Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods

Bag, P.K. and Winter, E. (1999) Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods. Journal of Economic Theory, 87 (1). pp. 72-94. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to uniquely implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic deviations by coalitions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H41, C72, D78. © 1999 Academic Press.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126889
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 13:04
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 01 Jan 2020 11:28
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126889

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