A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core

Okada, A. and Winter, E. (2002) A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. Theory and Decision, 53 (1). pp. 1-28. ISSN 0040-5833

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Abstract

We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Theory and Decision
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1700/1706
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126894
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 13:20
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 01 Jan 2020 11:28
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126894

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