Dagan, N. and Volij, O. and Winter, E. (2002) A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 19 (4). pp. 811-823. ISSN 0176-1714
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.
Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Social Choice and Welfare
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
?? disagreement pointbargaining solution rational alternative nash bargaining solution irrelevant alternative economics and econometricssocial sciences (miscellaneous) ??
Departments:
ID Code:
126895
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 13:24
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
15 Jul 2024 18:11