Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages

Seidmann, D.J. and Winter, E. (1997) Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages. Econometrica, 65 (1). pp. 163-169. ISSN 0012-9682

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Abstract

IF THE SENDER'S PREFERENCES are monotonic in the Receiver's action, then it is known that the Sender reveals its type in every sequential equilibrium of a Sender-Receiver game with verifiable messages (see, e.g., Milgrom (1981)). Monotonicity is a natural condition in social situations such as buyer-seller relationships; but there are obviously other situations in which the ideal action for a Sender varies with its type. Accordingly, we generalize Milgrom's result by replacing monotonicity with more general conditions on the Sender's preferences, which are sufficient for existence and uniqueness of a fully revealing equilibrium in verifiable message games. These conditions include all games in which preferences satisfy the conditions which Crawford-Sobel (1982) imposed on cheap talk games.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Econometrica
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126884
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 12:24
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 15 Oct 2019 04:56
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126884

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