the goals of the country-wide campaign of urban transformation:

> The cities that we will construct, the new houses, workplaces, living spaces
> will become the nucleus of the Turkey that we will erect. In a globalised

world, Turkey cannot have a place with deteriorating houses, temporary buildings, and un-aesthetic architecture that does not put our people in *serenity*. This we are changing (Hurriyet, 2013) (Emphasis added).

Here, Erdogan presented gentrification as *the* door opening to the globalised world and a developed Turkey, which would offer peace to its people. On the other hand, the construction of places offering serenity and security, free from any stress or disturbances, would help disguise the injustices involved in the gentrification processes and the inhabitants of those places could thus be pacified. Integration to the globalised world, thus, necessitated establishing *modernity* and *order* on urban space.

Gecekondu clearance and replacement thereof with 'modern' buildings was promoted as an essential part of this process. Due to their illegal, irregular, economically unproductive and un-aesthetic forms the *gecekondu* areas become no longer tolerable in the cities-to-be-modernised. Within the same context, the centralisation of authorities and their comprehensiveness is defended as a necessity for the pivotal yet delayed goal of slum clearance for the sake of creating modern cities. In the website of TOKI (Mass Housing Administration), it is argued that:

> *Because the problem of slums and shanty settlements cannot be solved through the efforts of the local governments only*, since 2003 TOKİ has been following a *comprehensive* policy toward supporting *modern urbanisation* in cooperation with local administrations, with the support of the central government… The areas of *gecekondu* houses and illegal housing, urban housing stock *whose economic life is over* constitutes a serious problem especially in the urban areas under disaster risk threatening both the wellbeing of the residents and the urban fabric. TOKİ not only transforms all these areas but also tries to prevent the formation of new slum areas by producing social housing the absence of which has delayed the solution for years. (Hurriyet, 2013) (Emphasis added).

This reveals that although gentrification was centred on the single logic of rent extraction this was pursued and realised in multiple ways in interconnected spaces. At the same time as the *gecekondu* people were promised inclusion through obedient participation in gentrification projects, the promise of modernising the city and the citizens through demolishing non-modern places and transferring the residents living there to the 'modern' social houses constructed by TOKI in the peripheries targeted the inclusion of the dominant classes in the process. Through linking the target of modernising the cities with

gecekondu clearance, the active state intervention into the process was legitimised.

As opposed to the initially rehabilitative approach of the Dikmen Valley project that aimed to integrate the *gecekondu* people into urban community through urban transformation, the state officials started to put more emphasis on *gecekondu* clearance and their replacement with higher-rise, luxurious apartments as an unavoidable necessity to create modern cities. This was noted earlier in the introduction chapter and chapter 5 referring to the promotion of the project in the weekly municipal bulletin.

In the Dikmen Valley project area multiple groups were living through gentrification in different ways. As noted earlier, following the settlement of more affluent residents in the valley, housing prices increased, and some of the former *gecekondu* dwellers, who were resettled in the area, sold or rented their apartment flats and moved to lower-income neighbourhoods. The people who replaced them were usually white-collar workers who wanted to be close to the city centre. When I did my fieldwork, the *gecekondu* people constituted approximately half of the populations in the mixed buildings constructed in the valley, while the rest was occupied by the newcomers (See figure 19).

Figure 19: The view of the valley from Dikmen neighbourhood. The affluent groups live in the low-rise houses in front whereas the two-colour higher-rise buildings behind them were occupied both by former *gecekondu* owners and the newcomers. The white, high-rise blocks to the right are the prestigious Park Valley Houses constructed for the affluent groups. (Photo: Author, 04.07.2015)

The participants who lived in these mixed apartments were white collar professionals. Most of them held a bachelor degree in the notable universities in big cities such as Ankara or Istanbul and a postgraduate degree abroad. As

children of low level public servants and teachers, who invested in their children's' education, they did not inherit any possessions from their parents. Four out of ten were homeowners, who had bought their houses in the beginning of 2000s, using either bank credits or savings – their own as well as those family members.

On the other hand, the people who lived in the prestigious gated communities in and/or close to the valley area were owners and/or shareholders of construction companies, senior bureaucrats, engineers and doctors. They also held a bachelor degree in the notable universities in big cities and some of them had a Master's degree in Turkey and/or from abroad. Most of them are children of senior bureaucrats, parliament members, company owners, or commercial men, so they inherited residential property and/or business from their parents. All of them were either owners of the house they lived in or could afford to purchase their apartment except for Nagehan, who used bank credits alongside her savings to purchase her house in the most prestigious Park Valley Terrace Houses.

Around 500 *gecekondu* people were still living in the non-gentrified part of the valley when I did my fieldwork. The people I interviewed were working as cleaners, tea makers, doorkeepers as well as drivers and barbers. Some of them had their own stores like a kebab store or grocery store. Since the announcement of the urban transformation project in 2006, they had been watching the valley transform day by day in a way that did not welcome their presence as they were. Only 12 of them had legal title-deeds for their *gecekondu* houses. The majority of those lacking title deeds had become homeowners using bank credits as a precaution against forced eviction.

I first visited the *gecekondu* neighbourhood in the valley on a rainy winter day. The rain water was flowing from the cracks at the edge of the neglected narrow road so I had to tiptoe in order not to get covered with mud. My partner took me there by car as there was no public transportation vehicle that went into the neighbourhood. The street that linked the adjacent Ilker district to the *gecekondu* neighbourhood formed a divide, and because there was a hill on the left, the neighbourhood was not seen from the outside. As we turned left from the junction, I saw one-layered *gecekondu* houses standing alongside each other modestly (see figure 20).

Figure 20: A view from the entrance of the *gecekondu* neighbourhood from the adjacent Ilker district (Photo: Author, 08.02.2015).

The adjacent single-storey houses with front yards connected by narrow stairs (see Figure 21) and roads represented the organisation of space not for profit but for the needs of the people living there. The yards in front of the houses facilitated a production-oriented life involving feeding animals, growing fruits and vegetables, etc. These were people adjusting to city life after migrating from a village. Its informality and spontaneous construction was shaped by needs, and offered autonomy in terms of using the space more flexibly for the residents' needs (See Figures 22 and 23). These areas served as children's playground, a common area where women washed their carpets together as well as a platform for wedding ceremonies.

Figure 21: One of the stairs that connect *gecekondu* houses in the neighbourhood (Photo: Author: 15.09.2015).

Figure 22: The drying fruits in the garden of Haydar's *gecekondu* house (Photo: Author: 12.07.2015).

Figure 23: The bower in the yard of one of the *gecekondu* houses (Photo: Author, 14.07.2015).

Because of the small-scale, needs-based, pedestrian-oriented features of the neighbourhood, my initial feelings when I went to the neighbourhood were that I travelled back in time. In comparison to the continuing gentrification projects and construction of high-rise, luxurious residential and commercial buildings all over Ankara, the *gecekondu* neighbourhood felt like a forgotten area, which was left to deteriorate. It stood in contrast to the surrounding milieu that included the huge campus of a private university (see Figure 24), the construction of a 50-storey prestigious mall (see Figure 25), and high-rise gated apartments connected by large roads, which were spaces of conspicuous consumption. It was this contrast between the deteriorating *gecekondu* neighbourhood and the well-ordered, luxurious places that was used to legitimise the unavoidability of its transformation, as was done in the municipal bulletin that was shown in the Introduction.

Figure 24: The *gecekondu* neighbourhood in Dikmen Valley and the construction of the campus of a private university (Photo: Author, 19.07.2015).

Figure 25: One-storey *gecekondu* houses side-by-side the high-rise gated apartments and the construction of 50-storey shopping mall on the right (Photo: Author, 15.09.2015)

6.2. Anxiety about the Proximity of the 'Uncivilised Other'

Shortly before I started my fieldwork, a new bridge was constructed at the end of the third phase of the project area. It separated the gentrified parts of the valley from the deteriorating, non-gentrified parts. This contrast was expressed by Berkay, a young adult who lived in the prestigious Park Valley Houses: 'There is a bridge (the Iron Bridge). One side is hell, let's say, and the other has turned into heaven'. He added that as the Dikmen Valley project progressed, those places he called hell would improve as well. The metaphor of hell revealed the intolerability of the presence of the *gecekondu* houses in the city as well as the unavoidability of gentrification that could turn hell into heaven for Berkay.

In the eyes of the affluent users of the city space the *gecekondu* houses constituted a bad image that did not suit modern city. Serra[19] talked about them as 'jerry-built constructions made by the people in very poor conditions'. She added that 'I mean you can't even name it as "construction". They definitely create *visual pollution* in a city.' Osman, who was a builder himself, hesitated to call them houses or even village houses as they were very poorly constructed and occupied by people living in very bad conditions. So, the visual pollution was sourced by the fact that the presence of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods was exposing poverty and irregularity. On the other hand, they revealed the absence of a developed state with sufficient sources of housing, thus they contrasted with the image of a modern city.

Ela (40), a senior public servant, agreed with Berkay in terms of the incompatibility of the *gecekondu* houses in the city centre saying that 'In the centre of Ankara, in Dikmen, a *gecekondu* neighbourhood can no longer be present, right? There are many *gecekondu* type houses there, of course, those will be transformed'. She was talking about *gecekondu* clearance as a necessity to create a modern capital city. These neighbourhoods represented the past as they had served the housing needs of the rural migrants, who migrated to the cities because they offered more opportunities compared to the villages and smaller towns.

She thought that the cities no longer had to host large rural populations, so provision of houses and expansion of cities must be stopped at some point. Serra also believed that there was no other formula than transforming the *gecekondu* houses into apartment buildings. Like Ela, she also thought that policies supporting reverse migration should be implemented through the expulsion of rural migrants from the city centre, as the rural-based migration was the reason for the degeneration of cities. Thus, when they talked about gentrification, they were referring to the transformation of not only places but also people living there and their culture, in line with the promise of modernising the cities through gentrification. The reference to modernisation revealed the simultaneity of the symbolic struggles regarding 'who can properly live in the city' to the material processes of rent extraction and redistribution.

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19 Serra was a retired woman at the age of 69, living in a prestigious gated community in the valley.

One of the sources of the incomplete modernisation of the cities was imagined by most of the affluent participants as the so-called '*gecekondu* culture', which was inappropriate for a modern, civilised city. As explained in more detail in the historical chapter, the urban elites initially tolerated the presence of the *gecekondu* people in the city with the expectation that they would urbanise and modernise over time. They thought of themselves as civilised, modern people serving as a model for the rural migrants. In the discussions below, I observed how these views were entrenched in my interviews with the middle and upper class residents of the valley.

The cultural binaries between modern/non-modern were reflected in the words of Leman, who was a retired high-school teacher. The first thing Leman (60) emphasised while introducing herself and the village where she was born was her pride to be from that place where the proportion of literacy was a hundred per cent. As a retired teacher, she said that she devoted herself to educating low-income children, who had nobody else but her. While talking about the wife of the doorkeeper[20] of her apartment, she represented herself and her neighbours as role models:

> I think we made a great contribution to her, because she came from a village, she could not even speak Turkish properly when she first came. When we came together with the other women in the common room of the apartment, I suppose she learns a lot of things just listening to us. (03.04.2015)

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20 Doorkeepers are, like the *gecekondu* people, rural migrant men, who live with their family in the ground or bottom floor of the traditional apartment buildings and serve the middle class dwellers.

Figure 26: The apartment building constructed for the former *gecekondu* owners living in the valley before the project Note the laundry hanging from the balcony (Photo: Author, 18.06.2014).

When I showed her photos from the valley explaining which groups lived where, she said that the houses where the former *gecekondu* people resided were recognisable as they hung out the laundry in the balconies (see Figure 26). She continued saying:

> These are the *remnants of the gecekondu culture*; they offend the eye. *We* dry the laundry in our drying racks inside the house. In our time, there must be nobody left without a drying rack *in houses of that kind* anyway. (03.04.2015) (Emphasis added)

She thought that living in 'houses of that kind' that is modern apartment buildings necessitated compliance to shared rules. Traditional 4- or 5-storey apartment buildings were constructed at a time when the prices of inner-city urban land increased to such an extent that made single ownership on land unaffordable for the middle classes. As a result, they came together and paid to small-scale constructors who took legal permission for construction of multi-storey apartments, which allowed plural ownership on the land. As opposed to the autonomy provided by the detached *gecekondu* houses, the apartments

imposed rules to which the residents needed to conform in order to live together in the privately owned flats in a shared building.

Thus, Leman was frustrated by the fact that the *gecekondu* culture had not yet fully melted away so far. The absence of fulfilment of this expectation created discomfort in the valley where the affluent groups, the white-collar professionals and former *gecekondu* dwellers lived close to each other. Within the same context, the young affluent residents, who were more individualised, took no responsibility for the other members of the society and consented to the state-led modernisation.

The affluent residents living in the gated communities represented the Dikmen Valley project as a successful example of urban transformation. They liked living in the valley as it was both in the inner city and at the same time isolated from the chaos, rush and visual pollution associated with it (see figure 27). Yet, the physical proximity of the 'other' that threatened the symbolic boundaries between the 'civilised' and the 'backward' was an important concern.

