Declining valuations in sequential auctions

Kittsteiner, T. and Nikutta, J. and Winter, E. (2004) Declining valuations in sequential auctions. International Journal of Game Theory, 33 (1). pp. 89-106. ISSN 0020-7276

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Abstract

We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
International Journal of Game Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1800/1804
Subjects:
ID Code:
126901
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 13:36
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
15 Apr 2020 05:31