Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods

Mutuswami, S. and Winter, E. (2004) Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 88 (3-4). pp. 629-644. ISSN 0047-2727

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Abstract

We propose two sequential mechanisms for efficient production of public goods. Our analysis differs from the existing literature in allowing for the presence of multiple public goods and in also being 'simple'. While both mechanisms ensure efficiency, the payoffs in the first mechanism are asymmetric, being sensitive to the order in which agents move. The second mechanism corrects for this through a two-stage game where the order of moves in the second stage is randomly determined. The payoffs from the second mechanism correspond to the Shapley value of a well-defined game which summarizes the production opportunities available to coalitions in the economy. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Public Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126898
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 13:32
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 01 Jan 2020 11:28
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126898

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