Figure 27: The view of the valley from the balcony of Hulya's house in the prestigious Park Valley Terrace Houses (Photo: Author, 21.09.2015).

Exposure to the '*gecekondu* culture' created discomfort which was expressed more manifestly by the middle class residents living in the apartment buildings where former *gecekondu* dwellers were resettled. Nil and Latif were a couple who used to live in an apartment building where they were neighbours with former *gecekondu* dwellers, whom they thought were insistent on maintaining their culture. Nil told me that:

Here there is a well-organised community life, at least. [The former] It was a proper house for us but irritated us because of the milieu, the people living in the apartment, the street and everything... When we came here, we said "Well, civilisation!". That's what matters! (07.07.2015)

Civilisation here referred to the compliance to the shared rules and middle-class norms in the apartment. Tulin was an older woman also living in a mixed gated community. She felt very disappointed when she found out that the former *gecekondu* owners also lived there after she moved. She told me she missed her previous apartment where she lived with the 'well-mannered, cultured people who made her happy'. She also complained that the former *gecekondu* owners did not comply with the middle class manners but on the contrary imposed their own rules as they still shook the carpet out from the window or spoke loudly at night in the shared garden. Both women attributed a 'culture of noncompliance' to the *gecekondu* people and blamed them for insisting on their lower class, rural habits and refusing to change, in a way that fixed them in time while Tulin et al. maintained themselves as modern, civilised people.

Proximity to the formal *gecekondu* dwellers also disturbed some of the participants who lived in the prestigious apartments. Hazal (40) was living in the terrace houses, which were opposite the mixed buildings where the former *gecekondu* dwellers were resettled. She criticised the Dikmen Valley project on the basis of the resettlement of the *gecekondu* people in the valley saying that: 'Is that right? Here, there is such life. I am never saying this to mean disdain but life here is this sort, but life there is a completely different sort.'

Azra was a young English teacher educated in the most notable private schools in Ankara and had a master's degree in the UK. She was living at her parents' house in a gated community adjacent to the bridge which Berkay said separated heaven from hell. She told me that her parents purchased that house both to live in it and as investment because they expected that the land values would increase over time as the project continued. However, she mentioned the contradictions they had to face as the project was delayed:

On the bridge, now there are the *gecekondu* people, the waste collectors, the tents, and the Syrians etc... I mean, on the one hand you think that you are living in a civilised house, but on the other, you live among *the very poor and stuff*. (06.10.2015) (Emphasis added)

The groups, who were outside of civility, were not even worthy of classification as 'people'.

The residents of prestigious gated communities were notably more worried about their security, particularly with reference to proximity of the former *gecekondu* dwellers. Serra told me that she did not feel secure despite the security personnel in the entrance and the cameras. She talked for ten minutes about the extra precautions she took against theft like adding fences to her garden.

What worried them was not only robbery. Hazal thought that there was a manifest 'security deficiency' in the valley referring to the proximity of the former *gecekondu* dwellers living in the mixed buildings. The young adults living in the terrace houses and Park Valley Houses complained about the young adult male groups, who parked their car near their houses and drank beer while watching the view of the valley (See Figures 28 and 29). Berkay also liked living in Dikmen Valley very much as it was in the inner city and at the same time completely isolated from the outside world. He made the same complaint as Hazal, saying that there was only one problem about the valley:

> Before the valley was constructed, those areas were all *gecekondu* areas. The people who lived there at the time, their children, and their nephews and so on… Probably it is because they used to this area very much, in the evenings, they still come to the valley and spend time in their cars… They park their cars, and sit for hours until morning… And it gets incredibly crowded on the side of our building. This has started to be a very disturbing situation. There are those who drink alcohol, turn up the music… a noisy quarrel! (11.08.2015)

Figure 28: Young male adults sitting on mobile chairs listening to the music from the car parked in front of the Park Valley Houses (Photo: Author, 21.09.2015).

Indeed, Berkay could not understand how come those groups sat there all day without getting bored. Thus, he said that it could only be their habits, and continued:

> Normally, police walk around everywhere, *cleanse*, I mean do not usually allow people to listen to very loud music or drink alcohol on the streets, to disturb other people but for some reason they never come to our neighbourhood, never! (Emphasis added)

Figure 29: A photo sent by Gozde (29) representing the things she did not like about Dikmen Valley.

His expectation of police intervention and 'cleansing' of the streets of groups who 'disturb other people' was echoed in other interviews in the participants' perception of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods as antagonistic places. Azra, whose father was born into a *gecekondu* neighbourhood, explained it referring to the physical organisation of the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in a 'hierarchical, irregular way where you could not know what to expect as someone could hide there or show up at any moment'. She contrasted the apartment building with such places in terms of *order* saying that the presence of rules in the apartment about where to park your car or where to enter the building made her more comfortable. Her words echoed the state's promotion of replacement of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods with well-ordered places in the municipal bulletin.

As opposed to Azra who referred to the spatial organisation of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, Leman referred to the lower standards the *gecekondu* people were subjected to. Nevertheless, rather than critically reflecting upon the political and economic processes that led to such inequalities, she added that those neighbourhoods became places where 'terror incidences happen and

terrorists grow' because it was impossible for the people to reach the standards of life that they saw in the city.

To the extent that these middle and upper class residents expected the expansion of middle class values and norms to the urban space and punishment of those who do not comply with them, the ways they invested in the cultural binary between civility/non-civility cannot be analysed as individualised ways of reconstituting their class distinction, as was done in the cultural analyses of the class impact of gentrification (cf. Chapter 2). Their symbolic power over deciding 'who can properly live in the city', that is the power to 'legitimise their world-view' (Bourdieu, 1979), generated political effects, as the way they enacted citizenship as 'civility' corresponded to the official configuration of citizenship as 'obedient'. Thus the maintenance of social images of the *gecekondu* settlers as 'uncivilised/non-modern' legitimised not only the demolition of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods but also the configuration of (housing) rights as granted by the benevolent state in return for obedience. I will come back to this in the last part of this chapter when I analyse the middle and upper class participants' responses to *gecekondu* settlers' political activism.

6.3. Demands of Homogeneity and Isolation

Within the context provided above, what concerned the majority of the upper class and some middle class participants was the smooth and urgent implementation of the projects in *gecekondu* areas. Yet, despite the alliance between the state actors and the affluent residents living in gated communities, the simultaneous promises of inclusion made to the obedient *gecekondu* dwellers through state-led gentrification generated anxiety among the affluent residents. Their residential choices of based on imagined shared class similarities revealed their concerns and disappointment driven by the inclusion of 'the non-modern other'.

In the gated communities, there seemed to be a latent agreement about keeping one's distance. Nilgun was a woman living in Upper Dikmen area in a recently constructed gated community. She compared the previous apartment she lived with that recent one and said:

There we could call our neighbour at night for him to take us to the hospital. Here, there are no such neighbour relations, no such warmth but relatively more distant relations… But I have good neighbours here, too. We are not close though, there is distance. But on the other hand nobody disturbs each other here with their noise or anything. There is a *civilised* life here because *you are together with the people who somehow had the same views of life*. (25.07.2015) (Emphasis added)

Aynur echoed Nilgun saying that:

But I sense such feeling of security in the gated community that I live now… In the former apartment, I mean, there are all kinds of people. Here, for instance, in this gated community, everybody has a shared view in terms of security, life standards, etc. (02.07.2015)

The alleged homogeneity of values served as a compensation for the close and co-operative neighbour relations that were experienced in the previous decades. Despite having spent their childhood in different cities and neighbourhoods, regardless of the class, age, gender differences, almost all of the residents of gated apartments I interviewed told me stories about past trust-based, close neighbour relations as the people living in the same apartment building were like an extended family and the boundaries between public and private space were blurred. In contrast, their current home had now become a 'highly-protected castle of individuals, which made you hesitate even to knock on the people's doors for fear of disturbing them' in the words of Ela, who lived in a 13-storey gated apartment. Nevertheless, only Habibe and Kenan, who were both over 60, were frustrated by the loss of close neighbour relations.

Their demands for isolation and homogeneity conformed to the imaginary ideals of the 'ideal neighbourhood' that was promoted through gentrification. Gated, gentrified places offer a more orderly relation to the space as opposed to the flexibility of the *gecekondu* neighbourhood in terms of the possibility of uses of space. Most of the people who lived in the gentrified part had not ever used the walk ways, parks or cafes in the valley. The orderly parks and ornamental pools rather offered a visually appealing background for the low-income young couples, who were getting engaged and/or married and looking for a cheap place to take photos before the ceremony. Two residents of the gentrified area told me that when they needed to go even a short distance, like the market or the opposite block to visit their friends who lived there, they used their cars as they felt lazy to walk. Their sense of belonging was limited to

their home and their friends' network in different places rather than the neighbourhood in which they lived. Not surprisingly, when I asked them whether they felt attached to where they lived, most of them responded saying that they loved their *home*.

This was also manifested in the photos of the things they liked that they sent me. These were usually of their garden or landscapes of the valley taken from their balcony. What many of the participants liked very much about living in the valley was the spaciousness and the view of the sky and the valley. As many said, living in the city centre *and* isolated from the things associated with inner city namely the density of construction, noise, traffic jam at the same time was the best thing about living in the valley. Berkay said that what he liked very much about his house was that it was 'extremely central and at the same time completely isolated from the outside world'. The photo Ceylan[21] sent me (Figure 30) represented this with the view of the spacious valley, as a result of which she did not have to see another building when she opened her windows. As an example of the things she liked about living in the valley, Nagehan sent me a photo of the view taken from her balcony. Her photo also demonstrated the spacious landscape with ornament pools, walking paths, grasses and high-rise apartment buildings (Figure 31).

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[21] Ceylan was a forty one year old resident in one of the high-rise apartment buildings that were constructed for the resettlement of the former *gecekondu* dwellers in the valley.

Figure 30: Photo sent by Ceylan (40) who lived in a high-rise apartment, in which the former *gecekondu* dwellers were resettled in Dikmen Valley.

Deniz also preferred sending me photos from the garden of the gated community where she lived (Figure 32), which mirrored her demands of isolation referred to in the beginning of the chapter. The photo demonstrated fancy apartment buildings surrounding an empty basketball ground. The photos reflected a more individualised way of relating to the city space. The photos were visually appealing in terms of order — the design of buildings, trees and parks and ostentation — yet they lacked the story of the *people* living in, using and appropriating those places.

Figure 31: A photo sent by Nagehan (46), from her balcony.

Figure 32: A photo sent by Deniz (36) who lived in a gated community in Dikmen district, close to Dikmen Valley.

Michel de Certeau (1984) refers to the 'territorialisation' and 'appropriation' of space through every day ritualised use of space arguing that the repeated use of urban space formed the basis of a sense of belonging. For de Certeau, attachments to place are built on the basis of accumulated knowledge, memory and intimate corporal experiences, and these are gained mainly walking through urban space. These often high-rise gated apartments within well-

organised and maintained gardens and parks in the valley impose a more distant relationship with space as the photos revealed.

In contrast to the middle and upper class participants, the *gecekondu* dwellers I interviewed — including those who had moved to apartment buildings years ago — had a very strong sense of attachment and also ownership to their home and neighbourhood as they had appropriated these places through repeatedly using them for their needs. What was perceived as 'hell' by Berkay meant for the *gecekondu* residents the place where they have spent their adulthood, raised their children, and built close neighbour relations and collectively overcame the challenges of adjusting to the city. The older adults told me the stories of moving to an unknown city, occupying the land with the help of their relatives or fellowmen, purchasing the construction materials with debt or scavenging materials from demolished houses in the first and second phases of the valley, and constructing the *gecekondu* houses in one night. Thus, they had a concrete sense of belonging to the space and made strong claims to it although they did not have legal (thus legitimate) documents proving ownership. In their eyes, what made them rights-holders on these spaces was the time and labour spent transforming a vacant land into a home.

In line with the neoliberal logic of reproducing the urban space for the more affluent users, the demolition of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods was promoted as an unavoidable condition for modernising the cities. The participants living in the *gecekondu* neighbourhood were conscious that the times were changing as the city changed in such a way that was less welcoming for them and their cultural practices. Just like the young adult, Ibo, in chapter 5, every day they witnessed the construction of progressively higher-rise and more luxurious residential and commercial buildings around their neighbourhood. That way, they became subjected to the symbolic violence of gentrification, as it legitimised the inegalitarian social relations through reproducing the city for the more affluent user. What the valley people were trying to figure out was 'why now?' after all those years of tolerance. Mustafa was an adult in his fifties, who had struggled actively against the implementation of the gentrification project. He explained the changes in urban policy and the duplicity of the state towards them, which created resentment. He said if the state did not tolerate them, they would never be able to construct *gecekondu* neighbourhoods:

We did not come here (the city), but you encouraged us to come! You tolerated us when we constructed these houses and then collected taxes and bills of electricity and water. In the election times, you treated us as citizens, you took my vote. Now, how come all of a sudden, I have become an illegal occupier after inhabiting here for 25 years! (01.09.2015)

Osman (29), who was a construction company owner and an owner-occupant in the most prestigious apartments in the valley, explained the reason saying that 'if this man built his *gecekondu* house in another place, not here, and the value of that land had not increased over time, would we call him an illegal occupier in that case?'. He also explicitly stated that the reason why the state promoted purchasing newly constructed homes to the low-income groups was to increase the profits offered to construction companies involved. He then added that the main question we should deal with was why these people moved to the cities from their villages as the cities were no longer able to satisfy the needs of so many people. Thus, despite the fact that he acknowledged the underlying motivations of rent-maximisation in the devaluation and criminalisation of the *gecekondu* people, what concerned him like Ela and Serra was not redistributive questions but prevention of rural-urban migration. The shared emphasis on 'sending them back' revealed that in the eyes of these upper class residents the *gecekondu* settlers, who were either pitied or hated, were not qualified as people who can properly live in the city.

