Subscription mechanisms for network formation

Mutuswami, S. and Winter, E. (2002) Subscription mechanisms for network formation. Journal of Economic Theory, 106 (2). pp. 242-264. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D20. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Journal of Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
?? mechanism designnetworksshapley valueeconomics and econometrics ??
ID Code:
126896
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 13:28
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
15 Jul 2024 18:11