Constitutional implementation

Peleg, B. and Winter, E. (2002) Constitutional implementation. Review of Economic Design, 7 (2). pp. 187-204. ISSN 1434-4742

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We consider the problem of implementing a social choice correspondence H in Nash equilibrium when the constitution of the society is given by an effectivity function E. It is assumed that the effectivity function of H, E H, is a sub-correspondence of E. We found necessary and efficient conditions for a game form Γ to implement H (in Nash equilibria), and to satisfy, at the same time, that EΓ, the effectivity function of Γ, is a sub-correspondence of EH (which guarantees that Γ is compatible with E). We also find sufficient conditions for the coincidence of the set of winning coalitions of EΓ and E H, and for EΓ = EH. All our results are sharp as is shown by suitable examples. © Springer-Verlag 2002.

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Review of Economic Design
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14 Aug 2018 13:18
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01 Jan 2022 13:30