Transparency and incentives among peers

Winter, E. (2010) Transparency and incentives among peers. RAND Journal of Economics, 41 (3). pp. 504-523. ISSN 0741-6261

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This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function-based teams with process-based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives. © 2010, RAND.

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Journal Article
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RAND Journal of Economics
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14 Aug 2018 14:28
Last Modified:
22 Nov 2022 06:13