The formateurs' role in government formation

Seidmann, D.J. and Winter, E. and Pavlov, E. (2007) The formateurs' role in government formation. Economic Theory, 31 (3). pp. 427-445. ISSN 0938-2259

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Abstract

Following an election, Heads of State typically choose a formateur to report back a prospective government by some deadline. If this formateur fails then another party leader is chosen on the same terms. We model this mechanism as a bargaining game, in which a single party leader has exclusive access to the Head of State, but does not have a monopoly on making proposals. We characterize the unique equilibrium of the game in which all parties are symmetric and parties split a fixed-size pie. We also show that supra-minimal governments may form when parties are asymmetrically sized: a result consistent with the evidence on government formation in countries which use a formateur mechanism. © Springer-Verlag 2007.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
ID Code:
126905
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 13:48
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
01 Jan 2020 11:28