A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

Balkenborg, D. and Winter, E. (1997) A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 27 (3). pp. 325-345. ISSN 0304-4068

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Abstract

In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at later, but not at previous, decision nodes.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2600/2604
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126883
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 12:16
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 30 Sep 2019 21:05
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126883

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