Bargaining with an agenda

O'Neill, B. and Samet, D. and Wiener, Z. and Winter, E. (2004) Bargaining with an agenda. Games and Economic Behavior, 48 (1). pp. 139-153. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: A family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Games and Economic Behavior
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
ID Code:
126900
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 13:36
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
19 Aug 2020 04:41