Veto power in committees:an experimental study

Kagel, J.H. and Sung, H. and Winter, E. (2010) Veto power in committees:an experimental study. Experimental Economics, 13 (2). pp. 167-188. ISSN 1386-4157

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Abstract

Veto power consists of the right of one or more players to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure their preferred outcome. Our experiment shows that (i) committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) and generate less consensus than without a veto player, (ii) veto power substantially enhances proposer's power, and (iii) non-veto players are substantially more willing to compromise than veto players. We relate our results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as to concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees. © Economic Science Association 2010.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Experimental Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2001
Subjects:
ID Code:
126920
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 14:30
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
15 Jul 2020 08:16