Voting and vetoing

Winter, E. (1996) Voting and vetoing. American Political Science Review, 90 (4). pp. 813-823. ISSN 0003-0554

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Abstract

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: American Political Science Review
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3312
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126881
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 11:00
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 16 Jul 2019 02:31
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126881

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