6.4. Unclear Boundaries of Winners and Victims of Gentrification

Far from thinking of going back to the rural areas from where they or their forbears originally came, against the threat of expulsion, almost all of the *gecekondu* people in the valley had purchased apartment flats using bank credits since the announcement of the project, as noted in Chapter 5 and 6. Although they became legal owners of apartment flats elsewhere, it cannot be simply said that they were profiteers of gentrification as they lost the place to which they constructed themselves and felt attached. Despite the deterioration in the physical conditions and the image of the neighbourhood, it was not an easy decision for some of them to leave the valley and move to their new homes.

Mustafa was one of them. He had also purchased a house in another low-income neighbourhood yet he still lived in the valley with his wife and two children. His wife, Ayse, told me that even when they went somewhere else like

their hometown, they did not want to stay there for long. She added that 'when we come here, it's peaceful'. The high-rise apartments associated with 'civility' and promoted as the ideal neighbourhood in publicity materials — like in the weekly municipal bulletins — was as undesirable as displacement.

Moreover, they were still not accepted as equally worthy citizens. Mahir (25) was a former squatter dweller, who had moved to a four-storey apartment block in a middle class neighbourhood next to the grocery store owned by his family. He also told me that he used to know almost everyone in the *gecekondu* neighbourhood but he did not know the person living next to him in the apartment. He was frustrated to see that his neighbours ignored him when they met in the apartment. He thought that the 'decent', 'highly educated', 'modern' residents of the Hosdere district associated neighbourly conduct with backwardness. Thus, the *gecekondu* stigma remained also after he moved to the 'ideal space of citizenship'.

Ulku (70) was a former *gecekondu* dweller who lived in one of the mixed buildings in the valley since 1998, and she told me that in her apartment she observed an enduring struggle between the former *gecekondu* dwellers and the newcomers. The newcomers looked down on the former *gecekondu* dwellers, and once she witnessed a verbal fight between the two. One of the newcomers went to the house of a former *gecekondu* dweller and argued with the parents because their children were making noise on the balcony. Ulku heard a woman yelling '*gecekonducu*'[22] in front of the door of one of the *gecekondu* dwellers, which 'made her feel very angry' and want to get involved in the argument to send her away. She told me that some of the newcomers did not even want to ride the elevator in order to avoid encountering the *gecekondu* people.

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22 *Gecekonducu* literally means the person who makes *gecekondu* but it is an insulting way of calling the *gecekondu* people as it also blames them for making profit out of *gecekondu*.

Figure 33: The view of the valley from across, Hosdere neighbourhood. The high-rise white blocks on the right were constructed for the *gecekondu* owners. When I did my fieldwork, they were resided by mixed groups. The houses on the left are the Park Valley Terrace Houses, which are the most prestigious buildings with best views of the valley. (Photo: Author, 03.04.2015).

On the other hand, more than half of the middle class participants I interviewed were still tenants. In 2015 September, the price of a medium-size apartment flat in the Park Valley Terrace Houses (See Figure 33) in the valley was above 1 million Turkish Liras (220.000 sterling pounds), at least twice as expensive compared to the apartments where the white collar professionals lived. Ceylan (40) was a white-collar worker living in one of the mixed apartments. She purchased her house in 2004 using her own savings and her grandmother's as well as bank credits. Although she was thinking about moving to a new, larger house in the city centre, she could only see those houses in the websites of property agencies. She said that 'Ours are houses of *normal citizens*' in comparison to the extremely expensive prestigious apartments in the valley area. So, she was conscious of the fact that the city space was becoming less affordable even for the 'normal' citizens, by which she meant white collar workers and professionals like her — as well as socially marginalised groups.

Like Ceylan, many middle class participants were attentive to the fact that the housing prices in the city centre were gradually inflating in a speculative way. Aynur (52) was a senior white-collar worker, who had purchased a house in a

more recently constructed gated apartment in the third phase of the valley. She told me that she initially wanted to buy a house from the Park Valley Houses but she gave up due to the 'snob attitude' of the estate agents. She said that it was more expensive than her current house but one of the rooms was dark in daytime as there were no windows. Yet, she added that the estate agents thought they could sell it at that price because of its central location and prestige. She thought that with such attitude the developers exploited her need of housing for more profit. Within the same context, most of the white-collar participants expressed concerns about purchasing new and high-quality houses in the inner city areas.

The affluent participants, who could afford to purchase the houses in the inner city, were receiving gains from speculation. Osman (29) lived in the Park Valley Terrace Houses, which he thought were the best apartments in the valley viewing both sides of the valley. He said that it ended up as a good investment as the housing prices increased one and a half time since 2011 when he purchased his house. He regretted that he had not purchased his house earlier when the terrace houses were constructed as their gains were higher. Hakan (65) lived in the prestigious Park Oran Houses, which were constructed after demolishing the lodgings of the parliament members, said that he purchased the house he lived in both to live in a prestigious residence and as an investment. He added that the price was 700.000 TL (which was approximately 250.000 GBP) when he bought the house in 2012 before the construction was finished, and it became 2.000.000 TL (which was approximately 444.000 GBP) when I interviewed with him in 2015.

Zukin (1987) argues that the motives of the gentrifiers who participated in the back-to-the-city movement in the 1970s in North America, were heterogeneous. They were motivated by an economic rationality as a result of the involvement of larger corporations, speculation and the possibility of higher rents in the process as well as social reproduction as inner city offered proximity to the services, information, and cultural and artistic activities. She adds that the speculative goal of the gentrifiers' property investments outweighed their aesthetic hallmark in terms of its social effect. The quotations from the white-collar workers in Dikmen Valley revealed that far from being the main agents and supporters of gentrification, they were blocked by the reduced opportunities for being able to afford to buy homes in the city centre.

On the other hand, although most of the *gecekondu* dwellers had become legal homeowners — mostly in low-income neighbourhoods — they were still not regarded as proper citizens for living in the city centre. As the narratives of the different groups of affluent citizens made clear, the *gecekondu* people became the absolute other of what was understood as modern. The affluent groups thus demanded to live in 'civilised' places in the city centre together with — but isolated from — 'civilised' people, who would respect their privacy. These discussions on material and symbolic processes demonstrated the blurring boundaries between who benefits from gentrification.

6.5. Denial of the Political Agency of Gecekondu People

The *gecekondu* represented a blurring between not only public and private but also formality and informality. The 'informal' housing settlements in developing countries encompassed activities operating outside of the legal framework defined by the state: they lacked tenure security of land and buildings, were constructed in a do-it-yourself manner, and lacked municipal services, all of which were claimed to imply non-monetary relationships in housing production (Pamuk, 1992, p. 140).

Given that modernism and civility were understood by multiple groups in Turkey in terms of compliance with rules, the ambiguous status of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods represented manifest disobedience to the state authority. Demolishing the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods thus meant annihilating *spaces of noncompliance* to the rules of the state. This confirmed the legitimacy of the state as the authority to set the rules of civility within the context of the state-centrism.

Within this framework, the affluent participants agreed that the high-rise TOKI blocks constructed in the peripheral areas to resettle the *gecekondu* dwellers constituted a much more orderly and thus better view than the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. The most popular example in the interviews was the TOKI blocks constructed on the main highway connecting the city to the airport (See figure 34). Osman thought that the former image of the airport highway full of *gecekondu* houses on the both sides of the road was damaging the prestige of Turkey as that road was used by the high-level bureaucrats when they visited the capital city. Tulin (63), a shop owner in a prestigious shopping mall, was also ashamed of the previous image of the airport way when 'everywhere you

turned your head was full of *gecekondu*'. In these narratives, order and compliance to rules was discussed with reference to modernism.

Figure 34: The TOKI blocks constructed on the airport highway for the former *gecekondu* dwellers living in the area (Source: Anonymous).

The middle class participants and two of the affluent participants, both of who were above the age 60, acknowledged that the state's inadequate housing policies 'forced' people to construct *gecekondu* houses illegally on public land. The common argument was that if there was enough supply of social housing, low-income people would not have to build *gecekondu* houses and live in lower standards. Moreover, by tolerating *gecekondu* construction instead of provision of the social right to housing, the state forced people to live parasitically, Aynur thought.

In the narratives of most of the middle class participants, *gecekondu* neighbourhoods were represented as places of the poor, not the criminal. When I quoted the Mayor's words about the criminal groups living in Dikmen Valley, Bora, who lived in a mixed building in the valley, was very surprised as he said that he never associated *gecekondu* neighbourhoods with such groups. Kivanc, a young public servant living in a high-rise apartment close to the bridge in the valley, also told me that crime did not decline after the project was implemented. He said that the housebreaking incidences that had taken place every year in his apartment building continued.

They supported the demolition of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods and transfer of the inhabitants into apartment buildings for the sake of the *gecekondu* people themselves as those buildings were equipped with better standards and higher quality infrastructure compared to the inferior conditions in the informal settlements. Kivanc had lived adjacently to the *gecekondu* neighbourhood when he first moved to the valley. He said that he was never disturbed by living close to the *gecekondu* neighbourhood. He supported *gecekondu* clearance for the sake of a planned urbanisation and the provision of better living standards for the residents. He said that the people lived under very unhealthy and dangerous conditions there due to bad infrastructure yet he also acknowledged the potential difficulties in adjusting to living in an apartment building after one-story houses with gardens. Deniz, another public servant who was a tenant in a gated community, also thought that TOKI blocks looked like ghettos where they enclosed people, even though she supported *gecekondu* clearance.

Thus, most of the middle class participants living in modest gated and non-gated buildings acknowledged the social costs of gentrification referring to the displacement and social isolation involved. They saw the *gecekondu* areas as unhealthy and disorderly but they did not necessarily establish a link between these qualities and the culture of the *gecekondu* people. They were conscious about what was going on beneath the surface as they also referred to corrupt and rent-seeking motives of the public and private actors involved — particularly the TOKI and the pro-government construction companies — and the potential rental gains offered by transforming the *gecekondu* areas.

Yet, they still supported *gecekondu* clearance and construction of TOKI houses as the latter looked more orderly, thus, 'felt more developed' (Bora). They thought that the transformation was for the betterment of the *gecekondu* people themselves as it would bring them better and healthier standards. In that, they reproduced themselves as 'highly educated, politically conscious citizens' who could analyse the complex processes whereas the *gecekondu* people were 'poorly educated, low income citizens', who might not comprehend what was best for them and the rest of the city.

The more affluent citizens living in the prestigious gated apartments predominantly represented the *gecekondu* people in a manifestly criminalising

way as the 'illegal occupier/disobedient other'. Leman, an owner-occupier in a moderate gated apartment close to Dikmen Valley, told me that she used to feel very sorry before when she saw the demolition news on TV but she got 'very angry' when she saw that those people started to 'claim rights' on the state's land that they had occupied unjustly. Although she acknowledged the earlier provision of title deeds by the state, she still saw those claims as illegitimate.

It was difficult for them to understand why the *gecekondu* people did not support urban transformation projects which offered them legal homeownership in new apartment buildings, which actually they did not deserve. The right to shelter struggle in the valley was explained by Nilgun in terms of the 'protest culture' of *gecekondu* people. She said that in such neighbourhoods, protest was part of their culture; they wanted to keep their neighbourhood as it was without knowing why. In this way, she not only neglected the experiences of displacement and indebtedness but also trivialised *gecekondu* people's rights-based claims to be recognised as equally worthy citizens.

Some of the affluent participants thought that the *gecekondu* people were greedy as they linked the struggles for the right to shelter to the motive of getting a bigger share of the increased urban land values. Osman, for instance, thought that the current *gecekondu* settlers living in Dikmen Valley were 'awakened' as they had the rationality that the longer you wait, the more luxurious construction is made and the higher the price of the land becomes. Hakan and Berkay also thought that the ones who opposed the projects wanted two or three houses in return for their *gecekondu* house/land instead of just one. Hulya said that struggling was part of the 'politics of exploiting the state'. In contrast to Aynur, who addressed inadequate state policies in terms of forcing the *gecekondu* residents to become parasitic, Hulya put the blame on the latter.

By more affluent residents, the *gecekondu* dwellers were not seen as right-bearing individuals with the power to claim their rights. As the 'undeserving', or 'criminal' other, they were expected to *obey* the terms offered the state when implementing the projects. For Nilgun, for instance, what the struggling *gecekondu* communities did was 'talk back to the state' for giving them a smaller share from the rental gains offered by the projects. Hakan, an owner of

a constructor company and an owner-occupier in a prestigious gated community was heavily concerned about the smooth progress of gentrification. He demanded more urgent and top-down implementation of gentrification:

> There is this *gecekondu* dweller; he resists the urban transformation project and refuses to leave the house. But, is that your own property? OK, you constructed this but a highway will be constructed on that land now. He applies to the court, and there is no decision in five years! The state must enact a law, if there needs to be a highway on that land, *the state should have no pity*. Take your money! It's less than the value! What's less? The land is not yours, it belongs to the state! *Nothing can be done against the state*! (12.09.2015) (Emphasis added).

