A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation

Seidmann, D.J. and Winter, E. (1998) A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation. Review of Economic Studies, 65 (4). pp. 793-815. ISSN 0034-6527

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We study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games, based on underlying TU games, in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements. We distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements ("reversible actions") and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game ("irreversible actions"). We show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible, but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions. On the other hand, we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty, irrespective of the reversibility of actions.

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Journal Article
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Review of Economic Studies
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14 Aug 2018 12:30
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18 Jan 2022 06:23