Experimental study of repeated team-games

Bornstein, G. and Winter, E. and Goren, H. (1996) Experimental study of repeated team-games. European Journal of Political Economy, 12 (4). pp. 629-639. ISSN 0176-2680

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Abstract

We report an experiment in which the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game was contrasted with a structurally identical (single-group) Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The games were played repeatedly for 40 rounds. We found that subjects were initially more likely to cooperate in the IPD game than in the PD game. However, cooperation rates decreased as the game progressed and, as a result, the differences between the two games disappeared. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects learn the structure of the game and adapt their behavior accordingly. Computer simulations based on a simple learning model by Roth and Erev (Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term, Games and Economic Behavior 8, 164-212, 1995) support this interpretation.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: European Journal of Political Economy
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3320
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126882
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 12:12
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 15 Oct 2019 04:56
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126882

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