The partnered core of a game with side payments

Reny, P.J. and Winter, E. and Wooders, M. (2012) The partnered core of a game with side payments. Social Choice and Welfare, 39 (2-3). pp. 521-536. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties. We also illustrate our main result for coalition structure games. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Social Choice and Welfare
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3301
Subjects:
ID Code:
126913
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 14:16
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
01 Jan 2020 11:29