Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining

Winter, E. (1996) Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining. Theory and Decision, 40 (2). pp. 131-147. ISSN 0040-5833

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Abstract

This paper discusses the relationship between coalitional stability and the robustness of bargaining outcomes to the bargaining procedure. We consider a class of bargaining procedures described by extensive form games, where payoff opportunities are given by a characteristic function (cooperative) game. The extensive form games differ on the probability distribution assigned to chance moves which determine the order in which players take actions. One way to define mechanism robustness is in terms of the property of 'no first mover advantage'. An equilibrium is mechanism robust if for each member the expected payoff before and after being called to propose is the same. Alternatively one can define mechanism robustness as a property of equilibrium outcomes. An outcome is said to be mechanism robust if it is supported by some equilibrium in all the extensive form games (mechanisms) within our class. We show that both definitions of mechanism robustness provide an interesting characterization of the core of the underlying cooperative game. © 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Theory and Decision
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1700/1706
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 126880
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 14 Aug 2018 11:00
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 30 Sep 2019 21:05
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126880

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