His words represented the state as the main and the only actor that can set the codes of urbanisation and criminalised the rights-based claims to substantive citizenship. He added that, as illegal occupiers, the *gecekondu* people had no right to claim and the state could even cut off their electricity and water if it wanted. Nagehan supported gentrification as long as the state was 'just when providing housing rights to its citizens and did not give the *gecekondu* people new houses for free in return for illegally occupied land. Thus, the authoritarian promotion of obedient participation in urban transformation projects and punitive measures against any form of opposition were legitimate in the eyes of Hakan.

On the other hand, for some participants urban transformation was not a question worthy of attention whether or not the process was done in a just way so long as the *gecekondu* people were transferred to the peripheral areas from the city centre. Despite saying that the act of illegally occupying the land was tyrannical, Berkay thought that we needed to be 'merciful'. The solution he proposed was to transfer the right-holder *gecekondu* people from the inner-city project areas:

> If you want, more luxurious, higher-quality apartments might still be constructed there as well. Maybe, they can be given title-deeds in other places… I mean, places in the peripheries of the city. They can be sent there instead of keeping them here. Maybe then, it will be more proper. (11.08.2015)

Hazal agreed with him saying that the transfer of the *gecekondu* people from the project area should not be left to their personal initiatives; as they 'of course would not want to leave such a place' like the valley. She emphasised

that the state should 'comply with' the wishes of the *gecekondu* people. She suggested that it should construct places with facilities like schools in it, and people should be informed beforehand, and 'convinced' to move, as forced eviction would only lead them to resist and delay the implementation of the projects. Thus, she gave consent for the inclusion of the *gecekondu* people in the process in a way that reserved the city centre for the more affluent users.

Lust but not least, Ela, who worked as an adviser in the Presidency, saw the provision of new houses for cheap in return for 'illegally occupied' *gecekondu* house/land as social aid which was totally unproblematic saying that, 'among thousands of the new houses constructed, a single house will be given to them; so be it'. Calling the *gecekondu* settlers who benefitted from the projects as 'poor people to whom the state should show mercy', she added that the gains made by the *gecekondu* people lacking title deeds were, and should be, tolerable bearing in mind the huge benefits of the large-scale constructors and the municipalities involved. Although she did not blame or criminalise the *gecekondu* settlers unlike the abovementioned participants, she echoed their narratives as she overlooked the rights-based struggles and thus conceptualised the struggling *gecekondu* communities as de-politicised groups lacking the power to influence the political processes and decisions.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the symbolic struggles over 'who can properly live in the city' by the middle and upper class groups who lived through gentrification in and/or close to Dikmen Valley in relation to the changing property structures throughout gentrification. This chapter argues that in line with the embedded state-centrism in the modernisation process in Turkey, state-led, non-participatory gentrification process promised the modern city that the urban middle and upper class citizens had dreamed of. Clearance of non-modern *gecekondu* neighbourhoods from the city centre was attached to this promise in a way that legitimised the former groups' claims to modernism.

Through enacting citizenship as civility, which was defined on the basis of order, they consented to the demolition of non-modern *gecekondu* areas and transfer of the residents to 'modern' apartment buildings constructed in the peripheral areas by TOKI. In so doing, however, these groups also consented to the authoritarian and non-participatory redevelopment of urban space, which

reinforced an understanding of citizenship not only as bestowed by the state in return for obedience but also criminalising rights-based claims. The focus on the symbolic power of the dominant groups revealed that the middle and upper class groups not only participate in gentrification as consumers of the gentrified houses but also as political actors, whose mundane class practices generate political impacts.

Thus, by taking political processes and motives into account this chapter demonstrates that inclusion in gentrification was promised on the basis of allegiance as well as consumption power. This revealed that the relation of the affluent groups to the contemporary gentrification in Turkey cannot be understood solely with reference to middle-class take back of the city following the processes of de-industrialisation and successive expansion of white-collar jobs. Far from being the main agents and supporters of gentrification process, the middle class participants in my study were financially threatened by the speculative urban redevelopment. By relating this to the provision of the obedient *gecekondu* settlers with cheap credits to become home owners, this chapter revealed the ways state-led gentrification complicated class dynamics. The next chapter will explore the ways struggling *gecekondu* communities in Dikmen Valley contested the complex processes of inclusion and exclusion throughout gentrification and enacted their own understanding of citizenship vis-à-vis those centred on obedience and civility.

Chapter 7: From a Struggle of Rights to a Demand of Deservingness

In this chapter, I explore the Right to Shelter Struggle in Dikmen Valley, which has been a leading example in Turkey as a resistance against gentrification-led displacement by the *gecekondu* people lacking title deeds. The accounts on its initial phases as well as the leftist-oriented news media emphasise that the struggle brought a heterogeneous *gecekondu* population together against exclusion. These, however, overlook the complex ways the *gecekondu* people negotiated with complex processes of inclusion and exclusion through gentrification.

Drawing upon the differences between what I had read about the valley and the data I collected through 26 in-depth interviews I conducted with 7 former and 19 current *gecekondu* dwellers, the group interviews and random chats as well as the participant observations in the *gecekondu* neighbourhood throughout my fieldwork from January to October 2015, I offer an analysis of the right to shelter struggle as a long-term, dynamic *process* during which multiple actors interact in a changing field. Analysing these interactions, I aim to reveal the inner tensions and contradictions generated through the complex combination of promises of gentrification and its disciplining efforts.

I offer a temporal analysis of the Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter Struggle to elaborate these complexities. I first shed light upon the fragile ground of political activism against the state referring to the projections of the embedded state-centrism when approaching the *gecekondu* populations. Then, I focus on the transformative character of the Dikmen Valley struggle, which was beyond effective mobilisation. Drawing upon Isin's concept of the 'right to claim rights' (2009), I elaborate the emergence of the traditionally obedient *gecekondu* people as claim makers. Finally, I detect the different challenges to the right making potential of the struggle.

7.1. Fragile Ground of Political Activism

The Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter Struggle, with over 9 years standing, has acquired a symbolic importance beyond its own boundaries, for its ability to mobilise a heterogeneous and vulnerable population. While the process of mobilisation drew much attention in the academic studies, in the leftist-oriented news media, it has been regarded as the symbol of the struggle for the right to shelter in Turkey. Thus, before I started my fieldwork, I was excited about going to the neighbourhood and meeting the struggling communities there.

I got access to the neighbourhood through two different members of the PH, who had been active in the struggle from the beginning. My first visit to the neighbourhood was in February 2015 when my partner took me there by car, as the neighbourhood was denied public transport facilities after they started political activism against the project. As I travelled to the Right to Shelter Bureau where the members of the PH were waiting for me, I saw people walking in groups, presumably to the bureau to attend the weekly meeting. I could see that as we passed by they were examining the stranger's car. I got out of the car where two women, who were informed by my gatekeeper, were waiting for me. The younger one was a member of the PH whereas the other one was not. As I walked with them to the bureau, the former immediately asked me where I knew the gatekeeper from — who was also a member of the PH — to understand whether I had any affiliation with the PH.

The older woman (Begum) — whom I also interviewed a few weeks later — also asked me which city and village I was from. This is a question asked usually by rural-origin people in order to understand whether the person is Alevi or Sunni.[23] In Turkey, the population of the villages is homogenous in terms of religious sect and ethnic origin. This is also relevant for some neighbourhoods of the cities where both Alevi and Sunni people live.

My first impression was different than I had expected as I thought I was going to find a 'united' neighbourhood based on what I had read. However, as opposed to the earlier observations of a non-hierarchical mobilisation without leadership (Aykan, 2011), the leading presence of the PH in the neighbourhood

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23 Sunnism is the orthodox sect, and Alevism is the main heterodox sect among the Muslim population in Turkey.

was explicit, as will be discussed below. When we arrived at the bureau, I noticed the red poster hanging on top of the bureau (see figure 35) saying that 'we have constructed with pains, won't give up to rentiers'. It indicated politicisation and collective disapproval of rent-seeking urban redevelopment. Before long, I was going to discover that this no longer represented the truth.

Figure 35: People waiting for the weekly meeting to start in the garden of the Right to Shelter Bureau. Note the orange poster above the door saying 'We have constructed with pains, won't give up to rentiers'. (Photo: Author: 26.07.2015).

The right to shelter bureau was opened in 2006 when the valley people transformed an empty *gecekondu* house situated in the centre of the neighbourhood into a place to discuss what to do about the gentrification project. This was in response to the opening of a bureau by the municipality in the adjacent Yildiz neighbourhood — which the valley people called 'the demolition bureau' — to invite the people to accept the terms of the project and sign the contract. Later, a container house was put next to this, where hardbound and online documents such as legal reports and books regarding the gentrification project in the valley were stored. Since then, the right to shelter bureau had been the centre where the valley people were informed about the process in weekly meetings and provided with consultancy about what to do by the representative figures of the struggle.

We arrived at the bureau and the younger woman introduced me to Tarik, the representative of the struggle, and told him that I wanted to do fieldwork in

the neighbourhood. Tarik was a member of the PH, who had been living in the valley for decades. After welcoming me in a distanced manner, he also asked me questions about who I was. The university I graduated from, the Middle East Technical University, was famous for its radical activism, thus, the name enabled me to create a positive impression. He was a revolutionary leftist, who went to jail for his activism throughout the 1970s. As part of such activism the *gecekondu* neighbourhood in the Dikmen Valley was established as noted earlier.

His leftism was still anti-imperialist and orthodox Marxist as he evaluated gentrification in Turkey with respect to the single logic of accumulation of global capital. He asked me questions about what I understood from gentrification. I felt that during our discussion for 15-20 minutes he tested whether my approach was critical enough to do research about the Dikmen Valley, thus whether I could be trusted. I emphasised that I had a critical approach to gentrification, and I wanted to analyse it from below focusing on the lay experiences. After our conversation, before leaving the bureau to attend the weekly meeting held in the adjacent *gecekondu* house, he told me gently 'you can come whenever you want'. By doing so, he announced my permission to do my research in the neighbourhood.

That day, I attended the weekly meeting for the first time. I was surprised to see that there were about 30 participants, who sat around the stove and listened to the speech of Tarik quietly and concernedly. Based on what I had read, I expected to see people collectively setting out the topics and discussing them in the meetings in a way that reproduced their claim-making potential and solidarity. However, the people seemed to be there to be informed about the process which was led by Tarik and a few other activist figures. Tarik also complained about people's reluctance to attend the meetings and actively monitor the process.

Another surprising thing for me was that I met two sisters of primary school age before the meeting. The first question they asked me was if I was a member of the PH, and the second one was if I went to Cem house.[24] This made me think that the children were accustomed to seeing strangers from particular groups in the neighbourhood. On the one hand, being asked such

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24 Cem house is the place of worship in the Alevi Islam, the main heterodox sect in Islam. Thus, it was a question about my religious sect.

questions revealed the significance of the issue of trust in strangers — undoubtedly due to the long-lasting conflicts with the local state and high level of stigmatisation and criminalisation of the neighbourhood. On the other, the fact that trust was attached to belonging to particular religious and political groups implied a strongly polarised world view in direct contrast to the representation of the struggle as having mobilised people and overwhelmed cultural and political divisions.

The process of mobilising a collective struggle had been challenging. Traditionally, *gecekondu* people, as the 'others' of the civilised, urbanite citizens, tended to vote for the mainstream political parties so as to be integrated to the mainstream society, a decidedly conservative political strategy grounded in inclusion not rebellion. Except for engaging with radical leftist activists in the 1970s, *gecekondu* neighbourhoods were famous for their allegiance to the local and national governments, in return for which they received state tolerance of informality. In particular, they were bribed with a share from the transformation of *gecekondu* houses into apartment buildings through amnesty laws to deter political activism against the state (Erman, 2001, pp. 986-987).

Thus, the valley people were initially sceptical of the idea of insurgence against the state and hesitated to be involved in a resistance movement, although they were unwilling to leave their houses. Then, a couple of households, who had been involved in political activism, came forward and turned one of the *gecekondu* houses in the centre of the neighbourhood into the Right to Shelter Bureau. People initially hesitated to go there but over time they started to go to the meetings to be informed about the process. Thus, the mobilisation was spontaneous rather than being a movement led by revolutionary subjects.

