A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

Dagan, N. and Volij, O. and Winter, E. (2002) A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 19 (4). pp. 811-823. ISSN 0176-1714

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Social Choice and Welfare
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3301
Subjects:
ID Code:
126895
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Aug 2018 13:24
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
01 Jan 2020 11:28