Activism was not a smooth process for the leading activists whom I interviewed, either. They told me about the doors shut in their faces, and the insults and humiliation they were subjected to when they went to the houses to talk to the people. One of them was Aysel (45), who worked as a tea maker in a private company. She was telling me about the initial processes when the bureau was established, saying that:

> We have never become part of a political organisation before; we have no idea! ... I mean how do we rebel against the state? We have that mentality,

you know. Then we said 'Ok, let's do it'! You know, you venture upon something, but what will happen? Is there a hole in front of you? Will you fall? Will you die? Let's do it! We went from house to house, distributed leaflets, spoke to the people… I mean we were telling them in our own way, what could we tell them? Because, I had no knowledge about it! I mean I was saying to myself when I went to bed at night 'can we really do it; can we rebel against the state?' (01.02.2015)

She described herself as 'an ordinary person, who is just concerned about welcoming her husband from work and providing a good future for her children'. This definition echoed the de-politicised, thus non-threatening behaviours of the *gecekondu* populations, which had been desired by the state and rewarded with inclusion into the urban space.

Because of the embedded state-centrism and the traditional contract between the state officials and *gecekondu* populations based on tolerance in return for allegiance, political activism was constructed on a fragile ground from the very beginning. However, in 2006 urban transformation project in the fourth and fifth phases of the valley was announced unilaterally by the greater municipality without any prior information or negotiation. Written notices were sent to dwellers lacking title deeds to sign the contract and evacuate their houses in 15 days. This indicated an unexpected change in the traditional contract based on tolerance and loyalty. Despite their hesitance, the sudden withdrawal of the state tolerance led the *gecekondu* dwellers in the valley, most of who lacked legal title-deeds as well as another place to go, to participate in some way in political activism or at least maintain staying in their houses although they were not necessarily involved in activism.

When the project was announced there were 1,084 households holding title deeds and 1,200 households lacking it (Deniz, 2010, p. 104 cited in Aykan, 2011, p. 29). The former was offered either to be relocated in apartment houses in the valley or sell their houses at a price much cheaper than the market value. In contrast to the early phases of the project — which excluded those lacking title deeds with environmental concerns in order to keep the construction density in the valley low — were included in the project, which was due to the political concerns of promoting obedience as well as economic concerns to include low-income people into the housing market. They were offered to be relocated to the Doğukent area, which was at the time an empty land 30 km away from the valley. They were also asked to pay 16,000 Turkish

Liras in advance for the apartment houses that were promised to be constructed on that land.

The *gecekondu* settlers who lacked title deeds claimed that they were as legitimate right-holders on the land as those holding title deeds and demanded to be offered the same conditions. This claim was based upon the long-lasting efforts and suffering caused by having to endure living in the absence of services in low-quality houses that they had constructed overnight. They blamed the state's inability to provide affordable shelter for low-income groups. They saw themselves equal to the holders of title deeds on the basis of *sense* of belonging and ownership, in contrasts to the official interpretations based on legality. So, they continued to stay in the valley.

In response to that, the municipality sent demolition teams with more than 5,000 anti-riot forces to the neighbourhood on the 1st February, 2007 to demolish 7 *gecekondu* houses, in which the municipality claimed the leading figures of the resistance movement lived. The clashes and violent attacks with pepper gas and water cannon lasted in different parts of the neighbourhood throughout the day, and 14 people were taken into custody. Although the demolitions were not carried out that day, the valley people were given the message about the insistence of the local state on implementing the project.

Most of the people who did not hold title deeds felt weak vis-à-vis such powerful and violent state actors due to fear of forced displacement. Nevertheless, state violence was responded in diverse ways. Hundreds of households gradually moved from the neighbourhood following the 1st February attack whereas on the other hand initial inhibitions about engagement in political activism weakened for some. Gulsen (40) was one of them. She started attending the weekly meetings as well as the protests outside the neighbourhood secretly from her husband, who did not want his family to be associated with the radical activists in case the municipality made any offers in the future. Nevertheless, Gulsen referred to the proverb 'the finger cut by the state does not hurt'[25], and added that 'but it does; you suffer great hardship'. This revealed her readiness to defy the local state for her right to shelter as well as embedded gender hierarchies in her family.

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25 A proverb meaning that the rule of law is always for justice even when it involves violence. So long as the law maker is the state, people have tended to obey the existing order even though they disapprove.

7.2. Becoming Right-Claimers

By the end of 2006, almost all of the title-deed holders signed the contracts and left the valley. Around 3,000 people without title deeds and 25-30 households with it and very few tenants were on the other hand involved in the resistance movement (Aykan, 2011, p. 47). Their struggle to be included in the process on equal terms with the ones holding title deeds and relocated in the valley created an impact beyond the boundaries of the valley. This was because of the fact that they were claiming rights to the space they illegally occupied without having a legal title deed. The *gecekondu* dwellers without title deeds expressed their will to participate in the gentrification process as right-claimers.

Engin Isin (2009) analyses the struggles of *sans-papiers* demanding their right to stay in Paris and the right to regularised status. He draws upon Arendt's conceptualisation of being political as the 'capacity to act' (Arendt, 1969: 179 cited in Isin, 2009, p. 380), which is defined as 'to actualise a rupture in the given, to enact the unexpected and unpredictable' (Sartre, 1957, p. 613; Arendt, 1958, p. 178 cited in Isin, 2009, p. 380). He argues that the importance of *sans-papiers* is not that they simply pointed to the injustice of their situation and sought their 'human rights'. Rather, they *enacted themselves as citizens* by usurping the right to *claim* rights (p. 381, Emphasis added). Through this example, Isin develops the concept of 'activist citizenship' as that which makes a break, a 'rupture' in the public sphere. Because of this rupture-making potential, this kind of activism is different from other democratic processes, such as voting, taxpaying and enlisting (p. 380).

Drawing on his emphasis on 'acts that make a break in the given', I evaluate the right to shelter struggle in Dikmen Valley as an act of citizenship. The Dikmen Valley struggle is important not only because of *what* it did, that is the effective mobilisation of a highly heterogeneous group of people — as underlined in the existing literature — but also because of *how* it did it, in other words, what people have become throughout the mobilisation process. Hereby I offer an analysis of struggle from two interconnected aspects: as a practice that enacts the *gecekondu* settlers mostly lacking title deeds as right claimers and, by so doing, refashioning citizenship in a way that challenges the understanding of 'granted rights' embedded in the political culture of Turkey and promoted throughout gentrification. From this perspective, the right to shelter struggle in Dikmen Valley was a struggle in which the people lacking legal title deeds

demanded to be included in the redistribution of urban lands among different urban actors and they did it through *claiming* their right to become parts of the decision-making process about the urban space. By actually appropriating their right to claim rights despite the absence of legal title deeds, they enabled themselves as claim-making citizens.

This is pioneering within the context of Turkey, where the potential of 'ordinary people' (in Aysel's words) for making and mobilising around rights-based claims had been eroded by the state-centric, duty-based configuration of citizenship and populist tolerance of informality, in particular. The act of refusing to leave the land which they did not legally possess defied the traditional compliance of the *gecekondu* settlers, who had been governed by the ruling politicians as 'apolitical' subjects. In doing that, the rebellious groups in the valley claimed not only the right to shelter but also to be recognised as equally capable and worthy to participate in the urban decision-making processes as opposed to the official promotion of obedient participation in state-led projects.

The act of claim-making through the right to shelter struggle helped the *gecekondu* people compensate for the 'hidden injuries', which had created 'ambivalence about their right to be angry at social hierarchies' (Sennett and Cobb, 1993, p. 79). As opposed to the on-going criminalisation of rights-based claims and the promotion of obedient citizenship, the power and solidarity derived from collective right claiming promised them 'activist citizenship'.

This targeted the traditional gap between the formal and substantive aspects of their citizenship. Holston and Appadurai (1996, p. 190) explain this gap, arguing that it is growing within the context of globalisation:

> If the formal refers to membership in the nation-state and the substantive to the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights people possess and exercise, much of the turmoil of citizenship derives from the following problem: although in theory full access to rights depends on membership, in practice that which constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent of its formal status. In other words, formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship. That it is not sufficient is obvious for many poor citizens who have formal membership in the state but who are excluded in fact or law from enjoying the rights of citizenship and participating effectively in its organization.

This indicates the class aspect hidden by the promise of formal equality by citizenship. There has always been a disjunction between the formal and substantive aspect of citizenship of the *gecekondu* residents, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4 within the context of the historical development of the citizenship regime in Turkey. The rural migrants' right to housing was denied due to the absence of social housing. Their solution was based on insurgence against state authority as they illegally occupied urban land and constructed their *gecekondu* houses overnight. They strategically supported the mainstream governments that tolerated their illegal occupation and maintenance of rural way of living in the city, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Despite being formal members of the state, the fact that their presence in the city depended on state's populist tolerance disguised the state's incapacity to meet the housing requirements of its citizens and blocked their access to the means to *exercise* and *claim* rights as they were concerned with maintaining the political support.

By enacting themselves as rights claimers, therefore, the actors in the Dikmen Valley right to shelter struggle created a rupture in the long-lasting consensus between the state officials and the *gecekondu* people about the disjunction between the latter's formal and substantive citizenship. Through making rights-based claims to redistribution and recognition as opposed to the traditional tendencies of *gecekondu* people towards integration into mainstream politics, the valley people imagined themselves as citizens, who were not only formal members of the state with constitutional rights but also with the capacity to claim their rights.

Within this context, Haydar, one of the leading figures in the right to shelter struggle, likened their 9-year struggle to a university in which they learnt how to become citizens through embracing their right to claim rights:

> **Haydar**: Since we established the right to shelter bureau, big things have changed. We have discovered that we are persons, *we are citizens*. (Emphasis added)

> **Oznur**: Were you not citizens before?

> **Haydar**: Really, citizen, I mean, let's say this. The elected head of the neighbourhood, when he said 'come, countryman'… there was clientelism.

There was religious sectarianism. There were also localisms. You are from Kars, from Sivas, from Yozgat, from Malatya, from Corum.[26] There were these kinds of things.

Oznur: And these divisions were separating you?

Haydar: Yes, they were.

Oznur: So, Alevi people did not interact much with Sunni people, for instance?

Haydar: No, they did not, really! But after the 1st February, we have become united, constituted a great unity. We believed in each other. When we started the struggle, we really believed in each other. (20.03.2015)

The valley had originally been organised based on homogenous blocks by a political community tied through customs, and religious and ethnic identities, who had limited or no interaction with one another. The shared threat of displacement led those heterogeneous groups not only to act in solidarity — as emphasised in the existing studies — but also and more importantly to view themselves and each other as 'holders of right claims'.

I had a chance to talk to two former *gecekondu* owner women who were resettled in the high-rise apartment buildings in the 2nd and 3rd phases of the project area. Both of them told me they were very grateful to the local state for making them legal homeowners in the valley, which they could have never imagined if the urban transformation project had not taken place. One of them, Ülkü, was a retired nurse at early 80s, who thought that God rewarded her for her hard work after long years of suffering in a *gecekondu* house.

She also mentioned that the implementation of the project took 4 years, during which some of her neighbours started to think that they were deceived by fake promises of replacement in the valley, and denounced the local state officials. She carefully distinguished herself from those people because she knew that she had no right to the land which she occupied without paying any rent thanks to the state tolerance. She thought that the on-going struggle in the valley was in vain, as the state would do whatever it wanted eventually. She

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26 These are the names of the Central and Eastern Anatolian cities in Turkey. The people used to live in the villages of these cities before they migrated to Ankara in the 1970s onwards. They settled in Dikmen valley together with their country folk, constituting homogenous blocks of people based on hometown in the neighbourhood.

suggested that they should be 'smart' and accept the terms offered by the local state, given that their claim to the land was, in her view, illegitimate. Thus, watching her *gecekondu* house become a modern apartment with the greatest view of the valley – in her opinion – and becoming a homeowner there had reinforced Ulku's notion of rights as bestowed from above. She thought that as long as the citizens remained loyal to the state they would be rewarded.

In contrast to Ülkü's supposedly civilised obedience, the actors of the right to shelter struggle created a rupture in her equation through integrating claim-making with citizenship and daring to denounce the state for ineffective housing policies. The neighbourhood became a new site of struggle as they collectively dealt with maintenance issues and providing security through keeping watch and reporting anything suspicious to the bureau. Begum also told me that they also attained multiple representatives from the PH members, who were responsible of the different areas in the neighbourhood.

Moreover, to reclaim the sense of belonging and establish solidarity beyond the neighbourhood, the bureau organised annual valley festivals, concerts, film screenings and workshops in the neighbourhood, invited domestic and foreign researchers and artists, and attended academic seminars and meetings of other right to shelter struggles in different parts of Turkey to share their experiences and build solidarity. Within the context of their call for justice, the bureau members effectively collaborated with lawyers, academics, and chambers of architects and urban planners to get assistance on legal issues to take the 'unlawful' decisions and practices of the local state to the court. The PH with its long-lasting experience of struggle for rights was very influential in terms of building solidarity beyond the neighbourhood and providing necessary information and resources for the valley people to embrace the right to shelter struggle (Aykan, 2011, p. 52).

Becoming rights claimers also turned the inside of the home to a new site of contestation. Women in particular stuck heart and soul to the right to shelter struggle, in contrast to often more cautious approach of men regarding widening the extent of right-claims. Almost everybody including the men with whom I spoke agreed that if it were not for the women of the valley, the struggle would have ended earlier. Gülsen, a married woman at her forties, said that she started to feel stronger and more self-confident after becoming

part of the right to shelter struggle as opposed to her initial fear of becoming associated with political activism. Aysel, another married woman, similarly told me that she was grateful to the right to shelter struggle for teaching her how to claim and struggle for rights:

> It was very useful for us, really. I mean I couldn't otherwise defend myself like this when friends (researchers) came to speak to me. I couldn't even speak maybe. I mean I couldn't express myself… I, for example, wouldn't dare to say something to my husband when something unjust happened, maybe I wouldn't be able to pursue my rights. I have realised all these, the rights of women, the struggle for rights. Maybe, I would just do what I have learnt from my family. Maybe, if there was a conversation in public, I would not speak when I disagree, or at least hesitate to speak. But now, I speak straight away, claim my right. (01.02.2015)

Thus, claiming their right to shelter in public space, as these women recalled, enabled them to start questioning and to challenge their patriarchal subordination. Likewise, mobilisation of right to shelter struggle encouraged a process whereby the *gecekondu* settlers mostly lacking legal title deeds felt empowered to question and denounce the populist urban policies and on-going citizenship regime, which had together managed class inequalities in such a way that they would not become a subject of activism against the state. As a result, their right to shelter struggle created a broader impact beyond the borders of the valley.

7.3. Detaching the Claims to Citizenship from Claims to Right to Shelter

When I arrived in the neighbourhood in 2015, what I saw was very different from what should be expected of such rupture-making struggle. Out of more than 3,000 participants, only around 500 residents were left, and 200 of them were not involved in political activism against the state although they remained in the neighbourhood. To shed light upon how the claim-making potential of the right to shelter struggle eroded over time, temporality needs to be integrated into the analysis of the struggle to capture the dynamism and complexity of the process, which cannot be reduced to a single experience of a united community.

The analyses of the right to shelter struggle from the perspective of the process of mobilisation of a heterogeneous population on the basis of rights (Deniz,

2009; Aykan, 2011; Ozen et al., 2012) and from a legal perspective as a struggle of uncertified *gecekondu* possessors to be eligible stakeholder (Karaguney, 2009) overlook the rupture-making potential of claiming rights. While the former accounts, as witnesses of the earlier phases of the movement, emphasise the success of mobilisation they overlook the inner tensions and contradictions. The latter, on the other hand, judges the claims of the struggling *gecekondu* dwellers as illegitimate due to the absence of legal title deeds.

The right to shelter struggle is viewed by the leading figures of the PH as an extension of working class struggle and reincarnation of revolutionary movements of the 1970s. Tarik, for instance, conceptualised the *gecekondu* dwellers lacking title deeds as an 'exploited class' and the right to shelter struggle as a class struggle against the exploitation of global capitalism. However, the picture was much more complicated because of the complexities brought by the changes in the neoliberal housing market through the expansion of consumer and particularly housing credits.

Tok and Oğuz (2011, p. 13) argue that gentrification encourages home ownership to create active, responsible home owners. In line with this, they address the processes through which the housing and credit markets in Turkey were restructured through a series of legal regulations. Accordingly, the people living in *gecekondu* houses without holding a title deed were encouraged to become legal homeowners in the social housing estates constructed by the Mass Housing Administration (which also provided cheap housing credit/loans). As noted above in Chapter 5, the ruling Justice and Development Party government made legal regulations aiming to restructure the housing finance sector, which had traditionally been weak.

Within the context of the criminalisation of rights-based struggles and promotion of legal homeownership as a path of inclusion to 'deserving citizenship', people were forced to think more seriously about finding a place to go in case of forced eviction, which would no longer be unexpected. As a result, many valley people used bank credits with long-term instalments to purchase legal houses to secure themselves in case of any forced eviction. When I did my fieldwork, there were less than 10 households who had not purchased apartment houses in other low-income neighbourhoods or TOKI

estates in the peripheries in Ankara. Some households, especially larger families with 3 or 4 people working, had bought more than one house and rented them to pay their credit debt with the income. Thus, they were still living in their *gecekondu* house to which they felt attached and viewed as a house rather than a commodity.

Some people, on the other hand, had moved to those apartment houses because of the increasing deterioration in the valley and criminalisation of the struggle. Yet, they had not demolished their *gecekondu* house with expectations of future rental gains in case an agreement would be signed with the municipality. As the settled residents in the neighbourhood and some PH members told me, from time to time, those people, who had moved outside, were visiting the bureau to check whether there was any news about the project. Moreover, when the news about the recommencement of the negotiations with the municipality spread in May 2015 onwards, the number of the participants in the weekly meetings started to increase.

Purchasing legal apartment house/s provided the *gecekondu* people without title deeds with security against the threat of forced eviction. There were men who talked about economic gains as the main achievements of the struggle. Eren (29) said for instance that his family was 'grateful to the mayor for being so cruel in the beginning that they realised that they had to take precautions'. What he referred to as precautions was to purchase apartment houses with bank credits. Kartal was a man at his late fifties, who moved in 2011 to the apartment house he had bought. He was also thankful to the struggle because through delaying the implementation of the project, it extended the duration in which he stayed in his *gecekondu* house, and as he did not pay any rent enabled him to make savings — with which he bought an apartment house.

On the other hand, the indebtedness fragmented them as each one of them became concerned with the repayment of their debt. As a result, the valorisation and strength derived from collective right claims started to erode. That is why Kartal referred to the 'profit' *he* made rather than the 'rights' *they* claimed as the gains of the struggling process. Henceforth, they were no longer *gecekondu* people without title deeds who make rights-based claims to be included in the decision-making processes about where they live. As financial inclusion made people '"monetary conservatives" who were more concerned

with inflation than wealth distribution' (Watson, 2008), people started to make calculations of their profit. Financial inclusion thus changed the *gecekondu* people's relationship to the space and weakened the claims to ownership of the land/house on the basis of 'enduring efforts to make a vacant land a liveable place in the absence of welfare services', which Holston (1998) describes as insurgent citizenship. More importantly, their voluntary involvement in credit markets undermined the rupture-making capacity of their rights-based claims as successful participation in market transactions was recognised as the condition for inclusion.

The on-going deterioration of the neighbourhood in the absence of municipal services also generated erosion in people's place attachment. Delaying the implementation of the project and staying in the neighbourhood did not help the feelings of displacement as people had to live among the ruins of the demolished houses that were abandoned by their neighbours in a gradually deteriorating neighbourhood as a result of withdrawal of municipal services (See Figure 36). Displacement was there in the sense of 'feelings of loss connected with a home that might be imminently lost and the cherished place around it' (Atkinson, 2015, p. 373). Ismail told me that he loved the vitality in the neighbourhood when people used to sit together in the evenings in the yards in front of the *gecekondu* houses, chatting and playing games while drinking tea. But after they left, the neighbourhood 'felt like dead'. Thus, he had also moved to an apartment house in the adjacent Ilker neighbourhood in 2011.

In the interviews, most of the participants were keener to talk about their memories in the neighbourhood before the struggle started. Begum (55), a prominent figure in the struggle told me during a group interview with her, her husband and her son that she was thankful to the Mayor for being so brutal against their struggle. She added that his effective criminalisation and continuous police attacks made the people unite against a shared threat and the struggling process brought her together with the neighbours that she had not known before. However, weeks later, during a spontaneous walk I took together with her in the neighbourhood without a voice recorder and without anybody from her family and neighbours, she told me that she missed the times before the struggle started when she was happier with the limited number of neighbours she knew back then.

Figure 36: Wastes of recyclers and ruins of abandoned houses in the *gecekondu* neighbourhood (Photo: Ela, 9-year old resident of the valley, 22.03.2015).

As gradually more people abandoned the neighbourhood, already existing deterioration led by disinvestment intensified. Just as the claim maker valley people without title deeds became legal homeowners worried about economic gains and losses, the neighbourhood was no longer the place they had constructed and maintained together.

This process of abandoning the neighbourhood gained momentum particularly after 2011 following the increasing criminalisation of *gecekondu* by the local and national state and the enactment in 2012 of Law no. 6303, known as the Disaster Law (see chapter 5). As part of that law, Dikmen Valley was declared a risky area that needed to be renewed in order to eliminate the risk of disaster. As this law further delegitimised opposing gentrification, the bureau took a step back and withdrew the demand for resettlement in the valley. The Mayor of Ankara offered to sell them the TOKI houses which were recently constructed in the Dogukent area to be paid back in unfixed instalments in 15 years; and this was refused because of the lack of fixity of repayment scheme.

The negotiations took place under the shadow of increased violence afterwards. A group of subcontracted workers of a private construction company attacked the neighbourhood with weapons, to which the valley people responded with sticks, stones and weapons (as referred in Chapter 5). After that attack, the bureau brought back the demand to be resettled within

the valley; however, the re-radicalisation of the struggle's claims was not embraced this time by the valley people this time.

Following the gradual weakening of collective mobilisation due to various reasons referred above, the PH with its long-lasting experience of political struggle attempted to become more influential in the neighbourhood. This was in direct contrast to the struggle's initial principle of 'no politics' that is preventing any political party or organisation from being active in the movement as the population was very heterogeneous in terms of political ideology. Aykan (2011) referred to a presentation made by members of the PH explaining its principles of struggle:

> People's Houses aimed in principle that the leading outsiders should merge into the local movement; enable people to become aware that they are subjects and citizens and a part of a collectivity with power and rights; encourage those real agents to participate, take part in all kind of processes and support them with their knowledge and organizational resources; but not standing out and creating a hierarchical order (Aykan, 2011, p. 45).

While I conducted my fieldwork, in contrast, the newspaper of the PH was being sold after some of the weekly meetings. Two of the three people, who represented the valley in the negotiations with the local state, were members of the PH. On one occasion, the bureau attempted to collect 100 Turkish Liras (approximately 24 sterling pounds) from the people to take low-income children to a concert organised by the PH as well as for the file costs of the lawsuits the bureau brought about the urban transformation decision in the valley. Some people were disturbed by this and one woman refused to pay money for the activity of the PH starting a verbal fight criticising the bureau for not being accountable as she did not know how the money collected so far by the bureau was used. The bureau then announced that the people who did not give money would not be included in the negotiation process.

I interviewed a family whose members had been among the people who initiated the process of struggle, but later withdrew their support. Orhan (50), the father counted many names of the people who had started the struggle but were then ejected by the PH for holding different views to those of the organisation:

> We did not want the PH here in our struggle from the beginning. We said that 'my brother, the only shared grievance in this neighbourhood is the claim to

the ownership of our *gecekondu* houses. Except for this, we are out.' But, as we entered into the process, we found ourselves in the whole propaganda of the PH. (17.08.2015)

His son, Eren (29), continued saying that:

> We entered into the process for the right to shelter. But then somehow we were in the protest meeting for right to free health or education. OK, health is my problem, education is as well. But I am already conscious of it. I can support the struggle for those individually. But, what is the purpose of me standing behind the PH banner or flag? (17.08.2015)

As they told me especially from 2012 onwards, the PH came forward in the struggle trying to incorporate the right to shelter struggle in the valley in its anti-capitalist struggle. The 'right to shelter' was replaced with the 'right to life' which also involved the rights to health, education and environment. These constituted the main themes in the PH's agenda of rights-based struggle. This shift was a step backwards as the citizenship-enabling claim to the political right to shelter was replaced with an abstract (human) right to life. By attempting to integrate the right to shelter struggle into its anti-capitalist class struggle, the PH failed to recognise the former's transformative right-claiming potential. This corresponded to the process whereby the PH became more dominant in the right to shelter struggle in the valley contrary to the disturbances of the non-members.

As the PH became more influential, the emphasis started to be put on attendance at collective protest meetings as well as weekly meetings. In those protests, the PH started to be more openly expressing its opposition not only to the mayor but also the ruling JDP government. It did this particularly through emphasising the on-going corruption of the local and national actors of urban transformation. For instance, in a protest meeting in 2014 in front of the Ankara Greater Municipality building, the valley people carried a banner saying 'Apparently the issue was not "urban transformation", but to fill the "shoe boxes"' (see Figure 37). This was referring to the corruption scandal in December 2013 that involved several key people from the ruling Justice and Development Party. Those detained in this scandal involved officials from TOKİ, the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning as well as sons of parliament members and manager of a state-owned bank Halkbank. 4.5 million US dollars in cash were found to have stored in shoeboxes in the house of one detainee.

Figure 37: The valley people hold a banner which says 'Apparently the issue was not urban transformation but to fill the shoe boxes'. (Source: sendika.org, 2014).

In another protest meeting in 2013, the valley people were holding a banner which said 'Neither villa, nor palace, we demand a place to live'. Here 'a place to live' symbolised a *moral* claim vis-à-vis the extremely luxurious White Palace of the President Erdoğan, which was illegally built on public land. One of the activists, Gulsen (44) compared her *gecekondu* house to the White Palace saying that 'my illegal *gecekondu* house is worth 40-50 million Turkish liras whereas the illegal palace of the President is trillions'.

In turning attention to the political corruption, the PH overlooked the reluctance of the *gecekondu* people to be associated with a radical political association within the context of growing criminalisation of rights-based struggles. One of the reasons people had been moving from the valley when they became legal homeowners was to save their children from being blacklisted due to residing in a neighbourhood famous for hostility to the government. By attempting to turn the valley into one of the symbols of radical political activism against the government, the PH encouraged the valley people to abandon the neighbourhood.

More importantly, the source of legitimacy of the struggle shifted from claiming the denied right to shelter by the *gecekondu* people lacking title deeds to a morally legitimised claim for their share of the urban rental gains as opposed to the corrupt redistribution of land by the municipalities. Thus, the empowering potential of the right to shelter struggle was lost as the strength

derived from collective rights claims eroded in the intangibility of moral claims, which ended up pacifying the vigorous crowd.

Within this context, distrust in the efficacy of political activism against the state was felt in the interviews. The participants referred to the brutality of the municipality towards them when they talked about why they resisted the project. Thus, they attempted to legitimise their 'misbehaviour' (rebellion) by blaming the state actors for the violence. Through an emphasis on struggle *as necessity against an immoral enemy* they were representing themselves less on the basis of their capacity to make right claims but more on the tolerability of their illegality as compared to the corruption and violence involved in the whole process. Within this context, the rights-based claims to equal citizenship turned into a demand to be recognised as 'deserving' citizens.

The leading figures of the struggle were also using the language of deservingness vis-à-vis the people who had not supported the struggle. During the time from February to October 2015 when I did my fieldwork, the number of the people who attended the weekly meetings had increased. The PH strategically involved those people, who had abandoned the valley but not demolished their houses, in the negotiation process with the municipality, in order to increase their negotiating power. This, however, created frustration among the activist people and weakened their desire to be more engaged in the long-lasting right to shelter struggle as the people who had left the valley would also benefit from the acquisitions of *their* struggle without paying same prices. During the weekly meetings, the activist residents were speaking sarcastically and sometimes arguing with the people from the non-activist group. In daily conversations, I heard many of them complain that they saw faces they had never seen in the 9-year process. This encounter facilitated the division of the community into the deserving and the undeserving, thus reinforced the language of 'deservingness' as opposed to rights.

The tensions between the two groups came to the surface in one of the weekly meetings when I witnessed a physical fight between two men, one of whom had been active in the struggle and the other had not. When the latter asked the former a question about the process, he was criticised for not being around for two years. The two men started to punch each other during the meeting and the people hardly broke up the fight. What was more interesting for me

was to realise that some of the activist people and PH members were very nervous about the fact that I saw the fight. In contrast to the warm ways they had treated me for months, I felt like an outsider again, all of a sudden. Two PH members politely but openly expressed their concern about my presence saying that 'Are you still here? You have seen many faces of us!' This was a confession of the deceptiveness of the image of the struggle by the PH as if it was free from contradiction.

In these ways, as the PH became more influential in imposing its own understanding and agenda of political activism on the right to shelter struggle in the Dikmen Valley, and within the context of increasing deterioration of the neighbourhood and criminalisation of political activism, the struggle lost its transformative potential. This reached a critical point where the main target of the struggle was reduced to getting their share from the re-appropriating of urban land in the valley, and legitimising themselves as officially recognised citizens through getting their terms officially accepted by the municipality.

7.4. Arrival of the Syrians: The Encounter with the 'Obedient' Migrants

Another factor challenging the rights-claiming potential of the struggle was the arrival of socially unpopular groups such as the Syrian asylum seekers and waste recyclers at the neighbourhood. The Syrians came from 2011 onwards and settled in the abandoned houses in the valley through covering the deteriorated roof and walls with plastic or canvas blankets (See Figures 38 and 39). While local and national state officials criminalised the *gecekondu* housing and the struggling communities in Dikmen Valley, the Syrians represented the obedient migrants. Their settlement in tents as well as semi-demolished *gecekondu* houses in the valley was tolerated by the local authorities.

Figure 38: The abandoned houses, whose deteriorated parts were covered with things like tent canvas by Syrians (Photo: Author, 08.02.2015).

Figure 39: More abandoned houses taken over by Syrians (Photo: Ela, 9-year old *gecekondu* resident of the valley, 22.03.2015).

The other new residents in the valley were the waste recyclers[27], who were Turkish and Kurdish citizens who had migrated from the South Eastern and Eastern region of Turkey, as the *gecekondu* settlers told me. Haydar explained that these were very large families, who came to big cities such as Ankara and Istanbul, where all the family members including the children worked as recyclers for a certain period, and went back to their hometown with the savings they made. The right to shelter bureau had welcomed these two groups who were socially marginalised, just like themselves, to settle in in their neighbourhood and tried to appease the valley people about their

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27 These groups probably strategically chose Dikmen Valley *gecekondu* area as they knew that leftist groups, who would not refuse the presence of other marginalised groups in their neighbourhood, resided there.

presence. However, there were only a few people who did not complain about the arrival of the Syrians and the waste recyclers.

What stood out in the narratives of the *gecekondu* people about the Syrians was the emphasis on the fact that they had no interaction with them. They referred to the harmlessness of the Syrians, as poor people living quietly and inoffensively and thought that they could develop solidarity with their displacement from their homes. However, the arrival of the Syrians coincided with the times when the neighbourhood started to decline as gradually more people abandoned, and thus, reminded the *gecekondu* people of their growing precarity and their diminishing control over the place they live.

As for the waste recyclers, the narratives were more openly opposed to their presence because they were polluting the neighbourhood through simply doing their job. As they collected a huge amount of different types of waste and kept it outside of their houses on the streets (See Figure 40), they worsened the decline of the neighbourhood. Seeing that mess in contrast to the former tidiness of the neighbourhood when everyone took care of the maintenance and cleaning of their own gardens and streets intensified their feelings of displacement even before they were physically displaced.

Figure 40: The plastic bottles and papers collected by recyclers (Photo: Author, 24.05.2015).

The waste recyclers knew that they had to stay in that *gecekondu* neighbourhood, which provided them with free and spacious accommodation to be able to continue doing their job. They could be more unrestrained compared to the struggling communities in terms of defending the neighbourhood against the police. At night and sometimes during the day, they

lit open fire outdoors as if they wanted to declare to the people that they were there to stay. One of the PH members, Baris, told me that they took the waste recyclers to a protest meeting once but they could hardly control them as they attempted to use guns against the police. After that, they gave up cooperating with the waste recyclers in order not to damage the legitimacy of their peaceful struggle.

Syrians, on the other hand, lived in big groups in tents or deteriorated *gecekondu* houses and moved to different places at different times of the year. Ibo once explained their initial view of the Syrians in the neighbourhood saying that 'we know that they are here, but we don't see them'. They were mostly settled in the peripheries of the neighbourhood, so I passed by those houses every week as I went to the bureau. Nevertheless, I did not see them most of the times. Even when they were outside of their houses, they seemed to be dealing with their own business without interacting with others. While taking walks with my participants, I also observed that they did not know or greet the Syrians when we encountered them on the road.

As undocumented migrants, the Syrians seemed more hesitant in terms of staking a claim on the space. As I observed throughout my fieldwork, they did not interact with the struggling communities except for those in the bureau; they sometimes visited in order to ask for guidance about legal issues or to celebrate a religious holiday. The participants told me that the Syrians knew that their presence in the neighbourhood was owing to the approval of the bureau and the struggling communities. Nevertheless, what drew my attention during my 9-month fieldwork in the neighbourhood was that the Syrians were also developing a sense of belonging to the place. Initially they were disregarding me as I passed by in the car every week, but through the end of my fieldwork, I realised that they were standing on the side of the road and looking at me in the eye. They were not as hesitant to make their presence manifest and avoid encounter with me and my partner as earlier. In the summer, I also saw a wedding ceremony of Syrian families (about 150-200 people) celebrated on a vacant land close to the bureau playing loud music.

Watching the socially unwanted groups settle in their neighbourhood was on the other hand nurturing the erosion of feelings of belonging by the long settled *gecekondu* communities. The valley people thought that the local state

encouraged the Syrians and waste recyclers to settle in the valley in order to discourage the activist citizens from staying in the neighbourhood. Although the PH strategically welcomed their presence leading the valley to become home for different groups of marginalised people; relations among these groups were not free from tension. These groups tended to understand and relate to each other in class ways. Similar to the narratives of the affluent groups about the *gecekondu* people, many squatter settlers I spoke emphasised that there were clear boundaries between them and those groups in cultural terms. They talked about the 'uncleanliness', 'rudeness', and 'brutality' of the waste recyclers. There was a popular story about a waste recycler man who killed his wife shortly before I started my fieldwork because she hit their dog.

What was more interesting was that some participants talked about the 'parasitic' lives of the waste recyclers. Once, a former *gecekondu* dweller told me that they lived in the neighbourhood without paying any electricity bills. He said that 'we pay their bills as they use it illegally'. So, he echoed the narratives of the affluent groups, who regarded the *gecekondu* settlers like himself as the 'undeserving rich other' on the basis of their illegal occupation of public land.

Within the same context, many participants also mentioned the fact that after the Syrians and waste recyclers arrived, incidents of robbery increased in the neighbourhood. Kardelen (46) talked about Syrians and waste recyclers as 'dangerous' groups and was frustrated to see that she and her fellow *gecekondu* residents were the ones who were being treated as illegal by the greater municipality:

> Currently there is no order in the neighbourhood. When we go back to bed at nights, we don't feel secure. For instance, if we get into trouble, we call the police, but even the police don't come... They left us to our fate here. (22.02.2015)

Ethnic differences were also emphasised when they referred to the Syrians. The arrival of the Syrians in the valley and the state's tolerance towards their presence in the neighbourhood as well as elsewhere became a turning point in the right to shelter struggle. As opposed to the critique of the disjunction between formal and substantive citizenship, some participants emphasised their formal/national membership to the state while claiming their rights. Aysel, a leading figure in the struggle, was very angry at the double-standard of the state towards its citizens and strangers. She said:

> I pay money to private courses, and all the other things to get my child educated. He (referring to the rich Syrians) comes from a foreign country, *occupies* my country, and I am oppressed and see violence by the state *in my own country*, think about it! If that is the case, I will struggle to the end. (01.02.2015) (Emphasis added)

The encounter with the Syrians created regressive demands for territorial/national citizenship. Whilst Aysel (45) was an illegal occupier of urban land in the eyes of the affluent groups, she perceived the Syrian groups as 'illegal occupiers of the territorial land', thus reproduced the legitimacy of the formal membership in claiming rights. During a group interview, Hanim, who was a widow with three children, similarly expressed her anger about the Mayor of Ankara, as he 'allowed foreigners to become residents in Turkey while trying to take their houses from them'.

Like Aysel, Kardelen also referred to her nationality when claiming her rights:

> **Oznur**: Erdogan says that 'we are going to demolish the *gecekondu* areas, which have surrounded our cities like a tumour!' The mayor Gokcek says that 'there are ideological groups in Dikmen Valley; these are terrorists, raiders'.
>
> **Kardelen**: They are the ones who are raiders! Look at his palace!
>
> **Oznur**: The urban elites, on the other hand, say that these areas are visual pollution. It seems like different groups cooperate in terms of demanding the demolition of *gecekondu* areas.
>
> **Kardelen**: OK, let them demolish but where will these *Turkish people* go? Where will the *Turkish citizens* go? (22.02.2015) (Emphasis added)

Kardelen's emphasis on her Turkish identity contrasted with the rights-based configuration of citizenship. The source of legitimacy of her right claim had shifted to her nationality rather than the right to claim right, which revealed that the promise of the initial stages of the struggle was being eroded.

Conclusion

This chapter focused on the contradictions and inner tensions throughout the Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter struggle. These aspects I have focused on here have been largely overlooked by previous studies as they were witnesses of the earlier phases of the struggle. Inspired by the differences between what I

had read and what I saw in the field, I offered an analysis of the right to shelter struggle as a *process*. I focus on the multiple ways the valley people negotiated with the complex processes of inclusion and marginalisation. The discussions in this chapter demonstrate the needs to interrogate collective mobilisation as a *process* that changes in relation to the broader political and economic processes and to avoid romanticising the voice of the communities resisting gentrification.

I argue that the right to shelter struggle of the *gecekondu* people lacking title deeds is important not only because it mobilised a heterogeneous population, as emphasised in earlier accounts, but also it empowered them as right claimers and enabled them to enact and mobilise citizenship as activism as opposed to the official configurations thereof centred on obedience . Based on my intentions to reveal inner tensions rather than looking for heroes in the struggling communities, I also attend to the fact that political activism in the valley was constructed on a fragile ground from the beginning, and analysed the challenges it faced vis-à-vis the state-centrism which was being consolidated through disciplining efforts of gentrification.

The most important challenge that fragmented the community was the promotion of financial inclusion to gentrification as legal homeowners. As the people became property owners, they became more concerned with paying debts and gradually withdrew their rights-based claims as they tried to remain within legal limits. Because of this, they also withdrew their support from the increasingly explicit opposition of the PH against the government. On the other hand, the activism of the PH further absorbed the transformative, claim-making potential of the struggle by shifting the source of legitimacy of the struggle from rights-based claims to a *morally* legitimised demand for redistribution. As a result, what I observed in the field was bargain with the local state for a payable debt and a demand of deservingness rather than a rights-based claim to equally valued citizens.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This research began with the question of how the class inequalities and relations are impacted by the state-led process of gentrification in Turkey. This was a central concern in studies on neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism as the country has been experiencing an intense process of state-led neoliberalisation since 1980 and especially from the early 2000s onwards. Nevertheless, the role of the state was analysed in these studies on the basis of an economic rationale that sees political actors as agents of economic processes of profit-maximisation. The main aim of the thesis was to move beyond these analyses centred on economic processes and their emphasis on displacement and socio-spatial segregation as the class impact of gentrification. Drawing on the argument that 'gentrification involves hidden rewards as well as hidden injuries' (Paton, 2014), the study attempted to extend the scholarship on gentrification.

Focusing on the complexities of the process rather than examining a single underlying logic of profit maximisation required a refusal of clear boundaries between simultaneous, interrelated processes. To the extent that inclusion exists in a continuum with exclusion, rather than in opposition to it (Mezzadra and Nielson, 2013, p. 7), I analysed how different but connected actors were included in gentrification from the perspective of how it complicates social class dynamics. I analysed different actors involved in gentrification in relation to one another, namely: local and national state actors, the middle and upper class residents living in high-rise apartments and prestigious gated communities, and the former and current *gecekondu* settlers lacking title deeds, who lived through the gentrification process in Dikmen Valley.

Despite bringing together different groups, the squatter settlers occupied a central place in my study. To move beyond the focus on displacement and socio-spatial segregation as the main class impact of gentrification, specifically, I focused on the ways and processes through which the squatter settlers, who are stigmatised and expelled by gentrification processes, were simultaneously

drawn into the state-led gentrification project in Dikmen Valley and how these were negotiated by them on the ground. Inspired by the focus on *boundaries* in relational ethnography and the studies of class relations in Turkey, which explored the boundary-making practices between middle class and working class women (cf. Chapter 2), I analysed how middle and upper class residents actively participated in symbolic struggles over refashioning the boundaries regarding who can properly live in the city. This was enlightening in terms of moving beyond both the focus on the reconstitution of middle class distinction and habitus in isolation in the cultural analyses as well as emphases on displacement based on an understanding of class as a polarised relationship between capital and labour.

To extend the analyses on financial inclusion of low-income groups into neoliberal market, I focused on the political considerations and processes behind the active role of the state when drawing those groups into gentrification projects. To explore how these political processes operate alongside the economic concerns of profit maximisation, I used the lens of citizenship. Drawing on the conceptualisations of 'state citizenship agendas' (de Koning et al., 2015) and 'spaces of citizenship' (Painter and Philo, 1995), I connected the changes in the state citizenship agendas in Turkey to the economic changes driven by neoliberal urbanisation (cf. Chapter 5).

This was important as I showed that the agency of the state was not limited to expanding the neoliberal market rule and deal with social and political oppositions driven by the social costs of neoliberalisation. Thus, through linking the two interrelated processes of remaking the physical boundaries of urban space and the normative boundaries of citizenship by state actors, this thesis revealed the hitherto overlooked role of political processes and in particular the state citizenship agendas in redrawing class boundaries throughout neoliberal urbanisation and more specifically gentrification. In other words, my research opened up a new area of scholarship investigating the implications of political processes and actors in gentrification in terms of generating a class shift.

Connecting gentrification to political processes using a citizenship lens, the thesis demonstrated that gentrification has become an important tool in Turkey with which the ruling government promoted the official definition of

citizenship. In so doing, it moves beyond merely economic explanations of gentrification as the reproduction of urban space for the 'more affluent user' and argues that state-led gentrification in Turkey produces urban space also for the more obedient user. Thus, the thesis argues that through neoliberal urban redevelopment, the authoritarian citizenship regime that criminalises whoever opposes it was promoted. The thesis demonstrated that the state was successful in disciplining residents with promises and threats while implementing a neoliberal urban agenda.

Secondly and relatedly, a focus on the political processes enabled me to analyse different class groups as political actors as well as potential consumers and investors. This necessitated attentiveness to the actors involved in gentrification as citizens whose political support and loyalty was targeted, as well as consumers whose aspirations to consume were to be encouraged. This enabled me to view the groups involved in gentrification as political agents who enact and mobilise their own interpretations and practices of citizenship. In so doing, I was able to emphasise the agency of different actors in terms of negotiating with the state citizenship and urban agenda. Moving from this, the thesis demonstrated that there were different competing configurations of citizenships that co-existed in Dikmen Valley namely citizenship as obedient, as civil and as act.

Through analysing material and symbolic processes with the citizenship lens, the thesis argued that new class hierarchies have been established through state-led gentrification linked to changing citizenship regimes in ways that complicate class boundaries. The upper-class participants appeared to be the main supporters of not only gentrification but also its disciplining efforts. The affluent respondents living in prestigious gated communities gave consent to the implementation of large-scale gentrification projects in squatter areas in a top-down, non-participatory manner. This was not only because they were financially winners in speculative urban redevelopment but also because their shared understandings of citizenship as civil and compliant corresponded to the obedience promoted by the official citizenship agenda and the understanding of the benevolent state. On the other hand, many middle-class participants, who were more suspicious about the ways large-scale gentrification projects were implemented by state actors, were threatened by the inflating prices of inner-city land due to speculative urban redevelopment.

In contrast, the former and current *gecekondu* dwellers were invited and given the means not only to participate but also to benefit gentrification project through promises of symbolic and financial inclusion, albeit in return for obedient participation.

Drawing on Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power, I explored the ways shared understandings regarding citizenship became a source of symbolic power for upper and middle-class participants. The focus on the symbolic power of the affluent groups revealed how their claims to the inner-city were connected to the political processes and the changing citizenship regime, rather than being individualised class constitutive practices as argued by cultural analyses of gentrification (cf. Chapter 2). The upper and middle-class participants claimed to be holders of 'proper' claims to the city that were centred on shared understandings of citizenship as a status or privilege, not a right. They were expecting the *gecekondu* dwellers to be like Ulku (cf. Chapter 6), grateful to the state and content with what they are given instead of being engaged in participation in activism. Thus, the political activism that had encouraged the struggling *gecekondu* communities to make rights-based claims paradoxically consolidated their disqualification from substantive citizenship in the eyes of the affluent groups and some middle-class residents.

Through focusing on the struggling squatter dwellers, the thesis demonstrated that the promotion of state citizenship agenda through state-led gentrification was contested. Despite the concentration of the 'means of history-making power' in the alliance between the upper classes and state actors, the *gecekondu* communities were not merely 'utensils of history makers' (Mills, 1959, p. 181). I revealed this by giving particular attention to the *gecekondu* communities living in the valley, most of whom lacked legal title deeds, who mobilised against forced upheaval and redistribution of their land to the more affluent groups. It was 'believing in one another', to use Haydar's words (cf. Chapter 7), rather than trusting in the populist state, that enabled them to discover newer means of history-making power.

Drawing on Engin Isin's conceptualisation of *citizenship as acts*, I analysed the right to shelter struggle in Dikmen Valley from the perspective of claims to citizenship with which they enacted themselves as right-claimers. This concept enabled me to shed light on the ways the *gecekondu* communities contested

and contributed to pushing the boundaries of inclusion beyond normative values such as civility and obedience to the basis of claiming rights. In order not to romanticise these acts, however, I focused on multiple and opposing perspectives and experiences of activism and also analysed the ethnographic data in comparison to the former studies on the mobilisation of the right to shelter struggle in Dikmen Valley.

My attentiveness on inner tensions enabled me to shed light on the limits of the disruptive potential of citizenship acts in the face of the prolonged deterioration and criminalisation that eroded their solidarity. More importantly, the discussions on the inner tensions prompted by the arrival of Syrians in the *gecekondu* neighbourhood showed how this encouraged a turn to nativist rationale and configuration of rights guaranteed by belonging to a nation diminishing the empowering potential of a more engaged, rights-based configuration of citizenship.

On October 2017, after 11 years (and two years after I finished my fieldwork), 280 former and current *gecekondu* dwellers lacking title deeds bade in the local state tender and were given the right to purchase the ownership of the lands they occupied in return for 97.500.000 TL (which was equal to 20.656.000 GBP at the time). For it was done through a tender offer, the act of citizenship in the valley did not generate a pathway for *gecekondu* dwellers lacking title deeds to legal ownership of the lands they occupied or inclusion in the political decision-making processes regarding those lands as legitimate stakeholders. This also revealed the importance of analysing the collective mobilisation in the valley and elsewhere as a dynamic process situated in a complex terrain of power relations.

The agreement was made between the local state officials and 280 *gecekondu* people, most of whom had already purchased apartment houses that they could move to during the implementation of the project. The few households who did not purchase houses during the process of struggle, and the Syrians and waste recyclers, on the other hand, will have to move from the area. Although my research was mainly concerned with class, even the limited glance to the Syrians in a gentrifying area showed the importance of the role ethnicity and racism can play in the changes described in the thesis which constitute a fruitful avenue for future research. Yet, it is not known whether

the Syrians in the neighbourhood have developed a sense of belonging and will attempt to oppose displacement. Within the context of the complex processes that citizenship is taking on a turn to obedience and nationhood, future research might further assess the role racism and ethnicity can play in material and symbolic struggles over who can live where in the city.

Appendix - List of the Participants

Name	Age	Sex	Work	Education	Tenancy
Aslı	44	F	Housewife	Primary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Ayça	15	F	-	High school student	Current *gecekondu* settler
Aynur	52	F	Computer engineer	PhD degree abroad	Gated community owner-occupier
Aysel	45	F	Tea maker	Primary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Ayşe	48	F	Cleaner	(Not known)	Current *gecekondu* settler
Azra	27	F	Psychologist in a private school	MSc degree abroad	Gated community, living w/ parents
Barış	38	M	House painter	Bachelor	Current *gecekondu* settler
Begüm	55	F	Cleaner	Primary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Bekir	58	M	Driver	Primary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Berkay	27	M	Food distributor	MSc degree	Prestigious gated community, living w/ parents

Beril	48	F	Former bank employer - Housewife	Bachelor	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier
Bora	34	M	Public servant	Bachelor	Former non-gated apartment tenant
Ceylan	40	F	English translator	Bachelor	Non-gated apartment owner-occupier
Deniz	34	F	Public servant	MSc degree abroad	Gated community tenant
Ekin	23	F	-	Undergraduate student	Former *gecekondu* settler
Ela	40	F	Working in the Presidency	PhD candidate	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier
Elif	(not known)	F	Housewife	Primary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Emel	45	F	Customer representative in a private firm	Bachelor drop out	Non-gated apartment tenant
Eren	29	M	Teacher in a private teaching centre	Bachelor	Current *gecekondu* settler
Fikret	55	M	Street peddler	Primary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Gözde	28	F	Housewife	Bachelor	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier

Gülsen	40	F	Household cleaner	Primary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Habibe	58	F	Housewife	Educational institute	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier
Hanım	56	F	Housewife	Secondary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Hakan	65	M	Construction engineer	Bachelor	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier
Haydar	59	M	Retired municipal worker	High school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Hazal	40	F	Housewife	Bachelor abroad	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier
Hülya	25	F	Housewife	MSc drop out	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier
İbo	34	M	Electrician	University drop out	Staying in the workplace
Ahmet	61	M	Retired door keeper	Primary school	Former *gecekondu* settler
Kardelen	43	F	Cleaner	Secondary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Kenan	66	M	Shopkeeper	High school	Gated community tenant
Kıvanç	38	M	Public servant	MSc degree	Non-gated apartment

					abroad	owner-occupier
Latif	43	M	Research specialist	Bachelor	Gated community owner-occupier
Leman	60	F	Retired science teacher	Bachelor	Gated community owner-occupier
Mahir	25	M	Working in a grocery store owned by his family	Bachelor	Former *gecekondu* settler
Murat	55	M	Apartment door keeper	Prımary school	Doorkeeper in non-gated apartment
Melek	49	F	Tea maker and cleaner	Primary school	Former *gecekondu* settler
Nagehan	44	F	Professor doctor in a public hospital	PhD degree abroad	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier
Nail	23	M	Working in his uncle's store	Secondary school	Former *gecekondu* settler
Nil	40	F	Producer in TV	Bachelor	Gated community owner-occupier
Nilgün	41	F	Director in TV	Bachelor	Gated community owner-occupier
Oktay	40	M	Software engineer	Bachelor	Non-gated apartment owner-occupier
Orhan	50	M	Electrician	(Not known)	Current *gecekondu* settler

Osman	27	M	Owner of a construction company	Bachelor	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier
Seher	23	F	-	University student	Current *gecekondu* settler
Semih	23	M	-	University student	Former *gecekondu* settler
Serra	69	F	Retired secretary	High school	Prestigious gated community owner-occupier
Tarık	65	M	Retired	High school drop out	Current *gecekondu* settler
Tülin	63	F	Shop-keeper	High school drop out	Gated community tenant
Umay	35	F	Public servant	MSc degree abroad	Gated community tenant
Umut	15	M	High school student	Secondary school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Ülkü	70	F	Retired nurse	School of nursing	Former *gecekondu* settler
Veysel	20	M	Taxi driver	High school	Current *gecekondu* settler
Yasin	30	M	Part owner of a subcontractor company	MSc degree	Prestigious gated community tenant
Yüksel	50	M	Cameraman in TV	Open University	Gated community owner-occupier

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